[Cite as Roubanes v. Roubanes, 2013-Ohio-5778.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Barbara A. Roubanes (nka Luke), : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 13AP-369 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 08DR-07-2851) 

Matthew G. Roubanes, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 30, 2013 

 

Barbara Roubanes Luke, pro se. 

Tyack, Blackmore, Liston & Nigh Co., L.P.A., and 

Elizabeth R. Werner, for appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

McCORMAC, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Barbara Roubanes Luke, appeals from a judgment of 

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, from an 

amended entry which denied her motion for reconsideration and sustained her motion 

to modify child support. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining 

the parties' incomes for child support purposes. For the following reasons, we reverse 

the trial court's judgment. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶2} The parties were married in 1998, had two children, and were divorced in 

2009. Under the final divorce decree, appellant was obligated to pay $742.35 per 

month, per child for child support, which included $554.00 per month for 28 months to 

pay past arrearages and to equalize the property settlement. Appellant's income was 

stipulated as $75,000 and appellee's income was stipulated at $40,000. In November 

2011, appellant was ordered to continue liquidating the arrearages at the rate of $554 

per month. On August 31, 2012, appellant filed a motion to modify child support. 
No. 13AP-369 2

{¶3} The trial court held a hearing on February 20, 2013. The child support 

arrears as of that date were $28,440.93. (Tr. 196.) The trial court found that both 

parties presented evidence of a change in circumstances with regard to their incomes. 

The trial court then found that appellant's income was $40,439.82 in 2012 and that 

appellee's income was $40,921.00 for 2012 but, after legitimate deductions listed on his 

2012 tax returns, found his income to be $17,189.00. Appellant was ordered to pay 

$308.98 per month per child, plus processing charge, as long as private health 

insurance is in effect. The trial court also ordered appellant to liquidate her arrearages 

by adding an additional 20 percent of the monthly child support order, plus processing, 

for a total of $756.39 per month. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶4} Appellant filed a notice of appeal and raised the following assignment of 

error: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING THE 

PARTIES' GROSS INCOME FOR CHILD SUPPORT 

PURPOSES BY ALLOWING FATHER TO MAKE 

DEDUCTIONS BASED ON HIS TAX RETURNS WITH NO 

SUPPORTING RECEIPTS OR WITNESSES, AND BY NOT 

ALLOWING MOTHER TO TAKE DEDUCTIONS SUPPORTED BY WITNESS TESTIMONY 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶5} Child support issues are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard 

and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 

Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997), citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). "The 

term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies 

that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). A trial court has not abused its discretion 

simply because a reviewing court can reach a different result. McClung v. McClung, 

10th Dist. No. 03AP-156, 2004-Ohio-240, ¶ 8. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

{¶6} Appellant makes several arguments in regard to her assignment of error 

contending that the trial court erred in calculating the parties' gross income for child 

support purposes. Initially, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
No. 13AP-369 3

allowing appellee to take $23,732 in deductions from gross income without any receipts 

or summary of business expenses or a supporting witness, which violates public policy 

demanding money available for child support purposes should be included in income. 

{¶7} R.C. 3119.01(C)(7) defines "gross income," for purposes of determining 

child support, as "the total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during a 

calendar year, whether or not the income is taxable[.] * * * 'Gross income' includes selfgenerated income; and potential cash flow from any source." Foster v. Foster, 150 Ohio 

App.3d 298, 2002-Ohio-6390 (12th Dist.), ¶ 14, quoting R.C. 3119.01(C)(7). R.C. 

3319.01(C)(13) defines "self-generated income" as "gross receipts received by a parent 

from self-employment, proprietorship of a business, joint ownership of a partnership or 

closely held corporation, and rents minus ordinary and necessary expenses incurred by 

the parent in generating the gross receipts." "Ordinary and necessary expenses incurred 

in generating gross receipts" include "actual cash items expended by the parent or the 

parent's business." R.C. 3119.01(C)(9)(a). Each parent is required to verify their income 

and personal earnings "by electronic means or with suitable documents, including, but 

not limited to, paystubs, employer statements, receipts and expense vouchers related to 

self-generated income, tax returns, and all supporting documentation and schedules for 

the tax returns." R.C. 3119.05(A). 

{¶8} Federal and state tax documents provide a starting point for calculating a 

parent's income for child support purposes, but they are not the sole factor for the trial 

court to consider. Foster at ¶ 12, citing Houts v. Houts, 99 Ohio App.3d 701, 706 (3d 

Dist.1995). See also Dannaher v. Newbold 10th Dist. No. 05AP-172, 2007-Ohio-2936, ¶ 

12. In Wood v. Wood, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-513, 2011-Ohio-679, ¶ 42, this court 

discussed the difference between determining income pursuant to the Internal Revenue 

Code and the child support guidelines, as follows: 

The purposes underlying the Internal Revenue Code and the 

child support guidelines are vastly different. * * * The federal 

tax code allows deductions from gross income based on a 

myriad of economic and social policy reasons that have no 

bearing on child support. Id. In contrast, the child support 

guidelines focus on determining how much money is actually 

available for child support purposes. Id. Consequently, a 

trial court must not blindly accept all of the expenses 

deducted on previous tax returns as ordinary and necessary 

business expenses incurred in generating gross receipts. Id.; 
No. 13AP-369 4

Buening v. Buening. 3d Dist. No. 10-10-01, 2010-Ohio-2164, 

¶ 13, Dressler v. Dressler, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-05-062, 

2004-Ohio-2072, ¶ 10, 14. 

 

Wood at ¶ 42, citing Amlin v. Amlin, 2d Dist. No. 2008CA15, 2009-Ohio-3010, ¶ 70. 

{¶9} R.C. 3119.01(C)(9) provides the instructions for business cash 

expenditures and depreciation for child support purposes, as follows: 

(a) "Ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in generating 

gross receipts" means actual cash items expended by the 

parent or the parent's business and includes depreciation 

expenses of business equipment as shown on the books of a 

business entity. 

(b) Except as specifically included in "ordinary and necessary 

expenses incurred in generating gross receipts" by division 

(C)(9)(a) of this section, "ordinary and necessary expenses 

incurred in generating gross receipts" does not include 

depreciation expenses and other noncash items that are 

allowed as deductions on any federal tax return of the parent 

or the parent's business. 

 

{¶10} As explained in Marcus v. Marcus, 2d Dist. No. 98 CA 83 (July 30, 1999): 

This exclusion of "depreciation expenses and other noncash 

items" from ordinary and necessary business expenses for 

child support purposes is "designed to ensure that a parent's 

gross income is not reduced by any sum that was not actually 

expended in the year used for computing child support." 

Emary v. Emary (Oct. 23, 1996), Lorain App. No. 

96CA006353, unreported, quoting Baus v. Baus (1991), 72 

Ohio App.3d 781, 784, 596 N.E.2d 509. The reason for this 

is that depreciation expenses for federal income tax purposes 

are not "actual cash outlays" of that corporation for the tax 

year. Harter [v. Harter, 3rd Dist. No. 1-97-55 (Feb. 26, 

1998)]. 

{¶11} Thus, for child support purposes, the Ohio Revised Code permits the 

deduction of depreciation expenses which relate to the replacement of equipment but 

not the deduction of depreciation expenses for other noncash items. R.C. 

3119.01(C)(9)(a) and (b). 

{¶12} In this case, appellee presented an unsigned copy of his personal 2012 tax 

return and the tax return of his S-corporation. He testified that he had income from 

three sources, his W-2 income as an employee, his 1099 income as an independent 
No. 13AP-369 5

contractor, and income from his company, as demonstrated on the tax return. Appellee 

did not present his W-2s or 1099. There was no evidence, such as receipts or expense 

vouchers, presented regarding the ordinary and necessary business expenses. The tax 

returns were the only evidence presented at the hearing. Appellee testified regarding his 

different jobs and the W-2s and the 1099 as referenced but could not testify how much 

he made at each job. Appellee's testimony also did not address any of the deductions on 

the tax return. 

{¶13} "In computing income for purposes of child support, a court should pay 

particular attention to the possibility that a spouse who is the sole shareholder of a 

business is engaged in 'creative accounting' designed to cloak net income. Therefore, 

the court needs to consider all financial data which relates to the operation of that 

spouse's business." Corrigan v. Corrigan, 8th Dist. No. 74088 (May 13, 1999). The 

failure to do so has been found to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Corrigan; 

Bowen v. Thomas, 102 Ohio App.3d 196, 201 (3d Dist.1995); Offenberg v. Offenberg, 

8th Dist. No. 78885, 2003-Ohio-269. 

{¶14} Here, the trial court only considered appellee's tax returns to determine 

his income, and there was no other supporting evidence. Appellee did not provide 

support for his tax returns and deductions to income for the corporation. The trial court 

abused its discretion in determining appellee's income by only considering his tax 

returns. Appellant's first arguments regarding her assignment of error are well-taken. 

{¶15} Appellant's last argument is that the trial court erred in determining her 

income because she presented evidence of $5,140 in business expenses, but the trial 

court did not deduct them from her income. Appellant contends that her witness, 

Donna Musilli, testified as an independent CAbi consultant, employed in the same 

capacity as appellant. Appellant argues that Musilli's testimony is that all CAbi 

consultants incur expenses twice per year in the amount of $2,500, plus $70 in shipping 

costs to purchase seasonal inventory, and she should have been permitted to deduct 

these expenses from her income. 

{¶16} Actual cash expended on business equipment by a self-employed parent 

may be deducted from gross income. The deduction "recognizes the economic reality 

that money legitimately expended by a self-employed parent to make more money is, in 

fact, not available for child support purposes." (Emphasis sic.) Helfrich v. Helfrich, 10th 
No. 13AP-369 6

Dist. No. 95APF12-1599 (Sept. 17, 1996), citing Kamm v. Kamm, 67 Ohio St.3d 174 

(1993); Woods v. Woods, 95 Ohio App.3d 222 (3d Dist.1994). 

{¶17} However, here we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing 

to deduct the expenses from appellant's income. Musilli's testimony was not as clear as 

appellant contends it was, and there was no connection made between Musilli's 

expenses and appellant's expenses. Appellant did not testify regarding her own 

expenses. Musilli testified, when asked about the investment to get involved as a CAbi 

consultant, as follows: 

I think it takes about 4- or $5,000 to get started, but the 

investment for the sample line is $2,500 and plus $70 for 

shipping, and then cost to go to our training which is twice a 

year. 

(Tr. 64-65.) 

 

{¶18} Musilli testified regarding the training, as follows: 

It's called The Scoop [the training]. 

* * * 

Twice a year you travel to a location where you have 

anywhere from two to five - - two to five days of training and 

that is at your own expense. So it is the cost of the airfare, 

hotel, meals. There is a Scoop registration fee which 

sometimes they will waive but sometimes they don't. 

* * * 

Yes, it is mandatory. 

(Tr. 65.) 

{¶19} The trial court determined that, despite the witness's testimony, appellant 

failed to provide any documentation of her particular expenses and, therefore, the 

amount, if any, of the ordinary and necessary expenses that should be deducted was 

unknown. The trial court found that appellant testified that she would not "bother" the 

trial court with business deductions. (Apr. 3, 2013 Entry, 2.) 

{¶20} Appellant did testify to the court that she did not believe she would be able 

to deduct any business expenses (Tr. 113; 127-28) and that her current income was 
No. 13AP-369 7

$40,439, which she rounded to $40,000. (Tr. 128; Plaintiff's Ex. D.) Given that 

testimony and the lack of receipts and expense vouchers for ordinary and necessary 

expenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not deducting expenses from her 

income. It is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to deduct expenses from income if 

there was not a proper demonstration of support to justify those expenses. See

Dannaher. Appellant's last argument is not well-taken, and, therefore, her assignment 

of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. 

V. CONCLUSION 

{¶21} Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, appellant's assignment of error is 

sustained in part as to the trial court's calculation of appellee's income and overruled in 

part as to the trial court's calculation of appellant's income; the judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, is affirmed in 

part and reversed in part; and this cause is remanded to that court to recalculate the 

child support obligation. 

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, 

 and cause remanded with instructions. 

BROWN and O'GRADY, JJ., concur. 

McCORMAC, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, 

assigned to active duty under the authority of the Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C). 

________________