* NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS

Township of Green **, a municipal TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY**  **Corporation of the State of New Jersey, : DOCKET NOS.:**  **009572-2016; 009068-2018**

**:**

**Plaintiff, :**  **:**
**v. :** Life With Joy, Inc. **, : A New Jersey non** 

**- profit corporation**  **:**
**: Defendant. :** 

**:** Life With Joy, Inc. **, A New Jersey non** 

**- profit**  **corporation : TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY**  **: DOCKET NOS.:**  **008566-2017;013541-2019;**

**Plaintiff, : 010728-2020**  **: v. :** 
**:** Township of Green **, a municipal**  **: Corporation of the State of New Jersey :** 

**: Defendant. :** 

**:**

**Decided: March 24, 2022**  **Robert B. McBriar for Township of Green, (**  **Schneck ,**  **Price ,**  **Smith ,**  **& King, LLP**

**. ,**  **attorneys )**  **Jay J. Freireich for**  **Life with Joy , (**  **Freireich, LLC. , attorney)**  **BIANCO, J.T.C.** Approved for Publication In the New Jersey Tax Court Reports**2**

**This shall constitute the court’s formal opinion**  **1 concerning c**  **onsolidated appeals**  **from various decisions of the Sussex County Board of Taxation**  **(“County Board**  **” ) concerning the tax** 

**** **exempt status under N.J.S.A. 54:4**

**- 3.6**  **, of property owned by Life with Joy (**  **“ LWJ**  **” ) loca**  **ted within the Township of Green (**  **“Township” ) at 3 Fox**  **Run , and**  **designated by the taxing district as Block 18 Lot 67 (**  **“ Subject Property**  **” ). Specifically at issue is whether or not the Subject Property is**  **actually used in furtherance of LWJ’s charitable pur pose, and whether or not it is impermissibly**  **used to make a profit. LWJ has appealed the**  **County Board’s denial**  **s of a tax exemption for**  **Tax**
**Years 2017, 2019, and 2020.**  **The Township appealed the County**  **Board’s decision s**  **to grant the exemption in**  **Tax Years 2016 and 2018.**  **For the reasons more specifically set forth herein, the court: (1) grants LWJ’s appeals for**  **2017 and 2020, reversing the judgments of the Board, finding that LWJ**  **has met its burden of**  **satisfying the elements of N.J.S.A. 54:4 -3.6 (2)**  **denies the Township’s 2016 and 2018 appeals, affirming the judgments of the**  **County Board; and (3)**  **dismisses LWJ’s 2019 appeal for lack of jurisdiction.** 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS **LWJ is a nonprofit New Jersey Corporation and a Federal 501(c)(3) Organization created**  **in 2014 by Susan and Gary Kolb (**  **collectively the**  **“Kolbs”), who are married to each other,**  **to be a living and learning center for young adults with developmental disabilities.**  **Ms. Kolb** 2 **serves as executive director of LWJ and is president of the board of trustees.**  **As president, Ms. Kolb ensures LWJ stays true to its mission to provide living arrangements and life skills training**  **to young adults**

1 **Judge Novin, J.T.C. was recused from participation in the Tax Court Committee on Opinion s**  **concerning this matter.**

2 **Ms. Kolb was the only witness for LW**  **J and her trial testimony was generally**  **undisputed by the**  **Township. 3** 

**with developmental disabilities, primarily autism. In 2015 LWJ purchased the Subject Property**  **largely with the Kolbs’ inh eritance.**  **The Subject Property is comprised of a two**

**- story five** 

**- bedroom house on about three and**  **a half acres. LWJ uses the house in furtherance of**  **its goals to provide living arrangements and**  **life skills training to young adults with developmental disabi lities.**  **The house has a 2,000 square foot basement with a full gym, a**  **six**

**- person capacity**  **movie theater, a craft area, and a storage pantry where clients can practice warehouse skills.**  **They cook meals in the kitchen and eat in the dining room.**  **The house**  **also contains a makeshift green house, a chess room,**  **and a library.**  **LWJ maintains an office in the house to comply**  **with the Division of Developmental Disabilities’ (DDD)**  **rules. 3**  **To facilitate the management of LWJ, the Kolbs entered into an automatically renew ing**  **lease with LWJ on October 1, 2015, by which the Subject Property became, and continues to be,**  **their primary and only residence. They live there as full** 

**- time caregivers t**  **o LWJ’s clients. Their**  **starting rent was $1,500 with an automatic yearly increase of $25. LWJ pays for utilities, cable,**  **and internet. The Kolbs and all other residents make use of these amenities.**  **At present, LWJ**  **has two clients leasing room**  **s. 4**  **The Kolb’s son has leased since LWJ**  **acquired the property . A**  **nother individual has a**  **lease with LWJ , which**  **runs from August 1, 2021, through July 31,**  **2022 , at a rate of $2,790 per month** 

**. One bedroom is deliberately kept open for** 

3 **The specifics of the DDD program are set forth in a brochure entitled, A Quick Guide for**  **Families , developed by The New Jersey Department of Human Ser**  **vices, Division of Developmental Disabilities, in collaboration with Regional Family Support Plannin**  **g Councils of**  **which the court takes judicial notice**

**. N.J. Division of Developemtntal Disabilities**  **, https://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/ddd/assets/documents/quick-guide-**  **for**

**- families** 

**** **english.pdf (last visted**  **Mar. 9 , 2022). The DDD program is**  **discussed in more detail infra** 

**.**
**4 For their privacy, the court did not list the names of the clients of LWJ.** **4**

**residents ’**  **family visits ,**  **or respite. Respite is an opportunity for individuals with developmental**  **disabilities to stay at the Subject Property temporarily in other to take a break from their cu rrent**  **living sit**  **u ation**  **, or to provide an individual the necessary care and safety precautions while that**  **individual’s regular care provider takes a break. Over the years,**  **multiple clients have spent varying amounts of time living at the Subject**  **Property, however, not all of them**  **are evidenced by leases.**  **For instance ,**  **one individual mov**  **ed in to the Subject Property**  **at the end of 2019. Two**  **other individuals spent time renting at**  **LWJ in its early years as well.**  **In addition to their full**

**- time residential clients, LWJ hosts several clients on a daily basis**  **at the Subject Property. Regardless of residential status, clients pay for the activities and services**  **in a similar manner. Once an individual with development**  **al disabilities becomes twenty**  **-one , they**  **are required by DDD eligibility requirements to take a state administered NJ Comprehensive**  **Assessment Tool (NJCAT). The DDD uses the NJCAT to evaluate an individual’s support needs** 

**. The**  **NJCAT’s results also**  **determine an individual’s annual budget amount from DDD** 

**. In order**  **for clients to pay LWJ**  via **their DDD budgets, LWJ first had to be certified by DDD. In 2017,**  **LWJ applied for DDD certification, and after correcting issues discovered by a n audit, LWJ** 

**sec ured DDD certification in 2018.**  **Once funding is secured, a support coordination agency**  **is selected whic**  **h helps write a**  **program that LWJ must follow. From the program, the client creates a personal budget in which**  **they determine**  **what services they will req**  **uire or activities they will participate in.**  **LWJ must then keep notes and maintain records as to how LWJ is working to further the individual’s**  **program and achieve their goal**  **s. 5** 

**Even before LWJ obtained DDD certification, LWJ paid the teachers. Originally LWJ**  **used the Kolbs’ inheritance to pay the teachers 100 dollars per**  **hour. When the inheritance ran**  **out, Ms. Kolb explained that they would pass a hat around to collect money fo**  **r the teachers.**  **One of LWJ’s goals is to find a place for their clients to work. In furtherance of that**  **mission, LWJ emphasizes pre**

**- vocational and vocational skills.**  **Ms. Kolb explained that pre**

  ** vocational classes simply teach job skills.** **LWJ’s primary p re**  **- vocational focus is gardening**  **because the Kolbs discovered that gardening is tailored to specific habits of people on t he autism**  **spectrum. Accordingly,**  **LWJ uses its four gardens, the**  **green house, and a myriad of houseplants to teach responsibility and healthy eating habits.**  **From the fruits of their labor, under supervision, clients at the LWJ house prepare meals and snacks.**  **To facilitate these programs and activities, LWJ relies on staff and volunteers** 

**. LWJ hosts activities and facilitates classes thr**  **oughout the week, and while each activity may not happen every day, Ms. Kolb**  **maintained that the whole of the Subject Property is used all**  **the time every day. Ms. Kolb testified that**  **there is always someone at the Subject Property because it is never real**  **ly closed. Generally, over the weekends there are three to four people at the Subject**  **Property ,**  **but for special events they can host between**  **twelve and fourteen individuals.**  **A typical day at LWJ consists of the clients engaging with one another and their community.**  **This can be through off**

**- site hikes, trips to the store or restaurants, or horseback riding.**  **Clients may also exercise, cook, practice social skills, and make podcasts on t he Subject Property.**  **Some days, LWJ hosts a drum circle or an African drumming class with dancing to provide an**  **opportunity for parents and clients to participate in activities together. Residents and clients do**  **not need to participate in every activity and class. 6** 

**In 2016 and 2017, LWJ hosted**  **classes at the Subject Property. However, in November**  **2016, the T**  **ownship sent LWJ a letter informing them that they were violating zoning laws by charging for classes conducted on the Subject Property.**  **The letter also explained that LWJ did**  **not have any of the necessary permits to make food and host parties on the Subject Property and any commercial use of the Subject Property violated the Township’s zoning ordinance.**  **In response, LWJ moved some of their c**  **lasses to the nearby Western Hills Christian Church. Dissatisfied with that response, the Township sent LWJ a notice of violation on May**  **23, 2018. The notice outlined the**  **specific alleged zoning violations.**  **Ms. Kolb testified that they did not go to the**  **Zoning Board or any other municipal authority prior to purchasing the Subject Property**  **because they had spoken**  **to the mayor and were under the impression that they had the Township’s blessing to use the Subject Property in the way they intended.**  **Paying no heed to the Township’s May 2018 letter, LWJ continues to use the Subject Property with clients for other activities.**  **Notably, clients use the basement gym facilities with the help of private trainers and personal aides.**  **These trainers and aides are get ting paid for their work**  **on the property through the clients’ personal state budget** via **the DDD programs. The personal**  **trainers are not LWJ employees but rather 1099 contractors. While the aides and trainers are not**  **restricted to the spaces in which they work, they have no reason to go upstairs into the residents’**  **living quarters. There is no evidence before the court that LWJ is being fined by the Township for its**  **alleged zoning violations, or that the Township, (other than its May 2018 letter)**  **has taken any action to**  **put a stop to the activities of LWJ on the Subject Property** 

**. 7**  Procedural History **Pending before this court are appeals for Tax Years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. The County Board gran**  **t ed LWJ the tax exemption in 2016 and 2018 and the Township appealed**  **that decision for each year. The County Board denied the exemption in 2017, 5**  **2019, 6**  **and 2020; 7**  **LWJ appealed, or attempted to appeal, the denial each year. While this court sits**  de nov o **on appeals from County Boards, it is worth noting that after 2016, the County Board opined that**  **it was not within their power to resolve the zoning dispute**  **8 and because the Tax Court already had**  **this matter pending before it, the County Board continued**  **to defer its judgment on the issue.**
APPLICABLE LAW

**A. Generally** 

**“N.J.S.A. 2A:3A**  **-4b directs this**  **court to hear and determine all issues of fact and**  **law** de novo **.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. City of Perth Amboy, 9 N.J. Tax 571, 581 (Tax 1988). “By**  **use of the term** de novo **the Legislature intended that this court**  **consider an original assessment completely anew” as a court of original, rather than appellate jurisdiction.**  **Ibid. Notwithstanding ,** 

**“ [i]**  **n a proceeding in the Tax Court there is a presumption of correctness in fav or of the**  **County**
**B oard judgment which must be overcome by plaintiff**  **’ s introduction of sufficient competent** 

**5 County Board Judgment**  **code 2B, “presum ption**  **of correctness not overturn**  **ed .”** 

**6 County Board Judgment code 5E, “appeal not timely filed.”** 

**7 County Board Judgment code 6A, “tax court pending.”** 

**8 After the Township’s attorney explained to the**  **County Board during the 2018 appeal hearing**  **discussing the 2017 exemption, that “the property exemption statute is not the vehicle for showing**  **a soft heart,” the County**  **Board remarked that “someone needs to draw the line as to where [the charitable exemption starts and stops],**  **[and] this board is not going to draw that line.”** **8**

