### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE D ec em be r 18, 200 7 S es sio n

CR AIG R OBER T N UN N v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 98-C- 1622 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2007- 00974-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Augu st 18, 2008

D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R

. , J

. , co n cu rr i n g.

Ijoin in the resul t s rea ched by the majority

but write sepa

rate ly to express a diffe rent conclusion re g ardingthe tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations. The majority opinion conclude s that the trial court err ed in findi ng that the post-conviction petition filed more tha n five
y ear s after

the entry of judg ment in this ca se is tim e-ba rre d. This conclusion is based upon the be lief that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hear ing showed t hat t he petiti oner was m isled by trial counsel re g ardinghis right to pursue post-conviction re lief under the terms of h i s g uilty

plea
ag ree ment.

I nit ia lly , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis a g re e wi th the langua g e a do pte d b y the ma jor ity and e xpre ss

c on c e rn that it g re a tly e xpand s the ru le of wh e n du e pr oc e ss c on sid e ra tio ns wa rr ant t oll ingthe statut e of lim itatio ns in a p os t- c on vic tio n a c tio n b e y on d th a t e sta bli sh e d b y

our s up re me c ourt

in Wi lli a ms v. State, 44 S.W .3d 464 (Tenn. 2001) . The majority opinion states that “the key inquiry is whether, under the totalit

y of the circumstance

s , the petit ioner was mislead into believing that his guilty pleas inc lud e d a wa ive r of his ri g ht to pe tit ion fo r po st- c on vic tio n re lie f. ” Con tr ary to bo th the ma jor ity opinion and the petitioner’s c ontention on appea l, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court has re marke d that “[t] he question, then, is whethe r the [ p et i tioner] in thi s case was, in fact , misled to believe that counsel wa s continuing the appea ls pr ocess, there by requiring the tolling of the limitations period.” Wil liams, 44 S.W .3d at 471 (empha sis added). The foundation of our supreme c ourt jurisprudenc e on this subject is that due process requires tol ling the statute of l imitations when the petitioner has be e n d e nie d th e op po rt

un ity to f ile a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f d ue to f a c tor s b e y on d h is control, spec ifically

mental illness and attorney misrepre sentation. Seals v. State, 23 S.W .3d 272, 27 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Will iams, 44 S.W. 3d a t 46 8. Attor

ne y mis re pr e se ntatio n c an be a ttr ibuta ble to

“ de c e pti on

or oth e r m isc on d

u c t ” a n d p r e v e nt s t h e p e t i t i o n e r f

ro m pu rs uin g po st- c on vic tio n r e me die s. Wil liams, 44 S.W .3d at 469. I n my opinion, the facts of t his case do not war rant such a

conclusion.Ifurther disag ree th at t he petitioner ha s shown that he wa s misled under either standard –
tot a lity of c ir c ums tanc e s o r i n f

a c t. T he re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e pe tit ion e r e nte re d h is guil ty ple a s in J an u ar y 1 9 9 9 an d

th a t t r ia l c o u n s e l m a in ta in e d

c lo s e an d

a c ti v e r e p r e s e n tati o no f

th e p e ti tioner
reg ardingvarious ci v il matters stemming fr om the criminal off enses until the civil matters we re

re solve d in

20 05 . T he ma

jor ity op ini on fi nd s si g nif

ic ant t hat tr ia l c ouns e l ma int a ine d s uc h c los e

co n t ac twi t h t h e p et i t i o n er an d ap p ar en t l y

n ev er d i s cu s s eda p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nac t i o n , s t at i n g:

We do not think i t unrea sonable in such a situation for the petitioner to have believed that trial counsel, whom he thought would continue to re prese nt him throughout the entire te rm of his sentence , would have inf ormed him that he ha d not waived his rig ht to petition for post-conviction re lief. Nothing in the rec ord contra dicts his testim ony that trial counsel ne ver sa id any thing to him about his r ight to f ile a post-convic tion petition or the statute of limit ations for doing so. The letter trial counsel sent to the petitioner explaining the r amifications and conseque nces of his guilty plea is silent

on the su bje c t.

