Filed 2/26/21 P. v. Higginson CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THEODORE RONALD HIGGINSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

B301820

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. MA075715)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.

Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Pursuant to a negotiated plea, defendant and appellant 

Theodore Ronald Higginson pled no contest to violation of Penal 

Code section 422, subdivision (a).

1 We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Porschea Alley and Higginson had dated for seven years 

and had an infant daughter together. They broke up in October 

2018. In February 2019, Alley was dating someone else.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on February 15, 2019, Alley 

and Higginson were outside Alley’s apartment, talking. 

According to Alley’s statements to a police officer after she called 

911 the next afternoon, she and Higginson argued. He shouted, 

“ ‘Bitch, let me get my daughter,’ ” and threatened to kill her. He 

started his car and drove toward her. She had to jump out of the 

way to avoid being hit, and the car came within five feet of her. 

Alley believed Higginson was going to hit her with the car.

At the preliminary hearing, Alley testified that she and 

Higginson had been arguing because he wanted to take their 

newborn daughter to his residence. Alley refused, because she 

disliked a woman who was at his home that evening. She falsely 

reported that Higginson threatened her and tried to run her over. 

She “wanted to put him in jail because [she] was upset that he 

had this girlfriend.”

In an information filed on March 26, 2019, Higginson was 

charged with assault with a deadly weapon, a vehicle (§ 245, 

subd. (a)(1), count 1) and making a criminal threat (§ 422, 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.

2 Because Higginson pled no contest before trial, we derive 

the facts from the preliminary hearing transcript.
3

subd. (a), count 2). The information alleged, as to both offenses, 

that Higginson personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon 

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and had suffered two prior serious or 

violent felony convictions. (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).)

On April 24, 2019, Higginson declined the services of a 

private attorney, apparently retained on his behalf by his family, 

because Higginson did not wish to waive time and retained 

counsel would have required a brief continuance. Appointed 

defense counsel expressed concern about Higginson’s competency. 

The trial court, Judge Charles A. Chung, asked Higginson a 

series of questions, concluded he was “perfectly lucid,” and 

declined to declare a doubt. In response, counsel stated that 

Higginson’s family had told him Higginson spent time in 

Atascadero Mental Hospital, and it appeared he was receiving 

mental health treatment in jail. In counsel’s view, Higginson 

appeared very suspicious and seemed to have difficulty making 

decisions. Although Higginson appeared “on a very minimal level 

to be oriented” and generally knew what was going on, counsel 

did not feel Higginson could fully assist in his defense. He 

seemed unable to “fully grasp the various decisions to be made in 

the case. For example, to have a private lawyer or myself. It just 

seems very difficult for him.” The court replied, “My ruling 

stands. I haven’t heard anything that is compelling to the court 

to declare a doubt. I know there is some concern about whether 

he is competent because of his decision making process in terms 

of the choice of attorneys. I actually find that there is a great 

clarity in that. He seems to fully understand that if he were to go 

with [private counsel], that would entail a time waiver. And he’s 

made it very clear he does not want to waive time. I think 

demanding a right to a speedy trial, which is a constitutional 
4

right and making decisions on that compelling interest makes 

him incredibly rational, not necessarily incompetent.”

The matter was transferred to a courtroom for trial, with 

Judge Kathleen Blanchard presiding. On May 17, 2019, 

pursuant to a negotiated disposition, and after being advised of 

and waiving his rights to a trial, to confrontation, and against 

self-incrimination, Higginson pled no contest to count 2, making 

a criminal threat. Higginson also admitted suffering a “strike” 

conviction for making a criminal threat in 2009. Counsel 

concurred in the plea. The trial court found Higginson’s waivers 

were knowingly, understandingly, and intelligently made, and 

that there was a factual basis for the plea. Pursuant to the 

parties’ agreement, Higginson’s case was sent to a different 

courtroom for determination of his eligibility for the Alternative 

Resources Court (A.R.C.) program. If not accepted, he would be 

sentenced to four years in prison. In accordance with the 

negotiated plea, the court struck a remaining prior strike 

allegation.

On June 19, 2019, Judge Christopher G. Estes found 

Higginson ineligible or unsuitable for “mental health court.”

On July 9, 2019, Judge Blanchard granted a continuance to 

allow defense counsel to seek an alternative treatment program 

for Higginson. However, Higginson was not accepted into the

treatment program counsel had identified.

On August 19, 2019,3 in accordance with the plea 

agreement, the court sentenced Higginson to the midterm of two 

3 Also on August 19, 2019, at defense counsel’s request, the 

court conducted an ex parte hearing with counsel. The transcript 

of that hearing, which we have reviewed, was sealed.

Accordingly, we do not further discuss it here.
5

years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, for a total of 

four years in prison, with credit for 373 days in custody. It 

imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a suspended 

parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount (§ 1202.45), 

a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a 

$30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). The 

court dismissed count 1, assault with a deadly weapon. It 

observed that defense counsel had made “extraordinary efforts” 

to find a placement program for Higginson.

Higginson timely appealed. As far as the record reflects, he 

did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

After review of the record, Higginson’s court-appointed 

counsel filed an opening brief that raised no issues, and 

requested that this court conduct an independent review of the 

record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. 

Appellant was advised that he had 30 days to submit by brief or 

letter any contentions or argument he wished this court to 

consider. We have received no response.

Pursuant to section 1237.5 and California Rules of Court,

rule 8.304(b), a criminal defendant who appeals following a plea

of no contest or guilty, without a certificate of probable cause,

may only challenge the denial of a motion to suppress evidence or

raise grounds arising after the entry of the plea that do not affect

the plea’s validity. (People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668,

676–677 & fn. 3; People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 43.) With

respect to sentencing or post-plea issues that do not in substance

challenge the validity of the plea itself, we have examined the

record and are satisfied no arguable issues exist and Higginson’s

attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel. 
6

(People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 125–126; People v. Wende,

supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–442.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

DHANIDINA, J.