No. 19-2204 (L) & 19-2306 (C) 

——————————————————— 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Federal Trade Commission, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

Andris Pukke, 

Defendant-Appellant 

and 

Federal Trade Commission, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

Peter Baker 

Defendant-Appellant 

———————————————————— 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Maryland 

No. 18-cv-3309 

Hon. Peter J. Messitte

———————————————————— 

FTC’s Informal Response Brief 

———————————————————— 

Alden F. Abbott 

General Counsel 

Joel Marcus 

Deputy General Counsel 

Theodore (Jack) Metzler 

Attorney 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-3502 

tmetzler@ftc.gov 
CONTENTS 

Background ..................................................................................................... 1

1. The Sanctuary Belize scam. .................................................................. 1

2. Procedural History ................................................................................. 3

Standard of Review ......................................................................................... 9

Argument ........................................................................................................ 9

I. Pukke’s Appeal ..................................................................................... 9

1. The district court correctly found the Commission was likely to 

succeed on the merits of the FTC Act claims. .................................... 10

2. The district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. .................... 12

3. The district court applied this Court’s binding precedent 

interpreting section 13(b) of the FTC Act. ......................................... 13

4. The district court properly declined to stay the case pending the 

resolution of certiorari petitions in other FTC cases. ......................... 14

5. The district court was not required to decide Pukke’s 

Telemarketing Sales Rule argument. .................................................. 15

6. The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering a 

temporary restraining order and interim preliminary injunction. ....... 17

7. Pukke’s venue, res judicata, and collateral estoppel arguments 

are frivolous. ....................................................................................... 19

II. Baker’s Appeal ................................................................................... 23

1. The district court has jurisdiction and venue is proper. ...................... 24

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by extending the 

terms of the temporary restraining order until the evidentiary 

hearing. ............................................................................................... 26

3. The district court correctly found that the Commission is likely 

to succeed on the merits. .................................................................... 28

4. The district court was authorized to enter an asset freeze. .................. 31

5. The district court correctly found the FTC is likely to 

successfully establish Baker’s personal liability. ............................... 31

6. The district court correctly found that the injunction was in the 

public interest. .................................................................................... 34

7. Baker’s remaining arguments are frivolous. ....................................... 35

Conclusion .................................................................................................... 38
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Background 

These appeals arise from an FTC enforcement action to halt a real-estate 

development scam which was run by appellants Andris Pukke and Peter 

Baker and known as “Sanctuary Belize.” Sanctuary Belize duped consumers 

into spending over $141 million on empty lots in remote southern Belize 

through promises that they were making a low-risk investment in a luxury 

resort community that would soon be completed. In fact, the investment was 

risky, the promised luxury amenities never materialized, and the development was never close to completion. 

1. The Sanctuary Belize scam. 

Pukke, Baker, and their codefendants lured consumers to buy properties 

in the phantom Sanctuary Belize resort community through a multi-step process. The pitch began with television ads and internet marketing, followed 

up with calls from Sanctuary Belize telemarketers. Dkt. 539 at 8. After making sure the marks could afford a substantial down payment, Sanctuary Belize telemarketers pitched lots in the development as a low-risk investment 

that would quickly appreciate in value. The telemarketers described a host of 

luxury amenities that would be completed at the resort within 2-5 years, including an airstrip, a championship-caliber golf course, a casino and hotel, a 

medical center, and high-end boutiques and restaurants. Id. at 28-30. The 
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telemarketers urged consumers to the next phase—attending webinars in 

which other telemarketers reinforced the same promises. Id. at 8. There, telemarketers pressed consumers to purchase an all-inclusive tour of the property for $999, and to purchase a right of first refusal on a particular lot by 

paying a deposit, typically $2,000 to $10,000. Id. at 8-9. 

When customers arrived in Belize to tour the lots they had paid to reserve, they were hosted at a resort near the Sanctuary Belize property.1

 Over 

the course of several days, consumers attended social events, made visits to 

the property, and attended group and individual sales presentations that reinforced the false promises made by telemarketers. Id. at 9-10. Customers reported that almost everyone who attended the tours ultimately purchased 

from Sanctuary Belize. 

Yet the development that Sanctuary Belize promised never came. Many 

purchasers who tried to build on their lots were unable to do so because the 

electrical, water, and sewer infrastructure was never installed. And almost 

none of the promised amenities were ever completed. The promised airstrip 

was never installed. There is no hotel or casino, no golf course, no medical 

center, and no boutiques or restaurants. Dkt. 539 at 26-27; 28-31. One early 

purchaser noted that when she visited the property 2012, “according to the 

 

1

 Some consumers purchased lots in Sanctuary Belize without visiting the 

development. Dkt. 539 at 9. 
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development timeline we received in 2008 . . . everything in the property 

should have been complete but almost nothing was complete.” Dkt. 124 

(Att. 2, Cunningham Decl.) at 4. After visiting two years later, the same purchaser stated that “[t]he only difference on the property that we saw from 

2012 and 2014 was that there was a guard at the entrance of Sanctuary Belize and the marina was flooded.” Id. at 5. 

Sanctuary Belize’s promises of a robust resale market in which properties 

would quickly appreciate likewise failed to materialize. Dkt. 539 at 31-33. 

The few purchasers who were able to sell their properties sold them back to 

Sanctuary Belize itself, and all but one them did so at a loss. Sanctuary Belize then attempted to resell those same lots to new marks. Id. at 11. 

2. Procedural History 

To bring a halt to the Sanctuary Belize scam, the FTC sued Pukke, Baker, 

and numerous other individuals and companies involved in the enterprise for 

a permanent injunction and other equitable relief. Dkt. 1. The complaint 

charged that Pukke originally purchased the land that became known as 

Sanctuary Belize in 2003 and has controlled the Sanctuary Belize enterprise 

ever since; that Baker owned several Sanctuary Belize companies; and that 

he participated in or controlled its illegal practices. Id. at 8-10. The complaint charged that Sanctuary Belize made six core false representations in 
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marketing properties to consumers: (1) that Sanctuary Belize was being 

completed without taking on debt, making it a particularly safe investment; 

(2) that every dollar collected from sales would be reinvested in the development; (3) that the development would be completed within a specific 

timeframe, usually two to five years; (4) that the development would have 

numerous deluxe amenities; (5) that Sanctuary Belize lots would rapidly increase in value; and (6) that there was a robust resale market for Sanctuary 

Belize lots. Dkt. 1 at 26-27. 

The Commission charged that those claims were false and material to 

consumers’ purchasing decisions, and therefore violated section 5 of the 

FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). Id. at 34-37. The complaint further charged that 

Sanctuary Belize’s telemarketers’ false representations violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.2. Id. at 38-44. 

To prevent the dissipation of assets, the FTC sought an ex-parte temporary restraining order, an asset freeze, and the appointment of a receiver, all 

of which the district court granted. Dkt. 615 at 2. Rather than scheduling an 

immediate evidentiary hearing, the district court stated that it believed more 

time was necessary to prepare for a preliminary injunction hearing and therefore permitted the FTC to file a motion to extend the terms of the TRO as an 

“interim” preliminary injunction pending a full evidentiary hearing. Dkt. 20; 
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see Dkt. 23 (FTC Motion). The court set a briefing schedule and held a telephone hearing to hear any objections to that plan. Dkt. 20. Pukke and Baker 

did not object, nor did they oppose entering an interim preliminary injunction until the evidentiary hearing.2 See Dkt. 25 & 26. 

After the hearing (Dkt. 31), the court extended the TRO as an interim PI 

and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for early 2019. Dkt. 34. That hearing 

began March 11, 2019 and lasted more than two weeks. After post-hearing 

briefing, the district court issued an opinion and order granting the Commission’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. 539, 615. 

The court found that the Commission was likely to succeed on the merits 

of the FTC Act claims. Dkt. 539 at 20-33. Specifically, it found that: 

(1) Sanctuary Belize “told consumers that Sanctuary Belize had or would 

have no debt and was therefore a particularly safe investment,” but 

“[t]he evidence strongly suggests those representations were and are 

false.” Id. at 20-21; 

(2) Sanctuary Belize telemarketers told consumers that the “no debt” 

model meant “every dollar the developer collected from sales lots 

 

2

 One defendant (Atlantic International Bank) did object, see Dkt. 24, 26; 

Dkt. 27 (FTC response). Baker’s brief (p. 30) says that unspecified defendants were not allowed to participate by telephone in certain hearings; that is 

incorrect. Baker appeared in the preliminary injunction hearing and was allowed to participate by phone in other hearings. See, e.g., Nov. 19, 2018 Tr. 

at 8; Baker Br. 16. 
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would go back into the development,” a claim that was “incontrovertibly false”—Sanctuary Belize “used only 14% of consumers’ money 

to cover construction costs.” Id. at 23, 25; 

(3) Sanctuary Belize employees told consumers as early as 2008 that the 

development “would be completed within a specific time frame: within two years, sometimes within five years.” Id. at 25-26. Yet the development “[m]ost definitely . . . was not finished within two to five 

years” and still was not complete “more than thirteen years after the 

first sale occurred.” Id. Although some amenities have been built, 

other promised amenities “appeared to have been abandoned altogether.” Id. at 26-27. 

(4) Sanctuary Belize promised “extraordinary amenities comparable to 

those of a small American city,” such as shops, restaurants, condominiums, entertainment venues, a hotel, an American-style supermarket, an American-quality hospital, an 18-hole golf course, an international airport, on-site airstrip, and a “world class” marina. Id. at 29-

31. Given the “aggressive marketing of all these deluxe amenities” 

and “the considerably less than promised number of features constructed to date,” the court found it “clear that the FTC has shown a 
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fair and tenable chance of proving at the merits stage that these material representations violated Section 5 of the FTC Act.” Id. at 31. 

(5) Sanctuary Belize employees claimed that lots would rapidly appreciate in value, but the lots “have never begun to appreciate anywhere 

near as promised, and there was never any basis—none—for [Sanctuary Belize] to have claimed this.” Id. at 31-32. 

(6) Contrary to Sanctuary Belize’s representations, “there have been few 

opportunities for dissatisfied owners to sell their lots at a profit.” Id.

at 32. 

The court found that each of the claims above was material to consumers’ 

decisions to purchase and based on its findings, the court was “easily” able 

to conclude that the Commission had a “fair and tenable” chance of success 

on the merits. Id. at 33. 

Because it found that the Commission was likely to succeed on the merits 

of its FTC Act claims, which independently justified all of the terms of the 

preliminary injunction, the court found it unnecessary to resolve the defendants’ argument that they fell within the exception to the Telemarketing Sales 

Rule for sales that occur face-to-face. Id. at 33-34. 

Turning to the individual defendants, the court first found “extensive evidence” that Pukke controlled the Sanctuary Belize enterprise, directed its 
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marketing strategies, and deceived consumers. Id. at 40. The court cited 

Baker’s testimony that “he and Pukke were the original partners in the Sanctuary Belize development,” and that “they continued their partnership” after 

the conclusion of the FTC’s earlier enforcement action against Pukke. Dkt. 

539 at 35. Baker likewise held numerous positions in Sanctuary Belize companies. Id. at 40-41. And although he claimed not to be involved from 2008-

2016, the “evidence shows that Baker appears to have been very much involved in the Sanctuary Belize marketing and sales operations during this 

time.” Id. at 42. In 2016, moreover, Baker took a more “hands-on role” and 

“directly control[ed] activities in Belize. Id. at 44-45. The court concluded 

that “the evidence strongly suggests” that Baker had an “intimate and continuous” involvement with Sanctuary Belize marketing efforts since the beginning of the development. Id. at 45. Accordingly, the court held that the 

FTC was likely to succeed on the merits of Pukke and Baker’s liability. 

