UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSI 

COMMISSIONERS: Joseph J. Simons, Chairman 

Noah Joshua Phillips 

Rohit Chopra 

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter 

Christine S. Wilson 

In the Matter of 

PUBLIC 

RagingWire Data Centers, Inc., 

a corporation, Docket No. 9386 

Respondent. 

COMPLAINT COUNSEL'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ADMINISTRATIVE 

COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR STAY AND REFERRAL 

Linda Holleran Kopp 

Robin L. Wetherill 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Ave, N .W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

Tel: (202) 326-2267 (Kopp) 

Fax: (202) 326-3062 

E-mail: lkopp@ftc.gov (Kopp) 

Comp laint Counsel 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010) ............................................... 2 

American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981) ....................................................................... 6, 7 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................................................................................... 2, 4 

Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 05-926-AA, 2009 WL 4823840 (D. Or. Dec. 11, 2009) .................... 4 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................................................... 2 

Chrysler Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ......................................... 6 

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AMG Servs, Inc., No. 2:12–cv–00536–GMN –VCF, 

2012 WL 6800525 (D. Nev. 2012) ............................................................................................. 4 

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cantkier, 767 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011) ........................................... 4 

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) ............................................ 4 

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. DeVry Educ. Grp., Inc., No. CV-16-00579-MWF-SSx, 

2016 WL 6821112 (C.D. Cal. 2016)........................................................................................... 3 

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Partners in Health Care Ass’n, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 1356 

(S.D. Fl. 2016) ............................................................................................................................ 5 

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2006) ........................................ 5 

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Freecom Communs., Inc., 401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) ....................... 6 

Kraft, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992)............................................... 4, 7 

LabMd, Inc., Dkt. No. 9357, 2014 WL 253518 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014). ........................................ 2 

McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................... 3 

Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2019)................................................................... 3 

NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................................................ 3 

Novartis Corp., 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 4 

Order Denying Motion for Stay of Proceedings, N.C. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 

Dkt. No. 9343, 151 F.T.C. 640 (Feb. 15, 2011) .......................................................................... 9 

Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ......................................................... 3 

Regina Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963) ............................................... 6 

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) ......................................................................................... 4 

REGULATIONS

16 C.F.R. § 3.11(b)(2) ..................................................................................................................... 2 

16 C.F.R. § 3.22 .............................................................................................................................. 2 

16 C.F.R. § 3.22(a).......................................................................................................................... 7 

16 C.F.R. § 3.22(b) ......................................................................................................................... 9 

OTHER AUTHORITIES

73 Fed. Reg. 58832 (Oct. 7, 2008) .............................................................................................. 8, 9 

74 Fed. Reg. 1804 (Jan. 13, 2009) .............................................................................................. 8, 9 

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Policy Statement on Deception (“Deception Statement”), 

103 F.T.C. 110 (Oct. 14, 1983) (appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 

110 (1984)).................................................................................................................................. 4 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 

I. LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................................................. 2 

II. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 3 

A. RagingWire’s Motion to Dismiss Should Be Denied Because

 the Complaint Adequately Pleads Materiality ........................................................ 3

B. RagingWire’s Request to Refer This Matter to the ALJ

Should Be Denied Because the Motion Involves Questions

 of Law and Policy ................................................................................................... 7

C. RagingWire’s Request for a Stay Should Be Denied

Because It Will Unnecessarily Delay the

Ultimate Resolution of this Case ............................................................................ 9

III. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 9 
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I. INTRODUCTION

Respondent RagingWire Data Centers, Inc. (“RagingWire”) violated Section 5 of the 

FTC Act when it made deceptive statements in its privacy policy and marketing materials that it 

participated in, and complied with, the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework (“Privacy Shield” or 

“Framework”). Compl. ¶¶ 4, 20-23. More specifically, RagingWire made express false claims 

that it was a certified Privacy Shield participant for ten months after its Privacy Shield 

certification had lapsed. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 22, 38-39 (Count 1). And contrary to RagingWire’s 

express claim to have complied with the Framework’s substantive privacy-related requirements, 

RagingWire failed to comply with Privacy Shield in three important ways: (1) it did not conduct 

a compliance review to assess whether its assertions regarding its privacy practices were accurate 

and implemented, see Count 2, Compl. ¶¶ 40-41; (2) it did not have an independent recourse 

mechanism for the entire period in which it participated in Privacy Shield, see Count 3, Compl. 

¶¶ 42-43; and (3) it did not affirm to the U.S. Department of Commerce when it left the Privacy 

Shield program that it would continue to apply the Privacy Shield protections to data it had 

collected under the program, or else return or delete such data, see Count 4, Compl. ¶¶ 44-45. 

RagingWire’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Respondent RagingWire Data 

Centers, LLC (“Answer”) admits that the above facts are true. Nevertheless, RagingWire 

asserts in its Motion to Dismiss Administrative Complaint and Request for Referral and Stay

(“Motion”) that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Noting that the 

Complaint fails to use the words “material” or “materiality,” RagingWire argues that the 

Complaint fails to plead a required element of a Section 5 deception claim: materiality. Mot. at 

4. Because the detailed Complaint pleads more than sufficient facts by which the Commission 

could find that the alleged misrepresentations are material—including through the application of 
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black letter law that express claims like those alleged here are presumed to be material—the 

Commission should deny RagingWire’s Motion. 

RagingWire’s Motion makes two additional requests. First, it asks the Commission to 

refer its Motion to the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The Commission should deny this 

request because the Commission amended its Rules of Practice in 2009 specifically to leverage 

its expertise to rule on matters of policy and law for all dispositive motions, including motions to 

dismiss. Second, the Motion requests a stay of the administrative proceedings pending its 

resolution. The Commission should also deny this request because Rule 3.22(b), as amended, 

generally precludes stays while dispositive motions are being decided in order to avoid delaying 

the ultimate resolution of a case. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Commission decides motions to dismiss under Rules 3.11(b)(2) and 3.22, 16 C.F.R. 

§ 3.22; 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(b)(2), according to the same legal standards as their analogous 

counterparts in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). LabMd, Inc., Dkt. 

No. 9357, 2014 WL 253518, at *2 n.3 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014). 

Under Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must plead facts showing that a violation is plausible. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678. 

In making this determination, the complaint’s allegations must be “accept[ed] as true” 

and “constru[ed] in the light most favorable to Complaint Counsel.” LabMD, 2014 WL 253518, 

at *2 (quoting Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010)); NL 
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Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Additionally, all reasonable inferences

must be drawn in Complaint Counsel’s favor. See, e.g., Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 

266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2019); McLin v. 

Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2017). 

III. ARGUMENT

RagingWire’s argument in its Motion to Dismiss that the Complaint fails to sufficiently 

plead materiality is without merit. The Commission should deny RagingWire’s Motion because 

the Complaint, regardless of its wording, alleges more than sufficient facts to allow the 

Commission to infer that RagingWire’s misrepresentations were material and that RagingWire is 

liable for those representations. RagingWire’s related requests to refer its Motion to the ALJ and 

to stay all proceedings pending the resolution of its Motion should also be denied because they 

are contrary to the Commission’s express policy to decide matters of law and policy and to 

expedite administrative proceedings. 

A. RagingWire’s Motion to Dismiss Should Be Denied Because the Complaint 

Adequately Pleads Materiality 

RagingWire’s Motion to Dismiss is based solely on its argument that the Complaint fails 

to plead “any facts that could support a finding of materiality,” and that the Complaint “does not 

even contain the words ‘material’ or ‘materiality.’” Mot. at 4-5. RagingWire’s argument 

quibbles with the form, rather than the substance, of the FTC’s allegations. 

The FTC is not required to use the word “material” in its Complaint. Courts have 

repeatedly found that FTC complaints adequately alleged deceptive acts or practices in violation 

of the FTC Act without expressly spelling out a theory of materiality. See, e.g., Fed. Trade 

Comm’n v. DeVry Educ. Grp., Inc., No. CV-16-00579-MWF-SSx, 2016 WL 6821112, at *5-6 

(C.D. Cal. 2016); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AMG Servs, Inc., No. 2:12–cv–00536–GMN –VCF, 
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2012 WL 6800525, at *3 (D. Nev. 2012); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cantkier, 767 F. Supp. 2d 147, 

155-56 (D.D.C. 2011). 

Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the complaint pleads sufficient facts to allow a 

reasonable inference of liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-679 (determining whether complaint 

“plausibly give(s) rise to an entitlement to relief”). For example, in Federal Trade Commission 

v. Cantkier, the Court inferred materiality from allegations that the defendant mortgage service 

misled consumers about its affiliation with federal government mortgage relief programs because 

such information was “‘likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding,’ that service.” 767 

F. Supp. 2d at 157-158 (citations omitted); see also Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 05-926-AA, 

2009 WL 4823840, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 11, 2009) (“Although plaintiff does not specifically use 

the term ‘reliance’... [t]aken as true, the allegations lead to the reasonable and plausible 

inference that plaintiff relied on defendant’s promise.”). Here, the Complaint sufficiently pleads 

facts that provide three independent bases from which the Commission can draw a reasonable 

inference that RagingWire’s misrepresentations were material.

1

 

First, because RagingWire’s statements were express, they are presumptively material. It 

is black letter law that the Commission is “entitled to apply, within reason, a presumption of 

materiality and does so with...express claims.” Kraft, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 970 F.2d 311, 

322 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 

(1965)); see also Novartis Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 223 F.3d 783, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Policy Statement on Deception (“Deception Statement”), 103 F.T.C. 110, 

182-83 (Oct. 14, 1983) (appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984)). Here, the 

Complaint alleges that RagingWire made express false claims that it complied with, and had 

 

1 At this stage, Complaint Counsel need not specify which theory or theories of materiality they will advance. See 

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (“[A] complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a precise 

legal theory.”)
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certified its adherence to, the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework. See Compl. ¶¶20-22. These 

allegations alone provide a sufficient basis for the Commission to infer that RagingWire’s 

misrepresentations were material.

Second, the Commission can reasonably infer that RagingWire’s customers found its 

misrepresentations material because they related to the customers’ legal obligations under 

European data protection law and Privacy Shield. Misrepresentations pertaining to consumers’ 

legal rights and obligations have been found to be material and actionable under the FTC Act. 

See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63-64 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming 

materiality where defendants’ representation related to consumers’ legal rights to contest 

telephone bill charges); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Partners in Health Care Ass’n, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 

3d 1356, 1365 (S.D. Fl. 2016) (finding defendant’s misrepresentations that its product, among 

other things, was health insurance satisfying the requirements of the Affordable Care Act, were 

material).

Here, the Complaint explains in depth how Privacy Shield offers one lawful means by 

which personal data can be lawfully transferred from the European Union to the United States

under the European General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and the Privacy Shield 

Framework. Compl. at ¶¶ 7-13. Specifically, the Complaint explains that, under GDPR, a 

company can only transfer personal data out of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) with the 

benefit of a lawful mechanism such as Privacy Shield, and that it can otherwise be subject to 

significant financial penalties. Id. at ¶ 14. The Complaint also describes that Privacy Shield 

participants that want to transfer data originally collected from the EEA can comply with their 

Privacy Shield obligations for onward transfers by using an agent that is also a Privacy Shield 

participant. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12, 16 (explaining that Privacy Shield requires participants to ascertain, 
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before transferring any personal data originally collected from the EEA to an agent, that the 

agent is obligated to provide the same level of privacy protections as is required under Privacy 

Shield). The Complaint then alleges how RagingWire’s Privacy Shield statements therefore 

signaled to RagingWire’s customers that are subject to the GDPR and/or their own Privacy 

Shield obligations that they could lawfully transfer personal data from the European Union to a 

server located at one of RagingWire’s U.S.-based data centers. Id. at ¶ 16. 

RagingWire unsuccessfully tries to undermine this basis for materiality by arguing that 

“the Complaint does not allege that there are, in fact, customers that want to or do transfer 

protected data to RagingWire,” and that “there is no reason to believe that such customers exist.”

Mot. at 4-5.2 This argument is curious given RagingWire’s statement in its Answer that “some 

of its customers” have locations in Europe, see Answer at 4, but it is also contradicted by the 

Complaint’s allegations that RagingWire touted its Privacy Shield certifications. See Compl. ¶¶ 

20-22. This allegation “strongly implies” that RagingWire sought customers to whom its 

certification would be material. See American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. 136, 164 (1981), aff’d, 

695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The very fact that AHP sought to distinguish its products from 

aspirin strongly implies that knowledge of the true ingredients of those products would be 

material to purchasers.”). 

