Affirmed, Motion for Rule 45 Damages Granted, Memorandum Opinion of 

December 23, 2014, Withdrawn, and Substitute Opinion filed January 22, 

2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00604-CV

MARY RIGGINS, Appellant

V.

RONALD E. HILL, LINDA C. HILL, WEST COLUMBIA PLAZA, LTD., 

AND LUCKY LINDY DEVELOPMENT, Appellees

On Appeal from the 239th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 35931

SUBSTITUTE O PINION 1

This appeal involves a challenge to an order in which the trial court enforced 

a judgment that was final by appeal. At issue is whether the trial court erred in 

determining that it lacked jurisdiction over post-mandate motions to alter the 

1 The memorandum opinion issued on December 23, 2014, is withdrawn, and this opinion is 

issued in its place to address appellees’ motion for damages under Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 45.

 
attorney’s fees awarded in the judgment, whether the trial court’s enforcement 

order was proper, and whether damages under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 

45 should be imposed against appellant’s counsel. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment and grant appellees’ motion for Rule 45 damages.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Nearly a decade ago, appellant/plaintiff Mary Riggins filed suit against 

various parties, including appellees/defendants Ronald E. Hill, Linda C. Hill, West 

Columbia Plaza, Ltd., and Lucky LindyDevelopment (hereinafter collectively the 

“West Columbia Parties”). Riggins asserted various claims against the West 

Columbia Parties, including that their failure to provide her with reasonable 

accommodations for her disability caused her to fall and suffer injuries. A few 

years later, Riggins and the West Columbia Parties entered into an agreement

under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in which they agreed to settle Riggins’s 

claims. After the parties entered into the Rule 11 agreement in May 2008, but 

before the trial court rendered judgment based on it, Riggins informed the West 

Columbia Parties that she was withdrawing her consent to the settlement 

agreement. In response, the West Columbia Parties filed a counterclaim seeking to 

enforce the settlement agreement. 

In the following year, the trial court granted the West Columbia Parties’ 

summary-judgment motion and rendered judgment enforcing the settlement 

agreement and awarding the West Columbia Parties attorney’s fees (hereinafter the 

“Judgment”). In the Judgment, signed in February 2009, the trial court awarded 

the West Columbia Parties $3,000 as “attorney’s fees and expenses for the filing 

and hearing on [their summary-judgment motion].” The trial court also awarded 

the West Columbia Parties $4,000 as additional attorney’s fees “if [Riggins] should 

appeal . . . to the Court of Appeals,” as well as $3,500 as additional attorney’s fees 

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“if [Riggins] should appeal . . . to the Texas Supreme Court.”

Riggins appealed the Judgment to this court (hereinafter the “First Appeal”).

See Riggins v. Hill, No. 14-09-00495-CV, 2011 WL 5248347, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 3, 2011, pet.denied) (mem. op.). On appeal, this court 

sustained one of Riggins’s issues, modified the Judgment to condition the award of 

appellate attorney’s fees on the West Columbia Parties’ success on appeal, and 

affirmed the Judgment as modified. See id. at *12. This court did not reverse any 

part of the Judgment or remand the case for further proceedings in the trial court. 

See id. Riggins then filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas. See 

id. at *1. The high court denied review, and this court issued its mandate. See id. 

In July 2012, Riggins filed a motion in the trial court requesting 

disbursement of the funds in the registry of the court. In her motion, Riggins

requested that the trial court order that only $3,000 of the funds be disbursed to 

counsel for the West Columbia Parties. In response, the West Columbia Parties 

filed a motion in which they requested that $10,500 plus interest be disbursed to 

their counsel based on the attorney’s fees awarded to the West Columbia Parties in

the Judgment. 

Later that year, Riggins filed a motion to transfer the case to the 239th

Judicial District Court. The West Columbia Parties did not oppose this motion, 

and the case was transferred.2

 The parties engaged in post-judgment discovery. In

late 2012 and early 2013, Riggins filed a motion for sanctions against the West 

Columbia Parties, a motion for determination of attorney’s fees and for release of 

the money in the registry of the court, and a motion for attorney’s fees (hereinafter 

collectively the “Post-Mandate Motions”). Riggins also filed a “counterclaim,”in 

which she purported to assert claims for breach of contract and intentional 

2 The propriety of this transfer is not at issue in this appeal.

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infliction of emotional distress.

In April 2013, the trial court signed an order enforcing the Judgment, as 

modified by this court, and ordering the court clerk to disburse $7,500 to counsel 

for the West Columbia Parties. In its order, the trial court also found that it did not 

have jurisdiction over Riggins’s Post-Mandate Motions. In June 2013, Riggins 

perfected an appeal from this order, which we resolve today.

II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

In six appellate issues, Riggins asserts various arguments in support of her 

contention that the trial court erred in granting the West Columbia Parties awards 

of attorney’s fees and in failing to grant her an award of attorney’s fees. Riggins 

asserts, among other things, that the trial court erred in awarding the West 

Columbia Parties attorney’s fees because (1) the West Columbia Parties were not 

prevailing parties; (2) attorney’s fees are not available for defendants in civil rights 

and torts actions and because seeking to enforce a settlement agreement did not 

change the nature of the action; (3) the West Columbia Parties’ attorneys did not 

file a brief or response in the Supreme Court of Texas; (4) awarding attorney’s fees 

for appellate work violates an indigent person’s right of access to the courts; (5) a 

Rule 11 agreement containing prospective language is not a contract; and (6) 

Riggins is entitled to attorney’s fees. 

A. Jurisdiction Over the Post-Mandate Motions

In the order from which Riggins appeals, the trial court determined that it 

lacked jurisdiction over the Post-Mandate Motions. The West Columbia Parties 

argue that the trial court was correct in making this determination. Construing 

Riggins’s appellate brief liberally, we conclude that Riggins asserts on appeal that 

the trial court had jurisdiction over the Post-Mandate Motions because the 

Judgment is void. Though Riggins’s briefing lacks clarity and precision, she

appears to be asserting that the Judgment is void because the trial court allegedly 

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erred in enforcing the Rule 11 agreement, ordering attorney’s fees, and rendering 

the Judgment.3

Jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to adjudicate a case. Reiss v. Reiss, 

118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003). If a court has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, 

an error in its resolution of the merits does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. 

See Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 443 (holding that a judgment is not void merely because 

the court erred in adjudicating the merits). Riggins does not argue that the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether to enforce the Rule 11 agreement 

and to determine whether any of the parties were entitled to attorney’s fees. 

Instead, Riggins appears to be asserting that the Judgment is void because the trial 

court allegedly made the wrong decision. Riggins has not cited any authority that 

supports this proposition. Any error by the trial court in adjudicating the merits in 

the Judgment did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to render the Judgment, 

nor did it make the Judgment void. See id. Though Riggins states in a conclusory 

manner that the Judgment is void or void ab initio, Riggins has not provided any 

analysis in support of this statement. We conclude that the Judgment is neither

void ab initio nor void.

In the remainder of her appellate brief, Riggins does not raise any other 

challenge to the trial court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the PostMandate Motions. Riggins’s argument challenging the trial court’s decision based 

on a purported lack of jurisdiction over the Post-Mandate Motions is without merit. 

To the extent that Riggins challenges the trial court’s determination that it lacked 

jurisdiction over the Post-Mandate Motions in her six appellate issues, those issues 

are overruled.

3 Riggins asserts that “[t]he judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Appellee’s [sic] counsel was in 

all things void for the foregoing referenced reasons, as well as those set out below.”

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B. Challenges to Enforcement of the Judgment

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure limit a trial court’s jurisdiction in the 

period after the trial court has rendered a final judgment. Custom Corporates, Inc. 

v. Security Storage, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2006, no pet.). After a trial court’s plenary power over a judgment expires, the 

trial court has an affirmative duty to enforce its judgment, and the trial court retains 

statutory and inherent authority to do so. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 308; In re CrowBillingsley Air Park, Ltd., 98 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. 2003); Bancorp South Bank v. 

Prevot, 256 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

But, after its plenary power over a judgment expires, the trial court may not issue 

an order that is inconsistent with the judgment or that otherwise constitutes a 

material change in the substantive adjudicative portions of the judgment. Custom 

Corporates, Inc., 207 S.W.3d at 839.

Under her third issue, Riggins argues that the West Columbia Parties are not 

entitled to attorney’s fees because they did not file a brief or a response in the 

Supreme Court of Texas. Under the language of the Judgment, as modified by this 

court in the First Appeal, the West Columbia Parties are entitled to an additional 

$4,000 in appellate attorney’s fees “if [Riggins] should appeal . . . to the Texas 

Supreme Court,” conditioned on the West Columbia Parties’ success on appeal. 

Under the unambiguous language of the Judgment, as modified by this court, the 

West Columbia Parties were not required to file a response or a brief to be entitled 

to recover these additional appellate fees. Riggins has not cited any authority in 

which a court concludes that a judgment creditor must file an appellate brief or 

response to be entitled to recover appellate attorney’s fees awarded to the judgment 

creditor, even though that condition is not contained in the judgment. Riggins has 

not shown that the trial court erred to the extent the trial court ordered the 

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disbursement of the additional attorney’s fees from the registry of the court.4

Under her first issue, Riggins also asserts that the trial court erred in 

ordering disbursement of attorney’s fees directly to the law firm representing the 

West Columbia Parties rather than to the West Columbia Parties. Riggins does not 

explain how she preserved error as to this complaint. A review of the record 

reveals that Riggins did not lay the proper predicate for appeal by voicing this 

complaint and obtaining an adverse ruling in the trial court. Therefore, Riggins

failed to preserve error as to this appellate complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); 

Gammill v. Fettner, 297 S.W.3d 792, 801–02 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2009, no pet.). This portion of her first issue is thus waived.

We have addressed all of Riggins’s appellate arguments that constitute a 

challenge to the manner in which the trial court enforced the Judgment rather than 

an attempt to relitigate the Judgment after the trial court lost plenary power over 

the Judgment. We conclude that, in these arguments, Riggins has not shown that 

the trial court erred in the manner in which it enforced the Judgment. Having 

concluded that all of Riggins’s arguments lack merit, we overrule Riggins’s 

appellate issues. 

C. Damages Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45, entitled “Damages for Frivolous 

Appeals in Civil Cases,” provides for the assessment of just damages if the court of 

appeals determines that a civil appeal is frivolous. See Tex. R. App. P. 45 (stating 

that, “[i]f the court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may—on 

motion of any party or on its own initiative, after notice and a reasonable 

opportunity for response—award each prevailing party just damages”); Hatton v. 

4 Riggins does not assert that the West Columbia Parties were not entitled to these fees because 

Riggins filed a petition for review rather than an appeal in the Supreme Court of Texas. Even if 

Riggins had made such an argument, we would conclude it lacks merit.

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Grigar, No. 14-09-00630-CV, 2011 WL 175501, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Jan. 20, 2011, no pet.) (ordering appellant and appellant’s attorney to pay 

Rule 45 damages to appellee) (mem. op.); Lookshin v. Feldman, 127 S.W.3d 100, 

107 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (ordering only appellant’s 

attorney to pay Rule 45 damages to appellee). Based on this rule, the West 

Columbia Parties have moved for just damages against Veronica L. Davis, counsel 

of record for Riggins. This court may award just damages under Rule 45 if, after 

considering everything in its file, this court makes an objective determination that 

the appeal is frivolous. Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (en banc). To determine whether an 

appeal is objectively frivolous, this court reviews the record from the viewpoint of 

the advocate and decides whether the advocate had reasonable grounds to believe 

the case could be reversed. Id. But, Rule 45 does not mandate that this court 

award just damages in every case in which an appeal is frivolous. Id. The decision 

to award such damages is a matter within this court’s discretion, which this court 

exercises with prudence and caution after careful deliberation. Id. 

In the First Appeal, Riggins had the opportunity to show that the trial court 

reversibly erred in rendering the Judgment. In that appeal, this court addressed the 

arguments that Riggins made, found merit in only one of her arguments, and 

affirmed the Judgment as modified. See Riggins, 2011 WL 5248347, at *1–12. 

The Supreme Court of Texas denied Riggins’s petition for review and motion for 

rehearing of the denial of that petition. This court issued its mandate commanding 

the trial court to observe and execute the Judgment as modified. Nonetheless, after 

issuance of this mandate, Riggins, represented by Davis, sought to relitigate the 

issues determined by the Judgment in the trial court. Riggins, through Davis, filed 

a “counterclaim,” in which Riggins purported to assert claims for breach of 

contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court signed an 

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order enforcing the Judgment, as modified by this court. In its order, the trial court 

found that it did not have jurisdiction over Riggins’s Post-Mandate Motions. 

Riggins perfected an appeal from this order.

In most of her appellate arguments, Riggins, through her counsel Davis,

seeks to relitigate the issues already resolved by the Judgment, which was final by 

appeal before Riggins perfected this appeal. Riggins has not shown, and the record 

does not reflect, any reasonable ground for concluding that the Judgment is void. 

Riggins has not made any other argument that, if successful, would allow her to 

obtain relief inconsistent with the Judgment, as modified by this court. As to 

Riggins’s challenges to the enforcement of the Judgment as modified by this court, 

the record does not show any reasonable ground for concluding that the West 

Columbia Parties were required to file a response or a brief to be entitled to recover 

the appellate fees awarded in that judgment. Nor does the record reveal any

reasonable ground for concluding that Riggins preserved error in the trial court 

regarding her other challenge to the enforcement of the Judgment as modified. 

The West Columbia Parties filed a Rule 45 motion asking this court to assess 

against Davis more than $54,000 in damages. At no time during the pendency of 

this appeal has Davis or Riggins filed any response in opposition to this motion. 

Nor has either Riggins or Davis undertaken to refute the stated reasons for the Rule 

45 damages sought, though each has had ample notice of the relief sought and 

opportunity to be heard. Considering everything in this court’s file and reviewing 

the record from the viewpoint of Davis, Riggins’s attorney, we conclude that Davis 

had no reasonable grounds to believe that the case could be reversed. Accordingly,

we make an objective determination that this appeal is frivolous. See Glassman, 

347 S.W.3d at 782–83. We also conclude that the West Columbia Parties should 

be awarded Rule 45 damages against Davis. See id.; Hatton, 2011 WL 175501, at 

*3; Lookshin, 127 S.W.3d at 107. 

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The West Columbia Parties seek damages based upon the attorney’s fees and 

expenses they have incurred since the trial court rendered the Judgment. Although 

Rule 45 does not prescribe a method for determining the amount of the “just 

damages,” courts have awarded just damages based on proof of expenditures 

incurred by the appellee as a result of the frivolous appeal. See Chapman v. 

Hootman, 999 S.W.2d 118, 123–25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no 

pet.); Lookshin, 127 S.W.3d at 105-07. In this case, we conclude that just damages 

should be calculated based upon the West Columbia Parties’ attorney’s fees and 

expenses incurred as a result of this appeal. See Chapman, 999 S.W.2d at 123–25; 

Lookshin, 127 S.W.3d at 105-07. Therefore, we calculate just damages based on 

the West Columbia Parties’ attorney’s fees and expenses in this case from the point 

Riggins perfected appeal in June 2013. The West Columbia Parties have submitted 

uncontroverted proof of reasonable attorney’s fees during this period in the amount 

of $12,175.50 and of $161.28 in expenses, for a total of $12,336.78.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order. In addition, under Rule 45, we order 

Veronica L. Davis to pay the West Columbia Parties $12,336.78 in just damages.5

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Wise.

5 The West Columbia Parties have not asked that Riggins be ordered to pay any damages under 

Rule 45, and we do not order Riggins to pay any Rule 45 damages.

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