alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In the Matter of Google LLC and iHeartMedia, Inc.

File No. 202-3092

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER AGAINST GOOGLE LLC

TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT

The Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) has accepted, subject to final approval,

an agreement containing a consent order as to Google LLC (“Google” or “respondent”). The 

proposed consent order (“order”) has been placed on the public record for 30 days for receipt of 

comments by interested persons. Comments received during this period will become part of the 

public record. After 30 days, the Commission will again review the order and the comments 

received, and will decide whether it should withdraw the order or make it final.

This matter involves Google’s practices with respect to advertising for its Pixel 4 

smartphone (the “Pixel 4”). The complaint alleges that Google wrote, recorded, and disseminated

first-person endorsements for the Pixel 4 by local radio personalities in several states. The 

complaint further alleges that, in the advertising, the respondent represented that the radio 

personalities owned or regularly used the Pixel 4, and had used it to take pictures at night, when 

the radio personalities did not own or regularly use the phone, and had not used it to take pictures 

at night. The complaint alleges that Google’s representations were false and misleading, and 

violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.

The order includes injunctive relief that prohibits the alleged violations and fences in

similar and related conduct for any Covered Product. Covered Product is defined as any: (i)

Respondent consumer electronic product; (ii) any Respondent operating system for handheld 

devices; and (iii) any Respondent operating system or consumer-facing feature when marketed as 

part of any consumer electronic product.

Part I prohibits misrepresenting that an endorser has owned or used any Covered Product

or about an endorser’s experience with any Covered Product.

Part II requires the respondent to cooperate in any Commission investigation or case 

related to the conduct that is the subject of the complaint. 

Part III requires the respondent to distribute the order to certain persons and submit

signed acknowledgments of order receipt.

Part IV requires the respondent to file compliance reports with the Commission, and to

notify the Commission of changes in corporate structure that might affect compliance 

obligations.

Part V contains recordkeeping requirements for certain accounting records, personnel 

records, consumer complaints, training materials, and advertising and marketing materials, and 

all records necessary to demonstrate compliance with the order.
Part VI contains other requirements related to the Commission’s monitoring of the

respondent’s order compliance.

Part VII provides the effective dates of the order, including that, with exceptions, the

order will terminate in 20 years.

The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the order, and it is not

intended to constitute an official interpretation of the complaint or order, or to modify the order’s

terms in any way.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50004

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANTOINE DARREN BREWER,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:13-CR-468-1

Before HAYNES, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Antoine Darren 

Brewer has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Brewer has filed a response. We have reviewed 

counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well 

as Brewer’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 3, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-50004 Document: 00515021434 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/03/2019
No. 19-50004

2

presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s 

motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further 

responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 19-50004 Document: 00515021434 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/03/2019
#### In the Matter of Louis Roman, Appellant, v Martin Cirincione, as Chair of the New York State Parole Division, Respondent.

[735 NYS2d 829]

Mugglin, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Hemmett, Jr., J.), entered January 2, 2001 in Washington County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner’s request for parole release.

Petitioner has been in prison since 1977 serving an aggregate sentence of 25 years to life after having been convicted of two counts- of murder in the second degree and four counts of robbery in the first degree. In May 2000, the Board of Parole denied petitioner’s most recent application for parole release. Supreme Court dismissed the CPLR article 78 proceeding to review that determination and we affirm.

*749The record demonstrates that the Board considered the relevant statutory factors in denying petitioner’s request for parole release, including his positive accomplishments "in prison and postrelease plans, before concluding that, due to the serious and violent nature of the crimes, petitioner is not an acceptable candidate for parole release *(see, Matter of Hurdle v New York State Bd. of Parole,*283 AD2d 739). Accordingly, in light of petitioner’s failure to demonstrate that the Board’s determination was affected by a “ ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety’” *(Matter of Silmon v Travis,*95 NY2d 470, 476, quoting *Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole,*50 NY2d 69, 77), we perceive no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination that petitioner was not an acceptable candidate for parole release *(see, Matter of Hurdle v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra).*Moreover, we find no support in the record for petitioner’s current claim that the Board’s reliance on the statutory factors in denying his application is pretextual only, its true motivation being to deny him parole so that the State can continue to be eligible to receive Federal Truth in Sentencing grant funds. Accordingly, this argument is rejected as meritless.

