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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMIE MATSUBA and TAKAHARO 

THOMAS MATSUBA, 

Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 20-50256

 20-50258

D.C. Nos. 2:16-cr-00538-RGK-4

 2:16-cr-00538-RGK-5

MEMORANDUM

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 7, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: OWENS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,*** District 

Judge.

Following a seven-day jury trial, Jamie Matsuba and Takaharo Thomas 

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without 

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the 

District of Montana, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 9 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Matsuba were convicted of mortgage fraud and conspiracy to commit mortgage 

fraud, wire fraud, and identity theft based on a multi-million-dollar foreclosure

rescue scheme targeting distressed homeowners in the Los Angeles area from 2008 

to 2015. They were sentenced, by application of an 18-level loss enhancement, to 

135 months and 168 months, respectively. We previously affirmed their 

convictions but remanded the case for resentencing based on the district court’s 

loss and restitution calculations. United States v. Matsuba, 809 F. App’x 390 (9th 

Cir. 2020). Following remand, the district court once again applied the 18-loss 

enhancement but reduced the restitution award. The defendants once again appeal. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We affirm the 

defendants’ sentences but remand the restitution award on limited grounds. 

1. Because the district court explicitly determined that the rents at issue were 

a “loss” under §2B1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the court 

was not required to engage in the “gain” substitution analysis as argued by the 

defendants. Nor did the district court err in its characterization. The rent that the 

Matsubas charged the original homeowners and other tenants after acquiring the 

properties provides a reasonable basis for estimating actual loss to the victims

because of their fraud. In considering a similar scheme we concluded that it was 

“pellucid that the rents [the defendant] received represent a value that he took from 

the owner-victims. It is, by the way, the very value (perhaps among others) that he 
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intended to take from them. Thus, the use of that figure has the virtue of 

representing actual loss, intended loss and even the offender’s gain.” United States 

v. Harper, 32 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying USSG §2F1.1 (1994)). 

That conclusion remains consistent with the Guideline definition of loss. See

USSG §2B1.1, comment. (n.3(A)) (2018). And the possibility that mortgage 

lenders could also be victims of the Matsubas’ scheme does not prevent those 

divested of the rent payments from being victims as well. 

2. The record supports a loss amount of $3.5 to $9.5 million. As we have 

previously recognized, “[t]he court need not make its loss calculation with absolute 

precision; rather it need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss based on the 

available information.” United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2007); 

USSG §2B1.1, comment. (n.3(C)). Here, the range adopted by the district court 

was consistent with the government’s loss calculation (approximately $19 million) 

less reductions proposed by the defendant’s sentencing expert (approximately $13

million). And, as stated by the district court, that determination was 

“conservative.” See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 2008)

(reiterating that “deference to a district court’s loss calculation is warranted 

because the district court is in a unique position to assess the evidence”) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not 

clearly err in its calculation of the loss amount. See United States v. Garro, 517 
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F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008).

3. Regarding restitution, we decline to revisit the district court’s valuation 

methodology or the reliability of the underlying evidence in this appeal. See 

United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the 

government “acknowledges error with respect” to certain aspects of the restitution 

award, specifically involving mortgage payments offsets and incorrectly identified 

victims. Given the government’s concession, a limited remand is appropriate to 

permit the district court to ensure all restitution offsets have been included and the 

proper victims named. 

4. Finally, the defendants fail to show this matter is a “rare and 

extraordinary circumstance” that requires reassignment to a different district judge. 

Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015). 

We remand for the limited reconsideration of the restitution award 

consistent with this disposition. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND 

REMANDED IN PART.