# Gazzetta ufficiale C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0944
  doi:10.3000/19770944.C_2013.237.ita |
| --- | --- |
| Gazzetta ufficiale
  dell'Unione europea | C 237 |
| | |
| Edizione in lingua italiana | Comunicazioni e informazioni | 56o anno15 agosto 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0944

doi:10.3000/19770944.C_2013.237.ita

Gazzetta ufficiale

dell'Unione europea

C 237

Edizione in lingua italiana

Comunicazioni e informazioni

56o anno15 agosto 2013

---

| Numero d'informazione | Sommario | pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicazioni |
| | COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 237/01 | Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Numero d'informazione

Sommario

pagina

II   Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

2013/C 237/01

Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informazioni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Tassi di cambio dell'euro | 2 |
| | INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO |
| | Autorità di vigilanza EFTA |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di chiudere un caso di aiuto esistente in seguito all'accettazione di opportune misure da parte di uno Stato EFTA | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in materia di aiuti di Stato, con riferimento ad aiuti regionali per il regime di incentivi agli investimenti in Islanda e sei accordi d’investimento | 4 |

IV   Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

2013/C 237/02

Tassi di cambio dell'euro

2

INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

2013/C 237/03

Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di chiudere un caso di aiuto esistente in seguito all'accettazione di opportune misure da parte di uno Stato EFTA

3

2013/C 237/04

Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in materia di aiuti di Stato, con riferimento ad aiuti regionali per il regime di incentivi agli investimenti in Islanda e sei accordi d’investimento

4

| | V   Avvisi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Comunicazione della Commissione pubblicata ai sensi dell’articolo 27, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 del Consiglio relativamente ai casi AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II e AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | ALTRI ATTI |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Pubblicazione di una domanda di registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Pubblicazione di una domanda di modifica ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Pubblicazione di una domanda di registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera b), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari | 40 |

V   Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione europea

2013/C 237/05

Comunicazione della Commissione pubblicata ai sensi dell’articolo 27, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 del Consiglio relativamente ai casi AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II e AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

28

ALTRI ATTI

Commissione europea

2013/C 237/06

Pubblicazione di una domanda di registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

31

2013/C 237/07

Pubblicazione di una domanda di modifica ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

36

2013/C 237/08

Pubblicazione di una domanda di registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera b), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

40

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE |

---

(1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE

1

| IT | |
| --- | --- |

IT

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II Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/1

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Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata

(Caso COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

2013/C 237/01

In data 18 aprile 2013 la Commissione ha deciso di non opporsi alla suddetta operazione di concentrazione notificata e di dichiararla compatibile con il mercato comune. La presente decisione si basa sull'articolo 6, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio. Il testo integrale della decisione è disponibile unicamente in lingua inglese e verrà reso pubblico dopo che gli eventuali segreti aziendali in esso contenuti saranno stati espunti. Il testo della decisione sarà disponibile:

| — | sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore, |
| --- | --- |

—

sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore,

| — | in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/index.htm) con il numero di riferimento 32013M6843. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario. |
| --- | --- |

—

in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/index.htm) con il numero di riferimento 32013M6843. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario.

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IV Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/2

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Tassi di cambio dell'euro (1)

14 agosto 2013

2013/C 237/02

1 euro =

| | Moneta | Tasso di cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dollari USA | 1,3243 |
| JPY | yen giapponesi | 130,17 |
| DKK | corone danesi | 7,4583 |
| GBP | sterline inglesi | 0,85440 |
| SEK | corone svedesi | 8,6393 |
| CHF | franchi svizzeri | 1,2415 |
| ISK | corone islandesi | |
| NOK | corone norvegesi | 7,8130 |
| BGN | lev bulgari | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corone ceche | 25,822 |
| HUF | fiorini ungheresi | 298,62 |
| LTL | litas lituani | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats lettoni | 0,7025 |
| PLN | zloty polacchi | 4,2037 |
| RON | leu rumeni | 4,4315 |
| TRY | lire turche | 2,5664 |
| AUD | dollari australiani | 1,4524 |
| CAD | dollari canadesi | 1,3689 |
| HKD | dollari di Hong Kong | 10,2705 |
| NZD | dollari neozelandesi | 1,6501 |
| SGD | dollari di Singapore | 1,6835 |
| KRW | won sudcoreani | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricani | 13,2129 |
| CNY | renminbi Yuan cinese | 8,1041 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,5415 |
| IDR | rupia indonesiana | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | ringgit malese | 4,3351 |
| PHP | peso filippino | 57,975 |
| RUB | rublo russo | 43,8995 |
| THB | baht thailandese | 41,504 |
| BRL | real brasiliano | 3,0586 |
| MXN | peso messicano | 16,8756 |
| INR | rupia indiana | 81,3700 |

Moneta

Tasso di cambio

USD

dollari USA

1,3243

JPY

yen giapponesi

130,17

DKK

corone danesi

7,4583

GBP

sterline inglesi

0,85440

SEK

corone svedesi

8,6393

CHF

franchi svizzeri

1,2415

ISK

corone islandesi

NOK

corone norvegesi

7,8130

BGN

lev bulgari

1,9558

CZK

corone ceche

25,822

HUF

fiorini ungheresi

298,62

LTL

litas lituani

3,4528

LVL

lats lettoni

0,7025

PLN

zloty polacchi

4,2037

RON

leu rumeni

4,4315

TRY

lire turche

2,5664

AUD

dollari australiani

1,4524

CAD

dollari canadesi

1,3689

HKD

dollari di Hong Kong

10,2705

NZD

dollari neozelandesi

1,6501

SGD

dollari di Singapore

1,6835

KRW

won sudcoreani

1 482,39

ZAR

rand sudafricani

13,2129

CNY

renminbi Yuan cinese

8,1041

HRK

kuna croata

7,5415

IDR

rupia indonesiana

13 667,59

MYR

ringgit malese

4,3351

PHP

peso filippino

57,975

RUB

rublo russo

43,8995

THB

baht thailandese

41,504

BRL

real brasiliano

3,0586

MXN

peso messicano

16,8756

INR

rupia indiana

81,3700

---

(1)  Fonte: tassi di cambio di riferimento pubblicati dalla Banca centrale europea.

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INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/3

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Aiuti di Stato — Decisione di chiudere un caso di aiuto esistente in seguito all'accettazione di opportune misure da parte di uno Stato EFTA

2013/C 237/03

L'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha proposto opportune misure, che sono state accolte dall'Islanda, in merito alla seguente misura di aiuto:

| Data di adozione della decisione | : | 24 aprile 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aiuto n. | : | 70958 |
| Numero della decisione | : | 159/13/COL |
| Stato EFTA | : | Islanda |
| Titolo | : | aiuti di Stato concessi a Landsvirkjun e Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Base giuridica | : | legge 42/1983 relativa a Landsvirkjun, legge 45/1998 sugli enti locali, legge 139/2001 sulla costituzione di Orkuveita Reykjavíkur come impresa comune e legge 121/1997 sulle garanzie statali. |
| Obiettivo | : | n.p. |
| Forma dell'aiuto | : | garanzie illimitate dello Stato e dei comuni proprietari, senza pagamento di premi di mercato adeguati, a favore di Landsvirkjun e di Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Settore economico | : | settore dell'energia elettrica |
| Altre informazioni | : | sulla base delle misure prese e degli ulteriori impegni offerti dalle autorità islandesi volti ad abolire la garanzia di Stato illimitata a favore di Landsvirkjun e Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, l'Autorità ha sciolto le proprie riserve circa l'incompatibilità del regime e l'indagine è stata chiusa. |

Data di adozione della decisione

:

24 aprile 2013

Aiuto n.

:

70958

Numero della decisione

:

159/13/COL

Stato EFTA

:

Islanda

Titolo

:

aiuti di Stato concessi a Landsvirkjun e Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Base giuridica

:

legge 42/1983 relativa a Landsvirkjun, legge 45/1998 sugli enti locali, legge 139/2001 sulla costituzione di Orkuveita Reykjavíkur come impresa comune e legge 121/1997 sulle garanzie statali.

Obiettivo

:

n.p.

Forma dell'aiuto

:

garanzie illimitate dello Stato e dei comuni proprietari, senza pagamento di premi di mercato adeguati, a favore di Landsvirkjun e di Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Settore economico

:

settore dell'energia elettrica

Altre informazioni

:

sulla base delle misure prese e degli ulteriori impegni offerti dalle autorità islandesi volti ad abolire la garanzia di Stato illimitata a favore di Landsvirkjun e Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, l'Autorità ha sciolto le proprie riserve circa l'incompatibilità del regime e l'indagine è stata chiusa.

Il testo della decisione facente fede, ad eccezione dei dati riservati, è disponibile sul sito dell'Autorità di vigilanza EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/4

---

Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in materia di aiuti di Stato, con riferimento ad aiuti regionali per il regime di incentivi agli investimenti in Islanda e sei accordi d’investimento

2013/C 237/04

Con decisione n. 177/13/COL del 30 aprile 2013, riprodotta nella lingua facente fede nelle pagine che seguono la presente sintesi, l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha avviato un procedimento ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia. Copia della decisione è stata inviata per informazione alle autorità islandesi.

Con la presente comunicazione, l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA invita gli Stati EFTA, gli Stati membri dell’UE e le parti interessate a inviare eventuali osservazioni sulla misura in oggetto, entro un mese dalla data di pubblicazione, al seguente indirizzo:

| Autorità di vigilanza EFTA |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

Registro

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Dette osservazioni saranno comunicate alle autorità islandesi. Su richiesta scritta e motivata degli autori delle osservazioni, la loro identità non sarà rivelata.

SINTESI

Procedimento

In data 13 ottobre 2010, l’Autorità di vigilanza ha approvato un regime di incentivi agli investimenti («il regime») notificato dalle autorità islandesi a norma dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 3, della parte I del protocollo 3, con decisione n. 390/10/COL.

Il regime prevede la possibilità di concedere aiuti sotto forma di sovvenzioni dirette, attraverso varie esenzioni fiscali per un periodo massimo di dieci anni, e tramite la vendita e locazione di terreni al di sotto del valore di mercato alle società in tutti i settori, ad eccezione del settore finanziario, in connessione con un investimento iniziale in zone ammesse a beneficiare degli aiuti regionali in Islanda (zone note come «regioni c»). Il regime giunge a scadenza il 31 dicembre 2013.

Come approvato dall’Autorità di vigilanza la base giuridica per il regime è composta da:

| — | la legge n. 99/2010 sugli incentivi per gli investimenti iniziali in Islanda («la legge»), adottata dal parlamento islandese il 29 giugno 2010, nonché |
| --- | --- |

—

la legge n. 99/2010 sugli incentivi per gli investimenti iniziali in Islanda («la legge»), adottata dal parlamento islandese il 29 giugno 2010, nonché

| — | il regolamento (UE) n. 985/2010 sugli incentivi per gli investimenti iniziali in Islanda, adottato dal Ministero dell’Industria il 25 novembre 2010 («il regolamento»), che corrisponde a un progetto di regolamento presentato all’Autorità il 27 settembre 2010. Il regolamento è un atto di diritto derivato, in base alla legge in oggetto. |
| --- | --- |

—

il regolamento (UE) n. 985/2010 sugli incentivi per gli investimenti iniziali in Islanda, adottato dal Ministero dell’Industria il 25 novembre 2010 («il regolamento»), che corrisponde a un progetto di regolamento presentato all’Autorità il 27 settembre 2010. Il regolamento è un atto di diritto derivato, in base alla legge in oggetto.

Il 30 dicembre 2010 il Ministero dell’Industria ha emesso un nuovo regolamento, il regolamento (UE) n. 1150/2010 («il regolamento supplementare»), che modifica il precedente in particolare per quanto riguarda l’effetto di incentivazione degli aiuti agli investimenti. Il regolamento supplementare non è stato notificato all’Autorità.

Nel periodo 2010-2013, lo Stato islandese ha stipulato una serie di accordi che riteneva all’interno del regime («sei accordi d’investimento»):

| 1) | il 30 dicembre 2010 con Becromal Islanda ehf; |
| --- | --- |

1)

il 30 dicembre 2010 con Becromal Islanda ehf;

| 2) | il 30 dicembre 2010 con Thorsil ehf; |
| --- | --- |

2)

il 30 dicembre 2010 con Thorsil ehf;

| 3) | il 17 febbraio 2011 con Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf; |
| --- | --- |

3)

il 17 febbraio 2011 con Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf;

| 4) | il 22 settembre 2011 con Verne immobili II ehf; |
| --- | --- |

4)

il 22 settembre 2011 con Verne immobili II ehf;

| 5) | il 7 maggio 2012 con GMR Endurvinnslan ehf; |
| --- | --- |

5)

il 7 maggio 2012 con GMR Endurvinnslan ehf;

| 6) | il 28 gennaio 2013 con Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6)

il 28 gennaio 2013 con Marmeti ehf.

Il 13 dicembre 2012 a seguito di discussioni avvenute nella fase di pre-notificazione, le autorità islandesi hanno comunicato all’Autorità di vigilanza, ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 3, della parte I del protocollo 3, una serie di proposte di modifica («gli emendamenti notificati») alla legge.

Valutazione della misura

Le modifiche comunicate consistono nella soppressione di sovvenzioni dirette, in un nuovo metodo per applicare la massima imposta sulle società a tutti i nuovi progetti nell’ambito del regime, in un’esenzione dall’imposta di bollo e nell’aumento di esenzioni dall’imposta comunale sui beni immobili e dai contributi previdenziali. L’Autorità è giunta alla conclusione preliminare che le modifiche comunicate al regime non si potevano scindere dal regime in quanto tale. Di conseguenza, la Commissione ha valutato il regime modificato. Inoltre, essa ha valutato l’applicazione del regime e ha constatato che alcuni elementi dei sei accordi di investimento che l’Islanda ha stipulato sulla base del regime modificato, hanno sollevato dubbi riguardo la compatibilità con l’accordo SEE.

In particolare, l’Autorità di vigilanza nutriva dubbi sul fatto che la concessione degli aiuti all’interno degli accordi d’investimento conclusi con Becromal, Kísilfélagið e Verne rientri nell’ambito del regime come approvato dall’Autorità e rispettino il criterio dell’effetto incentivante degli aiuti agli investimenti.

Inoltre, l’Autorità nutriva dubbi sul fatto che l’accordo di investimento con Marmeti si fosse concluso entro l’ambito di applicazione del regime, con riferimento al requisito dell’effetto incentivante.

Inoltre, l’Autorità di vigilanza nutriva dubbi sul fatto che gli elementi degli accordi di investimento con Thorsil e GMR prevedessero aiuti concessi al di fuori del regime di aiuti autorizzato.

Pertanto, l’Autorità nutriva dubbi sul fatto che il Regime di aiuti, modificato, e gli aiuti concessi nell’ambito dei sei accordi di investimento potessero essere considerati compatibili con l’accordo SEE.

Conclusioni

Alla luce delle considerazioni suesposte, l’Autorità non ritiene che il regime così modificato e i sei accordi d’investimento di cui sopra siano conformi all’articolo 61, paragrafo 3, dell’accordo SEE in combinato disposto con i requisiti indicati negli orientamenti sugli aiuti a finalità regionale dell’Autorità.

Alla luce delle considerazioni di cui sopra, l’Autorità di vigilanza ha deciso di avviare il procedimento d’indagine formale di cui all’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia, in relazione al regime di incentivi agli investimenti, con le modifiche notificate dalle autorità islandesi, e come modificato dal regolamento (UE) n. 1150/2010, attuato dalle autorità islandesi, e in relazione ai sei accordi di investimento.

Le parti interessate sono invitate a presentare le loro osservazioni entro un mese dalla pubblicazione della presente comunicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
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(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
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(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
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(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
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(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
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(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
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(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
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(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
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(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
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(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
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(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
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(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
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(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
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(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
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(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
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(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
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(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
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(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
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(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
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(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
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(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
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(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
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(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
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(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
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(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione europea

| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/28 |
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15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/28

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Comunicazione della Commissione pubblicata ai sensi dell’articolo 27, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 del Consiglio relativamente ai casi AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II e AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   INTRODUZIONE

| 1. | Ai sensi dell’articolo 9 del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 del Consiglio, del 16 dicembre 2002, concernente l’applicazione delle regole di concorrenza di cui agli articoli 101 e 102 del trattato (1), la Commissione, qualora intenda adottare una decisione volta a far cessare un’infrazione e le imprese interessate propongano degli impegni tali da rispondere alle riserve espresse dalla Commissione nella sua valutazione preliminare, può, mediante decisione, rendere detti impegni obbligatori per le imprese. La decisione può essere adottata per un periodo di tempo determinato e stabilire che l’intervento della Commissione non è più giustificato. Prima di adottare la decisione ai sensi dell’articolo 9 del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003, secondo l’articolo 27, paragrafo 4, dello stesso regolamento la Commissione pubblica una sintesi del caso e il contenuto essenziale degli impegni. I terzi interessati possono presentare le loro osservazioni entro un termine stabilito dalla Commissione. |
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1.

Ai sensi dell’articolo 9 del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 del Consiglio, del 16 dicembre 2002, concernente l’applicazione delle regole di concorrenza di cui agli articoli 101 e 102 del trattato (1), la Commissione, qualora intenda adottare una decisione volta a far cessare un’infrazione e le imprese interessate propongano degli impegni tali da rispondere alle riserve espresse dalla Commissione nella sua valutazione preliminare, può, mediante decisione, rendere detti impegni obbligatori per le imprese. La decisione può essere adottata per un periodo di tempo determinato e stabilire che l’intervento della Commissione non è più giustificato. Prima di adottare la decisione ai sensi dell’articolo 9 del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003, secondo l’articolo 27, paragrafo 4, dello stesso regolamento la Commissione pubblica una sintesi del caso e il contenuto essenziale degli impegni. I terzi interessati possono presentare le loro osservazioni entro un termine stabilito dalla Commissione.

2.   SINTESI DEL CASO

| 2. | Il 6 giugno 2013 la Commissione ha adottato una valutazione preliminare ai sensi dell’articolo 9, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 nei confronti di Deutsche Bahn AG e relative controllate: DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG e DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2). |
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2.

Il 6 giugno 2013 la Commissione ha adottato una valutazione preliminare ai sensi dell’articolo 9, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 nei confronti di Deutsche Bahn AG e relative controllate: DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG e DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2).

| 3. | Nella valutazione la Commissione esprime preoccupazione in merito all’eventualità che il gruppo DB abbia abusato della sua posizione dominante sul mercato per la fornitura della corrente di trazione in Germania, applicando ai concorrenti prezzi che comprimono i margini sui mercati del trasporto ferroviario di passeggeri su lunga distanza e del trasporto ferroviario di merci, in violazione dell’articolo 102 del TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nella valutazione la Commissione esprime preoccupazione in merito all’eventualità che il gruppo DB abbia abusato della sua posizione dominante sul mercato per la fornitura della corrente di trazione in Germania, applicando ai concorrenti prezzi che comprimono i margini sui mercati del trasporto ferroviario di passeggeri su lunga distanza e del trasporto ferroviario di merci, in violazione dell’articolo 102 del TFUE.

| 4. | In via preliminare la Commissione ritiene DB Energie dominante sul mercato per quanto riguarda la fornitura della corrente di trazione alle imprese ferroviarie che operano in Germania; tale corrente è indispensabile alle suddette imprese per poter competere sui mercati del trasporto ferroviario tedesco e dal 2003 DB Energie la vende loro in un «pacchetto» che raggruppa il prezzo del consumo d’energia elettrica (prezzo dell’energia elettrica) e il prezzo dell’uso della rete della corrente di trazione (tariffa d’accesso alla rete). |
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4.

In via preliminare la Commissione ritiene DB Energie dominante sul mercato per quanto riguarda la fornitura della corrente di trazione alle imprese ferroviarie che operano in Germania; tale corrente è indispensabile alle suddette imprese per poter competere sui mercati del trasporto ferroviario tedesco e dal 2003 DB Energie la vende loro in un «pacchetto» che raggruppa il prezzo del consumo d’energia elettrica (prezzo dell’energia elettrica) e il prezzo dell’uso della rete della corrente di trazione (tariffa d’accesso alla rete).

| 5. | Nella valutazione preliminare la Commissione è d’avviso che questo sistema di tariffazione, e soprattutto gli sconti di cui fruiscono maggiormente gli operatori ferroviari del gruppo DB rispetto ai loro concorrenti, possa aver ostacolato lo sviluppo della concorrenza sul mercato del trasposto di merci e su quello dei passeggeri su lunga distanza; la Commissione teme infatti che su questi mercati il sistema di tariffazione della corrente applicato da DB Energie possa creare uno scarto tra il prezzo della corrente di trazione applicato ai concorrenti e il prezzo dei servizi di trasporto applicato ai consumatori dalle compagnie ferroviarie DB, che impedirebbe ai loro concorrenti, a parità d’efficienza, di operare con profitto o ne ridurrebbe artificialmente il margine di profitto. Nell’indagine preliminare la Commissione conclude che questa situazione solleva riserve relativamente alla concorrenza sui mercati del trasporto ferroviario di passeggeri su lunga distanza e del trasporto ferroviario di merci. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Nella valutazione preliminare la Commissione è d’avviso che questo sistema di tariffazione, e soprattutto gli sconti di cui fruiscono maggiormente gli operatori ferroviari del gruppo DB rispetto ai loro concorrenti, possa aver ostacolato lo sviluppo della concorrenza sul mercato del trasposto di merci e su quello dei passeggeri su lunga distanza; la Commissione teme infatti che su questi mercati il sistema di tariffazione della corrente applicato da DB Energie possa creare uno scarto tra il prezzo della corrente di trazione applicato ai concorrenti e il prezzo dei servizi di trasporto applicato ai consumatori dalle compagnie ferroviarie DB, che impedirebbe ai loro concorrenti, a parità d’efficienza, di operare con profitto o ne ridurrebbe artificialmente il margine di profitto. Nell’indagine preliminare la Commissione conclude che questa situazione solleva riserve relativamente alla concorrenza sui mercati del trasporto ferroviario di passeggeri su lunga distanza e del trasporto ferroviario di merci.

| 6. | Nel novembre 2010 la Corte federale di cassazione tedesca ha statuito che la rete della corrente di trazione è considerata una rete energetica e che le condizioni di accesso e le tariffe sono disciplinate dalla legge sulla salvaguardia dell’approvvigionamento energetico (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Di conseguenza, DB Energie è tenuta ad applicare separatamente la tariffa d’accesso alla rete, in modo che i fornitori di energia elettrica terzi (ossia non appartenenti al gruppo DB) possano competere con DB Energie nella fornitura di tale energia alle imprese ferroviarie (4). |
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6.

