1

Filed 10/15/21 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SEIU

- USWW et al. , Plaintiff s and Respondent s ,
v. PREFERRED BUILDING SERVICES , INC. , Defendant and Appellant

. A 159790
( City and County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. C GC

- 15

- 545974 )

A class of janitors (Janitors) were employed by VPM Maintenance Management, LLC (VPM) at a residential complex (the Site). After VPM
terminated its janitorial contract with the Site, a successor janitorial contractor (Successor) replaced VPM. Janitors and their union (Union) (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued S uccessor for failing to retain Janit ors under

state and local law s . The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and awarded attorney fees. We affirm. BACKGROUND Janitors worked for VPM providing janitorial services at the Site

. The Union was Janitors’ elected bargaining representative. In 2014, VPM notified the Union that it was considering terminat ing its janitorial contract
with the Site . In June 2014, VPM and the Union executed a n agreement

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part s I.C

– F and II.2

regarding this potential terminati on (Termination Agreement ). The Termination Agreement provided that, in the event that VPM terminate d its janitorial contract with the Site , VPM would offer a specified severance package to employees who execute d an agreement stating they we re voluntarily resigning and releas ing all claims against VPM. The Termination Agreement also included the following: “[N]either the Union nor any bargaining unit employee waives any rights under the Displaced Janitors Opportu nity Act to require any successor employer to offer employment to existing employees

. . . .” In February 2015, VPM informed the Union that it was terminating its janitorial contract with the Site effective April 13, 2015

. Janitor s each signed a separat ion agreement (Separation Agreement). The Separation Agreements stated the employee was voluntarily resigning; provided lump sum payments based on the employee’s years of service; included a release of
all claims against VPM; and stated the employee’s last day would be April 13,
2015 , or earlier at VPM’s election. On April 10, 2015, VPM informed the Union that VPM was electing to move up Janitors’ last day pursuant to the Separation Agreements and “today will be everyone’s last day

. ” 1 For the follow ing three days, the Site
hired a nother company to provide essential janitorial services; VPM did not provide these services at the Site. On April 14, 2015, Successor began providing janitorial services at the Site

. On that date, Janitors appeared at the Site and asserted their right to
retention. Successor did not retain any of the Janitors.

1 VPM nonetheless paid Janitors through April 13, 2015.3

In May 2015, Plaintiffs sued Successor , alleging violations of the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (Lab. Code, 2 §§ 1060

– 1065; DJOA) , and the Displaced Worker Protection Act (S.F. Police Code, §§3300C.1

– 3300C.6; DWPA)

. Multiple motions for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication were filed and denied in whole or in part. In November 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which the tr ial court granted. The court subsequently awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs and issued judgment. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION
I

. Summary Judgment “An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] As a practical matter, ‘ “we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards which govern a trial court ’ s determination of a motion for summary judgment.” ’ [Citation.] A motion for summary judgment is properly granted ‘if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” ( Doe v. Good Samaritan Hospital (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 653, 661.) A. Legal Background The DJOA “ requires contractors who are awarded contracts for janitorial or building maintenance services at a particular site to retain certain employees working for the terminated contractor for a 60

- day transition employment period, and to offer those workers continued employment if their pe rformance during the 60

- day period is satisfactory. (§ 1061, subds. (b)(1) & (f).)

. . . [T] he DJOA requires a terminated contractor

2 All undesignated section references are to th e Labor Code.4

to provide the name, date of hire, and job classification of each employee employed at the site to the successor contracto r within three working days after receiving notice that its contract has been terminated. (§ 1061, subd. (a).) [¶] Under the DJOA, an employee of the terminated contractor who was not offered employment by the successor contractor may sue the successor fo r back pay, including the value of any lost employment benefits. (§ 1062, subd. (a).) If the employee is the prevailing party, the trial court ‘ shall award the employee reasonable attorney ’ s fees and costs as part of the costs
recoverable. ’ (§ 1062, sub d. (c).) ” ( Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 372, 379

– 380 ( Jones )

. ) 3 The DWPA similarly provides that persons employed under service

contracts shall be retained by a successor contractor for a 90

- day transition period. (S.F. Police Code, § § 3300C.1(c) & (f), 3300C.2( b).) 4
B

. Employees Successor argues Janitors were not “employees” within the meaning of the DJOA and DWPA

. “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature ’ s intent so as to effectuate the law ’ s purpose.’ [Citation.] The well

- established rules for

3 In a footnote, Successor cursorily asserts the DJOA does not apply because VPM terminated the contract, not the Site. T he contention is forfeited: “An appellant cannot bury a substantive legal argument in a footnote and hope to avoid waive r of that argument.” ( Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419.)

4 The DJOA was modeled on local ordinances adopted in various cities, including San Francisco

— presumably, the DWPA. ( Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 20 ( 2001

– 2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 4 , 2001 , p

. 3 [“SB 20 is modeled after local ordinances adopted by San Francisco in 1998, Washington, D.C., in 1994, and, most recently, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania”] .)5

performing this task require us to begin by examining the statu tory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to
the statute ’ s entire substance in order to determine its scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question in context, keeping in
mind the statute ’ s nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must
harmonize the statute ’ s various parts by considering it in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citation.] If t he statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative histor y.” ( Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1106

– 1107.) The DJOA defines “employee” as “ any person employed as a service employee of a contractor or subcontractor who works at least 15 hours per week and whose primary place of employment is in the State of California under a contract to provide janitorial or building maintenance services. ” ( § 1060 , subd. (c).) The DWPA provides a similar definition ; the only differences are not mat erial here . (S.F. Police Code, § 3300C.1( c) [ “ ‘ Employee ’ means any person employed as a service employee of a contractor or subcontractor who works at least 15 hours per week and whose primary place of employment is in the City and County of San Francisco under a contract to provide security services, janitoria l services, or building maintenance services for the awarding authority. ”].) Under the DJOA, a successor contractor is required to retain “ employees who have been employed by the terminated contractor or its subcontractors, if any, for the6

preceding four months or longer at the site or sites covered by the successor
service contract

. . . . ” (§ 1061, subd. (b)(1).) The DWPA imposes a nearly
identical requirement , but requires retained employees to have been employed for at least the preceding eight month s. (S.F. Police Code, § 3300C.2( b) [successor contractor must retain “ employees who have been employed by the terminated contractor or its subcontractors, if any, for the preceding eight months or longer at the site or sites covered by the

contract ”].)
Plaintiffs suggest the statutes require retention of any person “ recently or lately” employed by the terminated contractor. T his argument is fatally undermined by another provision, requir ing the terminated contractor to

p rovide information about “ each employee employed at the site or sites covered by the terminated service contract at the time of the contract
termination

. ” (§ 1061, subd. (a)(1) , italics added ; see S.F. Police Code, § 3300C.2(a) [ terminated contractor must provide information about “ each employee employed at the site or sites covered by the prospective contractor at the time of contract termination ” (italics added) ].) Similarly, the DJOA’s formula for calculating a backpay award incorporates “ [t] he final regular rate of pay receive d by the employee at the time of termination of the predecessor

contrac t

. . . .” (§ 1062 , subd. (a)(2) , italics added .) This language makes it clear that the individual must be an employee at the time of contract
termination. Successor argues the time of contract termination was April 13 , 2015 , relying on a declaration from VPM’s president averring that “[o]n April 13, 2015, VPM terminated” its janitorial contract with the Site. However , the undisputed evidence establishes that after April 10, 2015, VPM did not provide janitorial services at the Site

. No VPM employees provided these7

services. VPM also did not provide these services through other means;
i nstead, the Site itself hired a third company to provide janitorial services
between April 10 and April 14 , the date Successor began providing janitorial and maintenance services at the Site

. April 10, 2015 was thus the last day VPM provided janitorial services at the Site , either with its own employees or by some other means.
We must determine whether “ the time of contract termination” for purposes of the DJOA and DWPA is the nominal last day of the contract or the last day the terminated contractor actually provides ja nitorial services at
the site. The statutory purpose inform s our analysis. “ ‘ When construing the Labor Code

. . . , we adopt the construction that best gives effect to the purpose of the Legislature

. . . . [Citations.] Time and again, we have
charact erized that purpose as the protection of employees

— particularly given the extent of legislative concern about working conditions, wages, and hours when the Legislature enacted key portions of the Labor Code. [Citations.] In furtherance of that purpose, w e liberally construe the Labor Code

. . . to favor the protection of employees. ’ ” ( Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829, 839

. ) This employee

- protective purpose is confirmed by the legislative history of the DJOA , which “ indicates it was designed to protect vulnerable janitorial workers from a labor market in which they can lose their jobs with little or no warning. ” ( Jones , sup ra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 380, fn. 3.) 5 In addition, the DJOA includes provisions indicat ing a legislative
intent to forestall contractors and awarding authorities from circumventing its provisions. The statute defines “ ‘ Successor service contract ’ ” to mean “ a service contract for the performance of essentially the same services as were

5 The parties do not suggest the purpose of the DWPA is any different

.8

previously performed pursuant to a different service contract at the same facility that terminated within the previous 30 days. ” (§ 1060, subd. (g).) However, in a n apparent recognition that contractors and awarding authorities might wait 31 days to begin a new contract to avoid the statute’s requirements, the DJOA further provides, “ A service contract entered into more than 30 days after the termination of a predecessor service contract
shall be considered a ‘ successor service contract ’ if its execution was delayed for the purpose of avoiding application of this chapter. ” (§ 1060, s ubd. (g).) To allow a terminated contractor to stop providing services a few days before the nominal end of the contract and claim it therefore had no employees “at the time of contract termination” would create an easy way around the requirements of the DJOA and DWPA . Such a n interpretation
would contravene the legislative intent to close such loopholes, the worker

protective statutory purpose, and our obligation to liberally construe the

statute s in favor of employee protection. Accordingly, we conclud e that April 10, 2015

— the last day VPM provided janitorial services at the Site

— was “the time of contract termination” for purposes of the DJOA and DWPA, regardless of any other nominal or technical contract end date. Janitors were therefore employees at the time of contract termination. Our analysis is not impacted by Janitors’ statement s in the Separation Agreements that they voluntarily resigned. Setting aside the question of whether their departure is accurately characterized as voluntary (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 1256

– 1 , subd. (d) [for purposes of unemployment benefits, “ An employee who leaves work when asked by the employer to
either resi gn or be fired

. . . has not left work of his or her own free will ,” and is therefore “ involuntarily unemployed ”]), Janitors’ resignation s were9

effective at the end of the day on April 10, 2015. Therefore, Janitors were still employees at the time of cont ract termination. Successor also makes much of Janitors’ receipt of severance packages from VPM. We fail to see how this severance

— received by Janitors in exchange for their release of all claims against VPM

— impact s our interpretation of Successor’s obligations under the DJOA and DWPA. Nor are we persuaded by Successor ’s argument that , if we affirm the trial court, a janitor and terminated contractor could never “voluntarily sever their employment relationship

. . . without triggering a r etention obligation for the successor.” Most obviously, a janitor could waive his or her rights under the DJOA or DWPA

. 6 C

. Preemption Successor argues Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U. S.C. § 185; Section 301). We disagree. Section 301 “ ‘ provides federal court jurisdiction over controversies involving collective

- bargaining agreements

. . . .’ ” ( Balcorta v. Twentieth Century

- Fox Film Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 .) As r elevant here, if the right underlying the state law cause of action is “ ‘ “ substantially dependent on analysis of a collective

- bargaining agreement ” ’

. . . , the state law claim is preempted by § 301. ” ( Kobold v. Good Samaritan Regional
Medical Center (9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 1024, 1032

– 1033 .) However, “ ‘ a defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state

- law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law. ’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘ [i]f the claim is

6 In the unpublished portion of the opinion, w e reject Successor’s argument that Janitors so waived the se rights . (See post, part I.E.)10

plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense. ’ ” ( Id. at p. 1033 .)
Successor argues Plaintiffs’ claims are dependent on the Terminati on Agreement negotiated by VPM and the Union because : (1) Janitors cannot be “employees” within the meaning of the DJOA and DWPA because they resigned; (2) therefore, Janitors must rely on the reservation of rights in the Termination Agreement to pursue their DJOA and DWPA claims ; and (3) the reservation of rights applies to “existing employees , ” the meaning of which is disputed by VPM and Plaintiffs. Successor ’s argument fails at the first step: as explained ante, part I .B , Plaintiffs were em ployees within the meaning of
the DJOA and DWPA , without need ing to rely on the Termination Agreement. To the extent interpretation of the Termination Agreement is required by Successor ’s defenses, preemption does not result

. ( Kobold , supra, 832 F.3d 102 4 at p. 1033 .)
D

. C ause The DJOA provides a successor contractor is excused from the retention obligation if it “ has reasonable and substantiated cause not to hire a particular employee based on that employee ’ s performance or conduct while working under the terminated contract. ” (§ 1061, subd. (b)(1).) The DWPA similarly provides. ( S.F. Police Code, § 3300C.2(e) [successor contractor may terminate retained employee for “cause ” ].)
Successor argues Janitors’ conduct of resigning provided such cause. We disagree. Successor ’s argument appears to be that Janitors’ resignations constituted “cause” because they rendered them no longer employees for whom retention was required under the DJOA and DWPA . W e have rejected
th is argument (see ante, part I .B ).11

E

. Waiver and Estoppel Successor argues there are material issues of fact as to whether Janitors waived their right to retention under the DJOA and DWPA or are estopped from asserting such rights

. Again, w e disagree. 7

“ ‘ “[W] aiver ” means the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. ’ [Citations.] Waiver requires an existing right, the waiving party’s knowledge of that right, and the party’s ‘ actual intention to relinquish the right. ’ [Citation.] ‘ “ Waiver always rests upon intent. ” ’ [Citation.] The intention may be express, based on the waivi ng party’s words, or implied, based on conduct that is ‘ “ so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished. ” ’ ” ( Lynch v. California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 475 .) “ The elements of equitable estoppel are ‘ (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury

. [Citation.] ’ [Citation.] The detrimental
reliance must be reasonable. ’ ” ( Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261 .)
To the extent that Janitors’ resignation s suggest an intent to waive their rights under the DJOA and DWPA , the express reservation of rights in the Termination Agreement create s the inescapable inference that Janitors did not so intend. Similarly, for purposes of estoppel, to the extent there is a dispute of fact as to whether Janitors intend ed their resignations to indicate

7 Because we reject the argument s on the merits, we need not decide whether, as Plaintiffs contend, Successor abandoned the defense of waiver and/ or improperly pled the defense of estoppel

.12

they had no rights under the DJOA and DWPA , or whether Successor had a right to so believe, the express reservation of rights in the Termination Agreement is irrefutable evidence that Janitors sought to disabuse VPM (and anyone VPM communicated with) of this notion. In addition, on the first day of Successor ’s contract for janitorial services, Janitors appeared at the Site
and expressed their understanding that they were entitled to retention

. Successor argues the Termination Agreement’s reservation of rights does not apply because Janitors were no longer “existing employees” after their resignations. Such a construction of the Termination Agreement would
be absurd: retention rights would be reserved for bargaining unit members who did not resign, and therefor e had no need to reserve their rights, while retention rights would not be reserved for bargaining unit members who did resign . Instead, the plain meaning of “existing employees” is those bargaining unit members still employed by VPM at the time of contract termination. 8 Successor notes the trial court’s order did not expressly address the waiver defense and argues we should remand for that reason alone. (See Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1044,
10 47 [ where th e court’s minute order, the hearing transcript, and the formal
order a ll failed to address certain issues raised in summary judgment motion , “[t] he appellate record does not provide sufficient information to permit meaningful appellate review of these issu es ” ].) But the court’s order did
address the merits of the estoppel defense , and Successor itself asserts that

“ ‘[e] stoppel is, for practical purposes, indistinguishable from the doctrine of

8 Although the reservation of rights in the Termination Agreement only identifies the DJOA, not the DWPA, Successo r does not contend that our analysis is any different for the two statutes.13

implied waiver through conduct. ’ ” (Quoting Oakland Raiders v. Oakland

Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1190 .) The record therefore permits meaningful appellate review.
F

. Impossib ility Successor argues it was impossible to comply with the DJOA and DWPA

. “ ‘ The law never requires impossibilities. ’ (Civ. Code, § 3531.) Impossibility means not only strict impossibility but also impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss
involved. [Citation.] Consistent with this maxim, the law recogni zes exceptions to statutory requirements for impossibility of performance. ” ( Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 299

– 300

. ) Successor argues it was impossible to comply with any obligations under the DJOA and DWPA because it was told by the Site there were no employees , and neither the Site nor VPM provided it with a list of employees

. However, on Successor ’s first day at the Site, Janitors personally appeared and asserted their status as employees of the terminated contractor. Thus, a t the latest by its first day o n the job , Successor knew there may have been employees covered by the DJOA and DWPA, and further knew or could easily obtain the identity of such employees. There is no evidence that Successor ’s compliance with the s tatute was impossible.
II

. Attorney Fee s Successor challenges the amount of attorney fees awarded Plaintiffs

. Plaintiffs requested lodestar fees with a multiplier of 2.0. The trial court
awarded the requested lodestar fees but with a 1.4 multiplier

.

“ We review attorney fee awards on an abuse of discretion standard.

‘ The “ experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional
services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of14

course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong. ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the [appellant] must show error in
the award. ’ ” ( Laffitte v. Robert H alf Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 .)
A

. Downward Adjustment Successor argues the lodestar should have been adjusted downward
because Plaintiffs overstaffed the case with eight attorneys. The trial court
addresse d this contention in its order: “While [ Successor ’s] concern regarding overstaffing is not misplaced, given that Plaintiffs seek to recover for time expended by eight attorneys on the case, Plaintiffs’ showing establishes (1) that five of those attorneys who were principally involved in the case, lead counsel and four associates, account for over 90 percent of the hours worked on the litigation; (2) that Plaintiffs have excluded the time of any attorneys
who billed less than 10 hours on the case ; and (3) that Plaintiffs, in an exercise of billing judgment, applied an across

- the

- board 10 percent reduction of their total lodestar

. . . . Based on those adjustments, the Court finds, based in part on its familiarity with the most recent year or so of the litigation, that the overa ll amount of time for which counsel seek compensation is reasonable in light of the factual and procedural complexity of the case, which included a TRO request, discovery, five motions for

summary judgment/summary adjudication by both parties, a contested motion for class certification, and a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. ” (Record citations omitted.)
Successor does not dispute any of the showings identified by the trial

court , but instead generally argues Plaintiffs failed to suppor t staffing the case with so many attorneys. Successor’s assertion is refuted by the trial court’s analysis . The authority relied on by Successor is inapposite. ( Thayer15

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 840

– 84 4 [ award of requested lode star fees reversed where attorney : filed last of five nearly
identical class action lawsuits ; after the lawsuits were coordinated, let attorneys for other class actions take the lead ; and regularly appeared at hearings with a second attorney to simply express their concurrence with the other class action attorneys ]; Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 262 [ fee award for trustee reversed where “ [e] ight attorneys from three major law firms comprised the former t rustee ’ s legal team, with four to five of those attorneys simultaneously appearing at the 14

– day court trial ” ] .) Successor has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion.
B. Improper Double Counting Successor contends the trial court improperly double counted the attorneys’ skill by relying on it to enhanc e the fee award when it was already encompassed by the lodestar. A lodestar fee may be enhanced “ based on factors including

. . . (1) the novelty and difficu lty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee
award. ” (

Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1 122, 1132 .) With respect to counsel’s skill, “ that factor necessarily is reflected in the lodestar figure. The more skillful and experienced the attorney the higher his or her hourly charges will be. It follows that the skill of an attorney will justify enhancing the lodestar figure only if the skills exhibited are beyond those that might be expected of attorneys of comparable expertise or experience. ” ( Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1176 ; see also Ketchum, at p. 1132 [adjustment warranted where litigation “ required extraordinary legal skill16

justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services ” ] .)
The trial court identified four factors warranting a multiplier of 1.4. (See post, part II.C .) One of these factors was counsel’s representation “resulting in a rare summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff class .

. . .” Th e trial court thus impliedly found Plaintiffs ’ counsel exhibited skill beyond that expected of comparable attorneys. Successor ’s disagreement with this

assessment does not demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion or improperly double counted counsel’s skill

. C. Multiplier With respect to the multiplier, t he trial court’s order provides: “[T]he
Court concludes that a multiplier of 1.4 is the appropriate multiplier in light of the following factors, among others: (a) While Plaintiffs are correct that the issues presented by the case were novel in that there was no binding precedent construing either of the statutory schemes involved, Plaintiffs also acknowledge that ‘ [t]he basic material facts in this matter were largely undisputed from the start of the litigation. ’ Discovery, while thoro ugh, was not extraordinarily extensive; only three persons were deposed. The case involved primarily issues of statutory interpretation, and therefore was susceptible to resolution by summary judgment. (b) Plaintiffs ’ representation was indisputably compe tent and ultimately successful, resulting in a rare

summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff class, albeit for substantially less damages than Plaintiffs originally sought. It also included some unsuccessful efforts, including a second motion for summary judgment filed to correct evidentiary deficiencies in their first motion and an unsuccessful opposition to a motion to amend, and at times involved substantial delays. (c) Plaintiffs have shown that the nature of the litigation precluded other employment b y17

the attorneys. (d) The fee was entirely contingent, in that Plaintiffs would not have been entitled to recover fees unless they prevailed in the litigation. (Although Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs ’ supporting declaration does not address this fa ctor, the Court can reasonably infer it from the circumstances of the class members.) ” (Record citations omitted.)

“ ‘ There is no hard

- and

- fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation. ’ [Citation.] There are numerous such factors, and their evaluation is
entrusted to a trial court ’ s sound discretion; any one of those factors may be responsible for enhancing or reducing the lodestar. ” ( Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. ( 2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 947 .) Successor argues the trial court relied on Plaintiffs’ “counsel’s skill but provided no reasoning for why [Plaintiffs’] counsel’s skill was extraordinary.” As noted above, the trial court found counsel achieved a rare result. In any event, t he trial court was “ not required to explain how it calculated that factor, and we will generally presume the attorney fee award was correct ‘ “on
matters as to which the record is silent .” ’ ” ( Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004 ) 34 Cal.4th 553, 584

. )
Successor also challenges the trial court’s reliance on a n “unsupported” assertion that the litigation precluded other employment and the court’s failure to consider the resources of the Union in determining that the fee was
contin gent. We need not consider these factors because the multiplier is supported by the other factors relied on by the trial court. ( Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1252 [ “[w] e need not consider the first factor because the sec ond and third factors alone support a multiplier ”] .)18 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.19 _________________________ Simons, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Needham, J.

_________________________ Burns, J.

A15979020

SEIU

- USWW et al. v. PREFERRED BUILDING SERVICES, INC.
( A159790)

Trial Court: City and County of San Francisco
Trial Judges: Hon. Harold Kahn; Hon. Ethan P. Schulman
Attorneys:
Greenberg Traurig, Karin L. Bohmholdt, Charles Birenbaum, Jamie Rich, and Tayanah Miller for Defendant and Appellant.

Weinberg, Roger, & Rosenfeld, Antonio Ruiz, Janna h V. Manansala, Alexander S. Nazarov a nd Caitlin Gray for Plaintiff and Respondents.