28244 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 

(Virtual Meeting). 

Contact Person: Katherine M. Malinda, 

Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4140, 

MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–435– 

0912, Katherine_Malinda@csr.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel; Member 

Conflict: AIDS and AIDS Related Research. 

Date: July 10, 2018. 

Time: 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 

(Virtual Meeting). 

Contact Person: Shalanda A. Bynum, 

Ph.D., MPH, Scientific Review Officer, Center 

for Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 3206, 

Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–755–4355, 

bynumsa@csr.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel; Convergent 

Neuroscience: From Genomic Association to 

Causation. 

Date: July 10, 2018. 

Time: 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 

(Virtual Meeting). 

Contact Person: Jana Drgonova, Ph.D., 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5213, 

Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–827–2549, 

jdrgonova@mail.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel; Small 

Business: Neuroscience Assay, Diagnostics 

and Animal Model Development. 

Date: July 12–13, 2018. 

Time: 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: The Crown Plaza Seattle Hotel, 1113 

6th Ave., Seattle, WA 98101. 

Contact Person: Susan Gillmor, Ph.D., 

Scientific Review Officer, National Institutes 

of Health, Center for Scientific Review, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301– 

435–1730, susan.gillmor@nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel; Center for 

Neuroscience and Regenerative Medicine 

Program. 

Date: July 12, 2018. 

Time: 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 

(Virtual Meeting). 

Contact Person: Chittari V. Shivakumar, 

Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, National 

Institutes of Health, Center for Scientific 

Review, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 

20892, 301–408–9098, chittari.shivakumar@

nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel; PAR 

Review: Understanding and Modifying 

Temporal Dynamics of Coordinated Neural 

Activity. 

Date: July 12, 2018. 

Time: 11:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 

(Virtual Meeting). 

Contact Person: Jana Drgonova, Ph.D., 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5213, 

Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–827–2549, 

jdrgonova@mail.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel; Member 

Conflict: Integrative Neuroscience. 

Date: July 12, 2018. 

Time: 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 

(Telephone Conference Call). 

Contact Person: Jasenka Borzan, Ph.D., 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4214, 

MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892–7814, 301– 

435–1787, borzanj@csr.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Biology of 

Development and Aging Integrated Review 

Group; International and Cooperative 

Projects—1 Study Section. 

Date: July 13, 2018. 

Time: 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892. 

Contact Person: Seetha Bhagavan, Ph.D., 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5194, 

MSC 7846, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 237– 

9838, bhagavas@csr.nih.gov. 

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance 

Program Nos. 93.306, Comparative Medicine; 

93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333, 

93.337, 93.393–93.396, 93.837–93.844, 

93.846–93.878, 93.892, 93.893, National 

Institutes of Health, HHS) 

Dated: June 12, 2018. 

Natasha M. Copeland, 

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory 

Committee Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2018–12920 Filed 6–15–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4140–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards Personnel Surety Program 

AGENCY: National Protection and 

Programs Directorate (NPPD), 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). 

ACTION: 30-Day notice and request for 

comments; revision of information 

collection request: 1670–0029. 

SUMMARY: The DHS NPPD Office of 

Infrastructure Protection (IP), 

Infrastructure Security Compliance 

Division (ISCD) will submit the 

following information collection request 

(ICR) to the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) for review and clearance 

in accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995. NPPD 

previously published this ICR, in the 

Federal Register on December 27, 2017, 

for a 60-day public comment period. 

In this notice NPPD is responding to 

seven commenters that submitted 

comments in response to the 60-day 

notice previously published for this ICR 

and soliciting public comment 

concerning this ICR for an additional 30 

days. 

DATES: Comments are encouraged and 

will be accepted until July 18, 2018. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are 

invited to submit written comments on 

the proposed information collection to 

the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, OMB. Comments should be 

addressed to OMB Desk Officer, 

Department of Homeland Security, 

National Protection and Programs 

Directorate and sent via electronic mail 

to dhsdeskofficer@omb.eop.gov. All 

submissions must include the words 

‘‘Department of Homeland Security’’ 

and the OMB Control Number 1670– 

0029. 

Comments submitted in response to 

this notice may be made available to the 

public through relevant websites. For 

this reason, please do not include in 

your comments information of a 

confidential nature, such as sensitive 

personal information or proprietary 

information. Please note that responses 

to this public comment request 

containing any routine notice about the 

confidentiality of the communication 

will be treated as public comments that 

may be made available to the public 

notwithstanding the inclusion of the 

routine notice. 

Comments that include trade secrets, 

confidential commercial or financial 

information, Chemical-terrorism 

Vulnerability Information (CVI), 

Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or 

Protected Critical Infrastructure 

Information (PCII) should not be 

submitted to the public regulatory 

docket. Please submit such comments 

separately from other comments in 

response to this notice. Comments 

containing trade secrets, confidential 

commercial or financial information, 

CVI, SSI, or PCII should be 

appropriately marked and packaged in 


amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices 28245 

1For more information about the TSDB, see DOJ/ 

FBI–019 Terrorist Screening Records System, last 

published in full as 77 FR 26580 (May 25, 2017). 

accordance with applicable 

requirements and submitted by mail to 

the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD CFATS 

Program Manager at the Department of 

Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane 

SW, Mail Stop 0610, Arlington, VA 

20528–0610. Comments must be 

identified by OMB Control Number 

1670–0029. The Department will 

forward all comments received by the 

submission deadline to the OMB Desk 

Officer. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Questions and requests for additional 

information may be directed to Amy 

Graydon or the CFATS Program 

Manager via email at cfats@dhs.gov or 

telephone at (866) 323–2957. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

December 18, 2014, the President signed 

into law the Protecting and Securing 

Chemical Facilities from Terrorist 

Attacks Act of 2014, Public Law 113– 

254 (CFATS Act of 2014) providing 

long-term authorization for the 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) program. The 

CFATS Act of 2014 codified the 

Department’s authority to implement 

the CFATS program into the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002. See 6 U.S.C. 621 

et. seq. 

Section 550 of the Department of 

Homeland Security Appropriations Act 

of 2007, Public Law 109–295 (2006) 

(‘‘Section 550’’), provided (and the 

CFATS Act of 2014 continues to 

provide) the Department with the 

authority to identify and regulate the 

security of high-risk chemical facilities 

using a risk-based approach. On April 9, 

2007, the Department issued the CFATS 

Interim Final Rule (IFR), implementing 

this statutory mandate. See 72 FR 

17688. 

Section 550 required (and the CFATS 

Act of 2014 continues to require) that 

the Department establish risk-based 

performance standards (RBPS) for highrisk chemical facilities. Through the 

CFATS regulations, the Department 

promulgated 18 RBPS. Each chemical 

facility that has been finally determined 

by the Department to be high-risk must 

submit, for Department approval, a Site 

Security Plan (SSP) or an Alternative 

Security Program (ASP), whichever the 

high-risk chemical facility chooses, that 

satisfies each applicable RBPS. RBPS 12 

requires high-risk chemical facilities to 

perform appropriate background checks 

on and ensure appropriate credentials 

for facility personnel, and, as 

appropriate, unescorted visitors with 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. RBPS 12(iv) specifically requires 

high-risk chemical facility to implement 

measures designed to identify people 

with terrorist ties. For the purposes of 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

(PSP), ‘people’ in RBPS 12(iv) is in 

reference to affected individuals (i.e., 

facility personnel or unescorted visitors 

with or seeking access to restricted areas 

or critical assets at high-risk chemical 

facilities). 

Identifying affected individuals who 

have terrorist ties is an inherently 

governmental function and requires the 

use of information held in governmentmaintained databases that are 

unavailable to high-risk chemical 

facilities. See 72 FR 17688, 17709 (April 

9, 2007). Thus, under RBPS 12(iv), the 

Department and high-risk chemical 

facilities must work together to satisfy 

the ‘‘terrorist ties’’ aspect of the 

Personnel Surety performance standard. 

In accordance with the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, as amended by the 

CFATS Act of 2014, the following 

options are available to enable high-risk 

chemical facilities to facilitate the 

vetting of affected individuals for 

terrorist ties: 

Option 1. High-risk chemical facilities 

may submit certain information about 

affected individuals, which the 

Department will use to vet those 

individuals for terrorist ties. 

Specifically, the identifying information 

about affected individuals will be 

compared against identifying 

information of known or suspected 

terrorists contained in the Federal 

Government’s consolidated and 

integrated terrorist watch list, the 

Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), 

which is maintained by the Department 

of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) in the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC).1

Option 2. High-risk chemical facilities 

may submit information about affected 

individuals who already possess certain 

credentials or documentation that rely 

on security threat assessments 

conducted by the Department. This will 

enable the Department to verify the 

continuing validity of these credentials 

or documentation. 

Option 3. High-risk chemical facilities 

may comply with RBPS 12(iv) without 

submitting to the Department 

information about affected individuals 

who possess Transportation Worker 

Identification Credentials (TWICs), if a 

high-risk chemical facility electronically 

verifies and validates the affected 

individual’s TWICs through the use of 

TWIC readers (or other technology that 

is periodically updated using the 

Canceled Card List). 

Option 4. High-risk chemical facilities 

may visually verify certain credentials 

or documents that are issued by a 

Federal screening program that 

periodically vets enrolled individuals 

against the TSDB. The Department 

continues to believe that visual 

verification has significant security 

limitations and, accordingly, encourages 

high-risk chemical facilities choosing 

this option to identify in their SSPs the 

means by which they plan to address 

these limitations. 

In addition to the options described 

above for satisfying RBPS 12(iv), a highrisk chemical facility is welcome to 

propose alternative or supplemental 

options in its SSP that are not described 

in this document. The Department will 

assess the adequacy of such alternative 

or supplemental options on a facilityby-facility basis in the course of 

evaluating each facility’s SSP. 

Under Option 3 and Option 4, a highrisk chemical facility would not need to 

submit information about an affected 

individual to the Department. These 

Options are only mentioned in this 

notice for informational purposes, and 

there will be no analysis of Option 3 

and Option 4 in this information 

collection request. 

This information collection request 

does not propose changes to who 

qualifies as an affected individual. 

There are certain groups of persons that 

the Department does not consider to be 

affected individuals, such as (1) Federal 

officials that gain unescorted access to 

restricted areas or critical assets as part 

of their official duties; (2) state and local 

law enforcement officials that gain 

unescorted access to restricted areas or 

critical assets as part of their official 

duties; and (3) emergency responders at 

the state or local level that gain 

unescorted access to restricted areas or 

critical assets during emergency 

situations. 

OMB is particularly interested in 

comments that: 

1. Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

4. Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 


amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
28246 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices 

2The current information collection for CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program may be found at https:// 

www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_

nbr=201312-1670-001. 

3For more information about Redress Numbers, 

please go to http://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelersredress-process#1. 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

The current information collection for 

the CFATS PSP (IC 1670–0029) will 

expire on August 31, 2018.2

Summary of Proposed Revisions to the 

Information Collection 

The Department is seeking a revision 

to the CFATS PSP Information 

Collection to: (1) Obtain approval to 

collect information about affected 

individuals from all high-risk chemical 

facilities rather than only Tier 1 and 

Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities; (2) 

update the estimated number of annual 

respondents from 195,000 to 72,607 

based on historical information 

collected since the Department 

implemented the CFATS PSP; and (3) 

update the estimated time per 

respondent from 0.58 hours to 0.1667 

hours based upon historical data 

collected by the Department since the 

implantation of the CFATS PSP. 

Collection at All High-Risk Chemical 

Facilities 

In response to multiple comments on 

the current ICR, the Department agreed 

to a ‘‘phased implementation’’ of the 

CFATS PSP to Tier 1 and Tier 2 highrisk chemical facilities. Based on 

lessons learned and the near completion 

of the implementation at Tier 1 and Tier 

2 high-risk chemical facilities, the 

Department now seeks to close a 

security gap by implementing CFATS 

PSP at all high-risk chemical facilities. 

As implemented at Tier 1 and Tier 2 

high-risk chemical facilities, the 

Department will roll out the CFATS PSP 

in a ‘‘phased implementation’’ to Tier 3 

and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities. 

Updates to Burden Estimate Based on 

Historical Information 

The Department implemented the 

CFATS PSP in December 2015. Since 

implementation, the Department has 

evaluated many of the assumptions it 

used when estimating the burden 

estimate of this Information Collection. 

As a result, several of the assumptions 

can be revised using actual data rather 

than assumptions. The burden 

methodology and revised estimates are 

described in, ‘‘The Department’s 

Methodology in Estimating the Burden 

for CFATS PSP Information Collection.’’ 

Information Collected About Affected 

Individuals 

This information collection request 

does not propose changes to the 

information collected on affected 

individuals. 

Option 1: Collecting Information To 

Conduct Direct Vetting 

If high-risk chemical facilities select 

Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 12(iv) for an 

affected individual, the following 

information about the affected 

individual would be submitted to the 

Department: 

• For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and 

nationals, as well as U.S. lawful 

permanent residents): 

Æ Full Name; 

Æ Date of Birth; and 

Æ Citizenship or Gender. 

• For Non-U.S. Persons: 

Æ Full Name; 

Æ Date of Birth; 

Æ Citizenship; and 

Æ Passport information and/or alien 

registration number. 

To reduce the likelihood of false 

positives in matching against records in 

the Federal Government’s consolidated 

and integrated terrorist watchlist, highrisk chemical facilities would also be 

able to submit the following optional 

information about an affected individual 

to the Department: 

• Aliases; 

• Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons); 

• Place of Birth; and/or 

• Redress Number.3

High-risk chemical facilities have the 

option to create and use the following 

field(s) to collect and store additional 

information to assist with the 

management of an affected individual’s 

records. Any information collected in 

this field will not be used to support 

vetting activities. 

• User Defined Field(s) 

Table 1 summarizes the biographic 

data that would be submitted to the 

Department under Option 1. 

TABLE 1—REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA FOR AN AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL UNDER OPTION 1 

Data elements submitted to the department For a U.S. person For a nonU.S. person 

Full Name .................................................................................... Required.

Date of Birth ................................................................................ Required.

Gender ......................................................................................... Must provide ............................................................................... Optional. 

Citizenship ................................................................................... Citizenship or Gender ................................................................. Required. 

Passport Information and/or Alien Registration Number ............. N/A .............................................................................................. Required. 

Aliases ......................................................................................... Optional.

Place of Birth ............................................................................... Optional.

Redress number .......................................................................... Optional.

User Defined Field(s) .................................................................. Optional (Not used for vetting purposes).

Option 2: Collecting Information To Use 

Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS 

Programs 

In lieu of submitting information to 

the Department under Option 1 for 

vetting of terrorist ties, high-risk 

chemical facilities also have the option, 

where appropriate, to submit 

information to the Department to 

electronically verify that an affected 

individual is currently enrolled in 

another DHS program that vets for 

terrorist ties. 

To verify an affected individual’s 

enrollment in one of these programs 

under Option 2, the Department would 

collect the following information about 

the affected individual: 

• Full Name; 

• Date of Birth; and 

• Program-specific information or 

credential information, such as unique 

number or issuing entity (e.g., state for 

Commercial Driver’s License [CDL] 

associated with an Hazardous Material 

Endorsement [HME]). 

To reduce the likelihood of false 

positives, high-risk chemical facilities 

may also submit the following optional 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices 28247 

4See 6 CFR 27.300–345. 

5More information about access, correction, and 

redress requests under the Freedom of Information 

Act and the Privacy Act can be found in Section 

7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and 

available at http://www.dhs.gov/privacydocuments-national-protection-and-programsdirectorate-nppd. 

6See Section 1(b)(3) of Public Law 114–278, 

which may be viewed at https://www.congress.gov/ 

bill/114th-congress/house-bill/710/text/pl?overview

=closed. 

information about an affected individual 

to the Department: 

• Aliases; 

• Gender; 

• Place of Birth; and/or 

• Citizenship. 

High-risk chemical facilities have the 

option to create and use the following 

field(s) to collect and store additional 

information to assist with the 

management of an affected individual’s 

records. Any information collected in 

this field will not be used to support 

vetting activities. 

• User Defined Field(s) 

Table 2 summarizes the biographic 

data that would be submitted to the 

Department under Option 2. 

TABLE 2—REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA FOR AN AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL UNDER OPTION 2 

Data Elements Submitted to the Department 

Full Name ............................................................................................................................................. Required. 

Date of Birth ......................................................................................................................................... Required. 

Program-specific information or credential information, such as expiration date, unique number, or 

issuing entity.

Required. 

Aliases .................................................................................................................................................. Optional. 

Gender .................................................................................................................................................. Optional. 

Place of Birth ........................................................................................................................................ Optional. 

Citizenship ............................................................................................................................................ Optional. 

User Defined Field(s) ........................................................................................................................... Optional (Not used for vetting purposes). 

Other Information Collected 

The Department may also contact a 

high-risk chemical facility or its 

designees to request additional 

information (e.g., visa information) 

pertaining to an affected individual in 

order to clarify suspected data errors or 

resolve potential matches (e.g., an 

affected individual has a common 

name). Such requests will not imply, 

and should not be construed to indicate, 

that an affected individual’s information 

has been confirmed as a match to a 

record of an individual with terrorist 

ties. 

The Department may also collect 

information provided by individuals or 

high-risk chemical facilities in support 

of any adjudication requests under 

Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,4 or 

in support of any other redress 

requests.5

Responses to Comments Submitted 

During 60-Day Comment Period 

The Department solicited comments 

on four questions: 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

In response to the 60-Day Notice that 

solicited comments about the CFATS 

PSP ICR, the Department received 

twenty-seven comments from seven 

commenters. The seven commenters 

were all industry association. 

Comments Related to Whether the 

Proposed Collection of Information Is 

Necessary for the Proper Performance of 

the Function of the Agency, Including 

Whether the Information Will Have 

Practical Utility 

Comment: Four commenters 

suggested that the Department conduct 

further assessments on the PSP: 

One commenter suggested that the 

Department ‘‘should not expand the program 

until it can see the successes and failures it 

has with Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities.’’ Further, 

the commenter suggested a ‘‘formal 

assessment, in conjunction with the 

Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, on the benefits and positive 

outcomes of running PSP-gained information 

through the TSDB [Terrorist Screening 

Database]’’ be conducted. The commenter 

also suggested that such a review could 

evaluate the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP 

and opportunities ‘‘to make it more 

effective.’’ 

A second commenter encouraged the 

Department to ‘‘examine the effectiveness of 

such screening before proceeding to subject 

the bulk of CFATS regulated facilities to 

these additional measures.’’ The second 

commenter suggested the Department 

conduct a comprehensive evaluation, similar 

to the comprehensive evaluation the 

Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) is conducting with respect to the 

Transportation Worker Identification 

Credentials (TWIC) Program,6 before 

determining whether to expand the CFATS 

PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical 

facilities. 

A third commenter referenced an ongoing 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

assessment of the CFATS program and 

speculated that the GAO assessment might 

review the implementation of the CFATS 

PSP. The commenter suggested that the 

Department could benefit from considering 

the results of the GAO assessment with 

respect ‘‘to tailoring implementation of PSP 

for Tier 3 and 4 facilities.’’ The commenter 

also suggested that if the GAO assessment 

does not include a review of the CFATS PSP, 

the Department should undertake such an 

analysis. In conclusion, the same commenter 

suggested that the Department not expand 

the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered 

chemical facilities until such an analysis has 

been conducted and the results used to 

inform the CFATS PSP ICR. 

A fourth commenter requested that the 

Department allow a third-party review of the 

CFATS PSP after a suitable period of time 

has passed to determine if the program adds 

value to the security of the nation. 

Response: The Department does not 

believe that additional analysis is 

needed prior to OMB approving the 

collection of information concerning 

affected individuals from all covered 

chemical facilities. The Department has 

closely reviewed how Tier 1 and Tier 2 

covered chemicals facilities have 

implemented the check for terrorist ties. 

Tier 1 and Tier 2 covered chemical 

facilities have varied by size, 

complexity, security issue, and location. 


amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
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7The Department described the options for 

screening for terrorist ties on page 82 FR 61313 of 

its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https:// 

www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61313. 

Additionally, vetting for terrorist ties 

for all four tiers of covered facilities is 

required by CFATS. Members of the 

public commented on the CFATS 

rulemaking in 2007 before the 

regulation was finalized, and DHS 

considered all public comments 

(including comments about terrorist ties 

vetting and background checks) in 

coming to the reasoned decision to vet 

affected individuals for terrorist ties at 

all tiered facilities as part of the 

program. DHS disagrees that a 

modification to the program to eliminate 

this requirement for Tiers 3 and 4 or to 

indefinitely delay its rollout in order to 

conduct additional analysis would be 

appropriate. Preventing terrorist access 

to high-risk chemical facilities’ 

restricted areas and critical assets is a 

core purpose of CFATS, and failure to 

conduct terrorist ties checks may allow 

terrorist to gain access. 

Comment: One commenter reiterated 

its continued objection to the inclusion 

of railroad employees is within the 

scope of CFATS because the commenter 

claims that inclusion of railroad 

employees lacks a risk-based 

justification. 

Response: Under CFATS, the 

Department regulates covered chemical 

facilities that present a high risk from 

terrorist attack. Effectively regulating 

chemical facility security involves 

assessing whether terrorists have access 

to facilities, and terrorists seeking access 

might not be limited to facility 

employees. To help reduce risk to highrisk facilities, the Department requires 

covered chemical facilities to conduct a 

check for terrorist ties on affected 

individuals (e.g., facility personnel and 

unescorted visitors) with or seeking 

access to restricted areas and critical 

assets. A covered chemical facility has 

the discretion to decide if they want to 

escort railroad employees as visitors, 

identify railroad employees as affected 

individuals, or treat them in some other 

way consistent with CFATS 

requirements. Identifying railroad 

employees as affected individuals 

would require a covered chemical 

facility to ensure that those personnel 

are screened for terrorist ties pursuant to 

6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). 

In ensuring affected individuals are 

screened for terrorist ties, the facility 

has the discretion to choose from four 

options for vetting affected individuals 

or propose alternatives or supplemental 

options in its SSP or ASP (See 82 FR 

61312, 61316).7

Comment: One commenter 

highlighted the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) requirement at 49 

CFR 172.802(a)(1) which states, 

‘‘Personnel security. Measures to 

confirm information provided by job 

applicants hired for positions that 

involve access to and handling of the 

hazardous materials covered by the 

security plan. . . .’’ The commenter 

suggested that railroad employees 

having undergone such a background 

check and demonstrated their reliability 

by being stewards of the chemical 

during transit, should ‘‘not suddenly 

seem suspect simply by crossing a fence 

line at a covered chemical facility.’’ 

Response: It is the Department’s 

understanding that the sort of 

background checks discussed by the 

commenter do not include checks for 

terrorist ties. Checks for terrorist ties are 

required under CFATS (6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12)). 

Comments Related to the Accuracy of 

the Agency’s Estimate of the Burden of 

the Proposed Collection of Information, 

Including the Validity of the 

Methodology and Assumptions Used 

Comment: One commenter recognizes 

the assumptions that release facilities 

may have more affected individuals 

than theft and diversion facilities, that 

there are an average of 106 employees 

per facility, and that the time it takes to 

vet an affected individual may be valid, 

but states, ‘‘it is not clear upon what 

information they [the assumptions] are 

based.’’ 

Response: The Department based the 

assumptions on historical data collected 

by the Department since the 

implementation of the CFATS PSP. 

Specifically, for the difference between 

release and theft and diversion facilities, 

the Department recognizes that high-risk 

chemical facilities for release security 

issues may take a facility-wide approach 

rather than an asset-based approach in 

defining their restricted areas, which 

may result in a higher number of 

affected individuals than theft and 

diversion facilities. Therefore, the 

Department reviewed the number of 

release sites to ensure the estimated 

number of respondents for the Tier 3 

and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities 

were comparable to the historical data 

received by the Department since the 

implementation of the CFATS PSP. The 

Department found that the release 

security issues for Tier 1 and Tier 2 

high-risk chemical facilities made up 38 

percent of the total Tier 1 and Tier 2 

high-risk chemical facility population. 

For Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical 

facilities, the release security issue 

made up 25 percent of the total Tier 3 

and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facility 

population. Based on these findings, the 

Department is satisfied that the Tier 1 

and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facility 

historical data provided a valid 

representation of what the Department 

can expect from Tier 3 and Tier 4 highrisk chemical facilities. 

Specifically for the 106 employees, 

the Department estimates that under 

this collection there are (a) 200 Tier 1 

and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities 

that did submit or will have to submit 

information about affected individuals 

under the current ICR, and (b) 3,700 

Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical 

facilities that will submit for the first 

time under this new collection. 

Historically, each Authorizer submitted, 

on average, 180 initial respondents, 

with each Authorizer responsible for 1.7 

high-risk chemical facilities. Dividing 

180 affected individuals per Authorizer 

by 1.7 high-risk chemical facilities 

results in an average of 106 initial 

respondents submitted per high-risk 

chemical facility. 

The Department’s estimate per 

respondent (affected individual) is 

based on industry feedback and 

historical data collected on their use of 

the CFATS PSP application. The 

Department has estimated the time per 

respondent to be 5 minutes per 

submission of a record about an affected 

individual. Since this estimate is based 

on current submissions from Tier 1 and 

Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities, the 

Department has chosen an estimate of 

10 minutes per record to provide a more 

conservative estimate. 

Comment: Two commenters 

expressed concern that the ICR did not 

appear to account for the burden 

associated with part-time or seasonal 

employees or contractors that qualify as 

affected individuals. 

Response: The Department’s estimate 

of the number of affected individuals in 

the 60-day notice was based on actual 

data submitted by covered chemical 

facilities at which seasonal and parttime employees (to include contractors) 

are considered affected individuals. 

Thus, the Department concludes that 

the historical data relied upon in the 60- 

day notice incorporates seasonal and 

part-time employees. 

Comment: Three commenters felt the 

personal identifiable information 

collection is not ‘‘usual and customary’’: 

One commenter disagreed with the 

Department’s decision to invoke 5 CFR 

1320.3(b)(2) to exclude ‘‘certain activities and 

costs related to the PSP data collection 

process.’’ The commenter suggested that two 

assumptions made by the Department are not 

accurate. Specifically, that (a) the 

Department’s assumption that facilities 


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8The term ‘‘groups’’ is a technical term used by 

the Department to describe how a covered chemical 

facility may manage the access to records about 

affected individuals in the CSAT Personnel Surety 

application. The Department describes ‘‘groups’’ 

and provides additional information about how to 

create and manage ‘‘groups in section 9.5 of the 

CSAT User Manual which may be viewed at https:// 

www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/csatportal-user-manual-508-2.pdf. 

9 Information Collection 1670–0007 was approved 

by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of Action and 

Information Collection 1670–0007 may be viewed at 

https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR

?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001. 

10The Department described its assumptions, to 

include updates and corrections, about the 

estimated time per respondent on page 82 FR 61316 

of its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https:// 

www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61316. 

11The possibility of a company-wide approach is 

mentioned in: (1) The CFATS PSP 30-Day notice 

and request for comments published on February 3, 

2014 at 79 FR 6422 that may be viewed at https:// 

www.federalregister.gov/d/2014-02082/page-6422, 

and (2) the CFATS PSP 60-Day notice and request 

for comments published on March 22, 2013 at 78 

FR 17684 that may be viewed at https://

www.federalregister.gov/d/2013-06184/page-17684. 

12The Department describes the potential for a 

company-wide approach in CFATS 

PSPImplementation Notice published on December 

18, 2015 at 80 FR 79064 that may be viewed at 

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page79064. 

13 Information Collection 1670–0007 was 

approved by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of 

Action and Information Collection 1670–0007 may 

be viewed at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001. 

already possess the information necessary to 

submit under Option 1 or Option 2 of the 

CFATS PSP; and (b) the Department’s 

assumption that additional data collection is 

not required and there is no further burden 

imposed by this Information Collection 

beyond submitting the information to the 

Department under Option 1 or Option 2. 

A second commenter also objected to the 

exclusion of ‘‘the time needed for a site 

security officer to manage data collection, 

submissions, and tracking’’ under 5 CFR 

1320.3(b)(2) which is similar to some of the 

examples provided by the first commenter. 

A third commenter expressed concern 

similar in nature that the estimated time per 

respondent does not appear to account for 

acquiring the necessary personal information 

to compare against the TSDB. 

Response: The Department evaluated 

each of the examples provided by the 

commenters. The Department’s 

evaluation of the examples provided by 

the commenters are below: 

i. The Department considered whether the 

CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account 

for the burden associated with coordinating 

with CFATS-facility stakeholders, including 

Human Resources, Procurement, and/or 

Contract Administration to explain the PSP 

requirements and determine how best to 

gather the data from different populations 

(e.g., employees and resident and nonresident contractors). One commenter 

clarified elsewhere in its comments that the 

coordination included creating separate 

groups 8 and ‘‘PSP Submitter [user] accounts 

for each contract company, which may 

include hundreds of different contract 

companies in cases where a large facility is 

tiered for a release security issue.’’ After 

considering the comment, the Department 

did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because 

this burden is properly accounted for under 

a separate and different ICR. The 

establishment of Chemical Security 

Assessment Tool (CSAT) accounts, such as a 

PSP Submitter, and the assignment of such 

accounts to ‘‘groups’’ is covered under 

Information Collection 1670–0007.9

ii. The Department considered whether the 

CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account 

for the burden associated with ‘‘developing 

and providing communications, Privacy Act 

notices, and data collection forms to affected 

individuals.’’ After considering the comment, 

the Department did not revise the CFATS 

PSP ICR because, as described earlier in this 

notice, this burden is already accounted for 

in the 10 minutes per respondent burden 

estimate. 

iii. The Department considered whether 

the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to 

account for the burden associated with 

‘‘ensuring that all affected individuals 

provide the necessary [personally identifiable 

information] PII—and following up with 

those that do not.’’ After considering the 

comment, the Department did not revise the 

CFATS PSP ICR. The collection of data from 

affected individuals by a covered chemical 

facility or its designees is excluded under 5 

CFR 1320.3(b)(2). 

iv. The Department considered whether the 

CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account 

for the burden associated with ‘‘training 

personnel to use the CSAT PSP application.’’ 

After considering the comment, the 

Department did not revise the CFATS PSP 

ICR because the burden is properly 

accounted for under Information Collection 

1670–0007. 

v. The Department considered whether the 

CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account 

for the burden associated with ‘‘ensuring 

change management (e.g., once the initial 

data is gathered and uploaded, the facility 

still must account for new hires and new 

contractors—and further incorporate this into 

the facility access process).’’ After 

considering the comment, the Department 

did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because 

the burden is already accounted for in this 

ICR (See 82 FR 61312, 61316).10 The 

Department laid out the expectations to 

submit both existing affected individuals as 

well as new affected individuals in the ICR 

notices associated with the current 

Information Collection and in the CFATS 

PSP Implementation Notice. The clear 

expectation for covered chemical facilities to 

submit new affected individuals is therefore 

inherently a part of the actual historical data 

upon which the Department relied in the 60- 

day notice. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the CFATS PSP is being 

implemented on a facility-by-facility 

basis rather than a company-wide basis, 

which encourages duplicative processes 

for information collection and vetting 

and dramatically increases the burdens 

on railroads serving more than one 

company location. 

Response: The Department has 

designed the CFATS Program as a 

whole, and the CFATS PSP in 

particular, to allow for a company-wide 

approach. This has been mentioned in 

previous notices 11 and can be found in 

current program guidance and 

resources.12 Some companies have 

opted to implement a company-wide 

approach to the PSP while others have 

not. The design of the CFATS PSP and 

this ICR allows each company with 

multiple covered chemical facilities to 

choose for itself whether or not, or to 

what degree, to adopt a company-wide 

approach under CFATS. 

Comment: One commenter expressed 

concern that the estimated time per 

respondent of five minutes ‘‘does not 

appear to include the additional time 

necessary to notify employees of the 

PSP requirement, obtain consent . . .’’ 

Response: As previously discussed, 

the Department did not revise the 

CFATS PSP ICR because this burden is 

already accounted for in the 10 minutes 

per respondent burden estimate. 

Comment: One commenter is 

concerned with the time it takes 

Authorizer to create CSAT accounts for 

contractors. 

Response: The Department accounts 

for the burden related to the creation of 

CSAT accounts for contractors under 

Information Collection 1670–0007.13

Comments Related to the Quality, 

Utility, and Clarity of the Information 

To Be Collected 

The Department did not receive any 

comments related to the quality, utility, 

and clarity of the information to be 

collected. 

Comments Related To Minimizing the 

Burden of the Collection of the 

Information on Those Who Are To 

Respond, Including Through the Use of 

Appropriate Automated, Electronic 

Mechanical, or Other Technological 

Collection Techniques or Other Forms of 

Information Technology, e.g., Permitting 

Electronic Submissions of Responses 

Comment: Two commenters suggested 

that the Department use a flexible 

approach in the rollout: 

One commenter requested a phased 

roll out of the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and 

Tier 4 covered chemical facilities. 

A second commenter ‘‘appreciate[d] 

that DHS is proposing to roll out these 

requirements in a phased method . . .’’ 

The same commenter also encouraged 

the Department to consider a ‘‘site’s 

various risk factors, including location, 

number of employees, types and 


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14This specific text from the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program Implementation Notice may be 

found on 80 FR 79060 and can be viewed at https:// 

www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page-79060. 

volumes of chemicals of interest, and 

likely offsite incident consequences’’ 

when planning the phased-in approach. 

