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Dismissed, Order issued October ^ , 1996

In The

(tiaurl of Appeals

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No. 05-92-01177-CR

CEDRIC DEMICHAEL BUTLER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

OPINION AND ORDER

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Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Maloney and Hankinson

Cedric Demichael Butler appeals his conviction for sexual assault. Following

revocation of his probation, the trial court assessed punishment at eight years in prison. In

one point of error, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

The State, however, challenges this Court's jurisdiction over the appeal because appellant

originally pleaded guilty as part of aplea bargain agreement but filed only ageneral notice

of appeal.

As part of aplea bargain agreement, appellant pleaded guilty and was placed on

deferred adjudication probation for two years and fined $500. Subsequently, the State filed
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amotion to adjudicate guilt. Appellant entered an open plea of true to the allegations in

the motion, and the trial court revoked his probation and adjudicated him guilty. The trial

court then placed appellant on ten years' probation. Nine months later, the State filed a

motion to revoke probation. Appellant agreed to enter aplea of true in exchange for an

eight-year sentence. After being sentenced to eight years in prison, appellant filed notice

of appeal.

Rule 40(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

[I]f the judgment was rendered upon [an appellant's] plea of

guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to Article 1.15, Code of

Criminal Procedure, and the punishment assessed does not

exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and

agreed to by the defendant and his attorney, in order to

prosecute an appeal for anonjurisdictional defect or error that

occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall state that the

trial court granted permission to appeal or shall specify that

those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on

before trial.

Tex. R. Apt, P. 40(b)(1). Ageneral notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction upon this

Court to consider nonjurisdictional issues. Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. Crim.

App.), cert. denied, 114 S. Q. 2684 (1994). Further, rule 40(b)(1) applies to cases in which

an appellant is placed on deferred adjudication probation pursuant to aplea bargain

agreement and the probation is subsequently revoked and appelant adjudicated guilty.

Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

In this case, appellant entered his original plea pursuant to anegotiated plea bargain

agreement. Subsequently, as part of another negotiated plea agreement, appellant pleaded

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true totheState's motion torevoke probation inexchange for aneight-year prison sentence.

Appellant's notice of appeal does not state that the trial court granted permission to appeal

nor does it specify any matters raised by written motion or ruled on before trial.

Consequently, appellant's notice of appeal is general, and he can raise only jurisdictional

defects.

Appellant's sole point of error challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence. Sufficiency

of the evidence is a nonjurisdictional issue. Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 736. Because appellant

filed a general notice of appeal, this Court does not have jurisdiction over appellant's

appeal. See Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 736.

Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 90

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'EINDA THOMAS,

CHIEF JUSTICE

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