INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON GABRIELLE NGUYEN-ALUSKAR, an individual, Appellant,

v. THE LASIK VISION INSTITUTE, LLC; GORDON JENSEN, M.D., a physician; and JOHN/JANE DOE PHYSICIANS 1-10, Respondents. No. 73018-5-1 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: November 30, 2015 Appelwick, J. — Nguyen-Aluskar sued LVI and Dr. Jensen alleging a lack of informed consentand medical negligence. Failureto produceexperttestimonyto support herclaims broughtmotionsforsummaryjudgment. Nguyen-Aluskarrequested a CR 56(f) continuance in orderto afford her more time to obtain an expertwitness declaration. The trial court denied Nguyen-Aluskar's request for a continuance, granted summary judgment infavor of LVI and Dr. Jensen, and denied reconsideration. We affirm.
FACTS The LASIK Vision Institute LLC (LVI) provides management services to independent physician contractors who perform laser-assisted in situ keratomileusisNo. 73018-5-1/2 

### (LASIK) eye surgeries and other vision enhancement procedures. LVI had a contract with Dr. Gordon Jensen to provide management services for his practice. On February 5, 2005, Dr. Mark Nelson, an independent contractor affiliated with LVI, performed a photorefractive keratectomy (PRK) on Gabrielle Nguyen-Aluskar. A PRK is a laser refractive surgery performed to correct nearsightedness, farsightedness, and astigmatism. Priorto the procedure, Nguyen-Aluskarsigned a six page consentform outlining the risks and possible side effects ofthe surgery. By signing the consentform, Nguyen-Aluskar acknowledged that, among other risks, was an increased risk of eye irritation and permanent over-corrective or under-corrective vision requiring the use of glasses or lenses for reading ordistance vision. She also acknowledged that any vision 

### improvements resulting from the procedure might revert back to the level of vision immediately prior to having the procedure. The consent form also noted that many patients have a condition causing a reduced ability to see or read up close. The procedure was performed without complication. Nguyen-Aluskar was examined five days afterthe surgery and had 20/20 vision in both eyes. 

### In 2012, Nguyen-Aluskar underwent an enhancement procedure at LVI. Dr. Jensen performed the procedure. Once again, Nguyen-Aluskar signed a consentform. This time, the consent form—an enhancement consent form—was only one page, but 

### stated, "General LASIK/PRKcomplications discussed in your original LASIK/PRKpatient 

### consent form apply to the enhancement procedure." Italso listed several specific risks. 

### Nguyen-Aluskar signed the consentform indicatingthat she read the form, agreed to its terms, re-read the original consent form, and that she wanted Dr. Jensen to perform a LASIK/PRK enhancement procedure on her. Dr. Jensen also signed the consent formNo. 73018-5-1/3 

### indicating that he discussed the consent form with Nguyen-Aluskar and gave her the opportunity to ask questions. 

### Dr. Jensen performed the enhancement procedure on January 27, 2012. The medical records indicate that the procedure was performed successfully and without complication. Roughly sixweeks afterthe procedure, Nguyen-Aluskar's vision was 20/50 inherrighteye and 20/40 inherlefteye. Her vision had improved since herlastvisitafter the procedure. On January 17, 2013, Nguyen-Aluskar and Gokhan Aluskar, her husband at the time, sued LVI and Dr. Jensen claiming damages for injuries Nguyen-Aluskarsuffered as
a result oftheir negligence. The complaint alleged that the medical care provided by LVI and Dr. Jensen fell belowthe expected standard ofmedical care. And, italleged that Dr. Jensen failed to properly diagnose, refer, and monitor Nguyen-Aluskar's eye condition, inform her of the risks associated with the treatment plan, and obtain her informed consent. The complaintalso alleged that both LVI'sand Dr. Jensen's acts and omissions constituted violations ofthe ConsumerProtectionAct (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW. Intheir 

### prayerfor relief, Nguyen-Aluskarand her husband sought, among otherthings, economic and noneconomic damages, and damages for loss ofconsortium. While the initialcomplaint did not specify what injuries Nguyen-Aluskar allegedly incurred as a result ofthe procedure, her responses to LVI's interrogatories clarified that Nguyen-Aluskarwas experiencing decreased, impaired, and blurry vision, dry eyes, eye 

### pain and discomfort, headaches, depression, and anxiety. Specifically, Nguyen-Aluskar stated that as a result ofthe enhancement procedure, her cornea was too thin, so sheNo. 73018-5-1/4


### could notundergo any othercorrective procedures. She also statedthatshe requires the permanent use ofreading glasses and that hervision has generally worsened. On December 11, 2013, Nguyen-Aluskar and Gokhan Aluskar filed a motion for 

