ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

NO. 03-15-00051-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

AUSTIN, TEXAS

TRENT LINDIG, 

 Appellant, 

V. 

PLEASANT HILL ROCKY COMMUNITY CLUB, 

 Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 33RD DISTRICT COURT, BLANCO COUNTY, TEXAS

HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT PRESIDING

CAUSE NO. CV07580

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC

Samuel V. Houston, III

State Bar No. 24041135

4040 Broadway, Suite 440

San Antonio, Texas 78209

(210) 775-0882 – Telephone (210) 826-0075 – Fax

sam@hdappeals.com

ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C.

Zachary P. Hudler

State Bar No. 24032318

100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One

Johnson City, Texas 78636

(830) 868-7651 – Telephone

(830) 868-7636 – Fax 

zachary@hudlerlaw.com

ACCEPTED

03-15-00051-CV

4905311

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

4/15/2015 4:19:13 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/15/2015 4:19:13 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

The following is a list of all parties to this appeal and the names and 

addresses of those parties’ counsel:

APPELLANT APPELLATE COUNSEL 

Trent Lindig Samuel V. Houston, III

HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC

4040 Broadway, Suite 440

San Antonio, Texas 78209

TRIAL/APPELLATE COUNSEL

Zachary P. Hudler

ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C.

100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One

Johnson City, Texas 78636

APPELLEE APPELLATE COUNSEL 

Pleasant Hill Rocky

Community Club

Jeff Small

LAW OFFICE OF JEFF SMALL 

12451 Starcrest Drive, Suite 100

San Antonio, Texas 78216

TRIAL/APPELLATE COUNSEL 

Norman L. Nevins

THE NEVINS LAW FIRM

206 West Main Street

Fredericksburg, Texas 78624
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .....................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... vi

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT....................................... vii

ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................... vii

STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................... 1

I. The Lindig Family Has Owned the 1.3 Acre Tract in Blanco 

County That Is at Issue in this Appeal For Many Years. ............ 1

A. Trent’s Great Grandfather, Albert Lindig, Conveyed 

the Disputed Property Subject to a Limitation That It 

Could Only Be Used for School Purposes.......................... 1

B. Acknowledging That a School Was No Longer Being 

Operated on the Property, the Blanco County School 

Board Trustees Execute a Deed Purporting to Convey 

the Property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement 

Association. .......................................................................2

C. The Lindigs Continued To Assert Their Ownership 

Rights in the Property After 1952...................................... 3

D. The Lindigs Assert That Any Use By the Club or Other 

Groups Was Done with the Lindigs’ Permission...............4

II. Trent Files Suit to Confirm His Ownership in the Property, 

Leading the Club to Assert a Competing Ownership Claim 

to the Property............................................................................4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................................................6

ARGUMENT.................................................................................................. 7

I. The Trial Court’s Construction of the 1927 Deed and the 

Reverter Clause Is Reviewed De Novo on Appeal. ..................... 7

II. Applying Well-Established Legal Principles, the Court Should 

Conclude That Trent Owns the Property Because the Reverter 
iii

Clause Was Triggered.................................................................8

A. The 1927 Deed Created a Possibility of Reverter and Vested Albert Lindig’s Heirs with a Future Possessory 

Interest in the Property.....................................................8

B. The Limitation in the 1927 Deed Was Breached When 

a School No Longer Operated on the Property. .............. 10

C. The Club’s Construction of the 1927 Deed Is Flawed 

and Unsupported By Any Authority................................ 12

III. Conclusion and Prayer.............................................................. 13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.............................................................. 14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE........................................................................15

APPENDIX....................................................................................................A
iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no writ) ...9

City of Houston v. Van De Mark, 83 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ....................... 7

Cooke v. Morrison, 

404 S.W.3d 100 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ............... 7

Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., 

115 S.W.3d 67,(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied)......................9

El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013)...8, 9

Eyssen v. Zeppa, 

100 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ ref’d)................. 12

Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (en banc)....8

Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Nueces, 736 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1987)...........8

Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).......................................7, 8, 12

Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, Inc., 

264 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) ............................ 7

Monroe v. Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ..........8

Stewart v. Blain, 

159 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1913, no writ)............... 10, 12, 13

Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 

432 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied)................... 11

XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied)....................... 11

STATUTES & RULES

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d)....................................................... 7

TEX R. CIV. P. 248 .......................................................................................... 5
v

OTHER AUTHORITIES

36 David B. Brooks, Texas Practice Series: 

County and Special District Law § 30.10 (2d ed.) .................................... 3

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (7th ed. 1999)..................................................9
vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case:

Appellant Trent Lindig brought suit to confirm his ownership in a 1.3

acre tract of land in Blanco County, alleging a trespass to try title action, a suit 

to quiet title, and declaratory judgment claim. CR 439-43. Trent’s principal 

argument is that a reverter clause in a 1927 Deed executed by his great 

grandfather had been triggered when the property was no longer being used 

for school purposes. CR 441. As a result, Trent claimed fee simple ownership 

of the property. CR 441. Appellee Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club 

challenged Trent’s ownership claim by first asserting that the reverter clause 

had not been triggered. CR 454-55. Alternatively, even if the clause was 

triggered, the Club claimed title through adverse possession. CR 455-57.After 

denying the parties’ summary judgment motions, the trial court addressed the 

reverter clause in connection with a motion filed by Trent pursuant to Texas 

Rule of Civil Procedure 248. 4 RR 4-5.