The Complaint’s allegations that RagingWire’s claims related to its customers’ legal 

obligations therefore provides another independent basis for the Commission to infer that 

RagingWire’s misrepresentations were material.

 

2 To the extent that RagingWire is suggesting that Complaint Counsel needs to show actual reliance, that is not the 

law. “[P]roof of consumer reliance is unnecessary to establish a §5 violation.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom 

Communs., Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1205 (10th Cir. 2005). See also, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 561 

F.2d 357, 363, 363 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Regina Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963). 
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And third, the Complaint’s allegations suggesting that RagingWire believed its 

misrepresentations were material “strongly implies” that the misrepresentations were, in fact,

material. See American Home Products, 98 F.T.C.. at 164. Specifically, the Complaint alleges 

that RagingWire chose to participate in Privacy Shield and its predecessor, the Safe Harbor 

Framework. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18. RagingWire even sought to renew its Privacy Shield certification 

after the commencement of the FTC’s investigation, and ultimately rejoined the program in June 

2019. See Compl. ¶¶ 17, 23-24. The Complaint also alleges that RagingWire broadcast its 

misrepresentations about its participation, even in the face of Commerce’s warning to remove its 

Privacy Shield statements after its certification had lapsed. See id. at ¶¶ 22-23. These facts 

evidence RagingWire’s belief that it benefited from making those representations, which 

“strongly implies” that the misrepresentations were material. See American Home Products, 98 

F.T.C. at 164; see also Kraft, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 970 F.2d 311, 323 (7th Cir. 1992) 

(finding that Kraft’s persistence in running deceptive advertising “despite repeated warnings” 

was evidence supporting the conclusion that Kraft believed it derived some benefit from the 

deceptive claims and that the claims were material to consumers). These allegations therefore 

provide a third basis for finding that RagingWire’s misrepresentations were material.

In short, because the detailed Complaint pleads more than sufficient facts for the 

Commission to reasonably infer that RagingWire’s deceptive statements were material, the 

Commission should deny RagingWire’s Motion to Dismiss. 

B. RagingWire’s Request to Refer This Matter to the ALJ Should Be Denied 

Because the Motion Involves Questions of Law and Policy

FTC Rule 3.22(a), as amended, provides that the Commission will decide all dispositive 

motions, including motions to dismiss, unless the Commission refers the motion to the ALJ “in 

its discretion.” 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(a). RagingWire asks the Commission to refer its Motion to the 
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ALJ because it claims that it would be “difficult” for the Commission to make a “dispassionate 

ruling on the law” given its recent vote to file the Complaint. Mot. at 6. RagingWire’s request is 

without merit and should be denied. 

The Commission amended its Rules of Practice, including Rule 3.22(a), in 2009 to bring 

the Commission’s “expertise into play earlier and more often during the Part 3 process,” and to 

address criticisms that its administrative process was too protracted. See 73 Fed. Reg. 58832, 

58834 (Oct. 7, 2008); see also 74 Fed. Reg. 1804, 1806-07 (Jan. 13, 2009) (rule amendments

bring the Commission’s “expertise to bear sooner in the process, which can be expected to 

streamline cases...”). Rule 3.22(a), as amended in 2009, reflects the Commission’s judgment on 

the proper balance between the important functions of the ALJ as a hearing examiner and the 

Commission’s expertise on legal and policy determinations. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 58834; see also 

74 Fed. Reg. at 1806. 

Commentary during the public rulemaking process shows that, before finalizing Rule 

3.22, the Commission specifically considered and rejected arguments that it would be unfair for 

the Commission to rule on motions to dismiss. The American Bar Association’s Antitrust 

Section, among others, expressed concern about the impartiality and fairness of Part 3 

proceedings if the Commission ruled on such motions shortly after having voted out a complaint. 