Response: The Department agrees that 

a flexible approach is appropriate for 

the rollout of the PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 

4 covered chemical facilities. If 

approved, the Department plans to 

implement the CFATS PSP in a phased 

manner to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered 

chemical facilities over a three year 

period. Similar to the successful and 

recent retiering effort, the Department 

plans to consider the number of 

facilities assigned to a single Authorizer 

when notifying facilities to implement 

the PSP, as not to overwhelm a single 

Authorizer. The Department will also 

allow the flexibility for Authorizers, if 

desired, to complete the process for 

their facilities before notification by the 

Department. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department has downplayed 

the use of ‘‘existing options’’ that could 

lessen the burdens on third-party 

service providers, such as railroads, that 

employ affected individuals as defined 

by the covered chemical facility. The 

commenter suggested that one such 

‘‘existing option’’ is real-time video 

monitoring as a means of escort. 

Response: The Department has 

explicitly mentioned in multiple notices 

associated with this Information 

Collection (see 79 FR 6418, 6420) and in 

CFATS PSP resources the possibility of 

innovative escorting alternatives such as 

video monitoring. The Department has 

also worked with facilities to identify 

other alternatives for a covered chemical 

facility to limit who is an affected 

individual. Furthermore, the 

Department provided the following 

guidance to covered chemical facilities 

in the CFATS PSP Implementation 

Notice: 14

‘‘A high-risk chemical facility will 

have flexibility to tailor its 

implementation of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program to fit its individual 

circumstances and, in this regard, to 

best balance who qualifies as an affected 

individual, unique security issues, 

costs, and burden. For example, a highrisk chemical facility may, in its Site 

Security Plan: 

• Restrict the numbers and types of 

persons allowed to access its restricted 

areas and critical assets, thus limiting 

the number of persons who will need to 

be checked for terrorist ties. 

• Define its restricted areas and 

critical assets, thus potentially limiting 

the number of persons who will need to 

be checked for terrorist ties. 

• Choose to escort visitors accessing 

restricted areas and critical assets in lieu 

of performing terrorist ties background 

checks under the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. The high-risk chemical 

facility may propose in its SSP 

traditional escorting solutions and/or 

innovative escorting alternatives such as 

video monitoring (which may reduce 

facility security costs), as appropriate, to 

address the unique security risks 

present at the facility [emphasis 

added].’’ 

Comment: One commenter urged the 

Department to not include additional 

pre-conditions to the CFATS PSP that 

would preclude covered chemical 

facilities from leveraging the 

background checks performed in 

compliance with the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

(ATF) Employee Possessor Program 

under Option 4. 

Response: The Department has not 

modified the CFATS PSP to preclude a 

covered chemical facility from the 

potential of leveraging the vetting 

conducted by ATF under Option 4 for 

affected individuals who possess a 

Federal explosives license/permit. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

that the Department modify CSAT to 

allow designated employees such as 

human resource professionals the ability 

to upload and edit information about 

affected individuals without having to 

access CVI. 

Response: The Department currently 

provides the ability to restrict human 

resource professionals from accessing 

CVI in CSAT. If a user is designated as 

only a Personnel Surety Submitter and 

is not assigned any other facility roles, 

they are not able to access the CVI 

documentation. 

Other Comments Submitted in Response 

to the Information Collection Request 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that compliance with the CFATS PSP 

exposes railroad employee PII and 

exacerbates cyber-security risk. 

Response: The Department disagrees 

with the commenter that the CFATS 

PSP exposes PII and exacerbates cyber 

security risk. If (1) a covered chemical 

facility opts to identify the employee of 

a third-party service provider as an 

affected individual, and (2) a covered 

chemical facility opts to implement 

Option 1 or Option 2 in their SSP or 

ASP then the Department has designed 

the CSAT Personnel Surety Program 

Application to allow third-party 

companies, such as a railroad, to be 

granted access to the CSAT Personnel 

Surety Application for the express 

purpose of submitting information about 

affected individuals directly to the 

Department. 

If a covered chemical facility opts to 

implement Option 3 or Option 4, 

information about affected individuals 

is not submitted to the Department. 

Option 3 allows high-risk chemical 

facilities to comply with the PSP by 

electronically verifying and validating 

the affected individual’s TWICs through 

the use of TWIC readers. Option 4 

provides high-risk chemical facilities 

with the option to visually verify certain 

credentials or documents that are issued 

by a Federal screening program that 

periodically vets enrolled individuals 

against the TSDB. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department ‘‘has encouraged 

covered chemical facilities to collect 

information that exceeds the legal 

requirements.’’ 

Response: The Department outlined 

in the ICR all data elements and 

identified the ones that are required for 

a submission under Option 1 or Option 

2. While the minimum data is sufficient, 

it is the considered judgement of the 

Department that additional information 

reduces the likelihood of false positives 

in matching against records in the 

federal government’s consolidated and 

integrated terrorist watchlist. Although 

helpful in reducing false positives, this 

additional information is optional. 

Comment: Two commenters made 

suggestions as it relates to the 

consistency of inspections: 

One commenter requested that the 

Department ‘‘work with facilities that 

have already been inspected to make 

sure inspections are being handled in a 

consistent fashion.’’ 

A second commenter reported that 

there are ‘‘many regional 

inconsistencies in how inspectors 

conduct inspections within a region.’’ 

Response: Although this comment is 

outside the scope of the information 

collect request, DHS agrees and 

continues to work to ensure inspection 

consistency across the country. 

Comment: One industry association 

commented that any updates to the 

CFATS regulation should be flexible 

and tangible for facility compliance. 

Response: This information collection 

request does not modify existing 

regulations. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that a contradiction exists between the 

CFATS PSP and the railroads 

compliance with DOT regulations. 

Response: The Department disagrees 

with the commenter. If a covered 

chemical facility opts to identify a 

railroad employee as an affected 

individual, the performance of railroads 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices 28251 

with respect to complying with DOT 

regulations, does not materially alter the 

fact that a railroad employee is an 

affected individual. Covered chemical 

facilities must ensure that affected 

individuals have appropriate 

background checks performed, to 

include a check for terrorist ties. This 

ICR allows covered chemical facilities, 

and their service providers that employ 

affected individuals, an opportunity to 

enable a check for terrorist ties to be 

performed against the TSDB. 

Comment: One commenter stated that 

the CFATS PSP, as currently designed, 

‘‘does not take into consideration that 

Tier 3 and 4 facilities present a 

comparatively lower risk profile than 

Tier 1 and 2 sites.’’ The commenter 

suggested that the Department 

acknowledge the lower risk profile of 

Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical 

facilities and not require them to 

comply with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). 

The commenter requested that Tier 3 

and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities 

still be allowed to voluntarily 

participate. 

Response: The Department believes 

that 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv) mitigates 

the risk of an individual with terrorist 

ties having insider access. Terrorist 

insiders could cause significant harm to 

the United States through access to any 

tiered chemical facility. To achieve the 

anti-terrorism objective of CFATS, it is 

necessary to mitigate this risk by 

conducting terrorist ties checks at all 

covered facilities. RBPS 12 accordingly 

requires terrorist ties checks for 

facilities of all four tiers. 

Comment: One commenter questioned 

the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP if 

‘‘absent a clear national security, 

homeland security, or law enforcement 

rationale . . . DHS does not follow-up 

with the company to alert it of the 

possible threat.’’ The commenter further 

stated that the ‘‘value of conducting 

TSDB screening is questionable if an 

identified bad actor is permitted 

continued access to [chemicals of 

interest] unbeknownst to the facility, 

which is in the best position to ensure 

that the person is not afforded that 

opportunity.’’ 

Response: The Department’s design of 

the CFATS Program is intended to 

promote and enhance the security of 

high-risk chemical facilities; the PSP is 

one element of the larger CFATS 

Program. To prevent a significant threat 

to a facility or loss of life, a high-risk 

chemical facility will be contacted 

where appropriate and in accordance 

with federal law and policy, and per law 

enforcement and intelligence 

requirements. 

The Department’s Methodology in 

Estimating the Burden for the CFATS 

PSP 

This 30-day notice relies on the 

analysis and resulting burden estimates 

in the 60-day notice for this instrument. 

Analysis 

Title: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety 

Program. 

OMB Number: 1670–0029. 

Instrument: CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program. 

Frequency: ‘‘Other.’’ 

Affected Public: Business or other forprofit. 

Number of Annual Respondents: 72,607 

respondents (estimate). 

Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.1667 

hours (10 minutes). 

Total Annual Burden Hours: 12,101 

hours. 

Total Annual Burden Cost (capital/ 

startup): $1,719,409. 

Total Annual Burden Cost: $955,191. 

Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0. 

David Epperson, 

Chief Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2018–12523 Filed 6–15–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9P–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Fish and Wildlife Service 

[FWS–R8–ES–2018–N009; 

FXES11130800000–189–FF08E00000] 

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife 

and Plants; Initiation of 5-Year Status 

Reviews of 50 Species in California, 

Nevada, and the Klamath Basin of 

Oregon 

AGENCY: Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Interior. 

ACTION: Notice of initiation of reviews; 

request for information. 

SUMMARY: We, the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service (Service), are initiating 

5-year status reviews of 50 species in 

California, Nevada, and the Klamath 

Basin of Oregon under the Endangered 

Species Act of 1973, as amended (Act). 

A 5-year review is based on the best 

scientific and commercial data available 

at the time of the review; therefore, we 

are requesting submission of any new 

information on these species that has 

become available since the last review. 

DATES: To ensure consideration in our 

reviews, we are requesting submission 

of new information no later than August 

17, 2018. However, we will continue to 

accept new information about any 

species at any time. 

ADDRESSES: For how and where to send 

information, see Request for New 

Information. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

whom to contact for species-specific 

information, see Request for New 

Information. Individuals who are 

hearing impaired or speech impaired 

may call the Federal Relay Service at 

800–877–8337 for TTY assistance. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Why do we conduct 5-year reviews? 

Under the Endangered Species Act of 

1973, as amended (Act; 16 U.S.C. 1531 

et seq.), we maintain lists of endangered 

and threatened wildlife and plant 

species (referred to as the List) in the 

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) at 50 

CFR 17.11 (for wildlife) and 17.12 (for 

plants). Section 4(c)(2)(A) of the Act 

requires us to review each listed 

species’ status at least once every 5 

years. For additional information about 

5-year reviews, refer to our factsheet at 

http://www.fws.gov/endangered/whatwe-do/recovery-overview.html. 

What information do we consider in 

our review? 

A 5-year review considers all new 

information available at the time of the 

review. In conducting these reviews, we 

consider the best scientific and 

commercial data that have become 

available since the listing determination 

or most recent status review, such as: 

(A) Species biology, including but not 

limited to population trends, 

distribution, abundance, demographics, 

and genetics; 

(B) Habitat conditions, including but 

not limited to amount, distribution, and 

suitability; 

(C) Conservation measures that have 

been implemented to benefit the 

species; 

(D) Threat status and trends in 

relation to the five listing factors (as 

defined in section 4(a)(1) of the Act); 

and 

(E) Other new information, data, or 

corrections, including but not limited to 

taxonomic or nomenclatural changes, 

identification of erroneous information 

contained in the List, and improved 

analytical methods. 

Any new information will be 

considered during the 5-year review and 

will also be useful in evaluating the 

ongoing recovery programs for the 

species. 

Which species are under review? 

This notice announces our active 

review of the species listed in the table 

below. 


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