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
#### Terry Kerr COLLIER and Maria Isabel Collier, Petitioners, v. Hon. Warren H. EDWARDS, Judge, Criminal Court of Record, Division A, Orange County, Florida, and Rom W. Powell, County Solicitor, Orange County, Florida, Respondents.

No. 70-964.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 2, 1971.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1971.

James M. Russ of Law Offices of James M. Russ, Orlando, for petitioners.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Rodney Durrance, Jr., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This is a Petition for Writ of Prohibition based upon the alleged failure of the State to accord the defendant a speedy trial as required by F.S. 915.01 (2), F.S.A., Laws of 1969. We deny the Petition for two reasons. First, three full terms did not elapse following the first written demand of trial. Clawson v. Baker, 245 So.2d 223, Supreme Court Opinion filed March 3, 1971; Woodward v. Edwards, 244 So.2d 438, Fourth District Court of Appeal Opinion filed December 11, 1970. Contra, State ex rel. Retchin v. Turner, Fla.App.1970, 243 So.2d 168. Second, the operation of the speedy trial statute, supra, was tolled or stayed upon the filing of the interlocutory appeal by the State. State v. Cook, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 769.

Denied.

WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur.

CROSS, C. J., dissents with opinion.

CROSS, Chief Judge

(dissenting):

I respectfully dissent. I would grant the Writ of Prohibition with instructions to dismiss petitioner’s criminal prosecution on the authority of State v. Baker, Fla. 1970, 238 So.2d 281.
Order filed April 17, 2014 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-13-00176-CV

____________

IN THE ESTATE OF BILLIE LEE MARTIN, DECEASED, Appellant

V.

KIM OPPENHEIN AND RACHEL MARTIN, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Waller County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. P09-52

ORDER

On January 7, 2014, this court issued the following order:

The supplemental clerk’s record was filed November 22, 2013. 

Appellant filed a motion to correct and supplement the clerk’s record. 

The record does not contain:

• James Raymond’s Notice of Appeal, filed August 3, 2012;

• 13 Applications to Pay Appointee Fees, filed on May 22, 2012;

• 13 Orders to Pay Appointees Fees, signed on September 25, 2012;
• James Raymond’s Request for Preparation of the Clerk’s Record (in

connection with the December 21, 2012 Notice of Appeal)); and

• A complete copy of Court’s Docket Sheet.

The Waller County District Clerk is directed to file a supplemental 

clerk’s record on or before February 7, 2014, containing the abovelisted items. The Clerk is further directed to correct the Supplemental 

Clerk’s Record index, pagination, and electronic bookmarks to 

conform with 14th Court of Appeals Local Rule 2.2.b.

If the omitted items are not part of the case file, the district clerk is 

directed to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing a certified 

statement that the omitted items are not a part of the case file.

As of today, this court has not received the supplemental clerk’s record. 

Accordingly, the Waller County District Clerk is directed to file the supplemental 

clerk’s record on or before May 15, 2014.

PER CURIAM
EXHIBIT
32.2
   CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
  SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002
   In
connection with the Annual Report of Network CN Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Daley Mok, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
  (1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.
   /s/
      Daley MokDaley
      MokChief
      Financial OfficerMarch
      13, 2008
   1
#### W. Wirt CULBERTSON, as Tax Assessor of Metropolitan Dade County, et al., Petitioners, v. SEACOAST TOWERS EAST, INC., a Florida corporation, Respondent.

No. 39539.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 17, 1970.

Thomas C. Britton, County Atty., and John G. Fletcher, Asst. County Atty., for petitioners.

