IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-2108

Filed October 10, 2018

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF 

LORI FEISTNER,

Ward-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.

Lori Feistner appeals from an order establishing an involuntary 

guardianship and conservatorship. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS.

Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.

Kenneth Michael Steffen, Moline, pro se guardian/conservator.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

This case arises out of the appointment of a guardian and conservator for

Lori Feistner. On appeal, Feistner contends the district court erred in appointing 

her a guardian and conservator.

The petitioner in this case is Lori’s brother, Kenneth (Mike) Steffen. Steffen 

filed this petition for guardianship and conservatorship because of his concern for 

his sister’s well-being. At the time of trial, Feistner was fifty-six years old. She was 

married to her husband of twenty-six years, Roger Feistner. However, Roger was 

in the process of seeking a divorce due to Feistner’s erratic and aggressive 

behavior. Roger had communicated his intent to seek a divorce to Feistner and to 

Steffen. Steffen testified he sought the guardianship and conservatorship primarily 

to help Feistner transition during the period of divorce and help her with her 

financial situation. 

Feistner’s erratic and aggressive behavior is a symptom of her mentalhealth condition. Approximately fifteen years prior to trial, Feistner begin to display 

symptoms of mental illness. Her symptoms increased over time, including mania 

that would keep her up at nights and result in aggressive or confrontational 

behavior toward others. Eventually, Feistner was diagnosed with bipolar, type I, 

disorder. She was prescribed medication for her condition, but she frequently 

failed to take her prescribed medication because of the way it made her feel and 

its adverse side effects, including weight gain. In the decade prior to trial, Feistner

had been civilly committed on six occasions. The duration of her commitments 

ranged from several days to several weeks. 
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Our review of this case is for the correction of legal error. See Iowa Code 

§ 633.555 (2017) (providing actions shall be triable at law); In re Conservatorship 

of Leonard, 563 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1997) (stating conservatorship actions are 

reviewed for errors at law); In re Guardianship of S.K.M., No. 16-1537, 2017 WL 

5185427, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017) (concluding guardianship proceedings 

are reviewed for errors at law). The district court’s findings are binding on us if

supported by substantial evidence. See Leonard, 563 N.W.2d at 195. Evidence 

is substantial if a reasonable person “would accept it as adequate to reach the 

same findings.” In re Conservatorship of Deremiah, 477 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1991). We note the district court in this case made no specific findings of 

fact on any of the issues. Instead, the district court stated it reviewed the evidence 

and found “by clear and convincing evidence that the allegations of the said 

Petition are true and material and have been fully sustained by the evidence 

offered.” 

The petitioner has the burden of proving the guardianship and/or 

conservatorship is necessary and must do so by clear and convincing evidence. 

See Iowa Code § 633.551(1), (2). “Clear and convincing evidence is more than a 

preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). “It is the highest 

evidentiary burden in civil cases.” In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2016). “It means there must be no serious or substantial doubt about the 

correctness of a particular conclusion drawn from the evidence.” Id. Because of 

the ward’s significant interest in managing her own affairs, we cannot merely 

rubber stamp what has come before; it is our task as a court of review to ensure 
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the petitioner came forth with the quantum and quality of evidence necessary to 

prove his case. Cf. In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 573 (Iowa 1995) 

(“Recently, several courts have agreed with commentators that a guardianship 

‘involves significant loss of liberty similar to that present in an involuntary civil 

commitment for treatment of mental illness.’” (quoting In re Guardianship of Reyes, 

731 P.2d 130,131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)).

We first address the question of whether the petitioner proved the grounds 

necessary to establish an involuntary guardianship. The district court may 

establish an involuntary guardianship for an adult “whose decision-making 

capacity is so impaired that the person is unable to care for the person’s personal 

safety or to attend to or provide for necessities for the person such as food, shelter, 

clothing, or medical care, without which physical injury or illness might occur.” 

Iowa Code § 633.552(2)(a); accord Hedin, 526 N.W.2d at 581. This requires 

evidence

showing that the ward or proposed ward is unable to think or act for 

himself or herself as to matters concerning the ward’s personal 

health, safety, and general welfare. In addition, the district court’s 

findings of fact based upon this evidence should support the powers 

conferred on the guardian. These powers should be articulated as 

clearly as each case permits.

