IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1315

Filed December 20, 2023

VAHID ARIA,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Randy V. Hefner, 

Judge.

Vahid Aria appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. 

AFFIRMED.

John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
2

DOYLE, Senior Judge.

Vahid Aria appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief 

(PCR) following revocation of his deferred judgment and resentencing on a forgery 

charge and sentencing on his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. He 

maintains dismissal was improper because the PCR court did not comply with 

statutory notice requirements under Iowa Code section 822.6(2) (2022). Aria also 

argues a Double Jeopardy Clause violation in his resentencing because he did not 

receive credit for the days he was on probation and parole. We conclude the PCR 

court complied with relevant procedure and there were no other notice 

requirements. We also conclude Aria’s resentencing did not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause as his sentences do not impose punishment greater than 

intended by the legislature. So we find no merit in Aria’s “day for day probationary 

and parole credit” argument. Finding no error in the dismissal of Aria’s PCR 

application, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 2016, Aria pleaded guilty to one count of forgery. In exchange for Aria’s 

plea, the district court entered a deferred judgment, dismissed two other counts, 

and placed Aria on probation to the Fifth Judicial District Department of 

Correctional Services for two years. Less than three months after being placed on 

probation, the State charged Aria with possession of methamphetamine. And Aria 

incurred several written reports of violation of the terms of his probation. Aria 

stipulated that he had violated the terms of his probation. His deferred judgment 

and probation were revoked, he was adjudged guilty of forgery and sentenced to 

five years of incarceration. Aria also pleaded guilty to the possession charge and 
3

was sentenced to ten years of incarceration. The sentences were ordered to be 

served consecutively.

In 2022, Aria filed his pro se PCR application and brief asserting his 

sentence was illegal. He argued it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because

he did not receive day for day credit for the time he spent on probation and parole.

1

 

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution prohibits imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. Aria 

was given permission to apply for court-appointed counsel, and a trial scheduling 

conference was set. Because of an EDMS outage, the hearing was not held. The 

PCR court scheduled a hearing to determine whether Aria’s PCR application 

should be summarily dismissed. The court’s order cited Iowa Code section 907.3.2 

Aria filed a pro se motion to amend adding more constitutional grounds to his dayfor-day-credit argument. A telephone hearing was held. Aria argued his case. 

The State responded affirmatively when asked by the court if it was going to move 

for summary judgment. The court warned Aria there was a distinction between the 

cases he relied on and his factual situation. The court said it would look at the 

court files and then file a written ruling. The court ordered the State to move for 

summary judgment. Three days later, the State moved for summary disposition. 

1 The record is unclear, but it appears Aria’s parole time relates to a drug 

manufacturing conviction not related to the sentences that are pertinent to the PCR 

action.

2

Iowa Code section 907.3 concerns deferred judgments, deferred sentences, or 

suspended sentences.
4

Aria did not respond. Two weeks after the State filed its motion, the PCR court 

entered its ruling summarily dismissing Aria’s PCR application. Aria appeals.3

II. Review.

“We normally review postconviction proceedings for errors at law. This 

includes summary dismissals of applications for postconviction relief. . . . We 

review postconviction proceedings that raise constitutional infirmities de novo.” 

Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011) (internal citations omitted).

III. Discussion.

A. Notice of intent to dismiss PCR application. Aria asserts he did not 

receive proper notice of the PCR court’s intention to dismiss the case under Iowa 

Code section 822.6(2). Under this section, if a PCR court is inclined to sua sponte 

dismiss an applicant’s application, “the court may indicate to the parties its 

intention to dismiss the application and the reason for the dismissal.” Iowa Code 

§ 822.6(2). In its order setting hearing, the PCR court stated: “A hearing will be 

set to determine whether Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief should 

be summarily dismissed. Iowa Code section 907.3.” Aria claims a pro se litigant, 

like him, “would have no idea that the trial court had the authority to sua sponte 

notify the parties of its intention to dismiss the application for post conviction relief 

3

In an all-too-common assertion, Aria states error was preserved by timely filing a 

notice of appeal. As we have stated over and over—more than sixty times since 

our published opinion of State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d 844, 846–47 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2013)—the filing of a notice of appeal does not preserve error for our review. See

Thomas A. Mayes & Anuradha Vaitheswaran, Error Preservation in Civil Appeals 

in Iowa: Perspectives on Present Practice, 55 Drake L. Rev. 39, 48 (2006)

(“However error is preserved, it is not preserved by filing a notice of appeal. While 

this is a common statement in briefs, it is erroneous, for the notice of appeal has 

nothing to do with error preservation.”).
5

under Iowa Code section 822.6(2).” The flaw in Aria’s argument is that his PCR 

application was not dismissed sua sponte under section 822.6(2). Because the 

PCR court’s dismissal responded to the State’s motion for summary disposition, it 

falls under section 822.6(3), which requires no extra notice like the one in 

section 822.6(2). Aria was on notice at the hearing and after the State filed its 

motion that his application could be summarily dismissed. He took no action after 

the State filed its motion. The PCR court dismissed the application on the merits. 

We conclude there was no procedural error on the part of the PCR court in 

dismissing the application.

B. Parole credit. Aria also asserts the PCR court erred in denying him dayfor-day probationary and parole credit. We first address the parole credit issue. 

The PCR court addressed only the probation credit issue, not the parole credit 

issue. It is axiomatic under our error-preservation rules that an issue must not only 

be raised before the district court, it must also be ruled on before we will decide it 

on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). If the 

“district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who

raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for 

appeal.” Id. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. For instance, the errorpreservation rule generally does not apply “to void, illegal or procedurally defective 

sentences.” State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Iowa 2017). The PCR 

court considered Aria’s application as also requesting correction of an illegal 

sentence. 

It appears from the record that the parole time Aria refers to is for a 

conviction not related to the sentence he now challenges. We are given no 
6

explanation for how Aria’s parole time is in any way relevant to the issue before 

us. A random mention of an issue, without elaboration or supportive authority, is 

not enough to raise an issue for review. See EnviroGas, L.P. v. Cedar Rapids/Linn 

Cnty. Solid Waste Agency, 641 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Iowa 2002) (citing Soo Line R.R. 

v. Iowa Dep’t. of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 689 (Iowa 1994)). We do not consider 

conclusory statements not supported by legal argument. See, e.g., Baker v. City 

of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 103 (Iowa 2008) (holding that a party’s “conclusory 

contention” was waived when the party failed to support it with an argument and 

legal authorities); State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 913–14 (Iowa 2003); McCleeary 

v. Wirtz, 222 N.W.2d 409, 417 (Iowa 1974) (holding that a “subject will not be 

considered” where a “random discussion” is not supported by a legal argument 

and citation to authority); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th 

Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument’, really nothing more than an assertion, does not 

preserve a claim. . . . Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in 

briefs.”). “When a party, in an appellate brief, fails to state, argue, or cite to

authority in support of an issue, the issue may be deemed waived.” State v. Adney,

639 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001). A party’s failure in a brief to cite

authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue. See Iowa R.

App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (stating the argument section must include “[a]n argument 

containing the appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them with citations to 

the authorities relied on and references to the pertinent parts of the record . . . [and

f]ailure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that

issue”); see also State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997); Metro.

Jacobson Dev. Venture v. Bd. of Rev. of Des Moines, 476 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa 
7

Ct. App. 1991). We conclude Aria waived his claim related to the issue of credit 

for time served on parole. See State v. Root, 801 N.W.2d 29, 30 n.1 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2011) (finding defendant waived issues because of failure to follow the rules 

of appellate procedure). Even if not waived, any parole time Aria served was not 

for the same offense as he was sentenced to after his probation revocation and 

would therefore not be subject to the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

C. Probation credit. We move on to Aria’s argument related to a day-forday credit for probation time served on the forgery charge. It is based on his 

reading of State v. Jepsen, 907 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa 2018). Jepsen was convicted 

of two counts of sexual abuse, including a forcible felony. Id. at 497. His prison 

sentence was suspended, and a five-year term of probation was ordered. Id. After 

Jepsen served four years and four months on probation, the district court vacated 

the suspended sentence for illegality4 and resentenced Jepsen to two concurrent 

terms of incarceration. Id. The district court declined to credit the time spent on 

probation against the new term of imprisonment. Jepsen cried foul and appealed. 

The Jepsen court held, “when a defendant has been sentenced to a term of 

probation and is subsequently resentenced to a term of incarceration for the same 

offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the defendant’s new prison term be 

reduced by one day for each day spent on probation.” Id. at 504. The court 

ordered Jepsen’s time spent on probation be fully credited against his corrected 

sentence of incarceration. Id. 

4 Provisions for deferred judgments, deferred sentences, and suspended 

sentences do not apply to forcible felonies. Iowa Code § 907.3 
8

Aria readily acknowledges the differences between his situation and 

Jepsen’s. Jepsen received an illegal probationary sentence—a sentence which 

was not permitted under the Iowa Code. Aria acknowledges he received a legal 

sentence. The essence of Aria’s argument on appeal is that “[t]here really is no 

logical reason why the dicta in Jepsen is not applicable to Aria.” The Jepsen

language he cites is:

The guarantee under the Double Jeopardy Clause relevant to 

this case protects against the imposition of punishment greater than 

that intended by the legislature. Thus, the requirement of a credit 

under Pearce served to guard against the imposition of greater 

punishment. This constitutional mandate of a credit was not 

concerned with the risk that it might result in a lesser sentence, but 

served to guarantee against the risk of a greater sentence. 

Therefore, this guarantee necessarily accepts the risk of a lesser 

sentence to ensure the guarantee of no greater sentence. Justice 

can often be served by a context-specific inquiry, but such an inquiry 

still needs a meaningful standard that ensures no constitutional 

violation occurs. A credit that is inherently imprecise and arbitrary 

can risk both greater and lesser punishment, but the Double 

Jeopardy Clause does not. It demands a bright-line day-for-day 

credit that eliminates all risk of greater punishment. Any standard 

that does less must measure and quantify time by something other 

than time.

Id. at 504. 

The State counters that Aria’s sentence “is exactly what the legislature 

intended.” It points out that Iowa Code section 907.3(3) provides, “A person so 

committed who has probation revoked shall not be given credit for such time 

served.”5 But that statutory provision concerns only situations when the 

defendant’s sentence has been suspended and defendant is placed on probation. 

5 The statute provides an exception. “However, a person committed to an alternate 

jail facility or a community correctional residential treatment facility who has 

probation revoked shall be given credit for time served in the facility.” Iowa Code 

§ 907.3(3).
9

Iowa Code § 907.3(3). Aria did not receive a suspended sentence. He originally 

received a deferred judgment and was placed on probation. His probation was 

later revoked. Iowa Code section 907.3(1), not section 907.3(3), governs deferred 

judgments. It provides, “Upon a showing that the defendant is not cooperating with 

the program of probation or is not responding to it, the court may withdraw the 

defendant from the program, pronounce judgment, and impose any sentence 

authorized by law.” Iowa Code § 907.3(1)(b). Unlike section 907.3(3), there is no 

mention of probation credits in section 907.3(1). We also note that Iowa Code 

section 908.11(4) concerning probation violations provides that upon probation 

revocation “if imposition of sentence was deferred, [the court] may impose any 

sentence which might originally have been imposed.” Iowa Code § 908.11(4). Aria 

makes no challenge to the constitutionality of the applicable statutes.

Aria’s sentence imposed on probation revocation was authorized by law and 

one that could have been originally imposed. Upon revocation of his probation, 

Aria was adjudged guilty of forgery, a Class “D” felony. The maximum sentence

for a Class “D” felony is five years. Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(e). And that’s what the 

district court imposed after Aria’s probation revocation. 

We go back to Jepsen. Although the language of Jepsen’s last holding

paragraph, set forth above, can be read broadly, the opinion contains significant 

limiting language: “When an initial sentence is voided for illegality, any 

punishments already endured must be credited against the corrected sentence. 

We hold that all time spent on probation pursuant to a voided sentence must be 

fully credited against a corrected sentence of incarceration.” Jepsen, 907 N.W.2d 

at 497. And “[t]herefore, we conclude that when a defendant’s original sentence 
10

is voided for illegality and the defendant is subsequently resentenced without being 

again convicted, [North Carolina v.] Pearce, [395 U.S. 711 (1969)], requires courts 

to fully credit any punishment already endured against the new sentence.” Id. at 

500. Aria acknowledges that Jepsen “is particularly problematic for him.” Indeed, 

Jepsen is significantly different than Aria’s circumstances. Jepsen had an illegal 

probationary sentence imposed—one not permitted under the Code. Aria 

acknowledges he received legal sentences. Aria was not resentenced after 

imposition of an illegal sentence. Aria’s deferred judgment and probation were 

statutorily permitted. His original sentence carried with it the consequences of 

adjudication of guilt and imposition of a prison sentence if Aria violated the terms 

of probation. 

We will not expand the application of Jepsen beyond the circumstances 

presented in it. We leave it to our supreme court to determine whether its holding 

in Jepsen should be expanded. See Rosauer Corp. v. Sapp Dev., L.L.C., 856 

N.W.2d 906, 907 (Iowa 2014) (noting court of appeals “appropriately” deferred to 

supreme court on expansion of implied warranty). As an intermediate appellate 

court, “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.” 

State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).

IV. Conclusion.

After concluding there was no procedural error on the part of the PCR court 

in dismissing the application, and that Aria’s sentences do not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause, we find Aria’s arguments lack merit. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Aria’s PCR application.

AFFIRMED.