Federal Trade Commission

May 2014

DATA

BROKERS

A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Data Brokers

A Call for Transparency and Accountability

May 2014

Federal Trade Commission

Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman

Julie Brill, Commissioner

Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner

Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner

Terrell McSweeny, Commissioner

Table of Conte

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I. INTRODU

A. Background.

B. The Commission’s Past Efforts to Improve Transparency of Data Broker Practices. 

C. Data Broker Study. 

II. DATA ACQUISITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Sources of Data. .

1. Government Sources. .

2. Publicly Available Sources, Including Social Media, Blogs, and the Internet. 

3. Commercial Data Sources. 

B. Assessing Sources. .

C. Contracts with Sources. .

D. Collection Methods. 

E. Data Updates. .

III. DEVEOPMENT OF PRODUCTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Creation of Data Elements and Segments. .

B. Data Suppression. .

C. Data Storage. .

IV. TYES OF PRODUCTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Marketing. .

1. Direct Marketing. .

2. Online Marketing. .

3. Marketing Analytics. .
B. Risk Mitigation. .

1. Identity Verification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2. Fraud Detection. .

C. People Search. .

V. DATA QUALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Marketing Products. .

B. Risk Mitigation Products. .

C. People Search Products. .

VI. CLIENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Types of Clients. .

B. Client Screening, Contracting, and Monitoring Practices. .

VII. CONSUMER CONTROLS OVER DATA BROKER INFORMATION . . . . . . . .

A. Marketing Products. .

B. Risk Mitigation Products. .

C. People Search Products. .

VIII. FINDINGS AND RE

A. Findings. .

1. Characteristics of the Industry. .

2. Benefits and Risks. .

3. Consumer Choice. .

B. Legislative Recommendations. .

1. Marketing Products. .

2. Risk Mitigation Products. .

3. People Search Products. .

C. Best Practice Recommendations. .

IX. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIXA:  Text of the Model Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

APPENDIX :  Illustrative List of Data Elements and Segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

APPENDIX :  Concurring Statement of Commissioner Julie Brill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

List of Exhibi

Exhibit 1: Data Collection—Online & Offline. 

Exhibit 2: Data Sources. .

Exhibit 3: Revenue of Nine Data Brokers by Product Category. .

Exhibit 4: Onboarding. .

Exhibit 5: Clients by Product Type and Industry Sector. .

Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

EXECUTIVE SU

In today’s economy, Big Data is big business. Data brokers—companies that collect consumers’ personal 

information and resell or share that information with others—are important participants in this Big Data 

economy. 

In this report, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) discusses the results of an indepth study of nine data brokers. These data brokers collect personal information about consumers from 

a wide range of sources and provide it for a variety of purposes, including verifying an individual’s identity, 

marketing products, and detecting fraud. Because these companies generally never interact with consumers, 

consumers are often unaware of their existence, much less the variety of practices in which they engage. By 

reporting on the data collection and use practices of these nine data brokers, which represent a cross-section 

of the industry, this report attempts to shed light on the data broker industry and its practices. 

For decades, policymakers have expressed concerns about the lack of transparency of companies that 

buy and sell consumer data without direct consumer interaction. Indeed, the lack of transparency among 

companies providing consumer data for credit and other eligibility determinations led to the adoption of 

the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), a statute the Commission has enforced since its enactment in 

1970. The FCRA covers the provision of consumer data by consumer reporting agencies where it is used 

or expected to be used for decisions about credit, employment, insurance, housing, and similar eligibility 

determinations; it generally does not cover the sale of consumer data for marketing and other purposes. 

While the Commission has vigorously enforced the FCRA,1 since the late 1990s it has also been active in 

examining the practices of data brokers that fall outside the FCRA.

Most recently, in its 2012 report Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: 

Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers (“Privacy Report”),2 the Commission specifically 

addressed the subject of data brokers. The Commission described three different categories of data brokers: 

(1) entities subject to the FCRA; (2) entities that maintain data for marketing purposes; and (3) non-FCRA 

covered entities that maintain data for non-marketing purposes that fall outside of the FCRA, such as to 

detect fraud or locate people.3 The Commission noted that, while the FCRA addresses a number of critical 

transparency issues associated with companies that sell data for credit, employment, and insurance purposes, 

data brokers within the other two categories remain opaque. In the report, the Commission recommended 

1 The Commission has brought 100 FCRA enforcement actions resulting in over $30 million in penalties. See What 

Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It? Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & 

Transp., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Jessica Rich, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade 

Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-tradecommission-entitled-what-information-do-data-brokers-have-consumers/131218databrokerstestimony.pdf.

2 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses 

and Policymakers (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. Commissioners Ohlhausen and 

Wright were not members of the Commission at that time and thus did not offer any opinion on that matter.

3 Id. at 65.

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Federal Trade Commission

legislation in this area to improve the transparency of industry practices.4 Following the Privacy Report, the 

Commission determined that, despite some progress, too little was still known about the practices of data 

brokers and that further examination was needed. 

To further the objective of increased transparency, in December 2012, the Commission initiated a study 

of data broker practices. It issued identical Orders to File Special Reports (“Orders”) under section 6(b) of 

the Federal Trade Commission Act5 to nine data brokers seeking information about their data collection and 

use practices, as well as any tools provided to consumers to control these practices. Appendix A is a copy of 

the text of the Orders that the Commission issued to the data brokers. The nine data brokers that received 

the Orders are Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou, Rapleaf, and 

Recorded Future. The Orders requested detailed information regarding the data brokers’ practices, including 

the nature and sources of consumer data they collect; how they use, maintain, and disseminate the data; and 

the extent to which the data brokers allow consumers to access and correct data about them or to opt out of 

having their personal information sold or shared. 

This report summarizes the information provided in response to the Commission’s Orders, including 

information gathered through follow-up questions and meetings and publicly available sources. In general, 

the data brokers collect information about consumers from a wide variety of commercial, government, and 

other publicly available sources. In developing their products, the data brokers use not only the raw data 

they obtain from these sources, such as a person’s name, address, home ownership status, or age, but also 

certain derived data, which they infer about consumers. For example, a data broker might infer that an 

individual with a boating license has an interest in boating, that a consumer has a technology interest based 

on the purchase of a “Wired” magazine subscription, or that a consumer who has bought two Ford cars 

has loyalty to that brand. The data brokers use this actual and derived data to create three main kinds of 

products for clients in a wide variety of industries: marketing products, risk mitigation products, and people 

search products. 

Marketing Products

Five of the data brokers studied sell marketing products, which assist clients in a variety of ways. For 

example, businesses can purchase their customers’ email addresses from data brokers so that they can 

send email solicitations to them. They can also purchase information about their customers’ interests in 

order to market specific products to them, including using consumers’ offline activities to determine what 

advertisements to serve them on the Internet. The data brokers also sell analytics products. For instance, 

some data brokers analyze their client’s customer data and suggest the media channel to use to advertise 

a particular product (e.g., online or newspapers) and/or the geographic region where the advertisements 

4 Id. at 69.

5 15 U.S.C. § 46(b). See also Appendix A.

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

should be shown. A few data brokers also convert their analyses into marketing scores that, for example, 

rank clients’ customers on the basis of how likely they are to respond to particular marketing efforts or to 

make a purchase, their presence on the web or their influence over others, or other metrics.

Most of the data brokers that sell marketing products provide consumers with limited access to some, 

but not all, of the actual and derived data the data brokers have about them. Only two of the data brokers 

allow consumers to correct their personal information for marketing purposes, and four of the five data 

brokers that sell marketing products allow consumers to opt out of the use of their personal information for 

marketing purposes. However, it is not clear how consumers would learn about these rights; for example, 

no centralized portal currently exists for consumers to learn about data brokers and what access rights and 

choices they provide.

Risk Mitigation Products

Four of the data brokers studied sell risk mitigation products, which clients use to verify their customers’ 

identities or detect fraud. For example, a lender might use a data broker’s identity verification product 

to ensure that the individual presenting himself as John Smith at 123 Main Street who wants to open an 

account is in fact that John Smith. The same lender might use a fraud detection product to flag whether a 

Social Security number provided as part of the application process has recently been associated with many 

different addresses, thereby suggesting fraud.

Even if consumers knew about the data brokers providing products in this category or knew they were 

denied or limited in their ability to complete a transaction, they might not be able to access their own 

information from these data brokers and correct errors. Two of the data brokers studied provide consumers 

with some form of access to their information used in risk mitigation products after verifying their identity, 

but only one allows consumers to correct their information. 

People Search Product

Three of the data brokers studied provide “people search” websites through which users can search 

for publicly available information about consumers. Users can use these products to research corporate 

executives and competitors, find old friends, look up a potential love interest or neighbor, network, or obtain 

court records or other information about consumers. Consumers can generally access their information 

through the same free or fee-based products that the data brokers provide to their clients. These data brokers 

allow consumers to correct certain information to varying degrees; most of them also allow consumers to opt 

out of the disclosure of their information. 

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Based on the information obtained, the Commission makes the following findings. 

Finding

1. Characteristics of the Indust

⊲ Data Brokers Collect Consumer Data from Numerous Sources, Largely Without 

Consumers’ Knowledge: Data brokers collect data from commercial, government, and 

other publicly available sources. Data collected could include bankruptcy information, voting 

registration, consumer purchase data, web browsing activities, warranty registrations, and other 

details of consumers’ everyday interactions. Data brokers do not obtain this data directly from 

consumers, and consumers are thus largely unaware that data brokers are collecting and using 

this information. While each data broker source may provide only a few data elements about 

a consumer’s activities, data brokers can put all of these data elements together to form a more 

detailed composite of the consumer’s life. 

⊲ The Data Broker Industry is Complex, with Multiple Layers of Data Brokers 

Providing Data to Each Other: Data brokers provide data not only to end-users, but also 

to other data brokers. The nine data brokers studied obtain most of their data from other data 

brokers rather than directly from an original source. Some of those data brokers may in turn 

have obtained the information from other data brokers. Seven of the nine data brokers in the 

Commission’s study provide data to each other. Accordingly, it would be virtually impossible 

for a consumer to determine how a data broker obtained his or her data; the consumer would 

have to retrace the path of data through a series of data brokers.

⊲ Data Brokers Collect and Store Billions of Data Elements Covering Nearly Every 

U.S. Consumer: Data brokers collect and store a vast amount of data on almost every U.S. 

household and commercial transaction.  Of the nine data brokers, one data broker’s database 

has information on 1.4 billion consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data 

elements; another data broker’s database covers one trillion dollars in consumer transactions; 

and yet another data broker adds three billion new records each month to its databases. Most 

importantly, data brokers hold a vast array of information on individual consumers. For 

example, one of the nine data brokers has 3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.    

⊲ Data Brokers Combine and Analyze Data About Consumers to Make Inferences About 

Them, Including Potentially Sensitive Inferences: Data brokers infer consumer interests 

from the data that they collect. They use those interests, along with other information, to place 

consumers in categories. Some categories may seem innocuous such as “Dog Owner,” “Winter 

Activity Enthusiast,” or “Mail Order Responder.” Potentially sensitive categories include those 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

that primarily focus on ethnicity and income levels, such as “Urban Scramble” and “Mobile 

Mixers,” both of which include a high concentration of Latinos and African Americans with 

low incomes. Other potentially sensitive categories highlight a consumer’s age such as “Rural 

Everlasting,” which includes single men and women over the age of 66 with “low educational 

attainment and low net worths,” while “Married Sophisticates” includes thirty-something 

couples in the “upper-middle class . . . with no children.” Yet other potentially sensitive 

categories highlight certain health-related topics or conditions, such as “Expectant Parent,” 

“Diabetes Interest,” and “Cholesterol Focus.” 

⊲ Data Brokers Combine Online and Offline Data to Market to Consumers Online: Data 

brokers rely on websites with registration features and cookies to find consumers online and 

target Internet advertisements to them based on their offline activities. Once a data broker 

locates a consumer online and places a cookie on the consumer’s browser, the data broker’s 

client can advertise to that consumer across the Internet for as long as the cookie stays on the 

consumer’s browser. Consumers may not be aware that data brokers are providing companies 

with products to allow them to advertise to consumers online based on their offline activities. 

Some data brokers are using similar technology to serve targeted advertisements to consumers 

on mobile devices. 

2. Benefits and Ris

⊲ Consumers Benefit from Many of the Purposes for Which Data Brokers Collect and 

Use Data: Data broker products help to prevent fraud, improve product offerings, and deliver 

tailored advertisements to consumers. Risk mitigation products provide significant benefits 

to consumers by, for example, helping prevent fraudsters from impersonating unsuspecting 

consumers. Marketing products benefit consumers by allowing them to more easily find 

and enjoy the goods and services they need and prefer. In addition, consumers benefit from 

increased and innovative product offerings fueled by increased competition from small 

businesses that are able to connect with consumers they may not have otherwise been able 

to reach. Similarly, people search products allow individuals to connect with old classmates, 

neighbors, and friends.

⊲ At the Same Time, Many of the Purposes for Which Data Brokers Collect and Use 

Data Pose Risks to Consumers: There are a number of potential risks to consumers from 

data brokers’ collection and use of consumer data. For example, if a consumer is denied the 

ability to conclude a transaction based on an error in a risk mitigation product, the consumer 

can be harmed without knowing why. In such cases, the consumer is not only denied the 

immediate benefit, but also cannot take steps to prevent the problem from recurring. Similarly, 

the scoring processes used in some marketing products are not transparent to consumers. This 

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means that consumers are unable to take actions that might mitigate the negative effects of 

lower scores, such as being limited to ads for subprime credit or receiving different levels of 

service from companies. As to other marketing products, they may facilitate the sending of 

advertisements about health, ethnicity, or financial products, which some consumers may find 

troubling and which could undermine their trust in the marketplace. Moreover, marketers 

could even use the seemingly innocuous inferences about consumers in ways that raise concerns. 

For example, while a data broker could infer that a consumer belongs in a data segment for 

“Biker Enthusiasts,” which would allow a motorcycle dealership to offer the consumer coupons, 

an insurance company using that same segment might infer that the consumer engages in 

risky behavior. Similarly, while data brokers have a data category for “Diabetes Interest” that 

a manufacturer of sugar-free products could use to offer product discounts, an insurance 

company could use that same category to classify a consumer as higher risk. Finally, people 

search products can be used to facilitate harassment, or even stalking, and may expose domestic 

violence victims, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, public officials, or other individuals to 

retaliation or other harm. 

⊲ Storing Data About Consumers Indefinitely May Create Security Risks: Some of the 

data brokers store all data indefinitely, even if it is later updated, unless otherwise prohibited 

by contract. For some products, these data brokers report that they need to keep older data. 

For example, they explain that even if a consumer’s address is outdated, it is important to keep 

the consumer’s address history in order to verify the consumer’s identity. For other products, 

however, retention of older data may not be necessary. An older address may be less relevant 

to deliver marketing to a consumer. Although stored data may be useful for future business 

purposes, the risk of keeping the data may outweigh the benefits. For example, identity thieves 

and other unscrupulous actors may be attracted to the collection of consumer profiles that 

would give them a clear picture of consumers’ habits over time, thereby enabling them to 

predict passwords, challenge questions, or other authentication credentials.

3. Consumer Choi

⊲ To the Extent Data Brokers Offer Consumers Choices About Their Data, the Choices 

are Largely Invisible and Incomplete: Some data brokers provide consumers with choices 

about their data, but because data brokers are not consumer-facing, consumers may not know 

where to go to exercise any choices that may be offered. In addition, the data brokers’ opt 

outs do not clearly convey whether the consumer can exercise a choice to opt out of all uses 

of consumer data, and therefore, consumers may find the opt outs confusing. As a result, 

even those consumers who know who the data brokers are, find their websites, and take the 

time to find the opt out and use it may still not know its limitations. For marketing products, 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

the extent of consumers’ choices over their data is not clear. For risk mitigation products, 

many data brokers do not provide consumers with access to their data or the ability to correct 

inaccurate data. 

Many of these findings point to a fundamental lack of transparency about data broker industry practices. 

Data brokers acquire a vast array of detailed and specific information about consumers; analyze it to make 

inferences about consumers, some of which may be considered sensitive; and share the information with 

clients in a range of industries. All of this activity takes place behind the scenes, without consumers’ 

knowledge. 

In light of these findings, the Commission unanimously renews its call for Congress to consider enacting 

legislation that would enable consumers to learn of the existence and activities of data brokers and provide 

consumers with reasonable access to information about them held by these entities. The specific legislative 

recommendations made by the Commission reflect high-level principles drawn from the findings of this 

study, the Commission’s previous work in this area, and the ongoing public debate about data brokers.6 

In particular, the recommendations build on the Commission’s work for the last two decades to improve 

transparency and choice in the data broker industry. Indeed, despite the Commission’s call for greater 

transparency in the 1990s, the Individual References Services Group (“IRSG”) self-regulatory experiment to 

improve transparency of data broker practices was short-lived.7 Since then, data broker practices have grown 

dramatically, in both breadth and depth, as data brokers have expanded their ability to collect information 

from a greater number of sources, including from consumers’ online activities; analyze it through new 

algorithms and emerging business models; and store the information indefinitely due to reduced storage 

costs. Despite the Commission’s past recommendations, lack of transparency and choice remain a significant 

source of concern about this industry.

The Commission’s legislative recommendations vary depending on the product categories at issue—

marketing, risk mitigation, or people search—and reflect differences in the business models and the 

6 The legislative and best practice recommendations, both in the Executive Summary and in Findings and Recommendations, 

Section VIII of the Report, reflect the consensus of a majority of the Commission.  To the extent that particular 

Commissioners have different viewpoints on a particular legislative or best practice recommendation, those viewpoints 

can be found in footnotes in the Findings and Recommendations, Section VIII of the Report, or in a separate statement. 

Commissioner McSweeny did not participate in the Commission vote on this report.

7 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Individual Reference Services, A Report to Congress (1997), available at http://www.

ftc.gov/reports/individual-reference-services-report-congress.  In September 2001, approximately four years after it was 

established, the IRSG announced its termination.  See Notice of Termination of IRSG, IRSG, http://web.archive.org/

web/20020202103820/www.irsg.org/html/termination.htm (last visited May 19, 2014) (accessed by searching the Internet 

Archive index and viewing the Dec. 8, 2002, version of this page).

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sensitivity of the data used. Many of these legislative recommendations are consistent with best practices 

that certain of the nine data brokers have already implemented.8

Legislative Recommendation

With respect to data brokers that sell marketing products, the Commission recommends that Congress 

consider legislation requiring data brokers to provide consumers access to their data, including sensitive data 

held about them, at a reasonable level of detail, and the ability to opt out of having it shared for marketing 

purposes. The Commission recommends that Congress consider including four requirements in any such 

legislation. First, Congress should seek to enable consumers to easily identify which data brokers may 

have data about them and where they should go to access such information and exercise opt-out rights. 

Legislation could require the creation of a centralized mechanism, such as an Internet portal, where data 

brokers can identify themselves, describe their information collection and use practices, and provide links 

to access tools and opt outs. Second, Congress should consider requiring data brokers to clearly disclose to 

consumers (e.g., on their websites) that they not only use the raw data that they obtain from their sources, 

such as a person’s name, address, age, and income range, but that they also derive from the data certain 

data elements. Allowing consumers to access data about themselves is particularly important in the case 

of sensitive information—and inferences about sensitive consumer preferences and characteristics—such 

as those relating to certain health information. Third, Congress should consider requiring data brokers to 

disclose the names and/or categories of their sources of data, so that consumers are better able to determine 

if, for example, they need to correct their data with an original public record source. Finally, Congress 

should consider requiring consumer-facing entities to provide a prominent notice to consumers that they 

share consumer data with data brokers and provide consumers with choices about the use of their data, 

such as the ability to opt-out of sharing their information with data brokers. Congress should also consider 

protecting sensitive information, such as certain health information, by requiring that consumer-facing 

sources obtain consumers’ affirmative express consent before they collect sensitive information. Because few 

consumers know about the existence of data brokers, meaningful notice from the data source provides an 

important opportunity for consumers to learn that their data is shared with data brokers and how to exercise 

control over the use of their data. 

For data brokers that sell risk mitigation products, the Commission recommends that Congress consider 

legislation that provides consumers with transparency when a company uses a risk mitigation product to 

limit consumers’ ability to complete a transaction. Specifically, when a risk mitigation product adversely 

impacts a consumer’s ability to obtain certain benefits, the consumer-facing company should identify the 

8 For example, since the Commission began its study, Acxiom, one of the data brokers at issue in this report, has publicly 

announced changes to its access policy and launched a new website that allows consumers to access, correct, and opt out 

of having information about themselves included in certain marketing products. See Press Release, Acxiom Corp., Acxiom 

Launches New Consumer Portal (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.acxiom.com/acxiom-launches-new-consumerportal/.

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

data brokers whose data the company relied upon; these data brokers could, in turn, give consumers the 

right to access the information used and, where appropriate, correct any erroneous information. The level 

of transparency, access, and correction should be tied to the significance of the benefit or transaction in 

question. At the same time, the Commission recognizes that it may be appropriate for legislation to require 

data brokers to implement robust authentication safeguards before allowing such access and correction so 

that an unscrupulous individual cannot “correct” accurate data. Congress should consider how to enable 

consumer access while preserving the accuracy and security of such data.

The Commission also recommends Congress consider legislation that would require data brokers offering 

people search products to: (1) allow consumers to access their own information; (2) allow consumers to 

suppress the use of this information;9 (3) disclose to consumers the data brokers’ sources of information, so 

that, if possible, consumers can correct their information at the source; and (4) disclose any limitations of 

the opt-out option, such as the fact that close matches of an individual’s name may continue to appear in 

search results. 

Best Practice Recommendations

More generally, the Commission calls on the data broker industry to adopt several best practices. First, 

they should implement privacy-by-design, which includes considering privacy issues at every stage of 

product development. Second, the Commission encourages data brokers to implement better measures to 

refrain from collecting information from children and teens, particularly in marketing products. Finally, the 

Commission recommends that data brokers take reasonable precautions to ensure that downstream users of 

their data do not use it for eligibility determinations or for unlawful discriminatory purposes.

9 The data brokers use the term “suppress” to indicate that, although certain data may appear in their databases, they prevent 

the data from being included in their products.

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

I. INTROD

A. Backgro

On a daily basis, consumers engage in a variety of online and offline activities that reveal personal 

information about them. Some typical activities include using a mobile device, shopping for a home or 

car, subscribing to a magazine, making a purchase at a store or through a catalog, browsing the Internet, 

responding to a survey in order to get a coupon, using social media, subscribing to online news sites, or 

entering a sweepstakes. As consumers engage in these daily activities, the entities they interact with collect 

information about them and, in many instances, provide or sell that information to data brokers.1 

1 See, e.g., Sharing Information: A Day in Your Life, Fed. Trade Comm’n, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/media/video-0022-

sharing-information-day-your-life (last visited May 19, 2014).

1
Their info is 

collected 

by the

Consumers

register on 

websites

shop 

online

buy 

houses

shop at 

stores

websites

online 

stores 

post 

information 

publicly 

online

data 

brokers

local 

governments 

stores companies

fill out 

warranty 

cards

Consumer

As consumers go about their business, data brokers may collect information about them.