**evidence. ”**  **Glen Wall Assoc**

**. v. Wall T**  **wp. , 6 N.J. Tax 24, 28 (Tax 1983),**  **rev ’**  **d on other grounds, 99 N.J. 265 (1985).** 
**B. Property Tax**  **Exemption N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 provides in pertinent part that:**  **The following property shall be exempt from taxation . . . all buildings actually used in the work of associations and corporations organized**  **exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men, women and**  **children, provided that if any portion of a building used for that purpose is leased to profit** 

**- making organizations or is otherwise used for purposes**  **which are not themselves exempt from taxation, that portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion only shall be exempt.**  **[N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6] While value determinations by County Boards**  **generally enjoy a presumption of validity,**
**MSG W Real Estate Fund, LLC v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 18 N.J. Tax 364, 373**  **( Tax**  **1998), “the**  **determination of an exemption is more properly one of statutory and case law interpretation**  **than one requiring any special expertise possessed of an assessor [;]** 

**. . . ‘s**  **tatutory construction is ultimately a judicial**  **function. ’”**  **Hertz v. Borough of Lincoln Park, 31 N.J. Tax 1, 12 (Tax 2019)**  **(quoting O’ Rourke v. Fredon, 25 N.J. Tax 443, 450 (Tax 2010)).**  **“[T] ax**  **exemption cases . . . are necessarily limited to their facts and are not controlling.”**  **AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown**  **, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 499 (Tax 2015) (citing Int’l**  **Schs. Servs., Inc. v.**  **West Windsor**  **Twp. , 207 N.J. 3, 22 (2011)**  **).**

**“ The Supreme Cou**  **rt of New Jersey has set forth three criteria for whether a property qualifies for exemption under**  **N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 : (1) the owner of the property must be organized**  **exclusively for the tax**

**- exempt purpose**  **; (2) the property must be actually**  **used for the exempt** 
**purpose; and (3) the operation and use of the property must not be conducted for profit.**  **” Borough of Hamburg v. Tr**  **s. of Presbytery of Newton**  **, 28 N.J. Tax 311, 318**  **( citing**  **Paper Mill**  **Playhouse 9** 

**v. Millburn**  **Twp. , 95**  **N.J. 503, 506 (1984)). “**  **Each of these prongs is respectively referred to as (1) the**  **“organization test,” (2) the**  **“ use test,**  **” and (3) the “ profit test.**  **” Ibid.** 
**It has long**  **been recognized**  **that “ all**  **property shall**  **bear its**  **just and equal**  **share of the public**  **burden of taxation.” Princeton**  **Univ**

**. Press**  **v. Borough of Princeton**  **, 35 N.J.**  **209, 214 (1961). “**  **Statutes granting**  **exemption from**  **taxation represent**  **a departure**  **and consequently they** 

**are most**  **strongly construed against those claiming**  **exemption.” Ibid. Accordingly, “ [t]he**  **burden of proving a**  **tax -exempt**  **status is**  **upon the claimant.**  **” Ibid. However,**  **“ [t]**  **he rule of strict construction must never be allowed to defeat the evident legislative design.”**  **Soc ’**  **y of the Holy Child Jesus v. City of Summit**  **, 418 N.J. Super. 365, 373 (App. Div. 2011)**  **(quoting N.J.**  **Carpenters Apprentice**  **Training & Educ. Fund v. Borough of**  **Kenilworth , 147**  **N.J. 171, 177-78 (1996)).**  **When determining whether a property**  **is actually**  **used for a**  **tax**

**- exempt** 

**purpose, the**  **Tax**
**Court evaluates**  **whether the property is**  **“ reasonably**  **necessary ” for**  **such tax**  **-exempt purposes. See**  **Roman Catholic**  **Archdiocese of Newark**  **v. East**  **Orange City**  **, 18 N.J.**  **Tax 649, 653 (App.**  **Div. 2000)**  **(citing City**  **of Long Branch**  **v. Monmouth Med.**  **Ctr. , 138**  **N.J. Super.**  **524, 532 (App. Div.**  **1976), aff**  **’d, 73 N.J.**  **179 (1977)). When**  **applying this**  **test, the**  **Court has held that**  **“ necessary**  **” is** 
**not interpreted**  **to mean** 

**“absolutely indispensable.” Boys’**  **Club of**  **Clifton, Inc.**  **v. Twp.**  **of Jefferson**  **, 72**  **N.J. 389, 401 (1977).**  **Eligibility for**  **exemption is**  **determined as**  **of October 1 of the**  **prior tax**  **year. See**  **Catholic Relief**  **S ervs.**  **, U.S.C.C.**  **v. South Brunswick**  **Twp. , 9**  **N.J. Tax**  **25, 26-**
**7 (Tax**  **1987), aff** 

**’d, 9 N.J.**  **Tax 650 (App.**  **Div. 1987).**  **The test**  **for whether property**  **is used**  **for profit**  **is a “**  **pragmatic inquiry**  **into profitability** 

**. .**

**. [A]**  **realistic common-**  **sense analysis of the**  **actual operation of the taxpayer;**  **mechanical centering**  **on income and** 

**expense figures is**  **to be**  **avoided.” Paper**  **Mill Playhouse v.**  **Millburn Twp.**  **, 95 N.J.**  **503, 521 (1984). While**  **N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 requires**  **that the operation and use of proper**  **ty not**  **be 10** 

**conducted for**  **profit, t**  **here is**  **“ nothing**  **in the**  **statute requiring,**  **as a condition of**  **tax exemption,**  **that [an**  **entity] must**  **actually operate**  **at a**  **loss [.]”**  **Trenton v.**  **State, Div.**  **of Tax**  **Appeals, 65 N.J.**  **Super. 1, 10 (App.**  **Div. 1960). “A**  **crucial factor**  **is where**  **the profit goes . . . ‘ If**  **[the court]**  **can trace**  **it into**  **someone ’s personal pocket**  **[t he nonprofit]**  **[will not be]**  **entitled to**  **tax exemption.**  **”’ Paper**  **Mill , 95**  **N.J. at**  **522 (quoting Trenton, 65 N.J.**  **Super. at**  **12). “A narrow exception to**  **the profit**

**- making prohibition of N.J.S.A. 54:4** 

**- 3.6 [is the**  de
minimis **rule which explains] an occasional or incidental nonexempt activity, or a regula r**  **nonexempt activity which is of an inconsequential or** de minimis **character will not preclude an organization from obtaining tax exemption for its otherwise tax** 

**- exempt property.”**  **Greenwood Cemetery Ass’n of Millville, Inc. v** 

**. City of Millville**  **, 1 N.J. Tax 408, 414 (Tax 1980).** De minimis **activities are “an occasional or incidental activity, or, if engaged in re gularly, one which is of an**  **inconsequential . . . character [,]” not**  **“substantial, independent and permanent endevors specifically designed to make a**  **profit[**

**. ]”**  **Princeton Univ. Press , 3**  **5 N.J.**  **at 217. Furthermore,** 

**w hen “the taxpayer complies with the requirements of [N.J.S.A. 54:4** 

**- 3.6], it is entitled to the**  **exemption from real property taxes even if the use of the property does not comply w ith the**  **municipal zoning ordinance.” Soc’y of the Holy Child Jesus, 418 N.J. Super. at**  **368.**

**C. Appealing County Board Decisions** 
**“Any party who is dissatisfied with the judgment, action or determination of [the**  **County Board**  **] may seek review of that judgment, action or determination in the Tax Court by filing a**  **complaint in the Tax Court, pursuant to rules of court.” N.J.S.A. 54:51A**  **-1 (a)** 

**. The deadline for**  **filing tax appeals in New Jersey is on or before April 1, or 45 days from the date the bulk mailing**  **of notification of assessment is completed in the taxing district, whichever is l ater.**  **N.J.S.A. 54:3**

**- 11** 

**21. A complaint to review a**  **County Board**  **judgment must be filed within 45 days of service of the judgment. N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(a); R. 8:4-1(a)(2).**  **“Without timely filing of review petitions a county tax board . . . is without jurisdiction to**  **grant the review sought.” Danis**  **v. Middlesex**  **Cty**

**. Bd**  **. of Taxation, 113**  **N.J. Super. 6, 10**  **(App. Div.**  **1971)). “The failure to fi**  **le a timely appeal is a fatal jurisdictional defect.”**  **Lamantia v. Howell Twp.**  **, 12 N.J. Tax 347, 351 (Tax 1992)** 

**. These rules**  **must be strictly**  **enforced so that**  **municipal governments may**  **“ascertain the amount of taxable ratables within [their] jurisdiction in order that [they] might adopt a responsible and fairly accurate budget.”**  **Galloway Twp. v**  **. Petkevis, 2 N.J. Tax 85, 92 (**  **Tax 1980).** 

**D. Credibility of Witnesses** 

**The court must base its findings on its own credibility determinations.**  **See Judson**  **v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)**  **, superseded by statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15**  **-5.1 (unrelated to the credibility considerations)** 

**. When the facts are undisputed such as**  **here, th e**  **court is well within its authority to**  **weigh the witness’s credibility and establish the facts supporting the**
**outcome. See**  **Scott v. Salerno , 297 N.J. Super. 437, 447 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that “partie**  **s cannot complain that the trial court took as true facts which were not co**  **ntested or challenged”) ,**  **certif. denied , 149 N.J. 409 (1997).**  **Without creating a bright**

**- line rule,**  **this court has concluded that credible testimony is**  **“forthcoming” with “detail[s]” and includes helpful “factual back** 

**- up information.”**  **See AHS**  **Hosp. Corp., 28 N.J. Tax at 469,**  **470 (where the court found witness’ testimony “at times to be less than forthcoming, and often lacking sufficient support or foundation . . . often prompted by** 
**l eading questions on direct examination, and [the witnesses**  **’ ] memory and recollection of details,**  **facts, and events, particularly on cross**

**- examination, were somewhat selective**  **”) ;**  **See also**  **Hertz ,** **12**

**31 N.J. Tax at**  **17-20 (where the**  **Tax C ourt found the**  **applicant’s exemption application to be “substantially inconsistent with the evidence**  **[at trial ] . . . [and i**  **t was ]**  **the extent of those inconsistencies [that lead**  **the court] to conclude that [the applicant’s] testimony was substantially**  **not credible and se lf** 

**-serving.”)**
ANALYSIS
**LWJ ’s**  **status as a charitable organization is uncontested and therefore,**  **the court’s review**  **of LWJ’s**  **property tax exemption**  **qualifications is**  **limited to the second and third**  **prong of the**  **Paper Mill test**  **: (1) is the Subject Property actually used for the charitable purpose**  **; and (2) is the**  **Subject Property impermissibly used to make a profit**

**. For reasons more fully stated below, t**  **he court finds that LWJ satisfied**  **its burden in showing that the Subject Property is used in furtherance**  **of the organization’s charitable purpose. Furthermore,**  **because the non**

**- charitable profit** 

**** **generating use of the Subject Property is** de minimis **, this court finds that the Subject Property**

**s tatisfies the profit test.**  **Additionally, LWJ’s 2019 tax appea**  **l is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,**  **and the Township’s zoning argument, while unenforceable under current law, is not wholly**  **without merit**

**.**
1. The Use Test

**Courts have established that the use test**  **does not impose**  **a quantum of use. E.g.,**  **Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark**  **, 17 N.J.**  **at 311**  **(reasoning that “no courts in this state have ever suggested that the quantum, regularity, or consistency of religious activity are nece**  **ssary prerequisites to [tax exemption]”);**  **Borough of Hamburg v. Trs. of Presbytery of Newton, 28 N.J.**  **Tax 311, 320 n.5 (Tax 2015) (**  **e xplaining that**  **t he court need not “examine the ‘quantum of use’ of**  **a property under the exemption requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:4 -3.6”). In**  **Borough of Hamburg ,**  **the court found tha**  **t “the use of the [Subject Property] to store goods**  **[was a] v alid charitable purpose** **13**

**that advance[ed] [taxpayer’s] religious mission**  **.” 28 N.J. Tax at**  **323. Because the “court**  **conclude[d] that the [Subject Property] was reasonably necessary**  **for the [taxpayer’s] religious**
**purpose [,]**  **. . . the actual use requirement of the use test [was satisf ied].” Ibid.**  **While Borough of**  **Hamburg dealt with the religious exemption found in N.J.S.A. 54:4** 

**- 3.6, the analysis is on point in**  **that the court explained that it “need**  **not address the issue” of**  **a minimum threshold of use. Id.**  **at 320 n.5.**  **Here, LWJ submitted**

**uncontested evidence and testimony showing that the Subject**  **Property is actually used in furtherance of LWJ’s charitable mission.**  **Specifical ly**  **, LWJ uses the**  **Subject Property to facilitate a sense of community and opportunities for persona l and professional**  **growth for its**  **clients. C**  **lients maintain gardens on the Subject Property, they exercise in the basement, cook meals in the kitchen, complete puzzles in the dining room, have drum cir**  **cles in the living room, and engage in social events to promote communication and social developme**  **n t.**  **Th e court finds**  **the Township’s argument that ,**  **because the Kolb’s are a nuclear family and because they live at the Subject Property full** 

**- time, they are ineligible for an exemption under the** 
**statute ,**  **is without consequence.**  **In making this argument, the Township**  **fails to consider both the obviated exclusivity requirement in the use test, and the fact that courts**  **have refuse**  **d to impose a**  **quantum of use or specific amount of necessary use.**  **Based upon Ms. Kolb’s uncontested testimony, the**  **court is satisfied that**  **the Subject Property is actually being used in furtherance of LWJ’s charitable purpose, and that such use is reasonably necessary.** 

2. The Profit Test **While the Township did not give the profit prong any great attention, Ms. Kolb’s te stimony**  **prompted the court to undertake this inquiry. To that end, the**  **court finds that LWJ satisfies**  **the profit prong of the**  **Paper Mill test**  **in light of the narrow** de minimis **exception**

**. N.J.S.A. 54:4**  **-3.6 14** 

**does not require a nonprofit to operate at a loss,**  **but the nonprofit’s “operation**  **and use of its property must not be conducted for profit.”**  **Paper Mill , 95 N.J.**  **at 506, 522.**  **The presence of profit alone, however, does not bar the exemption. Id.**  **at 522. In**  **Paper Mill**  **, the court noted that while the property was used to make money through ticket sales, bec**  **ause the theater’s purpose was not to make a profit but rather to increase access to**  **the arts, the court found that the theater satisfied the profit test.**  **Id. at 521.**  **T he court**  **explained that to**  **find “Paper**  **Mill at times realiz**  **[e d]**  **a profit and generat [e**  **d] a surplus, [**  **and thus fail**  **ed the profit test**  **would ]**  **render[] [the test]**  **meaningless**

**. . .”**  **Id. at 520.**  **The court opined that “[n]o commercial enterprise,**  **whose essential purpose is to make money, would follow Paper Mill’s Policies.” I d. at 514.**  **While the DDD program**  **requires that certain**  **individuals and professional**  **s, who are paid**  **through** public funding **through the DDD program, presumably for profit,**  **accompany LWJ clients for specific purposes**  **on the Subject Property**  **, there has been no suggestion that any**  **money from the**  **DDD program has ever found its way**  **into LWJ’s**  **pockets, and therefore,**  **LWJ is not earning a** 
**pro fit from the DDD program.** 

**The Supports Program and Community Care Program were developed by the**  **N ew Jersey Department of Human Services’**  **Division of Developmental D**  **isabilities (DDD), which provides** public funding **for certain services that assist eligible New J**  **ersey adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities, age 21 and**  **older, to live as independently as possible. [**  **N.J. Div**

**. of Develop**  **men tal Disabilities,**  **https://www.state.nj.us/ humanservices/ddd/asse**  **ts/documents/quick -guide-for-**  **families -english.pdf (last visted**  **Mar. 9 , 2022).]** 

**In Paper Mill, the taxpayer was**  **earning the contested profit**  **by selling tickets.**  **Conversely, in the present matter,**  **a ides and trainers that accompany clients on the**  **Subject Property are paid**  **with public funds through**  **LWJ’s clients’ individual DDD programs. While these individuals are** **15**

**presumably working for profit, there is no financial gain for**  **LWJ as a facilitator of these DDD**
**programs. “When courts are called on to interpret tax exemption statutes . . . [t]he pa**  **ramount goal is to discern and implement legislative intent.”**  **Gourmet Dining, LLC v. Union T wp.**  , **243 N.J. 1, 16 (2020).**  **There is no dispute**  **here that LWJ adhered to the state** 

**- designed and implemented DDD** 
**program. LWJ became DDD certified in 2018, LWJ’s clients**  **received funding and grants through**  **the DDD program, and the clients’ aides and activities are paid for through the DDD program.**  **Th e**  **program requires that**  **the individual meet with a Support Coordinator to create an Individualized Service Plan (ISP).**  **The ISP dire cts and authorizes all DDD services and service**  **providers. It is through the ISP that individual aides are approved to assist clients and be covered**  **by the individual’s DDD budget. In this way, LWJ is able to offer paid classes to their clients**  **through DDD without exchanging or collecting money . Finding**  **that LWJ fails the profit test because DDD**  **funded aides**  **are making a profit on the Subject P**  **roperty would contravene the purpose of**  **the DDD program ’s “mission** 

**. . . to assure the opportunity for individuals with**  **developmental disabilities to receive quality services and supports . . . and exerci se their right to**  **make choices.” N.J.A.C. 10:40-1.1(a).** 
**AHS is instructive**  **; this**  **court found a hospital**  **failed the profit prong by find ing**  **that doctors**  **were “use[ing] the Hospital facility to generate private medical bills to patients.**  **T hese bills**  **[were] charged directly by the private physicians to the patients, and all the money**  **[went] directly to the**  **ph ysicians.”**  **AHS Hosp. Corp.**  **, 28 N.J. Tax at 502.**  **Furthermore, the court was “substantially unable to discern where non** 

**- profit activity**  **occur[ed] , and where for** 

**- profit activity occur[**  **ed .]”**  **Ibid. The key to this finding was**  **that “the**  **commingling of effort and activ**  **ities with for**

**- profit** **16**

**entities was significant, and a substantial benefit was conferred upon for**

**- profit entities as a**  **result.” Id. at 513.**  **New Jersey courts are emphatic in finding that significant profit making activity coupled**  **with an intent to make such a**  **profit is a clear violation of the profit prong. See**  **e. g.**  **Paper Mill , 95** 
**N.J. at**  **521 (in**  **upholding the exemption, the court noted that**  **the nonp r**  **ofit was**  **“ not conducted for**  **the purpose of making a profit, . . . [a]**  **lthough [taxpayer] produced a net income . . . that fact alone**  **does not mean that it is conducted**  **for profit”) ;**  **Princeton Univ**

