2016 UT App 2

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

THOMAS RANDALL AINSWORTH,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20130924-CA

Filed January 7, 2016

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Deno G. Himonas

No. 121902706

David P.S. Mack, Caleb J. Cunningham, and Lori J. 

Seppi, Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys

for Appellee

SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.

1

BENCH, Senior Judge:

¶1 Thomas Randall Ainsworth appeals his convictions and 

sentences for three counts of driving with a measurable amount 

of a controlled substance in his body and negligently causing 

death or serious bodily injury, second-degree felonies. See Utah 

Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(g)–(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). We 

vacate Ainsworth’s second-degree felony convictions and 

remand for the district court to enter a judgment of conviction 

 

1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special 

assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. 

Admin. 11-201(6).
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for three third-degree felonies and to resentence him 

accordingly.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Ainsworth’s actions led to a great tragedy. On December 

24, 2011, Ainsworth drove over a median into oncoming traffic 

and crashed head-on into another vehicle. The driver and front 

passenger sustained serious injury as a result of the crash, and 

their eighteen-month-old child was killed. Ainsworth informed 

police that he had dropped his cell phone on the floor of his 

vehicle and was reaching for it when he lost control of the 

vehicle. Following the accident, Ainsworth’s blood tested 

positive for methamphetamine.

¶3 Ainsworth was charged with three counts of driving with 

a measurable amount of a controlled substance in the body and 

negligently causing death or serious bodily injury, each a 

second-degree felony. Ainsworth moved to amend one of these 

counts to automobile homicide, a third-degree felony, and the 

other two to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 

causing serious bodily injury (DUI With Serious Injury), also a 

third-degree felony, on the ground that section 58-37-8(2)(g) and 

(h) of the Utah Code (the Measurable Amount Statute), under 

which he was charged, violate the Utah Constitution’s uniform 

operation of laws provision. In the alternative, he moved the 

court to reduce all three of his charges to third-degree felonies. 

The district court denied Ainsworth’s motion. Ainsworth then 

moved the court to declare the Measurable Amount Statute

unconstitutional as applied and to reconsider the motion to 

amend. The district court again denied Ainsworth’s motion.

¶4 Ainsworth pleaded guilty to all three charges under the 

Measurable Amount Statute but reserved his right to appeal the 

constitutionality of the statute. Ainsworth requested concurrent 

sentencing, but the district court ordered that Ainsworth serve 
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three consecutive prison terms of one to fifteen years each. 

Ainsworth now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶5 Ainsworth first asserts that the district court erred in 

concluding that the Measurable Amount Statute was 

constitutional. “Constitutional challenges to statutes present 

questions of law, which we review for correctness.” State v. 

Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 7, 254 P.3d 183 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶6 Ainsworth also asserts that the district court exceeded its 

discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. “Because trial 

courts are afforded wide latitude in sentencing, a court’s 

sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State 

v. Epling, 2011 UT App 229, ¶ 8, 262 P.3d 440 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Constitutionality of the Measurable Amount Statute

¶7 Ainsworth asserts that the Measurable Amount Statute 

violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, known as 

the uniform operation of laws provision, by making 

impermissible distinctions between those who may be charged 

under the Automobile Homicide Statute and the DUI With 

Serious Injury Statute and those who may be charged under the 

Measurable Amount Statute.

¶8 Under the Automobile Homicide Statute, a person who, 

while “under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 

influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the 

person incapable of safely operating a vehicle,” “operates a 
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20130924-CA 4 2016 UT App 2

motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of 

another” commits a third-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-

207(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). Under the DUI With Serious Injury 

Statute, a person who, while “under the influence of alcohol, any 

drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 

degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a 

vehicle,” “inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a 

proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 

manner” also commits a third-degree felony. Id. §§ 41-6a502(1)(b), -503(2)(a) (2014). But under the Measurable Amount 

Statute, a person who, “in an offense not amounting to a 

violation of *the Automobile Homicide Statute+,” “knowingly 

and intentionally *has+ in the person’s body any measurable 

amount” of a Schedule I or II controlled substance (such as 

methamphetamine) without a valid prescription, “operates a 

motor vehicle . . . in a negligent manner,” and causes either 

death or serious bodily injury to another commits a seconddegree felony. Id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (g), (h)(i) (Supp. 2015).

¶9 Ainsworth asserts that the Measurable Amount Statute 

violates the uniform operation of laws provision in two ways: 

first, by distinguishing between those who have a prescription 

for a controlled substance and those who do not and, second, by 

classifying a violation of the Measurable Amount Statute by use 

of a Schedule I or II controlled substance as a second-degree 

felony, while classifying the more culpable offenses of 

Automobile Homicide and DUI With Serious Injury as thirddegree felonies. We agree with the State that the legislature has a 

reasonable objective for distinguishing between prescription and 

nonprescription users of controlled substances. However, there 

does not appear to be any rational basis for punishing 

individuals who have “any measurable amount” of controlled 

substance in their bodies more harshly than individuals who 

have an incapacitating amount of the substance in their bodies.
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20130924-CA 5 2016 UT App 2

¶10 The uniform operation of laws provision mandates that 

“*a+ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” 

Utah Const. art. I, § 24. This provision is an “analogue to the 

federal due process guarantee,” Wood v. University of Utah Med. 

Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 33, 67 P.3d 436, but may, “in some

circumstances, [be] more rigorous than the standard applied 

under the federal constitution,” Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, 

¶ 33, 54 P.3d 1069 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

In analyzing the constitutionality of a statutory 

scheme under the uniform operation of laws 

provision[] we engage in a three-part inquiry. First, 

we determine what, if any, classification is created 

under the statute. Second, we inquire into whether 

the classification imposes on similarly situated 

persons disparate treatment. Finally, we analyze 

the scheme to determine if the legislature had any 

reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.

State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 34, 233 P.3d 476 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the 

legislature had a reasonable objective to warrant a disparity, we 

must consider “(1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) 

whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, 

and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the 

classification and the legislative purpose.” State v. Robinson, 2011 

UT 30, ¶ 22, 254 P.3d 183. “Broad deference is given to the 

legislature when assessing the reasonableness of its 

classifications and their relationship to legitimate legislative 

purposes.” Id. ¶ 23 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

¶11 Ainsworth first challenges the Measurable Amount 

Statute’s distinction between those who use controlled 

substances without a prescription and those who use them with 
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20130924-CA 6 2016 UT App 2

a prescription. Those who have a prescription for a controlled 

substance may be charged only under the Automobile Homicide 

Statute or the DUI With Serious Injury Statute, not the 

Measurable Amount Statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

8(2)(a)(i), (g)(i) (exempting from the Measurable Amount Statute 

those who have a valid prescription). In other words, unlike 

nonprescription users, prescription users can be charged with no 

more than a third-degree felony2 and can be convicted only if the 

State demonstrates that they were intoxicated to a degree that 

rendered them incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. See 

id. § 41-6a-503(2)(a) (2014); id. § 76-5-207(2)(a) (2012). Thus, the 

Measurable Amount Statute creates a classification. Because the 

same drugs may be used by both types of users and the existence 

of a prescription presumably does not alter the effect of the drug, 

we conclude that prescription and nonprescription users of 

controlled substances are similarly situated.

¶12 However, the classification does not violate the uniform 

operation of laws provision, because the legislature had a 

reasonable basis for making the classification. Ainsworth asserts 

that the distinction between prescription and nonprescription 

users of methamphetamine is not supported by a reasonable

legislative objective “because the harm presented by a person 

driving with methamphetamine in his system is the same 

regardless of whether he has a prescription.” Ainsworth’s 

assertion rests on the mistaken assumption that the only rational 

objective the legislature could have in distinguishing between 

prescription and nonprescription users of controlled substances

 

2. Automobile homicide may be a second-degree felony if the 

defendant was criminally negligent or had a previous DUIrelated conviction, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(b), (3) 

(LexisNexis 2012), but Ainsworth was not charged with either of 

those variations of automobile homicide, and they are not at 

issue in this case.
State v. Ainsworth

20130924-CA 7 2016 UT App 2

is the relative danger they pose when driving. But the legislature 

also has a legitimate interest in regulating the use of controlled 

substances due to their high potential for abuse. Those who use 

such substances pursuant to a valid prescription are subject to 

controls and safeguards, including, among other things, limits 

on their dosages and regulation of manufacturing consistency 

and quality, while those who obtain controlled substances 

illegally are not subject to any such constraints. Thus, the 

legislature has an interest in deterring the illegal use of 

controlled substances. The legislature has no concomitant 

interest in deterring the legal use of prescribed medications so 

long as that use does not render the patient incapable of safely 

operating a motor vehicle. Charging nonprescription controlledsubstance users that have “any measurable amount” of such 

substances in their bodies, while charging prescription users 

only when they are demonstrably unsafe to drive, is rationally 

related to the reasonable objectives of the legislature.

¶13 Ainsworth next challenges the Measurable Amount 

Statute’s distinction between those whose bodies contain “any 

measurable amount of a controlled substance,” Utah Code Ann. 

§ 58-37-8(g)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015), and those who are under 

the influence of any controlled substance “to a degree that 

renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle,” see

id. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (2014); id. § 76-5-207(2)(a)(ii) (2012). He 

asserts that, as applied to users of Schedule I and II controlled 

substances,3this distinction is not related to a reasonable 

 

3. Although users of other types of controlled substances are also 

subject to this classification, the degree of crime they can be 

charged with is lesser or equal to what they would be charged 

with under the Automobile Homicide Statute or the DUI With 

Serious Injury Statute. Because Ainsworth’s argument 

concerning this classification is premised on the fact that the 

Measurable Amount Statute imposes a greater penalty for a 

(continued...)
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20130924-CA 8 2016 UT App 2

legislative objective, because it punishes less culpable offenders 

with a significantly higher level of punishment.

¶14 The State asserts that no classification is created by this 

provision of the Measurable Amount Statute because the 

Automobile Homicide Statute and the DUI With Serious Injury 

Statute govern only drivers who are under the influence of legal 

intoxicants (alcohol or prescription drugs), not those who are 

under the influence of illegal intoxicants (nonprescribed 

controlled substances). Thus, according to the State, regardless of 

the degree of intoxication, negligently causing injury or death of 

another while driving with any measurable amount of a

controlled substance for which the user does not have a 

prescription should be prosecuted under the Measurable 

Amount Statute, not the Automobile Homicide Statute or the

DUI With Serious Injury Statute.

¶15 However, the plain language of the Measurable Amount, 

Automobile Homicide, and DUI With Serious Injury Statutes 

belies the State’s interpretation. Both the Automobile Homicide 

Statute and the DUI With Serious Injury Statute apply to 

individuals under the influence of “any drug.” See Utah Code 

Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2014); id. § 76-5-207(2)(a)(ii)

(2012). Both statutes include controlled substances within the 

definition of “drug.” Id. § 41-6a-501(1)(c)(i) (2014) (defining 

 

(...continued)

lesser crime, it challenges the constitutionality of the statute only 

as applied to Schedule I and II users. In requesting that his 

charges be reduced to third-degree felonies, Ainsworth’s 

argument presumes that a charge equal to what a defendant 

could have been charged with under the Automobile Homicide 

Statute or the DUI With Serious Injury Statute would not violate 

the uniform operation of laws provision, so we assume, without 

deciding, that this is the case.
State v. Ainsworth

20130924-CA 9 2016 UT App 2

“drug” for purposes of the DUI With Serious Injury Statute to 

include controlled substances); id. § 76-5-207(1)(a)(i) (2012)

(defining “drug” for purposes of the Automobile Homicide 

Statute to include controlled substances); id. § 58-37-2(1)(f)

(Supp. 2015) (defining “controlled substance” to include 

substances listed in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the Utah 

Controlled Substances Act and the federal Controlled Substances 

Act). Neither statute distinguishes between drugs used in 

accordance with a valid prescription and drugs used illegally. 

Thus, by their plain language, these statutes apply to the use of 

both prescription and nonprescription controlled substances. 

Furthermore, the Measurable Amount Statute implicitly 

identifies the Automobile Homicide Statute as defining an 

offense that could apply to users of illegal drugs by specifically 

distinguishing it from the Measurable Amount Statute, stating 

that “*a+ person is subject to the penalties” of the Measurable 

Amount Statute when the person violates the statute “in an 

offense not amounting to a violation of [the Automobile Homicide 

Statute+.” Id. § 58-37-8(g) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). This 

indicates that the legislature anticipated that the Automobile 

Homicide Statute would apply to nonprescription users of 

controlled substances under certain circumstances.

¶16 Thus, we agree with Ainsworth that the three statutes 

create a classification distinguishing between similarly situated 

persons—users of nonprescribed controlled substances who 

cause serious injury or death by negligently operating a motor 

vehicle—based on their degree of intoxication: Those who are 

intoxicated by legal or illegal substances to a degree that they are 

incapable of safely operating a vehicle are to be prosecuted 

under the Automobile Homicide Statute or the DUI With Serious 

Injury Statute. On the other hand, those who have consumed

illegal substances to a lesser degree, but still have a measurable 

amount in their bodies, are to be prosecuted under the 

Measurable Amount Statute. Because a conviction under the 

Measurable Amount Statute is a second-degree felony when the 
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20130924-CA 10 2016 UT App 2

individual has a measurable amount of a Schedule I or II 

controlled substance in his or her body, while convictions under 

the other two statutes are third-degree felonies regardless of the 

type of controlled substance used, unimpaired users of Schedule 

I and II controlled substances are ultimately subject to a greater 

charge for what is otherwise defined to be a lesser crime.