Richard P. Kenney of Williams, Salomon & Kenney, Miami, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The District Court of Appeal, Third District, certified to this Court that its decision in the instant case, reported at 232 So.2d 753 (3rd D.C.A.Fla.1970),

> “‘[P]asses upon a question * * * of great public interest’ in that it construes the meaning of the term ‘substantially completed’ as used in § 193.11 (4) Fla.Stat. [F.S.A.] and therefore affects the collection of taxes in this state.”

After consideration of the arguments, briefs and the record presented in this cause, we conclude that the District Court’s opinion correctly interprets the applicable law and properly construes the meaning of the term “substantially completed” in light of the facts in the case.

The writ is discharged.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, C. J., and DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 77 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 77

  To amend title 28, United States Code, to prohibit the issuance of 
             national injunctions, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2019

  Mr. Biggs introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 28, United States Code, to prohibit the issuance of 
             national injunctions, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Injunctive Authority Clarification 
Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. ORDERS PURPORTING TO RESTRAIN ENFORCEMENT AGAINST NON-PARTIES.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 155 of title 28, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 2285. Orders purporting to restrain enforcement against non-
              parties
    ``No court of the United States (and no district court of the 
Virgin Islands, Guam, or the Northern Mariana Islands) shall issue an 
order that purports to restrain the enforcement against a non-party of 
any statute, regulation, order, or similar authority, unless the non-
party is represented by a party acting in a representative capacity 
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 155 of 
title 28, United States Code is amended by inserting after the item 
relating to section 2285 the following:

``2285. Orders purporting to restrain enforcement against non-
                            parties.''.
                                 <all>
```
Order entered December 11, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-17-01361-CV

No. 05-17-01362-CV

IN RE SENRICK WILKERSON, Relator

Original Proceeding from the Criminal District Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F10-01183 and F10-01184

ORDER

Before Justices Lang-Miers, Myers, and Boatright

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY relator’s November 27, 2017 

petition for writ of mandamus. 

/s/ JASON BOATRIGHT 

JUSTICE
259 La. 686

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Charlie MONROE, Jr. v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 51636.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 17, 1971.

In re; Charlie Monroe, Jr. applying for writ of habeas corpus.

Writ refused. The showing made is insufficient to warrant the exercise of our original or supervisory jurisdiction.
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Carl E. Jones, Jr., certify that: 

1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Regions Financial Corporation; 

2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4.  The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) [Omitted in accordance with Commission Release No. 33-8238]~~~~
(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

5.  The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: November 13, 2003

/s/ Carl E. Jones, Jr.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-03-1997
<CASH>                                           3,776
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,036
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (537)
<INVENTORY>                                     32,621
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                45,629
<PP&E>                                         111,951
<DEPRECIATION>                                (53,773)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 122,522
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           42,232
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,622
<OTHER-SE>                                      28,817
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                        155,986
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               155,986
<CGS>                                          116,220
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                38,608
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,038
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    120
<INCOME-TAX>                                        48
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 72
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        72
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .04
        

</TABLE>
#### John Earl ZIEGLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. R-447.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 4, 1973.

Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, Thomas C. Turner, Ronald B. Cosgrove, and James O. Brecher, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We have carefully considered the briefs and oral arguments in this cause, and find that the appellant has failed to show error in the final judgment as to the first count of the information and we therefore affirm the judgment and sentence as to said first count.

As to the second count of the information, we feel that the jury was taking an adverse position and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and judgment therefor. Therefore, we reverse the conviction and judgment thereon and set aside the sentence on the second count of the information.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and JOHNSON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
##  Aircraft  **WEIGHT (INCLUDING BA TTERY AND PROPELLERS** **)**  1280 g  **DIAGONAL SIZE (INCLU DING PROPELLERS)**   590 mm  **MAX ASCENT SPEED**  5 m/s  **MAX DESCENT SPEED**  3 m/s  **HOVER ACCURACY**
 Vertical: +/- 0.1 m

(when Vision Positioning is active) or +/- 0.5 m  Horizontal: +/- 1.5 m  **MAX SPEED**  16 m/s (ATTI mode, no wind)  **MAX ALTITUDE ABOVE S EA LEVEL**   6000 m  **OPERATING TEMPERATUR E**   0°C to 40°C  **GPS MODE**  GPS/GLONASS



##  Camera  **SENSOR**  Sony EXMOR 1/2.3” Effective pixels: 12.4 M (total pixels: 12.76 M)  **LENS**  FOV 94° 20 mm (35 mm format equivalent) f/2.8, focus at ∞  **ISO RANGE**  100 - 3200 (video) 100 - 1600 (photo)  **SHUTTER SPEED**  8s - 1/8000s  **IMAGE MAX SIZE**  4000 x 3000  **STILL PHOTOGRAPHY MO DES** 
 Single Shot  Burst Shooting: 3/5/7 shots  Auto Exposure Bracketing (AEB): 3/5  Bracketed Frames at 0.7EV Bias  Time - lapse  **VIDEO RECORDING MODE S**  

##  Phantom

3 Professional UHD: 4096x2160p 24/25, 3840x2160p 24/25/30  FHD: 1920x1080p 24/25/30/48/50/60  HD: 1280x720p 24/25/30/48/50/60 

##  Phantom

3 Advanced

 2.7K: 2704 x1520p 24/25/30 (29.97)  FHD: 1920x1080p 24/25/30/48/50/60  HD: 1280x720p 24/25/30/48/50/60  **SUPPORTED SD CARD TY PES**   Micro SD Max capacity: 64 GB. Class 10 or UHS - 1 rating required  **MAX BITRATE OF VIDEO STORAGE**  

##  Phantom

3 Professional  60 Mbps 

##  Phantom

3 Advanced  40 Mbps  **SUPPORTED FILE FORMA TS** 
 FAT32/exFAT  Photo: JPEG, DNG  Video: MP4, MOV (MPEG -4 AVC/H.264)  **OPERATING TEMPERATUR E**   0°C to 40°C 

##  Gim bal  **CONTROLLABLE RANGE**  Pitch - 90° to +30°  **STABILIZATION**  3 - axis (pitch, roll, yaw)



##  Vision Positioning  **MAX VELOCITY**  Less than 8 m/s (when 2 m above ground)  **ALTITUDE RANGE**  30 cm- 300 cm  **OPERATING RANGE**  30 cm- 300 cm  **OPERATING ENVIRONMEN T**   Surface with clear pattern and adequate lighting (Lux > 15)


##  Remote Controller  **OPERATING FREQUENCY**  2.400 GHz - 2.483 GHz  **MAX DISTANCE**  2000m

(outdoors and unobstructed)  **VIDEO OUTPUT PORT** USB  **OPERATING TEMPERATURE**   0°C - 40°C  **BATTERY**  6000 mAh LiPo 2S  **MOBILE DEVICE HOLDER**  For tablet or phone  **RECEIVER SENSITIVITY (1%PER)**   - 101 dBm

±2 dBm  **TRANSMITTER POWER (E IRP)** 
 FCC: 20 dBm  CE: 16 dBm  **WORKING VOLTAGE**  1.2 A @7.4 V



##  Battery Charger  **VOLTAGE**  17.4 V  **RATED POWER** 

##  Phantom

3 Professional

 100 W 

##  Phantom

3 Advanced

 57 W



##  Intelligent Flight Battery  **CAPACITY**  4480 mAh  **VOLTAGE**  15.2 V  **BATTERY TYPE**  LiPo 4S  **ENERGY**  68 Wh  **NET WEIGHT**  365 g  **MAX FLIGHT TIME**  Approximately 23 minutes  **OPERATING TEMPERATUR E**   - 10°C to 40°C  **MAX CHARGING POWER**   100 W 

### 