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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS: Joseph J. Simons, Chairman

Noah Joshua Phillips

Rohit Chopra

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter

Christine S. Wilson

DOCKET NO. 9386

ORDER DENYING STAY AND REFERRAL AND CHANGING HEARING DATE

On December 2, 2019, Respondent RagingWire Data Centers, Inc. filed a Motion to 

Dismiss Administrative Complaint in this proceeding. In addition to seeking dismissal of the 

Commission’s Complaint in its entirety, that Motion requests that the Commission (1) stay 

further proceedings pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss and (2) refer the Motion to 

Dismiss to the Administrative Law Judge assigned to this proceeding. Complaint Counsel have 

contested the Motion to Dismiss and oppose the requests for stay and referral. As set forth 

below, we deny Respondent’s requests for stay and referral. We grant in part a separate, 

uncontested motion by Respondent to delay commencement of the administrative hearing.

I. THE REQUEST FOR A STAY

As to the request for a stay, Commission Rule of Practice 3.22(b) states in relevant part: 

“A [dispositive] motion under consideration by the Commission shall not stay proceedings 

before the Administrative Law Judge unless the Commission so orders . . . .” When the 

Commission first adopted this Rule, it explained that the provision’s “purpose . . . was to ensure 

that discovery and other prehearing proceedings continue while the Commission deliberates over 

the dispositive motions . . . .” Rules of Practice; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 1804, 1810 (Jan. 13, 

2009) (“Final Rule”). See also Rules of Practice; Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 58832, 58836 

(Oct. 7, 2008) (“Proposed Rule”) (explaining that “[t]he Commission anticipates that new 

paragraphs [3.22](b) and (e) would expedite cases by providing that proceedings before the ALJ 

In the Matter of

RagingWire Data Centers, Inc.,

a corporation,

Respondent.
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will not be stayed while the Commission considers a motion, unless the Commission orders 

otherwise . . .”). 

Here, Respondent argues, “a stay will avoid wasting the resources of the Commission, the 

FTC, and RagingWire.” Motion to Dismiss at 6. The expenses at issue, however, are normal 

consequences of litigation, routinely borne by litigants while dispositive motions are pending. 

See In re La. Real Estate Appraisers Bd., 2018 FTC Lexis 7 (F.T.C. Jan. 12, 2018), also 

available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09374_lreab_commission_

order_denying_respondents_expedited_motion.pdf. “Generally, routine discovery costs do not 

outweigh the competing public interest in the efficient and expeditious resolution of litigated 

matters.” Id.; see In re LabMD, 2013 WL 6826948, at *2-3 (Dec. 13, 2013) (denying a motion 

to stay proceedings in order to avoid pretrial expenses pending the Commission’s ruling on a 

motion to dismiss); N. Carolina Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 150 F.T.C. 851 (2010) (same).

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 Here, 

Respondent has not established that a stay would be appropriate.2

II. THE REQUEST FOR REFERRAL TO THE ADMISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Respondent seeks referral of its Motion to Dismiss to the administrative law judge 

assigned to this proceeding. The Commission’s Rules of Practice, however, expressly provide 

that motions to dismiss filed before the evidentiary hearing “shall be ruled on by the Commission 

unless the Commission in its discretion refers the motion to the Administrative Law Judge.” 16 

C.F.R. § 3.22(a). This rule reflects an “inten[tion] to ensure that the Commission is 

appropriately involved earlier in the adjudicatory process,” Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 

58834, and a judgment that bringing the Commission’s expertise to bear on dispositive motions 

will “improve the quality of the decisionmaking and . . . will expedite the proceeding,” Final 

Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 1809; see also Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 58836. Respondent’s sole 

reason for requesting referral—that the same Commissioners who voted to issue the Complaint 

might be unable to dispassionately review the motion—is unsupported by any facts indicating 

that the Commission cannot fairly and judiciously perform its statutory, adjudicatory duties

under 45 U.S.C. § 45(b). Lacking any specific support, Respondent effectively asks the 

Commission to disregard Rule 3.22(a)’s core determination that, in view of its statutory role as 

an expert adjudicator, Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 1806, the Commission should rule upon 

motions to dismiss. We decline to do so.

 1 See Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 1805 (explaining that in amending its rules for adjudicative proceedings, the 

Commission “intended . . . to balance three important interests: the public interest in a high quality decisionmaking 

process, the interest of justice in an expeditious resolution of litigated matters, and the interest of the parties in 

litigating matters without unnecessary expense”). 

2 In addition to arguing that a stay would save resources, Respondent asserts that it has acted in good faith and has 

taken affirmative corrective steps, so that there is no reason to anticipate future non-compliance. Motion to Dismiss 

at 5. These assertions raise factual issues, which, if relevant, would need to be assessed in the context of evidence 

developed at trial. 
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III. RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO RESCHEDULE ADMINSTRATIVE HEARING

On December 4, 2019, Respondent filed a motion to reschedule the administrative 

hearing. Under the current schedule, the hearing will begin on July 7, 2020. Respondent moves 

that it be postponed until or after the week of August 3, 2020. Respondent suggests that the 

current date would interfere with the planned family vacation of its lead counsel. Complaint 

Counsel do not oppose Respondent’s motion. 

Commission Rule of Practice 3.41(a) provides that the Commission may order a later 

date for the commencement of an evidentiary hearing “upon a showing of good cause.” 

Respondent’s motion cites the fact that that its lead counsel “is scheduled to be absent on a 

planned family vacation the week immediately prior to the currently scheduled July 7, 2020 start 

of the administrative hearing.” Motion of Administrative Hearing at 2. While that could justify 

a short delay in the start of the hearing, Respondent has provided no reason why the hearing 

should be delayed for nearly a month. Consequently, and in view of the public interest in 

resolving this matter efficiently and expeditiously, we find good cause to grant only a portion of 

the requested continuance and will reschedule the hearing to commence on July 21, 2020.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent’s request to stay further proceedings in 

this matter pending resolution of its Motion to Dismiss is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent’s request to refer its Motion to Dismiss 

to the Administrative Law Judge is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent’s Expedited Motion of Administrative 

Hearing is GRANTED IN PART. The evidentiary hearing shall begin on July 21, 2020, at 

10:00 a.m. The Administrative Law Judge retains discretion to adjust any pre-hearing deadlines 

to the extent compatible with the hearing date as extended by this Order.

By the Commission.

April J. Tabor

Acting Secretary

SEAL:

ISSUED: January 6, 2020