### voluntary nonsuitrequesting thatthe courtdismiss theirclaims without prejudicepursuant to CR 41(a)(1)(B). The trial court granted the motion on December 23, 2013. Then, on February 21, 2014, Nguyen-Aluskar, individually, refiled her lawsuit against LVI and Dr.
Jensen. On May 30, 2014, LVI filed a motion for costs and statutory attorney fees for $4,075.42—the amount of costs and fees incurred defending against Nguyen-Aluskar's first lawsuit. On June 10, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting LVI's motion. It awarded LVI costs and statutory attorney fees pursuantto CR 41(d). LVI made several fruitless requests to Nguyen-Aluskar's counsel for $4,075.42. On October 22, 2014, LVI filed a notice of hearing for December 12, 2014 on its anticipated motion for summary judgment. Nguyen-Aluskar's attorneys were listed on 

### LVI'snotice as a party requiring service ofthe notice. On November 14, 2014, LVI and Dr. Jensen separately filed and served motions for summary judgment dismissal of Nguyen-Aluskar's claims. LVI sought dismissal either through a CR 56 summary judgmentdismissal orthrough a CR 41 involuntarydismissal for failure to comply withthe court's June 10 order granting LVI costs and fees. Dr. Jensen sought only CR 56 summary judgment dismissal. Both defendants argued that summary judgment was 

### proper, because Nguyen-Aluskar had no qualified expert opinions in support of her breach ofstandard ofcare and informed consentclaims. And, they argued that she could not make the required evidentiary showing to support her CPA claims.No. 73018-5-1/5 

### Nguyen-Aluskarfiled a consolidated response to the summaryjudgment motions
on December 1, 2014. The response was also a requestfor a CR 56(f) continuance and
a motion for a trial continuance. In her response, she stated that she had consulted with and retained Dr. Richard Bensinger, a board certified ophthalmologist, to provide an opinion regarding the care she received. She stated that Dr. Bensinger examined her and reviewed her medical records in 2012, leading to the filing of the lawsuit. But, Nguyen-Aluskar claimed that while she was preparing her response to the motions for summary judgment, Dr. Bensinger informed her that he could no longer serve as a witness. Nguyen-Aluskar claimed that she was completely reliant upon Dr. Bensinger's opinion and had to seek a new expert witness to address the standard of care and informed consent issues. Consequently, she requested a continuance pursuant to CR 56(f) inorderto find a newexpertwitness. Nguyen-Aluskaralso respondedto the motions for summary judgment by arguing that she presented sufficient evidence to support a 

### CPA violation claim. And, she argued that LVI'srequestfordismissal pursuantto CR 41 should be denied, because she construed the trial court's June 10 order as a denial of LVI's requestfor costs. 

### On December 8, 2014, Dr. Jensen argued in reply that Nguyen-Aluskar failed to submitan affidavit insupportof her CR 56(f) requestfor a continuance, and a declaration 

### stating what discovery was contemplated, how it would raise an issue of material fact to preclude summaryjudgment, and why the discovery could not have been obtained prior to the summary judgment hearing. Consequently, on December 10, 2014, two days 

### before the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, Nguyen-Aluskar filed a declaration and an affidavit. The declaration was an unsigned and unsworn declarationNo. 73018-5-1/6
ofNguyen-Aluskar. The affidavit was from Nguyen-Aluskar's counsel. On December 11, 2014, LVI and Dr. Jensen filed a joint motion to strike Nguyen-Aluskar's declarations as untimely and improper. And, Nguyen-Aluskarfiled her declaration again, signed, but still

unsworn. 

### The summary judgment hearing took place on December 12, 2014. After the 

### hearing, the trial court made several rulings. First, itdeclined to rule on LVI's and Dr. Jensen's motion to strike the declarations. It instead treated the motions to strike as 

### objections and sustained the objections. It then granted summaryjudgment on all of 

### Nguyen-Aluskar's claims as to bothLVI and Dr. Jensen. Itdenied Nguyen-Aluskar's CR 56(f) motion to continue, reasoning that dilatory conduct is not a basis for a continuance. And, while the trial court declined to enterfindings as to LVI's CR 41 motion to dismiss

### instead dismissing pursuant to CR56—itreaffirmed its June 10orderawarding LVI fees and costs incurred defending against Nguyen-Aluskar's first lawsuit. 

### On December 22, 2014, Nguyen-Aluskarfiled a motion for reconsideration of the 

### trial court's summary judgment orders. The motion for reconsideration explained that 

### sincefiling herresponseto the motionsfor summaryjudgment, Nguyen-Aluskarclarified an "unfortunate miscommunication" withDr. Bensinger. Sheexplainedthat becausethey resolved the miscommunication, Dr. Bensinger was willing to provide a declaration 

### providing his expertmedical opinions. Nguyen-Aluskarattached severalexhibits to her motion for reconsideration. She attached Dr. Bensinger's declaration. In addition to 

### attaching Dr. Bensinger'sdeclaration, Nguyen-Aluskar also provided a list ofadditional medical experts that she contacted after Dr. Bensingerdeclined to serve as an expert witness. And, she also included a personal declaration dated December20, 2014.No. 73018-5-1/7


### On January 5, 2015, the trial court denied Nguyen-Aluskar's motion for reconsideration. Nguyen-Aluskar appeals. DISCUSSION Nguyen-Aluskar argues that the trial court abused its discretion when itawarded 

### LVI costs and statutory attorney fees under CR 41(d) that itincurred defending against her original lawsuit. She also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her requestfor a CR 56(f) continuance after Dr. Bensingerwithdrew. She claims the trial courterred ingranting summaryjudgmentinfavor ofLVI and Dr. Jensen. Finally, she alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for reconsideration ofthe trial court's ordergranting summaryjudgment. I. CR 41(d) Costs and Fees Nguyen-Aluskar first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded LVI costs and fees in its June 10, 2014 order. Nguyen-Aluskar moved for and was granted a voluntary nonsuit ofherfirst lawsuit against LVI and Dr. Jensen pursuantto CR 41 (a)(1 )(B). Nguyen-Aluskarfiledthe current 

### action, individually,against LVI on February 21, 2014. Like inherfirstaction, she alleged that Dr. Jensen and LVI negligently performed the enhancement procedure, failed to obtain her informed consent, and violated the CPA by representing that she would have 

### "falcon-like vision" after the procedure. She alleged the same damages as in the first complaint, but because her husband was no longer a party to the lawsuit, she did not 

### allege damages for loss of consortium. She also removed loss of consortium from damages sought under her prayerfor relief.No. 73018-5-1/8


### OnMay 30, 2014, LVI filed a motionforcosts andfees pursuant to CR41(d).1 LVI argued that becausethe lawsuitNguyen-Aluskaroriginally commenced was based upon almost the exact same allegations as those in her February 21, 2014 complaint, that it was entitled to costs incurred defending againstthe initial action. The trial court granted LVI's motion on June 10, 2014. On appeal, Nguyen-Aluskar argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded LVI fees under CR 41(d), because her claims in the second lawsuit were 

### different than those in the first. She contends this is so, because Nguyen-Aluskar's husband at the time was removed from the action, the loss of consortium claim was removed, and the issues were narrowed.2



### 1 CR 41(d) states, "If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such orderfor the payment oftaxable costs ofthe action previously dismissed as itmay deem proper and may stay the proceedings inthe action until the plaintiff has complied with the order." 

### 2LVI argues that Nguyen-Aluskar cannotchallenge the trialcourt's June 10, 2014 order on appeal, because she failed to designate the issue in her notice of appeal. Nguyen-Aluskar's notice of appeal did not seek review of the June 10 order. But, an appellate court may exercise its discretion in considering a case on its merits despite a technicalflaw incompliancewiththe rules ofappellate procedure. See RAP 1.2(a); Hiner v. Bridaestone/Firestone, Inc., 138 Wn.2d 248, 263, 978 P.2d 505 (1999). Cases and issues should not be determined on the basis of compliance or noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure except in compelling circumstances wherejustice demands it. RAP 1.2(a). The purpose of a notice of appeal is to notify the adverse party that an appeal is intended. In re TruancyofPerkins, 93 Wn. App. 590, 594, 969 P.2d 1101(1999), abrogated on othergrounds bv Bellevue School Dist. v. E.S., 148Wn. App. 205,199 P.3d 1010 (2009), reversed bv 171 Wn.2d 695, 257 P.2d 570 (2011). Ifthe appellant's brief sets forth assignments of error, arguments on the issues raised, and references to the legal authority, the opposing party is not unduly prejudiced by the court's decision to review an issue not raised in the notice of appeal. Id Here, Nguyen-Aluskar assigned error to the trial court's June 10 order in her opening brief and she dedicated several pages of her opening brief to related arguments and legal authority. Therefore, our consideration ofthe issue does not unduly prejudice LVI.