**. Press**  **, 35 N.J. at**  **216 (in denying taxpayer’s exemption**  **, the court emphasized that the activity “is undertaken for the purpose of**  **making a profit”) ;**  **Kimberly Sch**

**. v. Montclair, 2 N.J. 28, 37 (1949) (explaining that the true test**  **of profit prong compliance for a school was “ whether**  **charges [were] fixed with the obvious intention of yie**  **lding a profit ”)**  **. Furthermore,** de minimis **profit making activity, or activity that is** 

**“ an occasional or incidental nonexempt activity, or a regu**  **lar nonexempt activity whi**  **c h is of an**  **inconsequential . . . character will not preclude an organization f ro**  **m obtaining tax exemption[.] ”**  **Greenwood Cemetery Ass’n of Millville, Inc. v. City of Millville**  **, 1 N.J. Tax 408, 414 (Tax 1980). In Greenwood**  **Cemete ry**  **, the court found the**  **taxpayer’s use of the subject proper ty**  **was not** de
minimis **because “there was considerable business activity resulting in profit to a private**  **individual.” Ibid. The present facts are substantially different**  **from those in**  **AHS . Here,**  **any profit that may flow to**  **the aides from their**  **access to and presence upon**  **the Subjecct P**  **roperty is** de minimis

**. U**  **nlike the for**

**- profit doctors in**  **AHS , there is no significant**  **entanglement between the aides and**  **the Subject Property , and**  **LWJ derives no benefit**  **from the**  **activities of the aides there**

**. In**  **AHS , for** 

**- profit doctors**  **had lucrative contracts with the Hospital**  **. Those contracts often provided the for** 

**- profit doctors with**  **organizational and administrative rights to the operations of 17** 

**their medical disciplines**  **within the Hospital itself. Furthermore, for** 

**- profit doctors had**  **substantial entangl**  **ement with alleged nonprofit aspects**  **of the Hos pital, unlimited access to Hospital property,**  **whose presence there was clearly intended to make a**  **profit. In**  **sharp contra st**  **, t he aide**  **s operating at LWJ are paid**  **with public funds through the**  **New J**  **ersey Department of H**  **ealth’ s DDD program.**  **The only connection the aides have with the Subject Property is**  **to fulfill their duties to**  **the ir**  **clients through**  **the government-funded**  **DDD program**

**. The profit making activity in**  **Greenwood is also clearly distinguishable from the present**  **facts. Greenwood Cemetery Ass’n**  **, 1**  **N.J. Tax at**  **414. There**  **, the court reasoned that “a private,**  **profit- making business was carried on by a third party [at the subject property] . . . for the personal**  **benef it of [taxpayer’s wife.]”**  **Id. at 412.**  **“It is not the legislative purpose of the [exemption statute] to exempt property used for private personal gain from local property taxes.”**  **Ibid. T**  **he president of a cemetery association lived on the g**  **rounds of the**  **cemetery with his family because the “caretaker’s on** 

**- site residence is necessary for the operation and maintenance of the cemetery.”**  **Id.**
**at 410. However, his wife was “engaged in the business of selling bronze memorial pla**  **ques**
**. [The**  **profit of which] inured to the benefit of the president’s wife[.]” Id.**  **at 411. The wife engaged in**  **“collection of bills, the completion of orders, the keeping of books of account, the keeping of a**  **chec k**  **book, the keeping of the order forms and . . . winding down [the business].” Ibid.**  **Such “considerable business activity” rendered the**  de minimis **exception inapplicable. Id. at 414.** 
**Here ,**  **the aides’ activity is limited by their ISP and client budgets, it cannot be said to be**  **considerable ; there is no indication that a substantial profit is being mad**  **e, 9**  **and more importantly,**

**9 Pursuant to**  **the DDD Community Care Program Policies & Procedures Manual**  **, section**  **8.3.2.2 Wages and Benefits**  **, https://www.nj.gov/humanservices/ddd/docum ents/community** 

**- care**  **** **program-policy-manual.pdf (last visited Mar.**  **23, 2022), the clients’ support coordinators ensure**  **the aides’ hourly wages fall within a ‘reasonable and customary’ range and can be suppor ted in**  **the client’s budget. 18** 

**there is no evidence that LWJ or anyone using the Subject Property is motivated to m ake a**  **substantial profit. The aides themselves are reasonably necessary for the safety of the clients, and**  **to the success and efficiency of the DDD program.**  **For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that LWJ satisfies Paper Mill ’s profit prong**  **because of the** de minimis **nature of the activity and the blatant lack of profit making intent**

**.**
3. 2019 A ppeal

**This court finds that LWJ should have been aware of the filing deadline**  **for the 2019 appeal ,**  **and therefore**  **its untimeliness is inexcusable. At trial,**  **the Township submitted LWJ’s statement**  **of organization claiming property tax exemption , which**  **the Township**  **received on October 31,**
**2018. The Township**  **’ s**  **January 9, 2019 letter explicitly informed LWJ that their request for**  **exemption was denied, and they had the right to appeal.**  **LWJ may or may not have timely received the tax bill, but the**  **L egislature’s intent was not to require actual receipt of the tax bill but rather**  **notice. If the**  **L egislature wanted to require receipt**  **rather than notice, they could have required the**  **tax bill to be sent with return receipts. See**  **Green v. East Orange , 21 N.J. Tax**  **324 , 334**  **( Tax**  **2004) (explaining the difference between certified mail and return receipt**  **and how the absence of return receipt signals notice as the**  **L egislature’s**  **true requirement). LWJ**  **cannot deny actual knowledge under the pres**  **en t facts given that it**  **received the Township’s January 2019 letter**  **advising of the** 

**exem ption**  **application’s denial and the**  **right to appeal by**  **April 1, 2019. Because**  **it was untimely**  **filed, the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the 2019 appeal ,**  **and thus the matter is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.** **19**

4. Ms. Kolb’s Credibility **The court must weigh the credibility of witnesses**

**. Trial courts are in a unique position to**  **judge credibility because such findings are “substantially influenced by [their] opport unity to hear**  **and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case , which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.”**  **State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). “Deference to a trial court’s fact** 

