IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard J. Coppola, Jr., :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, : No. 687 C.D. 2021

Bureau of Motor Vehicles : Submitted: March 25, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: August 29, 2022

Richard J. Coppola, Jr. (Coppola) appeals, pro se, from the Bucks 

County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) May 11, 2021 order sustaining the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor 

Vehicles’ (DOT) Preliminary Objections to Coppola’s First Amended Complaint 

(Amended Complaint) and dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice. 

Essentially, Coppola presents five issues for this Court’s review:1 whether the trial 

1 Coppola’s brief does not contain the requisite Statement of Questions Involved. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 2111(a)(4) requires that an appellant’s brief 

contain, inter alia, a “[s]tatement of the questions involved.” Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(4). Rule 2116(a) 

mandates, in relevant part:

The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the

issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of 

the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will be 

deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised 

therein. No question will be considered unless it is stated in the

statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby. Each 

question shall be followed by an answer stating simply whether the 
2

court erred, abused its discretion, denied Coppola’s due process rights and right to 

access to the courts, and prejudiced him by: (1) sustaining DOT’s boilerplate and 

unsupported Preliminary Objections and dismissing the case with prejudice in the 

face of DOT’s admission of fault and liability; (2) violating the Code of Judicial 

Conduct (Code), and demonstrating bias, animus, and discrimination against

Coppola; (3) ignoring Coppola’s concern for his health and safety, and conducting 

in-person, rather than remote hearings; (4) dismissing the case with prejudice before 

Coppola could conduct discovery to prepare and support his case, and failing to 

weigh the relevance of Coppola’s motions, requests, and exhibits that would have 

led to admissible evidence of DOT’s misconduct and his damage recovery; and (5)

dismissing the case with prejudice despite that original service was properly made 

on DOT. After review, this Court affirms.

Background

The facts in this case are undisputed. Coppola sent DOT a $17.00 check 

to maintain the vehicle registration on his 2018 Load Rite trailer. By May 1, 2020 

notice, DOT informed Coppola that his bank had returned the check as uncollectable 

because Coppola’s Wells Fargo branch account had been sold. DOT also assessed 

a return check penalty. 

By May 11, 2020 letter, Coppola explained to DOT that his bank had 

not received the subject check for processing and, perhaps, DOT input an incorrect 

routing number. Coppola also requested copies of the front and back of the subject 

court or government unit agreed, disagreed, did not answer, or did 

not address the question.

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Although “an appellant’s violations of the [Rules] may result in waiver of the 

issue[s,]” Interest of N.B., 260 A.3d 236, 241 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2021), where Coppola fixed other 

errors about which this Court made him aware, this Court will nevertheless address what it gleans 

as Coppola’s issues presented, as the trial court addressed and both Coppola and DOT argued in 

their briefs to this Court.
3

check. In its May 20, 2020 response, DOT declared: “WE DIDN[’]T MAKE AN ERROR. 

THE CUSTOMER BANK BRANCH WAS SOLD. PLEASE GET AT [SIC] BANK LETTER IF THE 

BANK MADE AN ERROR.” Coppola Amended Complaint Ex. 3. On May 27, 2020, 

Coppola responded that DOT’s claim was absurd, and he again requested copies of 

both sides of the subject check. On June 13, 2020, DOT issued an Official Notice 

to Coppola stating that, because his financial institution failed to clear his check due 

to insufficient funds, his vehicle registration was suspended effective that day 

(Official Notice).

Statutory Appeal

Coppola appealed from the Official Notice to the trial court (Docket 

No. 2020-2562). On June 18, 2020, the trial court scheduled a hearing for August 

20, 2020. Coppola served interrogatories and a request for production of documents 

on DOT. On June 26, 2020, Coppola filed a motion to continue the hearing. 

On July 23, 2020, Coppola filed a motion to compel DOT’s 

answers/responses to his discovery requests, which DOT opposed. On July 22, 

2020, DOT’s assistant counsel Shannon M. Vecchio, Esquire (Counsel) emailed 

Coppola stating that, although pre-trial discovery does not apply to statutory appeals 

like this one, she was supplying certified documents, including the subject check. 

Upon his review, Coppola discovered that DOT processed his check under PNC

bank identification number 031000053, when his Wells Fargo bank identification 

number was 031000503. 

On August 7, 2020, Counsel emailed Coppola to memorialize her 

conversation with him earlier that week, during which she admitted that DOT had 

made an error while inputting his check, DOT waived the return check fee, and “the 

client” could not waive the statutorily mandated $17.00 registration fee, but DOT 

would rescind the suspension (pending his appeal) once he repaid the $17.00 
4

registration fee.

2

 Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 427b. Counsel also 

stated that DOT was reviewing its payment and investigation processes to avoid such 

errors in the future. On September 14, 2020, the trial court denied Coppola’s motion 

to compel. 

On September 1, 2020, DOT administratively rescinded Coppola’s 

suspension and reinstated his vehicle registration. At a November 23, 2020 de novo

appeal hearing,3the trial court dismissed the appeal as moot because DOT had 

already rescinded Coppola’s suspension. Although the appeal was resolved in his 

favor, Coppola was dissatisfied that he could not obtain discovery and he believed 

he was entitled to damages for DOT’s error, so he filed a motion for reconsideration 

on November 25, 2020, which the trial court denied on December 2, 2020. 

On January 4, 2021, Coppola appealed from the trial court’s order to 

this Court (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1297 C.D. 2020). On August 24, 2021, DOT filed a 

motion to dismiss Coppola’s appeal because Coppola had been afforded the relief 

he requested (i.e., rescission of the registration suspension). On August 27, 2021, 

this Court dismissed Coppola’s appeal as moot.

Civil Action

On August 11, 2020, Coppola filed a complaint in the trial court 

(Docket No. 2020-4010), wherein he asserted that DOT’s failure and refusal to 

investigate and resolve its check input error was negligent and/or willful, DOT’s 

issuance of the Official Notice was malicious under the circumstances, and DOT 

cannot hide behind a shield of immunity in the face of such abhorrent behavior. 

Coppola demanded $50,000.00 in damages, plus expenses, costs of suit, attorney’s 

2 DOT explained that because Coppola received a supersedeas of the suspension, he was 

permitted to continue normal use of the vehicle until the suspension was rescinded. See DOT Br. 

at 14.

3 Coppola did not attend the hearing.
5

fees, and $190.80 per hour for lost wages, plus other consequential damages and 

interest. On August 15, 2020, DOT filed preliminary objections to Coppola’s 

complaint, to which Coppola filed a response on August 19, 2020. 

Thereafter, Coppola served additional discovery requests upon DOT. 

On September 19, 2020, Coppola notified Counsel by email of his intent to take her 

deposition. On September 21, 2020, Coppola filed a motion to compel DOT to 

respond to his discovery requests. On September 22, 2020, Counsel informed 

Coppola that, as an attorney in the matter, she was not authorized to submit to a 

deposition. On September 23, 2020, Coppola filed a notice of his intention to take 

Counsel’s deposition on October 8, 2020, by Zoom, and for Counsel to identify: (1) 

all DOT employees who took part in the investigation of this matter; (2) all DOT 

employees who communicated and/or replied to his May 11 and May 27, 2020 

letters; (3) all DOT employees who replied to him through DOT’s May 1, 2020 

Return Check Notice; (4) all DOT employees who replied on May 1, 2020, that DOT 

did not commit an error; and (5) all individuals Counsel identified as “the client” in 

her August 7, 2020 email. 

On October 1, 2020, DOT filed a motion to quash the subpoena for 

Counsel’s deposition and requested a protective order (Motion to Quash). On 

October 6, 2020, the trial court issued a Rule to Show Cause. On October 7, 2020, 

Coppola filed an answer to the Motion to Quash. Neither party filed the requisite 

praecipe for the trial court to decide the Motion to Quash.

On November 17, 2020, the trial court sustained DOT’s preliminary 

objections and dismissed the original complaint, but allowed Coppola to file an 

amended complaint within 20 days. On November 30, 2020, Coppola filed the 

Amended Complaint. 

On December 17, 2020, DOT filed the Preliminary Objections to the 

Amended Complaint on substantially the same grounds as the preliminary objections 
6

to Coppola’s original complaint, arguing that the Amended Complaint, inter alia, 

was virtually identical to the original complaint that was previously determined to 

lack merit, and that the Amended Complaint failed to state a valid claim against 

DOT because DOT was immune from suit.

4 DOT added a request that the trial court 

dismiss Coppola’s Amended Complaint with prejudice. On December 18, 2020, 

Coppola filed preliminary objections to DOT’s Preliminary Objections.

On February 12, 2021, DOT filed a praecipe for the trial court to rule 

on the Preliminary Objections and Coppola’s preliminary objections thereto. On 

March 23, 2021, Coppola also filed a praecipe for the trial court to rule on the 

Preliminary Objections. On May 13, 2021, the trial court sustained DOT’s 

Preliminary Objections and dismissed Coppola’s Amended Complaint with 

prejudice. Coppola appealed to this Court.5 

On August 13, 2021, the trial court directed Coppola to file a Concise 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) (Rule 

1925(b) Statement). Coppola filed his Rule 1925(b) Statement on August 26, 2021. 

See Coppola Br. Attachment D. On October 20, 2021, the trial court filed its opinion 

pursuant to Rule 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion). See Coppola Br. Attachment F. 

Discussion

In reviewing preliminary objections, the [C]ourt must 

accept well-pleaded facts as true. Preliminary objections 

are only sustained in cases that are free from doubt and 

when it appears with certainty that the law permits no 

recovery under the allegations made. A preliminary 

objection in the nature of a demurrer presents a question 

4

“Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which ordinarily should be raised as new 

matter, but may be raised in preliminary objections when to delay a ruling thereon would serve no 

purpose.” Stackhouse v. Pa. State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 60 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

5

“Our review of a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing a 

complaint determines whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.” 

Circle of Seasons Charter Sch. v. Nw. Lehigh Sch. Dist., 273 A.3d 23, 28 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
7

of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.

Circle of Seasons Charter Sch. v. Nw. Lehigh Sch. Dist., 273 A.3d 23, 28 n.7 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2022) (citations omitted).

Preliminarily, in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court declared:

Coppola failed to provide a concise statement as defined 

under [Rule] 1925[(b)]. The [Rule 1925(b)] Statement is 

void of structure, clear statements of errors, and case law 

support for his position.

To the extent possible, the trial court has gleaned from the 

“[Rule 1925(b) S]tatement” that Coppola avers the [trial 

c]ourt erred when it,

1. violated to [sic] Code of Conduct for Judges and 

showed actual bias, discrimination, prejudice, 

impropriety, or lack of impartiality in deciding this 

case;

2. abused its discretion and prejudiced Coppola in 

failing to hold hearings remotely;

3. issued a final order before Coppola completed 

discovery; [and]

4. sustained []DOT’s Preliminary Objections to 

Coppola’s Amended Complaint.

. . . .

. . . First, this [trial c]ourt must address the following 

issues which are potentially fatal to this appeal[: sovereign 

immunity, one basis on which the trial court had 

previously determined that Coppola’s original complaint 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted].

Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op. at 4.

Coppola argues that the trial court erred, abused its discretion, denied 

Coppola’s due process rights and his right to access the courts, and prejudiced him 

by sustaining DOT’s boilerplate and unsupported Preliminary Objections and 
8

dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice in the face of DOT’s admission 

of fault and liability.

In the Amended Complaint, as in his original complaint, Coppola 

asserted that, despite his representation that his check was collectable because his 

bank branch had not been sold, DOT willfully refused to respond to his requests for 

DOT to correct its error or provide him with a copy of the check so he could resolve 

the issue, declared that DOT had not made an error, and issued the Official Notice 

suspending his registration. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 4-9 (S.R.R. at 142b-143b). 

Coppola contended that DOT’s refusal to conduct a simple investigation was 

negligent, wrongful, and an abuse of power. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 23-27

(S.R.R. at 148b-150b). Coppola avowed that “[]DOT chose to maliciously prosecute 

and punish [Coppola] with [its] suspension with the clear intent to damage and harm 

[Coppola].” Amended Complaint ¶ 26 (S.R.R. at 149b-150b). Coppola also 

declared that DOT’s refusal to respond to his discovery requests was an effort to 

conceal its abhorrent and illegal conduct. See Amended Complaint ¶ 21 (S.R.R. at 

145b). Finally, Coppola also averred that sovereign immunity does not shield DOT 

from liability for willful misconduct, fraud, or malice, particularly when DOT 

admitted fault. See Amended Complaint ¶ 28 (S.R.R. at 150b-151b).

1. Sovereign Immunity 

In the Preliminary Objections, DOT challenged Coppola’s Amended 

Complaint, inter alia, on the basis that DOT enjoys immunity from his claims. 

Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution declares:

All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done 

him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have 

remedy by due course of law, and right and justice 

administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be 

brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in 
9

such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by 

law direct.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.

Pursuant to section 11 of [a]rticle I of the Constitution of 

Pennsylvania, it is hereby declared to be the intent of the 

General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its 

officials and employees acting within the scope of their 

duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and 

official immunity and remain immune from suit except as 

the General Assembly shall specifically waive the 

immunity. When the General Assembly specifically 

waives sovereign immunity, a claim against the 

Commonwealth and its officials and employees shall be 

brought only in such manner and in such courts and in such 

cases as directed by the provisions of Title 42 (relating to 

judiciary and judicial procedure) or 62 (relating to 

procurement) unless otherwise specifically authorized by 

statute.

1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. 

In Section 8522 of what is commonly referred to as the Sovereign 

Immunity Act,6the General Assembly expressly waived sovereign immunity for

Commonwealth parties in limited cases. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522. Section 8522 of the 

Sovereign Immunity Act provides:

(a) Liability imposed.--The General Assembly, pursuant 

to section 11 of [a]rticle I of the Constitution of 

Pennsylvania, does hereby waive, in the instances set forth 

in subsection (b) only and only to the extent set forth in 

this subchapter and within the limits set forth in [S]ection 

8528 [of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8528] (relating to 

limitations on damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to 

an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages 

arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be 

recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a 

cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not 

having available the defense of sovereign immunity.

(b) Acts which may impose liability.--The following acts 

by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of 

6

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8527.
10

liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of 

sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for 

damages caused by: (1) Vehicle liability.--The operation 

of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of a 

Commonwealth party. . . . [;] (2) Medical-professional

liability. . . . [;] (3) Care, custody or control of personal

property.--The care, custody or control of personal 

property in the possession or control of Commonwealth 

parties, including Commonwealth-owned personal 

property and property of persons held by a 

Commonwealth agency . . . [;] (4) Commonwealth real

estate, highways and sidewalks. . . . [;] (5) Potholes and

other dangerous conditions. . . . [;] (6) Care, custody or

control of animals. . . . [;] (7) Liquor store sales. . . . [;] (8)

National Guard activities. . . . [;] (9) Toxoids and

vaccines. . . . [;] [and] (10) Sexual abuse. . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 8522 (text emphasis omitted). Accordingly,

“[t]o impose liability on a Commonwealth party, (1) the

alleged negligent act must involve a cause of action that is

recognized at common law or by a statute, and (2) the case

must fall within one of [the] exceptions to sovereign

immunity listed in Section 8522(b)” of . . . the Sovereign 

Immunity Act.[7]

Young v. Wetzel, 260 A.3d 281, 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (emphasis added); see also

LaChance v. Michael Baker Corp., 869 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Bufford v.

Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 670 A.2d 751 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

Section 8501 of the Judicial Code defines “Commonwealth party” as 

“[a] Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but only with respect to an 

act within the scope of his office or employment.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. “[DOT] has 

been recognized as a Commonwealth agency for purposes of the Sovereign 

Immunity Act.” Mullin v. Dep’t of Transp., 870 A.2d 773, 779 n.4 (Pa. 2005).

7

“Because of our General Assembly’s clear intent to insulate government from exposure 

to tort liability, courts must strictly construe the exceptions to sovereign immunity.” Manning v.

Dep’t of Transp., 144 A.3d 252, 256 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). 
11

Th[erefore], when an employee of a Commonwealth 

agency, such as a [DOT] employee, is acting within the 

scope of his or her duties, the employee is shielded by the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity from liability for tort 

claims arising from negligent acts that do not fall within 

the statutory exceptions listed in Section 8522(b) of the 

Sovereign Immunity Act. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310; 42 Pa.C.S. § 

8522(a)-(b). 

Paluch v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 175 A.3d 433, 438 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

“To state a negligence claim [in the first instance], ‘the plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant 

breached that duty, the breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff 

suffered an actual loss or damage.’” Young, 260 A.3d at 289 (emphasis added) 

(quoting Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1998)). Here, while DOT’s error 

in processing Coppola’s vehicle registration check and DOT’s subsequent delay in 

recognizing the error and correcting it may have constituted a breach of a duty to 

take reasonable action in response to Coppola’s representations, nowhere in the 

Amended Complaint does Coppola claim that he was injured by the breach and/or

suffered actual loss or damage as a result.

8

 In the absence of injury caused by a 

breach and resultant actual loss or damage, Coppola did not and cannot state a valid 

common law negligence claim against DOT that would satisfy the first prerequisite

under Section 8522(a) of the Sovereign Immunity Act to defeat DOT’s sovereign

immunity defense.

9

[B]ecause [Coppola] fail[ed] to meet his initial burden of 

setting forth a cause of action for negligence against 

8 Nor could the trial court or this Court glean such damage from circumstances in which 

DOT lifted the suspension, and Coppola was not cited for the temporary, erroneous suspension.

9

See Coppola v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., State Workers’ Ins. Fund (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 693 

C.D. 2020, filed Aug. 6, 2021) (wherein this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Coppola’s 

complaint with prejudice, in part, because the complaint failed to assert any negligent act that 

would fall under Section 8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act and, thus, his tort claims were 

barred by sovereign immunity).
12

[DOT] for which damages would be recoverable, it is not 

necessary to [further] consider whether any particular 

exception to [DOT’s] immunity is applicable under the 

circumstances sub judice.

[10] See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a); see

also LaChance . . . . 

Young, 260 A.3d at 290.

Moreover, “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, sovereign immunity applies to 

negligent and intentional torts.” Flagg v. Int’l Union, Sec., Police, Fire Pros. of Am.,

Local 506, 146 A.3d 300, 309 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Specifically,

the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars intentional tort 

claims [(like malicious prosecution and willful 

misconduct)] against Commonwealth parties. See

Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2007) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s 

intentional tort claim against prison employees, reasoning 

that where “an employee of a Commonwealth agency [is] 

acting within the scope of his or her duties, the 

Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign 

immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional 

tort claims”); La Frankie v. Miklich, . . . 618 A.2d 1145, 

1149 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992) (same). 

Young, 260 A.3d at 290 n.15. Conversely, if “a Commonwealth employee was not 

acting within the scope of employment, he cannot claim the affirmative defense of 

sovereign immunity.” Schell v. Guth, 88 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). This 

Court has specifically ruled that “conduct constituting . . . actual malice or willful 

misconduct is considered to be outside [a Commonwealth] employee’s scope of 

10 Notwithstanding, Coppola did not claim in the Amended Complaint that DOT’s conduct 

fell under any of the statutory exceptions listed in Section 8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act. 

Further, strictly construing the only potentially applicable exception, “care, custody, or control of 

personal property,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3), would not apply in this case. See Bufford (wherein 

this Court concluded that, even when DOT was clearly negligent and the licensee suffered injury 

and damages as a result, DOT’s administrative error did not fall under the personal property 

exception). Thus, even if Coppola had properly pled a valid negligence claim in the Amended 

Complaint, because he did not and could not allege that DOT’s actions fell under any of the 

exceptions set forth in Section 8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act, he could not satisfy the

second waiver prerequisite. See Young; Bufford.
13

employment for immunity purposes.” Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013). Therefore, “the issue of whether [DOT’s employees were] protected by 

sovereign immunity depends on whether they were acting within the scope of their 

employment in [processing Coppola’s vehicle registration check, responding to his 

inquiries, and/or investigating the error].”11 Id. at 157.

