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[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 249 (Friday, December 27, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78899-78910]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-30978]

[[Page 78899]]

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Comparability Determination for Switzerland: Certain Entity-Level 
Requirements

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Comparability Determination for Certain Requirements 
under Swiss Financial Market Regulation.

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SUMMARY: The following is the analysis and determination of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'') regarding certain 
parts of a request by UBS AG (``UBS'') that the Commission determine 
that laws and regulations applicable in Switzerland provide a 
sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of comparability with 
respect to the following regulatory obligations applicable to swap 
dealers (``SDs'') and major swap participants (``MSPs'') registered 
with the Commission: (i) Chief compliance officer; (ii) risk 
management; and (iii) swap data recordkeeping (collectively, the 
``Internal Business Conduct Requirements'').

DATES: Effective Date: This determination will become effective 
immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Barnett, Director, 202-418-5977, 
gbarnett@cftc.gov, Frank Fisanich, Chief Counsel, 202-418-5949, 
ffisanich@cftc.gov, and Scott Lee, Special Counsel, 202-418-5090, 
slee@cftc.gov, Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction

    On July 26, 2013, the Commission published in the Federal Register 
its ``Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations'' (the ``Guidance'').\1\ In the Guidance, 
the Commission set forth its interpretation of the manner in which it 
believes that section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') 
applies Title VII's swap provisions to activities outside the U.S. and 
informed the public of some of the policies that it expects to follow, 
generally speaking, in applying Title VII and certain Commission 
regulations in contexts covered by section 2(i). Among other matters, 
the Guidance generally described the policy and procedural framework 
under which the Commission would consider a substituted compliance 
program with respect to Commission regulations applicable to entities 
located outside the U.S. Specifically, the Commission addressed a 
recognition program where compliance with a comparable regulatory 
requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve as a reasonable 
substitute for compliance with the attendant requirements of the CEA 
and the Commission's regulations promulgated thereunder.
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    \1\ 78 FR 45292 (July 26, 2013). The Commission originally 
published proposed and further proposed guidance on July 12, 2012 
and January 7, 2013, respectively. See Cross-Border Application of 
Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 FR 41214 
(July 12, 2012) and Further Proposed Guidance Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 909 (Jan. 7, 2013).
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    In addition to the Guidance, on July 22, 2013, the Commission 
issued the Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap 
Regulations (the ``Exemptive Order'').\2\ Among other things, the 
Exemptive Order provided time for the Commission to consider 
substituted compliance with respect to six jurisdictions where non-U.S. 
SDs are currently organized. In this regard, the Exemptive Order 
generally provided non-U.S. SDs and MSPs in the six jurisdictions with 
conditional relief from certain requirements of Commission regulations 
(those referred to as ``Entity-Level Requirements'' in the Guidance) 
until the earlier of December 21, 2013, or 30 days following the 
issuance of a substituted compliance determination.\3\
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    \2\ 78 FR 43785 (July 22, 2013).
    \3\ The Entity-Level Requirements under the Exemptive Order 
consist of 17 CFR 1.31, 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 
23.603, 23.605, 23.606, 23.608, 23.609, and parts 45 and 46 of the 
Commission's regulations.
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    On July 11, 2013, UBS (``applicant'') submitted a request that the 
Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in 
Switzerland provide a sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of 
comparability with respect to certain Entity-Level Requirements, 
including the Internal Business Conduct Requirements.\4\ On November 
13, 2013, the application was supplemented with corrections and 
additional materials. The following is the Commission's analysis and 
determination regarding the Internal Business Conduct Requirements, as 
detailed below.\5\
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    \4\ For purposes of this notice, the Internal Business Conduct 
Requirements consist of 17 CFR 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 
23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606.
    \5\ This notice does not address SDR Reporting. The Commission 
may provide a comparability determination with respect to the SDR 
Reporting requirement in a separate notice.
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II. Background

    On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act\6\ (``Dodd-Frank Act'' or ``Dodd-
Frank''), which, in Title VII, established a new regulatory framework 
for swaps.
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    \6\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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    Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA by adding 
section 2(i), which provides that the swap provisions of the CEA 
(including any CEA rules or regulations) apply to cross-border 
activities when certain conditions are met, namely, when such 
activities have a ``direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States'' or when they 
contravene Commission rules or regulations as are necessary or 
appropriate to prevent evasion of the swap provisions of the CEA 
enacted under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.\7\
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    \7\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
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    In the three years since its enactment, the Commission has 
finalized 68 rules and orders to implement Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. The finalized rules include those promulgated under section 4s of 
the CEA, which address registration of SDs and MSPs and other 
substantive requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs. With few 
exceptions, the delayed compliance dates for the Commission's 
regulations implementing such section 4s requirements applicable to SDs 
and MSPs have passed and new SDs and MSPs are now required to be in 
full compliance with such regulations upon registration with the 
Commission.\8\ Notably, the requirements under Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act related to SDs and MSPs by their terms apply to all 
registered SDs and MSPs, irrespective of where they are located, albeit 
subject to the limitations of CEA section 2(i).
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    \8\ The compliance dates are summarized on the Compliance Dates 
page of the Commission's Web site available at: http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ComplianceDates/index.htm.
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    To provide guidance as to the Commission's views regarding the 
scope of the cross-border application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Commission set forth in the Guidance its interpretation of the 
manner in which it believes that Title VII's swap provisions apply to 
activities outside the U.S. pursuant to section 2(i) of the CEA. Among 
other matters, the Guidance generally described the policy and 
procedural framework under which the Commission would consider a 
substituted compliance program with respect to Commission regulations

[[Page 78900]]

applicable to entities located outside the U.S. Specifically, the 
Commission addressed a recognition program where compliance with a 
comparable regulatory requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve 
as a reasonable substitute for compliance with the attendant 
requirements of the CEA and the Commission's regulations. With respect 
to the standards forming the basis for any determination of 
comparability (``comparability determination'' or ``comparability 
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finding''), the Commission stated:

    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign 
regulatory requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the 
applicable requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, 
the Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors, 
including but not limited to, the comprehensiveness of those 
requirement(s), the scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s), the comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program, as well as the home jurisdiction's 
authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant. In 
this context, comparable does not necessarily mean identical. 
Rather, the Commission would evaluate whether the home 
jurisdiction's regulatory requirement is comparable to and as 
comprehensive as the corresponding U.S. regulatory 
requirement(s).\9\

    \9\ 78 FR 45342-45.
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    Upon a comparability finding, consistent with CEA section 2(i) and 
comity principles, the Commission's policy generally is that eligible 
entities may comply with a substituted compliance regime, subject to 
any conditions the Commission places on its finding, and subject to the 
Commission's retention of its examination authority and its enforcement 
authority.\10\
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    \10\ See the Guidance, 78 FR 45342-44.
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    In this regard, the Commission notes that a comparability 
determination cannot be premised on whether an SD or MSP must disclose 
comprehensive information to its regulator in its home jurisdiction, 
but rather on whether information relevant to the Commission's 
oversight of an SD or MSP would be directly available to the Commission 
and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP.\11\ The 
Commission's direct access to the books and records required to be 
maintained by an SD or MSP registered with the Commission is a core 
requirement of the CEA\12\ and the Commission's regulations,\13\ and is 
a condition to registration.\14\
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    \11\ Under Sec. Sec.  23.203 and 23.606, all records required by 
the CEA and the Commission's regulations to be maintained by a 
registered SD or MSP shall be maintained in accordance with 
Commission regulation 1.31 and shall be open for inspection by 
representatives of the Commission, the United States Department of 
Justice, or any applicable prudential regulator.
    In its Final Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 FR 858 (Jan. 7, 2013), the Commission noted 
that an applicant for registration as an SD or MSP must file a Form 
7-R with the National Futures Association and that Form 7-R was 
being modified at that time to address existing blocking, privacy, 
or secrecy laws of foreign jurisdictions that applied to the books 
and records of SDs and MSPs acting in those jurisdictions. See id. 
at 871-72 n. 107. The modifications to Form 7-R were a temporary 
measure intended to allow SDs and MSPs to apply for registration in 
a timely manner in recognition of the existence of the blocking, 
privacy, and secrecy laws. In the Guidance, the Commission clarified 
that the change to Form 7-R impacts the registration application 
only and does not modify the Commission's authority under the CEA 
and its regulations to access records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs. Commission access to a registrant's books and records is a 
fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly monitor and 
examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and the 
regulations adopted pursuant thereto. The Commission has maintained 
an ongoing dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral basis with 
foreign regulators and with registrants to address books and records 
access issues and may consider appropriate measures where requested 
to do so.
    \12\ See, e.g., sections 4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the 
CEA.
    \13\ See, e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.203(b) and 23.606.
    \14\ Id.
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III. Regulation of SDs and MSPs in Switzerland

    On July 11, 2013, UBS submitted a request that the Commission 
assess the comparability of laws and regulations applicable in 
Switzerland with the CEA and the Commission's regulations promulgated 
thereunder. On November 13, 2013, the application was supplemented with 
corrections and additional materials.
    As represented to the Commission by the applicant, SDs in 
Switzerland are primarily regulated by the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority (``FINMA''). FINMA protects creditors, investors, 
and policy holders, ensuring the smooth functioning of the financial 
markets and preserving the reputation of Swiss financial institutions. 
In its role as state supervisory authority, FINMA acts as an oversight 
authority of banks, insurance companies, exchanges, securities dealers, 
collective investment schemes, distributors, and insurance 
intermediaries. It issues operating licenses for companies in the 
supervised sectors. Through its supervisory activities, FINMA's role is 
to ensure that supervised institutions comply with the requisite laws, 
ordinances, directives and regulations, and continue at all times to 
fulfill the licensing requirements.\15\
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    \15\ Because the applicant's request and the Commission's 
determinations herein are based on the comparability of Swiss 
requirements applicable to FINMA supervised institutions, an SD or 
MSP that is not supervised by FINMA, or is otherwise not subject to 
the requirements applicable to FINMA supervised institutions upon 
which the Commission bases its determinations, may not be able to 
rely on the Commission's comparability determinations herein.
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IV. Comparable and Comprehensiveness Standard

    The Commission's comparability analysis will be based on a 
comparison of specific foreign requirements against the specific 
related CEA provisions and Commission regulations as categorized and 
described in the Guidance. As explained in the Guidance, within the 
framework of CEA section 2(i) and principles of international comity, 
the Commission may make a comparability determination on a requirement-
by-requirement basis, rather than on the basis of the foreign regime as 
a whole.\16\ In making its comparability determinations, the Commission 
may include conditions that take into account timing and other issues 
related to coordinating the implementation of reform efforts across 
jurisdictions.\17\
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    \16\ 78 FR 45343.
    \17\ 78 FR 45343.
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    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign regulatory 
requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the corollary 
requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission 
will take into consideration all relevant factors, including, but not 
limited to:
     The comprehensiveness of those requirement(s);
     The scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s);
     The comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program; and
     The home jurisdiction's authority to support and enforce 
its oversight of the registrant.\18\
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    \18\ 78 FR 45343.
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    In making a comparability determination, the Commission takes an 
``outcome-based'' approach. An ``outcome-based'' approach means that 
when evaluating whether a foreign jurisdiction's regulatory 
requirements are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, the corollary 
areas of the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission ultimately 
focuses on regulatory outcomes (i.e., the home jurisdiction's 
requirements do not have to be identical).\19\ This approach

[[Page 78901]]

recognizes that foreign regulatory systems differ and their approaches 
vary and may differ from how the Commission chose to address an issue, 
but that the foreign jurisdiction's regulatory requirements nonetheless 
achieve the regulatory outcome sought to be achieved by a certain 
provision of the CEA or Commission regulation.
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    \19\ 78 FR 45343. The Commission's substituted compliance 
program would generally be available for swap data repository 
reporting (``SDR Reporting''), as outlined in the Guidance, only if 
the Commission has direct access to all of the data elements that 
are reported to a foreign trade repository pursuant to the 
substituted compliance program. Thus, direct access to swap data is 
a threshold matter to be addressed in a comparability evaluation for 
SDR Reporting. Moreover, the Commission explains in the Guidance 
that, due to its technical nature, a comparability evaluation for 
SDR Reporting ``will generally entail a detailed comparison and 
technical analysis.'' A more particularized analysis will generally 
be necessary to determine whether data stored in a foreign trade 
repository provides for effective Commission use, in furtherance of 
the regulatory purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act. See 78 FR 45345.
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    In doing its comparability analysis the Commission may determine 
that no comparability determination can be made \20\ and that the non-
U.S. SD or non-U.S. MSP, U.S. bank that is an SD or MSP with respect to 
its foreign branches, or non-registrant, to the extent applicable under 
the Guidance, may be required to comply with the CEA and Commission 
regulations.
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    \20\ A finding of comparability may not be possible for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that the foreign jurisdiction has not 
yet implemented or finalized particular requirements.
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    The starting point in the Commission's analysis is a consideration 
of the regulatory objectives of the foreign jurisdiction's regulation 
of swaps and swap market participants. As stated in the Guidance, 
jurisdictions may not have swap specific regulations in some areas, and 
instead have regulatory or supervisory regimes that achieve comparable 
and comprehensive regulation to the Dodd-Frank Act requirements, but on 
a more general, entity-wide, or prudential, basis.\21\ In addition, 
portions of a foreign regulatory regime may have similar regulatory 
objectives, but the means by which these objectives are achieved with 
respect to swaps market activities may not be clearly defined, or may 
not expressly include specific regulatory elements that the Commission 
concludes are critical to achieving the regulatory objectives or 
outcomes required under the CEA and the Commission's regulations. In 
these circumstances, the Commission will work with the regulators and 
registrants in these jurisdictions to consider alternative approaches 
that may result in a determination that substituted compliance 
applies.\22\
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    \21\ 78 FR 45343.
    \22\ As explained in the Guidance, such ``approaches used will 
vary depending on the circumstances relevant to each jurisdiction. 
One example would include coordinating with the foreign regulators 
in developing appropriate regulatory changes or new regulations, 
particularly where changes or new regulations already are being 
considered or proposed by the foreign regulators or legislative 
bodies. As another example, the Commission may, after consultation 
with the appropriate regulators and market participants, include in 
its substituted compliance determination a description of the means 
by which certain swaps market participants can achieve substituted 
compliance within the construct of the foreign regulatory regime. 
The identification of the means by which substituted compliance is 
achieved would be designed to address the regulatory objectives and 
outcomes of the relevant Dodd-Frank Act requirements in a manner 
that does not conflict with a foreign regulatory regime and reduces 
the likelihood of inconsistent regulatory obligations. For example, 
the Commission may specify that SDs and MSPs in the jurisdiction 
undertake certain recordkeeping and documentation for swap 
activities that otherwise is only addressed by the foreign 
regulatory regime with respect to financial activities generally. In 
addition, the substituted compliance determination may include 
provisions for summary compliance and risk reporting to the 
Commission to allow the Commission to monitor whether the regulatory 
outcomes are being achieved. By using these approaches, in the 
interest of comity, the Commission would seek to achieve its 
regulatory objectives with respect to the Commission's registrants 
that are operating in foreign jurisdictions in a manner that works 
in harmony with the regulatory interests of those jurisdictions.'' 
78 FR 45343-44.
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    Finally, the Commission will generally rely on an applicant's 
description of the laws and regulations of the foreign jurisdiction in 
making its comparability determination. The Commission considers an 
application to be a representation by the applicant that the laws and 
regulations submitted are in full force and effect, that the 
description of such laws and regulations is accurate and complete, and 
that, unless otherwise noted, the scope of such laws and regulations 
encompasses the swaps activities \23\ of SDs and MSPs\24\ in the 
relevant jurisdictions.\25\ Further, as stated in the Guidance, the 
Commission expects that an applicant would notify the Commission of any 
material changes to information submitted in support of a comparability 
determination (including, but not limited to, changes in the relevant 
supervisory or regulatory regime) as, depending on the nature of the 
change, the Commission's comparability determination may no longer be 
valid.\26\
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    \23\ ``Swaps activities'' is defined in Commission regulation 
23.600(a)(7) to mean, ``with respect to a registrant, such 
registrant's activities related to swaps and any product used to 
hedge such swaps, including, but not limited to, futures, options, 
other swaps or security-based swaps, debt or equity securities, 
foreign currency, physical commodities, and other derivatives.'' The 
Commission's regulations under 17 CFR Part 23 are limited in scope 
to the swaps activities of SDs and MSPs.
    \24\ No SD or MSP that is not legally required to comply with a 
law or regulation determined to be comparable may voluntarily comply 
with such law or regulation in lieu of compliance with the CEA and 
the relevant Commission regulation. Each SD or MSP that seeks to 
rely on a comparability determination is responsible for determining 
whether it is subject to the laws and regulations found comparable. 
Currently, there are no MSPs organized outside the U.S. and the 
Commission therefore cautions any non-financial entity organized 
outside the U.S. and applying for registration as an MSP to 
carefully consider whether the laws and regulations determined to be 
comparable herein are applicable to such entity.
    \25\ The Commission has provided the relevant foreign 
regulator(s) with opportunities to review and correct the 
applicant's description of such laws and regulations on which the 
Commission will base its comparability determination. The Commission 
relies on the accuracy and completeness of such review and any 
corrections received in making its comparability determinations. A 
comparability determination based on an inaccurate description of 
foreign laws and regulations may not be valid.
    \26\ 78 FR 45345.
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    The Guidance provided a detailed discussion of the Commission's 
policy regarding the availability of substituted compliance \27\ for 
the Internal Business Conduct Requirements.\28\
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    \27\ See 78 FR 45348-50. The Commission notes that registrants 
and other market participants are responsible for determining 
whether substituted compliance is available pursuant to the Guidance 
based on the comparability determination contained herein (including 
any conditions or exceptions), and its particular status and 
circumstances.
    \28\ The applicant did not request a compatibility determination 
for Sec.  23.608 (Restrictions on counterparty clearing 
relationships), therefore, this notice does not address Sec.  
23.608. Additionally, this notice does not address Sec.  23.609 
(Clearing member risk management). The Commission declines to take 
up the request for a comparability determination with respect to 
Sec.  23.609 due to the Commission's view that there are not laws or 
regulations applicable in Switzerland to compare with the 
prohibitions and requirements of Sec.  23.609. The Commission may 
provide a comparability determination with respect to this 
regulation at a later date in consequence of further developments in 
the law and regulations applicable in Switzerland.
    This notice also does not address capital adequacy because the 
Commission has not yet finalized rules for SDs and MSPs in this 
area, nor SDR Reporting. The Commission may provide a comparability 
determination with respect to these requirements at a later date or 
in a separate notice.
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V. Supervisory Arrangement