**- findings is especially**  **appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involve s**  **questions of credibilitiy. ”**  In re **Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997). Here, Ms. Kolb was the only**  **witness , and**  **the T ownship**  **, notably, did not dispute the**  **majority of Ms. Kolb’s testimony. Ms. Kolb ably and adequately**  **testified to LWJ’s purpose and its use of the Subject Property.**  **Despite some minor inconsistencies, 10**  **the court did not find**  **anything in her testimony that would tarnish her credibility.**  **There was no evidence of impermissible leading questions or instances of selective memory as seen in**  **AHS Hosp. Corp. ,**  **28**
**N.J. Tax at**

**470. Furthermore,**  **Ms. Kol b**  **’s testimony was not**  **substantially inconsist ent**  **and self**

  ** serving** **with the intent to mislead the court, like that**  **found in**  **Hertz v. Borough of Lincoln Park ,**  **31 N.J. Tax 1, 17 (Tax 2019). Rather, Ms. Kolb**  **’s testimony was “forthcoming” with**  **specific detai**  **ls and included helpful “factual back** 

**- up information.”**  **See A**  **HS Hosp. Cor**  **p. , 28 N.J. Tax**  **at 470.**  **Ms. Kolb spoke**  **confidentially and passionately on all that LWJ does at the Subject Property**  **, from managing the gardens to preparing and eating meals, solving puzzles, recording** 

**10 Ms**  **. Kolb did testify as being confused about the zoning issue. She claimed that LWJ never**  **went to a municipal body to clarify the zoning issue after 2018, but later explained that LWJ appeared in front of the County Board in response to the Township’s 2018**  **letter. The court is satisfied that any inconsistencies in this regard are**  de mi nimis **in nature. 20** 

**podcasts, learning life skills, and**  **practicing responsibility.**  **She also testified as to how the DDD**  **payments work and how LWJ received their DDD certification.**  **This court also considers the lack of blatant coaching or nefarious leading of the witness at**  **trial. In light of the relevant testimony’s uncontested nature, this court finds Ms. Kolb’s**  **testimony to be credible and sufficient to meet her burden establishing that the Subject Pr**  **operty was in fact**
**actua lly used in furtherance of LWJ’s charitable purpose.** 

5. Z oning **Under prevailing law, the court**  **is compelled to reject the Township’s contention**  **that the Subject Property is barred from exemption**  **because it may be in violation of local zoning ordinances.**  **11 When**  **“ the taxpayer complies with the requirements of [N.J.S.A.**  **54:4- 3.6], it is**  **entitled to the exemption from real property taxes even if the use of the property does no t comply**  **with the municipal zoning ordinance.” Soc**  **’ y of the Holy Child Jesus**  **, 418**  **N.J . Super.**  **at 368.** 
**N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 does not require compliance with municipal land use law, so it is not up to the**  **courts to deny exemptions based on zoning noncompliance. Ibid. While**  **this court is compelled to follow the re asoning of**  **Soc’y of the Holy Child Jesus set**  **forth by the Appellate Division**  **on this issue**  **, 12**  **the following commentary is most respectfully offered: “**  **When reviewing two separate enactments, the [c]ourt has an affirmative duty to reconcile** 

**11 N.J.S.A. 40:55D**  **-66.1 establishes that “[c]om**  **m unity**  **residences for persons with developmental disabilities . . . shall be a permitted use in all residential distircts of a municipal**  **ity, and the requirements therefor shall be the same as for sin**  **gle family dwelling units**  **.” However, it is not**  **within the juri sdiction of this court to determine whether the current use of the Subject Property**  **by LWJ constitutes a “community residence” within the meaning of said statute.** 

12 **See Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J. Super 224, 233 (App. Div. 2003) (“Although trial judges are**  **privileged to disagree with ou r**  **decisions, ‘the privilege does not extend to non**

**- compliance.’** 

**. . . As such, the trial court has no discretion when a mandate issues from an appellat**  **e court. It simply**  **must comply .”)**  **(citing Reinauer Realty Corp . v. Paramus, 34 N.J. 406, 415 (1961)).** **21**

**them, so as to give effect to both expressions of the law makers’ will**  **. . . it is [a court’s]**  **obligation to make every effort to harmonize se**  **p arate statutes.**  **” St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp. v. Lacy**  **, 185 N.J. 1,**  **14 (2005) (citing** In re **Adoption of a Child by W.P. and M.P., 163 N.J. 158, 182 -83**  **(2000) (Poritz, C.J., dissenting)**  **). To interpret**  **N.J.S.A 54:4 -3.6**  **as if it has no bearing on**  **a zoning statute**  **strips the zoning statute of meaning**  **, rendering the overlooked statute superfluous.**  **“A construction that will render any part of a statute inoperative, su**  **perfluous or meaningless, is to be avoided .”**  **Hoffman v. Hook ,**  **8 N.J. 397, 406 (1952). Enforcing**  **a zoning statute**  **while interpreting an exemption statute is not**  **“engraft [ing] upon the unambigious language of the [s]tatute the requirement that [the Subject**  **Property] comply with [the municipal ] zoning ordinance**  **[,] ”**  **Soc’y of the Holy Child Jesus , 418**  **N.J. Super. a**  **t 387**  **, but rather reading the two controlling statutes in tandem. While N.J.S.A. 54:4** 

**- 3.6**  **does not require a taxpayer**  **to legally use their property , the controlling**  **zoning statute**  **does. In this court’s view,**  **granting an exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4**

**- 3.6 to a property violating a**  **municipal zoning statute**  **falls short of**  **a court’s obligation**  **to read statutes in harmony with one another.**  **Furthermore, allowing a taxpayer to enjoy the benefit s**  **of a tax exemption, w hile it violates**  **zoning laws, is patently inconsistent with the level of**  **scrutiny required to meet**  **the statutory and court enumerated criteria for**  **tax exemption applications. See**  **Feddrs Fin. Corp. v. Div. of**  **Taxation, 96 N.J. 376, 386 (1984) (Tax “exemptions are to be construed narrowly.”)**  **The court recognizes that the Township is not without recourse.**  **It can impose fines, and**  **take legal action to shut down illegal zoning operations until the violators apply f or and receive**  **zoning approval. Such**  **action has not happened under the present facts. Shutting down illegal use**  **that supported the granting of an exemption, would likely,**  arguendo **, lead to the loss of the** **22**

**exemption. That process, however, can be tenuous and take considerable time.**  **It seems to this court that the more practical solution is to require zoning compliance as part of the**  **exemption application process.**  **To that end, this court is in accord with our colleagues in the upper courts:**  **it is within the purview of** 

