1

Filed 10/15/21

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SEIU-USWW et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

PREFERRED BUILDING 

SERVICES, INC., 

Defendant and Appellant.

 A159790

 (City and County of San 

 Francisco Super. Ct. No. CGC-

 15-545974)

A class of janitors (Janitors) were employed by VPM Maintenance 

Management, LLC (VPM) at a residential complex (the Site). After VPM 

terminated its janitorial contract with the Site, a successor janitorial 

contractor (Successor) replaced VPM. Janitors and their union (Union)

(collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Successor for failing to retain Janitors under 

state and local laws. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

judgment and awarded attorney fees. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Janitors worked for VPM providing janitorial services at the Site. The 

Union was Janitors’ elected bargaining representative. In 2014, VPM 

notified the Union that it was considering terminating its janitorial contract 

with the Site. In June 2014, VPM and the Union executed an agreement 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts I.C–F and II.
2

regarding this potential termination (Termination Agreement). The 

Termination Agreement provided that, in the event that VPM terminated its 

janitorial contract with the Site, VPM would offer a specified severance 

package to employees who executed an agreement stating they were 

voluntarily resigning and releasing all claims against VPM. The 

Termination Agreement also included the following: “[N]either the Union nor 

any bargaining unit employee waives any rights under the Displaced Janitors 

Opportunity Act to require any successor employer to offer employment to 

existing employees . . . .” 

In February 2015, VPM informed the Union that it was terminating its 

janitorial contract with the Site effective April 13, 2015. Janitors each signed

a separation agreement (Separation Agreement). The Separation 

Agreements stated the employee was voluntarily resigning; provided lump 

sum payments based on the employee’s years of service; included a release of 

all claims against VPM; and stated the employee’s last day would be April 13, 

2015, or earlier at VPM’s election. 

On April 10, 2015, VPM informed the Union that VPM was electing to 

move up Janitors’ last day pursuant to the Separation Agreements and 

“today will be everyone’s last day.”

1 For the following three days, the Site 

hired another company to provide essential janitorial services; VPM did not 

provide these services at the Site. 

On April 14, 2015, Successor began providing janitorial services at the 

Site. On that date, Janitors appeared at the Site and asserted their right to 

retention. Successor did not retain any of the Janitors. 

1 VPM nonetheless paid Janitors through April 13, 2015. 
3

In May 2015, Plaintiffs sued Successor, alleging violations of the 

Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (Lab. Code,2 §§ 1060–1065; DJOA), and 

the Displaced Worker Protection Act (S.F. Police Code, §§3300C.1–3300C.6; 

DWPA). Multiple motions for summary judgment and/or summary 

adjudication were filed and denied in whole or in part. In November 2018, 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court 

granted. The court subsequently awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs and 

issued judgment. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment

“An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] 

As a practical matter, ‘ “we assume the role of a trial court and apply the 

same rules and standards which govern a trial court’s determination of a 

motion for summary judgment.” ’ [Citation.] A motion for summary 

judgment is properly granted ‘if all the papers submitted show that there is 

no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Doe v. Good Samaritan Hospital (2018) 

23 Cal.App.5th 653, 661.)

A. Legal Background

The DJOA “requires contractors who are awarded contracts for 

janitorial or building maintenance services at a particular site to retain 

certain employees working for the terminated contractor for a 60-day 

transition employment period, and to offer those workers continued 

employment if their performance during the 60-day period is satisfactory.

(§ 1061, subds. (b)(1) & (f).) . . . [T]he DJOA requires a terminated contractor 

2 All undesignated section references are to the Labor Code.
4

to provide the name, date of hire, and job classification of each employee 

employed at the site to the successor contractor within three working days 

after receiving notice that its contract has been terminated. (§ 1061, subd. 

(a).) [¶] Under the DJOA, an employee of the terminated contractor who was 

not offered employment by the successor contractor may sue the successor for 

back pay, including the value of any lost employment benefits. (§ 1062, subd. 

(a).) If the employee is the prevailing party, the trial court ‘shall award the 

employee reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as part of the costs 

recoverable.’ (§ 1062, subd. (c).)” (Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc. (2021) 62 

Cal.App.5th 372, 379–380 (Jones).)

3

The DWPA similarly provides that persons employed under service 

contracts shall be retained by a successor contractor for a 90-day transition 

period. (S.F. Police Code, §§ 3300C.1(c) & (f), 3300C.2(b).)4 

B. Employees

Successor argues Janitors were not “employees” within the meaning of 

the DJOA and DWPA. “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, 

our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to 

effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] The well-established rules for 

3 In a footnote, Successor cursorily asserts the DJOA does not apply 

because VPM terminated the contract, not the Site. The contention is 

forfeited: “An appellant cannot bury a substantive legal argument in a 

footnote and hope to avoid waiver of that argument.” (Holden v. City of San 

Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419.)

4 The DJOA was modeled on local ordinances adopted in various cities, 

including San Francisco—presumably, the DWPA. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 

Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 20 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Sept. 4, 2001, p. 3 [“SB 20 is modeled after local ordinances adopted 

by San Francisco in 1998, Washington, D.C., in 1994, and, most recently, in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania”].)
5

performing this task require us to begin by examining the statutory 

language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do 

not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to 

the statute’s entire substance in order to determine its scope and purposes. 

[Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question in context, keeping in 

mind the statute’s nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must 

harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the context of the 

statutory framework as a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is 

unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language 

supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to 

extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the 

legislative history.” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1106–

1107.)

The DJOA defines “employee” as “any person employed as a service 

employee of a contractor or subcontractor who works at least 15 hours per 

week and whose primary place of employment is in the State of California 

under a contract to provide janitorial or building maintenance services.” 

(§ 1060, subd. (c).) The DWPA provides a similar definition; the only

differences are not material here. (S.F. Police Code, § 3300C.1(c) 

[“ ‘Employee’ means any person employed as a service employee of a 

contractor or subcontractor who works at least 15 hours per week and whose 

primary place of employment is in the City and County of San Francisco 

under a contract to provide security services, janitorial services, or building 

maintenance services for the awarding authority.”].) Under the DJOA, a

successor contractor is required to retain “employees who have been 

employed by the terminated contractor or its subcontractors, if any, for the 
6

preceding four months or longer at the site or sites covered by the successor 

service contract . . . .” (§ 1061, subd. (b)(1).) The DWPA imposes a nearly 

identical requirement, but requires retained employees to have been 

employed for at least the preceding eight months. (S.F. Police Code, 

§ 3300C.2(b) [successor contractor must retain “employees who have been 

employed by the terminated contractor or its subcontractors, if any, for the 

preceding eight months or longer at the site or sites covered by the 

contract”].) 

Plaintiffs suggest the statutes require retention of any person “recently

or lately” employed by the terminated contractor. This argument is fatally 

undermined by another provision, requiring the terminated contractor to 

provide information about “each employee employed at the site or sites 

covered by the terminated service contract at the time of the contract 

termination.” (§ 1061, subd. (a)(1), italics added; see S.F. Police Code, 

§ 3300C.2(a) [terminated contractor must provide information about “each 

employee employed at the site or sites covered by the prospective contractor 

at the time of contract termination” (italics added)].) Similarly, the DJOA’s

formula for calculating a backpay award incorporates “[t]he final regular rate 

of pay received by the employee at the time of termination of the predecessor 

contract . . . .” (§ 1062, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) This language makes it 

clear that the individual must be an employee at the time of contract 

termination.

Successor argues the time of contract termination was April 13, 2015, 

relying on a declaration from VPM’s president averring that “[o]n April 13, 

2015, VPM terminated” its janitorial contract with the Site. However, the 

undisputed evidence establishes that after April 10, 2015, VPM did not 

provide janitorial services at the Site. No VPM employees provided these 
7

services. VPM also did not provide these services through other means; 

instead, the Site itself hired a third company to provide janitorial services 

between April 10 and April 14, the date Successor began providing janitorial 

and maintenance services at the Site. April 10, 2015 was thus the last day 

VPM provided janitorial services at the Site, either with its own employees or 

by some other means. 

We must determine whether “the time of contract termination” for 

purposes of the DJOA and DWPA is the nominal last day of the contract or 

the last day the terminated contractor actually provides janitorial services at 

the site. The statutory purpose informs our analysis. “ ‘When construing the 

Labor Code . . . , we adopt the construction that best gives effect to the 

purpose of the Legislature . . . . [Citations.] Time and again, we have 

characterized that purpose as the protection of employees—particularly given 

the extent of legislative concern about working conditions, wages, and hours 

when the Legislature enacted key portions of the Labor Code. [Citations.] In 

furtherance of that purpose, we liberally construe the Labor Code . . . to favor 

the protection of employees.’ ” (Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

829, 839.) This employee-protective purpose is confirmed by the legislative 

history of the DJOA, which “indicates it was designed to protect vulnerable 

janitorial workers from a labor market in which they can lose their jobs with 

little or no warning.” (Jones, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 380, fn. 3.)5 

In addition, the DJOA includes provisions indicating a legislative 

intent to forestall contractors and awarding authorities from circumventing 

its provisions. The statute defines “ ‘Successor service contract’ ” to mean “a 

service contract for the performance of essentially the same services as were 

5 The parties do not suggest the purpose of the DWPA is any different.
8

previously performed pursuant to a different service contract at the same 

facility that terminated within the previous 30 days.” (§ 1060, subd. (g).) 

However, in an apparent recognition that contractors and awarding 

authorities might wait 31 days to begin a new contract to avoid the statute’s 

requirements, the DJOA further provides, “ A service contract entered into 

more than 30 days after the termination of a predecessor service contract 

shall be considered a ‘successor service contract’ if its execution was delayed 

for the purpose of avoiding application of this chapter.” (§ 1060, subd. (g).)

To allow a terminated contractor to stop providing services a few days 

before the nominal end of the contract and claim it therefore had no 

employees “at the time of contract termination” would create an easy way

around the requirements of the DJOA and DWPA. Such an interpretation

would contravene the legislative intent to close such loopholes, the workerprotective statutory purpose, and our obligation to liberally construe the 

statutes in favor of employee protection. Accordingly, we conclude that April 

10, 2015—the last day VPM provided janitorial services at the Site—was “the 

time of contract termination” for purposes of the DJOA and DWPA, 

regardless of any other nominal or technical contract end date. Janitors were 

therefore employees at the time of contract termination.

Our analysis is not impacted by Janitors’ statements in the Separation 

Agreements that they voluntarily resigned. Setting aside the question of 

whether their departure is accurately characterized as voluntary (see Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 22, § 1256–1, subd. (d) [for purposes of unemployment 

benefits, “An employee who leaves work when asked by the employer to 

either resign or be fired . . . has not left work of his or her own free will,” and 

is therefore “involuntarily unemployed”]), Janitors’ resignations were 
9

effective at the end of the day on April 10, 2015. Therefore, Janitors were 

still employees at the time of contract termination. 

Successor also makes much of Janitors’ receipt of severance packages

from VPM. We fail to see how this severance—received by Janitors in 

exchange for their release of all claims against VPM—impacts our 

interpretation of Successor’s obligations under the DJOA and DWPA. Nor 

are we persuaded by Successor’s argument that, if we affirm the trial court, a 

janitor and terminated contractor could never “voluntarily sever their 

employment relationship . . . without triggering a retention obligation for the 

successor.” Most obviously, a janitor could waive his or her rights under the 

DJOA or DWPA.

6

C. Preemption

Successor argues Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by section 301 of the 

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185; Section 301). We 

disagree. 

Section 301 “ ‘provides federal court jurisdiction over controversies 

involving collective-bargaining agreements . . . .’ ” (Balcorta v. Twentieth 

Century-Fox Film Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1102, 1107.) As relevant 

here, if the right underlying the state law cause of action is “ ‘ “substantially 

dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement” ’ . . . , the state 

law claim is preempted by § 301.” (Kobold v. Good Samaritan Regional 

Medical Center (9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 1024, 1032–1033.) However, “ ‘a

defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that 

asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one 

arising under federal law.’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘[i]f the claim is 

6 In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we reject Successor’s argument 

that Janitors so waived these rights. (See post, part I.E.)
10

plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because 

the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.’ ” (Id. at p. 1033.)

Successor argues Plaintiffs’ claims are dependent on the Termination 

Agreement negotiated by VPM and the Union because: (1) Janitors cannot be 

“employees” within the meaning of the DJOA and DWPA because they 

resigned; (2) therefore, Janitors must rely on the reservation of rights in the 

Termination Agreement to pursue their DJOA and DWPA claims; and (3) the 

reservation of rights applies to “existing employees,” the meaning of which is 

disputed by VPM and Plaintiffs. Successor’s argument fails at the first step: 

as explained ante, part I.B, Plaintiffs were employees within the meaning of 

the DJOA and DWPA, without needing to rely on the Termination 

Agreement. To the extent interpretation of the Termination Agreement is 

required by Successor’s defenses, preemption does not result. (Kobold, supra,

832 F.3d 1024 at p. 1033.) 

D. Cause

The DJOA provides a successor contractor is excused from the 

retention obligation if it “has reasonable and substantiated cause not to hire 

a particular employee based on that employee’s performance or conduct while 

working under the terminated contract.” (§ 1061, subd. (b)(1).) The DWPA 

similarly provides. (S.F. Police Code, § 3300C.2(e) [successor contractor may 

terminate retained employee for “cause”].) 

Successor argues Janitors’ conduct of resigning provided such cause. 

We disagree. Successor’s argument appears to be that Janitors’ resignations 

constituted “cause” because they rendered them no longer employees for 

whom retention was required under the DJOA and DWPA. We have rejected 

this argument (see ante, part I.B). 
11

E. Waiver and Estoppel

Successor argues there are material issues of fact as to whether 

Janitors waived their right to retention under the DJOA and DWPA or are 

estopped from asserting such rights. Again, we disagree.7

“ ‘ “[W]aiver” means the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of 

a known right.’ [Citations.] Waiver requires an existing right, the waiving 

party’s knowledge of that right, and the party’s ‘actual intention to relinquish 

the right.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Waiver always rests upon intent.” ’ [Citation.] The 

intention may be express, based on the waiving party’s words, or implied, 

based on conduct that is ‘ “so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right 

as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished.” ’ ” 

(Lynch v. California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 475.) “The elements 

of equitable estoppel are ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the 

facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act 

that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; 

(3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must 

rely upon the conduct to his injury. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The detrimental 

reliance must be reasonable.’ ” (Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 

Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261.) 

To the extent that Janitors’ resignations suggest an intent to waive 

their rights under the DJOA and DWPA, the express reservation of rights in 

the Termination Agreement creates the inescapable inference that Janitors 

did not so intend. Similarly, for purposes of estoppel, to the extent there is a 

dispute of fact as to whether Janitors intended their resignations to indicate 

7 Because we reject the arguments on the merits, we need not decide 

whether, as Plaintiffs contend, Successor abandoned the defense of waiver 

and/or improperly pled the defense of estoppel. 
12

they had no rights under the DJOA and DWPA, or whether Successor had a 

right to so believe, the express reservation of rights in the Termination 

Agreement is irrefutable evidence that Janitors sought to disabuse VPM (and 

anyone VPM communicated with) of this notion. In addition, on the first day 

of Successor’s contract for janitorial services, Janitors appeared at the Site 

and expressed their understanding that they were entitled to retention. 

Successor argues the Termination Agreement’s reservation of rights 

does not apply because Janitors were no longer “existing employees” after 

their resignations. Such a construction of the Termination Agreement would 

be absurd: retention rights would be reserved for bargaining unit members 

who did not resign, and therefore had no need to reserve their rights, while 

retention rights would not be reserved for bargaining unit members who did 

resign. Instead, the plain meaning of “existing employees” is those 

bargaining unit members still employed by VPM at the time of contract 

termination.8 

Successor notes the trial court’s order did not expressly address the 

waiver defense and argues we should remand for that reason alone. (See 

Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1044, 

1047 [where the court’s minute order, the hearing transcript, and the formal 

order all failed to address certain issues raised in summary judgment motion, 

“[t]he appellate record does not provide sufficient information to permit 

meaningful appellate review of these issues”].) But the court’s order did 

address the merits of the estoppel defense, and Successor itself asserts that

“ ‘[e]stoppel is, for practical purposes, indistinguishable from the doctrine of 

8 Although the reservation of rights in the Termination Agreement only 

identifies the DJOA, not the DWPA, Successor does not contend that our 

analysis is any different for the two statutes.
13

implied waiver through conduct.’ ” (Quoting Oakland Raiders v. OaklandAlameda County Coliseum, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1190.) The 

record therefore permits meaningful appellate review.

F. Impossibility

Successor argues it was impossible to comply with the DJOA and 

DWPA. “ ‘The law never requires impossibilities.’ (Civ. Code, § 3531.) 

Impossibility means not only strict impossibility but also impracticability 

because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss 

involved. [Citation.] Consistent with this maxim, the law recognizes 

exceptions to statutory requirements for impossibility of performance.” 

(Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 299–300.)

Successor argues it was impossible to comply with any obligations 

under the DJOA and DWPA because it was told by the Site there were no 

employees, and neither the Site nor VPM provided it with a list of employees. 

However, on Successor’s first day at the Site, Janitors personally appeared 

and asserted their status as employees of the terminated contractor. Thus, at 

the latest by its first day on the job, Successor knew there may have been 

employees covered by the DJOA and DWPA, and further knew or could easily 

obtain the identity of such employees. There is no evidence that Successor’s 

compliance with the statute was impossible.

II. Attorney Fees

Successor challenges the amount of attorney fees awarded Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs requested lodestar fees with a multiplier of 2.0. The trial court 

awarded the requested lodestar fees but with a 1.4 multiplier.

“We review attorney fee awards on an abuse of discretion standard. 

‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional 

services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of 
14

course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is 

convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Fees approved by the trial 

court are presumed to be reasonable, and the [appellant] must show error in 

the award.’ ” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488.)

A. Downward Adjustment

Successor argues the lodestar should have been adjusted downward 

because Plaintiffs overstaffed the case with eight attorneys. The trial court 

addressed this contention in its order: “While [Successor’s] concern regarding 

overstaffing is not misplaced, given that Plaintiffs seek to recover for time 

expended by eight attorneys on the case, Plaintiffs’ showing establishes (1) 

that five of those attorneys who were principally involved in the case, lead 

counsel and four associates, account for over 90 percent of the hours worked 

on the litigation; (2) that Plaintiffs have excluded the time of any attorneys 

who billed less than 10 hours on the case; and (3) that Plaintiffs, in an

exercise of billing judgment, applied an across-the-board 10 percent reduction 

of their total lodestar . . . . Based on those adjustments, the Court finds, 

based in part on its familiarity with the most recent year or so of the 

litigation, that the overall amount of time for which counsel seek 

compensation is reasonable in light of the factual and procedural complexity 

of the case, which included a TRO request, discovery, five motions for 

summary judgment/summary adjudication by both parties, a contested 

motion for class certification, and a petition for writ of mandate in the Court 

of Appeal.” (Record citations omitted.)

Successor does not dispute any of the showings identified by the trial 

court, but instead generally argues Plaintiffs failed to support staffing the 

case with so many attorneys. Successor’s assertion is refuted by the trial 

court’s analysis. The authority relied on by Successor is inapposite. (Thayer 
15

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 840–844 [award of 

requested lodestar fees reversed where attorney: filed last of five nearly 

identical class action lawsuits; after the lawsuits were coordinated, let 

attorneys for other class actions take the lead; and regularly appeared at 

hearings with a second attorney to simply express their concurrence with the 

other class action attorneys]; Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 

259, 262 [fee award for trustee reversed where “[e]ight attorneys from three 

major law firms comprised the former trustee’s legal team, with four to five of 

those attorneys simultaneously appearing at the 14–day court trial”].) 

Successor has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion.

B. Improper Double Counting

Successor contends the trial court improperly double counted the 

attorneys’ skill by relying on it to enhance the fee award when it was already 

encompassed by the lodestar.

A lodestar fee may be enhanced “based on factors including . . . (1) the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in 

presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded 

other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee 

award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) With respect to 

counsel’s skill, “that factor necessarily is reflected in the lodestar figure. The 

more skillful and experienced the attorney the higher his or her hourly 

charges will be. It follows that the skill of an attorney will justify enhancing 

the lodestar figure only if the skills exhibited are beyond those that might be 

expected of attorneys of comparable expertise or experience.” (Weeks v. Baker 

& McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1176; see also Ketchum, at p. 1132 

[adjustment warranted where litigation “required extraordinary legal skill 
16

justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate 

the fair market rate for such services”].)

The trial court identified four factors warranting a multiplier of 1.4. 

(See post, part II.C.) One of these factors was counsel’s representation 

“resulting in a rare summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff class . . . .” The 

trial court thus impliedly found Plaintiffs’ counsel exhibited skill beyond that 

expected of comparable attorneys. Successor’s disagreement with this 

assessment does not demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion or 

improperly double counted counsel’s skill.

C. Multiplier

With respect to the multiplier, the trial court’s order provides: “[T]he 

Court concludes that a multiplier of 1.4 is the appropriate multiplier in light 

of the following factors, among others: (a) While Plaintiffs are correct that the 

issues presented by the case were novel in that there was no binding 

precedent construing either of the statutory schemes involved, Plaintiffs also

acknowledge that ‘[t]he basic material facts in this matter were largely 

undisputed from the start of the litigation.’ Discovery, while thorough, was 

not extraordinarily extensive; only three persons were deposed. The case 

involved primarily issues of statutory interpretation, and therefore was 

susceptible to resolution by summary judgment. (b) Plaintiffs’ representation 

was indisputably competent and ultimately successful, resulting in a rare 

summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff class, albeit for substantially less 

damages than Plaintiffs originally sought. It also included some unsuccessful 

efforts, including a second motion for summary judgment filed to correct 

evidentiary deficiencies in their first motion and an unsuccessful opposition 

to a motion to amend, and at times involved substantial delays. (c) Plaintiffs 

have shown that the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by 
17

the attorneys. (d) The fee was entirely contingent, in that Plaintiffs would not 

have been entitled to recover fees unless they prevailed in the litigation. 

(Although Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs’ supporting declaration does 

not address this factor, the Court can reasonably infer it from the 

circumstances of the class members.)” (Record citations omitted.)

“ ‘There is no hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an 

exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation.’ 

[Citation.] There are numerous such factors, and their evaluation is 

entrusted to a trial court’s sound discretion; any one of those factors may be 

responsible for enhancing or reducing the lodestar.” (Krumme v. Mercury Ins. 

Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 947.)

Successor argues the trial court relied on Plaintiffs’ “counsel’s skill but 

provided no reasoning for why [Plaintiffs’] counsel’s skill was extraordinary.” 

As noted above, the trial court found counsel achieved a rare result. In any 

event, the trial court was “not required to explain how it calculated that 

factor, and we will generally presume the attorney fee award was correct ‘ “on 

matters as to which the record is silent.” ’ ” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler 

Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 584.)

Successor also challenges the trial court’s reliance on an “unsupported” 

assertion that the litigation precluded other employment and the court’s 

failure to consider the resources of the Union in determining that the fee was 

contingent. We need not consider these factors because the multiplier is 

supported by the other factors relied on by the trial court. (Taylor v. Nabors 

Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1252 [“[w]e need not consider 

the first factor because the second and third factors alone support a 

multiplier”].) 
18

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on 

appeal.
19

_________________________

Simons, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Needham, J.

_________________________

Burns, J.

A159790
20

SEIU-USWW et al. v. PREFERRED BUILDING SERVICES, INC.

(A159790)

Trial Court: City and County of San Francisco

Trial Judges: Hon. Harold Kahn; Hon. Ethan P. Schulman

Attorneys:

Greenberg Traurig, Karin L. Bohmholdt, Charles Birenbaum, Jamie Rich, 

and Tayanah Miller for Defendant and Appellant.

Weinberg, Roger, & Rosenfeld, Antonio Ruiz, Jannah V. Manansala, 

Alexander S. Nazarov and Caitlin Gray for Plaintiff and Respondents.