alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 12
                           FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
                       Statement of Computation of Ratios
                             (Dollars In millions)


Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges:


                                     Twelve Months Ended         Year Ended
                                           March 31,            December 31,
                                       1998       1997         1997     1996
                                     --------   --------     -------- --------

NET INCOME                            $140.5     $234.7       $135.9   $238.4

Add:
  Operating Income Taxes                71.9      132.8         69.9    135.8
  Other Income Taxes                      .6        (.4)                  (.1)
                                     --------   --------     -------- --------
Income Before Taxes                    213.0      367.1        205.8    374.1

Total Interest Charges                 127.9       98.3        117.3     98.4
                                     --------   --------     -------- --------
Total Earnings (A)                    $340.9     $465.4       $323.1   $472.5

Fixed Charges (B)                     $127.9     $ 98.3       $117.3   $ 98.4
                                     --------   --------     -------- --------
 Ratio of Earnings to
  Fixed Charges (A/B)                   2.67       4.73         2.75     4.80
                                     ========   ========     ======== ========
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8024 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8024

  To extend certain waivers under the WIC program during the COVID-19 
                   pandemic, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            August 11, 2020

   Ms. Schrier (for herself and Ms. Herrera Beutler) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and 
                                 Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To extend certain waivers under the WIC program during the COVID-19 
                   pandemic, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``WIC Waiver Extension Act of 2020''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE WAIVER UNDER WIC DURING CERTAIN 
              PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES.

    Section 2203 of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (Public 
Law 116-127; 42 U.S.C. 1786 note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``any portion'' and 
        all that follows through the period at the end and inserting 
        ``the qualified emergency period described in subsection 
        (c)(1).''; and
            (2) by amending subsection (c) to read as follows:
    ``(c) Applicability.--
            ``(1) Qualified emergency period.--The qualified emergency 
        period described in this paragraph is the period--
                    ``(A) beginning on March 18, 2020; and
                    ``(B) ending on September 30, 2021.
            ``(2) Effect of extension.--The Secretary may extend 
        (without further application) a waiver approved by the 
        Secretary and received by a State agency under this section 
        before the date of the enactment of the WIC Waiver Extension 
        Act of 2020 such that such waiver applies during the qualified 
        emergency period described in paragraph (1).
            ``(3) Sunset.--The authority under this section shall 
        expire on September 30, 2021.''.

SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS WAIVER UNDER WIC.

    Section 2204 of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (Public 
Law 116-127) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``September 30, 2020'' 
        and inserting ``September 30, 2021''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(d) Effect of Extension.--The Secretary of Agriculture may extend 
(without further application) a waiver approved by the Secretary of 
Agriculture and received by a State agency under this section before 
the date of the enactment of the WIC Waiver Extension Act of 2020 such 
that such waiver applies until September 30, 2021.''.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                             _______________________

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT

                             _______________________

                     PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
                         SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported):

                                 February 27, 2012

                       Diamond Hill Investment Group, Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             (Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)

                                      Ohio
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation)

             000-24498                              65-0190407
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Commission File Number)         (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)

      325 John H. McConnell Blvd, Suite 200, Columbus, Ohio              43215
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Address of Principal Executive Offices)                    (Zip Code)

Registrant's Telephone Number, Including Area Code:   (614) 255-3333


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)



<PAGE>

Item 2.02   Results of Operations and Financial Condition
---------   ---------------------------------------------

Registrant has reported its results of operations for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2011, as described in Registrant's press release dated
February 24, 2012, a copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit 99.1 and
incorporated herein by reference.

Item 9.01.     Financial Statements and Exhibits
---------   ---------------------------------------------

Exhibit No.   Document
-----------   --------

99.1          Press release issued by the Registrant dated February 24, 2012.



                                    SIGNATURE
                                    ---------

     Pursuant to the  requirements  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,
the registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed  on its  behalf
by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                        DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.


Date: February 27, 2012			    By: /s/ James F. Laird
                                            -------------------------------
                                            James F. Laird, Chief Financial
                                             Officer and Secretary
#### Norman Paul HINCHMAN, Individually and as Juvenile Counselor for Hernando County, Florida, Petitioner, v. Monroe W. TREIMAN, County Judge and Juvenile Judge of Hernando County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 71-521.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 9, 1971.

