In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1828 

MICHAEL SHAKMAN, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v.

CLERK OF COOK COUNTY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:69-cv-02145 — Sidney I. Schenkier, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 10, 2020 — DECIDED APRIL 16, 2021 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal returns us to consent 

decrees—the so-called Shakman Decrees—entered in 1972 

and 1991 to monitor political patronage practices in Chicago. 

The Clerk of Cook County remains subject to the Consent Decrees to this day. Before us is the Clerk’s appeal from a decision finding recent violations of the Consent Decrees, appointing a special master to monitor the Clerk’s future compliance, and refusing the Clerk’s request to vacate the 
2 No. 20-1828 

Decrees. While we lack authority to review the appointment 

of the special master, we affirm the denial of the Clerk’s request to vacate. 

Though we affirm, we sound a federalism concern. This 

matter has languished in the federal courts for a long time—

indeed, as best we can tell, for decades with little to no meaningful activity. Permitting a consent decree over an arm of 

state or local government (here, the Cook County Clerk) to 

anchor itself on a federal docket for decades is inconsistent 

with our federal structure. Diligence, not dormancy, must 

mark the path forward. 

I 

A 

The Shakman Decrees date to 1972, and their history and 

twists and turns over the years have consumed many pages 

of the Federal Reporter. See, e.g., Shakman v. Democratic Org. of 

Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970) (“Shakman I”); Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Shakman II”). We 

need recount only the essential facts. 

Decades ago, Michael Shakman, an independent candidate seeking a delegate position at the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention, grew concerned that Chicago politicians 

influenced elections through patronage in public employment. He feared that elected officials were promising and 

awarding jobs in local government in exchange for pledges of 

political support. Unable and unwilling to engage in these 

practices, Shakman felt disadvantaged. He questioned how 

he could attract voters, recruit volunteers, and raise campaign 

money with as much success as incumbent candidates who 

engaged in these patronage practices. 
No. 20-1828 3

Shakman sought to level the playing field through 

litigation. In 1969 he and Paul Lurie, a political supporter, 

filed a complaint on behalf of independent candidates and 

voters in the Northern District of Illinois. Shakman alleged 

that city and county officials and arms of municipal 

government—including the Clerk of Cook County, the 

Chicago Park District, the Chicago City Council, the Forest 

Preserve, and indeed Cook County itself—conditioned 

government employment on political patronage. He 

contended that the patronage practices violated the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments. 

Shakman I: The putative class action struggled to get off the 

ground. In 1969 the district court dismissed Shakman’s complaint for lack of standing, reasoning that the proper plaintiffs 

were not political candidates like Shakman but instead the actual government employees allegedly forced to engage in patronage. See Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County., 

310 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1969). We reversed, concluding 

that Shakman and the putative class members sought redress 

for injuries to their own interests—both “the interests of candidates in an equal chance” and “the interests of voters in having an equally effective voice.” Shakman I, 435 F.2d at 270. We 

remanded and two years later the parties entered into the first 

of the Shakman Decrees. The 1972 Decree enjoined city and 

county officials from “conditioning, basing or knowingly 

prejudicing or affecting any term or aspect of governmental 

employment, with respect to one who is at the time already a 

governmental employee, upon or because of any political reason or factor.” The Cook County Clerk remains subject to the 

1972 Decree today. 
4 No. 20-1828 

Shakman II: After entering the 1972 Decree governing patronage with respect to current municipal employees, the district court retained jurisdiction to consider whether the prohibition on political patronage should extend to government 

hiring decisions. The district court answered in the affirmative and entered the 1983 Decree, which enjoined city and 

county officials from conditioning hiring or promotions on 

any political affiliation or considerations. See Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1355 (N.D. Ill. 

1979). Some parties consented to the 1983 Decree, while others, including the Cook County Clerk, appealed. The Clerk argued that the candidate and voter plaintiffs lacked standing 

to challenge municipal hiring policies. This time, we agreed. 

See Shakman II, 829 F.2d 1387. We saw the line of causation 

between alleged employment promises and Shakman’s asserted political disadvantage as “particularly attenuated” and 

too dependent “upon countless individual decisions” of citizens engaging with the political process or hoping for government jobs. Id. at 1397. So the Clerk’s office managed to shelter 

its hiring practices from the 1983 Decree. 

1991 Consent Decree: A few years after Shakman II, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment’s prohibition 

against patronage-based firings recognized in Elrod v. Burns, 

427 U.S. 347 (1976), “extends to promotion, transfer, recall, or 

hiring decisions involving public employment positions for 

which party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement.” 

Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 68 (1990). Shakman 

and the other plaintiffs reacted to Rutan by moving anew to 

extend the 1983 Decree to the Cook County Clerk. All of this 

led in 1991 to the Clerk consenting to a separate consent decree with prohibitions akin to those included in the 1983 Decree. The resulting 1991 Decree requires, among other 
No. 20-1828 5

conditions, that officials post “prior public notice of the opportunity to apply for and be hired for” all positions beyond 

a few specified exempt roles. 

B 

A couple of additional points set the stage for this appeal. 

In 1992 the Independent Voters of Illinois-Independent Precinct Organization—which we will call the Voters Organization for simplicity—entered the litigation when it joined the 

first amended complaint filed by Shakman and the other 

plaintiffs. The new complaint explained that the Voters Organization “is an Illinois political organization which endorses and supports candidates for public office both in party 

primary and general elections, especially in Cook County, Illinois.” Patronage practices, the amended complaint alleged, 

harm the Voters Organization and its members who are independent candidates, voters, and current public employees. 

And just as new plaintiffs have joined the case since 1991, 

the district court has found that some entities and officials, 

like the City of Chicago and the Chicago Park District, demonstrated substantial compliance with the Decrees. So those parties have been dismissed. 

In 2010 the Clerk of Cook County and other defendants 

consented to a magistrate judge conducting any further proceedings in the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The assigned magistrate oversaw the case for a decade before retiring in 2020. 

At that point the Governor of Illinois, as one of the parties to 

the Consent Decrees, objected to the reassignment of a new 

magistrate judge and observed that a new district judge also 

needed to be appointed given the retirement many years ago 

of the assigned district judge. The Governor’s objection 
6 No. 20-1828 

resulted in the assignment of a new district judge and a new 

magistrate judge. See N.D. Il. Local Rule 73.1(a) (delineating 

the procedures for assigning magistrate judges). No party has 

objected to the reassignment or raised any other argument regarding the recession of the prior consent to proceed before a 

magistrate judge. The multiple judicial retirements and subsequent shufflings late last year are indicative of just how long 

this case has burdened the federal docket. 

With this background in place, we consider the Clerk’s appeal from the magistrate judge’s decision to appoint a special 

master and to decline to vacate the Consent Decrees. 

II 

Though the Cook County Clerk remains subject to the 

1972 and 1991 Decrees, the case appears to have sat dormant 

on the federal docket for the last 30 to 40 years. No plaintiff 

has ever challenged the Clerk’s compliance. Nor has the Clerk 

ever sought to terminate or modify the Decrees. The case 

came back to life for the Clerk in 2019, however, when Michael Shakman, the Voters Organization, and the other plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief. 

It was then that these plaintiffs moved for the appointment of a special master to monitor the Clerk’s compliance 

with the Consent Decrees. The plaintiffs asserted that the 

Clerk’s hiring practices violate provisions of the 1991 Decree 

and that employees who choose to remain apolitical suffer 

workplace setbacks and discrimination, in violation of the 

1972 Decree. Right to it, the plaintiffs contended that the Clerk 

unilaterally changed the list of political positions exempt 

from hiring oversight, hired new employees for non-exempt 

positions without publicly posting the openings, and 
No. 20-1828 7

punished independent employees with disfavored job assignment rotation programs. 

The Clerk opposed the plaintiffs’ request for appointment 

of a special master, characterizing the alleged violations as 

technical and trivial. The Clerk also went on the offensive by 

asking the magistrate judge to vacate the 1972 and 1991 Consent Decrees. Though the Clerk never filed a separate motion 

to vacate, the magistrate treated the Clerk’s response in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for supplemental relief as a motion to vacate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b)(5). 

Limited discovery followed, and after a three-day evidentiary hearing in March 2020, the magistrate judge found that 

the Clerk violated the 1991 Decree. The magistrate likewise 

found that the evidence strongly suggested that the Clerk’s 

policy of rotating employees between offices was “instituted 

for the purpose of making life miserable” for certain longtime supervisors who did not come from “political pedigree[s],” in violation of the 1972 Decree. To provide a remedy 

and “to lay the groundwork for the day when those [Decrees] 

should indeed be vacated,” the magistrate invoked Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and appointed a special master to 

oversee compliance within the Clerk’s Office. 

Along the way, the magistrate judge concluded that all existing plaintiffs continue to have Article III standing. The 

magistrate likewise ruled that nothing about the Supreme 

Court’s 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 

2484, shows that continued enforcement of the Consent Decrees presents a non-justiciable political question, or that the 

time has come to vacate the Consent Decrees as to the Clerk. 
8 No. 20-1828 

The Clerk now appeals. 

III 

We begin with two threshold questions of appellate jurisdiction. Most often our jurisdiction comes from 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, which authorizes the courts of appeals to review the 

“final decisions” of the district courts. But we also have jurisdiction to review narrow categories of interlocutory orders, 

including those “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or 

dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Michael Shakman, the Voters Organization, and the other plaintiffs question our jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s decisions to appoint 

a special master and to decline to vacate the Decrees. The 

plaintiffs have it half right. 

A 

We agree that we lack jurisdiction to review the magistrate 

judge’s decision to appoint a special master. Enlisting the assistance of a special master is a tool district courts may use to 

help resolve ongoing disputes. The appointment does not terminate the litigation, however, and is thus not a final judgment appealable under § 1291. See Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 

406, 419 (2008) (defining a final judgment as “one which ends 

the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 

do”); see also Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 

1998) (determining that the extension of a special master’s 

term is not an appealable final judgment under § 1291). Nor 

does § 1292(a)(1) provide us jurisdiction, as “[t]he appointment of a special master” is a procedural order, and “procedural orders, though they often have the form of an 
No. 20-1828 9

injunction, are not classified as injunctions for purposes of 

section 1292(a)(1).” Bogard, 159 F.3d at 1063. 

The Clerk invokes the Fifth Circuit’s 1979 decision in Gary 

W. v. State of Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, and urges a narrower 

reading of Bogard, emphasizing that the district court there 

only extended the term of a special master, whereas the magistrate judge here appointed a master in the first instance. The 

initial appointment here, the Clerk explains, reflects the modification of an injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(a)(1). 

While we see the distinction, it does not make a difference 

in the circumstances before us. The appointment of a special 

master did not amount to the modification of the Consent Decrees, but instead reflected the magistrate judge’s invocation 

of a procedural tool to help monitor the parties’ compliance 

with the existing requirements of the Decrees. And while the 

appointment order authorizes the special master to implement certain provisions of the Decrees (for example, the development of the exempt position list), the substance of the 

Decrees’ terms and conditions did not change. On these facts, 

we see the special master acting only as an arm of the court to 

help address “posttrial matters that cannot be effectively and 

timely addressed” by the assigned judge. FED. R. CIV. P. 

53(a)(1)(C). 

In so concluding, we do not rule-out that the appointment 

of a special master in other facts and circumstances might 

amount to a modification of a consent decree reviewable on 

appeal. Here, however, we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the magistrate’s decision to appoint a special master under § 1292(a)(1). 
10 No. 20-1828 

B 

But we do have jurisdiction to review the magistrate 

judge’s decision denying the Clerk’s request to vacate the 

Consent Decrees. See id. at 1064–65 (explaining that the denial 

of a motion to modify a consent decree under Rule 60(b) is 

“appealable under section 1292(a)(1)”). 

Shakman and the other plaintiffs emphasize that the Clerk 

never filed a Rule 60(b)(5) motion before the magistrate. This 

failure, they press, deprives us of appellate jurisdiction. While 

mistaken in their ultimate conclusion, the plaintiffs are surely 

right to criticize the Clerk for not invoking Rule 60(b) and 

formally filing a motion seeking to vacate the 1972 and 1991 

Consent Decrees. Rule 60(b)(5), by its terms, authorizes 

district courts to provide relief from orders—including, as 

applied here, consent decrees—where the prior judgment or 

order has been satisfied or where prospective application is 

no longer equitable. Rather than invoking Rule 60(b)(5) in its 

brief in opposition to the plaintiffs’ request for supplemental 

relief, the Clerk should have filed a formal motion under the 

Rule. Not doing so created an entirely avoidable issue on 

appeal. The rules of appellate jurisdiction are meant to apply 

mechanically—not loosely or casually—as formal 

applications make the exercise of jurisdiction more efficient 

and predictable. Proper motions are preferred eight days a 

week over the kind of functional, close-enough request the 

Clerk saw as adequate here. 

The Clerk’s error does not deprive us of appellate jurisdiction, however. The record is clear that the magistrate judge 

understood and declined the Clerk’s request to vacate the 

Consent Decrees. The Clerk and the plaintiffs structured their 

arguments around Rule 60(b)(5), and the magistrate’s order 
No. 20-1828 11

concludes that the time has not “come for the [Decrees] to be 

vacated as to the County Clerk under Rule 60(b)(5).” In so ruling, the magistrate declined the Clerk’s request to vacate the 

ongoing application of the Consent Decrees. Our jurisdiction 

is therefore secure under § 1292(a)(1). 

IV 

We come, then, to the magistrate judge’s decision to leave 

the 1972 and 1991 Consent Decrees in place. Rule 60(b)(5) authorizes the district court, “on motion and just terms,” to relieve from a consent decree any party who demonstrates that 

“a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the 

decree.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 

(1992). We review a denial of a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for an 

abuse of discretion, adopting the court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 

925, 932 (7th Cir. 2005); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 

The Clerk renews the same three positions it urged before 

the magistrate. First, the law of Article III standing has developed since the entry of the Decrees and no plaintiff has standing to enforce their provisions today. Second, political patronage presents nonjusticiable political questions akin to the one 

recognized by the Supreme Court in Rucho v. Common Cause. 

Third, the magistrate judge misunderstood the Clerk’s alleged 

violations, which are merely technical and not cause for continued enforcement. We disagree on all fronts. 

A 

The magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that developments in the law of standing since 1971 

did not warrant vacating the Consent Decrees. The Clerk is 

correct that a Case or Controversy requires the existence, at 
12 No. 20-1828 

all stages of litigation, of a plaintiff who has suffered an injury 

in fact fairly traceable to the conduct of the Clerk and likely 

redressable by continued enforcement. See Lujan v. Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Where the Clerk falls 

short, though, is in demonstrating that, even though 50 years 

have passed since entry of the 1972 Decree, there is no longer 

any plaintiff with standing. 

In Shakman I, we determined that plaintiff Michael Shakman and his political supporters—as a putative class of candidates and voters—had standing to seek redress for patronage in government employment. See 435 F.2d at 269. Our 

holding stemmed from the recognition that Shakman, unable 

and unwilling to engage in patronage himself, operated at a 

distinct disadvantage in the political sphere against incumbent candidates engaging in patronage practices. The 1972 

Decree remains on the books and Shakman continues to press 

for its enforcement. This appeal presents no occasion to revisit 

our holding in Shakman I.

The 1991 Decree governing hiring decisions requires a 

more in-depth analysis, owing in part to our holding in Shakman II that candidate and voter plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that they suffered an injury 

fairly traceable to municipal hiring practices. See 829 F.2d at 

1397. But remember that candidates and voters are not the 

only parties to the 1991 Decree. The Voters Organization 

joined the case as a plaintiff in 1992, and the magistrate judge 

determined that the Organization had associational standing 

to sue on behalf of its members, one of whom is a current employee in the Clerk’s office. We agree. 

An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its 

members when any one of its members would have 
No. 20-1828 13

individual standing to sue, the interests involved are germane 

to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim nor requested relief are of the type that would require individual 

member participation. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. 

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). The Voters Organization 

meets each requirement. 

At least one member of the Voters Organization, George 

Tserotas, presently works in the Clerk’s office. Tserotas is subject to a job rotation because, as Shakman and the other plaintiffs explained in their request for appointment of a special 

master, he refuses to engage in political patronage. An employee who is subject to an adverse employment action because he refuses to endorse particular political views or support certain political candidates has suffered an injury redressable by the Consent Decrees to which the Clerk remains 

subject. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359–60. Put simply, Tserotas has 

an interest in a workplace free of patronage and has sustained 

or faced the threat of injury-in-fact. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. 

The record also confirms that elimination of political 

patronage—which the magistrate judge described as “a core 

principle of the [Voters Organization] since at least 1971”—is 

germane to the Voters Organization’s mission. We see no 

error in this finding. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 

470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). The Voters Organization focuses on 

maintaining election transparency and integrity by opposing 

solicitation of campaign contributions in public employment. 

Finally, Michael Shakman, the Voters Organization, and 

the other plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and the appointment of a special master, neither of which requires proof of 

individual damages or otherwise demands participation of 

the Voters Organization’s members. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. 
14 No. 20-1828 

The Clerk argues to the contrary, pointing out that the 

magistrate judge did not approve the Voters Organization’s 

request to amend the complaint and join as a plaintiff until 

1992, the year after the 1991 Decree went into effect. A plaintiff 

who was not a party at the time the 1991 Decree became effective, the Clerk continues, cannot have standing. Not so. 

The Voters Organization sought to join the litigation before the parties negotiated the 1991 Decree, and the magistrate 

judge held the request in abeyance. As the magistrate recognized, the Clerk was well aware that the Voters Organization 

intended to join the case. Even more, the Clerk never objected 

to the Voters Organization joining as a party. The 1991 Decree, 

by its terms, may be enforced by “any party.” That the Voters 

Organization joined the case in 1992 does not alter our conclusion that it is a party with standing to enforce the 1991 Decree. 

B 

Even if standing presents no hurdle, the Clerk contends 

that the 1972 and 1991 Decrees must be vacated because they 

involve political questions not fit for resolution by a federal 

court. As the Clerk sees it, amorphous and judicially unmanageable concepts of political equality inevitably govern our 

review, and enforcement of the Consent Decrees is no longer 

equitable under Rule 60(b)(5). We see things differently. 

The political question doctrine “identifies a class of questions that either are not amenable to judicial resolution because the relevant considerations are beyond the courts’ capacity to gather and weigh” or are committed by the Constitution to the exclusive discretion of the legislative or executive 

branches of government. Judge v. Quinn, 624 F.3d 352, 358 (7th 
No. 20-1828 15

Cir. 2010); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In a 

recent application of these principles in the context of partisan 

gerrymandering, the Supreme Court explained that “[f]ederal 

judges have no license to reallocate political power between 

the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and 

direct their decisions.” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507. 

The Clerk contends that the issues presented by the 1972 

and 1991 Consent Decrees are analogous to those presented 

in Rucho. That analogy is flawed. In contrast to Rucho, both the 

legal right and applicable standard here are evident and judicially manageable. The Consent Decrees guard the freedom of 

association protected by the First Amendment. See Elrod, 

427 U.S. at 355 (“The cost of the practice of patronage is the 

restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association.”). An 

imposition on that freedom must be “narrowly tailored to further vital government interests.” Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74. The 

magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding 

that ongoing enforcement of the Consent Decrees does not 

present nonjusticiable political questions. 

C 

A significant change in factual conditions may also warrant modification of a consent decree. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384. 

If a party complied in good faith and made a reasonable effort 

to conform its conduct, vacating a consent decree may be appropriate. But the magistrate judge found no such effort or 

record of compliance by the Clerk. To the contrary, the magistrate determined that the Clerk’s ongoing violations reflect 

the precise political patronage the Consent Decrees seek to 

end. Here, too, we see no clear error in the magistrate’s factual 

findings. 
16 No. 20-1828 

Take, for example, the provision in the 1991 Decree that 

lists which designated political positions within the Clerk’s 

office may be filled without judicial oversight. The 1991 

Decree authorizes changes to that list only with court 

approval. But the Clerk—without the magistrate’s 

approval—unilaterally amended the list to include positions 

not otherwise exempt under the 1991 Decree. The magistrate 

reasonably concluded that the Clerk’s doing so undermined 

the purpose of the exempt list: ensuring that political activity 

is considered in hiring only when politics are central to the 

potential employee’s day-to-day work. 

The Clerk’s second violation is as straightforward as the 

first. The magistrate judge found that the Clerk violated the 

1991 Decree by hiring employees for non-exempt positions 

without first providing public notice of open positions. This 

conduct allowed the Clerk to hire employees behind the 

scenes, away from the public accountability and oversight 

contemplated by the 1991 Decree. We see no error in the magistrate’s finding that the Clerk “without question” violated 

this “unequivocal mandate.” 

The magistrate also doubted the Clerk’s proffered 

justifications for its policy of rotating supervisors between 

offices, which seemed “calculated to maximize” the negative 

impact on employees. The magistrate found that the Clerk 

failed to offer evidence supporting its rationale for 

implementing the rotation practice, and underscored that 

employees exempted from the rotational requirement were 

politically well-connected. The magistrate underscored its 

“concern that the ill-fated rotation policy for supervisors” 

likely violated the 1972 Decree. 
No. 20-1828 17

Each of the magistrate’s determinations is rooted in evidence gathered over several days of hearings. The magistrate 

heard testimony from employees and supervisors and accepted over 100 exhibits into evidence. And it explained its 

rationale in a thorough 40-plus page opinion. The violations 

chronicled by the magistrate make clear that the Clerk of 

Cook County failed to demonstrate its compliance with the 

Consent Decrees. The magistrate did not abuse his discretion 

in denying the Clerk’s motion to vacate the 1972 and 1991 Decrees under Rule 60(b)(5). 

V 

Do not let today’s result cloud the grave federalism concerns we have with the fact that the Clerk of Cook County has 

been under the thumb of a federal consent decree for the last 

50 years. Such entrenched federal oversight should have 

raised red flags long ago. 

As best we can tell from the more than 7,000 entries on the 

federal docket, the past 30 to 40 years have been defined by 

little more than the Clerk filing quarterly status reports. Our 

brief sampling of the reports shows that they followed the 

same template and over time seemed to take on a rote character. The docket contains few accompanying and responsive 

filings addressing the Clerk’s compliance with the Consent 

Decrees and even fewer by the court. It is no exaggeration to 

say the Clerk’s case has remained a fixture on the federal 

docket for over half a century. 

Such stagnation is intolerable. Any federal consent decree 

is a very serious matter, and “[w]hatever may be the life expectancy of federal consent decrees, respect for the principle 

of separation of powers suggests that decrees imposing 
18 No. 20-1828 

obligations upon state institutions normally should be enforceable no longer than the need for them.” Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1993). Our federal structure, including the Article III Case or Controversy requirement, does 

not contemplate federal courts putting units of state or local 

government under what amount to static and permanent consent decrees. See Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004) (emphasizing the need to preserve the delicate balance between 

state and federal authority in the administration of consent 

decrees); Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (“[I]nstitutional reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns.”). Federal injunctions interfere with local control over 

local decision making, and, in turn, local democracy does not 

work as our federal constitutional design envisions. 

Federal courts, of course, remain open to adjudicate disputes between adverse parties and to remedy constitutional 

violations, including through the imposition of money damage awards. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983) (explaining that even 

where a federal court does not or cannot award injunctive relief, a plaintiff who “has suffered an injury barred by the Federal Constitution” will have “a remedy for damages under 

§ 1983”). But federal courts are not here to oversee and monitor the hiring practices of municipal government for decades 

on end. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (“If a federal consent decree 

is not limited to reasonable and necessary implementations of 

federal law, it may improperly deprive future officials of their 

designated legislative and executive powers.” (quotation and 

brackets omitted)). 

Over time, the Shakman Decrees have found a home on 

the docket of judge after judge in the Dirksen Courthouse. In 
No. 20-1828 19

April 2020, the then-assigned magistrate judge determined 

that the objects of the Shakman Decrees have not been obtained as to the Clerk of Cook County. Today’s decision does 

not upset that conclusion. But we trust—and expect—that the 

violations identified by the magistrate will be remedied with 

appropriate speed, and that, moving forward, all parties will 

work together to ensure swift compliance. It is time to get 

these cases off the federal docket, and all indications are that 

the newly assigned district judge shares the same objective. 

For these reasons, we DISMISS the appeal of the magistrate judge’s appointment of a special master for lack of jurisdiction, and we otherwise AFFIRM.