I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7260 

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 

States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 18, 2020 

Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Ms. TITUS, and Mr. BLUMENAUER) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period 

to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 

concerned 

A BILL 

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons 

to the United States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hastening Arms Limi5 tations Talks Act of 2020’’ or the ‘‘HALT Act of 2020’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis2 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President 

3 Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorba4 chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a 

5 ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 

6 fought’’. 

7 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 

8 people attended the largest peace rally in United 

9 States history, in support of a movement to freeze 

10 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that 

11 helped to create the political will necessary for the 

12 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties 

13 between the United States and former Soviet Union, 

14 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 

15 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 

16 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions. 

17 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 

18 1945, millions of people around the world have stood 

19 up to demand meaningful, immediate international 

20 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats 

21 posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 

22 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet. 

23 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera24 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon25 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (comVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:22 Jul 12, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7260.IH H7260

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1 monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

2 Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’), entered into force, which 

3 includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weap4 on states (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5’’), 

5 among other things, ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good 

6 faith on effective measures relating to the cessation 

7 of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar8 mament’’. 

9 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership 

10 has curbed the growth in the number of countries 

11 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall 

12 vertical proliferation among countries already pos13 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more 

14 than 85-percent reduction in the United States nu15 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 

16 31,255 in 1967. 

17 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap18 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol19 lowing major technical developments since the Sen20 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear21 Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the 

22 ‘‘CTBT’’) in 1999: 

23 (A) The verification architecture of the 

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1 nization (commonly referred to as the 

2 ‘‘CTBTO’’)— 

3 (i) has made significant advance4 ments, as seen through its network of 300 

5 International Monitoring Stations and its 

6 International Data Centre, which together 

7 provide for the near instantaneous detec8 tion of nuclear explosives tests, including 

9 all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea 

10 between 2006 and 2017; and 

11 (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 

12 days a week. 

13 (B) Since the United States signed the 

14 CTBT, confidence has grown in the science15 based Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

16 Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms 

17 the basis of annual certifications to the Presi18 dent regarding the continual safety, security, 

19 and effectiveness of the United States nuclear 

20 deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 

21 leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest 

22 Moniz to remark in 2015 that ‘‘lab directors 

23 today now state that they certainly understand 

24 much more about how nuclear weapons work 

25 than during the period of nuclear testing’’. 


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1 (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the 

2 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear 

3 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms 

4 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear 

5 weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction 

6 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 

7 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali8 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway 

9 with each of the countries that possess nuclear 

10 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each 

11 year to maintain and improve their arsenals. 

12 (8) The United States and the Russian Federa13 tion are both pursuing the development of desta14 bilizing types of nuclear weapons, including new 

15 lower-yield nuclear weapons that are more usable, 

16 and the People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan, 

17 and North Korea have each taken concerning steps 

18 to diversify their more modest, but nonetheless very 

19 deadly, nuclear arsenals. 

20 (9) Since January 2017, President Donald 

21 Trump has taken the following actions, which have 

22 run counter to the objectives of the Creating an En23 vironment for Nuclear Disarmament (commonly re24 ferred to as ‘‘CEND’’) initiative that his administra25 tion launched in 2018: 


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1 (A) The release of the 2018 Nuclear Pos2 ture Review on February 5, 2018, which low3 ered the threshold for nuclear weapons use and 

4 called for the development of the following new 

5 nuclear weapons: 

6 (i) A low-yield warhead on a sub7 marine-launched ballistic missile, which 

8 was deployed before the date of the enact9 ment of this Act. 

10 (ii) A sea-launched cruise missile, still 

11 under development on the date of the en12 actment of this Act. 

13 (B) The unilateral United States with14 drawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

15 Action (commonly referred to as the ‘‘JCPOA’’) 

16 announced on May 8, 2018, which may lead to 

17 the complete collapse of an agreement that had 

18 verifiably closed of each of Iran’s pathways to 

19 a nuclear weapon. 

20 (C) The unilateral United States with21 drawal, completed on August 2, 2019, from the 

22 Treaty Between the United States of America 

23 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 

24 the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 

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1 ington December 8, 1987, and entered into 

2 force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as 

3 the ‘‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Trea4 ty’’ or the ‘‘INF Treaty’’), in response to the 

5 material breach by the Russian Federation of 

6 its obligations under that Treaty, which has re7 moved all legal constraints on the testing, pro8 curement, and deployment of ground-based 

9 shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles, 

10 increasing the risk of a missile arms race in the 

11 Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. 

12 (D) The unilateral United States with13 drawal, announced on May 22, 2020, from the 

14 Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 

15 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 

16 2002 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Open Skies 

17 Treaty’’), which is likely to deny to United 

18 States allies and partners a key confidence19 building measure and one of the few remaining 

20 operational diplomatic forums, through the 

21 Open Skies Consultative Commission, to engage 

22 with the Russian Federation. 

23 (10) During a May 15, 2020, National Security 

24 Council meeting, one or more senior officials of the 

25 Trump administration reportedly advocated that the 


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1 United States conduct its first nuclear explosives 

2 test since 1992, as part of an effort to bring the 

3 Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 

4 China into negotiations on a trilateral arms control 

5 agreement. 

6 (11) A move by the United States to break its 

7 moratorium on nuclear explosives testing would con8 flict with United Nations Security Council Resolu9 tion 2310, led by the United States and adopted in 

10 2016, which states that any nuclear explosives test 

11 would defeat the ‘‘object and purpose’’ of the CTBT 

12 and called on all countries to maintain their respec13 tive moratoriums on such tests. 

14 (12) In light of moves by the United States and 

15 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear 

16 weapons, the 21st century nuclear freeze movement 

17 would seek to halt the new nuclear arms race by 

18 seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable 

19 freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of 

20 nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weap21 ons. 

22 (13) The United States would benefit from con23 clusion of a comprehensive nuclear arms agreement 

24 with each of the nuclear-weapon state parties to the 


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1 NPT and potentially all countries that possess nu2 clear weapons. 

3 (14) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons 

4 employment strategy of the United States submitted 

5 under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, 

6 determined that it is possible to ensure the security 

7 of the United States and allies and partners of the 

8 United States and maintain a strong and credible 

strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a 1 9 ⁄3

10 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 

11 established in the Treaty between the United States 

12 of America and the Russian Federation on Measures 

13 for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra14 tegic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and en15 tered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly re16 ferred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 

17 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

18 It is the policy of the United States that: 

19 (1) The United States should build upon its 

20 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num21 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter22 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction 

23 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 

24 freeze movement. 


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1 (2) The United States should immediately agree 

2 to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years, until 

3 February 5, 2026, through mutual agreement with 

4 the Russian Federation to provide continued insight 

5 into the location, movement, and disposition of stra6 tegic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads belong7 ing to the Russian Federation, which would be an 

8 important first step to building momentum for a 

9 multilateral arms control initiative. 

10 (3) Upon the successful extension of the New 

11 START Treaty, the United States should engage 

12 with all other countries that possess nuclear weapons 

13 to negotiate and conclude future multilateral arms 

14 control, disarmament, and risk reduction agree15 ments, which should contain some or all of the fol16 lowing provisions: 

17 (A) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on 

18 the testing, production, and further deployment 

19 of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for 

20 such weapons. 

21 (B) An agreement that establishes a 

22 verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed 

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1 tively) and the nuclear warheads associated 

2 with such systems belonging to the P5, and to 

3 the extent possible, all countries that possess 

4 nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. 

5 (C) An agreement by each country to 

6 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap7 ons. 

8 (D) An agreement on a proactive United 

9 Nations Security Council resolution that ex10 pands access by the International Atomic En11 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 

12 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 

13 with its obligations under the NPT. 

14 (E) An agreement to refrain from config15 uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 

16 nuclear posture allowing a country to launch a 

17 ballistic missile attack in response to detection 

18 by an early-warning satellite or sensor of a sus19 pected incoming ballistic missile. 

20 (F) An agreement not to target or inter21 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com22 munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 

23 infrastructure of another country through a 

24 cyberattack. 


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1 (G) An agreement on transparency meas2 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 

3 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are 

4 mounted on ballistic missiles. 

5 (H) An agreement to provide a baseline 

6 and continuous exchanges detailing the aggre7 gate number of active nuclear weapons and as8 sociated systems possessed by each country. 

9 (4) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 

10 in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 

11 governing the consensus rule on negotiation of a 

12 verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or Fissile Material 

13 Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to another 

14 international body or fora, such as a meeting of the 

15 P5. Successful conclusion of such a treaty would 

16 verifiably prevent any country’s production of highly 

17 enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear 

18 weapons. 

19 (5) The United States should convene a series 

20 of high level summits on nuclear disarmament mod21 eled on the Nuclear Security Summits process, 

22 which saw the elimination of the equivalent of 3,000 

23 nuclear weapons. 

24 (6) The President should seek ratification by 

25 the Senate of the CTBT and mobilize all countries 


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1 covered by Annex 2 of the CTBT to pursue similar 

2 action to hasten entry into force of the CTBT. The 

3 entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 

4 by the United States will provide critical momentum, 

5 will activate the CTBT’s onsite inspection provision 

6 to investigate allegations that any country that is a 

7 party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of 

8 any yield. 

9 (7) The President should make the accession of 

10 North Korea to the CTBT a component of any final 

11 agreement in fulfilling the pledges the Government 

12 of North Korea made in Singapore, as North Korea 

13 is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 

14 nuclear explosive test since 1998. 

15 (8) The United States should— 

16 (A) refrain from developing any new de17 signs for nuclear warheads or bombs, but espe18 cially designs that could add a level of technical 

19 uncertainty into the United States stockpile and 

20 thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive 

21 testing in order to test that new design; and 

22 (B) seek reciprocal commitments from 

23 other countries that possess nuclear weapons. 


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1 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR 

2 TEST EXPLOSIONS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to 

4 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 

5 2021 or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be ap6 propriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year 

7 before fiscal year 2021 and available for obligation as of 

8 the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated 

9 or expended to conduct or make preparations for any ex10 plosive nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until 

11 such time as— 

12 (1) the President submits to Congress an ad13 dendum to the report required by section 4205 of 

14 the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) 

15 that details any change to the condition of the 

16 United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the 

17 report submitted under that section in the preceding 

18 year; and 

19 (2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution 

20 of Congress that approves the test. 

21 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subsection (a) does 

22 not limit nuclear stockpile stewardship activities that are 

23 consistent with the zero-yield standard and other require24 ments under law. 

Æ 


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