Filed 12/16/13 In re Eduardo C. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPE A L, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re EDUARDO C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. EDUARDO C., Defendant and Appellant. D062740

(Super. Ct. No. J231024)

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Cou rt of San Diego County, Richard R. Monroy, Judge. Affirmed.

Esther K. Hong for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assi stant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General , for Plaintiff and Respondent.2

The juvenile court found Eduardo C. carried a c oncealed dirk or dagger in
violation of Penal Code section 21310 (subsequent section references are to this code unless otherwise noted) , continued him as a ward of the court, placed him on home supervision as directed by the probation officer , and imposed fines. Eduardo appeals , contending section 21310 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because a prior dismissal of a petition charging a similar violation shows the statute d oes not provide adequate notice of what conduct is forbidden or sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary
and discrimina tory enforcement. Eduardo also contends the evidence was insufficient to establish he had the knowledge required for a violation of section 21310. We affirm

. I

. BACKGROUND
A police officer spotted Eduardo and two known criminal street gang members in an alley holding op en beer containers

. The officer conduct ed a field interview of Eduardo, learned he was a minor on probation , and arrested him. During a search incident to arrest, the officer located a " typical screwdriver " in
Eduardo ' s front pants pocket. The screwdr iver was approximately seven and three

quarter inches long and had a flat metal head that was not sharpened or otherwise altered. The metal end of the screwdriver was pointed downward, and it " slid right out " of
Eduardo ' s pocket when t he officer removed it.
At the adjudication hearing , a gang expert testified that gang members carry
screwdrivers " for protection

. " He further testified that older gang members tell younger

ones to carry screwdrivers for use as weapons.3

Approximately t wo months before the arrest for the current offense , Eduardo had been arrested for possession of a concea led dirk or dagger. On that occasion, Eduardo

was traveling in a car with two known gang members when he was found to have in his pocket an unaltered screwdriver between six to eight inches long

. Based on this incident, a petition alleging a violation of section 21310 was filed, but the j uvenile court dismissed
it

. 1

II

. DISCUSSION
Eduardo contends his conviction for violating section 21310 violates his right to due process of law

. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Cons t., art. I, § 7.) Based on the dismissal of the prior petition alleging he violated section 21310 by carrying a screwdriver in his pocket, Eduardo argues (1) the statute is unconst itutionally vague as applied to him because it provide s neither adequate noti ce that carrying a screwdriver in a pocket is forbid den nor sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution for such conduct ; and (2) the re was insuffici ent evidence he knew the screwdriver could be used as a stabbing weapon

. 2 As we discuss below, these
contentions have no merit.

1 We grant Eduardo ' s request for judicial notice of the dismissal order filed in the prior case. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); R.S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1052, fn. 2.)
2 The People interpreted some of Eduardo ' s arguments as making a facial vagueness challenge to section 21310 and as asserting a " defense " of ignorance of the law. Although portions of Eduardo ' s opening brief suggest such arguments, Eduardo clarified4

A. Section 21310 Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to Eduardo As a threshold matter, we note that Eduardo fail ed to raise his vagueness challenge in the juvenile court

. Ordinarily, issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. (E.g., People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 142; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4 th 415, 477.) " Nevertheless, we will consider the
issue on the merits for [two] reasons. First, the issue is

. . . one of law presented by undisputed facts in the record before us

. . . . [Citations.] W e also confront the issue to avert any claim of in adequate assistance of counsel. " ( People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 31 0; s ee People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1370 [court
addressed claim first raised on appeal that presented question of law on undisputed acts ]; People v. Wil liams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 621 [court addressed merits of forfeited
claim to forestall ineffecti ve assistance of counsel claim] .) Turning to the merits of Eduardo ' s vagueness challenge , we begin with some general principles governing such challenges. " ' T he constitutional interest implicated in questions of statutory vagueness is that no person be deprived of " life, liberty, or prope rty without due process of law, " as assured by both the federal Constitution [citation] and the
California Constitution [citation]

. Under both Constitutions, due process of law in this context requires two elem ents: a criminal statute must " ' be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed a nd (2) a standard f or

in his reply brief that he " is presenting a cl aim that section 21310 is vague as applied to him, " not that it is vague on its face, and that he " did not present a defense that he was ignorant of the law. " We accept these clarifications and address Eduardo ' s claims as so clarified.5

police enforcement and for ascerta inment of guilt. ' " ' " ( People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 605. ) Unlike a facial challenge , where the defendant must show the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications ( id. at p. 606), a defendan t making an as applied challenge must show the statute is impermissibly vague as it was enforced against
him in light of the facts and circumstances of his particular case ( U.S. v. Powell (1975) 423 U.S. 87, 92; People v. Nguyen (2 013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1326 )

. Eduardo complains section 21310 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him
because he was not given adequate notice that carrying a concealed screwdriver
constituted a violation of the statute. Specifically, he contends (1) sections 21310 ( which prohibits carr ying a concealed dirk or dagger) and 16470 (which defines dirk or dagger)

" do not expressly state that a screwdriver is a ' dirk or dagger ' " ; and (2) less than two months before his arrest for the current offense, he " had learned from the juvenile court that it was not a crime to carry a concealed screwdriver. " These contentions have no
merit

. To avoid being unconstitutionally vague, section 21310 did not have to state expressly that carrying a concealed screwdriver was prohibited. Due process requires only that statutory language be reasonably specific or certain, i.e., that the language provide a person of ordinary intelligence sufficiently definite warning of what conduct is prohibited. ( U.S. v. Petrillo (1947) 332 U.S. 1, 8; Peo ple ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117; In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 717. ) As pertinent here,
section 21310 subjects to imprisonment " a ny person in this state who carries concealed upon the person any dirk or dagger

. " For purposes o f section 213 1 0 , " ' dirk ' or ' dagger '6

means a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflic t great bodily injury or death. " (§ 16470 , italics
added .) Although this language does not explicit ly prohibit carrying a concealed
screwdriver , it provided Eduardo adequate notice his conduct was prohibited under the
circumstances of this case

. A person of average intelligence would know that a
screwdriver is " capable of read y use as a stabbing weapon, " because its handle could be grasped and the sturdy metal tip plunged into someone ' s flesh. ( Ibid. ) A person of average intelligence in the company of gang members who carry screwdrivers as weapons for protection and advise their associates to do so would also know that by carrying a screwdriver in a pocket from which it could be quickl y removed , he was

" carr [ ying ] concealed upon the person any dirk or dagger. " (§ 21310.) " In other words, as to [Eduardo] the statute is not vague, and that is all the due process to which he is
entitled. " ( People v. Ballard (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 311, 317.)
We are not persuaded by Eduardo ' s related argument that he was given inadequate
notice that his conduct was unlawful because the juvenile court ' s dismissal of the prior petition alleging similar conduct " provided notice to [him] that carrying a concealed,
unaltered screwdriver was not prohibited under section 21310

. " T he order dismissing the prior petition states it was based on the granting of a motion made under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 701.1, which allows the juvenile court to dismiss a petition after the close of the People ' s case if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the allegations. ( In

re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 727

- 7 28; In re Andre G. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 62, 65

- 66.) Thus, all we can infer from the dismissal order is that the court7

held the evidence the People introduced at the prior adjudication hearing did not establish
a violation of section 21310 . Such a conclusion , made on a specific evidentiary showing,
did not constitute notice to Eduardo that carrying a concealed screwdriver can never be a
crime. We thus reject Eduardo ' s claim he received inadequate notice his conduct violated
section 21310.
A s an alternative to his inadequate notice argument , E duardo complains
section 21310 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because " two judges made opposite findings on the same set of material facts

. " Eduardo asse rts this inconsistency proves that " section 213 1 0 ' impermissibly delegate[d] basic policy matters

to

. . . judges

. . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, ' and in an ' arbitrary and discriminatory ' manner. " ( Quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104,
108

