IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE Inthe Matter ofthe Marriage of THERESA IBRAHIM GOHAR, Appellant, and SAMIR GOHAR, Respondent. Nos. 69920-2-1 70420-6-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

FILED: December 8, 2014 

### Schindler, J. —Theresa Gohar, acting pro se, appeals the "Amended Decree of Dissolution," "FinalParenting Plan," "Final Order of Child Support," and the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." Inthe separate linked appeal, Theresa challenges the 

### order ofcontemptforviolating the parenting plan.1 Because Theresa fails to establish any legal error or abuse ofdiscretion, we affirm. DISSOLUTION ACTION In 1999, Samir and Theresa Gohar were married in Massachusetts. Before the 

### marriage, Samirlived in Massachusetts and owned a restaurant and duplexwith his
We use the parties' first names for purposes ofclarity and mean nodisrespect by doing so.Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/2
brother. Theresa lived inWashington with her parents and worked at a fast food restaurant. After they married, Theresa and Samir lived in Massachusetts. In 2001, Theresa and Samir had a daughter, C.G., and in 2005, a son, M.G. After the birth of C.G., Theresa sought mental health treatment. Theresa took an antidepressant medication for approximately two years. During this two-year period, Samir described Theresa as having one bad day for every ten good days. Theresa stopped taking the medication. Theresa said the medication did not help her, and she could effectively manage her depression and anxiety by getting out ofthe house and engaging in activities. According to Samir, after Theresa stopped taking the medication, she had mostly bad days. Samir described her behavior as erratic and said that Theresa often slept until the afternoon. In 2007, Samir and Theresa moved to the Seattle area to be near Theresa's family. Samir sold the interest in his restaurant business and the duplex to his brother for $285,500. In 2008, Samir purchased the family home in Lynnwood for $400,000. Samir used $80,000 of proceeds from the sale of his Massachusetts property for the down payment and took out a mortgage in his name only for the balance. That same year, Samir purchased a restaurant in Marysville, Washington. Samir used $200,000 from the proceeds ofthe sale of his Massachusetts property for the down payment and secured a loan for the balance ofthe $1,015,000 purchase price for the business and the real property. The restaurant and real property is in Samir's name only. Samir managed the restaurant alone. Theresa neverworked inthe restaurant and, forthe most part, did not work outside the home during the marriage.
2Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/3 

### In September 2011, Samir moved out of the family home. In February 2012, Samir filed a petition for legal separation. The court later granted Samir's motion to 

### convert his legal separation petition to a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Samir 

### initially proposed that the children residewith Theresa the majority of the time. The court entered a temporary order requiring Samirto pay $6,000 per month for maintenance and child support. 

### Afterthe separation, the children missed a significant amount of school. Samir became concerned about Theresa's mental health, the children's well-being, and 

### Theresa's attempts to sabotage his relationshipwith the children. Samir requested 

### designation as the primary residential parent until Theresa engaged in mental health

treatment. 

### In July 2012, the trial court appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) Martha Wakenshaw to act in the children's best interests and make recommendations as to the 

### parenting plan. While Theresa was "largely non-cooperative," the GAL was eventually able to interview both parents, 11-year-oldC.G., and 6-year-old M.G. Samir raised concerns with the GAL about Theresa's mental health, the children's school attendance, and their emotional health and physical safety ifTheresa 

### insisted on refusing treatment. Samiradmitted he developed a gambling addiction in 2011. Samir also said he was attending Gamblers' Anonymous and was being treated for depression. Theresa told the GAL she wanted "nothing more" than for Samirto "return to the home as her husband and father to the children." Theresa did not allege that Samir was abusive to her or the children, but she felt that Samir neglected the children's feelings.Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/4 

### Theresa admitted that she let the children stay home from school when they had a 

### runny nose orstomachache. Theresa would not sign a release to obtain school records or allowthe GAL to speak to her treatment providers. Instead, Theresa provided the GAL with a declaration from a therapist who confirmed that Theresa had been 

### diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder but stated there was no evidence to support a diagnosis of paranoia or delusions. The therapist said that although some ofTheresa's concerns went beyond the normallevel, they were grounded in rational concerns. GAL Report 

### The GAL prepared a reportin October2012. The GAL reported that Theresa
was "extremely suspicious, guarded, and depressed." The GAL stated thatduring the home visit, Theresa had almost no interactionwith the children, and Theresa and her 

### mother openly discussed the court case in front ofthe children. TheGAL described C.G. as "articulate, anxious, and depressed." C.G. told the GAL that her mother tells 

### her"everything" aboutcourt so as nottoleave herin thedark, and lets her read the documents. C.G. said she was "mad at dad" after reading court documents containing 

### Samir's allegations aboutTheresa's mental health issues. TheGAL described M.G. as obese and having a "sadness and despondency" about him. 

### M.G. reported thathis mothergets frustrated about"court stuff' and thathis mom's judge was "really mean." 

### Neither child reportedabuse by either parent, and C.G. affirmatively denied it. C.G. told the GAL that Samir was the person who helped herwith schoolwork, and M.G.Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/5

said he liked it at Samir's house best. The GAL concluded the children were the victims of abusive use of conflict by the mother. Clearly, both [C.G.] and [M.G.] are the victims of an extreme abusive use of conflict on the part ofthe mother. Both children have stated that she has talked to them about the court case and itwas a strong theme in both oftheir interviews, especially [C.G.j's interview. Both children present as confused, depressed, and anxious and could both benefit from intensive, individual psychotherapy. It is unconscionable that the mother has permitted her eleven-year-old daughter to read the court documents and pleadings. The daughter has become so fearful that she was worried that the GAL mighttake her away from her parents and put her in foster care. The GALrecommended that the court designate Samir as the primary residential 

### parent, the children stay withTheresa every otherweekend and one weekday every week, and Theresa be prohibited from sharing court informationwith the children. The GAL recommended supervised visitationwith the children ifTheresa continued to 

### engage in abusive use ofconflict. The GAL also recommended that each parentobtain a psychological assessment and individual counselling for the children. Samir obtained a psychological assessment. The evaluator concluded that 

### Samir was being appropriately treated for his mild depression and his previous 

### gambling addiction, and expressed no concerns about his parenting. The same evaluator contacted Theresa to arrange an evaluation but she did respond. After the GAL filed her report, Theresa filed a motion to remove the GAL. On October 23, a court commissioner struck Theresa's motion because she had not served
the GAL.Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/6

Protection Order On October 24, Theresa went to C.G.'s middle school and told the school counsellor that the previous night, C.G. had disclosed that Samir touched her sexually. Child Protective Services (CPS) and the police initiated an investigation. Theresa filed a petition for a protection order. The court entered a temporary protection order. On October 26, Theresa took C.G. to the emergency room because of a sore throat but did not mention the sexual abuse allegation. On October 29, Theresa took C.G. to the doctorfor a previously scheduled appointment and asked the doctor to examine C.G. for possible injuries stemming from abuse. On October 30, a commissioner held a hearing on the protection order. Samir, Theresa, and the GAL appeared at the hearing. Theresa told the commissionerthat 

### C.G. said, "My dad touch [sic] me down there." Theresa said she was also concerned because some weeks earlier, there was blood on C.G.'s underwear. Theresa admitted 

### she did not immediately take C.G. to the doctor or inform the GAL following the
disclosure. 

### Upon learning that C.G. was in the courthouse, the commissioner asked the GAL to privately interviewthe child and report back. The GAL told the commissioner itwas a stressful interview for C.G. and described "chaos and interference" by Theresa and her 

### family members. Atfirst, Theresa's mother refused to leave the interview room. After she was forced to do so, Theresa and her family members hovered outside the glass window ofthe interview room, stating loudlythat the GAL was a "liar." C.G. told the GAL that her mother had told her about the GAL's report and that 

### as a result, she mightlive with her father. C.G. said that whilesh^and her mother were
6Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/7 discussing menstruation, her mother asked if her father had evertouched her. C.G. said yes. C.G. said her father touched her twice between the legs, over her clothing, for

no more than three seconds. The GAL questioned the validity ofthe reported abuse because the allegation was vague, contained inconsistencies about timing, and arose fromTheresa's suggestive questioning. Notingthe lack ofevidence about what C.G. reported to others, the suspicious circumstances ofthe allegations, and the fact that the 

### allegations themselves lacked credibility, the commissioner determined the allegation of
sex abuse was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The commissioner dismissed the petition to issue a protection order without prejudice to refiling if"more clear-cut information were to arise." Dissolution Trial 

### The two-day dissolution trial took place in early November. The courtconsidered 

### the testimony ofTheresa, Samir, the GAL, and brieftestimony ofTheresa's brother-inlaw. 

### Theresa's position at trialwas that the children should reside with her and have

no visitation or contact with Samir because ofthe alleged sexual abuse. Theresa testified about C.G.'s disclosure. Theresa also claimed Samir was emotionally abusive to her and to C.G., and for the first time, she mentioned incidents ofphysical abuse. 

### Theresa disputed many facts in the GAL's report. For instance, Theresa denied discussing the pending dissolution with the children. ButTheresa admitted that on occasion, she asked C.G. the meaning of a word that she did not understand incourt documents. Theresa also claimed that M.G. had been sexually assaulted when he was three or four. ButTheresa admitted that M.G. merely answered yes to a leading
7Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/8 question about abuse and she never took the child to the doctor or otherwise reported
the incident. In addition to the information and recommendations in the report, the GAL testified about the recent sexual abuse allegations and recommended that visitation with the children be supervised until Theresa obtained a psychological evaluation. The court found Theresa "not credible." The court found that Theresa's testimony was deceptive because she often indicated that she was confused and could not remember details to evade questions. The court found that Theresa is "in need of psychological services," and that she "attempted to falsely accuse the father ofsexual abuse" in order to discredit the GAL and her recommendations. The court found the GAL was credible and concluded both children were victims of extreme abusive use of conflict by the mother. The court entered a parenting plan designating Samir as the primary residential 

### parent and imposed limitations on Theresa's contact with the children under RCW 26.09.191 (3)(a) ("A parent's neglect or substantial nonperformance ofparenting 

### functions;); (3)(b) ("A long-term emotional or physical impairment, which interferes with the performance of parenting functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004); and (3)(e) ("The abusive use of conflict by the parent, which creates the danger ofserious damage to the 

### children's psychological development."). The court ordered visitation with Theresa to be supervised by a designee selected by Samir. The court ordered Theresa to obtain a 

### psychological evaluation within 30 days. The November 30 order provides that upon completion of the evaluation, Theresa may file a motion for unsupervised visitation. The court also ordered that both children should be enrolled in therapy.
8Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/9
With respect to the division of assets, the court determined that although Samir contributed separate funds toward the purchase ofthe family home, itwas a community asset. The court ruled the restaurant was a separate asset and awarded it to Samir. The court noted that the debt associated with the business outweighed its value, Theresa had not participated in running the restaurant, and the testimony indicated she


### was unwilling to assume any debt associated with the business. The court awarded the familyhome to Samir and awarded the parties' three retirement accounts to Theresa. 

### According to the court's calculation, the value of community assets awarded to Samir
was $109,900 and the value of community assets awarded to Theresa was $102,500. 

### The court ordered Samirto pay monthly maintenance to Theresa for two and a half 

### years ($2,500 for six months; $2,000 for six months; $1,500 for six months; $1,000for six months; and $500 for six months). 

### In calculating child support, the court found that Samir's monthly gross income
was $10,430 and Theresa's income was $2,350. Aftersubtracting deductions, the 

### combined monthly net income was $8,711 and the proportionalshare of the combined income for Samir and Theresa was 75.3 percent and 24.7 percent. The court calculated 

### Theresa's proportional share of the basic support obligation and health care expenses for both children as $546 per month, but deviated downward to $300 per month 

### because "[t]he mother is not employed at this time and will be living primarily offthe maintenance obligation so as to maximize her ability to create a new household." 

### On February 7, 2013, Theresa filed a notice ofappeal challenging entry of the amended decree of dissolution, final parenting plan, order of child support, and findings offact and conclusions of law.Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/10

CONTEMPT ACTION 

### Samir paid $2,500 toward a psychological evaluation forTheresa, butTheresa did not obtain an evaluation within 30 days as ordered. Theresa did not meet with the 

### psychologistuntil February 2013. Theresa also did notrequest visitation with the children until December 2012, over two months after the court entered its order. Samir 

### suggested using three people who offered to supervise for free. Theresa's attorney 

### responded that she preferred to use a professional supervisor. However, Theresa did not follow up to arrange visitation. 

### In February2013, Samir learned from the children that Theresa met each of them at the school bus stop. M.G. said his mother toldhim she was "fighting" forhim. 

