2017 IL App (1st) 142130 

SIXTH DIVISION

JULY 21, 2017 

No. 1-14-2130 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

 Respondent-Appellee, ) Cook County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 05 CR 26780 

 ) 

RONALD DANIELS, ) Honorable 

 ) Joseph G. Kazmierski, 

Petitioner-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant Ronald Daniels appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County 

denying his petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate his conviction 

for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. In a June 2016 opinion, this court vacated the 

defendant’s conviction, and determined that we lacked jurisdiction to grant the State’s request 

(raised for the first time on appeal) to reinstate charges that were nol-prossed at the time of 

defendant’s plea agreement. The supreme court subsequently directed us to consider the effect 

of People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, as to whether there is appellate jurisdiction to consider the 

reinstatement of the nol-prossed counts, and, if so, whether those counts can be reinstated. We 

reverse the denial of defendant’s section 2-1401 petition and vacate his conviction, but we

conclude we lack jurisdiction to determine whether the nol-prossed counts may be reinstated. 
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¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was arrested on a city bus after he was found in possession of a revolver and 

four rounds of ammunition. Defendant was charged with six counts of aggravated unlawful use 

of a weapon (AUUW) pursuant to various provisions of the AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 

(West 2004)), as well as two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). 720 ILCS 

5/24-1.1(a) (West 2004)). 

¶ 4 Defendant pled guilty to one charge of AUUW under the provisions criminalizing 

possession of an unloaded firearm with ammunition immediately accessible. 720 ILCS 5/24-

1.6(a)(1)/(3)(B) (West 2004)). As defendant had a prior felony conviction, this offense was a 

Class 2 felony under the AUUW statute’s sentencing provision. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(d) (West 

2006). Defendant received a six-year sentence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State entered 

a nolle prosequi with respect to the remaining seven counts. 

¶ 5 After he completed his sentence, defendant filed a petition to vacate his conviction1 

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). 

The petition asserted that his AUUW conviction was invalid pursuant to People v. Aguilar, 2013 

IL 112116, in which our supreme court held that “the Class 4 form of section 24-1.6(a)(1), 

(a)(3)(A), (d) violates the right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the second amendment to 

the United States Constitution.” Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22. In response, the State argued 

 1

Defendant titled this filing "Motion to Vacate the Conviction of Aggravated Unlawful Use 

of a Weapon." All subsequent filings by both parties before the trial court and before this court 

on appeal refer to it as defendant's "motion." Defendant refers to the filing as a "section 2-1401 

petition" for the first time in his reply brief. Agreeing with this characterization, we interpret 

defendant's January 2, 2014 filing to be a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), and we will refer to it accordingly. We further note 

that at no point did the State ever challenge defendant's ability to file this "motion," and the 

State's response brief on appeal refers to defendant's challenge to his conviction as a "collateral 

proceeding," which suggests that their own understanding of defendant's "motion" is consistent 

with our interpretation. 
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that Aguilar was limited to the “Class 4” form of the offense and did not invalidate the statutory 

provision specifying a “Class 2” felony when the offender has a prior felony conviction. 720 

ILCS 5/24-1.6 (d) (West 2006)). 

¶ 6 On March 11, 2014, the trial court denied defendant's petition to vacate his conviction. 

After the trial court denied his motion to reconsider, defendant filed a timely appeal. 

¶ 7 In its appellate brief, the State acknowledged that defendant's conviction must be vacated 

in light of People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, decided pending this appeal. However, the State 

asked this court to remand this cause to the trial court to reinstate six of the seven nol-prossed 

charges against defendant.

¶ 8 In June 2016, this court issued an opinion which vacated defendant’s conviction but held 

that we lacked jurisdiction to consider the State’s request to reinstate the nol-prossed charges. 

On March 29, 2017, our supreme court entered a supervisory order directing this court to vacate 

the June 2016 opinion and “to consider the effect of [the supreme court’s] opinion in People v. 

Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, on the issues of whether (1) the appellate court has jurisdiction to 

consider the reinstatement of previously nol-prossed counts following a court vacating a 

conviction based on a guilty plea in exchange for remaining counts being nol-prossed; and (2) if 

there is jurisdiction, whether the nol-prossed counts can be reinstated.” This court subsequently 

vacated our June 2016 opinion. 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 We first address defendant’s argument on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his 

section 2-1401 petition to vacate the conviction. “[S]ection 2-1401 of the Code represents a 

comprehensive statutory procedure authorizing a trial court to vacate or modify a final order or 

judgment in civil and criminal proceedings. [Citations.] A proceeding under section 2-1401 
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constitutes an independent and separate action from the original action ***.” Warren County 

Soil and Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31. Where a section 2-1401 

petition raises a purely legal challenge to a judgment, the standard of review is de novo. Id. ¶ 47. 

¶ 11 Defendant asserts that his conviction pursuant to section 24-1.6(a)(1)/(3)(B) of the 

AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)/(3)(B) (West 2004)) (subsection (3)(B)) must be 

vacated because the statute is unconstitutional. Subsection (3)(B) specified that a person 

committed the offense of AUUW if he knowingly possessed a firearm that was “uncased, 

unloaded and the ammunition for the weapon was immediately accessible at the time of the 

offense.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(3)(B) (West 2006). 

¶ 12 The State concedes, and we agree, that the rationale expressed in Aguilar applies equally 

to subsection (3)(B). Upholding a conviction under subsection (3)(B) would illogically prohibit 

the possession of an unloaded gun in the same situation where, under Aguilar, the possession of 

a loaded gun is constitutionally protected. There is nothing in Aguilar suggesting that whether a 

gun is loaded affects the second amendment “right to possess and use a firearm for self-defense 

outside the home.” 2013 IL 112116, 21. Accordingly, we find subsection (3)(B) constitutionally 

invalid under Aguilar. 

¶ 13 Further, the supreme court has clarified that Aguilar’s reasoning applies regardless of 

whether the offense is a Class 4 or Class 2 felony under the AUUW sentencing provision. 

People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22 (“our reference in Aguilar to a ‘Class 4 form’ of the 

offense was inappropriate” as “[t]here is no ‘Class 4 form’ or ‘Class 2 form’ of aggravated 

unlawful use of a weapon.”). Thus, the fact that defendant’s prior felony made his AUUW 

offense a Class 2 offense does not affect the application of Aguilar to void his conviction. 
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¶ 14 Under the reasoning of Aguilar, subsection (3)(B) is constitutionally invalid. A 

conviction pursuant to a facially unconstitutional statute must be vacated. See People v. 

Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294, ¶ 12 (vacating conviction based on a statutory section 

invalidated under Aguilar). Accordingly, defendant’s section 2-1401 petition to vacate his 

conviction should have been granted. 

¶ 15 Conceding that defendant's conviction under the plea agreement should be vacated, the 

State asks this court to remand this case to the circuit court to permit the State to reinstate six of 

the nol-prossed counts. The State asserts those counts “remain constitutional" and that there are 

no constitutional or statutory limitations precluding a prosecution on those charges. 

¶ 16 Our June 2016 opinion in this matter concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to address the 

State’s request to reinstate the nol-prossed counts, as that issue had not been raised in the trial 

court. Pursuant to the supreme court’s supervisory order, we now consider the effect of People 

v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, in determining whether “the appellate court has jurisdiction to 

consider the reinstatement of previously nol-prossed counts following a court vacating a 

conviction based on a guilty plea in exchange for remaining counts being nol-prossed.” Only if 

we have jurisdiction may we proceed to decide whether the nol-prossed counts can be reinstated. 

¶ 17 In Shinaul, defendant pled guilty to one count of AUUW, under the statutory provision 

subsequently invalidated by Aguilar. Id. ¶ 1. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State nolprossed several other charges. Id. Defendant completed the full term of his sentence. Id.

¶ 18 The Shinaul defendant subsequently filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code, 

seeking to vacate his conviction as void pursuant to Aguilar. Id. ¶ 2. The State, “[c]onceding 

that defendant’s conviction should be vacated in light of Aguilar, *** filed a motion to reinstate 

certain AUUW counts that were previously nol-prossed.” Id. Following a hearing, the trial court 
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agreed that the conviction was void pursuant to Aguilar. Id. ¶ 3. However, the trial court denied 

the State’s motion to reinstate the nol-prossed charges. Id. The State filed a motion to 

reconsider in which it argued there were no constitutional or statutory limitations barring 

reprosecution of the nol-prossed charges. Id. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider, and 

the State appealed. Id.

¶ 19 The appellate court determined it lacked jurisdiction, and denied the State’s petition for 

rehearing. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. However, the supreme court held that there was appellate jurisdiction 

under article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6), because the 

trial court order constituted a final judgment. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The supreme court explained that “a 

‘final judgment’ is a determination by the circuit court on the issues presented by the pleadings 

which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 10. Shinaul recognized “[t]he issues before the circuit court

were limited to whether the AUUW count to which defendant had pled guilty should be vacated, 

whether he should be allowed to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea, and whether the State 

should be allowed to reinstate the counts it had nol-prossed ***.” Id. ¶ 11. “Once the circuit 

judge resolved all the pending issues in its written order, the matter terminated *** allowing the 

State to seek review, as of right, of the circuit court’s ruling.” Id. ¶ 12. 

¶ 20 Proceeding to review the trial court’s denial of the State’s motion for reinstatement, the 

supreme court determined that the criminal statute of limitations (720 ILCS 5/3-5 (West 2012)) 

“serve[d] as an absolute bar to the State’s motion to reinstate the charges it nol-prossed.” Id. ¶¶ 

15-18 (holding that the limitations period was not tolled by section 2-1401 proceedings). Thus, 

the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Id. ¶ 20. 
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¶ 21 In assessing our jurisdiction to consider the State’s request to reinstate nol-prossed counts

in this appeal, we recognize that Shinaul also involved a section 2-1401 petition seeking to 

vacate a conviction under a plea agreement. However, Shinaul’s procedural posture differs: in 

Shinaul, the State moved the trial court to reinstate nol-prossed charges, and the trial court 

decided that motion in the same final judgment that granted the section 2-1401 petition. In this 

case, the State raised the issue of reinstatement for the first time on appeal. 

¶ 22 This procedural distinction is significant in deciding our jurisdiction to review the 

reinstatement issue. In Shinaul, there was jurisdiction to review that issue because it was 

decided as part of a final judgment. Shinaul recognized that “a ‘final judgment’ is a 

determination by the circuit court on the issues presented by the pleadings,” and the trial court’s 

order was final because it decided all “the issues before the circuit court,” including the motion 

for reinstatement. (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 10-11 (“When the circuit court ultimately denied the 

State’s motion ***, a final decision on the State’s motion was entered.”). 

¶ 23 Shinaul thus confirms appellate jurisdiction to review the reinstatement of nol-prossed 

charges where the State has made a motion for reinstatement in the trial court presiding over the 

section 2-1401 proceeding, and the motion is decided in a final order. Shinaul does not address 

the situation presented here, where the issue of reinstatement is raised for first time on appeal 

from the trial court order deciding the section 2-1401 petition. 

¶ 24 As Shinaul recognized that Article VI confers appellate jurisdiction to review final 

judgments by the circuit court, and that a final judgment is a determination “on the issues 

presented by the pleadings,” id. ¶ 10, we conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider 

an issue not considered by the circuit court in the underlying section 2-1401 proceeding. 
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Although the trial court entered a final judgment in this case, that judgment was limited to 

defendant’s petition to vacate his conviction under a single count of AUUW. The potential 

reinstatement of other counts was simply not part of the final judgment from which the defendant 

appealed. Thus, we conclude we do not have jurisdiction to review the State’s request for 

reinstatement of nol-prossed counts.

¶ 25 We recognize that Article VI elsewhere provides that “[t]he Appellate Court may 

exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to the complete determination of any case on 

review.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. However, the “case on review” in this appeal is not the 

original prosecution that resulted in the plea agreement, but rather the separate section 2-1401 

proceeding. See Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2015 IL 117687, ¶ 23 (a section 2-1401 petition “is 

not a continuation of the original action” but “is an initial pleading that commences a new and 

separate cause of action”). The possible reinstatement of nol-prossed charges is not necessary to 

the determination of the case on review, which is limited to whether the AUUW conviction 

should be vacated under Aguilar. Thus, we do not find that we have original jurisdiction to 

consider the reinstatement issue. 

¶ 26 Pursuant to the supreme court’s supervisory order, we determine that, notwithstanding 

Shinaul, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the reinstatement of previously nol-prossed 

counts following the vacatur of defendant’s conviction.

2

 In turn, we do not address the merits of 

the State’s request for reinstatement.

¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the section 2-1401 

petition, vacate defendant’s conviction, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 2

Our decision does not preclude the State from filing a new indictment or moving in the 

circuit court to vacate the nolle prosequi, subject to any statutory or constitutional defenses. 

People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 24-25.
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¶ 28 Reversed; conviction vacated; cause remanded.