# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 20

- 20324

**Michael L. Stout,**

Plaintiff

— Appellant **,**

versus

**William Stephens; Brad Livingston; Joni White; Rissie Owens; David Gutierrez,** 

Defendants

— Appellees

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:19

- CV

- 2152

Before **Smith, Higginson,** and **Willett,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *

Michael L

. Stout, Texas prisoner # 601193, filed a civil rights complaint asserting that his right to due process was violated by errors in the
calculati on of his initial parole eligibility date

. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 20, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 20-20324 Document: 00515987077 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/20/2021No. 20

- 20324

2 because Stout d oes not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole or parole procedures . The district court also denied Stout leave to proceed in forma pauperis ( IFP ) on appeal , certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving to appeal IFP, Stout challenges the district
court’s certification. See McGarrah v. Alford , 783 F.3d 584, 584 (5th Cir. 2015). “An appeal is taken in good faith if it raises legal points t hat are arguable on the merits and thus nonfrivolous.” Id

. Stout asserts that **Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.** § 508.150(a) gives rise to a liberty interest in release on parole. He asserts also that a provision in the Texas Administrative Code contains mandatory l anguage giving rise to a liberty interest.

We have determined repeatedly that Texas law and regulations do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole. See Johnson v. Rodriguez , 110 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 1997) (“It is . . . axi omatic that because Texas prisoners have no protected liberty interest in parole they cannot mount a challenge against any state parole review procedure on procedural (or substantive) Due Process grounds.”); Madison v. Parker , 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1 997) (“ In Texas, it is entirely speculative whether an inmate will actually obtain parole, inasmuch as there is no right to be released on parole. ”); see also Malchi v. Thaler , 211 F.3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Because it is entirely speculative whether a prisoner will be released on parole, the court has determined that there is no constitutional expectancy of parole in Texas. Therefore, any delay in Malchi’s consideration for parole cannot support a constitutional claim. ” ( internal q uotation marks and citation omitted) ). Accordingly, Stout’s assertion that state officials should have backdated his parole eligibility date as to one of his two consecutive

sentences does not involve a protected liberty interest. See Malchi , 211 F.3d

at 9 57. Case: 20-20324 Document: 00515987077 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/20/2021No. 20

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3 Stout has failed to show that his appeal involves legal points arguable
on their merits

. See McGarrah , 783 F.3d at 584

. Accordingly, his IFP motion
is **DENIED** , and his appeal is **DISMISSED** as frivolous. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 n.24 (5th Cir. 1997); see also **5th Cir. R.** 42.2. Case: 20-20324 Document: 00515987077 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/20/2021