Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 39 / Thursday, February 27, 1997 / Proposed Rules 8917

1The figure of 20 is based on information that

NHTSA has developed through NHTSA’s Special

Crash Investigation program and is not a census.

Studies of Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS)

data are underway to obtain a more precise figure.

2 In 1987, the agency issued a final rule extending

the automatic occupant protection requirements to

light trucks (i.e., vans, pickup trucks and sport

utility vehicles). (52 Fed. Reg. 44898; November 23,

1987)

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 74–14; Notice 113]

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards; Occupant Crash Protection

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY: This document solicits public

comments on a petition from U. S.

Senator Dirk Kempthorne to amend the

provisions in the agency’s automatic

occupant protection standard

concerning the use of unbelted as well

as belted dummies in testing air bagequipped vehicles. The petition asks

that the agency impose a moratorium on

testing with unbelted dummies. The

petition was submitted in response to

the deaths of young children and of

drivers, primarily short-statured

women, as a result of air bag

deployments in low speed crashes. The

petitioner believes that the necessity of

meeting the unbelted test requirement is

adversely affecting current air bag

designs and causing these deaths. The

petitioner also believes that the

requirement is preventing vehicle

manufacturers from optimizing air bag

designs for belted occupants.

The agency has concluded that

section 2508 of the Intermodal Surface

Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

precludes it from eliminating the

unbelted test requirement.

However, since the agency is

interested in all potential solutions to

the air bag deaths and since the agency

can recommend legislative changes to

Congress, the agency is seeking public

comment on the benefits and disbenefits

of eliminating the unbelted test.

DATES: Comments must be received by

March 31, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to

the docket and notice number of this

notice and be submitted to: Docket

Section, Room 5109, National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590. (Docket Room hours are 9:30

a.m.–4:00 p.m., Monday through

Friday.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For information about air bags and

related rulemakings: Visit the NHTSA

web site at ‘‘http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov’’

and select 11AIR BAGS: Information

about air bags.’’

For non-legal issues: Clarke Harper,

Chief, Light Duty Vehicle Division,

NPS–11, National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590.

Telephone: (202) 366–2264. Fax: (202)

366–4329.

For legal issues: J. Edward Glancy,

Office of Chief Counsel, NCC–20,

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC 20590. Telephone:

(202) 366–2992. Fax: (202) 366–3820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

Air bags have been installed in

millions of cars and light trucks. As of

the end of model year 1996, driver air

bags had been installed in over

56,000,000 vehicles and passenger air

bags in over 27,000,000 vehicles. As of

the end of calendar year 1996, air bags

had saved the lives of over 1,700

occupants, almost two-thirds of them

unbelted. However, they had also

caused the deaths of 35 young children

and 20 adults,1 primarily in low speed

crashes in which the other occupants of

the vehicles involved in the crashes

have either not been injured or received

only minor injuries. All but one of the

adults were drivers and a majority of

them were short-statured women.

The reports of air bag-related deaths

and injuries contrast sharply with the

expectations for air bags. The

Department’s initial interest in air bags

arose in the late 1960’s as researchers

observed that air bags offered a means

of increasing crash protection for

unbelted occupants. Despite vigorous

efforts to promote the use of the safety

belts that Federal regulation had

recently required in all passenger cars,

the rate of safety belt use was hovering

around 10 percent. With such a low

level of use, the safety belt was

providing very little of its expected

benefits. Beginning in 1969, under

Secretary John Volpe, the Department

explored the potential of air bags and

other measures, such as crash padding

and automatic safety belts, that needed

no occupant action. A series of

rulemaking actions followed, all of them

focussing on ways to provide automatic

protection. The air bag was always a

leading candidate to provide this

protection, but it was not specifically

required during the regulatory actions of

the 1970’s and 1980’s.

The current occupant protection

requirements trace back to 1984, when

Secretary Elizabeth Dole issued

performance requirements for automatic

restraints (i.e., automatic belts or air

bags). In a final rule amending Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)

No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49

CFR 571.208), the Department required

that the front outboard designated

seating positions in passenger cars be

equipped with automatic occupant

protection (i.e., either automatic belts or

air bags) instead of (or in addition to)

manual lap and shoulder belts. (49 Fed.

Reg. 28962; July 17, 1984).2 For vehicles

equipped with air bags, the Standard

specifies two crash tests for determining

whether the vehicles comply with the

standard’s injury criteria. Both tests

involve crashing a vehicle into a barrier

at speeds up to 30 mph. One crash uses

unbelted anthropomorphic test

dummies, while the other uses belted

dummies. The unbelted crash test

ensures that the vehicle provides

effective ‘‘automatic protection,’’ i.e.,

protection that meets injury criteria ‘‘by

means that require no action by vehicle

occupants,’’ in keeping with the

standard’s original goal of providing

protection to unbelted occupants.

In order to satisfy the injury criteria

in a 30 mph unbelted test, an air bag

must deploy very quickly. Even so, the

automatic protection requirements do

not specify a particular level of force.

The amount of force is a function of a

number of factors and air bag design

features; it is also affected by the extent

to which an air bag is designed to

exceed the Standard’s performance

requirements. Further, the Standard

affords substantial flexibility about how

air bags perform in circumstances other

than those specified in the test

procedure, such as low-speed crashes

and crashes with out-of-position

occupants.

In the 1984 decision, the Department

expressly recognized that commenters

had raised issues about potential risks

associated with air bags, but noted that

there were technological means

available for addressing those risks. The

Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA)

identified a variety of possible

technological solutions to those risks,

including dual level inflation systems of

several types and measures such as

changes in the shape and size of the bag,

in aspiration, and in inflation

techniques.

The development of air bags after the

1984 decision on automatic protection

occurred at the same time as a

significant increase in safety belt use.

From a very low 14 percent in 1984,

safety belt use increased rapidly in the

late 1980’s, reaching 59 percent by 1991,
8918 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 39 / Thursday, February 27, 1997 / Proposed Rules

3Belt use among fatally injured front seat

occupants of cars and light trucks is lower,

approximately 37 percent, based on 1995 FARS

data. The lowness of this rate reflects a number of

factors, including the belt use rate by motorists in

general and the effectiveness of belt use in

preventing fatal injury. A more useful belt use rate

is the rate among occupants involved in potentially

fatal crashes. Those crashes include all fatal crashes

as well as all crashes in which there would have

been a fatality but for belt use. The use rate in

potentially fatal crashes is slightly over 50 percent.

4Some State surveys are limited to passenger

cars. The agency’s latest National Occupant

Protection Use Survey, a probability-based study of

safety belt use in all vehicle types, indicates a

current use rate of 58 percent. Another survey will

be conducted in 1997.

5The burst of legislative activity after the 1984

decision was not coincidental. The 1984 decision

provided that the automatic protection

requirements would be rescinded if the Secretary of

Transportation determined by April 11, 1989 that

State safety belt use laws meeting specified

conditions had been passed by a sufficient number

of States to cover two-thirds of the U.S. population.

That date passed without such a determination

having been made.

6 In ISTEA, the Congress also provided that States

that failed to adopt mandatory safety belt use laws

would have a percentage of their Federal-aid

highway construction funds transferred to their

highway safety programs.

and stands at 68 percent 3 today

according to State-reported surveys.4

The primary reason for the rapid

increase in the rate of safety belt use in

the late 1980’s was the enactment of

State safety belt use laws. No State had

a safety belt use law in effect at the time

of the 1984 decision. The number rose

quickly thereafter as a result of the

concerted efforts of a large number of

groups including State and federal

safety authorities, consumer groups,

motor vehicle manufacturers, and the

insurance industry. The number of

States with safety belt use laws in effect

rose to 8 by the end of 1985, 22 by the

end of 1986 and 28 by the end of 1987.

All of the dozen most populous States

had laws in effect by the end of 1988 5.

Forty-nine States now have belt use

laws.6

The decisive move toward air bags

occurred in 1991, as safety belt use was

approaching 60 percent. The vehicle

manufacturers had begun installing

driver air bags in large numbers by

model year 1990 and were discussing

plans for fleetwide installation of air

bags, including passenger air bags,

within a few years. It appeared that air

bags had won out over automatic belts

as a means of providing automatic

protection. Accordingly, in Section

2508(a)(1) of the Intermodal

Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

(ISTEA), codified at 49 U.S.C.

§ 30127(b), Congress directed NHTSA to

amend Standard No. 208 to provide that

the ‘‘automatic occupant protection’’ in

passenger cars and light trucks shall be

‘‘an inflatable restraint,’’ (i.e., an air

bag). ISTEA mandated that air bags be

installed in 95 percent of passenger cars

in model year 1997 and in 100 percent

of cars in model year 1998 and

thereafter. For light trucks, it mandated

installation of air bags in 80 percent of

model year 1998 vehicles and 100

percent of model year 1999 and later

vehicles.

ISTEA did not change the compliance

tests for air bags. Section 2508(a)(1)

specified inflatable restraints

‘‘complying with the occupant

protection requirements under section

4.1.2.1 of such Standard.’’ At the time

ISTEA was adopted, section S4.1.2.1 of

FMVSS No. 208 required vehicles

covered by that section to comply with

subsections (a), (b), and either (c)(1) or

(c)(2). (Virtually all auto manufacturers

have chosen to certify their vehicles

under subsection (c)(2), rather than

(c)(1)). Section S4.1.2.1(a) provided that

at each front outboard designated

seating position, a vehicle must meet

certain frontal crash protection

requirements ‘‘by means that require no

action by vehicle occupants.’’ In other

words, compliance was required to be

demonstrated in an unbelted test.

Section S4.1.2.1(c)(2) provided that the

vehicle must meet these frontal crash

protection requirements through the use

of manual seat belts provided with the

vehicle ‘‘in addition to the means that

require no action by the vehicle

occupant.’’

Agency Actions To Eliminate Air Bag

Deaths

Reports of fatal injuries to young

children and drivers in low speed

crashes led the agency to make an

extensive effort to obtain and analyze

the data necessary to understand the

source of the problem and to evaluate

potential solutions. Since these data

were not otherwise available from

industry or any other outside source, the

agency conducted its own series of tests

to address these issues.

On November 22, 1996, NHTSA

announced its comprehensive strategy

for addressing the problems of air bag

deaths. In addition to public

information and education efforts, and

recommendations to the States to adopt

more effective safety belt use laws, the

agency outlined an array of rulemaking

actions it would take shortly. Pursuant

to that announcement, the agency

subsequently took the actions described

below.

To address the safety of vehicles

already on the road, the agency

proposed to authorize motor vehicle

dealers and repair businesses to

deactivate air bags upon the request of

vehicle owners who were informed of

the pros and cons of such deactivation.

(62 FR 831; January 6, 1997) The same

proposal would also apply to vehicles

produced during the next several model

years. This proposal is intended to

address the problems of families who

need to have young children in the front

seat for medical monitoring purposes, as

well as other persons who could be

harmed by a functioning air bag. The

agency strongly believes that children

and other vulnerable persons should not

be put at risk. The air bag technology

currently chosen to meet the unbelted

test presents such a risk. Although the

agency is not legally authorized to

eliminate the test, it has proposed

temporary changes to the testing

requirements that would permit

significant depowering. The agency took

several other actions that would affect

vehicles produced during the next

several model years. It issued a final

rule requiring vehicles made on or after

February 25, 1997, to be equipped with

new, attention-getting labels that clearly

warn consumers about the potential

dangers associated with air bags. (61 FR

60206; November 27, 1996) It issued

another final rule extending, until

September 1, 2000, a provision allowing

manufacturers the option of putting a

manual cut-off switch for the passenger

air bag in vehicles with no rear seat or

with a rear seat too small for rear-facing

child restraints. (62 FR. 798; January 6,

1997)

The agency also proposed two

temporary options that would permit or

facilitate the depowering of current air

bags. (62 FR 807; January 6, 1997) For

the unbelted crash test requirement, the

first option would replace the existing

‘‘60 g’s’’ chest injury criterion with a

less stringent ‘‘80 g’s’’ criterion. The

second option would convert the

unbelted crash test requirement from a

test of complete vehicles in barrier

crashes, to a sled test using an unbelted

dummy seated in a body buck and a

standardized 125 millisecond crash

pulse. That crash pulse is based on a

November 1996 submission from the

American Automobile Manufacturers

Association. Comments on the

deactivation and depowering proposals

were due February 5, 1997.

Agency Actions to Increase U.S. Belt

Use Rates

As the agency noted in its depowering

proposal, NHTSA is participating with

vehicle manufacturers, air bag suppliers,

insurance companies and safety

organizations in a coalition effort to

address the adverse effects of air bags by

increasing the use of safety belts and

child seats. Substantial benefits could

be obtained from achieving higher safety
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 39 / Thursday, February 27, 1997 / Proposed Rules 8919

belt use rates. If the safety belt use rate

were 75 percent in potentially fatal

crashes instead of the current level of

52.6 percent, an additional 4,000 lives

would be saved annually.

On January 23, 1997, the President

issued a memorandum directing the

Department to work with the Congress,

the States, and other concerned persons,

including representatives of the

automobile and insurance industries,

and safety and consumer groups, and

within 45 days (March 9, 1997) submit

a plan to the President for increasing

safety belt use nationwide.

The President specified that the plan

shall address, among other things, the

State laws that require the use of

seatbelts, assistance from the

Department of Transportation to

improve those laws, and a

comprehensive education campaign on

behalf of the public and private sector

to help the public understand the need

to wear seatbelts.

Agency Announcement of Public

Workshop on Smart Air Bags

Finally, with respect to the longer

term, NHTSA announced that it would

conduct a public workshop concerning

smart air bags. (62 Fed. Reg. 2996;

January 21, 1997) The purpose of the

workshop was to foster a constructive

dialogue with the industry, consumer

groups and other parties concerning

issues related to mandating the

introduction of reliable ‘‘smart’’ air bags

that either suppress deployment or

modulate the level of deployment under

circumstances in which full deployment

might cause serious injury. In addition

to ‘‘smart’’ technology, the workshop

addressed other air bag technologies

that could reduce the risk of air bag

injuries but that have not been

employed in current air bag designs. It

also explored the question whether

amendments to the standard are needed

that could prove counterproductive in

the long term or whether suitable

technology can be installed under the

current standard, as some air bag

suppliers have suggested. The workshop

was held February 11–12, 1997, in

Washington, D.C.

Petition for a Moratorium on the

Unbelted Test Requirement

Out of concern about the deaths

caused by air bags, Senator Dirk

Kempthorne sent the agency a letter,

dated December 4, 1996, petitioning the

agency to commence rulemaking to

establish an immediate moratorium on

the unbelted test requirement.

In support of his petition, the Senator

said in his letter:

This unbelted standard was developed

when few Americans used seat belts. Now 49

states require seat belts to be worn, and

nearly 70% of Americans use them. In

providing protection to those adults who

choose not to obey seat belt laws, we are

jeopardizing the lives of our children, as well

as small women. That is an unacceptable

policy choice.

He argued that, in the absence of the

unbelted test requirement, air bags

could be developed that ‘‘could improve

the performance of air bags for belted

occupants, provide significant

protection for unbelted occupants, and,

most importantly, significantly reduce

injuries to children.’’

Senator Kempthorne amplified his

views about the need for, and possible

benefits of, his requested amendment

during the January 9 Senate hearing. He

argued that NHTSA’s proposals do not

go far enough:

I agree that depowering is required, but

unless the administration acts on my

proposal, both smart and depowered air bags

must still protect adult males who refuse to

wear their seat belt. That still puts children

and women at risk * * *. [T]he

Administration even today insists that adults

not wearing seat belts should be protected at

the expense of children and women. While

49 States require seat belts to be used, this

Federal policy says, in essence, law breakers

who don’t wear seat belts will be protected,

but maybe at the cost of the children. Seat

belts provide the primary protection in all

types of crashes. Air bags are intended to

provide supplemental protection in car

accidents * * * Air bags should supplement

seat belts, not replace them. Federal highway

safety policy should acknowledge and

recognize individual responsibility.

In closing, he listed the benefits he

anticipated from that his proposed

moratorium. He stated that the

moratorium:

[O]ne, will make air bags live up to [their]

rightful supplemental safety responsibility.

Number two, will increase safety for twothirds of the American people who obey

the law and wear seat belts.

Number three, will get safer bags into cars

faster.

Number four, will better protect women and

senior citizens.

Number five, will minimize chances of

children being killed.

Views of Other Participants in the

Senate Hearing

Statements by Committee members

and witnesses during the Senate hearing

on January 9 illustrate the range of

views and arguments regarding the

unbelted test requirement. Support for

elimination of the requirement was

expressed by the President of the

American Automobile Manufacturers

Association and the President of the

Association of International Automobile

Manufacturers.

Expressing his personal views, the

Chairman of the National

Transportation Safety Board said:

Federal regulations and NHTSA’s recent

proposal to depower air bags * * * still

require that vehicle test procedures be based

on unrestrained occupants. In essence, air

bags are being designed, because of

certification testing requirements, primarily

to protect unbelted, rather than belted

occupants, even though the air bags are being

promoted as supplemental restraints systems

and the majority of motor vehicle occupants

now use seat belts. Air bag regulatory

standards, based on unrestrained occupants,

are no longer appropriate.

He suggested that air bag performance

certification testing should be based

primarily on belted occupants.

Mr. Robert Sanders, representing the

Parents’ Coalition for Air Bag Warnings,

a group composed of parents of young

children killed by air bags, did not

explicitly address the issue of the

unbelted test requirement. However, Mr.

Sanders, himself a parent of a child

killed by an air bag, questioned some of

the same arguments used in support of

eliminating the requirement:

This problem is not a problem with the

regulators. It’s also not a problem with the

safety standard. The safety standard 208

* * * does not say that they [the vehicle

manufacturers] can’t make a bag that has less

power. They can have a bag that has a lot of

power when it is needed, for an adult, and

less power when it’s not needed, for a child

or for an unbelted occupant. And it is a fact

that GM successfully designed such a system

in the mid 70’s.

They [the vehicle manufacturers] are

saying that the Federal government safety

standard compels us to make a bag that’s

dangerous for children. Therefore, please

change the safety standard.

There’s nothing wrong with the safety

standard * * *. They had the capability to

comply with 208 and simultaneously make a

bag that was safe and effective for all sizes

of occupants.

Additional concerns about

eliminating the unbelted test

requirement were raised by several

other participants:

• U.S. Senator Richard Bryan asked

whether a moratorium on the unbelted

test requirement might be equivalent to

‘‘no standard’’ at all for air bag

performance.

• Joan Claybrook, President of Public

Citizen, suggested that the existing

standard does not force vehicle

manufacturers to produce air bags that

pose a risk to young children and

women in low speed crashes. She said

that manufacturers have the flexibility

under the Standard to use dual level

inflators based on crash severity. In low

speed crashes, there would be a low

level of inflation and in high speed
8920 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 39 / Thursday, February 27, 1997 / Proposed Rules

7A more detailed analysis of this legal issue has

been prepared by NHTSA and placed in the docket

for this proceeding.

crashes, an appropriately higher level of

inflation.

• Ricardo Martinez, Administrator of

NHTSA, noted that of the approximately

1,700 persons whose lives had been

saved by air bags, an estimated 1,200 of

them were unbelted.

Recent Agency Statements About the

Unbelted Test Requirement

During the Senate hearing on January

9, Senator Kempthorne asked the agency

to provide its views regarding its legal

authority to eliminate the unbelted test

requirement. In a letter dated January

13, 1997, the agency responded to the

Senator, concluding that it lacked such

authority. The agency pointed out the

following:

In section 2508(a)(1) of that statute, which

is currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 30127(b),

Congress directed NHTSA to amend FMVSS

No. 208 ‘‘to provide that the automatic

occupant protection for the front outboard

designed seating positions [of certain

vehicles] shall be an inflatable restraint

complying with the occupant protection

requirements under section 4.1.2.1 of such

Standard.’’ Thus, each vehicle must have an

air bag that provides ‘‘automatic occupant

protection.’’ If the unbelted test were

eliminated from FMVSS No. 208, such that

vehicles only had to satisfy the performance

requirements of the standard with the

manual belts attached, there would be no

way to ensure that the air bags would in fact

provide ‘‘automatic’’ protection to front seat

occupants.7

NHTSA’s January 13 letter to the

Senator noted that, as part of its analysis

of the air bag problem and its efforts to

identify the best solutions, the agency

considered whether eliminating the

unbelted test requirement would be

advisable, putting aside the issue of

legal authority. At that time, the agency

concluded that elimination was

unnecessary. NHTSA decided that other

measures would enable vehicle

manufacturers to depower air bags to an

extent that would eliminate much of the

risk to belted occupants and children

and that the agency’s other regulatory

solutions (deactivation, enhanced

labels, cut-off switches, and smart air

bags) would address the remaining risk.

Additional depowering appeared

undesirable, given the associated tradeoffs. As the agency stated in its January

13 letter:

Our research indicated that depowering air

bags in the range of 20–35 percent would

reduce the risk to children without

significantly increasing the risk that the bags

would be too weak to protect occupants in

high-speed crashes. Our tests indicated that

depowering beyond that level produced little

additional benefit for children, and markedly

increased the risk for larger occupants. The

amendment we proposed on January 6, 1997,

will enable the manufacturers to depower

their air bags by the 20–35 percent that seems

to present the best balance for the safety of

all occupants.

Nevertheless, the agency recognized

that there might come a point at which

dropping the unbelted test might

become appropriate for reasons other

than additional depowering. As NHTSA

noted in its depowering proposal:

The agency recognizes that, at some point,

belt use might rise to a point at which

retention of the unbelted test requirements

might no longer be appropriate. The agency

notes that belt use in Australia is over 95

percent, and averages 93 percent in Canada.

However, as noted above, the belt use among

fatally injured vehicle occupants is less than

40 percent.

(62 FR 807, at 824)

The level of safety belt use is an

essential factor in evaluating the effects

of eliminating the unbelted test, since

there is little doubt that most if not all

vehicles now on the market can comply

with the injury criteria by means of

safety belts alone. Thus, if the unbelted

test were deleted and no other tests

were added to regulate the performance

of air bags, the vehicle manufacturers

would be free to install air bags that

afford no protection to either belted or

unbelted occupants. In effect, the

standard would no longer regulate the

level of protection afforded to unbelted

occupants. This would be a

fundamental departure from the original

concept of the standard, which was to

protect unbelted occupants as well as

belted occupants.

Agency Decision To Request Public

Comment

NHTSA has decided to seek public

comment on its tentative conclusions

about the appropriateness of dropping

the unbelted test requirement under the

current circumstances, and the factual

issues presented by the request for a

moratorium. Given the importance of

the underlying problem and the interest

in eliminating the unbelted test

requirement expressed by participants

in the Senate hearing, the agency

believes that it would be beneficial to

obtain public comments analyzing the

benefits and disbenefits of eliminating

the unbelted test requirement. NHTSA

is seeking as much detailed technical

data as possible in support of any

comments. Although the agency

currently lacks the authority to take that

action, it could ask Congress to adopt

the necessary legislation.

To help frame the issues relevant to

the merits of eliminating the unbelted

test, the agency has drawn the following

arguments from the information

submitted to it:

Arguments for eliminating the

unbelted test:

(1) A vehicle safety standard should

not benefit some occupants by means

that cause harm to others. The rule

should be: ‘‘First, do no harm.’’

(2) To the extent that the need to

satisfy the injury criteria of Standard

No. 208 in an unbelted test results in air

bags that are causing injuries in lowspeed crashes, the standard needs to be

changed.

(3) The increase in national belt use

rate to 68 percent has made the unbelted

test requirement obsolete.

(4) Air bags ought to be designed for

the benefit of those who obey the law

and use their safety belts.

(5) Air bags are intended to be

supplemental safety devices and ought

to be optimized for the benefit of belted

occupants, and thus save increased

numbers of those occupants.

Arguments against eliminating the

unbelted test:

(1) The unbelted test requirement

does not require manufacturers to install

air bags that cause deaths in low speed

crashes. Technology such as dual level

inflators, higher deployment thresholds

and smart air bags have the potential to

prevent deaths in low speed crashes,

while preserving the ability of air bags

to protect occupants in higher speed

crashes.

(2) In the short run, the agency’s

depowering proposal will allow

manufacturers to achieve the same goals

sought by proponents of eliminating the

unbelted test requirement, while

retaining some protection for unbelted

occupants.

(3) Thirty-two percent of front seat

occupants—and 50 percent of occupants

in potentially fatal crashes—do not wear

safety belts. The air bag is the primary

protection for these people, not merely

supplemental protection.

(4) If the unbelted test requirement

were eliminated, with no compensatory

changes, future air bags might be less

protective than current ones, even for

belted occupants. If air bags were

depowered too much, they would not

provide adequate protection at higher

speeds or for larger occupants, whether

belted or unbelted.

(5) Without the unbelted test, the

performance of air bags would not be

regulated. The manufacturers would be

free to reduce the power of air bags to

any level the market would permit.

Safety decisions like this are too critical

to be left to the marketplace.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 39 / Thursday, February 27, 1997 / Proposed Rules 8921

Questions for Commenters

1. What would the benefit of

eliminating the unbelted test

requirement be compared to the

projected benefits of the agency’s

proposed options to allow depowering

of air bags? Would eliminating the

unbelted test requirement allow greater

depowering than adoption of the 80g

option? The sled test option? Would

greater depowering have benefits or

disbenefits?

2. What changes would the

manufacturers make in response to the

elimination of the unbelted test

requirement? How long would it take to

implement those changes? Would

manufacturers respond differently to

eliminating the unbelted test

requirement than they would if the

agency adopted the 80g option? The

sled test option?

3. How and to what extent could air

bags be made more effective for belted

occupants in the absence of an unbelted

test requirement? Would these changes

affect the performance of air bags in

protecting unbelted occupants?

4. Given current belt use rates, should

Federal law continue to require

automatic protection for unbelted

occupants? If so, should the required

level of protection be the same as for

belted occupants? Should the ISTEA air

bag mandate be repealed to allow

manufacturers to provide automatic

protection by automatic safety belts?

5. Is there a level of safety belt usage

at which it would be appropriate to no

longer require protection for unbelted

occupants? If so, what level?

6. If the unbelted test requirement

were eliminated, should that

elimination be coupled with

simultaneous compensatory changes to

the injury criteria or to the test

requirements, or both, to ensure the

continued protective value of air bags?

Changes might take the form of making

the existing criteria more stringent,

adding additional criteria, or both. If

compensatory changes are desirable,

what changes should be made? What

level of protectiveness should be

required for belted occupants? For

unbelted occupants?

7. Would the effects of eliminating the

unbelted test requirement be different

for driver air bags versus passenger air

bags? Have the design changes that the

vehicle manufacturers have been

making to driver air bags significantly

reduced the problem of driver deaths

caused by air bags? For unbelted

drivers? For belted drivers?

8. If the unbelted test requirement

were eliminated, should such

elimination be permanent or temporary?

If temporary, for how long should it be

suspended? Should it be reinstated after

smart air bags are required?

9. Would any potential harm from

eliminating the unbelted test fall

disproportionately on groups who tend

to have lower belt use rates and higher

crash rates, such as young drivers?

Would the belts designed to protect

belted occupants be less effective for

unbelted occupants?

10. What should the role of the

Federal government be with respect to

the design of air bags so as to minimize

air bag deaths in low speed crashes?

Should government merely point out

potential ways of avoiding such

consequences and let the marketplace

decide whether they should be

implemented, or should it mandate

features that will minimize the risk?

11. If the unbelted test were to be

deleted through legislation, should that

action be coupled with measures to

secure the enactment of stronger safety

belt use laws or other measures to

increase safety belt use?

Submission of Comments

Interested persons are invited to

submit comments. It is requested but

not required that 10 copies be

submitted.

All comments must not exceed 15

pages in length. (49 CFR 553.21).

Necessary attachments may be

appended to these submissions without

regard to the 15-page limit. This

limitation is intended to encourage

commenters to detail their primary

arguments in a concise fashion.

If a commenter wishes to submit

certain information under a claim of

confidentiality, three copies of the

complete submission, including

purportedly confidential business

information, should be submitted to the

Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the street

address given above, and seven copies

from which the purportedly confidential

information has been deleted should be

submitted to the Docket Section. A

request for confidentiality should be

accompanied by a cover letter setting

forth the information specified in the

agency’s confidential business

information regulation. 49 CFR Part 512.

All comments received before the

close of business on the comment

closing date indicated above will be

considered, and will be available for

examination in the docket at the above

address both before and after that date.

To the extent possible, comments filed

after the closing date will also be

considered. Comments will be available

for inspection in the docket. The

NHTSA will continue to file relevant

information as it becomes available in

the docket after the closing date, and it

is recommended that interested persons

continue to examine the docket for new

material.

Those persons desiring to be notified

upon receipt of their comments in the

rules docket should enclose a selfaddressed, stamped postcard in the

envelope with their comments. Upon

receiving the comments, the docket

supervisor will mail the postcard back.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor

vehicles.

(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,

30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at

49 CFR 1.50)

Issued on February 24, 1997.

L. Robert Shelton,

Associate Administrator for Safety

Performance Standards.

[FR Doc. 97–4985 Filed 2–24–97; 4:51 pm]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

50 CFR Part 660

[I.D. 022197B]

RIN 0648–AI82

Fisheries Off West Coast States and in

the Western Pacific; Commercial and

Recreational Pacific Salmon Fishery

Amendment 12; Pacific Coast

Groundfish Fishery Amendment 10

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),

Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of availability of

amendments to fishery management

plans; request for comments.

SUMMARY: NMFS announces that the

Pacific Fishery Management Council

(Council) has submitted Amendment 12

to the Fishery Management Plan for

Commercial and Recreational Salmon

Fisheries off the Coasts of Washington,

Oregon, and California (Salmon FMP)

and Amendment 10 to the Pacific Coast

Groundfish Fishery Management Plan

(Groundfish FMP) for Secretarial

review. Amendment 12 would allow

retention, but not sale, of salmon

bycatch by groundfish trawl vessels

under a monitoring program that meets

certain guidelines; would specify

Endangered Species Act (ESA)

standards as management objectives for

salmon species listed under the ESA;

and would update the Salmon FMP,