Data Collection

Online & O	ine 

The consumer’s info is shared or sold to the

 Email address

 When a product was 

bought online

 The price paid for a

product online

 Personal interests

 In-store purchases

 The purchase price of 

 house 

Name

Address

Phone number

Data

Broker

Exhibit 1:

Data Collection 

Online & Offli

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

This report examines and makes findings and recommendations with respect to the practices of data 

brokers—companies whose primary business is collecting personal information about consumers from 

a variety of sources and aggregating, analyzing, and sharing that information, or information derived 

from it, for purposes such as marketing products, verifying an individual’s identity, or detecting fraud. 

Significantly, data brokers typically collect, maintain, manipulate, and share a wide variety of information 

about consumers without interacting directly with them. Indeed, as discussed further below, data brokers 

collect data from a variety of sources, ranging from criminal records to property data to purchase history 

to warranty card registration information. In addition to using raw data, data brokers often aggregate and 

analyze it to make inferences about specific consumers. For example, they may categorize a consumer as an 

expectant parent, a car enthusiast, interested in diabetes, a discount shopper, and more likely to be interested 

in brand medications than generic. Other data brokers may flag a consumer’s Social Security number 

(“SSN”) as potentially associated with fraud. 

Data brokers provide the information they compile to clients, who can use it to benefit consumers. 

Their clients may use the information to send relevant offers and coupons to consumers, which can 

give consumers more choices and lower their costs for searching for products and services. In addition, 

consumers may benefit from increased and innovative product offerings fueled by increased competition 

from small businesses that are able to connect with consumers that they may not have otherwise been able 

to reach. Data broker clients can also use data broker products to detect and prevent fraud, which can lower 

costs for businesses and, in turn, consumers. 

At the same time, data broker practices may raise privacy concerns. Data brokers typically collect, 

manipulate, and share information about consumers without interacting directly with them. Consumers are 

largely unaware that data brokers are engaging in these practices and, to the extent that data brokers offer 

consumers explanations and choices about how the data brokers use their data, that information may be 

difficult to find and understand. 

This report reflects the record developed through the Federal Trade Commission’s (“Commission” or 

“FTC”) issuance of Orders to File Special Reports (“Orders”) to nine data brokers pursuant to Section 6(b) 

of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(b). The Orders sought information about the data 

brokers’ practices starting January 1, 2010, related to the collection and use of consumer data. This report 

also reflects information gathered through follow-up communications and meetings and from publicly 

available sources. 

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Federal Trade Commission

B. The Commission’s Past Efforts to Impro

Transparency of Data Broker Practices

For decades, policymakers have expressed concerns about the transparency of companies that buy and 

sell consumer data. Indeed, the existence of companies selling consumer data for credit and other eligibility 

determinations with little consumer awareness or transparency led to the enactment in 1970 of the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),2 a statute the Commission has since enforced. The FCRA primarily 

regulates consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”), which compile consumers’ information and provide it to 

companies making credit, employment, insurance, housing, and similar decisions. Among other things, 

the FCRA requires CRAs to undertake reasonable procedures to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of 

consumer information they provide; it also requires CRAs to provide consumers with the right to access and 

correct their consumer reports. 

In addition to enforcing the FCRA, the Commission has hosted workshops, drafted reports, and testified 

before Congress about the privacy implications of data brokers’ practices.3

 In 1997, the Commission held a 

workshop to examine database services used to locate, identify, or verify the identity of individuals, referred 

to at the time as “individual reference services.” The workshop prompted industry members to form the selfregulatory Individual References Services Group (“IRSG”). The Commission subsequently issued a report 

on the workshop and the IRSG in which it commended the IRSG for its self-regulatory efforts, but noted 

that its principles did not do enough to address the lack of transparency of data broker practices.4 After 

2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012).

3 See, e.g., What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It? Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 

Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Jessica Rich, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. 

Trade Comm’n) [hereinafter FTC Statement on Data Brokers], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-entitled-what-information-do-data-brokers-have-consumers

/131218databrokerstestimony.pdf; Identity Theft: Recent Developments Involving the Security of Sensitive Consumer Information 

Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Deborah Majoras, Chairman, 

Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/050310idtheft.pdf; The Information Marketplace: Merging 

and Exchanging Consumer Data, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infomktplace/

index.shtml. See also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Information Flows: The Costs and Benefits Related to the Collection 

and Use of Consumer Information (June 18, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/

information-flows-costs-and-benefits-consumers-and-businesses.

4 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Individual Reference Services, A Report to Congress (1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/

reports/individual-reference-services-report-congress.

4
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

industry terminated the IRSG in September 2001,5 a series of public breaches—including several involving 

ChoicePoint—ultimately led to renewed scrutiny of the practices of data brokers.6

In recent years, the development of new technologies and business models, such as social media and 

mobile applications, has dramatically increased the availability, variety, and volume of consumer data.7 New 

forms of tracking and increasingly powerful analytics capabilities have emerged, such as mobile tracking 

and analytics services that enable tracking of users across devices so that companies can communicate a 

timely message tailored to a consumer based on the consumer’s location.8 With these new sources and 

technologies, along with competitive demands from companies to seek more data about more consumers on 

an increasingly granular level, data brokers are finding new opportunities to collect, compile, package, and 

sell the consumer information they obtain. 

In its 2012 report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations 

for Businesses and Policymakers (“Privacy Report”),9 the Commission discussed the privacy concerns 

raised by the practices of data brokers and identified three different categories of data brokers: (1) entities 

subject to the FCRA; (2) entities that maintain data for marketing purposes;10 and (3) entities that maintain 

data for non-marketing purposes that fall outside of the FCRA, such as to detect fraud or locate people. In 

the Privacy Report, the Commission noted that, while the FCRA addresses a number of critical transparency 

issues associated with companies that sell data for credit, employment, and insurance purposes, data brokers 

within the other two categories operate largely in the dark. 

The Commission’s Privacy Report made two primary recommendations to improve the transparency of 

the practices of data brokers, which built on the prior work of the agency. First, the Commission renewed 

5 In September 2001, approximately four years after it was established, the IRSG announced its termination.   See Notice of 

Termination of IRSG, IRSG, http://web.archive.org/web/20020202103820/www.irsg.org/html/termination.htm (last visited 

May 19, 2014) (accessed by searching the Internet Archive index and viewing the Dec. 8, 2002, version of this page). 

6 See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Reed Elsevier Inc., No. C-4226 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/

default/files/documents/cases/2008/08/080801reedcomplaint.pdf; Complaint at 4–7, United States v. ChoicePoint, 

No. 1:06-CV-0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

cases/2006/01/0523069complaint.pdf. See also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumer Data Broker ChoicePoint 

Failed to Protect Consumers’ Personal Data, Left Key Electronic Monitoring Tool Turned Off for Four Months (Oct. 19, 

2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/10/consumer-data-broker-choicepoint-failed-protectconsumers. 

7 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Information Resellers: Consumer Privacy Framework Needs to Reflect 

Changes in Technology and the Marketplace (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-663. 

8 On February 19, 2014, the FTC hosted a seminar on Mobile Device Tracking, as part of a series of seminars to examine the 

privacy implications of new areas of technology. See Spring Privacy Series: Mobile Device Tracking, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Feb. 

19, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/02/spring-privacy-series-mobile-device-tracking. 

9 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses 

and Policymakers (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter Privacy Report]. 

Commissioner Ohlhausen and Commissioner Wright were not members of the Commission at that time and thus did not 

participate in the vote on the report.

10 The FCRA covers consumer report information used to make eligibility determinations in connection with credit, insurance, 

and employment. It generally does not cover information used for marketing purposes.

5
Federal Trade Commission

a call for legislation that it had first recommended in 2009,11 which would have provided consumers with 

access to information data brokers held about them, in order to improve the transparency of the industry’s 

practices. In its recommendations, the Commission emphasized that the level of access should be reasonable 

in light of the privacy issues raised, meaning that it should be in proportion to the nature, sensitivity, and 

use of the data. Subsequently, in testimony before Congress, the Commission reaffirmed its support for 

legislation that would provide consumers with such reasonable access.12 

Second, the Commission recommended best practices to improve the transparency of the data broker 

industry. For example, it proposed exploring the idea of a centralized website where data brokers that 

compile and sell data for marketing purposes could identify themselves to consumers, describe how they 

collect consumer information, disclose the types of companies to which they sell the information, and 

explain the access rights and other choices they offer consumers.13 The Commission’s recommendations 

regarding data brokers built on almost two decades of work on these issues14—indeed, decades marked by an 

expansion in the number of data brokers and the richness of data they collect, but little progress in providing 

transparency and choices to consumers about their practices. While the Commission recognizes the benefits 

that data brokers offer, it continues to support legislation to provide consumers with more information and 

meaningful choices about data broker practices. 

The Commission is not alone in calling for greater transparency of the data broker industry. In 

September 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office released a report on the practices of data 

11 See Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2221, the Data Accountability and Protection Act, and H.R. 1319, the Informed P2P User Act 

Before the H.R. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Eileen Harrington, Acting Director of the 

Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_

statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-legislative-hearing-h.r.2221-data-accountability-and-protection-actand-h.r.1319-informed-p2p-user-act/p064504peertopeertestimony.pdf.

12 See The Need for Privacy Protections: Perspectives from the Administration and the Federal Trade Commission Before the S. Comm. 

on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/120509privacyprotections.pdf.

13 Privacy Report, supra note 9, at 69–70. The current website of the Direct Marketing Association offers choices to 

consumers to opt out of receiving direct marketing materials, such as catalogs. This could be a potential model for such a 

website. See DMAChoice, https://www.dmachoice.org/ (last visited May 19, 2014).

14 The Commission’s two decades of work regarding the data broker industry began when the Commission held its first public 

workshop on Internet privacy in April 1995. In a series of hearings held in October and November 1995, the FTC examined 

the implications of globalization and technological innovation for competition and consumer protection issues, including 

privacy concerns. This workshop culminated in an FTC Staff Report.  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Anticipating the 21st 

Century: Consumer Protection Policy in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace (1996), available at http://

www.ftc.gov/reports/anticipating-21st-century-competition-consumer-protection-policy-new-high-tech-global.  Expanding 

on this work, at a public workshop in June 1996, the Commission examined a wide range of consumer privacy issues, 

including website practices with respect to the collection and use of consumers’ personal information. FTC staff issued a 

report summarizing this workshop. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Staff Report: Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the 

Global Information Infrastructure (Dec. 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/staff-report-public-workshopconsumer-privacy-global-information-infrastructure.  Finally, in June 1997, the agency held a four-day workshop to explore 

issues relating to unsolicited commercial e-mail, online privacy, children’s online privacy, and individual reference services.  

Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Privacy Week—June 10–13 (June 4, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/1997/06/ftc-privacy-week-june-10-13.  

6
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

brokers and concluded that Congress should consider legislation to reflect the challenges posed by changes 

in technology, the increased market for consumer information, and the lack of transparency of the data 

broker industry.15 Congress has also investigated data broker activities. In December 2013, the U.S. Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation released a Majority Staff report summarizing its 

investigation into how data brokers collect, compile, and sell consumer information.16 The report concluded 

that data brokers that sell data for marketing purposes operate with minimal transparency and are subject to 

virtually no statutory consumer protections.17 And on February 12, 2014, Senators Jay Rockefeller and Ed 

Markey introduced a bill, entitled “Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act,” that would improve 

transparency of data broker practices by, among other things, requiring data brokers to make available the 

information they have collected about each consumer.18 Similarly, U.S. Representatives Bobby L. Rush and 

Joe Barton re-introduced a bipartisan bill, entitled “The Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2014,” that 

would improve transparency of data broker practices by, among other things, requiring data brokers to make 

available at least once per year the information they have collected about each consumer.19

C. Data Broker St

To further the objective of increased transparency, in December 2012, the Commission initiated a 

study of data broker practices. It issued identical Orders to nine data brokers seeking information about 

the recipients’ information collection and use practices. The Orders contained requests for information and 

documents about each data broker’s products and services, data collection practices, the sources of its data, 

its clients, and the extent to which it provides consumers with access to and control of their information. 

Appendix A is a copy of the text of the Orders that the Commission issued to the data brokers. 

The Commission did not seek information about the data brokers’ activities that fall within the scope 

of the FCRA.20 As noted above, the FCRA generally governs the practices of entities that assemble or 

evaluate consumer information for use by creditors, employers, insurance companies, landlords, and others 

15 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 7, at 46. In its report, the GAO analyzed laws, studies, and other 

documents, and interviewed representatives of federal agencies, the data broker industry, consumer and privacy groups, and 

others. The report contains an extensive discussion of existing laws affecting the data broker industry. 

16 Majority Staff of S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Office of Oversight & Investigations, A Review of 

the Data Broker Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes (2013) available 

at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-08f2f255b577. The 

Committee found that data brokers collect and maintain data on hundreds of millions of consumers, which they analyze, 

package, and sell for a variety of purposes. 

17 Id. In addition, on July 24, 2012, eight members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to nine data brokers asking for 

information about how the companies amass, refine, sell, and share consumer data. See Natasha Singer, Congress to Examine 

Data Sellers, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/technology/congress-opens-inquiry-into-databrokers.html?_r=0. 

18 See Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 113th Cong. (2014). 

19 The Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2014, H.R. 4400, 113th Cong. (2014).

20 Some of the data brokers studied sell FCRA and non-FCRA covered products. 

7
Federal Trade Commission

engaged in making certain eligibility determinations affecting consumers. It allows consumers to access their 

consumer reports and dispute inaccurate information about them. 

The nine data brokers that received the Orders are as follows: 

1. Acxiom: Acxiom provides consumer data and analytics for marketing campaigns and fraud 

detection. Its databases contain information about 700 million consumers worldwide with over 

3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.21 

2. Corelogic: Corelogic provides data and analytic services to businesses and government based 

primarily on property information, as well as consumer and financial information. Its databases 

include over 795 million historical property transactions, over ninety-three million mortgage 

applications, and property-specific data covering over ninety-nine percent of U.S. residential 

properties, in total exceeding 147 million records.22

3. Datalogix: Datalogix provides businesses with marketing data on almost every U.S. household and 

more than one trillion dollars in consumer transactions.23 In September 2012, Facebook announced 

a partnership with Datalogix to measure how often Facebook’s one billion users see a product 

advertised on the social site and then complete the purchase in a brick and mortar retail store.24

4. eBureau: eBureau provides predictive scoring and analytics services for marketers, financial services 

companies, online retailers, and others. eBureau primarily offers products that predict whether 

someone is likely to become a profitable customer or whether a transaction is likely to conclude in 

fraud. It provides clients with information drawn from billions of consumer records,25 adding over 

three billion new records each month.26

5. ID Analytics: ID Analytics provides analytics services designed principally to verify people’s 

identities or to determine whether a transaction is likely fraudulent. The ID Analytics network 

21 Acxiom Corp., Annual Report 8 (2013), available at http://d3u9yejw7h244g.cloudfront.net/wp-content/

uploads/2013/09/2013-Annual-Report.pdf.

22 Corelogic, Annual Report 7 (2012), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTkw

NDg0fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1.

23 About Us, Datalogix, http://www.datalogix.com/about/ (last visited May 19, 2014).

24 Joey Tyson, Relevant Ads That Protect Your Privacy, Facebook (Sept. 30, 2012, 8:55AM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/

facebook-and-privacy/relevant-ads-that-protect-your-privacy/457827624267125.

25 Find Your Next Customer Through Predictive Analytics, eBureau, http://www.ebureau.com/sites/default/files/file/ebureau_

solutions_brochure.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).

26 eScores, eBureau, http://www.ebureau.com/sites/default/files/file/datasheets/ebureau_escore_datasheet.pdf (last visited May 

19, 2014).

8
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

includes hundreds of billions of aggregated data points, 1.1 billion unique identity elements, and it 

covers 1.4 billion consumer transactions.27

6. Intelius: Intelius provides businesses and consumers with background check and public record 

information. Its databases contain more than twenty billion records.28 

7. PeekYou: PeekYou has patented technology that analyzes content from over sixty social media sites, 

news sources, homepages, and blog platforms to provide clients with detailed consumer profiles.29 

8. Rapleaf:30 Rapleaf is a data aggregator that has at least one data point associated with over eighty 

percent of all U.S. consumer email addresses.31 Rapleaf supplements email lists with the email 

address owner's age, gender, marital status, and thirty other data points.32

9. Recorded Future: Recorded Future captures historical data on consumers and companies across the 

Internet and uses that information to predict the future behavior of those consumers and companies. 

As of May 2014, Recorded Future had access to information from over 502,591 different open 

Internet sites.33

The Commission selected these data brokers because they represent a broad swath of activity from a 

cross-section of large, mid-sized, and small data brokers. The Commission also considered their prominence 

in the industry; the amount and types of data they collect; their use of different models to find, collect, and 

analyze data; and the range of products they sell. While some of these data brokers are established entities, 

others are new entrants to the data broker market.

The data brokers submitted Special Reports in response to the Orders, responded to follow-up questions, 

and met with Commission staff to provide additional clarification regarding their business models and 

practices. The Commission used the information obtained from the data brokers and from publicly available 

sources to prepare this report. Consistent with Sections 6(f) and 21(d) of the FTC Act, information that the 

27 Leverage Deep Insight Into Consumer Identity Behavior, ID Analytics, https://web.archive.org/web/20130901122631/http://

www.idanalytics.com/technology/ (last visited May 19, 2014) (accessed by searching the Internet Archive index and viewing 

the Sept. 1, 2013 version of this page).

28 Intelius Facts, Intelius, http://corp.intelius.com/intelius-facts (last visited May 19, 2014).

29 About Us, PeekYou, http://www.peekyou.com/about/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 

30 In August 2012, Rapleaf became a wholly-owned subsidiary of LiveRamp.  In October 2013, TowerData purchased Rapleaf’s 

assets and Rapleaf was dissolved.  Press Release, TowerData, Inc., TowerData Acquires Rapleaf, Forges Comprehensive 

Email Data Solutions Company (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.towerdata.com/company/news/towerdata-acquiresrapleaf-press-release/. In its response to the Orders, Rapleaf provided information for both Rapleaf and LiveRamp, which, 

for the purpose of this report, were treated as one entity. In May 2014, Acxiom acquired LiveRamp. Press Release, Acxiom 

Corp., Acxiom to Acquire LiveRamp (May 14, 2014), available at http://www.acxiom.com/acxiom-liveramp/. 

31 Fast. Simple. Secure., Rapleaf, http://www.rapleaf.com/why-rapleaf/ (last visited May 19, 2014).

32 Batch Append, Rapleaf, http://www.rapleaf.com/pricing-append/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 

33 Recorded Future, https://www.recordedfuture.com/ (last visited May 19, 2014).

9
Federal Trade Commission

data brokers have designated as confidential or privileged commercial or financial information is reported on 

an aggregate basis, without naming the particular company to which it pertains.

This report describes several key practices staff examined through the Commission’s Orders. First, it 

identifies how and from where the data brokers acquire their data. Second, it describes how the data brokers 

develop their products from this raw data. Third, it discusses the types of products the data brokers provide 

to their clients.34 Fourth, it explains the data brokers’ procedures to ensure the quality of their products. 

Fifth, it describes the assortment of clients that use the data broker products. Finally, it describes the options 

the data brokers give to consumers to access, suppress, and correct their own data.

34 As noted above, the Orders focused on the data brokers’ non-FCRA covered products.

10
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

II. DATA ACQ

A. Sources of 

None of the nine data brokers collect data directly from consumers. Rather, they collect data from 

numerous other sources, which fall into three categories: (1) government sources; (2) other publicly 

available sources; and (3) commercial sources. While each data broker source may provide only a few data 

elements about a consumer’s activities, data brokers can put all of these data elements together to form a 

more detailed composite of the consumer’s life. 

1. Government Sour

a. Federal Governm

All but three of the nine data brokers obtain information directly from federal government sources. 

For example, the U.S. Census Bureau provides information about the demographics of particular city 

blocks, such as ethnicity, age, education level, household makeup, income, occupations, and commute 

times. In addition, it provides geographic information including roads, addresses, congressional districts, 

and boundaries for cities, counties, subdivisions, and school and voting districts. The Social Security 

Administration provides information such as the Death Master File, which includes consumers’ names, 

SSNs, and dates of death. The U.S. Postal Service provides information such as address standardization 

and change of address information. Other federal and international agencies, such as the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, U.S. Secret Service, and European Union, provide information related to terrorist watch 

lists or most wanted lists. In addition, federal and international agencies provide lists of individuals who are 

ineligible to receive government contracts or other benefits.35 Also, federal courts provide information on 

bankruptcies. 

b. State and Local Governm

State and local governments offer a wide variety of information, including:

⊲ Professional licenses (e.g., licenses for pilots, doctors, lawyers, architects)

⊲ Recreational licenses (e.g., hunting and fishing licenses)

⊲ Real property and assessor records

•	 Taxes

35 For example, such lists are maintained and provided by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Department of State.

11
Federal Trade Commission

•	 Assessed Value

•	 Liens

•	 Deeds

•	 Mortgages

•	 Mortgage Releases

•	 Pre-foreclosures

•	 Identifying information about the owner

•	 Information about the property (e.g., square footage, number of bathrooms and bedrooms, and 

whether the property has a pool) 

⊲ Voter registration information (e.g., name, address, date of birth, and party affiliation) 

⊲ Motor vehicle and driving records 

⊲ Court records

•	 Criminal records

•	 Civil actions and judgments

•	 Birth, marriage, divorce, and death records

Two points are worth highlighting in connection with this information. First, some of the data 

brokers do not obtain this information directly from state and local governments. Rather, they obtain the 

information from other data brokers that either hire people to visit local offices to compile the information 

or that have relationships with these offices that allow them to acquire this information automatically (e.g., 

through an online portal). The data brokers identified nearly twenty-five other data brokers from which they 

obtain state and local government information. 

Second, some laws restrict the use of this information. For example, at least twenty-two states prohibit 

the use of voter registration records for commercial or non-election-related purposes.36 In addition, the 

federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”)37 and some state laws contain restrictions that apply to 

36 States restricting the use of such information for commercial purposes include California, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, 

Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 

37 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012). 

12
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

state motor vehicle departments.38 For instance, the DPPA prohibits the disclosure of motor vehicle and 

driving record information, except for limited purposes such as law enforcement, insurance, and identity 

verification or fraud detection. It allows the unrestricted use of such information with the express consent of 

the individual, which at least one state requests in its driver’s license application.39  

2. Publicly Available Sources, Including Social Media, Bl

and the Internet

Over half of the data brokers reported that they obtain other publicly available information, including 

telephone and other directories, press reports, and information that individuals post on the Internet, 

including blogs and social media sites. For example, some of them obtain information by crawling social 

media sites, such as Bebo and LinkedIn, where individuals have not set their privacy settings to restrict access 

to their information and the social media sites have given the data brokers access to such information.40 As 

with government sources, these data brokers either obtain information directly from these sources or, in 

limited instances, from other data brokers that compile such information. 

3. Commercial Data Sour

All but one of the data brokers in this study purchase information about individuals from wide-ranging 

commercial sources. For example, the data brokers obtain detailed, transaction-specific data about purchases 

from retailers and catalog companies. Such information can include the types of purchases (e.g., high-end 

shoes, natural food, toothpaste, items related to disabilities or orthopedic conditions), the dollar amount of 

the purchase, the date of the purchase, and the type of payment used. Several of the data brokers also obtain 

information from magazine publishers about the types of subscriptions sold. 

Three data brokers obtain customer lists from registration websites, which are sites where consumers 

register or log in to obtain services, such as retail, news, and travel sites. Such lists can include a consumer’s 

name, along with a postal or email address. A few of the data brokers obtain aggregated transaction data 

from financial services companies. The types of data that the data brokers obtain from these sources include 

38 At least twenty-three states have state laws governing the disclosure of motor vehicle records that prohibit companies from 

using such information, except for limited purposes such as identity verification or fraud prevention (i.e., Connecticut, 

Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 

Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Colorado, Arizona, and Alaska). 

Other states prohibit access to this information in virtually all circumstances (i.e., Montana, Washington, and Delaware). 

39 Driver License/Identification Card Application, Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., available at http://www.azdot.gov/docs/default-source/

mvd-forms-pubs/40-5122.pdf?sfvrsn=11 (last visited May 19, 2014).

40 According to the data brokers, some social media sites restrict third parties’ ability to collect data from their sites in an 

automated way. For example, some of the data brokers stated that Facebook only allows specified search engines to crawl 

its site, and its Terms of Service bar scraping, or the copying of the information on Facebook’s website, without Facebook’s 

written permission. The Commission did not independently examine the policies of social media sites as part of this study. 

13
Federal Trade Commission

more sensitive information (e.g., certain health-related purchases41) and less sensitive information (e.g., 

certain clothing purchases). 

Some of the data brokers report that they obtain data directly from their merchant and financial service 

company clients, either to create or enhance products or services for those particular clients or to use in other 

products in aggregated, de-identified form, as explained further below. Other data, such as some data from 

registration websites, comes from non-client consumer-facing companies pursuant to specific contractual 

arrangements. At least one of the nine data brokers obtains consumers’ web browsing activities from online 

advertising networks. 

Most of the commercially sourced data, however, comes from other data brokers outside this study. For 

example, the data brokers in this study obtain information from other data brokers that:

⊲ Obtain information from telephone companies about consumers who have recently created a new 

landline account;

⊲ Obtain information from automobile dealers about sales and service, warranty, and aftermarket 

repairs;

⊲ Aggregate and model the purchase history of 190 million individual consumers from more than 

2600 merchants; and

⊲ Compile self-reported information that consumers provide online or offline through marketing 

surveys, warranty registrations, and contests. One data broker that compiles self-reported 

information maintains data of over 240 million consumers sorted into 1000 interest categories.

Several of the data brokers share the same sources. And each data broker utilizes multiple sources for 

similar data. For example, one of the data brokers in this study obtains consumers’ contact information 

from twenty different sources.42

In addition, seven of the nine data brokers buy from or sell information to each other. Accordingly, 

it may be virtually impossible for a consumer to determine the originator of a particular data element. As 

shown in Exhibit 2, which depicts the flow of data among the nine data brokers in this study, the consumer 

would have to retrace the path of data through a series of data brokers to finally arrive at the original source.

41 The health-related purchases are not covered under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 

(“HIPAA”), which protects the privacy of certain health-related information. The data brokers are not covered entities under 

HIPAA, which are defined to include certain doctors’ offices, hospitals, insurance companies, and others that electronically 

bill insurance companies. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 

1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 

42 The data brokers share not only commercial sources but government and other publicly available sources as well.

14
* The Commission issued identical Orders to File Special Reports (“Orders”) to nine data brokers under Section 

6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(b), to seek information about the data brokers’ 

practices related to consumer data collection and use.

† Includes data brokers that sell information from government sources.

‡ Includes data brokers that sell information from publicly available sources.

Data Collection

commerical 

sources

publicly available 

sources‡

government 

sources†

data brokers

in the study

The nine data brokers the FTC studied collect information from 

many sources.*

9

8

7

6 5

4

3

2

C 1

G

P

G

C

P

G

C

G

C

P

G

C

P

G

C

P

G

C

P

G C

Exhibit 2:

Data Source

15
Federal Trade Commission

B. Assessing Sou

While the data brokers in this study do not typically take steps to assess government and other publicly 

available sources, they may take some steps to assess their commercial sources in order to ensure that the 

sources provide accurate data. The majority of the data brokers in this study selects these sources based on 

their reputation in the industry. A few, however, affirmatively evaluate the legitimacy, stability, and quality of 

their sources before accepting data from them. This credentialing process may include reviewing the source’s 

website, terms of use, data collection methods, privacy policy, privacy practices, and regulatory compliance. 

A few of the data brokers ask the source for its sources and then evaluate the original sources’ websites, terms 

of use, privacy policies, and collection methods. 

Several of the data brokers test the reliability of the information their sources provide up front. When 

they acquire a new data source, they put the new data in a holding area and test it to make sure it is 

internally consistent, corroborated by other sources, verifiable as legitimate, and that it encompasses a 

sufficiently large portion of the population.43 Part of the testing process may include comparing the data 

against known truths (e.g., comparing the actual birthdate of the data broker’s employee to the birthdate 

provided by the source). It may also include comparing the data to that obtained from other high-quality 

sources. Other data brokers assess the reliability of the data on an ongoing basis. They rely on automated 

systems that detect material deviations in their data and identify the sources that are causing such deviations. 

If there are discrepancies in the data obtained from two separate sources, some data brokers will use the data 

from the source they trust the most. 

C. Contracts with Sour

The data brokers often enter into a variety of written contracts with their data sources. The data brokers 

may acquire ownership of the data under a data supply contract, use of the data for a defined time period 

under a data licensing agreement, or the right to resell the source’s product using the data broker’s brand 

under a data reseller agreement. These contracts generally include a description of the data provided to the 

data broker, the method for transferring the data, the frequency of updates, and any restrictions on using the 

data. 

The contracts between the data brokers and their data sources include a range of provisions. Most 

of the data brokers insert provisions in these contracts stating that the data source warrants that it legally 

obtained the information. Only two of the data brokers insert contractual provisions requiring the data 

source to warrant that either it or its sources provided consumers with notice that their information would 

be shared with third parties and an opportunity to opt out of that sharing. At least one of these two data 

brokers appears to review the original source’s website, terms of use, and privacy policy to determine whether 

43 For example, before acquiring data on “Soccer Moms,” the data broker will want to verify that this source has data on 10,000 

“Soccer Moms,” rather than just 100 “Soccer Moms.”

16
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

the source provided consumers such notice and opt out opportunity. These contractual provisions do not 

contain requirements about the prominence of the notice or opt out, which the source may include in a 

privacy policy. Finally, the data brokers’ contracts with their sources generally do not address the accuracy of 

information provided beyond noting that the sources will make best efforts to ensure accuracy.

The contracts also often contain use restrictions on data brokers. For example, certain federal or state laws 

or agencies require a written agreement affirming that the data broker will only use the data for a specified 

purpose. Sources may also prohibit data brokers from reusing or reselling the data without permission; 

decoding or reverse engineering the data; illegally or illicitly using the data; and using the data in violation 

of the FCRA,44 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”),45 HIPAA,46 or Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 

(“COPPA”).47 

D. Collection Metho

The data brokers in this study collect information from sources in numerous ways. First, some data 

brokers collect publicly available web-based data through web crawlers, which are programs that capture 

content across the Internet and transmit it back to the data broker’s servers.48 The data brokers use software 

to determine which websites to crawl, how often, and what data points to collect from each website. Second, 

some data brokers buy or acquire printed information, such as telephone directories or local government 

records, and either scan these documents into an electronic format or have data entry professionals manually 

create an electronic record. Third, some data brokers arrange for batch processing of information. For 

example, some data brokers acquire data from their sources through a daily feed. Finally, the data brokers 

may arrange for their sources to make available to them an Application Programming Interface (“API”) 

through which to process the data. 

Whatever the method, it appears that the data brokers often collect more information than they use. 

Several of the data brokers reported that they cannot obtain a subset of data elements they request. For 

example, some sources sell the data brokers a multitude of data elements as part of a fixed data set even if 

the data broker does not need all of these elements. The data brokers may try to use the additional data 

elements in some other way, such as for matching or authentication purposes or to create models to predict 

consumer behavior. Or they may not use the data at all.

44 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681v.

45 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 

15 U.S.C.). 

46 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 110 Stat. 1936.

47 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).

48 As noted in supra note 40, some websites restrict or prohibit web crawlers from collecting data from their sites. 

17
Federal Trade Commission

E. Data Upda

The data brokers’ sources generally dictate the frequency of update schedules. Sources may update data 

either in real time, daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, biannually, annually, or, in some limited instances, 

never. Data that is available through crawling or an API is typically updated more frequently than data 

acquired through, for example, batch processing or other non-automated collection methods. 

Even if a source updates its data on a frequent basis, the data broker may not update its databases to 

reflect this new information immediately. There is typically a delay between when the data broker receives 

updated information from a source and when the data broker’s system reflects this updated information.49 

Such a delay may occur because it is more cost effective for the data broker to update its databases at 

scheduled intervals rather than as each new data set is received. Or a delay may occur because the data 

broker is testing the data for accuracy. For example, when a source updates its data, the data broker may 

compare the source’s newest file with its previous files for deviations that could affect accuracy. If the 

data broker obtains a substantially smaller file from a source that had previously provided a larger file, the 

data broker may discover that the source failed to provide information for all consumers with last names 

beginning with “A.” When the data broker discovers such an omission, it may contact the source and ask for 

a new updated file.50

49 One data broker reports that it is upgrading its technology so that its system will update in real time.

50 Some of the data brokers report that they perform similar reviews of their own data to ensure that their databases reflect the 

most accurate data. For example, after updating its database to reflect an update from a source, a data broker might discover 

that its database is substantially smaller than the previous version of the database. In comparing the files, the data broker 

might discover that it failed to upload information about consumers residing in California.

18
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

III. DEVEOPMENT

A. Creation of Data Elements and Seg

In developing their products, the data brokers use not only the raw data that they obtain from their 

sources, such as a person’s name, address, home ownership status, age, income range, or ethnicity ( “actual 

data elements”), but they also derive additional data (“derived data elements”). For example, a data broker 

might infer that an individual with a boating license has an interest in boating, that a consumer has a 

technology interest based on the purchase of a Wired magazine subscription, that a consumer has an interest 

in shoes because she visited Zappos.com, or that a consumer who has bought two Ford cars has loyalty to 

that brand. 

The data brokers in this study sell both the actual and derived data elements to their clients. For 

example, elements they sell about Jane Doe may include her name, her age (36), her marital status (married), 

her interests (children and recreational sports), and her residence (123 Main Street). They may also use the 

actual and derived data elements to put consumers in categories (“data segments”). 

The data brokers create segments by:

⊲ Combining data elements to create a list of consumers who have similar characteristics. Soccer 

Moms, for example, might include all women between the ages of 21 and 45, with children, who 

have purchased sporting goods within the last two years; or

⊲ Developing complex models to predict behaviors. The data brokers can identify a group of 

consumers that has already bought the products in which the data broker wants to predict an 

interest, analyze the characteristics the consumers share, and use the shared characteristic data to 

create a predictive model to apply to other consumers. For example, a data broker can:

•	 Analyze the characteristics of a subset of consumers that purchased camping gear in the last year, 

identify consumers in its database that share these characteristics, and create a segment called 

“Consumers Interested in Buying Camping Gear;” 

•	 Identify a group of consumers that sought chargebacks on their credit cards in the last year, 

analyze the characteristics those consumers share, and use the characteristic data to predict 

“Consumers that are Likely to Seek a Chargeback;” or 

•	 Analyze data on consumers in this manner to predict which consumers are likely to use brand 

name medicine, order prescriptions by mail, research medications online, or respond to 

pharmaceutical advertisements.

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Federal Trade Commission

Some segments primarily focus on minority communities51 with lower incomes, such as “Urban 

Scramble” and “Mobile Mixers,” both of which include a high concentration of Latino and AfricanAmerican consumers with low incomes.52 Other segments highlight older consumers with lower incomes. 

For example, “Rural Everlasting” includes single men and women over the age of 66 with “low educational 

attainment and low net worths,” and “Thrifty Elders” includes singles in their late 60s and early 70s in 

“one of the lowest income clusters.” Yet other segments focus purely on consumers’ financial status, such as 

“Underbanked Indicator,” “Credit Worthiness,” “Invitation to Apply Offers – Bankcard Utilization Rate,” 

“Invitation to Apply Score,” “Consumer Prominence Indicator,” “Pennywise Mortgagees,” and “Number of 

Orders – Low Scale Catalogs.” Finally, other segments showcase a consumer’s interests, such as “Truckin’ & 

Stylin’” and “Health & Wellness Interest.”53 While some of these segments seem innocuous, others rely on 

characteristics, such as ethnicity, income level, and education level, which seem more sensitive and may be 

disconcerting.

51 Some of the data brokers offer an “Assimilation Code,” which indicates a consumer’s degree of assimilation to the English 

language.

52 Other segments focusing on a combination of ethnicity and/or income levels include: (1) “Work & Causes,” which includes 

consumers “with lower-incomes, in their late 40s, early 50s,” “living in multi-unit dwellings;” (2) “Resolute Renters,” which 

includes consumers in their 30s and 40s, single with no children, that are “relatively mobile renters and on the lower rungs of 

income and net worth;” (3) “Metro Parents,” which includes consumers, “primarily in high school or vocationally educated,” 

“handling single parenthood and the stresses of urban life on a small budget;” (4) “Modest Wages,” which includes “lowincome singles living without children in a mix of smaller, industrial cities” with low “educational attainment;” (5) “Kids and 

Rent,” which includes “lower income households” with children that are “mostly renters, living in both single-family and 

multiple-family apartment buildings;” (6) “Downtown Dwellers,” which includes “lower-income, single, downtown-metro 

dwellers,” that are “upper-middle-aged” and with a “high-school” or “vocational/technical” degree working to “make[ ] ends 

meet with low-wage clerical or service jobs;” (7) “Financially Challenged,” which includes consumers “[i]n the prime working 

years of their lives, . . . including many single parents, struggl[ing] with some of the lowest incomes and little accumulation 

of wealth.” These consumers are “[n]ot particularly loyal to any one financial institution, [and] they feel uncomfortable 

borrowing money and believe they are better off having what they want today as they never know what tomorrow will bring;” 

(8) “Timeless Traditions,” which includes “immigrants, many of retirement age, . . . who have been in the country for 10 or 

more years,” that “speak[ ] some English, but generally prefer[ ] Spanish,” and that have “lower than average” incomes; (9) 

“Traditions & Timecards,” which includes consumers with “an average age of 53” that “are still working” and that are the 

“least acculturated Hispanics, residing in more metro areas;” and (10) “Latchkey Leasers,” which includes consumers with “an 

average age of 52” that are “predominately single renters living in multiple unit dwellings.” This group tends “to be bicultural 

and bilingual,” and “they earn some of the lower incomes and have relatively little net worth accrued at this point in their 

lives.”

53 The data brokers offer a variety of segments, including at the individual, household, and zip code levels. 

20
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Segment Exampl

⊲ Financial Newsletter Subscriber

⊲ African-American Professional

⊲ Affluent Baby Boomer

⊲ Spanish Speaker

⊲ Outdoor/Hunting & Shooting

⊲ Allergy Sufferer 

⊲ Santa Fe/Native American Lifestyle

⊲ Senior Products Buyer

⊲ Twitter User with 250+ Friends

⊲ Media Channel Usage - Daytime TV

⊲ Bible Lifestyle

⊲ New Age/Organic Lifestyle

⊲ Plus-size Apparel

⊲ Biker/Hell's Angels

⊲ Leans Left

⊲ Exercise - Sporty Living

⊲ Working-class Mom

⊲ Upscale Retail Card Holder

⊲ Modest Wages

⊲ Financially Challenged

B. Data Suppress

Most of the data brokers exclude or suppress certain data from their products in several ways.54 For 

example, they obtain suppression lists, such as the Commission’s Do Not Call registry, to determine which 

data elements to mark as suppressed when processing the data that they acquire. Some of the data brokers 

reported that they have a policy against collecting or using information about children or teens.55 Some of 

these data brokers rely on their sources to suppress the information, but do not take any additional steps. 

Others take additional steps to double check that the source has properly suppressed the information; they 

search the age, age range, or date of birth information to identify records of children or teens, filter out those 

records, and suppress any other records they associate with that same child or teen in the products they 

provide to their clients. 

54 The data brokers use the term “suppress” to indicate that, although certain data may appear in their databases, they prevent 

the data from being included in their products.  This section does not address consumer opt-out requests which, as discussed 

in Section VII.A., infra, also result in the data brokers suppressing data from their products.

55 Some of the data brokers intentionally include or factor in children’s and teens’ information in certain products. The data 

brokers that provide risk mitigation products used to detect fraudulent activity in commercial transactions, for example, may 

flag for a mobile telephone provider that an applicant’s personal information belongs to an individual under the age of 18 and 

that the transaction may be fraudulent. 

21
Federal Trade Commission

C. Data Stor

Three of the data brokers reported that they store data in the form of individual consumer profiles. For 

these data brokers, Jane Doe’s file may contain her contact and demographic information, interests, and 

purchasing habits.56

Two of the data brokers store data by listing “events” in a database. For example, rather than having a 

profile of Jane Doe, they may have a long list of events such as:

⊲ Jane Doe opened an account with ABC Bank on August 2 and listed her address as 123 Main Street;

⊲ 123 Main Street was associated with a fraudulent transaction on September 23;

⊲ John Smith moved to 123 Main Street on July 3; 

⊲ Mark Nobody was reported as deceased on December 21; and

⊲ Mark Nobody opened a new mobile telephone account on December 31 and listed his address as 

123 Main Street.

When these data brokers run a query on “Jane Doe,” they can create a profile on her. For example, 

these brokers can determine not only that Jane Doe lives on 123 Main Street and that she has an ABC Bank 

account, but also that her address has been associated with multiple, potentially fraudulent transactions. 

Two of the data brokers maintain databases that correspond to the sources of the data. For example, 

a data broker may have one database containing “court records” and another containing “real estate 

transactions.” Some of the data brokers maintain databases that correspond to a product line; for example, 

a data broker may have a database for all of the data that is used in its risk mitigation products and another 

database for the data used in its marketing products, even if the data is duplicative. (These types of products 

are described in Section IV., infra.)

As to the length of retention of data, some of the data brokers store all data indefinitely, even if it is 

later amended, unless otherwise prohibited by contract. For some products, these data brokers report that 

they need to keep older data. For example, they explain that even if a consumer’s address is outdated, it is 

important to keep the consumer’s address history in order to verify his or her identity. For other products, 

however, retention of older data may not be necessary. An older address, for instance, is less relevant to 

deliver marketing to a consumer. 

56 Rather than using names, some of these data brokers store individual consumer profile information using unique 

identification numbers.

22
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

IV. TYES OF 

The data brokers offer products in three broad categories: (a) marketing; (b) risk mitigation; and (c) 

people search. These products generated a combined total of approximately $426 million in annual revenue 

in 2012 for the nine data brokers. The following graph depicts the proportion of revenue contributed by 

each type of product category.

Exhibit 3: Revenue of Nine Data Brokers by Product Catego

A. Market

Five of the data brokers sell marketing products that collectively generated over $196 million in annual 

revenue in 2012. The Commission has grouped these marketing products into (1) direct marketing, 

which encompasses postal mail, telemarketing, and email marketing; (2) online marketing, which includes 

marketing to consumers on the Internet, on mobile devices, and through cable and satellite television; and 

(3) marketing analytics. All of these products enable the data brokers’ clients to create tailored marketing 

messages to consumers. 

1. Direct Marketi

Based on the information received, the Commission has identified two categories of direct marketing 

products: (a) data append; and (b) marketing lists. 

$196,206,100

$177,842,153

$52,694,542

$0

$50,000,000

$100,000,000

$150,000,000

$200,000,000

$250,000,000

Marketing Risk Mitigation People Search

23
Federal Trade Commission

a. Data App

“Data append” products help companies learn more about their customers. They require the data 

broker’s client to provide some customer information, such as name and address; the client can then select 

additional information—such as the customers’ telephone number and purchasing habits—that the data 

broker appends to the client’s data set for the client’s use in direct mail, telemarketing, and email marketing 

campaigns. 

Some products help clients fill in gaps that may exist in customer contact information. For example, the 

client may provide a customer’s name and address, and the data broker could provide the customer’s landline 

telephone number or email address. Alternatively, the client may provide the customer’s landline telephone 

number, mobile telephone number, or email address, and the data broker could provide the customer’s name 

and address. In some data append products, the client provides a customer’s name and a store’s zip code, and 

the data broker provides the customer’s address. 

Other products help clients better understand their customers. Clients may provide their customers’ 

identifying information. The data broker can then append data to the clients’ data sets. The data brokers in 

this study offer a large array of actual and derived data elements, including: 

⊲ Age

⊲ Religious Affiliation

⊲ Technology Interest

⊲ Expectant or New Parent

⊲ Gender

⊲ Political Affiliation

⊲ Social Media Usage

⊲ Real Property Attributes

⊲ Height

⊲ Household Income

⊲ Vehicle Ownership

⊲ New Mover/Renter/Owner

⊲ Weight

⊲ Net Worth

⊲ Credit Card Usage

⊲ Discount Shopper

⊲ Race

⊲ Marital Status

⊲ Vacation Habits

⊲ High-End Shopper

⊲ Ethnicity

⊲ Biker

⊲ Cholesterol Focus

⊲ Home Loan Type

⊲ Occupation

⊲ Presence of Children

24
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

⊲ Diabetes Interest

⊲ Investment Habits

⊲ Soon-to-be High School Graduates

⊲ School-aged Children

⊲ Smoker in Household

⊲ Gambling

⊲ Guns and Ammunition Purchases

⊲ Home Ownership Status 

⊲ Buy Disability Insurance

⊲ Lenses or Contacts

⊲ Brand Medication Conscious

This information may include actual data elements, derived data elements, and data segments, as 

described in Section III.A. of this report. Appendix B provides an illustrative list of data elements and 

segments to demonstrate further the breadth of information available to clients. 

b. Marketing Li

Marketing lists identify consumers who share particular characteristics (e.g., all persons living with 

at least two children, all persons who are both women and own a specific car brand, people interested in 

diabetes, and households with smokers in them). The client identifies the attributes that it would like to 

find in a consumer audience, and the data broker provides a list of consumers with those attributes.57 A 

client, for example, can request a list of consumers who are “Underbanked” or “Financially Challenged” in 

order to send them an advertisement for a subprime loan or other services.58 Marketing lists can be limited 

to consumer names and addresses for direct mail campaigns, consumer names and telephone numbers for 

telemarketing campaigns, or consumer email addresses for email marketing campaigns. For clients who want 

more robust data to better tailor their marketing campaigns, the data brokers can include in the marketing 

lists any of the other data elements or segments described under the data append products. For example, a 

client can request a list of consumers in a particular region with an interest in gourmet cooking for a direct 

mail campaign and, in addition to the consumer names and addresses, the data broker can include in the 

marketing list the age or age range and household income of the consumers. 

57 It has been reported that other data brokers, not part of this study, sell marketing lists identifying consumers who have 

addictions, AIDS and HIV, genetic diseases, or are police officers and troopers. See, e.g., Addictive Behaviors, Alcohol and 

Drugs Mailing List, Exact Data, http://www.consumerbase.com/mailing-lists/addictive-behaviors-alcohol-and-drugsmailing-list.html (last visited May 19, 2014); Ailments Mailing Lists/Email Lists, DMDatabases.com, http://dmdatabases.

com/databases/consumer-mailing-lists/ailments-lists (last visited May 19, 2014); Complete Medical’s Ailments, Illnesses and 

Medical Conditions Mailing List, Nextmark, http://lists.nextmark.com/market?page=order/online/datacard&id=221569 (last 

visited May 19, 2014); Police Officers By District Mailing List, Nextmark, http://lists.nextmark.com/market?page=order/

online/datacard&id=330218&trk=y&aId=1381 (last visited May 19, 2014). See also What Information Do Data Brokers Have 

on Consumers, and How Do They Use It? Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement 

of Pam Dixon, Executive Director, World Privacy Forum), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.

Serve&File_id=e290bd4e-66e4-42ad-94c5-fcd4f9987781.

58 Even though these categories may implicate creditworthiness, the use of data about a consumer’s financial status in order to 

send the consumer targeted advertisements is generally not covered by the FCRA, unless the advertisements are for certain 

pre-approved offers of credit. 

25
Federal Trade Commission

2. Online Market

Three of the data brokers facilitate the online marketing of products to consumers through the Internet, 

mobile devices, and cable and satellite television. The Commission has grouped the online marketing 

products into the following categories: (a) registration targeting; (b) collaborative targeting; and (c) 

onboarding. As discussed below, these practices permit companies to provide more targeted and potentially 

relevant advertising to consumers. 

a. Registration Targeti

The data brokers can help registration websites59 promote products to consumers more effectively 

through a more customized user experience. For example, if a travel website, XYZ Travel, wants to promote 

particular products to its users on its website, it can send the data broker a list of its registered users, and 

the data broker can provide XYZ Travel with the vacation interests of those specific users. With this 

information, XYZ Travel can highlight for Jane Doe a particular vacation package to Hawaii based on Jane 

Doe’s interest in tropical islands when she logs on to XYZ Travel’s website. 

If XYZ Travel does not want to customize its site to individual registered users but instead wants to sell 

third-party advertising space on its site, it can send the data broker a list of its registered users. The data 

broker can then inform XYZ Travel that the majority of its registered users are interested in motorcycles and 

household cleaning products. With this information, XYZ Travel can offer to sell advertising space on its 

website to motorcycle vendors and cleaning product manufacturers. 

The process works similarly for advertising on mobile devices and cable and satellite television. For 

example, Cable Company CBA can provide a data broker with a list of its registered customers, and the data 

broker can append that list with additional information about those customers. Cable Company CBA can 

use that information not only to market its own products—for example, to decide to which customers it 

should broadcast a promotional advertisement about its new Spanish-channels package—but also to offer 

third parties the ability to target advertising via these new Spanish channels. Specifically, Cable Company 

CBA may learn that a large subset of its Spanish-channels package subscribers enjoys international travel. 

Thereafter, Cable Company CBA can approach local travel agencies to purchase broadcast advertisements for 

those particular viewers. 

b. Collaborative Targeti

Whereas in registration targeting, the data broker’s client is the registration website, in “collaborative 

targeting,” the data broker services two clients—the registration website and an advertiser looking to target 

advertisements on a registration website. The registration website gives the data broker a list of its users, and 

59 “Registration websites,” as discussed in Section II.A.3., supra, are websites that allow consumers to register or log in to obtain 

services, such as retail, news, and travel sites. 

26
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

the advertiser gives the data broker its customer and prospect list. The data brokers report that neither party 

has access to personal information about consumers who are customers, potential customers, or registered 

users of the other. Only the data broker has access to both parties’ information. The data broker can then 

analyze the data in order to enable the advertiser to decide whether to advertise on the registration website. 

For example, Surfshop, a retailer of surfboards, wants to advertise a new surfboard and give its customers 

a discount through online advertisements. XYZ Travel offers Surfshop space on its website for a web banner, 

but Surfshop does not know whether its customers typically visit XYZ Travel. XYZ Travel and Surfshop 

do not want to share their customer lists with each other. XYZ Travel sends the data broker a list of its 

registered users, including names and email addresses. Surfshop sends the same data broker a list of its best 

customers, including names and postal addresses. The data broker appends email addresses to the Surfshop 

list and identifies 3000 Surfshop customers that are registered on XYZ Travel’s website. Satisfied with these 

numbers, Surfshop sends the data broker the advertisement it wants to display on XYZ Travel’s website, 

which in turn sends the advertisement to XYZ Travel. XYZ Travel displays Surfshop’s advertisement to 

visitors of the site.

c. Onboardin:  Combining Online and Offline

While collaborative targeting allows advertisers to determine which campaigns to run on particular 

registration websites, the practice of onboarding goes further. “Onboarding” refers to a process whereby a 

data broker adds offline data into a cookie (the process of onboarding offline data) to enable advertisers to 

target consumers virtually anywhere on the Internet. It allows advertisers to use consumers’ offline activities 

to determine what advertisements to serve them on the Internet.60 

Onboarding clients either (1) provide data about their customers to a data broker to facilitate the 

process of finding those consumers on the Internet to deliver targeted advertisements; or (2) use a data 

broker to identify an audience of consumers who are likely to share particular characteristics and find those 

consumers on the Internet to deliver advertisements. Three of the data brokers offer an onboarding product. 

Onboarding typically includes three steps: (i) segmentation; (ii) matching; and (iii) targeting. 

i. Segmentat

The onboarding process starts when a client asks a data broker to find consumers with particular 

characteristics. Data brokers may have stock data segments that they have created based on anticipated 

client demand or they may create custom segments based on the client’s request. For example, a data broker 

could help a clothing retailer advertise its new luxury fashion line to consumers online in several ways:

60 Some of the data brokers are also offering their onboarding services to clients so they can serve targeted advertisements on 

mobile devices. 

27
Federal Trade Commission

⊲ To target the retailer’s existing customers: The retailer gives the data broker its customer list and 

the data broker compares its stock segments, such as “Persons Interested in High-End Clothing” 

or “Sophisticated Shoppers,” to the retailer’s existing list of customers to predict which of the 

retailer’s customers will be interested in the new fashion line. If the data broker does not have a 

stock segment that fits the retailer’s needs, the data broker can create custom segments based on the 

retailer’s criteria. For example, the retailer might want to target its line to all of its existing customers 

who are “Women” living in the “Zip Code 12345.” After creating the segment, the data broker 

would compare individuals in the customized segment to the retailer’s customer list and identify 

those existing customers best suited for the retailer’s advertising campaign. 

⊲ To target new customers for the retailer: The data broker may also offer the retailer access to the 

data broker’s own list of segments to find new customers. The retailer would select one or more 

stock segments (e.g., “Sophisticated Shoppers” or “Persons Interested in High-End Clothing”), 

and the data broker would then identify consumers from its own databases that fit within these 

segments. If none of the data broker’s stock segments fit the retailer’s needs, the data broker can 

simply customize a segment (e.g., “Women” that are living within “Zip Code 12345”) and apply that 

segment to the data broker’s database of consumers. 

ii. Matchi

The next step in the onboarding process is “matching,” where the data broker finds the consumers 

it identified through the segmentation process online. To find consumers online, the data broker enters 

into contracts with registration websites to buy lists of registered users. It then compares these registered 

users with the consumers identified through the segmentation process in order to find matches. When the 

data broker finds a match, it appends to that consumer any data elements or segments associated with the 

consumer.61 

Thus, in the example of the clothing retailer looking to advertise its new luxury clothing line, suppose 

the data broker comes up with 100,000 consumers meeting the criteria of the clothing retailer, including 

Jane Doe. Suppose further that the data broker has bought Social Media X’s registered users list. If the 

data broker finds that Jane Doe is a registered user of Social Media X, it has found a match. The data 

broker thereafter can associate Jane Doe with the data elements and segments requested by the client (e.g., 

“Woman,” “Zip Code 12345,” and “Sophisticated Shopper”). 

61 The data brokers represent that they typically do not store the consumer’s name, but maintain a unique identifier for each 

consumer. The entire matching process is conducted using unique identifiers, rather than consumer names. 

28
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

iii. Targeting Consumers Onl

The last step in the onboarding process is to target the matched consumers online. To do so, the data 

broker must first place a cookie on the browsers of the consumers it has identified through the above 

process. It does so when the registration website notifies the data broker that such a consumer has logged 

on to the registration website. The cookie includes the information that the data broker has appended to 

the consumer’s profile, but the data brokers reported that it does not include other more traditional forms of 

identifying information, such as name, email address, or postal address. 

Once the data broker has placed a cookie on the consumer’s browser, the data broker can advertise to 

the consumer across the Internet for as long as the cookie stays on the consumer’s browser. The data broker 

either acts as an advertising network itself by buying advertising space on various websites or contracts with 

advertising networks that have secured advertising space on these websites. In this way, the data broker can 

place a cookie on Jane Doe’s browser, add to the cookie that she is a “Woman,” living in “Zip Code 12345,” 

and a “Sophisticated Shopper,” and serve her an advertisement within the data broker’s partner network, 

either on behalf of the fashion retailer or any other one of its online or offline clients. 

In addition to the example described above, data broker clients can use onboarding products in 

several additional ways:

⊲ Retargeting. A retailer may want to use its existing customer and prospect lists to present those 

consumers with specific offers across the Internet. For example, a lender may want to target its 

financially distressed customers for a new subprime credit card, or a hotel might want to target its 

high-value rewards members to advertise a vacation getaway. 

⊲ Cross-Channel Campaigns. A retailer may want to target an identical audience through multiple 

channels. For example, a pet store may want to run a campaign to sell a new dog shampoo to dog 

owners simultaneously via direct mail, email, and Internet advertisements. Through onboarding, the 

pet store can find on the Internet the customers to whom it sent its direct mail and email brochures 

and target them with Internet advertisements as well. 

Finally, although some of the studied data brokers are onboarding consumers’ offline activities to 

advertise to them online, they do not appear to be using consumers’ online web browsing activities to target 

them offline. However, one of the data brokers stated that its customers have asked for this functionality and 

that it plans to offer it in the future. A review of the privacy policies of other data brokers that were not part 

of this study demonstrates that some data brokers may be already using consumers’ web browsing activities 

in offline direct marketing products.62

62 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, FiveData, http://fivedata.com/privacy.html (last visited May 19, 2014); Privacy Policy, 

eTargetMedia, http://www.etargetmedia.com/privacy.html (last visited May 19, 2014).

29
Exhibit 4:

Onboarding Onboardin

When data brokers help businesses find consumer targets for online advertising.

When Jane Doe visits certain websites, 

the business’s ads may be displayed.

Next time Jane Doe logs on to 

Social Media X, the data broker 

places a cookie on her browser.

Other News

Nam aliquet, ante in mattis fringilla, P lorem 

molestie nisi, sed scelerisque massa ante et 

metus. Nam sit amet sollicitudin diam, nec lacinia 

libero. Integer eu felis accumsan turpis feugiat 

posuere. Phasellus vehicula lacus mauris, eu 

rhoncus nisl hendrerit in.

Some News Today

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur 

adipiscing elit. Nam aliquet, ante in mattis fringilla, 

orci lorem molestie nisi, sed scelerisque massa 

ante et metus. Nam sit amet sollicitudin diam, nec 

lacinia libero. Integer eu felis accumsan turpis 

feugiat posuere. 

News Yesterday

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur 

adipiscing elit. Nam aliquet, ante in mattis fringilla, 

orci lorem molestie nisi, sed scelerisque massa 

ante et metus. Nam sit amet sollicitudin diam, nec 

lacinia libero. Integer eu felis accumsan turpis 

feugiat posuere. Phasellus vehicula lacus mauris, 

eu rhoncus nisl hendrerit in.

Oh, a sale!

Jane

Social Media X

The data broker uses cookies to display the business’s ads on sites the targeted

consumers visit.

3 Targeting

and finds Jane Doe is registered on 

Social Media X.

What sites does 

Jane Doe visit?

Jane

Social Media X

assigns Jane Doe to the targeted 

segment,

Jane Doe

woman

12345

sophisticated 

shopper

Matching

The data broker finds the targeted consumers online,

2

We’re looking for new 

customers who are:

 • women 

 • living in the zip code 12345 

• sophisticated shoppers.

Our databases tell us 

people like Jane Doe fit 

these characteristics!

Ok, we’ll find them 

in our databases.

A business asks a data broker to find consumers with particular characteristics.

1 Segmenting

30
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

3. Marketing Analyt

Five of the data brokers in this study provide analytics for marketing purposes, as a way to predict 

consumers’ likely behavior. Among other things, the analytics products offered by some of the data 

brokers enable a client to more accurately target consumers for an advertising campaign, refine product 

and campaign messages, and gain insights and information about consumer attitudes and preferences. For 

example, some data brokers will analyze their client’s customer data and advise a client regarding the type 

of media channel to use to advertise a particular product or brand (e.g., online, newspapers, television) and 

where the advertisements should be shown (e.g., Florida or California). As part of this analysis, the data 

brokers can also help their clients model the expected outcomes of various marketing tactics, thus allowing 

the clients to better advertise their products to consumers. For example, a data broker might be able to 

predict whether advertising a new product exclusively through Twitter will yield the desired outcome. 

Some of the data brokers offer their clients the ability to evaluate the impact of an advertising campaign 

after it has run. These analytic products are generally based on algorithms that consider hundreds or 

thousands of data elements, including historical data provided by the client and data that the broker gathers 

from the government, other publicly available sources, and commercial sources described above. For 

example, after a telecommunications company runs an online advertising campaign for its newest mobile 

device, that company might want to know how many of its customers saw those advertisements, went into a 

physical store, and purchased that device. 

Some of the data brokers convert their analyses into a variety of different marketing scores for 

consumers. Some scores rank clients’ customers on the basis of how likely they are to respond to particular 

marketing efforts. For example, clients may rely on marketing scores to identify consumers or addresses on 

direct mail lists with a low response rate. Clients may also rely on marketing scores to identify addresses 

that have a high undeliverable mail rate or consumers with a low purchase rate. These types of scores could 

be used to determine the types of offers consumers may receive, the number of offers, or even the level of 

customer service provided to specific individuals. Other scoring products measure a consumer’s presence on 

the Internet or a consumer’s influence over others. These scores are based on, for example, the consumer’s 

blogging practices, participation in social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, the number of friends, 

followers, or readers the consumer has, the amount of content the consumer creates on the Internet, or 

the consumer’s prominence in the news. Clients may use these social influence scores to ensure that they 

advertise their products to these particular consumers, with the expectation that these consumers will, in 

turn, tout these products to their friends and followers.63 

63 On March 19, 2014, the FTC hosted a seminar on alternative scoring products, as part of a series of seminars to examine the 

privacy implications of new areas of technology. See Spring Privacy Series: Alternative Scoring Products, Fed. Trade Comm’n

(Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/03/spring-privacy-series-alternativescoring-products. The seminar included discussions about the scores discussed in this report. Id. (transcript available at www.

ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/182261/alternative-scoring-products_final-transcript.pdf).

31
Federal Trade Commission

B. Risk Mitigati

Four of the data brokers sell risk mitigation products that generated approximately $177 million in 

annual revenue in 2012. The Commission has grouped these products into two categories: (1) identity 

verification and (2) fraud detection.64 

1. Identity Verificati

In general, identity verification products assist clients in confirming the identity of an individual. 

The data broker clients use identity verification products for diverse reasons. For example, banks use 

such products to comply with “know your customer” identity verification requirements under the USA 

PATRIOT Act65 or to otherwise help deter fraud at the time a consumer commences a transaction. 

Some of the data brokers offer identity verification products in several formats. First, the data brokers 

offer a scoring format, in which the client receives a numerical score indicating the level of risk associated 

with the transaction, along with explanatory codes that relate to the calculation of the score. For a consumer 

with a high risk score, the explanatory codes could state that the SSN provided by the consumer is associated 

with a deceased individual, the address used by the consumer has been associated with fraud or is a prison 

address, the SSN has been used very frequently in a short period of time, or the SSN has been attributed to 

an address other than the one submitted by the consumer.66 

Second, as a standalone product or to provide an additional layer of authentication, the data brokers 

offer their clients a quiz product, which typically includes questions to which the answers should be easily 

known to the consumer, but would not likely appear in information stolen by an identity thief, such as 

information that can be found in the consumer’s wallet. Questions might include: “Which of these is 

an email address you have used?” or “What is your mother’s birthday?” When used in conjunction with 

a scoring product, if a consumer scores high on risk, the data broker’s client may require the consumer to 

answer five out of the six questions correctly; however, if the consumer’s risk score is low, the data broker’s 

client may only require that the consumer answer three of the six questions correctly.

64 As noted earlier, the Commission’s Orders to the nine data brokers did not seek information about data broker activities that 

fall within the scope of the FCRA. However, some risk mitigation products could be covered by the FCRA, depending upon 

the information collected and its use. The Commission has previously sent warning letters to data brokers that appeared 

willing to sell data for FCRA purposes but did not consider themselves to be subject to the FCRA. See Press Release, Fed. 

Trade Comm’n, FTC Warns Data Broker Operations of Possible Privacy Violations (May 7, 2013), available at http://www.

ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/05/ftc-warns-data-broker-operations-possible-privacy-violations. The Commission 

will continue to focus on this issue.

65 Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit Unions, and Certain Non-Federally Regulated 

Banks, 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (implementing Section 326 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 

115 Stat. 272 (2001)).

66 The data brokers use the SSN to create these types of products, but do not share the SSN with their clients.

32
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Third, the data brokers offer the “match/no match” format, which provides confirmation that 

information provided by the consumer matches the information in the data broker’s files. In some cases, 

the data broker may provide a “close match” option, where, for instance, two digits in the telephone number 

look like they may have been transposed. 

Some of the data brokers provide a category of identity verification products called a status verification 

product, which serves to both identify an individual and indicate a status of that individual. Status 

verification products can ascertain whether a person is active duty military personnel and thereby entitled 

to certain foreclosure protections67 or whether an individual is listed as an excluded party for purposes 

of government contracting or procurement.68 They also include products that provide verification of 

employment (e.g., that X consumer works for Y employer).

2. Fraud Detect

Some of the data brokers also sell products to help their clients identify or reduce fraud. For example, 

one data broker offers a product that indicates whether an email address has existed for a period of time or 

has a history of transactions related to it. Another data broker tracks address information to assist companies 

in detecting patterns associated with attempted fraud (e.g., the delivery address is not associated with the 

listed consumer). 

Fraud detection products also can assist entities in verifying the reliability or truthfulness of information 

a consumer submits to them. For example, if a public benefit is contingent on a consumer’s level of 

income, a consumer may fill out a form declaring his or her income. The data brokers can provide a general 

confirmation of such income (inferred from broad demographic data) or, with the consumer’s consent, can 

verify the individual’s income based on his or her Internal Revenue Service tax return. 

Data broker products also can assist companies that have had a data breach by analyzing patterns to 

determine whether there appears to be misuse of the personal information breached. For example, if the 

breach included employees’ SSNs, the company can provide the data broker with a list of those SSNs 

67 See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 108-109, 117 Stat. 2835 (2003) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app §§ 501–596). 

The protections of this statute apply to active duty military personnel who had a mortgage obligation prior to enlistment or 

prior to being ordered to active duty.

68 As a means of protecting public funds from fraud and abuse, governmental entities and certain others publish lists of 

individuals and entities that are excluded or barred from receiving government benefits, contracts, financial assistance, 

or funds. Such exclusionary lists have been maintained by General Services Administration. See System for Award 

Mgmt., https://www.sam.gov/portal/public/SAM/##11 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) (The General Services Administration 

discontinued the Excluded Parties List System on November 21, 2012. Exclusions are now maintained by the System 

for Award Management); U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, see Exclusions Program, Office of Inspector 

General: U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/index.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) 

(setting forth a list of individuals and entities excluded from participating in Medicare, Medicaid, and any other federal 

health care program); Freddie Mac, see How to Access Freddie Mac’s Exclusionary List in Loan Prospector, Freddie Mac (Sept. 

2008), http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/ex_lst_lp.pdf (setting forth list of individuals and entities excluded from 

participating in transactions involving Freddie Mac loans); and others. 

33
Federal Trade Commission

and ask the data broker to monitor whether a particular SSN on the list is suddenly associated with many 

different addresses, thereby suggesting fraud.

C. People Sea

Three of the data brokers provide people search products, which generated over $52 million in combined 

annual revenue in 2012. “People search” products offer information about consumers obtained from 

government and other publicly available sources, such as social media sites, as described above. These 

products are unique in that they are often intended for use by individuals, although they can be used by 

organizations as well. Users utilize people search products for such purposes as tracking the activities of 

executives and competitors, finding old friends, researching a potential love interest or neighbor, networking, 

or locating court records. People search products provide personal information about consumers. These 

products may allow a user to conduct a search with as little as one data element, such as name, address, 

city/state, telephone number (including mobile telephone number), email address, username, or SSN. The 

products provide a variety of information including:

⊲ Aliases

⊲ Age and date of birth

⊲ News stories

⊲ Telephone number 

⊲ Gender

⊲ Interests/affiliations

⊲ Address history

⊲ Education information

⊲ Death records

⊲ Relatives 

⊲ Employment history

⊲ Marriage records

⊲ Email address

⊲ Criminal records

⊲ Divorce records

⊲ Civil records (including bankruptcies, liens, 

judgments)

⊲ Property ownership and sales history 

(including loan activity)

⊲ Social media information (including 

usernames, profile URL, friend connections)

⊲ Neighbors (including sex offenders)

Some of the data brokers provide free search products, and other data brokers provide fee-based 

products. In general, the data brokers instruct users that they cannot use these products for purposes 

34
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

governed by the FCRA, including eligibility for employment, credit, insurance, housing, or similar 

purposes.69 

69 The Commission has stated that a disclaimer alone will not suffice to keep a product outside the confines of the FCRA. 

See Complaint at 3, Filiquarian Publ’g. LLC, No. C- 4401 (F.T.C. Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/05/130501filquariancmpt.pdf; Complaint at 5, United States v. Spokeo, Inc., 

No. CV12-05001-MMM-SH (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

cases/2012/06/120612spokeocmpt.pdf. 

35
Federal Trade Commission

V. DATA Q

The procedures that the data brokers use to assure the quality of the data they provide to clients 

depend on the type of product at issue and the data broker’s business model.70 

A. Marketing Produ

For marketing products to be effective, the data brokers generally need to provide information to 

their clients so that the relevant marketing message (e.g., a golf-related advertisement) reaches the correct 

consumer (e.g., golfer Jane Doe at 123 Main Street). To this end, they implement several procedures. 

First, as described in Section II.B. of this report, they take steps to ensure the accuracy of the data they 

receive from their sources, so that, for example, consumers whom the source identifies as being interested in 

hiking are, in fact, interested in hiking. These steps range from relying on the reputation of their sources to 

affirmatively evaluating some of the data provided. 

Second, they take steps to ensure that they are matching the correct information with the correct 

consumer in their database. The data brokers’ matching practices vary. Some, for example, require stringent 

matching of the name and address elements. For example, if a source says that Jane Doe at 123 Main Street 

is interested in golfing, the data broker will only assign the golfing interest to the Jane Doe in its database 

who lives at 123 Main Street. Others rely on fuzzy logic71 matching rules. These data brokers may assign the 

golfing interest to Jane Dae, rather than Jane Doe, if their files show that Jane Dae lives at 123 Main Street.72 

Third, they may take steps to ensure that the identifying information they have is accurate and up-todate. Some of the data brokers will attempt to fill in missing information, such as a middle initial on a name 

or a street suffix (e.g., Avenue or Terrace). A few data brokers will check an address to make sure that a move 

record is not associated with the individual and keep the most recent address. Several of the data brokers 

will delete a record if it shows up on the Death Master File. 

Fourth, the data brokers may reconcile conflicting information. One data broker relies on mathematical 

algorithms to reconcile conflicting data elements. For example, if two data sources list a consumer’s age as 

25, another as 26, and two others as 25–35, the data broker might assign the age as 25 to that consumer.

70 The phrase “data quality” has traditionally been referred to as “data accuracy.” For the reasons described in Section V.B., for 

some fraud detection products, having some inaccurate data is important in order to detect anomalies and potential fraud. 

Thus, this section uses the term “data quality.” 

71 Fuzzy logic matching rules allow a computer to find matches even where the search terms are misspelled. For example, a 

search for “Barack Obama” under fuzzy logic matching rules might retrieve information about “Barak Obama” and other 

related terms.

72 A similar matching process takes place when data brokers in this category sell data append products, where they have to 

associate information with a particular customer, as requested by the client.

36
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Finally, several of the data brokers report that they accept inquiries from clients about data quality and 

attempt to take appropriate remedial action. These data brokers reported that data quality matters to their 

clients, who may terminate a data broker who provides less useful or accurate data than another data broker 

providing the same product. For example, if a data broker receives numerous complaints from its clients 

about the accuracy of the data, and the data broker determines that the information comes from a particular 

source, the data broker may further evaluate that source before obtaining updates or additional data from it. 

B. Risk Mitigation Produc

Like the data brokers that offer marketing products, the data brokers that provide risk mitigation 

products take steps to assess whether their sources are providing reliable information. (See Section II.B., 

supra). Unlike the data brokers that provide marketing products, however, for the most part, the data brokers 

selling fraud detection products avoid altering the data they obtain73 and tend to retain historical and 

anomalous data in order to spot potential trends associated with fraud. For example, while a data broker 

that sells a marketing product may delete a consumer record if that consumer appears on the Death Master 

File, a data broker providing a fraud detection product will keep the data in the consumer’s record to flag 

when a person using the deceased consumer’s data attempts to open an account. Similarly, if John Doe 

attempts to use his SSN to apply for a mobile telephone contract and a data broker’s fraud detection product 

shows that the same SSN belongs to another individual, then the transaction may be flagged as potentially 

fraudulent.74 Eliminating the entries related to other consumers’ use of John Doe’s SSN may undercut 

the ability to detect or prevent fraud. Thus, while some data used in fraud detection products may not be 

current or accurate, that data may nevertheless be relevant for purposes of detecting possible fraud. 

In contrast, for identity verification products, associating correct identifying information (often an SSN) 

with a particular individual is critical. The data brokers selling identity verification products tend to require 

precise matching before linking a data element to an individual. While a data broker selling a marketing 

product may match information to a consumer using only name and address, identity verification products 

are more rigorous. They rely not only on names and addresses, but may also require that the driver’s 

license and SSN match the information in their records to ensure that the information relates to the correct 

individual. In this way, the data broker can try to ensure that, for example, John Doe, Senior, will not be 

denied the ability to complete a transaction because he has been misidentified as John Doe, Junior, who lives 

in the same house.

73 They may use standardization information to make data more consistent with U.S. Postal Service standards (e.g., they may 

change “North 32nd Street” in one file to “32nd Street North”).

74 See Section VIII.B.2., infra, for a discussion of the FCRA’s application to these products. 

37
Federal Trade Commission

C. People Search Produ

Unlike the data brokers in the other two categories, the data brokers providing people search products, 

for the most part, do not assess their sources because they primarily use publicly available sources. One 

data broker reported, however, that it compares the information acquired from publicly available sources to 

information acquired from other data brokers in order to assess the accuracy of the information.

The data brokers providing people search products report that they take steps to match the data they 

receive to the appropriate individual. For example, if a data broker finds a newspaper article relating to John 

Doe, and there are two John Does in its system, the data broker may look at the newspaper article to see if it 

mentions John Doe’s place of residence or his age. In doing so, the data broker might be able to determine 

that the newspaper article relates to the John Doe living in California, rather than the John Doe living in 

Florida. One of these data brokers has patented a matching logic system to facilitate better matches.

In many cases, a user’s search through one of these people search products will generate a number of 

different results. For example, a search for “Mike Smith” might provide results for “Michael Smith,” “Mike 

D. Smith,” “Micheal Smith,” and “Mike E. Smith.” Typically, the data brokers in this category will leave it 

to users to determine which results, if any, match the person they are seeking. 

38
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

VI. C

A. Types of Clie

Each of the data brokers studied has numerous clients. The following chart provides a snapshot of the 

main categories of data broker clients. 

Exhibit 5: Clients by Product Type and Industry Sect

Direct

Marketing

Online 

Marketing

Marketing 

Analytics

Identity 

Verification

Fraud 

Detection

People

Search

Alternative Payment 

Providersi X X

Attorneys & 

Investigators X

Automotive Industry X X X

Consumer Packaged 

Goods Manufacturersii X X X

Data Brokers X X X X X

Educational

Institutions X X X

Energy/Utilities X

Government

Entities X X X X X

Hospitality/Travel/

Entertainment X X X

Individual Consumers X

Insurance Companies X X X X

Lenders/

Financial Services 

Firms

X X X X X X

39
Federal Trade Commission

Direct

Marketing

Online 

Marketing

Marketing 

Analytics

Identity 

Verification

Fraud 

Detection

People

Search

Marketing/

Advertising Firms X X X X X X

Media X X X

Non-profit Entities/

Political Campaigns X X X X

Pharmaceutical

Firms X X X

Real Estate Services X X X

Retail Companies X X X X X X

Technology

Companiesiii X X X X

Telecom Companiesiv X X X X

i Alternative Payment Providers include companies who provide consumers with alternative methods of 

payment rather than traditional methods such as checks or credit cards. 

ii Consumer Packaged Goods Manufacturers include companies that manufacture items that consumers use 

and have to replace frequently, such as food and beverages, apparel, and household products.

iii Technology Companies include hardware companies, software companies, Internet companies, and other 

technology companies. 

iv Telecom Companies include telephone, mobile, cable and satellite television providers, and other 

telecommunication companies.

In addition, some of the data brokers, on a limited basis, have also sold information to companies in the 

debt collection and debt buying industries to help those companies locate individuals and/or determine the 

likelihood that they will repay a debt. 

B. Client Screening, Contracting, and Monitori

Practices

The data brokers’ client screening, contracting, and monitoring practices vary, depending on the type 

of product (e.g., marketing or fraud detection), the type of data provided by the product (e.g., property 

information or lifestyle data), or the type of client (e.g., financial institution or retailer). For example, when 

compiling government and other publicly available information to provide people search products to the 

40
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

general public, the data brokers tend to engage in minimal screening or monitoring of their clients. Clients, 

including individual consumers, access these products through the data brokers’ websites and the data 

brokers do not determine the purpose for which the client will use the product. The data brokers state that 

they prohibit certain uses of data through their websites’ Terms of Use, which often include prohibitions 

on using the products for unlawful purposes, for FCRA purposes, or both. Some of the data brokers only 

post their Terms of Use on their websites without requiring clients to affirmatively agree to the terms; others 

require clients to affirmatively agree to the Terms of Use when completing the transaction, although the 

terms may not be displayed during the transaction. The data brokers generally do not review, monitor, 

audit, or evaluate the use of their people search products after the client completes the transaction.

Apart from the people search category, several of the data brokers engage in some screening and 

monitoring of their clients.75 The screening process may include meeting or speaking with potential clients, 

relying on the well-established reputation of the potential client, and performing some research on the 

legitimacy of the potential client’s business, such as verifying the business address, performing Internet 

searches, and reviewing the potential client’s website. In addition, one data broker reported that it does not 

sell its products to clients involved in certain industries, such as pornography, debt repair, credit counseling, 

private investigation, or the sale of illegal drug products or services or illegal weapons. 

A few of the data brokers engage in more significant screening and monitoring. In addition to the 

screening process described above, the data brokers may include a credentialing questionnaire to determine 

if the client is a legitimate entity and has a lawful use for the product, site inspection, security review, website 

review, and reference checks. These data brokers also include auditing provisions in their client contracts, 

perform audits of their clients, and have terminated clients for contract violations.

Whether or not they screen or monitor their clients, the data brokers that offer risk mitigation and 

marketing products enter into written, signed contracts with their clients that describe the permitted and 

prohibited uses of the product. Prohibited uses may include reuse or resale of the data without permission; 

decoding or reverse engineering of the data; illegal or illicit uses; uses in violation of the FCRA, GLBA, 

HIPAA, or COPPA; and uses in violation of industry self-regulatory guidelines. 

The contracts between data brokers and their clients include few provisions regarding the accuracy of 

their products. Some of the data brokers represent to their clients that their information is only as accurate 

as their sources and accept no responsibility to validate the accuracy of their data. Other data brokers, rather 

than making representations regarding the accuracy of their data, focus on the utility and predictive quality 

of their products. 

75 Notably, the IRSG principles discussed in the Introduction were designed to screen clients, in part to avoid misuse of data 

that IRSG member companies provided to their clients.  However, the industry ultimately terminated the IRSG. See IRSG, 

supra note 5.

41
Federal Trade Commission

VII. CONSUMER CON

BROKER INF

In the following sections, the Commission describes some of the salient features of the data brokers’ 

access, correction, opt-out, and deletion policies by product type.

A. Marketing Produ

Of the five data brokers that sell marketing products, four provide consumers with access to certain 

limited information.76 These data brokers provide notice on their website, typically within a lengthy 

privacy policy, and an explanation of how to access the information; however, these notices may be hard to 

understand. In response to a consumer request, some of these data brokers will provide the consumer’s name 

accompanied by a few general interest categories the data broker has associated with that consumer, such as 

“Travel Enthusiast” or “Green Consumer.” Consumers are not provided access to all of the data that the data 

broker has associated with them and/or all of the inferences made from that data. The data brokers typically 

provide access to raw data and not to their proprietary information that they derive through algorithms. As 

a result, consumers may not know they have been categorized in a particular manner. 

To the extent consumers can access information about themselves, they are required to submit personal 

information to verify their identity and sometimes additional documentation through postal or electronic 

mail, such as a physical or scanned copy of a government-issued photo identification card or passport, 

and, for one broker, possibly a copy of a recent credit, utility, or telephone bill.77 The data brokers in this 

study report that they use this personal information only for authentication purposes and to process access 

requests. 

Only two data brokers that sell marketing products allow consumers to correct their information. Of 

them, one data broker launched a new website in September 2013 that, among other things, lists some 

elements the data broker sells in its marketing products used for online advertising and enables consumers to 

correct some of these elements. 

The four data brokers that sell marketing products and provide consumers with access also allow 

consumers to opt out of the use or sharing of their personal information for marketing purposes. Opting 

out means suppressing the consumer’s personal information from display in the data broker’s marketing 

76 In September 2013, one data broker, Acxiom, publicly announced changes to its access policy after submitting its final 

responses to the Order. This data broker launched a new website to enable consumers to access and correct information about 

them, and to and opt out of having some information included in certain marketing products.  See Press Release, Acxiom 

Corp., Acxiom Launches New Consumer Portal (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.acxiom.com/acxiom-launches-newconsumer-portal/.

77 Despite recognizing that minors would not typically have such documentation, one data broker explained that it provides 

access only to consumers able to produce the documentation. 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

products. These data brokers generally do not delete the consumer’s information from their systems. 

Instead, they maintain the information in order to be able to match records that they may receive in the 

future and identify which consumer records should be suppressed. Some data brokers also report that they 

might continue to use the suppressed information in products that display data in aggregated, anonymous 

form. 

These four data brokers provide notice of their opt-out policy via their individual, company-specific 

websites, usually in the privacy policy. Consumers can submit opt-out requests through a web form that 

requires basic consumer contact information, such as name, mailing address, and possibly an email address. 

Some of the data brokers also accept opt-out requests by mail or fax. When compared with the data access 

requests, the data broker opt-out procedures appear to focus less on authentication of the individual and 

more on streamlining the process for both the data broker and the consumer. For example, opt-out requests 

generally do not require the submission of supporting documents. When consumers provide their personal 

information in order to opt out, the data brokers have indicated that they use the information only for the 

opt out. 

The data brokers that provide consumers with the ability to opt out convey some limitations regarding 

opt outs to consumers, but do not convey others, which could confuse consumers. For example, among 

the three data brokers that sell risk mitigation and marketing products, one data broker’s opt-out disclosures 

did not clearly convey that the opt out is limited to just the marketing products, which comprise a small 

percentage of the data broker’s business. 

Opting out typically does not take effect immediately. It often takes a data broker several weeks to 

suppress a consumer’s personal information from its database. Furthermore, while a consumer may opt 

out, information about that consumer might still appear in another consumer’s records, such as that of a 

spouse. In addition, if a consumer submits identifying information in an opt-out request that varies from 

the identifying information in the data broker’s records, the opt out may not capture all of those records. 

For example, “Jonathan Doe” may not know to also submit for his shortened name, “Jon Doe.” As a result, 

consumer opt-out requests may not be completely effective. 

B. Risk Mitigation Produc

Of the four data brokers that sell risk mitigation products, two provide consumers with some form of 

access to their information. In order to obtain their information, consumers are required to submit personal 

information to verify their identity, such as name, address, telephone number, email address, and possibly 

provide a photocopy or electronic scan of a government photo identification card and a copy of a recent 

credit card, utility, or telephone bill. As with data brokers selling marketing products, the data brokers 

providing risk mitigation products use this personal information only for authentication purposes and to 

process the access request. Depending on the data broker’s procedures, consumers can submit access requests 

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by web form, mail, or email. One of the two data brokers charges a $5 processing fee for access. The two 

data brokers that provide consumers with access set forth a notice on their website, typically within their 

privacy policy, and provide an explanation of how to obtain the information. The two data brokers provide 

different levels of detail in their website notice. For example, one data broker describes a procedure to obtain 

the data used in its products generally, whereas the other data broker specifies a procedure for obtaining the 

data used in its risk mitigation products.78 

Only one data broker allows consumers to correct their information. The others do not offer such 

an option, stating that it would undermine their efforts to detect fraud. None of the data brokers allows 

consumers to opt out of the use or sharing of their personal information in the data brokers’ risk mitigation 

products. 

C. People Search Produ

The three data brokers that provide people search products provide access to consumers by allowing 

them to search for themselves by using the same free or fee-based products the data broker offers to its 

clients. One data broker that offers fee-based people search products provides consumers with free access to 

their own information, but consumers must verify their identity by responding to a number of knowledgebased authentication questions.

These data brokers also allow consumers to correct some information in varying degrees. One data 

broker allows consumers to correct their displayed email address, another data broker allows consumers 

to annotate their information by appending remarks to their profile, and the third data broker allows 

consumers to report facts as inaccurate, which prompts the data broker to check on the accuracy of its source 

and, if necessary, fix the inaccurate fact within twenty-four hours.

Two of the data brokers that provide people search products allow consumers to opt out of the disclosure 

of their information. One data broker requires that the consumer provide a copy of the consumer’s driver’s 

license—with the photo and license number crossed out—by mail or fax or uploaded through a web form, 

and the other data broker does not require any documentation. One of the data brokers indicated that it 

treats people search product-related complaints as opt-out requests even if the consumer does not specifically 

request to opt out. As with marketing products, opt outs for people search products may be incomplete. 

If a consumer submits identifying information in an opt-out request that varies from the identifying 

information in the data broker’s records, the opt out may not capture all of those records. As a result, 

consumers may find themselves having to submit many opt-out requests to the same data broker. 

78 One of the data brokers has been providing consumers access to the data used in its risk mitigation products for a number of 

years, while the other began in August 2012. 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

As to deletion, the three data brokers that provide people search products explained that they do 

not offer consumers the option to delete their information because such measures would be futile. They 

explained that, because they refresh their data via automated means such as web crawling, the same, similar, 

or seemingly related information about consumers that was deleted is otherwise publicly available and will 

reappear on the Internet and in their databases. 

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VIII. FINDINGS AND

This report reflects the information provided in response to the Orders issued to nine data brokers, 

information gathered through follow-up communications and interviews, and information gathered through 

publicly available sources. Based primarily on these materials about a cross-section of data brokers, the 

Commission makes the following findings and recommendations: 

A. Find

1. Characteristics of the Indust

⊲ Data Brokers Collect Consumer Data from Numerous Sources, Largely Without 

Consumers’ Knowledge: Data brokers collect data from commercial, government, and 

other publicly available sources. Data collected could include bankruptcy information, 

voting registration, consumer purchase data, web browsing activities, warranty 

registrations, and other details of consumers’ everyday interactions. Data brokers do not 

obtain this data directly from consumers, and consumers are thus largely unaware that 

data brokers are collecting and using this information. While each data broker source 

may provide only a few data elements about a consumer’s activities, data brokers can put 

all of these data elements together to form a more detailed composite of the consumer’s 

life. 

⊲ The Data Broker Industry is Complex, with Multiple Layers of Data Brokers 

Providing Data to Each Other: Data brokers provide data not only to end-users, but 

also to other data brokers. The nine data brokers studied obtain most of their data 

from other data brokers rather than directly from an original source. Some of those 

data brokers may in turn have obtained the information from other data brokers. 

Seven of the nine data brokers in the Commission’s study provide data to each other. 

Accordingly, it would be virtually impossible for a consumer to determine how a data 

broker obtained his or her data; the consumer would have to retrace the path of data 

through a series of data brokers.

⊲ Data Brokers Collect and Store Billions of Data Elements Covering Nearly Every 

U.S. Consumer: Data brokers collect and store a vast amount of data on almost every 

U.S. household and commercial transaction.  Of the nine data brokers, one data broker’s 

database has information on 1.4 billion consumer transactions and over 700 billion 

aggregated data elements; another data broker’s database covers one trillion dollars in 

consumer transactions; and yet another data broker adds three billion new records each 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

month to its databases. Most importantly, data brokers hold a vast array of information 

on individual consumers. For example, one of the nine data brokers has 3000 data 

segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.    

⊲ Data Brokers Combine and Analyze Data About Consumers to Make Inferences 

About Them, Including Potentially Sensitive Inferences: Data brokers infer 

consumer interests from the data that they collect. They use those interests, along 

with other information, to place consumers in categories. Some categories may seem 

innocuous such as “Dog Owner,” “Winter Activity Enthusiast,” or “Mail Order 

Responder.” Potentially sensitive categories include those that primarily focus on 

ethnicity and income levels, such as “Urban Scramble” and “Mobile Mixers,” both 

of which include a high concentration of Latinos and African Americans with low 

incomes. Other potentially sensitive categories highlight a consumer’s age such as 

“Rural Everlasting,” which includes single men and women over the age of 66 with “low 

educational attainment and low net worths,” while “Married Sophisticates” includes 

thirty-something couples in the “upper-middle class . . . with no children.” Yet other 

potentially sensitive categories highlight certain health-related topics or conditions, such 

as “Expectant Parent,” “Diabetes Interest,” and “Cholesterol Focus.”

⊲ Data Brokers Combine Online and Offline Data to Market to Consumers Online: 

Data brokers rely on websites with registration features and cookies to find consumers 

online and target Internet advertisements to them based on their offline activities. Once 

a data broker locates a consumer online and places a cookie on the consumer’s browser, 

the data broker’s client can advertise to that consumer across the Internet for as long 

as the cookie stays on the consumer’s browser. Consumers may not be aware that data 

brokers are providing companies with products to allow them to advertise to consumers 

online based on their offline activities. Some data brokers are using similar technology 

to serve targeted advertisements to consumers on mobile devices. 

2. Benefits and Ris

⊲ Consumers Benefit from Many of the Purposes for Which Data Brokers Collect 

and Use Data: Data broker products help to prevent fraud, improve product offerings, 

and deliver tailored advertisements to consumers. Risk mitigation products provide 

significant benefits to consumers by, for example, helping prevent fraudsters from 

impersonating unsuspecting consumers. Marketing products benefit consumers by 

allowing them to more easily find and enjoy the goods and services they need and prefer. 

In addition, consumers benefit from increased and innovative product offerings fueled 

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by increased competition from small businesses that are able to connect with consumers 

they may not have otherwise been able to reach. Similarly, people search products allow 

individuals to connect with old classmates, neighbors, and friends.

⊲ At the Same Time, Many of the Purposes for Which Data Brokers Collect and Use 

Data Pose Risks to Consumers: There are a number of potential risks to consumers 

from data brokers’ collection and use of consumer data. For example, if a consumer 

is denied the ability to conclude a transaction based on an error in a risk mitigation 

product, the consumer can be harmed without knowing why. In such cases, the 

consumer is not only denied the immediate benefit, but also cannot take steps to 

prevent the problem from recurring. Similarly, the scoring processes used in some 

marketing products are not transparent to consumers. This means that consumers 

are unable to take actions that might mitigate the negative effects of lower scores, 

such as being limited to ads for subprime credit or receiving different levels of service 

from companies. As to other marketing products, they may facilitate the sending of 

advertisements about health, ethnicity, or financial products, which some consumers 

may find troubling and which could undermine their trust in the marketplace. 

Moreover, marketers could even use the seemingly innocuous inferences about 

consumers in ways that raise concerns. For example, while a data broker could infer 

that a consumer belongs in a data segment for “Biker Enthusiasts,” which would allow a 

motorcycle dealership to offer the consumer coupons, an insurance company using that 

same segment might infer that the consumer engages in risky behavior. Similarly, while 

data brokers have a data category for “Diabetes Interest” that a manufacturer of sugarfree products could use to offer product discounts, an insurance company could use that 

same category to classify a consumer as higher risk. Finally, people search products can 

be used to facilitate harassment, or even stalking, and may expose domestic violence 

victims, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, public officials, or other individuals to 

retaliation or other harm. 

⊲ Storing Data About Consumers Indefinitely May Create Security Risks: Some of 

the data brokers store all data indefinitely, even if it is later updated, unless otherwise 

prohibited by contract. For some products, these data brokers report that they need to 

keep older data. For example, they explain that even if a consumer’s address is outdated, 

it is important to keep the consumer’s address history in order to verify the consumer’s 

identity. For other products, however, retention of older data may not be necessary. 

An older address may be less relevant to deliver marketing to a consumer. Although 

stored data may be useful for future business purposes, the risk of keeping the data may 

outweigh the benefits. For example, identity thieves and other unscrupulous actors may 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

be attracted to the collection of consumer profiles that would give them a clear picture 

of consumers’ habits over time, thereby enabling them to predict passwords, challenge 

questions, or other authentication credentials.

3. Consumer Choi

⊲ To the Extent Data Brokers Offer Consumers Choices About Their Data, the 

Choices are Largely Invisible and Incomplete: Some data brokers provide consumers 

with choices about their data, but because data brokers are not consumer-facing, 

consumers may not know where to go to exercise any choices that may be offered. In 

addition, the data brokers’ opt outs do not clearly convey whether the consumer can 

exercise a choice to opt out of all uses of consumer data, and therefore, consumers may 

find the opt outs confusing. As a result, even those consumers who know who the data 

brokers are, find their websites, and take the time to find the opt out and use it may still 

not know its limitations. For marketing products, the extent of consumers’ choices over 

their data is not clear. For risk mitigation products, many data brokers do not provide 

consumers with access to their data or the ability to correct inaccurate data. 

B. Legislative Recommendati

Many of the above findings point to a fundamental lack of transparency about data broker industry 

practices. Data brokers acquire a vast array of detailed and specific information about consumers; analyze 

it to make inferences about consumers, some of which may be considered quite sensitive; and share the 

information with clients in a range of industries. Much of this activity takes place without consumers’ 

knowledge. In light of these findings, the Commission unanimously recommends that Congress should 

consider enacting legislation that would enable consumers to learn of the existence and activities of data 

brokers and provide consumers with reasonable access to information about them held by these entities. 

The specific legislative recommendations detailed below build on the Commission’s work for the last two 

decades to improve transparency and choice in the data broker industry. Indeed, despite the Commission’s 

call for greater transparency in the 1990s, the IRSG self-regulatory experiment to improve transparency of 

data broker practices was short-lived. Since then, data broker practices have grown dramatically in breadth 

and depth, as data brokers have the ability to collect information from more sources, including consumers’ 

online activities; analyze it through new and emerging algorithms and business models; and store the 

information indefinitely due to dwindling storage costs. Despite the Commission’s recommendations, lack 

of transparency and choice remain significant issues in this industry.

The specific legislative recommendations discussed below reflect high-level principles drawn from the 

findings of this study, the Commission’s previous work in this area, and the ongoing public debate about 

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data brokers. Among other things, the recommendations borrow from the Commission’s best practice and 

legislative recommendations regarding data brokers in its 2012 Privacy Report; self-regulatory developments 

among industry members;79 and the Commission’s extensive enforcement experience with data broker 

practices. For example, the Commission’s case against ChoicePoint, described above, underscores the 

importance of employing reasonable and appropriate measures to screen clients before sharing consumers’ 

information in order to secure the consumer information retained by the data broker.80 The Commission’s 

case against data broker U.S. Search addressed the importance of disclosing any limitations on opt-outs.81 

The Commission has organized its legislative recommendations by product type. In offering these highlevel recommendations, the Commission recognizes that it will be important to weigh the costs and benefits 

of more concrete legislative proposals as they are developed.82 

1. Marketing Produc

The Commission recommends that Congress consider legislation requiring data brokers to give 

consumers (1) access to their data and (2) the ability to opt out of having it shared for marketing purposes.83 

Currently, consumers do not have meaningful information about which data brokers may have their data, 

nor do consumers have meaningful information about where they can access their data or how they can 

exercise any opt-out rights that data brokers may already provide.

To enable consumers to efficiently avail themselves of these rights, legislation could also require the 

creation of a centralized mechanism, such as an Internet portal, where data brokers can identify themselves, 

describe their information collection and use practices, and provide links to access tools and opt outs.84 This 

79 See AboutTheData, https://www.aboutthedata.com/ (last visited May 19, 2014). 

80 United States v. ChoicePoint, No. 1:06-CV-0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2009) (Supplemental Stipulated J.), available 

at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/10/091019choicepointstiporder.pdf; United States v. 

ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) (Stipulated Final J.), available at http://www.ftc.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/01/stipfinaljudgement.pdf.

81 US Search, Inc., No. C-4317, at 6–7 (F.T.C. Mar. 14, 2011) (Decision and Order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/

default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110325ussearchdo.pdf.

82 The following legislative and best practice recommendations reflect the consensus of a majority of the Commission.  To the 

extent that particular Commissioners have different viewpoints on a particular legislative or best practice recommendation, 

those viewpoints can be found in footnotes below or in a separate statement. Commissioner McSweeny did not participate in 

the Commission vote on this report.

83 As noted above, data brokers often refer to such an opt out as data “suppression.” See Section VII.A. and supra note 54.

84 See Privacy Report, supra note 9, at 69–70. 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

approach would enable consumers to visit a single site to ascertain what kinds of information data brokers 

have about them and how to exercise opt-out choices.85 

Some industry members have expressed concern that such a centralized portal would be unwieldy, given 

the sheer number of data brokers in the marketplace and the fact that consumers may be overwhelmed by 

the breadth of information. To address this concern, in creating such a portal, Congress could consider 

limiting the portal to a number of the largest data brokers (fifty, for example, or other number deemed 

appropriate).86 This approach is similar to that contained in the FCRA, which places CRAs in different tiers. 

All CRAs are subject to some requirements; other requirements apply only to “nationwide specialty CRAs;” 

and still other requirements apply only to “nationwide CRAs.” The FCRA requires the “nationwide CRAs” 

to create a centralized website which grants consumers the ability to access their free annual credit reports.87

The Commission recommends that Congress consider requiring data brokers to provide consumers 

with access to their data, including any sensitive data, at a reasonable level of detail. Because data brokers 

create and manipulate thousands of data elements and segments, it would be very difficult for consumers to 

interpret and digest an access tool that gave them access to every category of data a data broker has about 

them. Despite these challenges, Congress should consider requiring data brokers to provide enough detail 

that a consumer can see the breadth of categories the data broker has about them, including any sensitive 

data. 

Allowing consumers the ability to exercise control over the use of sensitive information is particularly 

important. There appears to be widespread agreement on certain core sensitive categories of data—such as 

whether a consumer has AIDS, diabetes, or depression—while the sensitivity of other information may lie in 

the “eye of the beholder.” For categories that some consumers might find sensitive and others may not (e.g., 

visually impaired, balding, overweight), having access to this data, along with the ability to suppress the use 

85 Commissioner Wright agrees that Congress should consider legislation that would provide for consumer access to the 

information collected by data brokers. However, he does not believe that at this time there is enough evidence that the 

benefits to consumers of requiring data brokers to provide them with the ability to opt out of the sharing of all consumer 

information for marketing purposes outweighs the costs of imposing such a restriction. Finally, although the concept of a 

centralized portal to provide consumers with information about the practices of data brokers may be useful in theory, he 

believes that the Commission should engage in a rigorous study of consumer preferences sufficient to establish that consumers 

would likely benefit from such a portal prior to making such a recommendation.

86 Because there may be many ways to define the universe of “large data brokers,” it may be appropriate for any legislation that 

addresses this issue to include a rulemaking, similar to the rulemakings the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau undertook 

to determine the “larger participants” that would be subject to its examination authority. See Section 1024 of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B) (2012).

87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (2012); see also 16 C.F.R. § 1022.136 (2012); Annual Credit Report, http://www.

annualcreditreport.com/ (last visited May 19, 2014).

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of it for marketing, will improve the transparency of data broker practices and allow consumers to control 

uses of the data about which they care the most.88 

In addition, to further enhance transparency, the Commission recommends that Congress consider 

legislation requiring data brokers to clearly disclose to consumers (e.g., on their website) that they not only 

use the raw data that they obtain from their sources, such as a person’s name, address, age, and income range, 

but that they also derive certain inferences from the data. For example, the data broker may explain that it 

infers a consumer’s interests from the consumer’s licenses, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, websites 

visited, or previous purchases.89 Congress should also consider requiring data brokers to clearly disclose the 

names and/or categories of their data sources, so that consumers are better able to determine if, for example, 

they need to correct their data with an original public record source.90 Of course, any legislation in this area 

should weigh the potential security risks of providing access to individual consumer data and any potential 

methods for mitigating such risks. 

Given the current invisibility of data brokers, the question remains: If these access and opt-out tools 

were to exist and be available to consumers through a centralized mechanism, how would a consumer learn 

about them? One way legislation could increase the visibility of the data broker industry and the access and 

opt-out tools they offer is to require that consumer-facing sources provide a prominent notice to consumers 

that they share consumer data with data brokers and give consumers choices, such as the ability to opt out of 

sharing their information with data brokers. Congress should also consider imposing important protections 

for sensitive information, such as certain health information, by requiring that consumer-facing sources 

obtain consumers’ affirmative express consent before collecting and sharing such information with data 

brokers. Finally, Congress should consider requiring that consumer-facing sources provide the names of the 

data brokers to which they provide data, along with information or links to the centralized mechanism with 

its description of the access and opt-out rights offered by these data brokers.91 Providing such notice at the 

88 Commissioner Wright believes that in enacting statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Congress undertook efforts to 

balance the benefits of information collection and sharing (fair and accurate credit reporting is beneficial to both businesses 

and consumers) against the costs of such information collection and sharing (potential risks to confidentiality, accuracy, 

relevancy, and appropriate use). In doing so, Congress carefully articulated the types of information to be protected, limited 

the use and access to such information, and provided certain consumer protections relating to the accuracy of and the ability 

to dispute and correct such information. In the instant case, Commissioner Wright is wary of extending FCRA-like coverage 

to other uses and categories of information without first performing a more robust balancing of the benefits and costs 

associated with imposing these requirements.

89 This recommendation is not intended to require data brokers to disclose their proprietary algorithms. 

90 For example, Acxiom has released a tool that provides consumers with access to information about the categories of sources 

from whom the company obtains its data. See AboutTheData, supra notes 76 & 79.

91 In addition, Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioner Brill believe that data brokers should take reasonable steps, such as 

through contractual provisions with their immediate data source, to ensure that the consumer data they obtain was procured 

by the original source—such as a retailer—with notice and choice, including express affirmative consent for sensitive data, 

in the manner outlined above. Accordingly, they recommend that Congress consider including a provision to this effect in 

legislation. In the absence of such a legal requirement, they believe that data brokers should, as a best practice, contractually 

require their immediate sources to take reasonable steps to ensure, to the extent practicable, that the original source of data 

had provided notice and choice to consumers in the manner described above. 

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

source could give consumers a timely opportunity to learn that their data is shared with data brokers and to 

exercise choices about such sharing.92 

The Commission recognizes the reality that many consumers will not seek access to the data maintained 

by the data brokers and that those who do may not understand the nuances of how their data is used. 

However, the legislative recommendations in this section will do more than provide transparency to 

individual consumers. They also will promote accountability by allowing other key stakeholders—including 

regulators, policymakers, academics, industry, and consumer advocates—to assess whether data brokers are 

clearly and accurately describing their practices to consumers. 

2. Risk Mitigation Produc

The Commission recommends that Congress consider legislation that would provide consumers with 

transparency when a company uses a risk mitigation product that limits a consumer’s ability to complete a 

transaction. Such legislation could address scenarios that the FCRA may not cover. Consider the example 

of John Doe applying for a new mobile telephone contract. If a data broker’s product is used to assess John 

Doe’s ability to pay his bills on time, the FCRA would likely apply, because its obligations are generally 

triggered when consumers are denied credit, employment, housing, insurance, government benefits, or the 

ability to engage in a transaction that they initiated—such as an application for a mobile telephone contract. 

The Commission aggressively enforces the FCRA in connection with these and other uses.93 

If, however, the mobile telephone company uses a risk mitigation product only to confirm John Doe’s 

identity—i.e., to determine whether John Doe is in fact John Doe and not an identity thief—the FCRA 

may not apply. Despite the differing objectives, the ultimate result could be the same—John Doe cannot 

obtain a mobile telephone contract.94 In essence, he may be prevented from completing a transaction 

without knowing why.95 Congress should consider enacting legislation to address this scenario. Congress 

should consider requiring that, if a risk mitigation product adversely impacts a consumer’s ability to 

92 These recommendations complement the Commission’s previous recommendations with respect to consumer-facing data 

sources from the 2012 Privacy Report. See Privacy Report, supra note 9, at 35, 47–50.

93 FTC Statement on Data Brokers, supra note 3, at 4 (“The Commission maintains an aggressive FCRA enforcement program. 

To date, it has brought almost 100 cases and obtained in excess of $30 million in civil penalties.”). 

94 The determination of whether the FCRA applies does not turn on whether the data broker labels a product as a “risk 

mitigation” product.  There may be instances in which a product that is marketed as a risk mitigation product may be covered 

by the FCRA because, for example, it is used to determine creditworthiness.  Whether the FCRA applies to particular uses of 

consumer data depends on the specific facts involved, and the FTC will make these determinations on a case-by-case basis.  

95 The Commission does not have any information on the prevalence of errors in the consumer data that underlie data brokers’ 

risk mitigation products. In a different context, a recent Commission Report assessed the accuracy of consumer information 

in credit reports and found that 5.2% of consumers had errors on at least one of their three major credit reports that 

could lead to them paying more for products such as auto loans and insurance. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Section 319 of 

the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003: Fifth Interim Federal Trade Commission Report to 

Congress Concerning the Accuracy of Information in Credit Reports 47 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/reports/section-319-fair-and-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-fifth-interim-federal-tradecommission/130211factareport.pdf.

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complete a transaction or obtain a benefit, the consumer-facing company should identify the data brokers 

upon whose data the company relied. These data brokers should in turn give consumers the right to access 

the information used and correct any erroneous information, as appropriate. One of the data brokers 

in our study already implements a similar approach for its risk mitigation products. The required level 

of transparency, access, and correction should be tied to the significance of the benefit or transaction in 

question.96 

It would likely be impractical for data brokers whose risk mitigation products rely on hundreds or more 

data elements to provide access to every data element used to develop the products. However, data brokers 

could provide access to the results generated by the products, any explanatory codes associated with the 

results, the range of possible results, and a description of how the results are developed. This information 

would help consumers dispute or correct any errors. At the same time, one would not want an unscrupulous 

individual to be able to “correct” his or her own truthful data. For this reason, Congress should consider 

how to enable consumer access while preserving the accuracy and security of such data. 

3. People Search Produ

Finally, the Commission unanimously recommends that Congress consider legislation requiring data 

brokers offering people search products to: (1) allow consumers to access their own information; (2) allow 

consumers to opt out of the use of this information; (3) clearly disclose to consumers the data brokers’ 

sources of information, so that, if possible, the consumer can correct his or her information at the source; 

and (4) clearly disclose any limitations of the opt out, such as the fact that close matches of an individual’s 

name may continue to appear in search results.97 

C. Best Practice Recommendatio

More generally, the Commission continues to call on data brokers in all product categories to adopt 

the principles contained in the Privacy Report, to the extent they have not already done so in the two years 

since the Commission issued its report. In addition to the specific recommendations described above, they 

should also practice privacy by design, which includes considering privacy issues at every stage of product 

development. 

96 Commissioner Wright believes that this recommendation is premature because there is no evidence about the existence 

or scope of this hypothetical problem. As noted in supra note 95, the Commission does not have any information on the 

prevalence of errors in the consumer data that underlie data brokers’ risk mitigation products.

97 See US Search, Inc., No. C-4317, at 6–7 (F.T.C. Mar. 14, 2011) (Decision and Order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/

default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110325ussearchdo.pdf (alleging deception where a company’s “Privacy Lock” service 

would not prevent a consumer’s name and other information from appearing in many instances, including as an associate on 

another person’s profile, in a “reverse search,” or if the consumer changed addresses, thereby generating a new record).

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

As part of privacy by design, data brokers should strive to assess their collection practices and, to 

the extent practical, collect only the data they need and properly dispose of the data as it becomes less 

useful. This is particularly important in light of companies’ increased ability to collect, aggregate, and 

match consumer data and to develop secondary uses for the data in ways that consumers could never 

have contemplated when they provided the information. Sound data collection and disposal practices 

also reinforce data security, as collecting and storing large amounts of data not only increases the risk of a 

data breach or other unauthorized access but also increases the potential harm that could be caused.98 For 

example, identity thieves and other unscrupulous actors may be attracted to detailed consumer profiles 

maintained by data brokers99 that do not dispose of obsolete data, as this data could give them a clear picture 

of consumers’ habits over time, thereby enabling them to predict passwords, answers to challenge questions, 

or other authentication credentials. 

Data brokers also should implement better measures to refrain from collecting information from 

children and teens, particularly in marketing products. As to children under 13, COPPA already requires 

certain online services to refrain from collecting personal information from this age group without parental 

consent; the principles underlying that legislation could apply equally to information collected offline 

from children.100 As to teens, the Commission previously has noted that they often lack the judgment to 

appreciate the long-term consequences of, for example, posting data on the Internet.101 And as noted above, 

it appears that some of the data brokers themselves have policies or have stated that they do not use teens’ 

data in their marketing products; yet they may not check data from their sources to ascertain whether it 

contains such data. Data brokers providing data for marketing products should take further reasonable steps 

to avoid collecting and using teens’ and children’s data. 

Finally, the Commission recommends that data brokers take reasonable precautions to ensure that 

downstream users of their data do not use it for eligibility determinations or for unlawful discriminatory 

purposes.102 For example, while the data segment of “Smoker in Household” could be used to market a 

new air filter, a downstream entity also could use the segment to suggest that a person is a poor credit or 

98 See Privacy Report, supra note 9, at 24, 26–29. Commissioner Ohlhausen does not support a strict data minimization 

requirement. 

99 Cf. United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) (Stipulated Final J.), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/01/stipfinaljudgement.pdf.

100 For example, under § 312.7 of the COPPA Rule, an operator is prohibited from conditioning a child’s participation in an 

activity on the child’s disclosing more personal information than is reasonably necessary to participate in such activity. 16 

C.F.R. § 312.7.

101 See Privacy Report, supra note 9, at 59–60.

102 On September 15, 2014, the Commission will examine the potential effects of “Big Data” on American consumers, at a 

workshop entitled “Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion?.” See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine 

Effects of Big Data on Low Income and Underserved Consumers at September Workshop (Apr. 11, 2014), available at http://

www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-examine-effects-big-data-low-income-underserved-consumers. See also

Exec. Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values 51–53 (2014), available at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (discussing the potential for big data 

uses to result in discrimination). 

55
Federal Trade Commission

insurance risk, or an unsuitable candidate for employment or admission to a university. This would be 

especially pernicious if the segment included a high concentration of minorities. Of course, the use of race, 

color, religion, and certain other categories to make credit, insurance, and employment decisions is already 

against the law,103 but data brokers should help ensure that the information does not unintentionally go to 

unscrupulous entities104 that would be likely to use it for unlawful discriminatory purposes.105 Similarly, data 

brokers should conduct due diligence to ensure that data that they intend for marketing or risk mitigation 

purposes is not used to deny consumers credit, insurance, employment, or the like.106 

Some of the data brokers are already contractually limiting the purposes for which their clients 

can use their data. A subset of these data brokers goes further, by “seeding” data107 or auditing their 

clients to ascertain that it is not being used for a contractually prohibited purpose. The Commission’s 

recommendations on this issue seek to build on these best practices.108 

103 See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691–1691f (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in credit decisions on the 

basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, and receipt of public assistance).

104 This recommendation is analogous to current FCRA requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e. It is also analogous to the relief 

required in the consent decree resulting from the Commission’s ChoicePoint case, in which the Commission alleged a data 

broker had violated the FCRA by failing to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the personal information 

it collected for sale to its subscribers, including reasonable policies and procedures to verify or authenticate the identities 

and qualifications of prospective subscribers, thereby enabling downstream illegal uses of consumers’ data. See Complaint at 

7–8, United States v. ChoicePoint, No. 1:06-CV-0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/

default/files/documents/cases/2006/01/0523069complaint.pdf. Notably, because some of ChoicePoint’s activities were not 

FCRA-covered, the Commission alleged that ChoicePoint’s failure to implement these policies and procedures was also an 

unfair practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Id. at 9. Under the consent decree, ChoicePoint must, among other things,

establish and maintain reasonable procedures to ensure that consumer reports are provided only to those with a permissible 

purpose and verify the identity of businesses that apply to receive consumer reports, including making site visits to certain 

business premises and auditing subscribers’ use of consumer reports. See United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 1:06-CV0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) (Stipulated Final J.), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

cases/2006/01/stipfinaljudgement.pdf. 

105 Commissioner Wright believes that to the extent that information is being used for unlawful discriminatory purposes, the 

Commission’s law enforcement authority is the appropriate vehicle to address this problem. He also notes the Commission 

plans to examine issues related to “Big Data” at a September workshop. See supra note 102. Before imposing additional 

obligations on data brokers to conduct due diligence, he would like to see evidence about the existence, nature, and scope of 

any such problematic uses.

106 If the data broker’s activities do not meet the definition of a “consumer reporting agency,” as defined by the FCRA, these uses 

of the data would not trigger FCRA protections.

107 Some data brokers systematically add unique dummy data, or “seed” data, into their databases to monitor how this data is 

being used by their partners, resellers, or end clients. 

108 Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioner Brill believe that legislation—rather than simply a best practice recommendation—

is warranted to help ensure that consumers are protected from unlawful uses of data supplied by data brokers. 

56
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

IX. CO

In the nearly two decades since the Commission first began to examine data brokers, little progress 

has been made to improve transparency and choice. While data brokers provide important benefits to 

consumers, and some data brokers have taken steps to improve their privacy practices, overall transparency 

in this industry continues to be lacking. And with the emergence of new sources of information, 

improvements in analytics methods, and the availability of more granular information about individual 

consumers, the need for consumer protections in this area has never been greater. 

This report attempts to provide a window into data brokers’ collection and use of consumer information 

and makes recommendations to enhance transparency and consumer control. It also raises concerns about 

the collection of sensitive data about consumers and the development of labels and categories that could be 

used to target and potentially discriminate against consumers. The findings and recommendations in this 

report are intended to be part of an ongoing dialogue, and the Commission welcomes further input and 

information on these issues. The Commission will continue to work with industry, consumer groups, and 

lawmakers to further the goals of increased transparency and consumer control. 

57
Federal Trade Commission

58
Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

APPENDIX

Text of the Model Orde

A-1
Federal Trade Commission

A-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS: Jon Leibowitz, Chairman

J. Thomas Rosch

Edith Ramirez

Julie Brill

Maureen K. Ohlhausen

File No. P125404

ORDER TO FILE SPECIAL REPORT

Pursuant to a resolution of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “the Commission”)

dated December 14, 2012, titled “Resolution Directing Use of Compulsory Process to Collect

Information Regarding Data Brokers,” a copy of which is enclosed, [COMPANY NAME],

hereinafter referred to as the “Company,” is ordered to file with the Commission, no later than

February 1, 2013, a Special Report containing the information and documents specified herein.

The information provided in the Special Report will assist the Commission in compiling

a study of data broker industry information collection and use activities. 

The Special Report must restate each item of this Order with which the corresponding

answer is identified. Your report is required to be subscribed and sworn by an official of the

Company who has prepared or supervised the preparation of the report from books, records,

correspondence, and other data and material in your possession. If any question cannot be

answered fully, give the information that is available and explain in what respects and why the

answer is incomplete. The Special Report and all accompanying documentary responses must be

Bates-stamped. 

Confidential or privileged commercial or financial information will be reported by the

Commission on an aggregate or anonymous basis, consistent with Sections 6(f) and 21(d) of the

FTC Act. Individual submissions responsive to this Order that are marked “confidential” will

not be disclosed without first giving the Company ten (10) days notice of the Commission’s

intention to do so, except as provided in Sections 6(f) and 21 of the FTC Act.

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Specifications

Please provide the following information, documents and items, consistent with the

definitions, instructions, and formatting requirements contained in Attachment A:

1. Identification of Report Author: Identify by full name, business address, telephone

number, and official capacity the person(s) who has prepared or supervised the

preparation of the Company’s response to this Order and describe in detail the steps

taken by the Company to respond to this Order. For instructions pertaining to document

(written and electronic) and information preservation, identify the person who gave the

instructions, describe the content of any oral instructions, provide copies of any written

or electronic instructions, and identify the person(s) to whom the instructions were given. 

For each specification, identify the individual(s) who assisted in preparation of the

response. Provide a list of the persons (identified by name and corporate title or job

description) whose files were searched and identify the person who conducted the search.

2. Company Information: 

A. State the Company’s complete legal name and all other names under

which it has done business, its corporate mailing address, all addresses

from which it does or has done business, and the dates and states of its

incorporation. 

B. Describe the Company’s corporate structure, and state the names of all

parents, subsidiaries (whether wholly or partially owned), divisions

(whether incorporated or not), affiliates, branches, joint ventures,

franchises, operations under assumed names, websites, and entities over

which it exercises supervision or control. For each such entity, describe

the nature of its relationship to the Company.

C. Identify each individual or entity having an ownership interest in the

Company, as well as their individual ownership stakes and their positions

and responsibilities within the Company.

3. Products and Services:

A. Provide a list and description as to the nature and purpose of all the

products and services (both online and offline) that the Company offers or

sells that use personal data. Include a separate description of each product

or service identified; and for each product or service, describe with

specificity each type of personal data that is used in or by the product or

service; and identify and describe with specificity:

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(1) the source(s) of each such type of personal data, including whether

the source is a government agency or office;

(2) the procedures or means by which each such type of personal data

is collected, generated, or derived, including, but not limited to,

cookies, a user’s direct textual input, a user’s behavior on the

Company’s website, a user’s behavior on other websites, social

media, a user’s mobile use and activity, or other online or offline

sources;

(3) for each such type of personal data, whether the Company acquires

the consent, permission, or approval of consumers before

obtaining, collecting, generating, deriving, disseminating, storing,

or causing to be stored the personal data of said consumers. As

part of your response, describe in detail how the Company obtains

the consent, permission, or approval of said consumers;

(4) the frequency with which each such type of personal data is

updated; 

(5) the extent to which and reasons why the availability of each such

type of personal data differs depending upon the purchaser;

(6) whether the Company provides each such type of personal data to

users in the form in which it is acquired or whether the Company

changes the form or content of such type of personal data in any

way, and for the latter describe each and every way in which the

Company changes the form or content of each such type of

personal data and the methodology employed to effect such

change;

(7) whether each such type of personal data is aggregated,

anonymized, or de-identified and describe the process used to do

so;

(8) whether each such type of personal data includes information from

or about children or teenagers. As part of your response, describe

in detail whether the Company distinguishes personal data about

children ages 12 and under from personal data about teenagers

ages 13 through 17 and how the collection and provision of this

data differs.

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B. State whether the Company monitors, audits, or evaluates the accuracy of

personal data contained in each product or service identified in response to

3.A. If it does, provide a step-by-step explanation of how the Company

monitors, audits, or evaluates the accuracy of such personal data, and 

describe the results from the Company’s audits, evaluations, and

monitoring efforts, including the accuracy rates for the personal data

contained in each product or service. As part of your response, describe in

detail:

(1) the Company’s policies, practices, and procedures relating to the

monitoring, auditing, or evaluation of the accuracy of personal

data contained in each product or service;

(2) the Company’s search and retrieval logic for matching its records

with particular consumers; and 

(3) the Company’s matching logic (i.e., evaluations regarding the

effectiveness of the information submitted by clients and/or used

by the Company about consumers in retrieving results related to

the correct consumer); 

C. For each product or service identified in response to 3.A., indicate (1) the

number of such products or services sold annually, and (2) the Company’s

annual gross revenues attributable to each such product or service. 

4. Other Collection of Data: 

A. Identify each type of personal data the Company has obtained, collected,

generated, derived, disseminated, stored, or caused to be stored that is not

currently used in or by a product or service identified in your response to

3.A., and describe with specificity:

(1) the reason(s) why each such type of personal data is not currently

used in or by a product or service and any plans for future use; 

(2) for each such type of personal data that was previously used in a

product or service, identify (i) the name of the product(s) or

service(s) that used the personal data, (ii) the number of such

products or services sold annually, (iii) the Company’s annual

gross revenues attributable to each such product or service, (iv) the

types of customers (e.g., individual consumers, retailers, ad

networks, etc.) to which the Company provided each product or

service, (v) the percentage of the product’s or service’s revenue

contributed by each type of customer, and (vi) the names and

contact information of the product’s or service’s 25 largest

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customers (25 entities who purchased the greatest unit and dollar

amounts of each product or service) for each type of customer

except individual consumers;

(3) the source of each such type of personal data, including whether the

source is a government agency or office;

(4) the procedures or means by which each such type of personal data

is or was collected, generated, or derived, including, but not limited

to, cookies, a user’s direct textual input, a user’s behavior on the

Company’s website, a user’s behavior on other websites, social

media, a user’s mobile use and activity, or other online or offline

sources;

(5) for each such type of personal data, whether the Company acquires

or acquired the consent, permission, or approval of consumers

before obtaining, collecting, generating, deriving, disseminating,

storing, or causing to be stored the data of said consumers. As part

of your response, describe in detail how the Company obtains the

consent, permission, or approval of said consumers;

(6) the frequency in which each such type of personal data is or was

updated; 

(7) the extent to which and reasons why the availability of each such

type of personal data differs or differed depending upon the

purchaser;

(8) each specific purpose or manner in which the Company anticipates

or anticipated that each such type of personal data would or could

be used by its users or customers and any limitations the Company

places or placed on the use of each such type of personal data;

(9) whether the Company provides or provided each such type of

personal data to users in the form in which it is acquired or whether

the Company changes or changed the form or content of such type

of personal data in any way, and for the latter describe each and

every way in which the Company changes or changed the form or

content of each such type of personal data and the methodology

employed to effect such change;

(10) whether each such type of personal data is or was aggregated,

anonymized, or de-identified and describe the process used to do

so;

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(11) whether each such type of personal data includes or included

information from or about children or teenagers. As part of your

response, describe in detail whether the Company distinguishes or

distinguished personal data about children ages 12 and under from

personal data about teenagers ages 13 through 17 and how the

collection and provision of this data differs or differed.

B. State whether the Company monitors, audits, or evaluates the accuracy of

personal data contained in each product or service identified in response to

4.A., either presently or previously. If it does, provide a step-by-step

explanation of how the Company monitors, audits, or evaluates the

accuracy of such personal data, and describe the results from the

Company’s audits, evaluations, and monitoring efforts, including the

accuracy rates for the personal data contained in each product or service. 

As part of your response, describe in detail:

(1) the Company’s policies, practices, and procedures relating to the

monitoring, auditing, or evaluation of the accuracy of personal data

contained in each product or service;

(2) the Company’s search and retrieval logic for matching its records

with particular consumers; and 

(3) the Company’s matching logic (i.e., evaluations regarding the

effectiveness of the information submitted by clients and/or used by

the Company about consumers in retrieving results related to the

correct consumer); 

5. Customers:

A. For each product or service identified in your response to 3.A., identify the

types of customers (e.g., individual consumers, retailers, ad networks, etc.)

to which the Company provides each product or service, the percentage of

the product’s or service’s revenue contributed by each type of customer,

and the names and contact information of the product’s or service’s 25

largest customers (25 entities who purchased the greatest unit and dollar

amounts of each product or service) for each type of customer except

individual consumers. As part of your response, describe in detail:

(1) the method(s) by which the Company provides each product or

service; 

(2) the fees associated with each product or service;

(3) a step-by-step explanation of how the Company’s customers access

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the Company’s products and services and the flow of personal data

from the initial request made to the Company to the furnishing of

personal data to the customer;

(4) all of the purposes, and how the Company determines the purposes,

for which the Company’s customers use personal data provided by

the Company, including but not limited to marketing, background

screening, resale, or fraud detection purposes; 

(5) how the Company evaluates its customers (e.g., whether the

Company evaluates whether a customer is a legitimate business

entity and its data security measures) at the time of purchase; and

(6) whether the Company reviews, monitors, audits, or evaluates how

its customers use personal data post-purchase and the nature,

timing, results, and actions taken as the result of these reviews,

audits, or evaluations.

B. For each product or service identified in your response to 3.A., describe in

detail any prohibitions or restrictions (e.g., contractual, technological) the

Company communicates or enforces against its customers on the sale or

use of such product or service. As part of your response, explain:

(1) whether the Company’s contracts, agreements, and terms and

conditions of use between the Company and any user of any of the

Company’s products or services enumerate such prohibitions and

restrictions. Provide contracts, agreements, and terms and

conditions of use for the Company’s three largest customers for

each type of customer identified in your response to 5.A. and four

other examples representing the range of contracts, agreements, and

terms and conditions of use for each type of customer identified in

your response to 5.A.;

(2) how the Company monitors compliance with such prohibitions or

restrictions; and

(3) whether the Company has ever taken any action against a customer

to enforce such prohibitions or restrictions and, if so, a description of

those actions.

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6. Consumers:

A. State whether consumers are able to access personal data about them that is

held by the Company. If consumers are not able to access their personal

data, state the Company’s rationale for not providing such access. If

consumers are able to access their personal data, describe in detail how

consumers access this personal data, including but not limited to:

(1) a step-by-step explanation of how consumers access such personal

data;

(2) the types of personal data that consumers can and cannot access;

(3) the terms and conditions for accessing personal data, including any

limitations on the frequency of access;

(4) how the Company notifies consumers of their right to access this

personal data and the contents of the notice;

(5) the types of personal information consumers are required to provide

to verify their identities prior to accessing their personal data, and

how the Company utilizes this verification information; 

(6) the number of consumers that have requested access to their personal

data on an annual basis and the Company’s response by category

(i.e., number of consumers provided access, number of consumers

denied access, reasons for denial, etc.);

(7) the date on which the Company first began to give consumers access

to personal data; and

(8) the average and maximum length of time before an access request is

implemented, and the factors that determine the length of time

before access is provided. 

B. State whether consumers are able to correct personal data that is held by the

Company. If consumers are not able to correct their personal data, state the

Company’s rationale for not allowing such corrections. If consumers are

able to correct their personal data, describe in detail how consumers correct

their personal data, including but not limited to:

(1) a step-by-step explanation of how consumers correct such personal

data;

(2) the types of personal data that consumers can and cannot correct;

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(3) the terms and conditions for correcting personal data, including the

Company’s efforts to prevent the reappearance of inaccurate data;

(4) how the Company notifies consumers of their right to correct this

personal data and the contents of the notice;

(5) the types of personal information consumers are required to provide

to verify their identities before correcting their personal data, and

how the Company utilizes this verification information;

(6) the number of consumers that have requested a correction to their

personal data on an annual basis and the Company’s response by

category (i.e., number of corrections, number not corrected, reasons

for not correcting, etc.);

(7) the date on which the Company first began to give consumers the

ability to correct their personal data; and

(8) the average and maximum length of time before a correction request

is implemented, and the factors that determine the length of time

before the correction takes effect. 

C. State whether consumers are able to opt out of the collection, use, or sharing

of their personal data. If consumers are not able to opt out, state the

Company’s rationale for not allowing consumers to opt out. If consumers

are able to opt out, describe in detail the Company’s opt out procedures,

including but not limited to:

(1) a step-by-step explanation of how consumers opt out;

(2) the specific products, services, or search results to which the opt out

applies and does not apply; 

(3) the terms and conditions for opting out;

(4) the technologies utilized to effectuate the opt out;

(5) how the Company notifies consumers of their right to opt out and the

contents of the notice;

(6) the types of personal information consumers are required to provide

to verify their identities before opting out, and how the Company

utilizes this verification information; 

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(7) the number of consumers that have requested to opt out on an annual

basis and the Company’s response by category (i.e., number of opt

outs provided, number of opt outs denied, reasons for denial, etc.);

(8) the date on which the Company first began to give consumers the

ability to opt out; and

(9) the average and maximum length of time before an opt out request is

implemented, the factors that determine the length of time before the

opt out takes effect, and the period of time the opt out remains in

effect.

D. State whether consumers are able to have the Company delete their personal

data from the Company’s database(s). If consumers are not able to delete

their personal data, state the Company’s rationale for not allowing such

deletions. If consumers are able to delete their personal data, describe in

detail how consumers delete their personal data, including but not limited

to:

(1) a step-by-step explanation of how consumers delete such personal

data;

(2) the types of personal data that consumers can and cannot delete;

(3) the terms and conditions for deleting personal data, including the

Company’s efforts to prevent reinsertion of the data;

(4) how the Company notifies consumers of their right to delete this

personal data and the contents of the notice;

(5) the types of personal information consumers are required to provide

to verify their identities before deleting their personal data, and how

the Company utilizes this verification information; 

(6) the number of consumers that have requested to delete their personal

data on an annual basis and the Company’s response by category

(i.e., number of deletions provided, number of deletions denied,

reasons for denial, etc.);

(7) the date on which the Company first began to give consumers the

ability to delete their personal data; and

(8) the average and maximum length of time before a deletion request is

implemented, and the factors that determine the length of time

before the deletion takes effect. 

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E. State whether the Company charges consumers a fee for accessing,

correcting, opting out, or deleting their personal data from the Company’s

database(s). As part of your response, describe in detail:

(1) the amount the Company charges consumers to access, correct,

delete, or opt out; and 

(2) the total revenue earned annually by the Company through such fees.

F. In your responses to 6.A-E., describe each and every way in which the

Company’s procedures relating to children and teenagers is different from

the Company’s procedures relating to adults. 

7. Policies:

A. State the methods by which the Company provides notice to consumers

about the Company’s personal data collection, use, or sharing practices. 

Provide representative samples of any notices or disclosures provided to

consumers in connection with the products and services identified in

response to 3.A.

B. State whether the Company has (or had) any written policies or statements

regarding the collection, disclosure, and use of personal data, including any

policies and statements relating to the privacy or security of such data. 

Provide a copy of each such policy or statement, indicating for each the date

on which it became effective and, if applicable, all means by which it was

distributed or made available. If the policies changed at any time, please so

state and describe the nature of the change and its effective time period.

C. Identify the names and titles of the individuals at the Company who are

responsible for developing and implementing any policies described in your

responses to each specification.

8. Promotional Materials and Advertisements:

A. Provide representative samples of each type of advertisement or

promotional material the Company has disseminated referring or relating to

the products and services identified in response to 3.A. or the personal data

identified in response to 4.A., including but not limited to websites, emails,

advertisements, and brochures. For each advertisement or promotional

material provided, state the beginning and ending dates of dissemination,

and the dates, times, and locations the ads were disseminated. For print ads

and press releases, identify every publication, date, and community for

dissemination; for Internet ads, identify every URL, date, and number of

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An electronic version of the Excel spreadsheets for Attachments B, C, and D are 1

provided on the included CD. The company must use Attachments B, C, and D to report

Page 12 of 15

hits or visits; for all other materials, provide sufficient information to permit

a determination of how many items were disseminated, and when, where,

and to whom such items were disseminated.

B. For each product or service identified in response to 3.A. and each item of

personal data identified in response to 4.A., identify any keywords, terms,

phrases, or other criteria that the Company has used to effect the placement

or delivery of any advertisement or sponsored link in connection with any

online advertising network or advertisement delivery or contextual

marketing software or system, including but not limited to the placement or

delivery of any advertisement or sponsored link in search results generated

by any Internet search engine.

9. Complaints/Inquiries: 

A. State the number of complaints or disputes related to data collection, use,

aggregation, or display the Company has received on an annual basis.

Describe in detail the Company’s process for recording consumer

complaints or disputes related to data collection, use, aggregation, or

display, including, but not limited to, any categorization of the complaints

or disputes and the Company’s response to the complaints or disputes. 

Provide copies of all documentation of complaints or disputes and the

Company’s response.

B. State whether the Company has been the subject of any government or

regulatory inquiry or private action. Identify each such inquiry or action

and describe the nature of the inquiry or action, the practices investigated or

at issue, the violations of law investigated or alleged, and the status or

outcome of the inquiry or action. For government or regulatory inquiries,

identify the agency or entity conducting the inquiry and the name and

contact information for the Company’s contact person at such agency or

entity. For each private action, identify the court in which the action was

filed, the date it was filed, and its docket number.

The Special Report responses called for in this Order are to be filed no later than

February 1, 2013.

All responses for all Specifications must be provided in narrative form in two (2) printed

copies and in electronic form (by CD or as email attachments), formatted as Word or WordPerfect

documents. In addition, electronic responses to Specifications 3-6 must also be provided on the

Excel spreadsheets included as Attachments B, C, and D to this Order. Documentary responses 1

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activities and must not modify, delete, or add to the columns on the spreadsheet. The company

must submit the spreadsheets in Excel in a format that is readable and writable and must not

include footnotes or endnotes on the spreadsheet.

Page 13 of 15

must be formatted as Adobe Acrobat documents. All responses must be labeled to indicate the

Specification to which the information or data responds. All files contained in electronic

submissions must have a file name that includes the company name, Specification numbers

included in the file, and date of the submission, in the following format:

[COMPANYNAME]_Spec._[SPEC. #'S]_[MM-DD-YY].

Penalties may be imposed under applicable provisions of federal law for failure to file

Special Reports or for filing false reports.

By the Commission.

________________________

Jon Leibowitz

Chairman

SEAL

Date of Order: December 14, 2012

The Special Report required by this Order,

or any inquiry concerning it, should be 

addressed to the attention of:

Peder Magee

Federal Trade Commission

Division of Privacy and Identity Protection

601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., NJ-8100

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 326-3538 phone

(202) 326-3062 facsimile

pmagee@ftc.gov

or

Tiffany George

Federal Trade Commission

Division of Privacy and Identity Protection

601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., NJ-8100

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 326-3040 phone

(202) 326-3062 facsimile

tgeorge@ftc.gov

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Page 14 of 15

Attachment A

DEFINITIONS & ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. “Advertisement” or “advertising” or “ad” or “promotional material” shall mean any

written or verbal statement, illustration, or depiction, whether in English or any other language,

that is designed to effect a sale or create interest in the purchasing of goods or services, whether it

appears on or in a label, package, package insert, radio, television, cable television, brochure,

newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, leaflet, circular, mailer, book insert, free standing insert, letter,

catalogue, poster, chart, billboard, public transit card, point of purchase display, film, slide, audio

program transmitted over a telephone system, telemarketing script, onhold script, upsell script,

training materials provided to telemarketing firms, program-length commercial (“infomercial”),

the Internet, email, or any other medium. 

B. “Personal data” shall mean information from or about consumers, including, but not

limited to: (1) first and last name; (2) home or other physical address, including street name and

name of city or town; (3) email address or other online contact information, such as an instant

messaging user identifier or a screen name; (4) telephone number; (5) date of birth; (6) gender,

racial, ethnic, or religious information; (7) government-issued identification number, such as a

driver’s license, military identification, passport, or Social Security number, or other personal

identification number; (8) financial information, including but not limited to: investment account

information; income tax information; insurance policy information; checking account information;

and credit, debit, or check-cashing card information, including card number, expiration date,

security number (such as card verification value), information stored on the magnetic stripe of the

card, and personal identification number; (9) employment information, including, but not limited

to, income, employment, retirement, disability, and medical records; or (10) a persistent identifier,

such as a customer number held in a “cookie” or processor serial number.

C. “Product or service” shall not include those products or services that are “consumer

reports” as set forth in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).

D. Meet and Confer: You are encouraged to contact Peder Magee at (202) 326-3538 or

Tiffany George at (202) 326-3040 as soon as possible to schedule a meeting (telephonic or in

person) in order to confer regarding your response.

E. Applicable Time Period: Unless otherwise directed in the specifications, the applicable

time period for the request shall be from January 1, 2010 until the date of full and complete

compliance with this Order.

F. Document Production: Because postal delivery to the Commission is subject to delay due

to heightened security precautions, please use a courier service such as Federal Express or UPS. 

G. Production of Copies: Copies of marketing materials and advertisements shall be

produced in color, and copies of other materials shall be produced in color if necessary to interpret

them or render them intelligible.

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Page 15 of 15

H. Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information: If any material called for by these

requests contains sensitive personally identifiable information or sensitive health information of

any individual, please contact us before sending those materials to discuss ways to protect such

information during production. 

For purposes of these requests, sensitive personally identifiable information includes: an

individual’s Social Security number alone; or an individual’s name or address or phone number in

combination with one or more of the following: date of birth, Social Security number, driver’s

license number or other state identification number, or a foreign country equivalent, passport

number, financial account number, credit card number, or debit card number. Sensitive health

information includes medical records and other individually identifiable health information

relating to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or conditions of an individual, the

provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision

of health care to an individual.

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Federal Trade Commission

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

APPENDIX 

Illustrative List of

Data Elements and Segmen

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Illustrative List of Data Elements an

Segment

Identifying Data

•	 Name

•	 Previously Used Names

•	 Address

•	 Address History

•	 Longitude and Latitude

•	 Phone Numbers

•	 Email Address 

Sensitive Identifying Dat

•	 Social Security Number

•	 Driver’s License Number

•	 Birth Date

•	 Birth Dates of Each Child in Household

•	 Birth Date of Family Members in 

Household

Demographic Data

•	 Age

•	 Height

•	 Weight

•	 Gender

•	 Race & Ethnicity

•	 Country of Origin

•	 Religion (by Surname at the Household 

Level)

•	 Language

•	 Marital Status

•	 Presence of Elderly Parent

•	 Presence of Children in Household

•	 Education Level

•	 Occupation

•	 Family Ties

•	 Demographic Characteristics of Family 

Members in Household

•	 Number of Surnames in Household

•	 Veteran in Household

•	 Grandparent in House

•	 Spanish Speaker

•	 Foreign Language Household (e.g., Russian, 

Hindi, Tagalog, Cantonese)

•	 Households with a Householder who is 

Hispanic Origin or Latino

•	 Employed - White Collar Occupation

•	 Employed - Blue Collar Occupation

•	 Work at Home Flag

•	 Length of Residence

•	 Household Size

•	 Congressional District

•	 Single Parent with Children

•	 Ethnic and Religious Affiliations

Court and Public Record Data

•	 Bankruptcies

•	 Criminal Offenses and Convictions

•	 Judgments

•	 Liens

•	 Marriage Licenses

•	 State Licenses and Registrations (e.g., 

Hunting, Fishing, Professional)

•	 Voting Registration and Party Identification

Social Media and Technology

Data

•	 Electronics Purchases

•	 Friend Connections

•	 Internet Connection Type

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•	 Internet Provider

•	 Level of Usage

•	 Heavy Facebook User

•	 Heavy Twitter User

•	 Twitter User with 250+ Friends

•	 Is a Member of over 5 Social Networks

•	 Online Influence

•	 Operating System

•	 Software Purchases

•	 Type of Media Posted

•	 Uploaded Pictures

•	 Use of Long Distance Calling Services

•	 Presence of Computer Owner

•	 Use of Mobile Devices

•	 Social Media and Internet Accounts 

including: Digg, Facebook, Flickr, Flixster, 

Friendster, hi5, Hotmail, LinkedIn, Live 

Journal, MySpace, Twitter, Amazon, 

Bebo, CafeMom, DailyMotion, Match, 

myYearbook, NBA.com, Pandora, 

Photobucket, WordPress, and Yahoo

Home and Neighborhood Dat

•	 Census Tract Data

•	 Address Coded as Public/Government 

Housing

•	 Dwelling Type

•	 Heating and Cooling

•	 Home Equity

•	 Home Loan Amount and Interest Rate

•	 Home Size

•	 Lender Type

•	 Length of Residence

•	 Listing Price

•	 Market Value

•	 Move Date

•	 Neighborhood Criminal, Demographic, and 

Business Data

•	 Number of Baths

•	 Number of Rooms

•	 Number of Units

•	 Presence of Fireplace

•	 Presence of Garage

•	 Presence of Home Pool

•	 Rent Price

•	 Type of Owner

•	 Type of Roof

•	 Year Built

General Interest Data

•	 Apparel Preferences

•	 Attendance at Sporting Events

•	 Charitable Giving

•	 Gambling - Casinos

•	 Gambling - State Lotteries

•	 Thrifty Elders

•	 Life Events (e.g., Retirement, Newlywed, 

Expectant Parent)

•	 Magazine and Catalog Subscriptions

•	 Media Channels Used

•	 Participation in Outdoor Activities (e.g., 

Golf, Motorcycling, Skiing, Camping)

•	 Participation in Sweepstakes or Contests

•	 Pets

•	 Dog Owner

•	 Political Leanings

•	 Assimilation Code

•	 Preferred Celebrities

•	 Preferred Movie Genres

•	 Preferred Music Genres

•	 Reading and Listening Preferences

•	 Donor (e.g., Religious, Political, Health 

Causes)

•	 Financial Newsletter Subscriber

•	 Upscale Retail Card Holder

•	 Affluent Baby Boomer

•	 Working-Class Moms

•	 Working Woman

•	 African-American Professional

•	 Membership Clubs - Self-Help

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

•	 Membership Clubs - Wines

•	 Exercise - Sporty Living

•	 Winter Activity Enthusiast

•	 Participant - Motorcycling

•	 Outdoor/Hunting & Shooting

•	 Biker/Hell’s Angels

•	 Santa Fe/Native American Lifestyle

•	 New Age/Organic Lifestyle

•	 Is a Member of over 5 Shopping Sites

•	 Media Channel Usage - Daytime TV

•	 Bible Lifestyle

•	 Leans Left

•	 Political Conservative

•	 Political Liberal

•	 Activism & Social Issues

Financial Dat

•	 Ability to Afford Products

•	 Credit Card User

•	 Presence of Gold or Platinum Card

•	 Credit Worthiness

•	 Recent Mortgage Borrower

•	 Pennywise Mortgagee

•	 Financially Challenged

•	 Owns Stocks or Bonds

•	 Investment Interests

•	 Discretionary Income Level 

•	 Credit Active

•	 Credit Relationship with Financial or Loan 

Company

•	 Credit Relationship with Low-End 

Standalone Department Store

•	 Number of Investment Properties Owned

•	 Estimated Income

•	 Life Insurance

•	 Loans

•	 Net Worth Indicator

•	 Underbanked Indicator

•	 Tax Return Transcripts

•	 Type of Credit Cards

Vehicle Data

•	 Brand Preferences

•	 Insurance Renewal

•	 Make & Model

•	 Vehicles Owned

•	 Vehicle Identification Numbers

•	 Vehicle Value Index

•	 Propensity to Purchase a New or Used 

Vehicle

•	 Propensity to Purchase a Particular Vehicle 

Type (e.g., SUV, Coupe, Sedan)

•	 Motor Cycle Owner (e.g., Harley, Off-Road 

Trail Bike)

•	 Motor Cycle Purchased 0-6 Months Ago

•	 Boat Owner

•	 Purchase Date

•	 Purchase Information

•	 Intend to Purchase - Vehicle

Travel Data

•	 Read Books or Magazines About Travel

•	 Travel Purchase - Highest Price Paid

•	 Date of Last Travel Purchase

•	 Air Services - Frequent Flyer

•	 Vacation Property

•	 Vacation Type (e.g., Casino, Time Share, 

Cruises, RV)

•	 Cruises Booked

•	 Preferred Vacation Destination

•	 Preferred Airline

Purchase Behavior Data

•	 Amount Spent on Goods

•	 Buying Activity

•	 Method of Payment

•	 Number of Orders

•	 Buying Channel Preference (e.g., Internet, 

Mail, Phone)

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Federal Trade Commission

•	 Types of Purchases

•	 Military Memorabilia/Weaponry

•	 Shooting Games

•	 Guns and Ammunition

•	 Christian Religious Products

•	 Jewish Holidays/Judaica Gifts

•	 Kwanzaa/African-Americana Gifts

•	 Type of Entertainment Purchased

•	 Type of Food Purchased

•	 Average Days Between Orders

•	 Last Online Order Date

•	 Last Offline Order Date

•	 Online Orders $500-$999.99 Range

•	 Offline Orders $1000+ Range

•	 Number of Orders - Low-Scale Catalogs

•	 Number of Orders - High-Scale Catalogs

•	 Retail Purchases - Most Frequent Category

•	 Mail Order Responder - Insurance

•	 Mailability Score

•	 Dollars - Apparel - Women’s Plus Sizes

•	 Dollars - Apparel - Men’s Big & Tall

•	 Books - Mind & Body/Self-Help

•	 Internet Shopper

•	 Novelty Elvis

Health Data

•	 Ailment and Prescription Online Search 

Propensity

•	 Propensity to Order Prescriptions by Mail

•	 Smoker in Household

•	 Tobacco Usage

•	 Over the Counter Drug Purchases

•	 Geriatric Supplies

•	 Use of Corrective Lenses or Contacts

•	 Allergy Sufferer

•	 Have Individual Health Insurance Plan

•	 Buy Disability Insurance

•	 Buy Supplemental to Medicare/Medicaid 

Individual Insurance

•	 Brand Name Medicine Preference

•	 Magazines - Health

•	 Weight Loss & Supplements

•	 Purchase History or Reported Interest in 

Health Topics including: Allergies, Arthritis, 

Medicine Preferences, Cholesterol, Diabetes, 

Dieting, Body Shaping, Alternative 

Medicine, Beauty/Physical Enhancement, 

Disabilities, Homeopathic Remedies, 

Organic Focus, Orthopedics, and Senior 

Needs

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

APPENDIX 

Concurring Statement of

Commissioner Julie Brill

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Matter No. P125404

Statement of Commissioner Julie Brill

May 27, 2014

[H]e that filches from me my good name

Robs me of that which not enriches him,

And makes me poor indeed.

– William Shakespeare, Othello

Data brokers gather massive amounts of data, from online and offline sources, and combine them 

into profiles about each of us. Data brokers examine each piece of information they hold about us – 

where we live, where we work and how much we earn, our race, our daily activities (both off line and 

online), our interests, our health conditions and our overall financial status – to create a narrative about 

our past, present and even our future lives. Perhaps we are described as “Financially Challenged” or instead as “Bible Lifestyle.”1

 Perhaps we are also placed in a category of “Diabetes Interest” or “Smoker 

in Household.”2 Data brokers’ clients use these profiles to send us advertisements we might be interested in, an activity that can benefit both the advertiser and the consumer. But these profiles can also 

be used to determine whether and on what terms companies should do business with us as individual 

consumers, and could result in our being treated differently based on characteristics such as our race, income, or sexual orientation. If data broker profiles are based on inaccurate information or inappropriate 

classifications, or used for inappropriate purposes, the profiles have the ability to not only rob us of our 

good name, but also to lead to lost economic opportunities, higher costs, and other significant harm. 

Consumers are largely unaware of the existence of data brokers and the detailed, sensitive information contained in their profiles. As a result, to the extent that some data brokers offer consumers 

the ability to access and correct or suppress their data, consumers don’t know how to exercise these 

rights, rendering such rights illusory. Furthermore, as detailed in the Commission’s report, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, data may change hands many times along the way 

from source to data product. As a result, even if consumers are aware of the existence of data brokers 

and their profiles, and have the ability to access the data about them, it is challenging, if not effectively 

impossible, for them to identify the sources of data and who else has seen it.

As the Commission outlines in today’s report, many data broker practices fall outside of any specific laws that require the industry to be transparent, provide consumers with access to data, or take steps 

to ensure that the data that they maintain is accurate. The Commission’s legislative recommendations, 

if enacted into law, would add transparency across the data broker industry, provide more information 

1 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Data Brokers A Call for Transparency and Accountability at 20 n.52, 21 (2014) [h

Data Broker Repo

2 Id. at 46, 55.

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about the sources of data brokers’ information, help give consumers appropriate access and the ability 

to correct data used for marketing and risk mitigation products, and give consumers greater ability to 

correct data in their people search profiles. In addition, the report encourages data brokers to be more 

accountable by conducting due diligence on their customers’ use of the data, and creating contractual 

requirements that prohibit their customers from using the data in an unlawful manner. 

I fully support the report and its legislative recommendations. In the report, the Commission describes the benefits and risks that arise in an interconnected system of data brokers, their customers and 

sources – some consumer-facing and some not —and their subjects – the consumers themselves. The 

Commission’s recommendations are based on a thorough study and analysis of how these different players relate to each other, and the recommendations address risks to consumers in a coherent way. Specifically, the Commission recommends that Congress consider legislation that establishes requirements for 

each of the three categories of data brokers’ products described in the report: marketing products, risk 

mitigation products, and people search products.3

 I set out my understanding of the Commission’s legislative recommendations in a separate document available at http://go.usa.gov/8NpT.

For marketing products, the Commission recommends legislation that would require “the creation of a centralized mechanism, such as an Internet portal, where data brokers can identify themselves, 

describe their information collection and use practices, and provide links to access tools and opt outs.”4

 

A centralized portal is critically important. If adopted, the portal would provide transparency across a 

broad swath of the data broker industry while also affording consumers greater practical control over 

their data. This requirement is a key element of the best practices that I have been encouraging data 

brokers to adopt.5

Also of critical importance is the Commission’s call for requirements that data brokers’ sources 

offer consumers transparency and choice mechanisms.6 Data broker sources often collect information 

that consumers provide in a different context and for a different purpose. For example, a consumer who 

provides her name and email address to register with a travel or medical website might find that information being disclosed to a data broker and used to create an individual profile that combines information 

about her from many other sources. A requirement that the sources of data broker information used for 

marketing purposes provide consumer control over collection – express affirmative consent for sensitive 

information collection, notice and choice for other information – would allow consumers to prevent the 

collection and use of data that might harm them by blocking information from entering marketing databases in the first place.7

 Because disclosure of information to data brokers, and their subsequent use of 

the information, often fall outside of the context in which consumers provide the information, prominent 

3 See id. at 48-53.

4 Id. at 50.

5 See, e.g., Julie Brill, A Call to Arms: The Role of Technologists in Protecting Privacy in the Age of Big Data (Oct. 23, 

2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/call-arms-role-technologistsprotecting-privacy-age-big-data/131023nyupolysloanlecture.pdf; Julie Brill, Reclaim Your Name – Keynote Address to 

the 23rd Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference (June 26, 2013) available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/

files/documents/public_statements/reclaim-your-name/130626computersfreedom.pdf.

6 Data Broker Report, supra note 1, at

7 This recommendation to require express affirmative consent for sensitive information, and notice and choice for other 

information, is consistent with the Commission’s 2012 privacy report. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Cons

Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers 48-50 (2012), a

http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacyera-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

notice is appropriate. The Commission’s call for transparency and choice at the source of data would 

enhance the ability of consumers to learn about these practices as the information would come to them 

from retailers, websites, social media, and other entities with which consumers are interacting.8

Taken together, the Commission’s legislative recommendations, if enacted, would begin to build 

meaningful levels of transparency, access, and control into the data broker industry. 

I write separately today to describe the additional legislative requirements that I believe are 

needed to ensure that all participants in the industry are appropriately accountable for the use of data 

brokers’ products. 

Two areas of discussion in the report demonstrate the need to build additional transparency and 

accountability measures into legislation. First, data brokers are not only collecting health, financial, 

racial, and other sensitive information about consumers, but also using other, innocuous data to predict 

or infer sensitive characteristics.9

 Congress has acted repeatedly to create privacy protections for health 

and financial data, and federal laws restrict the use of certain kinds of information in credit, lending, 

housing, and other contexts. Some data products discussed in the Commission’s report expose some 

significant gaps in these laws. Some data brokers – albeit not the nine brokers that the Commission 

studied for this report – sell marketing lists that identify consumers with specific health conditions, such 

as addictions and AIDS. The report also identifies marketing segments that focus on ethnicity, financial 

status, and health conditions.10 Examples of segments with apparent ethnic dimensions include “Metro 

Parents” (single parents who are “primarily high school or vocationally educated” and are handling the 

“stresses of urban life on a small budget”) and “Timeless Traditions” (immigrants who “speak[] some 

English, but generally prefer[] Spanish”).11 Nothing in the Commission’s report suggests that data brokers or their clients are running afoul of anti-discrimination laws. It is foreseeable, however, that data 

that closely follow categories that are not permissible grounds for treating consumers differently in a 

broad array of commercial transactions will be used in exactly this way. 

The second area of the report that demonstrates the need for further legislative accountability 

requirements is its discussion of risk mitigation products. Risk mitigation products support an expanding range of decisions that could have a substantial impact on consumers’ lives. For example, banks use 

identity verification products to meet statutory customer identification requirements.12 Other data broker clients use the history of transactions associated with a consumer’s email address to assess whether 

a particular transaction is likely to be fraudulent.13 In these ways, risk mitigation products can protect 

consumers and businesses. 

When inaccurate information wrongly leads to a consumer being identified as a risk that needs 

8 Moreover, placing such requirements on data sources would appropriately complement legal protections that apply to 

other industry sectors, such as healthcare providers and financial institutions. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act, 110 Stat. 1936 (establishing privacy safeguards for personal health information in certain settings); 

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 

and 15 U.S.C.) (establishing safeguards that financial institutions must observe for “nonpublic personal information”).

9 Data Broker Report, supra note 1, at 20 & n.52; id. at 25 & n

10 See id. at 20 & n.52; id. at 25 & n.57

11 Id. at 20 n.52.

12 Id. at 32 & n.65 (discussing banks’ use of identity verification products to meet customer identification requirements 

under the USA PATRIOT Act).

13 Id. at 33.

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to be mitigated, however, that consumer may suffer significant harm. The consumer may be unable to 

complete important transactions, such as opening a bank or mobile phone account, if the data that went 

into a risk mitigation product is incorrect. Moreover, the consumer may be unable to determine why a 

transaction was blocked, much less correct underlying inaccuracies, if she has no knowledge that risk 

mitigation products have been used in rendering the adverse decision. As the Commission notes in the 

report, enabling consumers to correct inaccurate data used in risk mitigation products should not enable 

consumers to “correct” truthful information or otherwise undermine broader identity protection, fraud 

detection, or other risk-reduction purposes. The report also notes that some data brokers have already 

determined how to effectively provide consumers with access and correction rights while still ensuring 

the integrity of their products.14 This demonstrates that the Commission, industry, and other stakeholders should be able to address the challenge of enabling correction while preventing the subversion of risk 

mitigation systems. 

In addition, some data brokers sell scores that indicate the level of risk associated with an individual or a transaction.15 For example, a score that indicates a high level of risk may lead a business to 

require consumers to go through additional steps to complete a transaction, to raise its cost to the consumer, or to block the transaction entirely.16 Some scores may correlate closely with ethnicity or financial status. For example, “aggregated” credit scores average the individual credit scores from five to 15 

households in a ZIP+4 geographical area.17 There may be little that consumers can do to affect scores 

that group them with others based on some shared characteristic, such as the neighborhood in which they 

live. The use of such scores to make risk mitigation decisions creates the potential for ethnic or financial 

status to have a substantial effect on consumers. More generally, in the absence of any visibility into the 

use of these risk mitigation products, consumers cannot make choices to avoid being scored unfavorably 

if they do not know that risk scores exist and how businesses use them. 

Existing laws do not sufficiently address data brokers’ handling of sensitive data in marketing or 

risk mitigation contexts. The products examined in the report do not trigger legal requirements for data 

brokers, their data sources, or the companies that use their products to provide access to this data or ensure its accuracy. Though the report makes clear that applying a risk mitigation label to a consumer data 

product or service does not, on its own, render the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) inapplicable, 18 it 

identifies some risk mitigation products that do not fall under the FCRA. For example, the use of a risk 

mitigation product by a mobile phone service provider to confirm the identity of an account applicant or 

to confirm that her SSN is not associated with fraud is probably not covered by the FCRA.19 The carrier 

might refuse to open an account if the product reflects a risk of fraud, even if the underlying informa14 One data broker that was part of the Commission’s study allows consumers to have some access to information used 

in its risk mitigation products. See Data Broker Report, supra note 1, at 3.  In addition, the members of the cre

reporting industry have long met the challenge of allowing consumers access and correction rights, and still maintained a 

high level of accuracy in their credit reports.

15 See Data Broker Report, supra note 1, at

16 See id.

17 In re Trans Union, Opinion of the Commission, at 12, Mar. 2000, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/cases/2000/03/transunionopinionofthecommission.pdf; see also Comments of Pam Dixon, Final Transcript of 

FTC Spring Privacy Series: Alternative Scoring Products, at 54-55, Mar. 19, 2014 (stating that “[a]ggregate credit scores 

apply to a neighborhood” and “I can’t purchase my aggregate credit score, . . . [i]t’s not regulated.”), available at http://

www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/182261/alternative-scoring-products_final-transcript.pdf.

18 See, e.g., Data Broker Report, supra note 1, at 52

19 See id. at 37, 52-53.

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Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

tion is inaccurate. And, given the lack of transparency into these practices, it would be very hard to 

detect whether a risk mitigation score is being used in a manner that triggers FCRA requirements. More 

troubling still, some of the laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and certain other categories are limited to certain settings, such as the extension of credit, and do not include marketing and 

risk mitigation. Thus, existing anti-discrimination laws may leave significant gaps where risk mitigation 

products are concerned.

To close these gaps, I urge Congress to consider legislation provisions – in addition to the provisions recommended by the Commission – that would create greater accountability for data suppliers, 

data brokers, and data broker clients. Creating appropriate levels of accountability requires addressing 

data flows both “upstream” (from data suppliers to data brokers) and “downstream” (from data brokers 

to users of their products). First, Congress should consider legislation – and not merely a best practice 

recommendation – that would require data brokers to employ reasonable procedures to ensure that their 

clients do not use their products for unlawful purposes.20 Reasonable procedures could include requirements for data brokers to verify the identity of their customers, and conduct due diligence and other 

monitoring, to provide a level of accountability that their customers are not using data for unlawful 

purposes. 

Data brokers are well-situated to monitor their clients’ data use and to be part of an early warning system when their highly sensitive information is used for unlawful purposes. Data brokers interface directly with their clients, and can assess their clients’ ability to comply with existing prohibitions 

on discrimination. Requiring the data brokers to monitor their clients use will create a system whereby 

consumers are not required to bear the entire burden of managing all privacy risk associated with data 

brokers’ profiles,21 and will allow those who are best situated to spot problems to help prevent consumer 

harms that would otherwise be difficult if not impossible to detect.

A second accountability measure that Congress should consider is to require data brokers to take 

reasonable steps to ensure that their original sources of information obtained appropriate consent from 

consumers.22 This requirement would help to ensure that data brokers’ sources comply with the Commission’s recommendation that the sources secure well-informed consumer consent to disclose information to data brokers. Placing requirements on both the sources to secure this consent as well as the 

data brokers to ensure that their sources secure this consent is a “belts and suspenders” approach that is 

entirely appropriate, because sources often share with data brokers information about consumers, including sensitive information, outside the context in which consumers provide the information. 

*****

The data broker enterprise is complex, and involves multiple players collecting, sharing, aggregating, creating and using consumer profiles that can contain sensitive information. As the Commission 

has found, these profiles can be used in contexts that can adversely impact consumers. Greater transparency and accountability must be infused into this enterprise. The Commission’s legislative recommendations, along with the additional recommendations that I have outlined here, would go a long way 

to shining a much needed light on the practices of data brokers, and to providing consumers and other 

20 See id. at 56 n.108. 

21 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1880 (201

22 See Data Broker Report, supra note 1, at 52 n.1.  One example of a reasonable step that data brokers could take

ensure that their sources obtained appropriate consent from consumers is to inspect their sources’ notices and choice 

mechanisms.

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Federal Trade Commission

interested stakeholders with meaningful tools to ensure that the narratives data brokers tell about us are 

accurate fair, and used in appropriate ways. I am committed to working with Congress, my colleagues 

at the Commission, the Administration, and other policymakers to help make these important legislative 

recommendations a reality.

*****

The Commission’s report is the result of diligent and painstaking work by Commission staff. I 

applaud their efforts. I look forward to working with my colleagues at the Commission and with staff as 

we explore in depth other aspects of commercial use of big data, including alternative scoring products,23

user-generated and user-controlled health data,24 and low income and underserved consumers.25

23 See Spring Privacy Series: Alternative Scoring Products, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://www.

ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/03/spring-privacy-series-alternative-scoring-products.

24 Spring Privacy Series: Consumer Generated and Controlled Health Data, Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 7, 2014), available 

at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/05/spring-privacy-series-consumer-generated-controlled-healthdata. 

25 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine Effects of Big Data on Low Income and Underserved Consumers 

at September Workshop (Apr. 11, 2014) ,available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftcexamine-effects-big-data-low-income-underserved-consumers. 

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Federal Trade Commission

May 2014