Trial Court:

District Judge J. Allan Garrett considered Trent’s Rule 248 Motion.

Trial Court Disposition:

The trial court interpreted the 1927 Deed in the Club’s favor, ruling that 

“the circumstances have not occurred to trigger the reverter clause.” CR 475; 

Appx. A. The trial court also granted the parties’ agreed request to permit an 

immediate appeal of the order on Trent’s Rule 248 Motion. CR 479; Appx. B. 
vii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

This appeal presents a straightforward issue regarding the construction 

of a deed. The authorities cited herein compel the result advanced by Trent. 

Nonetheless, should the Court determine that oral argument is necessary, 

Trent reserves the right to participate in any future oral argument. 

ISSUE PRESENTED

Appellant believes this case presents the following issue:

1. Did the trial court err when it concluded that Trent Lindig was 

not the rightful owner of the disputed property by virtue of the 

reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed from Albert 

Lindig to the Blanco County Board of Trustees?
1

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant Trent Lindig respectfully presents this brief requesting that 

the Court reverse the trial court’s order denying the relief requested in his Rule 

248 Motion. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. The Lindig Family Has Owned the 1.3 Acre Tract in Blanco 

County That Is at Issue in this Appeal for Many Years.

A. Trent’s Great Grandfather, Albert Lindig, Conveyed the 

Disputed Property Subject to a Limitation That It Could 

Only Be Used for School Purposes.

The Lindig family has owned a multi-acre tract of land in Blanco County

since the early 1900s. See CR 104, 385. That tract of land, which is described 

in deeds as being part of the Seaborn Hopper Survey, includes the disputed 1.3 

acre tract of land that is at the center of the dispute between Trent and the 

Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club. See CR 101, 116. This appeal concerns 

the interpretation of a deed executed by Trent’s great grandfather, Albert 

Lindig, in 1927 (hereinafter the “1927 Deed”). See CR 96-98.1

Albert Lindig conveyed the 1.3 acre tract to “J.C. Goar, T.E. Patton, Scott 

Klett, J.J. Fuchs and Gus Artzt, constituting the County Board of Trustees for 

Blanco County, Texas.” CR 96. The deed limited the type of activity that could 

be conducted on the property in three separate clauses. In describing the 

consideration being exchanged in the conveyance, the deed recites “that the 

 1 The 1927 Deed appears multiple times in the appellate record. Trent references the most 

legible copy in this brief. 
2

land herein conveyed shall be used for School purposes only.” CR 96. The 

deed’s granting clause provides that the property “shall be used for School 

purposes for the Pleasant Hill School District No. 21.” CR 96. The deed’s 

habendum clause confirms that the property was being conveyed to the 

County Board of School Trustees “for School Purposes.” CR 97. Consistent 

with this limitation, the deed contains a reverter clause setting forth the 

following: “But it is understood that in case the said School House or any other 

house which may be built and used for a School house is removed from said 

land herein described then the said above described land shall revert back to 

me, my heirs, assigns or legal representatives.” CR 96. 

A school operated on the property in the years following 1927. See CR 

102, 116. It is undisputed, however,that a school was no longer being operated 

on the property by 1952. CR 102, 110, 116, 132, 458; see also CR 253. The same 

remains true today. CR 102.

B. Acknowledging That a School Was No Longer Being 

Operated on the Property, the Blanco County School 

Board Trustees Execute a Deed Purporting to Convey the 

Property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association.

In August 1952, the Blanco County Board of School Trustees attempted

to convey the property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association for use 

“as a Community Center for the benefit of Pleasant Hill Community in Blanco 

County, Texas.” CR 381.2 The deed recites that the property was “formerly 

 2 The grantees in the 1927 Deed comprise the “County Board of Trustees for Blanco County, 

Texas.” CR 96. The grantors in the 1952 Deed are identified collectively as the “Blanco 
3

used for school purposes but now [is] no longer so used.” CR 381. The deed 

also acknowledges the reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed. CR 382. 

In particular, the conveyance “is made subject to the reversionary interest of 

Albert Lindig, his heirs or assigns, as set forth in his deed to the Blanco County 

School Trustees dated September 10, 1927.” CR 382. 

C. The Lindigs Continued To Assert Their Ownership Rights

in the Property After 1952. 

After a school ceased to operate on the property, the Lindigs continued 

to assert their ownership rights in the property. Lindig family members have 

maintained the property and made improvements on it, including putting up 

fences, putting up a gate, and clearing the property on a regular basis. CR 94. 

The Lindigs have also been paying the property taxes. CR 94, 98-99, 260-305. 

Real property and probate records also demonstrate that the Lindig 

family continued to assert its ownership interest in the property. Following 

Albert Lindig’s death, the property passed to Trent’s grandfather (Felix Lindig) 

and then to his grandmother (Addie Lindig). CR 117, 396, 401; see also CR 

106. In a series of transfers, Trent’s grandmother eventually conveyed the 

entirety of her interest in the property to Trent’s parents, Al Louis Lindig and 

Brenda Lindig. CR 116, 117, 387-92. Then, on December 4, 2006, Al Louis 

 

County Board of School Trustees.” CR 381. Presumably, these references are synonymous 

given that Texas law has provided, in some instances, that “the management and control of 

the public schools within a county” may be “vested in a ‘board of county school trustees.’” 

