alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                             _______________________

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT

                             _______________________

                     PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
                         SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported):

                                 November 11, 2004

                       Diamond Hill Investment Group, Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             (Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)

                                      Ohio
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation)

             000-24498                              65-0190407
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Commission File Number)         (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)

      375 North Front Street, Suite 300, Columbus, Ohio              43215
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Address of Principal Executive Offices)                    (Zip Code)

Registrant's Telephone Number, Including Area Code:   (614) 255-3333


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)

<PAGE>

Item 8.01.     Other Events
- -------   --------------------------------------------

          Roger G. Blackwell and William G. Perkins resigned from the
Company's Board of Directors, effective November 11, 2004.


                                    SIGNATURE
                                    ---------

     Pursuant to the  requirements  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,
the registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed  on its  behalf
by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                        DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.


Date: November 11, 2004                     By: /s/ James F. Laird
                                            -------------------------------
                                            James F. Laird, Chief Financial
                                             Officer and Secretary
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE
30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000037637
<NAME> FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                        3,637
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                        358
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                             514
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                             0
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                     465
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   4,973
<COMMON>                                         1,004
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                            0
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                                844
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                   1,848
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         34
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                             1,554
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                      46
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                       92
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                   1,400
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                    4,973
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                        1,242
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                                71
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                         987
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                       1,058
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                            184
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                   4
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                     188
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            59
<NET-INCOME>                                       129
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          1
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                      128
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                           100
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                            0
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                             287
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00


</TABLE>
#### John Burke, Doing Business as Nassau Grain Co., Plaintiff, *v.*Yvonne R. Melli et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County,

September 24, 1952.

*526
      *Dorothy M. Fordyce*for plaintiff.

*Underhill & Bubinger*for Florence Pezet, third-party claimant.

Hallinan, J.

A third party filed with the Sheriff of Nassau County an affidavit, contemplated by section 696 of the Civil Practice Act, claiming as her property the personal property which was levied upon as the property of the judgment debtors. Upon such affidavit, the judgment entered on March 25, 1952, the. execution dated March 31,1952, and the notice of the Sheriff, dated August 5, 1952, the judgment creditor has moved in the original action for an order adjudging that at the time of the levy, title to the personal property involved was in the judgment debtors, free of the alleged interest therein or lien thereon asserted by the third party in her affidavit, and ordering the Sheriff to sell said personal property as provided by law. The third party opposes the application on the ground that the moving papers are insufficient in that they are not founded either upon a petition or even an affidavit. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 7, subd. 3.)

Section 696 of the Civil Practice Act, as amended, has substituted for the former inquisition by a Sheriff’s jury, a hearing, either with or without a jury, which will result in a final determination as to the title to the personal property levied upon.. *(Matter of Monarch Sales Co.*v. Vollmer, 188 Misc. 281.) The new procedure contemplates the institution by the judgment creditor of “ a proceeding ”, which has been held to be wholly independent of the action in which the judgment was rendered. *(Dunn*v. *Seidenschwarz,*173 Misc. 495.)

A special proceeding is instituted by petition and notice of motion. Occasionally, as here, such a proceeding is confused with a motion. The difference between them, as noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, in *Matter of Callahan*(262 App. Div. 398, 399, motion for leave to appeal dismissed 287 N. Y. 743), *“*is that the one is an application in a proceeding already pending or about to be commenced, on which it depends for jurisdiction, while the other is an independent prosecution of a remedy, in which jurisdiction is obtained by original process. A motion is not a remedy but is based upon some remedy and is always connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.”

Inasmuch as the judgment creditor has merely made a motion in the original action in which the judgment was rendered, *527instead of instituting a separate proceeding, and said motion is not even supported by an affidavit much less a petition, it does not meet the requirements of the statute (Civ. Prac. Act, § 696), and must be denied. This disposition, however, is without prejudice to the institution of *“*a proceeding ” upon proper papers.

Submit order.
EXHIBIT
31.2





CERTIFICATION
ACCOMPANYING PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002





I,
Hongkeung Lam, certify that:





1.           I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Forlink Software Corporation,
Inc.;





2.           Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.           Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;





4.           The
registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:





(a) Designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;





(b) Evaluated
the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and





(c) Disclosed
in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and





5.           The
registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a) All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and





(b)
            Any
      fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control
      over financial reporting.





Date:  March
      30, 2009
                By:
                /s/ Hongkeung LamHongkeung
      LamChief
      Financial and Accounting
Officer
#### Michael Glenn WILSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-394.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 6, 1978.

Rehearing Denied July 7, 1978.

Max P. Engel and Don Cohen, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before HENDRY, HUBBART and KE-HOE, JJ.

HUBBART, Judge.

The defendant Michael Glenn Wilson appeals from a conviction and sentence for burglary while armed, shooting into an occupied dwelling, aggravated assault, and battery, entered after a jury trial in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Cir*902cuit of Florida. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion of judgment of acquittal on all charges made at the close of the state’s case and renewed at the close of all the evidence; and that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the prosecuting attorney’s cross-examination of the defendant at trial. We reject both contentions as lacking in merit and affirm.

The evidence adduced at the trial relating to the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming on all the charges for which he was convicted. The trial court was eminently correct in denying the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal at trial. As to the burglary charge, the state clearly established that the defendant entered his father-in-law’s house without the consent of said father-in-law for the purpose of assaulting his wife who temporarily resided therein. Such an act without question constitutes a burglary within the meaning of Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1975).

The defendant’s reliance on *Vazquez*v. *State,*350 So.2d 1094 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), is misplaced. In that case, the court held that it is not a burglary for a husband who is physically separated from his wife to enter upon premises possessed by his wife without the wife’s consent with the intent to commit an offense therein if there is no legal separation agreement, restraining order or court decree limiting or ending consortium rights of the parties. In the instant case, the premises herein were indisputably possessed by the wife’s father wherein the wife temporarily resided thereby rendering *Vazquez*inapplicable. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, *Vazquez*does not stand for the sweeping proposition that an estranged husband may enter without criminal liability upon the premises of any person wherein his wife may temporarily be present. The holding of the case is confined solely to premises possessed by the wife wherein the husband has a legal right to be, not to premises possessed as here by a third party.

We further find no merit in the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on a question propounded by the prosecuting attorney to the defendant upon cross-examination when such defendant testified at trial. The defendant made no objection to such question and we do not find that the question or the answer given warranted a mistrial. *Perry v. State,*146 Fla. 187, 200 So. 525 (1941).

Affirmed.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

                                    FORM 8-K

              CURRENT REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
                         SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                          DATE OF REPORT: May 17, 2002
                  (Date of earliest event reported) May 8, 2002


                          AMERICAN CELLULAR CORPORATION
             (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)


           DELAWARE               333-59322 and 333-63454     22-3043811
(State or other jurisdiction of      (Commission             (IRS Employer
        incorporation)               File Number)          Identification No.)


                           14201 Wireless Way
                         Oklahoma City, Oklahoma          73134
               (Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code)

                                 (405) 529-8500
              (Registrant's telephone number, including area code)

Information To Be Included in the Report

Item 5. Other Events

     On May 8, 2002, but effective January 1, 2002, the Registrant's parent, ACC
Acquisition,  LLC,  and AT&T  Wireless  Services,  Inc.  amended the Amended and
Restated Operating Agreement between them originally dated February 25, 2000, to
establish rates for the Amended and Restated  Operating  Agreement  through June
30, 2007.

Item 7. Financial Statements and Exhibits:

     (c)  Exhibits:

10.3.1* Addendum  to  Amended  and  Restated  Operating  Agreement  between AT&T
        Wireless Services, Inc. and its Affiliates and  ACC Acquisition, LLC and
        its Affiliates dated May 8, 2002.
_______________

*    Confidential  treatment has been  requested for this exhibit.  As a result,
     this exhibit is omitted from this 8-K.

<PAGE>

                                   SIGNATURES

     Pursuant to the  requirements  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, the
Registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed  on its  behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                   AMERICAN CELLULAR CORPORATION


                                   By BRUCE R. KNOOIHUIZEN
                                      Bruce R. Knooihuizen, Treasurer and
                                      Director

May 17, 2002
<PAGE>

                                 EXHIBIT INDEX

Exhibit No.    Description                      Method of Filing
-----------    -----------                      ----------------

10.3.1   Addendum to Amended and Restated      Filed herewith electronically
         Operating Agreement between AT&T
         Wireless Services, Inc. and its
         Affiliates and ACC Acquisition,
         LLC and its Affiliates dated May 8,
         2002.
#### UNITED BONDING CO. v. PADGETT.

No. 38057.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion.
#### Ruth H. BOWERS, Appellant, v. BAYSIDE OFFICE BUILDING, INC., Appellee.

No. 72-555.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 21, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 21, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-30988

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OCIE LEE PICKENS, JR,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CR-20007-10

--------------------

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ocie Lee Pickens, Jr., appeals from the district court’s

imposition of a 36-month sentence of imprisonment following the

revocation of Pickens’s supervised release. Pickens contends

that the sentence is plainly unreasonable under all the

circumstances. He notes that his violations consist solely of

Grade C violations, and that the range of imprisonment

recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines is seven to thirteen
No. 02-30988

-2-

months. He contends that his conduct on supervised release took

a downward turn when he returned to Oakdale, Louisiana at the

insistence of his probation officer. 

Pickens’s sentence was not plainly unreasonable given that

it fell within the statutory maximum and was based on the

district court’s determination that Pickens is in need of

comprehensive drug rehabilitation during incarceration. 

See United States v. Pena, 125 F.3d 285, 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1997)

(upholding 24-month sentence for Grade C violations, where

imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines was three to

nine months). The district court’s consideration of Pickens’s

need for drug rehabilitation during incarceration also falls

within 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), which requires the district

court to consider the need for “medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Further,

by taking into account the needs of the people of Oakdale, and

the young people in Pickens’s family, the district court also

properly considered the need to protect the public from further

crimes of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 

Because Pickens has failed to show that the sentence imposed

is plainly unreasonable, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
#### Daniel A. B. TUCKER, as father and next friend of Kim Marie Tucker, a minor, Deceased, and Daniel A. B. Tucker, Individually, Appellants, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellee.

No. 72-1009.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 18, 1973.

Horton & Perse, Ronald W. Jabara, Miami, for appellants.

Bradford, Williams, McKay, Kimbrell, Hamann & Jennings and Paul A. Carlson, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, CARROLL and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

ORDER ON MANDATE

PER CURIAM.

Whereas, the judgment of this court was entered on March 20, 1973 (274 So.2d 549) affirming the summary final judgment of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, in the above styled cause; and

Whereas, on review of this court’s judgment, by certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida, by its opinion and judgment filed December 13, 1973 (288 So.2d 238) and mandate now lodged in this court quashed this court’s judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings;

Now, therefore, It is ordered that the mandate of this court heretofore issued in this cause on April 4, 1973 is withdrawn, the judgment of this court filed in this cause on March 20, 1973 is vacated, the said opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is herewith made the opinion and judgment of this court and the summary final judgment appealed herein is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida. Costs allowed shall be taxed in the trial court (Rule 3.16, subd. b, F.A.R., 32 F.S.A.).