2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-19-2009

Denise Proctor v. ARMDS Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 07-4144

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Recommended Citation

"Denise Proctor v. ARMDS Inc" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 803.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/803
The Honorable Alan D. Lourie, Federal Circuit Judge, sitting by designation. *

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_________

No. 07-4144

_________

DENISE PROCTOR; TYREA ALEXANDER

v.

 ARMDS INC,

Appellee

DENISE PROCTOR,

Appellant

___________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the District of New Jersey

No. 04-cv-00899

(District Judge: The Honorable Peter G. Sheridan) 

___________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 5, 2009

Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and LOURIE Circuit Judges.

*

(Filed August 19, 2009) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT

McKee, Circuit Judge,

Denise Proctor appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendant, ARMDS, Inc., in this employment discrimination claim based on racial discrimination

that Proctor brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. 

For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I. 

Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we

need not recite the factual or procedural history. Our review of the grant of summary judgment is

plenary. Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). To

raise a “genuine” issue of fact, the record must contain evidence “such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). 

Proctor alleges that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she

received the same quality and amount of training as similarly situated employees outside of her

protected class. However, there is no evidence that any similarly situated employee received

better training. In her deposition, Proctor mentioned two employees who may have attended a
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meeting that Proctor believed that she should also have attended. (App. 126-27). However,

Proctor was unsure of the job positions of these employees, and she could not say whether they

actually attended the meeting in question. “The central focus . . . in a case such as this is always

whether the employer is treating ‘some people less favorably than others because of their race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577

(1978) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). “If a plaintiff fails

to show the existence of a similarly situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate where

no other evidence of discrimination is present.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th

Cir. 1997). Here, Proctor’s conclusory allegations, unsupported by any evidence that she

received less rigorous training than those who were similarly situated, fail to raise a genuine issue

of material fact. 

Although we note that Proctor mentions a racially charged incident involving another

employee and reference to a “chimpanzee,” she does not attempt to establish the existence of a

hostile work environment, and that theory of recovery is not included under the “Statement of

The Issue Presented for Review” in her brief. Accordingly, Proctor’s failure to show that a

white employee received more favorable treatment or training, or that such an employee received

training that she was denied, is fatal to her claim of racial discrimination under Title VII.

Proctor also argues that summary judgment was improper because there are genuine

issues of material fact as to whether, during her initial job interview, she told the interviewer that

she had experience with Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security and Charity Care programs. 

According to Proctor, she merely said that she was “knowledgeable” with regard to the programs,

meaning that she knew of their existence, and the interviewer took this to mean that she had
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experience she did not actually have working with such programs. This argument misses the

point, however. In order to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must

show, among other things, “that [s]he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer

was seeking applicants.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). We

have held that “[o]bjective job qualifications should be considered in evaluating a plaintiff’s

prima facie case.” Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 320 (3d Cir.

2000). 

Here, Proctor admits that she did not have the requisite job experience actually working

with Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security and Charity Care programs. Therefore, Proctor did not

meet the objective qualifications for the job in question, and she failed to make out a prima facie

case. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate. See, Narin v. Lower Merion School Dist.,

206 F.3d 323, 332 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff did not possess

required teaching certificates and thus could not establish prima facie claim). We will therefore

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

II. 

For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the order of the district court granting

summary judgment to the plaintiff.