Nel novembre 2010 la Corte federale di cassazione tedesca ha statuito che la rete della corrente di trazione è considerata una rete energetica e che le condizioni di accesso e le tariffe sono disciplinate dalla legge sulla salvaguardia dell’approvvigionamento energetico (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Di conseguenza, DB Energie è tenuta ad applicare separatamente la tariffa d’accesso alla rete, in modo che i fornitori di energia elettrica terzi (ossia non appartenenti al gruppo DB) possano competere con DB Energie nella fornitura di tale energia alle imprese ferroviarie (4).

3.   CONTENUTO ESSENZIALE DEGLI IMPEGNI PROPOSTI

| 7. | Il gruppo DB non concorda con la valutazione preliminare della Commissione in merito all’eventuale abuso di posizione dominante del gruppo nella fornitura della corrente di trazione alle imprese ferroviarie in Germania. Ha nondimeno proposto di assumere impegni ai sensi dell’articolo 9 del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 al fine di rispondere alle riserve espresse dalla Commissione relativamente alla concorrenza. Gli elementi fondamentali degli impegni sono illustrati di seguito. |
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7.

Il gruppo DB non concorda con la valutazione preliminare della Commissione in merito all’eventuale abuso di posizione dominante del gruppo nella fornitura della corrente di trazione alle imprese ferroviarie in Germania. Ha nondimeno proposto di assumere impegni ai sensi dell’articolo 9 del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003 al fine di rispondere alle riserve espresse dalla Commissione relativamente alla concorrenza. Gli elementi fondamentali degli impegni sono illustrati di seguito.

| 8. | Al più tardi entro tre mesi dalla notifica della decisione della Commissione che rende obbligatori gli impegni per il gruppo DB e al più presto il 1o gennaio 2014, DB Energie istituirà un nuovo sistema tariffario della corrente di trazione, con prezzi distinti per l’approvvigionamento dell’energia elettrica e per le tariffe d’accesso alla rete, approvato dall’Autorità tedesca di regolamentazione competente (Bundesnetzagentur). Il nuovo sistema tariffario è volto a garantire l’entrata di fornitori terzi sul mercato della fornitura di energia elettrica alle imprese ferroviarie (5). |
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8.

Al più tardi entro tre mesi dalla notifica della decisione della Commissione che rende obbligatori gli impegni per il gruppo DB e al più presto il 1o gennaio 2014, DB Energie istituirà un nuovo sistema tariffario della corrente di trazione, con prezzi distinti per l’approvvigionamento dell’energia elettrica e per le tariffe d’accesso alla rete, approvato dall’Autorità tedesca di regolamentazione competente (Bundesnetzagentur). Il nuovo sistema tariffario è volto a garantire l’entrata di fornitori terzi sul mercato della fornitura di energia elettrica alle imprese ferroviarie (5).

| 9. | Nel nuovo sistema, DB Energie applicherà lo stesso prezzo per l’energia elettrica a tutte le imprese ferroviarie, senza sconti in base al volume o alla durata. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Nel nuovo sistema, DB Energie applicherà lo stesso prezzo per l’energia elettrica a tutte le imprese ferroviarie, senza sconti in base al volume o alla durata.

| 10. | DB Energie rimborserà alle imprese ferroviarie in Germania che non appartengono al gruppo DB un importo una tantum retroattivo pari al 4 % della fattura della corrente di trazione su un anno prima dell’entrata in vigore del nuovo sistema tariffario. |
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10.

DB Energie rimborserà alle imprese ferroviarie in Germania che non appartengono al gruppo DB un importo una tantum retroattivo pari al 4 % della fattura della corrente di trazione su un anno prima dell’entrata in vigore del nuovo sistema tariffario.

| 11. | DB Energie e DB Mobility Logistics AG forniranno ogni anno alla Commissione i dati per valutare se i livelli di prezzo della corrente di trazione e dei servizi di trasporto applicati dal gruppo DB possano comportare una compressione dei margini. DB Energie notificherà inoltre preliminarmente alla Commissione eventuali modifiche del prezzo dell’energia elettrica. |
| --- | --- |

11.

DB Energie e DB Mobility Logistics AG forniranno ogni anno alla Commissione i dati per valutare se i livelli di prezzo della corrente di trazione e dei servizi di trasporto applicati dal gruppo DB possano comportare una compressione dei margini. DB Energie notificherà inoltre preliminarmente alla Commissione eventuali modifiche del prezzo dell’energia elettrica.

| 12. | Gli impegni entreranno in vigore al più tardi entro tre mesi dalla notifica della decisione della Commissione e resteranno in vigore per cinque anni (6) dalla notifica della decisione della Commissione o fino a che il 20 % del volume di corrente di trazione sarà acquistato dai concorrenti di DB presso fornitori terzi di energia elettrica. Il gruppo DB nominerà inoltre un fiduciario che verificherà l’osservanza degli impegni da parte del gruppo stesso. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Gli impegni entreranno in vigore al più tardi entro tre mesi dalla notifica della decisione della Commissione e resteranno in vigore per cinque anni (6) dalla notifica della decisione della Commissione o fino a che il 20 % del volume di corrente di trazione sarà acquistato dai concorrenti di DB presso fornitori terzi di energia elettrica. Il gruppo DB nominerà inoltre un fiduciario che verificherà l’osservanza degli impegni da parte del gruppo stesso.

| 13. | Gli impegni sono pubblicati sul sito Internet della direzione generale della Concorrenza al seguente indirizzo: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

Gli impegni sono pubblicati sul sito Internet della direzione generale della Concorrenza al seguente indirizzo: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   INVITO A PRESENTARE OSSERVAZIONI

| 14. | In funzione dei risultati del test di mercato, la Commissione intende adottare una decisione ai sensi dell’articolo 9, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003, in cui dichiara vincolanti gli impegni sopra riassunti e pubblicati sul sito Internet della direzione generale della Concorrenza. |
| --- | --- |

14.

In funzione dei risultati del test di mercato, la Commissione intende adottare una decisione ai sensi dell’articolo 9, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003, in cui dichiara vincolanti gli impegni sopra riassunti e pubblicati sul sito Internet della direzione generale della Concorrenza.

| 15. | Conformemente all’articolo 27, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003, la Commissione invita i terzi interessati a presentare osservazioni sugli impegni proposti. Tali osservazioni devono pervenire alla Commissione entro un mese dalla data di pubblicazione della presente comunicazione. Le osservazioni contenenti informazioni che i terzi interessati ritengono segreti aziendali o di natura riservata vanno inviate anche in una versione non riservata in cui le parti non pubblicabili sono omesse e sostituite, a seconda dei casi, da una sintesi non riservata o dalla dicitura «segreti aziendali» oppure «riservato». Ai sensi dell’articolo 16 del regolamento (CE) n. 773/2004, le richieste di riservatezza devono essere debitamente motivate, adducendo le ragioni per cui la divulgazione delle informazioni in questione potrebbe causare un pregiudizio grave. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Conformemente all’articolo 27, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2003, la Commissione invita i terzi interessati a presentare osservazioni sugli impegni proposti. Tali osservazioni devono pervenire alla Commissione entro un mese dalla data di pubblicazione della presente comunicazione. Le osservazioni contenenti informazioni che i terzi interessati ritengono segreti aziendali o di natura riservata vanno inviate anche in una versione non riservata in cui le parti non pubblicabili sono omesse e sostituite, a seconda dei casi, da una sintesi non riservata o dalla dicitura «segreti aziendali» oppure «riservato». Ai sensi dell’articolo 16 del regolamento (CE) n. 773/2004, le richieste di riservatezza devono essere debitamente motivate, adducendo le ragioni per cui la divulgazione delle informazioni in questione potrebbe causare un pregiudizio grave.

| 16. | Occorre argomentare le risposte e le osservazioni, esponendo i fatti salienti. In caso siano individuati problemi relativi ad aspetti degli impegni proposti, la Commissione invita a suggerire una possibile soluzione. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Occorre argomentare le risposte e le osservazioni, esponendo i fatti salienti. In caso siano individuati problemi relativi ad aspetti degli impegni proposti, la Commissione invita a suggerire una possibile soluzione.

| 17. | Le osservazioni possono essere inviate alla Commissione, specificando il riferimento «AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III», per posta elettronica (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), per fax al numero (+32 22950128) o per posta al seguente indirizzo:





  Commissione europea |
| --- | --- |
| Direzione generale della Concorrenza |
| Protocollo antitrust |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

17.

Le osservazioni possono essere inviate alla Commissione, specificando il riferimento «AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III», per posta elettronica (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), per fax al numero (+32 22950128) o per posta al seguente indirizzo:

Commissione europea

Direzione generale della Concorrenza

Protocollo antitrust

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  GU L 1 del 4.1.2003, pag. 1. Dal 1o dicembre 2009 gli articoli 101 e 102 del TFUE sostituiscono rispettivamente gli articoli 81 e 82 del trattato CE. senza modificarne la sostanza. Ai fini della presente comunicazione, i riferimenti agli articoli 101 e 102 del TFUE vanno intesi in riferimento rispettivamente agli articoli 81 e 82 del trattato CE, ove necessario.

(2)  Nel seguito, Deutsche Bahn AG e l’insieme delle controllate sono denominate «il gruppo DB».

(3)  Bundesgerichtshof, sentenza del 9 novembre 2010, causa EnVR 1/10.