8No. 73018-5-1/9


### The award ofcosts against a plaintiffwho has once dismissed an action and then
commences an action based upon the same claim is a matter within the trial court's 

### discretion. CR 41 (d) ("[T]he court may make such orderforthe paymentoftaxable costs ofthe action previously dismissed as it may deem proper."). Where the decision ororder of the trial court is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review except on a 

### clear showing ofabuse of discretion. In re Marriage ofFreeman, 169 Wn.2d 664, 671, 239 P.3d 557 (2010). 

### Nguyen-Aluskar first argues that the case the trial court relied on to award LVI costs and fees—Johnson v. Horizon Fisheries. LLC. 148 Wn. App. 628, 201 P.3d 246 

### (2009)—is distinguishable. In Johnson, the trial court granted Horizon Fisheries a cost 

### and statutory fee award under CR 41(d). id\at 632. Itdid so, because Johnson moved to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit when his attorneywithdrew and then refiled the same action. Id at 631-32. The Johnson court reasoned that because Johnson chose to 

### prevent a trial when he took the voluntary dismissal, he should be responsible for the costs HorizonFisheries reasonably incurred in anticipation of trial. ]d. at 636. 

### Nguyen-Aluskardesignatedintherecord Horizon Fisheries' motionforcosts. She relies on it for the assertion that the Johnson court's reasoning for affirming the award
was based on the fact that Johnson's nonsuit was related to his failure to prosecute due 

### to methamphetamine use. Nguyen-Aluskar argues that the facts in Johnson are 

### distinguishablefrom her case, because shediligently prosecuted herinitial lawsuit. But, there is no indication that the Johnson court considered the reason behind Johnson's 

### voluntary dismissal when deciding whethertoaward costs under CR 41(d). Id. at633- 36. Notably, the Johnson courtdid notinclude in its decision any of the facts Nguyen-No. 73018-5-1/10

Aluskar discusses from Horizon Fisheries' motion. See id. The court awarded the costs based on the fact thatJohnson filed the same lawsuit afterthe voluntary nonsuit. See id,
at 632, 636. 

### Nguyen-Aluskar also argues that the award of costs and fees was an abuse of discretion, because her first action was different than her second action. The trial court 

### found that Nguyen-Aluskar's complaint was not substantially different from her earlier complaint, as the second complaint alleged substantially similar claims. The only 

### differences between Nguyen-Aluskar's first complaint and her second complaint is that she removed her then-husband as a party and removed the loss of consortium claim. Otherwise, her second action includes the same claims. The language of CR 41(d) is clearifthe second action includes the same claim againstthe same defendant, the court 

### may ordercosts forthe action previously dismissed. 

### Nguyen-Aluskarfurther contends that because LVI did not insinuate that itwould incurcosts as a result of the voluntary nonsuit and did not object to the nonsuit that it is now—after the dismissal of her first lawsuit—estopped from seeking costs. Because 

### Nguyen-Aluskar provides no authority for the assertion that LVI had to object orinform herthatitintended to seekcosts underCR 41(d) inthewake of her voluntary nonsuit, we 

### do notaddress this argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancyv.Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 547 (1992) (stating that arguments not supported by authority will not be considered). 

### Finally, Nguyen-Aluskarargues that an award of costs toLVI results in awindfall, because LVI is using the same resources obtained in the previous action for the current 

### action. In other words, she argues that LVI should be compensated for onlythose costs

10No. 73018-5-1/11


### incurred in the first lawsuit that were specific to the first lawsuit. But, once again, she provides no authority for this assertion. And, her assertion that LVI will not need to 

### duplicate costs incurred defending against the first lawsuit inorderto defend againstthe present lawsuit is purely speculative. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded LVI 

### costs and statutory attorney fees3 under CR 41(d).

II. Motion for Continuance Nguyen-Aluskar argues thatthe trial court abused its discretion when itdenied her request for a CR 56(f) continuance, because she demonstrated good cause for the continuance. CR 56(f) states: Should itappearfrom the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refusethe application forjudgmentor may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained ordepositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as isjust. The court may deny a continuance underthe rule if (1)the requesting party does not offer a good reason for the delay in obtaining the desired evidence; (2) the requesting partydoes not statewhat evidence would be established through the additional discovery; or (3) the desired evidence will not raise a genuine issue ofmaterial fact. 

### Turnerv. Kohler. 54 Wn. App. 688, 693, 775 P.2d 474 (1989). Only one ofthe qualifying grounds is needed for a denial. Pelton v. Tri-State Mem'l Hosp.. 66 Wn. App. 350, 356,



### 3While an award ofattorney fees is improper under CR 41(d), it is withinthe trial court's discretion to award statutory attorney fees. See Hall v. Stolte, 24 Wn. App. 423, 426, 601 P.2d 967 (1979); Johnson, 148 Wn. App. at 635.

11No. 73018-5-1/12

831 P.2d 1147 (1992). This court reviews denials of CR 56(f) motions for abuse of discretion. MRC Receivables Corp. v. Zion, 152Wn. App. 625,629, 218 P.3d 621 (2009). Nguyen-Aluskar's consolidated response to LVI's and Dr. Jensen's motions for summaryjudgment stated that she had a good reason for the delay, because her expert witness withdrew on the eve of the due date of her opposition leaving her without an expert and without an opinion to present. She stated that her "subsequent expert witness's opinion" would address the standard of care and informed consent issues present in the lawsuit. The trial court denied Nguyen-Aluskar's CR 56(f) motion to continue the summary judgment hearing, reasoning that dilatory conduct is not a basis for a continuance. The trial court noted that in the three and a half weeks since Nguyen-Aluskar's summary 

### judgment response was due, she submitted nothing supporting the fact that she made any efforts to find another expert after Dr. Bensingerwithdrew. And, the trial court also noted that Nguyen-Aluskar had failed to respond to interrogatories five months earlier, 

### when those interrogatories specificallyasked her to identify her experts.4 The trial court ultimately concluded that to grant the continuance would support Nguyen-Aluskar's dilatory conduct.



### 4Nguyen-Aluskar responded to LVI's interrogatories and requests for production inJune 2013—forthefirst lawsuit. Inresponse to LVI'sinterrogatory asking forthe name 

### ofeach expert witness Nguyen-Aluskar expected to call at trial, Nguyen-Aluskar stated thatexpertwitnesses had not yet been determined. She stated that Dr. Bensinger "may 

### serve" as Nguyen-Aluskar's medical expert. But, the first lawsuit was dismissed. LVI 

### again served interrogatories and requests for production on Nguyen-Aluskar on August 29, 2014—for the second lawsuit. Nguyen-Aluskar did not respond to LVI'sAugust 29 

### discovery request. Not until November 24, 2014 in her possible primary witness disclosure did Nguyen-Aluskar identifyDr. Bensinger as a medical expert witness in the second lawsuit.

12No. 73018-5-1/13 Nguyen-Aluskar relies on Coggle v. Snow. 56 Wn. App. 499, 507, 784 P.2d 554 (1990), for the assertion that when a party knows of the existence of a material witness and shows good reason why the witness's affidavit cannot be obtained in time for the summary judgment proceeding, the court has a duty to give the party a reasonable opportunity to complete the record before ruling on the case. In Coggle, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Coggle's motion for a continuance when he was unable to produce an expertdeclaration intimefor a summary judgment hearing, because he hadjust hired a new attorney. |d at 508. In Coggle, the new attorney appeared for the plaintiff and filed a motion for continuance along with a declaration, ]d at 502. The new attorney's declaration stated thathis client had already been seen by a physician, described whatevidencetheaffidavit ofthe physician would rebut, and explained that itwas too late to obtain the physician's affidavit within the time required by LR 56 because of his late substitution into the case, jd 

### Unlike inCoggle, Nguyen-Aluskardid not initially attach supporting declarations to her CR 56(f) motion to continue containing reasons why she could not yet presentfacts essential to justify her opposition. And, after she filed untimely declarations, two days 

### before the summary judgment hearing, LVI and Dr. Jensen moved to strike the declarations.5 The trial court sustained their objections to the declarations. Even considering the untimely declarations, the substance of the attorney's declaration in Coggle makes that case distinguishable. The attorney in Coggle was diligent and made


### 5CR 56(c) requires an adverse party to fileand serve opposing affidavits no later than 11 calendardays before the summaryjudgment hearing.

13No. 73018-5-1/14


### itclear that the plaintiffwas nearly ready to submit the physician's affidavit and would have been ableto, but forthe shortenedtimeline resultingfromthe substitution ofcounsel. Id at 502. This is distinguishable from the case here, in which Nguyen-Aluskar was effectively asking the courtfor time to conduct an entirely new expert search. Here, Nguyen-Aluskar consulted with Dr. Bensinger in November 2012. Nothing inthe record affirms further contactfor nearlytwo years, until afterthe summaryjudgment motion had been filed. Had Nguyen-Aluskar not been dilatory in responding to discovery, she would have much earlier had reason to follow up with Dr. Bensinger to confirm his 

### availability and his opinion.6 Nguyen-Aluskar had notice on October 22, 2014 that LVI noted the motion seeking dismissal on summaryjudgment. And, Nguyen-Aluskar had additional notice when LVI and Dr. Jensen filed their motions for summaryjudgment on 

### November 14, 2014. But, Nguyen-Aluskarwaited untilNovember21, 2014 to contact Dr. 

### Bensinger. Nguyen-Aluskar set up a meeting with Dr. Bensingeron November26, 2014 to "finalize [his]declaration." And, Nguyen-Aluskarlearned ofDr. Bensinger's withdrawal
on November26, 2014. Nguyen-Aluskardoes not provide a good reason for her delayabout a month—once she received notice that LVI was seeking dismissal. We concludethatthetrial courtdid not abuse its discretion when itdenied Nguyen

### Aluskar's CR 56(f) motion for a continuance.7 6 LVI points out that there were other events in the litigation that should have 

### prompted communication between Nguyen-Aluskar and Dr. Bensinger prior to her responseto the motions forsummaryjudgment. Specifically, that Nguyen-Aluskar should have confirmed the existence ofsupportive experttestimonywhen LVI served her with its first interrogatories and requests for production several months prior to the summary 

### judgmenthearing—on August29, 2014. Failure to identifyan expertinvitedthe summary judgment motions. 

### 7Because onlyone qualifying ground is needed for the trial court to properly deny a motion for continuance, we need not address whether Nguyen-Aluskar sufficiently

14No. 73018-5-1/15

III. Motion for Reconsideration Nguyen-Aluskar argues thatthe trial court abused its discretion when itdenied her 

### motion forreconsideration of the trialcourt's ordergranting summaryjudgment.8
A. Standard of Review CR 59 governs motions for reconsideration. We review a trial court's denial of a motion for reconsideration and its decision to consider new or additional evidence presented with the motion to determine if the trial court's decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Martini v. Post, 178 Wn. App. 153, 161, 313 P.3d 473 (2013). Reversal ofthe trial court's orderdenying a motion for reconsideration ofan order 

### granting summaryjudgment is appropriate when new or additional evidence creates a 

### genuine issue of material fact. ]d at 157. The trial court's denial of a motion for reconsideration may be manifestly unreasonable ifthe evidence, when viewed in the light

stated what evidence would be established through the additional discovery or whether 

### the desired evidence would raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Pelton, 66 Wn. 

### App. at 356. But, we note that unlike in Coggle, Nguyen-Aluskar did not maintain that 

### she had already found a specific expert who would provide a declaration. Rather, she stated onlythat she generally planned to findanotherexpert ifallotted more time. 8Although Nguyen-Aluskar designates the trial court's orders granting summary 

### judgment in her notice ofappeal, she appears to concede that summaryjudgment was properly granted on the record before the trial court at the time it made its original summary judgment rulings. All of her arguments focus on the propriety of summary 

### judgment based on Dr. Bensinger's declaration and her December 20, 2014 personal declaration. She did not submit either declaration until afterthe court granted LVI's and 

### Dr. Jensen's summaryjudgmentmotions. Whiledeclarations were attached to NguyenAluskar's response to the motions for summary judgment (her declaration and her 

### attorney's declaration), the trial courtsustained LVI's and Dr. Jensen's objections tothose declarations and properly excluded them. Therefore, we focus on the trialcourt's ruling 

### on Nguyen-Aluskar's motionforreconsideration—andthe evidenceavailable at thatpoint intime—instead ofwhatwas available when the trial courtmade its original rulings on the motions for summaryjudgment.

15No. 73018-5-1/16



### mostfavorable to the nonmoving party, creates a genuine issue of material fact as tothe nonmoving party's claims, jd at 164. A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the ligation depends, inwhole or in part. Coggle, 56 Wn. App. at 509. B. Only Informed Consent Claim Considered on Appeal Nguyen-Aluskar argues that Dr. Bensinger's declaration creates a genuine issue ofmaterial fact that precludes summaryjudgmentas to her informed consentclaim. She also argues that her personal declaration provides the necessary support for her additional claims (CPA; extreme and outrageous conduct; fraud and misrepresentation; negligenttraining, management and supervision; and failure to warn). LVI challenges the adequacy of Dr. Bensinger's declaration as to all of NguyenAluskar's claims. Dr. Jensen argues only that Dr. Bensinger's declaration is insufficient to maintain Nguyen-Aluskar's informed consent claim. He does so, because he argues that Nguyen-Aluskar waived her right to appeal the dismissal of her claims for CPA violations and medical negligence. Specifically, Dr. Jensen notes that Nguyen-Aluskar's opening briefdid not address or assign errorto the trial court's dismissal ofherCPAclaim
or the dismissal of her medical negligence claim. He also notes that Dr. Bensinger's declaration focuses only on the informed consent claim. This court does not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Nakatani v. State. 109 Wn. App. 622, 625 n.1, 36 P.3d 1116 (2001). Nguyen-Aluskar's opening brief quite clearly addresses whether Dr. Bensinger's declaration creates a 

### genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to her informed consentclaim. Italso quite clearly does not provide any argument as to Nguyen-Aluskar's CPA claim. Nor does Nguyen16No. 73018-5-1/17


### Aluskar's opening brief address her general medical negligence claim. Therefore, we consideronly Nguyen-Aluskar's informed consent claim. C. Evidence Before the Trial Court As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute what evidence the trial court actually considered when it ruled on Nguyen-Aluskar's motion for reconsideration. Nguyen-Aluskar argues thatthe trial court abused its discretion when itdenied her motion for reconsideration, because Dr. Bensinger's declaration constituted newly 

### discovered evidence pursuantto CR 59(a)(4)9 establishing a ground forreconsideration. But, the trial court's order denying Nguyen-Aluskar's motion for reconsideration stated that in making its decision, itreviewed Nguyen-Aluskar's motion for reconsideration, her attorney's declaration and the exhibits attached thereto. The exhibits included, among other things, Dr. Bensinger's declaration and Nguyen-Aluskar's personal declaration signed on December 20, 2014. The court's order gives no indication that itrejected any ofthe proffered evidence on reconsideration as untimely or inadmissible. LVI and Dr. Jensen argue that the declarations submitted for the first time with Nguyen-Aluskar's motion for reconsideration were submitted too late to be considered by the trial court and that we should not consider them. The decision to consider new or 

### 9 Nguyen-Alusukar first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for reconsideration, because Dr. Bensinger's withdrawal constituted surprise under CR 59(a)(3). Under CR 59(a)(3), a motion for reconsideration may be granted if a party's rights were materially affected by surprise which ordinary prudence 

### could not have guarded against. Nguyen-Aluskar argued that she was entitled to a continuance, because Dr. Bensinger withdrew at the last minute. In other words, she argued that Dr. Bensinger's withdrawal was a complete surprise. But, the trial court concluded that learning of Dr. Bensinger's withdrawal so late was as a result of Nguyen

### Aluskar's dilatory conduct. The same facts and reasons that supported denial of the continuance affirm that itwas not an abuse ofdiscretion to deny reconsideration on this basis.

17No. 73018-5-1/18


### additionalevidence presentedwith a motionforreconsideration issquarelywithinthe trial court's discretion. ]d at 162. In the contextofsummaryjudgment, unlike in a trial, there 

### is no prejudice ifthe court considers additional facts on reconsideration, id Generally, nothing in CR 59 prohibits the submission of new or additional materials on reconsideration. Id. Therefore, the trial court's decision to consider the two new 

### declarations submitted on reconsideration was not manifestly unreasonable. We will review the trial court's decision assuming itconsidered the declarations.
D. No Issue of Material Fact as to Informed Consent RCW 7.70.050 sets out the standard for informed consent. A plaintiff alleging negligence on the basis of failure to obtain informed consent has the burden of establishing (a) that the health care providerfailed to inform the patient of a material fact
or facts relating to the treatment, (b) that the patient consented to the treatment without being aware of or fullyinformed ofsuch materialfactorfacts, (c) thata reasonablyprudent patientundersimilarcircumstanceswould not have consentedto thetreatmentifinformed of such material fact or facts, and (d) that the treatment in question proximately caused injury to the patient. RCW 7.70.050. A signed consent form that sets out specific criteria is prima facie evidence that 

### the patient gave his or her informed consent to the treatment administered.10 RCW

10 The consent form must set forth (1) the nature and character ofthe proposed 

### treatment, (2) the anticipated results of the proposed treatment, (3) the recognized possible alternative forms of treatment, and (4) the recognized serious possible risks, complications, and anticipated benefits involved in the treatment and inthe recognized 

### possible alternative forms oftreatment, including nontreatment. RCW 7.70.060(1 )(a). 

### Nguyen-Aluskardoes not allegethatthe substance of the forms was statutorily deficient.

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### 7.70.060. A plaintiffhas the burden of rebutting this prima facie evidence of informed consent by a preponderance ofthe evidence. RCW 7.70.060. 

### Here, Nguyen-Aluskar does not dispute that she signed both the one page enhancementconsentform and the original consentform. And, by signing the one page consentform, Nguyen-Aluskar agreed that she had been provided a copy ofthe original six page form and re-read the form. The one page consentform warned thatthere could be "complications" and specifically listed loss ofvision, vision which cannotbe completely corrected with glasses or contact lenses, infection, and inflammation. The original six page form specifically indicated that requiring reading glasses is a risk ofthe procedure. And both forms emphasized that there are nonsurgical alternatives to the procedure. To rebut her signature on the informed consentforms, Nguyen-Aluskar relied on a 

### general denial in her declaration that she was not sufficiently informed about all of the risks ofthe procedure. Ageneral denial is not sufficientto create a material issue of fact. See CR 56(e); Int'l Ultimate. Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 122 Wn. App. 736, 744, 87 P.3d 774 (2004). Thus, Nguyen-Aluskar must rely on only Dr. Bensinger's declaration—based inpart on her hearsay statements—to create a material question of fact about informed consent. 

### Evidence submitted in opposition to summary judgment must be admissible. SentinelC3. Inc. v. Hunt, 181 Wn.2d 127, 141, 331 P.3d 40 (2014). A declaration in 

### support of or inopposition to summaryjudgment must satisfy the standard of CR 56(e). Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr, 117 Wn.2d 772, 787, 819 P.2d 370 (1991). The declaration, like an affidavit, must be made on personal knowledge, setforth admissible 

### evidentiary facts, and affirmativelyshow that the declarant is competent to testify to the

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matters stated. McKee v. Am. Home Prods.. Corp.. 113 Wn.2d 701, 706, 782 P.2d 1045 (1989). 

### An expert witness may base his or her opinion upon hearsay. Deep Water Brewing, LLC v. Fairway Resources Ltd.. 152 Wn. App. 229, 275, 215 P.3d 990 (2009). And, the trial court may allow the admission of otherwise hearsay evidence and inadmissible facts for the purpose of showing the basis of the expert's opinion, but the admission ofthese facts is not substantive proofofthem. Allen v. Asbestos Corp., 138 Wn. App. 564, 579-80, 157 P.3d 406 (2007). In Allen, the plaintiff sued a company alleging that his lung cancerwas caused by asbestos dust from a product the company manufactured that his father brought home from workon his clothes. Id at569. TheAllen courtconcluded thatthetrial courtproperly struck portions of a doctor's declaration that included statements concluding that the plaintiffwas exposed to asbestos, ]d at 580-81. The court opined that the doctor was 

### qualified to testify about only the medical effect that asbestos had on the plaintiff, assuming the plaintiffwas actually exposed to asbestos. ]d Itreasoned thatthe expert's opinion aboutfactual matters outside his industrial hygiene and epidemiologyexpertise— 

### whether the company's products were present or used at the father's workplace—were properly excluded as substantive evidence. ]d at 581. Here, the relevant statements in Dr. Bensinger's declaration amount to the following: (1) Nguyen-Aluskar met briefly with Dr. Jensen, but did not discuss any substantive issues, the risks, or go overinformed consent, (2) The enhancementconsent 

### form was only one page whereas the original consent form was six pages, and (3) 

### Nguyen-Aluskarwas unable to read the formbecause of the administration ofeye drops

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### so thetechnician showed herwhere to sign. Based on thatinformation, Dr. Bensinger concluded thatitwould not have been prudent or reasonablefor a doctortorely on the
one page consentform, becausetoo much time had passed and because afull disclosure 

### should have been used. And, he concluded that Nguyen-Aluskar "should have been informed that she should require reading glasses" after the procedure. He also stated that a "reasonably prudent physician" would have discouraged Nguyen-Aluskarfrom undergoing a second procedure based upon the potential risks and side effects. He 

### opined that a reasonably prudent physician would have performed the surgery only ifthe patient had consented after having been well informed ofthe risks and then only if the patient had insisted. Dr. Bensinger's declaration states that he drew his opinions based on his personalknowledge, training, andexperienceas a physician, his review ofNguyenAluskar's medical records, and his interview and examination ofNguyen-Aluskar. As illustrated in Allen, whether an LVI technician put drops in hereyes prior to her signing the consentform so she could not read, whether she discussed any substantive issues or informed consent with Dr. Jensen, and whether LVI recommended that she undergo the procedure are factual matters for which Dr. Bensinger has no personal knowledge. And, they are not matters of ophthalmological expertise. In the context of Dr. Bensinger's declaration they are simply hearsay statements. Those statements cannot be considered as substantive evidence and do not create a genuine issue of material fact merely by virtue of being included in his declaration. See Allen, 138 Wn. App. at 579-80. Significantly, Nguyen-Aluskar did not include those key foundational facts relied upon by Dr. Bensingerin herdeclaration. Thefacts simplywere notinevidence. Without

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### them, Dr. Bensinger's declaration lacks the factualfoundation necessary to support its ultimate conclusions. And, Dr. Bensinger's declaration effectively concedes that had the original sixpageformbeen used ontheday of the enhancementprocedure instead of the truncated one page form, that Nguyen-Aluskar would have received adequate informed consent. Nguyen-Aluskar's signature on both forms constitutes prima facie evidence of informed consent. Nguyen-Aluskar has not raised a material issue of fact to rebut that presumption. 

### Because Nguyen-Aluskarfails to demonstratethe existence ofanygenuine issues ofmaterial fact pertaining to her informed consent claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when itdenied Nguyen-Aluskar's motion for reconsideration.
We affirm.

WE CONCUR: 

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