Case: 1:22-cv-01690 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/31/22 Page 1 of 29 PageID #:1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION and PEOPLE OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

NORTH AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, 

INC., also d/b/a Ed Napleton Automotive Group, a 

corporation, 

ED NAPLETON ELMHURST IMPORTS, INC., a 

corporation, also d/b/a Napleton’s Kia of Elmhurst/Ed 

Napleton Acura, 

NAPLETON’S ARLINGTON HEIGHTS MOTORS, 

INC., a corporation, also d/b/a Napleton’s Arlington 

Heights Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, 

NAPLETON’S NORTH PALM AUTO PARK, INC., a 

corporation, also d/b/a Napleton’s Northlake Chrysler 

Dodge Jeep Ram, 

NAPLETON ENTERPRISES, LLC, a limited liability 

company, also d/b/a Napleton’s South 

Orlando/Kissimmee Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, 

CLERMONT MOTORS, LLC, a limited liability 

company, also d/b/a Napleton’s Clermont Chrysler 

Dodge Jeep Ram, 

NORTH PALM MOTORS, LLC, a limited liability 

company, also d/b/a Napleton’s Northlake Kia, 

NAPLETON’S ELLWOOD MOTORS, INC., a 

corporation, also d/b/a Napleton’s Ellwood Chrysler 

Dodge Jeep Ram, 

NAPLETON MID RIVERS IMPORTS, INC., a 

corporation, also d/b/a Napleton’s Mid Rivers Kia, and 

Case No. ____________ 

COMPLAINT FOR 

PERMANENT 

INJUNCTION, 

MONETARY RELIEF, 

AND OTHER RELIEF 

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HITKO KADRIC, 

Defendants. 

Plaintiffs, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the People of the State of Illinois, 

by KWAME RAOUL, Illinois Attorney General, for their Complaint allege: 

1. The FTC brings this action under Sections 13(b) and 19 of the Federal Trade 

Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), 57b, and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j, and its implementing Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. Part 226, and the Equal 

Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, which authorize the FTC to seek, 

and the Court to order, permanent injunctive relief, monetary relief, and other relief for 

Defendants’ acts or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) and 

the TILA and its implementing Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226, and the ECOA and its 

implementing Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202. Defendants’ violations are in connection with the 

advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale, lease, or financing, or sale, lease or 

financing of vehicles. 

2. The People of the State of Illinois, as part of the same case or controversy, also 

bring this action pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 

815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., (“Consumer Fraud Act”) and the Illinois Motor Vehicle Advertising 

Regulations, 14 Ill. Adm. Code 475.110 et seq., to obtain restitution, injunctive and other 

equitable relief and penalties. 

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SUMMARY OF CASE 

3. In the course of promoting, advertising, marketing, selling, leasing, or financing 

vehicles, in addition to charging consumers for the vehicles themselves, Defendants charge 

consumers for additional products and services (“add-on” or “add-on products”), such as service 

contracts, GAP insurance, or paint protection. Add-on charges can range from a hundred dollars 

to well over a thousand dollars, substantially increasing the cost of a vehicle—and auto 

dealerships’ profits on a sale. In many instances, Defendants tack on charges for add-ons in 

consumers’ contracts without their informed consent. In other instances, Defendants mention 

add-ons, but falsely tell consumers they are mandatory. Further, Corporate Defendants have a 

discretionary policy that permits its employees to mark up interest rates and tack on charges for 

add-on products, resulting in higher costs to Black applicants than similarly-situated non-Latino 

White applicants. Defendant Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR and Hitko Kadric have 

violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and Illinois Motor Vehicle Advertising Regulations by 

placing prohibited coupon offers in their advertising material and have violated these statutes and 

the TILA by failing to provide disclosures where required. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), 

and 1345. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court with respect to the 

supplemental state law claims of the State of Illinois by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

5. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), (c)(1), (c)(2), and 

(d), and 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 

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PLAINTIFFS 

6. The FTC is an independent agency of the United States Government created by 

the FTC Act, which authorizes the FTC to commence this district court civil action by its own 

attorneys. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58. The FTC enforces Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 

The FTC also enforces the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, which, inter alia, prohibits 

discrimination on the basis of race or color, and the TILA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j, which 

establishes, inter alia, certain disclosure requirements for advertisements promoting closed-end 

credit transactions. 

7. The Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Kwame Raoul, is charged, inter 

alia, with the enforcement of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Illinois Motor Vehicle 

Advertising Regulations promulgated thereunder (815 ILCS 505/7, 815 ILCS 505/4). 

8. The Illinois Attorney General believes this action to be in the public interest of the 

citizens of the State of Illinois and brings this lawsuit pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud 

and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/7(a). 

DEFENDANTS 

9. Defendant North American Automotive Services, Inc., also doing business as Ed 

Napleton Automotive Group (“Napleton Auto Group”), is an Illinois corporation with its 

principal place of business at One Oakbrook Terrace, Suite 600, Oakbrook Terrace, IL 60181. 

North American Automotive Services, Inc. transacts or has transacted business in this District 

and throughout the United States. 

10. Defendant Ed Napleton Elmhurst Imports, Inc., also doing business as Napleton’s 

Kia of Elmhurst/Ed Napleton Acura (“Napleton’s Elmhurst Kia/Acura”), is an Illinois 

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corporation with its principal place of business at 745 W Lake St, Elmhurst, IL 60126. Ed 

Napleton Elmhurst Imports, Inc. transacts or has transacted business in this District and 

throughout the United States. 

11. Defendant Napleton’s Arlington Heights Motors, Inc., also doing business as 

Arlington Heights Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (“Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR”), is an 

Illinois corporation with its principal place of business at 1155 W Dundee Rd, Arlington Heights, 

IL 60004. Napleton’s Arlington Heights Motors, Inc. transacts or has transacted business in this 

District and throughout the United States. 

12. Defendant Napleton’s North Palm Auto Park, Inc., also doing business as 

Napleton’s Northlake Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (“Napleton’s Northlake CDJR”), is a Florida 

corporation with its principal place of business at 3701 Northlake Blvd, Lake Park, FL 33403. 

13. Defendant Napleton Enterprises, LLC, also doing business as Napleton’s South 

Orlando/Kissimmee Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (“Napleton’s Kissimmee CJDR”), is a Florida 

limited liability company with its principal place of business at 1460 E Osceola Pkwy, 

Kissimmee, FL 34744. 

14. Defendant Clermont Motors, LLC, also doing business as Napleton’s Clermont 

Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (“Napleton’s Clermont CDJR”), is a Florida limited liability company 

with its principal place of business at 15859 State Road 50, Clermont, FL 34711. 

15. Defendant North Palm Motors, LLC, also doing business as Napleton’s Northlake 

Kia (“Napleton’s Northlake Kia”), is a Florida limited liability company with its principal place 

of business at 3626 Northlake Blvd, Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33403. 

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16. Defendant Napleton’s Ellwood Motors, Inc., also doing business as Napleton’s 

Ellwood Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (“Napleton’s Ellwood CJDR”), is a Pennsylvania corporation 

with its principal place of business at 1000 Lawrence Ave, Ellwood City, PA 16117. 

17. Defendant Napleton’s Mid Rivers Imports, Inc., also doing business as Napleton’s 

Mid Rivers Kia (“Napleton’s Mid Rivers Kia”), is a Missouri corporation with its principal place 

of business at 4955 Veterans Memorial Pkwy, St Peters, MO 63376. 

18. Defendant Hitko Kadric (“Kadric”) is the General Manager of Napleton’s 

Arlington Heights CDJR and Napleton’s Elmhurst Kia/Acura. At all times relevant to this 

Complaint, acting alone or in concert with others, he has formulated, directed, controlled, had the 

authority to control, or participated in the acts and practices set forth in this Complaint. 

Defendant Kadric resides in this District and, in connection with the matters alleged herein, 

transacts or has transacted business in this District. 

COMMON ENTERPRISE 

19. Defendants Napleton Auto Group, Napleton’s Elmhurst Kia/Acura, Napleton’s 

Arlington Heights CDJR, Napleton’s Northlake CDJR, Napleton’s Kissimmee CJDR, Napleton’s 

Clermont CDJR, Napleton’s Northlake Kia, Napleton’s Ellwood CJDR, and Napleton’s Mid 

Rivers Kia (collectively, “Corporate Defendants”) have operated as a common enterprise while 

engaging in the deceptive and unfair acts and practices alleged below. Corporate Defendants 

have conducted the business practices described below through an interrelated network of 

companies that have common ownership, officers, managers, business functions, and employees. 

Because these Corporate Defendants have operated as a common enterprise, each of them is 

liable for the acts and practices alleged below. 

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COMMERCE 

20. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants have maintained a substantial 

course of trade in or affecting commerce, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 44. 

21. Subsection 1(f) of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act defines “trade” and 

“commerce” as follows: 

The terms ‘trade’ and ‘commerce’ mean the advertising, offering for sale, 

sale, or distribution of any service and any property, tangible or intangible, 

real, personal, or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of 

value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly 

or indirectly affecting the people of this State. 815 ILCS 505/1(f). 

22. Defendants Napleton Auto Group, Napleton’s Elmhurst Kia/Acura, and 

Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR were at all times relevant to the Complaint engaged in trade 

and commerce in the State of Illinois by advertising, offering for sale, and selling new and used 

vehicles in and from the State of Illinois. 

DEFENDANTS’ BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 

Background on Unauthorized and Deceptive Add-on Charges 

23. Defendants frequently lure consumers into their dealerships with low advertised 

prices. Consumers who call to confirm advertised prices are told that there will be no fees 

beyond routine taxes and fees. Many consumers drive hours to the dealerships based on the 

advertised prices. 

24. At the dealership, consumers frequently spend time test driving and selecting a 

vehicle, and then go through the long process of negotiating the price of the vehicle. After that, 

for consumers who are financing vehicles, there is often a lengthy discussion of the financing 

terms. After an often hours-long process, Defendants present consumers with a stack of 

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complex, highly technical documents. Defendants then rush consumers through the closing 

process, which typically requires paperwork that is more than 60 pages deep and over a dozen 

signatures, simply indicating where to sign. 

25. In numerous instances, Defendants have inserted charges for add-on products in 

these documents without obtaining consumers’ express informed consent. These charges 

commonly amount to hundreds or thousands of dollars and are typically added to the amount 

financed and spread out over monthly payments, making the added charges more difficult to 

detect. 

26. In other instances, also after consumers have been at a dealership for hours, 

Defendants falsely tell consumers that add-on products or packages are required to purchase or 

finance the vehicle, even though they were not included in the low prices advertised or disclosed 

to consumers who called to confirm prices. If consumers ask to have these extra charges 

removed, stating that they do not want to purchase add-ons, Defendants falsely tell the 

consumers that the add-ons are not optional. 

27. According to a survey of Napletons’ customers, at least 83% of them were 

charged for add-on products without authorization or as a result of deception. 

28. Defendants have charged thousands of consumers hundreds to thousands of 

dollars each for such unauthorized, unwanted add-ons. In the aggregate, Defendants have 

charged over $70 million in unauthorized, unwanted add-ons since 2017. 

Defendants Charge Consumers without Their Consent 

29. In numerous instances, Defendants have charged consumers for add-on packages 

that the consumers never agreed to purchase—and, in some cases, specifically declined—with 

the unauthorized charges buried in a mountain of paperwork and rolled into the financing of the 

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vehicle. In fact, a Napleton training document lists “[n]on-disclosed packages” among the top 

four types of complaints that the corporate office receives. 

30. For example, one consumer agreed to a total price for a vehicle at the Napleton’s 

Arlington Heights CDJR, prior to the down payment being applied. The consumer later 

discovered, however, that that the dealership took the consumer’s $4,000 down payment and 

tacked on add-on charges of roughly the same amount without the consumer’s consent. Thus, 

the consumer’s down payment only covered the cost of the unauthorized charges, and he still 

owed the full cost of the vehicle. Many consumers have complained about Defendants charging 

for multiple add-ons without authorization. For example, one consumer complained that a 

Defendant dealership added multiple add-on products to the sales contract without authorization. 

In response, the dealership acknowledged that the consumer had been charged for seven add-on 

products, and refused to refund the consumer for one that it deemed not cancellable, despite the 

fact that the consumer had never authorized it. 

31. In some instances, Defendants have charged consumers for add-ons that they told 

the consumers were free. For example, one consumer was told that two oil changes, a tire 

rotation and windshield protection came with the purchase of the vehicle. He lived far from the 

dealership and was unlikely to have his car serviced there, and would never have paid for 

windshield protection because it was already covered by his insurance. He also initially declined 

an extended warranty as far too expensive, but then ultimately agreed when offered a discounted 

price. He later discovered he had been charged $426 for oil changes, tire rotation and windshield 

protection, despite Defendants’ representations that they were free, and that he was charged the 

full amount of $3,937 for the extended warranty. He was also charged $289 for window etching 

without his knowledge or authorization. He tried calling the dealership multiple times to cancel 

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the add-ons and request refunds, but his calls went unreturned. He eventually had to contact the 

warranty add-on provider directly to request a cancellation of the warranty. 

32. In other instances, Defendants have charged consumers for add-on products that 

consumers have specifically declined. One consumer said that a Defendant dealership inserted a 

maintenance package onto his invoice even after he told them that he did not want it. He also 

said that he did not want VIN etching, but they charged him for it anyway, and insisted that the 

charge could not be reversed. Another consumer said that he told the sales representative that he 

did not want GAP insurance, but one of Napleton Auto Group’s dealerships added it on his 

invoice anyway, which he only discovered after he left the dealership. 

Defendants Falsely Claim that Add-ons Are Mandatory 

33. In numerous instances, Defendants tell consumers that the purchase of add-on 

products is required to purchase or finance a vehicle, purportedly due to dealership or finance 

company policy. In actuality, add-on products are not required by the Defendants’ dealerships or 

by financing companies. When consumers ask to have charges for add-on products they do not 

want removed, or to purchase the vehicle at the advertised price without additional charges for 

add-ons, in numerous instances, they are falsely told that these extra charges are not optional and 

consumers are therefore unable to purchase vehicles at the advertised prices. 

34. For example, a consumer noted that a Defendant dealership listed a final price on 

its website for a particular car, and he confirmed this was the price before driving more than 

three hours to the dealership to see it. When he arrived, he was told that he would need to pay a 

higher price for the vehicle than the price listed on the website because a Napleton add-on 

package totaling $2,495 was required. The consumer was not permitted to purchase the vehicle 

at the advertised price without paying more for the Napleton package. 

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35. Another consumer went to look at a vehicle that was advertised online for 

$27,699, only to be told at the dealership that he would have to pay an additional $1,300 for an 

add-on package. In a later call, the dealership again told him that purchasing the add-on package 

was required, despite the online advertisement that the car was available for $27,699. After 

additional interactions, during which the consumer spent additional time trying to get the vehicle 

for the advertised price, a salesman said that the consumer was still required to take the package. 

After substantial pushback from the consumer, the salesman eventually agreed to offset the cost 

of the package in the price of the vehicle, though this “concession” by the sales representative 

limited the consumer’s ability to negotiate the price of the vehicle further, as he otherwise would 

have done. 

36. In another instance, a consumer noticed during his negotiations with Napleton’s 

Elmhurst Kia/Acura that his purchase price was nearly $1,000 higher than expected. Only after 

the consumer pointed out the additional charge did the salesman inform him that he was being 

charged for an add-on package. The consumer said that he was not interested in purchasing the 

add-on package, but the salesman said he could not remove it. After some debate, the consumer 

asked if he could at least remove some of the add-ons in the package. The salesman said he 

could not, stating that the full package was required. 

37. Similarly, Napleton’s Kissimmee CDJR included multiple add-ons, totaling over 

$700, on a consumer’s contract without obtaining the consumer’s authorization. This included a 

maintenance plan that the consumer did not want, as the dealership was too far away for him to 

travel for routine maintenance. When the consumer requested that the add-ons be removed prior 

to signing, the consumer was told they were required and could not be removed. 

38. In responses to consumer complaints filed with third parties regarding these 

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practices, Defendants have admitted that add-ons are not required by Defendants’ dealerships. 

39. In another instance, a salesman at Napleton’s Northlake CDJR told a consumer 

that a particular add-on – specifically, a $900 GAP insurance policy – was required for the 

financing company to approve his loan. The consumer later found out from the financing 

company that the add-on was not required. Similarly, a consumer was told by a salesman at 

another of Napleton Auto Group’s dealerships that add-ons totaling $3,400 were required by the 

financing company to get his financing approved, only to be told later by the financing company 

that this was incorrect. 

40. As a result of such conduct, in many instances, consumers have reported being 

out hundreds, and often, thousands of dollars for unwanted or unauthorized add-on products. For 

example, Defendants’ add-on packages range from $1,395 to $2,495 for each vehicle. 

41. Many consumers are unable to obtain refunds or only receive partial refunds, 

regardless of whether the charges have been authorized. 

42. As the General Manager of the Defendant dealerships in Illinois, Napleton’s 

Elmhurst Kia/Acura and Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR, Defendant Kadric has received 

consumer complaints that employees at these dealerships pack in add-on charges without 

consumers’ consent, yet he has failed to correct these issues. Indeed, the corporate customer 

retention manager wrote to Kadric that she was beginning to see “a small pattern with customers 

claiming they’re not given proper disclosures for products being added to the deal” at the 

dealerships managed by Kadric. Kadric responded in part, “Tough times.” 

Corporate Defendants’ Discriminatory Practices 

43. Corporate Defendants arrange financing for consumers’ purchase of motor 

vehicles through third-party financing entities. Each financing entity provides Corporate 

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Defendants with a specific “buy rate,” a risk-based finance charge that reflects the interest rate at 

which the entity will finance a retail installment contract from the dealer. Corporate Defendants 

typically obtain and complete consumer applications for credit, obtain consumer credit reports, 

and verify income to make an initial determination whether a financing applicant will meet the 

financing entity’s underwriting guidelines. Corporate Defendants then submit applications to the 

financing entity on behalf of consumers. 

44. Corporate Defendants maintain a policy and practice by which they permit sales 

personnel, at their discretion, to increase the cost of the transaction for consumers. Corporate 

defendants act on this policy by, among other things, adding a finance charge, or “markup,” to 

the buy rate, and adding charges for items consumers do not want or are not required. Unlike the 

buy rate, the markup is not based on the underwriting risk or credit characteristics of the 

consumer submitting the application. Corporate Defendants communicate to consumers only the 

final total contract rate, which equals the buy rate plus the markup. The financing entity 

compensates Corporate Defendants from the increased interest revenue derived from the markup. 

Corporate Defendants’ discretionary policy allows sales personnel to arrange consumers’ 

financing with entities that permit higher markups than other entities. 

45. Adding unwanted or unneeded charges increases the total amount the consumer 

pays in a cash transaction and the total amount a consumer finances in credit transactions. 

46. At least since 2017, Corporate Defendants have charged, on average, Black 

borrowers more for markups and add-ons than similarly situated non-Latino White consumers. 

47. Indeed, among tens of thousands of consumers who received motor vehicle 

financing through Corporate Defendants, Corporate Defendants charged Black borrowers, on 

average, approximately $190 (approximately 18.4 basis percentage points) more in interest. 

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Corporate Defendants charged Black consumers more often for add-ons, and Black consumers 

paid approximately $99 more on average for similar add-on packages than non-Latino White 

borrowers. 

48. Disparities in charges between Black consumers and non-Latino White consumers 

are statistically significant and cannot be explained by factors related to underwriting risk or 

credit characteristics of the applicants. 

49. Corporate Defendants’ discretionary policy is not justified by a business necessity 

that could not be met by a less discriminatory alternative. 

Defendant Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR and Defendant Hitko Kadric’s Unlawful 

Advertising Practices 

50. During the month of April 2021, Defendant Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR 

in the course of its trade or commerce, sent a direct mail advertisement to numerous Illinois 

residents in the greater Chicago-land area. 

51. The direct mail advertisement offered a detachable card that states: “Napleton’s 

Arlington Heights Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram $3,000 Gift Card.” In addition, the mailer 

states: “PS: Please use the attached $3,000 Gift Card as a Discount Voucher towards a 

brand new FCA Brand Vehicle!” A true and correct copy of the advertisement is attached 

hereto as Exhibit A. 

52. Defendant Kadric, as General Manager of Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR, 

reviewed and approved of the advertisement above. 

53. Section 475.590 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Advertising Regulations prohibits 

dealers from offering a free gift in connection with the purchase or lease of a vehicle where the 

price is arrived at through bargaining or negotiation. 14 Ill. Adm. Code 475.590. In addition, the 

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Consumer Fraud Act, Section 2 (j) (1) prohibits dealers from using coupons in connection with 

the retail sale of motor vehicles. 

54. Section 2J.1 of the Consumer Fraud Act states that “no coupon shall be offered in 

connection with any retail sale of a motor vehicle.” 815 ILCS 505/2J.1. 

55. The mailer, by operating as an offer to receive an invitation-only price and by 

including a voucher to present to the dealership in order to obtain that price, operates as a coupon 

in connection with the retail sale of a vehicle. 

56. The mailer further states: “$90 DOWN” without clearly and conspicuously 

disclosing the required credit sales advertising disclosures anywhere on the mailer. 

57. Section 475.610 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Advertising Regulations prohibits 

dealers from advertising “closed-end credit” terms in an advertisement, offer of sale, or sale of 

any motor vehicle if the advertisement contains a “triggering term” such as the amount of down 

payment. 14 Ill. Adm. Code 475.610. 

58. In the event the dealer uses a “triggering term,” it must clearly and conspicuously 

disclose a) the amount or percentage of any down payment, terms of repayment, and “annual 

percentage rate” using that term spelled out in full or the abbreviation “APR”, b) the contractual 

amount owing at the conclusion of a pre-determined schedule of installment payments, in close 

proximity to and, where applicable, in the same decibel tone as, the “triggering term” when a 

dealer advertises the availability of balloon-note financing and c) a manufacturer’s or 

manufacturer captive finance company's tiered financing offer. 14 Ill. Adm. Code 475.610. 

59. Thus, by stating “90 DOWN” in the mailer, Defendants Napleton’s Arlington 

Heights CDJR and Kadric were required to make certain disclosures, which they did not. 

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60. The advertisement’s reference to the downpayment amount is also a “triggering 

term” under the TILA, but the advertisement does not disclose the terms of repayment or an 

annual percentage rate (“APR”), as required by the TILA when a triggering term is used. 15 

U.S.C. § 1664. 

61. Finally, the mailer states “RECEIVE UP TO: 30% OFF MSRP” without 

clearly and conspicuously disclosing the lowest discount or highest price in the range in the 

advertisement. 

62. Section 475.390 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Advertising Regulations requires 

the highest price or lowest discount in the range be clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the 

advertisement when vehicles are being offered for sale at a range of prices or at a range of 

percentage or fractional discounts, through the use of the terms "As Low As" or "From," or terms 

of similar import. 14 Ill. Adm. Code 475.390(a). 

63. By stating “RECEIVE UP TO: 30% OFF MSRP” Defendants Napleton’s 

Arlington Heights CDJR and Kadric were required to disclose the lowest discount, which they 

did not. 

64. Defendant Kadric is the General Manager of Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR 

and his name appears on the advertisement. 

65. Defendant Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR’s unfair and deceptive advertising 

and transactional practices harm both consumers and other dealerships in the State of Illinois. 

* * * 

66. Based on the facts and violations of law alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiffs have 

reason to believe that Defendants are violating or are about to violate laws enforced by the 

Commission and the People of the State of Illinois. 

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VIOLATIONS OF THE FTC ACT 

67. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts 

or practices in or affecting commerce.” 

68. Misrepresentations or deceptive omissions of material fact constitute deceptive 

acts or practices prohibited by Section 5(a) of the FTC Act. 

69. Acts or practices are unfair under Section 5 of the FTC Act if they cause or are 

likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that consumers cannot reasonably avoid 

themselves and that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. 

15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 

Count I (by Plaintiff FTC) 

Misrepresentations Relating to Add-On Products 

70. In numerous instances, in connection with the offering for sale, lease, or 

financing, or sale, lease or financing of vehicles, Defendants represent, directly or indirectly, 

expressly or by implication, that in order to purchase, lease, or finance vehicles, consumers are 

required to purchase add-on products. 

71. In truth and in fact, in numerous instances in which Defendants have made the 

representations set forth in Paragraph 70, consumers are not required to purchase add-on 

products. 

72. Therefore, Defendants’ representations as set forth in Paragraph 70 are false or 

misleading and constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 

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Count II (by Plaintiff FTC) 

Misrepresentations Regarding Charges 

73. In numerous instances, in connection with the offering for sale, lease, or 

financing, or sale, lease or financing of vehicles, Defendants represent, directly or indirectly, 

expressly or by implication, that charges appearing on consumers’ sales contracts are authorized 

by consumers. 

74. In truth and in fact, in numerous instances in which Defendants make the 

representations set forth in Paragraph 73, the charges appearing on consumers’ sales contracts 

include charges not authorized by consumers. 

75. Therefore, Defendants’ representations as set forth in Paragraph 73 are false or 

misleading and constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 

Count III (by Plaintiff FTC) 

Unfair Practices Relating to Add-On Charges 

76. In numerous instances, Defendants charge consumers for add-on products without 

obtaining consumers’ express, informed consent. 

77. Defendants’ actions cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 

that consumers cannot reasonably avoid themselves and that is not outweighed by countervailing 

benefits to consumers or competition. 

78. Therefore, Defendants’ acts or practices as set forth in Paragraph 76 constitute 

unfair acts or practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (n). 

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VIOLATIONS OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND REGULATION Z 

79. Under Section 144 of the TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1664, and Section 226.24(d) of 

Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(d), as amended, advertisements promoting closed-end credit in 

consumer credit transactions are required to make certain disclosures (“TILA additional terms”) 

if they state any of several terms, including the amount or percentage of any downpayment 

(“TILA triggering terms”). 

80. Under Section 144 of the TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1664, and Section 226.24(c) of 

Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(c), as amended, advertisements promoting closed-end credit in 

consumer credit transactions are required to state the terms of repayment and an “annual 

percentage rate,” using that term, if they state the “amount or percentage of any downpayment.” 

81. Defendants Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR’s and Kadric’s advertisement 

promotes closed-end credit, and these Defendants are subject to the requirements of the TILA 

and Regulation Z. 

82. Pursuant to Section 108(c) of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c), every violation of TILA 

and Regulation Z constitutes a violation of the FTC Act. 

Count IV (by Plaintiff FTC) 

Failure to Disclose or Disclose Clearly and Conspicuously Required Credit Information by 

Defendants Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR and Kadric 

83. Defendants’ Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR’s and Kadric’s advertisement 

promoting closed-end credit fails to disclose, or fails to disclose clearly and conspicuously, TILA 

additional terms required by the TILA and Regulation Z, including one or more of the following: 

(a) The terms of repayment, which reflect the repayment obligations over the 

full term of the loan, including any balloon payment; and 

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(b) The “annual percentage rate,” using that term, and, if the rate may be 

increased after consummation, that fact. 

84. Therefore, the practices as set forth in Paragraph 83 violate Section 144 of the 

TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1664, and Section 226.24(d) of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(d), as 

amended. 

VIOLATIONS OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AND REGULATION B 

85. Section 701(a)(1) of the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1), and Section 202.4(a) of 

Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(a), prohibit a creditor from discriminating against an applicant 

with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national 

origin, sex, marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); because all 

or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program; or because the 

applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 

U.S.C. Ch. 41. 

86. Corporate Defendants are creditors as defined in Section 702(e) of the ECOA, 15 

U.S.C. § 1691a(e), and Section 202.2(l) of Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(l). 

87. Section 704(c) of the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c), specifically empowers the 

Commission to enforce the ECOA. Corporate Defendants’ violations of the ECOA are deemed 

to be violations of the FTC Act and are enforceable as such by the Commission under that Act. 

Further, the Commission is authorized to use all of its functions and powers under the FTC Act 

to enforce compliance with the ECOA by any person, irrespective of whether that person is 

engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests set by the FTC Act. This includes 

the power to enforce a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulation promulgated under the 

ECOA, such as Regulation B, in the same manner as if a violation of that regulation had been a 

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violation of an FTC trade regulation rule. 

Count V (by Plaintiff FTC against Corporate Defendants) 

Discriminatory Financing Practices 

88. In connection with motor vehicle credit transactions, on the basis of race, color, or 

national origin, Defendants impose higher costs on Black applicants on average than similarly 

situated non-Latino White applicants. 

89. Defendants’ acts, policies, and practices as set forth in Paragraph 88 constitute 

discrimination against applicants with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of 

race, color, or national origin in violation of Section 701(a)(1) of the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 

1691(a)(1), and Section 202.4(a) of Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(a). 

VIOLATIONS OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD ACT 

90. Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act provides: 

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any 

deception fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or 

the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with 

intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or 

omission of such material fact, or the use or employment of any 

practice described in Section 2 of the “Uniform Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act”, approved August 5, 1965 [815 ILCS 510/2], in the 

conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful 

whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged 

thereby. In construing this section consideration shall be given to the 

interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal 

courts relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 

815 ILCS 505/2. 

91. Section 2 of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides in relevant part 

as follows: 

§ 2. Deceptive trade practices. 

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(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the 

course of his or her business, vocation, or occupation, the person: 

(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, 

sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services; 

(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a 

likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding. 

815 ILCS 510/2. 

92. Section 7 of the Consumer Fraud Act provides: 

(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person 

is using, has used, or is about to use any method, act or practice declared 

by the Act to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public 

interest, he may bring an action in the name of the State against such 

person to restrain by preliminary or permanent injunction the use of such 

method, act or practice. The Court, in its discretion, may exercise all 

powers necessary, including by not limited to: injunction, revocation, 

forfeiture or suspension of any license, charter, franchise, certificate or 

other evidence of authority of any person to do business in this State; 

appointment of a receiver, dissolution of domestic corporations or 

association suspension or termination of the right of foreign corporation or 

associations to do business in this State; and restitution. 

(b) In addition to the remedies provided herein, the Attorney General may 

request and this Court may impose a civil penalty in a sum not to exceed 

$50,000 against any person found by the Court to have engaged in any 

method, act or practice declared unlawful under this Act. In the event the 

court finds the method, act or practice to have been entered into with the 

intent to defraud, the court has the authority to impose a civil penalty in a 

sum not to exceed $50,000 per violation. 

(c) In addition to any other civil penalty provided in this Section, if a person is 

found by the court to have engaged in any method, act, or practice declared 

unlawful under this Act, and the violation was committed against a person 65 

years of age or older, the court may impose an additional civil penalty not to 

exceed $10,000 for each violation. 

815 ILCS 505/7. 

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93. Section 10 of the Consumer Fraud Act provides, “In any action brought 

under the provisions of this Act, the Attorney General is entitled to recover costs for the 

use of this State.” 815 ILCS 505/10. 

Count VI (by Plaintiff State of Illinois) 

Misrepresentations Relating to Add-On Products made by Defendants located in Illinois 

94. In numerous instances, in connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, 

offering for sale or financing, or sale and financing of vehicles, and while engaged in a course of 

trade or commerce, Defendants Hitko Kadric, Napleton Auto Group, Napleton’s Elmhurst 

Kia/Acura, and Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR represent, directly or indirectly, expressly or 

by implication, that in order to purchase vehicles, consumers are required to purchase add-on 

products with the intent that the consumer rely on the information. 

95. In truth and in fact, in numerous instances in which Defendants have made the 

representations set forth in Paragraph 94, consumers are not required to purchase add-on 

products. 

96. Therefore, Defendants’ representations as set forth in Paragraph 94 are false or 

misleading and constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 2 of the Consumer 

Fraud Act. 

97. Further, Defendants’ representations as set forth in Paragraph 94 cause a 

likelihood of confusion as to whether add-on products are a purchase requirement in violation of 

Section 2 of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 

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Count VII (by Plaintiff State of Illinois) 

Misrepresentations Regarding Charges made by Defendants located in Illinois 

98. In numerous instances, in connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, 

offering for sale or financing, or sale and financing of vehicles, and while engaged in a course of 

trade or commerce, Defendants Hitko Kadric, Napleton Auto Group, Napleton’s Elmhurst 

Kia/Acura, and Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR represent, directly or indirectly, expressly or 

by implication, that charges appearing on consumers’ sales contracts are authorized by 

consumers. 

99. In truth and in fact, in numerous instances in which Defendants make the 

representations set forth in Paragraph 98, the charges appearing on consumers’ sales contracts 

include charges not authorized by consumers. 

100. Therefore, Defendants’ representations as set forth in Paragraph 98 are false or 

misleading and constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 2 of the Consumer 

Fraud Act. 

101. Further, Defendants’ representations as set forth in Paragraph 98 cause a 

likelihood of confusion as to whether consumers agreed or were required to agree to all charges 

the Defendants placed in their contracts in violation of Section 2 of the Uniform Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act. 

Count VIII (by Plaintiff State of Illinois) 

Unfair and Deceptive Practices Relating to Add-On Charges made by Defendants located 

in Illinois 

102. In numerous instances, and while engaged in a course of trade or commerce, 

Defendants Hitko Kadric, Napleton Auto Group, Napleton’s Elmhurst Kia/Acura, and 

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Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR charge consumers for add-on products without obtaining 

consumers’ express, informed consent. 

103. Defendants’ actions cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 

that consumers. 

104. Therefore, Defendants’ acts or practices as set forth in Paragraph 102 constitute 

unfair acts and deceptive practices in violation of Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act. 

Count IX (by Plaintiff State of Illinois) 

Violation of Section 2J.1 of the Consumer Fraud Act by Defendants Napleton’s 

Arlington Heights CDJR and Hitko Kadric 

105. Section 2J.1 of the Consumer Fraud Act provides: 

Any retail seller, or motor vehicle dealer within the meaning of 

Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, who publishes or issues 

coupons for use by consumers in the purchase of specific items of 

merchandise in the retail outlet of the seller, or established place of 

business, and represents that presentation of a coupon permits the 

purchase of a specific item of merchandise for less than the regular 

price shall clearly state (a) the discount or (b) the fact that the coupon 

featured price is a “sale” price to which the presenter is entitled. No 

coupon shall be offered in connection with any retail sale of a motor 

vehicle. 

815 ILCS 505/2J.1 

106. While engaged in a course of trade or commerce Defendant Napleton’s 

Arlington Heights CDJR and Hitko Kadric violated Section 2J.1 of the Consumer Fraud Act, 815 

ILCS 505/2J.1, by offering a coupon in connection with the retail sale of a motor vehicle. 

Count X (by Plaintiff State of Illinois) 

Violation of Illinois Motor Vehicle Advertising Law by Defendants Napleton’s Arlington 

Heights CDJR and Hitko Kadric 

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107. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Consumer Fraud Act, the Illinois Attorney General 

promulgated the Illinois Administrative Rules on Motor Vehicle Advertising, 14 Ill. Adm. Code 

Section 475, which have the force of law. 

108. Defendant Napleton’s Arlington Heights CDJR violated the Illinois Motor 

Vehicle Advertising Regulations, 14 Ill. Adm. Code 475.110, et seq., thereby committing 

deceptive and unfair acts and practices declared unlawful under Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud 

Act, 815 ILCS 404/2 by: 

a) Advertising or offering a free gift in connection with the purchase or lease 

of a vehicle where the vehicle is sold or leased at a price arrived at through 

bargaining or negotiation in violation of Section 475.590; 

b) Advertising or offering "closed-end credit" terms without clearly and 

conspicuously disclosing the required credit sales advertising disclosures in 

violation of Section 475.610; and 

c) Advertising vehicles offered for sale at a range of percentage discounts, 

without clearly and conspicuously disclosing the highest price or lowest discount 

in the range in the advertisement in violation of Section 475.390. 

CONSUMER INJURY 

109. Consumers are suffering, have suffered, and will continue to suffer substantial 

injury as a result of Defendants’ violations of the FTC Act, the TILA, the ECOA, and the Illinois 

Consumer Fraud Act. Absent injunctive relief by this Court, Defendants are likely to continue to 

injure consumers and harm the public interest. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

Wherefore, Plaintiffs request that the Court: 

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A. Enter a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of the FTC Act, the 

TILA, the ECOA, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act by Defendants; 

B. Award monetary and other relief within the Court’s power to grant; 

C. Award civil penalties, including: 

1. Ordering the Defendant to pay up to $50,000 per deceptive or unfair act or 

practice and an additional amount of $50,000 for each act or practice 

found to have been committed with intent to defraud, as provided in 

Section 7 of the Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/7; 

2. An additional civil penalty in the amount of $10,000 per deceptive act or 

practice found by the Court to have been committed by Defendants against 

a person 65 years of age and older as provided in Section 7 of the 

Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/7; 

D. Award the costs of bringing this action, including all costs incurred by the Illinois 

Attorney General for the investigation and prosecution of this action, as provided by Section 10 

of the Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/10; and 

E. Award any additional relief as the Court determines to be just and proper. 

Respectfully submitted, 

REILLY DOLAN 

Acting General Counsel 

Dated: March 31, 2022 /s/Helen Clark 

HELEN CLARK 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 

Mail Stop CC-10232 

Washington, DC 20580 

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hclark@ftc.gov 

(202) 326-2273 

WILLIAM J. HODOR, Local Counsel 

Federal Trade Commission 

Midwest Region 

230 South Dearborn Street, Room 3030 

Chicago, IL 60604 

whodor@ftc.gov 

(312) 960-5634 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

KWAME RAOUL 

Illinois Attorney General 

Dated: March 31, 2022 _/s/Jacob Gilbert___________________________ 

CASSANDRA HALM 

JACOB GILBERT 

GREG GRZESKIEWICZ, Bureau Chief 

Consumer Fraud Bureau 

100 W. Randolph, 12th Fl. 

Chicago, IL 60601 

Cassandra.Halm@ilag.gov 

Jacob.Gilbert@ilag.gov 

Greg.Grzeskiewicz@ilag.gov 

(217)725-9591 (Halm) 

(773) 590-6926 (Gilbert) 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

ILLINOIS 

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Exhibit A 

29