- 109.) W e disagree , for three reasons

. First, Eduardo has not established the factual predicate for this argument because
he has not shown the same evidence was introduced at the two adjudication hearings. He has not supp lied us with a transcript of the prior adjudication hearing, and the dismissal
order of which he asks us to take judicial notice contains no information about what specific evidence the court concluded was insufficient to establish a violation of
section 2 1310

. Second , the possibility that different courts or juries considering the same or similar facts might reach different conclusions on whether a defendant violated a

statute does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. ( Smith v. U.S. (1977) 43 1 U.S. 291, 309; Pineda v. Williams

- Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 536.)
Third and finally , our Supreme Court rejected a similar vagueness challenge to former8

section 12020, subdivision (a), the substantively identical predecessor of section 2 1310 ( see Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6), in People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322. T he Supreme C ourt noted that " the statute may invite arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement not due to any vagueness in the statutory language but due to the wide range of otherwise innocent conduct it proscribes. " ( Id. at p. 333.) It nevertheless held " ' [t]he role of the judiciary is not to rewrite legislation to satisfy the court ' s, rather than the Legislature ' s, sense of balance and order, ' " and " le[ft] it to the Legislature to reconsider the wisdom of its statutory enactments. " ( Ibid. ) We, of course, are bound by Rubalcava

. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 4 55. )
C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Establish That Eduardo Knew the Screwdriver Carried in His Pocket Could Be Used as a Stabbing Weapon Eduardo also argues the juvenile court ' s finding that he violated section 213 1 0 deprived him of his 14th Amendment right to due process of law because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding. Specifically, Eduardo contends that based on the dismissal of the prior petition alleging a violation of section 213 1 0 , he " learned that carrying a concealed and unaltered screwdriver in similar circumstances was not equivalent to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. Therefore, there is insufficient
evidence that [ Eduardo ] possessed the requisite knowledge that a screwdriver could be
used as a sta bbing weapon under the eyes of the law

. " We disagree.
Where , as here, a defendant complains his federal due process rights were violated because a criminal conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, " the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the9

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation

. ] This familiar standard giv es full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder ' s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the
evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. " ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 ( Jac kson ). ) Here, the evidence was sufficient to find that Eduardo knew the screwdriver
carried in his pocke t was " capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon

. " (§ 16470.) A screwdriver is a common household tool, and it is obvious from its configuration that it

can be used to puncture or lacerate flesh

. Eduardo ' s suggestion he " learned " a screwdriver could not be so used when the juvenile court dismiss ed the petition based on his prior alleged violation of section 213 1 0 h as no support in the record . A s we have explained, the dismissal order indicates only that the evidence introduced at the prior adjudication hearing was insufficient to establish Eduardo violat ed section 21310 ; the
order d id not advise Eduardo that carrying a concealed screwdriver c ould never constitute
a violation

. In fact, e vidence indicated Eduardo received specific instruction during his prior arrest that carrying a screwdriver in his pocket was illegal : The arresting officer for the prior offense testified at the current adjudicati on hearing that he " described how [Eduardo] violated [the] law and what he was being arrested for

. " Further , where an object is not a weapon per se and has innocent uses, circumstantial evidence the10

defendant would use the object as a weapon may establish the knowledge required for a
conviction under section 213 1 0

. ( People v. Davis (2013) 2 1 4 Cal.App.4th 13 22 , 1 327 .) When Eduardo was arrested for carrying the screwdriver in his pocket, he was in the
company of known gang members, and th e gang expert testified gang members carry screwdrivers as weapons to protect t hemselves and tell others to do so

. ( Cf. In re Quintus W. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 640, 645 [defendan t ' s statement, " ' Hey , man, that ' s my kn ife. I carry it for protection. There are some dudes trying to jack me up [ , ] ' "
showed guilty knowledge] ; In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401, 405 [ statement
defendant concealed ice pick in waistband " for protection " showed guilty knowledge] .) Thus, " afte r viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, " we conclude there was no due process violation because the juvenile court reasonably " could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. " ( Jackson , supra , 443 U.S. at p. 319.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

O ' ROURKE, J.