Id. at 579 (altered for readability). 

Steffen failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a guardianship is 

necessary. Feistner suffers from bipolar disorder. Her disorder causes her to be 

manic and to be aggressive and confrontational with others. However, there is no 

evidence her capacity to make decisions is so impaired that she poses a risk of 

harm to herself. See Iowa Code § 633.552(2)(a); Hedin, 526 N.W.2d at 581.
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Indeed, the record is to the contrary. Feistner testified she could provide for herself 

and live on her own. She has a full-time job in a call center assisting in-bound 

callers. She has a car and a driver’s license. She does not have any thoughts of 

suicidal ideation or self-harm. Roger testified Feistner could live alone: “I think 

she could live alone. I think she could function on her own.” Steffen testified 

Feistner can perform the five major activities of daily living—bathing, dressing, 

transferring (movement and mobility), toileting, and eating. He testified, “She could 

function on her own.” He testified Feistner was smart, can and should be able to 

vote on her own, and can and should make a decision to remarry. In sum, there 

is no evidence establishing Feistner’s decision-making capacity is so impaired that 

she presents a risk of physical harm to herself. The establishment of the 

guardianship was in error. See In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Teeter,

537 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“The liberty interests as well as the 

stigma in being defined as an incapacitated person require before there be a 

determination of whether an adult can make responsible decisions with regard to 

his or her safety or property, there must first be a finding his or her decision-making 

process is so impaired he or she is not able to care for his or her own personal 

safety and is not able to provide necessities of life.”).

We next address the establishment of the involuntary conservatorship. The 

district court may establish an involuntary conservatorship only upon clear and 

convincing evidence that the proposed ward’s “decision-making capacity is so 

impaired that the person is unable to make, communicate, or carry out important 

decisions concerning the person’s financial affairs.” See Iowa Code 

§ 633.566(2)(a). 
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As with the guardianship, Steffen failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence the need for a conservatorship. Steffen testified his primary motivation 

for establishing a guardianship or conservatorship was his concern for Feistner’s 

ability to manage her finances after the divorce. He noted Roger managed the 

couple’s finances during the marriage so Feistner had little experience. Steffen’s 

concern is insufficient evidence to establish a guardianship. See In re 

Guardianship of F.W. Jr., No. 11-1574, 2012 WL 5355801, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Oct. 31, 2012) (noting people may handle their finances in different ways without 

justifying a conservatorship); Teeter, 537 N.W.2d at 810 (concluding foolish 

spending alone is not sufficient to demonstrate incompetency). There is no 

evidence Feistner’s decision-making capacity is so impaired that she cannot 

manage her financial affairs. The evidence is actually to the contrary. There is no 

evidence of any past financial mismanagement. Cf. In re Guardianship of Evans, 

No. 16-2192, 2017 WL 4570438, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (finding ward’s 

inability “to make and carry out important financial decisions regarding her financial 

affairs,” as demonstrated by her history of sharing her debit card; ignorance of her 

bills and payment procedures; and inability to consistently pay her rent, supported 

the establishment of a conservatorship). 

There is no evidence from which one could infer a future inability to manage 

her affairs. As noted above, Feistner has a full-time position in a call center 

assisting in-bound callers. She has managed her own checking account for four

decades. Her trial testimony made clear she understood her finances. She 

explained how she intended to use her property settlement in the impending 

divorce to purchase a condominium for herself because she did not want to pay 
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rent. She appeared knowledgeable regarding the expenses associated with daily 

living, including food, transportation, and tax expenses and how she would need 

to work to pay those items. 

In sum, there is not clear and convincing evidence nor a factual finding that 

the proposed ward had impaired decision-making capacity and the need for an 

involuntary guardianship or conservatorship. The district court erred in concluding 

otherwise. We remand this matter for entry of an order dismissing the petition. 

See, e.g., Leonard, 563 N.W.2d at 196 (concluding “there was neither evidence 

nor a court finding that the [ward’s] decision-making process to handle his own 

financial affairs was impaired according to the Hedin standard” and reversing and 

remanding with instructions to dismiss the petition); Teeter, 537 N.W.2d at 810 

(reversing and dismissing).

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.