No. 20-55397

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JASON CARDIFF and EUNJUNG CARDIFF, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants, 

and

DANIELLE CADIZ, AKA Danielle Walker, et al., 

Defendants,

JACQUES POUJADE,

Objector.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

No. 5:18-cv-02104-DMG-PLA

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

REPLY OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TO

RESPONSE OF JASON AND EUNJUNG CARDIFF TO

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel

MARK S. HEGEDUS

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 326-2115

mhegedus@ftc.gov

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 1 of 18
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ................................................................................................................1

1. The FTC’s Complaint, the District Court’s TRO and PI, and 

its First Contempt Order.............................................................................1

2. Second Contempt Order.............................................................................4

3. The Cardiffs’ Motion to Dissolve the PI....................................................6

Argument....................................................................................................................8

I. The District Court’s Order Declining To Dissolve the 

Preliminary Injunction Is Not Appealable..................................................8

II. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear a Party’s Appeal from 

a Civil Contempt Order in an Ongoing Proceeding .................................11

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................13

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 2 of 18
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2013).............................................................8

Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989) ........................................................9

Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1996).....................................................11

Credit Suisse First Boston v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 

(9th Cir. 2005)........................................................................................................9

Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105 (1936).................................................................13

FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., 910 F.3d 417, 426 (9th Cir. 

2018), reh’g en banc denied, No. 16-17197, 2019 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 18551 (9th Cir. Jun. 20, 2019), petition 

for certiorari filed Oct. 18, 2019, No. 19-508 .................................................7, 10

FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 

2016).....................................................................................................................10

FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 

2019), petition for certiorari filed Dec. 19, 2019,

No. 19-825............................................................................................................10

FTC v. Evans Products, 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985)......................................7, 11

FTC v. H.N. Singer, 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982)..................................................9

Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989).........................................1

Hicks v. Freick, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) ......................................................................11

Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).................................................................7, 9

Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KSD Tech., Inc., 539 

F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).................................................................... 1, 11, 12, 13

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)................................................9

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 3 of 18
iii

Owner Operator v. Independent Drivers Association, Inc. 

v. Swift Transportation Co., 632 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 

2011).......................................................................................................................9

Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) .....................................................................6

Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).......................................................8

Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 

1415 (9th Cir. 1984)...............................................................................................8

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) ............................................................ 11, 12

STATUTES

15 U.S.C. § 1693o(c) .................................................................................................2

15 U.S.C. § 45(a) .......................................................................................................1

15 U.S.C. § 52............................................................................................................1

15 U.S.C. § 53(b)...................................................................................................7, 9

15 U.S.C. § 6105........................................................................................................2

15 U.S.C. § 8404........................................................................................................2

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C) ........................................................................................3

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 4 of 18
Jason and Eunjung Cardiff appeal three interlocutory district court orders. 

The Court directed them to show why the appeals should not be dismissed for lack 

of appellate jurisdiction. Dkt. 3. In response to that order, the Cardiffs voluntarily 

dismissed with respect to one of the challenged orders, but assert appellate 

jurisdiction as to the remaining two: an order denying a motion to dissolve a 

preliminary injunction, and an order holding the Cardiffs in contempt for violating 

that injunction. 

The Court does not have jurisdiction over either order. Orders denying a 

motion to dissolve an injunction are appealable only if the motion raised a “new 

matter,” Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1989), but the

Cardiffs identify no such matter. Judicial decisions issued long before the 

injunction are not “new,” and the concurring opinion of a recent panel member is 

not a change in the law. The Court lacks jurisdiction over the contempt order 

because it is a civil order subject to appeal only upon entry of a final judgment. See 

Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KSD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 

2008). The Court should dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

1. The FTC’s Complaint, the District Court’s TRO and PI,

and its First Contempt Order

In October 2018, the FTC sued the Cardiffs and others for violating the FTC 

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52, the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act, 15 

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 5 of 18
2

U.S.C. § 8404, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o(c), and the 

Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6105, 

through a wide-ranging scheme of fraud and deception.1 ECF 1. The complaint 

alleges that the Cardiffs and their co-defendants made false and unsubstantiated 

claims that their products would help people quit smoking, lose weight, and 

improve their sexual performance. It also charged a related unlawful auto-ship 

continuity program that resulted in unauthorized shipments and charges, abusive 

telemarketing through robocalls, and unsubstantiated claims regarding a multilevel marketing scheme.

On October 10, 2018, the district court entered a temporary restraining order

against Defendants, ECF 29, which it extended two weeks later, ECF 48. On 

November 7, 2018, the court entered a preliminary injunction (PI) against them. 

ECF 59. The TRO and PI froze the Cardiffs’ assets; established a Receivership 

over their assets and businesses; required financial disclosures and accounting of 

all assets; required repatriation to the United States of foreign assets, documents, 

and records, including those in possession of third parties; prohibited the 

 1 The other defendants are Danielle Cadiz, a/k/a Danielle Walker; Redwood 

Scientific Technologies, Inc. (California); Redwood Scientific Technologies, Inc. 

(Nevada); Redwood Scientific Technologies, Inc. (Delaware); Identify, LLC; 

Advanced Men’s Institute Prolongz LLC; Run Away Products, LLC; and Carols 

Place Limited Partnership. ECF 1.

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 6 of 18
3

dissipation of domestic and foreign assets; required delivery of assets and 

information to the Receiver; and ordered expedited discovery. ECF 59 at 14-22, 

30-31. The TRO/PI authorized the FTC and Receiver to conduct expedited 

discovery “for the purposes of discovering: (1) the nature, location, status, and 

extent of Defendants’ Assets; or (2) compliance with this Order.” ECF 59 at 35, 

§ XXVI Expedited Discovery. The provisions of the TRO/PI apply not only to 

Defendants, but also to “their officers, agents, employees, and attorneys, and all 

other persons in active concert or participation with any of them, who receive 

actual notice of this Order, whether acting directly or indirectly.” See, e.g., ECF 59 

at 14, § VII Asset Freeze; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C).

Despite the restrictions imposed by the district court, the Cardiffs worked in 

concert with their friend and business partner, Jacques Poujade, to transfer frozen 

assets from an account for which the Cardiffs were the sole signatories, without 

informing the Receiver. Upon learning of the transfer, the FTC filed a motion to 

show cause why the Cardiffs and Poujade should not be held in contempt. ECF 

134. The district court issued an Order to Show Cause on June 24, 2019, ECF 140,

to which the Cardiffs responded. ECF 147, 166. The court then held a four-day 

hearing at which the Cardiffs testified. ECF 181, 182, 183, 249. At the conclusion 

of the testimony on July 31, the court found them in contempt, see ECF 238 at 2, 

and stated:

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 7 of 18
4

I would say of the 16 years I’ve been on the federal court, I’ve never 

presided over a matter where the fraud committed by the defendants 

was so clear, the deception so extreme. I’m astounded.

ECF 188-1, Tr. 389:3-6. The court continued:

I’ve heard carefully from the Cardiffs. Their stories are totally 

unbelievable. It’s pretty clear to the Court that they’ve lied, that they 

worked in concert with each other and with others to avoid, violate the 

conditions of the orders of the Court.

ECF 188-1, Tr. 390:3-7. 

On October 29, 2019, the district court issued its order holding the Cardiffs 

and Poujade in contempt and established conditions for purging the contempt. 

ECF 237, 238 (hereafter “First Contempt Order”). Among other requirements, the 

Cardiffs were ordered to produce a “full and detailed accounting, under oath, of all 

assets held by, for the benefit of, or otherwise controlled, directly or indirectly, by 

Eunjung Cardiff or Jason Cardiff (or both) for the period from July 31, 2018 to the 

date of [the Contempt] Order [October 29, 2019].” ECF 238 at 4-5. As part of the 

accounting, the Cardiffs were required to identify “the source of each 

deposit/credit” to all relevant accounts. The Court warned the Cardiffs that for each 

day they did not comply with the terms of the First Contempt Order, they would be 

incarcerated. ECF 238 at 7.

