I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7423 

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait 

accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 30, 2020 

Mr. GALLAGHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed 

Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces 

to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

6 In this Act: 

7 (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 

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1 timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 

2 of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 

3 resulting in— 

4 (A) the termination of hostilities or, at a 

5 minimum, the termination of the attempted fait 

6 accompli; or 

7 (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 

8 People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 

9 accompli against Taiwan. 

10 (2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 

11 means the strategy of the People’s Republic of 

12 China designed to allow the People’s Republic of 

13 China to use military force to seize control of Tai14 wan before the United States Armed Forces are able 

15 to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring 

16 an effective combined joint response by the United 

17 States Armed Forces by convincing the United 

18 States that mounting such a response would be pro19 hibitively difficult or costly. 

20 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

21 Congress makes the following findings: 

22 (1) Taiwan is— 

23 (A) a beacon of democracy in Asia; and 


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1 (B) a steadfast partner of the United 

2 States in the common pursuit of a free and 

3 open Indo-Pacific region in which— 

4 (i) all societies enjoy sovereign auton5 omy; 

6 (ii) people live securely, prosperously, 

7 and with dignity; and 

8 (iii) the societies of the region rise 

9 and fall not by coercion but on the basis 

10 of peaceful competition. 

11 (2) If the Government of the People’s Republic 

12 of China were to use military force to compel the 

13 unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 

14 China— 

15 (A) the world would lose one of the great 

16 champions of freedom and democracy; 

17 (B) the United States and allies and part18 ners of the United States would face severe dif19 ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 

20 power relative to the People’s Republic of China 

21 in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 

22 (C) as the balance of power in the Indo23 Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 

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1 ple’s Republic of China would possess an in2 creasing ability— 

3 (i) to impose its will throughout the 

4 Indo-Pacific region; and 

5 (ii) to prevent United States access to 

6 key trade routes and markets in the Indo7 Pacific region, thereby imposing severe 

8 economic hardship on middle-class and 

9 working-class people of the United States 

10 and undermining the American way of life. 

11 (3) In January 2019, the Defense Intelligence 

12 Agency assessed that the ‘‘longstanding’’ intent of 

13 the Government of the People’s Republic of China to 

14 compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s 

15 Republic of China, and deter any attempt by Taiwan 

16 to declare independence, was the ‘‘primary driver for 

17 China’s military modernization’’. 

18 (4) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific 

19 Strategy Report released in June 2019, states that 

20 the Government of the People’s Republic of China is 

21 ‘‘preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with 

22 the mainland by force, while simultaneously deter23 ring, delaying, or denying any third-party interven24 tion on Taiwan’s behalf’’. 


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1 (5) Department of Defense statements and pub2 lications indicate that the Government of the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China is developing the plans and 

4 capabilities required to employ the fait accompli 

5 strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with 

6 the People’s Republic of China, including— 

7 (A) the assessment by the Defense Science 

8 Board in 2017 that the Government of the Peo9 ple’s Republic of China had adopted a theory of 

10 victory whereby once conflict with the United 

11 States appeared inevitable, as might be the case 

12 if the Government of the People’s Republic of 

13 China attempted to use military force to compel 

14 the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Re15 public of China, then the Government of the 

16 People’s Republic of China ‘‘will attempt to 

17 achieve a decisive outcome very quickly, pre18 senting the United States and its allies with a 

19 fait accompli’’ and ‘‘then seek to demonstrate 

20 that the United States and its allies will incur 

21 significant costs in seeking to reverse that out22 come’’; 

23 (B) the assessment in the Indo-Pacific 

24 Strategy Report that, if the Government of the 

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1 itor in the Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to ad2 vance their interests through force, they are 

3 likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the 

4 onset of conflict. In a fait accompli scenario, 

5 competitors would seek to employ their capabili6 ties quickly to achieve limited objectives and 

7 forestall a response from the United States and 

8 its allies and partners’’; 

9 (C) testimony by then Acting Secretary of 

10 Defense Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 

11 that— 

12 (i) the Government of the People’s 

13 Republic of China ‘‘has made investments 

14 specifically intended to offset U.S. advan15 tages’’; and 

16 (ii) if deployed in the initial stages of 

17 a conflict, ‘‘these capabilities could seek to 

18 achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make 

19 reversing Chinese gains more difficult, 

20 militarily and politically’’; and 

21 (D) testimony by then Commanding Gen22 eral of Marine Corps Combat Development 

23 Command Lieutenant General David Berger in 

24 April 2019 that peer adversaries of the United 


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1 States seek ‘‘to create strategic dilemmas 

2 through fait accompli scenarios’’. 

3 (6) In March 2019, then Acting Secretary of 

4 Defense Patrick Shanahan testified that the imple5 mentation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 

6 would ensure the United States has ‘‘the capabili7 ties, posture, and employment of forces’’ required to 

8 prevent a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

9 China. 

10 (7) According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Re11 port, ‘‘[t]he National Defense Strategy implicitly ac12 knowledges the most stressing potential scenarios 

13 will occur along our competitors’ peripheries’’. An 

14 attempted fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

15 China against Taiwan should therefore be expected 

16 to constitute a ‘‘most stressing’’ potential scenario 

17 for the United States Armed Forces. 

18 (8) The National Defense Strategy Commission 

19 found that the United States Armed Forces must be 

20 postured ‘‘to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 

21 agile opportunistic adversary’’ in order to compete 

22 effectively in the Indo-Pacific region and stated that 

23 ‘‘the United States must develop new operational 

24 concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by 

25 addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to 


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1 achieve a fait accompli against states on their pe2 riphery,’’ in recognition of— 

3 (A) the unique challenges to the United 

4 States Armed Forces posed by the employment 

5 of the fait accompli strategy by the Government 

6 of the People’s Republic of China or another 

7 strategic competitor; and 

8 (B) the consequent urgent need for new 

9 thinking and steady focus by the Department of 

10 Defense on ensuring the ability of the United 

11 States Armed Forces to prevent an adversary 

12 from using the fait accompli strategy to ad13 vance its interests at the expense of those of the 

14 United States. 

15 (9) Department of Defense strategic guidance 

16 and official statements underscore the essential role 

17 that denial operations will play in preventing a fait 

18 accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

19 Taiwan, including— 

20 (A) the incorporation in the National De21 fense Strategy of the Global Operating Model 

22 that includes a ‘‘blunt layer’’ of combat-credible 

23 forward forces postured and employed to 

24 ‘‘delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression’’; 


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1 (B) the conclusion by the National Defense 

2 Strategy Commission that the Department of 

3 Defense must position ‘‘substantial capability 

4 forward’’ in the form of the ‘‘blunt layer’’ in5 cluded in the Global Operating Model to ‘‘deter 

6 and prevent a fait accompli’’; 

7 (C) the statement for the record by the 

8 Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific 

9 Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, in April 

10 2018 in which he concludes, ‘‘[d]ue to the dis11 tances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot 

12 rely solely on surge forces from the continental 

13 United States to deter Chinese aggression or 

14 prevent a fait accompli. PACOM must maintain 

15 a robust blunt layer that effectively deters Chi16 nese aggression in the Indo-Pacific’’; 

17 (D) the Joint Operating Concept for De18 terrence Operations, which states that forward19 deployed forces, such as those included in the 

20 blunt layer of the Global Operating Model and 

21 referenced by the National Defense Strategy 

22 Commission and the Commander of the United 

23 States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to 

24 ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 

25 likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 


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1 tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver2 sary decisionmakers from concluding they 

3 might achieve a military fait accompli that 

4 could be extremely costly for the [United 

5 States] to reverse by force’’; 

6 (E) the United States Army Multi-Domain 

7 Operations concept document, which states that 

8 the Armed Forces must demonstrate the capa9 bility ‘‘to immediately deny a fait accompli at10 tack’’ in order to deter a near-peer adversary; 

11 and 

12 (F) the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 

13 report, which states that forward-deployed 

14 forces ‘‘that can continue to operate inside an 

15 adversary’s long-range precision-fire weapons 

16 engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally 

17 relevant than forces which must rapidly maneu18 ver to positions outside the WEZ in order to re19 main survivable,’’ and that such ‘‘stand-in’’ 

20 forces possess the capability to ‘‘attrite adver21 sary forces, enable joint force access require22 ments, complicate targeting and consume adver23 sary [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais24 sance] resources, and prevent fait accompli sce25 narios’’. 


