alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>      5

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                           3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                 DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                    APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                      JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                                108,068
<SECURITIES>                                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         714,661
<ALLOWANCES>                                           15,000
<INVENTORY>                                           472,645
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    1,744,240
<PP&E>                                              9,177,073
<DEPRECIATION>                                      3,105,395
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      8,419,765
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               4,959,181
<BONDS>                                                     0
<COMMON>                                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                      14
<PREFERRED>                                               350
<OTHER-SE>                                          2,279,574
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        8,419,765
<SALES>                                            12,787,211
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   12,787,211
<CGS>                                               7,666,154
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       7,666,154
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      315,320
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                    501,726
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (617,069)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (617,069)
<DISCONTINUED>                                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                             0
<CHANGES>                                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (617,069)
<EPS-BASIC>                                            (.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            (.18)



</TABLE>
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7670 

To prevent the establishment of a denaturalization section in the Department 

of Justice, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 20, 2020 

Mr. CARBAJAL (for himself, Mr. ESPAILLAT, and Mrs. TORRES of California) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the 

Judiciary 

A BILL 

To prevent the establishment of a denaturalization section 

in the Department of Justice, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defend New Ameri5 cans Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION. 

7 No Federal funds may be used to implement, admin8 ister, or enforce the policy of the Department of Justice, 

9 issued February 26, 2020, to establish a denaturalization 

10 section in the Office of Immigration Litigation of the Civil 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7670 IH

1 Division of the Department of Justice or any successor 

2 policy. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### Allan H. APPLESTEIN, Appellant, v. Albert H. ALBERRING, Appellee.

No. 73-932.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 12, 1974.

Diaz-Asper, Katzen, Chulock & Thompson, South Miami, for appellant.

Fowler, White, Humkey, Burnett, Hurley & Banick; Bernard S. Yedlin, Miami, for appellee.

Before CARROLL, HENDRY AND HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant seeks review of a nunc pro tunc order dismissing his counterclaim with prejudice.

Plaintiff, employed as a process server by Dade County, Florida, alleged that while attempting service of process upon the defendant-appellant, the defendant threatened and accosted him with a deadly weapon. He filed a complaint seeking compensatory and punitive damages for (1) assault and (2) false imprisonment. In response thereto, defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim against the plaintiff and Dade County. Thereafter, plaintiff-appellee moved to dismiss the counterclaim and his motion was granted by the trial court which in its order of dismissal stated that defendant had no argument in opposition thereto.

Trial on plaintiff’s cause of action commenced on June 4, 1973 and upon recess for luncheon, the parties entered into a discussion of possible settlement. Plaintiff discussed the proposed settlement with the trial judge who explained to him that the counterclaim had been dismissed. In addition, appellant’s counsel allegedly stated that plaintiff’s acceptance of the settlement would end all litigation against the plaintiff. Thereupon, plaintiff accepted the settlement. Several days later, defendant-appellant filed a complaint setting forth the same issues which were pled in the dismissed counterclaim. In addition, defendant filed a motion to compel settlement. Thereafter, the trial judge in the original case had counsel for appellee draw up a nunc pro tunc order which reflected that appellant’s counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. Based upon the entry thereof, the trial judge in the pending action dismissed appellant’s complaint as res judicata. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant-appellant contends it was error to have entered the nunc pro *207tunc order dismissing his counterclaim with prejudice. We cannot agree.

The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to supply an omission in the record of action previously done which omission was made through inadvertence or mistake. Freeman v. Blackburn, Fla.1957, 92 So.2d 262. The nunc pro tunc order in the case sub judice clearly expresses the fact that through inadvertence the counterclaim was not dismissed with prejudice although such was the court’s intention. Thus, we find the trial judge was correct in entering the nunc pro tunc order herein appealed to supply this omission in the record.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### Buford POGUE and Allie Mae Thompson, Petitioners, v. NEWPORT DIVISION, TENNECO CHEMICALS, INC., a corporation, Respondent.

No. S-200.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 20, 1973.

Lefferts L. Mabie, Jr., of Levin, War-field, Graff, Mabie & Rosenbloum, Pensacola, for petitioners.

Robert P. Gaines, of Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, Pensacola, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petition for common law writ of certi-orari denied.

Hazouri v. Maillet and Peninsular Fire Insurance Co., 276 So.2d 70 (Fla.App., filed February 8, 1973).

SPECTOR, C. J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
Complaint Exhibit E-1

Case 4:18-cv-00806 Document 1-5 Filed 02/07/18 Page 1 of 2

Student -Loan Department -866-238-97 43 Account"#: 

RE: Student Loan Paymen_t Reduc~on & F<?rgi ''enas.s . 

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Complaint Exhibit E-2

Case 4:18-cv-00806 Document 1-5 Filed 02/07/18 Page 2 of 2

I __ _ 

ATTENTION: 

t,;e are ~ased .!o .inform yo-J ti1at 'PJ. may nCJu parocipate ID the. Student Lean Docurre:: ?t=::aratb:'t -1 F'~sr,g 

Ser\lices Progrcft Thts program can immeorately .assist.you in.potentiaUy Sa"'Ving 1:hoLscr.ds ~n yi::ur . 

. . . ·- . . . .student loarsSc 

$0/ month·Monthty Student loan Payment 

No Minimum income ·Requirement or Cred~t Ch~cfiloan Forgiveness Programs 

No Impact on your Credit Rating or Sccre 

No Program Payment for up to·SO days 

I 

i 

. 

- . : 

Toll Free: 866-238~9743 .. 

· · · : ~to~d~y .. Friday toa~-~ ~P~ ~s: .. 

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**EXHIBIT 32.1**

FIRST HARTFORD CORPORATION

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of First Hartford Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending October 31, 2005 as filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),

INeil H. Ellis, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.         The Report fully complieswith the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934; and

2.         Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                           /s/ Neil H. Ellis                                     Neil H. EllisPresident and ChiefExecutive Officer

Date:   December 15, 2005
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period
ending January 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by
TriMedia Entertainment Group, Inc. (the "Company") on the date hereof (the
"Report"), Jason Meyers, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.
         This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.

June  16, 2008

                                              By:  /s/ Jason Meyers
                                                   -------------------
                                                   Jason Meyers
                                                   Chief Executive Officer and
                                                   Chief Financial Officer
#### In re ESTATE of James MORTON, Deceased. Richard MORTON and Alan Morton, as Co-Executors of the Estate of James Morton, Appellants, v. NEW ORLEANS JEWISH WELFARE FEDERATION, Appellee.

No. 72-1513.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 22, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
United States


Securities and Exchange Commission


Washington, D.C. 20549





FORM 8-K








CURRENT REPORT


Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the


Securities Exchange Act of 1934





Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): February 4, 2019














DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.


(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)





Ohio000-2449865-0190407(State or other jurisdiction ofincorporation)(Commission File Number)(I.R.S. EmployerIdentification No.)


325 John H. McConnell Blvd., Suite 200, Columbus, Ohio43215(Address of Principal Executive Offices)(Zip Code)





Registrant's Telephone Number, Including Area Code:   (614) 255-3333








Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions:





 ̈ Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)





 ̈ Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)





 ̈ Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))





 ̈ Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))


Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is an emerging growth company as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933 (§230.405 of this chapter) or Rule 12b-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§240.12b-2 of this chapter).


Emerging growth company ☐





If an emerging growth company, indicate by check mark if the registrant has elected not to use the extended transition period for complying with any new or revised financial accounting standards provided pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. ☐








---







Item 8.01   Other Events





The following is a summary of assets under management as of January 31, 2019 of Diamond Hill Capital Management, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Diamond Hill Investment Group, Inc. (in millions):





By Investment VehicleProprietary funds$14,614Sub-advised funds1,522Institutional accounts4,695Total$20,831





By Investment StrategySmall Cap$1,116Small-Mid Cap3,075Mid Cap209Large Cap10,521All Cap Select486Long-Short4,041Global/International20Short Duration Fixed Income597Core Fixed Income56Long Duration Fixed Income52Corporate Credit800High Yield60(Less: Investments in affiliated funds)(202)Total$20,831








SIGNATURES





Pursuant to the  requirements  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.





DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.Date:February 4, 2019By:/s/ Thomas E. LineThomas E. Line, Chief Financial Officer
#### Willie James WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-1230.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 2, 1971.

Willie James Williams, in pro per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This court, proceeding in the manner outlined and recommended by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, having deferred ruling on a motion of the public defender to withdraw as counsel for the indigent-defendant and having furnished appellant with a copy of the public defender’s memorandum brief, and having allowed the appellant a reasonable specified time within which to raise any points that he chose in support of his appeal, and the appellant having failed to respond thereto, on consideration thereof upon full examination of the proceedings we conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Crum v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 24; Stewart v. State, Fla.App.1969, 221 So.2d 155; Thomas v. State, Fla.App.1969, 223 So.2d 118; Tafero v. State, Fla.App.1969, 223 So.2d 564. Whereupon, the public defender’s said motion to withdraw is granted and the order or judgment is hereby affirmed.
#### James GILLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-177.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 17, 1970.

Appeal dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7759 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7759

   To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to authorize the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to forgive the repayment, extend 
  the timeline of repayment, and lower the interest rate of Medicare 
 hospital accelerated payments made during the COVID-19 public health 
                   emergency, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 23, 2020

  Mr. Smith of Missouri (for himself, Mr. McKinley, Mrs. Miller, Mr. 
Long, Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Westerman, Mr. David P. Roe of Tennessee, and 
 Mr. Fortenberry) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to authorize the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to forgive the repayment, extend 
  the timeline of repayment, and lower the interest rate of Medicare 
 hospital accelerated payments made during the COVID-19 public health 
                   emergency, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Saving Rural Hospitals from Closure 
Act''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZING THE FORGIVENESS OF REPAYMENT, EXTENSION OF 
              REPAYMENT, AND LOWERING OF INTEREST RATE OF MEDICARE 
              HOSPITAL ACCELERATED PAYMENTS MADE DURING THE COVID-19 
              PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY.

    Section 1815 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395g) is 
amended--
            (1) in subsection (d), by inserting ``subject to subsection 
        (f)(5),'' after ``determination,''; and
            (2) in subsection (f)(2)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``subject to 
                paragraph (5),'' before ``the Secretary''; and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following new 
                paragraph:
            ``(5)(A) Upon the request of a hospital, the Secretary may 
        forgive the repayment, extend the timeline of repayment 
        described in subparagraph (C)(i), and lower the interest rate 
        of any accelerated payment within 30 days of receiving such 
        request if such a hospital experiences significant financial 
        hardship.
            ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), `significant 
        financial hardship' means, with respect to a hospital, the 
        existence of a serious chance of closure, impending bankruptcy, 
        large-scale layoffs, or any other situation the Secretary 
        determines appropriate.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Lawrence Leibowitz, Appellant, v St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center et al., Respondents.

[722 NYS2d 164]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered January 14, 2000, which, *inter alia,*granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs causes of actions sounding in libel per se and slander per se were properly dismissed by the motion court since the statements made by defendants Benn and Eden were, by plaintiffs own admission, substantially true and therefore not actionable *(see, Guccione v Hustler Mag.,*800 F2d 298, 301; *Fairley v Peekskill Star Corp.,*83 AD2d 294). Also properly dismissed was plaintiffs cause for intentional infliction of emotional distress since it is plain that the complained of statements were neither outrageous nor made with the requisite intent to cause plaintiff emotional injury *(see, Howell v New York Post Co.,*81 NY2d 115). Nor is there any triable issue with respect to plaintiffs claims alleging that defendant hospital was negligent in investigating the alleged libelous and slanderous statements. Contrary to plaintiffs arguments, the hospital was under no duty to investigate the truth of the complained statements, entries by a nurse in a patient’s hospital chart, prior to releasing the chart pursuant to plaintiffs request for use in a Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding commenced by plaintiff. Moreover, since the subject statements were substantially true, their nonverification cannot have been damaging to plaintiff.

We have reviewed plaintiffs remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Tom, Mazzarelli, Ellerin and Friedman, JJ.
Office of the Secretary

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

July 12, 2017 

Andrew M. Lacy, Esquire 

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1155 F. Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20004 

Re: Holcim Ltd. and Lafarge S.A., Docket No. C-4519

Dear Mr. Lacy: 

 This letter is in reference to the Petition of LafargeHolcim For Approval of Amendments 

Related to the Essroc Divestiture Agreement (“Petition”) that you filed with the Commission on 

behalf of LafargeHolcim Ltd. on May 19, 2017. 

 Pursuant to Rule 2.41(f) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, the Commission has 

determined to approve the Petition of LafargeHolcim to amend the Essroc Divestiture 

Agreement, as proposed in the Petition. In according its approval, the Commission has relied 

upon the information submitted and the representations made in connection with the Petition, and 

has assumed them to be accurate and complete.

By direction of the Commission. 

 

April J. Tabor 

Acting Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS: Joseph J. Simons, Chairman

Noah Joshua Phillips

Rohit Chopra

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter

Christine S. Wilson

In the Matter of

Docket No. 9391 Peabody Energy Corporation,

a public company;

and

Arch Coal, Inc., 

a public company.

ORDER REGARDING SCHEDULING 

IN LIGHT OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

Because of the declared public health emergency1 associated with the outbreak of the 

coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”), also known as SARS-CoV-2; and because it has been 

advised that gatherings of ten or more persons may facilitate the spread of the disease, the 

Commission has determined that it is in the public interest to mitigate the transmission and 

impact of COVID-19, and that good cause exists to stay this proceeding and reschedule the 

evidentiary hearing date. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this proceeding be fully stayed for 30 calendar days; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the evidentiary hearing date and all pre-hearing 

deadlines in this proceeding be extended by the number of calendar days of this stay. The 

Administrative Law Judge retains discretion to adjust any such pre-hearing deadlines to the 

extent compatible with the hearing date as extended by this Order or to make a recommendation 

to the Commission regarding an alternative hearing date.

 1 Pursuant to the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. 247d, on January 31, 2020, the Secretary of the Department 

of Health and Human Services issued a declaration that a health emergency exists because of COVID-19; and on 

March 13, 2020, the President of the United States issued a proclamation that a national emergency exists concerning 

COVID-19. Remarks by President Trump, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-conference-3/ (Mar. 13, 2020).
2

By the Commission.

April J. Tabor

Acting Secretary

SEAL:

ISSUED: March 19, 2020