74 Fed. Reg. at 1809-1810. After carefully considering these comments, the Commission 

concluded that the comments “failed to undermine the central premise supporting the rule 

change: that the Commission has the authority and expertise to rule initially on dispositive 

motions and that doing so will improve the quality of the decisionmaking and (as acknowledged 

by the Section) will expedite the proceeding.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 1809-1810.
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Because the Commission has already considered and rejected the only argument that 

RagingWire raises in support of its request for referral, the Commission should deny 

RagingWire’s request to refer its Motion to the ALJ.

C. RagingWire’s Request for a Stay Should Be Denied Because It Will 

Unnecessarily Delay the Ultimate Resolution of this Case

Rule 3.22(b) of the FTC Rules of Practice states that any “motion under consideration by 

the Commission shall not stay proceedings” before the ALJ unless the Commission so orders or 

otherwise provided by an applicable rule. 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(b). RagingWire requests a stay 

because it asserts that there is no “pressing need for expedition in this matter, and a stay will 

avoid wasting the resources of the Commission, the FTC, and RagingWire.” Mot. at 5-6. 

Like Rule 3.22(a), the Commission amended Rule 3.22(b) in 2009 as part of the 

Commission’s efforts to expedite its administrative proceedings and reflects a policy decision to 

avoid delaying the ultimate resolution of the case. 73 Fed. Reg. 58832, 58835; 74 Fed. Reg. at 

1810. This policy consideration is so significant that the Commission has even denied an 

unopposed motion for a stay pending the resolution of dispositive motions. See Order Denying 

Motion for Stay of Proceedings, N.C. Bd. of Dental Examiners, Dkt. No. 9343, 151 F.T.C. 640 

(Feb. 15, 2011). Because RagingWire has not expressed a compelling justification to overcome 

the significant policy consideration to expedite adjudicative proceedings—particularly when, as 

here, RagingWire is unlikely to win its motion to dismiss for the reasons described above—the 

Commission should deny RagingWire’s request. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Complaint Counsel respectfully requests that the Commission 

deny RagingWire’s Motion to Dismiss and requests for referral and stay. 
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Dated: December 12, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

 /s/ 

Linda Holleran Kopp 

Robin L. Wetherill 

Division of Privacy and Identity Protection 

Bureau of Consumer Protection 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Mailstop CC-8402 

Washington, DC 20580 

Telephone: (202) 326-2267 (Kopp) 

Facsimile: (202) 326-3393 

Electronic mail: lkopp@ftc.gov (Kopp) 

Complaint Counsel 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 12, 2019, I caused the foregoing document to 

be filed electronically through the Office of the Secretary's FTC E-filing system, which 

will send notification of such filing to: 

April S. Tabor Acting Secretary

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Rm. 

H-113 Washington, DC 20580 

I also certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be transmitted via 

electronic mail to:

The Honorable D. Michael 

Chappell Administrative Law Judge

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Rm. 

H-110 Washington, DC 20580 

I further certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be served via 

electronic mail to:

Corey W. Roush 

C. Fairley Spillman

Diana E. Schaffner 

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 

2001 K. Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20006 

(202) 887-4000 

croush@akingump.com 

fspillman@akingump.com 

dschaffner@akingump.com

Counsel for Respondent RagingWire Data Centers, Inc.

December 12, 2019 By: /s/ 

 Robin Wetherill 

Federal Trade Commission

 Bureau of Consumer Protection 
Notice of Electronic Service 

I hereby certify that on December 12, 2019, I filed an electronic copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT 

COUNSEL’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST 

FOR STAY AND REFERRAL, with: 

D. Michael Chappell 

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 

Suite 110 

Washington, DC, 20580 

Donald Clark 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 

Suite 172 

Washington, DC, 20580 

I hereby certify that on December 12, 2019, I served via E-Service an electronic copy of the foregoing 

COMPLAINT COUNSEL’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

AND REQUEST FOR STAY AND REFERRAL, upon: 

Linda Kopp 

Federal Trade Commission 

lkopp@ftc.gov 

Complaint 

Robin Wetherill 

Federal Trade Commission 

rwetherill@ftc.gov 

Complaint 

Corey Roush 

Partner 

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 

croush@akingump.com 

Respondent 

C. Fairley Spillman 

Partner 

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 

fspillman@akingump.com 

Respondent 

Diana Schaffner 

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 

dschaffner@akingump.com 

Respondent 

Robin Wetherill 

Attorney