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1 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

2 It is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) the ability of the United States to uphold 

4 a free and open Indo-Pacific region would be se5 verely compromised if the Government of the Peo6 ple’s Republic of China were able to compel the uni7 fication of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 

8 China, particularly if the People’s Republic of China 

9 were able to do so by military force; 

10 (2) the loss by the United States of the ability 

11 to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region 

12 would result in the significantly increased vulner13 ability of the middle-class and working-class people 

14 of the United States and the allies and partners of 

15 the United States to economic coercion by the Gov16 ernment of the People’s Republic of China; 

17 (3) the fate of Taiwan is therefore crucially 

18 linked to the fates of all countries in the Indo-Pa19 cific region, including to the fate of the United 

20 States; 

21 (4) under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 

22 3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 

23 to consider any effort to determine the future of 

24 Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave 

25 concern to the United States; 


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1 (5) since 1979, the United States Government 

2 has consistently upheld the commitments of the 

3 United States under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 

4 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); 

5 (6) the National Defense Authorization Act for 

6 Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) reaffirms 

7 that the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 

8 seq.) and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ are the cornerstones 

9 of United States relations with Taiwan; 

10 (7) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 

11 et seq.) further establishes the policy of the United 

12 States ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United 

13 States to resist any resort to force or other forms 

14 of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 

15 social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’’; 

16 (8) the Government of the People’s Republic of 

17 China appears to be developing the plans and capa18 bilities required to use the fait accompli strategy to 

19 compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s 

20 Republic of China, thereby jeopardizing the security 

21 and the social and economic system of the people of 

22 Taiwan; 

23 (9) denial operations will have an essential role 

24 in any strategy to prevent a fait accompli by the 

25 People’s Republic of China against Taiwan; and 


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1 (10) implementation of the Taiwan Relations 

2 Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) therefore requires the 

3 United States to maintain the ability to defeat a fait 

4 accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

5 Taiwan, especially by denial operations. 

6 SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

7 It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain 

8 the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a 

9 fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

10 Taiwan. 

11 SEC. 6. REPORT ON PROGRESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

12 DEFENSE WITH RESPECT TO DENYING A FAIT 

13 ACCOMPLI BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

14 CHINA AGAINST TAIWAN. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 30 each year, 

16 beginning in 2021 and ending in 2026, the Secretary of 

17 Defense shall submit to the congressional defense commit18 tees a report on the progress of the Department of De19 fense with respect to improving the ability of the United 

20 States Armed Forces to conduct combined joint operations 

21 to deny the ability of the People’s Republic of China to 

22 execute a fait accompli against Taiwan. 

23 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report under 

24 subsection (a) shall include the following: 


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1 (1) An explanation of the objectives for the 

2 United States Armed Forces that would be nec3 essary to deny the fait accompli by the People’s Re4 public of China against Taiwan. 

5 (2) An identification of joint warfighting capa6 bilities and current efforts to organize, train, and 

7 equip the United States Armed Forces in support of 

8 the objectives referred to in paragraph (1), includ9 ing— 

10 (A) an assessment of whether the pro11 grams included in the most recent future-years 

12 defense program submitted to Congress under 

13 section 221 of title 10, United States Code, are 

14 sufficient to enable the United States Armed 

15 Forces to conduct joint combined operations to 

16 achieve such objectives; 

17 (B) a description of additional investments 

18 or force posture adjustments required to main19 tain or improve the ability of the United States 

20 Armed Forces to conduct joint combined oper21 ations to achieve such objectives; 

22 (C) a description of the manner in which 

23 the Secretary of Defense intends to develop and 

24 integrate Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 

25 Corps, and Space Force operational concepts to 


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1 maintain or improve the ability of the United 

2 States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined 

3 operations to achieve such objectives; and 

4 (D) an assessment of the manner in which 

5 different options for pre-delegating authorities, 

6 including authorities relating to kinetic strikes 

7 against targets on the mainland of the People’s 

8 Republic of China, may improve the ability of 

9 the United States Armed Forces to conduct 

10 joint combined operations to achieve such objec11 tives. 

12 (3) An assessment of the role of the nuclear 

13 forces of the United States in deterring or defeating 

14 a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China 

15 against Taiwan, including concepts for— 

16 (A) deterring limited use of nuclear weap17 ons by the People’s Republic of China in the 

18 Indo-Pacific region without undermining the 

19 ability of the United States Armed Forces to 

20 maintain nuclear deterrence at the strategic 

21 and theater levels against the Russian Federa22 tion and the Democratic People’s Republic of 

23 Korea; and 

24 (B) ensuring the United States Armed 

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1 erations to defend Taiwan in a nuclear environ2 ment following nuclear weapons use by the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China or the United States. 

4 (c) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a) 

5 shall be submitted in classified form but may include an 

6 unclassified executive summary. 

7 (d) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE8 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘congressional defense 

9 committees’’ has the meaning given the term in section 

10 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code. 

Æ 


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