Grenz v

Grenz v. Fire & Casualty of Conn.

Decided Feb. 18, 1999

(NOT TO BE CITED AS AUTHORITY)

No. 97-503

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 35N

SAMUEL L. GRENZ,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

FIRE AND CASUALTY OF CONNECTICUT,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court,

The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Joe C. Maynard and David M. Wagner; Crowley,

Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich; Billings,

Montana

For Respondent:

Samuel J. Grenz, Pro Se, Stevensville, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: December 11, 1997

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Grenz v

Decided: February 18, 1998

Justice Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court

1996 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not

be cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public document

with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case

title, Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State

Reporter Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly

table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.

¶2 Fire & Casualty of Connecticut appeals from an order of the

Workers' Compensation Court reversing the Montana Department of

Labor and Industry's decision that Grenz's 1984 elbow injury

claim for occupational disease benefits was barred by res

judicata. We affirm.

¶3 The sole issue on appeal is whether the Workers'

Compensation Court erred in concluding that Grenz's 1984 claim

for occupational disease benefits was not barred by res judicata. 

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 22, 1984, Samuel J. Grenz injured his right elbow

while working on a steel railing for his employer, American Stud

Company. Within a week of his injury, Grenz filed a claim for

workers' compensation benefits ("1984 claim") and sought

treatment. The insurer, Fire & Casualty of Connecticut ("F&C"),

accepted liability for the right elbow injury and paid

compensation and medical benefits.

¶5 Grenz's 1984 injury "began a seemingly endless stream of

litigation that has resulted in multiple appeals to this Court

and innumerable proceedings in the Workers' Compensation Court." 

Grenz v. Fire and Casualty of Connecticut (1993), 260 Mont. 60,

61, 857 P.2d 730, 731 (Grenz III ). We need not, however,

address each of Grenz's prior claims for the purposes of this

opinion.

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¶6 In 1991, this Court affirmed a decision of the Workers'

Compensation Court that determined Grenz's degenerative arthritis

and psychological problems were not causally related to his 1984

injury and denied his claim for permanent total disability

benefits. Grenz v. Fire and Casualty of Connecticut (1991), 250

Mont. 373, 820 P.2d 742 (Grenz I ). Following this decision,

Grenz filed a claim alleging that his degenerative arthritis was

caused by work-related microtrauma unrelated and subsequent to

the August 1984 injury. The Workers' Compensation Court dismissed

the claim on res judicata grounds. We reversed and remanded,

holding that the issue presented by Grenz's claim was not the

same issue decided in Grenz I. Grenz v. Fire and Casualty of

Connecticut (1992), 255 Mont. 121, 841 P.2d 494 (Grenz II ). 

Upon remand, the Workers' Compensation Court determined that

Grenz's microtrauma claim was time barred. In 1993, this Court

affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court. Grenz

III, 260 Mont. at 66, 857 P.2d at 734.

¶7 Grenz had also filed an Occupational Disease claim in which

he sought benefits for his degenerative arthritis condition. 

This claim was based on microtrauma occurring subsequent to the

elbow injury. The Workers' Compensation Court affirmed the

decision of the hearing examiner, which concluded that this claim

was time barred. Again, we affirmed the decision of the Workers'

Compensation Court. Grenz v. Fire and Casualty of Connecticut

(1996), 278 Mont. 268, 924 P.2d 264 (Grenz IV).

¶8 This leads us to the present case. On November 12, 1996,

Grenz filed another petition with the Montana Department of Labor

and Industry. In his petition, he alleged that he is entitled to

occupational disease benefits under his 1984 claim for

compensation. On December 27, 1996, the Department entered an

order dismissing Grenz's petition on the grounds that this Court

had previously decided the issue in Grenz IV. The Department

also restricted Grenz's pro se filings. 

¶9 Grenz appealed the Department's decision to the Workers'

Compensation Court. The court determined that our decision in

Grenz IV did not bar Grenz's most recent petition and remanded

the case to the Department for further proceedings.

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¶10 F&C now appeals the decision of the Workers' Compensation

Court.

 DISCUSSION

¶11 Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that

Grenz's 1984 claim for occupational disease benefits was not

barred by res judicata?

¶12 We review the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusions of

law to determine whether they are correct. CNA Ins. Cos. v. Dunn

(1995), 273 Mont. 295, 298, 902 P.2d 1014, 1016; Stordalen v.

Ricci's Food Farm (1993), 261 Mont. 256, 258, 862 P.2d 393, 394. 

We review the Workers' Compensation Court's findings of fact to

determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings. 

Wunderlich v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. (1995), 270 Mont.

404, 408, 892 P.2d 563, 566 (citing Smith v. United Parcel

Service (1992), 254 Mont. 71, 75, 835 P.2d 717, 720).

¶13 F&C argues that the Workers' Compensation Court erred in

reversing the decision of the Department dismissing Grenz's claim

for occupational disease benefits. Specially, F&C argues that

the Workers' Compensation Court erred when it held that no court

has addressed whether Grenz's 1984 elbow injury claim also

encompassed a separate and independent claim for occupational

disease benefits. F&C contends that this Court's decisions in

Grenz I, Grenz III, and Grenz IV operate to bar Grenz's current

claim on the basis of res judicata.

¶14 Grenz counters that in 1984 the Department did not make a

distinction between an occupational disease and an industrial

injury in resolving the 1984 claim. He asserts that the

Department only focused on the elbow injury as an industrial

injury. Therefore, he argues the he may still pursue

occupational disease benefits under the 1984 claim. 

¶15 The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of a

claim once a final judgment has been entered. Holtman v. 4-G's

Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 432, 872 P.2d 318. 

Finality is accorded to the disposition of all issues that were

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raised or that could have been raised; a party, therefore, is

prohibited from relitigating a claim that he or she has already

had an opportunity to litigate. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale &

Dye, P.C. (1995), 273 Mont. 506, 510, 905 P.2d 158, 161. The

following four elements must be satisfied in order to apply the

doctrine of res judicata: (1) the parties or their privies must

be the same; (2) the subject matter of the action must be the

same; (3) the issues must be the same and relate to the same

subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons must be the

same in reference to the subject matter and to the issues. 

Holtman, 264 Mont. at 436, 872 P.2d at 320. 

¶16 Applying the elements to the claim before it, the Workers'

Compensation Court determined that the doctrine of res judicata

did not bar Grenz's 1996 petition for occupational disease

benefits relating to his 1984 claim. We agree.

¶17 Grenz's petition asserts that his 1984 claim constituted

both a claim for his elbow injury and a separate claim for

occupational disease benefits due to microtrauma suffered at work

prior to his elbow injury. In Grenz I, this Court determined

that Grenz's degenerative arthritis was not causally related to

his 1984 elbow injury. Grenz I, 250 Mont. at 379-80, 820 P.2d

at 746. That decision did not address whether Grenz's

degenerative arthritis was an occupational disease related to his

work at American Stud Company prior to the 1984 elbow injury.

¶18 Furthermore, our decisions in Grenz III and Grenz IV did not

relate to Grenz's 1984 claim. In Grenz III, Grenz was requesting

compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act for microtrauma

occurring after the 1984 elbow injury. The microtrauma claim was

filed in 1991 and was separate from the 1984 claim. We

determined that the 1991 claim was barred by the statute of

limitations because Grenz did not timely file. Grenz III, 260

Mont. at 66, 857 P.2d at 733-34. Also in 1993, Grenz was

pursuing occupational disease benefits based upon microtrauma

occurring subsequent to the 1984 elbow injury. In Grenz IV, 278

Mont. at 273, 924 P.2d at 267, we determined that this claim was

also time barred. 

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¶19 No decision by this Court has considered whether Grenz is

entitled to occupational disease benefits for microtrauma

suffered at work prior to his injury under his 1984 claim for

compensation. Therefore, we determine that the doctrine of res

judicata does not bar Grenz from proceeding with his claim.

¶20 Also, whether the doctrine of estoppel applies to bar

Grenz's petition is not a matter currently before this Court. In

the Department proceeding, F&C did not argue that estoppel barred

Grenz's petition. Moreover, the hearing officer's December 27,

1996, order dismissing Grenz's claim did not address the issue.

¶21 We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court did not err

in concluding that Grenz's 1996 petition relating to his 1984

claim for occupational disease benefits was not barred by res

judicata.

¶22 Affirmed.

 JUSTICE REGNIER

CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES NELSON, HUNT and LEAPHART concur.

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