### Samir's attorney contactedTheresa's attorney about the contact and warned that Samir would be forced to file a motion for contempt ifTheresa continued to violate the 

### parenting plan. Theresa's attorney responded that Theresa said the problem was that "Samir isn'tallowing her to see the children—at all," and requested that Samirprovide 

### suggested namesfor supervised visitation. Samir's attorney pointed outthatSamir had already provided names for supervised visitation and thatTheresa rejected the 

### suggested supervisors anddecided tohire a professional. Samirlateroffered topayfor thefirst supervisedvisit and splitthe costthereafter. Theresa refused the offer. Theresa took the position that she was notrequired to pay for the costs ofsupervision. Samir learned that on March 18 and 19, Theresa contacted the children again at 

### the bus stop. M.G. said hismothertold him she had justreceived the psychological evaluation report, she was not"not sickanymore," and she would be able to see him 

### again in abouttwo weeks. Samir saidC.G. camehome "angrywith him" because her
10Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/11 mother told her the same thing and C.G. demanded to know "the details" aboutwhat

was happening in court. Samirfiled a motion to show cause why Theresa should not be held in contempt for violating the parenting plan. Acourt commissioner entered a show cause order that required Theresa to appear in court on April 10. Theresa's attorney accepted service ofthe contempt motion inexchange for an agreementto continue the hearing until April 25. 

### Theresa appeared at the contempt hearing on April 25 without an attorney. The court commissioner continued the hearing, in part so Theresa could obtain a court

### appointed attorney. The order continuing the hearing directs Theresa to appear at the Office of Public Defense. AtTheresa's request, the court revised the order, finding that Theresa was "adamant" that she did not want an attorney and had waived her right to
counsel. 

### Theresa represented herself at the hearing on the contempt motion. Theresa 

### argued that the motion should be dismissed because she was notpersonally served. Theresa denied visiting her children at the bus stop and pointed to lack of "physical 

### proof." Theresa admitted she had not had anyvisits with the children as contemplated by the parenting plan but argued it was because Samir and his attorney "refuse to let

me see my children." The commissioner held Theresa in contempt, finding that she was properly 

### served with the contempt motion, violated the parenting plan byhaving unauthorized contact with the children on more than one occasion, and unreasonably rejected 

### arrangements for supervised visitation. The commissioner also found thatTheresa's
11Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/12 noncompliance with the parenting plan was in bad faith. The order allows Theresa to purge the contempt by remaining at least 100 yards away from the children's bus stops, home, and schools. The order requires supervised visitation with a professional supervisor at Theresa's expense. The commissioner awarded $1,500 in attorney fees to Samir. A superior courtjudge denied Theresa's motion for revision. Theresa filed a 

### notice of appeal challenging the contempt order and order denying revision.2 Parenting Plan Theresa primarily challenges the trial court's decision designating Samir as the primary residential parent and the imposition ofsupervised visitation. We review a trial court's parenting plan for abuse ofdiscretion. In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23. 35. 283 P.3d 546 (2012). cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 889 (2013). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on 

### untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35. We defer to the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the parties, determine their 

### credibility, and sort out conflicting evidence. In re Marriage ofWoffinden, 33 Wn. App. 326, 330, 654 P.2d 1219 (1982). Because ofthe trial court's unique opportunity to observe the parties, the appellate court should be extremely reluctant to disturb 

### decisions with regard to child placement decisions. In re Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001).

2In June 2013, Theresa filed another noticeof appeal challenging the October 30, 2012 dismissal of her petition for a protection order to prohibitcontact between Samir and C.G. See No. 70594-6-I. Acommissioner of this court dismissed the appeal as untimely. Because we previously deniedTheresa's motion to modify the commissioner'sruling dismissing review, her arguments related to the protection order are not properly before us. 12Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/13 The best interests of the child is the standard "by which the court determines and 

### allocates the parties' parental responsibilities." RCW 26.09.002; Schroeder, 106Wn. 

### App. at 349. In establishing a residential schedule forchildren in a parenting plan, RCW 26.09.187(3) identifies the following factors a trial court must consider: 

### (i) The relative strength, nature, and stability of the child'srelationship with each parent; 

### (ii) The agreements of the parties, provided they were entered into knowingly and voluntarily; 

### (iii) Each parent's past and potential forfuture performance ofparenting functions . . . , including whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for performing parentingfunctions relating to the daily needs of the child; (iv) The emotional needs and developmentallevel of the child; 

### (v) The child's relationship with siblings and with othersignificant adults, as well as the child's involvement with his or her physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities; 

### (vi) The wishes ofthe parents and the wishes of a child who issufficiently mature toexpress reasoned and independent preferences as to his or her residential schedule; and 

### (vii) Each parent's employment schedule, and shall make accommodations consistent with those schedules. 

### Theresa's arguments do not reference any ofthe relevant statutory factors. And 

### contrary to Theresa's apparentbelief, there is nopresumption in favor ofthehistoric 

### primary caregiver. In re Marriage ofKovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 800, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). Rather, the statute requires the court to consider both past and potential future performance ofparenting functions. 

### While restrictions in a parenting plan are mandatory under some circumstances, 

### the courtimposed supervisedvisitation in thiscase underRCW 26.09.191 (3)(g), a 

### discretionary provision thatpermits atrial courttolimitthe terms ofa parenting plan. Katare, 175Wn.2d at 36. Thisdiscretionary authority isconditioned on the existence of

13Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/14 specific factors or conduct that the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child. Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 36. Theresa contends that the trial court (1) ignored evidence of sexual abuse, (2) made its decision without allowing appropriate state agencies to investigate the abuse allegations, (3) failed to considerTheresa's historic role as the day-to-day caretaker, (4) ignored the fact that Samir abandoned the family, (5) gave undue weight to the opinions and recommendations of the GAL, and (6) disregarded evidence that the children were performing well in school when she was the primary caretaker. Theresa's 

### arguments rely entirely upon her subjective interpretation of the conflicting evidence and reflect a fundamental misunderstanding ofthe role ofthe appellate court. 

### An appellate court may not substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that made 

### by the trier of fact. Goodman v. Boeing Co., 75 Wn. App. 60, 82-83, 877 P.2d 703 (1994), affd, 127Wn.2d401.899P.2d 1265(1995). Ifthey are supported by substantial evidence, we acceptthe court's factual findings. In re Marriage ofThomas. 

### 63 Wn. App. 658, 660, 821 P.2d 1227 (1991). Evidence is substantial when there is a sufficientquantum ofevidence "topersuade a fair-mindedperson of the truth of the declared premise." In re Marriage ofBurrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 868, 56 P.3d 993 (2002). So long as a finding is supported by substantial evidence, itdoes not matter that other evidence may contradict the finding. Burrill, 113 Wn. App. at 868. This court does not review the trial court's determinations as to the credibility and persuasiveness ofthe evidence. Inre Marriage of Rich, 80 Wn. App. 252, 259, 907 P.2d 1234 (1996). The record shows that the trial court considered and weighed the evidence in accordance withthe factors under RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) and made specific findings of
14Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/15
the presence offactors under RCW 26.09.191 (3)(a) (substantial nonperformance of parenting functions), (3)(b) (emotional or physical impairment), and (3)(e) (abusive use ofconflict) that adversely affected the best interests of C.G. and M.G. The imposition of restrictions is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence showed that Theresa continually involved the children inthe legal proceedings, attempted to alienate them from Samir, and made unsubstantiated abuse allegations. There was evidence that the children were adversely affected by Theresa's conduct and were anxious, stressed, 

### fearful, and depressed. Evidence supports the court's findings that Theresa suffered from mental health issues that interfered with her parenting. Specifically, since the parties separated, the mother was sleeping much ofthe time, allowingthe children to 

### miss school, keeping the children up at night, and isolating them. Theresa's insistence upon unsubstantiated sexual abuse allegations with regard to both children also 

### supports the court's finding of mental health impairment that interferedwith parenting. The evidence supports the court's decision to limit Theresa's residential time under RCW26.09.191(3) and order supervised visitationuntil she completed an evaluation and followed treatment recommendations. 

### AlthoughTheresa obviously disagrees with the court's decision, the court did not abuse its discretion, and substantial evidence supports the provisions ofthe parenting plan. Inaddition to her argument that the GALwas not credible or persuasive, Theresa also contends the court should not have considered the GAL's report because itwas not 

### filed 60 days before trial as required by RCW26.12.175(1)(b). But nothing in the record 

### suggests that she was prejudiced by the delay. The GAL testified at trial and the report
15Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/16

was admitted as evidence without objection. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a); Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 139 Wn. App. 334, 338, 160 P.3d 1089 (2007). The record indicates that the court and the parties had access to the report before itwas filed on the first day of trial. Although Theresa soughtto have the GAL removed from the case, the basis for her request was her claim that the GALreported 

### false facts and she disagreed with the GAL's recommendations. The court concluded that Theresa's motion to remove the GALwas not properly before the court because she failed to serve the GAL, a fact she does not dispute. Theresa also twice moved to continue the trial but did not mention needing more time to respond to the GAL's report. The court did not err in considering the GAL's report. Division of Property 

### Theresa challenges the court's division of property. Theresa claims the court awarded all of the parties' community property to Samir, followed all ofSamir's requests with respect to property, and denied all of her requests. Theresa argues the court 

### awarded all the primaryassets to Samir including the restaurant, the marital home, and the children's college fund. 

### The trial court's objective when dividing property is to divide and distribute the 

### parties' property in a manner that is "just and equitable." RCW 26.09.080. The statute requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to: (1) The nature and extent ofthe community property; (2) The nature and extent ofthe separate property; (3) The duration ofthe marriage; and

16Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/17 

### (4) The economic circumstances ofeach spouse ... at the time the division ofthe property is to become effective
.... RCW 26.09.080. A just and equitable distribution does not mean that the court must 

### make an equal distribution. In re Marriage ofDewBerrv, 115Wn. App. 351, 366, 62 P.3d 525 (2003). 

### We review the division of property forabuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005). The trial court has "broad 

### discretion," whichwill be reversed only ifexercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Inre Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242-43, 170 P.3d 

### 572 (2007). "The trial court isin the best position to assess the assets and liabilities of the parties . . ." and to determine what constitutes an equitableoutcome. In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 769, 976 P.2d 102 (1999). 

### Theresa disregards some critical facts. In arguing that the court awarded all the 

### property toSamir, Theresafails toacknowledge that thecourt awarded all ofthe retirement savings to her. The value ofthe retirement accounts was $87,000 and is 

### nearly equal to theequity in theparties' home of$92,000. Thedifference in value in the property awarded toSamirand theproperty awarded to Theresa wasapproximately $7,000. And as the courtpointed out, despite the slight discrepancyin favor ofSamir, the distribution was equitablein light ofthe priordistribution of$15,000in community assets to Theresa for legal expenses and Samir's payment of $6,000 permonth in 

### temporary maintenance and child supportduring the pendency ofthe proceedings. While the court's division of property does not include Samir's restaurant nor 

### account for the stream of income it provides, there is no dispute that Samir used

17Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/18 separate property to purchase the business and the evidence showed that the debts associated withthe restaurant outweighed its value. The court found that the net value of the restaurant was negative $21,000. Theresa's claim that the court awarded property ofover $1 million inassets to Samir is apparently based on the purchase price ofthe restaurant, $1,015,000, without adjustment for the substantial mortgage debt and the current value ofthe real property. Theresa also contends that the court erred in relying on valuations ofproperty prepared by Samir or his nonprofessional acquaintances. Butthe record shows there 

### were two expert valuations of the restaurant, and the trial court used the valuation figure 

### assigned byTheresa's expert. Andwhile the court didassign value to the parties' home based on a market analysis submitted by Samir and prepared by a real estate broker, 

### Theresa fails to explain why the broker was unqualified to render an opinion about the 

### likely sales price of the home. There was no other evidence of the current value ofthe home before the court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by assigning values to 

### propertywithin the scope of the evidence. See In re Marriage of Soriano, 31 Wn. App. 432, 435, 643 P.2d 450 (1982). 

### Further, it is not true, as Theresa suggests, that the trial court adopted all of 

### Samir's requests fordistribution ofproperty. The court rejected Samir's request that the award reflect his contribution ofseparate funds toward the purchase of the family home. 

### And contrary to Samir's request, the court awarded the two retirement accounts in
Samir's name to Theresa.

18Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/19
Child Support and Maintenance 

### Theresa argues the trial court did not award sufficientmaintenance to allow her maintain the lifestyle she had before the dissolution. Theresa also contends that for 

### purposes ofdetermining maintenance and child support, the court erred in calculating Samir's income by not using the incomefigure listed on the 2011 tax return. Theresa also asserts the court erroneously imputed an "amplified" income to her and appears to 

### argue that the court erred in ordering her to paychild supportbecause bydoing so, the court effectively reduced her maintenance. 

