alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In connection with the Quarterly Report of 1st Source Corporation (1st Source) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Larry E. Lentych, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:








(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of 1st Source.














By:








/s/LARRY E. LENTYCH


Larry E. Lentych


Chief Financial Officer


October 21, 2010
#### Thomas POPE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-725.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Jan. 19, 1970.

Appeal from Court of Record, Broward County; E. Summers Sheffey, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
## THE STATE OF TEXAS MANDATE

TO THE 188TH DISTRIC T COURT OF GREGG COU NTY, GREETINGS: Before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the 21st day of July, A.D. 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your Judgment was determined;
and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

Roderick King, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee No. 06

- 14

- 00166

- CR

Trial Court No. 43416

- A

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court
below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We note that the appellant, Roderick King, has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal. There fore, we waive payment of costs. WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in this behalf, and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed. WITNESS, the Hon. Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice of our said Court of Appeals, with the seal thereof annexed, at the City of Texarkana, this the 16th day of September , A.D. 2015

.

DEBRA K. AUTREY , Clerk
#### Edward M. ELLISON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 43213.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 22, 1973.

Certiorari denied. 269 So.2d 789.

CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
JUAN JOSE GADIDAS GONZALEZ, AKA M ario R oda s Dia z ,

Pe t i tione r,
v. M ATTHEW

G. W H ITAKER , Ac t ing Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R e sponde nt. No. 16-70240 Age n c y No. A029-249-349
M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for R e vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Argue d and Subm i tte d Nove m

be r 13, 2018 Sa n Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : SC HR OEDER

and WATFORD, C irc uit Judge s, a nd KOR M AN, ** Distric t Judge
. Pe titione r Jua n Ga dida s Gonz a l e z , a

na tive an d c itiz e n of Gua te m a la , pe titions for re vie w of the B IA’ s de nia l, on c re dibility grounds, of a sy lum , 

# FIL ED

N OV 30 2018 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The Honora

ble Edwa rd R . Korm an, Unite d Stat e s Distric t Judge for the E a s te rn Distric t of Ne w York, sitting by de signa tion.withholding of rem o v a l, a nd C onve ntion Aga inst Torture (“ C AT” ) re lie f. The
a dve rse c re dibility

finding wa s ba se d on a

n inc onsiste nc y

in the re c ord ste m

m ing from pe titione r’ s te stim o ny

on c ross-e xam ination. No re c ording wa s m a de of the
c ross-e xam ination. B e c a

use the IJ e x pre ssly

re pre se n te d tha

t c re dibility

would not be an issue — inde e d, she sta

t e d on the re c ord tha

t she “ d idn't find [Pe titione r] to be inc re dible ” —

the pa rtie s c onse nte d to the IJ re a ding he r note s into there c ord in lie u of re doing c ross-e x a m ination. The pe titione r’ s te stim ony on c ross-e xam i na tion turne d out to bea de te rm i na tive issue in the IJ’ s de c i sion, but ne ithe r the IJ nor the B IA gav e the Pe titione r an opportunity

to e xpla in, on the re c ord, the inc onsiste nc y on whic h the
a dve rse c re dibility

de te rm inat ion wa s ba se d. R at he r, Pe titione r wa s m isa dvise d by the IJ tha t the re would be no ne e d for a n e xpla na t ion be c a

use c re dibility

wa s not a proble m . Pe titione r wa s the re fore de nie d the full a nd fa ir he a

ring tha t due proc e ss
re quire s. Se e J

ose ph v . Holde r , 600 F.3d 1235, 1244-1245 (9th C ir. 2010); C ampos-Sanc he

z v . I.N .S. , 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th C ir. 1999). The de fic ie nc ie s in the re c ord we re a de quate ly ra ise d be fore the B IA. It should ha ve re quire d a ne w c ross-e xam ination of the pe titione r. The pe tition is G RANT E D and R E M ANDE D. The B IA’ s de c ision is there fore V ACAT E D. 2
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                               EXHIBIT 11


                                       FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC.
                             STATEMENT RE COMPUTATIONS OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


                                                             QUARTER ENDED                   QUARTER ENDED
AS PRESENTED                                               NOVEMBER 28, 1998               NOVEMBER 30, 1997 * 
                                                         BASIC         DILUTED           BASIC        DILUTED
<S>                                                <C>             <C>               <C>            <C> 

AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING                          172,231,640     172,231,640       171,733,028    171,733,028

NET INCOME                                         $ 29,608,931    $ 29,608,931      $ 24,326,969   $ 24,326,969

EARNINGS PER SHARE
                                                          $ .17           $ .17             $ .14          $ .14
PRO FORMA DILUTION IMPACT OF COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS

ADDITIONAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES FROM
   ASSUMED EXERCISE AT THE BEGINNING
   OF THE YEAR OF DILUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS                              4,206,758                        3,583,356

WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES ASSUMED REPURCHASED FROM
  ASSUMED PROCEEDS OF EXERCISES USING TREASURY STOCK
  METHOD (AVERAGE MARKET PRICE)                                      (2,969,182)                      (2,567,824)
 
NET PRO FORMA COMMON STOCK
  EQUIVALENT INCREMENTAL SHARES                                       1,237,576                        1,015,532

PERCENTAGE DILUTION FROM PRO FORMA COMMON
  STOCK EQUIVALENT INCREMENTAL SHARES                                     0.72%                            0.59%

TOTAL COMMON STOCK AND COMMON
  STOCK EQUIVALENTS                                                 173,469,216                      172,748,560

NET INCOME                                                         $ 29,608,931                     $ 24,326,969

PRO FORMA EARNINGS PER SHARE (INCLUDING DILUTIVE
   COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS)                                              $ .17                            $ .14

     * All figures have been adjusted for the two-for-one stock split distributed April 30, 1998.

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7838 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7838

To provide for certain temporary waivers with respect to the 340B drug 
 discount program due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 29, 2020

Ms. Matsui (for herself and Mr. Stewart) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for certain temporary waivers with respect to the 340B drug 
 discount program due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TEMPORARY WAIVERS WITH RESPECT TO THE 340B DRUG DISCOUNT 
              PROGRAM DUE TO THE COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY.

    (a) Temporary Waiver of Minimum Disproportionate Share Adjustment 
Percentage Requirement for Certain Covered Entities.--In the case of an 
entity that met the requirements of a covered entity described in 
subparagraph (L), (M), or (O) of section 340B(a)(4) of the Public 
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 256b(a)(4)), and that was participating 
or had applied to participate in the drug discount program under such 
section 340B, as of the day before the emergency period went into 
effect, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall, for each 
calendar quarter with respect to which eligibility for such drug 
discount program is based on a cost reporting period during any portion 
of which such emergency period is in effect, deem such entity as 
continuing to meet the minimum disproportionate share adjustment 
percentage requirement applicable to such entity under such 
subparagraph (L), (M), or (O), as the case may be.
    (b) Temporary Waiver of Prohibition on Obtaining Covered Outpatient 
Drugs Through Group Purchasing Organizations for Certain Covered 
Entities.--During the emergency period, a covered entity described in 
subparagraph (L) or (M) of section 340B(a)(4) of the Public Health 
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 256b(a)(4)) may, notwithstanding clause (iii) of 
such subparagraph (L), obtain covered outpatient drugs through a group 
purchasing organization or other group purchasing arrangement.
    (c) Emergency Period Defined.--For purposes of this section, the 
term ``emergency period'' means the period during which there exists 
the public health emergency declared by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services pursuant to section 319 of the Public Health Service Act 
on January 31, 2020, with respect to COVID-19.
                                 <all>
```
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 777 

To reauthorize programs authorized under the Debbie Smith Act of 2004. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 24, 2019 

Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York (for herself, Mrs. WAGNER, and 

Mr. COHEN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To reauthorize programs authorized under the Debbie Smith 

Act of 2004. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Debbie Smith Reau5 thorization Act of 2019’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION. 

7 Section 2 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination 

8 Act of 2000 (34 U.S.C. 40701) is amended— 

9 (1) in subsection (c)(3)— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 777 IH

1 (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking 

2 ‘‘2014 through 2019’’ and inserting ‘‘2019 

3 through 2024’’; and 

4 (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking 

5 ‘‘2014 through 2019’’ and inserting ‘‘2019 

6 through 2024’’; and 

7 (2) in subsection (j), by striking ‘‘2015 through 

8 2019’’ and inserting ‘‘2019 through 2024’’. 

9 SEC. 3. TRAINING AND EDUCATION. 

10 Section 303(b) of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice 

11 Act of 2004 (34 U.S.C. 40722(b)) is amended by striking 

12 ‘‘2015 through 2019’’ and inserting ‘‘2019 through 

13 2024’’. 

14 SEC. 4. SEXUAL ASSAULT FORENSIC EXAM GRANTS. 

15 Section 304(d) of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice 

16 Act of 2004 (34 U.S.C. 40723(d)) is amended by striking 

17 ‘‘2015 through 2019’’ and inserting ‘‘2019 through 

18 2024’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A2199. MICHAEL BERNARD BROADNAX v. THE STATE

On June 14, 2016, this Court granted Michael Bernard Broadnax’s application

for discretionary appeal from a trial court’s order denying his motion for an out-oftime appeal. The order directed that the appellant file a notice of appeal within 10

days of the date of the order. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Twenty-four days later, on July

8, 2016, Broadnax filed his notice of appeal. After the case was docketed, The State,

filed a motion to dismiss. 

The timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer

jurisdiction on this Court. White v. White, 188 Ga. App. 556 (373 SE2d 824) (1988).

Because Broadnax failed to file a notice of appeal within 10 days of our order

granting the discretionary application, the notice of appeal is untimely. Accordingly,

the motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED for lack

of jurisdiction. See OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (1); Barnes v. Justis, 223 Ga. App. 671, 671-

672 (478 SE2d 402) (1996).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

10/05/2016

October 05, 2016
#### Doc COLE, a/k/a Dock Cole, a/k/a Mississippi, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-241.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Oct. 19, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-3173

___________ Martin Lindstedt, Republican * Candidate for Governor of Missouri, * also known as Mad Dog, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Matt Blunt, Secretary of State and * Chief Election Official of Missouri, * [UNPUBLISHED] also known as Runt, and Rival * Republican Candidate for Governor * of Missouri; Robin Carnahan, * Secretary of State, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: June 13, 2006 Filed: June 16, 2006

___________ Before ARNOLD, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________1 The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. -2- PER CURIAM. The district court 1 dismissed Martin Lindstedt’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after concluding that Mr. Lindstedt had filed it for the improper purpose of harassment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The court then denied Mr. Lindstedt’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration. Mr. Lindstedt appeals. We find no abuse of discretion in either the dismi ssal of Mr. Lindstedt’s complaint, or the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (review ing Rule 11 determinations for abuse of discretion); Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. , 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998) (reviewing denial of Rule 59(e) motions fo r abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47A(a).

______________________________
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERWIN STUARDO VIVAR-FLORES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-72526

Agency No. A029-249-620

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted November 5, 2012

San Francisco, California

Before: FARRIS, NOONAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Although the law prescribed a sentence of two, three or five years

imprisonment for second-degree robbery, the crime of which Vivar-Flores was

convicted, the court on appeal must look to the actual sentence entered when

removal proceedings are initiated under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA. 8

FILED

NOV 20 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Here no actual sentence was imposed because the trial

court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Flores directly on probation.

We must again remand. Although Flores was found guilty of second-degree

robbery, more was required. The question under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) is a

combination of the conduct and the sentence actually imposed. 8 U.S.C. §§

1101(a)(43)(G), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 

The BIA merely looked at the offence and the sentence authorized. It was

required to consider what term of imprisonment was imposed. It need not

reconsider whether a conviction under state law is a removable offense. In light of

existing precedents, the BIA’s decision on that question was erroneous. We do not

ignore the definition of second-degree robbery. We merely hold that the conduct

and the sentence imposed are the combined controlling factors. The inquiry is to

the term of prison actually imposed rather than what is authorized by statute. 

Under California law, a court ordering probation has the option of “leaving a

defendant unsentenced and placing him on probation, or . . . sentencing him and

thereafter placing him on probation.” Patel v. INS, 542 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir.

1976). It is, therefore, imperative to an analysis of punishments under California

law “to focus closely on the precise nature of the sentence, i.e., whether prior to

granting probation imposition of sentence was suspended, as in the first alternative,
3

or execution of the sentence was suspended, as in the second alternative.” Id. at

798-99. If a trial court chooses to suspend the imposition of a sentence, it is

prohibited from specifying and pronouncing a term of imprisonment from the

statutory range. Cal. Penal Code § 1170(b). Here, no term of imprisonment was

actually imposed on Flores because the trial court suspended the imposition of his

sentence. 

We could merely grant the petition for review and reverse the BIA decision

with instructions to vacate the order of removal and terminate removal

proceedings. We remand instead to permit the BIA to consider the matter in its

proper posture in the first instance.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

EDWARD STODDARD,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D23-1532

September 27, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for

Pasco County; Gregory G. Groger, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 2068** 

L. RUTHER , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

BARRY GASH , Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Leonie M. Brinkema , District Judge. ( 1:16

- cv
- 01044

- LO

- MSN )

Submitted : January 31, 2017 Decided: February 2, 2017

Before WILKINSON , KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

L. Ruther, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
L. Ruther appeals the district court ’ s order summarily dismissing his civil action. We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error. A ccordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated by the district court. Ruther v. Gash , No. 1:16

- cv
- 01044

- LO

- MSN
(E.D. Va. filed Aug. 19, 2016; entered Aug. 22, 2016) . We dispense with oral argument bec ause the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 38 (Wednesday, February 26, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 8777]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4727]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

TA-W-33,164, Frigidaire Home Products Greenville, Michigan; 
Notice of Termination of Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, an investigation 
was initiated on February 10, 1997, in response to a worker petition 
which was filed on February 10, 1997 on behalf of workers at Frigidaire 
Home Products, Greenville, Michigan.
    The petitioning group of workers is subject to an ongoing 
investigation for which a determination has not yet been issued (TA-W-
33113). Consequently, further investigation in this case would serve no 
purpose, and the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed in Washington, D.C. this 11th day of February, 1997.
Russell T. Kile,
Program Manager, Policy and Reemployment Services Office of Trade 
Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 97-4727 Filed 2-25-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

IN RE: ESTATE OF FRED H. NAVARRA

SANDRA ROBERTS NAVARRA, BY HER

AGENT, CHRYSTIE CLARKE

v.

RICHARD E. NAVARRA, EXECUTOR OF

THE ESTATE OF FRED H. NAVARRA

AND THE ALLEGHENY GROUP, INC.

PETITION OF: RICHARD E. NAVARRA

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 167 WAL 2015

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
#### James Lester BIGGS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-294.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 24, 1970.

Appeal dismissed.