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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED November 15, 2016

v No. 328358 Monroe Circuit Court SCOTT ALAN LOCKMILLER, LC No. 14-041318-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: S TEPHENS , P.J., and S AAD and M ETER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. A jury convicted defendant of three counts of assaulting or ob structing a probation officer, MCL 750.479. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to consecutive prison terms of 32 to 48 months on each count. Def endant appeals, and we affirm his convictions but remand for the court to consider whether an amended judgment of sentence needs to be entered.

I. BASIC FACTS

In a previous case, defendant was sentenced to five years’ pro bation and ordered to complete a substance abuse treatment program at the Salvation A rmy in Grand Rapids. However, defendant did not compl ete the program as required by the terms of his probation and instead was kicked out. Later that day, defendant called his p robation officer, Robert Greenwood, to request another program of his choice. Greenwood informed defendant that this was not allowed under the terms of his probation and that defen dant was to report to the jail or to the probation department. Green wood subsequently prepared a wa rrant for defendant’s arrest and sent it on for approval.

The following day, defendant reported to the probation departm ent. Greenwood met defendant on the first floor and escorted him to Greenwood’s of fice on the second floor. Probation officers Randy Whittaker and Steve Rechsteiner gather ed in the hallway outside Greenwood’s office as a “show of force” if needed during the ar rest.

While waiting for law enforcement to arrive to arrest defendan t, Greenwood began going over defendant’s probation report with him. At one point, Lori Lehman, who was Greenwood’s supervisor, entered Greenwood’s office and instructed defendant to put a cell phone away. Defendant ignored the instruction and walked out of the office. Greenwood followed defendant-2- into the hallway and observed him in a physical confrontation w ith Whittaker and Rechsteiner. Whittaker testified that defendant initiated the confrontation by attempting to push through Whittaker and Rechsteiner to ex it. Greenwood testified that he began to aid Whittaker and Rechsteiner, and they all fell to the ground. Greenwood explai ned that defendant was commanded to put his hands behind his back so he could be handc uffed, but defendant did not comply and resisted efforts to place the handcuffs on him. Gre enwood reported that while he was on top of defendant and attempted to get defendant’s right arm behind his back, he felt defendant’s hand on Greenwood’s concealed weapon. According to Greenwood, defendant did not comply with his commands to remove his hand from the weapon . Rechsteiner testified that he was able to take defendant’s hand off the weapon. Greenwood testified that after others came to help, defendant “finally put his second hand behind his back ” and was placed in handcuffs.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidenc e to support his convictions for assaulting or obstructing a probation officer. We review the argument de novo. People v Harverson , 291 Mich App 171, 177; 804 NW2d 757 (2010).

“[W]hen determining whether sufficient evidence has been prese nted to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favo rable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found t hat the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe , 440 Mich 508, 515-516; 489 NW2d 748, amended on other grounds 441 Mich 1201 (1992). In so doing, a witness’s credibility and the weight accorded to evidence is a question f or the jury, and any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in the prosecution’s favor. People v McRunels , 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999). “The fact that some evidence is intro duced does not necessarily mean that the evidence is suffi cient” to justify a conviction. People v Hampton , 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979). Nonetheless, “circumstantial evidenc e and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can c onstitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Allen , 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 869 (1993).

To prove that defendant was guilty of assaulting or obstructin g a probation officer, the prosecution had to prove each of the three following elements b eyond a reasonable doubt: (1) defendant assaulted or obstruct ed a probation officer who was p erforming his or her duties, (2) defendant knew the person assaulte d or obstructed was then a pr obation officer performing his or her duties, and (3) defendant’s actions were intended and not a ccidental. MCL 750.479(1)(a); see also People v Gleisner , 115 Mich App 196, 198-199; 320 NW2d 340 (1982).

On appeal, defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the ev idence with respect to the second element, i.e., that defendant did not know, or have a re ason to know, that Greenwood, Whittaker, and Rechsteiner were probation officers performing t heir duties.

There is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable ju ry to conclude that defendant knew that Greenwood was a probation officer performing his duti es when the charged incident occurred. Defendant’s father te stified that defendant phoned G reenwood to inquire about how to proceed after being dismissed from the Salvation Army program. In addition, when asked when he told defendant that he was h is probation officer, Greenwood responded, “The day, I believe,-3- when he was—either him or his father I spoke to on the phone an d informed him to report to the Probation Department or Monroe County Jail.” A reasonable jury could have concluded that while Greenwood and defendant had not physically met, defendant was nonetheless aware that someone named Greenwood was his probation officer. Further, de fendant had to wait in the lobby of the probation department before being escorted by Gree nwood to his office. Although Greenwood stated it would not be normal for him to introduce hi mself when going to get a probationer in the lobby, the fact that defendant was at the de partment to meet his probation officer and had to wait to be escorted would have put defendant on notice that the person escorting him was an individual with authority, and if not Gree nwood himself, someone associated with Greenwood. After bringing defendant to his off ice, Greenwood then sat behind the desk and engaged defendant in conversation. Greenwood test ified to asking defendant how he was doing in treatment and what had happened in treatment, w hich are all matters a probation officer would ask about when meeting with a probationer who had been kicked out of a drug treatment program, and the subject of the prearranged meeting. Thus, at a minimum, defendant should have known that Green wood was a probation officer.

There is also sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonab le jury to conclude that defendant knew that Whittaker was a probation officer performin g his duties. Unlike Greenwood, defendant had met with W hittaker previously. Whitta ker reviewed the conditions of defendant’s probation with him during his orientation following sentencing. Indeed, Whittaker explained that he reviewed with defendant the requirement that he attend substance abuse treatment provided by the Salvation Army in Grand Rapids.

As for Rechsteiner, a reasonabl e jury could conclude from the circumstantial evidence that because he was standing w ith Whittaker outside Greenwood’s office, and acted in concert with Whittaker in attempting to restrain defendant, defendant s hould have known that Rechsteiner was a probation officer as well.

Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to suppo rt defendant’s three convictions for resisti ng a probation officer.

Defendant’s convictions are affi rmed. We note, however, that the judgment of sentence indicates that the three sentences for assaulting or obstructin g a probation officer are to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to the sentence imposed in the earlier case. At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that the sentences on the three counts in the case now before
us were to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the prior sentence. Consequently, we remand to the trial court to determine if the judgment of se ntence accurately reflects its sentencing decision, and if not, to issue an amended judgment o f sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Cynthia D. Stephens /s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Patrick M. Meter