alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed April 17, 2019.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D18-905

Lower Tribunal No. 15-525

________________



### Mary D. Benitez

, Petitioner,

vs.



### Jorge L. Benitez

, Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction

— Prohibition

Mary D. Benitez, in proper person

.

Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass, (Fort Lauderdale), for respondent.

Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

We treat the instant appeal as a petition for writ of prohibition. See Eato v.

State

, 7 So. 3d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (treating an appeal from an order denyinga motion for disqualification as a petition for writ of prohibition). As the trial court

correctly denied the legally insufficient disqualification motion, we hereby deny

the petition for writ of prohibition. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(e) (“A motion to

disqualify shall be filed within a reasonable time not to exceed [ten] days after

discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be promptly

presented to the court for an immediate ruling.”); see also MacKenzie v. Super

Kids Bargain Store, Inc.

, 565 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1990) (“[A]n allegation in a

motion [for disqualification] that a litigant or counsel for a litigant has made a legal

campaign contribution to the political campaign of the trial judge,

. . . without

more, is” legally insufficient.); Zaias v. Kaye

, 643 So. 2d 687, 687 (Fla. 3d DCA

1994) (“The fact that an attorney made a campaign contribution to a judge or

served on a judge’s campaign committee does not, without more, require

disqualification.”) (citations omitted).

2
#### Richard D. Atkins et al., Respondents, v Jacob J. Piazza, M.D., et al., Defendants, and Mian A. Majeed, M.D., et al., Appellants.

[722 NYS2d 196]

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: We affirm for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court. We add only that, assuming, arguendo, that defendants Mian A. Majeed, M.D. and West-field Memorial Hospital made a prima facie showing that any negligence on their part was not a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff Richard D. Atkins, we conclude that the affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert raises a triable question of fact on that issue *(see, Bastin v Soldiers & Sailors Hosp.,*258 AD2d 922). (Appeals from Order of Supreme Court, Chautauqua County, Martoche, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present — Pine, J. P., Hurl-butt, Scudder, Kehoe and Burns, JJ.
#### Ana LINDHAL, Appellant, v. Phylis BLOOM and the Travelers Insurance Company, a corporation authorized to do business in the State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-671.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 27, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
United States of America

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Office of the Secretary

May 9, 2014

Amanda Wait, Esq.

Hunton & Williams LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20037

Re: In the Matter of Service Corporation International and Stewart Enterprises, Inc.

Docket No. C-4423

Dear Ms. Wait:

This is in reference to the Petition For Approval of Proposed Divestiture filed by Service 

Corporation International (“SCI”) and received on March 7, 2014 (“Petition”). Pursuant to the 

Decision and Order in Docket No. C-4423, SCI requests prior Commission approval of its 

proposal to divest certain assets to Carriage Services, Inc. (“Carriage”).

After consideration of SCI’s Petition and other available information, the Commission 

has determined to approve the proposed divestiture as set forth in the Petition. In according its 

approval, the Commission has relied upon the information submitted and the representations 

made by SCI and Carriage in connection with SCI’s Petition and has assumed them to be 

accurate and complete.

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark

Secretary

cc: Paul Houston

97 North Street

Brooklin, Ontario

Canada, L1M-0C5
#### Irma Williams COLLINS et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Charles Ray SWEAZIE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 6564.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

June 29, 1978.

P. Spencer Torry, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant.

Edward Larvadain, Jr., Alexandria, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before CUTRER, DOMENGEAUX and WATSON, JJ.

CUTRER, Judge.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Ex proprio motu we issued a show cause order questioning this court’s jurisdiction because the appeal from the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction was not perfected within fifteen days as required by LSA-C.C.P. art. 3612.

We dismiss the appeal.

The trial court judgment denying the preliminary injunction was signed December 13, 1977. Notice of Judgment, though not required since the matter had not been taken under advisement, was mailed to the defendant the same day. On December 19, 1977, the defendant was granted a devolu-tive appeal conditioned on furnishing a $250 bond. The appeal bond was filed December 29, 1977.

An appeal from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction must be taken and a bond furnished within fifteen days from the date of the order or judgment. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3612.

The defendant has answered the rule, admitting that his bond was filed a day late, but pleading that “The court, in the administration of justice, should in every case, decide the issue on the merits and not deny a party, on mere, minute. technicalities, especially when they are not prejudicial in nature to the appellees’ position.” We disagree with that position. When the appeal bond is not timely filed, this court is without jurisdiction. *Eyraud v. Com. on Alcoholic Beverage Control,*282 So.2d 578 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1973); *State v. Robouche,*332 So.2d 600 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1976).

The appeal is dismissed at appellant’s cost.

*APPEAL DISMISSED.*
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 111 (Friday, June 8, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 26702]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-12396]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke; Notice 
of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of a meeting of the Board of Scientific 
Counselors, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke.
    The meeting will be closed to the public as indicated below in 
accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(6), Title 
5 U.S.C., as amended for the review, discussion, and evaluation of 
individual intramural programs and projects conducted by the National 
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, including consideration 
of personnel qualifications and performance, and the competence of 
individual investigators, the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Board of Scientific Counselors, National 
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke.
    Date: July 15-17, 2018.
    Time: 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate personal qualifications and 
performance, and competence of individual investigators.
    Place: Residence Inn Bethesda, 7335 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, 
MD 20814.
    Contact Person: Alan P. Koretsky, Ph.D., Scientific Director, 
Division of Intramural Research, National Institute of Neurological 
Disorders and Stroke, NIH, 35 Convent Drive, Room 6A 908, Bethesda, 
MD 20892, (301) 435-2232, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#cea5a1bcabbabda5b7af8ea0a7a0aabde0a0a7a6e0a9a1b8"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ec87839e89989f87958dac828582889fc2828584c28b839a">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.853, 
Clinical Research Related to Neurological Disorders; 93.854, 
Biological Basis Research in the Neurosciences, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS).

    Dated: June 4, 2018.
Sylvia L. Neal,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2018-12396 Filed 6-7-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### Willie James KING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-339.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District

Dec. 14, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
FTC Office of Inspector General Organization Chart Tuesday, May 19, 2020

Inspector General

Program Analyst Administrative Assistant Auditor Audit Manager Attorney Advisor

Counsel to Inspector General
_______________________________________ __ 

### Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



## October 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice



## 136826 Michael F. Cavanag h Elizabeth A. Weave r Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n 

## PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, J ustices



## v SC: 136826 COA: 274241 Wayne CC: 05-009240-01 DERRICK ANTHONY GRUBBS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _________________________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the May 29, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

1015 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 22, 2008

Clerk
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7600 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7600

To expand the scope of the Department of Veterans Affairs open burn pit 
                               registry.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 13, 2020

   Mr. Ruiz (for himself, Mr. Hudson, and Mr. Welch) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To expand the scope of the Department of Veterans Affairs open burn pit 
                               registry.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS OPEN 
              BURN PIT REGISTRY TO INCLUDE OPEN BURN PITS IN EGYPT AND 
              SYRIA.

    Section 201(c)(2) of the Dignified Burial and Other Veterans' 
Benefits Improvement Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-260; 38 U.S.C. 527 
note) is amended, in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking 
``or Iraq'' and inserting ``, Iraq, Egypt, or Syria''.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00297-CR

RICHARD LAREDO JR.,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 21st District Court

Burleson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15,584

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard Laredo Jr. was convicted by a jury of the offenses of aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon and evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2016); see also id. § 38.04(b)(2)(A) (West 2016). We 

affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Laredo’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief in 

support of the motion asserting that he has diligently reviewed the appellate record and 
Laredo. v. State Page 2

that, in his opinion, the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Counsel’s brief evidences a professional evaluation of the record for error and compliance 

with the other duties of appointed counsel. We conclude that counsel has performed the 

duties required of appointed counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 

807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see also Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

In reviewing an Anders appeal, we must, “after a full examination of all the 

proceedings, . . . decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see 

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); accord Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509-11 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991). An appeal is “wholly frivolous” or “without merit” when it lacks any 

basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 439 n.10 (1988). After a 

review of the entire record in this appeal, as well as appellant’s pro se response, we have 

determined the appeal to be wholly frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation of Laredo is granted.

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice
Laredo. v. State Page 3

Before Chief Justice Gray

Justice Davis, and

Justice Neill

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed December 16, 2020

Do not publish

[CRPM]
#### Ronald CARTER et ux. v. R. L. SALTER et al.

No. 61086.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 14, 1977.

In re: Ronald Carter and Frances Carter applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Sabine. 351 So.2d 312.

Writ denied.

SUMMERS and TATE, JJ.,

would grant for limited purpose of considering the father’s claim for survival benefits and wrongful death benefits.
#### Desch *v.*Lehigh County, Appellant.

*Negligence*— Bridges—Counties—Change *of character of travel*— Harm*less error.*

1. A county is bound to strengthen and maintain its bridges in order to support automobiles of the ordinary and usual weight of vehicles traveling over the highways in the locality.

2. Where a county is sued for a death resulting from the breaking of the floor of a county bridge under an automobile, a verdict against the county will not be reversed because the trial judge inadvertently used the word “unusual” in connection with an automobile when he intended to use the word “usual,” if it is plain from other parts of the charge that the jury could not have been misled by the mistake.

Argued Jan. 31, 1911.

May 1, 1911:

Appeal, No. 253, Jan. T., 1910, by defendant from judgment of C. P. Lehigh Co., Sept. T., 1909, No. 35, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Katie S. Desch v. Lehigh County.

Before Brown, Mestrezat, Elkin, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for death of plaintiff’s husband. Before Trexler, P. J.

The facts are the same as in Gehringer v. Lehigh County, ante, p. 497.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $7,000. Defendant appealed.

*Errors assigned*were various instructions.

*Reuben J. Butz,*with him *Claude T. Reno,*county solicitor, for appellant.

*Thos. F. Diefenderfer,*with him *Francis G. Lewis,*for appellee.

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Moschzisker,

This is another appeal growing out of the accident described in the opinion this day filed in the case of Geh*512ringer v. Lehigh County, ante, p. 497. We there determined the controlling principles of law, and it would serve no useful purpose to enlarge upon them here. It is sufficient to say that we have looked into and considered all of the defendant’s fifteen specifications and find no reversible error upon the record. The only assignment to which it is necessary to refer particularly is the thirteenth, containing this excerpt from the charge: ‘' The question is whether on this day this truck was such an automobile as was usual considering its weight and character, or whether it was unusual, and then if you find it was unusual you can consider the case in the further aspects as I have presented them to you.” The last use of the word “unusual,” was probably intended for “usual.” However, it is plain that the appellant did not suffer any harm therefrom, for, both before and after, the trial judge repeatedly told the jury that the county could not be held liable unless “this auto was usual and ordinary,” unless “the load that was carried .... was a common and ordinary load,” and, finally, “if you find that the auto was not of an extraordinary character but was of the ordinary and usual character .... then you say was the bridge insufficient.”

The assignments are all overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
**Exhibit 32.0**

 

**Certification Required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

This certification is given by the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Cascade Bancorp (the “registrant”) pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, with respect to the registrant’s annual report of Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), that:

 

| 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

 

| /s/ Patricia L. Moss |
|----------------------|

Patricia L. Moss

President and Chief Executive Officer

 

 

| /s/ Gregory D. Newton |
|-----------------------|

Gregory D. Newton

Executive Vice President and

Chief Executive Officer

 

 

| Dated: | March 3, 2006 |
|--------|---------------|
Ex.31.1








CERTIFICATION
BY PRESIDENT AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER,


VLADO P.
HRELJANOVIC, PURSUANT TO U.S.C SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002.





I, Vlado
P. Hreljanovic, certify that:





1. I have
reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-KSB of Juniper Group,
Inc.


2. Based
on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;


3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.


4. I am
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-15) for the registrant and
have:


a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is


being
prepared;


b)
evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report, based on such evaluation (the "Evaluation Date"); and c)
disclosed in this report any changes in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and


5. I have
disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of the Registrant's internal
controls, over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):


a) all
significant deficiencies and weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls;
and


b) any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial
controls.









By: /s/
Vlado P. Hreljanovic


------------------------------------


Chairman
of the Board, President,


Chief
Executive Officer and


Chief
Financial Officer





May 19,
2008
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

In re SANCTUARY BELIZE LITIGATION 

(proposed) 

No: ____________1

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AMERIDEBT, INC. et al. 

Defendants. 

[UNDER SEAL] 

DO NOT DOCKET/ 

MOTION TO DELAY ECF PENDING

No: 03-cv-3317-PJM 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S MOTION TO HOLD ANDRIS PUKKE, PETER 

BAKER, AND JOHN USHER IN CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO TURN THE 

SANCTUARY PARCEL OVER TO THE RECEIVER 

 Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher defied this Court’s repeated orders to turn 

over a parcel of land in Belize (the “Sanctuary Parcel”) to the Receiver in this matter, resulting in 

significant financial harm to the FTC v. AmeriDebt victims. See DE122, 473, 571, 572, 604, 

614, and 625. The Court has broad authority to compensate the FTC’s and consumers’ losses, 

including turnover orders and coercive incarceration. United States v. United Mine Workers of 

Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 

U.S. 821, 828 (1994); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370–71 (1966); Hicks v. Feiock, 

485 U.S. 624, 632-35 (1988); Enovative Techs., LLC v. Leor, 110 F. Supp. 3d 633, 637 (D. Md. 

2015). For the reasons detailed in the accompanying memorandum of law, the FTC, therefore, 

 

1

 Currently pending before the Court is a motion to consolidate this matter with the related 

FTC v. Ecological Fox LLC (“Ecological Fox”) matter, pursuant to Rule 42, under the joint case 

name In re Sanctuary Belize Litigation. 
moves the Court to order that Pukke, Baker, and Usher finally tum over the Sanctuary Parcel to 

the Receiver on pain of coercive incarceration. 

Dated: October 31 , 2018 

Respectfully submitted, 

--- ...... 

JONATHAN COHEN, D. Md. Bar No. 16776 

jcohen2@ftc.gov 

BENJAMIN J. THEISMAN, pro hac vice 

btheisman@ftc.gov 

AMANDA B. KOSTNER, pro hac vice 

akostner@ftc .gov 

KHOURYANNA DIPRIMA,pro hac vice 

kdiprima@ftc.gov 

600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, CC 9528 

Washington, DC 20580 

Phone: (202) 326-2551 (Cohen), -2223 (Theisman), 

-2880 (Kostner), -2029 (DiPrima) 

Facsimile: (202) 326-3197 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

2
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11300 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JUAN CARLOS PLANCARTE, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:96-CR-60-1-A

- - - - - - - - - - June 17, 1997 Before SMITH, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Juan Carlos Plancarte has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and we have independently reviewed counsel's brief and the record, and found no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.