After briefing on the form of the injunction, the district court entered the 

preliminary injunction on October 3, 2019, and these appeals followed. After 

Pukke and Baker filed separate informal opening briefs, the Court consolidated their appeals. 
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Standard of Review 

The Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 

Acres of Land, 915 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir. 2019). The district court’s factual 

findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions are reviewed 

de novo, In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159, 171 (4th 

Cir. 2019), but the court will not reverse “so long as the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Mountain Valley, 915 F.3d at 213 (cleaned up). 

Argument 

For the Court’s convenience, the Commission addresses the arguments 

made in Pukke’s and Baker’s briefs separately. 

I. PUKKE’S APPEAL 

None of Pukke’s seven arguments presents a serious reason to find that 

the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. 

 He argues that the court applied the wrong likelihood-of-success 

standard without showing how his standard is different or how it 

should have been applied. 

 He argues that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous without 

challenging any of those findings. 
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 He argues that the court erred by following this Court’s binding precedent and that the court should have stayed the case pending the outcome of other FTC matters in other circuits, which it was not bound to 

do. 

 He argues that the court erred by not deciding an issue—whether the 

Telemarketing Sales Rule applies—that was not necessary to its preliminary injunction decision. 

 He challenges non-appealable interlocutory decisions (to enter a temporary restraining order and the time between that order and the preliminary injunction hearing) that he did not challenge below. 

 And he makes frivolous arguments that collateral estoppel or res judicata should apply to cases that did not involve the claims or the parties 

at issue before the district court. 

Pukke’s arguments are self-evidently meritless. The preliminary injunction 

against him should be affirmed without further proceedings. 

1. The district court correctly found the Commission was likely to succeed on the merits of the FTC Act claims. 

Pukke first argues that the district court applied an impermissibly low 

standard for granting a preliminary injunction by requiring that the Commission demonstrate a “fair and tenable” chance of success on the merits. Br. 

23-25. He argues that the court should instead have applied an “abuse of dis-
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cretion standard.” Id. at 24-25. On its face, the argument is nonsensical; 

“abuse of discretion” is a standard applied by appellate courts, not trial 

courts.3

 Nor does Pukke explain how his proposed standard differs from the 

standard applied by the district court, or how the Commission’s evidence 

failed to meet the standard. See id. 

In any case, the district court acted within its discretion. In an FTC enforcement action, “the district court is required (i) to weigh equities; and (ii) 

to consider the FTC’s likelihood of ultimate success before entering a preliminary injunction.” FTC v. World Wide Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344, 346 

(9th Cir. 1989); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1217 (11th Cir. 

1991) (same). Unlike in a dispute between private parties, “[h]arm to the 

public interest is presumed.” FTC v. Consumer Def., LLC, 926 F.3d 1208, 

1212 (9th Cir. 2019). 

The district court held that the Commission demonstrates likelihood of 

success on the merits if it “shows preliminarily, by affidavits or other proof, 

that it has a fair and tenable chance of ultimate success on the merits.” Dkt 

539 at 17 (citing FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co., 587 F.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 

1978). The court found that the Commission met that standard after closely 

 

3

 See Black’s Law Dictionary 12 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “abuse of discretion” as “[a]n appellate court’s standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the 

evidence”). 
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examining the Commission’s evidence that Sanctuary Belize had made six 

material claims to consumers in the marketing of Sanctuary Belize lots, and 

determining that the claims were false. Dkt. 539 at 20-33. That is all the law 

requires for a finding of likely success, whatever the precise verbal formulation.4

 Pukke’s bare assertion that the court set the bar too low shows no error 

on this record. 

2. The district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. 

Pukke next makes the blanket claim that the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, but he does not challenge any of the findings 

themselves. See Br. 25-28; Dkt. 539 at 20-33. Over 13 pages of its opinion, 

the district court carefully analyzed the extensive evidence showing that 

Sanctuary Belize made six core deceptive claims, that the claims were false, 

and that they were material to consumers’ purchasing decisions. See Dkt. 

539 at 20-33. Rather than challenge those findings, Pukke attacks a stringcitation relating to a single assertion in the “background” section of the district court’s opinion: specifically, that Sanctuary Belize repeated its deceptive claims when consumers visited Belize. Pukke Br. 26. That argument 

 

4

 See 11a Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 200-201 § 2948.33 

(“[V]erbal differences [adopted by different courts on the likelihood of success factor] do not seem to reflect substantive disagreement.”). 
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does not show or even attempt to show that any the district court’s findings 

were clearly erroneous.5

 

3. The district court applied this Court’s binding precedent interpreting section 13(b) of the FTC Act. 

Pukke’s third argument is that the district court erred by entering a preliminary injunction and asset freeze because “the FTC Act does not give the 

FTC the ability to seek restitution.” Br. 28-31, 31. Pukke relies on a Seventh 

Circuit decision, contrary to the approach of six other courts of appeals, 

holding that section 13(b) of the FTC Act does not authorize restitution. Id.

at 28-31; see FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 

2019). 

As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, this Court’s precedent is to the 

contrary. See Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 779. In FTC v. Ross, 743 

F.3d 886, 890-892 (4th Cir. 2014), this Court held that Section 13(b) does 

authorize monetary relief: “by authorizing the district court to issue a permanent injunction in the Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress presumably authorized the district court to exercise the full measure of its equitable 

jurisdiction,” including by awarding “monetary consumer redress, which is a 

 

5

 Pukke does not show “clear error” on the one factual point he does discuss 

because his argument rests on his own characterization of the evidence cited—consumers’ affidavits and testimony—as “boilerplate accusations,” 

“lies and propaganda,” and “talking points.” Pukke Br. 27. 
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form of equitable relief.” Id. at 891. That same authority permitted the district court to take necessary measures to preserve assets pending a final ruling. The district court did not abuse its discretion by following this Court’s 

binding precedent. 