2. Second Contempt Order

The Cardiffs did not comply with the First Contempt Order. They: (1) failed

to identify the source of the money that funded their luxurious lifestyle; (2) 

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 8 of 18
5

dissipated assets subject to the asset freeze by spending freely on extravagant 

personal and unapproved living expenses, as well as attorneys’ fees; and (3) 

allowed their residence (one of the Receivership Assets) to waste by refusing to 

pay the mortgage. Accordingly, on March 2, 2020, the FTC filed another motion to 

show cause why the Cardiffs should not be held in contempt of court and 

coercively incarcerated until they complied. ECF 300. The Cardiffs filed their 

opposition the next day. ECF 301.

On March 31, 2020, the district court again found the Cardiffs in contempt 

of the TRO and PI’s provisions requiring that they disclose and account for their 

assets, turn all assets over to the Receiver, and prevent the dissipation of those 

assets. ECF 315 at 5. Rather than order coercive incarceration at that time, the 

district court ruled that the Cardiffs could purge their contempt if by April 30, 

2020, they:

• Identify the source of each and every cash deposit into a cashfunded credit union (FCCU) account;

• To the extent Gerald Cardiff [Jason Cardiff’s father] is the 

source of any cash deposit into the FCCU account, identify 

each and every source from which he deposited funds into that

account;

• Turn over all Cardiff assets to the Receiver, including assets 

held abroad; and

• Replenish the Receivership Estate for any and all unpaid 

mortgage payments on the Cardiffs’ residence, until the date of 

sale of that residence.

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 9 of 18
6

ECF 315 at 5.

The Cardiffs have not purged themselves of the Second Contempt Order. 

Instead, they filed a notice of appeal on April 7, 2020, ECF 317,2 and filed a 

motion in the district court for a stay pending appeal on April 23, 2020, ECF 324.

That motion remains pending.

3. The Cardiffs’ Motion to Dissolve the PI

Meanwhile, on January 20, 2020, the Cardiffs moved to dissolve the PI, ECF 

265, which the FTC opposed, ECF 277. On March 10, 2020, the district court 

denied the motion. ECF 305. Noting that “a court must never ignore significant 

changes in the law or circumstances underlying an injunction lest the decree be 

turned into instrument of wrong,” ECF 305 at 3 (quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 

U.S. 700, 714-15 (2010) (cleaned up)), the court concluded that the Cardiffs had 

failed to show any changes in facts or law to justify dissolution of the PI.

First, the district court determined that the Cardiffs had not shown any 

changed factual circumstances that would justify dissolving the PI. Their claimed 

cessation of deceptive sales prior to the filing of the FTC’s complaint did not 

warrant dissolution. ECF 305 at 4. The court concluded that the Cardiffs’ claim 

 2 The Cardiffs appealed three orders: ECF 305 (denying motion to dissolve PI), 

ECF 309 (approving marketing of house for sale), and ECF 315 (Second Contempt 

Order). They have voluntarily dismissed the appeal of ECF 309 (house sale). Dkt. 

6.

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 10 of 18
7

was not credible or supported by the evidence, but that even if it were true, 

stopping sales would be relevant only to whether the PI should have issued in the 

first place, not whether it should be dissolved based on changed circumstances. Id. 

Further, the FTC had shown that the Cardiffs were likely to resume sales in the 

future. Id. at 5.

Second, the district court disagreed that the Cardiffs had proven a 

“significant change in the law” since the issuance of the PI to justify dissolution. 

ECF at 6. The court explained that both before and after issuance of the PI, the law 

in this Circuit is that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), permits the 

award of equitable monetary relief. The Supreme Court has not abrogated that law, 

and subsequent to issuance of the PI the Circuit confirmed its existing law. Id. at 

6-7 (citing FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018)). The court 

also rejected the Cardiffs’ position that non-binding, out-of-circuit precedent could 

constitute a change of law sufficient to dissolve the PI. Id. at 7.

For similar reasons, the district court rejected the Cardiffs’ argument that the 

FTC Act required the FTC to initiate an administrative proceeding 20 days after 

filing its complaint under Section 13(b) in federal court. Circuit precedent 

predating the PI had rejected that very position. Id. at 7 (citing FTC v. Evans

Products, 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985)). Likewise, the district court rejected the 

Cardiffs’ view that the decision in Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), had cast 

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 11 of 18
8

doubt on the FTC’s authority to seek monetary remedies such as asset freezes and 

restitution. Id. at 7-8. Not only did the Kokesh decision not pertain to the FTC Act, 

the Ninth Circuit had previously confirmed that the FTC Act provides for equitable 

relief. Id. at 8. 

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER DECLINING TO DISSOLVE THE 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS NOT APPEALABLE

A district court’s “denial of a motion to modify or dissolve an injunction” is 

appealable “only if the motion raises new matter not considered when the 

injunction first issued.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 

1415, 1418 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984). This jurisdictional limitation rests on the idea “that 

the moving party could have appealed the grant of injunction but chose not to do 

so, and thus that a subsequent challenge to the injunctive relief must rest on 

grounds that could not have been raised before.” Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 

1120 (9th Cir. 2013). The Cardiffs bear the “burden of establishing that a 

significant change in facts or law warrants revision or dissolution of the 

injunction.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2000). The Cardiffs 

have failed to show that their motion to dissolve the PI raised new matter that they 

could not have raised at the time the PI was entered.

The Cardiffs fail to identify any specific “new matter” they raised in seeking 

to dissolve the PI. They claim only that “there were significant changes in the law 

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 12 of 18
9

both before and after the Preliminary Injunction” that undermine the legal basis for 

the injunction. The argument is that the court relied on FTC v. H.N. Singer, 668 

F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982), as support for its authority to order equitable monetary 

relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), but subsequent 

decisions have overruled Singer. Cardiffs at 5 (Dkt. 8). They point to Owner 

Operator v. Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. Swift Transportation Co., 632 

F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011), and Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 

(1996). Cardiffs at 6. The decisions, however, predate the PI and therefore cannot 

be “new matter.” This Court has recognized that “new matter” means “intervening 

decisions” issued after the district court’s original decision. See Babcock v. Tyler, 

884 F.2d 497, 501 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Credit Suisse First Boston v. 

Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2005) (California Ethics Standard 

issued after entry of PI was “new matter”). As the district court correctly 

recognized, those decisions do not represent a “significant change[] in the law.”

ECF 305 at 5.3

 3 The Cardiffs have abandoned their argument that the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), supported dissolution of the PI. The 

district court correctly rejected the claim (ECF 305 at 8) since Kokesh pre-dated 

the PI. The Cardiffs have also abandoned their claim that changed factual 

circumstances, namely, their alleged cessation of deceptive sales, supported 

dissolution of the PI. The district court correctly observed that the Cardiffs claimed 

the alleged cessation occurred before entry of the PI and concluded that the claim 

was not credible in any event. ECF 305 at 4.

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 13 of 18
10

The Cardiffs are even further afield with their contention that this Court’s 

decision in FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018), 

represents “new matter.” Cardiffs at 7. In fact, AMG did not change the law in any 

way. The panel expressly adhered to controlling precedent holding that Section 

13(b) allows monetary remedies. Id. at 427 (citing FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 

815 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2016)). Commerce Planet in turn relied on H.N. 

Singer, the case cited by the district court. See 815 F.3d at 598-99. That two judges 

called for the full Court to reverse its binding precedent is of no moment. See 910

F.3d at 429 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring). The Court denied rehearing en 

banc, without a single judge calling for a vote. See id., reh’g en banc denied, No. 

16-17197, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 18551 (9th Cir. Jun. 20, 2019), petition for 

certiorari filed Oct. 18, 2019, No. 19-508.4

Finally, the Cardiffs assert that the FTC can secure equitable remedies under 

Section 13(b) only if it also issues an administrative complaint. Cardiffs at 8. They 

identify no decision from any court that amounts to a “new matter” that could 

support this Court’s jurisdiction. As the district court correctly determined, the 

 4 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d 764 

(7th Cir. 2019), petition for certiorari filed Dec. 19, 2019, No. 19-825, is not a

“new matter” because it is a non-binding, out-of-circuit decision. See Babcock, 884 

F.2d at 501 n.4.

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 14 of 18
11

Cardiffs’ position is contrary to this Court’s decision in Evans Products, 775 F.2d 

1084, which remains good law. ECF 305 at 7.

II. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR A PARTY’S APPEAL 

FROM A CIVIL CONTEMPT ORDER IN AN ONGOING PROCEEDING

The Cardiffs expressly concede that “an order of civil contempt entered 

against a party to ongoing litigation is generally not immediately appealable.”

Cardiffs at 9 (citing Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KSD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 

1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008)). That should end the matter, as this case is ongoing. 

The Cardiffs nonetheless attempt to escape their concession by suggesting that the 

contempt sanction at issue here is criminal contempt and not civil contempt and is 

therefore immediately appealable. See Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th 

Cir. 1996).

The Second Contempt Order is civil, not criminal. “Civil contempt seeks 

“only to coerce the defendant to do what a court had previously ordered him to 

do.” Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (cleaned up). “[O]nce a civil 

contemnor complies with the underlying order, he is purged of the contempt and is 

free.” Id. at 442 (cleaned up). He “carries the keys of his prison in his own 

pockets.” Hicks v. Freick, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988) (cleaned up). On that standard, 

the finding of contempt for violation of the PI was plainly civil. As detailed above 

(pages 2-3), the PI required the Cardiffs to disclose their finances and to account 

for all their assets. It also required them to repatriate to the United States and 

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 15 of 18
12

deliver to the Receiver foreign assets, documents, and records, including those in 

possession of third parties. It prohibited the dissipation of domestic and foreign 

assets. In addition, the PI authorized expedited discovery “for the purposes of 

discovering: (1) the nature, location, status, and extent of Defendants’ Assets; or 

(2) compliance with this Order.” ECF 59 at 35, § XXVI Expedited Discovery. 

The district court’s contempt order set forth purge conditions for the purpose 

of coercing them “to do what a court had previously ordered [them] to do.” Turner, 

564 U.S. at 441. Specifically, the Cardiffs can purge their contempt by identifying 

and accounting for their assets, repatriating those assets, turning over the assets to 

the Receiver, and ceasing the dissipation of those assets. ECF 315 at 5. The Second 

Contempt Order is thus civil and unappealable. It seeks to bring into the 

Receivership Estate assets that should have been transferred to the receiver in the 

first place, thus serving a coercive or compensatory purpose. See Koninklijke 

Philips Elect., 539 F.3d at 1042. It also establishes conditions by which the 

Cardiffs may purge their contempt. Id.

The district court’s warning that it may incarcerate the Cardiffs if they fail to 

comply does not change its character. The threat of incarceration aims to coerce 

compliance, not to punish. ECF 315 at 5. “The rule is settled in this Court that . . . a 

party to a suit may not review upon appeal an order fining or imprisoning him for 

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 16 of 18
13

the commission of a civil contempt.” Koninklijke Philips Elecs., 539 F.3d at 1042

(quoting Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936)).

The Cardiffs also appear to argue that the merits of their claim, including an 

alleged lack of due process, makes the Second Contempt Order immediately 

appealable. Cardiffs at 9-15. They cite no authority for this proposition, which 

cannot be squared with the rule of Koninklijke.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss the Cardiffs’ appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

Alden F. Abbott

General Counsel

Joel Marcus

Deputy General Counsel

/s/ Mark S. Hegedus

MARK S. HEGEDUS

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

May 8, 2020

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 17 of 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 8th day of May, 2020, an electronic copy of the 

foregoing Reply of the Federal Trade Commission was filed with the Clerk of the 

Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit using the 

appellate CM/ECF system and that service will be accomplished via that system.

/s/ Mark S. Hegedus

Mark S. Hegedus

Attorney 

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

Case: 20-55397, 05/08/2020, ID: 11685016, DktEntry: 9, Page 18 of 18