J.A13039/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CCI COMMUNICATIONS, INC., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

THE RICHARD F. SASSA INSURANCE :

AGENCY INC., :

: No. 2569 EDA 2013

Appellee :

Appeal from the Order July 18, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division No(s).: February Term, 2010 No. 2070

BEFORE: ALLEN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2014

Appellant, CCI Communications, Inc., appeals from the order of the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in 

favor of Appellee, The Richard F. Sassa Insurance Agency, Inc. Another 

panel of this Court previously reversed summary judgment in favor of

Appellee and remanded for further discovery. CCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. The 

Richard F. Sassa Ins. Agency, Inc., 3253 EDA 2011 (unpublished 

memorandum) (Pa. Super. Nov. 20, 2012). Appellant contends the trial 

court erred in finding that the statute of limitations barred its claim for 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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negligence against Appellee. Appellant argues the discovery rule tolled the 

statute of limitations on Appellant’s claim against Appellee. We affirm.

This Court, in the prior appeal, adopting the summary of the facts as 

provided by Appellant, stated:

[Appellant] is a video production company that provides 

TV production services such as studio production, on-site 

mobile production using trucks, and video editing utilizing 

audio/visual equipment. The programming includes the 

Phillies Pre-Game Show. The video equipment was 

initially installed in a truck and the truck was insured for 

$300,000 under [an automobile policy with the 

Employer’s Fire Insurance Company (“EMPLOYERS”).]

A fire occurred at [Appellant’s] Building II on August 23, 

2007 (“date of loss”) destroying the building and business 

personal property located therein including certain video 

equipment that formerly had been installed in the truck. 

In addition [Appellant] sustained a business income loss

from destruction of the building and business personal 

property. EMPLOYERS paid [Appellant] for destruction to 

the building and partially paid for the business personal 

property. EMPLOYERS also paid the business loss income 

resulting from the destruction of Building II but partially 

paid for the destruction of the video equipment but paid 

nothing for the business income loss resulting from the 

destruction of the video equipment. [Appellant] sued 

EMPLOYERS for unpaid portion of the video equipment 

loss and also for the business income loss resulting from 

the destruction of the video equipment.

Kenneth Selinger [(“Selinger”)], President of Appellant 

testified at his deposition that he [had] asked John 

Geraldi [(“Geraldi”)], President of [Appellee] to procure 

business income loss coverage on [Appellant’s] video 

equipment. [Selinger] communicated to [Geraldi] the 

purpose of the $300,000 in Schedule 8 of the Auto policy 

was to insure any loss arising out of damage to the video 

equipment in the truck including loss of income.
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At the time of the fire, the video equipment was not in 

the truck but stored in [Appellant’s] Building II. As a 

result, EMPLOYERS attempted to calculate [Appellant’s] 

losses under Building II’s property and business income 

coverages rather than the Auto Policy that contained the 

$300,000 limit of insurance. Building II and another 

provision of the insurance policy did not have enough 

coverage to cover the video equipment damage fully and 

[Appellant’s] business income loss to the video 

equipment. The rest of the policy did not have any 

business income coverage that would be applicable as 

result of which [Appellant] was not paid for the 

business income loss to the video equipment by 

EMPLOYERS and only partially paid for the damage 

to the video equipment.

Initially [Appellant’s] suit was to reform 

EMPLOYERS’ policy to provide [that] the video 

equipment and business income loss was covered 

under the $300,000 in the auto policy. However, 

[Appellant] had to settle its reformation claim 

against EMPLOYERS for partial payment on the 

video equipment loss only and nothing on the 

business income loss arising from the damage to 

the video equipment. This was because the 

averments in [Appellant’s] complaint turned out to 

be incorrect. [Appellant] had averred in its complaint 

that:

16. [Appellant] communicated to [Appellant’s] 

broker, [Geraldi] of [Appellee], the purpose of the 

$300,0-00 in Schedule 8 was to insure any loss 

arising out of damage to the equipment in the 

truck including loss of income.

17. Upon belief, [Appellee] communicated the 

purpose of the $300,000 coverage on the truck to 

[EMPLOYERS via a separate nonparty entity].

 * * *

When [Appellant] settled its claims against 

EMPLOYERS that left only the sole liability claim in 

EMPLOYERS’ joinder complaint against [Appellee] 
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outstanding. [Appellee] filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment against [Appellant] on the grounds that the 

two year statute of limitations[1] had run on [Appellant’s] 

claim under the sole liability claim and [Appellant’s] claim 

against [Appellee] was thus barred. The [trial] court 

entered an order granting [Appellee’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations defense.

Brief of Appellant, pp. 4-7 (emphasis omitted).

CCI Commc’ns, Inc. 3253 EDA 2011 at 1-3 (emphases added). Appellant 

appealed from the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee. 

On November 20, 2012, this Court reversed and remanded for further 

proceedings. See id. at 7-8.

In remanding the case sub judice for further discovery, this Court 

reasoned:

. . . [Appellant] claims “there are no record facts upon 

which the [trial] court could have based its conclusion that 

the statute of limitations on [its] professional malpractice 

claim began to run on August 23, 2007.” The basis of this 

argument is the following germane factual findings 

rendered by the trial court:

Here, [Appellant] knew that the insurance policy as 

issued did not contain the coverage they thought 

they had requested. [Appellant’s] first-party 

insurance claim became knowable on August 

23, 2007, the date of the fire. As to [Appellant,] 

the statute of limitations against [Appellee] for 

negligence in the issuance of the policy expired on 

August 23, 2009. Since [Appellee] was joined on 

August 27, 2010, [Appellant] had no claim for 

negligence [i.e. malpractice] against [Appellee]. Any 

direct claim is now barred as a matter of law.

 

1 The statute of limitations for a negligence claim is two years. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 5524(7).
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Trial [Ct. Op., 5/10/12, at 3] (emphasis supplied). Having 

now reviewed the record, we are compelled to agree with 

[Appellant] that, granting it the benefit of all doubt as the 

nonmoving party, it may, at the time of the fire, have 

had a good faith basis upon which to believe that it 

had purchased the appropriate insurance. Thus, the 

mere occurrence of an event for which insurance coverage 

is sought, was not evidence that claimant was aware that 

the sought after coverage was not in place. While we are 

certainly mindful that the claimant’s good faith basis would 

obviously be undercut by notice of the denial of coverage 

from the insurer, we do not find that critical information─ 

specifically, the date of such notice of denial─apparent on 

this record. Thus, we are compelled to agree with 

[Appellant] that the factual information necessary to 

evidence the triggering of the applicable statute of 

limitations against [Appellee] is not contained in the 

present record. Therefore, we must reverse the grant 

of summary judgment and remand this case for 

further proceedings.[ ]

CCI Commc’ns Inc., 3253 EDA 2011 at 7-8 (some citations omitted and 

some emphases added).2 

 

2 As the trial court stated:

It should be noted that the Superior Court implied that 

“the date of the denial of coverage decision by the 

Insurance Company” would be important; however, there 

was no denial of coverage here. Instead, 

[Appellant] argued that the loss had been adjusted 

improperly under the property portion of the policy, 

rather than under the auto portion of the policy 

whose proceeds had not been exhausted. 

[Appellant’s] Third Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Neither party has 

addressed the Superior Court’s concerns over a “denial 

date.” Because payment was made, but there was an 

alleged problem with the type of coverage, neither party 

appears to assert a “date of denial,” as being critical.
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On remand, additional discovery was taken. Selinger, Appellant’s 

president, was re-deposed on March 4, 2013 and testified to the following. 

Selinger’s son Steve, John Geraldi, Appellee’s president, and the adjuster for 

One Beacon, Michael Hagan, assisted in adjusting the fire loss. N.T., 3/4/13, 

at 7. Martin Rabinowitz worked with the adjuster, received the policies and 

Appellant’s losses, and made a recommendation. Id. at 8. Geraldi assisted 

in trying to determine what coverage existed for the loss. Id. One of the 

components of the loss was the loss of income resulting from the 

fire. Id. at 9.

Selinger further testified, inter alia, as follows:

Q: Can you give me . . . a general time frame on when 

your meetings with [ ] Geraldi would have taken place?

A: They were frequent right after the fire. He was 

there that day. [Geraldi] had the policy, we did not have 

the policy on site. . . .

 * * * 

Q: You mentioned a little bit ago that you did not have the 

policy for that particular coverage period at the time the 

fire happened and that [Geraldi] had to provide that to 

you. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Would that be something he did at one of your very 

first meetings after the fire?

[ ] Went over what the coverages were?

 

Trial Ct. Op., 7/18/13, at 5 n.17 (emphasis added). 
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A: Yes.

 * * *

After the fire, it was the first time I saw the 

complete policy. Because that is what [Hagan] from 

One Beacon wanted to go through so he could 

ascertain what coverages were there.

 * * *

Q: And how quickly after the fire would you and [Geraldi] 

and [Hagan] have gotten together and looked over the 

policy?

A: I think that was within the week as well. I think in 

that first meeting we were all together, I think the policy 

was also part of that meeting.

Q: Can you tell me the nature of what you discussed, and 

as I understand your testimony, shortly after the fire you 

met with [Geraldi] and you looked at a summary of 

coverages and talked about the process I assume, 

adjustment process. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And at that point, was anything that you now know to 

be a business income claim relating to the downtime for 

the mobile unit discussed? This is just the first meeting 

with [Geraldi] only. And it may not have been discussed 

specifically, but was the concept discussed?

A: The concept was discussed, I believe, because the─that 

was one of our immediate concerns.

 * * *

Q: And the meeting with─we just talked about your initial 

meeting with [Geraldi]. Now, at your─I think you said 

there was another meeting with [Geraldi] and then 

[Hagan] as well probably still within a week or so of the 

fire. Correct?
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A: Correct.

Q: And at that point, you had the policy . . . . Is that 

correct?

A: Correct. I mean, most of the discussions, [Geraldi] was 

really helping [Hagan], you know, understand some of the 

coverages and they were both searching, okay, is this 

covered and they would go through and they would look at 

it and so forth and so on.

Q: So that was at one of your first meetings with you, 

[Geraldi] and [Hagan], that they were looking in the 

policy to see what coverages were there and where 

things might fall. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Did any other meeting like that take place over the 

course of the adjusting, including [Geraldi, Hagan] and 

yourself, possibly your son, were reconvening to vet out 

coverages under the policy?

A: I don’t know how many times is happened, but it was 

at least six to eight meetings[3] where we were all 

together. . . . 

 * * *

Q: Do you recall [ ] Geraldi specifically telling you that the 

assigned coverage limit for the truck specifically also 

provided for business income protection?

A: It’s difficult to recall the specific─if you want to ask 

specifically, but it certainly through all those years was 

something that we definitely assumed was part of that.

Q: After the fire, you testified that Mr. Geraldi 

participated in six to eight meetings with you, some 

of which─at some of which you went over the policy 

 

3 These meetings occurred in 2007. N.T. at 30.
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and discussed what you were eligible for and what 

you had to do. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And at any point during those meetings, and I’ll ask the 

same question for those meetings, did he represent to you 

specifically that a business income claim would be covered 

or should be covered under the auto portion of the policy?

A: I don’t know if he specifically mentioned under the auto 

part of the policy, but he certainly indicated that we would 

be covered for some of the interruption that we were 

experiencing.

 

Q: I think it was your testimony previously that you 

expected business income or business interruption to be 

covered, but you just weren’t sure how or under what 

portion of the policy it would be covered. Would that be 

fair to say?

A: That would be fair to say. . . .

Q:. . . [I]n your complaint . . . it seems to indicate that its 

[your] position that it should be covered under the auto 

portion of the policy and that is what is written in black 

and white. Correct?

A: Correct.

N.T., 3/4/13, at 12, 14, 20, 21-22, 23-24, 60-62 (emphases added).

The trial court summarized the procedural posture of this case as 

follows:

On May 19, 2010, [Appellant] filed its Third Amended 

Complaint against [EMPLOYERS] for breach of contract, 

reformation, and bad faith.[4] [Appellant’s] complaint 

 

4 The docket entries in the case sub judice commence on February 17, 2010, 

with the filing of Appellant’s Complaint against EMPLOYERS. See Docket, 
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arises out of a fire loss that occurred on its premises on 

August 23, 2007.

On August 27, 2010, [EMPLOYERS] filed a joinder 

complaint against additional defendant [Appellee] for a 

claim of negligence.

On October 15, 2010, [Appellee] filed its answer with 

new matter and cross-claim to [EMPLOYERS’] joinder 

complaint.

On October 12, 2011, [Appellee] filed a motion for 

summary judgment. At the time of filing, [Appellant] had 

settled all claims with [EMPLOYERS] . . . .

On October 31, 2011, [the court] granted [Appellee’s] 

motion for summary judgment . . . . The court reasoned: 

“[Appellant’s] first-party insurance claim became 

actionable on August 23, 2007, the date the fire occurred. 

Since no claim was asserted against [Appellee] until 

August 27, 2010, any direct claim is now barred as a 

matter of law.”[5]

 

2/17/10, at 3. On March 11, 2010, Appellant filed its First Amended 

Complaint. See id. at 4. The Second Amended Complaint was filed on April 

7, 2010. See id.

 

5 The trial court had previously opined: 

The party seeking to invoke the discovery rule bears the 

burden of establishing the inability to know of the injury 

despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. [Appellant] 

knew of [Appellee’s] involvement in procuring the policy at 

issue in this case, [Appellant] knew the coverage it asked 

[Appellee] to obtain, [Appellant] knew the contents of the 

policy, [Appellant] knew the reason for the denial of 

coverage, and [Appellant] was represented by counsel who 

could ascertain what the policy did or did not cover, within 

the statute of limitations. The discovery rule does not 

apply in this case.

Trial Ct. Op., 10/31/11, at 2 n.5.
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On November 29, 2011, [Appellant] appealed from the 

October 31, 2011 Order to the Superior Court.

On January 15, 2013, the Superior Court reversed the 

order granting summary judgment in favor of [Appellee], 

and remanded the case.[6] 

Trial Ct. Op., 7/18/13, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted and emphases added). 

On April 11, 2013, Appellee filed the underlying motion for summary 

judgment, which the trial court granted on July 18, 2013. The trial court 

concluded, based upon Selinger’s testimony, that Appellant failed to “meet 

its burden to demonstrate it could not, upon reasonable investigation, 

ascertain [this coverage was] not present in the policy.” Id. at 7. 

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on August 5, 

2013. This timely appeal followed. Appellant was not ordered to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. Under the discovery rule did the statute of limitations on 

[Appellant’s] professional malpractice claim against 

[Appellee] for an unpaid business interruption loss not 

start to run until [Appellee] filed an answer to EMPLOYERS’ 

joinder complaint that revealed that [Appellee] had never 

requested business interruption coverage for [Appellant] 

from EMPLOYERS?

 

6 See CCI Commc’ns, Inc. 3253 EDA 2011. We note that this Court’s 

memorandum was filed on November 20, 2012 and the record was remitted 

to the trial court on January 11, 2013. Our memorandum was then entered 

on the trial court’s docket on January 15, 2013. 
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B. Did the lower court decide the wrong issue when it 

decided when did [Appellant] know [sic] it did not have 

business income coverage when the correct issue is when 

did [Appellant] know that [Appellee] had not requested 

business income coverage?

C. Did the lower court commit reversible error by not 

allowing [Appellant] to present evidence it told [Appellee] 

to procure business income coverage on its video 

equipment?

D. Did the lower court commit reversible error by not 

finding the six years statute of limitations for breach of 

contract was applicable?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.

First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in entering summary 

judgment in Appellee’s favor.7 Appellant contends the discovery rule applies 

in the instant case as an exception to the requirement that suit must be 

brought within the statutory period. Id. at 16. We reproduce Appellant’s 

argument verbatim:

In this case, [Appellant] first discovered the possible 

existence of its professional malpractice claim against 

[Appellee] on October 15, 2010 when [Appellee] 

 

7

Previously, this Court reversed the order granting summary judgment in 

favor of Appellee because there was insufficient “factual information 

necessary to evidence the triggering of the applicable statute of limitations” 

in the record. CCI Commc’ns, Inc., 3253 EDA 2011 at 7-8. Appellant had 

argued the cause of action should be deemed timely filed because the 

discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations. Id. at 5. This Court found 

the issue waived because it was not raised in the trial court. Id. at 6. After 

remand, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment averring the claim 

was time barred. Appellee’s Mot. Summ. J., 4/11/13. Appellant’s response 

to the motion raised the discovery issue. See Appellant’s Resp. Mot. Summ. 

J., 5/13/13, at 8.

 
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revealed for the first time in its Answer to EMPLOYERS’ 

Joinder Complaint that it had not communicated to 

EMPLOYERS a request for business income coverage on 

[Appellant’s] video equipment. That means that under the 

Discovery Rule the statute of limitations on [Appellant’s] 

professional malpractice claim against [Appellee] for 

payment of the unpaid business income claim did not 

begin to run until October 15, 2010 and the statute of 

limitations would not have expired until October 14, 

2012. Since [Appellee] was joined on August 27,

2010, such joinder was timely. The lower court 

committed reversible error in deciding the Discovery Rule 

began to run by the end of 2007, granting [Appellee’s] 

Motion for Summary Judgment against [Appellee] and this 

Court should reverse and remand this case for trial.

Id. at 16-17.8 We find no relief is due.

 

8 We note that in Appellant’s first appeal to this Court, Appellant asserted 

that the cause of action against Appellee was timely under the discovery 

rule. This Court opined:

[Appellant] first argues that its cause of action against 

[Appellee] should be considered as timely filed under the 

“discovery rule,” and that its discovery date should be 

regarded as the deposition date (February 10, 2011) of 

[Geraldi, the representative of Appellee] who testified that 

the contested coverage was never requested. . . . Here, 

however, Appellant acknowledges that it never asserted 

this argument before the trial court.[ ] Thus, that issue has 

not been preserved for this Court’s review, and must be 

regarded as waived.

CCI Commc’ns, Inc., 3253 EDA 2011 at 5, 6 (emphasis added). 

“[Appellant] next argues that its alleged claim against [Appellee] should 

have been regarded as timely filed because the applicable statute of 

limitations did not commence to run until [Appellant] had settled its original 

claim against EMPlOYERS.” Id. at 6. This Court opined: “[Appellant], 

however, cites no compelling authority to support this somewhat novel 

position. . . . Thus, we find no basis upon which to grant relief on this 

claim.” Id. 
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Our standard of review governing summary judgment 

motions is well settled.

[O]ur standard of review of an order granting summary 

judgment requires us to determine whether the trial court 

abused its discretion or committed an error of law[,] and 

our scope of review is plenary. We view the record in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all 

doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material 

fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only 

where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered.

Clausi v. Stuck, 74 A.3d 242, 247-48 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted). 

“[T]he statute of limitations begins to run as soon as 

the right to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of 

knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll 

the running of the statute of limitations.” The statute

of limitations requires aggrieved individuals to bring their 

claims within a certain time of the injury, so that the 

passage of time does not damage the defendant’s ability to 

adequately defend against claims made. 

Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997) (emphasis added). “If 

a party has the means of discovery within his power but neglects to use 

them, his claim will still be barred.” Burnside v. Abbott Labs., 505 A.2d 

973, 988 (Pa. Super. 1985). 

“The party seeking to invoke the discovery rule bears the burden of 

establishing the inability to know of the injury despite the exercise of 

reasonable diligence.” Id. at 167.

In Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005), the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court opined that
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it is not relevant to the discovery rules application whether 

or not the prescribed period has expired; the discovery 

rule applies to toll the statute of limitations in any case 

where a party neither knows nor reasonably should have 

known of his injury and its cause at the time his right to

institute suit arises.

Id. at 859. In Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354 (Pa. 2009), the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “[m]ost cases apply a reasonablediligence requirement, as opposed to an all-vigilance one, see, e.g., Fine, 

[ ] 870 A.2d at 858, and reasonable diligence as described in Fine is the 

appropriate formulation.” Id. at 363. 

Instantly, the trial court opined:

In its Third Amended Complaint, [Appellant] claimed 

that [EMPLOYERS] failed to fully compensate [it] for the 

“business interruption” losses resulting from the loss and 

damage to the video equipment. The issue here is 

whether the discovery rule may have tolled the statute of 

limitations for any negligence claim [Appellant] may have 

against [Appellee] for failing to place the type of coverage 

that [Appellant] claims it wanted.

 * * *

The precise “injury” at issue here is [Appellant’s] claim 

that [Appellee]: . . . negligently failed to secure loss of 

income coverage for loss of use of the video equipment . . 

. .

Here, Selinger, [Appellant’s] president re-testified on 

March 4, 2013, that he reviewed the Policy, at the latest, 

within days of the fire with both [Geraldi, Appellee’s 

president] and [Hagan, EMPLOYER’S adjustor].

 * * *

It is undisputed that the policy, issued in July 2007, 

did not contain business income coverage . . . nor had any 
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of the previous policies purchased from [Appellee]. 

[Appellant] did not, despite three amended complaints, 

ever allege a claim against [Appellee]. Instead, 

[Appellant] indicated that [its] position was that the loss 

should have been covered under the auto policy.

 * * *

. . . Here, in fact, [Appellant’s] president reviewed the 

policy within a week of the fire with representatives of both 

[EMPLOYERS] and [Appellee], and again six to eight times 

thereafter in the next three months. The policy has no 

coverage for business lost income.

. . . [Appellant] has not explained what, despite 

reasonable diligence and assistance of the multiple

professionals it consulted, should have tolled the 

statute of limitations, where the policy was clearly 

reviewed within days of the fire to determine what 

was covered.

 * * *

. . . It[’s] clear now, through additional discovery, that 

[Appellant] was not affirmatively mislead . . . .

. . . [Selinger, Appellant’s] president acknowledges that 

the Policy was reviewed in detail with him six to eight 

times at least three months after the fire, and does not 

testify that he was assured his damaged [sic] would be 

covered under the auto portion of the policy.

* * *

There was extensive discussion about the issues of 

coverage, and nowhere is it averred or established that 

[Appellee] lied to or mislead [Appellant] to an extent 

where the statute of limitations could have been tolled 

beyond the end of 2007. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 5, 6, 7, 8-9, 10, 11 (footnotes omitted and some emphasis 

added). We agree. 
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We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court. 

See Clausi, 74 A.3d at 247-48. Appellant’s lack of knowledge, mistake, or 

misunderstanding will not toll the statute of limitations. See Dalrymple, 

701 A.2d at 167. Appellant has not satisfied his burden to establish the 

inability to learn of the injury despite exercising reasonable diligence. See 

Brown, 701 A.2d at 167. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that 

Appellant’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Burnside, 505 

A.2d at 988.

Appellant’s brief is devoid of any citation to legal authority for issues B, 

C and D. The “failure to develop an argument with citation to, and analysis 

of, relevant legal authority waives that issue on review.” Harris v. Toys 

“R” Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A. 2d 1270, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2005). Therefore, 

issues B, C and D are waived.9 See id. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor 

of Appellee.

Order affirmed.

 

9 We note Appellant’s reply brief contains no citation to legal authority. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/2014