[Cite as In re Jastrzebski, 2010-Ohio-2373.]

Court of Claims of Ohio 

Victims of Crime Division

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Fourth Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9860 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

IN RE: ELIZABETH L. JASTRZEBSKI 

ELIZABETH L. JASTRZEBSKI 

 Applicant 

 

 Case No. V2009-40188 

Commissioners: 

Karl C. Kerschner, Presiding 

Randi M. Ostry 

Lloyd Pierre-Louis 

ORDER OF A THREE-COMMISSIONER PANEL

{¶ 1} On May 6, 2008, the applicant, Elizabeth Jastrzebski, filed a 

compensation application as the result of an assault which occurred on April 8, 2007. 

On October 29, 2008, the Attorney General issued a finding of fact and decision finding 

the applicant met the necessary jurisdictional requirements to receive an award of 

reparations. Hence, the applicant was granted an award in the amount of $335.81, of 

which $96.00 represents payment to Debra K. Goran, Ph.D., $15.00 represents 

reimbursement to the applicant for a payment to the Cleveland Clinic, and $224.81 

represents mileage expenses incurred by the applicant. The Attorney General noted 

that 80 percent of the counseling expenses incurred with Dr. Goran was related to the 

criminally injurious conduct, while the remaining 20 percent was not. The Attorney 

General directed the applicant to file a compensation application on behalf of her minor 

son A.B. to address his counseling expenses. The Attorney General determined 

expenses incurred at South West General Health Center are subject to the Hospital 

Care Assurance Program (HCAP). Therefore, HCAP would reimburse these 

expenses. The applicant was unable to prove she incurred work loss as a result of the 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 2 - ORDER

criminally injurious conduct and her claim for replacement services loss was denied 

since the child care expenses she was seeking do not meet the legal definition of 

replacement services loss. 

{¶ 2} On November 24, 2008, the applicant submitted a request for 

reconsideration. The applicant asserted she incurred work loss on September 13, 

2007, October 15, 2007, October 16, 2007, November 19, 2007, November 20, 2007, 

January 15, 2008, April 1, 2008 and May 2, 2008, and this loss should be reimbursed by 

the compensation program. The applicant also requested mileage reimbursement to 

attend meetings with relevant parties concerning the domestic violence she suffered. 

The applicant also indicated that her husband’s insurance carrier refused to reimburse 

the expenses incurred with Dr. Goran because Dr. Goran was not within the insurance 

carrier’s network. The applicant requested reimbursement of a $50.00 co-payment she 

incurred for treatment at South West. Finally, the applicant asserted she may not 

qualify for HCAP since she and her husband are, or were at the time, still married and 

their joint income would be considered. 

{¶ 3} On February 23, 2009, the Attorney General rendered a Final Decision. 

The Attorney General granted the applicant an additional award in the amount of 

$50.00, which represented reimbursement of the co-payment she incurred at South 

West General Health Center. With respect to the additional issues raised by the 

applicant, the Attorney General found no reason to modify its prior decision. On March 

2, 2009, the applicant filed a notice of appeal from the February 23, 2009 Final Decision 

of the Attorney General. Hence, a hearing was held before this panel of 

commissioners on February 3, 2010 at 10:25 A.M. It should be noted that this hearing 

concerned both V2009-40188 and V2009-40781, however, this decision will only 

address the issues raised in V2009-40188. 

{¶ 4} The applicant and her attorney, Kimberley Wells, appeared at the hearing 

while the state of Ohio was represented by Assistant Attorneys General Lyndsay Nash 

and Amy O’Grady. As a preliminary matter, it was disclosed to the parties that 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 3 - ORDER

Commissioner Ostry was associated with a firm for whom attorney Wells had, in the 

past, performed contract work. Neither party expressed any objection to Commissioner 

Ostry hearing this matter. 

{¶ 5} Initially, the parties agreed that the applicant should be compensated for 

her counseling expenses and the related mileage expenses she incurred to attend 

these sessions. Also, the applicant should be compensated for the work loss she 

incurred to meet with law enforcement. These expenses have been paid by the 

Attorney General. 

{¶ 6} With respect to V2009-40188, the case at bar, the issues that were 

addressed were work loss incurred on October 7, 2007 to meet with law enforcement, 

lost wages to attend the custody hearing, and child care expenses which qualify as 

replacement services loss. 

{¶ 7} Elizabeth Jastrzebski was called to testify. She described the history of 

domestic violence she experienced with her husband. She revealed that she filed for 

divorce on May 16, 2007. Initially her husband was granted supervised visitation with 

his children. However, after approximately three months, he was allowed unsupervised 

visitation. On October 15, 2007, Darlene Wilcox was appointed guardian ad litem. 

{¶ 8} The applicant testified she began working in August 2007 as a substitute 

teacher. Currently, she works as a substitute teacher during the day, works at a 

ski-resort seasonally, and at McDonald’s on the weekends. Prior to this time period, 

she took care of her children on a full time basis. She now has to pay for before-school 

childcare. 

{¶ 9} The applicant was then shown Exhibit 2, a list of the days of work she 

missed. The exhibit was prepared by the applicant. The applicant testified that she 

was off work on September 13, 2007 to meet with conciliatory services; that October 15, 

2007 was the day after her husband did not return A.B. as scheduled and that she 

stayed home from work because she was worried; that on October 16, 2007, she met 

with the guardian ad litem, Darlene Wilcox; that November 19 and 20, 2007, were court 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 4 - ORDER

dates for visitation and grandparent visitations; January 15, 2008 was another court 

appearance; that on April 1, 2008, a court hearing was postponed due to illness of her 

husband but she had already called off work; and that May 2, 2008, was the final court 

date where she was awarded custody of A.B. and was named residential parent. 

{¶ 10} The applicant was then shown Exhibit 1, the final divorce decree from the 

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations. The 

applicant’s attention was directed to page 2 of the document where the court named the 

applicant as the residential parent and legal custodian of A.B. The applicant indicated 

that she had to attend a mandatory parenting class. 

{¶ 11} The applicant was presented with Exhibit 3, a certificate of attendance 

from a Parent Education Seminar dated June 26, 2007. The applicant’s attention was 

then directed back to Exhibit 2. The applicant testified that she had to travel to the 

October 16, 2007 meeting with the guardian ad litem and the September 13, 2007, 

January 15, 2008 and May 2, 2008, court dates required her to incur travel expenses. 

She testified she traveled to both the Parma and the North Royalton Police 

Departments to file police reports when A.B. was not returned from visitation on October 

15, 2008. 

{¶ 12} The applicant reiterated that although she is the residential parent and has 

custody of A.B., her former husband has visitation rights. While she attempted to 

terminate visitation rights, she was unsuccessful. 

{¶ 13} Assistant Attorney General Amy O’Grady cross-examined the applicant. 

The applicant revealed that initially after the offender was charged with domestic 

violence a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) was issued. During the time the TPO 

was enforced no visitation was allowed; however, visitation was subsequently granted. 

The applicant related that Family Conciliatory Services was associated with the Division 

of Domestic Relations of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. During this 

time period A.B. did not suffer any verbal or physical abuse by his father. 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 5 - ORDER

{¶ 14} The applicant testified that the dates listed in Exhibit 2 represent all the 

times she attended court hearings regarding the custody of A.B. 

{¶ 15} On redirect the applicant testified that she went to court many other times 

concerning the divorce matter but is not seeking reimbursement for those expenses. 

Whereupon, the testimony of the applicant was concluded and the applicant moved for 

admission of Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. The Attorney General moved to admit a letter dated 

February 28, 2008 from Darlene Wilcox and a letter dated October 1, 2007 from Freda 

Saleem of Family Conciliation Services. 

{¶ 16} The applicant asserts the mileage expense incurred in October 2007, to 

file a police report concerning her husband’s interference with custody, should be 

compensable because it was incurred pursuant to her obligation to report criminal 

conduct. Furthermore, the applicant contends that expenses she incurred for mileage 

and lost wages to attend custody proceedings. However, the applicant does not seek 

reimbursement of attorney fees incurred as the result of the custody proceedings should 

be compensable. The applicant argues these expenses were incurred due to her 

attempts to protect her child from the offender. The applicant also requests work loss 

and mileage expenses incurred when she met with Freda Saleem of Family Conciliation 

Services, and Darlene Wilcox, the guardian ad litem, for the same reason, to protect the 

interests of her child. The applicant concedes that pursuant to R.C. 2743.51(F)(4), 

attorney fees are not compensable for representation in custody proceedings, however, 

R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) does not address the issue of lost wages and mileage expenses and 

therefore should have no applicability in this situation. 

{¶ 17} Finally, the applicant argues she should be granted an award for 

replacement services loss. The applicant contends that due to her divorce from the 

offender and the court awarding her custody of her minor child A.B., she had to seek full 

time employment. Therefore, any child care costs she incurred should be considered a 

replacement services loss. 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 6 - ORDER

{¶ 18} The Attorney General reasons that any decision rendered by this panel 

must take into consideration the change in the statute based upon the enactment of 

R.C. 2743.51(F)(4). Prior case law had recognized the compensability of attorney fees 

for limitations of visitation, custody proceedings resulting in less than full physical 

separation, and guardian ad litem fees. However, with the addition of R.C. 

2743.51(F)(4), it was the General Assembly’s intent to specifically delineate the scope 

of the compensability of attorney fees as an allowable expense. In doing so, the 

General Assembly wanted to ensure that funds be expended only when there was a 

physical separation of the victim from the offender. The applicant’s argument seeks to 

circumvent the intent of the legislature by requesting reimbursement for mileage 

expense and work loss, when the underlying proceeding, in this case a custody order 

which did not physically separate the victim from the offender, failed to meet the specific 

requirements of R.C. 2743.51(F)(4). The Attorney General also claims that the 

applicant’s claims for work loss and mileage as it relates to meeting with Family 

Conciliation Services and the guardian ad litem, attending parenting classes and doing 

whatever is in the best interest of the child occur in the vast majority of divorces 

involving children. Certainly, the reparations fund should not be burdened with 

reimbursing these expenses, since they are not directly related to the criminally injurious 

conduct. 

{¶ 19} Finally, the expenses involved in obtaining a police report for an 

interference of custody matter should not be compensated since no testimony was 

presented that this report was made as a result of A.B. suffering from any criminally 

injurious conduct. 

{¶ 20} The Attorney General concluded by stating that the applicant failed to 

meet the definition of replacement services loss as contained in the statute. Pursuant 

to R.C. 2743.51(H), replacement services loss can be granted only when the injured 

person is unable to perform ordinary and necessary services. In this case, the 

applicant offered no testimony supporting the replacement services she seeks were the 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 7 - ORDER

result of injuries she sustained from the criminally injurious conduct. Accordingly, the 

day care expenses requested by the applicant should be denied. 

{¶ 21} The applicant responded to the Attorney General’s arguments by citing the 

case of In re Richardson, V94-31959sc (1-30-95), affirmed tc (7-28-95), affirmed jud 

(1-10-96), for the proposition that she incurred replacement services loss. The 

applicant contends this case stands for the proposition that replacement services loss 

can be awarded to one who has not been injured, but who incurs a loss to replace the 

services of the injured person. Whereupon, the hearing was concluded. 

{¶ 22} R.C. 2743.51(F)(1) in pertinent part states: 

“(F)(1) ‘Allowable expense’ means reasonable charges incurred for reasonably 

needed products, services, and accommodations, including those for medical 

care, rehabilitation, rehabilitative occupational training, and other remedial 

treatment and care and including replacement costs for eyeglasses and other 

corrective lenses.” 

{¶ 23} R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) in pertinent part states: 

“(4) ‘Allowable expense’ includes attorney’s fees not exceeding one thousand 

three hundred twenty dollars, at a rate not exceeding sixty dollars per hour, 

incurred to successfully obtain a restraining order, custody order, or other order 

to physically separate a victim from an offender * * *” 

{¶ 24} R.C. 2743.51(G) states: 

“(G) ‘Work loss’ means loss of income from work that the injured person would 

have performed if the person had not been injured and expenses reasonably 

incurred by the person to obtain services in lieu of those the person would have 

performed for income, reduced by any income from substitute work actually 

performed by the person, or by income the person would have earned in 

available appropriate substitute work that the person was capable of performing 

but unreasonably failed to undertake.” 

{¶ 25} R.C. 2743.51(H) states: 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 8 - ORDER

“(H) ‘Replacement services loss’ means expenses reasonably incurred in 

obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those the injured person 

would have performed, not for income, but for the benefit of the person’s self or 

family, if the person had not been injured.” 

{¶ 26} From review of the case file and upon full and careful consideration of the 

testimony and arguments presented by the parties, we find that applicant should be 

granted counseling and mileage expenses related to the counseling sessions in 

accordance with the agreement of the parties. 

{¶ 27} This panel believes that all statutory sections relating to the same general 

subject matter must be read in pari materia. When reading statutes in pari materia, this 

panel must give reasonable construction as to the proper force and effect each statutory 

provision has on the other and the interpretation and application of statutes must be 

viewed in a manner to carry out the legislative intent of the sections. Johnson’s Market 

Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. Of Health (1991), 58 Ohio St. 3d 28; see also In re Fletcher, 

V2006-20836jud (7-2-09). Accordingly, when we read R.C. 2743.51(F), we must 

harmonize the particular section of the statute to give proper force and effect to the 

intent of the General Assembly. Accordingly, we find when the General Assembly 

amended R.C. 2743.51 on June 26, 2004 by including R.C. 2743.51(F)(4), it intended to 

limit the compensability of attorney fees, as an allowable expense, only to those 

situations where a successful restraining order, custody order, or other order physically 

separated a victim from an offender. Accordingly, we find applicant’s argument that 

mileage and work loss expenses in conjunction with trips to custody hearings, Family 

Conciliation Services, parenting classes, and guardian ad litem meetings (where no 

physical separation was ordered), should be compensable, but attorney fees incurred 

for the same custody proceedings are not compensable is an incongruous interpretation 

of the statute. If the General Assembly chose to limit the reimbursement of attorney 

fees to those situations only where the victim and the offender were physically 

separated, we would be remiss in granting R.C. 2743.51(F)(1) expenses e.g. mileage 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 9 - ORDER

and work loss, when that requirement is not met. Therefore, we find the applicant’s 

claims for mileage and work loss relating to visits to Family Conciliation Services, the 

guardian ad litem, and attendance at custody proceedings and parenting classes are 

denied. 

{¶ 28} The applicant asserts a claim for work loss and mileage expense 

reimbursement for reporting a custody interference charge to law enforcement. While 

the applicant correctly cites the claim of In re T.R.G., for the proposition that work loss 

incurred to take a minor victim to meet with law enforcement is compensable, this is not 

the situation in this case. In the case at bar, the applicant asserts she incurred work 

loss and mileage expenses to meet with law enforcement to pursue an interference with 

custody matter. However, this situation is distinguishable from the holding in In re 

T.R.G. In In re T.R.G., the work loss was compensable since the applicant took time 

off of work to report the criminally injurious conduct that was the basis for filing the 

compensation application. In the case at bar, the underlying criminally injurious 

conduct toward A.B. was domestic violence, not any events that transpired in October 

2007. No documentary or testimonial evidence has been presented that A.B. was a 

victim of criminally injurious conduct in October 2007. Therefore, the applicant’s claim 

for mileage and work loss to meet with law enforcement concerning the interference 

with custody matter is denied. 

{¶ 29} Finally, the applicant maintains the holding in In re Richardson, 

V94-31959sc (1-30-95), affirmed tc (7-28-95), affirmed jud (1-10-96), stands for the 

proposition that the applicant can receive an award for replacement services loss due to 

the fact she incurred daycare expenses while she was working. The applicant 

reasoned that but for the domestic violence which resulted in her divorce, she would 

have remained a stay-at-home parent and would not have sought full-time employment. 

However, due to the divorce and the divorce decree granting her request to be the 

custodial parent of A.B., she was required to seek full-time employment and thus incur 

daycare expenses when she was not able to care for A.B. While the Attorney General 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 10 - ORDER

correctly notes that R.C. 2743.51(H) requires replacement services loss to be limited to 

the injured party’s loss, the applicant contends Richardson provides an exception. 

{¶ 30} Richardson presents a unique situation where the applicant’s husband 

acted as a caregiver for their child, while the applicant was working. The applicant was 

assaulted. As a result of the assault, the applicant’s husband accompanied the 

applicant to work to assist the applicant with fears she was experiencing and to protect 

her from another assault. In other words, the applicant would not have been able to 

return to work on her own unless she was accompanied by her husband. Therefore, 

the loss experienced by the husband altering his work schedule was less than if the 

applicant had quit her job due to her fears. Therefore, this court determined it was 

reasonable under those circumstances to pay for replacement services loss. 

Furthermore, the award was granted to the applicant, not to the applicant’s husband. 

{¶ 31} In the case at bar, the applicant is not asserting that the daycare expenses 

are incurred for A.B.’s protection from or fear of the offender. The divorce decree 

mandates that the offender have unsupervised visitations with A.B. The applicant has 

presented no information to this panel that A.B. is afraid of his father or that the sole 

purpose of daycare is to protect A.B. from his father. The applicant sought 

employment to show the domestic relations court that she had the ability to financially 

support her child and was qualified as the custodial parent. We find the causal 

connection between the criminally injurious conduct suffered by A.B., and the daycare 

expenses is too remote and tenuous, and accordingly, the applicant’s claim for 

replacement services loss is denied. 

{¶ 32} Therefore, the February 23, 2009 decision of the Attorney General is 

modified. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT 

{¶ 33} 1) Applicant’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 are admitted into evidence; 
Case No. V2009-40188 - 11 - ORDER

{¶ 34} 2) The letters submitted by the Attorney General, dated February 28, 

2008, from Darlene Wilcox, guardian ad litem and dated October 1, 2007, from Freda 

Saleem of Family Conciliation Services are admitted into evidence; 

{¶ 35} 3) The February 23, 2009 decision of the Attorney General is 

MODIFIED to render judgment in favor of the applicant for counseling expenses and 

associated mileage expenses agreed to at the hearing; 

{¶ 36} 4) This claim is remanded to the Attorney General for payment of 

these expenses; 

{¶ 37} 5) Applicant’s claims for mileage and work loss expenses associated 

with trips to Family Conciliation Services, the guardian ad litem, and law enforcement in 

October 2007 are DENIED; 

{¶ 38} 6) Applicant’s claim for replacement services loss is DENIED; 

{¶ 39} 7) This order is entered without prejudice to the applicant’s right to file 

a supplemental compensation application, within five years of this order, pursuant to 

R.C. 2743.68; 

{¶ 40} 8) Costs are assumed by the court of claims victims of crime fund.

 _______________________________________ 

 KARL C. KERSCHNER 

 Presiding Commissioner

 _______________________________________ 

 RANDI M. OSTRY 

 Commissioner
Case No. V2009-40188 - 12 - ORDER

 _______________________________________ 

 LLOYD PIERRE-LOUIS 

 Commissioner 

 A copy of the foregoing was personally served upon the Attorney General and 

sent by regular mail to Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney and to: 

Filed 5-14-2010 

Jr. Vol. 2275, Pgs. 97-109 

To S.C. Reporter 5-27-2010