1

CLD

- 259 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 13

- 1597

___________ MICHAEL ANGLIN ,

Appellant

v. MR. WERLINGER, Warden, FCI Loretto

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No . 3:11

- cv - 00023 ) Distric t Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson

____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P . 10.6

May 31, 2013 Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : June 13, 2013 )

_________ OPINION

_________ PER CURIAM Michael Anglin appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his habeas petition. For the following reasons, we will summ arily affirm.2 I.
In 1997 , a jury found Michael Anglin guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United States, bank r obbery, and firearms violations

— crime s that he committed in 1996. The Southern District of New York sentenced him to 140 months of imprisonme nt. Anglin filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied. Anglin appealed, and, in 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, Anglin was embroiled
in a separate criminal action in the Eastern District of New York for cr imes that he committed in 1993. Anglin was convicted of these crime s in 2000, and sentenced as a career criminal to an enhanced term of 240 months to be served consecutive ly to his first
sentence

. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the Second Circuit, A nglin filed a § 2255 motion as to his second conviction . The Eastern District denied the motion, and, in 2005, the Second Circuit affirmed. In January 2011, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania, Anglin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 i n the Western District of Pennsylvania

. In his petition, Anglin claimed that he was not eligible for enhanced sentencing because the criminal conduct underlying his second conviction occurred before the criminal conduct underlying hi s first conviction

. The Magistrate Judge
recommended that his petition be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that he failed to show that a § 2255 motion was inadequate or ineffective to3

test the validity of his sentence

. Despi te Anglin’s objections, the District Co urt adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation

. Anglin timely appealed.
II. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a) , and we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s judgment. See Vega v. United States , 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007)

. We may summarily affirm the District Court ’s judgment if an appeal does not present a substantial question. See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe , 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)

. A nglin argues on appeal that his “actual innocence” of the enhanced sentence
p ermitted him to bring a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

— that his actual innocence makes the fact that he cannot bring a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 fundamentally unfair. Al though a motion pursuant to § 2255 is generally “ the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their

. . . sentences ,” a prisoner can challenge the validity of his sentence under § 2241 if the remedies available under § 2255 are inadequate or ineffective

. Okereke v. United States , 307 F.3d 117, 120

- 21 (3d Cir. 2002)

. This “safety valve” exception “ensure[s] that petitioners have a fair opportunity to
seek collateral relief

. . . . ” Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner , 290 F.3d 536, 5 39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Here, however, Anglin clearly had an earlier opportunity to raise
his actual innocence claim in the § 2255 proceeding s before the Second Circuit, but he failed to do so. And, of course, a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineff ective “only if it can be shown that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a Section 22554

proceeding from affording the prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim of wrongful detention.” United States v. Brooks , 230 F.3d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Anglin did not make such a showing. Anglin also argues that his § 2241 motion was permissible because it challenge d the execution, rather than the validity, of his sentence

. Indeed, habeas petitions under § 22 41 can be used to challenge the execution of a sentence

. See Coady v. Vaughn , 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). Unquestionably, though, Anglin attac ked the validity of his sentence. As he himself admitted in his habeas petition , he “is challenging the s entence imposed ... [and] asserts that he is actually innocent of the sentence in question

. . . . ” Anglin’s complaint is with the judgment issued by the District Court , not the way in which his judgmen t of conviction was effectuated

. See Cardona v. Bledso e , 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012)

. For the reasons given, the District Court properly dismissed Anglin’s petition. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. Murray v. Bledsoe , 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per cu riam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R.; I.O.P.
10.6. His “motion for preliminary review for appeal” is denied.