COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

RONNIE JAMES GOODE

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1643-98-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 SEPTEMBER 28, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge 

 Margaret A. Nelson, Senior Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Ronnie James Goode (appellant) was indicted by a grand jury 

for possession of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-250. 

Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the cocaine found 

on his person, contending that the police officer had neither a 

warrant nor probable cause for an arrest. The trial court 

denied the motion and subsequently convicted appellant in a 

bench trial. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. 

 On an appeal from a trial court's ruling on a suppression 

motion, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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party prevailing below, in this case the Commonwealth. See

Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 

47, 48 (1991). However, "'[u]ltimate questions of reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause . . . are reviewed de novo on 

appeal.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 

S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)). Similarly, whether a seizure 

occurred at all is both a factual and legal question for this 

Court to review de novo. See id. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261. 

 The evidence established that approximately two weeks prior 

to appellant's arrest, Officer Benedict (Benedict) and Officer 

Graves (Graves) went to 2200 Poplar Street in the City of 

Lynchburg and spoke to Emma Wade (Mrs. Wade), one of the owners 

of the property. Mrs. Wade stated she was "interested in 

getting a letter on file" to ensure that the police would 

enforce the trespassing laws on her property. She also 

indicated that she and her husband were elderly and that they 

were the only two residents of the property. The letter, signed 

by Mrs. Wade on February 23, 1998, stated the following: 

In order to enforce the No Trespassing signs 

posted on my property at 2200 Poplar 

Street[,] I would like to request the 

assistance of the Lynchburg Police 

Department. 

Increasingly, I have experienced problems 

with trespassers on my porch and around my 

yard. I have been advised that these 

subjects are hiding there [sic] drugs behind 
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my house and selling them on the corner of 

Poplar St. and Florida Ave. 

At the time of the instant offense, Benedict was aware that Mrs. 

Wade's letter requesting enforcement of the trespassing laws was 

on file with the police department. 

On March 3, 1998, at approximately 1:40 a.m., Benedict 

drove by the Wade residence, which had the no trespassing sign 

posted, and saw appellant and another individual "walking 

through Wade's yard." The two men appeared to be between twenty 

and forty years old, and the officer did not observe an elderly 

man with them. Benedict also noticed that the lights in the 

house were off.1 

 Officer Benedict exited his vehicle and approached the two 

men, stopping within two feet of appellant. Benedict testified 

as follows: 

 Q. And did you get out of your vehicle and 

 approach him? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. And did you speak with him? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. What did you say to him, if anything? 

 A. When I got to him, I asked him if he 

 lived there. 

1

 The Commonwealth introduced into evidence a drawing of the 

property, including the streets, residence, trespassing sign and 

location of appellant when the officers first arrived on the 

scene. 
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 Q. And what was his response? 

 A. He said nothing. 

* * * * * * * 

 Q. He didn't respond at all? 

 A. He said nothing at all. 

 Q. And did the other subject with him say 

 anything? 

 A. No. 

 Q. Did you see where his hands were? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. Where were his hands? 

A. He had some sort of shirt on [sic] 

 which had pockets in the front and he 

 had his hands in the pockets. 

 Q. Both hands? 

 A. Both hands. 

 Q. When the Defendant didn't respond to 

 your question, what did you do at that 

 point? 

 A. I placed him under arrest for 

 trespassing. 

In a search incident to arrest, Benedict found a sandwich baggie 

containing .39 grams of cocaine in the appellant's right hand. 

 Mrs. Wade testified that she had been acquainted with 

appellant for about ten to fifteen years and she considered him 

a friend. She had never denied appellant access to her 

property, and he had been in her house on several occasions. 
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However, Mrs. Wade also stated that she had not given anyone 

permission to be on her property late at night and that it was 

uncommon for appellant to be there at that hour of the night. 

 The trial court found that Officer Benedict had probable 

cause to arrest appellant and that the search incident to the 

arrest was lawful. The trial judge stated as follows: 

It's 1:40 in the morning. It's in the 

middle of the night. [Appellant] was 

walking through the yard in the vicinity of 

a No Trespassing sign. I realize the sign 

is facing the street, but the officer 

doesn't know whether he approached the house 

from the street and circled it or whether 

he's casing the joint. 

