1

The Honorable William Jay Riley became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2010.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-3626

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Deborah Cheatum, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner *

of Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

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Submitted: September 22, 2009

Filed: July 30, 2010

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Before RILEY,1

 Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Deborah Cheatum applied for social security disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income, alleging a disability onset date of October 1, 2003.

Cheatum alleged disability resulting from lupus, fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel

syndrome, and mental retardation. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined

that Cheatum did not meet the requirements for mental retardation found in Listing

12.05C and that her other impairments did not prevent her from performing her past
2

The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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relevant work. The Commissioner denied review of the ALJ’s decision, making the

decision final. Cheatum appealed the decision to the federal district court,2

 which

affirmed the denial of benefits. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Cheatum appeals the denial of her application for benefits, arguing solely that

she meets the requirements for mental retardation disability found in Listing 12.05C.

This court reviews the Commissioner’s decision de novo to determine whether it is

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Maresh v. Barnhart, 438 F.3d 897,

898 (8th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence “is less than a preponderance, but is enough

that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s

conclusion.” McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000). During this

analysis, we defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social Security

Administration. Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Cheatum alleges disability under Listing 12.05C, which states :

Mental retardation: Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning

initially manifested during developmental period; i.e., the evidence

demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22.

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the

requirements of A, B, C, or D are satisfied.

. . .

C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a

physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and

significant work-related limitation of function.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1, § 12.05.
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The ALJ determined that Cheatum had a verbal IQ score of 69 at the age of

fifteen and suffered from the additional impairment of lupus. The ALJ denied

benefits, however, reasoning that Cheatum failed to establish deficits in adaptive

functioning initially manifested before age 22 as is required by the introductory

paragraph of Listing 12.05.

On appeal, Cheatum argues that the introductory paragraph of Listing 12.05

does not require evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning if the claimant meets the

requirements of one of the subsections, in her case subsection C. She relies on

language taken from Maresh, in which we summarized that "to meet Listing 12.05C,

a claimant must show: (1) a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through

70; (2) an onset of the impairment before age 22; and (3) a physical or other mental

impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of

function." Although Cheatum meets this three-part test, she ignores our explicit

statement in Maresh that “the requirements in the introductory paragraph are

mandatory.” Id. Those requirements clearly include demonstrating that the claimant

suffered “deficits in adaptive functioning” and that those deficits “initially manifest

during the developmental period [before age 22].” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1,

§ 12.05; see Randall v. Astrue, 570 F.3d 651, 659-60 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that

Listing 12.05 requires claimant to demonstrate deficits in adaptive functioning in case

where claimant otherwise meets the requirements in Listing 12.05C, citing similar

rulings in other circuits). 

Cheatum goes on to argue that if she is required to demonstrate deficits in

adaptive functioning, she met this requirement through evidence that she was “placed

in an educatable mentally retarded self contained classroom at the junior high school

level.” But this evidence, when taken in light of Cheatum’s own testimony, does not

necessitate a finding that she suffered deficits in adaptive functioning. There is no

indication in the record that the school’s recommendation for Cheatum’s classroom

placement was made by a qualified mental health professional. Further, Cheatum

testified that her school work suffered because she was caring for her mother who was
3

As the district court correctly noted, evidence of Cheatum’s ability to perform

gainful activity is not relevant if she otherwise meets the requirements of Listing

12.05. See Maresh, 438 F.3d at 901. It is relevant, however, to whether she has

shown the deficits in adaptive functioning necessary to meet that listing. 

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sick with cancer and she had to commute between towns to attend school. The

evidence also showed that Cheatum had maintained employment in semi-skilled and

unskilled positions for many years.3

 She was able to perform activities of daily living

and light housework, drive a car, help prepare meals, and care for her father who was

suffering from Alzheimer’s. In addition, Dr. Michah Mazurek, a licensed

psychologist who evaluated Cheatum in March of 2007, diagnosed Cheatum as having

“Borderline Intellectual Functioning,” as opposed to mental retardation. Dr. Mazurek

specifically stated that “there is no evidence to suggest concurrent adaptive

impairments at the level to warrant a diagnosis of mental retardation.”

Accordingly, the Commissioner’s conclusion that Cheatum failed to establish

the deficits in adaptive functioning necessary to meet Listing 12.05 is supported by

substantial evidence. Further, based on our review of the record as a whole, the

Commissioner’s conclusions concerning Cheatum’s ability to perform her past

relevant work are also supported by substantial evidence. The judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

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