**the L egislature**  **, and not the courts, to reconcile the exemption statute**  **( N.J.S.A. 54:4**  **-3.6) with**  **Municipal Land U se**  **L aw**  **(N.J.S.A. 40:55D -1-163).**  **See Christian**  **Mission John 3:16 v. Passaic City, 243 N.J. 175, 192 (2020) (interpreting Soc’y of the Holy Child**
**Jesus ,**  **to hold that “a violation of zoning and construction ordinances is not enough to deny a tax exemption**  without legislative authorization **”) (**  **emphasis added ).**  **It is not within the jurisd iction**  **of this court to effectuate a change in the law in this regard. McMahon v. City of Newark, 195**  **N.J. 526, 546 (2008) (“The Tax Court is vested with limited jurisdiction [ as**  **outlined in] N.J.S.A 2B:13-2[.]”)**  **; see also**  **Jablonowska v. Suther, 195 N.J. 91, 105 (2008) (“[C]ourts ought not ‘rewrite a plainly** 

**- written enactment of the Legislature[.]’”) (quoting**  **DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).** 

6. Public Policy

**“ [O]**  **ne justification for granting a charitable tax exemption is that if the charita ble work** 
**were not done**  **by a private party, it would have to be done at public expense.” Advanced Housing,** 
**Inc. v. T wp. o**  **f Teaneck , 215 N.J. 549, 568**  **(2013). Additionally, if**  **“the charitable work done by the private entity will spare the government an expense that ultimately it must b**  **ear [,]”**  **the tax exemption operates as a**  quid pro quo **. Id. at 572**  **(ci tations omitted**  **). “ [T]**  **he receipt of government**  **subsidies or funds is not contraindicative of a charitable purpose .” Id.**  **at 573 (citing**  **Southern Jersey Family Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. City of Pleasantville, 351 N.J. Super. 262, 266, 273** 

**- 75 (App.**  **Div. 2002) (finding that receipt of sub stantial government grants and “virtually no voluntary**  **charitable contributions” does not negate charitable purpose), aff’d o.b., 176 N.J. 184 (2003)). 23** 

**In Advanced Housing**  **, this**  **state’s Sup**  **reme C**  **ourt examined a similar situation in which a nonprofit corporation ran housing for individuals with developmental disabilities.**  **215 N.J. at 553.**  **Among other things, the municipalities challenged the organization’s exempti on**  **, claiming that the**  **charitable effects of the organization were secondary to its primary purpose, providing housing**  **and thus the exemption must be denied. Id.**  **at 563. In granting the exemption, the court**  **emphasized the housing crisis**  **for individuals with developmental disabilities. Id.**  **at 522. Citing**  **a 2005 Task Force on Mental Health commissioned by Acting Governor Cod e**  **y, the court explained that there is a “dearth of affordable housing that offer[s] comprehensi**  **ve support services.”**  **Ibid. The court went on to say that the taxpayer’s charitable operation of providing housing to**  **“mentally disabled citizens, who otherwise would be dependent on government relie f, is in**  **furtherance of this State’s express policy.” Id.**  **at 554. While noting that the organization receiv**  **ing money from fed**  **eral and state agencies “is supportive of its charitable purpose[,]” the court explained that the organization “reasonably posits” that denying the exemption would hi**  **nder the organization’**  **s ability to continue in its charitable purpose. Id. at 575. In granting the exemption,**  **the court noted that den**  **ying the organization the exemption**  **“runs directly contrary to our State’s public policy.” Ibid.**  **The same would be true under the present facts**

**. LWJ’s charitable status is uncontested.**  **This court is satisfied that LWJ actually uses the Subject Property to help indivi duals with**  **developmental disabilities have**  **lives filled with learning and joy in accordance with N.J.S.A. 54:4**

**- 3.6.**  **Furthermore, to find that LWJ violates the profit prong of the**  **Paper M**  **ill test**  **by allowing**  **individuals using the Subject Property to be paid**  **pursuant to various state -sanction**  **ed programs**  **would contravene reason. LWJ’s purpose and existence**  **is evidenced by their federal and state** **24**

**nonprofit certification s,**  **their DDD certification, and every other certification LWJ has obtained to**  **further its objectives** 

**. The court also observes:**  **The stigmatization of mental illness is still an important societal problem. The general population is largely ignorant about this**  **problem, and fear of the mentally ill remains prevalent. Although we no longer imprison, burn or kill the mentally ill as in the Middle**  **Ages or in Nazi Germany, our social standards and attitu des are**  **nonetheless unworthy of modern welfare states. Structural discrimination of the mentally ill is still pervasive, whether in**  **legislation or in rehabilitation efforts**

**. [Wulf R**  **ö ssler,**  **The Stigma of Mental Disorders:**  **A** Millennia‐Long **History of Social Exclusion and Prejudices, EMBO Rep.**  **, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5007563/**  **(last visited**  **Feb. 11, 2022) .]**  **Regrettably, “[t]he stigma of mental illness is universal. . . . ‘**  **there is no country, society or culture where people with mental illness have the same societal value as people withou**  **t mental illness.**  **’” American Psychiatric**  **Association, Stigma, Prejudice and**  **Discrimination Against People with Mental Illness**  **, https://www.psychiatry.org/patients**

**- families/stigma**  **-and- discrimination**  **(last visted**  **Feb. 11, 2022) (**  **citations omitted)**

**. Without the Kolbs**  **’ innovative approach**  **for the care of their**  **developmentally disabled son,**  **and others like him, the costs of his care would fall upon society . Also,**  **present government, already**  **strained in its resources for the mentally ill,**  **would bear the obligation to see to his well**  **being at a cost likely to be**  **significantly higher than the public funding allotted for DDD programs**

**. See**  **Advanced Housing, Inc., 215 N.J. at**  **559 (explaining that in 2005, it cost the state $146,000 a year to care for**  **an individual in a state psychiatric hospital). 25**  CONCLUSION
**Because LWJ met**  **its burden by**  **satisfying the elements of N.J.S.A. 54:4 -3.6**  **as enumerated by**  **Paper Mill , LWJ’s appeals for 2017 and 2020 are**  **GRANTED , the Township’s 2016 and 2018**  **appeals are DENIED**  **, and LWJ’s 2019 appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.**  **The Tax Court’s judgment consistent with this opinion will be uploaded to**  eCourts

**.**