United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-2232 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

CARLOS R. CAMACHO-SANTIAGO, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Thompson, Dyk, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Raul S. Mariani Franco for appellant. 

Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Senior Appellate 

Counsel, United States Attorney's Office, with whom Rosa Emilia 

Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. BauzáAlmonte, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were 

on brief, for appellee. 

March 15, 2017 

 

 Of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by 

designation. 
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KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Carlos 

Camacho-Santiago ("Camacho") of two counts of drug trafficking 

based on his involvement in a criminal conspiracy to move cocaine 

in luggage stowed on commercial airline flights from Puerto Rico 

to the mainland United States. On appeal, Camacho raises an array 

of challenges to his conviction based on the contention that he 

was not a member of the conspiracy proven at trial. He also argues 

that his conviction depended upon the erroneous admission of 

hearsay evidence and that the district court failed to do enough 

to ensure the jury could fairly render a verdict. Finding the 

evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction as a member of the 

conspiracy charged in the indictment and proven at trial, and 

finding no other reversible error, we affirm. 

I. Background 

In May 2012, a grand jury indicted Camacho and nineteen 

others on two criminal counts arising out of a drug trafficking 

conspiracy. We described the charged conspiracy in our recent 

opinion vacating the conviction of another individual, Nelson 

Pereira. See United States v. Pereira, 848 F.3d 17, 19–20 (1st 

Cir. 2017). In brief, the indictment alleged that Wilfredo 

Rodríguez-Rosado ("Rodríguez")--not indicted here--created and ran 

an operation using baggage handlers to smuggle cocaine on American 

Airlines flights from Puerto Rico to the mainland over roughly a 
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ten-year period beginning in 1999. The indictment charged Camacho 

with two counts of joining and aiding and abetting this conspiracy. 

Rodríguez did not oversee the distribution process in 

the continental United States, nor was he the original source of 

the cocaine that made its way onto American Airlines flights. The 

cocaine was furnished by a variety of suppliers who brought their 

cocaine supply to Rodríguez's people and worked with them to get 

cocaine packaged and delivered to American Airlines employees at 

Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in San Juan. One such 

supplier was Carlos Arce Lopez ("Arce"), who first connected with 

Rodríguez through Camacho. 

Gerardo Torres Rodríguez ("Torres"), one of the 

government's key witnesses against Camacho, testified that 

Rodríguez offered to forgive a debt Camacho owed him if Camacho 

brought him a new supplier, and that Camacho accepted that offer 

by bringing Arce to Rodríguez. According to Torres, on at least 

three occasions, Camacho traveled with him to Newark to test the 

route for Arce, pick up suitcases of drugs, and collect money to 

return to Puerto Rico. Arnaldo Sierra-Menendez ("Sierra") also 

testified that Camacho worked for Arce and that on one occasion 

when some cocaine went missing, Camacho and Rodríguez confronted 

Sierra about his involvement in the drugs' disappearance. Sierra 

testified that Camacho pointed a gun at him while asking what 

happened to the cocaine and threatening to kill him. The only 
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other witness who offered first-hand testimony as to Camacho's 

involvement in the conspiracy was Javier Olmo-Rivera ("Olmo"), a 

member of Rodríguez's organization who testified that every 

supplier had an intermediary who delivered the cocaine to the 

airport and facilitated the trafficking group's connection to the 

supplier, and that Camacho was the person who delivered Arce's 

cocaine. 

Rodríguez did not testify, but many other members of the 

conspiracy did. Torres and Sierra both testified as to statements 

Rodríguez made concerning the conspiracy and Camacho's alleged 

role in it, testimony the court allowed as relating out-of-court 

statements of a coconspirator. The jury convicted Camacho on both 

counts, and the judge sentenced him to 360 months' imprisonment. 

This timely appeal followed. 