¶17 There does not appear to be any rational basis for 

charging users of nonprescribed Schedule I or II controlled 

substances who have a measurable amount of controlled 

substance in their body, but not enough to render them 

incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle, with a higherdegree crime than users of nonprescribed Schedule I or II 

controlled substances who have so much controlled substance in 

their body that they are demonstrably unsafe to operate a 

vehicle. Thus, we agree with Ainsworth that the second-degree 

designation in subsection (2)(h)(i) in the Measurable Amount 

Statute violates the uniform operation of laws provision of the 

Utah Constitution.

¶18 When a statutory provision is determined to be 

unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute will nevertheless 

be allowed to stand if it “is operable and still furthers the 

intended legislative purpose.” State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 19, 

980 P.2d 191. The legislature has determined that “*i+f any 

provision of [the Measurable Amount Statute], or the application 

of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 

the remainder of [the Measurable Amount Statute] shall be given 

effect without the invalid provision or application.” Utah Code 

Ann. § 58-37-8(17) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). Thus, striking the 

second-degree designation in subsection (2)(h)(i) of the 

Measurable Amount Statute does not undermine the legislative 

purpose of the statute. The only question remaining, then, is 

whether subsection (2)(h)(i) can remain operable without its 

second-degree designation. “An offense designated as a felony 

either in [the criminal code] or in another law, without 
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20130924-CA 11 2016 UT App 2

specification as to punishment or category, is a felony of the 

third degree.” Id. § 76-3-103 (2012). Therefore, subsection (2)(h)(i) 

can remain operable as a third-degree felony. Accordingly, we 

vacate Ainsworth’s convictions and remand with instructions for 

the district court to re-enter them as third-degree felonies.

II. Consecutive Sentencing

¶19 Because we must vacate Ainsworth’s convictions and 

remand for the district court to adjust the degree of the 

convictions, which will require that the district court also 

resentence him, we need not address Ainsworth’s argument that 

the district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. 

Nevertheless, as this issue has been fully briefed and is likely to 

arise on remand, we elect to address it. See State v. James, 819 

P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991).

¶20 Ainsworth asserts that the district court exceeded its 

discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because it failed to

adequately consider his history, character, and rehabilitative 

needs. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (LexisNexis 2012). 

Although “*a+ court exceeds its discretion if it . . . fails to 

consider all legally relevant factors,” State v. Epling, 2011 UT 

App 229, ¶ 8, 262 P.3d 440, “*i+t is the defendant’s burden to 

demonstrate that the trial court failed to properly consider 

legally relevant factors,” State v. Bunker, 2015 UT App 255, ¶ 3, 

361 P.3d 155. A defendant cannot meet this burden by merely 

pointing to . . . the existence of mitigating circumstances.” Id. “If 

the record shows that the trial court has reviewed information 

regarding the relevant legal factors, we can infer that the trial 

court adequately considered those factors.” Id.

¶21 Ainsworth argues that the court failed to adequately 

consider the fact that his offenses arose out of a single criminal 

episode resulting from negligent rather than intentional 

behavior; that despite not having been amenable to 

rehabilitation in the past, he had expressed genuine remorse and 
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20130924-CA 12 2016 UT App 2

a desire to accept responsibility for his actions; that he has 

participated in substance-abuse classes while in jail and has a 

newfound desire to participate in substance-abuse treatment; 

that he is employed; and that he has strong emotional health and 

family connections. While these factors could have supported a 

decision to impose concurrent sentences, they do not mandate 

such an outcome and we see no indication that the district court 

failed to consider them. On the contrary, the district court 

indicated that it had “carefully considered *Ainsworth’s+ history 

and rehabilitative needs in reaching [its] decision” but 

concluded that the “nature, circumstances and gravity of the 

offense[,] . . . as well *as+ the number of victims” made 

consecutive sentencing appropriate. “The fact that the trial court 

assessed the relevant factors differently than [Ainsworth] would 

have liked does not indicate that it exceeded its discretion.” See 

Epling, 2011 UT App 229, ¶ 22.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We agree with Ainsworth that subsection (2)(h)(i) of the 

Measurable Amount Statute violates the uniform operation of 

laws provision of the Utah Constitution. Thus, we vacate 

Ainsworth’s convictions and remand with instructions for the 

district court to enter his convictions as third-degree felonies and 

to resentence him accordingly.4

 

4. In reducing the degree of Ainsworth’s convictions, as we 

believe the law requires, we by no means wish to discount the 

tragic losses suffered by the victims of Ainsworth’s crimes.