Under Pennsylvania law, an action falls within the scope 

of employment if: (1) it is the kind that the employee is 

employed to perform; (2) it occurs substantially within the 

job’s authorized time and space limits, and; (3) it is 

motivated at least in part by a desire to serve the employer.

Flagg, 146 A.3d at 309.

Here, Coppola’s Amended Complaint specified that his references to 

DOT therein included unnamed employees who “are person(s) who acted on behalf 

of [DOT] . . . .” Amended Complaint ¶ 2. The Amended Complaint is 

devoid of any factual allegations to suggest that [DOT or 

its employees] engaged in conduct while ‘off duty’ or 

outside their obligations as employees of [DOT, nor does 

the Amended Complaint contain allegations from which 

to infer such action]. Instead, the [Amended C]omplaint 

suggests that any purported actions occurred while serving 

in their respective roles as Commonwealth employees. 

Smart v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 631 C.D. 2017, filed June 27, 2018),

12 slip 

op. at 12. Accordingly, sovereign immunity also bars Coppola’s intentional tort 

claims against DOT and/or its employees.

11 “Generally, the scope of [an employee’s] employment is a fact question for the jury. 

Where the facts are not in dispute, however, the question of whether . . . the [employee] is within 

the scope of his [] employment is for the court.” Ludwig v. McDonald, 204 A.3d 935, 943 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (quoting Ferrell v. Martin, 419 A.2d 152, 155 (Pa. Super. 1980) (citation omitted)).

12 Unreported decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited as 

persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures. 210 

Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
14

It is clear on the face of the Amended Complaint that “[e]ach of the . . .

claims that [Coppola] assert[ed] . . . are either intentional torts or they do not fall 

within the exceptions in Section 8522 of the Sovereign Immunity Act that would 

permit [Coppola] to maintain a suit against [DOT]. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b).” Paluch, 

175 A.3d at 438. Because sovereign immunity bars Coppola’s negligence, willful 

misconduct, and malicious prosecution claims against DOT, the trial court properly 

sustained DOT’s Preliminary Objections and dismissed Coppola’s Amended 

Complaint on that basis. In light of the fact that the Amended Complaint was nearly 

identical to his original complaint, and Coppola still failed to allege circumstances 

to overcome DOT’s sovereign immunity defense, the trial court properly dismissed 

the Amended Complaint with prejudice.

2. Trial Court Bias, Animus, Discrimination, and Prejudice

Coppola also contends that the trial court erred by violating the Code,

and demonstrating bias, animus, and discrimination against Coppola, who was pro 

se. In particular, Coppola points to the trial court’s refusal to permit argument by 

Zoom rather than in person, denying his right to discovery, dismissing his case with 

prejudice, and dismissing his case as frivolous.13

Preliminarily, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

Under Pennsylvania law, pro se defendants are subject to 

the same rules of procedure as are represented defendants. 

See Commonwealth v. Williams, . . . 896 A.2d 523, 534 

([Pa.] 2006) (pro se defendants are held to same standards 

as licensed attorneys). Although the courts may liberally

construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status 

confers no special benefit upon a litigant, and a court 

cannot be expected to become a litigant’s counsel or find 

13 In his brief to this Court, Coppola includes arguments regarding the conduct of the 

statutory appeal in the trial court. Because Coppola’s statutory appeal has been resolved and is 

not currently before this Court, we will not address it herein. 
15

more in a written pro se submission than is fairly conveyed 

in the pleading.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) (italics omitted); see also 

Young v. Est. of Young, 138 A.3d 78 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

Moreover, relative to Coppola’s claims that the trial court violated the 

Code, Pennsylvania courts have explained that the Code merely establishes a norm 

of judicial conduct without imposing substantive legal duties and, thus, this Court is 

not the proper forum in which to adjudicate Code violations. See Reilly by Reilly v.

Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985); see also Tindal v. Workers’ Comp.

Appeal Bd. (City of Phila.), 799 A.2d 219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

In addition, when Coppola observed circumstances under which he felt 

the trial court should have recused itself due to bias or impartiality, he was required 

to ask the trial court to do so. See Tindal, 799 A.2d at 223 (“Because recusal is a 

matter of individual discretion for a judge, a party must normally raise the issue of 

recusal before a decision has been rendered in a case or that issue will be deemed 

waived.”). Coppola does not state, nor does the record before this Court reflect, any 

instance in which Coppola made a motion for the trial court judge to recuse. By

failing to raise the issue to the trial court in the first instance, Coppola waived the 

argument. 

However, even if the issue were not waived, [Coppola] has 

failed to allege facts that would necessitate the trial judge’s

recusal. “The party who asserts a trial judge must be 

disqualified bears the burden of producing evidence 

establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating

recusal.” Commonwealth v. Druce, . . . 848 A.2d 104, 108 

([Pa.] 2004); see also Reilly by Reilly . . . . “Adverse 

rulings alone do not, however, establish the requisite bias

warranting recusal, especially where the rulings are legally 

proper.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, . . . , 720 A.2d 79, 

90 ([Pa.] 1998).

City of Phila. v. Shih Tai Pien, 224 A.3d 71, 86 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
16

Finally, Coppola argues that the trial court’s conclusion that dismissal 

of his case was also proper because it was frivolous also reflected the trial court’s 

bias. The trial court ruled: 

Coppola claims the Preliminary Objections were absurd 

and unsupported. This [trial c]ourt sustained the 

Preliminary Objections to the Amended Complaint 

because the Amended Complaint failed to address the 

legal insufficiencies of the original [c]omplaint. The 

Amended Complaint was almost identical to the original

[complaint].

Coppola’s Amended Complaint contained all the same 

claims this [trial c]ourt previously ruled upon. 

[Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule)] 233.1 

provides the following:

[Civil Rule] 233.1 addresses frivolouslitigation by 

pro se plaintiffs. The [Civil] Rule states-

(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by 

a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a 

defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action 

on the basis that:

(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or 

related claims which the pro se plaintiff 

raised in a prior action against the same or 

related defendants, and

(2) these claims have already been resolved 

pursuant to a written settlement agreement or 

a court proceeding.

(b) The court may stay the action while the motion 

is pending.

(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the 

action, the court may bar the pro se plaintiff from 

pursuing additional pro se litigation against the 

same or related defendants raising the same or 

related claims without leave of court. [Pa.R.Civ.P. 

233.1.]
17

This [trial c]ourt’s November 17, 2020[] [o]rder addressed 

Coppola’s original claims therefore, pursuant to [Civil 

Rule] 233.1, dismissal with prejudice is proper.

Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op. at 9-10.

The Comment to Civil Rule 233.1 provides:

It has come to the attention of the Supreme Court that 

certain litigants are abusing the legal system by repeatedly 

filing new litigation raising the same claims against the 

same defendant even though the claims have been 

previously adjudicated either through settlement or 

through court proceedings. New [Civil] Rule 233.1 

provides relief to a defendant [that] has been subjected to 

this type of repetitive litigation. While attorneys are 

subject to the rules of disciplinary procedure, no analogous 

rule exists to curb this type of abuse when done by a pro

se party.

Upon the filing of an action by a pro se plaintiff, a 

defendant may file a motion to dismiss a pending action 

provided that (1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same 

or related claims against the same or related defendants, 

and (2) the claims have already been resolved pursuant to 

a settlement agreement or a court proceeding. The new 

rule also gives the trial court discretion to bar the pro se

litigant from filing further litigation against the same or 

related defendants raising the same or related claims 

without leave of court.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1, Explanatory Comment (italics omitted).

Coppola refused to correct the original complaint’s infirmities with his 

Amended Complaint. He admits in his brief to this Court: “I had no obligation to 

materially change my [original c]omplaint . . . [,]” Coppola Br. at 2, and “there were 

no substantive revisions necessary to be made.” Coppola Br. at 19. Where Coppola 

admits that his Amended Complaint was substantively identical to his original 

complaint, which is precisely the circumstance that the Supreme Court intended 

Civil Rule 233.1 to ameliorate, the trial court’s determination that the Amended 
18

Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous under Civil Rule 233.1 was clearly not 

based on bias.

Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Coppola’s claims 

that the trial court violated the Code, or showed actual bias, discrimination, 

prejudice, impropriety, or lack of impartiality in deciding this case lacked merit.

3. Trial Court Hearings

Coppola further asserts that the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion, denied his due process rights and his rights to access to the courts, and 

prejudiced him by ignoring his health concerns during the COVID-19 pandemic by 

forcing him to attend hearings in person despite preexisting health conditions. 

The trial court explained:

Coppola’s claims surrounding hearing[s] . . . are irrelevant 

in this case. Coppola argues this [trial c]ourt was biased 

and prejudicial and abused it[s] discretion [by] not 

allowing him to attend hearings remotely. However, there 

were no hearings scheduled at any point in this instant 

case. Coppola may have been referring to his statutory

appeal against []DOT.

Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op. at 7. Coppola admits in his brief to this Court that the 

trial court did not conduct hearings relative to the civil proceeding, but claims “THIS 

trial court ignored [his] request for oral argument by remote [(i.e., by Zoom)],” and 

cited to Exhibit “CCA-11, Par. 4)[.]”14 Coppola Br. at 24. However, there is no 

document marked either CCA-11 or Exhibit 11 in Coppola’s Reproduced Record

(R.R.), and there is no document behind the Exhibit 11 face sheet in either the 

14 Coppola explained in his brief to this Court: “‘CCA’ Exhibit prefix denotes 

Commonwealth Court Appeal with the Exhibit number to follow. EX: ‘CCA-1’.” Coppola Br. at 

1.
19

Reproduced Record or Supplemental Reproduced Record. See R.R. at 615;15 S.R.R. 

at 122b. 