4. The district court properly declined to stay the case pending the 

resolution of certiorari petitions in other FTC cases. 

The Commission has asked the Supreme Court to review the Seventh 

Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau Center, which as mentioned is contrary 

to the decisions of multiple other courts of appeals (including this one) holding that Section 13(b) of the FTC authorizes the Commission to seek monetary consumer redress. See Ross, 743 F.3d at 891-892 (collecting cases); 

FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, No. 19-825 (petition filed Dec. 19, 

2019). Defendants in two other FTC enforcement cases have asked the Supreme Court to resolve same circuit split. See Publishers Bus. Servs., Inc. v. 

FTC, No. 19-507 (petition filed Oct. 18, 2019); AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. 

FTC, No. 19-508 (petition filed Oct. 18, 2019). Pukke argues that the district 

court should have stayed all proceedings in the case until “a final determination is made, resolving the split in the Circuits.” Pukke Br. 32. 

But the mere existence of a circuit split and pending petitions for high 

court review does not suspend the application of the law until it is resolved 

by the Supreme Court. Courts “apply the law as it stands,” not as 
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it might be interpreted by the Supreme Court in the future. Air Line Pilots 

Ass’n, Int’l v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The 

district court was bound to follow this Court’s precedent in Ross, not to 

await the speculative possibility that the Supreme Court might grant certiorari in a different case, from a different circuit, and come to a different conclusion. Declining to do so was not an abuse of discretion. 

5. The district court was not required to decide Pukke’s Telemarketing 

Sales Rule argument. 

Pukke’s fifth argument6

 is that the district court abused its discretion by 

declining to rule on whether the misrepresentations charged in the complaint 

fall within an exception to the Telemarketing Sales Rule. Pukke Br. 37-44. 

Pukke fails to show an abuse of discretion because the district court’s findings on the FTC Act are sufficient to justify the preliminary injunction. 

The complaint charges that Sanctuary Belize violated the Telemarketing 

Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.2(a)(2)(iii) & 310.2(a)(2)(iv), by making misrepresentations in its telemarketing calls about (a) material aspects of its 

“goods or services;” and (b) material aspects of “investment opportunities.” 

Dkt. 1 at 39-40, 41-42. Section 310.6(b) of the Rule, however, exempts “telephone calls in which the sale of goods or services or charitable solicitation 

 

6

 This argument is labeled “Issue 6” in Pukke’s brief (at 37), but there is no 

“Issue 5.” 
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is not completed, and payment or authorization of payment is not required, 

until after a face-to-face sales or donation presentation.” 16 C.F.R. 

§ 310.6(b). 

Pukke argues that Sanctuary Belize’s misrepresentations are exempt from 

the Rule because most Sanctuary Belize customers completed their purchase 

of Sanctuary Belize lots during face-to-face meetings in Belize. Pukke Br. 

37-44. The Commission argued below that the “face-to-face” exception did 

not apply because Sanctuary Belize sold $999 tours of the property without 

any face-to-face meeting, and also took substantial deposits on Sanctuary 

Belize lots over the phone. See Dkt. 539 at 34. The district court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the exception applied at the preliminary injunction stage, and declined to do so: “It suffices that the Court is about to conclude that the FTC has met is burden sufficient to enter a Preliminary Injunction against Defendants as to their purported violations of Section 5 of the 

FTC Act.” Id. 

That decision was correct. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits, and directs 

the Commission to prevent, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). It does not contain any exception for 

face-to-face sales. Because the Commission showed that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its charge that Sanctuary Belize misled consumers in 
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the marketing of Sanctuary Belize properties, the district court was authorized to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining that conduct and an asset 

freeze to protect assets for possible consumer redress in the event of a monetary judgment, whether or not the conduct also violated the Telemarketing 

Sales Rule. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). The court therefore did not need to resolve 

whether the conduct also violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule in order to 

enter the preliminary injunction and did not abuse its discretion in declining 

to do so. 

6. The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering a temporary restraining order and interim preliminary injunction. 

Pukke argues that the district court improperly granted the TRO in this 

case and allowed it to continue in effect for more than six months without an 

evidentiary hearing. Br. 44-45. Pukke admits that the court held an evidentiary hearing before it entered the preliminary injunction now on appeal. He 

nevertheless claims that “the damage that the TRO had done to the businesses and defendants had already been inflicted.” Id. at 45. He complains that 

he is homeless, cannot afford to bring witnesses to the trial, hire counsel, or 

travel across the country.7

 

 

7

 In fact, Pukke has been present at throughout the trial on the merits, which 

began Jan. 21, 2020, and has indicated that he will call witnesses. The district court allocated $30,000 of the frozen assets for his legal defense as well 

as $3,000 thousand per month for living expenses. See Dkt. 649. Further, at 
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Pukke’s argument presents no genuine challenge to the court’s preliminary injunction. To the extent he challenges the temporary restraining order 

itself, that order is not appealable. Drudge v. McKernon, 482 F.2d 1375, 

1376 (4th Cir.1973). To the extent he challenges the district court’s extension of injunctive relief until the evidentiary hearing, this Court has held that 

“broad discretion is given to the district court to manage the timing and process for entry of all interlocutory injunctions—both TROs and preliminary 

injunctions—so long as the opposing party is given a reasonable opportunity, commensurate with the scarcity of time under the circumstances, to prepare a defense and advance reasons why the injunction should not issue.” 

Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2000). 

Here, the district court gave the defendants a reasonable opportunity to 

defend against the entry of a preliminary injunction. Soon after entering the 

TRO, it accepted briefs and heard argument on whether to enter an interim 

extension of its terms to allow the parties to prepare for a full evidentiary 

hearing, see Dkt. 20, 31, 34. At that hearing, Pukke’s counsel did not make 

any objection to extending interim injunctive relief or the proposed date for 

the hearing, even when specifically asked. Nov. 19, 2019 Tr. at 22-23. Nor 

did Pukke object at any time before the evidentiary hearing. As Pukke ad-

 

the pretrial conference, the receiver agreed to give Pukke and Baker $5,000 

from receivership funds to facilitate their participation in the trial. 
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mits, the court then held a full evidentiary hearing on the merits, Pukke Br. 

45, at which Pukke was represented by counsel and had the opportunity to 

present evidence and legal argument. The court’s preliminary injunction was 

then based on the evidence presented in that hearing. Dkt. 539 at 20-33. 

Pukke was afforded a fair opportunity to participate and object at every 

stage. The district court did not abuse its discretion. 

7. Pukke’s venue, res judicata, and collateral estoppel arguments are 

frivolous. 

Lastly, Pukke argues that venue in Maryland was improper and that the 

action is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Pukke Br. 46-48. 

As an initial matter, the district court’s decisions on venue, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel are not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. “An order 

allowing transfer of a matter to another district is committed to the discretion 

of the district court,” and “[t]he denial of a motion to transfer is not an appealable order.” In re Ralston Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002, 1004 (4th Cir. 

1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Similarly, because collateral estoppel and res 

judicata are defenses to liability, they are “ineligible for immediate review.” 

United States v. Whyte, 918 F.3d 339, 344 n.8 (4th Cir. 2019). Pukke does 

not explain why the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction permits 

him to obtain interlocutory review of its venue, res judicata, or collateral es-
- 20 - 

toppel decisions. In any case, as shown below, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion. 

Beginning with venue, Pukke does not explain why the district court’s 

reasons for keeping the case amount to an abuse of discretion. District courts 

within this circuit consider four factors when deciding whether to transfer 

venue: (1) the weight accorded to plaintiff’s choice of venue; (2) witness 

convenience and access; (3) convenience of the parties; and (4) the interest 

of justice.” Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015). The district court considered those factors, noting that the FTC’s choice of forum was entitled to 

some weight, and while Maryland was a less convenient forum for the defendants and some witnesses, it was convenient for the FTC and no less 

convenient for witnesses who are in neither D.C. nor California. March 1, 

2019 Tr. at 36-37. The court stated that the “key component” in its denial of 

the motion to transfer was the interest of justice, based on the overlap between the Sanctuary Belize case and a related FTC case with which it is consolidated, the court’s familiarity with the earlier case, and the interests of judicial economy that would be served by avoiding duplicative trials. Id. at 37. 

Instead of engaging that reasoning, Pukke simply asserts that “ALL defendants [except one], companies, key witness, records and even the receiver 
- 21 - 

are located in California,” and characterizes the earlier consolidated case as 

“settled.” Br. 47. But as the district court’s reasoning shows, the location of 

the parties is not the only relevant consideration. And although aspects of the 

earlier enforcement action were settled, the FTC filed three motions to hold 

Pukke in contempt of the district court’s orders that case for conduct that is 

directly related to the Sanctuary Belize fraud. See Dkt. 266, 267, 268. That is 

no abuse of discretion. Indeed, this Court has already ruled that the district 

court did not “usurp its judicial power in favoring judicial economy and 

denying [Pukke’s] motion[] to transfer.” In re Pukke, No. 19-2353 (4th Cir. 

Jan. 21, 2020) (denying Pukke’s petition seeking mandamus on the venue 

issue). The district court did not abuse its discretion either. 

Pukke is likewise incorrect that res judicata or collateral estoppel applies 

here. He asserts that those doctrines apply because the prior FTC enforcement action was settled and because “practically every one of the FTC’s 

claims in this case had been previously litigated in the Supreme Court of Belize.” Br. 47-48. 

 “Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment 

on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Pueschel v. 

United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004). It applies only where there 
- 22 - 

is “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) an identity of the 

cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit; and (3) an identity of 

parties or their privies in the two suits.” Id. at 354-355. 

Pukke’s res judicata argument fails because the present case involves different causes of action and different parties than the earlier actions. The earlier FTC enforcement action cannot be res judicata for this case because it 

concerns conduct that had not yet occurred and thus could not have been litigated in the earlier suit—there is no “identity of the cause of action” between the two cases. Nor does res judicata apply to cases litigated in Belize: 

the Commission was not a party to those cases and the violations of the FTC 

Act alleged here were not and could not have been brought there. 

Pukke’s argument that collateral estoppel should apply fails for similar 

reasons. Collateral estoppel requires that “(1) the issue or fact is identical to 

the one previously litigated; (2) the issue or fact was actually resolved in the 

prior proceeding; (3) the issue or fact was critical and necessary to the judgment in the prior proceeding; (4) the judgment in the prior proceeding is final and valid; and (5) the party to be foreclosed by the prior resolution of the 

issue or fact had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in the 

prior proceeding.” In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 326 

(4th Cir. 2004). Again, the issues here were not and could not have been 
- 23 - 

brought in the earlier enforcement case or in the non-FTC cases heard in Belize, and the Commission was not even a party to the Belize cases. 

* * * 

In sum, Pukke’s arguments are wholly without merit. The preliminary injunction against him should be affirmed. 

II. BAKER’S APPEAL 

Baker’s arguments are no more meritorious than Pukke’s: 

 He argues that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the FTC’s case or personal jurisdiction over the defendants, 

but this case involves a federal question and the FTC Act’s nationwide service of process provision provides personal jurisdiction. 

 He argues that the district court’s extension of the terms of the TRO 

as interim injunctive relief was itself a preliminary injunction that required an evidentiary hearing, but Baker had a reasonable opportunity 

to object to that relief and did not take it. 

 He argues that the Telemarketing Sales Rule does not apply, but the 

district court did not decide that issue. 

 He argues that part of one of Sanctuary Belize’s “core” misrepresentations was not misleading but ignores the others; he argues that some 

of the other misrepresentations were “cured” by consumers’ in-person 
- 24 - 

visits to Belize, but that is not the law and those visits did not give 

consumers any more relevant information. 

 Like Pukke, he argues that the FTC Act does not authorize monetary 

relief, contrary to this Court’s decision in Ross. 

 He argues that the district court incorrectly found the FTC was likely 

to establish his personal liability, but does not address the evidence 

that the district court relied on. 

 He argues that the district court incorrectly balanced the equities, but 

ignores the public interest. 

 And he litters his brief with a host of incomplete arguments, none of 

which has any merit. 

1. The district court has jurisdiction and venue is proper. 

Baker first argues that the district court lacks jurisdiction over the defendants and the subject matter of the Commission’s enforcement action, 

and that as a result, “the venue is wrong.” Baker Br. 28-29. That is incorrect. 

The district court plainly has federal question jurisdiction over this case. 

The Commission sued under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to enjoin unfair 

or deceptive practices prohibited by the Act. See Dkt. 1; 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 

The matter thus raises a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
- 25 - 

The court also has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Section 

13(b) of the FTC Act provides that “process may be served on any person, 

partnership, or corporation wherever it may be found.” 15 U.S.C. § 53. 

“Congress’ typical mode of providing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction has been to authorize service of process.” BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 

S. Ct. 1549, 1555 (2017). As this Court has held, when a defendant has been 

served under such a nationwide service of process provision, “a district court 

has personal jurisdiction over the defendant so long as jurisdiction comports 

with the Fifth Amendment.” Plumbers & Pipefitters, 791 F.3d at 443. Jurisdiction does not violate the Fifth Amendment unless it “would result in such 

extreme inconvenience or unfairness as would outweigh the congressionally 

articulated policy evidenced by a nationwide service of process provision.” 

Id. at 444 (cleaned up). “Normally, when a defendant is a United States resident, it is highly unusual that inconvenience will rise to a level of constitutional concern.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Baker does not show that proceeding in Maryland has resulted in such an 

extreme inconvenience that it violates due process. He simply argues that the 

individual defendants and most of the business-entity defendants are in California rather than Maryland. Baker Br. 28-29. But as the district court found, 

the inconvenience to the defendants of litigating in Maryland was out-
- 26 - 

weighed here by the interest of justice, based on the overlap between the 

Sanctuary Belize case and an earlier FTC enforcement action against Pukke 

with which it is consolidated, the court’s familiarity with the earlier case, 

and the interests of judicial economy that would be served by avoiding duplicative trials. March 1, 2019 Tr. at 36-37; see also Dkt. 539 at 13-16 (analyzing personal jurisdiction over Baker’s codefendant Luke Chadwick). This 

Court has already determined that the district court did not “usurp its judicial 

power in favoring judicial economy and denying [Pukke’s and Baker’s] motions to transfer.” In re Pukke, No. 19-2353 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2020) (denying 

mandamus). Baker has not shown that that same decision violated due process. 

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by extending the terms 

of the temporary restraining order until the evidentiary hearing. 

Baker’s second argument is that the district court abused its discretion by 

entering a preliminary injunction without holding an evidentiary hearing. 

Baker Br. 32-36. But because the brief acknowledges in multiple places that 

the court did hold an evidentiary hearing before entering the order on appeal 

(e.g., at 15-16, 17-20, 30, 32), the Commission understands Baker’s argument to be that the district court’s extension of injunctive relief pending the 

evidentiary hearing was itself a preliminary injunction which required its 
- 27 - 

own evidentiary hearing. See id. at 32 (“the evidentiary hearing was held 

more [than] 5 months later, therefore violating the law.”). 

That argument is incorrect. As noted above, under this Court’s precedent, 

“broad discretion is given to the district court to manage the timing and process for entry of all interlocutory injunctions—both TROs and preliminary 

injunctions—so long as the opposing party is given a reasonable opportunity, commensurate with the scarcity of time under the circumstances, to prepare a defense and advance reasons why the injunction should not issue.” 

Ciena Corp. 203 F.3d at 319. 

The district court gave the defendants here a reasonable opportunity to 

object to the interim relief. Within two weeks of entering the TRO, the court 

accepted briefs and heard argument on whether to enter an interim extension 

of the TRO’s terms to allow the parties to prepare for a full evidentiary hearing, see Dkt. 20, 31, 34. For the one defendant who objected, the district 

court conducted a telephone hearing, analyzed the preliminary injunction 

factors, and ruled on the FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction for that 

defendant. See Nov. 19, 2018 Tr. 56-61. Another defendant, who appeared 

pro se, objected to the extension of the asset freeze by letter and ultimately 

reached an agreement with the Commission. Id. at 25-27; Dkt. 35, 47, 49. 
- 28 - 

Baker had the same opportunity to object as the other defendants. Indeed, 

his counsel was informed of the hearing on extending the terms of the TRO, 

but he did not appear. Nov. 19, 2018 Tr. at 8. Nor did Baker object to the interim injunction or extending the asset freeze between the November telephone hearing and the March evidentiary hearing. Baker’s failure to take advantage of the reasonable opportunities the district court provided to object 

to the interim injunction does not constitute an abuse of discretion by the 

district court. 

3. The district court correctly found that the Commission is likely to 

succeed on the merits. 

Baker argues that the Commission did not meet its burden to show likelihood of success on the merits in two parts: 

First, he argues that there was no violation of the Telemarketing Sales 

Rule under the “in-person” exception of 16 C.F.R. § 310.6(b). Baker Br. 37-

40; 41-43. But the district court has not decided that question. See Dkt. 539 

at 33-34. “It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does 

not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 

106, 120 (1976). Because the district court did not decide whether the exception applies below, there is no district court decision on the issue for Baker 

to challenge here. 
- 29 - 

Second, Baker argues that the Commission failed to show a likelihood of 

success on the merits of its FTC Act claim because (a) Sanctuary Belize’s 

claims that the resort would feature specific amenities were not likely to 

mislead “consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances,” due to the 

sophistication of Sanctuary Belize customers; and (b) misrepresentations 

made by telephone “are not material—or are mitigated and corrected—when 

buyers have the opportunity to inspect the real estate in person.” Baker Br. 

44-45. Neither argument shows that the district court abused its discretion. 

To begin with, the claim that Sanctuary Belize consumers were too 

sophisticated to rely on promises to provide particular amenities addresses 

only one of Sanctuary Belize’s deceptive claims. See Dkt. 539 20-33. It does 

not address the claims (a) that investing in Sanctuary Belize was particularly 

safe because of the “no debt” model; (b) that every dollar would be invested 

in the development; (c) that the resort would be completed within 2-5 years; 

(d) that lots would quickly appreciate; or (e) that there would be a robust resale market. See id. The district court’s finding that the Commission is likely 

to succeed on even one of those claims would be sufficient to sustain the 

preliminary injunction. Moreover, Baker’s argument that consumers could 

not rely on representations about “things such as airports and hospitals, 

which are paradigm public work projects” applies to only a few of the prom-
- 30 - 

ised amenities. Many others—shops, restaurants, condominiums, entertainment venues, a hotel and golf course— are paradigmatic resort amenities 

that consumers would have no reason to expect Sanctuary Belize could not 

deliver. Further, a representation may be deceptive if it omits qualifying information necessary to prevent deception. See FTC, Policy Statement on 

Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 n.4 (1984).8

 But Sanctuary Belize never 

made any “caveats or disclaimers suggesting some amenities might not be 

built.” Dkt. 539 at 28. 

As for Baker’s claim that Sanctuary Belize’s telephone misrepresentations were cured when consumers visited Belize, that is not the law. As a 

general matter, later disclosures do not undo a seller’s false statements; thus, 

“[a] court need not look past the first contact with a consumer to determine 

the net impression from that contact.” FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide, 767 F.3d 

611, 632 (6th Cir. 2014). In this case, there was not even arguably a subsequent disclosure: visiting the property did not give purchasers any more information about the relative safety of Sanctuary Belize as an investment, 

whether every dollar would truly be put toward the development, whether 

Sanctuary Belize would be complete within 2-5 years, whether the amenities 

would be built, whether lots would appreciate, or whether there would be a 

 

8 http://bit.ly/FTC-PolicyStmtDeception. 
- 31 - 

robust resale market. To the contrary, the evidence showed that Sanctuary 

Belize reinforced those promises when purchasers visited Belize. Dkt. 539 at 

9-10. Those representations were material because they were “likely to affect a consumer’s decision to buy a product or service.” E.M.A. Nationwide, 

767 F.3d at 631. Visiting the property did not make them less so. 

4. The district court was authorized to enter an asset freeze. 

Baker argues that the district court should not have ordered an asset 

freeze because section 13(b) of the FTC Act does not authorize monetary relief, and thus an asset freeze intended to preserve funds for monetary relief is 

inappropriate. Baker Br. 46-49. As with Pukke’s version of that argument, 

see supra p. 13, Baker’s is foreclosed by the Court’s controlling decision in 

Ross, holding that the FTC Act authorizes “monetary consumer redress.” 

743 F.3d at 891. The district court did not abuse its discretion by following 

Ross. 

5. The district court correctly found the FTC is likely to successfully establish Baker’s personal liability. 

Baker next argues that there was insufficient evidence to find that the 

FTC is likely to succeed in establishing his personal liability for Sanctuary 

Belize’s misrepresentations. Baker Br. 49-51. 

This Court established in Ross that an individual may be liable under the 

FTC Act if he “(1) participated directly in the deceptive practices or had au-
- 32 - 

thority to control those practices, and (2) had or should have had knowledge 

of the deceptive practices.” 743 F.3d at 892. Here, the district court found 

that, in addition to his ownership of and control positions in numerous Sanctuary Belize companies, “the evidence strongly suggests” that Baker was 

“intimate[ly] and continuous[ly]” involved in Sanctuary Belize’s marketing 

efforts. Dkt. 539 at 45. For example, Baker “was involved in reviewing marketing claims,” “participated in sales tours,” and “work[ed] to close sales.” 

Id. at 46. The court further found it “hard to conclude” that Baker did not 

know about Sanctuary Belize’s representations. Indeed, he admitted knowing that the “every dollar” claim was false, and testified himself “that owners 

had difficulty selling lots,” contrary to Sanctuary Belize’s promise of a robust resale market. Id. at 47. Moreover, Baker admits that for the two years 

preceding the FTC’s enforcement action, he was the general manager of the 

Belize development company, and that as a result, he had “direct knowledge 

of the current information.” Baker Br. 22, 18. 

The district court’s finding that the Commission is likely to succeed in 

establishing Baker’s liability is reviewed for clear error. “A factual finding 

is clearly erroneous when [the court is] ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 

F.3d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
- 33 - 

564, 573 (1985)). The Court will not reverse so long as “the district court’s 

account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-574). “Thus, when there are 

two permissible views of the evidence, the district court’s choice between 

them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Baker asserts that he was not “engaged in the alleged misconduct” and 

did not “gain[] anything from the unlawful practices.” Baker Br. 49. He describes numerous ways in which he says he did not participate in or control 

Sanctuary Belize’s marketing, and while he admits creating Sanctuary Belize’s marketing and sales company, he claims he was not actually involved 

and that his signature was forged on documents showing his ownership and 

control positions in other Sanctuary Belize companies. Id. at 49-50. 

