United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-51176

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Royshena Holt, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:16-CR-86-2

Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Royshena Holt pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine base. The district court sentenced her to 13 

months in prison, with credit for time served, and three years of supervised 

release. She was released to supervised release after completing her prison 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 5, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 21-51176

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term, but her supervised release was revoked after she violated the conditions 

of her supervision. The district court imposed an 18-month sentence. 

On appeal, Holt contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

revoke her supervised release and impose sentence. We review her claim de 

novo. See United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 640 F.3d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 2011).

According to Holt, the district court did not have jurisdiction because 

the underlying criminal judgment was void. She maintains that the amended 

judgment in the criminal case, which specified the terms under which she had 

to report to prison, was invalid because the district court lacked the authority 

to modify her sentence after its imposition. She also asserts that, but for the 

void amended judgment, she would not have been convicted and sentenced 

for failure to surrender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a), on account of her 

noncompliance with the terms of the amended judgment. Holt alleges that 

the time that she served for that offense wrongly was used to extend the start 

date for her term of supervised release.

Her argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction is premised on 

a challenge to the legality of the amended judgment. However, the district 

court in a revocation case is effectively bound by the underlying judgment, 

regardless of its validity, and a defendant may not use a revocation appeal to 

challenge the underlying criminal conviction and sentence. See United States 

v. Willis, 563 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 

114, 116 (5th Cir. 2005). To the extent that Holt seeks to use this revocation

appeal to challenge her conviction and sentence for failure to surrender—a

separate criminal judgment from the one underlying this appeal—her claims

are more attenuated and inapposite. Any concerns that she has regarding the 

underlying judgment or her conviction and sentence for failure to surrender 

are more appropriate in an appeal from the disputed judgment or a 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion. See United States v. Moody, 277 F.3d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 2001).

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The record supports that the district court otherwise had jurisdiction. 

The revocation proceeding was initiated and completed within three years of 

Holt’s release from custody. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57 

(2000); United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 2005); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3624(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). Although Holt suggests that her supervised 

release should have begun when she was arrested for the underlying criminal 

offense, her supervised release began following her prison term once she was 

released to the supervision of a probation officer. See § 3624(e); Johnson, 529 

U.S. at 57; United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 640 F.3d 129, 130, 134 (5th Cir. 

2011). Because she was convicted of the underlying offense and was granted

credit for time served, her supervised release could not have begun while she 

was in pretrial detention for the offense. See Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 

1826, 1832 (2019); United States v. Molina-Gazca, 571 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 

2009). Her term of supervised release otherwise was tolled while she was in 

prison, including, inter alia, during her pretrial detention and imprisonment

for her failure-to-surrender conviction. See § 3624(e); Johnson, 529 U.S. at 

57; Molina-Gazca, 571 F.3d at 472-74; Jackson, 426 F.3d at 304. Her claim 

that her imprisonment for her failure-to-surrender conviction wasinvalid and 

could not toll her supervised release under Mont is unavailing. See Mont, 139 

S. Ct. at 1834; see also Willis, 563 F.3d at 170; Hinson, 429 F.3d at 116. 

Given the foregoing, Holt has not shown that the district court lacked 

the authority to conduct the revocation hearing and impose sentence. Thus, 

the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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