IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2015-CP-00263-COA DONALD CHAMBLISS A/K/A DONALD GREGORY CHAMBLISS A/K/A GREG CHAMBLISS A/K/A DONALD G. CHAMBLISS APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/02/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LESTER F. W I LLIAMSON JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DONALD CHAMBLISS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DISMISSED MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/19/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., CARLTON AND JAMES, JJ. CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A L a u d e r d a l e C o u n t y grand j u r y i n d i c t e d D o n a l d C h a mb l i s s f o r s a l e o f

m etham phetam ine, as a subsequent and habitual of f ender. 1 Cham

bliss pled guilty , and the trial court sentenced h i m to “eight y ears in the custody of t he [ Mississippi Departm ent of

1 T h e g ran d j u ry in d icted C h a mb l i s s f o r s ale o f m eth am

p h etam in e w ith i n f

if teen h u n d red f eet o f a c h u rch i n v io latio n o f M i s sissip p i C o d e A n n o t ated sectio n s 4 1 -2 9 -1 3 9 ( S u p p . 2 0 1 5 ) an d 4 1 -2 9 -1 4 2 (R ev . 2 0 1 3 ). A f ter a m ak in g a p lea b arg ain w ith th e S ta t e , C h am b liss p lead ed g u ilty to th e sectio n 4 1 -2 9 -1 3 9 sale-o f -m eth am p h etam in e ch arg e.Corrections (MDOC)] as a habitual of f ender under [ Mississ i p p i C ode Annotated section] 99-
19-81 [ (Rev. 2015)] without the possibility of such sentence b eing reduced or suspended nor
to be eligible f

or early release, with three y ears suspended, f ollowed by f

i v e y e a r s of postrelease supervision.” 2 The trial court f urther o rdered Cham

b liss to p ay f

ines and court
f ees. ¶2. Cham

bliss f iled a m otion f

or postconviction relief (PCR ) , w h i c h t h e t r i a l court ultim ately dism i ssed. Cham bliss now a

ppeals, raising t he f

ollowing assignm e nts o f e r r o r : (1) his guilty plea was n ot entered voluntarily , knowingly , a nd intelligently ; (2) he received

an illegal sentence; and (3) h e received inef f ective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we af f irm the trial court’s judgm ent dism issing Cham b liss’s PCR m otion.
FACTS ¶3. O n M a y 1 9 , 2 0 1 4 , C h a mb l i s s p l e aded guilty t o selling m etham phetam ine o n Decem ber 12, 2012, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated s ection 41-29-139. At the May 19, 2 0 1 4 p l ea hearing, Cham bliss testif

ied that he subm itted his plea f reely and voluntarily

. During the plea coll o q u y , C ham bliss also conf

irm ed that he sold

m etham phetam ine o n Decem

ber 1 2, 2012, a nd adm itted that he w as convicted of at least two prior f elonies. ¶4. In his plea petition, Cham bliss again af

f irm ed that he entered his guilty plea “f reely and v oluntarily and of [ h is] o w n accord and with f u ll understanding of

all m atters set f

orth

2 We ack n o w led g e th a t th e trial c o u rt d eterm in ed C h am b liss to b e a h ab itu al o f

f en d er in acco r d an ce w ith sectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 , b u t th en su s p en d ed th ree y e ars o f th e imp o sed sen ten ce. H en ce, C h am

b liss receiv ed an illeg ally len ien t sen ten ce sin ce h e f ailed to receiv e th e m ax im

u m sen ten ce f

o r h is crim es, as req u ired b y sectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1

. 2in the indict me n t a n d in [ the plea] petition.” Cham bliss f urther acknowledged that he believed his attorney “ha[ d] done all that any one could do to counsel and a ssist” C ham bliss, and Cham

bliss stated that he was “satisf ied with the advice and help” f rom his attorney

. ¶5. At the July 30, 2014 s entencing h earing, t he trial court sentenced Cham bliss to serve “eight y ears in the custody of the [ MDOC] as a habitual of f ender under [ section] 99-19-81 without the possibility of such sentence being reduced o r suspe n d e d n o r to be eligible f or early release, w ith three y ears suspended, f ollowed b y f

i ve y e ars of postrelease supervision.” The trial judge instructed that a f ter Cham bliss served f

ive y ears in the custody o f the MDOC, he is rem a nded to the supervision o f MDOC staf f to serve the postrelease-supervision portion of his sentence. ¶6. On February 2, 2 015, Cham bliss f iled a P CR m otion, which t he trial court dism issed. This appeal f

o llowed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. “W hen reviewing a lower c ourt' s decision t o d eny a [ PCR m otion], this Court will not d i s t urb the trial court' s f actual f indings unless they are f ound to be clearly errone o u s . H o w ever, where questions of law are raised, t he applicable standard of review is de
novo.” Mann v. State , 73 So. 3d 564, 565 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). ¶8. Additionally , “the burden of proving f actual allegations in s u p p o r t o f t h e [ PCR]

m otion is upon the def

endant.” McClendon v. State , 539 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Miss. 1989).

DISCUSSION
I. Guilty Plea

3¶9. Cham bli s s a r g u e s t h a t his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily , k nowingly , and intelligently

. Cham

b liss admi t s t h at he signed the plea petition af f irm ing his voluntary , knowing, and intelligent plea, but h e c o n t ends t hat no plea colloquy occurred. Cham bliss specif ically states that he did not r eceive an opportunity t o stand bef ore a judge and enter his plea. ¶10. This Court h a s l ong recognized that “[ a] guilty plea is binding w here it is entered voluntarily , knowingly , and intelligently .” Hill v. State , 60 So. 3d 824, 828 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Alexander v. State , 605 S o. 2d 1170, 1 172 (Miss. 1992)). Determ ining whether a guilty plea m eets this standard depends on whether “the def endant is advi s ed concerning the nature of t he c harge agai n st him and the consequences of the plea.” Id

. “Specif ically , the def

endant m

ust be advised that his gu i l t y p l e a waives m ultiple constitutional rights.” Id. As the P CR m o vant, C ham bliss bears the burden to show that his plea was not voluntarily

entered. Id

. ¶11. In Hill , this C ourt observed that the M i s s i s s i ppi S uprem e C ourt has held that when assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, [ t]he thoroughness w ith which [ the def endant] was interrogated by the lower court at the t im e his plea was tendered is the m ost signif icant evidence of all. For, without regard to the advice or instructions [ the def endant] m ay have been given by his attorney , the lower court' s questioning a nd explanations to [ him ] of his rights and of the consequences of h is plea were suf f icient to r ender the plea voluntary

. Id. (citing Gardner v. State , 531 So. 2d 805, 809 (¶10) (Miss. 1988)). ¶12. The record bef

ore us contains a transcript of the M ay 19, 2 0 1 4 p l e a hearing. The transcript shows t hat the trial judge reviewed the charges against Cham bliss as set f

orth in

4his indictm ent, and the trial court explained t he possible s entence Cham bliss could receive

as a habitual of

f ender. T he trial judge also inf o rm ed Cham

b lis s o f t h e r i g hts Cham

bliss waived by

pleading guilty

. W hen asked, Cham b liss af f irm e d u nder oath t hat he subm itted his p lea f reely and voluntarily

