[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Strauss , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1263.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are req uested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographic al or other formal errors in the opini on, in order that corrections m ay be made before the opi nion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -1263
C LEVELAND M ETROPOLITAN B AR A SSOCIATION v . S TRAUSS
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it

may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Strauss , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1263.] Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct— Conduct adversely reflecting on fitne ss to practice law—Engaging in an illegal act that reflects adverse ly on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension. (No. 2020-1512—Submitted Janua ry 27, 2021—Decided April 15, 202 1.)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Professiona l Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2020-032.

______________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Marc Ian Strauss, of Willoughby Hills, Ohio, Attorn ey Registration No. 0036808, was admitte d to the practice of law i n Ohio in 1986. {¶ 2} In a July 1, 2020 complaint, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Ba r Association, alleged that Str auss committed illegal acts that a dversely reflect onS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 his honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness to practice law when he operated a
vehicle under the influence of alcohol, struck a parked police vehicle, and fled. {¶ 3} The parties submitted stipula tions of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors and agreed that a one-year c onditionally stayed suspension was the appropriate s anction for Strauss’s misconduc t. After a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Cond uct issued a report finding that Strauss ha d committed the charged misconduc t. Though the panel rejected the stipulated a ggravating factor and one of the stipulated mitigating factors, it recommende d that the board adopt the par ties’ stipulated sanction. The board adopt ed the panel’s repor t in its entirety

. {¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and suspend Strauss from the practice of law for one year, stayed in its entirety o n the conditions recommended by the board. Stipulated Facts and Misconduct {¶ 5} On March 2, 2018, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Strauss was drivi ng southbound on I-271 in snowy conditions when he rear-ended a Be achwood police cruiser parked on the side of the road near the scene of another accident. Although the impact caused substa ntial damage to Strauss’s car and the cruiser, Strauss left the scene without stopping. He continued driving southbound on I271 until he crashed into the medi an; he then abandoned his veh icle and fled on foot. Police officers found Strauss walking in the middle of a nearby road. He did not obey their orders to st op and continued walking. The p olice officers arrested Strauss and took him to the Beachwood Police Departmen t, where an officer read him his rights and administered field sobriety tes ts. An Intoxilyzer breath-alcohol test performed at approximately 2:47 a.m. showed that Strauss’s
blood-alcohol content was 0.148. {¶ 6} On January 7, 2019, Strauss pleaded no contest to two counts of operating a vehicle without reas onable control and single count s of resistingJanuary Term, 2021

3 arrest, leaving the scene of an accident, unsafe operation of a vehicle in the vicinity of an emergency vehicle, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”). 1 Beachwood v. Strauss , Shaker Heights M.C. case Nos. 18TRC00044, 18CRB00246, and 18TRD012106. {¶ 7} On April 15, 2019, Strauss was sentenced to 90 days in jail wit h 87 days suspended and three days’ credit for successful completion of an accredited driver-intervention program. H is driver’s license was suspende d for two years from the date of the accident, with driving privileges conditio ned on the
installation of an interlock de vice on his vehicle. He was als o placed on active probation for 12 months followed by 24 months of inactive (nonr eporting) probation. Strauss completed hi s term of active probation, whi ch required him to attend two Alcoholics Anonymous m eetings per week, wear a secur e continuous remote alcohol-monitoring device, and pay a fine and court cost s. He remains subject to inactive probation until April 15, 2022. {¶ 8} The parties stipulated and the board found that Strauss’s condu ct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (committing an illegal act that re flects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(h) (engaging i n conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). W e adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and determine that his efforts to flee t he scene of the accident and avoid arrest are sufficiently egregious to warrant finding a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker , 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21.
Sanction {¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for atto rney misconduct, we consider al l relevant factors, including the e thical duties that the lawyer violated, the

1. Strauss was previously charged with OVI in the Euclid Munici pal Court in August 2012 and pleaded no contest to a charge of physical control of a vehicle while under the influence.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. {¶ 10} The board did not find any aggravating factors in this case. T he board rejected the parties’ stipul ation that Strauss’s past mon etary sanctions for failing to comply with continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) requi rements were an aggravating factor under Gov.Bar R. (V)(13)(B)(1). See Gov.Bar. R. X(17)(C) (monetary sanctions imposed for CLE violations shall not be con sidered as prior discipline). {¶ 11} As to mitigating factors, because Strauss stipulated that he ha d engaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflected on his hone sty or trustworthiness in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) when he fle d the scene of the accident, the board rejected the parties’ stipulation that the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive was a mitigating factor in this case. See Gov.Bar R. (V)(13)(C)(2). The board did, however, attribute mitigating ef fect to Strauss’s clean disciplinary record and to his full and free disclosure t o the board and cooperative attitude toward the di sciplinary proceedings, as de monstrated by his extensive stipulations and candor at his disciplinary hearing. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (4). We adopt the se findings and also accept t he parties’ stipulation that the criminal penalties imposed for Strauss’s m isconduct qualify as an additional mitigating factor. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(6). {¶ 12} In addition to these mitigating factors, the board noted that although he maintains an active law license, Strauss left the p ractice of law in 2006 to engage in real-estate development full time and he perf orms limited legal work for his friends, fam ily, and business entities. {¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that a one-year conditionally stayed suspension is the appropriate sanction for Strauss’s misconduct. In support of that sanction, the board considered three cases in which we have disciplined attorneys who have been convicted of OVI or relatedJanuary Term, 2021

5 offenses. In two of those cases, we imposed two-year partially stayed suspensions, but those attorneys also had engaged in additional acts of
misconduct. In Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lewis , 152 Ohio St.3d 614, 2018-Ohio2024, 99 N.E.3d 404, we imposed a two-year suspension with the final six months conditionally stayed on an attorney who had been previously dis ciplined; he had left the scene of an auto accident after a night of drinking an d was later convicted of obstructing official business for submitting a false, writte n witness statement to police. And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan , 157 Ohio St.3d 447, 2019-Ohio3748, 137 N.E.3d 1141, we imposed a two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed on an attorney who, in addition to being c onvicted of OVI, appeared in court on behalf of himself and at least one client while under the
influence of alcohol and committe d additional clie nt-related et hical offenses. {¶ 14} In the third case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Mitchell , 158 Ohio St.3d 356, 2019-Ohio-5218, 142 N.E.3d 669, the attorney, like Strauss , stipulated that
he violated Prof.C ond.R. 8.4(b) and 8.4(h) by driving while int oxicated and leaving the scene of an accident. Both the driver and passenge r in the vehicle that
Mitchell struck sustained minor injuries. Consequently, Mitche ll was convicted of a felony count of leaving th e scene of an accident involving injury or death and a misdemeanor count of driving while intoxicated. Id. at ¶ 6. In contrast, Strauss was the only person injured by his conduct in this case, and he was convicted of
six misdemeanor offenses. {¶ 15} In Mitchell , the only aggravating factor present was Mitchell’s dishonest or selfish motive. In addition to having the same mi tigating factors that are present in Strauss’s case, Mitchell self-reported his crimi nal convictions to disciplinary authorities, submitted letters attesting to his go od character, and established his diagnosed alcoholism as a mitigating factor pur suant to Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). Id. at ¶ 11. On those facts, we suspended Mitchell from the practice of law for one year, stayed in its entirety on the con ditions that heS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 successfully complete his crimin al probation, continue to activ ely participate in the substance-abuse-recovery a nd treatment programs recommended by his treatment professionals, remain d rug- and alcohol-free, and com mit no further
misconduct. Id. at ¶ 14. {¶ 16} In this case, the board expressed some concern that Strauss was
reluctant to submit to an assessm ent conducted by the Ohio Lawy ers Assistance Program. It noted, however, that that concern was diminished b y the facts that (1) an assessment completed as part of Strauss’s criminal sanction found that he had no substance-use disorder and (2) relator never sought an order to compel any further assessment. Ultimately, the board determined that a on e-year suspension, stayed in its entirety on the conditions that Strauss commit no further misconduct and comply with the terms of hi s inactive probation—which requi res him to refrain from using nonprescriptive drugs and submit to random d rug testing—is the appropriate sanc tion for his misconduct. {¶ 17} Having thoroughly reviewed the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the applicable mitigating factors, and the sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct, we agree.
Conclusion {¶ 18} Accordingly, Marc Ian Strauss is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, stayed in its entirety on the conditi ons that he engage in no further misconduct and abide by the terms of the probation i mposed by the Shaker Heights Municipal Court in case No. 18TRC0004. If Strau ss fails to comply with either of these conditions, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full one-year suspension. Cos ts are taxed to Strauss. Judgment accordingly.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , S TEWART , and
B RUNNER , JJ., concur.
D ONNELLY , J., not participating.January Term, 2021

7 _________________ Brenda M. Johnson, and Jordan D. Lebovitz; and Heather M. Zirke , Bar Counsel, and Christopher J. Klasa , Assistant Bar Counsel, for r elator. Marc Ian Strauss, pro se.

_________________