Opinion filed February 9, 2023

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-21-00243-CR

__________

WILLIAM DAVID CRUTHIRD, III, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 50th District Court

Baylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 5784

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, William David Cruthird, III, was indicted for the offense of arson, 

a second-degree felony, enhanced with a prior felony conviction. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(2)(A) (West 2019). The jury found Appellant guilty of the 

charged offense, found the enhancement allegation to be true, and assessed his 

punishment at 40 years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. 
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On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

During the early morning hours of January 12, 2021, Appellant and his 

girlfriend got into an argument while they were at the residence of Kristen Logan, 

Appellant’s girlfriend’s sister. Appellant’s girlfriend and son were living with 

Logan in Seymour, and Appellant had stayed there overnight. Following the 

argument, Appellant requested the keys to a maroon 2005 Chrysler Sebring; his 

request was refused. Appellant then went outside and began yelling and striking 

multiple vehicles that were parked at Logan’s residence. Logan looked outside

through the window to determine the cause of the disturbance and observed 

Appellant “dropping the gas can and lighting the car.” She then saw Appellant pour 

gasoline on another vehicle. Logan thereafter called 9-1-1 to report the disturbance. 

Logan testified that she saw Appellant use a cigarette lighter to ignite the gasoline

that he had poured on the vehicles, which resulted in a medium-sized flame 

appearing on the maroon vehicle that quickly burned out.

William Cruthird IV, Appellant’s son, also observed the incident. William

testified that he saw Appellant pour “something” on the vehicles that were parked 

outside and use a lighter to cause a “spark” that became more than a spark. William

then ran outside the house to stop Appellant and heard Appellant yelling: “I’m going 

to light this on fire” and “I’m going to burn it.” 

The chief of police of the City of Seymour, John Michael Griffin, arrived 

shortly thereafter. Chief Griffin testified that when he arrived at Logan’s residence, 

he observed Appellant walking around the vehicles that were parked in front of the 

house, and he smelled the odor of gasoline on Appellant’s person. Chief Griffin’s

body camera footage revealed that Appellant told Chief Griffin that he was “fixin’ 

to burn” the vehicle that Appellant’s girlfriend would not let him use. Appellant also
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told Chief Griffin that he had poured gasoline on that vehicle. Chief Griffin then 

arrested Appellant for arson. 

II. Standard of Review

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of 

whether it is denominated as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the 

standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v.

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 

288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we 

review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 

330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence 

admitted at trial and defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ 

credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Winfrey v. State, 393 

S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v. 

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This standard accounts for the 

factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to 

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility 

of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. 

State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports 

conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor 

of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; 

Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 

S.W.3d at 778.
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Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial 

evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. 

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as 

probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without 

more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does 

not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. 

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating 

circumstances may be sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in 

evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of 

the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. 

State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 

III. Analysis

In a single issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the evidence 

presented at trial does not establish that he started a fire or caused an ignition because 

(1) there was no evidence of a fire, (2) absent some evidence of damage to the 

vehicle, his conduct cannot amount to more than attempted arson, and (3) the 

absence of a definition for the term “ignition” results in an ambiguous statute that 

leads to absurd results. 

A person commits the offense of arson “if the person starts a fire, regardless 

of whether the fire continues after ignition, or causes an explosion” with the intent 

to destroy or damage any vehicle and while knowing that the vehicle is located 

within the limits of an incorporated city or town. PENAL § 28.02(a)(2)(A). The 

offense of arson is complete when the actor starts a fire with the requisite culpable 

mental state, even if no damage flows from the prohibited act. Romo v. State, 593 

S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980), overruled on other grounds 
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by Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303, 313 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1984); 

Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). 

First, Appellant argues that there is no evidence that a fire occurred. However, 

both Logan and William testified that they saw Appellant start a fire. Logan saw

Appellant pour gasoline onto the maroon vehicle and then use a cigarette lighter to 

ignite the gasoline, which resulted in a medium-sized fire. During one of her 

conversations with the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Logan stated that Appellant was trying to 

catch the vehicle on fire; she also reported that “it’s [the car] already lit.” In a 

subsequent call to 9-1-1, Logan explained that the car was not currently on fire and 

that she believed the cold weather had prevented the fire from burning for a longer 

period of time.

Similarly, William saw Appellant pour “something” on the vehicles and then 

use a lighter to cause a spark. When asked whether the vehicle caught on fire, 

William stated that “it definitely did.” Further, Appellant confirmed that he poured 

gasoline on the vehicles and threatened to burn them. Appellant testified that the 

lighter sparked but that no flame ever appeared on the vehicle. 

