Case 3:19-cv-00933-VAB *SEALED* Document 32 Filed 06/18/19 Page 1 of 9 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

GRAND TETON PROFESSJONALS, LLC, 

et. al., 

Defendants. 

No. 3: I 9-cv-933 (VAB) 

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRIANING ORDER 

The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has sued Grand Teton Professionals, LLC, 99th 

Floor, LLC, Mail Management, Inc., Demand Dynamics, LLC, Atomium Corps, Inc., Startup 

Masters NJ lnc. (both as a Wyoming and New Jersey Corporation), First Incorporation Services, 

Inc. (both as a Wyoming and Florida corporation), Douglas Filter, and Marcio Andrade 

(collectively "Defendants") for violations oftbe 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b) and 57(b) of the FTC Act, 

41 0(b) of the Credit Repair Organizations Act ("CROA"), Section 6(b) of the Telemarketing and 

Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 61 0S(b) of the Consumer Review 

Fairness Act, Section 108(c) of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), and Section 918(c) of the 

Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(c). Complaint for Pennanent Injunction and 

other Equitable Relief, ECF No. 1. 

Along with the filing of its Complaint, the FTC has moved ex parte for a temporary 

restraining order that included a freezing of assets, the temporary disabling of websites, the 

preservation ofrecords, and expedited discovery under Section l 3(b) of the FTC Act and Rule 

65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the FTC's motion for a temporary 

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restraining order. The Court also will issue an order detailing the scope of the temporary 

restraining order and for the Defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not 

issue on Friday, June 28, 2019 at 11:30 a.m. 

To the e~tent that any Defendant subject to this Ruling and the subsequent Order 

wish the Co111·t to address the appropriateness of an injunction or continuing the 

temporary restraining order before J une 28, 2019, they may move for an earlier hearing 

date. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under section l3(b) of the FTC Act, federal cou.rts may grant preliminary or pemument 

injunctive relief in actions where the FTC, acting "in the interest of the public," has reason to 

believe that any entity "is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the 

[FTC]." 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Even though section I3(b) refers only to injunctive relief, courts have 

held that the statutory authority found in section I 3(b) "permits courts to grant ancillary 

equitable relief, including equitable monetary relief" FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 

F.3d 359,365 (2d Cir. 201 I) (citing cases). Further, federal di.strict courts have "inherent power . 

. . to fashion effective relief." SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 20 10) (noting that a di.strict 

court's "inherent power" to "fashion effective reli ef" includes the ability to issue anti-litigation 

injunctions) (quoting SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

A federal agency's motion for a preliminary injunctive relief in the public interest for a 

statutory violation does not require proofofin-eparable hann. See Smith v. SEC, 653 F.3d 121, 

127 (2d Cir.2011) (discussing what the SEC must show in seeking injunction under section 

20(b) of the Secutities Act). Moreover, as opposed to a "preliminary injunction enjoining a 

violatiou ... , an asset freeze requires a lesser showing." SEC v. Heden, 51 F. Supp. 2d 296,298 

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(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing SEC v. Unifi.ind SAL, 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990)). Likelihood of 

success on the merits is all that must be shown. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 132 (2d 

Cir. 1998); SEC v. Heden, 5 I F. Supp. 2d at 298 One reason for requiring a lesser showing is 

that "[a]n asset freeze is a provisional remedy" that merely preserves the status quo to ensure 

that, if the agency obtains a judgment, "money will be available to satisfy that judgment." SEC v. 

Byers, No. 08 Civ. 7104, 2009 WL 33434, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2009). 

Further, "[t]he plenary powers of a federal court to order an asset freeze are not limited to 

assets held solely by an alleged wrongdoer, who is sued as a defendant in an enforcement 

action." Smith, 653 F.3d at 128. Rather, "asset freezes may 'apply to non-parties, such as relief 

defendants allegedly holding the funds of defendants."' SEC v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 752 F. 

Supp. 2d l 94, 205 (N.D.N.Y. 201 0)(quoting Heden, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 299), vacated in part on 

other grounds, SEC v Wojeski, 752 F. Supp. 2d 220 (N.D.N.Y. 2010), and afrd, 432 F. App'x. 

IO (2d Cir. 20 I I) (summary order). 

In such cases, federal courts may freeze the assets of a relief defendant who possesses 

ill-gotten funds and does not have a legitimate claim to those funds. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 

F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction freezing illegitimate proceeds 

transferred to relief defendant wife by defendant husband); McGinn, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 205 

(noting that an asset freeze requires the "less burdensome standard" of showing "only that [the 

agency) is likely to succeed on the meri ts, or that an inference can be drawn that the party has 

violated" applicable laws) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, "[t)he 

standard of review for an injunction freezing assets of a relief defendant is whether [the agency] 

has shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits; [the agency] need not make any showing that 

a future violation is likely, because it is not accusing the nominal defendant of any wrongdoing." 

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Cavanagh, J 55 F .3d at l 36. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Unlike a preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining order is not constrained by Rule 

65(a)'s requirement of notice to the adverse party. See Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas 

Instruments, Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Where speed is needed, the rules of procedure 

provide for temporary restraining orders, even without notice, to prevent irreparable harm." 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65)). Rule 65(b) provides t11at a temporary restraining order may be 

granted without notice to the adverse party only if"(!) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified 

complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (2) the movant's attorney 

certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be 

required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The restrictions on the availability of ex parte temporary 

restraining orders imposed by Rule 65(b) are "stringent," Granny Goose Foods, inc. v. 

Brotherhood o/Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cty., 415 U.S. 423, 

438-39 (1974), and must be "scrupulously honored." Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273, 275. 

Under section 13(b) of the ITC Act, a district cou11 is authorized to issue preliminary and 

pe1manent injunctive relief at the request of the Commission "[u]pon a proper showing that, 

weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such 

action would be in the public interest .. . " See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). "ln actions under section l3(b) 

of the FTC Act, a district court bas authority to issue a TRO to preserve the status quo and 

prevent irreparable hann to the court's ability to award final relief." FTC v. leanspa, LLC, No. 

3:11-cv-1715 (VLB), ECFNo. 23, at4;I-TCv. lv./allett,818 F. Supp. 2d 142,149 (D.D.C. 2011) 

("The public interest in ensuring the enforcement of federal consumer protection laws is strong . 

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. .. "). 

Based on a review of the FTC's filings, there is good cause to believe that the FTC is 

likely to prevail on the merits of their claims. FTC has credibly and sufficiently alleged that 

Defendants, through websites, e-mails, and text messages, target customers with false promises 

of credit relief services. When consumers provide their credit or debit card to receive credit relief 

services, Defendants allegedly force consumers to pay illegal advance fees. In addition, the FTC 

alleges several unlawful financing, billing, and accounting practices. 

The Second Circuit has recognized court authority to grant relief from illegal consumer 

conduct under Section 13(b). See Bronson, 654 F.3d at 363 (holding that Section 13(b) of the 

FTC Act permits courts to grant ancillary equitable relief). To ensure future relief, the FTC asks 

the Court to enter the proposed ex parte temporary restraining order: (A) prohibiting Defendants 

from engaging in illegal conduct; (B) freezing Defendants's assets; (C) disabling temporarily 

Defendants's websites; and (D) preserving records; and (E) expediting discovery. 

A. Prohibiting Conduct 

The FTC seeks an ex parte order prohibiting Defendants from making future 

misrepresentations concerning credit repair services, charging advaneed foes, failing to provide 

Credit Repair Organizations Act's mandated disclosures, using anti-disparagement or antichargeback clauses in consumer contracts, using remotely created checks, advertising financing 

without Truth in Lending Act mandated disclosures, or debiting consumer accounts without 

written authorization. 

The FTC alleges the following "unlawful credit repair practices" by the Defendants:" (I) 

false promises that they will remove negative infom1ation from consumers' credit reports and 

improve consumers' credit scores, in violation of the FTC Act, CROA; and the [the FTC's 

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Telemarketing Sales Rule (the "TSR")]; (2) advising consumers to mislead credit reporting 

agencies (through filing false ID theft affidavits) and lenders (through the use of third-party 

tradelines), in violation ofCROA; (3) failure to make required CROA disclosures; and (4) 

collection of prohibited advance fees for credit repair services, in violation ofCROA and TSR." 

Memorandum in Support ofFTC's Ex Parle Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 

9-1 ("Memo. In Supp. ofFTC's Ex Parte Motion"). at 8. 

The FTC further alleges that "Defendants unlawfully attempt to stifle consumers' posting 

of negative but tmthful reviews about Defendants and from exercising their statutory rights to 

dispute Defendants' illegal advance fees" and have "financing and billing practices" in violation 

of various federal statutes and regulations. Id. 

As a result, under the Court's authority "to grant ancillary equitable relief: including 

equitable monetary relief," see Bronson, 654 F.3d at 365, given the serious nature of the harms 

alleged, restrictions of unlawful conduct are reasonable. See Mallett, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 150 

(("[R]equiring [ defendant] to comply with federal Jaw cannot rise to a cognizable burden .. . . "). 

The Court therefore finds that enjoining Defendants from engaging in illegal conduct is 

necessary for the Court to effectuate final relief in this case. 

B. Asset Preservation 

The FTC also seeks to "help ensure the availability of assets, preserve the status quo, and 

guard against the dissipation and diversion of assets" and thus seek to "freeze the assets of 

corporate and individual defendants and require an accounting, where, as here, the individual 

Defendants controlled the deceptive activity and had actual or constructive knowledge of the 

deceptive nature of the practices." Memo. In Supp. of FT C's Ex Parle Motion at 46 ( citations 

omitted). 

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An asset freeze is appropriate where there is a significant risk of the dissipation of 

defendants' assets during litigation. See SEC v. Jl,fanor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1106 

(2d Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit has characterized freezing assets "as ancillary relief that 

facilitates monetary recovery by preserving the status quo pending litigation of statutory 

violations." FTC v. Strano, 528 F. App'x 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order). 

Here, the FTC has alleged that "[t]he pervasive natnre of Defendants' unlawful behavior 

and attempts to conceal their identities as the individuals responsible for that behavior 

demonstrates a likelihood that they will dissipate or conceal assets and destroy or conceal 

evidence of their unlawful conduct if they are notified of the FTC's intention to seek equitable 

monetary relief" Rule 65 Certification and Declaration of FTC Counsel Gregory Ashe Tn 

Support of the FTC's Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show 

Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue, and Motion to Temporarily Seal Case 

File, ECF No. 9-3 ("Ashe Deel."), at 2. In suppo1t of an asse1t freeze, counsel for the FTC has 

submitted a sworn affidavit providing illustrative examples of parties subject to court orders 

seeking to dissipate assets. See id. at 3-11 . 

As a result, there is a strong likelihood that assets may be dissipated during litigation 

based on evidence the FTC has submitted demonstrating that Defendants' operation is penneated 

by fraud . See id. at 11 (asserting that " there is good cause to believe that immediate and 

irreparable damage will result to consumers from the concealment, transfer, or destruction of 

Defendants' records and from the concealment or transfer of Defendants' assets if Defendants 

receive advance notice of the FTC's application for a temporary restraining order with other 

equitable relief. Thus, it is in the interests of justice that such application be granted without 

notice."). An asset freeze therefore is reasonable. 

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Accordingly, the Court finds that enjoining Defendants with an asset preservation order is 

necessary for the Court to effectuate final relief in this case. 

C. Temporary Disabling of Defendant Websites 

The FTC further requests the iemporary disabling of Defendants' websites to prevent 

future consumers from hann by their fraudulent credit scheme. The FTC argues that: "Disabling 

these websites and suspending their domain name registrations will ensure the Defendants cannot 

evade compliance with any preliminary relief entered by this Court pending final detenn.ination 

of this matter." Memo. In Supp. ofFTC's Ex Parle Motion at 48. 

Given the breadth of online accessibility and the show cause hearing scheduled for June 

28, 2019, as well as the Court's availability for a hearing even earlier than June 28, 2019, the 

Cou1t finds that temporary disabling of Defendants websites until a show cause hearing can be 

held is necessary for the Court to effectuate final relief in this case. See AW Licensing, UC v. 

Bao, N0.J 5- CV-1373, 201 5 WL 10527603, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. April 2, 2015) (entering a 

temporary restraining order to "disable service to these websites until the disposition of this 

action") 

D. Preservation of Records and Expedited Discovery 

Finally, the FTC requests immediate access to Defendants' records and expedited 

discovery because Defendants might otherwise destroy evidence or dissipate assets. The FTC 

argues that, in the past, "defendants engaged in similarly serious unlawful practices destroyed 

documents upon ]earning of an impending law enforcement action." Memo. In Supp. of FTC's 

Ex Parle Motion at 48; see also Ashe Deel. at 11 (asserting that "there is good cause to believe 

that immediate and irreparable damage will result to consumers from the concealment, transfer, 

or destrnction of Defendants' records . .. if Defendants receive advance notice of the FTC's 

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application for a temporary restraining order with other equitable relief. Thus, it is in the interests 

of justice that such application be granted without notice."). 

"District Courts are authorized to depart from normal discovery procedures and fashion 

discovery by order to meet particular needs in particular cases, which is approp1iate here where 

asset dissipation is likely." FTC v. Campbell Capital LLC, No. I 8-CV-1163, 20 l 8 WL 5781458, 

at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2018). 

Accordingly, a temporary restraining order requiring Defendants to make financial 

disclosures, preserve records, and expedite discovery is necessary for the Court to effect final 

relief in this case. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the FTC's motion for a temporary 

restraining order. 

The Court also will issue an order detailing the scope of the temporary restraining order 

and for the Defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue on Friday, 

June 28, 2019 at 11:30 a.m. 

To the extent that any Defendant subject to this Ruling and the subsequent Order 

wish the Court to address the appropriateness of an injunction 01· continuing the 

temporary restraining order before June 28, 2019, they may move for an earlier hearing 

date. 

SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 18th day of June 2019. 

Isl Victor A. Bolden 

VICTOR A. BOLDEN 

UNITED ST A TES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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