    In the Guidance, the Commission stated that, in connection with a 
determination that substituted compliance is appropriate, it would 
expect to enter into an appropriate memorandum of understanding 
(``MOU'') or similar arrangement \29\ with the relevant foreign 
regulator(s). Although existing arrangements would indicate a foreign 
regulator's ability to cooperate and share information, ``going 
forward, the Commission and relevant foreign supervisor(s) would need 
to establish supervisory MOUs or other arrangements that provide for

[[Page 78902]]

information sharing and cooperation in the context of supervising [SDs] 
and MSPs.'' \30\
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    \29\ An MOU is one type of arrangement between or among 
regulators. Supervisory arrangements could include, as appropriate, 
cooperative arrangements that are memorialized and executed as 
addenda to existing MOUs or as, e.g., independent bilateral 
arrangements, statements of intent, declarations, or letters.
    \30\ 78 FR 45344.
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    The Commission is in the process of developing its registration and 
supervision regime for provisionally-registered SDs and MSPs. This new 
initiative includes setting forth supervisory arrangements with 
authorities that have joint jurisdiction over SDs and MSPs that are 
registered with the Commission and subject to U.S. law. Given the 
developing nature of the Commission's regime and the fact that the 
Commission has not negotiated prior supervisory arrangements with 
certain authorities, the negotiation of supervisory arrangements 
presents a unique opportunity to develop close working relationships 
between and among authorities, as well as highlight any potential 
issues related to cooperation and information sharing.
    Accordingly, the Commission is negotiating such a supervisory 
arrangement with each applicable foreign regulator of an SD or MSP. The 
Commission expects that the arrangement will establish expectations for 
ongoing cooperation, address direct access to information,\31\ provide 
for notification upon the occurrence of specified events, memorialize 
understandings related to on-site visits,\32\ and include protections 
related to the use and confidentiality of non-public information shared 
pursuant to the arrangement.
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    \31\ Section 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.606 require a registered SD or MSP to make all records 
required to be maintained in accordance with Commission regulation 
1.31 available promptly upon request to, among others, 
representatives of the Commission. See also 7 U.S.C. Sec.  6s(f); 17 
CFR 23.203. In the Guidance, the Commission states that it 
``reserves this right to access records held by registered [SDs] and 
MSPs, including those that are non-U.S. persons who may comply with 
the Dodd-Frank recordkeeping requirement through substituted 
compliance.'' 78 FR 45345 n. 472; see also id. at 45342 n. 461 
(affirming the Commission's authority under the CEA and its 
regulations to access books and records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs as ``a fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly 
monitor and examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and 
the regulations adopted pursuant thereto'').
    \32\ The Commission retains its examination authority, both 
during the application process as well as upon and after 
registration of an SD or MSP. See 78 FR 45342 (stating Commission 
policy that ``eligible entities may comply with a substituted 
compliance regime under certain circumstances, subject, however, to 
the Commission's retention of its examination authority'') and 45344 
n. 471 (stating that the ``Commission may, as it deems appropriate 
and necessary, conduct an on-site examination of the applicant'').
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    These arrangements will establish a roadmap for how authorities 
will consult, cooperate, and share information. As with any such 
arrangement, however, nothing in these arrangements will supersede 
domestic laws or resolve potential conflicts of law, such as the 
application of domestic secrecy or blocking laws to regulated entities.

VI. Comparability Determination and Analysis

    The following section describes the requirements imposed by 
specific sections of the CEA and the Commission's regulations for the 
Internal Business Conduct Requirements that are the subject of this 
comparability determination, and the Commission's regulatory objectives 
with respect to such requirements. Immediately following a description 
of the requirement(s) and regulatory objective(s) of the specific 
Internal Business Conduct Requirements that the requestor submitted for 
a comparability determination, the Commission provides a description of 
the foreign jurisdiction's comparable laws, regulations, or rules and 
whether such laws, regulations, or rules meet the applicable regulatory 
objective.
    The Commission's determinations in this regard and the discussion 
in this section are intended to inform the public of the Commission's 
views regarding whether the foreign jurisdiction's laws, regulations, 
or rules may be comparable and comprehensive as those requirements in 
the Dodd-Frank Act (and Commission regulations promulgated thereunder) 
and therefore, may form the basis of substituted compliance. In turn, 
the public (in the foreign jurisdiction, in the United States, and 
elsewhere) retains its ability to present facts and circumstances that 
would inform the determinations set forth in this notice.
    As was stated in the Guidance, the Commission recognizes the 
complex and dynamic nature of the global swap market and the need to 
take an adaptable approach to cross-border issues, particularly as it 
continues to work closely with foreign regulators to address potential 
conflicts with respect to each country's respective regulatory regime. 
In this regard, the Commission may review, modify, or expand the 
determinations herein in light of comments received and future 
developments.

A. Chief Compliance Officer (Sec.  3.3)

    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(k) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 3.3 generally sets forth the following 
requirements for SDs and MSPs:
     An SD or MSP must designate an individual as Chief 
Compliance Officer (``CCO'');
     The CCO must have the responsibility and authority to 
develop the regulatory compliance policies and procedures of the SD or 
MSP;
     The CCO must report to the board of directors or the 
senior officer of the SD or MSP;
     Only the board of directors or a senior officer may remove 
the CCO;
     The CCO and the board of directors must meet at least once 
per year;
     The CCO must have the background and skills appropriate 
for the responsibilities of the position;
     The CCO must not be subject to disqualification from 
registration under sections 8a(2) or (3) of the CEA;
     Each SD and MSP must include a designation of a CCO in its 
registration application;
     The CCO must administer the regulatory compliance policies 
of the SD or MSP;
     The CCO must take reasonable steps to ensure compliance 
with the CEA and Commission regulations, and resolve conflicts of 
interest;
     The CCO must establish procedures for detecting and 
remediating non-compliance issues;
     The CCO must annually prepare and sign an ``annual 
compliance report'' containing: (i) A description of policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance; (ii) an assessment 
of the effectiveness of such policies and procedures; (iii) a 
description of material non-compliance issues and the action taken; 
(iv) recommendations of improvements in compliance policies; and (v) a 
certification by the CCO or CEO that, to the best of such officer's 
knowledge and belief, the annual report is accurate and complete under 
penalty of law; and
     The annual compliance report must be furnished to the CFTC 
within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year of the SD or MSP, 
simultaneously with its annual financial condition report.
    Regulatory Objective: The Commission believes that compliance by 
SDs and MSPs with the CEA and the Commission's rules greatly 
contributes to the protection of customers, orderly and fair markets, 
and the stability and integrity of the market intermediaries registered 
with the Commission. The Commission expects SDs and MSPs to strictly 
comply with the CEA and the Commission's rules and to devote sufficient 
resources to ensuring such compliance. Thus, through its CCO rule, the 
Commission seeks to ensure firms have designated a qualified individual 
as CCO that reports directly to the board

