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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7850 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7850

 To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy forces, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 29, 2020

 Mr. Schneider (for himself, Mr. Zeldin, Mrs. Murphy of Florida, Mrs. 
   Brooks of Indiana, Mr. Correa, Mrs. Walorski, Mr. Gottheimer, Mr. 
 Suozzi, Mr. Yoho, and Mr. Rooney of Florida) introduced the following 
     bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy forces, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``NIE on Iranian Proxy Forces Act''.

SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Hizballah is Iran's oldest and most successful proxy 
        force.
            (2) Hizballah has trained militia groups in Iraq.
            (3) Hizballah is active in Syria and its fighters have 
        helped President Bashar Al-Assad maintain regime control.
            (4) Hizballah fighters are returning to Lebanon more 
        battle-tested and more capable than ever before.
            (5) In 2006, Hizballah's rocket and missile arsenal in 
        Lebanon was approximately 15,000; however, by 2020, this figure 
        has grown ten-fold to more than 150,000.
            (6) With the assistance of Iran, Hizballah's weapons 
        arsenal has not only increased in quantity, but also quality, 
        including technologically advanced weapons and more accurate 
        missiles.
            (7) Iran is reportedly building missile production 
        facilities in Lebanon to enable an indigenous rocket-producing 
        capability for Hizballah.
            (8) Iran is actively pursuing its regional interests and 
        challenging United States interests and United States allies 
        through the use of proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
    (b) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
produce a National Intelligence Estimate--
            (1) on Iranian support of proxy and other partner and 
        militia forces in the Middle East region; and
            (2) assessing the increased threat posed to Israel, other 
        United States regional allies, and other specified interests of 
        the United States as a result of such support.
    (c) Matters To Be Included.--The National Intelligence Estimate 
required under subsection (b) shall include, at a minimum, information 
relating to the following matters with respect to both the strategic 
and tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
            (1) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled 
        personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's 
        Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating in Iraq, 
        Syria, and Lebanon, including the number and geographic 
        distribution of such personnel.
            (2) A description of arms and related material transferred 
        by Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel since 
        January 2011, including the number and type of such arms and 
        related material and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or 
        air, as well as financial and additional technological 
        capabilities.
            (3) An identification of financial institutions, 
        businesses, and other persons that provide material support, 
        including financial support, to such Iranian and Iranian-
        controlled personnel.
            (4) An assessment of the operational and doctrinal lessons 
        learned and relationships forged by such Iranian and Iranian-
        controlled personnel based on recent battle experiences in Iraq 
        and Syria, and on the performance of these groups in the 
        aftermath of the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu-Mahdi al-
        Muhandis.
            (5) A description of any rocket and missile production and 
        modification facilities in Lebanon and Syria for such Iranian 
        and Iranian-controlled personnel, and whether--
                    (A) such facilities involve precision-guided 
                munitions;
                    (B) such facilities were assessed to be built at 
                the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian 
                leadership, or both Hizballah and Iranian leadership; 
                and
                    (C) such facilities are connected to the Iranian 
                ``landbridge'' project.
            (6) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains 
        that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid 
        Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production 
        facilities, including the geographic distribution of such 
        foreign and domestic supply chains.
            (7) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or 
        technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah 
        to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
            (8) The number of arms or related material transferred by 
        Iran or its affiliates to such Iranian and Iranian-controlled 
        personnel in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and an identification of 
        the Iranian or Iranian-controlled personnel to which the arms 
        or related material were transferred.
            (9) An identification of foreign persons that are, based on 
        credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant 
        financial support or arms or related material to such Iranian 
        and Iranian-controlled personnel.
            (10) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other 
        United States partners in the Middle East by the transfer of 
        arms or related material or other support offered to such 
        Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel.
            (11) An assessment of the military capabilities of United 
        States partners in the region to address and offset the 
        transfers described in paragraph (10).
    (d) Submission to Congress.--Upon completion of the National 
Intelligence Estimate required under subsection (b), the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed 
Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy 
of such estimate.
    (e) Arms or Related Material Defined.--The term ``arms or related 
material'' means--
            (1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons 
        or materials or components of such weapons;
            (2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or 
        components of such weapons;
            (3) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
        conventional weapons, as well as unmanned aerial threats such 
        as drones, rockets, and mortars;
            (4) defense articles or defense services, as those terms 
        are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section 
        47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
            (5) defense information, as that term is defined in section 
        644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or
            (6) items designated by the President for purposes of the 
        United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

SEC. 3. STRATEGY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after completion of the 
National Intelligence Estimate required under section 2(b), the 
President shall transmit to Congress a strategy to prevent Iran from 
expanding its influence and power in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--Such strategy shall include plans to--
            (1) limit Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel, 
        including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's Revolutionary 
        Guard Corps forces, operating in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; and
            (2) interdict the sale, supply, or transfer of weapons from 
        Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel operating 
        in such countries.
                                 <all>
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