United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 16, 2021 

Decided July 16, 2021 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 20-3306 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

QUINCE D. WRIGHT, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 05-cr-121-bbc-1 

Barbara B. Crabb, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Quince Wright, a federal prisoner, appeals the revocation of his supervised 

release, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to 

withdraw. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We agree with counsel that there 

are no nonfrivolous issues on appeal, so we grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss 

the appeal. 

Wright served 188 months’ confinement for conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), after which he began a three-year term of 

supervision. In the first year of his supervision, however, he failed several drug tests 

and pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual assault in violation of Wisconsin Statute 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20-3306 Page 2 

§ 940.225(3)(a). See Wisconsin v. Wright, No. 19CF1000 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2020). The

government sought to revoke his supervised release. After a hearing, the district court 

found revocation warranted because of his guilty plea and sentenced him to the 

statutory maximum term of 24 months in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 

Wright does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel when

appealing a revocation order, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–91 (1973), so the 

Anders safeguards need not govern our review. Nevertheless, our practice is to follow 

them. United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains 

the nature of the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal of this kind 

would be expected to involve. Because her analysis appears adequate, and Wright has 

not responded, see CIR. R. 51(b), we focus our review on the issues she discusses in her 

brief. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel does not tell us, as she should have, whether Wright wishes to challenge 

the revocation order or to withdraw any of the admissions upon which that order was 

based. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Knox, 

287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). The omission is harmless, however, because Wright 

admitted his violations at the hearing. These include the Grade A violation of 

committing a new felony crime of violence, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); U.S.S.G. 

§§ 4B1.2(a)(2), and several Grade C violations—i.e., possessing and using illegal drugs.

See U.S.S.G. §§ 5D1.3(a)(1), (4), (d)(4). Because the district court properly found that

Wright violated at least one condition of his release by a preponderance of the evidence, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)–(2), any argument that the court 

wrongly revoked his release would be pointless. See United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 

948 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Counsel does consider whether Wright could challenge the length of his 

sentence, and rightly concludes he could not. The court correctly calculated a range of 

24–30 months’ imprisonment under the Guidelines Chapter Seven policy statements, 

based on Wright’s criminal history (Category IV), underlying offense (a class C felony), 

and most serious violation (Grade A). See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(1)(3); U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(b); 

7B1.4(a). Although the court initially imposed a 27-month sentence that was consistent 

with the policy statements but exceeded the 24-month statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3), it promptly corrected its error and imposed the statutory maximum 

sentence. The record reflects no “misunderstanding about the statutory maximum.” 

Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857. 
No. 20-3306 Page 3 

Finally, counsel rightly rejects any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of 

Wright’s 24-month prison term. That sentence falls within policy-statement range, so 

we may presume it to be reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption. The court acknowledged Wright’s 

positive post-sentencing conduct (obtaining housing and employment and enrolling in 

college classes) but found these outweighed by the applicable factors under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a), including the seriousness of his crimes (“I can’t just overlook them”) and the 

need to promote respect for the law and deter him and others from similar conduct

(“[t]he purpose of this sentence is to hold you accountable for your repeated 

violations”). The court’s explanation reflects that it sufficiently considered the relevant 

factors and that any challenge on this basis would be frivolous. See United States v. 

Raney, 842 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016). 

We therefore GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.