[[Page 78903]]

of directors or the senior officer of the firm and that has the 
independence, responsibility, and authority to develop and administer 
compliance policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, resolve conflicts 
of interest, remediate noncompliance issues, and report annually to the 
Commission and the board or senior officer on compliance of the firm.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(k) of the CEA and 
Commission regulation 3.3.
    The applicant represented that Swiss law and FINMA regulations 
require a regulated entity within FINMA's jurisdiction to appoint a 
senior management member to act in the capacity of a CCO, with 
responsibility for the oversight of all of the entity's regulated 
businesses, including its swaps business. The CCO is required by law to 
report, directly or indirectly, to senior management of the regulated 
entity with respect to any material compliance issues in any of the 
banking entity's businesses.
    Under Swiss law, compliance entails the adherence to legal, 
regulatory and internal policies, as well as the observance of the 
customary standards and rules of professional conduct within the 
market. The risk of violations of provisions, standards, or rules of 
professional conduct and the corresponding legal and regulatory 
sanctions, financial losses, or damage to one's reputation are deemed 
to be compliance risks.
    Accordingly, FINMA Circular 2008/24 of November 20, 2008, 
Supervision and Internal Control of Banks,\33\ requires banks to take 
the necessary operational measures and precautions to ensure 
compliance. Pursuant to such Circular, banks:
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    \33\ Text of English translation by KPMG available at: http://www.kpmg.com/CH/de/Library/Legislative-Texts/Documents/pub_20081120-FINMA_Circ_08-24.pdf.
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     Must designate one member of senior management to act in 
the capacity of the CCO with responsibility for oversight of the 
compliance function;
     Must maintain a compliance function with unrestricted 
access to information and independence from profit-generating business 
activities;
     Must allocate adequate resources and authority to the 
compliance function;
     Must not permit compensation of employees of the 
compliance function to contain incentives that could lead to conflicts 
of interest;
     Must conduct an annual assessment (at minimum) of 
compliance risk and compliance policies, approved by management;
     Must timely report to management regarding material 
changes to compliance risks, serious violations, and remediation; and
     Must prepare an annual report assessing compliance risks 
and activities and furnish such report to the board of directors, 
internal auditors, and outside auditors.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec.  3.3 by seeking to ensure firms have designated a qualified 
individual as the compliance officer that reports directly to a 
sufficiently senior function of the firm and that has the independence, 
responsibility, and authority to develop and administer compliance 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with 
the CEA and Commission regulations, resolve conflicts of interest, 
remediate noncompliance issues, and report annually on compliance of 
the firm.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the CCO requirements of Swiss law 
and regulations are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  3.3, 
with the exception of Sec.  3.3(f) concerning certifying and furnishing 
an annual compliance report to the Commission.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of the Swiss standards specified above are comparable to 
and as comprehensive as Sec.  3.3(f), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
3.3 and the Swiss law and regulations specified above are applicable 
would generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  3.3 if that SD 
or MSP complies with the Swiss law and regulations specified above, 
subject to certifying and furnishing the Commission with the annual 
report required under Swiss law and regulations specified above in 
accordance with Sec.  3.3(f). The Commission notes that it generally 
expects registrants to submit required reports to the Commission in the 
English language.

B. Risk Management Duties (Sec. Sec.  23.600--23.609)

    Section 4s(j) of the CEA requires each SD and MSP to establish 
internal policies and procedures designed to, among other things, 
address risk management, monitor compliance with position limits, 
prevent conflicts of interest, and promote diligent supervision, as 
well as maintain business continuity and disaster recovery 
programs.\34\ The Commission adopted regulations 23.600, 23.601, 
23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606 to implement the statute.\35\ The 
Commission also adopted regulation 23.609, which requires certain risk 
management procedures for SDs or MSPs that are clearing members of a 
derivatives clearing organization (``DCO'').\36\ Collectively, these 
requirements help to establish a robust and comprehensive internal risk 
management program for SDs and MSPs with respect to their swaps 
activities,\37\ which is critical to effective systemic risk management 
for the overall swaps market. In making its comparability determination 
with regard to these risk management duties, the Commission will 
consider each regulation individually.
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    \34\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(j).
    \35\ See Final Swap Dealer and MSP Recordkeeping Rule, 77 FR 
20128 (April 3, 2012) (relating to risk management program, 
monitoring of position limits, business continuity and disaster 
recovery, conflicts of interest policies and procedures, and general 
information availability, respectively).
    \36\ See Customer Documentation Rule, 77 FR 21278 (April 9, 
2012). Also, SDs must comply with Commission regulation 23.608, 
which prohibits SDs providing clearing services to customers from 
entering into agreements that would: (i) Disclose the identity of a 
customer's original executing counterparty; (ii) limit the number of 
counterparties a customer may trade with; (iii) impose counterparty-
based position limits; (iv) impair a customer's access to execution 
of a trade on terms that have a reasonable relationship to the best 
terms available; or (v) prevent compliance with specified time 
frames for acceptance of trades into clearing.
    \37\ See supra note 20.
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1. Risk Management Program for SDs and MSPs (Sec.  23.600)
    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(j)(2) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 23.600 generally requires that:
     Each SD or MSP must establish and enforce a risk 
management program consisting of a system of written risk management 
policies and procedures designed to monitor and manage the risks 
associated with the swap activities of the firm, including without 
limitation, market, credit, liquidity, foreign currency, legal, 
operational, and settlement risks, and furnish a copy of such policies 
and procedures to the

[[Page 78904]]

CFTC upon application for registration and upon request;
     The SD or MSP must establish a risk management unit 
independent from the business trading unit;
     The risk management policies and procedures of the SD or 
MSP must be approved by the firm's governing body;
     Risk tolerance limits and exceptions therefrom must be 
reviewed and approved quarterly by senior management and annually by 
the governing body;
     The risk management program must have a system for 
detecting breaches of risk tolerance limits and alerting supervisors 
and senior management, as appropriate;
     The risk management program must account for risks posed 
by affiliates and be integrated at the consolidated entity level;
     The risk management unit must provide senior management 
and the governing body with quarterly risk exposure reports and upon 
detection of any material change in the risk exposure of the SD or MSP;
     Risk exposure reports must be furnished to the CFTC within 
five business days following provision to senior management;
     The risk management program must have a new product policy 
for assessing the risks of new products prior to engaging in such 
transactions;
     The risk management program must have policies and 
procedures providing for trading limits, monitoring of trading, 
processing of trades, and separation of personnel in the trading unit 
from personnel in the risk management unit; and
     The risk management program must be reviewed and tested at 
least annually and upon any material change in the business of the SD 
or MSP.
    Regulatory Objective: Through the required system of risk 
management, the Commission seeks to ensure that firms are adequately 
managing the risks of their swaps activities to prevent failure of the 
SD or MSP, which could result in losses to counterparties doing 
business with the SD or MSP, and systemic risk more generally. To this 
end, the Commission believes the risk management program of an SD or 
MSP must contain at least the following critical elements:
     Identification of risk categories;
     Establishment of risk tolerance limits for each category 
of risk and approval of such limits by senior management and the 
governing body;
     An independent risk management unit to administer a risk 
management program; and
     Periodic oversight of risk exposures by senior management 
and the governing body.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(2) of the CEA 
and Commission regulation 23.600.
    Article 9 of the Swiss Banking Ordinance,\38\ FINMA Circular 2008/
24,\39\ and Bank Liquidity Ordinance of the Swiss Federal Council, 
address specific forms of risk and detail requirements related to 
controls and management of those risks including, but not limited to: 
market risk, liquidity risk, operational and settlement risk, credit 
risk, reputational risk, and legal risk. Specifically, pursuant to such 
Swiss law and regulations, Swiss banks:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Text of English translation by KPMG available at: http://www.kpmg.com/CH/de/Library/Legislative-Texts/Documents/pub_20090101-BankO.pdf.
    \39\ See supra note 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Must have an internal audit function that annually 
assesses the effectiveness of risk management;
     Must segregate the risk management function from trading 
functions;
     Must make the board of directors responsible to regulate, 
establish, maintain, monitor, and regularly supervise an appropriate 
internal control function in conformity with the bank's risk profile;
     Must have internal documentation of the risk management 
function sufficient for an outside auditor to form a reliable opinion;
     Must keep internal auditors independent from management;
     Must have internal controls based on systematic risk 
analysis, and must ensure material risks are recorded, limited, and 
monitored, including risks posed by affiliates;
     Must establish an internal audit function that reports 
directly to the board or audit committee;
     Must have the board of directors regularly discuss with 
management its assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of internal 
controls;
     Must maintain and regularly test internal control 
functions; and
     Must define the bank's capacity to assume liquidity risk 
(risk tolerance limits), monitor and manage intra-day liquidity risks, 
and monitor assets that are used to generate liquidity.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec.  23.600 by requiring a system of risk management that seeks to 
ensure that firms are adequately managing the risks of their swaps 
activities to prevent failure of the SD or MSP, which could result in 
losses to counterparties doing business with the SD or MSP, and 
systemic risk more generally. Specifically, the Commission finds that 
the Swiss law and regulations specified above comprehensively require 
SDs and MSPs to establish risk management programs containing the 
following critical elements:
     Identification of risk categories;
     Establishment of risk tolerance limits for each category 
of risk and approval of such limits by senior management and the 
governing body;
     An independent risk management unit to administer a risk 
management program; and
     Periodic oversight of risk exposures by senior management 
and the governing body.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the risk management program 
requirements of Swiss law and regulations, as specified above, are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.600, with the exception 
of Sec.  23.600(c)(2) concerning the requirement that each SD and MSP 
produce a quarterly risk exposure report and provide such report to its 
senior management, governing body, and the Commission.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of Swiss law and regulations are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.600(c)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
23.600 and the Swiss law and regulations specified above are applicable 
would generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  23.600(c)(2) 
if that SD or MSP complies with Swiss law and regulations specified 
above, subject to compliance with the requirement that it produce 
quarterly risk exposure reports and provide such reports to its senior 
management, governing body, and the Commission in accordance with Sec.  
23.600(c)(2). The Commission notes that it generally expects reports 
furnished to the Commission by registrants to be in the English 
language.
2. Monitoring of Position Limits (Sec.  23.601)
    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(j)(1) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 23.601 requires each SD or MSP to establish and 
enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed

[[Page 78905]]

to monitor for, and prevent violations of, applicable position limits 
established by the Commission, a designated contract market (``DCM''), 
or a swap execution facility (``SEF'').\40\ The policies and procedures 
must include an early warning system and provide for escalation of 
violations to senior management (including the firm's governing body).
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    \40\ The setting of position limits by the Commission, a DCM, or 
a SEF is subject to requirements under the CEA and Commission 
regulations other than Sec.  23.601. The setting of position limits 
and compliance with such limits is not subject to the Commission's 
substituted compliance regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulatory Objective: Generally, position limits are implemented to 
ensure market integrity, fairness, orderliness, and accurate pricing in 
the commodity markets. Commission regulation 23.601 thus seeks to 
ensure that SDs and MSPs have established the necessary policies and 
procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations of 
applicable position limits established by the Commission, a DCM, or a 
SEF. As part of its Risk Management Program, Sec.  23.601 is intended 
to ensure that established position limits are not breached by the SD 
or MSP.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(1) of the CEA 
and Commission regulation 23.601.
    The applicant represented that Swiss law and regulations require 
banking entities under FINMA's supervision to comply with regulations 
in the jurisdictions in which they conduct business, which would 
include compliance with the position limit regimes imposed by the 
Commission, a DCM, or SEF, as applicable. Specifically, FINMA Circular 
2008/24 \41\ requires banking entities whose compliance policies and 
procedures govern activities in multiple jurisdictions must ensure that 
such policies and procedures ensure compliance in each jurisdiction. 
Thus, activities of a Swiss banking entity that have an impact on 
United States territory must be in compliance with the Commission's 
position limit regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See supra note 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINMA Newsletter 31 of December 13, 2011, Unauthorized Trading of 
Banks \42\ and Swiss law address specific requirements relating to 
monitoring for and complying with applicable position limits. Pursuant 
to Swiss law and regulations, Swiss banks:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Text of English Translation available at: http://www.finma.ch/e/finma/publikationen/Documents/finma-mitteilung-31-2011-e.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Must manage for unauthorized trading and maintain 
oversight of trading activities and related risks, including compliance 
with applicable position limits; and
     Banking entities must devote adequate attention and 
management resources to identify, measure, and control compliance 
risks.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec.  23.601 by requiring SDs and MSPs to establish necessary policies 
and procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations 
of applicable position limits established by applicable laws and 
regulations, including those of the Commission, a DCM, or a SEF. 
Specifically, the Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations 
specified above, comprehensively require SDs and MSPs to monitor for 
regulatory compliance with position limits set pursuant to applicable 
law and the responsibility of senior management (including the board of 
directors) for such compliance.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the compliance monitoring 
requirements of Swiss law and regulations, as specified above, are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.601. For the avoidance 
of doubt, the Commission notes that this determination may not be 
relied on to relieve an SD or MSP from its obligation to strictly 
comply with any applicable position limit established by the 
Commission, a DCM, or a SEF.
3. Diligent Supervision (Sec.  23.602)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.602 implements 
section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the CEA and requires each SD and MSP to 
establish a system to diligently supervise all activities relating to 
its business performed by its partners, members, officers, employees, 
and agents. The system must be reasonably designed to achieve 
compliance with the CEA and CFTC regulations. Commission regulation 
23.602 requires that the supervisory system must specifically designate 
qualified persons with authority to carry out the supervisory 
responsibilities of the SD or MSP for all activities relating to its 
business as an SD or MSP.
    Regulatory Objective: The Commission's diligent supervision rule 
seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with the CEA and the 
Commission's rules. To this end, through Sec.  23.602, the Commission 
seeks to ensure that each SD and MSP not only establishes the necessary 
policies and procedures that would lead to compliance with the CEA and 
Commission regulations, but also establishes an effective system of 
internal oversight and enforcement of such policies and procedures to 
ensure that such policies and procedures are diligently followed.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the 
CEA and Commission regulation 23.602.
     FINMA Circular 2008/24 \43\ requires segregation of duties 
and control activities. Management is required to ensure an appropriate 
segregation of duties and avoids assigning responsibilities which could 
lead to conflicting responsibilities or interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See supra note 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Controlling activities are to be an integral part of all 
work processes, e.g., process controls; results monitoring; and review 
of conduct of employees and organizational units where no quantitative 
results are observable.
    As previously stated above, the applicant represents that Swiss law 
requires banking entities under FINMA's supervision to comply with 
regulations in the jurisdictions in which they conduct business, which 
would include compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations as 
applicable. Specifically, FINMA Circular 2008/24 requires banking 
entities whose compliance policies and procedures govern activities in 
multiple jurisdictions must ensure that such policies and procedures 
ensure compliance in each jurisdiction. Thus, activities of a Swiss 
banking entity that have an impact on United States territory must be 
in compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec.  23.602 because such standards seek to ensure that SDs and MSPs 
strictly comply with applicable law, which would include the CEA and 
the Commission's regulations. Through the Swiss laws and regulations 
specified above, Swiss laws and regulations seek to ensure that each SD 
and MSP not only establishes the

[[Page 78906]]

necessary policies and procedures that would lead to compliance with 
applicable law, which would include the CEA and Commission regulations, 
but also establishes an effective system of internal oversight and 
enforcement of such policies and procedures to ensure that such 
policies and procedures are diligently followed.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the internal supervision 
requirements of Swiss law and regulations, as specified above, are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.602.
4. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (Sec.  23.603)
    Commission Requirement: To ensure the proper functioning of the 
swaps markets and the prevention of systemic risk more generally, 
Commission regulation 23.603 requires each SD and MSP, as part of its 
risk management program, to establish a business continuity and 
disaster recovery plan that includes procedures for, and the 
maintenance of, back-up facilities, systems, infrastructure, personnel, 
and other resources to achieve the timely recovery of data and 
documentation and to resume operations generally within the next 
business day after the disruption.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.603 is intended to 
ensure that any market disruption affecting SDs and MSPs, whether 
caused by natural disaster or otherwise, is minimized in length and 
severity. To that end, this requirement seeks to ensure that entities 
adequately plan for disruptions and devote sufficient resources capable 
of carrying out an appropriate plan within one business day, if 
necessary.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.603.
     Annex 1 of FINMA's Circular on Operational Risk \44\ 
requires banks to have contingency or business continuity plans to 
ensure their ability to operate under exceptional circumstances and to 
limit consequences of severe business disruptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Text of English translation by KPMG available at: http://www.kpmg.com/CH/en/Library/Legislative-Texts/Documents/pub-20130408-finma-circular-***8-21-en.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     FINMA Circular 2008/10 of November 20, 2008, Self-
regulation as a minimum standard,\45\ and sections 5.4.1 (Business 
Impact Analysis) and 5.4.2 (Business Continuity Strategy) of the Swiss 
Bankers' Association Recommendations for Business Continuity 
Management,\46\ establish minimum business continuity management 
standards for banks and securities dealers in Switzerland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Text of English translation available at: http://finma.ch/e/regulierung/Documents/finma-rs-2008-10-e.pdf.
    \46\ Text of English translation available at: http://shop.sba.ch/11107_e.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec.  23.603 because such standards seek to ensure that any market 
disruption affecting SDs and MSPs, whether caused by natural disaster 
or otherwise, is minimized in length and severity. To that end, the 
Commission finds that the Swiss laws and regulations specified above 
seek to ensure that entities adequately plan for disruptions and devote 
sufficient resources capable of carrying out an appropriate plan in a 
timely manner.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the business continuity and 
disaster recovery requirements of Swiss law and regulations, as 
specified above, are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  
23.603.
5. Conflicts of Interest (Sec.  23.605)
    Commission Requirement: Section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.605(c) generally require each SD or MSP to establish 
structural and institutional safeguards to ensure that the activities 
of any person within the firm relating to research or analysis of the 
price or market for any commodity or swap are separated by appropriate 
informational partitions within the firm from the review, pressure, or 
oversight of persons whose involvement in pricing, trading, or clearing 
activities might potentially bias their judgment or supervision.
    In addition, section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission regulation 
23.605(d)(1) generally prohibits an SD or MSP from directly or 
indirectly interfering with or attempting to influence the decision of 
any clearing unit of any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to provide 
clearing services and activities to a particular customer, including:
     Whether to offer clearing services to a particular 
customer;
     Whether to accept a particular customer for clearing 
derivatives;
     Whether to submit a customer's transaction to a particular 
DCO;
     Whether to set or adjust risk tolerance levels for a 
particular customer; or
     Whether to set a customer's fees based on criteria other 
than those generally available and applicable to other customers.
    Commission regulation 23.605(d)(2) generally requires each SD or 
MSP to create and maintain an appropriate informational partition 
between business trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of 
any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to reasonably ensure compliance 
with the Act and the prohibitions set forth in Sec.  23.605(d)(1) 
outlined above.
    The Commission observes that Sec.  23.605(d) works in tandem with 
Commission regulation 1.71, which requires futures commission merchants 
(``FCMs'') that are clearing members of a DCO and affiliated with an SD 
or MSP to create and maintain an appropriate informational partition 
between business trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of 
the FCM to reasonably ensure compliance with the Act and the 
prohibitions set forth in Sec.  1.71(d)(1), which are the same as the 
prohibitions set forth in Sec.  23.605(d)(1) outlined above.
    Finally, Sec.  23.605(e) requires that each SD or MSP have policies 
and procedures that mandate the disclosure to counterparties of 
material incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of 
a counterparty to execute a derivative on a swap execution facility or 
DCM or to clear a derivative through a DCO.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.605(c) seeks to 
ensure that research provided to the general public by an SD or MSP is 
unbiased and free from the influence of the interests of an SD or MSP 
arising from the SD's or MSP's trading business.
    In addition, the Sec.  23.605(d) (working in tandem with Sec.  
1.71) seeks to ensure open access to the clearing of swaps by requiring 
that access to and the provision of clearing services provided by an 
affiliate of an SD or MSP are not influenced by the interests of an 
SD's or MSP's trading business.
    Finally, Sec.  23.605(e) seeks to ensure equal access to trading 
venues and clearinghouses, as well as orderly and fair markets, by 
requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to counterparties any material 
incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of a 
counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM, or to clear a 
derivative through a DCO.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the

[[Page 78907]]

following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland 
are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.605(c).
    The FINMA Circular on market conduct rules \47\ and the FINMA 
Circular on Self-regulation recognize the Swiss Bankers' Association 
Directives on the Independence of Financial Research \48\ as minimum 
standards. These circulars require information partitions where 
necessary to prevent conflicts of interest. In particular, they require 
the research unit to be independent from business trading units. 
Adherence to information partitions is to be monitored and is a 
designated compliance function, while the ultimate responsibility for 
handling confidential price-sensitive information and conflicts of 
interest lies with executive management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Text of English translation available at: http://www.finma.ch/e/regulierung/Documents/finma-rs-2008-38-e.pdf (stating 
that analysis or research departments are to be organized 
independently and be segregated as separate areas of 
confidentiality).
    \48\ Text of English translation available at: http://www.swissbanking.org/12108.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More generally, imposing restrictions on particular customers would 
contradict the open access principles outlined in art. 33 of the Swiss 
National Bank Ordinance. In addition, under Swiss law, a bank must 
comply with the Swiss competition laws, including the Federal Act on 
Cartels and other Restraints on Competition. An activity that violates 
the provision of these laws is a violation of these laws regardless of 
where the putative activity took place.
    The applicant has represented to the Commission that FINMA, in the 
process of its oversight and enforcement of the foregoing Swiss 
standards, would require any SD or MSP subject to such standards to 
resolve or mitigate conflicts of interests in the provision of clearing 
services by a clearing member of a DCO that is an affiliate of the SD 
or MSP, or the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a 
SEF or DCM, or clear a derivative through a DCO, through appropriate 
information firewalls and disclosures.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above with respect to conflicts of interest 
that may arise in producing or distributing research are generally 
identical in intent to Sec.  23.605(c) because such standards seek to 
ensure that research provided to the general public by an SD is 
unbiased and free from the influence of the interests of an SD arising 
from the SD's trading business.
    With respect to conflicts of interest that may arise in the 
provision of clearing services by an affiliate of an SD or MSP, the 
Commission further finds that although the general conflicts of 
interest prevention requirements under the Swiss standards specified 
above do not require with specificity that access to and the provision 
of clearing services provided by an affiliate of an SD or MSP not be 
improperly influenced by the interests of an SD's or MSP's trading 
business, such general requirements would require prevention and 
remediation of such improper influence when recognized or discovered. 
Thus such standards would ensure open access to clearing.
    Finally, although not as specific as the requirements of Sec.  
23.605(e) (Undue influence on counterparties), the Commission finds 
that the general disclosure requirements of the Swiss standards 
specified above would ensure equal access to trading venues and 
clearinghouses by requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to 
counterparties any material incentives or conflicts of interest 
regarding the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a 
SEF or DCM, or to clear a derivative through a DCO.
6. Availability of Information for Disclosure and Inspection (Sec.  
23.606)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.606 implements 
sections 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA, and requires each SD and MSP to 
disclose to the Commission, and an SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential 
regulator (if any) comprehensive information about its swap activities, 
and to establish and maintain reliable internal data capture, 
processing, storage, and other operational systems sufficient to 
capture, process, record, store, and produce all information necessary 
to satisfy its duties under the CEA and Commission regulations. Such 
systems must be designed to provide such information to the Commission 
and an SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential regulator within the time frames 
set forth in the CEA and Commission regulations and upon request.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.606 seeks to ensure 
that each SD and MSP captures and maintains comprehensive information 
about their swap activities, and is able to retrieve and disclose such 
information to the Commission and its U.S. prudential regulator, if 
any, as necessary for compliance with the CEA and the Commission's 
regulations and for purposes of Commission oversight, as well as 
oversight by the SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential regulator, if any.
    The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the 
regulatory objective of Sec.  23.606 unless the required information is 
available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator under the 
foreign legal regime. Thus, a comparability determination with respect 
to the information access provisions of Sec.  23.606 would be premised 
on whether the relevant information would be available to the 
Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on 
whether an SD or MSP must disclose comprehensive information to its 
regulator in its home jurisdiction.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, 
and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.606.
    The Swiss Code of Obligations,\49\ Ordinance of the Swiss Federal 
Council on Business Record Keeping,\50\ Swiss Financial Markets 
Supervisory Authority Act,\51\ Swiss National Banking Ordinance,\52\ 
National Bank Act,\53\ and FINMA Circulars impose comprehensive 
requirements with respect to data retention and storage, and the 
availability of such data to regulatory authorities. These requirements 
apply to all of a banking entity's business, including its swaps 
business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Text of English translation available at: http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19110009/201305280000/220.pdf.
    \50\ Text of ordinance available at: http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20001467/201301010000/221.431.pdf.
    \51\ Text of English translation available at: http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20052624/201307010000/956.1.pdf.
    \52\ Text of English translation available at: http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20040259/201307010000/951.131.pdf (requiring banks to report OTC derivatives information 
biannually to the Bank of Internal Settlement).
    \53\ Text of English translation available at: http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20021117/201203010000/951.11.pdf (requiring the Swiss National Bank, pursuant to art. 14, 
to monitor financial market developments and requiring banks to 
provide statistical data about their activities to the Swiss 
National Bank).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Collectively, these Swiss laws and regulations require a firm to 
maintain swaps data and related books and records in a systematic, 
logical, and chronological format so that the data cannot be damaged, 
altered, or deleted. Further, a firm is required to maintain account 
records, accounting records, and business correspondence for ten years. 
These records must contain all