II. Discussion 

 Camacho begins with two arguments that train on the 

nature of the conspiracy proven at trial. He contends that the 

evidence was insufficient to convict him of the one conspiracy 

charged. Alternatively, he contends that the jury should have 

been told more expressly that proof of multiple conspiracies rather 

than the one conspiracy alleged in the indictment was not grounds 

for conviction. Third, Camacho challenges the admission of what 

he says is hearsay evidence. Fourth, he requests a new trial 

because he claims the jury was twice contaminated. Fifth, he avers 
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that the court read testimony back to the jury during deliberations 

without taking adequate steps to ensure the jury did not place 

undue weight on what it heard.1 We address these arguments in 

their logical order. 

A. One Conspiracy, Or More? 

The indictment alleged a conspiracy to "possess with 

intent to distribute [cocaine]." The specific object of the 

conspiracy was "to smuggle into American Airlines commercial 

aircrafts, suitcases filled with large amounts of cocaine to be 

transported from Puerto Rico to the continental United States with 

the intent to generate and obtain large monetary profits." Against 

this backdrop, the essence of Camacho's conspiracy-related 

arguments is that the evidence showed at least two conspiracies, 

not one, and he was not a part of the only one alleged in the 

indictment. To demonstrate the existence of at least two 

conspiracies rather than one, he describes the evidence as perhaps 

showing him in a conspiracy with Arce, as Arce's employee, to 

supply cocaine to Rodríguez, who in turn ran a separate conspiracy 

 1 In the table of contents to his opening brief, Camacho also 

lists as one issue for review whether "the district court committed 

reversible error by applying a higher than legally mandated 

guideline range for Mr. Camacho and when it sentenced Camacho to 

360 months based on such erroneous guideline." His briefs, though, 

never address this issue or argue that such error occurred. The 

issue is therefore waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 

1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory 

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, 

are deemed waived."). 
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to smuggle cocaine into the continental United States. This "twoconspiracy" description provides the launch pad for two arguments: 

the evidence was insufficient to convict Camacho of a single 

conspiracy; alternatively, the evidence was at least ambiguous 

enough to warrant what Camacho calls a "multiple conspiracy" 

instruction. By that he means an instruction telling the jury 

that it should decide whether the government has proved one or 

multiple conspiracies, and that Camacho must be found not guilty 

if he did not join the conspiracy alleged, even if he joined 

another. Camacho requested such an instruction, but it was not 

given. Because the argument challenging the instructions is an 

easier one for a defendant to support, we address it first. 

"A trial court should grant a defendant's request for a 

multiple conspiracy instruction if, on the evidence adduced at 

trial, a reasonable jury could find more than one such illicit 

agreement, or could find an agreement different from the one 

charged." United States v. Ramírez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1, 45 (1st 

Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 449 

(1st Cir. 1994)). "To determine whether a set of criminal 

activities constitutes a single conspiracy, we generally look to 

three factors: (1) the existence of a common goal, (2) overlap 

among the activities' participants, and (3) interdependence among 

the participants." United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 26 (1st 

Cir. 2012). "A general scheme may exist 'notwithstanding 
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variations in personnel and their roles over time.'" Id. (quoting 

United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 665 (1st Cir. 2000)). "'The 

goal of selling cocaine for profit' satisfies the common goal 

requirement. That each defendant had an interest in furthering 

the distribution of cocaine is also sufficient evidence that they 

shared a common goal with the other participants." United States 

v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir. 1999) (footnotes and 

citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 

1075 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

We review a preserved challenge to a district court's 

decision not to provide a multiple conspiracy instruction for abuse 

of discretion, but "[w]e will reverse a district court's decision 

not to provide a multiple conspiracy instruction only if the 

defendant can show that he suffered substantial prejudice." United 

States v. Díaz, 670 F.3d 332, 350 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing United 

States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 139 (1st Cir. 2008)). "In the 

context of alleged multiple conspiracies, the defendant's main 

concern is that jurors will be misled into attributing guilt to a 

particular defendant based on evidence presented against others 

who were involved in a different and separate conspiratorial 

scheme." Brandon, 17 F.3d at 450. 

The evidence at trial, to the extent it pointed a finger 

at Camacho, was unambiguous on three points: securing a supply of 

cocaine was an essential element of Rodríguez's conspiracy to 
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distribute; Rodríguez recruited Camacho into the conspiracy to 

find a supplier; and Camacho knew, in great detail, how the 

smuggling portion of the conspiracy operated, and actually tested 

out the route and delivered drugs and money himself. In short, if 

the evidence was to be believed at all, there was: (1) "the 

existence of a common goal, (2) interdependence among 

participants, and (3) overlap among the participants." United 

States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 111 (1st Cir. 2011). 

The fact that the conspiracy had several integrated 

steps does not mean that each step could reasonably be seen as a 

separate conspiracy, at least where the evidence shows Camacho was 

aware of all the steps. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 434 

F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing that it was not plainly 

erroneous for a district court to refuse to give a multiple 

conspiracy instruction where the evidence demonstrated the 

defendant knew the extent of the conspiracy alleged and acted in 

furtherance of it). A person need not be involved at every level 

of a conspiracy to be a participant in it. See Brandon, 17 F.3d 

at 451. At any point in time in the course of the conspiracy, it 

could be said of Camacho that which the indictment alleged: he 

was involved in a scheme to possess cocaine with the intent of 

shipping it on commercial flights into the continental United 

States for sale. By supplying drugs to Rodríguez and ensuring 

that those drugs successfully made their way through his packaging-
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and-distribution operation, Camacho's "aspect of the scheme [was] 

necessary [and] advantageous to the success of" Rodríguez's 

distribution scheme. Portela, 167 F.3d at 695. To find on this 

evidence that Camacho was engaged only in a conspiracy with Arce 

to supply cocaine to Rodríguez would be like saying that a center 

on a football team was engaged only in a conspiracy to supply the 

ball to the quarterback but was otherwise not a part of the team. 

Nor did the government's case suggest any alternative 

conspiracy that might have attracted jurors as a possible basis 

for convicting Camacho. He does point to two snippets of testimony 

that Rodríguez and Camacho met each other when they "started" 

"doing business" with an individual named Tun Tun. The evidence 

was obviously aimed at explaining how Camacho and Rodríguez met. 

It concerned events "much" before 1999. While a juror could have 

inferred that the "business" was drug smuggling, the testimony 

contained no details at all about any smuggling at that time, or 

about Camacho's involvement. Nor was it presented or argued as a 

possible alternative conspiracy upon which jurors might rest a 

verdict. 

Camacho also argues that a multiple conspiracy 

instruction was necessary because of evidence of a smuggling 

conspiracy that predated the one alleged and that involved Sierra, 

Rodríguez, and another drug trafficker; evidence of a similar, 

concurrent drug-trafficking conspiracy in which another drug 
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trafficker used Rodríguez's same smuggling method and facilities 

to ship cocaine to the mainland United States; and the government's 

references to other drug traffickers separately working to supply 

Rodríguez with cocaine for his smuggling operation. But Camacho 

does not argue, nor does the record show, that the government's 

evidence purported or even attempted to show that Camacho was a 

participant in any of these other conspiracies. Simply put, the 

government did not adduce evidence tending to show that Camacho 

was involved in any conspiracy but the one alleged in the 

indictment. 

Adding belt to suspenders, we note that the district 

court told the jury that it needed to find beyond a reasonable 

doubt "that the agreement specified in the Indictment, and not 

some other agreement or agreements, existed between at least two 

people . . . to possess with intent to distribute cocaine." We 

have found virtually identical instructions sufficient in similar 

cases in which a defendant challenged a district court's refusal 

to give a multiple conspiracy instruction. See United States v. 

Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 126–27 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 315–16 (1st Cir. 2004). And while more 

might be said on the matter by a judge in a case posing a greater 

risk of confusion, see, e.g., United States v. Trainor, 477 F.3d 

24, 34 & n.20 (1st Cir. 2007), this was not such a case.
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The foregoing discussion also removes the heart from 

Camacho's insufficiency argument, which rests on the assertion 

that there was no evidence of the single conspiracy charged. Here, 

the indictment, the evidence, the instructions, and the verdict 

all aligned: at Rodríguez's request, Camacho secured a supply for 

the smuggling pipeline and otherwise knowingly assisted in using 

the pipeline to convert cocaine into dollars by shipping it from 

Puerto Rico for sale in the mainland United States. 

B. Hearsay 

Camacho's hearsay argument trains on the trial court's 

admission of the testimony by Torres and Sierra relating what 

Rodríguez told them about Camacho's role in the conspiracy. 

Camacho's principal argument challenging the admission of that 

testimony relies on his claim that he was not a member of 

Rodríguez's conspiracy, thus Rodríguez's out-of-court statements 

were not admissible against him. This argument fails in the wake 

of our determination that the evidence amply supported a finding 

that the two were in the conspiracy together. 

That leaves Camacho with a second, more technical 

argument. He points out that when affirming a tentative decision 

to admit the challenged testimony subject to proof of the 

conspiracy, and in listing the names of the conspirators, the 

district court neglected to mention the undisputed leader, 

Rodríguez, by name. Having read the district court's comments, we 
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think it fairly plain that the court was including the leader of 

the conspiracy even though the court did not mention him by name. 

Guided by the initial objections, none of which challenged 

Rodríguez's role as a leader of the conspiracy, the court appears 

to have been concerned not with listing every person who, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, appeared to be a member of the 

conspiracy, but rather, with listing the testifying witnesses 

capable of relaying the statements of their named-defendant 

coconspirators. In any event (and likely because Rodríguez's 

inclusion was obvious), Camacho did not object or in any way point 

out the exclusion when it was clear that the court would have 

readily confirmed our reading of its statement if asked. The 

objection is therefore forfeited (if not waived) and our foregoing 

discussion of the conspiracy evidence negates any possibility of 

finding plain error. 

C. Jury Contamination 

Camacho trains his final two arguments on the district 

court's handling of two procedural issues separate and distinct 

from the issues of proof discussed above. 

A week into Camacho's trial, Juror Number 23 advised the 

U.S. Marshal assigned to the jury that Camacho's stepson had 

approached her at her place of business. The Marshal informed the 

court, which conducted voir dire of the juror in the presence of 

the parties and outside the presence of the other jurors. 
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Questioning revealed that Camacho's stepson had approached Juror 

Number 23 to tell her that the case against Camacho was 

"fabricated" and Camacho was "a good person." Juror Number 23 

also indicated that she had not spoken to any other jurors about 

the incident. The government argued for Juror Number 23's 

dismissal; Camacho and his codefendants argued against it. The 

district court sided with the government, excusing Juror 

Number 23--in the presence of the rest of the jury--because of the 

"situation" in which she had been "involved" and advising her to 

"not contact any of the jurors about this case or what happened or 

anything having to do with this case." Juror Number 23 agreed and 

departed. No party lodged any objection to the court's 

instructions to Juror Number 23. 

A few weeks later, a second, unrelated incident occurred 

involving prosecution witness Juan Delgado-Biaggi ("Delgado"), a 

former American Airlines crew chief who had participated in the 

drug smuggling operation. Delgado advised a court security officer 

that he recognized Juror Number 60. The officer informed the court 

and a recess was called. After questioning Delgado outside the 

presence of the jury, the court questioned Juror Number 60 outside 

the presence of the other jurors (and Delgado). Juror Number 60 

told the court that he had seen Delgado working as an American 

Airlines employee. He also informed the court that he had 

mentioned as much to another juror, Juror Number 8, during 
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Delgado's testimony. Juror Number 60 told the court that he had 

not made any other comments to any other members of the jury.

Shortly thereafter, the court questioned Juror Number 8. 

Juror Number 8 stated that she did not know whether or not Juror 

Number 60 said anything to her about Delgado, explaining, "I know 

I heard that he told me that one of them he kind of seen him--

like, he recognizes as he saw him, but he didn't make it for sure. 

He didn't say for sure, as far as I know." She said that she 

"didn't talk to anybody about it" and that it would "[n]ot at all" 

affect her impartiality. The court denied the defendants' request 

for complete voir dire of the entire jury and denied the 

defendants' subsequent motion for a mistrial. The court then 

excused Juror Number 60 and instructed him to have no further 

contact with the other jurors. It did not excuse Juror Number 8, 

but it did instruct her to refrain from discussing the incident. 

On appeal, Camacho argues that the district court abused 

its discretion when it refused to conduct full voir dire to ensure 

that no other jurors were affected by either incident.2 As to the 

 2 Camacho appears also to argue that by obliquely referring 

to Juror Number 23's "situation" in the presence of the other 

jurors, the district court created some measure of mistrust or 

bias against the defendants. Camacho did not raise this issue 

below, so we review for plain error. See United States v. DeLeon, 

187 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 1999). We do not see how the court's 

vague, euphemistic reference to Juror Number 23's run-in with 

Camacho's stepson could have engendered in the minds of the 

remaining jurors anything more than curiosity. The district court 

did not plainly err. 
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first incident (involving Juror Number 23), we find that Camacho 

has waived any argument challenging the trial court's failure to 

question the entire jury. When the government sought Juror 

Number 23's removal because of her contact with a person friendly 

to the defense, Camacho objected, arguing that the juror testified 

that she could remain impartial and did not feel threatened. 

Having affirmatively made such an argument below, Camacho cannot 

now argue on appeal that it was plain error for the court not to 

investigate further whether other jurors may have been 

contaminated by Juror Number 23 to Camacho's prejudice. See United 

States v. Gaffney-Kessell, 772 F.3d 97, 100 (1st Cir. 2014) 

(observing that waiver occurs where a party's actions "ring not of 

oversight, inadvertence, or neglect in asserting a potential 

right, but rather of a deliberate course of conduct" (citation 

omitted)). 

As to the second incident, Camacho joined his 

codefendants in arguing for full voir dire and objecting to the 

court's decision to retain Juror Number 8, so we review the court's 

decision for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Morosco, 

822 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2016). In response to a nonfrivolous 

claim that a jury might be biased or contaminated, a district court 

is required to inquire into whether contamination occurred and, if 

so, whether such contamination was prejudicial. See United States 

v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458, 464 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. 
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Bristol-Mártir, 570 F.3d 29, 42 (1st Cir. 2009). "[T]he trial 

court has wide discretion to fashion an appropriate procedure for 

assessing whether the jury has been exposed to substantively 

damaging information, and if so, whether cognizable prejudice is 

an inevitable and ineradicable concomitant of that exposure." 

United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2002). We 

will defer to a trial court's finding that the jury was not 

contaminated "[s]o long as the district judge erects, and employs, 

a suitable framework for investigating the allegation and gauging 

its effects, and thereafter spells out his findings with adequate 

specificity to permit informed appellate review." United States 

v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir. 1990). 

Camacho argues that the district court abused its 

discretion because it did not do enough to ascertain whether Juror 

Number 60's recognition of a witness and the juror's act of 

disclosing such recognition to one of his fellow jurors led to 

contamination. As an initial matter, we find the claim of bias or 

contamination tenuous at best. After all, the witness's employment 

was not a matter of dispute, and Juror Number 60 merely reported 

that he had seen the witness before and knew the witness worked 

for American Airlines. While the cautious judge with an available 

alternate did not abuse his discretion in excusing Juror Number 60, 

that decision did not turn Juror Number 60 into a Typhoid Mary of 

bias warranting any extraordinary effort to root out all 
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contamination. In any event, the district court took adequate 

steps to ensure that Juror Number 60's comments to Juror Number 8 

had no effect on Juror Number 8's ability to decide the case 

impartially and that those comments were not shared with any other 

members of the jury. On this record, the district court was 

entitled to deem the jurors' explanations credible. We, in turn, 

have no reason not to believe that both jurors followed the court's 

instructions. See United States v. Pagán-Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573, 

587–88 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Correia v. Fitzgerald, 354 F.3d 

47, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Assuming that venirepersons pass through 

this screen [of voir dire], the trial court may operate on the 

presumption that the chosen jurors will obey the judge's 

instructions to put extraneous matters aside and decide each case 

on its merits."). The district court did not abuse its discretion. 

D. Testimony Read-Back 

Camacho's final challenge concerns the district court's 

handling of the jury's request to hear certain testimony read back 

after the jury began deliberations. During deliberations, the 

jury sent a note to the court asking to hear Torres's testimony 

again. The parties agreed that the court would read back Torres's 

entire testimony, including both direct and cross examination. 

The jury returned to the courtroom and the courtroom deputy read 

Torres's direct examination, including a portion of the 

examination in which Torres explained that he had traveled with 
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Camacho from New Jersey to Puerto Rico. When the court finished 

reading Torres's direct testimony, the jury sent a note to the 

court stating: "[W]e do not need to hear the contra-interrogatory. 

Thank you for your support. Respectfully." The court without 

objection polled the jury, and every one of the jurors confirmed 

that they did not want to hear cross-examination again. The court 

thus allowed the jury to resume deliberations without hearing 

Torres's cross-examination anew. The court shortly thereafter 

admonished the jury not to place additional weight on Torres's 

direct testimony just because they did not rehear the cross. 

Camacho argues on appeal that the court committed 

reversible error by reading back Torres's direct testimony without 

reading back his testimony on cross-examination. Camacho contends 

that the court's choice to permit the jury to return to the jury 

room without rehearing Torres's complete testimony kept the jury 

from hearing Torres state that, contrary to his direct testimony 

that he and Camacho returned to Puerto Rico from a trip to New 

Jersey they took together, he in fact flew back from Philadelphia 

while Camacho flew back from New Jersey. As Camacho sees it, 

Torres effectively recanted his direct testimony on cross. Camacho 

argues that Torres's contradictory testimony undermined the 

government's proof and demonstrated Torres's lack of credibility. 

According to Camacho, allowing Torres's direct testimony to be 

heard without his cross-examination functionally rehabilitated 
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Torres as a witness and reasserted his faulty testimony. Camacho 

did not object at the time this alleged error occurred, so we 

review for plain error. See United States v. Flores-Rivera, 787 

F.3d 1, 30 (1st Cir. 2015). 

The district court did not plainly err. For one thing, 

"our circuit has yet to establish any bright-line rules on readback procedures." Id. The district court thus could not have 

plainly erred because a plain error is one that is clear and 

obvious, and "an error will not be clear or obvious where the 

challenged issue of law is unsettled." United States v. Goodhue, 

486 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2007). We need keep in mind, too, a 

jury's practical ability to decide what evidence to focus on during 

its deliberations. Jurors might discuss part of a witness's 

testimony, or part of a document. One simply does not normally 

know when this happens. The fact that in this instance we happen 

to know that the jury was interested in rehearing only Torres's 

direct testimony provides no reason to force-feed the jury a readback that it expressly deemed unnecessary. In short, the court 

likely made no error, much less plain error, in declining to 

require the jury during deliberations to rehear testimony that it 

specifically stated it had no need to rehear. 
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III. Conclusion 

Finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 

verdict and observing no other reversible errors in the record 

below, we affirm.