J-S33025-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM D. TURNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2639 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1007161-1980

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2020

William D. Turner (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order denying his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court treated as an untimely 

serial petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

A prior panel of this Court summarized:

On February 20, 1981, a jury convicted Appellant of firstdegree murder and possessing instruments of crime.[1]

 The court 

imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on March 18, 1982. On 

May 20, 1983, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Turner, 460 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. 1983) 

(unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied 

allowance of appeal on September 21, 1983 []. Appellant did not 

pursue further direct review.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502 and 907.
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On December 19, 1983, Appellant filed a pro se petition for 

post-conviction relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, the 

PCRA’s predecessor. The court appointed counsel, who filed an 

amended petition, and the court subsequently denied relief. On 

February 16, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to modify sentence, 

which the court treated as a serial PCRA petition. The court issued 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on August 10, 2012; Appellant 

responded, and on September 13, 2012, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s petition. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of 

appeal on September 24, 2012.

Commonwealth v. Turner, 2758 EDA 2012, 1-2 (Pa. Super. Dec. 9, 2013) 

(footnotes added and omitted).

On December 9, 2013, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order 

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. See id. at 3. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of 

appeal on July 28, 2014.

On November 7, 2014, Appellant filed the underlying pro se petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. Appellant filed two amendments to his petition on 

February 20, 2015 and April 1, 2016, respectively. On June 23, 2016, 

Appellant filed a motion to compel a habeas corpus hearing.

The PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition 

pursuant to Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure on July 

19, 2019. Appellant did not file a response or an amended petition. On August 

21, 2019, the PCRA court entered an order denying relief on the basis that it 

lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition because it was an 

untimely PCRA petition. See PCRA Court Order, 8/21/19; see also PCRA

Court Opinion, 10/28/19, at 1-2. Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal to this 
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Court. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Appellant presents three issues for review: 

I. WHETHER THE [PCRA] COURT ABUSE[D] ITS DISCRETION 

BY SUSPENDING A STATE HABEAS CORPUS WHEN ONE IS 

CHALLENGING THE LEGALITY OF THEIR CONFINEMENT 

ONCE THE ELEMENTS OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS NOT 

SATISFIED WITH DUE PROCESS CONCERNS?

II. WHETHER THE [PCRA COURT] ABUSE[D] IT[S] DISCRETION 

IN [ITS] OPINION BY NOT ADDRESSING [APPELLANT’S] 

OBJECTIONS ON WHY HE SHOULD BE HEARD ON ERROR OF 

LAW AND PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS ONCE HABEAS SET 

FOR FIVE YEARS UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATE JUDGE WAS 

WRITTEN TO RELATING TO NOT OFFERING A DEAL BEFORE 

TRIAL[,] ACTUAL INNOCENCE EVIDENCE NOT HEARD BY 

THE JURY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S KEY WITNESS 

PROBATION STATUS FOR BIAS AND MOTIVE NOT HEARD BY 

THE JURY OR ADDRESS THE RIGHT-TO-KNOW MATERIAL 

UNDER 42 PA. C.S § 9545(b), SINCE THE HABEAS WAS 

SUSPENDED?

III. DID THE [PCRA COURT] ABUSE ITS DISCRETION ONCE/BY 

APPLYING THE 42 PA. C.S.[]§ 9545(b) STANDARD EVEN 

[THOUGH] THERE WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE ERROR BEFORE 

THAT COURT ONCE TRIAL COUNSEL WENT IN TO IN 

CAMERA STATING HIS WITNESS TESTIMONY WAS FALSE 

ALTHOUGH OTHER COUNSELS WERE IN THE COURT ROOM 

BY THIS MOCKERY THE COMMONWEALTH’S CASE WASN’T 

PUT TO PROPER/MEANINGFUL ADVERSARIAL TEST, 

ALLOWING COMMONWEALTH TO VOUCH FOR ITS KEY 

WITNESS WITH FALSE INFORMATION, THEN ALLOWED THE 

COMMONWEALTH TO ASK [APPELLANT] ABOUT A NONCONVICTION, ALSO TOLD TRIAL COUNSEL TO USE SUCH 

AGAINST THE D.A.[‘s] WITNESS AND INSTRUCTION ON 

DEADLY WEAPON ON VITAL PART OF THE BODY WENT 

UNCHECK[ED]?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.
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Prior to addressing Appellant’s issues, we must determine whether we 

have jurisdiction. Appellant identified his filing as a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus and the trial court construed the petition as a serial PCRA petition. Our 

Supreme Court has held that “the PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, 

including habeas corpus, to the extent a remedy is available under such 

enactment.” Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) 

(emphasis in original). From the best we can discern, it appears Appellant is 

challenging his first-degree murder conviction. See Appellant’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus, 11/7/14, at 2-3 (arguing the “intentional killing” 

element of his first-degree murder conviction was never satisfied); see also

Appellant’s Concise Statement, 10/10/19, at 1 (“[Appellant] is challenging the 

elements of first degree murder was [sic] not satisfied.”). Our Supreme Court 

has held that a claim attacking a petitioner’s underlying conviction falls within 

the ambit of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 986 

(Pa. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Stout, 978 A.2d 984, 988 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (applying for a writ of habeas corpus as a tactical choice to evade 

the timeliness requirements of the PCRA is not permitted). Consequently, the 

trial court was correct in construing Appellant’s habeas petition as a serial 

PCRA petition. We therefore consider the petition’s timeliness.

“Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an 

untimely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 

(Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 

1161 (Pa. 2003)). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one year of 
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the date on which the petitioner’s judgment became final, unless one of the 

three statutory exceptions applies:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner must file a petition invoking one of 

these exceptions “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented.”

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 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If a petition is untimely, and the 

petitioner has not pled and proven any exception, “neither this Court nor the 

trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply 

do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.” 

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2 Act 146 of 2018 amended 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), effective December 

2018, and now provides that a PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception 

must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been 

presented. Previously, a petitioner had 60 days from when the claim could 

have been presented. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 2 and § 3. 

Section 3 of Act 2018 provides that the amendment to subsection (b)(2) “shall 

apply only to claims arising one year before the effective date . . . or 

thereafter.” Id. As Appellant’s petition was filed on November 7, 2014, the 

change does not impact Appellant or our analysis.
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Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006)).

In this case, the trial court sentenced Appellant on March 18, 1982. This 

Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on May 20, 1983, and our Supreme 

Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on September 21, 1983. 

Because Appellant did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States 

Supreme Court, his judgment of sentence became final on November 21, 

1983, 60 days3 after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of 

appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating that a judgment of sentence 

becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review”). As 

explained above, Appellant had one year – until November 21, 1984 – to file 

a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant filed the 

underlying petition on November 7, 2014, almost 30 years later. Accordingly, 

the petition is patently untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to decide the merits 

unless Appellant has pled and proved one of the three timeliness exceptions 

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3 See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20 (effective June 30, 1980; amended August 1, 1984 at 

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1) (allowing 60 days to file petition for writ of certiorari). 

United States Supreme Court Rule 13 is the current rule, which allows 90 days 

to file a petition for writ of certiorari. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Sixty days from 

September 21, 1983 was Sunday, November 20, 1983. Therefore, the time 

period for Appellant seeking review by the United States Supreme Court 

expired on Monday, November 21, 1983. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 30.
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of section 9545(b)(1). See Derrickson, 923 A.2d at 468. Our review reveals 

that Appellant did not attempt to plead or prove any of the timeliness 

exceptions. See Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 11/7/14; see 

also Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/19, at 4 (“[Appellant] does not plead an 

exception to the timeliness requirement, nor does a liberal reading of 

[Appellant’s] claims make out an exception to the timeliness requirement.”). 

As Appellant has failed to plead and prove an exception under section 

9545(b)(1), we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of this appeal. See

Derrickson, 923 A.2d at 468.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/31/20