T h is a p p e a l re su lts f ro m the trial c o u rt’s gr a n ting a d e la ye d a p p e a l as p o st-co n v ic tio n re lief. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE Fe br ua ry 8, 200 5 S es sio n ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. M IG U EL GA R C IA Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham blen Coun ty No. 02CR192 Jam es E. Beckner, Judge

No. E2004-01698-CC A-R3- CD - F iled March 28, 2005

A Hamblen County

Criminal Court J ury convicted the defe ndant, Migue l G arc ia, of possession of more than three hundred gr ams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class A felony , and the tria l court sente nced him as a Rang e I , standard of

fende r to twenty -two y ear s in t h e De partment of Cor re c tio n. Th e de fe nd a nt a pp e a ls, c la imi ng tha

t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in de nying his mot ion to suppress and that his sentenc e is excessive. We aff irm the defe ndant’s judg ment of convic tion, but we mod if y his se nte nc e un de r the ru le a nn ou nc e d in Bla ke ly v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. _ _, 12 4 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), f

rom twenty -two y ear s to twenty y ear s. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt Aff irm ed in Par t, Sentence M odif

ied
J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE a n d J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.
Gre g W. Eichelman, District Public Def ender , and Ethel P. Rhoades, Assistant Public Defe nder, f or the appe llant, Migue l Garc ia.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Se th P . K e stn e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. B e rk e le y B e ll, Jr., Di stric t A tto rn e y G e n e r a l ; Jo n a

th anH o l c o m

b , A s s i s t an t

D i s t ric t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee. OP IN ION A Hamblen County

Gra nd J ury

indicted the def

endant with the of

fe n s e o f p o ssession of cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of T.C.A. § 39-17-417( a)( 4), (j)(5)

. At the trial, the jury fo un d th e de fe nd a nt g uil tya s c ha rg e d. On app e a l , th e de fe nd a nt c la ims that th e se arc h o f h is 1
ve hic le , wh ic h re ve a le d the pr e se nc e of c oc a ine , vio la te d his ri g hts g ua rante e d by th e F ou rth Amendment to the United States Constituti on and that his se ntence is e x cessive under both state and-2-

fede ral law

. The state arg ues that the sear ch of the defe ndant’s ca r did not violate his constituti onal rig hts and that his sentence is proper.
I. M OTI ON TO SU P P RE SS
The de fenda nt co n te n d s th at b e c a u s eh is c a r w a s immediately

surrounde d by

law enf orce ment office rs when he was stopped, no exigent circumstance s exi sted to justifya wa rra ntless searc h. The state ar g ues that proba

ble cause existed to believe the defe ndant was in possession of coca ine and that e xig e nt c ir c ums ta nc e s e xiste d to se arc h th e c ar b e c a us e of its inh e re nt m ob ili ty . We a g re e wi th the state. At the motion to suppress hearing, Mor ris to w nPo li c eD e p a

r tm e n t ( MPD) Detec tive Serg eant Dan Cox, t he hea d of MPD’s nar cotics and vice unit, testified he r ece ived a tip from a confide ntial informant in December of 2001 that the defendant was traff icking in narc otics. He sa id that based upon this ti p, officers of his unit set up a surve illance of the def endant. He said the surve illance corr oborate d some of the information the informant had g iven hi m , n am ely , the fa ct that the defe ndant was f

reque ntly rec eiving packa g es fr om FedE x and UPS , the types of automobiles the de fe nd a nt w a s u sin g , th e way the de fe nd a nt w a s sp e nd ing his tim e du ri ng th e da y , a ndthe pe op le with whom the defe ndant was a ssociating . He sa id that in Febr uary 2002, he re ceive d information from law e nforc ement off icer s from anothe r state, whom a nd which he de clined to name beca use of an ong oing inve stigation, tha t t h e defenda nt was a na rcotics tra fficke r. He said this information corr oborate d the information which he rec eived from the informant and the information gle aned a s a re sult of the surveillance

. Detec tive Cox testified t hat i n Marc h 2002, he rece ived i nformation from another informant that Gre g Scony ers, who ow ned a h o u s e i n the B rentwood ne ighbor hood of Morristown, wa s traff icking in coca ine and marijuana. He said this information resulted in his unit set t i ng up s u rv ei l l an ce o f M r. S co n y er s ’ h o u s e. He s ai d t h at o n Ap ri l 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , i n d i v i d u al s wi t h p ri o r d ru gr e late d c o n v ic ti o n s a

rr iv e d a t th e Sc o n y e r s ’ h o u s e
. H e s a id th a t w h e n th e f ir s t in d iv id u a l, Ralph Peebles, Jr., left the house in his car , office rs from his unit st opped him. He sa id a re sulting sea rch uncover ed the presenc e of cocaine and marijuana. He said that he immediately beg an questioning Mr. Peebles a nd that Mr. Peebles c onfesse d to buy ing c ocaine from anothe r individual at the Scony ers’ house. He said that as Mr. Peebles was confe ssing, the other individual dr ove by the sce ne and that his offic ers stopped the other individual. He said the resulting sear ch uncover ed the amount of money , $6,000.00, that Mr. Peebles sa id he paid for the drug s. Detec tive Cox said he we nt to Mr. Sc on y e rs ’ h ou se a ndc on fr on te d h im w ith thi s in fo rm a tio n. He sa id M r. Sc on y e rs a g re ed to cooper ate with law e nforc ement by arr ang ing to have the defe ndant, who was his s upplier, deliver a kilog ram of c ocaine to his house t h e n ex t d ay . Detec tive Cox testified that he wa s not present whe n M r. S co n y er s ca l l ed t h e d ef en d an tb u tt h at M r. S co n y er s ca l l ed h i mi m m ed i at el y af t ers p ea king to the defe ndant and told him the defe ndant would ar rive at his house i n twenty minutes, driving a n extended ca b t ru ck . He sa id Mr. Scony ers told him the defe ndant would have the kilogr am of c oc a ine wi th h im.-3-

Detec tive Cox testified that approx imately twenty minutes later, the de fenda nt approa ched Mr . Sc on y e rs ’ h ou se in h is truc k, wh ic h matc he d th e de sc ri pti on pr ov ide d b y Mr . Sc on y e rs . H e sa id that his of fice rs had previously set up surveillanc e of the subdivision and that when he wa s told the de fe nd a nt h a d a

rrive d, he or de re d Offi c e r R ic ha rd so n to sto p th e de fe nd a nt. He sa id that w hil e Offic er Richa

rdson detaine d the def

endant, a nother off

icer walked a drug dog around the ca

r and that the dr ug do g a le rt e d to the pr e se nc e of ill e g a l dr ug s. He sa id that Off

ic e r R ic ha

rd so n atte mpt e d to obtain the def

endant’ s co nsent to sear ch but that the def endant r efuse d. He sa id that he aske d the defe ndant for a

key to the bed of his truck, that the defe ndant said he did not ha ve a ke y , that a sea rch of the de fenda nt reve aled a key , and that his office rs sea rche d the truck, r evea ling the pr esenc e of a kilog ram of c ocaine . Detec tive Cox said he used “ the dog sear ch as a tool of finding drug s [i ]n t he car , not as probable cause to searc h the ca r.”
On cr oss-examination, Detective Cox acknowledge d that his office rs had the de fenda nt’s truck blocked. He a lso acknowle dg ed that Of fice r Richar dson had deta ined the def endant a nd that the de fe nd a nt w a s n ot f

re e to le a ve . M or

ri sto wn Pol ic e De te c tiv e s T on y Ric ha rd so n a ndPhi l H ur st also testified but their testimony was mer ely

cumulative to that of De tective Cox.
T h e d e f e n d a n tt e s t i f

i e d t h a tw h e n h e arr i v e da tM r
. S c o n y e r s ’ h o u s e , h e w a s i m m e d ia te ly stopped by

law enforce ment personne l, one of whom approa ched his truck with a pis tol drawn a nd the other w ith a shotgun. H e said that the of fice rs’ c ars ha d him blocked and that he could not have fled. He said that the offic ers a sked him to consent to a sea rch a nd that he dec lined. He sa id that an off icer ran a drug dog around his truc k, that the dog did not alert, and that the offic ers se arc hed his truck any way . After

listening to the e vidence prese nted, the trial c ourt denied the def endant’s motion to s uppress finding that probable cause exis ted to stop and sear ch the de fenda nt’s truck ba sed upon the automobile exception to the g ener al war rant re quirement.
A trial court’s fac tual finding s on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appea l unless the evidenc e pre ponder at es aga inst them. S tate v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Jo n e s , 8 0 2 S. W. 2 d 2 2 1 , 2 2 3 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 9 0 )

. Q u e s ti o n s ab o u t th e “ c r e d ib il it y o f the witnesses, th e we i gh t an d value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in the evide nce a re matters entrusted to the t rial j udg e as the t rier of fac t.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. The application of the law to the fac ts as determined by the trial court is a question of law whic h is reviewe d de novo on appea l. State v. Year g an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).
Th e F ou rth A me nd ment to the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on pr ote c ts a g a ins t un re a so na ble sear ches a nd seizures, and “‘article 1, section 7 [of the Tenne ssee Constitution] is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment.’” State v. Downey , 945 S.W .2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Sneed v. S t at e, 2 2 1 Tenn. 6, 13, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968)). The analy sis of any war rantless sea

rch must beg in with the proposition that such searc hes ar e per se unre asonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States C o nstitut ion and article I , section 7 of the T ennesse e Con sti tut ion . T his princ ipl e a g a ins t w arr a ntl e ss s e arc he s is su bje c t on ly to a fe w s pe c if

ic a lly e sta bli sh e d a ndwe ll- de lin e a te d e xce pti on s. Se e Katz v. Un ite d St a te s, 38 9 U .S. 34 7, 35 7, 88 S. Ct

. 50 7, 51 4 ( 19 67 ); Sta te v. Ty le r, 59 8 S. W.2 d 7 98 , 8 01 (T e nn
. Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ). B e fo re the fr uit s-4-

of a w arr antless sea

rc h are admissible as evidenc e, the state must establish bya pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that the se arc h falls into one of th e n ar rowlydraw n exceptions to the warr ant require ment. See State v. S h aw , 6 0 3 S.W .2d 741, 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . For instance, a war rant is not neede d if an office r has probable cause to be lieve that a vehic le contains c ontraba nd and exige nt circumstanc es re quire a n immediate sea rch. Car roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155- 56, 45 S. Ct . 280, 286 (1925); ac cord St at e v
. L ev ey e, 796 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1990). “Exigent
c ir c ums ta nc e s e xist w he n a ve hic le is m ov ing on a

pu bli c hig hw a y

a ndit i s impr a c tic able to o btain a se arc h warr a nt but do no t exist af te r the ve hic le ha s com

ple te d it s jo urne y

a ndis at r e st o n p ri vate pr e mis e s. ” I d. (q uo tin g F uq ua v. Armou r, 54 3 S. W.2 d 6 4, 66 (T e nn . 1 97 6) ); se e a lso Pe nn sy lvania v
. L ab ro n , 5 18 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S. C t. 2485, 2487 (1996) (holding that an automobile’s “ rea dy mob ili ty ” is “ a n e xig e nc y su ff ic ie nt to e xcu se failu re to o btain a se arc h w arr a nt o nc e pr ob able c a us e to c o n d u c t t h e s e ar c h i s c l e ar ” )

. T o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e s e ar c h c o n d u c t e d i n t h i s c a s e m e e ts t his exception, we must determine w hether the ar resting office rs had probable cause to believe that the
car the def endant wa s driving c ontained contr aband



### .
I f the information upon wh i ch p ro b ab l e cause is base d is not of the office rs’ pe rsonal kn ow le dg e , b ut i s r e c e ive d f ro m a n in fo rm a nt, pr ob able c a us e un de r o ur state c on sti tut ion is determined by

the application of the Ag uilar-Spinelli two-prong ed tes t

. S t ate v. J acumin, 778 S.W .2d 430, 431 (Tenn. 1989) . The test re quires the stat e t o establish a fa ctual basis for the information provided a nd the ver acity of those supply ing the information. I d. The ve rac ity prong ma y be sa tis fi e d b y

e sta bli sh ing a n in fo rm a nt’ s inh e re nt c re dib ili ty or by e sta bli sh ing the re lia

bil ity of t he information. Spinelli v. United S tates, 393 U.S. 410, 415, 89 S. Ct . 584, 588 (1969); Ag uilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115, 84 S

. C t

. 1 509, 1514 (1964). How ever , any defic iency

in the informant’s information under this two-prong test may be over come by

independe nt police corr oboration. Jacumin, 778 S.W .2d at 436.
I n the pre sent ca se, we note that Mr. S cony ers was under inve stigation from members of the MPD fo r t

ra ff ic kin g in c oc a ine a nd mari juana
. He tol d th e inv e sti g a tor s th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s h is supplier, that he ha d talked to the def endant a bou t b u y i n g a kilog ram of c ocaine , and that the defe ndant was de livering it to his house. This satisfies the basis of knowledg e prong . Concerning the ve ra c ity

pr on g , th e pr ob able c a us e to sto p an d sea rc h the de fe nd a nt’ s tr

uc k w a s b a se d n ot o nly upon Mr. Scony ers’ informatio n b u t al s o upon the information re veale d during the cour se of the investigation of the defe ndant. Additionally , Mr. Scony ers’ information conc erning the timing and method of the de fenda nt’s delivery of coc aine wa s corr oborate d befor e the of fice rs stopped the defe ndant’s truc k. Under these c ircumstance s, we c onclude that pr obable c ause e x isted to stop and sear ch the de fenda nt’s truck. The defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
II. EXCESS IVE SE NTENCE
The de fenda nt contends that his se ntence is e x cessive under state law and the r ule announc ed in Blake ly

v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004). The state ar g ues that the de fenda nt’s sentenc e is proper

under state law and that he has waived any Blakely issue. We conclude that the-5-

trial court’ s enhanc ement of the defe ndant’s sente nce violate d his right to trial by jury and acc ording ly

reduc e his sentenc e to twenty y ear s, the presumptive minimum in t he ra ng e.
No one testified at the sentenc ing he aring

. After considering the ar g uments of counse l and the pre sentenc e re port, the trial court found that the def endant wa s a leader in the commi ssion of the offe nse, and acc ording ly , enhanc ed his sentenc e from twenty y ear s to twenty -two y ear s. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 3). The trial court found no a pplicable mitigating f

actor s. Cf. T.C.A. § 40-35-113. Appellate r evie w o f sentenc ing is de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial court’s d eterminations are c orre ct. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d). As the Sentenc ing Commission Comments to t his section note, the burden is now on t he appe aling party to show that the sentenc ing is improper. This means that if the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fa ct that ar e adequately supported in the record, and g ave due consideration and proper we ig ht t o th e fa c tor s a ndprinc ipl e s tha t ar e re le va nt t o s e nte nc ing un de r the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t, we may not disturb the sentence even if a diffe rent re sult were pr efe rre d. State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. Ho we ve r, “ the pr e su mpt ion of c or rect nes s wh ic h a c c omp a nie s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s a c tio n is conditioned upon t he af

firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). I n this respec t, for the pur pose of meaningf

ul appellate r eview,
the trial court must pl ace on the re cord its re asons for a rriving at the final sentenc ing decision, identify the mitigating and en h an ceme nt fac tors found, state the spe cific f acts supporting ea ch enhanceme nt fac tor found, and a

rticulate how the mitigating and enhan ceme nt fac tors h av e b ee n ev al u at ed an d b al an ce d i n d et er m i n i n g t h e s en tence

. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( f) ( 1990).
State v. J ones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1994). Also, in conducting a de novo r eview, w e must consider (1) the evidenc e, if any , rec eived at the trial and se ntencing hearing, ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port, (3) the pri n ci p l es of se ntencing and arg ume nts a s to sen te nc ing a lte rn a tiv e s, (4 ) the natur e a nd c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f the c ri min a l c on du c t, (5) any mitigating or st atutory enhanc ement factors, (6) any statement t hat the def endant made on his own behalf, and (7) the pote nti al fo r re h abil itation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40- 35-102, -103, -210; see A shby , 823 S.W .2d at 168; State v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 236-37 (Te nn. 1986).
Th e rang e of pu nis hme nt fo r a Ra ng e I de fe nd a nt is fi ft e e n to t we nty -f ive y e ars fo r a

Cla ss A fe lony

. T.C.A. § 40-35-112( a)( 1). Unless there are enhanc ement fac tors prese nt, the presumptive s en t ence to be imposed is the midpoint in t he ra ng e for a Class A fe lony . T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c). Our sente ncing act pr ovides that the trial court is to incre ase the sentenc e within the ra ng e base d on the exist ence of enha nceme nt fac tors and then reduc e the sentenc e as appr opriate f or any mitigating-6-

fac tors. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( d), (e)

. The weig ht to be af forde d an existi ng fac tor is left to the trial court’s discr etion so long a s it c omplies w ith the purposes and principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act and its findings a

re a dequate ly

sup p o rt ed by

the re cord. T.C.A. § 40- 35-210, Sentenc ing Commi ssion Com ments; Moss, 727 S .W.2d at 237; see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.
Th e de fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y no t re du c ing his se nte nc e to f if te e n y e ars , the minimum i n the ra ng e. Howe ver, he provides no authority for the proposition that the trial court err ed, nor doe s he state whic h fac tor in m i t i gat i on the trial court should have applied. The trial court’s r efusa l to apply

fac tors in miti g ation was not er ror.
The de fenda nt also asserts that the tria l court violated his constitutional rig ht to trial by jury when it e nhance d his sentence based upon its application of enhanc ement fa ctor (3) , which wa s not found by a jury bey ond a re asonable doubt or admitted by the defe ndant. Blakely specifie s that other than prior c onvictions, any fac ts not reflec ted in the j ury ’s verdict or admit ted by the def endant use d to increa se a de fenda nt’s punishment above the presumptive sentenc e must be found by the jury , not the trial court. 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. C t. at 2537. When the t ri al court enhanc ed the de fenda nt’s se nte nc e by

app ly ing fa c tor (3 ), that the de fe nd a nt w a s a le a de r i n th e c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e , it violat ed his r ig ht t o tria l by jury . We c on c lud e thi s e rr or wa s n ot h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt. See State v. C hester Way ne W alters, No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3CD, Whit e C ounty , slip op. at 23-25 (T enn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004). We modify the def endant’ s sentence from twenty -two y e ars to t we nty

y e ars
. Ba sed on the for eg oing and the re cord a s a whole, w e af firm the def

endant’ s conviction but mod if y his se nte nc e fr om t we nty -t wo y e ars to t we nty y e ars
.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE