Nos. 19-56397 & 20-55066

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JACQUES POUJADE,

Objector-Appellant,

TRUE PHARMASTRIP, INC.,

Movant-Appellant,

JASON CARDIFF, et al.,

Defendants.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California

No. 5:18-cv-02104-DMG-PLA

The Honorable Dolly M. Gee

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

ANSWERING BRIEF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel

Of Counsel:

ELIZABETH JONES SANGER 

SHIRA D. MODELL 

JAMES A. PRUNTY 

EDWIN RODRIGUEZ 

Attorneys

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20580

MARK S. HEGEDUS

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 326-2115

mhegedus@ftc.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities................................................................................................. iii

Introduction................................................................................................................1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................2

A. Jacques Poujade (No. 19-56397).....................................................................2

B. True Pharmastrip, Inc. (No. 20-55066). ..........................................................2

Questions Presented ...................................................................................................2

Statutes and Regulations............................................................................................3

Statement of the Case.................................................................................................4

A. The FTC’s Enforcement Action and the TRO/PI...............................................4

B. Poujade, TPI, and the Transfer of Assets in Violation of the 

TRO/PI................................................................................................................8

C. The Contempt Orders........................................................................................10

D. TPI’s Motion to Intervene. ...............................................................................17

Summary of Argument ............................................................................................17

Argument..................................................................................................................20

I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction In No. 19-56397, But The District 

Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Holding Poujade In 

Contempt In Any Event....................................................................................20

A. Standard of Review. .................................................................................20

B. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Poujade’s Appeal. .......................21

C. The District Court Correctly Held Poujade in Contempt for 

Violating the TRO/PI’s Asset Freeze and Transfer 

Requirements............................................................................................24

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D. The District Court Correctly Held Poujade in Contempt for 

Not Complying with the TRO/PI’s Expedited Discovery 

Provisions. ................................................................................................28

1. The TRO/PI did not require the FTC to file a motion to 

compel...............................................................................................28

2. The purge conditions were not criminal punishment. ......................31

II. The District Court Correctly Denied TPI’s Motion to Intervene. ....................35

A. Standard of Review. .................................................................................35

B. The District Court Correctly Rejected TPI’s Intervention as 

of Right.....................................................................................................35

1. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

TPI’s intervention to be untimely.....................................................36

2. The District Court correctly concluded that TPI does 

not have a significantly protectable interest in the 

pending action...................................................................................39

3. TPI’s ownership claims are not impeded in the absence 

of intervention...................................................................................43

4. TPI will represent its own interests if and when the 

district court considers its ownership claim. ....................................45

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion when It 

Denied Permissive Intervention. ..............................................................46

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................48

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906)....................................................23

Black & Veatch Corp. v. Modesto Irrigation District, 

2011 WL 4842319 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011)......................................................44

CFTC v. Emerald Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 2004 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 27511 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2004)......................................................41

CFTC v. Heritage Capital Advisory Servs., Ltd., 736 F.2d 

384 (7th Cir. 1984)...............................................................................................43

CFTC v. Topworth Intern. Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 

1999).....................................................................................................................43

David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1977) ..............................................22

Donovan v. Mazzola, 761 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1985)..............................................21

FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 

1999).....................................................................................................................20

FTC v. Johnson, 2013 WL 4039069 (D. Nev. Aug. 5, 

2013).....................................................................................................................38

FTC v. Loss Mitigation Servs., 2009 WL 10673186 (C.D. 

Cal. Dec 7, 2009) .................................................................................................41

FTC v. Pricewert LLC, 2010 WL 94264 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

6, 2010) ................................................................................................................43

Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1984)............................................. 20, 25

Hicks v. Freick, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) ......................................................................31

Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., 663 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 

1981).....................................................................................................................45

In re Campbell, 628 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980).......................................................24

In re Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, 663 

F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2011)........................................................................... 29, 34

In re Fannie Mae Securities Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................... 33, 34

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 

1297 (9th Cir. 1997)................................................................................ 35, 36, 46

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Nelson v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1120 

(C.D. Cal. 2013)...................................................................................................45

Orange Cty. v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986)............................................46

Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 708 F.2d 492 

(9th Cir. 1983)......................................................................................................30

Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Advocates 

for Life, Inc., 877 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1989) .........................................................23

Rabkin v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 350 F.3d 967 

(9th Cir. 2003)......................................................................................................35

Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 

1468 (9th Cir. 1992)...................................................................................... 21, 24

Schering Corp. v. Illinois Antibiotics Co., 62 F.3d 903 

(7th Cir. 1995)......................................................................................................21

SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1992) .......................................................44

SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).........................................................43

SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................44

SEC v. Lefebvre, 2004 WL 2696731 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 

2004).....................................................................................................................42

SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1986).........................................................44

Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1999).......................................................37

Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 

810 (9th Cir. 2001)...............................................................................................39

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) ............................................................ 31, 34

United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915 (9th 

Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 36, 43

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STATUTES

15 U.S.C. § 1693o......................................................................................................4

15 U.S.C. § 45............................................................................................................4

15 U.S.C. § 52............................................................................................................4

15 U.S.C. § 6105........................................................................................................4

15 U.S.C. § 8404........................................................................................................4

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.......................................................................................... 3, 35, 46

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.............................................................................................. 18, 28

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INTRODUCTION

These consolidated interlocutory appeals arise from ongoing district court 

proceedings involving a wide-ranging scheme of fraud and deception perpetrated 

by Defendants Jason and Eunjung Cardiff through companies that they own. In 

No. 19-56397, non-party Jacques Poujade, a business partner of the Cardiffs, seeks 

review of district court orders holding him in contempt for helping the Cardiffs 

avoid an asset freeze and for violating expedited discovery obligations. Poujade

has since purged the contempt relating to the asset freeze by transferring assets to a 

court-appointed receiver. As for his response to the expedited discovery provision 

and contempt orders, Poujade produced some documents on July 10, 2020, but it is 

not yet known whether he has, in fact, fulfilled his obligations.

Meanwhile, True Pharmastrip, Inc. (TPI), for which Poujade currently serves 

as CEO, sought to intervene in the district court proceedings in order to lay claim 

to the assets Poujade transferred to the Receiver. The district court denied 

intervention, finding that TPI could protect any interest in the assets during postjudgment proceedings following any ruling that the Defendants broke the law. In 

No. 20-55066, TPI appeals the district court’s denial of the motion to intervene.

This Court should dismiss Poujade’s appeal in No. 19-56397 for lack of 

jurisdiction. The contempt order from which he appeals merely established 

conditions for Poujade to purge his violation. It imposed no sanction and is thus 

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non-appealable. Separately, Poujade’s challenge to the contempt finding regarding 

evasion of the asset freeze is moot, since Poujade purged the contempt by 

transferring the assets as required. Should the Court reach the merits, it should 

affirm the district court’s contempt findings, which plainly applied to Poujade and

which he does not dispute he violated.

The Court should also affirm the district court’s denial of TPI’s motion to 

intervene. The motion was untimely, which alone provides sufficient grounds for 

affirmance. In addition, TPI has no significant protectable interest in the ongoing 

proceedings; its asserted ownership of the transferred assets presents a separate 

issue, independent from the merits of the underlying case, that TPI will be able to 

protect in any post-judgment proceedings. 

JURISDICTION

A. Jacques Poujade (No. 19-56397).

For the reasons set forth in Argument Section I.B. below, this Court lacks 

jurisdiction over Jacques Poujade’s appeal.

B. True Pharmastrip, Inc. (No. 20-55066).

The FTC does not contest this Court’s jurisdiction over TPI’s appeal.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal (Case 

No. 19-56397) from a district court contempt order that did not impose sanctions.

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2. Whether the Court may consider the appeal (Case No. 19-56397) of a 

contempt order where the contemnor has purged his contempt.

3. Whether the district court correctly held Poujade in contempt for 

failing to comply with its order to transfer Receivership Assets to the Receiver.

4. Whether the district court correctly held Poujade in contempt for

failing to produce communications as required by multiple district court orders.

5. Whether the district court correctly denied an untimely motion to 

intervene to protect property interests, when the grounds for intervention did not 

involve the subject matter of the case, and any ownership interest could be fully 

assessed post-trial.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 provides: 

(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. 

On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: 

(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or

(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 

subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action 

may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to 

protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that 

interest. 

(b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. 

(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to 

intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a 

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federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main 

action a common question of law or fact. 

(2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court 

may permit a federal or state governmental officer or agency to 

intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or 

executive order administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any 

regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the 

statute or executive order. 

(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must 

consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 

adjudication of the original parties’ rights.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The FTC’s Enforcement Action and the TRO/PI.

In October 2018, the FTC sued the Cardiffs along with a handful of other 

individual and corporate defendants for running a wide-ranging scheme of fraud 

and deception that violated the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52, the Restore 

Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8404, the Electronic Fund Transfer 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o(c), and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 

Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6105.

1 ER96. The complaint alleges that the scheme 

encompasses, among other things, false and unsubstantiated claims that 

Defendants’ oral dissolvable thin film strips would help smoking cessation, 

 1 Besides Jason Cardiff and Eunjung Cardiff (a/k/a Eunjung Lee, a/k/a Eunjung 

No), Defendants include Danielle Cadiz, a/k/a Danielle Walker; Redwood 

Scientific Technologies, Inc. (California); Redwood Scientific Technologies, Inc. 

(Nevada); Redwood Scientific Technologies, Inc. (Delaware); Identify, LLC; 

Advanced Men’s Institute Prolongz LLC; Run Away Products, LLC; and Carols 

Place Limited Partnership. ER96-98.

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facilitate weight loss, and improve male sexual performance. It also charged a 

related unlawful auto-ship continuity program that resulted in unauthorized 

shipments and charges, abusive telemarketing through robocalls, and 

unsubstantiated earnings claims for a multi-level marketing scheme.

The district court entered a TRO against Defendants, SER 355, extended it 

once, SER 353, and then entered a PI against them. SER 316. The TRO and PI 

contained a number of provisions designed to secure and preserve assets that could 

be used to provide equitable monetary relief if the district court held Defendants 

liable for violating the FTC Act. 

In particular, the orders froze Defendants’ assets and appointed a Receiver 

over the assets. SER 365-366, 372-373; SER 329-330, 337. They defined “Assets” 

as “any legal or equitable interest in, right to, or claim to, any property, wherever 

located and by whomever held.” SER 358; SER 322. The orders defined 

“Receivership Entities” as “Corporate Defendants as well as any other entity that 

has conducted any business related to Defendants’ marketing and sale of 

dissolvable firm strips ... and that the Receiver determines is controlled or owned 

by any Defendant.” SER 360; SER 324. They defined “Receivership Property” as 

“any Assets, wherever located, that are: (1) owned, controlled, or held by or for the 

benefit of the Receivership Entities, Jason Cardiff, or Eunjung Cardiff, in whole or 

in part; (2) in the actual or constructive possession of the Receivership Entities, 

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Jason Cardiff, or Eunjung Cardiff; or (3) owned, controlled or held by, or in the 

actual or constructive possession of, or otherwise held for the benefit of, any 

corporation, partnership, trust, or other entity directly or indirectly owned or 

controlled by the Receivership Entities, Jason Cardiff, or Eunjung Cardiff....” 

SER 360; SER 324.

Other relevant provisions include:

• An Asset Freeze (Section VII) that prohibits Defendants and 

“all other persons in active concert or participation with any of 

them, who receive actual notice of this Order,” from, among 

other things, “transferring, liquidating, converting, 

encumbering, pledging, loaning, selling, concealing, 

dissipating, disbursing, assigning, relinquishing, spending, 

withdrawing, granting a lien or security interest or other interest 

in, or otherwise disposing of” any Assets that are “[o]wned or 

controlled, directly or indirectly, by any Defendant, including 

but not limited to, those for which any Defendant is a signatory 

on the account.” SER 366; SER 329.

• Duties of Asset Holders and Other Third Parties (Section VIII) 

that require any person who received actual notice of the orders 

to hold, preserve, and retain within its control and prohibit the 

withdrawal, removal, alteration, assignment, transfer, pledge, 

encumbrance, disbursement, dissipation, relinquishment, 

conversion, sale, or other disposal of the Defendants’ assets.

SER 367; SER 331-332.

• Foreign Asset Repatriation (Section X) that requires, among 

other things, transfer to the territory of the United States and 

delivery to the Receiver of Assets located in foreign countries 

that are “under the direct or indirect control, whether jointly or 

singly, of any Defendant.” SER 369-370; SER 334.

• Non-Interference with Asset Freeze and Repatriation (Section 

XI) that prohibits all persons with actual notice of the orders 

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from taking any action, directly or indirectly, which may result 

in the encumbrance, transfer, relocation, or dissipation of 

domestic or foreign assets, or in the hindrance of the 

repatriation required by the orders. SER 370-371; SER 335.

• Transfer of Receivership Property to Receiver (Section XVII) 

that requires Defendants and “any other person with possession, 

custody or control” of the “Assets” of the Cardiffs with notice 

of the orders to “fully cooperate and assist the Receiver in 

taking and maintaining possession, custody, or control of ... the 

Assets of” the Cardiffs and to transfer them to the Receiver. 

SER 380; SER 344.

• Non-Interference with the Receiver (Section XX) that prohibits 

all persons with actual notice of the order from interfering with 

the Receiver’s efforts to manage, or take custody, control, or 

possession of, the Assets subject to the Receivership. SER 382-

383; SER 347.

The TRO/PI also authorized the FTC and Receiver to conduct expedited 

discovery “for the purpose of discovering: (1) the nature, location, status, and 

extent of Defendants’ Assets; or (2) compliance with this Order.” SER 387-388; 

SER 350. The orders further directed that: “Any expedited discovery taken 

pursuant to this Section is in addition to, and is not subject to, the limits on 

discovery set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of 

this Court.” SER 388; SER 351. In accordance with these provisions, the FTC 

served Poujade with a subpoena, via his counsel, on April 10, 2019. ER 359-367. 

In response, Poujade produced some documents but largely failed to comply with 

the subpoena.

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B. Poujade, TPI, and the Transfer of Assets in Violation of the 

TRO/PI.

Poujade, though not a defendant, was (and may still be) the Chief Financial 

Officer and a Director of Defendant Redwood Scientific Technologies. SER 392; 

SER 294, 298-301. Redwood is owned and operated by Defendants Jason and 

Eunjung Cardiff. ER 104-107.

Jason Cardiff formed TPI in July 2018, though the company was originally

known as Clover Cannastrip Thin Film Technologies Corp. ER 439. It had three 

founding directors: Eunjung Cardiff, Jason Cardiff, and Jacques Poujade. 

SER 271-274. TPI operates through a wholly owned subsidiary, Pharmastrip 

Corp., of which Jason Cardiff at one time was president and CEO. SER 304. 

(Poujade and TPI maintain, however, that Jacques Poujade’s brother, Richard 

Poujade, served as Pharmastrip’s president and sole director. Br. 9.)2 Similar to 

Defendant Redwood Scientific, TPI is in the business of selling oral dissolvable 

thin film strips, though its strips contain THC, the active substance in marijuana.3

 2 Before the district court, Jason and Eunjung Cardiff moved for the return of 

their passports, which the district court had previously ordered them to relinquish. 

In support of that motion, the Cardiffs represented that Richard Poujade, on behalf 

of Pharmastrip, offered Jason Cardiff a job, but the evidence showed that the job 

offer was a sham to mask Jason Cardiff’s continuing leadership of TPI. SER 131-

132, 135.

3 In this brief, “TPI” refers to TPI itself, Clover Cannastrip Thin Film 

Technologies and Pharmastrip, unless otherwise indicated for clarity.

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In August 2018, Jason Cardiff traveled to Toronto, Canada, to meet with 

TPI’s investment advisor, Haywood Securities, as well as potential investors. 

SER 100; SER 275. At least two investors agreed to invest in TPI, SER 264-266, 

278-285, and in early September 2018, nearly $2 million CAD was deposited in an 

account, the “3745 account,” held by TPI at TD Canada Trust Bank. ER 375;

ER 431. Jason Cardiff had opened the account on August 31, 2018, ER 375, and 

Jason and Eunjung Cardiff were its sole signatories. ER 422-430. In addition, on 

October 4, 2018, the Cardiffs executed a banking and services agreement 

associated with the account and identified themselves as TPI’s President and 

Manager, respectively. Id.

On October 10, 2018, the district court entered the TRO, which froze 

Defendants’ assets, including approximately $1.56 million CAD in the 3745 

account, which as mentioned was controlled by Jason and Eunjung Cardiff. 

SER 305-306, 367-368; ER 374. On October 12, 2018, Poujade learned of the 

TRO and asset freeze when Jason Cardiff called him to tell him that “all of 

[Cardiff’s] assets were seized” and “that the injunction completely prohibited him 

from having a bank account,” SER 96-97; SER 314-315; SER 395, 405-407, 409.

Despite the asset freeze, on October 16 and 18, 2018, Jason Cardiff and 

Jacques Poujade cooperated to transfer $1.56 million CAD out of the 3745

account. ER374, ER 503. Of that amount, they wired $1.2 million CAD to a TPI 

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trust account at Sui & Co., ER 443, ER 503, SER 303, and wired another $360,000 

CAD to Richard Poujade (Pharmastrip’s titular president), ER 503, ER 374. A 

week later, Sui & Co. wired $1.2 million CAD from the trust account to another 

TPI bank account. SER 303. Thereafter, TPI transferred approximately $490,000 

USD to a Jacques Poujade-owned company (Br. 1), Alphatech (Br.12, SER 136-

137). At least $211,000 USD of the $490,000 USD was used to pay the Cardiffs’ 

personal expenses. Br. 13; ER 240; SER 404; SER 219-226.

C. The Contempt Orders.

When the FTC learned of those evasions of the district court’s order, it filed 

a motion on June 17, 2019, for an order to show cause why the Cardiffs and 

Jacques Poujade should not be held in contempt for transferring assets out of the 

3745 account controlled by Jason Cardiff and failing to transfer the money to the 

Receiver. SER 307. Among other things, the FTC showed that Poujade:

• Violated the TRO/PI Asset Freeze (Section VII) by cooperating 

with the Cardiffs to transfer, loan, conceal, and disburse the 

Assets controlled by the Cardiffs, specifically, $1.56 million 

CAD in the 3745 account; 

• Violated the TRO/PI Duties of Asset Holders and Third Parties 

(Section VIII) by failing to hold, preserve, and prohibit the 

disbursement, dissipation, or other disposal of the $1.56 million 

CAD;

• Violated the TRO/PI’s requirement of Non-Interference with 

Asset Freeze and Repatriation (Section XI) through actions that 

dissipated foreign Assets and hindered the repatriation of those 

Assets; and

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• Violated the requirement to Transfer Receivership Property to 

Receiver (Section XVII) by failing to deliver the $1.56 million 

CAD to the Receiver.

The FTC also requested that the Cardiffs and Poujade be held in contempt for 

failing to comply with the Expedited Discovery provisions of the TRO/PI. 

SER 307, 310.

The district court issued an Order to Show Cause on June 24, 2019, 

SER 267, in response to which Poujade filed numerous pleadings and declarations 

in opposition, ER 432, SER 261; SER 227; SER 211; SER 193; SER 191; 

SER 159; SER 157.

From July 29 to 31, 2019, and on August 27, 2019, the district court held a 

four-day hearing at which Poujade testified and was represented by counsel. 

SER 103; SER 102; SER 101; SER 18. Poujade swore under oath that he did not 

learn that he was not a signatory on the 3745 account until July 11, 2019, some ten 

and a half months after it had been opened, ER 499, and that he did not know the 

identities of the payees for the October 16 and 18, 2018, withdrawals in which he 

participated until July 2019. SER 83; ER 431. At the conclusion of the testimony 

on July 31, the court rejected that defense, stating:

Mr. Poujade, I find that you are totally unbelievable. You lied to this 

Court. You perpetrated fraud on this Court. You did that in 

conjunction with the Cardiffs [Defendants]. You created a paper trail 

perpetuating the fraud on the Court. It’s unbelievable considering the 

positions that you hold as a financial officer.

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But I guess money is everything and greed is everything. And in 

pursuit of your greed, you have advanced the interest of the Cardiffs 

to the detriment of the public, government agencies, the receiver, and 

the Court.

ER 654-655. In concluding that the Cardiffs and Poujade had violated the court’s 

orders, it found clear and convincing evidence that Poujade knew of the asset 

freeze and the requirement that all assets controlled by the Cardiffs be turned over 

to the receiver, yet allowed money from the 3745 account to be withdrawn 

anyway. ER 654; ER 47-48.

The district court did not rule immediately, but instead continued the hearing 

to August 27, 2019, encouraging the parties to explore resolution of the matter in 

the meantime. SER 80. On August 8, 2019, the FTC filed proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law in which it requested, inter alia, that the “Cardiffs and 

Jacques Poujade [be] further ordered to turn over all communications, including 

emails, text messages, and encrypted chat messages (e.g., Whatsapp, Signal, 

Telegram), from October 12, 2018 [the day Poujade learned of the TRO] through 

the present with any of the following individuals/entities: Jason Cardiff, Eunjung 

Cardiff, Jacques Poujade, Richard Poujade, Ralph Olson, Dana Rohrabacher, 

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Kamlesh Shah, Anton Drescher, Haywood Securities, Falcon, and Industrial Court 

L7.” SER 154.

4

At the hearing on August 27, the district court ordered, inter alia, production 

of recorded communications between Defendants and Poujade. SER 79. It also 

ordered the Cardiffs to turn over their mobile phones. Id.

5 In addition, the district 

court ordered Poujade’s counsel to transfer the $1.56 million CAD to the Receiver, 

as required by the TRO and PI, which eventually did occur. ER 53; ER 586.

At the district court’s direction, the FTC and Poujade engaged in ultimately 

unsuccessful discussions regarding a stipulated order implementing the district 

court’s contempt findings and orders. On October 3, 2019, the FTC filed a 

proposed order regarding the turnover of funds and film strip machines to the

Receiver, an accounting of assets, and the production of documents to the FTC. 

SER 73, ER 578-583. On the same day, Poujade filed objections and an alternative 

to the FTC’s proposed order. SER 59

 4 The individuals named are TPI directors, while the companies provided 

services to TPI. The evidence indicates that Jason Cardiff continued to lead TPI 

and communicated with directors and these companies after the district court 

adopted the TRO and PI. See SER 49-50; SER 51; SER 215-218.

5 Subsequent forensic analysis of the phones ratified the district court’s 

assessment of Poujade’s mendacity. Although he had sworn in a declaration that 

Jason Cardiff was terminated and had no more connection with company, ER 512; 

ER 554, the phone records showed that Poujade and Cardiff continued to 

communicate about TPI, SER 49-50; ER 623-624.

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On October 29, 2019, the district court overruled Poujade’s objections to the 

FTC’s proposed order and rejected his alternative. ER 44. In so doing, the district 

court stated that Poujade’s failure to comply with the FTC’s April 10 subpoena 

violated the TRO/PI’s expedited discovery provisions and that such failure 

constituted contempt. ER 47. It further stated that “communications between 

Defendants and Mr. Poujade, as well as Mr. Poujade’s business associates, are 

relevant to the FTC’s investigation of whether the Defendants remain involved in 

[TPI]” and that such communications must be turned over as part of the TRO/PI’s 

Expedited Discovery provisions. Id.

Concurrently, the district court entered its “Order Regarding Turnover of 

Funds to Receiver, Film Strip Machines, Accounting, and Production of 

Documents.” ER 51 [hereafter “Contempt Purge Order”].6 As relevant here, the 

Order provided:

j. Jacques Poujade shall within thirty days of entry of this Order 

comply with the FTC’s April 10, 2019 Subpoena for Documents, to 

the extent the Subpoena requests information falling within the scope 

of this Court’s expedited discovery (ECF No. 59 at 35-36) and this 

Order. The parties are reminded that the Court’s expedited discovery 

permits discovering: “(1) the nature, location, status, and extent of 

Defendants' Assets; or (2) compliance with this Order.” (ECF No. 59 

at 35.) Such expedited discovery includes communications in any 

form between Defendants and Mr. Poujade. Such expedited discovery 

also includes communications between Mr. Poujade and 

 6 The court’s order overruling Poujade’s objections, ER 44, and the Contempt 

Purge Order, ER 51, are the orders on appeal in No. 19-56397.

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individuals/entities affiliated with Pharmastrip pertaining to the 

nature, location, status, and extent of Defendants’ Assets, and 

compliance with the TRO and PI. Counsel for the FTC and counsel 

for Mr. Poujade shall continue to meet and confer to accomplish Mr. 

Poujade’s compliance. Any discovery dispute within the scope of the 

Court's expedited discovery and this Order shall be brought to the 

Court's attention in a renewed motion for contempt. Any discovery 

dispute extending beyond the scope of this Court’s expedited 

discovery and this Order shall be resolved pursuant to the Standing 

Order, Local Rules, and Federal Rules of Procedure.

k. Eunjung Cardiff, Jason Cardiff, and Jacques Poujade shall within 

thirty days of entry of this Order produce to the FTC all 

communications of any type, including emails, text messages, and 

encrypted chat messages (e.g., Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram), from 

October 12, 2018 through the present with any of the following 

individuals/entities: Jason Cardiff, Eunjung Cardiff, Jacques Poujade, 

Richard Poujade, Ralph Olson, Dana Rohrabacher, Kamlesh Shah, 

Anton Drescher, Haywood Securities, Falcon, and Industrial Court 

L7. This Order does not require the Cardiffs to produce any 

communications already obtained by the FTC as a result of the 

Cardiffs’ turnover of their mobile phones (Dkt. 217).

ER 56-57. The Contempt Purge Order provided that noncompliance after 

November 28 would lead the district court to order monetary sanctions, with 

increasing severity over time. ER 57-58.

Rather than comply, on November 22, 2019, Poujade filed an ex parte 

motion to modify the October 29, 2019, Order or, in the alternative, to stay the 

order pending appeal. SER 20. He asked the district court to strike Section 2(k) 

altogether on grounds that the FTC’s subpoena had not requested the 

communications identified in Section 2(k) and that Section 2(k) exceeded the 

scope of the TRO/PI’s Expedited Discovery provision. 

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The district court denied Poujade’s motion to modify or stay on December 

17, 2019. ER 619. It specifically found that the communications ordered to be 

produced in Section 2(k) were responsive to several of the document requests 

included in the FTC subpoena, including ones seeking communications between 

Poujade and others regarding companies that include the company name 

“Pharmastrip.” ER 624. It also ruled that Section 2(k) fell within the scope of the 

Expedited Discovery provision because it sought to discover the extent of 

Defendants’ involvement with TPI for purposes of assessing their compliance with 

the TRO and PI. It said: “The Court’s credibility finding renders the documents 

even more critically important to revealing the actions of Defendants with respect 

to [TPI], via the actions of Mr. Poujade.” ER 625. 

Poujade continued his defiance of the district court orders. On May 29, 

2020, the FTC filed a motion asking the district court to hold Poujade in contempt 

for failing to comply with the Contempt Purge Order. SER 14. Finding that 

Poujade did not dispute that he violated that order, the court concluded that the 

FTC had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Poujade should be held in 

contempt. SER 4. The court provided Poujade until 12:00 p.m. on July 10, 2020, to 

comply or face $360,000 in monetary sanctions and incarceration. SER 5.

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D. TPI’s Motion to Intervene.

Meanwhile, TPI moved to intervene in the FTC’s case on October 18, 2019. 

ER 593. TPI asserted an ownership interest in the $1.56 million CAD originally 

deposited in the 3745 account and claimed a right to intervene in light of the 

district court’s statements during the Contempt Hearings that TPI would “have its 

day in court.” ER 601-602. The FTC, joined by the Receiver, opposed intervention. 

SER 32; SER 28. In the order on review in No. 20-55066, the district court denied 

intervention. ER 628. It ruled that TPI’s purported ownership interest was separate 

and distinct from the question of which of Defendants’ assets should be subject to 

the TRO/PI’s asset freeze. ER 634. It also rejected TPI’s view that the district 

court’s statement that TPI would “have its day in court” meant that TPI would 

receive special treatment as an intervenor. “The Court finds no reason for [TPI] to 

have its interests elevated above those of others, especially since [TPI] can 

participate in post-judgment proceedings.” ER 635.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1a. The Court should dismiss Poujade’s appeal in No. 19-56397 for lack of 

jurisdiction. The district court orders under review imposed no sanction, but 

merely announced contempt and established conditions to purge the contempt. The 

law is clear that non-party contemnors may not appeal until the district court has 

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imposed sanctions. In addition, Poujade purged his contempt with respect to the 

transfer of money to the Receiver, mooting that question.

b. If the Court deems the issue live, the district court properly held Poujade 

in contempt for failing to transfer money to the Receiver. Poujade does not deny 

that he cooperated with the Cardiffs to transfer the money out of an account they 

controlled and that he failed to transfer the money to the Receiver. His contention 

that the TRO and PI did not apply to his actions is unfounded. The plain terms of 

the TRO/PI both forbade Poujade from working in concert with the Cardiffs and 

required him to cooperate with the Receiver’s efforts to secure control of the 

money. The TRO/PI also plainly governed assets controlled by the Cardiffs, not 

just those they owned. 

c. The district court properly held Poujade in contempt for violating the 

TRO/PI’s Expedited Discovery provision. The Expedited Discovery provision 

explicitly provided that Fed. R. Civ. P. 45’s requirements did not apply to 

subpoenas issued under it. The FTC therefore was not required to file a motion to 

compel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B) before seeking to hold Poujade in 

contempt for failing to respond to a subpoena, which could be enforced directly via 

contempt. And even if Rule 45 applied, the FTC’s motion to show cause why 

Poujade should not be held in contempt functioned as a motion to compel. The 

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substance of a motion, not its label, determines whether Rule 45’s requirements 

have been met.

d. Poujade is also wrong that the district court’s order in Section 2(k) of the 

Contempt Purge Order that he produce various communications between 

Defendants and others is a criminal contempt sanction. Section 2(k) is an 

appropriate civil contempt sanction because it required Poujade to produce the 

communications he had already been required to produce under the Expedited 

Discovery provisions. 

2a. The district court correctly denied TPI’s motion to intervene. With 

respect to intervention as of right, the district court committed no clear error in its 

finding that the motion was untimely. TPI learned in June 2019 of the FTC’s 

motion to compel it to transfer money to the Receiver, but it did not seek 

intervention for four months. The district court’s statement that TPI would “have 

its day in court” does not amount to a promise of intervention that would justify the 

delay. The court was plainly referring to a post-judgment proceeding, not 

intervention in the pending one. 

The district court also correctly concluded that TPI does not have a 

significant protectable interest in the ongoing proceeding. This case concerns 

Defendants’ liability for deceptive and fraudulent conduct and the preservation of 

assets owned or controlled by them to ensure that money is available for monetary 

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relief in the event of a judgment. TPI’s claim to the money at issue here is 

independent and separate from the issues at stake in the case. Claims such as TPI’s 

are adequately protected in post-judgment claim proceedings, where TPI can 

represent its own interests. 

b. The district court correctly denied permissive intervention. TPI’s motion 

was untimely for permissive intervention for the same reasons as intervention by 

right. TPI’s ownership claim also does not share common questions of law or fact 

with the questions presented in the case: whether the Defendants are liable for 

deceptive and fraudulent conduct and which of their assets may be used to provide 

relief to consumers. And intervention would be disruptive of the orderly 

disposition of the Receivership estate.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION IN NO. 19-56397, BUT THE 

DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING 

POUJADE IN CONTEMPT IN ANY EVENT.

A. Standard of Review.

The Court reviews a civil contempt order for abuse of discretion and its 

factual findings for clear error. FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 

1239 (9th Cir. 1999). A district court “has wide latitude in determining whether 

there has been contemptuous defiance of its order,” Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 

263, 266 (9th Cir. 1984), and its interpretation of its own injunction is entitled to 

“particularly heavy weight,” Schering Corp. v. Illinois Antibiotics Co., 62 F.3d 

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903, 908 (7th Cir. 1995). Its decision should not be reversed “absent a definite and 

firm conviction that the district court made a clear error of judgment.” Richmark 

Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned 

up). 

B. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Poujade’s Appeal.

Poujade appeals an interlocutory order of the district court establishing 

conditions for him to purge the court’s prior finding of contempt. ER51-58. This 

Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. The law is well established in this Circuit 

that “an adjudication of civil contempt is not appealable until sanctions have been 

imposed.” Donovan v. Mazzola, 761 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985). The order 

challenged by Poujade did not impose sanctions and is therefore unappealable.

The district court initially found Poujade in contempt on July 31, 2019, for 

failing to comply with expedited discovery provisions established in the court’s 

TRO and PI and for helping the Cardiffs avoid repatriating at least $1.56 million 

CAD in funds that the court had ordered frozen and transferred to a courtappointed Receiver. ER 52. Poujade subsequently purged his contempt with 

respect to the money, ER 53, but he persisted in ignoring the discovery provisions. 

On October 29, 2019, the district court gave Poujade 30 days to purge his contempt 

by producing the required documents and established proposed monetary sanctions 

for noncompliance. ER 57. Those monetary sanctions, however, were not selfCase: 19-56397, 07/13/2020, ID: 11751065, DktEntry: 24, Page 27 of 56
22

executing, and when Poujade again failed to comply, the FTC had to file a motion 

asking the district court to enter a judgment imposing monetary sanctions and 

coercive incarceration. SER 14. 

Although a non-party such as Poujade may seek review of a contempt order 

before any final judgment in the underlying litigation, he cannot do so until he has 

been subject to sanctions. “To obtain a right of review” of a discovery order or 

other pretrial directive, “the non-party must refuse to comply with the order, and 

the district court must find the non-party to be in contempt and apply sanctions 

against him.” David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1977)

(emphasis added). In other words, a non-party’s right to appeal an order 

compelling behavior ripens only once the district court imposes a “sentence for 

civil contempt” or a “contempt judgment.” Id. As the Supreme Court has 

explained:

[S]uch an order may coerce a witness, leaving him no alternative but 

to obey or be punished. It may have the effect and the same 

characteristic of finality as the orders under review, but from such a 

ruling it will not be contended there is an appeal. Let the court go 

farther, and punish the witness for contempt of its order,—then arrives 

a right of review; and this is adequate for his protection without 

unduly impeding the progress of the case.

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Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).

7

Poujade’s reliance (Br. 3) on Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center v. 

Advocates for Life, Inc., 877 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1989), is misplaced. There, the 

district court imposed sanctions, id. at 789, the indispensable ingredient rendering 

a matter subject to appeal. No sanction was imposed by the Contempt Purge Order, 

so Portland Feminist has no bearing on this case. Poujade’s appeal must be 

dismissed in its entirety.

Even if the Court were not to dismiss Poujade’s appeal outright, it would

still lack jurisdiction over his challenge to that part of the district court’s order 

finding him in contempt for helping the Cardiffs avoid transferring money to the 

Receivership estate. That issue would be moot because Poujade purged his 

contempt when he transferred the money to the Receiver. ER 48, 53. “A long line 

of precedent holds that once a civil contempt order is purged, no live case or 

 7 On June 26, 2020, the district court provisionally granted the FTC’s motion for 

sanctions and gave Poujade until July 10, 2020, to comply or face incarceration 

and a $360,000 penalty. SER 5. If Poujade remains in contempt and the court 

actually sanctions him, his appeal rights will ripen, opening the door for him to file 

a new notice of appeal of the district court’s contempt rulings. Alexander, 201 U.S. 

at 121.

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controversy remains for adjudication.” In re Campbell, 628 F.2d 1260, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1980) (citing cases); Richmark Corp., 959 F.2d at 1479-80.

8

C. The District Court Correctly Held Poujade in Contempt for 

Violating the TRO/PI’s Asset Freeze and Transfer 

Requirements.

The district court committed no error when it held Poujade in contempt for 

violating the TRO’s and PI’s requirements that assets controlled by the Defendants 

be frozen and turned over to the Receiver. ER 47-48. The TRO/PI ordered the 

Cardiffs to turn over to the Receiver all their assets, whether held directly or 

indirectly. SER 369-370, 373-374; SER 334-335, SER 344-345. It expressly 

prohibited any third party with knowledge of the order from hindering the transfer 

of assets to the Receiver. SER 382-383; SER 347. The FTC showed that Poujade, 

who knew of the order, nevertheless cooperated with the Cardiffs to engage in a 

series of transfers meant to evade the freeze and keep the Receiver from gaining 

control of money in the 3745 bank account controlled by the Cardiffs. See pp. 9-10

supra. In other words, Poujade knew he was helping the Cardiff’s violate the 

court’s order, clearly contumacious conduct.

 8 The same might be true with respect to the appeal concerning the Expedited 

Discovery provisions. Poujade produced some documents to the FTC on July 10, 

2020, in purported compliance with those provisions and the subsequent contempt 

orders. The FTC is reviewing that production to determine whether Poujade is in 

substantial compliance and will update the Court of the FTC’s assessment.

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Poujade here disputes none of the facts shown by the FTC and determined 

by the district court. He does not dispute that he knew of the restrictions imposed 

on him by the TRO/PI order yet cooperated with the Cardiffs to transfer money to 

avoid the Receiver. Instead, he challenges the district court’s reading of its own 

orders as imposing on Poujade the obligations he was found to have violated. In his 

view, the TRO/PI order simply did not prohibit what he admits he did. Poujade’s 

claims cannot be squared with the plain language of the order, which the district 

court properly interpreted. Especially given a district court’s “wide latitude” to 

interpret its own orders, see Gifford, 741 F.2d at 266, the Court should reject 

Poujade’s reading of them.

Poujade first maintains that the TRO’s and PI’s requirement that assets 

controlled by the Cardiffs be transferred to the Receiver did not apply to him. 

Br. 48. That is clearly wrong. By its plain terms, the asset-transfer requirement 

applied not only to Defendants (including the Cardiffs), but also to their “officers, 

agents, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or 

participation with any of them, who receive actual notice of this Order[s].” 

ER 155, ER 176 (emphasis added). In a finding not contested by Poujade here, the 

district court concluded that he had actual notice of the TRO no later than October 

12, 2018. ER 654; ER 47-48. Poujade also does not dispute that he received notice 

of the PI no later than March 20, 2019. ER 492; SER 270. Anyone knowingly 

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bound by the order would have understood that it prohibited him from actively 

working with Jason Cardiff to accomplish things that Cardiff himself was 

forbidden from doing. At the very least, that reading of it falls well within the 

district court’s wide latitude of interpretation.

The TRO and PI are clear about Cardiffs’—and Poujade’s, as a person in 

active concert or participation with them—responsibility to transfer money to the 

Receiver. Section XIX required affirmative cooperation with the Receiver to 

transfer the money to Receivership estate. SER 382; SER 346. Section XX 

prohibited interfering with the Receiver’s efforts to take possession of the money 

and from “transferring ... or otherwise disposing” of the $1.56 million CAD. 

SER 382-383; SER 347. Having directly violated those clear commands, Poujade 

was properly held in contempt.

Next, Poujade contends that the requirement to transfer to the Receiver the 

$1.56 million CAD applied only to assets “owned” by the Cardiffs. Br. 49, 51. In 

fact, by its plain language the requirement applied to assets controlled by the 

Cardiffs as well. SER 360, 380-382; SER 324, 344-46. Moreover, the TRO and PI 

broadly defined “Asset” as “any legal or equitable interest in, right to, or claim to, 

any property, wherever located and by whomever held.” ER 152, ER 171. The

asset freeze provision enjoins “transferring, liquidating, converting, encumbering, 

pledging, loaning, selling, concealing, dissipating, disbursing, assigning, 

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relinquishing, spending, withdrawing, granting a lien or security interest or other 

interest in, or otherwise disposing of any Assets that are ... owned or controlled, 

directly or indirectly, by any Defendant, including, but not limited to, those for 

which a Defendant is a signatory on the account.” ER 156, ER 176 (emphasis 

added). Section XVII of the TRO and PI specifically required that assets controlled

by the Cardiffs be transferred to the Receiver. SER 380; SER 344-45. The Cardiffs

were signatories on the 3745 account containing the $1.56 million CAD, ER 374; 

ER 422-431, and thus controlled that money even though the account nominally 

belonged to TPI. The TRO and PI unquestionably required that it be transferred to 

the Receiver. 

Finally, Poujade maintains that he could not be held in contempt because the 

TRO and PI required only that the $1.56 million CAD be frozen but did not require

Poujade to actually transfer the money to the Receiver. Br. 51. The claim cannot be 

squared with the actual language of the TRO and PI, which clearly required that 

Poujade “fully cooperate with and assist the Receiver in taking and maintaining 

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possession, custody, or control” of the Cardiffs’ assets, including the money frozen 

in the 3745 account. SER 380; SER 344.

9

D. The District Court Correctly Held Poujade in Contempt for 

Not Complying with the TRO/PI’s Expedited Discovery 

Provisions.

1. The TRO/PI did not require the FTC to file a motion

to compel.

The district court held Poujade in contempt for violating the TRO/PI’s 

Expedited Discovery provisions, under which the FTC issued its April 10, 2019, 

subpoena. ER 49, ER 624-625. Poujade first attacks that holding by asserting that, 

because he served objections to the FTC’s subpoena, the FTC had to a file a 

motion to compel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B) before the court could find him 

in contempt. Br. 52-54. Under the TRO/PI, however, Rule 45 did not apply and, in 

any event, the FTC’s Motion for an order to show cause functioned as a motion to 

compel.

The expedited discovery provision authorized the FTC to pursue discovery 

via a Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 subpoena. SER 387; SER 350. At the same time, the 

TRO/PI stated that “[a]ny expedited discovery taken pursuant to this Section is in 

 9 Poujade’s observation that the district court made no finding that TPI was a 

Receivership Entity is irrelevant to whether the district court correctly held 

Poujade in contempt. Br. 50. The contempt holding rests on (1) the Cardiff’s 

control over the 3745 bank account, not their control over TPI itself, and (2) 

Poujade’s personal obligations as a person working with the Cardiffs and with 

notice of the TRO/PI to ensure that frozen assets were transferred to the Receiver.

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addition to, and is not subject to, the limits on discovery set forth in the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court.” SER 388; SER 351

(emphasis added). Thus, Poujade is wrong that the district court “ignored Rule 

45(d)’s plain language.” Br. 53. Under the express terms of the court’s orders, Rule 

45 did not apply; a failure to comply with the expedited discovery provision was a 

violation of the court’s order, enforceable directly via contempt. The district court 

properly held that Poujade’s failure to respond to the FTC’s subpoena constituted 

contempt because “[a]ny failure to provide such discovery is a violation of the 

TRO and PI.” ER 49. Requiring compliance with a court order to produce 

documents “is a classic use for civil contempt.” In re Contempt Finding in United 

States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Poujade does not 

show otherwise. 

In any event, the FTC’s show-cause motion functioned for all practical 

purposes as a motion to compel—indeed, when the FTC sought to enforce the

April 10 subpoena, the district court referred to the show-cause motion as a 

“Motion to Compel” (ER49)—and Poujade was able to, and did, raise his 

objections just as he would have in an ordinary motion to compel. See ER 453-464

(Poujade response to FTC motion attaching objections). In its contempt ruling, the 

district court addressed Poujade’s specific objections (see, e.g., ER 460-461) such 

as the relevancy of the discovery and the existence of privileged documents. On 

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relevancy, the court noted that “communications between Defendants and Mr. 

Poujade, as well as Mr. Poujade’s business associates, are relevant to the FTC’s 

investigation of whether the Defendants remain involved in True Pharmastrip.” 

ER 49 (citing ER 33-34). On privilege, the court stated that “[t]o the extent any 

documents are privileged, the rules governing discovery set forth an established 

procedure for seeking to withhold.” ER 625. 

Poujade complains that the FTC wrongly did not “obtain a court order 

directing” compliance with the subpoena. See Br. 53 (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. 

Durand-Wayland, Inc., 708 F.2d 492, 494 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983)). But as a matter of 

legal substance, it did. Indeed, Pennwalt Corp., the very case relied on by Poujade,

demonstrates that the relief sought in a pleading, not its label, determines whether 

the requirements of Rule 45 have been met. There, the objecting party, Sunkist, did 

not serve separate written objections but instead filed a motion to quash which it 

served on Pennwalt. The Court treated Sunkist’s motion as written objections for

purposes of Rule 45. Id. at 494. So too, here: Though not entitled “Motion to 

Compel,” the FTC’s Motion for an order to show cause sought the same relief as a 

motion to compel—an order directing Poujade to comply with the subpoena. What 

matters is not the form of the motion, but its substance.

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2. The purge conditions were not criminal punishment.

The district court ordered Poujade to produce within 30 days 

communications between himself and the Defendants, companies with which they 

did business, and TPI board members. ER 57. It also identified graduated monetary 

sanctions and possible incarceration to coerce Poujade’s compliance, though 

imposition of the sanctions would require a further order from the court. ER 57-

ER58. Poujade maintains that the order to produce these communications, under 

threat of penalties or incarceration, operated as criminal punishment because the 

FTC’s subpoena did not require their production. Br. 54-58. Poujade is wrong. 

Section 2(k) of the Contempt Purge Order served the dual functions of requiring

production of documents covered by the FTC’s subpoena and as a remedy to 

enforce the expedited discovery provisions of the district court’s own TRO/PI 

orders (under which the FTC issued its subpoena). The contempt therefore is civil.

“Civil contempt ... seeks only to coerce the defendant to do what a court had 

previously ordered him to do.” Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011)

(cleaned up). “[O]nce a civil contemnor complies with the underlying order, he is 

purged of the contempt and is free.” Id. at 442 (cleaned up). He “carr[ies] the keys 

of [his] prison in [his] own pockets.” Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988)

(cleaned up). 

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Under these standards, Section 2(k) is clearly within the district court’s civil 

contempt authority. First, the district court explained that the “documents ordered 

to be produced by [Section] 2(k) are responsive to the FTC’s subpoena.” ER 624. 

Among other things, the subpoena required production of “[a]ll documents and 

communications, without limitation to time, referring or relating to any company in 

which” the names Pharmastrip, Cloverstrip, Clover Cannastrip Thin Film 

Technologies Corp., Cannabis, and variations of those names appeared. ER 364-

365. It also sought the Cardiffs’ and Poujade’s communications with companies 

that provided services to TPI, including Haywood Securities. ER 364. Section 2(k) 

ordered the production of these communications and thus represented an 

appropriate condition for Poujade to purge his failure to respond to the subpoena.

Second, the district court concluded that the communications required to be 

produced under Section 2(k) “fall within the scope of the Court’s Preliminary 

Injunction.” ER 624. Poujade contends that the TRO/PI authorized discovery only 

of the Cardiffs’ assets, Br. 55, but he ignores that it also covered discovery of 

evidence of “compliance with” those orders. ER 164, ER 188. The district court 

addressed this claim directly:

The Preliminary Injunction permitted limited expedited discovery to 

discover the nature, location, status, and extent of Defendants’ Assets, 

or compliance with the Preliminary Injunction. (Preliminary 

Injunction, ECF No. 59, at 35.) Paragraph 2(k) orders production of 

communications between Mr. Poujade, Defendants, and business 

associates of True Pharmastrip. These communications are relevant to 

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determine the extent of Defendants’ involvement with True 

Pharmastrip. The existence of such involvement is evidenced by Jason 

Cardiff’s communications with Mr. Poujade, and Mr. Poujade’s role 

as Chief Executive Officer of True Pharmastrip. As stated during the 

August 27 hearing, and noted again in the Court’s Order Overruling 

Objections, communications between Mr. Poujade and his business 

associates are relevant to the FTC’s investigation as to whether and to 

what extent Defendants remain involved in True Pharmastrip. (Order 

Overruling Objections 6 (citing 8-27 Tr. at 33-34).)

ER 624-625.

10 In short, the communications ordered produced by Section 2(k) bear 

directly on whether Defendants’ ongoing involvement with TPI violated the TRO 

and PI. As such, Section 2(k) obligates Poujade to do what the TRO/PI required 

him to do, which is “a classic use for civil contempt.” Stevens, 663 F.3d at 1274. 

Poujade’s final argument is not clear, but seems to boil down to the 

following. In Poujade’s view, Section 2(j) ordered compliance with the FTC’s 

subpoena, while Section 2(k) required production of documents not sought by the 

subpoena. Because (he claims) only Section 2(j) falls within the TRO/PI’s 

Expedited Discovery provisions, however, Poujade purportedly has no obligation 

to comply with Section 2(k). If he complies with Section 2(j), but refuses to 

comply with Section 2(k), the argument goes, he cannot purge his contempt, which 

renders the sanctions “determinate” in that they could not be avoided through 

 10 The district court reasoned that “[t]he Court’s credibility finding renders the 

documents even more critically important to revealing the actions of Defendants 

with respect to True Pharmastrip, via the actions of Mr. Poujade.” ER 625. 

Therefore, even in the absence of a subpoena, the district court had independent 

authority to order production of communications covered by Section 2(k). See In re 

Fannie Mae Securities Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

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compliance with the FTC’s subpoena. Br. 57. As such, the sanction is allegedly 

criminal. Id.

Poujade’s argument has no merit. The district court concluded that Section 

2(k) requires production of communications requested by the FTC’s subpoena. 

ER 624. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the FTC’s subpoena did not 

ask for the communications identified in Section 2(k), the provision was necessary, 

and Poujade had to comply with it, to remedy his failure to comply with the 

TRO/PI’s Expedited Discovery provision relating to the Cardiffs’ compliance with 

the TRO/PI. As the district court explained, Section 2(k) sought communications 

that could show the extent of Defendants’ involvement with TPI in possible 

violation of the TRO/PI. ER 624-625. The district court had authority to order 

further discovery as a civil contempt sanction to remedy the contemnor’s failure to 

comply with prior orders, and Poujade was required to comply with that order. See 

Stevens, 663 F.3d at 1274-75. Section 2(k) thus “was a proper exercise of the 

district court’s contempt power because it coerced compliance” with the TRO/PI.

In re Fannie Mae Securities Litig., 552 F.3d at 823. Accordingly, the threat of 

monetary sanctions or coercive incarceration if Poujade were not to comply within 

30 days are classic purge conditions. Poujade had the power to purge himself of his 

contempt simply by producing the communications required by Section 2(k). See 

Turner, 564 U.S. at 441-42.

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II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED TPI’S MOTION TO 

INTERVENE.

A. Standard of Review.

This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to intervene as of 

right de novo, except for the district court’s factual findings on timeliness, which 

are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 

Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997) (“LULAC”). The Court sets aside 

factual findings only if they are “clearly erroneous.” Rabkin v. Oregon Health 

Sciences Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court reviews a district 

court’s denial of a motion for permissive intervention “only for abuse of 

discretion.” LULAC, 131 F.3d at 1307.

B. The District Court Correctly Rejected TPI’s Intervention as 

of Right.

As applied by this Court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) requires that: “(1) the 

application [for intervention] must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a 

significantly protectable interest relating to the transaction that is the subject of the 

litigation; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action 

may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect its 

interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the 

parties before the court.” LULAC, 131 F.3d at 1302 (cleaned up). Timeliness is 

“the threshold requirement,” so if this Court upholds the district court’s factual 

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finding that TPI’s intervention was not timely, it may affirm without reaching the 

other elements. Id. (cleaned up). 

1. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding TPI’s intervention to be untimely.

There is no specific deadline for intervention, but courts use a three-factor 

timeliness test that considers: “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant 

seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and 

length of the delay.” United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th 

Cir. 2004). Here TPI sought to intervene four months after it had notice that the 

FTC sought an order requiring Poujade to turn over to the Receiver at least $4 

million CAD. The district court properly exercised its discretion in weighing the 

timeliness factors and rejecting intervention.

The court found that the first two factors—stage of the proceedings and 

prejudice to other parties—“weigh[ed] slightly in favor of a finding of timeliness.” 

ER 632. Citing ongoing discovery, the court seemed to suggest that TPI’s 

participation in it would not necessarily slow things down and seemed to downplay 

the prejudice to the FTC as simply “more time and expense for litigation.” Id. The 

court then concluded that the third factor—“the reason for and length of delay”—

“weigh[ed] heavily in favoring of a finding of untimeliness.” ER 633. The court 

found TPI’s asserted attempts to include language providing for TPI’s intervention 

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in an order addressing Poujade’s contempt to be “insufficient,” especially given 

that TPI had notice no later than August 27, 2019, that it might have an interest. Id.

TPI advances no good reason for this Court to disturb the district court’s 

well-supported factual finding that TPI’s intervention was untimely. TPI “should 

have been aware that [its] interests would not be adequately protected by the 

existing parties,” Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (cleaned 

up), by mid-June, four months before it sought to intervene. That is when the FTC 

served its Motion for an Order to Show Cause on TPI’s counsel, putting it on 

notice that the FTC sought to require Poujade to turn over to the Receivership 

estate at least $4 million CAD. SER 38. Yet TPI chose to remain on the sidelines 

until October 18, 2019.

TPI tries to account for the nearly two-month delay between the August 27, 

2019, order requiring TPI to transfer $1.56 million CAD to the Receiver and the 

filing of the motion to intervene on October 18, 2019, by claiming that it resulted 

from efforts to meet and confer with the FTC so that TPI would “have its day in 

court regarding whether the funds ... rightfully belong to” TPI. Br. 34 (quoting 

ER 15). As shown below, however, the district court made clear on August 27 that 

TPI’s “day in court” would be a post-judgment proceeding, not intervention.

ER 14-15. Poujade’s counsel (also representing TPI) repeatedly sought to insert 

language about TPI’s intervention in negotiations with the FTC over an order 

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implementing the district court’s findings about Poujade’s contumacious conduct. 

But the FTC rejected that language on August 30 and again on September 11. 

ER 612, ER 630. At that point, it was clear that the FTC would not agree to 

intervention, but even then TPI inexplicably waited over a month to file its motion 

to intervene. The district court properly concluded that TPI had failed to justify its 

delay. ER 633. See FTC v. Johnson, 2013 WL 4039069, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 5, 

2013) (finding untimely intervention filed over 30 days after court clarified status 

of receivership assets).

TPI mistakenly relies on the district court’s statement that TPI should “have 

its day in court” as justifying its delay. Br. 34 (quoting ER 15). TPI’s apparent 

claim is that TPI did not move to intervene sooner because it relied on the court’s 

alleged promise that it would be permitted to intervene. In fact, when the court 

discussed a “day in court,” it was clearly referring to post-judgment proceedings, 

not to intervention. On August 27, counsel for the Receiver explained in open 

court that the Receiver would establish a post-judgment proceeding where 

interested parties, including TPI, would have an opportunity for discovery and 

have “their day in court.” ER 13. TPI’s counsel then reiterated TPI’s need for 

discovery. ER 14. In response, the district court said:

If you have concerns regarding the final disposition of those funds at 

a later date in time, your client will have its day in court to make 

certain claims and provide evidence to the Court that suggests that 

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your client was duped by the Cardiffs and the monies deposited are 

rightfully your client’s. There may be other claimants also here.

ER 14-15 (emphasis added). In context, the district court quoting the Receiver’s 

promise of a “day in court” and noting possible “other claimants” obviously 

referred to the post-judgment proceeding, not intervention by TPI during the 

ongoing proceeding. Indeed, the court confirmed as much in its order denying 

intervention. ER 635. 

Second, TPI asserts that the district court “ignored” the “absence of 

prejudice [to the FTC] resulting from intervention. Br. 35. But the district court did 

not ignore that factor. It said that both the prejudice and stage-of-the-proceeding

prongs “weigh[ed] slightly in favor of a finding of timeliness.” ER 632. TPI may 

wish the district court had weighed the timeliness factors differently, but its 

dissatisfaction does not show an abuse of discretion.

2. The District Court correctly concluded that TPI does 

not have a significantly protectable interest in the 

pending action.

To satisfy the significantly protectable interest element, TPI needed to have 

proven that the FTC’s action against the Defendants would “have direct, 

immediate, and harmful effects upon [TPI’s] legally protectable interest” and “that 

there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at 

issue.” Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 

2001) (cleaned up). TPI based its motion to intervene on a claimed ownership 

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interest in $1.56 million CAD that the district court concluded should be 

transferred to the Receiver under the asset freeze (Sections VII and VIII) and 

foreign asset repatriation (Section X) provisions of the TRO and PI. SER 368-374; 

SER 329-335. Those provisions required that any assets owned or controlled by 

Defendants be frozen and transferred to the Receiver. The district court concluded 

that Jason Cardiff controlled the TPI bank account containing at least $1.56 million 

CAD, making them subject to the asset freeze and transfer requirements. See

pp. 24-38 supra.

The district court concluded that any interest TPI had was “too attenuated” 

from the FTC’s action to amount to a significant protectable interest. ER 634. It 

explained that, although TPI sought intervention to establish ownership over the 

$1.56 million CAD, the FTC’s action concerns Defendants’ liability for violating 

the FTC Act and whether Defendants’ ownership or control over certain assets 

required them to be included in the Receivership estate to provide relief to 

Defendants’ victims. Id. It made clear that any claims by third parties would be 

heard in separate, post-judgment proceedings. ER 635.

TPI’s ability to raise its ownership claims later defeats its claim that the 

ongoing pre-judgment proceedings have a “direct, immediate, and harmful effect” 

on those claims. Br. 38-39. The district court based its ruling on Jason Cardiff’s 

control over the TD bank account containing the funds, which sufficed to bring the 

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money into the Receivership estate. TPI’s nominal ownership is irrelevant to 

whether the funds should be included. See CFTC v. Emerald Worldwide Holdings, 

Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27511, **18-21 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2004) (“irrelevant 

whether or not” defendants “actually ‘owned’” assets “so long as they controlled 

them”). The money will remain in the Receiver’s control for the time being (to 

prevent its dissipation), and the district court’s ruling and the ongoing proceedings 

do not impair TPI’s ability to pursue its ownership claim in post-judgment 

proceedings.

TPI attempts to analogize this case to FTC v. Loss Mitigation Services, 2009 

WL 10673186 (C.D. Cal. Dec 7, 2009), where a district court permitted 

intervention in a receivership case, but the comparison fails. Br.37. There, the 

would-be intervenor argued that a receiver’s erroneous ownership determination 

caused it to take possession of a credit card reserve account pursuant to a courtordered asset freeze. The district court permitted intervention on the issue of 

whether the receiver had erred on the question of who owned the account. Loss 

Mitigation Servs., 2009 WL 10673186, at *4. Here, by contrast, the question is not 

whether TPI owned the account, but whether the Cardiffs controlled it—and TPI 

does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that he did. The court did not 

need to resolve whether TPI had any ownership interest, a question that is separate 

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and independent from the pending action and can be resolved afterwards. 

ER 634.11

TPI’s reliance on SEC v. Lefebvre, 2004 WL 2696731 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 

2004), is misplaced for a similar reason. Br. 39. As in Loss Mitigation, the question 

was whether the would-be intervenor owned the frozen funds. Once again, that is 

not the question here, and TPI does not challenge the factual finding of the

Cardiffs’ control that justified subjecting the funds to the asset freeze. Even if TPI 

could prove ownership, the money would remain part of the Receivership estate 

under the provisions of the TRO/PI. 

Finally, TPI’s current inability to use the $1.56 million CAD for operating 

expenses does not create a significantly protectable interest. Br. 37, 44. All 

creditors with monetary claims against a receivership estate lose access to the 

money held by the receiver. This Court, however, has declined to find such an 

interest sufficient to support intervention:

A mere interest in property that may be impacted by litigation is not a 

passport to participate in the litigation itself. To hold otherwise would 

create a slippery slope where anyone with an interest in the property 

 11 Indeed, TPI’s actions demonstrate that it understood that its ownership claim 

raised an issue distinct from whether the disputed funds belonged in the 

Receivership estate. While the district court was considering that question, TPI 

brought a separate action in Canada seeking a declaration that it was the sole 

owner of the money. SER 181. Even if a Canadian court had ruled that TPI owned 

the funds, it would not have been enough to overcome the court’s finding that 

Jason Cardiff controlled the money.

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of a party to a lawsuit could bootstrap that stake into an interest in the 

litigation itself.

Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d at 920 n.3.

3. TPI’s ownership claims are not impeded in the 

absence of intervention.

The record establishes that TPI will have the opportunity to assert its 

ownership claims in a post-judgment proceeding, if and when the district court 

holds Defendants liable. ER 635. TPI’s assertions to the contrary are supported by 

neither law nor fact.

Courts routinely hold that would-be intervenors’ interests are not impaired 

where a court has established another procedure by which they may assert their 

claims. See Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d at 921; CFTC v. Heritage Capital 

Advisory Servs., Ltd., 736 F.2d 384, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Pricewert 

LLC, 2010 WL 94264, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010). Indeed, summary proceedings 

satisfy the requirements of due process so long as the claimant has “fair notice and 

a reasonable opportunity to respond.” SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 

1986); CFTC v. Topworth Intern. Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999).

TPI’s intervention would elevate its interest above all others, including 

defrauded victims and creditors, and would be contrary to the public interest and 

equity. A primary purpose of equity receiverships is to promote orderly and 

efficient administration of the estate by the district court for the benefit of all 

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creditors. See SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 837 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986); SEC v. 

Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The government’s and parties’ 

interests in judicial efficiency underlie the use of a single receivership proceeding. 

... A summary proceeding reduces the time necessary to settle disputes, decreases 

litigation costs, and prevents further dissipation of receivership assets.”). TPI’s 

desire for special treatment would undermine that purpose.

Citing Black & Veatch Corp. v. Modesto Irrigation District, 2011 WL 

4842319, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011), and SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 

1133 (9th Cir. 2003), TPI maintains that it is unlike consumer victims or other 

creditors and should have its claim heard before any post-judgment claim 

proceeding. Br.41-42. In Black & Veatch, the would-be intervenor City of Modesto

sought to be a co-defendant in a contract dispute where Modesto was the thirdparty beneficiary of the contract subject to litigation. 2011 WL 4842319, *1, *7-

*8. Quite differently, TPI is not seeking to be a co-defendant and denies that it 

shares an interest with the Defendants. TPI has a claim for money in the 

Receivership estate, just like a creditor or a consumer. Hickey is not even an 

intervention case and, in any event, involved the question of whether a district 

court could freeze all of the assets of a third party based on a defendant’s control. 

Hickey, 322 F.3d at 1133. Here, the district court ordered transferred only the

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$1.56 million CAD in a specific TPI account over which the Cardiffs were 

signatories, not all TPI assets.

Finally, TPI says that its interests would not be protected because there is no 

post-judgment claims process. Br. 42. The district court, the FTC, and the 

Receiver, however, have all stated that such a process will occur, if and when 

Defendants are found liable. ER 635. TPI provides no basis to question that pledge. 

TPI also says that any such process will limit its ability to participate in discovery. 

Br. 42-43. The Receiver informed the district court, however, that as part of that 

process “everybody can have their discovery if they need it,” ER 13, and based on 

that statement the court told TPI that it “will have its day in court to make certain 

claims and provide evidence to the court that suggests that your client was duped 

by the Cardiffs and the monies deposited are rightly” TPI’s, ER 14-15.

12

4. TPI will represent its own interests if and when the 

district court considers its ownership claim.

As the foregoing showed, the ongoing district court proceeding is not the 

forum for adjudicating TPI’s asserted ownership interest in the $1.56 million CAD. 

TPI’s claim can be heard at any post-judgment proceeding. At such time, TPI can 

 12 As an example of the kind of harm it would suffer in a post-judgment 

proceeding, TPI cites the offering of third-party statements from a deposition at 

which TPI had no representation. Br. 43. Given the Receiver’s statement that 

discovery will be available, TPI’s example is pure speculation. Further, the cases 

cited by TPI involved evidence offered against defendants, not against a non-party. 

Id. (citing Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., 663 F.2d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 1981); 

Nelson v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2013)).

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make a claim and represent itself. It will not need to rely on the Cardiffs or the 

FTC. See ER 636. Accordingly, the question of whether the Cardiffs or the FTC 

could adequately represent TPI’s interest is academic, and TPI’s arguments on this 

issue (Br. 44-46) merit no response.

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion when It 

Denied Permissive Intervention.

“Permissive intervention is committed to the broad discretion of the district 

court....” Orange Cty. v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). A district 

court may permit anyone to intervene who (1) files a “timely motion;” (2) “has a 

claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or 

fact;” and (3) after exercising its discretion, the court does not believe 

“intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ 

rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). Like with 

intervention as of right, a finding of untimeliness will defeat permissive 

intervention. See LULAC, 131 F.3d at 1308. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying TPI permissive intervention.

The FTC has already shown that the district court’s untimeliness finding is

factually sound and should not be disturbed. See pp. 36-39 supra. Regarding 

common questions of fact or law, TPI maintains that its “claim for the funds shares 

a common question of fact with the main action under Rule 24(b)(1)(b) in that the 

FTC claims that the funds were Cardiff assets and that TPI was a mere 

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continuation of Redwood Scientific.” Br. 47. That statement is incorrect. The FTC 

sought and the district court froze the $1.56 million CAD because of Jason 

Cardiff’s control over the funds as demonstrated by the fact that Cardiff was an 

authorized signer for the 3745 account. As shown above, Cardiff’s control made 

the money part of the Receivership estate; the district court did not have to assess 

TPI’s ownership. 

The district court also concluded that TPI’s intervention would be disruptive. 

It noted that allowing TPI to intervene would inappropriately elevate its interest 

over other claimants and consumers. ER 635. Since the question whether the $1.56 

million CAD should be part of the Receivership estate had already been answered, 

and TPI could have its ownership claims heard in any post-judgment proceeding, 

the detriments of intervention outweighed any benefit. ER 636. 

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CONCLUSION

The Court should dismiss Poujade’s appeal in No. 19-56397 for lack of 

jurisdiction. Alternatively, for the reasons above it should affirm the district court’s 

contempt orders. In No. 20-55066, the Court should affirm the district court’s 

denial of TPI’s motion to intervene.

Respectfully submitted,

ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel

July 13, 2020 /s/ Mark S. Hegedus

MARK S. HEGEDUS

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

Of Counsel:

ELIZABETH JONES SANGER 

SHIRA D. MODELL 

JAMES A. PRUNTY 

EDWIN RODRIGUEZ

Attorneys

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20580

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the foregoing brief complies with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)

and Circuit Rule 32-1, in that it contains 11,397 words, excluding the items 

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f). The brief’s type size and typeface comply 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (6).

July 13, 2020 /s/ Mark S. Hegedus

Mark S. Hegedus

Attorney 

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing brief using the

appellate CM/ECF system on July 13, 2020. All participants in the case are

registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF

system.

/s/ Mark S. Hegedus

Mark S. Hegedus

Attorney 

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

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