DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MICHELLE TUCKER,

Appellant,

v.

LEONARD TUCKER,

Appellee.

No. 4D14-4423

[July 22, 2015]

Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Merrilee Ehrlich, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

FMCE 10-011803 40/91.

Theresa Yuricic of Yuricic Law Firm, Delray Beach, for appellant.

Leonard Tucker, Boca Raton, pro se.

GERBER, J.

The former wife appeals from a non-final order valuing stock shares 

which the former husband was directed to transfer to her. The former wife 

argues that the court did not possess competent, substantial evidence to 

value the stock. We agree with the former wife’s argument and reverse.

The former wife filed a motion for contempt alleging that the former 

husband failed to pay alimony arrearages. The former wife sought to 

obtain the former husband’s stock shares to satisfy the arrearages.

The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the shares’

value. The former wife’s expert witness, on direct examination, opined that 

the stock’s value was one cent per share. Before the former wife’s expert 

could complete cross-examination and possible re-direct examination, the 

hearing time ended. The court scheduled a second hearing.

At the second hearing, both sides’ experts were present. The former 

husband’s attorney began the hearing by stating the former husband was

claiming the stock’s value was four cents per share. The court then stated 

the following finding of fact without hearing from the parties’ experts:
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[W]ife says that the value is [one cent] and husband says it’s 

[four cents]. . . . I am finding that the value of the . . . stock 

is 2.5 cents each.

The former wife moved for reconsideration. The former wife argued that 

the court erred in not hearing the parties’ full evidence regarding the 

stock’s value, and in averaging the one cent and four cents values to arrive 

at the 2.5 cents value. The former husband conceded that the former 

wife’s arguments were correct as a matter of law.

The court did not rule on the former wife’s motion for reconsideration. 

Instead, the court entered an order on the former wife’s motion for 

contempt, which order states, in pertinent part:

With regard to the valuation of the . . . stock, the Court finds 

the value is 2.5 cents. The former wife presented expert 

testimony that the value of the . . . stock was one cent. Former 

husband had an expert witness of valuation of the stock of the 

parties in court prepared to testify. The Court asked what his 

testimony would be and was informed that his opinion was that 

the . . . stock had a value of 4 cents per share. The Court 

declined to hear his testimony and announced its conclusion 

that the value of the . . . shares was 2.5 cents per share.

(emphasis added).

The former wife filed a motion for rehearing repeating the same 

arguments included in her motion for reconsideration. The court denied 

the motion for rehearing. 

This appeal followed. The former wife argues that the court did not 

possess competent, substantial evidence to value the stock because the 

court determined the stock’s value before the former wife finished 

presenting her evidence and without hearing the former husband’s

evidence. The former wife also argues that the court erred in averaging 

the one cent and four cents values to arrive at the 2.5 cents value.

We agree with the former wife’s arguments. “A trial court’s property 

valuation must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Garcia 

v. Garcia, 25 So. 3d 687, 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Here, the court’s stock 

valuation was not supported by competent, substantial evidence because 

of three errors.
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First, the court erred in determining the stock’s value before the former 

wife finished presenting her evidence. See Garcell v. Garcell, 151 So. 3d 

46, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“[A]ppellant was never given a full opportunity 

to present her case to the court prior to the entry of the final order. . . . 

[B]y entering the final order before appellant had an opportunity to be 

heard, the trial court deprived her of the due process guaranteed by the 

Florida Constitution.”) (citation omitted).

Second, the court erred in determining the stock’s value without 

hearing the former husband’s evidence but instead relying on the former 

husband’s attorney’s unsworn statement. See Rosa-Hernandez v. 

Hernandez, 979 So. 2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“[F]acts are not 

established for consideration by the trial court or by appellate review when 

attorneys make representations in their arguments before the trial court. 

Facts are established by testimony, affidavits and stipulations. It is of no 

moment in establishing facts that attorneys are ‘officers of the court.’”) 

(citation omitted).

Third, the court erred in determining the stock’s value because the 

court, without providing a factual explanation, appears to have split the 

difference between the parties’ respective values of one cent and four cents 

to arrive at the 2.5 cents value. See Blossman v. Blossman, 92 So. 3d 878, 

878-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“In setting the [stock’s] value . . . , it appears 

as though the trial court split the difference between the two valuations. 

Florida law prohibits this type of valuation. The Court offered no findings 

or explanation of how it arrived at the value . . . . Therefore the valuation 

is not supported by competent, substantial evidence and must be reversed 

and remanded to allow the trial court to make a finding based on 

competent, substantial evidence.”) (internal citation omitted).

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the order on the former wife’s motion 

for contempt only to the extent the court concluded without competent, 

substantial evidence that the stock’s value was 2.5 cents per share. We 

remand for the court to resume and complete the evidentiary hearing in a 

manner consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STEVENSON and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.