### The purpose of spousal maintenance is to help support a spouse until he or she is able to become self-supporting. In reMarriage ofIrwin, 64Wn. App. 38, 55, 822 P.2d 

### 797 (1992); In reMarriage ofLuckev, 73Wn. App. 201,209, 868 P.2d 189(1994). Under RCW 26.09.090(1), the trial court may award maintenance to either spouse in an amount and for a duration deemed just, considering sixnonexclusive factors: (1) the 

### respective financial resources andability toindependently meetneeds; (2) thelength of themarriage; (3) thetime necessaryforthe spouse receiving maintenance toacquire employment-related education ortraining; (4) the standard ofliving established during themarriage; (5) the age, health, andfinancial obligations ofthe spouse receiving maintenance; and (6) the ability ofthe spouse paying maintenance to supporthimselfor herself as well as the spouse receiving maintenance. We review a spousal maintenance award for abuse ofdiscretion. In re Marriage ofWashburn, 101 Wn.2d 168, 179, 677P.2d 152(1984). The court's calculation ofSamir's income is supported by the testimony and 

### evidence at trial, including documentation of the business revenue and expenses. 19Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/20 

### AlthoughTheresa claims the court should have calculated the monthly income based on the annual income figure listed on the 2011 joint tax return, the evidence shows this 

### figure includes sizable gambling winnings that were later treated as a deduction and also includes money transferred by the business to Samir to pay the mortgage on the 

### real property where the restaurant is located. The record supports the income figures used by the court for both parties, and the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of maintenance. 

### With respect to child support, parents have a legalobligation to support their children. RCW 26.19.001; Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d 592, 599, 575 P.2d 201 

### (1978). The child supportobligation "should be equitably apportioned between the parents." RCW 26.19.001. 

### While, in appropriate circumstances, a trial court may grant a deviation from the standard child supportcalculation under RCW 26.19.075, a deviation is an "exception to the rule and should be used onlywhen it would be inequitable to do otherwise." In re Marriage ofOakes, 71 Wn. App. 646, 652 n.4, 861 P.2d 1065 (1993). A decision 

### regarding a deviation iswithin atrial court's sounddiscretion and "will seldom" be disturbed on appeal. In re Marriage ofBooth, 114Wn.2d 772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 

### (1990). Here, thetrial court exercised itsdiscretion to deviatedownward, recognizing that maintenance was Theresa's sole source of income. However, the court was not 

### required to deviate, much less required to deviate to a zero transfer payment. Continuance ofthe Trial Theresa contends that the court abused its discretion indenying her two motions 

### to continue the trial. According to Theresa, the court's denial was based on the
20Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/21

erroneous beliefthat the GAL report had been filed on time. But Theresa's motions did not mention the timing ofthe GAL report, and again, Theresa fails to explain how she
was prejudiced by the delay infiling the report. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that itwas not inthe children's best interests to delay the trial. See Lewis v. Bell, 45 Wn. App. 192, 196, 724 P.2d 425 (1986) (this court will not disturb a decision denying a continuance absent manifest abuse ofdiscretion). Motion for a New Trial Afterthe trial, Theresa hired another attorney, the fifth attorney to represent her 

### inthese proceedings, and filed a CR 59 motion for a new trial or reconsideration. The court granted the motion in part, agreeing that maintenance should be subjectto modification, but otherwise denied the motion. On appeal, Theresa reiterates the same 

### arguments she raised below. Butas the trial court ruled, Theresa's claim of "irregularity" based on her trial counsel's representation is unavailing. CR 59(a)(1); Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir.1985) (plaintiffin a civil case generally has


### no right to effective assistance of counsel). In any event, we disagree that her attorney's performance deprived the trial court of sufficientinformation to render a decision. Bothparties presented evidence and effectivelyutilized cross-examination. The court acted well within its discretion in denying Theresa's motion. See Sommer v. Dep't ofSoc. & Health Servs., 104 Wn. App. 160, 170-71, 15 P.3d 664 (2001) 

### (appellate court reviews denial of CR 59 motion forabuse of discretion). We affirm the Amended Decree of Dissolution, Final Parenting Plan, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order of Child Support.

21Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/22
Contempt Order 

### In her linked appeal, No. 70420-6-1, Theresa claims the court erred in holding her in contemptbased on "falseclaims" and the evidence does not support the trial court's 

### findings that she hadunsupervised contactwith herchildren and unreasonably refused to engage in visitation with them. Theresa also challenges the award ofattorney fees to
Samir. 

### In the context of compliance with a parenting plan, contempt is governed by RCW 26.09.160. UnderRCW 26.09.160(2)(b), a court "shallfind" a partyin contempt if, 

### after a hearing, the court enters a written finding "thatthe parent, in badfaith, has not complied with the orderestablishing residential provisions for the child . . .." In re Marriage ofJames, 79 Wn. App. 436, 440, 903 P.2d 470 (1995). We review a trial court's decision in a contempt proceeding for abuse of 

### discretion. James. 79Wn. App. at440. Acourt's decision ismanifestly unreasonable if it isoutside the range ofacceptable choices given the facts and theapplicable legal standard and it is based on untenable groundsifthefactual findings are unsupported by the record. In re Marriage ofLittlefield. 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). 

### When, as here, an appeal is takenfrom an orderdenying revision of a court commissioner's decision, we review the superior court's decision, notthe 

### commissioner's. Inre Marriage ofWilliams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010). 

### Samir submitted a declaration in support of the motion for contempt. In it, Samir 

### states thatin February 2013 and several weeks laterin March 2013, both children 

### reported thattheir mothercontacted them at the busstop and talked tothem aboutthe court case. While Theresa denied the contact at the contempt hearing, the court was 22Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/23


### notrequired to believe her in light of the conflicting evidence and her attorney's implicit acknowledgement that she had visited the children but had a legitimate reason to do so. Theresa also claims the court ignored evidence of her good faith efforts to exercise 

### supervised visitation and evidence that Samirrejected all her attempts to arrangevisits with them. Butto the contrary, the evidence shows that Samir and his attorney made 

### significantefforts tofacilitate Theresa's supervisedvisitation in accordance with the 

### parenting plan. Theresa, on the otherhand, rejected thevisitation supervisors Samir 

### suggested, objected toproposed locations, refused Samir's offerto sharethe costofa professional supervisor, and evenrejected his offerto paythefull costfortheinitial supervised visit. 

### Theresa provides noauthority that supports her argument that Samirwas 

### required topersonally serve herwith themotion for contempteventhough theattorney 

### representing heraccepted service. It appears thatTheresa wasunhappy when she learned that herattorney accepted service ofthe motion in exchangefor a continuance ofthe contempthearing. However, she does not dispute the fact that the attorney was 

### representing herin this matterorargue thatthe scopeoftherepresentation did not include the authority to accept service. 

### Theresa argues that the amountawarded to Samirfor attorney fees was unreasonable because Samir was ordered to pay attorney fees of only$1,000 in a 

### previous finding ofcontemptpriorto the dissolution. RCW 26.09.160 (2)(b)(ii) provides thatupon finding a parentin contempt, thecourt "shall" orderthatparenttopay "all court costs and reasonable attorneyfees" incurred as a result ofthe noncompliance to 

### themoving party. No evidence shows that thetwo differentfindings ofcontempt
23Nos. 69920-2-1 and 70420-6-1/24
resulted inthe same amount offees and costs, nor is there any evidence to support her 

### claim of bias. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Theresa's motion to revise the commissioner's order ofcontempt and award ofattorney fees. In sum, we affirm the amended decree ofdissolution, final parenting plan, 

### findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, and child support order. We also affirm the order of contempt and the award attorney fees to Samir under RCW26.09.160 in the 

### linked appeal. Subject tocompliance with RAP 18.1,we grant Samir's requestfor attorney fees on appeal underRCW 26.09.160 and RCW 7.21.030, See In reMarriage of Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 359, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003) ("[A] party is entitled to an award 

### ofattorney fees on appeal to the extentthe fees relate to the issue ofcontempt.").

WE CONCUR: 

# (A ci< e>f --J

24 

## LA\r-A%0^ 

# (joX^

err. CD —,
oi CO ~-7

—.. Z. C? :£.;"-

—, c