Prohibition denied.
261 La. 1039

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Johnny T. JOHNSON, Jr. v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 52403.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 18, 1972.

In re: Johnny T. Johnson, Jr. applying for writ of review.

Application denied; the ruling of the trial judge after the evidentiary hearing is correct.
#### Jack Curtis HIGGINBOTHAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-1041.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 25, 1971.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Olean, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

SWANN, Judge.

Defendant, an unmarried minor who lived with his mother, was charged with a *541crime. On May 22, 1969, he pleaded guilty to the charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. He testified; the court found him guilty as charged but withheld entry of an adjudication of guilt and placed him on probation for two years. The defendant’s mother was not properly notified of these proceedings.

Subsequently, defendant was charged with the crime of breaking and entering an automobile with intent to commit grand larceny and his mother was duly notified of this charge. He entered a plea of guilty to the crime of trespass and the court adjudicated him guilty and imposed sentence.

Defendant was then charged with violation of probation and his mother was present at the hearing on this charge. His probation was revoked and he was adjudicated guilty of breaking and entering with intent to commit petty larceny and sentenced for a term of two years in the State Penitentiary.

Defendant appeals from the last judgment and conviction of sentence and asserts that the state’s failure to comply with the requirements of § 932.38, Fla.Stat., F. S.A., constitutes reversible error. The statute requires that due notice of criminal charges shall be given to the parents of an unmarried minor prior to the trial.

We hold that the proceedings on May 22, 1969 at which the defendant pled guilty and was found guilty constituted the trial in this cause and that the failure of the state to notify the parents of the minor defendant of that charge prior to trial constitutes reversible error. See Kinard v. Cochran, Fla.1959, 113 So.2d 843; Johnson v. Cochran, Fla.1960, 124 So.2d 488; Bell v. State, Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 565; Brooks v. State, Fla.App.1966, 183 So.2d 550; and Milligan v. State, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 75.

Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the defendant, Higginbotham, was null and void because of the failure of the state to comply with § 932.38, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. The judgment and sentence for the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit petty larceny be and the same is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded for further action consistent herewith.

It is so ordered.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6682

ARTHUR R. WEIDLICH,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GEORGE TRENT, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert Earl Maxwell, Senior

District Judge. (CA-95-7-2)

Submitted: November 7, 1996 Decided: November 19, 1996

Before RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Arthur R. Weidlich, Appellant Pro Se. Scott E. Johnson, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on

his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Weidlich v. Trent,

No. CA-95-7-2 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 17, 1996). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Joan T. KERN, Appellant, v. Jack D. KERN, Appellee.

Nos. 73-361, 73-362.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 22, 1974.

Ronald E. Jones, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Richard B. Burk, of Scott, Burk & Royce, Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by Joan T. Kern, respondent, from an order denying her motion to set aside default and final judgment entered pursuant thereto in favor of Jack D. Kern, petitioner.

The respondent’s motion to set aside default and final judgment was filed pursuant to Rule 1.540(b), FRCP, 31 F.S.A., and was predicated upon “misrepresentations” and “fraudulent misrepresentations” made by the petitioner upon which respondent relied and which misrepresentations result*211ed in respondent’s failure to file a responsive pleading in a divorce action between the parties thereby allowing the default and final judgment to be entered against her.

Rule 1.540(b) provides, in part:

> “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;

The policy of the courts of Florida in setting aside defaults in order to permit a trial on the merits is one of liberality; a greater leniency is granted in those cases not decided on the merits. Imperial Industries, Inc. v. Moore Pipe & Sprinkler Co., Fla.App. 1972, 261 So.2d 540; Florida Investment Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., Fla.App.1964, 160 So.2d 733; 19 Fla. Jur., Judgments and Decrees, Sec. 457. Reviewing the evidence in the record in light of the foregoing principle and with due regard to the proposition that a motion to vacate is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, we are of the opinion that the motion to vacate should have been granted. See North Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, Fla. 1962, 143 So.2d 849; Gordon v. Vaughan, Fla.App.1967, 193 So.2d 474; Coggin v. Barfield, 1942, 150 Fla. 551, 8 So.2d 9. There was sufficient evidence to demonstrate misrepresentation by the petitioner with particular regard to the matter of child custody so as to afford respondent a trial on the merits with respect to that issue and with regard to the other matters contained in a separation agreement previously entered into by the parties prior to the dissolution of their marriage; the misrepresentations were shown by the respondent to be such as to cause her not to contest the dissolution proceedings. See Horra v. Horra, Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 670; 10A Fla.Jur., Dissolution of Marriage, Sec. 17.