Wh il e I a g r e e th a t t

h e r e is n o th in g in

th e r e c o r d

to r e f u te th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s te s ti mo n y th a t h e “ d id

n [o ]t have a ny discussion [ about post-conviction re lief] with [ trial counsel],” I would note that neither the
state no r t he pe tit ion e r q

ue sti on e d tr ia l c ouns e l r e g ard ingany a dv ic e or dis c us sio ns re la tiv e to a

po stconviction action that occ urre d at the time of the e ntry of the guilty

plea. The underly

ing issue
prese nted in this case se ems to be whe ther a n attorney , afte r re prese nting a client at the hi g hest level of prof essionalism, is obli g ated to advise the client of the rig ht to file a petition for post-c onviction

re lie f b a se d u

po n in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. I a m un wi lli ng to i mpl ic itl y or oth e rw ise imp os e such an oblig ation.

The e vidence further re fl ec t s that, despite the pe titioner’s admitted knowledg e of othe r inmates’ post-convic tion filings, the first inquiry made to trial c ounsel reg ardinga post-convic tion action occ urre d in 2002, more than thre e y ear s after the entry of t he guilty plea, and the inquiry was made by a fa mily friend with littl e int ere st by the petitioner himself. In fac t, the petitioner testified that he did

no t c on sid e r h ims e lf

to h a ve re c e ive d in a de qu a te repr e se ntatio n unti l me e tin g po stconviction counse l in J uly 2004, who at that time advised him that trial counse l’s advice reg arding such matters a s the estimated inca rce ration t ime he could face and the multiplicity of cha rg es in the ind ic tme nt w a s d e fi c ie nt o r “ of f b a se ” in s ome wa

y . U nd e r t

he se c ir c ums tan ces, I th in k th a t it is

unrea sonable to conc lude that trial counse l misl ed the pe titioner – by dece ption, misconduc t or any other mea ns – to warr ant tolling the statute of limit ations.

F ur the rm or e , th e pe tit ion e r’ s te sti mony re fl e c ts that he a ssume d h e c ou ld n ot f ile a po stconviction ac tion bas ed u p o n lang uag e in his g uilty plea pe tition s tating “ [t ]hat no appeal or

c ha lle ng e to s a id convic tio n o r s e nte nc e is m a int a ine d b y [the pe tit ion e r]. ” Whil e the ma jor ity opinion chara cter izes this lang uag e as “all-inc lusive” and deems it to be an additional fa ctor in the “t o t al i t y o f c i rc u m s t an ce s ” l ea d i n g t o a c o n cl u s i o nth at t h e p et i t i o n er wa s m i s l ed
, I v i ew t h e l an gu age of the guilty plea to be particula rly exclusive of any mention of the petitioner’s r ights re lative to a collater al attac k on his convictions or sentenc es. Also, as noted by the m aj o ri ty , the
contem p o rane ous corr espondenc e betwe en trial c ounsel and the pe titioner expl aining the
conseque nces of

the g uilty plea c ontains no ref

ere nce to a

post-conviction ac tion. I n summary , dueto the lack of proof presented at the evidentiary hear ing that the petit ioner was, in fac t, misled by trial counsel re g ardinghis pursuit of post-conviction reme dies, Ido not co n cl ude that the statute of limit ations should be tolled in this c ase. The trial court c orre ctly found that the pe tition s hould be dismiss ed as time-ba

rre d.

Ifurther note my ag ree ment with the trial court a nd the majority

opinion that the petitioner failed to e stablish his subs tantive claim of ine ffe ctive assist an ce o f co u n sel. My revie w of the

e vid e nc e pr e se nte d a t the e vid e nti ary he ari ng re fl e c ts that the pe tit ion e r, a ft e r dis c us sio ns wi th p os tconviction counse l, became diss at i s fi ed wi th a sentenc e of inc arc eration because he fe lt that he sh ou ld h a ve re c e ive d c ouns e lin g and an a lte rn a tiv e to i nc arc e ra tio n. Th is d iss ati sfa cti on wi th h is
sentenc e ar ose despite the fact that trial counsel a ccur ately advised the pe titioner reg ardingthe possible and proba

ble penalties fac ed at trial and manag ed to ne g otiate a sentenc e substantially lower than either . For

these re asons, I

concur in the result reache d by

the majority , but Iconclude that due
proce ss conce rns do not require that the statute of limitations be tolled in thi s case

.

D. KEL L Y THOMAS, JR ., J UDGE