# FILED

July 29, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk IN RE: ANNI

E CHRISTIN

A HARRIS, )

) ANNIE CHRISTINA HARRI S, and ) STEPHANIE DEVONA HAMILTO N, ) ) Appeal No. Petitioners-Appe

llants, ) 01A01-9901-CV-00017

) v. ) ) Rutherford Circ

uit WILLIA M THOMAS BLANTON, ) ) Respondent-Appellee, )

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE MIDDLE S ECTION AT NAS HVILLE

APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUTHERFO RD COUNTY AT MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE ROYCE TAYLOR, JUDGE

JEFFREY J. MILLER 427 Cummins Station 209 Tenth Avenue South Nashville, Tennessee 37203-0777 Attorney fo

r Petitioners-App

ellants WILLIAM B. BRUCE and LOU ISE R. F ONTEC CHIO BRUCE , WEAT HERS , COR LEY, DU GHMAN & LYLE 2075 First American Center 315 Deaderick Street Nashville, Tennessee 37238-2075 Attorney for Respondent-Appellee

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, JUDGE

CONCUR: GODDA RD, P.J. SUSANO, J..

O P I N I O N2 In this paternity action, the Trial Judge dismissed the complaint on the basis that the statute of limitations had run.

Annie Christina Harris, was born May 21, 1978. On September 22, 1998, when Ms. Harris w

as twenty y

ears old, she and

her mother filed a

paternity a

ction against William Thomas Blan

ton, and the Complai

nt alleged that M

r. Blanton is the f

ather of Ms. Harris. The issue on appeal involves the construction of a statute, specifically, the statute of limitations applicable to this case. Statutory construction presents a question of law, and our stand

ard of review is de novo, without any presumption of correctness. See State v. Levandowski , 955 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn. 1997).

“A statute comes t

o a court ‘clothe

d in a presumption of

constitutionality [since] the Legislature does not intentionally pass an unconstitutional act.’” Vogel v. Wells Fargo Gu

ard Services,937 S.W.2d 856, 858 (T enn. 1996). I

n construing stat

utes, the court “must indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of constitutionality.” Id. It is the duty of the court “to a

dopt a constructio

n which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any reasonable construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution.” Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter

, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Tenn. 1993). At the time Ms. Harris was born in 1978, the applicable statute of limitations, then fo

und at Tenn. Code A

nn. § 36-224(2), p

rovided that proc

eedings to estab lish the pa terni ty of a ch ild m ust be broug ht wit hin t wo years of the child ’s bir th. In 1983, the United Sta

tes Supreme Court d

eclared this stat

ute unconstitutiona

l because it denied certain illegitimate children the equal protection of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983).

In response, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the statute of limitations in 1984 by

deleting the pro

vision found to be un

constitutional and

replacing it with the fo llowing: Proceedings to establish the paternity of a child may be instituted before or after the birth of the child and until one year bey ond the child’s3 age o f ma jor ity. 1984 Tenn. Public Acts ch. 614, §1. In 1989, the General Assembly fur ther amended the statute, which had been renumbered as Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-103(b), by designating the preceding subsection as (1) and adding the following subsection:

(2) Proceedings to establish paternity may be brought on behalf of a child in whose behalf a paternity action could have been broug ht under this part on August 16, 1984, but for whom no such action was brought, or for whom a paternity action was previously brought but was dismissed because the pre

vious more restric

tive statute of limit

ations was then in effect. 1989 Tenn. Public Acts ch. 206 § 9. This statute was in effect when Ms. Harris reached the age of majority, and when she reache d the age of nineteen. In 1997, the General Assembly combined the pater nity and legitimation causes of action, and amended the statute of limitations in the process. SeeTenn. Public Acts. ch. 477. The

current statute o

f limitations provide

s as follows: (a) An action to establish the parentage of a child may be instituted before or after the birth of the child and until three (3) yea rs beyond the child’s age of majority. The provisions of this chapter shall not affect the relationship of parent and child as established in § 31-2-105. (b) An action to establish parentage may be broug ht on behalf of a child in whose behalf a paternity action could have been broug ht under this chapter on August 16, 1984, but for whom no such action was brought, or for whom a paternity action was brought but was dismissed because the pre

vious more restric

tive statute of limit

ations was then in effect. Nothing herein shall be construed to permit the filing of any paternity action after the statute of limitations established by subsec tion (a). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36

-2-306 (Supp. 1998

); 1997 Tenn. Public

Acts ch. 477, § 1. Th

is provision went into effect on July 1, 1997, slightly over a month after Ms. Ha rris turned nineteen. Neither party contends that the current version of the statute of limitations revives a cause of action that expired under the old law, but Ms. Harris essentially ar gues that under the statute in effect when she turned nineteen, there was no statute of limitations applica

ble to her cause o

f action. Ig

noring subsectio

n (b)(1), which s

ets forth the one year after the age of ma jority limitation, Ms. Harris relies on subsection (b)(2), which states: An action to establish parentage may be brought on beha lf of a child in whose behalf a paternity action could have been broug ht under4 this chapter on August 16, 1984, but for whom no such action was brought, or for whom a paternity action was brought but was dismissed because the pre

vious more restric

tive statute of limit

ations was then in effect. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-103(b)(2) (repealed 1997). She asserts that she was six ye ars old on August 16, 1984, and neither she nor her mother had brought a paternity action at that time, so the statute applies to her and allows her to bring such an action at any time, with no limitations. She

states that the only

effect the cur

rent statute had o

n this right to bri ng a p ate rni ty ac tio n is to l imi t th at r ight to t hree years aft er he r age of m ajo rit y.

Construing the statute in its entirely, we determine that subsection (b)(1) sets forth the statute of limitations in paternity actions, which is one year pa st the age of majority. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-103(b)(1) (repealed 1997). Subsection (2) then provides that act

ions may be br

ought if they

could have been b

rought “under this part

” on August 16, 1984, but had not been brought, or if they had been broug ht and dismissed due to the more restrictive and unconstitutional statute of limitations. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-103(b)(2) (repealed 1997) (emphasis added). The natural and ordinary meaning of “under this part”

indicates that it is r

eferring to the

statute of limitatio

ns provision. Thus, a cause of actio

n could be broug

ht “under this par

t” on August 16, 1984, if the child in question had not yet reached his or her nineteenth birthday on August 16, 1984. The language of the subsection indicates that it was designed to ensure that children who wer e once subject to the unconstitutional statute of limitations have a right of action for support that is not ba

rred by the

unconstitutional sta

tute. However, th

at right was still subject to the provisions of subsection (b)(1), which sets forth the amended statute of limitations. Essentially, subsection (b)(2) was intended to clarify that pate rnity actions could be brought on behalf of all children who were not yet ninete en on August 16, 1984, up until their nineteenth birthdays, even if their actions would have been barred by the unconstitutional sta

tute previously

in effect. The more recent enactment indicates that this is what the legislature intended by its addition of subsection (b) (2) to the statute. In the curre nt version, the legislature increased the statute of limitations to three years past the ag e of majority, but kept the language of the prior subsection (b)(2), permitting actions to be brought if they5

could have been brought “under this part” on August 16, 1984. However, the legislature clarified its prio

r intent by a

dding the senten

ce, “Nothing he

rein shall be cons

trued to permit the filing of any paternity a ction after the statute of limitations established by subsection (a).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-306(b). This sentence does not change the application of the law, it simply clarifies the intent of the legislature, that actions can be brought if they

were previously

barred by

the prior unconsti

tutional statute of

limitations, but remain subjec

t to the current, s

tatute of limitation

s. To construe the statute as Ms. Harris requests would create an unconstitutional result. Under the urged construction, the statute would create two classes, depending upon when the children were born. One class, born after Aug ust 16, 1984, would be subject to the one year after the age of majority statute of limitations, and they would not be able to bring their causes of action after they turned nineteen. The other class, born

between August

17, 1965 and Augu

st 16, 1984, would not

be subject to any statute of limitations, and could bring their causes of action at any time. We do not conceive of any rational basis to justify such a n inequitable classification. We are required to adopt a construction which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict. Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc.

We therefore conclude the statute of limitations barred this action, and we affirm the dismissal of the action by the Trial Judge.

The cause is remanded with the cost of the appeal assessed to the appellants.

________________________ Hersc hel P. F ranks, J. CONCUR:

___________________________ Houston M. Godd ard, P.J.

___________________________ Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.