Other than his forgery claim (for which the district court found there was 

a “welter of contrary evidence in the record”), Baker does not address the 

district court’s careful examination of the evidence establishing that the 

Commission is likely to succeed in establishing his liability. See id. Much 

less does he show that the district court’s finding was not “plausible in light 

of the record viewed in its entirety” and therefore amounted to clear error. 

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-574. 
- 34 - 

6. The district court correctly found that the injunction was in the public interest. 

The district court’s preliminary injunction is supported by the strong public interest embodied in Section 5 of the FTC Act, which outlaws deceptive 

acts and practices and directs the Commission to prevent them. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 45(a). The district court found that the Commission was likely to succeed 

in showing that Sanctuary Belize lied consumers into spending more than 

$141 million on its phantom resort community. The preliminary injunction 

and asset freeze serves the public interest by halting the scam and preserving 

the district court’s ability to order redress to consumers harmed by the conduct. See Dkt. 539 at 55-56. In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court correctly gave “greater weight” to the public interest than to the 

“private equities” involved. Id. at 16-17, 55-57; see also Dkt. 615 at 6-7; 

FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1988). 

Without acknowledging the public interest in enforcing the law or protecting consumers from deceptive practices, or the likelihood that assets 

would be dissipated absent a freeze, Baker argues that the injunction “has 

caused damage and irreparable harm to defendants and [the] public at large.” 

Br. 53. He argues that the defendant companies have been shut down and 

their employees put out of work, that the individual defendants have been 

harmed by the asset freeze, that the development has been harmed by ceas-
- 35 - 

ing further development, and that owners’ lots have lost value. See id. at 53-

54; 25-26, 21. But all of those alleged harms stem from stopping illegal 

practices that the district court found the Commission was likely to prove. 

The defendant companies’ (and their employees’) harm comes from not allowing them to continue to make money by deceiving consumers. The burdens of the asset freeze and the supposed harm from stopping further spending on the development come from keeping defendants from spending ill 

gotten gains that could redress the harm they caused. And any loss in the 

value of Sanctuary Belize lots likely stems more from exposing the lies and 

false promises behind the scam than from the preliminary injunction. Indeed, 

the district court found that absent an injunction, the defendants would continue to harm consumers and lot owners would continue to lose money. Dkt. 

539 at 55. The court further found that the court-appointed receiver had 

“done a credible job maintaining the stability of the development,” and 

would “keep the development on an even keel until the merits hearing.” Id.

at 56. In short, it was within the district court’s discretion to find that the 

private harms that Baker asserts were outweighed by the public interest. 

7. Baker’s remaining arguments are frivolous. 

Baker’s brief often digresses to make fragmentary arguments within its 

other arguments. As explained below, none of those arguments has merit. 
- 36 - 

A. In his statement of the issues and throughout the brief, Baker alleges 

that Sanctuary Belize owners were satisfied and wanted the Commission’s 

action to stop. Br. 5, 8, 18, 39-40. But customer satisfaction does not make 

Sanctuary Belize’s false or misleading representations true. See, e.g., FTC v. 

Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing standard for deceptive acts or practices). 

B. Baker’s statement of the issues also asks whether the district court 

abused its discretion by appointing certain Sanctuary Belize property owners 

to a “Managing Board of Owners” to run the development during these proceedings. Baker Br. 6; see also Id. at 22-25 (discussing proceedings on an 

interim development management plan). Whatever Baker’s complaint with 

those proceedings, the district court did not decide them in its preliminary 

injunction order and they are not properly considered in this appeal. 

C. At various points, Baker’s brief mentions collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the statute of limitations (Br. 5-6, 8-9, 17-18), but does not develop 

any argument that they apply. As explained above, res judicata and collateral 

estoppel do not apply here. Baker does not identify any statute of limitations 

that he claims applies. 

D. Baker argues that a preliminary injunction may only be granted “if the 

wrongs are ongoing or apt to continue.” Baker Br. 35-36. But the conduct 
- 37 - 

alleged in the complaint was ongoing when it was filed, and Baker does not 

explain why it would not be likely to continue absent an injunction. In any 

case, the “cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal 

of power to hear and determine the case,” and the “court’s power to grant 

injunctive relief survives the discontinuance of the illegal conduct.” United 

States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); see also FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009). 

E. Baker argues that temporary restraining order is “invasive to the point 

of appearing punitive” and “should have been denied for lack of evidentiary 

support.” Baker Br. 45-46. But the TRO was not an appealable order. 

Drudge, 482 F.2d at 1376. 

F. Baker argues that the district court improperly declined to hold a jury 

trial because the FTC is effectively seeking civil penalties. Baker Br. 48. But 

in Ross, this Court held that “monetary consumer redress,” which the FTC 

seeks here, “is a form of equitable relief.” 743 F.3d at 891. Jury trials are required only in “Suits at common law,” not equity. U.S. Const. Amd. VII. 

G. Baker argues that his wife’s assets should be unfrozen, see Baker Br. 

27, 51-52, but Baker’s wife did not appeal the preliminary injunction and 

because he is not an attorney, Baker cannot represent her. 
- 38 - 

Conclusion 

The preliminary injunction should be affirmed without further proceedings. 

Feb. 3, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

 ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel 

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel 

 

s/Theodore (Jack) Metzler 

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

Attorney 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-3502 

tmetzler@ftc.gov 

 
- 39 - 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on February 3, 2020, I filed this motion using the Court’s 

appellate CM-ECF system, and served appellants by U.S. mail at the following addresses: 

Andris Pukke 

3334 East Coast Highway 

Corona Del Mar, CA 92625 

Peter Baker 

100 Lido Park Dr. #32 

Newport Beach, CA 92663 

February 3, 2019 s/Theodore (Jack) Metzler 

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

Attorney 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

 (202) 326-3502