This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A16-0296 

In re the Marriage of: 

Bridget Kathleen Corrigan, f/k/a Bridget Kathleen Schmidt, petitioner, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Daniel Thomas Schmidt, 

Appellant. 

Filed January 17, 2017 

Reversed and remanded 

Reyes, Judge 

Ramsey County District Court 

File No. 62-FA-11-221 

Carrie A. Doom, McKinnis & Doom, P.A., Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Christopher Zewiske, Ormond & Zewiske, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and T. Smith, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

REYES, Judge 

 Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting respondent’s motion to 

enroll the parties’ children at Hanover Elementary School instead of the school they had 

been attending, St. John’s School of Little Canada (St. John’s), asserting that the district 
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court abused its discretion by failing to make detailed findings and explanations 

regarding each of the best-interests factors as required by Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (2016). 

Appellant also argues that the district court erred in concluding that he waived the right to 

enforce a provision of a stipulated parenting plan in which respondent agreed to move 

closer to appellant’s residence (the locale restriction). Because the district court erred in 

concluding that appellant waived the locale-restriction issue, did not make detailed 

findings and explanations regarding the best-interests factors, and failed to consider 

certain relevant factors, we reverse and remand. 

FACTS 

 Appellant-father Daniel Thomas Schmidt and respondent-mother Bridget Kathleen 

Corrigan dissolved their marriage by a stipulated judgment and decree in 2011. The 

parties stipulated to a parenting plan under Minn. Stat. § 518.1751 (2016) that gave them 

joint legal and joint physical custody of their three minor children. The parenting plan 

contains a locale restriction stating that Corrigan “will move to within approximately 10 

miles of [Schmidt’s] residence after the 2011-2012 school year” and before the start of 

the 2012-2013 school year. The stated goal of the locale restriction is “to allow [] each 

parent to reduce the travel time and distance between the parties, thereby allowing both 

parties to enjoy their parenting time unfettered by the distance between St. Paul and 

Plymouth.” The parenting plan designates a school for 2011-2012 and states that for 

future years, the parties “will discuss the issue of the children’s school,” taking into 

consideration Corrigan’s new residence and the costs and benefits of “any and all schools 

that are located in a reasonable distance to the residences of the parties.” The parties 
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agreed to “consider any school that [Corrigan] may be teaching at in the Twin Cities 

area.” The parenting plan states that if the parties cannot agree on a school, the children 

will attend St. Rose of Lima Catholic School (St. Rose) in Roseville. 

The parenting plan identifies a parenting consultant who will “try to facilitate a 

resolution with the parties,” or if a resolution is not possible, “decide the issue and advise 

the parents of the decision” pursuant to Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 114.02(a)(10). The 

parenting plan gives the parenting consultant authority to “[d]ecide school attendance.” 

Under the parenting plan, the parenting consultant’s decisions are “binding on the parties 

until otherwise ordered by the [c]ourt” and are reviewed by the district court de novo. 

 Despite the locale restriction in the parenting plan, Corrigan did not move. In 

2012, Corrigan began teaching at St. John’s, which is within five miles of Schmidt’s 

residence. The parties agreed that all three children would attend school at St. John’s, 

which they did. Schmidt did not object to Corrigan’s failure to move immediately after 

the 2011-2012 school year, but he sought enforcement of the locale restriction by the 

parenting consultant in May 2013. The parenting consultant did not reach a decision 

because her contract expired while the decision was pending and the parties did not 

renew it. 

Corrigan accepted a teaching position at a school in Buffalo, Minnesota, for the 

2015-2016 school year. She left her job at St. John’s and disenrolled the children from 

that school without Schmidt’s knowledge. Schmidt discovered this and re-enrolled the 

children at St. John’s. Corrigan wanted the children to attend Hanover Elementary, 

which is within the same school district as Corrigan’s new school. Hanover Elementary 
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is approximately 20 miles west of Corrigan’s Plymouth residence, 41 miles west of 

Schmidt’s St. Paul residence, and 77 miles west of Schmidt’s workplace in Hudson, 

Wisconsin. Schmidt wanted the children to remain at St. John’s, which is approximately 

5 miles from Schmidt’s residence and 28 miles east of Corrigan’s residence. 

 On July 7, 2015, Schmidt moved the district court for an order enforcing the locale 

restriction and directing the parties to enroll the children at either St. John’s or St. Rose. 

Corrigan moved the district court to deny Schmidt’s motion and moved for an order that 

the children attend Hanover Elementary. At a hearing on July 21, the parties agreed to 

work with the parenting consultant to resolve these issues. 

On the parenting consultant’s recommendation, the parties hired an educational 

consultant to analyze the proposed schools’ fitness for the children based on many 

factors. Although more factors favored Hanover Elementary than St. John’s, the 

educational consultant was “not compelled that the likely educational benefits . . . that 

would eventually accrue to the children [from attending Hanover] would sufficiently 

counterbalance the potential stress and disruption that a sudden relocation to Buffalo, 

Minnesota might bring.” The educational consultant recommended that the children 

attend St. John’s until the oldest child is ready to transition to middle school, at which 

time all of the children should transfer to Buffalo schools or “other strong public, private 

or parochial school setting that is equidistant” to the parties’ residences. 

The parenting consultant agreed with the educational consultant and decided that 

the children should attend St. John’s for 2015-2016, but “anticipate[d] that the parents 

will seek to review this issue within the next two years, at which time the 
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recommendation will likely be for the girls to transition to a new school/district.” The 

parenting consultant noted that the parties “have expressed the goal of enrolling the girls 

in a school within a community where they both live,” and that this goal “involves 

reconsideration of their residences and a new look at schools and school districts.” 

In October, Schmidt moved the district court for an order enforcing the decision of 

the parenting consultant. Corrigan moved for an order that the children attend Hanover 

Elementary. At the October 29 hearing, the district court asked the parties questions, but 

there was no opportunity for direct or cross-examination by counsel. Schmidt raised the 

issue of the locale restriction at the hearing, but the district court concluded that Schmidt 

had waived his right to enforce it. The district court granted Corrigan’s motion, ruling 

that the children should attend Hanover Elementary starting the next semester, in 

December 2015. 

Schmidt appeals. 

D E C I S I O N 

I. Waiver of the Locale Restriction 

Schmidt argues that the district court erred in concluding that he waived the right 

to seek enforcement of the locale restriction in the parenting plan. We agree. 

 We review de novo the legal question of whether Schmidt’s failure to request 

enforcement of the locale restriction in 2012 or in his motion after the parenting 

consultant’s September 2015 decision resulted in a waiver of his right to enforce that 

restriction. See Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2001), review 

denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001) (“This court reviews purely legal issues . . . de novo.”). 
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In concluding that Schmidt waived the locale-restriction issue, the district court 

reasoned that Schmidt “knew he could enforce that residency requirement after the 2011-

2012 school year, but declined to do so.” The district court did note that Schmidt sought 

to enforce the locale restriction in his July 2015 motion “but did not highlight this part of 

his requested relief after the parenting consultant’s decision” in his October 2015 motion. 

We conclude that Schmidt did not waive his right to enforce the locale restriction 

for two reasons. First, the record does not support the conclusion that Schmidt waived 

the locale-restriction issue. The district court found that Schmidt contacted the parenting 

consultant to address Corrigan’s failure to move in May 2013. The record indicates that 

the only reason the parenting consultant did not reach a decision on the locale restriction 

in 2013 is because her contract expired before a decision was made. After Corrigan quit 

working at St. John’s and removed the children from enrollment at St. John’s without 

Schmidt’s approval, Schmidt moved the district court to enforce the locale restriction and 

to make a decision about school choice. The locale-restriction issue was not resolved at 

the July 21 hearing because the district court recommended that the parties seek a 

decision from the parenting consultant instead. The parenting consultant did not reach 

the locale-restriction issue, but decided that the children should attend St. John’s for at 

least the upcoming school year. When Schmidt moved the district court to enforce the 

parenting consultant’s school decision in October 2015, he did not reassert his request for 

enforcement of the locale restriction because the parenting consultant’s decision kept the 

children at Schmidt’s preferred school. However, he had twice sought to enforce the 
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locale restriction. On these facts, it was erroneous for the district court to conclude that 

Schmidt waived his right to enforce the locale restriction. 

Second, neither the district court nor Corrigan cites to any binding caselaw 

supporting the position that a party waives his right to seek enforcement of a stipulated 

provision by not seeking district court enforcement immediately after the provision 

became enforceable or by not asserting it in every motion related to any parenting 

dispute. To hold as such would create the unfavorable practical result of encouraging 

parties to litigate every issue in their stipulated agreements as soon as possible rather than 

trying to resolve problems cooperatively outside of court. Because no binding caselaw 

supports the position the district court took here, and because taking such a position 

would lead to undesirable results, we do not adopt that position now. Therefore, we 

reverse the district court’s granting of Corrigan’s motion to change schools because it 

relies on the erroneous conclusion that Schmidt waived his right to enforce the locale 

restriction. 

II. Analysis of the Best-Interests Factors

Schmidt asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing to make 

detailed findings on each of the best-interests factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, 

subd. 1(a), and failing to explain how each factor led to its conclusions and determination 

as required by section 518.17, subdivision 1(b)(1). We agree. 

Disputes related to custody and parenting-time issues must be resolved according 

to the best interests of the children. Novak v. Novak, 446 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 

1989), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). “In evaluating the best interests of the 
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child[ren] . . . , the court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including” 12 

specific factors set out in the statute. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). The statute 

requires the district court to “make detailed findings on each of the factors in paragraph 

(a) based on the evidence presented and explain how each factor led to its conclusions 

and to the determination of custody and parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1). 

The standard of review on appeal from a district court’s custody-related 

determination is whether the district court “abused its discretion by making findings 

unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 

N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Effective appellate review of a 

district court’s exercise of its discretion “is possible only when the [district] court has 

issued sufficiently detailed findings of fact to demonstrate its consideration” of all 

relevant factors. Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989). Therefore, a district 

court’s failure to make detailed findings on relevant statutory factors generally requires a 

remand. Id. 

A. Formal Requirements 

As an initial matter, Corrigan argues that the district court did not need to make 

detailed findings on each statutory best-interests factor and explain how each factor led to 

its conclusions. We disagree. Corrigan cites to Nazar v. Nazar, in which this court stated 

that “[w]hile the [district] court must consider all [statutory] factors that pertain to the 

best interests of the children, the court need not make a specific finding on each and 

every one.” Nazar v. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied
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(Minn. Oct. 28, 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Minn. Stat. § 518A.28(d) 

(2014). 

Nazar was interpreting the 1992 version of section 518.17, which, like the current 

statute, provided that “[t]he court must make detailed findings on each of the factors and 

explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination of the best 

interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (1992). Nazar cited Schultz v. 

Schultz as authority for the rule that a court need not make specific findings on each 

factor. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d at 633 (citing Schultz v. Schultz, 358 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Minn. 

App. 1984)). But Schultz was interpreting an earlier version of section 518.17 that did 

not contain language requiring the district court to make detailed findings on each factor. 

Schultz, 358 N.W.2d at 138; compare Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1982), with id., subd. 

1(a) (1992), and id., subd. 1(b)(1) (2016). The Nazar court’s citation of the Schultz rule 

was questionable because it was inconsistent with the then-existing 1992 version of the 

statute. 

We conclude that the Schultz rule—that failure to discuss each statutory bestinterests factor is not an abuse of discretion—has been superseded by the current version 

of Minn. Stat. § 518.17, which requires the district court to “make detailed findings on 

each of the factors in paragraph (a) based on the evidence presented and explain how 

each factor led to its conclusions and to the determination of custody and parenting time.” 

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1) (2016); see Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 817 

n.2 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding that cases decided under a prior version of a statute 
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“have been, to the extent they are inconsistent with the amended statute, superseded by 

the amended statute”). 

B. Adequacy of the District Court’s Best-Interests Analysis 

Schmidt argues that the district court did not fulfill its statutory obligation to make 

detailed findings on each best-interests factor and explain how each factor led to its 

conclusions and determination. We agree. 

The district court generally referred to the best interests of the children as being 

the overarching standard throughout its findings and ultimate determination. It also made 

some factual findings that appear relevant to some of the best-interests factors. But it did 

not make detailed findings on each of the best-interests factors and did not explain how 

each best-interests factor led to its conclusions and ultimate determination. 

Failure to make such findings obscures the district court’s reasoning and impairs 

our ability to correct errors. The district court’s failure to make adequate findings of fact 

under Minn. Stat. § 518.17 is an error of law, resulting in an abuse of discretion regarding 

the questions of custody and parenting time presented to the district court for decision. 

For this reason, a reversal of the order and a remand so the district court can make 

appropriate findings and explanations is required. 

III. Factors Not Sufficiently Considered 

Schmidt argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider 

and evaluate all relevant factors in evaluating the best interests of the children, as 

required by Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). We agree, and also note that legal errors 
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prevented the district court from considering certain relevant factors, amounting to an 

abuse of discretion. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. 

Specifically, because the district court erroneously concluded that Schmidt waived 

his right to enforce the locale restriction, it did not sufficiently consider how Corrigan’s 

choice to disregard the locale restriction affects the best-interests factors. It does not 

appear that the district court considered the impact the increased distance between the 

children’s school and Schmidt’s residence and workplace would have on Schmidt’s 

ongoing relationships with the children, particularly with respect to Schmidt’s ability to 

attend school functions. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(9). Furthermore, the district 

court did not analyze whether making Corrigan solely responsible for transporting the 

children between Hanover Elementary and Schmidt’s residence realistically would 

impact the relative parenting-time arrangement by increasing the children’s time with 

Corrigan at the expense of their time with Schmidt. Id., subd. 1(a)(10). 

We acknowledge that some of the statutory factors may not be material to the 

particular issues presented here. But if that is the case, the district court must at least 

identify those specific immaterial factors and state its finding that each does not affect its 

decision. Id., subd. 1(b)(1). 

Because the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider and evaluate 

all relevant factors and failing to make detailed findings on each factor and explain how 

each factor led to its conclusions, we reverse the district court’s order granting Corrigan’s 

motion to change schools. We remand to the district court so it can fully review all facts, 
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make detailed findings on each best-interests factor, and explain how each factor led to 

its conclusions and ultimate determination in accordance with this decision. 

Reversed and remanded.