J-A18002-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee : 

: 

v. : 

: 

LaQUINCEY ANTRON WATSON, : 

: 

Appellant : No. 900 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on April 23, 2013 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, 

Criminal Division, No. CP-22-CR-0004167-2010 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, WECHT and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2014 

LaQuincey Antron Watson (“Watson”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his convictions of twelve counts of burglary and 

one count each of robbery, receiving stolen property, and possession of a 

firearm.1

 We affirm. 

 The trial court has set forth an extensive recitation of the underlying 

facts in its Opinion, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 1-12. Relevantly, Detective James Glucksman 

(“Glucksman”) worked as a police officer for eleven years and investigated 

between 600 and 1,000 burglaries, including serial burglary cases. 

Glucksman became involved with this case on March 5, 2010, when he was 

ordered to investigate the third burglary in Lower Paxton Township that 

 

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502, 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3925, 6105(a)(1). 
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weekend. Glucksman determined that a witness had encountered the 

burglar and, based on the information and description provided, assembled a 

photo array for review by the witness, which ultimately led to the 

identification of Watson as a suspect. The burglaries that occurred in 

Glucksman’s patrol zone, and other surrounding areas, fit a pattern of 

burglaries wherein the modus operandi involved parking a car in the home’s 

driveway and kicking in a door in order to gain access during daylight hours. 

Watson was subsequently arrested and Glucksman obtained a search 

warrant for Watson’s residence. 

Glucksman searched for, inter alia, a pair of sneakers that had a tread 

pattern consistent with marks recovered from the door of a home that had 

been robbed. While conducting the search, Glucksman seized two pairs of 

sneakers matching the tread pattern and photographed a gun holster, 

cameras, jewelry, laptop, coins and radios. Glucksman subsequently 

received an anonymous tip that Watson’s girlfriend had removed the 

photographed items from Watson’s residence and was attempting to sell 

them on the internet. Glucksman contacted her, and, after observing the 

items in her apartment and confirming they were in fact reported as stolen, 

seized the items with her consent. Watson was charged with more than 

twenty crimes, predominantly burglaries, which took place over the course 

of approximately four months (November 2009-March 2010) 

 
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in four counties.2 The stolen items included household electronics, jewelry, 

collectible coins, and other cash or coins. Watson moved to suppress this 

evidence at one of the pretrial hearings, but his Motion was denied. 

 Watson also filed a Motion to Sever Charges, a Motion for Severance of 

Charges Or, In The Alternative, A Bifurcated Trial (“Motion for Severance”), 

and a Motion to Exclude Admission of Cellular Telephone Tower “Ping” 

Evidence and Accompanying Expert Testimony (“Motion to Exclude”), all of 

which were denied.3

 

Watson’s charges were consolidated and a jury trial was held in 

Dauphin County in September 2012. Watson was found guilty of the abovementioned crimes, and acquitted on three counts of burglary. On December 

17, 2012, Watson was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 331⁄2-67 years 

in prison. Watson filed a timely Post-Sentence Motion. On April 23, 2012, 

the trial court granted Watson’s Post-Sentence Motion and issued an 

Amended Sentencing Order, stating that Watson was to serve 22-441⁄2 years 

in prison. Watson filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

 On appeal, Watson raises the following questions for our review: 

 

2

 The Commonwealth dropped eleven of the charges, leaving Watson to face 

charges for 5 burglaries that occurred in Dauphin County, 5 burglaries that 

occurred in York County, 5 burglaries that occurred in Cumberland County, 

and 2 burglaries that occurred in Lancaster County. 

3 The other Motions made in Watson’s Omnibus and Amended Omnibus 

Pretrial Motions are not relevant to this appeal. 
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I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s] 

[M]otion to [S]uppress physical evidence and identification 

of evidence where the search exceeded the scope of the 

warrant and the plain view exception was [] inapplicable in 

violation of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution? 

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s] 

[P]retrial [M]otion for [S]everance where the crimes were 

not part of a single criminal episode? 

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s] 

[P]retrial [M]otion to [E]xclude Commonwealth’s [C]ellular 

[T]elephone [T]ower “[P]ing” [E]vidence and 

[A]ccompanying [E]xpert [T]estimony where such is not 

generally accepted in the field of cell phone technology? 

IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s] 

[M]otions for [M]istrial after the Commonwealth’s witness 

repeatedly violated a pre[]trial order forbidding opinion 

testimony regarding the cellular phone records? 

Brief for Appellant at 8. 

 In his first claim, Watson argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his Motion to Suppress and allowing the gun holster, cameras, coins, laptop, 

and radios that were manipulated, photographed, and eventually seized by 

Glucksman, to be introduced as evidence. Id. at 31, 33. Watson claims 

that these items were outside of the four corners of the search warrant; 

Glucksman had no reason to suspect that they were stolen; and they were 

not in plain view. Id. at 30, 32-34. Watson asserts that the evidence 

should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at 34. 

Our standard of review of a denial of suppression is 

whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from 
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error. Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only the 

evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of 

the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of 

the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions 

based upon the facts. 

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). 

“The scope of a lawful search pursuant to a warrant is defined by the 

object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 

believe that it may be found.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 

1265-66 (Pa. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “It is permissible to 

seize things other than those described in the search warrant if they have a 

reasonable relation to the purpose of the search and are the fruits of crime, 

such as stolen property.” Commonwealth v. Gannon, 454 A.2d 561, 565 

(Pa. Super. 1982) (citations and quotations omitted). Further, a warrant is 

not necessary where evidence comes to an officer’s “attention by virtue of 

being in plain sight.” Commonwealth v. Bowers, 274 A.2d 546, 547 (Pa. 

Super. 1970) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Anderson, 

40 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

The plain view doctrine applies if 1) police did not violate 

the Fourth Amendment during the course of their arrival at the 

location where they viewed the item in question; 2) the item was 

not obscured and could be seen plainly from that location; 3) the 

incriminating nature of the item was readily apparent; and 4) 

police had the lawful right to access the item. Thus, police 

executing a valid search warrant may seize items not listed in 

the warrant if their incriminating nature is immediately apparent. 
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Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64 A.3d 690, 698 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citation omitted). 

Here, the trial court addressed Watson’s claim and determined that it 

is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 14-17. We adopt 

the trial court’s reasoning regarding this aspect of Watson’s appeal, and 

affirm on its basis. See id.; see also Harvard, 64 A.3d at 698 (concluding 

that police officers, executing a valid search warrant, properly seized items 

that were not listed in the search warrant, but matched the description of 

items stolen in the robberies under investigation). 

 In his second claim, Watson contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his Motion for Severance, as venue was not proper in Dauphin 

County for crimes that occurred in other counties. Brief for Appellant at 34-

36. Watson argues that because his conduct was not “one criminal episode,” 

and only five of the burglaries he was charged with occurred in Dauphin 

County, venue was improper. Id. at 35-36. 

“The standard of review for a denial of a motion for change of venue is 

whether there has been an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 612 A.2d 1382, 1384-85 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

Venue relates to the right of a party to have the controversy brought and 

heard in a particular judicial district. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 

1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003). Venue is predominately a procedural matter, 

generally prescribed by the rules of [the Supreme] Court. Id.
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Criminal Rule 130(A)(3) governs venue and transfer of criminal 

proceedings and provides, in relevant part, the following: 

(A) Venue. All criminal proceedings in summary and court 

cases shall be brought before the issuing authority for the 

magisterial district in which the offense is alleged to have 

occurred...subject, however, to the following exceptions:

***

(3) When charges arising from the same criminal episode

occur in more than one judicial district, the criminal proceeding 

on all the charges may be brought before one issuing authority 

in a magisterial district within any of the judicial districts in 

which the charges arising from the same criminal episode

occurred. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Kohler, 

811 A.2d 1046, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2002) (recognizing that a “condition 

precedent to the exercise [of jurisdiction] by a single county [] in a case 

involving multiple offenses in various counties is ... a single criminal 

episode.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

A single criminal episode exists “[w]here a number of charges are 

logically ... related and share[] common issues of law and fact[.]” Kohler, 

811 A.2d at 1050. 

In ascertaining whether a number of statutory offenses are 

logically related to one another, the court should initially inquire 

as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factual, and/or 

legal issues presented by the offenses.... The mere fact that the 

additional statutory offenses involve additional issues of law or 

fact is not sufficient to create a separate criminal episode since 

the logical relationship test does not require an absolute identity 

of factual backgrounds. 
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Id. at 1050-51 (internal quotations omitted). 

 Here, the fact that the criminal acts occurred over a course of four 

months in multiple counties does not preclude the acts from constituting a 

single criminal episode. Relevant evidence of each crime Watson was 

charged with would also be admissible as relevant evidence of the other 

charged crimes. Indeed, all of the burglaries took place during morning 

daylight hours, with the perpetrator gaining access by kicking in a door. The 

same types of items were stolen during each burglary. Further, 

eyewitnesses were able to identify Watson and link him to the vehicles used 

during the crimes. Stolen property identified by the victims was discovered 

at Watson’s residence, and cellular phone records demonstrated that he was 

near the crime scenes around the time the burglaries occurred. The 

underlying facts of this case establish a logical relationship between the 

crimes, and as such, the multiple burglaries constitute a single criminal 

episode. See id. at 1051 (determining that the criminal acts, despite having 

occurred in various counties over the course of 14 months, amounted to a 

single criminal episode with “substantial duplication of factual, and/or legal 

issues presented by the offenses.”). Thus, venue was proper in Dauphin 

County.4

 

4

 To the extent Watson argues that the trial court misinterpreted 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 130, we conclude that such argument is without merit. 
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 Watson also contends that the out-of-county charges should have 

been severed, as they were improperly joined under Pa.R.Crim.P. 503 and 

582. Brief for Appellant at 34, 38-39. 

Our standard of review is as follows: 

It is well settled that a motion for severance is addressed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and that the decision reached 

by the trial court will not be disturbed absent a showing of 

manifest abuse of discretion.... A better chance of acquittal from 

a separate trial is not sufficient cause to warrant severance. 

Commonwealth v. Presbury, 665 A.2d 825, 827-28 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(citation omitted). 

The trial court addressed Watson’s claim and determined that it is 

without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 23-25. We adopt the 

sound reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis, with regard to 

this issue of Watson’s appeal. See id.

 In his third claim, Watson argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his Motion to Exclude the cellphone tower “ping” evidence and accompanying 

testimony because using that information to locate a cellphone is not 

generally accepted in the field of cellphone technology and because 

Glucksman (who provided testimony about the evidence) is not an expert. 

Brief for Appellant at 40, 44-45. Watson contends that any testimony 

surrounding the cellphone tower evidence was, by its very nature, expert, as 

the average layperson knows nothing about the technology. Id. at 44.
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Therefore, Watson claims, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 7025 was not 

satisfied, and his Motion to Exclude should have been granted. Id. at 41-42, 

44-47.

The standard of review employed when faced with a 

challenge to the trial court’s decision as to whether or not to 

admit evidence is well[-]settled. Questions concerning the 

admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s 

decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion 

is not merely error of judgment, but rather where the judgment 

is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or 

where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will. 

Commonwealth v. Young, 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations 

omitted). 

 The trial court addressed Watson’s claim and determined it is without

merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 25-32. We adopt the sound 

 

5

 Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witness, provides the following: 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise, if: 

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson; 

(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 

or to determine a fact in issue; and 

(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the 

relevant field. 

Pa.R.E. 702. 
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reasoning of the trial court regarding this issue of Watson’s appeal, and 

affirm on this basis. See id. 

 In his final claim, Watson contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his Motion for Mistrial, as Glucksman’s testimony surrounding the “ping” 

evidence was impermissible expert testimony, was forbidden by a pre-trial 

order, and resulted in prejudice to Watson’s case. Brief for Appellant at 48-

50. 

 Our standard of review in assessing the denial of a mistrial 

is as follows: the trial court is in the best position to assess the 

effect of an allegedly prejudicial statement on the jury, and as 

such, the grant or denial of a mistrial will not be overturned 

absent an abuse of discretion. A mistrial may be granted only 

where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a 

nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a 

true verdict. Likewise, a mistrial is not necessary where 

cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome any possible 

prejudice. 

Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1016 (Pa. 2007) (citation 

omitted). 

 The trial court addressed Watson’s final claim and determined it is 

without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 32-34. We adopt the 

sound and detailed reasoning of the trial court regarding the final issue, and 

affirm on this basis. See id. 
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 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/11/2014 
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