[[Page 78908]]

necessary information to establish, review, and reconstruct the 
financial situation of the firm by FINMA, regulatory authorities, audit 
firms, and persons or companies legally authorized to review such 
records.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec.  23.606 because such standards seek to ensure that each SD and MSP 
captures and stores comprehensive information about their swap 
activities, and are able to retrieve and disclose such information as 
necessary for compliance with applicable law and for purposes of 
regulatory oversight.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the requirements of Swiss law and 
regulations with respect to the availability of information for 
inspection and disclosure, as specified above, are comparable to, and 
as comprehensive as, Sec.  23.606, with the exception of Sec.  
23.606(a)(2) concerning the requirement that an SD or MSP make 
information required by Sec.  23.606(a)(1) available promptly upon 
request to Commission staff and the staff of an applicable prudential 
regulator. The applicant has not submitted any provision of law or 
regulations applicable in Switzerland, upon which the Commission could 
make a finding that SDs and MSPs would be required to retrieve and 
disclose comprehensive information about their swap activities to the 
Commission or any U.S. prudential regulator as necessary for compliance 
with the CEA and Commission regulations, and for purposes of Commission 
oversight and the oversight of any U.S. prudential regulator.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of Swiss law and regulations are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.606(a)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
23.606 and the Swiss standards specified above are applicable would 
generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  23.606(a)(2) if that 
SD or MSP complies with the Swiss standards specified above, subject to 
compliance with the requirement that it produce information to 
Commission staff and the staff of an applicable U.S. prudential 
regulator in accordance with Sec.  23.606(a)(2).

C. Swap Data Recordkeeping (Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203)

    Commission Requirement: Sections 4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) of the 
CEA, and Commission regulation 23.201 generally require SDs and MSPs to 
retain records of each transaction, each position held, general 
business records (including records related to complaints and sales and 
marketing materials), records related to governance, financial records, 
records of data reported to swap data repositories (``SDRs''), and 
records of real-time reporting data along with a record of the date and 
time the SD or MSP made such reports. Transaction records must be kept 
in a form and manner identifiable and searchable by transaction and 
counterparty.
    Commission regulation 23.203, requires SDs and MSPs to maintain 
records of a swap transaction until the termination, maturity, 
expiration, transfer, assignment, or novation date of the transaction, 
and for a period of five years after such date. Records must be 
``readily accessible'' for the first 2 years of the 5 year retention 
period (consistent with Sec.  1.31).
    The Commission notes that the comparability determination below 
with respect to Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 encompasses both swap data 
recordkeeping generally and swap data recordkeeping relating to 
complaints and marketing and sales materials in accordance with Sec.  
23.201(b)(3) and (4).\54\
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    \54\ See the Guidance for a discussion of the availability of 
substituted compliance with respect to swap data recordkeeping, 78 
FR 45332-33.
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    Regulatory Objective: Through the Commission's regulations 
requiring SDs and MSPs to keep comprehensive records of their swap 
transactions and related data, the Commission seeks to ensure the 
effectiveness of the internal controls of SDs and MSPs, and 
transparency in the swaps market for regulators and market 
participants.
    The Commission's regulations require SDs and MSPs to keep swap data 
in a level of detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to 
understand an SD's or MSP's swaps business and to assess its swaps 
exposure.
    By requiring comprehensive records of swap data, the Commission 
seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk management, and 
strictly comply with Commission regulations. Further, such records 
facilitate effective regulatory oversight.
    The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the 
regulatory objective of Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 unless the 
required information is available to the Commission and any U.S. 
prudential regulator under the foreign legal regime. Thus, a 
comparability determination with respect to the information access 
provisions of Sec.  23.203 would be premised on whether the relevant 
information would be available to the Commission and any U.S. 
prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on whether an SD or MSP must 
disclose comprehensive information to its regulator in its home 
jurisdiction.
    Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented 
to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations 
applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect Switzerland, and 
comparable to and as comprehensive as sections 4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) 
of the CEA and Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203.
    Under Swiss law and FINMA Circulars, a banking entity is subject to 
extensive requirements regarding accounting records, which cover 
records of transactions in all areas of the bank's business, including 
its swaps business. Under the Swiss Code of Obligations,\55\ for 
example:
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    \55\ See supra note 51.
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     According to art. 957, a Swiss firm has to properly 
capture and maintain its books necessary to provide a fair view of its 
kind and size of business. Accounting records and business 
correspondence can be maintained in written or electronic format, 
provided the format ensures that the records adequately reflect 
business transactions;
     According to art. 962, accounts, accounting records, and 
business correspondence have to be retained for ten years;
     Pursuant to art. 713, all deliberations and decisions by 
the supervisory body have to be recorded in a protocol, signed by the 
Chairman and the secretary; and
     Pursuant to art. 747, the accounting records of a 
dissolved company are kept for ten years at a location designated by 
the liquidators or, if the liquidators cannot reach agreement, by the 
commercial registry.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law 
and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to 
Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.202 because such standards seek to ensure the 
effectiveness of the internal controls of SDs and MSPs, and 
transparency in the swaps market for regulators and market 
participants.
    In addition, the Commission finds that the Swiss laws and 
regulations specified above require SDs and MSPs to keep swap data in a 
level of detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to 
understand an SD's or MSP's swaps business and to assess its swaps 
exposure.

[[Page 78909]]

    Finally, the Commission finds that Swiss laws and regulations 
specified above, by requiring comprehensive records of swap data, seek 
to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk management, seek to 
ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with applicable regulatory 
requirements (including the CEA and Commission regulations), and that 
such records facilitate effective regulatory oversight.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the requirements of Swiss law and 
regulations with respect to the swap data recordkeeping, as specified 
above, are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, Sec. Sec.  23.201 
and 23.203, with the exception of Sec.  23.203(b)(2) concerning the 
requirement that an SD or MSPs make records required by Sec.  23.201 
open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the United 
States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential 
regulator. The applicant has not submitted any provision of law or 
regulations applicable in Switzerland, upon which the Commission could 
make a finding that SDs and MSPs would be required to make records 
required by Sec.  23.201 open to inspection by any representative of 
the Commission, the United States Department of Justice, or any 
applicable U.S. prudential regulator.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of Swiss law and regulations are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.203(b)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
23.203 and the Swiss law and regulations specified above are applicable 
would generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  23.203(b)(2) 
if that SD or MSP complies with the Swiss law and regulations specified 
above, subject to compliance with the requirement that it make records 
required by Sec.  23.201 open to inspection by any representative of 
the Commission, the United States Department of Justice, or any 
applicable U.S. prudential regulator in accordance with Sec.  
23.203(b)(2).

    Issued in Washington, DC on December 20, 2013, by the 
Commission.
Christopher J. Kirkpatrick,
Deputy Secretary of the Commission.

Appendices to Comparability Determination for Switzerland: Certain 
Entity-Level Requirements

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Chilton and 
Wetjen voted in the affirmative. Commissioner O'Malia voted in the 
negative.

Appendix 2--Joint Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler and Commissioners 
Bart Chilton and Mark Wetjen

    We support the Commission's approval of broad comparability 
determinations that will be used for substituted compliance 
purposes. For each of the six jurisdictions that has registered swap 
dealers, we carefully reviewed each regulatory provision of the 
foreign jurisdictions submitted to us and compared the provision's 
intended outcome to the Commission's own regulatory objectives. The 
resulting comparability determinations for entity-level requirements 
permit non-U.S. swap dealers to comply with regulations in their 
home jurisdiction as a substitute for compliance with the relevant 
Commission regulations.
    These determinations reflect the Commission's commitment to 
coordinating our efforts to bring transparency to the swaps market 
and reduce its risks to the public. The comparability findings for 
the entity-level requirements are a testament to the comparability 
of these regulatory systems as we work together in building a strong 
international regulatory framework.
    In addition, we are pleased that the Commission was able to find 
comparability with respect to swap-specific transaction-level 
requirements in the European Union and Japan.
    The Commission attained this benchmark by working cooperatively 
with authorities in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Switzerland to reach mutual agreement. The 
Commission looks forward to continuing to collaborate with both 
foreign authorities and market participants to build on this 
progress in the months and years ahead.

Appendix 3--Statement of Dissent by Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia

    I respectfully dissent from the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission's (``Commission'') approval of the Notices of 
Comparability Determinations for Certain Requirements under the laws 
of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Switzerland (collectively, ``Notices''). While I support the narrow 
comparability determinations that the Commission has made, moving 
forward, the Commission must collaborate with foreign regulators to 
harmonize our respective regimes consistent with the G-20 reforms.
    However, I cannot support the Notices because they: (1) Are 
based on the legally unsound cross-border guidance (``Guidance''); 
\1\ (2) are the result of a flawed substituted compliance process; 
and (3) fail to provide a clear path moving forward. If the 
Commission's objective for substituted compliance is to develop a 
narrow rule-by-rule approach that leaves unanswered major regulatory 
gaps between our regulatory framework and foreign jurisdictions, 
then I believe that the Commission has successfully achieved its 
goal today.
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    \1\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 26, 
2013).
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Determinations Based on Legally Unsound Guidance

    As I previously stated in my dissent, the Guidance fails to 
articulate a valid statutory foundation for its overbroad scope and 
inconsistently applies the statute to different activities.\2\ 
Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') states that the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction over foreign activities unless 
``those activities have a direct and significant connection with 
activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States * * *.'' 
\3\ However, the Commission never properly articulated how and when 
this limiting standard on the Commission's extraterritorial reach is 
met, which would trigger the application of Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act \4\ and any Commission regulations promulgated thereunder 
to swap activities that are outside of the United States. Given this 
statutorily unsound interpretation of the Commission's 
extraterritorial authority, the Commission often applies CEA section 
2(i) inconsistently and arbitrarily to foreign activities.
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    \2\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
    \3\ CEA section 2(i); 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
    \4\ Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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    Accordingly, because the Commission is relying on the legally 
deficient Guidance to make its substituted compliance 
determinations, and for the reasons discussed below, I cannot 
support the Notices. The Commission should have collaborated with 
foreign regulators to agree on and implement a workable regime of 
substituted compliance, and then should have made determinations 
pursuant to that regime.

Flawed Substituted Compliance Process

    Substituted compliance should not be a case of picking a set of 
foreign rules identical to our rules, determining them to be 
``comparable,'' but then making no determination regarding rules 
that require extensive gap analysis to assess to what extent each 
jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable based on overall outcomes of 
the regulatory regimes. While I support the narrow comparability 
determinations that the Commission has made, I am concerned that in 
a rush to provide some relief, the Commission has made substituted 
compliance determinations that only afford narrow relief and fail to 
address major regulatory gaps between our domestic regulatory 
framework and foreign jurisdictions. I will address a few examples 
below.
    First, earlier this year, the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group 
(``ODRG'') agreed to a number of substantive understandings to 
improve the cross-border implementation of over-the-counter 
derivatives reforms.\5\ The ODRG specifically agreed that a 
flexible, outcomes-based approach, based on a broad

[[Page 78910]]

category-by-category basis, should form the basis of comparability 
determinations.\6\
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    \5\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6678-13.
    \6\ http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/odrgreport.pdf. The ODRG agreed to six understandings. 
Understanding number 2 states that ``[a] flexible, outcomes-based 
approach should form the basis of final assessments regarding 
equivalence or substituted compliance.''
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    However, instead of following this approach, the Commission has 
made its comparability determinations on a rule-by-rule basis. For 
example, in Japan's Comparability Determination for Transaction-
Level Requirements, the Commission has made a positive comparability 
determination for some of the detailed requirements under the swap 
trading relationship documentation provisions, but not for other 
requirements.\7\ This detailed approach clearly contravenes the 
ODRG's understanding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The Commission made a positive comparability determination 
for Commission regulations 23.504(a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), 
(b)(4), (c), and (d), but not for Commission regulations 
23.504(b)(5) and (b)(6).
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    Second, in several areas, the Commission has declined to 
consider a request for a comparability determination, and has also 
failed to provide an analysis regarding the extent to which the 
other jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable. For example, the 
Commission has declined to address or provide any clarity regarding 
the European Union's regulatory data reporting determination, even 
though the European Union's reporting regime is set to begin on 
February 12, 2014. Although the Commission has provided some limited 
relief with respect to regulatory data reporting, the lack of 
clarity creates unnecessary uncertainty, especially when the 
European Union's reporting regime is set to begin in less than two 
months.
    Similarly, Japan receives no consideration for its mandatory 
clearing requirement, even though the Commission considers Japan's 
legal framework to be comparable to the U.S. framework. While the 
Commission has declined to provide even a partial comparability 
determination, at least in this instance the Commission has provided 
a reason: the differences in the scope of entities and products 
subject to the clearing requirement.\8\ Such treatment creates 
uncertainty and is contrary to increased global harmonization 
efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Yen-denominated interest rate swaps are subject to the 
mandatory clearing requirement in both the U.S. and Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, in the Commission's rush to meet the artificial deadline 
of December 21, 2013, as established in the Exemptive Order 
Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (``Exemptive 
Order''),\9\ the Commission failed to complete an important piece of 
the cross-border regime, namely, supervisory memoranda of 
understanding (``MOUs'') between the Commission and fellow 
regulators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap 
Regulations, 78 FR 43785 (Jul. 22, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I have previously stated that these MOUs, if done right, can be 
a key part of the global harmonization effort because they provide 
mutually agreed-upon solutions for differences in regulatory 
regimes.\10\ Accordingly, I stated that the Commission should be 
able to review MOUs alongside the respective comparability 
determinations and vote on them at the same time. Without these 
MOUs, our fellow regulators are left wondering whether and how any 
differences, such as direct access to books and records, will be 
resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, as I have consistently maintained, the substituted 
compliance process should allow other regulatory bodies to engage 
with the full Commission.\11\ While I am pleased that the Notices 
are being voted on by the Commission, the full Commission only 
gained access to the comment letters from foreign regulators on the 
Commission's comparability determination draft proposals a few days 
ago. This is hardly a transparent process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unclear Path Forward

    Looking forward to next steps, the Commission must provide 
answers to several outstanding questions regarding these 
comparability determinations. In doing so, the Commission must 
collaborate with foreign regulators to increase global 
harmonization.
    First, there is uncertainty surrounding the timing and outcome 
of the MOUs. Critical questions regarding information sharing, 
cooperation, supervision, and enforcement will remain unanswered 
until the Commission and our fellow regulators execute these MOUs.
    Second, the Commission has issued time-limited no-action relief 
for the swap data repository reporting requirements. These 
comparability determinations will be done as separate notices. 
However, the timing and process for these determinations remain 
uncertain.
    Third, the Commission has failed to provide clarity on the 
process for addressing the comparability determinations that it 
declined to undertake at this time. The Notices only state that the 
Commission may address these requests in a separate notice at a 
later date given further developments in the law and regulations of 
other jurisdictions. To promote certainty in the financial markets, 
the Commission must provide a clear path forward for market 
participants and foreign regulators.
    The following steps would be a better approach: (1) The 
Commission should extend the Exemptive Order to allow foreign 
regulators to further implement their regulatory regimes and 
coordinate with them to implement a harmonized substituted 
compliance process; (2) the Commission should implement a flexible, 
outcomes-based approach to the substituted compliance process and 
apply it similarly to all jurisdictions; and (3) the Commission 
should work closely with our fellow regulators to expeditiously 
implement MOUs that resolve regulatory differences and address 
regulatory oversight issues.

Conclusion

    While I support the narrow comparability determinations that the 
Commission has made, it was my hope that the Commission would work 
with foreign regulators to implement a substituted compliance 
process that would increase the global harmonization effort. I am 
disappointed that the Commission has failed to implement such a 
process.
    I do believe that in the longer term, the swaps regulations of 
the major jurisdictions will converge. At this time, however, the 
Commission's comparability determinations have done little to 
alleviate the burden of regulatory uncertainty and duplicative 
compliance with both U.S. and foreign regulations.
    The G-20 process delineated and put in place the swaps market 
reforms in G-20 member nations. It is then no surprise that the 
Commission must learn to coordinate with foreign regulators to 
minimize confusion and disruption in bringing much needed clarity to 
the swaps market. For all these shortcomings, I respectfully dissent 
from the Commission's approval of the Notices.

[FR Doc. 2013-30978 Filed 12-26-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```