UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7180

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Petitioner - Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN STEPHENSON, 

Respondent - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (5:12-hc-02022-BR) 

Submitted: January 31, 2013 Decided: February 13, 2013

Before MOTZ, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Joseph Bart 

Gilbert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Diana H. Pereira, 

Research and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

John Stephenson appeals the district court’s order 

committing him to the custody of the Attorney General in 

accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (2006). Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm. 

A person may be committed under § 4246 if the district 

“court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is 

presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result 

of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily 

injury to another person or serious damage to property of 

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). The Government must establish

dangerousness under § 4246 by clear and convincing evidence. 

Id. The district court’s finding that the Government has 

established dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence will 

not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. 

United States v. LeClair, 338 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2003); 

United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). 

In 2010, Stephenson came to the attention of police in 

Hillsdale, Michigan after a manager of a local convenience store 

reported that Stephenson made a threat in the store to “kill 

thousands” and that “Washington and Obama are going down.” 

Agents with the United States Secret Service and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation interviewed Stephenson at his residence 

prior to a scheduled visit in Michigan by the President and 
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observed large quantities of ammunition. Body armor and 

thousands of rounds of ammunition were subsequently recovered 

from the residence. Following his indictment in the Western 

District of Michigan on one count of possession of ammunition by 

a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2006), Stephenson was found not competent to stand 

trial. A magistrate judge later rejected the Government’s 

request to medicate Stephenson against his will and ordered that 

he be evaluated to determine whether he was suffering from a 

mental disease or defect such that his release from the Federal 

Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”) would 

create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or 

serious damage to the property of another. 

In 2011, a panel consisting of three FMC Butner staff 

members issued a report concluding that Stephenson suffers from

Delusional Disorder, Mixed Type, and that this mental illness 

was such that Stephenson’s release would pose a substantial risk 

of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the 

property of another. Based on the report, the warden filed a 

certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness. 

At a hearing on the certificate, Hayley Blackwood —

one of the three FMC Butner staffers who signed the report and 

the one who diagnosed Stephenson — testified as an expert in the 

field of forensic psychology. Blackwood expressed her expert 
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opinion that Stephenson would be substantially dangerous if 

released. Her opinion was based on: Stephenson’s disorder; his 

lack of insight into the nature of his mental illness and 

unwillingness to comply with treatment offered to him; his past 

training regarding and access to weapons and his lack of 

understanding that he was prohibited from possessing weapons or 

ammunition; his history of making violent threats related to his 

illness; his impulsive behavior; the nature of the social 

support he would receive in the community; and the results of a 

clinical risk management assessment tool indicating Stephenson 

presented a “moderate to high” risk for future violence. 

Stephenson presented the testimony of psychiatrist Dr. 

Graddy. Dr. Graddy — who testified as an expert in the field of 

forensic psychiatry — expressed his expert opinion that, 

although Stephenson had several risk factors for future 

dangerousness, his social support in the community would 

adequately mitigate against these risk factors, such that his 

risk of dangerousness to others was low. The district court 

accepted the opinion of Ms. Blackwood and issued an order 

finding the existence of clear and convincing evidence that 

Stephenson suffered from a mental disease or defect and that, as 

a result of his mental illness, there was clear and convincing 

evidence that Stephenson’s release would pose a substantial risk 

of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the 
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property of another. Therefore, the district court ordered 

Stephenson committed to the custody of the Attorney General in 

accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). 

Ms. Blackwood’s expert opinion on dangerousness was

cogent, reasoned, and grounded in factors specific to 

Stephenson’s risk of behaving violently in the future and was 

based on a review of a plethora of forensic, health, and legal 

records and a multi-month course of observation, interviews, and 

testing. If the district court credited Blackwood’s opinion 

over that given by Dr. Graddy, it alone was sufficient to 

establish Stephenson’s dangerousness by clear and convincing 

evidence. On appeal, Stephenson implicitly challenges 

Blackwood’s credibility by challenging the basis for some of her 

conclusions and comparing her credentials with those of Dr. 

Graddy. Here, however, the district court had before it the 

testimony of two experts who drew opposing conclusions regarding 

Stephenson’s risk of future dangerousness. To reach its 

conclusion based on clear and convincing evidence, the court had 

to accept one opinion and discount the other. Where a finder of 

fact observes a witness, its credibility determinations 

ordinarily are not disturbed on appeal. Anderson v. City of 

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); Evergreen Int’l, S.A. 

v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 531 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008); 

United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314, 1317 (4th Cir. 1987) 
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(per curiam). The district court found Ms. Blackwood credible, 

and it based its commitment order on that determination. 

Stephenson argues that his substantial dangerousness 

was not established by clear and convincing evidence because 

there exists in the record no documented history that he engaged 

in “physically aggressive behavior” or “acted out violently” on 

his delusional beliefs and because Dr. Graddy found that 

protective factors present in his life overcame any risk factors 

for future violence. We reject these arguments as meritless. 

As Stephenson acknowledges, overt acts of violence are not 

required to prove substantial dangerousness in a § 4246(d) case. 

United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2002). 

Further, the arguments ignore Ms. Blackwood’s testimony 

concerning Stephenson’s violent threats and physically 

aggressive behavior related to his mental illness, his 

unwillingness to utilize health resources made available to him, 

and her opinion on the nature of his social support system in 

the community. Moreover, the arguments effectively ask this 

court to overturn the district court’s conclusions regarding 

Blackwood’s dangerousness opinion in favor of that given by Dr. 

Graddy. In light of the great deference on appeal this court 

affords to credibility determinations, these efforts must fail. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED