Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 1 of 28 

No. 19-10840-AA

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

STEVEN J. DORFMAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

0:18-cv-62593-DPG (Hon. Darrin P. Gayles)

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Opposition of the Federal Trade Commission to 

Emergency Motion to Abate or Stay Proceeding in 

District Court Pending Resolution of Appeal

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Of Counsel:

ELIZABETH C. SCOTT

JAMES H. DAVIS

JOANNIE WEI 

Attorneys

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Chicago, Illinois 60604

ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel

BRADLEY DAX GROSSMAN

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

bgrossman@ftc.gov

202-326-2994
No. 19-10840-AA (11th Cir.) 

Federal Trade Commission v. Steven J. Dorfman 

C1 of 2

Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1 Certificate of Interested Persons

Akerman LLC – Receiver/Counsel for Receiver

Crespo, Janelly – Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 

Davis, James – FTC Attorney

DLA Piper LLP – Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 

Dorfman, Steven – Defendant-Appellant

Federal Trade Commission – Plaintiff-Appellee 

Gayles, The Hon. Darrin P.

Gershoni, Elan – Counsel for Defendant-Appellant

Goldberg, Michael – Receiver

Grossman, Bradley – FTC Attorney

Health Benefits One LLC – Defendant 

Health Center Management LLC – Defendant 

Innovative Customer Care LLC – Defendant 

Levit, Joan – Counsel for Receiver 

Marcus, Joel – FTC Attorney

O’Quinn, Ryan – Counsel for Defendant-Appellant

Peoples, Gera – Counsel for Receiver

Scott, Elizabeth – FTC Attorney

Senior Benefits One LLC – Defendant 

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 2 of 28 
No. 19-10840-AA (11th Cir.) 

Federal Trade Commission v. Steven J. Dorfman 

C2 of 2

Simple Health Plans LLC – Defendant 

Simple Insurance Leads LLC – Defendant 

Surgeon, Naim – Counsel for Receiver

Ward, Guy – FTC Attorney

Wei, Joannie – FTC Attorney

The Federal Trade Commission further states that, to the best of its 

knowledge, no publicly traded company or corporation has an interest in the 

outcome of this case or appeal. 

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 3 of 28 
OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION TO 

ABATE OR STAY PROCEEDING IN DISTRICT 

COURT PENDING RESOLUTION OF APPEAL

The Court should deny the eleventh-hour attempt of appellant, Steven J. 

Dorfman, to disrupt a preliminary injunction hearing scheduled to take place in the 

district court on April 16. His pending appeal of the district court’s temporary 

restraining order does not justify upending the orderly conduct of this case and a 

long-planned hearing to which he expressly agreed.

Dorfman’s motion to “abate” the April hearing should be denied because 

this appeal does not affect the district court’s jurisdiction to hold the hearing. A 

“notice of appeal from a nonappealable order should not divest the district court of 

jurisdiction.” United States v. Saintil, 705 F.2d 415, 418 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting 

United States v. Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc)). The TRO 

and the order declining to vacate it from which Dorfman appeals are 

nonappealable, see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 429-30 (11th Cir. 

1982), and thus have no effect on the district court’s authority to proceed. A TRO 

can be appealable if it is extended too long, but not when the “adverse party 

consents” to the extension. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). Dorfman has repeatedly 

requested or consented to extension of the TRO, including through the April 16 

hearing, and it therefore “remains a nonappealable order.” Fernandez-Roque, 671 

F.2d at 430. 

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Even if the appeal could deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the 

question of monetary relief, the only issue Dorfman presents here, the court would 

retain jurisdiction over other aspects of the preliminary injunction proceeding, 

including a behavioral injunction and notification to Dorfman’s victims. The 

district court can resolve those matters without any effect on the narrow issue 

presented on appeal. 

If this Court believes that the district court lacks jurisdiction over any part of 

the preliminary injunction proceedings, it should treat the district court’s orders 

declining to vacate the TRO and scheduling the preliminary injunction hearing as 

an indicative ruling and remand for the limited purpose of completing the 

proceedings pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12.1. Any other approach will result in 

needless and wasteful proceedings in both this Court and the district court. With 

the hearing just three weeks away—long before briefing, argument, and decision in 

this appeal are likely—by far the most efficient course here is to await the outcome 

below and then allow the parties to litigate a proper appeal (if necessary) on a 

genuine preliminary injunction.

 Dorfman also asks this Court to stay the preliminary injunction proceedings 

even if the district court still has jurisdiction, but he does not come close to meeting 

the prerequisites for a stay. Dorfman has no likelihood of success on the merits of 

his appeal because this Court lacks jurisdiction, Dorfman lacks standing at this 

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point, and his legal argument that the FTC may not secure equitable monetary 

relief is flatly inconsistent with established precedent of this Court. E.g., FTC v. 

Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Dorfman’s claims of irreparable injury—principally, that holding the hearing 

will defame him and that he does not want to incur the costs involved—are risible. 

By contrast, staying the proceeding would severely harm the victims of Dorfman’s 

health insurance scam, who have already lost more than $150 million and many of 

whom are still paying monthly fees, unaware that their insurance is worthless. As 

the district court observed, “there is actually a great danger of irreparable harm to 

the public if the Court does not proceed with this hearing.” 3/20/19 Hearing Tr. 

(FTC Exh. 15) at 16. 

BACKGROUND 

A. The FTC’s Action Against Dorfman

The FTC’s complaint charges Dorfman and his businesses1 with selling 

useless “insurance” to tens of thousands of Americans in a classic bait-and-switch 

scheme. D.E. 1.

2

 Dorfman’s telemarketers and websites falsely told consumers 

that they were buying comprehensive, ACA-compliant insurance policies that 

would cover preexisting conditions for a nominal co-pay. Id. ¶¶ 15-47. 

 

1 The corporate defendants have neither appeared nor responded in this case and 

are not parties to this appeal.

2 A copy of the district court docket sheet is attached hereto as FTC Exhibit 1. 

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Consumers who incurred large medical bills learned too late that they lacked 

conventional health insurance, but had only discount memberships and limited 

benefit plans that did not nearly live up to the promises made. Id. ¶¶ 20, 53. 

Dorfman had charged monthly “premiums” of up to $500 (id. ¶¶ 38-39, 52) for 

products that failed to cover routine medical expenses and in some cases left 

consumers with uncovered medical bills of $60,000 or more (id. ¶¶ 40, 48, 50, 53). 

That conduct violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which 

prohibits unfair and deceptive acts or practices, and Section 310.3 of the FTC’s 

Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.3(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(vii), & (a)(4), 

which prohibits deceptive telemarketing practices. 

Upon filing its complaint, the FTC moved ex parte for a TRO with an asset 

freeze, temporary receivership, and an order to show cause why a preliminary 

injunction should not issue. D.E. 3. The FTC submitted evidence showing that 

Dorfman and his businesses cleared over $150 million from the scheme, and that 

Dorfman was rapidly spending millions of swindled dollars on jewelry, luxury 

cars, gambling sprees (including $368,000 at a single casino), nightclub trips

(including $57,000 from one night’s outing), an oceanfront condominium, and a 

lavish wedding decorated with $133,000 worth of flowers. D.E. 12 at 7, 31, 37. 

On October 31, 2018, the district court issued the TRO and set a November 

14 hearing date on the FTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction. D.E. 15.

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B. Dorfman’s Three Requests To Extend The TRO

As we discuss more fully in our response to the Jurisdictional Question, 

Dorfman requested three continuances of the hearing date on the FTC’s motion for 

preliminary injunction. In each instance, Dorfman consented to extension of the 

TRO through the date of the court’s ruling on the preliminary injunction. 

Dorfman’s First Consent: One week after the district court entered the TRO,

it granted the parties’ joint motion to continue the preliminary injunction hearing 

until December 6 and extend the TRO until the court’s ultimate ruling. D.E. 17

(FTC Exh. 2); D.E. 18. 

Dorfman’s Second Consent: Days after the first continuance, Dorfman’s 

counsel told FTC counsel that he planned to seek a second continuance, 

emphasizing, “Of course, an extension of the PI hearing date would contemplate 

and [sic] extension of the TRO.” D.E. 44-3 (FTC Exh. 5) at 3. The parties jointly 

moved to postpone the hearing until at least January 22 and leave the TRO in place 

until the court reached its decision. D.E. 27 (FTC Exh. 3). The court granted the 

motion and scheduled the hearing for January 29. D.E. 30 (FTC Exh. 4). 

Dorfman’s Third Consent: Dorfman successfully persuaded the district 

court to grant a third continuance of the January 29 hearing date and extension of 

the TRO, this time over the FTC’s objection. Dorfman sought an extension until 

28 days after the close of discovery and attached a proposed order with a hearing 

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 8 of 28 
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date of February 26 at the earliest. D.E. 50 (FTC Exh. 6) at 5; D.E. 50-1 (FTC 

Exh. 7) at 5. The FTC objected because Dorfman had failed to “justif[y] 

indefinitely delaying the preliminary injunction ... hearing ... which the Court 

already has extended twice.” D.E. 52 (FTC Exh. 8) at 1. The district court 

nonetheless granted Dorfman’s motion, explaining that it would set a new hearing 

date at a status conference in mid-January. D.E. 55.

C. The Government Shutdown And Dorfman’s Agreement To An April 16 

Hearing Date

On December 31, 2018, the FTC sought, and the district court granted, a 

temporary stay of the case due to the government shutdown and furlough of FTC 

staff. D.E. 58 (FTC Exh. 9); D.E. 59. One week later, Dorfman asked the court to 

reconsider the stay and either strike the TRO, or, “[i]n the alternative,” order the 

FTC to produce additional discovery and set a hearing date for the preliminary 

injunction motion. D.E. 60 (FTC Exh. 10) at 5. The district court then partially 

lifted the stay “for the limited purposes of allowing discovery to proceed, and to 

promptly resolve discovery disputes.” D.E. 64 (FTC Exh. 11). On January 29, the 

court vacated the remaining stay because the shutdown had ended. D.E. 68. 

On February 5, the court asked the parties to propose dates for the 

preliminary injunction hearing. D.E. 71. Dorfman requested a hearing on April 

16, eleven weeks after the end of the shutdown (FTC counsel independently 

proposed the same date). D.E. 75 (FTC Exh. 12); see also D.E. 74. Dorfman’s 

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counsel emailed chambers to verify that the April 16 hearing date “works for Mr. 

Dorfman” and he declared that it would “provide both parties sufficient time to 

prepare for the hearing.” D.E. 96-1 (FTC Exh. 14) at 1. The court accepted 

Dorfman’s recommendation and extended the TRO until the hearing date. D.E. 76

(FTC Exh. 13). 

D. Dorfman’s Motion To Strike The TRO 

Eleven days later, Dorfman turned about-face and demanded that the court 

immediately strike the TRO because the court had taken too long to conduct the 

hearing. D.E. 79 (Dorfman Exh. A). Dorfman contended that the TRO had 

“expired by operation of law” because he had only consented to an extension 

through January 29. Id. at 6, 8, 25. He complained that “[e]ven to the extent there 

was an unforeseen government furlough, the hearing could still have been held on 

January 29.” Id. at 25. 

 Dorfman failed to acknowledge that he was the one who asked the district 

court—over the FTC’s objection—to indefinitely postpone the January 29 hearing 

and to extend the TRO until after the rescheduled hearing date. See supra pp. 5-6. 

Dorfman also failed to mention that he had agreed to the April 16 hearing date just 

eleven days earlier. See supra pp. 6-7. 

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 10 of 28 
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Dorfman also asked the court to lift the TRO’s asset freeze on the ground 

that the FTC lacks authority to obtain monetary relief under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 

D.E. 79 (Dorfman Exh. A) at 9-24. 

At a February 22 hearing, the district court denied Dorfman’s motion to 

strike the TRO. 2/22/19 Hearing Tr. (Dorfman Exh. C) at 28. The court explained 

that “any reasonable review of this record indicates that the defendant consented to 

the extension.” Id. at 29. Nevertheless, the court advised Dorfman’s counsel that 

“if you want an earlier date, you are being afforded that opportunity.” Id. at 34. 

The court also rejected Dorfman’s argument that it lacked authority to freeze his 

assets. Id. at 29. Dorfman never sought an earlier hearing date, but instead filed a 

notice of appeal from the TRO and the district court’s order refusing to strike it. 

D.E. 85. 

E. Dorfman’s Stay Motion 

 Dorfman next asked the district court to stay the April 16 injunction 

hearing—although he had specifically requested that date—pending this appeal. 

D.E. 94 (Dorfman Exh. E). The district court denied Dorfman’s motion. D.E. 100. 

At a March 20 hearing, the court rejected Dorfman’s contention that his appeal 

divested it of jurisdiction to hold the preliminary injunction hearing, emphasizing 

that “[t]he defendant has identified a very narrow set of issues on appeal.” 3/20/19 

Hearing Tr. (FTC Exh. 15) at 15. It also found that a stay was not warranted

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because Dorfman was unlikely to succeed on the merits and would not suffer 

irreparable damage. By contrast, “there is actually a great danger of irreparable 

harm to the public if the Court does not proceed with this hearing.” Id. at 16. 

ARGUMENT

I. DORFMAN’S APPEAL DOES NOT DIVEST THE DISTRICT COURT OF 

JURISDICTION TO HOLD THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING 

Dorfman’s principal claim is that because he filed an appeal of the TRO and 

the court’s order declining to strike it, the district court no longer has jurisdiction 

over the scheduled preliminary injunction proceedings. Mot. 9-11.

3

 That is not so 

for two reasons. First, as we explain at length in our answer to the Court’s 

Jurisdictional Question and address more briefly below, the TRO and the district 

court’s order declining to strike it are not subject to appeal, and “[f]iling a notice of 

appeal from a nonappealable order should not divest the district court of 

jurisdiction.” Saintil, 705 F.2d at 418 (quoting Hitchmon, 602 F.2d at 694); see 

United States v. Kapelushnik, 306 F.3d 1090, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] 

 

3 The motion lacks page numbers, so we use the ECF pagination. 

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premature notice of appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the 

case.”).4

 

Second, the narrow issue on appeal does not preclude all proceedings 

involving a preliminary injunction. Indeed, a hearing to determine the FTC’s 

entitlement to a behavioral injunction would have no impact on the current appeal, 

which deals instead with the question of monetary relief. 

A. The TRO And The District Court’s Order Declining To 

Dissolve It Are Not Appealable 

Congress has conferred appellate jurisdiction over “injunctions” and “orders 

refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). A TRO, 

however, generally does not count as an “injunction” for these purposes. See 16

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3922.1 (3d ed. 2018); 

Fernandez-Roque, 671 F.2d at 429. Courts may construe a TRO as an appealable 

preliminary injunction when it continues in force beyond 14 days and thus has 

“expired,” but a TRO does not expire when “the adverse party consents” to an 

extension. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). Thus, if a TRO is “extended with the consent 

 

4 A contrary rule would “leave[] the court powerless to prevent intentional 

dilatory tactics, foreclose[] without remedy the nonappealing party’s right to 

continuing trial court jurisdiction, and inhibit[] the smooth and efficient 

functioning of the judicial process.” Saintil, 705 F.2d at 418-19 (quoting 

Hitchmon, 602 F.2d at 494). 

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of all parties,” it “remains a nonappealable order.” Fernandez-Roque, 671 F.2d at 

430. 

As the district court put it when denying the motion to strike the TRO, “any 

reasonable review of [the history of this case] indicates that the defendant 

consented to the extension.” 2/22/19 Hearing Tr. (Dorfman Exh. C) at 29. Indeed, 

Dorfman agreed three separate times to keep the TRO in place until the district 

court decided “whether a preliminary injunction should be entered in this matter.” 

D.E. 17 (FTC Exh. 2); D.E. 27 (FTC Exh. 3); D.E. 50-1 (FTC Exh. 7) at 5. On the 

basis of those assurances, the district court agreed to Dorfman’s request—over the 

FTC’s objection—to postpone the preliminary injunction hearing indefinitely 

beyond January 29 (D.E. 50 (FTC Exh. 6) at 5; D.E. 55), and to set a hearing on 

April 16 (D.E. 75 (FTC Exh. 12)). 

Dorfman concedes that he consented to extension of the TRO, but asserts 

that his consent expired either during the government shutdown or on January 29, 

which was the hearing date the district court had set after the parties’ second joint 

extension request. D.E. 79 (Dorfman Exh. A) at 26; see supra p. 5. But it was 

Dorfman who moved—successfully, and over the FTC’s objection—to extend the 

hearing date and TRO beyond January 29. D.E. 50 (FTC Exh. 6) at 5; D.E. 50-1 

(FTC Exh. 7) at 5; D.E. 55. It was Dorfman who told the district court that the 

April 16 hearing date “works for” him. D.E. 96-1 (FTC Exh. 14) at 1. And it was 

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Dorfman who declined the district court’s invitation to seek an earlier date. See 

supra p. 8. Dorfman omits these essential facts from his motion to stay and his 

response to this Court’s Jurisdictional Question. 

Indeed, even before the shutdown, Dorfman had already asked the court to 

postpone the hearing date until at least February 26 and agreed to leave the TRO in 

place in the meantime. D.E. 50 (FTC Exh. 6) at 5; D.E. 50-1 (FTC Exh. 7) at 5. 

The shutdown ended four weeks before Dorfman’s proposed February 26 hearing 

date. D.E 68. Yet when the district court asked the parties to propose hearing 

dates after the shutdown, Dorfman requested a hearing on April 16, not February 

26. D.E. 75 (FTC Exh. 12). It is no surprise that the district court found that “any 

reasonable review of this record indicates that the defendant consented to the 

extension.” 2/22/19 Hearing Tr. (Dorfman Exh. C) at 29.

5

 

In any event, as we explain more fully in our response to the Court’s 

Jurisdictional Question (at pp. 11-12), Dorfman should be judicially estopped from 

withdrawing his consent. He has “assume[d] a certain position in a legal 

proceeding, and succeed[ed] in maintaining that position,” and he may not now 

“simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position.” New 

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 

 

5 This Court “review[s] factual findings related to jurisdiction for clear error.” 

United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir. 2016). 

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U.S. 680, 689 (1895)). Specifically, Dorfman asked the district court to delay the 

preliminary injunction hearing from November until the following April, and 

having convinced it to do so, he now has reversed course and complains that he 

can appeal the TRO because it extended too long. Dorfman’s positions are 

“clearly inconsistent” and appear “calculated to make a mockery of the judicial 

system.” See Ajaka v. Brooksamerica Mortg. Corp., 453 F.3d 1339, 1344-45 (11th 

Cir. 2006). 

B. The Preliminary Injunction Hearing Would Not Interfere 

With The Narrow Matters On Appeal 

Even if Dorfman were challenging an appealable order and the appeal could 

deprive the district court of some of its jurisdiction, the court was correct in finding 

that the issues for appeal are “very narrow” and thus do not remove all jurisdiction 

to conduct the preliminary injunction hearing. 3/20/19 Hearing Tr. (FTC Exh. 15)

at 15. An interlocutory appeal does not “divest the district court of jurisdiction of 

collateral matters not affecting the questions presented on appeal.” Doe, 1-13 ex 

rel. Doe Sr. 1-13 v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1064 (11th Cir. 2001). Rather, the 

district court “has authority to proceed forward with portions of the case not related 

to the claims on appeal.” Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 

341 F.3d 1292, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Dorfman’s only claim on the merits is that the district court could not 

properly freeze his assets because the FTC may not legally obtain monetary relief. 

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See Mot. 13-15. He does not dispute the FTC’s authority to obtain injunctive relief 

to halt his unlawful conduct, nor does he raise any factual defenses to the FTC’s 

charges that he misled consumers. See Dorfman’s Civil Appeal Statement (Mar. 

18, 2019). Thus, the district court may still hold a hearing on whether the 

Commission is likely to succeed in proving that Dorfman’s practices violated the 

law and whether an injunction against similar misdeeds is warranted. The court’s 

consideration of such issues would have no impact on the narrow question 

presented in this appeal. 

C. The Court May Treat The Scheduled Hearing As An 

Indicative Ruling And Remand For The Purpose Of 

Conducting The Hearing

Should the Court determine that Dorfman’s appeal is proper and that it 

deprives the district court of any jurisdiction over this matter, it nevertheless may 

deem the district court’s orders declining to vacate the TRO and scheduling the 

preliminary injunction hearing as an indicative ruling and remand to the district 

court for the limited purpose of completing the preliminary injunction proceeding. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.1; 11th Cir. R. 12.1-1. That procedural approach will avoid 

needless and wasteful proceedings in both this Court and the lower court. Indeed, 

a preliminary injunction proceeding could be finished in the district court long 

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before briefing, argument, and decision in this appeal.

6

 Dorfman could then 

properly appeal from a genuine preliminary injunction, resulting in only one 

appellate proceeding. 

By contrast, taking the appeal of the TRO will almost certainly result in 

further proceedings in district court (at least regarding a behavioral injunction) no 

matter how this Court rules, spurring yet another appeal. The most efficient course 

therefore is to allow the district court to complete its job and to hear any appeal in 

the ordinary course.

II. DORFMAN DOES NOT NEARLY MEET THE TEST FOR ASTAY 

PENDING APPEAL

Dorfman’s alternative request for a stay pending appeal also fails. To merit 

a stay, Dorfman must prove that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he 

will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) issuance of the stay will not 

substantially injure other parties; and (4) the public interest favors a stay. See Nken 

v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). The first two factors “are the most critical.” 

Id. Dorfman does not claim that he is likely to succeed on the merits—he asserts 

only that his case is “substantial” (Mot. 13)—so the remaining factors must 

 

6 Briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction is well underway. On March 

25, Dorfman filed his memorandum in opposition to the preliminary injunction and 

accompanying exhibits. D.E. 104.

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“weigh[] heavily in favor of granting the stay.” Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 

1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Dorfman has shown no prospect of success on the merits and no serious 

claim of injury (let alone irreparable injury). Meanwhile, a stay of the preliminary 

injunction hearing pending appeal will seriously harm Dorfman’s victims and the 

public interest. 

A. Dorfman Is Highly Unlikely To Succeed On The Merits

Dorfman has virtually no chance of prevailing in this appeal. As discussed 

on pp. 5-7, 11-13, supra, and in our response to the Jurisdictional Question, the 

TRO is unappealable because Dorfman consented to it.

In addition, Dorfman lacks standing to object to the duration of the TRO or 

the district court’s scheduling of the preliminary injunction hearing. “To establish 

appellate standing, a litigant must ‘prove that he has suffered a concrete and 

particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely 

to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” United States v. Amodeo, 916

F.3d 967, 971 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 

(2013)). 

The district court’s actions did not cause Dorfman to suffer any concrete or 

particularized injuries, since Dorfman himself was the primary cause of the delays 

in scheduling the preliminary injunction hearing. See supra pp. 11-13. Dorfman’s 

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claimed injuries are also not redressable. Although Dorfman claimed below that 

he was deprived of a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” (D.E. 79 (Dorfman 

Exh. A) at 9), he will have that opportunity very soon at the April 16 hearing. 

Granting Dorfman’s motion to stay the April hearing would exacerbate, not 

redress, his alleged injuries by postponing the hearing for several more months 

while he remains bound by the TRO pending this appeal. 

Beyond claiming that the TRO has lasted too long, Dorfman raises just one 

challenge to the substance of the TRO: that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 53(b), does not allow courts to award equitable monetary relief, including 

asset freezes, to the FTC. Mot. 13-14. He euphemistically describes his argument

as “novel,” id. at 14; a more accurate label would be “wrong.” The claim 

contravenes the settled law of this Court and the eight other circuits that have 

decided the issue. As this Court has explained, “the unqualified grant of statutory 

authority to issue an injunction under section 13(b) carries with it the full range of 

equitable remedies, including the power to grant consumer redress and compel 

disgorgement of profits.” Gem Merch., 87 F.3d at 468-70; accord FTC v. WV 

Universal Mgmt., LLC, 877 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2017); FTC v. IAB Mktg. 

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Assocs., LP, 746 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Washington Data 

Resources, Inc., 704 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).7

 

Those decisions are binding on the panel that decides this appeal; the only 

way Dorfman could prevail is by convincing the full court to abandon its precedent 

and change its position. But he fails to explain why he has any likelihood of 

securing such an outcome. See Mot. 14-15. Dorfman speculates, based on Kokesh 

v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), that the Supreme Court may someday hold that the 

FTC Act does not permit equitable monetary relief. See Mot. 11, 14. But Kokesh

made clear that “[n]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion” on 

whether the SEC was authorized to obtain similar relief. 137 S. Ct. at 1642 n.3. 

This Court has continued to uphold equitable disgorgement remedies after Kokesh. 

See, e.g., SEC v. Hall, No. 17-13897, 2019 WL 103892, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 

2019). 

Dorfman mistakenly relies on a concurring opinion in FTC v. AMG Capital 

Management, LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018). The two judges who signed 

 

7 Every other court of appeals to have considered the issue agrees. See FTC v. 

Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2016); FTC v. Ross, 743 

F.3d 886, 890-91 (4th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 

365-66 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Magazine Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x 155, 158 n.2 (3d 

Cir. 2011) (unpublished); FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st 

Cir. 2010); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 

2005); FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC 

v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-14 (8th Cir. 1991).

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 21 of 28 
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that opinion properly recognized in the majority opinion authored by one of them 

that binding law required them to rule that the FTC can obtain monetary relief. Id.

at 426-27. The concurrence calls for the full court to overturn its decades of 

consistent law, but it represents the views of only two judges on a court of two 

dozen. The opinion does not remotely show that Dorfman is likely to succeed on 

his claim.

Dorfman’s reliance on SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2016), is 

likewise misplaced. There, this Court held, similar to Kokesh the following year,

that SEC disgorgement remedies are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. 

Id. at 1363-64. It did not question the SEC’s statutory authority to obtain equitable 

monetary relief. Dorfman does not argue here (nor could he) that the FTC’s claims 

are time-barred. 

B. Dorfman Has Not Shown Irreparable Harm

The other injunction factors cut particularly sharply against Dorfman. His 

claims of irreparable harm are trifling. He anticipates that the FTC might 

eventually obtain a final judgment “liquidat[ing] all of the Defendants’ assets so 

they can be distributed to the U.S. Treasury, the Defendants’ customers, and other 

entities.” Mot. 15-16. If so, then Dorfman could take an appeal from the final 

judgment and seek a stay of that judgment pending appeal. No harm is posed now. 

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 20

Dorfman also claims he will suffer injury because evidentiary hearings in 

federal court “by their nature are defamatory” and would “expose any and all [of 

his] trade and business secrets.” Mot. 15. If he has legitimate trade secrets, he 

may ask the district court for a sealing order. The remainder of his charge is not 

only untrue on its face, but would justify a stay of every single injunction 

proceeding in federal court. 

To the degree Dorfman complains about the costs of going through the 

preliminary injunction proceeding, Mot. 18, the Supreme Court determined long 

ago that “litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not 

constitute irreparable injury.” FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 

(1980).8

 

C. The Public Will Suffer Irreparable Harm If The Case Is 

Stayed

The FTC brought this case in order to halt a fraudulent enterprise that 

deceived tens of thousands of consumers into purchasing what they falsely were 

led to believe was comprehensive health insurance. Many consumers only 

discovered the truth after they had incurred staggering medical bills, at which point 

it was too late. Some of Dorfman’s customers have developed serious health 

 

8 Dorfman raises the expense issue as part of the public interest inquiry, but there 

is no public interest in reducing an accused fraudster’s lawyer bills by exempting 

him from a hearing in court.

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 23 of 28 
 21

conditions that are going untreated because they are essentially uninsured. See

Dorfman Exh. F at 33-109 (examples of consumer complaints). Far from serving 

the public interest, as the district court rightly found “there is actually a great 

danger of irreparable harm to the public if the Court does not proceed with this 

hearing.” 3/20/19 Hearing Tr. (FTC Exh. 15) at 16. 

Dorfman is wrong that consumers are no longer being harmed because the 

defendants’ “assets are frozen and held in receivership” due to the TRO. Mot. 16. 

In fact, thousands of victims are still paying his “premiums” every month despite 

the TRO, unaware that Dorfman’s products have left them practically uninsured. 

For example, between December 2018 and February 2019, Dorfman’s third-party 

administrator, Health Insurance Innovations, charged his customers 165,798 times, 

totaling $14.6 million, for “policies” Dorfman sold them. See Dorfman Exh. F at 

30-31 (Supplemental Declaration of FTC investigator Nathaniel Al-Najjar) ¶¶ 5-7. 

Each month this litigation is stayed will be one more that those victims go without 

relief. If these consumers develop a serious illness, they may face a tragic choice 

between financial ruin and forgoing necessary treatment. 

Under the TRO, the receiver has only a temporary appointment, which limits 

his ability to protect Dorfman’s customers. A preliminary injunction would allow 

the receiver to contact (with court permission) each of Dorfman’s customers who 

continue to pay fees, notify them about the true nature of his products, and give 

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 22

them an opportunity to cancel. A stay will injure consumers by preventing the 

receiver from taking these protective steps. Dorfman responds that his victims can

protect themselves because they “should have” read about his transgressions in the 

newspaper (Mot. 17), but that rationalization serves only Dorfman’s interests and 

not those of the public. 

Finally, Dorfman claims there is a public interest in hearing his statutory 

arguments about monetary relief. He of course remains free to raise those 

arguments before the district court and then again (if necessary) before this Court 

on a proper appeal. There is no public interest in Dorfman’s presenting these 

arguments now. 

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CONCLUSION

This Court should deny Dorfman’s motion for a stay pending appeal. 

Respectfully submitted,

ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel

March 27, 2019 /s/ Bradley Grossman

BRADLEY DAX GROSSMAN

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Office of the General Counsel 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 326-2994

bgrossman@ftc.gov

Of Counsel:

ELIZABETH C. SCOTT

JAMES H. DAVIS

JOANNIE WEI 

Attorneys

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 26 of 28 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(g), I certify that the foregoing motion

complies with the volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(2)(A) because it 

contains 5,066 words, as created by Microsoft Word, excluding the items that may 

be excluded under Fed. R. App. P. 32(f). 

March 27, 2019 /s/ Bradley Grossman 

Bradley Dax Grossman

Attorney 

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 27 of 28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 27, 2019, I filed the foregoing with the Court’s 

appellate CM-ECF system, and that I caused the foregoing to be served through the 

CM-ECF system on counsel of record for defendant-appellant, who are registered 

ECF users.

Dated: March 27, 2019 /s/ Bradley Grossman

Bradley Dax Grossman

Attorney

Office of the General Counsel

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20580

(202) 326-2994 (telephone)

(202) 326-2477 (facsimile)

bgrossman@ftc.gov

Case: 19-10840 Date Filed: 03/27/2019 Page: 28 of 28