. During the plea colloquy , Cham bliss also adm itted u nder oath the f ollowing: that he k

new he w a s s e l l ing m etham phetam ine on Decem

ber 12, 2012; that

no one f orced him to sell the m etham phetam ine; and that he was convicted of a t least two f elonies prior to the charge at issue. Cham bliss also adm itted that he had recently used the drugs L ortab and X anax. He a lso explained that he did n ot have a drug problem and that he was not under the inf

luence of any alcohol or drugs during the plea hearing. ¶13. In its order dism issing Cham bliss’s PCR m ot i o n , t h e t rial court provided that the transcrip t f

r o m t he guilty -plea hearing “clearly establishes t hat the [ trial] court adequately questioned [ Cham

bliss] and established a f

actual b asis f

or the guilty plea, [ a nd Cham bliss] conf irm ed his desire to plead guilty in open court, repeatedly adm i tted to the elem ents of the

c r im e, and did so f

reely and voluntarily .” The trial court ultim ately f ound that C h a mb l i s s “f reely , knowingly , intelligently , and voluntarily entered his guilty p lea.” ¶14. W e agree, and f

ind that this issue lacks m erit.
II. Illegal Sentence ¶15. C h am

bliss also argues that the trial court m isapplied the senten c i n g r e q u i r e me n t s f ound in House Bill Num

ber 5 8 5; and as a result, h e c laim s that the t rial court incor rectly sentenced him to serve eight y ears in the c ustody of the MDOC, with three y ears suspended. Cham b liss provides that House Bill Nu m b e r 585, codif

ied in section 41-29-139, becam e

5ef

f ective on July

1, 2014, nearly

two m onths bef

ore he was sentenced. ¶16. The record shows that Cham bliss pled guilty in May 2014. A t t h e t im e Cham bliss pled guilty , the applicable sentencing statute, section 41-29-139(b)(1), provided:
In t he case of controlled substances classif ied in Schedule I or II, as set out in [ s]ections 41- 2 9

- 1 1 3 a nd 41-29-115, except thirty (30) gram s or less of m arihuana or s y

nthetic cannabinoids, and except a f irst of f ender as def

ined in Section 41-29-149(e) who violates subsection (a) of this section with respect to less than one (1) kilogram but m o re t han t hirty (30) gram s of m a rihuana or sy nthetic cannabinoids, such person may, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than thirty (

30) years a nd shall be f ined not less than [ f

]ive [ t]housand [ d]ollars ($5,00 0

. 00) nor m ore than [ o]ne [ m ]illion [ d]ollars ($1,000,000.00), or both[ .] ( E mp hasis added). The July 2 0 14 revision to section 41-29-139, however, provided t h a t Cham b liss could “be im

p risoned f

or not mo r e t h a n eight ( 8) y ears or f ined not m ore than [ f ] i f ty [ t]housand [ d]ollars ($50,000.00), or both.” The trial court sentenced Cham bliss i n August 2014. In the s entencin g o r d e r , t h e trial judge acknowledged that the s e ntencing

statute was m odif

ied on July 1, 2014. The trial court s e n t e n c e d Cham bliss t o s erve “eight
y ears in the custody of the [ MDOC] as a habitual of f ender under [ section] 99-19-81 without the p ossibility of such sentence being reduced o r s u s p e n d e d n or to be eligible f or early release, with three y ears suspended, f ollowed by

f i ve y ears of postrelease supervision.” ¶17. Our r eview of t he record ref lec ts that C ham

bliss received a n illegally lenient sentence. The trial court suspended part of Cham bliss’s sentence, despite the f act that C ham

bliss was sentenced as a h a b i t u a l o f f ender pursuant to s ection 99-19-81. As a result, C ham bliss’s

sentence w as m ore lenient than authorized by statute. Jurisprudence establis h e s t h at a def endant m ay

not com plain of an illegally

lenient sentence, and his assignm e nt of error is

6without m erit. Hamberlin v. State , 165 So. 3 d 4 9 1 , 4 9 5 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2015);

Burkhalter v. State , 179 So. 3d 67, 73 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶18. Cham

bliss next asserts that he f ailed to r eceive ef

f ective a s sistance f

rom his def

ense counsel. C h a mb l i s s claim s that his def ense c ounsel f

ailed to inf

orm h im of h is potential sentence prior to pleading guilty

. ¶19. In Chamberlin v. State , 55 So. 3d 1046, 1050 (¶¶4-5) ( Miss. 2010), t he suprem e court recited the test f

or inef f ective assistance of

counsel: The benchm ark f

or j udging any claim of i nef f ectiveness m

ust b e w h ether counsel' s conduct s o underm ined the p roper f unctioning o f the adversarial process t hat the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. In order to p r evail on an inef f ective-assistance-of

-counsel c laim , a def

endant m ust f irst p rove that his counsel was def icient, which re q u i r e s showing t hat counsel m ade errors so serious that he or s h e w a s n o t f unctioning as the c o u n s e l g uaranteed the def endant by the S ixth Am endm e nt. Secondly , a def endant m ust prove that the def

icient perf

o rm ance prejudiced the def e nse, which requires showing that counsel' s errors were s o serious as to deprive the def endant of a f

air trial, a trial whose r esult is reliable. A b sent both showings, a def endant m ay

not prevail on his claim

that his counsel was inef f ective. This Court m

ust strongly presum e that counsel' s conduct f alls within a wide range of reasonable p r of

essional assistance, and t he challenged act o r om ission m ight be c onsidered sound trial strategy

. I n o t h e r words, d ef ense counsel is presum ed com

petent. And even where prof essional error is proven, t his Court mu s t determ ine if there is a r easonable probability that, b ut f or counse l ' s unprof essional errors, the result of the proceedings would h ave been dif f erent. A r easonable probability i s a p robability suf f icient to underm i ne conf

idence in the outcom e. Id

. (internal citations and quotation m arks om itted); see also Strickland v
. W ashington , 466
U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Cham bliss bears the burden of proving that his counsel’s perf orm ance

was d ef icient and this def

iciency prejudiced h is def ense. Smith v
. State , 129 So. 3d 243, 246

7(¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

¶20. The transcript f

rom the plea colloquy ref lects that Cham

bl i s s ’ s d e f

e n s e c o u n s el inf orm ed the j u dge, “I told [ Cham bliss] that—what I told him is that he would g et day -forday any where f rom ten y e ars down to probably about t wo. I didn’t want to g o to zero.” The trial court also explained t o Cham bliss the potential sentence he could recei v e : “ N o mo re than ten y e ars initial tim e to s erve, so long as—it will be conditioned on s everal things.” The transcript also ref

lects that both Cham

b liss a nd t h e t r ial court acknowledged C ham bliss’s two prior convictions. Cham

bliss also testif

ied that he was s atisf

ied with his def

ense counsel’s assistance. ¶21. The trial court f

ound that Cham

b lis s ’ s “ a s s e r t i o n s d o n o t a l l e g e w i th enough

s p e c i f i c i t y and detail that h i s counsel’s p erf orm ance was def

i cient and[ ,] t hus, h is def

ens e

was p r e j u diced.” The t rial c ourt also observed that Cham bliss’s counsel “was highly ef f ective” in working to have several of Cham bliss’s indict m ents withdrawn, greatly reducing Cham

bliss’s potential sentence. ¶22. Our review o f the r ecord ref lects that Cham

b liss f ailed to m eet his burden of showing that his c ounsel’s p e rf

orm ance was def

icient, and that this def

iciency prejudiced his def ense. S e e Smith , 129 S o. 3d a t 2 46 (¶9); W i lliams v. S

tate , 1 10 So. 3 d 840, 844 (¶21) (Miss. Ct

. App. 2 013) (petitioner m

u st provide support fo r i nef f e c tive-assistance-of

-counsel claim with specif ic f acts to overcom e strong presum ption that counsel' s perf

o rm ance was suf

f icient). Accordingly , Cham

bliss’s claim lacks m erit. ¶23. W e theref

ore af f irm the trial court’s dism i ssal of Cham bliss’s PCR m otion.

8¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAUDERDALE C O U N T Y C I R C U I T COURT

DISMISSING THE M OTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF I S AFFI RMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAUDERDALE COUNTY. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, I SHEE, FAIR, JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

9