36 David B. Brooks, Texas Practice Series: County and Special District Law § 30.10 (2d 

ed.).
4

Lindig and Brenda Lindig conveyed their interest in the property to Trent. CR 

393; see also CR 204.

D. The Lindigs Assert That Any Use By the Club or Other 

Groups Was Done with the Lindigs’ Permission. 

The Lindigs maintain that they permitted the Pleasant Hill community 

to use the property. CR 115, 118; see also CR 94. The Pleasant Hill Rocky 

Community Club,3 along with other groups, had been given permission to use 

the property for various functions. CR 103, 104, 106.In June 2013, the Lindigs 

withdrew any previously-granted permission to the Club. CR 103, 115. Club 

members, however, refused to vacate the property. See 438. 

II. Trent Files Suit to Confirm His Ownership in the Property, 

Leading the Club to Assert a Competing Ownership Claim to 

the Property.

Trent filed suit in September 2013, seeking to confirm his ownership 

rights in the property. CR 5. The Club responded, asserting that it was the 

rightful owner of the property. CR 30. In that regard, the Club asserted a 

counterclaim seeking a ruling that the 1952 Deed vested it with title and 

challenging Trent’s assertion that the reverter clause in the 1927 Deed had 

been triggered. CR 31-35. Alternatively, the Club claimed ownership through 

adverse possession. CR 31-35. 

 3 There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the Pleasant Hill Rocky Community 

Club is a successor in interest of the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association and able to 

claim an ownership interest by virtue of the 1952 Deed. See CR 351; see also CR 118. 
5

The parties submitted traditional and no-evidence motions for summary 

judgment. CR 3, 80, 83, 367, 370, 373. Those motions were denied. CR 361, 

363; 3 RR 34. The week before trial, Trent sought a ruling from the trial 

court—through Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248—with respect to his 

construction of the 1927 Deed and its reverter clause. CR 460.

The trial court held a hearing on Trent’s Rule 248 Motion. The parties 

were permitted to re-urge their respective motions for summary judgment “on 

the legal issue of reverter and the interpretation of the 1927 deed.” 4 RR 5. In 

connection with Trent’s motion, the trial court further clarified that—

consistent with the parties’ agreement—the ruling on the reverter issue would 

be subject to an immediate appeal pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code section 51.014(d). 4 RR 7. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made two findings: (1) 

the 1927 Deed is unambiguous; and (2) the Club “has current title to the 

subject property” because “the circumstances that give rise to that reverter 

have not occurred.” 4 RR 14. Those oral rulings were reduced to a written 

order. CR 475; Appx. A. Further, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the trial 

court signed an order permitting Trent to seek an immediate appeal of the 

order. CR 479; Appx. B. 
6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The possibility of reverter created in the 1927 Deed unequivocally vests 

Trent with title to the disputed property. Reading the entire deed and giving 

effect to all relevant clauses, the only reasonable construction is that the 

Lindigs’ reversionary interest became a present possessory interest once a 

school was no longer operating on the property. Obviously, without a school, 

the property could not be used for school purposes. It is undisputed that the 

property has not been used for school purposes since August of 1952. Thus, 

Trent is the rightful owner of the property. 

The Court should reject the Club’s flawed argument. The Club posits that 

the reversionary interest created in the 1927 Deed does not become a present 

possessory interest so long as the building that once housed the nowabandoned school is still on the property. Not only does this argument violate 

well-established rules for deed construction, which require the Court to 

harmonize all parts of a deed, but this same argument has been expressly 

rejected in a prior appeal involving substantially similar deed provisions. 

While the building may still be on the property, it cannot be a schoolhouse if 

there is no school. Accordingly, the trial court’s order must be reversed. 
7

ARGUMENT

I. The Trial Court’s Construction of the 1927 Deed and the 

Reverter Clause Is Reviewed De Novo on Appeal. 

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 248 permits a trial court to resolve 

questions of law in a pretrial hearing. Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, 

Inc., 264 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). The 

construction of the 1927 Deed was appropriately raised through Trent’s Rule 

248 Motion because “[t]he construction of an unambiguous deed is a question 

of law for the court.” Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). The 

construction of a reverter clause also presents a question of law. City of 

Houston v. Van De Mark, 83 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, 

pet. denied).4 Thus, the trial court’s construction of the 1927 Deed and its 

reverter clause is reviewed de novo on appeal. Cooke v. Morrison, 404 S.W.3d 

100, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 

In construing a deed, the Court’s primary duty “is to ascertain the intent 

of the parties from all of the language in the deed by a fundamental rule of 

construction known as the ‘four corners’ rule.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461. The 

Court does this by examining and considering “the entire writing in an effort 

to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the agreement, even if 

different parts of the deed appear inconsistent or contradictory.” Hausser v. 

Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (en 

 4 The trial court found the 1927 Deed to be unambiguous. CR 475. Trent agrees that the 

deed is unambiguous. 
8

banc). It is presumed that every clause is “to have some effect; therefore, the 

language of the deed should be interpreted so that no provision is rendered 

meaningless.” Id. 

II. Applying Well-Established Legal Principles, the Court Should 

Conclude That Trent Owns the Property Because the Reverter 

Clause Was Triggered. 

A. The 1927 Deed Created a Possibility of Reverter and 

Vested Albert Lindig’s Heirs with a Future Possessory 

Interest in the Property. 

A person conveying property can retain an interest in the property 

through a reversionary interest. El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 

S.W.3d 798, 802 (Tex. 2013). There are a number of reversionary interests 

that are recognized in Texas. Id. They include reversions, possibilities of 

reverter, and rights of entry. Id. Collectively, reversionary interests represent 

“future interests that remain with the grantor . . . and may be viewed ‘as claims 

to property that the grantor never gave away.’” Id. at 802-03 (citation 

omitted). 

A possibility of reverter describes “a future interest retained by a grantor 

that conveys a determinable fee.” Id. at 801 n.6. Stated differently, “it is the 

grantor’s right to fee ownership in the real property reverting to him if the 

condition terminating the determinable fee occurs.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 

464. It is a property interest that has value. Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. Cnty. of 

Nueces, 736 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1987). It can be assigned or sold. Monroe v. 

Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
9

The interest cannot be destroyed through a subsequent conveyance of the 

property. See id. Finally, title vests in the grantor (or his heirs) immediately 

once the limitation imposed by the deed is breached. Cypress-Fairbanks 

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2003, pet. denied); see also El Dorado Land Co., 395 S.W.3d at 803. 

No particular words are required to create a possibility of reverter. 

Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 196 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no 

writ). Rather, the Court’s analysis focuses upon the grantor’s intent as 

expressed in the deed. Id. A possibility of reverter is created by a deed that (1) 

prescribes a limitation on the grantee’s rights with respect to the property, and 

(2) contains a reverter clause that does not require the grantor to re-enter the 

property to claim the reversionary interest. See id. 

The 1927 Deed can only be characterized as having created a possibility 

of reverter in Albert Lindig and his heirs should the property cease to be used 

for school purposes. As consideration for the transaction between Albert 

Lindig and the Blanco County Board of Trustees, the deed recites “that the 

land herein conveyed shall be used for school purposes only.” CR 96. Further, 

the granting clause in the deed provides that the property “shall be used for 

School purposes for the Pleasant Hill School District No. 21.” CR 96. The 

habendum clause5 reflects that the property is being conveyed “for School 

 5 The habendum clause is the “part of a deed that defines the extent of the interest being 

granted and any conditions affecting the grant.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (7th ed. 1999).
10

Purposes.” CR 97. Finally, the deed’s reverter clause acknowledges that “in 

case the said School House or any other house which may be built and used for 

a School house is removed from said land herein described then the said above 

described land shall revert back to me, my heirs, assigns or legal 

representatives.” CR 96. If a school was not being operated on the property 

then it is obviously not being used for “school purposes.”

Similar language has previously been found to create a possibility of 

reverter. In Stewart v. Blain, the deed recited that the grantor was conveying a 

tract of land “‘for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse.’” 159 S.W. 928, 929 

(Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1913, no writ). The deed went on to explain that 

“‘in the event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom by said county 

judge and his successors in office the said acre of land shall revert back to me 

or my heirs or assigns, and this deed shall become void and inoperative.’” Id.

Analyzing the deed, the court held the following:

It seems to us that these provisions mean, and were intended to 

mean, that the grantees should own and use and enjoy the 

property so long as it was so used for the purpose for which it was 

conveyed, and that when this condition ceased the title and right 

of possession should at once revert to the grantor, “or his heirs or 

assigns.” 

Id. at 931. The Court should reach the same result in this case. 

B. The Limitation in the 1927 Deed Was Breached When a 

School No Longer Operated on the Property. 

It is undisputed that a school was not operating on the property by the 

time that the 1952 Deed was signed. The witnesses offering affidavit and 
11

deposition testimony all confirm that the school closed in the early 1950s. See

CR 102, 110, 116, 132, 253, 458. Indeed by the time that the property is 

(purportedly) conveyed to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association, a 

school was not being operated on the property. The 1952 Deed confirms this 

fact. See CR 381. The granting clause in the deed recites that the property was 

“formerly used for school purposes but now no longer [is] so used.” CR 381. 

This recitation is conclusive. 

“The doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes parties to a deed from 

denying the truth of any material fact asserted in the deed.” Teal Trading & 

Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 432 S.W.3d 381, 

388 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied); XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 

357 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). “Estoppel by 

deed binds, not only the parties to the deed, but also their successors-ininterest.” Teal Trading & Dev., LP, 432 S.W.3d at 388. The doctrine “may 

arise from the recitals, reservations, and exceptions within a deed.” Id. 

Given that it is undisputed that a school no longer operated on the 

property by 1952, the reverter clause has been triggered. Based upon the 

record, title vested in Albert Lindig and his heirs once the property was no 

longer being used for school purposes. Thus, the trial court’s order must be 

reversed. 
12

C. The Club’s Construction of the 1927 Deed Is Flawed and 

Unsupported By Any Authority. 

The Club’s construction of the 1927 Deed must be rejected because it is 

based upon an isolated reading of the 1927 Deed. According to the Club, the 

possibility of reverter is dependent upon a single fact: whether the actual 

building that once housed the school is still on the property. See CR 471-72. 

This position, of course, violates well-established principles for deed 

construction. Namely, the Court must “harmonize all parts of the deed.” 

Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462. In that connection, Albert Lindig’s intent could not 

be more clear. The land was to “be used for school purposes only.” CR 96. This 

limitation is also found in the 1927 Deed’s granting and habendum clauses. CR 

96-97. Thus, giving effect to the entire deed, the possibility of reverter sprang 

to life once the property was no longer being used for school purposes. See 

Eyssen v. Zeppa, 100 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ 

ref’d) (holding that “the words ‘so long as said tract or parcel of land is used 

for school purposes’ . . . created a conditional limitation and that the title 

thereto ipso facto reverted to the grantor”). 

The argument advanced by the Club has already been rejected. As was 

discussed in section II.A, supra, the deed in Stewart v. Blain provided that the 

property was being conveyed “‘for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse.’” 159 

S.W. at 929. Similar to the 1927 Deed, the reverter clause in Stewart provided 

that “‘in [the] event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom . . . said acre 

of land shall revert back to me or my heirs or assigns.’” Id. The grantor’s heirs 
13

sought to confirm their ownership interest given that a school was no longer

operating on the property. Id. 930-31. While the property was no longer being 

used for school purposes, the building that once housed the school was still on 

the property. Id. at 930. 

The court concluded that the possibility of reverter was triggered once 

the property was no longer used for school purposes, i.e., when there was no 

longer a school operating on the property. Id. at 931. The reverter was not 

dependent upon whether the building was still on the property. Id. According 

to the court, the “sale and the abandonment of the land for school purposes 

was to all intents and purposes ‘a removal of the schoolhouse therefrom.’ The 

building may be there yet, but it is not a schoolhouse.” Id. The Court should 

reach the same result in this case. Accordingly, the trial court’s order should be 

reversed.

III. Conclusion and Prayer.

Trent is the rightful owner of the disputed property. The limitation 

found in the 1927 Deed has been breached. Under the deed’s unambiguous 

terms, the reversionary interest became a present possessory interest once a 

school ceased to operate on the property. Because there was no school, the 

building could not be a schoolhouse. Therefore, the trial court’s order must be 

reversed. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant Trent Lindig 

respectfully prays that the Court reverse the trial court’s order on Appellant’s 
14

Rule 248 Motion, declare that Appellant holds title to the disputed property, 

and grant other and further relief to which he may be justly and equitably 

entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III

SAMUEL V. HOUSTON,III

State Bar No. 24041135

HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC

4040 Broadway, Suite 440

San Antonio, Texas 78209

Telephone: (210) 775-0882

Fax: (210) 826-0075

sam@hdappeals.com

Zachary P. Hudler

State Bar No. 24032318

ZACHARY P. HUDLER, P.C.

100 E. Pecan Street, Suite One

Johnson City, Texas 78636

(830) 868-7651 – Telephone

(830) 868-7636 – Fax

zachary@hudlerlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4, the 

undersigned certifies that the foregoing computer-generated brief contains 

3,399 words.

/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III

SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III
15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 

has been served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on 

the 15th day of April, 2015, to the following:

Jeff D. Small Via email/e-service

LAW OFFICE OF JEFF SMALL

12451 Starcrest Dr. #100

San Antonio, Texas 78216

jdslaw1951@gmail.com

Norman L. Nevins Via email/e-service

THE NEVINS LAW FIRM

206 West Main Street

Fredericksburg, Texas 78624

nnevinslaw@yahoo.com

/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III

SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III
A

APPENDIX

A. Rule 248 Hearing Order

B. Order pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(d)
TRENT LINDIG 

v. 

PLEASANTIIlLL ROCKY 

COMMUNITY CLUB 

NO.CV07580 

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

33td JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 

BLANCO COUNTY~ TEXAS 

RUUf 248 HEARING ORDJ'£R 

On December 11, 2014, the trial court heard Plaintiff Trent .Llndig's MOTIONFORRULE 

248 HEARING. The parties appeared in person and by their attomey8. By agreement, the parties 

re-urged their respective motion$ for summary judgment asking the Court to determine 

unresolved questions of law. The Court considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, and 

finds and concludes that the 1927 Deed dated and recorded September 10, 1927, fu:lm Albert 

Lindig to the County Board of Trustees for Blanco County5 Texas (attached hereto as Exhibit 

"A") is hOt ambiguous. The Court finds further that the circumstances h~ve not·occutted to 

trigger the reverter clause contained in the foregoing deed. 

It is, thereforej ORDERED and DECLARJID that the above-referenced 1927 Deed is 

unambiguous and no reversion has occutted under the terms of that deed. 

Signed~':"~ -1£.., 201r 

Judge Presiding 

JAN - 9 201(" 

475

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·'-'lllll·s~w~ ·. •. ·1 . · . ~ . . • . . mtolf ~' JlElr llY THRSB Pnllfli:Hsi ... 01!,Ullt:r at lllnaa. ) • • • • . • . • , • 

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: l'hat x,'am:1a~ien lLindig h:U.e~ 11.;lmn11l~dgod l\1'Yl!IOD1' 1~ £1111 Df 'tba ~Q· llG\u ror tho a;.' I I 

~ Orr& '?h~u.aaml ·~~iqrumlrad, :&'U'ty (Uq;-o.oo):Da~iuin 111i11. 1,n'"!f'•lli doucribu4 in lload·11Xaa11tedl 

'IJ;r'U1 I?', Ltndig ~~II~~ ohi:tati~n Ltmlig to ;r, D, ltlnnoY ;n tba J.Jth. d..; at llo11tamllol', r • 

a.91f, 1U1d1r1111ordatl 1~ .B~d ;i111pa l.Ja lloa~11ll• ot lli.ui11a· Ooullty, ToXIJ.o, IUtl\ liains tha ~eglll 1 

. ..... ;. . . r.·· hl!lller and o'lnllll! DJ.' fiha 8111111','1 do hOllaby rl!l-•aa, 1111d aaqu11: to ;r, Ji. X111110,.- Mu hdza '111111. 

11qa1snu; tha :iu:a11llt'ty donuriba~a~·-~n~;,.'..n~! ~: · . · ' . · 

.lll. that a~t~ l.a~· or ~ur:~l ~ltllcl ~l~uo.t~~ • ~n .Dtuaa Coun~;r, ~8l<lla, lllJd be1pg_ ~ ot lllaalc lla• 17 amt all ot r.ota lf4. l, lla l!., :m;. '' qnd ira. 6 in llloo); Ila. 4 at tbo ·him 11r 

;J'abn~a~ Oity, '1'a1"'D1 aa aballl! b.) the 111ot • ~aid "timnf rrua ,frOlll all lion aroB,ated by. ran11on •

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ot. ·ua:ld nato ar the 1natrlllllmt 11bovo manU111ul11. · 

)iit11e1m lilY' ~ at J'11hnll111J. ~lty, tldu 8th. at slll'taabar~ 1927 • 

suboori'tied ta tha to:ragaing l.no""'mlint, and 11ulmnl Dd.ged ta ma 

.tl\a ~1'•~e11 ilall iianai4er11tbn therein .aoul!d·· .. . . . 

.. , i ll1Vlll\ lladt!J! ,,q. biind llll.d· aaal ~.. a1'lioa, at •.Tahn. aon. Oit;r., Tai.u, th1a. 8 ~ UT :of. 

··=s~ptemb8l', A.D. 1927. \. 

•I {B!W.} Cauni;i:' ll~~@ii~oo llo11nb·1 ¥11x1U/·•"\' 

ll7. @pa lf!l!'ll@l' .Dtnuty •• 

· ·· f ·l'ILllll .r6n lllWDIUI Bln''lEUlll!ll lltb. A.JI. ·1927~ nt ':oo·.p .u. · ·' , '!!OJI llUDlrAr coml!l'l' omm: llLA!mo oonrrr TBXAB. • • • • : • • '-" I, Rnt:lffillED 8El"pJIDJllll l~. A.JI, l!J2\J, at 1l10D ..r..11. • • : , . , • : 

j f1P~'f.i:'l/IJ~t'K4'Jr:~flJ#'f~~.$~~flfl/$/if,'P#fll!!'J~f{lt~~~#.~~-'li~~~ . .' 

1•::~::11:?ll::.:D· ~ !mow~· b7 tlln~11·lJl!aaante: !tbnt r: ~b~~~~m11;, a£ t~o OolDI~ ·~ .. ; 

''" · Blnn; ... nnd 1ltat9 ~ 'l'axaa, t11r ~d .ln aanllideratio11 m: lllio llouirra' an'd ~tbor '!'lll~b~u aan1~111orntl"1l 110ill. b;y ;r.O.GoU',!l'·lil·l'fi~tor,t,Buatt lO.ah,t,J'.l'llahn tilld Oif11 .Ar't:.t, 11on.11tit11Ung .tbii . . ' . aawit:.- P~d at" ~Bataan 'tor Blono9 OD.\lntT. '1'11Xll8, the l'aoeipt ot 'llbiah !ii IJ.ar1>b)' allknmr1ndgad,1 

~d "tl~a :rurtbBl' o.11~01durat~an -thllt thtr lBDd llaroln aonyayo4.almμ.bn uae.i. ro.r aoholll. puq11isoa. ' .... . . ,. . . . { ... uoly, ; . •• - • . r. 

•HO.vu grantM, sold., lli~on nml i.onyoy111I, and by tlloue }U'aaant.a ta ((l'ant, ooU, Siva nnd. .. . ·. . . . . . ) 

oan'H/(. Ullta the 11nid :r.a~DD~,!1'.:B,Patton,Saatt lllatt,;t~J'.l'uoho And .<llfl Jl:rlllt, tho lllnnoo OountyL 

;a~l/l'd to -:rruute~n, and tlluu ouoaa11001111 1n' oi'fioo, tbo.1'al1u!dng doaori"bod hoot or par11al or J. ~ I .. o 0 

l.llnd i,v.l.!ig ~d J;ofng 11itu11teU in'.l11ni.ioo County; fl!XIX;, out al: and pi.rt. or Survoy lfo, 94, ill 

tho ~~. ot ~b\lb•r~ l~ll,lltW; ba~~~.tng at ~ba ir.~.carnar ~t lluYay Uo. 9S; H.u.»oy an, tlaa s.11nii 

o.t .. 'sllllYdY Jfa. 94; f~nu'a ~. if4.S vro ta Pobt Diile 12 lbll di&• blllaad on 4 Bidell ~or ,lJ.V,Qau1111'; . . . . ~ . . · • Thsnao JJ: .. 119 v.ro t~ nton~·~· &: oal\Bll ;punt. far JJ,~.Oazn'lll!I !l'honaa s. 94-•U 'Vi:~ to at.~ an e, 

]Jhb at ~1ginai BllrYllYI :fllana~ If• 119 T.t'D to tb111Jlaaa of bagiunillg; •Qaid a11avu d~aaribad. 

1.~at oll! xinrool at llllld • o~ bn 11nad. fa:r Sal\oa:L-:plllipaaaa :tas.- th9 »;DJ'•'!fl1:. lfill. Saboal 1Jiotria1' 

u~. 21. llut i~ leWHlorQtood".~bat iit ~pue tho n~ci·ll~bbai llouno er any 11tbar bauao wbiall"may 

·• bo 1lll~ anll uoad 1'~ a eOhao1_ha

0

1u1a 0lo• r~oved'_~dlll. allld. ia;icl hor'!-ln tlo~or~lunl tbull the &!144 

1 .' • · riba"ra aoocu-il>oll 111114 vba11 r~ud baa~. tu· !Je, J!v'iiot.i.a'.s 4.lialgaa or io!Pi1 J>"u~11no11tatbaa. •. . ·· . • • . ... • . -'ti. ·. ~ . • ... ,. -• ... . -·· ,, • : . ... .. .... . . · .:• fo 111r-vo nnit· to bu+tl· tha 111i0Tia· ~aa~111e4 Pl:'Bllll.aaa1\'1:oliathai: il.j:ii:nll'·~rni: !nlnauhi:- tbn,'' • 

. ~11lhh0 ai:·d a;ii_p'~~Ob~~11a,."thor~t11:.1·n aml~~q· i411~g~g ,Uat.,o ·:tba; ~ai~ !i;~·~,Oo~~. ·f.)Mlatt~u·,~aott ..... · .. · ·~ .:: .. _: '." ....... ::.:·?:;?~::.:~·,~· .:.;..~.{( .. ,:~·:.:·~~~.~ ......... /~~ .. ·~.::.~: - .

·"".··I .•... :_: .. ,·, .. '.. ·:. 1 • •• , ...... :___,,.., ,F •• ., " '·~\'•illi.;;;, .·:-. - • • 'I' • • • .. .,,-, li - • '•1''1n:;r • ~ "~ 

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EXHIBIT 

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Xlnt\, J.~.li'uoba, ~nun Allt:t, ao tha DblliltirnGJl~d ot Hoban1 :J.'ruataoa, otlll11110~.0o~ntY,; 

Tl!lClln, Dttd their nttaoanaura in oi'tioa,. And J: ltorllll;y "1ll:rant nnd ·dDi'aolf tbo titla to tbn nboYn . . ' . den11.dbail Pl'l!llllann 1111to • tha a:boTo · urua11d oounty llo~d of Bohaal !i'ruotoon, and tbui.J: ~una11nnol:'11 · .. , . -. . . . . in :oi'.r~oo,, tar Sahool P11tposoa. 

l'litliDDa 1117 hlllid tbla tho 10th. dn;ir ~ Do.;ptam1>al', .A.D. 1927 • 

.AJ.bor1' Lilldlg 

Tho Stnte of Texnu, 

County. a!' nlnnco.. ) . llo:roro 111e, tho U»da~oignod auth11d ty in 01111 fl11' lllnnl!_o Caunt;v, !l'axaa, an 

1 thia W.;y :paraonally a;ppQarud Albort Ll.111lig 1 lmollll to 110 tu b11 thq ;paraan whoaa lllltle in .allbM 

1 pcrl)ia~ t11 tlla Corel!Ding i1111t.;U1Dimt1 1111d aolmowled'l!arl to me tlsut ho exebutotl the ~a tm; tba -t 

lJllrponea Ibid conoiduation thuain uxplleoasd. 

Olvan under llll' band und aelll. or a1'1'illa thla tho lOf:ll., dD.Y ol' Bo;ptl!llb.a:ir._ t..~ll. 1927. 

. (S!W'.) y, JI. Gour, 

Uotury l'llhl111, lllanva llo11nty, 'h::cn••. 

l!r II• llota lloluaidt at viii .taoii 

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li'l'all.11l'iak11burg lt. li'. i . .J.., )i 

SBOOl!D i.mr ~mm:l.ll!:ll! • • • I 

'1'11.B &'Lmt o:r T&XA.9 •• , I 

llllOl'I Jl.J>. l!Ell DY 5!.llllBB :!!1111S111'JlS I 'Illa'!: • • , / ' • lloun ty 01' :alonQa. 

\'l1181lJUS 1 '?llnodaro ltlnmhealt11, tho log11l. lllli!Bl' and· boldor of aurtaln inllabtadll''' fl'l'idonoed 

by.Ma nota far &5'00.00, dun two Ylllll'D artor-lla~11,: al.x notais 1'01! 175'9:0~ a~o~(~ 2, 4, -,; 6,. 

'I and B .)'alU'D ai'teJ: d11to 111111 ana nota :Ul.' #3'/l.·Ollt' :1111 9 ;Yo..ru attar .~tn,.Jllld. aoom:'!.4 by lion 

on·oe.rt111n lnnd moro tul~ d1111orilloil in lleed dat.acl Detiember l!j', 1!1Jl31 o:c.fuutocl by .ll.borl. :r. 

K1:'11ua t,~ 31.'n.qt 9chni1dt and wi:ro 1md now aha;,,. at roaol'd in Vol. ~9 ;4" lill Dom llaoudo o:r 

lllanoo llounty, '!'axon, to wb.iah tno1'l'lllll111d: and tha .u:aca11d 'lhersot reflll'QllGG in hl!l!ll Jiadll fol' 

o 11111:ro 001FJ11qt11 duuor1lttion of 1111.id ii!Jid D11d tbo indabtndnaa hove montJ:ohad, .ea.id '1and no• 

b aing onned b.Y ::ii a. l!ata Schnlld b • andbuaballd, Jtrnat Su~d , wha han llllda 1111plioatian to 1'llll ' 

Ji'8DEHAL IA.1D ll.~nc DH llDUSTQlf, tar n •lonn in thp 11um. • 0~700.00 to bu 'ovidunoed by A11m:timt1011j /. ' 1into ]!a;rablu to all.id ~k in 011!111-f!nnUal. :pll,Yl'llUl~D temUnrr onr a 11er.t1H1 or Yl>D.1'!11 to bu uacuio, 

acl by Daed or 'b:uat an uald 111114 to J'.Jt.Dpnuat ~untau tor all.I.II "Bank.I and · • . . .. . .. 171!1!!llt\9, "is aid !Janie hna doelinud to Bak~on! lolllt unl.ao~ it11 lion.'nball. bo a. :fij,nt. and auplll!.14r 

lion to any and all liDDa 11111llnot oaid d:· · · 

ll01f, :tlll!it!l!'OllB, tor lltld in oanaill ation at tb.oprOlllbao and 11113 DDLIJ.1\ in bMd :paid by /· . 1111id Dank, nacipt or whiah !Q' her.aby aolQlowla dsad, ltia honb;r D]l•nitiaal1y ngraed thafi llDY' /. . - . and au lien• 'llow held and ovq_71 by tile 11ndoraiBt1•d nsainat aqid lllltd, oholl lla, 111¥1 tho nllllla -: 

in llerehy do11J.nr11d to 110., 11,.fund aP<l iJlfarh.; to .tho lion :1.n ta.yor or ,oaid :B1111k1 that tho note 

ln t'avor or' enid Ba.Ilk 11..v{lla Deed of l'ruat nuuuring IPlllln, nd aU rona'lllll.a tbe11o1:, ahall. ba . 

' BRd la a i'irat and BUl!,UI' li1!11 on oald l.l\nd0

1 and nbnJ.l. GO J."-111 •QO long a& Q~ld i.mut111atbl1 

lloto, or nn:v :Pllrt ttfuooi, r ... llil1ll nnpdc!, and tllnt.ndd :Bank llaY iaulca anid: lonn upoa quoh tUJB 

nM :for auull' 1m~ of tl.Jlln nn lt uay datari:iinth • , · ' 

Thill th..la).l'd d~y o:f ;..,1!1101:, 1921 • • , , 

' / · · ' Tl1oado.ra Xoonnaako •, 

!rJIQ~~~.) •. 

O~y o£ CilJ.DD.P10 ) • ''. 

. . lie.Coro i:io, ,tba undaroigqad nut11a1'ity, 011:.'thill day »!'X'~onally 11p:i;all1'~d !!!heoihro lro~nn~lll!:a' 

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'rlie page to w111a111llJd 6QNifli1411ll IS llfff ~ed hi 11 full . lruu and correct cnpy of lhe original on file end ut ' 

r"bcord in my office., ~? U 'JC\J3 

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(.!! Ams~ ~ 

~~ .. KAR!iN NEW A ,Cqun~ ~~~ ~- fDJli!~· 1'JlJ!Y] . i:t) tV '" μJL\LJ"~ · . PPlllV 

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TRENT LINDIG 

v. 

PLEASANT HILL ROCKY 

COMMUNITY CLUB 

NO.CV07580 

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

33rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

BLANCO COUNTY, TEXAS 

Order pursuant .to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §5L014 (d) 

On December 11, 2014, the trial courtheard.PlaintiffTrentlindig's MOTIONRJR.RULE 

248 HEARING and ruled that the 1927 Deed at issue in this cause was not ambiguous and that the 

reverter clause in that deed had not been triggered. The Court on its own initiative and with the 

agreement of the parties hereby grants permission for the immediate appeal of its order declaring 

the 1927 Deed to be unambiguous and that the circumstances triggering the reverter in that deed 

have not occw:red because the Court finds that order involves a controlling question of law as to 

which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Further, the Court finds that an 

immediate appeal. from the order will materially advance the ultimate termination of the 

litigation. 

It is ORDERED, therefore, that Plaintiff Trent Lindig is granted permission to appeal this 

Court's RULE 248 HEARING ORDER referenced above. 

It is, further, ORDERED that during the appeal of the aforementioned Order that the 

status quo as of December 11, 2014, shall remain in force. and effect until further 

Court. 

Signed ~~r -1L_, 201g" 

Approved by: 

~l~~l~ NormanL.Nevins 

Jeff Small 

~~l. 

l,,."'"' ""JI:~ ~ ~~ior Attomey for Trent Lindig, 7 

Attomeys for Pleasant Hill · Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant · -.,1,. _ 

Rocky Community Club . OEB8Y ELSBURY ~ A f~ ~ DefendantJCounter-Plaintiff Ci.ERK DISTRIC1' COURT BLANCO COON1Y, 1EXA'.1 

FILED 

JAN - 9 20fi 

479