COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JAMES EDWARD CRAWLEY, JR. 

v. Record No. 1582-94-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DECEMBER 29, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Maureen L. White, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Thomas D. Bagwell, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 James Edward Crawley Jr. was convicted of possession of 

cocaine and heroin with intent to distribute. He appeals his 

convictions on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove that he possessed drugs. We agree, and reverse the 

convictions. 

 On October 22, 1992, a detective executed a search warrant 

at Room 119 of the Relax Inn. When the detective arrived at the 

room, Crawley's girlfriend was the only occupant in the room. In 

the closed drawers of a dresser and a nightstand, the police 

found cocaine, heroin, scales, $560 in cash, a picture of 

defendant, and clothing belonging to the defendant. On the floor 

between a dresser and a bed, the police found a folded playing 

card containing a small amount of cocaine. The defendant's 
- 2 - 

girlfriend showed the detective where the drugs could be found. 

The Commonwealth did not present evidence showing to whom or when 

the room was registered, nor had the police done surveillance of 

the room to show who had been occupying it. 

 Crawley arrived at the room about fifteen minutes after the 

search began. He had in his possession two pagers, and a key to 

room 119. Crawley at first informed police that he did not know 

anyone in the room; he then indicated that he was visiting his 

girlfriend in the room. 

 Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the Court 

considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth and grants it all reasonable inferences deducible 

therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 

S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The judgment of a trial court sitting 

without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict. 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 

(1987). 

 The defendant's conviction was based on the Commonwealth's 

evidence to prove constructive possession. "To support a 

conviction based on constructive possession, `the Commonwealth 

must point to evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the 

accused or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that 

the defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the 

substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control.'" 

McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 

(1987) (quoting Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 
- 3 - 

S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986)). Where the Commonwealth's case for 

constructive possession is based on circumstantial evidence, such 

evidence must be sufficiently convincing to exclude every 

reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Shurbaji v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 415, 423, 444 S.E.2d 549, 553 (1994); 

Hairston v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 183, 186, 360 S.E.2d 893, 

895 (1987) (citations omitted). 

 This case is similar to Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 

619, 238 S.E.2d 820 (1977), where the Supreme Court found the 

evidence insufficient to prove constructive possession. In that 

case, drugs were found concealed behind a dresser mirror and 

underneath a bed. The room was registered to Clodfelter and he 

had left some personal property there. Clodfelter, when 

questioned by the police, gave a false identity. The Supreme 

Court found that the evidence created a "strong suspicion of 

guilt", but fell short of showing that the drugs were either 

actually or constructively possessed by Clodfelter with an 

awareness of their character. Id. at 623, 238 S.E.2d at 822. 

 Two factors that distinguish this case from Clodfelter are 

the presence of Crawley's girlfriend, who knew the location of 

the drugs, and the location of the drugs. However, these 

differences do not prove that Crawley knew of the nature and 

presence of the drugs or exercised dominion or control over them. 

 In Clodfelter, the drugs could have been left by a former 

occupant. Here the drugs could have been possessed solely by the 

girlfriend. The police could not say when or whether Crawley had 
- 4 - 

been in the room before he arrived and was arrested. Although 

his possession of a key to the room, the presence of his clothes 

and photo in the room, his possession of a pager, and his false 

denial of knowing his girlfriend are highly suspicious, those 

factors do not prove that he exercised dominion or control over 

the contraband. Thus, the Commonwealth's evidence did not 

exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Unsupported 

inferences, mere probabilities, and speculation are insufficient 

to sustain these convictions. Therefore, the judgment of the 

trial court is reversed. 

 Reversed.