In case number S16956 the Defendant pled guilty to failure to appear and received a one-year sentence that 1

he does not appeal.

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 28, 2007

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CARROLL CARSON SANDERS

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Carter County

Nos. S16907, S16939, S16956 Robert E. Cupp, Judge

No. E2006-00574-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 10, 2007

The Defendant, Carroll Carson Sanders, pled guilty in two cases to eight counts of theft over

$10,000, five counts of theft over $1000, and one count of theft over $500. The parties agreed to an

effective sentence of ten years, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the ten-year

sentence, followed by five years of probation. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the

Defendant to serve his effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the

Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. Concluding

there exists no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT,

JR., and J.C. MCLIN, JJ., joined.

Gene. G. Scott, Jr., Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Carroll Carson Sanders. 

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Jennifer L. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney

General; Anthony W. Clark, District Attorney General; Kenneth C. Baldwin, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from the sentencing in case numbers S16907 and S16939. In case number 1

S16907, the Defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft over $10,000, with an agreed effective

sentence of five years. In case number S16939, the Defendant pled guilty to six counts of theft over

$10,000, five counts of theft over $1000, and one count of theft over $500 with an agreed effective

sentence of ten years followed by five years of supervised probation. The parties agreed that the
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sentences in the two cases should run concurrently with the manner of service to be determined by

the trial court.

The following evidence was presented at a sentencing hearing: Robert Gobble testified that

he was a constable in Elizabethton where the Defendant owned a business. Gobble became friends

with the Defendant, and the Defendant asked Gobble to invest in a business that the Defendant was

forming. The Defendant told Gobble that for every $1000 that he invested in the company he would

get one percent back from the company. Gobble invested $10,000, which the Defendant said would

entitle him to ten percent of the company. Gobble also gave the Defendant $2000 in exchange for

a 1965 Ford two-door hardtop car that was supposedly in Arizona. Gobble then gave the Defendant

$10,000 to purchase Corvettes on which they could make a profit when the Defendant resold them

to a dealer in Arizona. Additionally, Gobble was charged $2000 for the light bill on the business,

which he expected would be paid by the Defendant. Gobble was never reimbursed for that bill by

the Defendant. 

Gobble testified that the Defendant left Carter County two or three weeks after he gave the

Defendant the money for the Corvettes. The Defendant never told Gobble that he was leaving, and,

the night before he left, he told Gobble that he was moving everything for the business into a

building where the business was opening. Gobble discovered the Defendant had left town when he

went to the shop and the Defendant’s house the next day and there was no one at either place.

Someone told Gobble that he saw the Defendant leaving that afternoon with a U-Haul truck and a

trailer. On cross-examination, Gobble testified that he entered into a partnership with the Defendant.

He also said that he thought that the 1965 Ford that the Defendant told him he could purchase for

$2000 was worth between $13,000 and $16,000. Gobble agreed that the Defendant worked on

Gobble’s car and charged him only for parts, providing the labor for free. 

Howard Ensor testified that he met the Defendant when the Defendant serviced some cars

for him. Ensor recalled that the Defendant wanted to set up a motor sports business and needed

some money. Ensor gave the Defendant $15,000, and the Defendant gave him the house that the

Defendant was living in as collateral. Ensor then gave the Defendant $25,000 in cash for the

business. Ensor also gave the Defendant $12,000 for a Cadillac and $500 to transport the car, but

Ensor never received the car. Ensor stated that he gave the Defendant the money approximately six

weeks before the Defendant left Carter County. Ensor said that, according to his agreement with the

Defendant, he was to receive $1500 per month from the business, but he never received any money.

On cross-examination, Ensor testified that he gave the Defendant over $52,000, $40,000 of which

was investment in a business. In total, Ensor was expecting to receive for his investment $3500 per

month for as long as the business was in operation.

Gary Cole testified that he met the Defendant when he was trying to purchase a truck. A

mutual friend told Cole that the Defendant had a truck for sale for $9500. When Cole went to look

at the truck, the Defendant said that he had just sold the truck but that he received similar trucks “all

the time.” Cole told the Defendant he would be interested in a truck. A few days later, the

Defendant called Cole and told him that he had a truck for him for $9500. The Defendant told Cole
We note that on June 7, 2005, the General Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35- 2

102(6), -114, -210, -401. See 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 353, §§ 1, 5, 6, 8. However, the amended code sections are

inapplicable to the Defendant’s appeal.

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that he wanted $4000 as a deposit for the truck. The Defendant then asked Cole if he wanted another

work truck, and Cole said “yes.” In total, Cole gave the Defendant $11,000 for trucks that he never

received. When confronted by Cole, the Defendant told Cole that he had mailed him a cashier’s

check for the money. On cross-examination, Cole agreed that he was going to pay the Defendant

less than the trucks were worth. He also said that the Defendant fixed the front end of one of his

trucks in exchange for Cole removing some stumps from the Defendant’s business.

Dan Bowman, an investigator with the Highway Patrol, testified that he was the investigator

in this case. He said that the business involved in this case was East Tennessee Motor Sports, but

the business was not licensed with the motor vehicle commission. As part of his investigation,

Investigator Bowman contacted the police in Arizona who informed him that the Defendant had

committed similar crimes against forty victims in Arizona for a total theft of 1.5 million dollars. The

investigator estimated that the total amount of money taken by the Defendant in this case was

approximately $183,000.

Investigator Bowman testified that he spoke with the Defendant about these events, and the

Defendant explained that he had been arrested in Arizona for obtaining money under false pretenses.

The Defendant alleged that he gave a lot of money to a man named “Stoner” in Arizona for

automobiles, and “Stoner” was not able to produce those vehicles. The Defendant justified his

conduct in Carter County, stating that he had to pay off his debt in Arizona. 

The presentence report reflected that the Defendant had two prior felony convictions and that,

at the time of the hearing, he was serving a seven-year prison sentence, followed by seven years of

probation, in Arizona. 

Based upon this evidence and the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the Defendant’s

request for probation in light of the Defendant’s prior criminal history and after finding among other

things that the Defendant lacked potential for rehabilitation and that society needed to be protected

from possible future criminal conduct by the Defendant.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for an

alternative sentence. When a defendant challenges the length, range, or the manner of service of a

sentence, it is the duty of this court to conduct a de novo review of the record with a presumption

that “the determinations made by the court from which the appeal is taken are correct.” T.C.A. § 40-

35-401(d) (2003) . This presumption is “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that

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the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State

v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 847 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. 1999); State

v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The presumption does not apply to the legal

conclusions reached by the trial court in sentencing a defendant or to the determinations made by the

trial court that are predicated upon uncontroverted facts. State v. Dean, 76 S.W.3d 352, 377 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2001); State v. Butler, 900 S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Smith,

891 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, we

must consider: (a) any evidence received at the trial and/or sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence

report; (c) the principles of sentencing; (d) the arguments of counsel relative to sentencing

alternatives; (e) the nature and characteristics of the offense; (f) any mitigating or enhancement

factors; (g) any statements made by the defendant on his or her own behalf; and (h) the defendant’s

potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210 (2006); State

v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The party challenging a sentence imposed

by the trial court has the burden of establishing that the sentence is erroneous. T.C.A. § 40-35-401

(2006), Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.

If our review reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed

a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and proper weight to the factors and

principles set out under the sentencing law, and made findings of fact that are adequately supported

by the record, then we may not modify the sentence, even if we would have preferred a different

result. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In the case under

submission, the record demonstrates that the trial court carefully and thoroughly considered relevant

sentencing principles. Accordingly we apply the presumption that the trial court’s sentencing

determinations are correct. See T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d).

In determining whetherto grant or denyprobation, the trial court may consider the following:

the circumstances ofthe offense; the defendant’s criminal record; background and social history; the

defendant’s physical and mental health; the deterrent effect on other criminal activity; and the

likelihood that probation is in the best interests of both the public and the defendant. State v. Parker,

932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The Defendant bears the burden of establishing

suitability for probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(b); Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169. Sentences involving

confinement should be based upon the following considerations:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has

a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or

confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely

to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been

applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.

T.C.A. § 40-35-103 (2006). Additionally, the principles of sentencing reflect that the sentence

should be no greater than that deserved for the offense committed and should be the least severe
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measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence was imposed. See T.C.A. § 40-

35-103(2), (4). Further, the potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the

defendant should be considered in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term to be

imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-103(5).

The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred because it improperly considered his prior

criminal history and did not heavily weigh the fact that alternatives to incarceration have not been

used with him. Further, the Defendant asserts that the victims in this case deserve restitution, and

he can only do that if he is not incarcerated. We find the Defendant’s contentions unpersuasive. The

Defendant is currentlyserving a seven-yearsentence in Arizona for similar crimes for which he owes

victims a total of 1.5 million dollars. After being charged with those crimes, but prior to pleading

guilty, theDefendant came to Tennessee and stole $183,000. It is unlikely that within any reasonable

time frame any of the victims will receive the restitution to which they are entitled. Further, the trial

court found that the Defendant lacked potential for rehabilitation because he repeatedly committed

similar crimes. Finally, the trial court found that society needed to be protected from the Defendant.

We conclude that the record supports the trial court’sfindings and that the trial court was well within

its discretionary powers when it denied the Defendant an alternative sentence. Accordingly, we

conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

We agree with the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s

sentence.

___________________________________ 

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE