IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2015-KA-01462-COA WILLIAM RAY PARKS A/K/A BILL PARKS A/K/A WILLIAM PARKS APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/17/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAMAR PICKARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: COPIAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MATTHEW ALLEN BALDRIDGE BENJAMIN FREEMAN ROBINSON ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA W AKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ALEXANDER C. MARTIN NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCED TO TW ENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, W ITH TW O YEARS SUSPENDED AND TW O YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/11/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, JJ. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. W i lliam Parks claim ed that he shot and killed Joshua Tarver in se l f

- d e f ense, but a Copiah County jur y c o n v i c t ed him of heat-of -passion m anslaughter. The circuit court sentenced Parks to t wenty y ears in the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections, with two y ears suspended and t wo y ears of post-release s upervision. O n appeal, Parks arguesthat the j ury should not h ave been instructed o n heat-of -passion m a n slaughter, th a t the deputy

m edical e x am iner was not qualif ied or com

petent to testif

y as to T arver’s cause of death or about Tarver’s autopsy , that t here was insuf f icient evidence to support his conviction , and
t hat his conviction is against t he overwhelm ing weight of the evidence. W e f in d n o reversible error; theref

ore, we af f i rm Parks’s conviction and sentence. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Parks lived and o p e r a t e d a n a u to repair a nd restoration business in a rural area of Copiah C ounty near Cry stal Springs. Parks lived with his m o ther, Mary , near the entrance
to the p roperty , and his business w as located f arther back on the land. There w ere also two trailers on the property . In 2014, Parks hired twenty -three-y e ar-old Tarver to assist him at his shop. Parks also allowed Tarver to live in one of the trailers on the property

. ¶3. Parks was also em

ploy ed by a contractor in t he of f shore drilling industry

. Parks went
to work of

f shore o n Novem

ber 13, 2014, and d id n ot return h om e until Novem ber 27, 2014. W h ile Parks w a s g o n e, around N ovem ber 20, 2014, his shop was burglarized. Tarver notif ied the Copiah County Sherif f ’s Departm ent of the b urglary , and D eputy A lvin Starkey responded and m et with Tarver and Mary

. Starkey asked f or a l ist of the m issing property , but he n ever received it. On Novem ber 22, 2014, Starkey

returned to Parks’s property and

m et with Mary

. Tarver was gone, and the trailer in which he had been living was em pty

. Starkey attem

pted to call Tarver to f

ollow up, but Tarver never returned his calls. Parks m et with Starkey

on Novem

ber 28, 2014, af

ter he returned hom e f

rom his work of

f shore. ¶4. On Saturday , Decem ber 6, 2014, Parks was working in his shop. The shop was not

2open f

or business, so Parks h ad all of its d oors closed as he worked. F rom i nside the shop, Parks heard a noise f

rom the back of the property that sounded a s though a v ehicle was stuck in the m ud. Parks took a .45-calib e r h a n d g un and went t o investigate. Outside the shop, Parks met Mary , and Mary told h im t hat Tarver was on the property

. Parks had not seen Tarver since he returned hom e and learned of the burglary

. Parks told Mary to call 911. ¶5. Parks testif

ied in his own def

ense at trial. He testif

ied that as he walked toward the noise, he s aw a truck with a trailer stuck in the m ud. H e did not recognize t he truck, but he

saw tools in the trailer that he be l i e v e d h ad been stolen f rom his shop. As Parks em erged f rom a wooded a rea, h e b egan f i ring at the truck. P arks testif ied that he was shooting at the
t r u c k ’ s t i r es because he w anted to prevent it f rom leaving his property bef ore la w enf orcem ent arrived. As he f i red at the t ruck, Parks saw som eone i n his “side v i s i o n”

run n i n g t oward him

. H e turned and recognized that it was Tarver. Tarver a nnounced, “Don’t s hoot! It’s Josh. ” P a r k s testif ied that he acknowledged Tarver and t old him to “stop.” Park claim s that h e “shot a t the ground in f ront of [ Tarver’s] f

e et to s top him .” Parks then turned back toward the truck and resum e d shooting at the truck. ¶6. Parks claim s t hat Tarver continued toward him , so he “turned a round a nd looked at [ Tarver] dead in t he ey e” and f ired another warning shot near Tarver. Parks testif ied that he sensed that t he truck was about to g et unstuck f rom t he m u d, so he turned a nd again resum ed shooting at the truck. Parks claim s that Tarver then continued r unning toward him , knocked him o f f h is f eet, and g rabbed f

or the gun. Parks testif

ied that w hile they “were tussling with each other

. . . on the ground,” t he gun “went o f f .” Tarver was shot in the arm , and the bullet

3traveled through Tarver’s arm into his torso. Tarver f

ell to the ground. ¶7. Parks then stood u p and f ired the rest of his b ullets at the truck as it lef t his property

. He t estif ied that he did not notice that Tarver had been shot until af ter the t ruck was gone. He then walked back to h is h ouse to check on his m other a nd to conf irm that she had called 911

. H e r e t u r ned to c heck on Tarver, who was dead, and then s at a nd waited f or law enf orcem ent to arrive. ¶8. W h en law enf

orcem ent arrived, Parks tol d t h e m t hat he had shot Tarver. Of f icers looked f or shell casings in the area but did n ot f ind any . They did f

ind T a rver’s cell phone, which showed that Tarver had called Parks that d ay . Parks claim ed t hat cell phone reception

was spotty in his s hop, and h e denied that h e had received T a r v e r’s calls. Judy Evans, the deputy m e dical exam iner f o r Copiah County , arrived and f o und Tarver’s b ody f

ace-down in the m ud. She turned over t he body to photograph it and declared Tarver dead at the scene. ¶9. Parks was indicted f or f i rst-degree m

urder. At t rial, Deputy Michael Stogner of the Copiah County Sherif

f ’s Departm ent testif

ied that dispatch received a call f rom M ary at 1:08
p.m . to report that Parks was shooting at Tarver, who, according to Mary , “wasn’t supposed to be on [ Parks’s] land.” At 1:14 p.m ., dispatch received a c all f rom A pril Cline, who had been in the truck. April reported that Tarver had been shot. ¶10. April and two others who had been in th e t r u c k

— B r a d l e y C line ( April’s son) and Matthew Tate—testif

ied at trial. Bradley testif ied that on Decem

b er 5, 2014, Tarver asked him t o help h im m ove “som e tools” the next day

. Bradley knew that the tools were at Curtis McManus’s house, but he d i d not know where or why Tarver wanted to m ove them

. On

4Decem

ber 6, 2014, Bradley , April, Tate, Destiny Cline, and Blake G rif f in 1 all m et Tarver at McManus’s house with April’s truck and trailer, and they loaded the tools into the trailer. 2 ¶11. Tarver then drove the t ruck to Parks’s house. The o thers did not know Parks. Tarver spoke to M ary near the entrance to the property , and sh e s a i d t hat Parks w as working

som ewhere f

ar t h e r b a c k on the property

. Tarver also tried to c all P arks, but there is no evidence that P arks answered. Tarver drove the truck f arther onto the property , and the truck and trailer becam e stuck in som e m ud. Tarver, Bradley , and Tate then got out of the truck and unhooked the trailer. They had just m anaged to get the truck unstuck and reconnect it to the trailer when Parks em erged f rom a wooded area. P arks im m ediately began shooting
at them

. Bradley , April, and Tate all testif i e d t h a t T a rver ran toward Parks, identif ied him self , a nd pled with Parks to stop shooting. They did not s ee P arks s h oot Tarver, but they

saw Tarver ly i ng on t he g r o u n d af ter he was s hot. A pril testif ied that T arver “push[ ed]” Parks j ust bef

ore he was shot. W hile Parks was shooting, Tate j u mp e d into t he truck and began try ing to drive away . Parks continued f iring at them

as they lef t the property

. ¶12. Evans testif

i ed—over P arks’s objection—that the m an ner of death was “hom icide” and that “ [ t]he cause of d eath was [ a] gunshot w ound through the lef t a rm [ that] penetrated

1 D estin y is B rad l ey ’s sister an d T ate’s g irlf rien d

. S h e an d T ate w ere b o th eig h teen y ears o ld at th e tim e o f trial. B lak e is B rad ley ’ s f rien d an d w as six teen y ears o ld a t th e t im e o f trial. D estin y

an d B lak e w ere in th e tru ck w h en T arv er w as k illed b u t d id n o t testif y . 2 M cM an u s testif

i ed th at ab o u t a w eek earlier, T arv er c a m e to stay w ith h im f o r a f ew d ay s an d ask ed h im to h elp p ick u p th e to o ls at a h o u se in B r o o k h av en . T h ey d ro v e to B r o o k h av en an d l o ad e d th e to o ls i n to M cM a n u s’s co v ered trailer, w h ere t h e y rem ain ed u n til T a rv er et al. m o v ed th em o n D ecem

b er 6

. M c M an u s d id n o t k n o w w h o o w n e d th e h o u se in B ro o k h av en , an d h e d id n o t acco m p an y T arv er et al. to P ark s’s h o u se o n D ecem b er 6

. 5the torso.” E vans witnessed Tarver’s autopsy , which w as perf orm e d by D r. Erin Barnhart,

a f orensic p a t h o l o g i s t. S he testif ied that during the autopsy , Dr. Barnhart showed her the wounds and the path o f the bullet. On cross-exam ination, Parks’s counsel asked Evans how she could “tell the j ury f

or a f a ct

. . . that

. . . Tarver did not die f rom a heart attack.” Evans answered that, at the crim e scene, Parks him self had told her that he had shot Tarver, and she was “[ a]lm ost certain that nothing else killed [ Tarver], a y oung m an at 23.” ¶13. As noted above, Parks testif ied in his own def

e nse at trial. He acknowledged f iring “warning” shots in the d irection of the truck and at Tarver, b ut he denied that he intended to shoot Tarver. Parks testif ied that the gun “ w e n t of

f ” a s he and Tarver struggled, af ter Tarver reached f or t he gun. H e also claim ed that he knew that Tarver generally carried a .40-caliber h a n d g u n ; however, n either Tarver nor any one else in the truck w as arm e d, display e d a weapon, or returned f

ire on Parks at any

point during the encounter. ¶14. The jury f

ound Parks g uilty of m anslaughter. T he circu i t c o u r t s e n t e n c e d him to twenty y ears’ im

prisonm ent, with eighteen to serve, two y ears s u spended, and two y ears of post-release supervision. Parks f iled a m otion f

o r a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied, and a tim ely notice of appeal. ANALYSIS ¶15. Parks raises three issues on appeal. He argues that the circuit court erred by granting the S tate’s jury instruction on heat-of -passion m anslaughter. He a lso argues that Evans was
not q u a l i f

i e d o r com

petent to testif

y about the cause of death or Dr. Barnhart’s autopsy f indings. Finally , Parks claim s that there is insuf f icient evidence t o support the jury ’s verdict

6or, i n the alte r n a t i v e , that the verdict is against the overwhelm ing weight of the e vidence.

W e f ind no reversible error and theref ore af f irm Parks’s conviction and sentence. I. Manslaughter Instruction ¶16. At trial, Parks argued that th e j u r y s h o u l d b e instructed on f irst-degree (deliberate design) m urder only , not heat-of

-passion m anslaughter or second- degree (depraved heart)

mu r d e r . However, the trial court ruled that there was e v idence f r om w hich the jury could have returned a g u ilty verdict on those lesser o f f enses and, t heref

ore, granted the State’s request f or jury i nstructions covering them

. On a p peal, Parks argues that t here was no evidence to support an instruction on heat-of -passion m an slaughter and that “the jury m ay well have arrived at a com prom ise verdict.” ¶17. W e review the denial of jury instructions f or abuse of discretion o nly

. Quinn v. State , 191 So. 3d 1227, 1231-32 (¶18) (Miss. 2016). Our standard o f r eview “is well-established”: Jury instructions m

u st be read as a whole to determ i ne if the instructions were pr o p er. Jury instructions m ust f airly announce the l aw of the case and not create a n injustice against the def e ndant. This r

ule is sum m ed up as f

ollows: In other words, if a l l instructions t aken as a whole f airly , b ut not necessarily perf ectly , announce the applicable rules of law, no error results. Davis v. State , 18 So. 3 d 842, 847 (¶14) (Miss. 2009) (citations, quotation m arks om itted). ¶18. “[ A]s a m atter of trial strategy , def ense counsel m ay wish to have t he case put to the jury on an all or nothing basis, the jury ’s alternatives being to f ind the def

endant guilty

[ of

m urder] as charged in the indictm ent or acquitted.” Harveston v
. State , 493 So. 2d 365, 375 (Miss. 1986). However, under Mississippi law, the prosecution has the sam e ability as the def endant to request and o btain an instruction on m anslaughter. Id. “The test f or whether

7such an instruction should be granted is the sam e [ regardless of who re q u e s ts it]: is it

warranted by the evidence? ” Id. “W here the a nswer is a f f irm at i v e , the def

endant has no right to com

plain of the circu i t court’s subm ission to the jury of a properly phrased [ m a nslaughter] instruction.” Id. In addition, the Mississippi Suprem e Court has held “in a

num ber of cases and i n a wide variety of contexts that, where there is in t he r ecord evidence legally s u f

f i c i e n t to support a jury f

i nding of guilty o f m

urder, had the jury so f

o und, the def endant will not be heard t o com plain that a m anslaughter instruction was given.” Jackson v. State , 551 So. 2d 132, 146 (Miss. 1989) (collecting cases). ¶19. As we explain below, there wa s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e nce to support t he jury ’s verdict f inding Parks guilty of m anslaughter. That determ ination necessarily disposes of any claim that there w as insuf

f icient evidence to subm it the issue to the jury

. Parks’s prim ary a rgum ent is t hat t here was n o evid e n c e of “[ p]assion or anger suddenly aroused at the tim e by som e im m ediate and reasonable provocation, by words or a cts o f one at the t im e.” Jones v. State , 39 So. 3d 860, 866 (¶36) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Mullins v. State , 493 So. 2d 9 71, 9 74 (Miss. 1986)). However, there w as evidence f rom which the jury could h ave f ound that Parks becam e angry and shot Tarver because he perceived that Tarver had brazenly r eturned to his property despite having previously stolen his t ools. Although Parks claim e d that he acted in self -def e nse, the e vidence also s upported a n i n f e rence that he acted in the heat of passion. “[ T]he question of whether the def endant has com m itted m urder or m ansla u g h t e r is ordinarily a question to be r esolved by the jury .” Strahan v. State , 7 29 So. 2d 8 00, 806 (¶24) (Miss. 1998). In this case, the issue was properly subm itted to the jury

.

8II. Deputy Medical Ex am iner’s Testim ony

¶20. At trial, Parks objected when the State asked Evans: “[ A]f ter visiting the scene and

m aking th e o bservations that y o u m ade and witnessing the autopsy , were y ou able to determ ine the m anner and cause of death? ” He argued that the q uesti o n “ c a l l [ e d ] f

or an expert opin i o n ” a n d that Evans was “not q ualif i ed as an expert.” The court overruled the objection and allowed Evans t o answer because i t c o ncluded that s he was not testif y ing as

an expert. On a

ppeal, Parks argues that the ruling v iolated Mississippi Rule of E vidence 702 and h is constitutional right “to be conf ronted with t he witnesses against him .” W e address these argum ents in turn.

A. Rule 702 ¶21. W e begin by em

phasizing that although it is the S tate’s burden to prove t hat “death resulted f rom a crim inal agency , ” “[ i]t is well established

. . . t hat proof of the cause of death in hom icide cases m ay be by l ay t estim ony .” N eal v. State , 386 So. 2d 718, 719-20 (Miss. 1980). A s our Suprem e Court has explained, “ [ t]he c rim inal a g ency or cause of death is usually shown by w itnesses who saw the hom icide, or by circum stances suf f icient to establish the crim e to the exclusion of every o ther reasonable hy pothesis.” Gibson v. State , 503 So. 2d 230, 2 33 (Miss. 1987) (quoting K i ng v. State , 251 Miss. 161, 176, 168 So. 2d 637, 643 (1964)). In such cases, neither an autopsy nor e xpert m edical opinion is necessary . Id. The evidence concerning the circum stances o f the death in this case was, l ike m a n y hom icide
cases, suf f icient to e stablish the c ause of death without expert testim ony . Parks a d m itted that he shot Tarver, and T arver was f ound dead a t the scene with s ignif ic ant blood loss f

rom

9obvious bullet wounds in his arm and torso. ¶22. Nonetheless, Parks tim ely objected to Evans’s testim ony concerning the m anner and

cause o f d eath. Evans was appointed deputy m edical e xam iner b y the c ounty coroner. She is not a m edical doctor but has an associate’s degree in m edical laboratory technology , has

com pleted f orty h ours of training in basic death inv e s t i g a tion, and is required to com plete twenty

- f our hours o f c ontinuing education each y ear. Parks a rgues that her opinion as to the

m anner and cause of

death was im

proper expert testim ony

that should have been excluded under Rule 702 and Daubert v
. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. , 509 U.S

. 5 7 9 (1993), which our Suprem e Court adopted in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. M cLemore , 8 6 3 S o . 2d 31 ( Miss. 2003). In response, both during trial a n d on appeal, the State ha s agreed that Evans w as not tendered or qua l i f i ed as an expert. Thus, t he issue really boils down to whether Evans’s testim ony was perm issible lay opinion testim o ny . See M.R.E. 701; Jones v. State , 678 So. 2d 707, 710 (Miss. 1996). ¶23. Evans testif

ied o n direct exam ination that her o pinions as t o the m anner and cause of death w ere based on her own observations o f Tarver’s body at t he scene and during the autopsy

. W e review the trial court’s decision to adm it such lay opini o n t e s t i mo n y f or an abuse of discretion. See Davis v. State , 904 So. 2d 1212, 1215 (¶7) (Miss. C t. App. 2004). And although we question whether such non-expert t estim ony a s t o the cause of death is truly “helpf ul” to the trier of f

act, M.R.E. 701(b), in a previous c a se this Court held t hat a trial
court did not abuse i ts d iscretion by allowing a coroner to give s im ilar opinion testim ony that

a hom icide victim died of a gunshot wound. See Tillis v. State , 176 So. 3d 3 7, 47-48 (¶¶22-

1 026) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014); see also Neal , 3 86 So. 2d at 7 20 (pre-Rules case holding that a

trial court did not err by allowing a f uneral director/em

balm er t o t estif

y “that he assum ed (but did not positively know) that [ the victim ] died f rom the g unshot wound.”). Given our ruling in Tillis , we hold that the trial j udge in this case did not abuse his discr e t i o n b y overruling Parks’s objection to the State’s question to Evans. ¶24. In addition, even if we thought t h a t t h e ruling was an abuse of d iscretion, any error would have been h arm less. Evans was clearly com petent t o testif

y , inter alia, that Tarver was f ound d ead, having bled p rof usely f rom obvious gunshot wounds, and that P arks told her that he shot Tarver. Parks’s only objection is that she should not have been able to say that she determ ined that the cause of death was a g unshot wound. However, the evidence at trial was overwhelm ing that Tarver died f rom the gunshot wound inf

licted by Parks. B. Confrontation Clause ¶25. Parks also a rgues t hat his rights under the Conf rontation Clause were viol ated because Evans t estif

ied about Dr. Barnhart’s autopsy f inding a s t o t h e cause of death. However, Parks did n ot preserve an objection on this ground. In f act, t he testim ony a

bout which Parks

now com plains was elicited on cross-exam ination by h is own attorney

. Parks’s attorney
spec i f ically questioned Evans about Dr. Barnhart’s f indings, and h e did not m ention the Conf r ontation Clause or m ove to strike Evans’s testim ony a b out the autopsy

. See Logan v. State , 773 So. 2d 338, 346 (¶29) ( Miss. 2000) (holding that objections on other grounds are
not suf f i cient to preserve an alleged violation of the Conf rontation Clause); Fleming v. State , 604 So. 2 d 280, 289 (Miss. 1992) (“It is axiom atic that a d e f e n d a nt cannot com

plain on

1 1appeal concerning evidence that he him self b rought out a t t rial.”). “[ A] crim inal def endant who f ails to object t o evidence i ntroduced by the State m ay still have the issue reviewed on appeal f or plain e rror. However, a criminal defendant w ho affirmatively introduces evidence himself may not then complain o n appeal t hat he introduced that eviden c e . ” P a s c agoulaGautier Sch. Dist. v. B d. of S u pervisors of

J a ckson Cty. , No. 2014-CA-01774-SCT, 2016 W L 6125423, at *6 n.9 ( Miss. Oct. 2 0, 2016) (em phasis added; citation om itted). Accordingly , the issue is procedurally barred. ¶26. Procedural bar a side, the testim ony at issue would not have r isen to the level of plain
error; rather, any error w ould have been harm less. A s noted above, the evidence that Tarver died of a gunshot wound inf licted by Parks was overwhelm i ng. See Burdette v. State , 110 So. 3d 2 96, 304-05 ( ¶¶25-26) (Miss. 2013) (holding that adm ission of a c rim e lab ballistics report in violation of t he Conf rontation Clause w as n ot prejudicial because the e v idence was clear that the def

endant shot the victim

with the gun in question). III. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence ¶27. In h is f

inal issue on appeal, Parks argues t hat he i s entitled to a judgm ent o f acquittal because there was insuf

f icient e vidence to support the j ury ’s verdict. In the alternative, he

a r gues that he is e ntitled to a new trial because the verdict was against the overwhelm i n g weight of the evidence. ¶28. W h en we a ddress a c hallenge to the suf f iciency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, af

ter viewing the evidence in the l i g h t mo s t f avorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of f

a ct c ould h ave f

ound the e ssential elem ents of t he crim e b ey ond a r easonable

1 2doubt.” Bush v
. State , 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia ,

443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)). The issue is not whether w e would have f ound Parks guilty based

on the evidence at trial; rather, his conviction m ust b e af f irm ed i f there was e n ough evidence f or “any rational trier of f act” t o have returned a guilty verdict. I d

. “ When reviewing a denial of a m otion f

or a new t rial based on an objection to the weight of t he evidence, we will only disturb a v e rdict when it is so contrary to t he overwhelm ing w eight of t he evidence that
to a llow it to stand would s anction an unconscionable injustice.” Id. at 844 (¶ 1 8). The evidence m

ust be “[ v]iewed i n the l i g h t mo st f avorable to the v erdict,” and we will af f irm unless “[ t]he trial court . . . abuse[ d] its discretion in deny ing a new trial.” Id. at (¶19). ¶29. Parks c l a i ms t h a t t h e evidence does not support t he v erdict because there was no evidence t o show that he shot Tarver in t h e h e a t of passion. He a rgues that his version of
events was uncontradicted at trial and supported an acquittal on all ch a r g e s because the shooting was in self

-def e nse. W e disagree. As discussed above, t he evidence presented at trial supported a jury instruction on heat-of -passion m anslaughter, a nd it w as also suf f icient to support the jury ’s verdict. ¶30. The evidence indicated that Parks believed that Tarver had burglarized his shop and then a bsconded with his t o o l s , a n d Parks had n ot seen Tarver s ince the b urglary

. On Decem ber 6, Parks’s m other told him that Tarver was on his p roperty looking f or him

. W hen Parks s aw a truck stuck in t he m ud, he im m ediately opened f i re. He then f

ired upon Tarver,

even though he recognized him

. Mor e o v e r , h e c o ntinued shooting at Tarver even af ter Tarver identif

ied h im self and begged him to stop s hooting. Parks claim s that he acted in self

1 3def

ense or shot Tarver b y accident when t he gun “ went of f ” d uring their scuf

f le, and the jury

was g iven appropriate instructions on the l aw of s elf -def ense. However, the jury could have f ound otherwise based on the evidence presented. ¶31. Viewed in the l ight m ost f avorable to the Stat e , t h e r e w a s s u f f icient e vidence to sustain the verdict. A rational trier of f act could have concluded that Parks believed Tarver had b urglarized his shop a nd that Tarver’s r eturn to the scene of the suspected crim e aroused Parks’s anger and led him to kill Tarver. A ccordingly , Parks is not e ntitled to a j udgm ent of acquittal. In addition, Parks’s testim ony did not clearly overwhelm t he evidence s u pporting the jury ’s guilty verdict; t hus, i t d oes not “sanction an unconscionable injustice” to allow the verdict to stand. B u s h , 8 9 5 So. 2d at 844 (¶18). Theref ore, w e cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion by deny ing Parks’s m otion f or a new trial. CONCLUSION ¶32. W e af

f irm Parks’s conviction and sentence. The evidence was s uf f icient t o support

an instruction and conviction o n the of f ense of m anslaughter, and t he v erdict was not against the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence. I n addition, under this Court’s precedent, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the deputy

m edical exam iner to testif y as to the cause o f death, and Parks w aived any Conf rontation Clause objection b y f ailing to raise the issue at trial and by eliciting the testim ony about which he now com plains. Furtherm ore,

even if the deputy m edical exam iner’s testim ony should have b een lim ited in som e f ashion,
any error was harm less because t h e evidence was overwhelm ing that Tarver died f rom a gunshot wound inf

licted by Parks.

1 4¶33. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT C OURT O F C O P I A H C OUNTY OF

CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER A ND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS IN T H E C U S T O D Y O F T H E M I S S I S S I P P I D E P A R T M E N T O F C O R R E C T I O N S , W I T H T W O Y E A R S SUSPENDED A ND T W O Y E A R S O F P O S T
- R E L E A S E SUPERVISION, IS A FFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C .J., IRVING AND GRI F F I S , P . J J . , B A R N E S , I S H E E , C A R L T O N , F A I R, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

1 5