### J-A18002- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

LaQUINCEY ANTRON WATSON, :

:

Appellant : No. 900 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on Apri l 23, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Criminal Division, No. CP

- 22

- CR -0004167-2010

BEFORE: LAZARUS, WECHT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2014

LaQuincey Antron Watson (“Watson”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed following his convictions of twelve count s of burglary and

one count each of robbery, receiving stolen property, a nd possession of a

firearm. 1 

### We affirm.

The trial court has set forth an extensive recitation of the underlying

facts in its Opinion, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial

Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 1-12. Relevantly, Dete ctive James Glucksman

(“Glucksman”) worked as a police officer for eleven years a nd investigated

between 600 and 1,000 burglaries, including serial bur glary cases.

Glucksman became involved with this case on March 5, 2010 , when he was

ordered to investigate the third burglary in Lower P axton Township that

1 

### See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502, 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3925, 6105(a) (1).

### J-A18002- 14

- 2 -

weekend. Glucksman determined that a witness had encoun tered the

burglar and, based on the information and description provided, assembled a

photo array for review by the witness, which ultimatel y led to the

identification of Watson as a suspect. The burglaries that occurred in

Glucksman’s patrol zone, and other sur rounding areas, fit a pattern of

burglaries wherein the modus operandi involved parking a car in the home’s

driveway and kicking in a door in order to gain access during daylight hours.

Watson was subsequently arrested and Glucksman obtained a search

warr ant for Watson’s residence.

Glucksman searched for, inter alia , a pair of sneakers that had a tread

pattern consistent with marks recovered from the door o f a home that had

been robbed. While conducting the search, Glucksman sei zed two pairs of

sneakers matching the tread pattern and photographed a gun holster,

cameras, jewelry, laptop, coins and radios. Glucksman sub sequently

received an anonymous tip that Watson’s girlfriend had removed the

photographed items from Watson’s residence and was attem pting to sell

them on the internet. Glucksman contacted her, and, af ter observing the

items in her apartment and confirming they were in f act reported as stolen,

seized the items with her consent. Watson was charged wi th more than

twenty crimes, predominantly burglaries, which took pla ce over the course

of approximately four months (November 2009-March 201 0)

### J-A18002- 14

- 3 -

in four counties. 2 

### The stolen items included household electronics, jewelry

,

collectible coins, and other cash or coins. Watson moved to suppress this

evidence at one of the pretrial hearings, but his Moti on was denied.

Watson also filed a Motion to Sever Charges, a Motion for Severance of

Charges Or, In The Alternative, A Bifurcated Trial (“M otion for Severance”),

and a Motion to Exclude Admission o f Cellular Telephone Tower “Ping”

Evidence and Accompanying Expert Testimony (“Motion to E xclude”), all of

which were denied. 3



### Watson’s charges were consolidated and a jury trial was he ld in

Dauphin County in September 2012. Watson was found g uilty of the abovementioned crimes, and acquitted on three counts of burgl ary. On December

17, 2012, Watson was sentenced to an aggregate sentence o f 331⁄2-67 years

in prison. Watson filed a timely Post-Sentence Motion . On April 23, 2012,

the trial court granted Watson’s Post -Sentence Motion and issued an

Amended Sentencing Order, stating that Watson was to ser ve 22-441⁄2 years

in prison. Watson filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a Concise Statement of

Matters Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P . 1925(b).

On appeal, Watson raises the following questions for o ur review:

2 

### The Commonwealth dropped eleven of the charges, leav ing Watson to face

charges for 5 burglaries that occurred in Dauphin County , 5 burglaries that

occurred in York County, 5 burglaries that occurred in C umberland County,

and 2 burglaries that occurred in Lancaster County.

3 

### The other Motions made in Watson’s Omnibus and Amended Omnibus

Pretrial Motions are not relevant to this appeal.

### J-A18002- 14

- 4 -

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s]

[M]otion to [S]uppress physical evidence and identificat ion

of evidence where the search exceeded the scope of the

warrant and the plain view exception was [] inapplica ble in

violation of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution?

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s]

[P]retrial [M]otion for [S]everance where the crimes w ere

not part of a single criminal episode?

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s]

[P]retrial [M]otion to [E]xclude Commonwealth’s [C]e llular

[T]elephone [T]ower “[P]ing” [E]vidence and

[A]ccompanying [E]xpert [T]estimony where such is not

generally accepted in the field of cell phone technol ogy?

IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Watson’s]

[M]otions for [M]istrial after the Commonwealth’s witn ess

repeatedly violated a pre[]trial order forbidding o pinion

testimony regarding the cellular phone records?

Brief for Appellant at 8.

In his first claim, Watson argues that the trial court erred in denying

his Motion to Suppress and allowing the gun holster, cam eras, coins, laptop,

and radios that were manipulated, photographed, and eventually seized by

Glucksman, to be introduced as evidence. Id. at 31, 33. Watson claims

that these items were outside of the four corners of th e search warrant;

Glucksman had no reason to suspect that they were stolen; and they were

not in plain view. Id. at 30, 32-34. Watson asserts that the evidence

should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at 34.

Our standard of review of a denial of suppression is

whether the record supports the trial court’s factual fi ndings and

whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from

### J-A18002- 14

- 5 -

error. Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only the

evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence f or the

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the contex t of

the record as a whole. Where the record supports the f indings of

the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions

based upon the facts.

Commonwealth v. Galendez , 27 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2011) ( en

banc ) (citation omitted).

“The scope of a lawful search pursuant to a warrant is def ined by the

object of the search and the places in which there is pro bable cause to

believe that it may be found.” Commonwealth v. Taylor , 771 A.2d 1261,

1265- 66 (Pa. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “It is permissible to

seize things other than those described in the search warr ant if they have a

reasonable relation to the purpose of the search and ar e the fruits of crime,

such as stolen property. ” Commonwealth v. Gannon , 454 A.2d 561, 565

(Pa. Super. 1982) (citations and quotations omitted). Further, a warrant is

not necessary where evidence comes to an officer’s “attentio n by virtue of

being in plain sight.” Commonwealth v. Bowers , 274 A.2d 546, 547 (Pa.

Super. 1970) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Anderson

,

40 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The plain view doctrine applies if 1) police did not v iolate

the Fourth Amendment during the course of their arriv al at the

location where they viewed the item in question; 2) t he item was

not obscured and could be seen plainly from that locati on; 3) the

incriminating nature of the item was readily apparent ; and 4)

police had the lawful right to access the item. Thus, p olice

executing a valid search warrant may seize items not l isted in

the warrant if their incriminating nature is immediat ely apparent.

### J-A18002- 14

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Harvard

, 64 A.3d 690, 698 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal

citation omitted).

Here, the trial court addressed Watson’s claim and determined that it

is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 14-17. We adopt

the trial court’s reasoning regarding this aspect of Wat son’s appeal, and

affirm on its basis. See id. ; see also Harvard , 64 A.3d at 698 (concluding

that police officers, executing a valid search warrant, properly seized items

that were not listed in the search warrant, but matched the description of

items stolen in the robberies under investigation).

In his second claim, Watson contends that the trial cour t erred in

denying his Motion for Severance, as venue was not pro per in Dauphin

County for crimes that occurred in other counties. Brief for Appellant at 34-

36. Watson argues that because his conduct was not “one crim inal episode,”

and only five of the burglaries he was charged with occu rred in Dauphin

County, venue was improper. Id. at 35-36.

“ The standard of review for a denial of a motion for change of venue is

whether there has been an abuse of discretion on the p art of the trial judge.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson , 612 A.2d 1382, 1384-85 (Pa. Super. 1992).

Venue relates to the right of a party to have the con troversy brought and

heard in a particular judicial district. Commonwealth v. Bethea , 828 A.2d

1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003). Venue is predominately a pro cedural matter,

generally prescribed by the rules of [the Supreme] Cou rt. Id.

### J-A18002- 14

- 7 -

Criminal Rule 130(A)(3) governs venue and transfer of criminal

proceedings and provides, in relevant part, the follow ing:

(A) Venue. All criminal proceedings in summary and court

cases shall be brought before the issuing authority for the

magisterial district in which the offense is alleged to have

occurred...subject, however, to the following exceptions:

***

(3) When charges arising from the same criminal episode

occur in more than one judicial district, the criminal proceeding

on all the charges may be brought before one issuing au thority

in a magisterial district within any of the judicial districts in

which the charges arising from the same criminal episode

occurred.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Kohler

,

811 A.2d 1046, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2002) (recognizing t hat a “condition

precedent to the exercise [of jurisdiction] by a single co unty [] in a case

involving multiple offenses in various counties is ... a single criminal

episode.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

A single criminal episode exists “[w]here a number of char ges are

logically ... related and share[] common issues of law and fact[.]” Kohler

,

811 A.2d at 1050.

In ascertaining whether a number of statutory offenses are

logically related to one another, the court should ini tially inquire

as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factu al, and/or

legal issues presented by the offenses.... The mere fact t hat the

additional statutory offenses involve additional issues of law or

fact is not sufficient to create a separate criminal episod e since

the logical relationship test does not require an absol ute identity

of factual backgrounds.

### J-A18002- 14

- 8 -

Id. at 1050-51 (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the fact that the criminal acts occurred over a cou rse of four

months in multiple counties does not preclude the acts fr om constituting a

single criminal episode. Relevant evidence of each crim e Watson was

charged with would also be admissible as relevant evide nce of the other

charged crimes. Indeed, all of the burglaries took pla ce during morning

daylight hours, with the perpetrator gaining access by kicking in a door. The

same types of items were stolen during each burglary. Further,

eyewitnesses were able to identify Watson and link him to the vehicles used

during the crimes. Stolen property identified by the victims was discovered

at Watson’s residence, and cellular phone records demonstr ated that he was

near the crime scenes around the time the burglaries o ccurred. The

underlying facts of this case establish a logical relatio nship between the

crimes, and as such, the multiple burglaries constitute a single criminal

episode. See id. at 1051 (determining that the criminal acts, despite ha ving

occurred in various counties over the course of 14 months, amounted to a

single criminal episode with “substantial duplication of factual, and/or legal

issues presented by the offenses.”). Thus, venue was proper in Dauphin

County. 4

4 

### To the extent Watson argues that the trial court misi nterpreted

Pa.R.Crim.P. 130, we conclude that such argument is w ithout merit.

### J-A18002- 14

- 9 -

Watson also contends that the out- of -county charges should have

been severed, as they were improperly joined under Pa .R.Crim.P. 503 and

582. Brief for Appellant at 34, 38-39.

Our standard of review is as follows:

It is well settled that a motion for severance is addresse d to the

sound discretion of the trial court, and that the decisio n reached

by the trial court will not be disturbed absent a show ing of

manifest abuse of discretion.... A better chance of acquitt al from

a separate trial is not sufficient cause to warrant sev erance.

Commonwealth v. Presbury , 665 A.2d 825, 827-28 (Pa. Super. 1995)

(citation omitted).

The trial court addressed Watson’s claim and determined t hat it is

without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 23-25. We adopt the

sound reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis, with regard to

this issue of Watson’s appeal. See id.

In his third claim, Watson argues that the trial court erred in denying

his Motion to Exclude the cellphone tower “ping” eviden ce and acco mpanying

testimony because using that information to locate a cell phone is not

generally accepted in the field of cellphone technolog y and because

Glucksman (who provided testimony about the evidence) i s not an expert.

Brief for Appellant at 40, 44- 45. Watson contends that any testimony

surrounding the cellphone tower evidence was, by its ver y nature, expert, as

the average layperson knows nothing about the technolo gy. Id. at 44.

### J-A18002- 14

- 10

- Therefore, Watson claims, Pennsylvania Rule of Eviden ce 702 5 

### was not

satisfied, and his Motion to Exclude should have been granted. Id. at 41-42,

44

- 47.

The standard of review employed when faced with a

challenge to the trial court’s decision as to whether or not to

admit evidence is well[-]settled. Questions concerning t he

admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretio n of the

trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse th e trial court’s

decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Abuse of disc retion

is not merely error of judgment, but rather where th e judgment

is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not appl ied or

where the record shows that the action is a result of p artiality,

prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Young , 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

omitted).

The trial co urt addressed Watson’s claim and determined it is without

merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 25-32. We adopt the sound

5 

### Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witness, provides the fo llowing:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, sk ill,

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an

opinion or otherwise, if:

(a) the expert’s scientif ic, technical, or other specialized

knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layper son;

(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialize d

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand t he evidence

or to determine a fact in issue; and

(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in t he

relevant field.

Pa.R.E. 702.

### J-A18002- 14

- 11

- reasoning of the trial court regarding this issue of W atson’s appeal, and

affirm on this basis. See id.

In his final claim, Watson contends that the trial court erred in denying

his Motion for Mistrial, as Glucksman’s testimony surround ing the “ping”

evidence was impermissible expert testimony, was forbidd en by a pre-trial

order, and resulted in prejudice to Watson’s case. Br ief for Appellant at 48-

50.

Our standard of review in assessing the denial of a m istrial

is as follows: the trial court is in the best position to assess the

effect of an allegedly prejudicial statement on the j ury, and as

such, the grant or denial of a mistrial will not be ov erturned

absent an abuse of discretion. A mistrial may be grante d only

where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a

nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the d efendant of a

fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a

true verdict. Likewise, a mistrial is not necessary wher e

cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome any possi ble

prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Rega , 933 A.2d 997, 1016 (Pa. 2007) (citation

omitted).

The trial cour t addressed Watson’s final claim and determined it is

without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/13, at 32-34. We adopt the

sound and detailed reasoning of the trial court regard ing the final issue, and

affirm on this basis. See id.

### J-A18002- 14

- 12

- Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/11/2014Circulated 07/21/2014 02:24 PM 

# tCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PMCirculated 07/21/2014 02:24 PM