 He doesn't know what's going on. And 

when [appellant] doesn't answer, he's either 

got to release him or arrest him. . . . Your 

motion is overruled. 

* * * * * * * 

 . . . The question is whether there was 

probable cause to arrest [appellant] for 

trespass at 1:40 a.m. in the morning when 

he's walking on property and the police 

observed him and there's a No Trespassing 

sign in the vicinity. Actually, there are 

two [individuals] on the property and the 

police have been asked to enforce the no 

trespass. . . . The motion is overruled. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found 

appellant guilty as charged. 

II. 

 Appellant concedes that Officer Benedict had a reasonable 

basis to approach him and conduct a Terry stop. However, he 
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contends that the circumstances did not rise to the level of 

probable cause to arrest for trespass solely because appellant 

failed to respond to Benedict's inquiry whether appellant lived 

on the property. He argues that Benedict was required to 

conduct further investigation in order to establish probable 

cause for arrest. Accordingly, the cocaine seized in the search 

incident to his arrest should have been suppressed. We 

disagree. 

 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes three categories 

of police-citizen confrontations, including the following: "(1) 

consensual encounters, (2) brief, minimally intrusive 

investigatory detentions, based upon specific, articulable 

facts, commonly referred to as Terry stops, and (3) highly 

intrusive arrests and searches founded on probable cause." 

Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 169, 455 S.E.2d 744, 

747 (1995) (citations omitted). "[P]robable cause exists when 

the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and 

of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are 

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe 

that an offense is being committed." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 

222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981), cert. denied, 465 

U.S. 906 (1982). 

 Probable cause is determined by the totality of the 

circumstances and does not require "an actual showing" of 
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criminal activity, but, rather, "only a probability or 

substantial chance" of such activity. Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). Additionally, we have recognized 

that "[t]rained and experienced officers . . . may be able to 

perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be 

wholly innocent to the untrained observer." Richards v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 612, 616, 383 S.E.2d 268, 270-71 

(1989). 

 In the instant case, Officer Benedict observed appellant 

and another man walking through the yard of the home of an 

elderly couple in the middle of the night. The lights in the 

house were off. Benedict knew that the owners did not want 

trespassers on their property and that Mrs. Wade had signed a 

letter requesting police enforcement of the posted no 

trespassing signs. The letter also indicated that Mrs. Wade 

"experienced problems with trespassers on [her] porch and around 

[her] yard." The letter specified that with the exception of 

her, her husband, and a few guests, there should be no one else 

on her property. Additionally, the area was known for illegal 

drug sales. When Benedict approached appellant and asked if he 

lived in the house, appellant did not respond, but stood silent, 

with his hands in his pockets. Under the totality of the 

circumstances, Benedict had probable cause to arrest appellant 

for trespassing. See Langston v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 276, 
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283-84, 504 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1998) (holding that the defendant's 

actions, standing and walking on property known to be abandoned 

with "no trespassing" signs, gave the officers probable cause to 

believe that defendant was trespassing); see also Jordan v. 

Commonwealth, 207 Va. 591, 596, 151 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1966) 

(holding that "a police officer may arrest without a warrant 

when a misdemeanor is committed in his presence, and . . . when 

a person without authority of law goes upon the lands, buildings 

or premises of another after having been forbidden to do so by a 

sign or signs . . .").2 Because Officer Benedict had probable 

cause to arrest appellant for trespassing, the search incident 

to arrest was lawful. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

 2 Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 491 S.E.2d 721 (1997), 

is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Ewell, 

the Supreme Court held the arresting officer did not have a 

reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have been engaged in 

trespassing or any other activity. The Court noted that the 

officer "merely observed an unfamiliar automobile and its 

operator in the parking lot of the apartment complex about 12:30 

a.m." Id. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 723. Accordingly, the Court 

concluded that the defendant was seized in violation of her 

Fourth Amendment rights. See id. However, in the present case, 

appellant was walking in the yard of a private residence at 

1:40 a.m. Officer Benedict was patrolling the area in response 

to a specific request to enforce the no trespassing signs, and 

he was aware that the property owners experienced problems with 

drug sales in their yard.