In the absence of support for Coppola’s contention that the trial court 

in this civil action refused to allow him to attend oral argument remotely, this Court 

rules that the trial court properly concluded that Coppola’s claims that it erred and 

abused its discretion by forcing him to attend hearings in person also lacked merit.

4. Pre-Trial Discovery/Dismissal With Prejudice

Coppola argues that the trial court erred, abused its discretion, denied 

him due process and discovery rights, and prejudiced him by ignoring and ultimately 

dismissing the case with prejudice before he could conduct pre-trial discovery to 

support his case, prepare for hearings and trial, and assess his monetary and other 

damages. 

The trial court expounded:

In Pennsylvania[,] the trial court is responsible for 

overseeing discovery between the parties. [See Rohm &

Haas Co. v Lin, 992 A.2d 132 (Pa. Super. 2010).] 

Pursuant to [Civil Rule] 4012, a court may, upon motion 

by a party and for good cause, “make any order which 

justice requires to protect a party or person from 

unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 

burden or expense.” [Pa.R.Civ.P. 4012.] Further, [Civil 

Rule] 4013 provides that a court may stay or halt all 

proceedings for good cause. [See Pa.R.Civ.P. 4013.]

On September 23, 2020, Coppola filed a Notice of Intent 

to Take Deposition of [DOT’s] Counsel. During this civil 

action, []DOT’s Counsel had confidential communication 

with her client through communications with []DOT’s 

15 Rule 2173 requires a reproduced record to “be numbered . . . in Arabic figures . . . 

followed in the reproduced record by a small a . . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 2173. Because Coppola’s 

Reproduced Record pages are not numbered at all, the page numbers referenced in this Opinion 

reflect electronic pagination.
20

employees. Pursuant to [Section 5928 of the Judicial 

Code,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 5928, taking an attorney’s testimony 

is prohibited if doing so would violate the attorney-client 

privilege.

On October 1, 2020, []DOT filed [the] Motion to Quash 

and for a Protective Order in response to numerous 

discovery requests. This [M]otion [to Quash] was filed 

contemporaneously with a Praecipe Under Bucks County 

Rule [of Civil Procedure [(B.C.R.C.P) No.] 208.3(b).[16]

On October 6, 2020, this [trial c]ourt issued a Rule to

Show Cause.

[FN]24 On October 7, 2020, Coppola filed an 

Answer to the Motion to Quash but failed to file the 

necessary praecipe under [B.C.R.C.P. No.] 206.4(c)(4)(a).

[FN]25

During the interim, on November 17, 2020, this [trial 

c]ourt issued an [o]rder sustaining []DOT’s [p]reliminary 

[o]bjections and permitted Coppola to file an [a]mended 

[c]omplaint within twenty (20) days. [On November 30, 

2020,] Coppola filed [the] Amended Complaint which was 

substantially the same as the original [c]omplaint. [On 

December 17, 2020,] []DOT filed [the] Preliminary 

Objections to the Amended Complaint. [On December 18, 

2020, Coppola filed preliminary objections to the 

Preliminary Objections. On February 12, 2021, DOT filed 

a B.C.R.C.P. No. 208.3(b) praecipe and, on March 23, 

2021, Coppola filed a B.C.R.C.P. No. 208.3(b) praecipe. 

On May 13, 2021, t]his [trial c]ourt issued an [o]rder 

sustaining the Preliminary Objections and dismissed the 

Amended Complaint with [p]rejudice.

The interests of justice are furthered by a court order 

barring discovery until the plaintiff’s complaint has been 

filed, the defendant’s preliminary objections to the 

plaintiff’s complaint have been resolved, and the 

defendant has filed an answer to the complaint.

16 B.C.R.C.P. No. 208.3(b)(1)(a) (Alternative Procedures) states: “Note: See B.C.R.C.P. 

No[s]. 208.3(a)(2) and 206.4(c)(4)(a).” www. 

buckscounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3552/Rule-2083b?bidId= (last visited Aug. 26, 2022). 

B.C.R.C.P. No. 208.3(a) specifies, in relevant part: “When the Court issues a rule on a motion, it 

shall be governed by the provisions of [Civil Rules] 206.5 and 206.7.” 

www.buckscounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3553/Rule-2083a?bidId= (last visited Aug. 26, 

2022).
21

Therefore, this [trial c]ourt did not deny [d]ue [p]rocess 

o[r] [p]rejudice Coppola by issuing a final [o]rder 

sustaining [the] Preliminary Objections and dismissing 

[his] Amended Complaint.

[FN]24 The Rule [to Show Cause] ordered: (2) On 

or before November 2, 2020, [] [DOT] may file a 

response to [the M]otion [to Quash]; (3) In event 

o[f] a response, the matter shall be decided under 

[Civil Rule] 206.7[17]and [B.C.R.C.P. No.] 

208.3(b); (4) All discovery and depositions shall 

cease pending disposition of this [M]otion [to 

Quash].

[FN]25 B.C.R.C.P. [No.] 206.4. When a rule is 

issued and a response is filed in opposition, the 

petition shall be submitted under B.C.R.C.P. [No.] 

208.3(b).

Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op. at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). Thus, before either party 

sought resolution of the Motion to Quash, DOT and Coppola moved for the trial 

court to rule on the Preliminary Objections, and the trial court sustained the 

Preliminary Objections, thereby rendering the discovery issue moot.

17 Civil Rule 206.7 provides:

(a) If an answer is not filed, all averments of fact in the petition may 

be deemed admitted for the purposes of this subdivision and the 

court shall enter an appropriate order.

(b) If an answer is filed raising no disputed issues of material fact, 

the court on request of the petitioner shall decide the petition on the 

petition and answer.

(c) If an answer is filed raising disputed issues of material fact, the 

petitioner may take depositions on those issues, or such other 

discovery as the court allows, within the time set forth in the order 

of the court. If the petitioner does not do so, the petition shall be 

decided on petition and answer and all averments of fact responsive 

to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer shall be deemed 

admitted for the purpose of this subdivision.

(d) The respondent may take depositions, or such other discovery as 

the court allows.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.7.
22

Further, this Court has held:

Where, as here, a defendant files preliminary objections to 

a plaintiff’s complaint in the nature of a demurrer, see

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4), the court’s review is confined to 

the content of the complaint and any attachments 

thereto. Thomas v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014). Thus, the court may determine only whether, on 

the basis of the plaintiff’s allegations, he or she possesses 

a cause of action recognized at law. Id.

Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5, by McNesby v. City of Phila., 267 A.3d 531,

541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (emphasis added). 

Coppola admits that his sole purpose for discovery was to assess his 

damages:

The simple admission of fault does not relieve []DOT of 

[its] subsequent liability from [its] admitted malicious 

prosecution of [Coppola]. What []DOT’[s] admission 

does do however is support and set the foundation for 

[Coppola’s] damage[s] claim[] which are permissible by 

Pennsylvania statute and law which was the basis for 

[Coppola’s civil action] which has been appealed herein.

Coppola Br. at 12. Although Coppola sought damages, nowhere in the Amended 

Complaint did he aver that DOT’s error caused him injury for which he could be 

entitled to damages. 

Moreover, 

[Civil] Rule 1033 . . . [, Pa.R.Civ. P. 1033,] allows a party 

to amend his or her pleadings with either the consent of 

the adverse party or leave of the court. Leave to amend 

lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and 

“the right to amend should be liberally granted at any stage 

of the proceedings unless there is an error of law or 

resulting prejudice to an adverse party.”

Werner v. Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331, 1338 (Pa. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Connor v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 461 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. 1983)). Further, one 
23

purpose of Civil Rule 233.1 is to afford trial courts “discretion to bar the pro se

litigant from filing further litigation against the same or related defendants raising 

the same or related claims without leave of court.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1, Explanatory 

Comment (italics omitted).

The trial court in the instant matter reviewed Coppola’s allegations in 

the Amended Complaint and the documents attached thereto and determined, “on 

the basis of [Coppola’s] allegations,” the Amended Complaint did not make out any 

viable claims. McNesby, 267 A.3d at 541. 

[A] court is not required to allow amendment of a pleading if 

a party will be unable to state a claim on which relief could 

be granted. See Spain v. Vicente, . . . 461 A.2d 833, 837 ([Pa. 

Super.] 1983) (trial court did not err in refusing to permit 

amendment of defamation complaint to allow more specific 

details since no formal motion to amend was ever made and 

plaintiff’s deposition militated against likelihood of 

establishing claim). Thus, [Coppola’s] claim must fail.

Werner, 681 A.2d at 1338. Accordingly, Coppola’s argument that the trial court

erroneously dismissed his claims with prejudice before he was afforded pre-trial 

discovery is meritless.

5. Service of Original Process

Finally, Coppola argues that the trial court erred, abused its discretion, 

denied Coppola’s due process rights and right to access to the courts, and prejudiced 

him by dismissing the case with prejudice despite that original service was properly 

made on DOT.

18

 However, the trial court did not specifically dismiss the Amended 

Complaint on the basis that Coppola failed to properly serve it on DOT. Moreover, 

this Court has held that an appellant waives any issue that is not included in his 

18 DOT addresses the matter extensively in its brief to the Court. See DOT Br. at 20-28. 

In his brief to this Court, Coppola argues only that he properly served his Notice of Appeal and 

Rule 1925(b) Statement on the trial court. See Coppola Br. at 19.
24

Statement of Questions Involved and addressed in the Argument portion of his brief. 

See Penn Beverage Distrib. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Rebich), 901 A.2d 

1097 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Here, Coppola’s brief did not contain a Statement of 

Questions Involved, and he states in the Argument portion of his brief only that he 

properly served his Notice of Appeal and Rule 1925(b) Statement on the trial court. 

See Coppola Br. at 19. Because Coppola failed to argue that the trial court erred by 

dismissing the case with prejudice despite that original service was properly made 

on DOT, that issue is waived.

Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard J. Coppola, Jr., :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, : No. 687 C.D. 2021

Bureau of Motor Vehicles :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 29th day of August, 2022, the Bucks County Common 

Pleas Court’s May 11, 2021 order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge