appellant) and electronic service (as to respondent) from the Second 

Judicial District Court has been transmitted to this court, the service of 

such a document by the district court is not effective to commence the 

running of the time for filing either a notice of appeal or a tolling motion. 

Appellant subsequently appealed from the October 15 order (Docket No. 

64509) through a notice of appeal filed on November 18, 2013. But before 

this appeal was filed, on November 14, 2013, appellant filed a motion for 

reconsideration in the district court,' and the timely filing of this postjudgment motion for reconsideration tolled the time for filing a notice of 

appeal until the entry of a written order resolving that motion. AA Primo 

Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. „ 245 P.3d 1190, 1195 

(2010). Under these circumstances, the appeal in Docket No. 64509 was 

prematurely filed, and thus, did not divest the district court of jurisdiction 

over the case below, NRAP 4(a)(6), or confer jurisdiction on this court. 

Nonetheless, on December 12, 2013, the district court entered 

an order declining to rule on appellant's motion for reconsideration 

because, in its view, the November 18 notice of appeal had divested it of 

jurisdiction. That same day, the district court also entered an order 

declining to rule on appellant's post-judgment motion to strike 

respondent's opposition to the reconsideration motion for the same reason. 

As detailed above, however, appellant's November 14 motion for 

reconsideration tolled the time for filing an appeal, and thus, the 

premature filing of the November 18 notice of appeal did not divest the 

'The district court docket entries confusingly indicate that this 

motion for reconsideration was received below on November 7, 2013, and 

that respondent filed an opposition to that motion one day before the 

district court's receipt of these documents, on November 6, 2013. 

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district court of jurisdiction to resolve these motions. NRAP 4(a)(6) 

(stating that "[a] premature notice of appeal does not divest the district 

court of jurisdiction"). On January 17, 2014, appellant filed separate 

notices of appeal from the district court's December 12 orders, which were 

docketed in this court as Docket Nos. 64894 and 64895. 

Rehearing in Docket No. 64509 

The appeal pending in Docket No. 64509 was placed in this 

court's pilot program for civil proper person appeals on January 14, 2014. 

The appeal was later dismissed on March 25, 2014, based on appellant's 

failure to file a civil proper person appeal statement. Appellant now seeks 

rehearing of this decision, arguing that this court changed the due date for 

the appeal statement and that he later filed this document as required. 

But the documents appellant relies on to support these contentions are the 

proper person pilot program forms he received in Docket No. 64894 and 

the completed appeal statement form he filed in that case. Because these 

materials have no bearing on our dismissal of the appeal in Docket No. 

64509, we deny rehearing. NRAP 40(c). 

Jurisdictional issues and dismissal of appeals in Docket Nos. 64894 and 

64895 

As detailed above, the district court has not entered an order 

resolving appellant's motion for reconsideration. Thus, even if we had not 

dismissed the appeal from the October 15, 2013, summary judgment order 

in Docket No. 64509 based on appellant's failure to file his appeal 

statement, his premature appeal would have been dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction. See NRAP 4(a)(4) and (6). Further, the order refusing to rule 

on appellant's motion for reconsideration challenged in Docket No. 64894 

and the order refusing to rule on appellant's motion to strike respondent's 

opposition to the reconsideration motion challenged in Docket No. 64895 

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J. 

do not constitute appealable post-judgment determinations. See NRAP 

3A(b)(8) (allowing an appeal from a special order entered after a final 

judgment); Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 920, 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002) 

(defining special order after final judgment as an order affecting the rights 

of some party arising from the previous judgment). We therefore dismiss 

the appeals in Docket Nos. 64894 and 64895 for lack of jurisdiction. Once 

a written, file-stamped order resolving his motion for reconsideration is 

entered, if aggrieved, appellant may appeal from the October 15 order at 

that time. See NRAP 4(a)(4) (providing that, if a party timely files a 

tolling motion in the district court, "the time to file a notice of appeal runs 

. from entry of an order disposing of [that] motion, and the notice of 

appeal must be filed no later than 30 days from the date of service of 

written notice of entry of that order"). 

It is so ORDERED. 

/ ,J. 

Hardesty 

DIA(21 ta2 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge 

John Steven Olausen 

Kenneth J. McKenna 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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