The order appealed is reversed with directions to vacate the default and set aside the final judgment and take such further action as may be deemed appropriate and not inconsistent herewith.

OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8044 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8044

 To forestall the loss of research talent by establishing a temporary 
               early career research fellowship program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            August 14, 2020

Ms. Johnson of Texas (for herself, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Beyer, Mr. Garcia of 
    California, Mr. Lipinski, Mr. Weber of Texas, Ms. Bonamici, Mr. 
 Gonzalez of Ohio, Mr. Tonko, and Mr. Cohen) introduced the following 
   bill; which was referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and 
                               Technology

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To forestall the loss of research talent by establishing a temporary 
               early career research fellowship program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Supporting Early-Career Researchers 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Nation's universities and industrial research labs 
        are facing unprecedented budget pressure as part of the COVID-
        19 health crisis, resulting in considerably fewer openings for 
        research and teaching positions.
            (2) Emergency funding is needed to forestall the loss of 
        research talent likely to occur if early-career researchers are 
        forced to seek employment outside of research due to the sharp 
        economic decline caused by the COVID-19 health crisis.

SEC. 3. EARLY-CAREER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--The Director of the National Science Foundation 
may establish a 2-year pilot program to award grants to highly 
qualified early-career investigators to carry out an independent 
research program at the institution of higher education chosen by such 
investigator, to last for a period not greater than 2 years.
    (b) Institution of Higher Education Defined.--The term 
``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in 
section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).

SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There is authorized to be appropriated to the Director of the 
National Science Foundation $250,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2021 
through 2022 to carry out the activities in this Act.
                                 <all>
```
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8093 

To adjust the boundary of Big Bend National Park in the State of Texas, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 22, 2020 

Mr. HURD of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To adjust the boundary of Big Bend National Park in the 

State of Texas, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Big Bend National 

5 Park Boundary Adjustment Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 

8 (1) MAP.—The term ‘‘map’’ entitled ‘‘Big Bend 

9 National Park, Proposed Boundary Adjustment’’, 

10 numbered 155/167,296, and dated July 2020. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8093 IH

1 (2) PARK.—The term ‘‘Park’’ means the Big 

2 Bend National Park, as established pursuant to the 

3 Act of June 20, 1935 (49 Stat. 393; 16 U.S.C. 

4 156). 

5 (3) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

6 the Secretary of the Interior. 

7 SEC. 3. BIG BEND NATIONAL PARK BOUNDARY ADJUST8 MENT. 

9 (a) LAND ACQUISITION.—The Secretary is author10 ized to acquire approximately 6,100 acres of lands or in11 terests in land generally depicted on the map as ‘‘Proposed 

12 Park Addition’’ by donation, purchase from willing sellers, 

13 or exchange. 

14 (b) AVAILABILITY OF MAP.—The map shall be on file 

15 and available for public inspection in the appropriate of16 fices of the National Park Service, the Department of the 

17 Interior. 

18 (c) BOUNDARY REVISION AND ADMINISTRATION.— 

19 Upon the acquisition of any lands or interests in land pur20 suant to subsection (a), the Secretary shall revise the 

21 boundary of the Park to include the acquisition, and shall 

22 administer such lands or interests in land as part of the 

23 Park in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED August 28, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50534 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RAUL GARCIA-GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 2:04-CR-852-ALL

-------------------- Before DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Raul Garcia-Garcia (Garcia) pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Garcia appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court mistakenly believed that the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory when it sentenced him. In addition, Garcia argues that his sentence is unreasonable and that the enhancement provisions of 8No. 05-50534 -2- U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The record belies Garcia’s contention that the district court sentenced him believing that the Guidelines were still mandatory. At sentencing, the district court stated that it knew that it was not bound by the Guidelines. Furthermore, there is no indication that the sentence the district court imposed, which was at the low end of the guidelines range of imprisonment, was unreasonable. See United States v. Alonzo , 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Garcia’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Garcia contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi , we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Garcia properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
AFFIRMED.