The Honor able Amul R. Thapa r, United States District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0549n.06 No. 08-4463 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT QI AO Z HEN JI ANG, Petitioner,

v. ERI C H. HOL DER, J R., Un ite d St a te s A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, Re sp on de nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE B OARD OF IM M IG RA T IO N A P P E A LS

OPI NI ON

Be fore : CL AY and SUTTO N, Circuit J udg es; THAPAR, District J udg e. * SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Qiao Z hen Ji ang , a native a nd citizen of Chin a, s eeks r eview of an orde r deny

ing h er application for

withholding of r emoval and f or re lief under

the Convention Ag ainst Torture. B eca

use substantial evidenc e supports the orde r, we deny the petition. I. I n 1997, J iang emig rate d from China to the United States. Although she enter ed the c ountry on a fia ncee visa, she neve r mar ri ed her sponsor. T he g overnme nt theref ore initiated re moval proce eding s ag ainst her in 2000. Conce ding removability , J iang filed applications for withholding of re moval and re lief under the Convention Ag ainst Torture.No. 08-4463

Jiang v. Holde r

- 2 - She testified as the sole w itness at her he aring , claiming that she would suffe r per secution or torture if retur

ned to China beca

use she be g an pra cticing Fa lun Gong afte r ente ring the United States, and she introduced t h re e short letters from other individuals purportingto corrobor ate he r status as a Fa lun G ong prac titioner. The I mmigration J udg e (I J ) did not find cre dible her te stimony that she wa s “a F alun Gongmember.” R OA 66. Even if she we re c redible, the I J added, she had not met her burde n of proof fo r obtaining r elief on e ither g round bec ause the three letters we re entitled to no weig ht and bec ause Jiang did not pre sent other r easona bl y av ai l ab l e cor

roborating
e vid e nc e . T he I J ac c or din g ly de nie d Jiang ’s a

pp lic a tio ns . The B oard of

I mmigration Appeals (BIA) adopted a nd aff irmed the I J ’s dec ision without clar ifying w hether

it relied on the I J ’s cr edibility det er m ination or J iang ’s fa ilure to satisfy her burd e n o f p ro of

. Jianga pp e a le d, and

we re mand e d th e case (at th e Attor ne y Ge ne ra l’ s urg ing ) t o clar ify the basis of the B I A’s dec ision. On r emand, the BIA clar ified that J iang had not satisfied he r b u rd en o f p ro o f a n d

ad d eda b ri ef

an al y s i s o f i t s o wn s u

p p l em en t i n g t h e IJ ’s re as o n i n g. II. A. The Attorne y

Gene ral c annot re move J ian g from the United States if he r “life or fr eedom would be thre atene d in” China bec ause of her “ rac e, re ligion, nationality , membership in a pa rticular social g roup, or polit ical opini on.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)( 3)(A)

. To preve nt removal, Jiang must show “it is more likely

than not that . . . she will be per secute d” on those g rounds if remove d. Sarr v. Gonzalez , 4 85 F .3 d 3 54 , 362 (6 th Cir . 200 7) (i nte rn a l quot a tio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; se e als o 8 C. F .R. § 1208.16(b)( 2). When the B I A adopts the I J ’s opinion “with additional commentar y , we r eview theNo. 08-4463

Jiang v. Holde r

- 3 - decision of the I J , as suppl emented by the BI A,” as the final a g ency action. Ceraj v. Muk

asey , 511 F .3 d 5 83 , 5 88 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7). And w e mus t a c c e pt t he a g e nc y ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t a s tr ue un le ss a “re asonable adjudicator

would be compe lled to conclude to the contrary ,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (B ),

a s t an d ar d o f r e v i e w t h a t a p p l i e s t o a g e n c y f

i n d i n g s t h a t c o r

r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e i s r e a so nably available , Id. § 1252(b)( 4). J iang ’s fa ilure to corr oborate her status a s a F alun Gongp ra ct i t i o ner is fatal to her application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)( C) (providing that burden of proof deter minations shall be

m a d e p u rs u an t t o 8 U. S
. C
. § 1 1 5 8 (b )( 1 )( B) (i i ), wh i ch re qu i re s co rr o b o ra t i n g ev i d en ce i f t h e IJ de te rm ine s it is ne c e ssa

ry “ un le ss t

he a pp lic ant .
. . c ann ot r e a so na bly ob ta in t he e vid e nc e ” ); Lin v. Holder , 565 F.3d 971, 977 ( 6th Cir. 2009). The I J found that J iang should have pre sented witnesse s subject to cross- examination to corroborate her Fa lun Gong prac tice. Dee ming implausible J iang ’s claim that eve ry

potential witness fea

red pe rsec ution if they

testified in support of her petition, the I J also found such w itnesses wer e re asonably available

. The re cord doe s not “compel[] ” a “contr ary” conclusion. Acc ording to Jiang , she pra cticed Fa lun Gong for f

our y ear s befor e the hear ing and attended Fa lun G ong g ather ings in Ne w York a nd Washington, D.C. A rea sonable trier of fac t c ould f ind it implausible, a s the I J did in this case, that J iang encounte red no one during that time who would be willing to testify on her be half. F u rth e r u n d e r c u tt in g th e p la

u s ib il it y o f Jia n g ’ s ar g u me n t, tw o in d iv id u a ls

—Z h uCh e n g Wu and Ta ng Haiying—submitted l etters to the I J on J iang ’s behalf disclosing that they prac ticed F alun Gong with J iang

. Submit ting those letters was only slightly less perilous to these individuals than testify ing at J i an g’s h ea ri ng—if, that is, the purported r eason the y wer e unwilling to g ive liveNo. 08-4463

Jiang v. Holde r

- 4 - testimony is that they fea

red gove rnment per secution for admitting those be liefs themselves. Jiang’ s explanation also does not acc ount for the third letter-wr iter, the owne r of the Platinum Dra g on, who claimed only

to have obse rved Jiang pr acticingFa lun Gong . J iang does not argue that China p e r s e c u t e s i n d i v i d

u a l s m e r e l y

f o r r e c o g n i z i n g F a l u nG o n g p r a c t i c e s

— o r f o r t h a tm a t t e r

j u st observingthem. Cf. Lin , 565 F.3d at 975. That Jiang ne ver attempted to subpoena a ny witnesses under 8 C.F .R. § 1003.35 cements the soundness of the I J ’s ava ilability deter mination. Se e Sh k

ab ar i v. Gonzalez , 427 F.3d 324, 331 (6th Cir. 2005) (fa iling to attempt to obtain corr oborating evidenc e
un de rm ine s argume nt that e viden ce was un a va ila ble ); c f. Fe d. R. Evid. 804(a)( 5). Substantial evidenc e supports the I J ’s dec ision. J iang resists this conclusion on two fronts. Fi rst , she say s that she ade quately corr oborate d he r c la im thr ou gh th e th ree sub mit te d le tte rs and tha t th e I J shou ld h a ve g ive n g re a te r w e ig ht t o t h e m . B u t n o r

u l e o r p r e c e d e n t t o o u r k

n o w l e d g e

— an d c e rt a i n l y n o t o n e t h a t J i an g h a s c i t e d

— s a ys that an applica

nt may meet her burden of

proof m ere ly

by offe ring up letters or a ffidavits at a n
e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , a s o pp os e d to liv e te stimony . Wh ile the I J may no t ha ve be e n c omp e lle d to ins ist on liv e , c or ro bo ratin g te sti mony , “ re -w e ig hin g the e vid e nc e is n ot p art of this Co ur

t’ s r ole under the substantial-evidenc e standa rd.” Lin , 5 65 F .3 d at 97 8; se e als o Ko lia da v . I NS , 259 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2001) (“ [W ]e may no t re verse the B oard’ s determination simply beca use we would have de cided the matter diffe rently .”). No doubt, our unfamiliar leg al sy stem may intimi date immigr ants—it in t i m i d at es many
natur a l- bo rn c iti zen s— e sp e c ia lly tho se no t flu e nt in Eng lis h or he re ill e g a lly . Per ha ps , a s a re su lt, submitt ing a

letter is less intimidating than appe aring in person. And i t may

also be that, c ontraryNo. 08-4463

Jiang v. Holde r

- 5 - to th e A tt o r

n e y G e n e r a l’ s ar g u me n t, mo s t p o te n ti a l w it n e s s e s w il l n o t n e c e s s ar il y know that immigration procee dings a re c onfidential. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.6. But all of this sugg ests only that the e vid e nc e c ou ld s up po rt a c on tr ary c on c lus ion , n ot t hat it c om pe ls one. Se e Do ro sh v . A sh c ro ft , 39 8 F .3 d 3 79 , 3 81 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) . In th e e nd , th is w a s a c a ll f or the I J to make ba se d o n th e fa c ts and cir cumstance s prese nted. The bre vity

and conc lusory

nature of the letters also supports the I J ’s dec ision to give them no weig ht. The most detailed letter rec ounts that Z hu Chen Wu met J iang in 2001 in New Yor k, the tw o r e g ula

rl y pr a c tic e d F a lun

Go ngtog e the r, and the y so me tim e s we nt t o F a lun Go ngg a the ri ng s in New Y ork and Washing ton, D.C. Tang Haiying’ s letter states only that the t wo of them “have been cultivating and practicing (F alun Gong) toge ther every Sunday ” for roug hly a y ear . ROA 232. And t h e l as tl et t er , b y

“[ t ] h e o wn er

o f P l at i n u m Dr ago n , ” h as j u s t o n e re l ev an ts en t en ce : “I sa w [ J i an g] prac tice F a L

un Gong with other fe w people.” ROA 235. Such conclusory letters, lacking any supportive or illuminating de tail, did not compel the I J to acc ept J iang ’s claim. Se e Lin , 565 F.3d at 977. Second , J iang argues that, eve n without corrobor ation, her t est imony by itself satisfies her burden of proof. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (“The testimony of the applicant, if cre dible, may be suff icient to sustain the burden of proof without corr oboration.”)

. But to say that an applicant’s testimony by itself may suffice to meet her

burden of proof is not to say

that it must do so—or that an I J ’s contra ry conclusion must be re verse d. Se e Sh k ab ar i , 427 F.3d at 331 (noting that “eve n when a n applicant’ s
cre di b i l i ty

has not bee n questioned, the fa ilure to provide r easona bly available corr oborating evidenc e” c an itself constitute g rounds for concludingthat an applica nt has failed to mee t the burdenNo. 08-4463

Jiang v. Holde r

- 6 - of proof ). After al l , t h i s i s not a ca se whe re the applicant’ s “testimony is the only

evidenc e available ,” Do ro sh , 398 F.3d at 382 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed), a

nd the self- servingand unelabor ated nature of Jiang ’s testimony g ave the I J ample re ason to insist on corr o borating evidenc e here

. See id. (“ [W]he re it i s r e a so na ble to e xpe c t c or

ro bo ratin g e vid e nc e . . . , su c h e vid e nc e sh ou ld be provide d.”) ( internal quotation marks omitted). B. Jian g a lso pe tit ion s fo r re vie w of the B I A’ s de nia l of re lie f un de r the Con venti on Aga ins t Torture . To obtain relief

, J iang bear s the burden of establishing “ it is m ore likely than not that . . . she would be tortur ed if re moved to” Chin a. 8 C .F.R. § 1208.16(c )(2) . As with her r equest for withholding re moval, this claims hinges on he r status as a F alun Gong prac titioner. This claim thus fails for the same re asons as he r application for withholding of remova l. See F

ang Huang v. Mukase y , 523 F.3d 640, 651 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the standards applicable to withholding of
remova l under the I

NA and the Convention are the same). III
. For these re asons, we de ny

the petition.