(4)  Per maggiori informazioni sulla modifica del sistema tariffario e le condizioni del nuovo sistema, si veda il sito web di DB Energie (solo in tedesco): http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  Inoltre, l’introduzione del nuovo sistema sarà integrata dall’obbligo di separare la contabilità e le informazioni tra le attività di DB Energie in quanto gestore della rete della corrente di trazione e in quanto fornitore di energia elettrica.

(6)  L’impegno di DB Energie di non accordare sconti in base alla durata della fornitura di energia elettrica si estende solo a tre anni.

---

ALTRI ATTI

Commissione europea

| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/31

---

Pubblicazione di una domanda di registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

2013/C 237/06

La presente pubblicazione conferisce il diritto di opporsi alla registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 51 del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio (1).

DOCUMENTO UNICO

REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 510/2006 DEL CONSIGLIO

relativo alla protezione delle indicazioni geografiche e delle denominazioni d'origine dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari
   (2)

«SZENTESI PAPRIKA»

N. CE: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

IGP ( X ) DOP ( )

1.   Denominazione

«Szentesi paprika»

2.   Stato membro o paese terzo

Ungheria

3.   Descrizione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare

3.1.   Tipo di prodotto

| Classe 1.6. | Ortofrutticoli e cereali, allo stato naturale o trasformati. |
| --- | --- |

Classe 1.6.

Ortofrutticoli e cereali, allo stato naturale o trasformati.

3.2.   Descrizione del prodotto a cui si applica la denominazione di cui al punto 1

L’indicazione geografica protetta «Szentesi paprika» designa i frutti coltivati mediante forzatura dei tipi varietali e delle varietà elencate di Capsicum annuum.

All’atto della loro immissione sul mercato, i prodotti protetti dalla IGP «Szentesi paprica» devono in generale essere integri, sani e tutti i tipi varietali, dal canto loro, devono rispondere alle seguenti caratteristiche.

| a) | Peperone bianco da farcire (TV) (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  A maturazione, il «Szentesi paprica» è bianco e dolce al tatto con buccia liscia, scivolosa; ha forma appuntita e ricurva all’estremità e la polpa è croccante e spessa. La sua superficie è liscia, di colore crema brillante (avorio). È di forma conica, misura da 60 a 120 mm di lunghezza e da 40 a 70 mm di larghezza. Di norma è composto da tre o quattro lobi; lo spessore della polpa varia da 4 a 7 mm, la sua consistenza è soda, la buccia è fine; il profumo di peperone è intenso, aromatico e dolce.
  Varietà coltivate: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Peperone bianco da farcire (TV) (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

A maturazione, il «Szentesi paprica» è bianco e dolce al tatto con buccia liscia, scivolosa; ha forma appuntita e ricurva all’estremità e la polpa è croccante e spessa. La sua superficie è liscia, di colore crema brillante (avorio). È di forma conica, misura da 60 a 120 mm di lunghezza e da 40 a 70 mm di larghezza. Di norma è composto da tre o quattro lobi; lo spessore della polpa varia da 4 a 7 mm, la sua consistenza è soda, la buccia è fine; il profumo di peperone è intenso, aromatico e dolce.

Varietà coltivate: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia.

| b) | Peperoncino appuntito (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  Il «Szentesi paprica» appuntito ha superficie brillante, liscia o leggermente ondulata; è lungo e appuntito. Ha una colorazione verde chiaro, medio o scuro, e misura da 150 a 250 mm di lunghezza e da 20 a 50 mm di larghezza; è costituito generalmente da due o tre lobi, lo spessore della polpa varia da 3 a 4 mm, la consistenza è soda, la buccia è sottile. Il prodotto libera un profumo di peperone intenso, è piccante e ha un aroma e gusto gradevole.
  Varietà coltivate: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.
  Le varietà coltivate presentano un valore di piccantezza compreso tra 2 500 e 5 000 su scala di Scoville. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Peperoncino appuntito (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

Il «Szentesi paprica» appuntito ha superficie brillante, liscia o leggermente ondulata; è lungo e appuntito. Ha una colorazione verde chiaro, medio o scuro, e misura da 150 a 250 mm di lunghezza e da 20 a 50 mm di larghezza; è costituito generalmente da due o tre lobi, lo spessore della polpa varia da 3 a 4 mm, la consistenza è soda, la buccia è sottile. Il prodotto libera un profumo di peperone intenso, è piccante e ha un aroma e gusto gradevole.

Varietà coltivate: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.

Le varietà coltivate presentano un valore di piccantezza compreso tra 2 500 e 5 000 su scala di Scoville.

| c) | Peperone di Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Il «Szentesi paprika» del gruppo Kápia ha forma conica, leggermente appiattita; superficie liscia, brillante, di colore vellutato, rosso scuro alla maturazione. Misura da 60 a 120 mm di lunghezza e da 40 a 70 mm di larghezza; è composto di norma da due o tre lobi. Lo spessore della polpa varia da 4 a 7 mm, la sua consistenza è soda, la buccia è di medio spessore. Il frutto ha un sapore dolce intenso, un profumo di paprica macinato ed è dolce.
  Varietà coltivate: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Peperone di Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Il «Szentesi paprika» del gruppo Kápia ha forma conica, leggermente appiattita; superficie liscia, brillante, di colore vellutato, rosso scuro alla maturazione. Misura da 60 a 120 mm di lunghezza e da 40 a 70 mm di larghezza; è composto di norma da due o tre lobi. Lo spessore della polpa varia da 4 a 7 mm, la sua consistenza è soda, la buccia è di medio spessore. Il frutto ha un sapore dolce intenso, un profumo di paprica macinato ed è dolce.

Varietà coltivate: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus.

| d) | Peperone a forma di pomodoro (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Il peperone a forma di pomodoro «Szentesi paprika» ha forma ben caratteristica: una sfera appiattita di superficie liscia, brillante, e colore rosso scuro a maturazione. Il diametro varia da 60 a 120 mm e la lunghezza da 40 a 60 mm, si compone normalmente da tre o quattro lobi, lo spessore della polpa è varia da 5 a 7 mm, la consistenza è soda, la buccia è fine e libera un profumo di peperone intenso ed è dolce.
  Varietà coltivate: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.
  All’interno dei singoli tipi varietali, la gamma di varietà sotto indicate che possono essere messe a coltura può variare ogni anno. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Peperone a forma di pomodoro (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Il peperone a forma di pomodoro «Szentesi paprika» ha forma ben caratteristica: una sfera appiattita di superficie liscia, brillante, e colore rosso scuro a maturazione. Il diametro varia da 60 a 120 mm e la lunghezza da 40 a 60 mm, si compone normalmente da tre o quattro lobi, lo spessore della polpa è varia da 5 a 7 mm, la consistenza è soda, la buccia è fine e libera un profumo di peperone intenso ed è dolce.

Varietà coltivate: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.

All’interno dei singoli tipi varietali, la gamma di varietà sotto indicate che possono essere messe a coltura può variare ogni anno.

3.3.   Materie prime (solo per i prodotti trasformati)

—

3.4.   Alimenti per animali (solo per i prodotti di origine animale)

—

3.5.   Fasi specifiche della produzione che devono avvenire nella zona geografica identificata

Tutte le fasi del processo di produzione del «Szentesi paprika» devono avvenire nella zona geografica identificata al punto 4:

| — | la produzione e la coltivazione di piante di peperoni, |
| --- | --- |

—

la produzione e la coltivazione di piante di peperoni,

| — | in particolare, la coltura integrata e biologica di alcuni tipi varietali e di talune varietà, |
| --- | --- |

—

in particolare, la coltura integrata e biologica di alcuni tipi varietali e di talune varietà,

| — | la scelta del periodo di produzione, |
| --- | --- |

—

la scelta del periodo di produzione,

| — | la realizzazione di una zona di coltivazione, |
| --- | --- |

—

la realizzazione di una zona di coltivazione,

| — | la preparazione e la concimazione del suolo, |
| --- | --- |

—

la preparazione e la concimazione del suolo,

| — | l’impianto, |
| --- | --- |

—

l’impianto,

| — | la preparazione delle strutture di sostegno, |
| --- | --- |

—

la preparazione delle strutture di sostegno,

| — | i lavori di manutenzione delle piante (fitotecnica), |
| --- | --- |

—

i lavori di manutenzione delle piante (fitotecnica),

| — | l’irrigazione e l’apporto di nutrienti, |
| --- | --- |

—

l’irrigazione e l’apporto di nutrienti,

| — | la regolazione delle condizioni climatiche, |
| --- | --- |

—

la regolazione delle condizioni climatiche,

| — | l’applicazione di metodi di trattamento antiparassitario integrati ed ecologici, |
| --- | --- |

—

l’applicazione di metodi di trattamento antiparassitario integrati ed ecologici,

| — | la raccolta, la preparazione del prodotto, lo stoccaggio anticipato, la conservazione, |
| --- | --- |

—

la raccolta, la preparazione del prodotto, lo stoccaggio anticipato, la conservazione,

| — | lo smaltimento delle rimanenze di coltivazione, la pulizia e la disinfezione degli impianti di produzione. |
| --- | --- |

—

lo smaltimento delle rimanenze di coltivazione, la pulizia e la disinfezione degli impianti di produzione.

3.6.   Norme specifiche in materia di affettatura, grattugiatura, confezionamento, ecc.

La calibratura, il condizionamento e l’etichettatura del «Szentesi paprika» sono effettuate presso il produttore o in qualsiasi altro impianto appropriato, nella zona geografica delimitata.

Condizionati per lotti: vassoi, cesti, sacchi di polietilene (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 peperoni/unità); confezionati a peso: ceste, rete tubolare (0,35, 0,5, 0,7, 1,2 kg di peperoni/unità) o cartoni: in imballaggi M10, M20, M30 (2,5, 10, 12, 14 kg di peperone/unità). Il tipo d’imballaggio di alcuni tipi varietali può cambiare in qualsiasi momento in funzione delle esigenze commerciali.

Al fine di salvaguardare la qualità e l’omogeneità caratteristiche di ogni tipo varietale, e in particolare di ciascuna varietà, nonché il gusto, il profumo, gli aromi, la struttura e l’integrità della specificità dell’IGP «Szentesi paprika», ma anche per garantire la tracciabilità dei prodotti, il condizionamento deve avvenire nella zona geografica delimitata.

3.7.   Norme specifiche in materia di etichettatura

| — | La combinazione di parole «Szentesi paprika» deve figurare sugli imballaggi. |
| --- | --- |

—

La combinazione di parole «Szentesi paprika» deve figurare sugli imballaggi.

| — | Deve essere apposta un’etichetta con codice a barre per la tracciabilità del «Szentesi paprika». |
| --- | --- |

—

Deve essere apposta un’etichetta con codice a barre per la tracciabilità del «Szentesi paprika».

4.   Delimitazione concisa della zona geografica

La zona di produzione del «Szentesi paprika» cui si riferisce l’indicazione geografica protetta (IGP) si trova nel dipartimento di Csongrád e costituisce una zona omogenea.

La coltivazione del «Szentesi paprika» ha luogo all’interno dei confini amministrativi delle località del dipartimento di Csongrád sotto elencate: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár et Szentes.

5.   Legame con la zona geografica

5.1.   Specificità della zona geografica

I fattori che incidono sulla qualità della cultura del peperone, in particolare le condizioni di temperatura e di luminosità, nonché le condizioni del suolo e idrografiche hanno creato un contesto particolarmente favorevole allo sviluppo della coltura irrigua del peperone tipica della regione di Szentes, che è iniziata grazie al lavoro pionieristico degli «orticoltori bulgari» (orticoltori che utilizzavano metodi particolari su piccola scala, la coltura forzata in serre calde e l’irrigazione) trasferitisi nella regione durante la seconda metà del XIX secolo.

La zona di coltivazione tradizionale della regione di Szentes si trova nell’Ungheria sudorientale, in uno dei bacini più profondi della Grande Pianura. Da un punto di vista topografico, la zona occupa un posto assai particolare, perché comprende i terreni più bassi del paese; il rilievo presenta tre versanti che degradano dai dipartimenti confinanti fino alla valle del fiume Tisza. Il corso d’acqua più importante del sistema idrografico della regione è il fiume Tisza, che ne delimita anche la fisionomia geografica nel suo complesso. Data la moltitudine di acque di superficie tipiche della regione, i tipi di suoli dominanti sono calcarei e nei suoli salini delle pianure di Cernozëm. I terreni della zona di produzione presentano buone caratteristiche fisiche, una tessitura granulare, si scaldano rapidamente, hanno una leggera alcalinità, sono ricchi di acque e di sostanze nutritive, nonché di elevato contenuto di humus, presentano inoltre uno spesso strato seminativo.

Nella produzione del «Szentesi paprika», tra i fattori climatici che conferiscono ai frutti le loro proprietà intrinseche, sono compresi la luce ed il numero di ore di sole, da un lato, e le temperature e la quantità di calore irradiato, dall’altro. La zona di coltivazione tradizionale della regione di Szentes è principalmente contraddistinta da caratteristiche climatiche continentali. Il periodo di soleggiamento è ripartito in modo uniforme nella regione. In media annualmente si contano 2 050 ore di sole. Se si tiene conto delle tendenze della temperatura media annuale nella zona di produzione, quest’ultima fa parte delle zone più calde del paese. La temperatura media annua è + 10-11 °C, il calore totale del periodo vegetativo è di 3 200-3 300 °C, molto favorevole alla coltivazione del peperone che ha bisogno di calore.

Per quanto riguarda le precipitazioni annuali, questa regione è tuttavia la più povera del paese con precipitazioni da 500 a 550 mm medie annue. La precisa ripartizione delle precipitazioni durante l’anno è la seguente: il 40 % si verificano durante l’inverno e il 60 % nel periodo estivo. La coltura irrigua sviluppata grazie alle condizioni idrografiche favorevoli — e applicata dagli orticoltori bulgari, ha permesso la produzione del peperone che richiede notevoli risorse idriche.

5.2.   Specificità del prodotto

I principali valori e caratteristiche organolettiche del «Szentesi paprika» originario della zona geografica sono: gusto pronunciato, speziato, dolce o piccante; un profumo di peperone intenso, o che richiama il paprica macinato; buccia fine; polpa dei frutti variabile da 3 a 7 mm di spessore, il che consente di beneficiare pienamente dei sapori e degli aromi anche se consumato fresco, cosa che avviene abitualmente.

Il «Szentesi paprika» bianco: a maturazione, è dolce al tatto; la buccia liscia, scivolosa; ha forma appuntita e ricurva all’estremità e la polpa è croccante e spessa. Il profumo e l’aroma del peperone fresco sono particolarmente caratteristici, ciò è anche contenuto nell’espressione popolare dei consumatori: «Il peperone di Szentes ha sapore».

La superficie del «Szentesi paprica» appuntito è brillante, liscia o leggermente ondulata; è appuntito e lungo e la consistenza della polpa è soda. Il prodotto libera un profumo di peperone intenso, è piccante e ha un aroma e gusto gradevole.Il «Szentesi paprika» del gruppo Kápia ha forma conica, leggermente appiattita; la consistenza della polpa è soda, la buccia è di medio spessore. La sua superficie è liscia, brillante e sviluppa sotto gli effetti dell’ambiente geografico (luce, caldo) un colore vellutato rosso scuro particolarmente attraente.

Il peperone a forma di pomodoro «Szentesi paprika» ha una forma ben caratteristica: è una sfera appiattita; nonostante lo spessore della polpa, la buccia è molto sottile e la sua superficie è liscia. A maturazione ha un colore rosso scuro.

5.3.   Legame causale tra la zona geografica e la qualità o le caratteristiche del prodotto (per le DOP) o una qualità specifica, la reputazione o altre caratteristiche del prodotto (per le IGP)

Il legame con la zona geografica si basa sulla buona reputazione di cui gode da sempre il prodotto e sull’esperienza locale degli agricoltori produttori di «Szentesi paprika», che si tramanda da padre in figlio.

Reputazione del «Szentesi paprika»

La coltura irrigua del peperone tipico della regione di Szentes si è sviluppata grazie al lavoro pionieristico degli «orticoltori bulgari» che si sono trasferiti nella regione nella seconda metà del XIX secolo. Da allora la produzione del celebre «Szentesi paprika» non è mai cessata. La reputazione del prodotto è importante ancora oggi, come dimostra il primo premio ottenuto nel 2006 a Debrecen, in occasione del salone parigino dell’orticoltura organizzato a margine della Fiera agricola Farmer Expo, in cui erano rappresentate 300 imprese nazionali e straniere. Nel 2007 il peperone destinato ad essere consumato fresco ha vinto il Magyar Termék Nagydíj (Gran premio del prodotto in Ungheria).

Numerosi dati storici dimostrano il legame secolare tra la reputazione del «Szentesi paprika» e la zona geografica. L’apparizione in Ungheria del peperone dolce può essere fatta risalire all’insediamento degli orticoltori bulgari vicino a Úsztató major nella regione di Szegvár durante l’inverno 1875-1876. Secondo il grande censimento agricolo del 1895, il 92,74 % della produzione totale di peperoni ungheresi era concentrata nella parte sudorientale del paese, nella regione di Szentes. I coltivatori locavano le pianure di Cernozëm e i terreni alluvionali della regione dell’attuale dipartimento di Csongrad, ricchi di humus e dal rapido riscaldamento, e sceglievano se possibile un terreno in lieve pendenza. Utilizzavano semi pre-germogliati e serre riscaldate per la coltura precoce. Praticavano anche la coltura incrociata nei vivai, coltivando, ad esempio a fianco del peperone, piantine di cetriolo, che rimanevano sul posto anche dopo il trapianto del peperone. Essi trapiantavano con un pane di terra le piante prelevate. In seguito annaffiavano regolarmente e abbondantemente. A tal fine veniva utilizzata l’acqua stagnante riscaldata o l’acqua proveniente da corsi d’acqua non molto profondi e di modesta portata. Avevano un unico metodo di raccolta dell’acqua e di drenaggio. All’epoca, nella regione di Szentes, si utilizzava la ruota idraulica che era adeguata al livello idrometrico variabile.

Esperienza locale

Nella zona di coltura tradizionale della regione di Szentes, la superficie del suolo conserva molto bene il calore. Poiché il terreno in cui è coltivato il «Szentesi paprika» assorbe maggiormente il calore rispetto a quello che si perde per irradiazione, nelle prime ore del mattino, il calore immagazzinato nel suolo e nell’aria di superficie si diffonde, con conseguente aumento della temperatura. Il microclima equilibrato ottenuto grazie all’apporto di calore armonioso, associato alla coltura irrigua predisposta dagli orticoltori bulgari, consente al «Szentesi paprika», che necessita di molta acqua e calore, di diventare un prodotto molto saporito.

Ai fattori naturali si aggiunge il contributo dell'uomo degli operatori regionali e l’esperienza pratica acquisita nella coltura forzata (controllo della temperatura, ventilazione, protezione dal sole, cura delle piante) trasmessa di famiglia in famiglia. L’esperienza così acquisita può compensare gli effetti nefasti delle condizioni meteorologiche apparse negli ultimi decenni, assicurando e, se possibile, preservando il sapore, il colore, l’aroma del «Szentesi paprika», nonché la forma interessante e specifica di alcuni tipi di varietà.

In effetti, la tecnologia introdotta dagli orticoltori bulgari durante circa 150 anni di coltivazione si evoluta per adattarsi alle esigenze dei tempi. I fattori essenziali della coltura del peperone sono stati rivalutati durante la produzione, e sono apparsi nuovi metodi di produzione. Dagli inizi e fino agli anni ’60, tra i fattori più importanti nella produzione figuravano le buone condizioni del suolo, il potenziale di irrigazione (Tisza, Körös e i sistemi di canali di irrigazione), il numero di ore di soleggiamento (possibilità di coltura precoce) e il riscaldamento dell’inizio della primavera. Il periodo successivo va dalla fine degli anni sessanta alla fine degli anni ottanta. I produttori di peperoni hanno iniziato ad utilizzare il riscaldamento precoce per la coltura in serre, sfruttando in modo ottimale il numero elevato di ore di soleggiamento durante i mesi invernali e primaverili. Negli anni 1960-1980, sotto l’effetto dell’energia geotermica scoperta nella regione, la coltura del «Szentesi paprika» è passata da coltura all’aperto alla coltura in serre, in cui si applica la coltivazione idroponica.

Riferimento alla pubblicazione del disciplinare

[articolo 5, paragrafo 7, del regolamento (CE) n. 510/2006 (3)]

Bullettino di sviluppo rurale (Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő), 16 novembre 2011, anno LXI, numero 6, pagina 317.

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

---

(1)  GU L 343 del 14.12.2012, pag. 1.

(2)  Sostituito dal regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012.

(3)  Cfr. nota 2.

---

| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/36

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Pubblicazione di una domanda di modifica ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

2013/C 237/07

La presente pubblicazione conferisce il diritto di opporsi alla domanda di modifica ai sensi dell'articolo 51 del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio (1).

DOMANDA DI MODIFICA

REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 510/2006 Del CONSIGLIO

relativo alla protezione delle indicazioni geografiche e delle denominazioni d'origine dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari
   (2)

DOMANDA DI MODIFICA AI SENSI DELL'ARTICOLO 9

«TERRA D’OTRANTO»

N. CE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IGP ( ) DOP ( X )

1.   Rubrica del disciplinare interessata dalla modifica

| — |  | Denominazione del prodotto |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Descrizione del prodotto |
| — |  | Zona geografica |
| — | ☒ | Prova dell'origine |
| — |  | Metodo di produzione |
| — |  | Legame |
| — |  | Etichettatura |
| — | ☒ | Requisiti nazionali |
| — | ☒ | Altro (da precisare) |

—



Denominazione del prodotto

—

☒

Descrizione del prodotto

—



Zona geografica

—

☒

Prova dell'origine

—



Metodo di produzione

—



Legame

—



Etichettatura

—

☒

Requisiti nazionali

—

☒

Altro (da precisare)

2.   Tipo di modifica

| — |  | Modifica del documento unico o della scheda riepilogativa |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Modifica del disciplinare della DOP o IGP registrata per la quale né il documento unico né la scheda riepilogativa sono stati pubblicati |
| — |  | Modifica del disciplinare che non richiede alcuna modifica del documento unico pubblicato [articolo 9, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 510/2006] |
| — |  | Modifica temporanea del disciplinare a seguito dell'imposizione di misure sanitarie o fitosanitarie obbligatorie da parte delle autorità pubbliche [articolo 9, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 510/2006] |

—



Modifica del documento unico o della scheda riepilogativa

—

☒

Modifica del disciplinare della DOP o IGP registrata per la quale né il documento unico né la scheda riepilogativa sono stati pubblicati

—



Modifica del disciplinare che non richiede alcuna modifica del documento unico pubblicato [articolo 9, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 510/2006]

—



Modifica temporanea del disciplinare a seguito dell'imposizione di misure sanitarie o fitosanitarie obbligatorie da parte delle autorità pubbliche [articolo 9, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 510/2006]

3.   Modifica (modifiche)

3.1.   Descrizione del prodotto

Si è modificato il Disciplinare di produzione introducendo le mediane dei descrittori tipici eliminando il punteggio di 6,5 (oramai non più significativo) ed adottando quanto previsto dal metodo COI/T20 Doc. n. 22. Inoltre si è inserita nell’analisi organolettica alcune specifiche che scaturiscono dalla prevalenza di una delle due cultivar autoctone.

Applicando il nuovo metodo scaturisce la seguente parte descrittiva:

| — | colore: verde oppure giallo con leggeri riflessi verdi, |
| --- | --- |

—

colore: verde oppure giallo con leggeri riflessi verdi,

| — | odore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori di 3 e 6) di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione con leggera sensazione di foglia, |
| --- | --- |

—

odore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori di 3 e 6) di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione con leggera sensazione di foglia,

| — | sapore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori 3 e 6) con sensazione di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione. Media o leggera sensazione di piccante e di amaro a seconda dell’epoca di raccolta (mediana degli attributi con valori superiori allo 0 e fino a 6). Inoltre, a seconda dell’epoca di raccolta e della prevalenza varietale, il fruttato si integra con le sensazioni di foglia di olivo, erba appena falciata, cardo/carciofo/cicoria per l’ogliarola, oppure frutta/pomodoro/frutti di bosco per la cellina. |
| --- | --- |

—

sapore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori 3 e 6) con sensazione di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione. Media o leggera sensazione di piccante e di amaro a seconda dell’epoca di raccolta (mediana degli attributi con valori superiori allo 0 e fino a 6). Inoltre, a seconda dell’epoca di raccolta e della prevalenza varietale, il fruttato si integra con le sensazioni di foglia di olivo, erba appena falciata, cardo/carciofo/cicoria per l’ogliarola, oppure frutta/pomodoro/frutti di bosco per la cellina.

Si sono apportati alcune modifiche nei parametri chimici, diminuendo l’acidità massima totale espressa in acido oleico (da < 0,8 all’attuale < 0,65) ed aumentando lievemente il contenuto di acido linolenico (da ≤ 0,7 a ≤ 0,8) e del valore di K232 (da ≤ 2,1 a ≤ 2,2). Queste modifiche derivano dalla tendenza ad aumentare la rappresentatività delle due cultivar più diffuse nell’area geografica, la Cellina di Nardò e l’Ogliarola Salentina, che determinano negli oli monovarietali, prima molto poco rappresentativi, dei valori in acido linolenico e di K232 leggermente diversi.

3.2.   Prova dell’origine

Si è adeguato il Disciplinare di produzione alle disposizioni previste dal regolamento (CE) n. 1898/2006 inserendo le procedure che gli operatori devono attuare per stabilire la o le prove dell’origine.

3.3.   Condizioni nazionali

Sono eliminati gli adempimenti previsti dalla Legge 15 febbraio 1992 n. 69, «Disciplina per il riconoscimento della denominazione di origine controllata degli oli di oliva vergini ed extravergini», e dal Decreto Ministeriale n. 573/93.

3.4.   Altro

L’Associazione richiedente le modifiche è il Consorzio di tutela dell’olio extra vergine di oliva «Terra d’Otranto» soggetto, legittimato a presentare l’istanza di modifica. Il Consorzio di tutela si è costituito successivamente alla data dell’originaria richiesta di registrazione DOP Terre d’Otranto, avanzata, all’epoca, dall’associazione APROL, in qualità di capofila di ben sette organismi associativi dei produttori olivicoli.

DOCUMENTO UNICO

REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 510/2006 DEL CONSIGLIO

relativo alla protezione delle indicazioni geografiche e delle denominazioni d'origine dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari
   (3)

«TERRA D’OTRANTO»

N. CE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IGP ( ) DOP ( X )

1.   Denominazione

«Terra d'Otranto».

2.   Stato membro o paese terzo

Italia.

3.   Descrizione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare

3.1.   Tipo di prodotto

| Classe 1.5. | Oli e grassi (burro, margarina, olio, ecc.). |
| --- | --- |

Classe 1.5.

Oli e grassi (burro, margarina, olio, ecc.).

3.2.   Descrizione del prodotto a cui si applica la denominazione di cui al punto 1

La «Terra d’Otranto» è un olio extra vergine di oliva che presenta le seguenti caratteristiche chimiche ed organolettiche:

| — | acidità massima di 0,65 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

acidità massima di 0,65 %,

| — | perossidi ≤ 14 Meq O2/kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

perossidi ≤ 14 Meq O2/kg,

| — | K232 ≤ 2,2, |
| --- | --- |

—

K232 ≤ 2,2,

| — | K270 ≤ 0,17, |
| --- | --- |

—

K270 ≤ 0,17,

| — | acido linolenico ≤ 0,8, |
| --- | --- |

—

acido linolenico ≤ 0,8,

| — | colore: verde o giallo con riflessi verdi, |
| --- | --- |

—

colore: verde o giallo con riflessi verdi,

| — | odore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori di 3 e 6) di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione con leggera sensazione di foglia, |
| --- | --- |

—

odore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori di 3 e 6) di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione con leggera sensazione di foglia,

| — | sapore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori di 3 e 6) con sensazione di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione. |
| --- | --- |

—

sapore: fruttato medio (mediana dell’attributo compresa fra i valori di 3 e 6) con sensazione di oliva al giusto grado di maturazione.

Media o leggera sensazione di piccante e di amaro a seconda dell’epoca di raccolta, inoltre, a seconda dell’epoca di raccolta e della prevalenza varietale, il fruttato si integra con le sensazioni di foglia di olivo, erba appena sfalciata, cardo/carciofo/cicoria per l’Ogliarola, oppure frutta/pomodoro/frutta di bosco per la Cellina.

3.3.   Materie prime (solo per i prodotti trasformati)

—

3.4.   Alimenti per animali (solo per i prodotti di origine animale)

—

3.5.   Fasi specifiche della produzione che devono avere luogo nella zona geografica delimitata

Le operazioni di coltivazione, produzione e molitura dell’olio extra vergine di oliva «Terra d’Otranto» devono avvenire esclusivamente all’interno dell’area geografica di produzione di cui al punto 4.

3.6.   Norme specifiche in materia di affettatura, grattugiatura, confezionamento, ecc.

L’olio extra vergine di oliva «Terra d’Otranto» deve essere immesso al consumo in recipienti in vetro o in banda stagnata di capacità non superiore a litri 5. Il confezionamento dell’olio extra vergine di oliva «Terra d’Otranto» deve avvenire all’interno dell’area geografica di produzione per meglio garantire il controllo dell’origine del prodotto nonché per impedire che il trasporto dello stesso allo stato sfuso al di fuori di tale area geografica possa causare il deterioramento e le perdita delle sue peculiari caratteristiche definite al precedente punto 3.2, in particolare le tipiche note di cardo/carciofo/cicoria dell’olio «Terra d’Otranto». Il quadro compositivo, caratterizzato da un significativo livello di acidi grassi polinsaturi, predispone l’olio a perdere la sua qualità organolettica e tipicità per l’azione dell’ossigeno dell’aria durante la fase di travaso, pompaggio, trasporto e scarico, operazioni che si ripetono con maggiore frequenza nell’eventualità dell’imbottigliamento fuori zona.

3.7.   Norme specifiche in materia di etichettatura

La denominazione «Terra d’Otranto» deve essere riportata in etichetta con caratteri chiari e indelebili nettamente distinguibili da ogni altra scritta che compare in etichetta e deve essere immediatamente seguita dalla menzione «Denominazione di origine protetta» oppure dal relativo acronimo DOP, oltre al relativo simbolo comunitario.

Ogni confezione posta in commercio deve riportare una numerazione progressiva attribuita dal confezionatore sulla base di quanto previsto dal relativo piano dei controlli.

È vietata l’aggiunta di qualsiasi qualificazione non espressamente prevista, ivi compresi gli aggettivi: fine, scelto, selezionato, superore.

E’ tuttavia consentito l’utilizzo di indicazioni che facciano riferimento a nomi o ragioni sociali o marchi privati purché non abbiano significato laudativo o tali da trarre in inganno il consumatore.

É obbligatorio indicare in etichetta l'annata di produzione delle olive da cui l'olio è ottenuto.

4.   Delimitazione concisa della zona geografica

La zona di produzione della DOP «Terra d’Otranto» comprende l’intera provincia di Lecce, parte della provincia di Taranto e parte della provincia di Brindisi. Tale zona si estende ad arco insinuandosi fra i mari Jonio ed Adriatico, dalle Murge tarantine e dalle estreme pendici brindisine delle Murge di sud-est, per il tavoliere (pianura) di Lecce, per finire nelle Serre, alla confluenza dei due mari.

5.   Legame con la zona geografica

5.1.   Specificità della zona geografica

Il prodotto deve le sue caratteristiche alle particolari condizioni pedoclimatiche: i fattori ambientali e le cultivar specifiche di questo territorio danno infatti un carattere distintivo all’olio «Terra d’Otranto». I terreni presentano su vasta scala una notevole uniformità originati dai calcari del Cretaceo sui quali si adagiano lembi di calcari del terziario con sedimenti calcareo-sabbiosi-argillosi del Piocene e del Pleistocene, appartengono alle terre brune o rosse, spesso presenti in lembi alternati, poggianti su rocce calcaree. Orograficamente la zona è caratterizzata da estese pianure delimitate e interrotte da basse e dolci colline. L’area è priva di corsi d’acqua superficiali, ma è ricca di una potente rete idrica sotterranea conferendo all’intera regione un carattere decisamente carsico. Per il carattere litoraneo e per le scarse latitudini l’area possiede un clima dolce, tendente al caldo.

5.2.   Specificità del prodotto

Il patrimonio olivicolo dell’area geografica è caratterizzato dalla preponderante presenza delle varietà autoctone Cellina di Nardò ed Ogliarola leccese che caratterizzano qualitativamente l’olio prodotto. L’indicazione della percentuale minima del 60 % di queste due cultivar contribuisce a determinare le caratteristiche organolettiche degli oli che, a seconda della prevalenza di una varietà rispetto all’altra, passano da una sensazione cardo/carciofo/cicoria ad una di pomodoro/frutta di bosco.

5.3.   Legame causale tra la zona geografica e la qualità o le caratteristiche del prodotto (per le DOP) o una qualità specifica, la reputazione o altre caratteristiche del prodotto (per le IGP)

L’olivicoltura rappresenta il principale comparto produttivo della zona. Essa riveste un ruolo fondamentale nell’economia locale. L’indicazione geografica Terra d’Otranto comprendeva, ancora nel XIX secolo, le attuali province di Lecce, Brindisi e Taranto. Questa regione è sempre stata caratterizzata da una forte presenza dell’olivo, da cui si estraeva un «pregiato liquore». Le origini del nome Terra d’Otranto si confondono con la storia stessa dell’olivicoltura di quella regione, introdotta in tempi antichissimi dai coloni Fenici Greci, e dava origine, per opera dei monaci Brasiliani, insediatisi nel X secolo, al primo fiorente mercato di oli pregiati provenienti dalla Terra d’Otranto. Terra d’Otranto rappresenta il nome medievale del Salento, dovuto al fatto che Otranto fu nel medioevo la città principale dell’intera regione.

Riferimento alla pubblicazione del disciplinare

[Articolo 5, paragrafo 7, del regolamento (CE) n. 510/2006 (4)].

Questa Amministrazione ha attivato la procedura nazionale di opposizione pubblicando la proposta di modifica del disciplinare di produzione della denominazione di origine protetta «Terra d’Otranto» sulla Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 297 del 21 dicembre 2010. Il testo consolidato del disciplinare di produzione è consultabile sul sito Internet:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

oppure accedendo direttamente all’home page del sito del Ministero delle politiche agricole alimentari e forestali (http://www.politicheagricole.it), cliccando su «Qualità e sicurezza» (in alto a destra dello schermo) ed infine su «Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE».

---

(1)  GU L 343 del 14.12.2012, pag. 1.

(2)  Sostituito dal regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012.

(3)  Cfr. nota 2.

(4)  Cfr. nota 2.

---

| 15.8.2013 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 237/40

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Pubblicazione di una domanda di registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera b), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

2013/C 237/08

La presente pubblicazione conferisce il diritto di opporsi alla registrazione ai sensi dell'articolo 51 del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio (1).

DOMANDA DI REGISTRAZIONE DI UNA STG

REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 509/2006 DEL CONSIGLIO

relativo alle specialità tradizionali garantite dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari
   (2)

«ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS»

N. CE: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Nome e indirizzo del richiedente

| Nome dell’associazione o organizzazione (se pertinente): | «Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai» |
| --- | --- |
| Indirizzo: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Nome dell’associazione o organizzazione (se pertinente):

«Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai»

Indirizzo:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 44422201

Fax

+370 44474897

E-mail:

info@zpienas.lt

2.   Stato membro o paesi terzi

Lituania.

3.   Disciplinare

3.1.   Nome (nomi) da registrare [articolo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione]

«Žemaitiškas kastinys».

3.2.   Nome

| ☒ | è di per sé specifico |
| --- | --- |
|  | indica la specificità del prodotto agricolo o del prodotto alimentare |

☒

è di per sé specifico



indica la specificità del prodotto agricolo o del prodotto alimentare

Il nome «Žemaitiškas kastinys» non rimanda alle caratteristiche specifiche del prodotto, ma è ben consolidato e noto sia in Samogizia (regione occidentale della Lituania) che nel resto della Lituania per designare tradizionalmente questo prodotto, come emerge dalle varie fonti menzionate al punto 3.8.

Il nome «Žemaitiškas kastinys» (kastinys di Samogizia) figura nel libro di ricette culinarie del ventesimo secolo «Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai» (Tilžė, 1927), nel libro «Cosa mangiamo» scritto dal dr. Tumėnienės e altri («Ką valgome» Kaunas, 1935), e nel libro «La cucina lituana» di J. Pauliukonienė («Lietuvių valgiai», Vilnius, 1983).

3.3.   La domanda prevede l'uso riservato del nome ai sensi dell'articolo 13, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006

| ☒ | Registrazione con l’uso riservato del nome |
| --- | --- |
|  | Registrazione senza l'uso riservato del nome |

☒

Registrazione con l’uso riservato del nome



Registrazione senza l'uso riservato del nome

3.4.   Tipo di prodotto (v. allegato II)

| Classe 1.4. | Altri prodotti di origine animale (uova, miele, prodotti lattiero-caseari ad eccezione del burro, ecc.). |
| --- | --- |

Classe 1.4.

Altri prodotti di origine animale (uova, miele, prodotti lattiero-caseari ad eccezione del burro, ecc.).

3.5.   Descrizione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare a cui si riferisce il nome di cui al punto 3.1 [articolo 3, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione]

Lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è un prodotto tradizionale che consiste in una panna sbattuta a caldo e poi raffreddata.

Lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è caratterizzato dalla consistenza omogenea e spessa; a una temperatura di + 6 °C è friabile, con una consistenza paragonabile a una crema compatta con goccioline sparse e si squaglia facilmente in bocca. Il colore è assolutamente uniforme: giallastro. In funzione delle spezie utilizzate, lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» può presentare sfumature corrispondenti a queste ultime e può contenere frammenti di spezie. Il gusto è quello leggermente acidulo dell'acido lattico ed è inoltre lievemente salato; si avverte inoltre la presenza di spezie.

Lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» ha le seguenti proprietà fisico-chimiche:

| — | lipidi in base alla ricetta: da 25 % a 30 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

lipidi in base alla ricetta: da 25 % a 30 %,

| — | tenore di sale alimentare: da 1 % a 1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

tenore di sale alimentare: da 1 % a 1,5 %.

3.6.   Descrizione del metodo di produzione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare di cui al punto 3.1 [articolo 3, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione]

Materie prime:

| — | panna acida, con un tenore in materie grasse compreso tra il 25 e il 30 %: da 80 kg a 83 kg/100 kg di prodotto, |
| --- | --- |

—

panna acida, con un tenore in materie grasse compreso tra il 25 e il 30 %: da 80 kg a 83 kg/100 kg di prodotto,

| — | burro, con un tenore in materie grasse non all'82 %: da 6 kg a 7 kg/100 kg di prodotto, |
| --- | --- |

—

burro, con un tenore in materie grasse non all'82 %: da 6 kg a 7 kg/100 kg di prodotto,

| — | latte cagliato, con un tenore in materie grasse compreso tra il 2,5 % e il 4 %, da 5 kg a 5,5 kg/100 kg di prodotto, |
| --- | --- |

—

latte cagliato, con un tenore in materie grasse compreso tra il 2,5 % e il 4 %, da 5 kg a 5,5 kg/100 kg di prodotto,

| — | sale alimentare: da 1 kg a 1,5 kg/100 kg di prodotto. |
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sale alimentare: da 1 kg a 1,5 kg/100 kg di prodotto.

Si possono utilizzare spezie (pepe nero, pepe della Giamaica, cumino, aneto, menta o una miscela di tali spezie: dallo 0,1 kg a 0,15 kg/100 kg di prodotto) e ortaggi aromatici (aglio o cipolle: da 1 a 2 kg/100 kg di prodotto).

Metodo di produzione:

lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» viene prodotto secondo metodi tradizionali.

Gli ingredienti vengono dosati seguendo le indicazioni della ricetta. La panna acida viene mescolata con latte cagliato in un recipiente a parte che viene portato a una temperatura tra i 25 e i 30 °C. Il burro freddo viene ammorbidito portandolo a una temperatura tra i 25 e i 30 °C. Gli ortaggi aromatici vengono lavati e tritati finemente.

Il burro riscaldato e ammorbidito viene versato secondo la ricetta nel piatto destinato alla fabbricazione del prodotto. La miscela panna acida-latte cagliato viene versata poco a poco nella misura di 1/8 della quantità prevista della ricetta e viene mescolato a mano o con un meccanismo equivalente. Lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» viene sempre mescolato nella stessa direzione. Una volta ottenuta la consistenza della panna acida (senza produrre latticello) viene aggiunto di nuovo 1/8 della miscela panna acida-latte cagliato e si continua a mescolare. Si ripete tale procedimento fino a che tutta la miscela panna acida-latte cagliato sia stata versata (in funzione della ricetta). Quando lo «Zemaitiškas kastinys» comincia a solidificarsi viene salato, e si aggiungono spezie e ortaggi aromatici e tritati continuando a mescolare. Lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys»deve essere imballato appena prima che indurisca.

Lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» viene imballato in piccole terrine di terracotta o in singoli recipienti da 250 g, 200 g e 100 g. Le terrine vengono ricoperte con un piccolo coperchio in terracotta, con un sovracoperchio e con uno spago annodato attorno a quest'ultimo. I singoli recipienti sono chiusi con un coperchio in alluminio. Una volta imballato lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» viene raffreddato a 6 °C. Una volta raffreddato il prodotto acquisisce la sua consistenza omogenea e compatta.

3.7.   Specificità del prodotto agricolo o alimentare [articolo 3, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione]

Lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» si distingue dagli altri prodotti della stessa categoria per le seguenti caratteristiche:

| — | componenti tradizionali e metodo di produzione: al contrario degli altri tipi di kastinys, la ricetta dello «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è rimasta quasi immutata rispetto alle prime diciture nelle fonti scritte menzionate al punto 3.8; gli stessi ingredienti vengono utilizzati in proporzioni quasi identiche. Nel frattempo sono comparsi successivamente altri tipi di kastinys: per ottenere le qualità gustative più varie, la panna acida viene sostituita interamente dal latte cagliato o viene mescolata con il kephir; si possono aggiungere barbabietole rosse, o succo di carota, o anche tuorlo d'uovo e ciò conferisce al kastinys un colore rosso o giallo. La produzione dello «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è caratterizzata dall'agitazione lenta, circolare e costante della miscela di burro e di panna acida durante la quale la miscela panna acida-latte cagliato viene versata in 8 volte, facendo attenzione alla regolazione della temperatura (25-30 °C) in modo da evitare di produrre latticello. La produzione degli altri tipi di kastinys è modernizzata: si utilizza la sbattitura invece dell'agitazione; inoltre tutti gli ingredienti sono versati in 3-4 volte o perfino in una volta sola; anche la temperatura può variare maggiormente, |
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componenti tradizionali e metodo di produzione: al contrario degli altri tipi di kastinys, la ricetta dello «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è rimasta quasi immutata rispetto alle prime diciture nelle fonti scritte menzionate al punto 3.8; gli stessi ingredienti vengono utilizzati in proporzioni quasi identiche. Nel frattempo sono comparsi successivamente altri tipi di kastinys: per ottenere le qualità gustative più varie, la panna acida viene sostituita interamente dal latte cagliato o viene mescolata con il kephir; si possono aggiungere barbabietole rosse, o succo di carota, o anche tuorlo d'uovo e ciò conferisce al kastinys un colore rosso o giallo. La produzione dello «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è caratterizzata dall'agitazione lenta, circolare e costante della miscela di burro e di panna acida durante la quale la miscela panna acida-latte cagliato viene versata in 8 volte, facendo attenzione alla regolazione della temperatura (25-30 °C) in modo da evitare di produrre latticello. La produzione degli altri tipi di kastinys è modernizzata: si utilizza la sbattitura invece dell'agitazione; inoltre tutti gli ingredienti sono versati in 3-4 volte o perfino in una volta sola; anche la temperatura può variare maggiormente,

| — | il suo gusto — il gusto tipico dello «Žemaitiškas kastinys», è quello lievemente acidulo dell'acido lattico, ed è leggermente salato; si avverte il sapore delle spezie o delle piante aromatiche. Gli altri tipi di kastinys sono caratterizzati dal gusto acido piuttosto aspro dell'acido lattico (se la panna acida è sostituita dal latte cagliato); o da quello dell'acido lattico con un retrogusto di lievito (se la panna acida è sostituita dal kephir); si avverte anche il gusto caratteristico del succo aggiunto (di barbabietola rossa o di carota) o del tuorlo d'uovo, |
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il suo gusto — il gusto tipico dello «Žemaitiškas kastinys», è quello lievemente acidulo dell'acido lattico, ed è leggermente salato; si avverte il sapore delle spezie o delle piante aromatiche. Gli altri tipi di kastinys sono caratterizzati dal gusto acido piuttosto aspro dell'acido lattico (se la panna acida è sostituita dal latte cagliato); o da quello dell'acido lattico con un retrogusto di lievito (se la panna acida è sostituita dal kephir); si avverte anche il gusto caratteristico del succo aggiunto (di barbabietola rossa o di carota) o del tuorlo d'uovo,

| — | consistenza — lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è caratterizzato dalla consistenza spessa e omogenea; a una temperatura di + 6 °C è friabile, con una consistenza paragonabile a una crema compatta con goccioline sparse e molto fondente in bocca. Gli altri tipi di kastinys sono caratterizzati dalla consistenza molle e spalmabile. |
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consistenza — lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» è caratterizzato dalla consistenza spessa e omogenea; a una temperatura di + 6 °C è friabile, con una consistenza paragonabile a una crema compatta con goccioline sparse e molto fondente in bocca. Gli altri tipi di kastinys sono caratterizzati dalla consistenza molle e spalmabile.

3.8.   Tradizionalità del prodotto agricolo o alimentare [articolo 3, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]

Oltre al metodo primitivo di fabbricazione del burro ampiamente diffuso in tutta la Lituania, che consiste nello sbattere la panna acida in un piatto con un cucchiaio, nella sola regione di Šalia è comparsa una tecnica originale di preparazione della panna acida, che si è diffusa in tutta la Lituania e che consiste nel girare tale panna acida a caldo evitando in tal modo che diventi latticello. Si ottiene così un prodotto di gusto e consistenza specifici — lo «Žemaitiškas kastinys» — dall'Atlante della lingua lituana («Lietuvių kalbos atlasas» T. 1. Leksika, Vilnius, 1977). Tale prodotto viene descritto nei testi scientifici dell'ottocento [Litwa pod wzgledem starozytnych zabytkow, obyczajow i zwyczajow skreslona (Ludwik Adam Jucewicz (Ludwik z Pokiewia), Vilnius, 1846] e Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona (Leon Potocki, Poznań, 1869) in cui si insiste nel metodo di fabbricazione (prodotto a partire dalla panna acida riscaldata) e sul gusto molto saporito.

I racconti delle persone nate alla fine del diciannovesimo secolo e all'inizio del ventesimo secolo, conservati al Museo nazionale lituano (fondi della sezione etnografica del Museo nazionale lituano F 15-4; F 15-13; F 32-7; F 32-48) descrivono il metodo di fabbricazione e la ricetta: in un piatto di terracotta riscaldato versare anzitutto tre cucchiai di panna acida e mezzo cucchiaio di burro. Mescolare bene il tutto e con un cucchiaio di legno girare sempre nella stessa direzione. Quando la massa mescolata comincia a raffreddarsi e a separarsi dal latticello, riscaldare il piatto nell'acqua calda e versare la massa così liquefatta nel piatto contenente l'acqua fredda. Mentre si mescola il tutto versare la panna acida nella massa in piccole porzioni. Una parte della panna acida viene spesso sostituita con latte cagliato, il che rende il kastinys più magro. Una volta terminato di sbattere la panna aggiungere il sale e le altre spezie (cumino, pepe macinato, aglio e cipolle tritate cipolle verdi di stagione, pezzi di finocchio o di menta).

Nel libro scritto nel 1983 da accademici e intitolato «La cucina lituana» («Lietuvių valgiai» compilato da J. Pauliukonienė, «Mokslas», Vilnius, 1983 ) che descrive le antiche tecniche tradizionali di preparazione delle materie prime nelle quali la panna acida veniva separata dal latte manualmente (con un cucchiaio) con parte del latte cagliato che rimaneva naturalmente presente, figura la ricetta dello «Žemaitiškas kastinys» — 1⁄2 litro di panna acida, un cucchiaio di burro, mezzo cucchiaio di cumino o altre spezie e sale. Il burro e un cucchiaio di panna acida vengono versati in un piatto di terracotta, poi il piatto viene messo nell'acqua calda e si mescola il tutto con un cucchiaio di legno. Poco dopo (prima che si formi il latticello) si aggiunge un cucchiaio di panna acida e si gira fino a che tutta la panna acida sia stata versata. Quando la massa comincia a diventare spessa si aggiungono sale e cumino lavato e asciugato e si mescola bene il tutto. Il gusto del kastinys risulta leggermente salato e un po' acido.

Il metodo di preparazione e la ricetta dello Žemaitiškas kastinys sono rimasti immutati fino a oggi, come dimostra il certificato che è stato attribuito a questo prodotto in Lituania nel 2010 dal «Kulinarinio paveldo fondas» (Fondo del patrimonio gastronomico), che conferma che la produzione dello Žemaitiškas kastinys si svolge secondo le tecnologie tradizionali, con materie prime, ingredienti e strumenti tradizionali.

3.9.   Requisiti minimi e procedure di controllo della specificità del prodotto [articolo 4 del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione]

Tenuto conto delle caratteristiche specifiche dello Žemaitiškas kastinys viene controllato quanto segue:

| 1) | la qualità delle materie prime di ciascuna partita:






  — | il tenore in materie grasse della panna acida e del latte cagliato deve corrispondere a quello indicato al punto 3.6 e dev'essere controllato in laboratorio, |
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1)

la qualità delle materie prime di ciascuna partita:

—

il tenore in materie grasse della panna acida e del latte cagliato deve corrispondere a quello indicato al punto 3.6 e dev'essere controllato in laboratorio,

| — | il tenore in materie grasse del burro deve corrispondere a quello indicato al punto 3.6 e dev'essere controllato in laboratorio, |
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il tenore in materie grasse del burro deve corrispondere a quello indicato al punto 3.6 e dev'essere controllato in laboratorio,

| — | le caratteristiche organolettiche delle spezie e degli ortaggi aromatici (gusto, aroma e colore) sono controllati in base ai documenti e mediante analisi organolettica; |
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le caratteristiche organolettiche delle spezie e degli ortaggi aromatici (gusto, aroma e colore) sono controllati in base ai documenti e mediante analisi organolettica;

| 2) | la conformità al metodo di produzione indicato al punto 3.6: la successione delle tappe del processo e il rispetto dei parametri definiti (temperatura degli ingredienti e proporzioni) sono controllati visivamente e mediante misurazioni al momento del processo di produzione di ciascuna partita; |
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2)

la conformità al metodo di produzione indicato al punto 3.6: la successione delle tappe del processo e il rispetto dei parametri definiti (temperatura degli ingredienti e proporzioni) sono controllati visivamente e mediante misurazioni al momento del processo di produzione di ciascuna partita;

| 3) | la qualità del prodotto finale di ciascuna partita:






  — | le caratteristiche organolettiche (consistenza, colore e gusto) devono corrispondere alle caratteristiche organolettiche indicate al punto 3.5: esse vengono controllate mediante analisi organolettica, |
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3)

la qualità del prodotto finale di ciascuna partita:

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le caratteristiche organolettiche (consistenza, colore e gusto) devono corrispondere alle caratteristiche organolettiche indicate al punto 3.5: esse vengono controllate mediante analisi organolettica,

| — | il tenore in lipidi deve corrispondere al tenore in lipidi indicato al punto 3.5 e viene controllato in laboratorio, |
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il tenore in lipidi deve corrispondere al tenore in lipidi indicato al punto 3.5 e viene controllato in laboratorio,

| — | il tenore di sale alimentare deve corrispondere al tenore indicato al punto 3.5 ed è controllato in base alla ricetta; in caso di dubbio viene controllato in laboratorio. |
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il tenore di sale alimentare deve corrispondere al tenore indicato al punto 3.5 ed è controllato in base alla ricetta; in caso di dubbio viene controllato in laboratorio.

Almeno una volta all'anno l'autorità indicata al punto 4.1 controlla la conformità del prodotto e del processo di produzione con i requisiti del disciplinare.

4.   Organi o enti responsabili del controllo del disciplinare del prodotto

4.1.   Nome e indirizzo

| Nome: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
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| Indirizzo: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Nome:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Indirizzo:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 52404361

E-mail:

vvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Pubblico |  Privato |
| --- | --- |

☒ Pubblico

 Privato

4.2.   Compiti specifici dell’organo o ente

La struttura di controllo indicata al punto 4.1 è responsabile del controllo di tutte le condizioni definite nel disciplinare.

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(1)  GU L 343 del 14.12.2012, pag. 1.

(2)  Sostituito dal regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012.

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