# FILED
July 7, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE SUPREME COUR T OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

FOR PUBLICA

TION WESTLAND WEST COMMUNITY ) Filed: July 7, 1997 ASSOCIATION, et al. ) ) Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) KNOX CHANCERY ) v. ) Hon. Sharon Bell, Chancell or ) KNOX COUNTY, et al., ) No. 03S01-9610-CH-00098 ) Defendants/Appellees. )

FOR APPELLANT : FOR APPELLEE : George W. Morton, Jr. Courtney N. Pearre Knoxville Knoxville Michael W. Moyers Knox County Law Dep

artment Knoxville



# O P I N I O N

COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED HOLDER, J.1 SC is limited to retai l uses. SC limits buil ding height to a maximum of three stories and is intended for retail developments that generally attract consumers from the surrounding residential areas. 2 OPINION
We granted this appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a) mandates submissi on of a newly proposed z oning classification amendment to the regional planning commission f ollowing the commission's rejection of a similar but different proposed classif ication. The Court of Appeals held that the statute does not req uire futile resubmissions o f revised proposals. We, however, find that the proposal in q uestion was not merely a revised prior proposal but was a new and previously unsubmi tted proposal. The statute clearly mandates submissi on of new proposals to the reg ional planning commission. We reverse the Appellate C ourt and hold that the new z oning proposal should have been submi tted to the regional planni ng commission.

BACKGROUND
The appellee, Thomas N. Schrive r, filed a rezoning appl ication with the Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission (“MPC”). His application sought to amend a tr act of land’s zoning from Ag riculture ("A") to Shopping Center (“SC”) 1 . The MPC unanimously denied Schriver’s reque sted change. He then appealed the MPC’s decision to the County Commission.
During the hearing before the County Commission, the appellee presented a zoning proposal that differed from the proposal he originally submitted to the MPC. He re quested the commission to rez one the property to2 PC permits extensiv e commercial services

and light distributi on centers. Buildings may exceed four stories in height i n land zoned as PC. PC i s intended to draw customers from both out side and inside the immediate r esidential area. This attraction of a larger market may increase consu mer traffic to the area. The presence of commercial trucki ng may also be more prev alent in land zoned as PC as opposed to SC.

3 Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-105 pr ovides, in pertinent par t, as follows: (a) The county legis lative body may from ti me to time amend the number, shape, boundary, area or any other provisi on of any zoning ordinance; but s uch amendment shall not be made or become effective unless that same be f irst submitted for approval, disapproval or suggestions to the regional pl anning commission of the region in which the territory covered by the ordinance is located, and, if such regional planning commission disappr oves within thirty (30) days after such admission, such amendment shall require the favorable v

ote of a majority of the entire member ship of the coun ty legislat ive body. 3 Planned Commercial ("PC") 2 as opposed to SC. The County C ommission approved the revised amendment request and rezoned the property as PC.
The appellants, Westland West Community Association, et al ., appealed the commission's zoning decision to the Knox Count y Chancery Court. They alleged that the Commission’s decision was voi d. They argued that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a) 3 mandated that the appellee submit his new proposal to the MPC prior to seeking review before the County Commission. The chancery court agreed and held that when the appellee changed his req uest from SC to PC, he was required to by statute to resubmit the zoning request to the MPC.
The Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court's dec ision. They found that resubmission of the more onerous propose d amendment to MPC would have been futile due to the MPC's previous determination that "any commercial zone would be contrary to the . . . Sector plan." Pur suant to Wilgus v. City of Murfreesboro , 532 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. App. 1975), the court held that resubmission is not mandated unl ess there is "a strong pr obability that the4 [regional planning] c

ommission's recommendation w ould have been affected by the revision."

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The appellants argue that the Co urt of Appeals erred in focusing its analysis solely on whether the board's deci sion would have been the s ame upon resubmission. They maintain that the proper inquiry should focus on the gravity of the revised proposal's changes. Provided the r evisions are substanti al, Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a) mandates r esubmission. We agree in part.
A county legislativ

e body is vested the st

atutory power to amend z oning ordinances. Tenn. Code Ann § 13-7- 105(a). A proposed zoning amendment, however, shall neither be granted nor become effectiv e unless the proposed amendment is first submitted to the r egional planning commiss ion. Id . The regional commission can then either approve, disappr ove, or make suggesti ons. Id . If the regional commission rejects the proposed amendment, the amendment may then be submitted to the county legislative body

for approval. Id

. Our analysis is g uided by the principles of statutory interpretati on. Legislative inten t shall be derived f rom a statute's face when a stat ute's language is unambiguous. Hamblen County Educ. Ass'n v. Hamblen County Bd. of Educ. , 892 S.W.2d 428, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); see also Carson Creek Vac. Resorts v. Dept. of Rev. , 865 S.W .2d 1, 2 (Tenn . 1993) (stating whe re language within four corners of statute is plain, clear, and unambi guous ambiguous, intent shall be derived from statut e's face). If a statute's lang uage is expressed in a manner devoid of ambiguity, courts are not at liberty to depart from the stat ute's words. Id . Accordin gly, courts are restri cted to th e "natur al and ord inary"5 meaning of a statute unless an ambig uity necessitates res orting elsewhere to ascertain legislati

ve intent. Austin v. Memphis Publ. Co ., 655 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tenn. 1983).
We find the statute's language clear. A pr oposed amendment to a zoning scheme mu st firs

t be subm itted to

the reg ional pl anning commiss ion. If a proposed zoning amendment is not first presented to the reg ional planning commission, the county commis sion is devoid of juris

diction to act upon the proposal.
Once a proposed admendment has been submitte d to the regional planning commission, the pr oposal may be revised. Whether the revised proposal must then be resubmitted to the regional plann ing commission is contingent upon: (1) the gravity of the revision(s), and (2) whether the board's recommendations would have been altered by the revision(s). Wilgus v. City of Murfeesboro , 532 S.W.2d 50, 53-54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975). If the revision is inconsequential and woul d not have altered the board's recommendation, resubmission is not mandated. If, however, the revision(s) substantially alters the initial proposal, the p roper inquiry is : (1) whether there i s a detrimental impact on those who would oppose the proposal; and (2) whether the board's recommendations would have been altered by the revision(s). Id .; State v. Board of Comm'rs of Knox County Tenn. , 806 S.W.2d 181, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). An affirmative answer to ei ther question mandates resubmi ssion.
In the present case, we ar e not confronted with a mere r evision to a previously proposed zoning amendment. According ly, we do not rev ert to the test for determining whether a revision was substantial. We are confronted with an entirely new z

oning classification pr

oposal (i.e., a new z

oning admendment6 pr op os al ) whi ch ha d n ev

er be en befo re

th e r eg io na l p la nn in g c

om mi ss io n. We find a clear distinction between a newly proposed classification and a previously submitted classification that has undergone mere revis ions. Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-105 mandates submissi on of the new classification w ithout further inquiry.
Accordingly, w

e hold that the proposed zoning change to planned commercial in the present cas e must have been presented to the r egional planning commission before the c ounty commission had juri sdiction to act on the proposal. The county commissi on's review and appr oval was, therefore, both null and void. Costs shall be taxed to the Knox County Board of Commissioners for which execution may issue i f necess ary.

Janice M. Holder, Justice
Concurring: Birch, C.J. Reid, Drowota and Anderson, JJ.