The actus reus of the offense of arson, as recited in the arson statute, is that 

“the person starts a fire, regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition.” 

PENAL § 28.02(a) (emphasis added). Logan and William testified that they observed

Appellant start a fire on the vehicle by holding a lighter to the gasoline that he had 

poured onto to the vehicle; however, the fire did not continue after its original 

ignition. While Appellant testified that only the lighter ignited, not the gasoline, the 

jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is 

to be afforded. See Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. 

Appellant’s inconsistent testimony does not cause the jury’s verdict to be lacking in 

sufficiency; the 9-1-1 recordings and the testimony provided by Logan and William

are sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Because the jury was free to believe 
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or disbelieve all, some, or none of the testimony presented, we may presume that the 

jury resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict. See Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

Second, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction because, absent some evidence of damage to the vehicle, his conduct

cannot amount to more than attempted arson. In this regard, Appellant contends that 

without some level of “burning-damage-combustion” to the vehicle, Appellant’s 

conduct is indistinguishable from an attempt to commit arson. However, to satisfy 

the statutory elements of the charged offense, damage to the vehicle is not required; 

it is only the actor’s intent to damage the vehicle that is of significance. As we have 

said, the offense of arson is complete when a person “starts a fire.” Romo, 593 

S.W.2d at 693; Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 689. Starting a fire requires an ignition and 

nothing more. PENAL § 28.02(a) (“regardless of whether the fire continues after 

ignition”). As such, we decline to expand the scope of the arson statute, as Appellant 

suggests, to include evidence of damage to the vehicle as a required element of the 

offense. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“Where 

the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean 

what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a 

statute.” (quoting Coit v. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991))).

Importantly, Appellant’s conduct is distinguishable from an attempt to 

commit arson, because he ignited the gasoline. Furthermore, and although not 

required to support Appellant’s conviction, evidence of damage to the vehicle is 

supported by the record. Chief Griffin testified that he observed scorch marks on 

the hood of the vehicle that Appellant ignited. Logan testified that there were 

markings on the vehicle after the incident that were not present the day before. Thus, 

there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could have inferred and found that 

Appellant’s conduct constituted arson, rather than attempted arson.
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Finally, Appellant argues that the term “ignition,” at least in the manner used 

to convict him in this case, is unclear or ambiguous and leads to absurd results. 

Appellant contends that a reasonable interpretation of the term “ignition” within the 

context of Section 28.02(a) requires that the object of the intended burning must

have been affected in some way. Statutory interpretation is necessary when the 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence turns on the meaning of the statute under which the 

defendant has been prosecuted. Pruett v. State, 510 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2017). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. 

Pruett, 510 S.W.3d at 927; Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015). “We interpret a statute according to the plain meaning of its language unless 

the statute is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the 

Legislature could not possibly have intended.” Pruett, 510 S.W.3d at 927. 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we conclude that the term “ignition” as 

used in Section 28.02(a) is unambiguous. Ignition, while not statutorily defined, is 

not reasonably susceptible to more than one plain meaning or understanding in this 

context. See Cortez, 469 S.W.3d at 598 (statutory language was ambiguous because 

a key word was not statutorily defined and reasonably susceptible to more than one

meaning and understanding in the context). The prohibited act under Section 28.02 

is to “start a fire.” The phrase “regardless of whether the fire continues after 

ignition” clarifies the legislature’s intent that the prohibited act is complete 

whenever the actor starts a fire, irrespective of whether damage of any kind results

therefrom. PENAL § 28.02(a); see Romo, 593 S.W.2d at 693. Therefore, because the 

statute only requires that the actor must start a fire and intend for it to either cause 

damage or destruction, the combination of these events forecloses the possibility of 

any absurd result. 

Moreover, the plain meaning of “ignition” in Section 28.02(a) when read in 

proper context does not lead to absurd results. Thus, we may not go beyond the text 
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of the statute in our interpretation and application of it. See Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at

786. We hold, therefore, that the term “ignition” within the context of 

Section 28.02(a) means to start a fire; there is no requirement that the object of the 

fire must have been damaged. In this regard, the only relevant culpable mental state 

is the actor’s intent to cause damage. It follows, then, that the evidence adduced by 

the State is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction under Section 28.02(a).

We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict 

and conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury 

could have inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty 

of the offense of arson as charged in the indictment. Accordingly, we overrule 

Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

IV. This Court’s Ruling 

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

W. STACY TROTTER

JUSTICE

February 9, 2023

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.