[Cite as State v. Stallings, 2012-Ohio-2925.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97480

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

WILLIS STALLINGS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-444002 

 BEFORE: Blackmon, A.J., Cooney, J., and Kilbane, J. 

 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 28, 2012
-iATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Robert L. Tobik, Esq. 

Chief Public Defender 

By: John T. Martin 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Daniel T. Van 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J.: 

{¶1} Appellant Willis Stallings appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

terminate postrelease control and assigns the following error for our review: 

I. Because the original sentence did not impose post-release control, 

and has never been corrected, the trial court was required to discharge 

the defendant from post-release control supervision after he completed 

the service of his prison term and had been released. 

{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we reverse the trial court’s 

decision, vacate Stallings’s postrelease control, and remand for the trial court to note on 

its record that Stallings cannot be resentenced, thus is not subject to postrelease control. 

The apposite facts follow. 

{¶3} On July 26, 2004, Stallings pleaded guilty to one count of receiving stolen 

property, breaking and entering, and two counts of vandalism. In addition, Stallings 

pleaded guilty to a single count of felonious assault of a peace officer. The trial court 

then imposed an agreed prison sentence of eight years. 

{¶4} On July 6, 2009, Stallings filed a motion for a de novo resentencing. 

Stallings argued that the trial court had failed to advise him of the consequences for 

violating postrelease control. The state filed a concurring brief, but argued that the trial 

court should resentence Stallings to merely add postrelease control to the sentence. 

{¶5} On September 7, 2011, after serving his sentence, Stallings filed a motion to 

terminate postrelease control. On September 29, 2011, the trial court denied the motion. 

Motion to Terminate Postrelease Control
{¶6} In the sole assigned error, Stallings argues the trial court erred when it 

denied his motion to terminate postrelease control. 

{¶7} Postrelease control is a “period of supervision by the adult parole authority 

after a prisoner's release from imprisonment[.]” Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 509, 

2000-Ohio-171, 733 N.E.2d 1103, quoting R.C. 2967.01(N). The trial court must inform 

a defendant at his sentencing hearing that postrelease control is a part of his sentence. Id. 

at 513. 

{¶8} R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(e) provides that the court at sentencing must notify the 

offender that if a period of supervision is imposed upon his release and if the offender 

violates that supervision, the parole board may impose a prison term of up to one-half of 

the stated prison term originally imposed on the offender. This notice must be repeated in 

the sentencing entry. State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 

958, ¶ 11, 22. And, a mere reference to a statute is insufficient notice. See, e.g., State v. 

Jones, 7th Dist. No. 06 MA 17, 2009-Ohio-794, ¶ 12. 

{¶9} In the instant case, the record reveals that the trial court failed to provide the 

proper notice in the sentencing entry that postrelease control for a specific term would be 

part of his sentence. In the sentencing journal entry, the trial court stated “postrelease 

control is a part of this prison sentence for the maximum period allowed for the above 

felony under R.C. 2967.28.” The state concedes this error. Thus, the remaining issue is 

the remedy that we can provide. 
{¶10} It is well settled that once the sentence for the offense that carries 

postrelease control has been served, the court can no longer correct sentencing errors and 

impose postrelease control at resentencing. State v. Peterson, 8th Dist. No. 96958, 

2012-Ohio-87, citing State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 

961. Because Stallings has been released from his term of imprisonment, we cannot 

remand for application of the corrected sentencing procedures contained in R.C. 

2929.191. The failure to notify Stallings properly was, in effect, the failure to properly 

impose postrelease control, which cannot now be remedied because he has been released. 

{¶11} Accordingly, we sustain the sole assigned error and reverse the trial 

court’s decision. Stallings’s postrelease control is vacated, and this case is remanded for 

the trial court to note on its record that Stallings cannot be resentenced and thus is not 

subject to postrelease control. 

{¶12} Judgment is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee his costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR