United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-1562 

IN RE: JOSÉ DE JESÚS GONZÁLEZ; NIXSA GARCÍA REYES, 

Debtors 

-------------------- 

SITKA ENTERPRISES, INC.; BERRIOS & LONGO LAW OFFICE, P.S.C.; 

FERNANDO E. LONGO QUINONES, 

Appellants, 

v. 

WILFREDO SEGARRA MIRANDA; MRS. JANE SEGARRA 

and their conjugal partnership; V.B. RENTAL, INC.; 

VDJ LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, S.E.; BANCO POPULAR DE 

PUERTO RICO; JOSÉ DE JESÚS GONZÁLEZ; XYZ INSURANCE; 

UNKNOWN COLLABORATORS; JOHN DOE COMPANY; JOHN DOE; 

UNKNOWN INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Lynch and Thompson, Circuit Judges. 

 
Edilberto Berríos Pérez on brief for appellants. 

 Eldia M. Díaz-Olmo on brief for appellees. 

July 31, 2015 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Appellants purport to appeal in 

order to reverse a bankruptcy court's denials of their motion for 

a jury trial and motion to remand to state court. We conclude we 

have no jurisdiction because the bankruptcy court's orders were 

not final, as the district court also found, and so we dismiss the 

appeal. 

The bankruptcy case of which this proceeding is a part 

began in 2002, when debtors José De Jesús González and Nixsa García 

Reyes filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in 

bankruptcy court in the District of Puerto Rico. The case was 

later converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. A decade later, in 

2012, the appellants, to whom we will refer collectively as Sitka, 

filed a complaint in Arecibo Superior Court in Puerto Rico against 

the Trustee in bankruptcy, Wilfredo Segarra Miranda, and other 

defendants. Segarra removed the state case to the bankruptcy court 

on the ground that it was "a core proceeding that arises in" the 

bankruptcy case for which he was Trustee. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 157(b)(2), 1334(b), 1452(a). 

Once in bankruptcy court, Sitka filed two motions 

relevant here: a motion for a jury trial and a motion requesting 

remand to Arecibo Superior Court. The bankruptcy court denied 

both motions in two separate orders issued on February 20, 2013.
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Sitka separately appealed each of the February 20 denial 

orders to the district court. The appeal from the denial of the 

motion for a jury trial was assigned docket number 13-1288, and 

the appeal from the denial of the request for remand was assigned 

docket number 13-1289. The district court consolidated the two 

cases, along with a third case, and directed that all filings be 

made under No. 13-1288. 

On March 31, 2014, the district court dismissed the 

appeals in No. 13-1288 and No. 13-1289, holding that it lacked 

jurisdiction because both of the underlying bankruptcy court 

orders were non-final. Two days later, the court entered judgment 

in each case.1

On May 1, 2014, Sitka filed a notice of appeal to this 

court in No. 13-1288, but not in No. 13-1289. The notice purports 

to appeal "from the Opinion and Order and Judgment . . . dated 

March 31, 2014 . . . dismissing the appeal filed under Civil No. 

13-1288 as the order denying remand and the request for jury trial 

are allegedly interlocutory non-final order[s]."

Sitka's brief is nearly incomprehensible. Its primary 

arguments appear to be (1) the bankruptcy court should have 

 1 Because judgment entered on April 2, 2014, Sitka's May 

1, 2014, notice of appeal was filed on the 29th day of the 30-day 

appeal period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), 26(a)(1)(A). 

Segarra's argument that we should dismiss these appeals as untimely 

is without merit. 
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remanded the case to the Arecibo Superior Court pursuant to the 

mandatory abstention provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), and (2) 

the bankruptcy court erred in denying the motion for a jury trial. 

Sitka makes no meaningful effort to address the jurisdictional 

issues that prompted the district court to dismiss the appeal, 

even though it has an obligation to do so. See United States v. 

Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 777 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 

Calderón-Serra v. Wilmington Trust Co., 715 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 

2013)). Segarra argues (1) our review must be limited to the 

district court's decision as to the motion for a jury trial,2 and 

(2) the district court lacked jurisdiction over Sitka's appeal 

from the bankruptcy court's denial of that motion, so we 

necessarily lack jurisdiction over the appeal from the district 

court.

We move to the second issue. Even if we construe the 

notice of appeal to properly raise both the denial of the motion 

for a jury trial and the denial of the motion to remand to state 

court, but cf. Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 

 2 Segarra devoted a substantial portion of his brief to 

the technical argument that Sitka did not appeal the denial of the 

remand motion in No. 13-1289 because it only filed a notice of 

appeal in No. 13-1288. Neither party acknowledged the existence 

of the district court's post-consolidation requirement that all 

filings be made in No. 13-1288, much less discussed that order's 

impact, if any, on Sitka's perfection of its appeal. 
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929-30 (1st Cir. 2014), the outcome of this case is the same. We 

lack jurisdiction and so must dismiss the appeal. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), district courts "have 

jurisdiction to hear appeals [] from final judgments, orders, and 

decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges." Courts of Appeals, in turn, 

"have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, 

orders, and decrees entered under" § 158(a). 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 

"'For purposes of § 158(d), a determination of the district court 

is not final unless the underlying order of the bankruptcy court 

is final.'" Lurie v. Blackwell (In re Popkin & Stern), 105 F.3d 

1248, 1250 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Flor v. BOT Fin. Corp. (In re 

Flor), 79 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1996)); accord Watson v. Boyajian 

(In re Watson), 403 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005); In re Am. Colonial 

Broad. Corp., 758 F.2d 794, 800-01 (1st Cir. 1985). 

The question for us, then, is whether the bankruptcy 

court's denials of Sitka's motion for a jury trial and motion to 

remand to state court were final orders which can be appealed to 

this court. "'[F]or a bankruptcy court order to be final within 

the meaning of § 158(d), the order need not resolve all the issues 

raised by the bankruptcy; but it must completely resolve all of 

the issues pertaining to a discrete claim, including issues as to 

proper relief.'" 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[1][b] (16th ed. 

2015) (quoting Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. 
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Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated Res., Inc.), 3 F.3d 49, 53 

(2d Cir. 1993)); see also In re Am. Colonial, 758 F.2d at 801. In 

other words, within each discrete adversary proceeding in a 

bankruptcy, "ordinary concepts of finality apply," meaning that 

"orders in which the merits are not determined" are generally not 

final. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[1][b], [5]. 

Under this standard, it is clear that "[t]he bankruptcy 

court order denying [Sitka's] demand for a jury trial is not a 

final order." In re Popkin, 105 F.3d at 1250. That order did not 

resolve the merits of the adversary proceeding between Sitka and 

Segarra. Indeed, the Supreme Court has squarely held that "an 

order denying a demand for trial by jury in a federal court" is 

not a final order and hence is not immediately appealable. City 

of Morgantown, W. Va. v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 255-59 

(1949). 

The bankruptcy court's order refusing to remand the case 

to state court was likewise not final. Under the general federal 

removal statute, this circuit treats an order refusing remand to 

state court in a diversity case as a non-final interlocutory order 

which is not immediately appealable. BIW Deceived v. Local S6, 

Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 132 F.3d 824, 829 

(1st Cir. 1997). Other courts have reached the same conclusion in 

bankruptcy as to a refusal to abstain under § 1334(c)(2), noting 
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that such a refusal "d[oes] not 'end[] the litigation on the merits 

and leave [] nothing for the court to do but execute the 

judgment.'" Beightol v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., 354 F.3d 187, 189 

(2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.) (second and third alterations in 

original) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 

(1978)); accord Schuster v. Mims (Matter of Rupp & Bowman Co.), 

109 F.3d 237, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Krasnoff v. Marshack 

(In re Gen. Carriers Corp.), 258 B.R. 181, 187 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 

2001) (collecting cases). We agree. A refusal to abstain "merely 

determine[s] where the case w[ill] be adjudicated; it d[oes] not 

resolve any of the substantive issues raised in the lawsuit." 

Beightol, 354 F.3d at 189; see also 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 

¶ 5.08[5] (noting that "orders in which the merits are not 

determined" are generally not final).3

 3 One tersely-reasoned decision of a Tenth Circuit 

bankruptcy appellate panel has concluded that a bankruptcy court's 

refusal to abstain and remand represents an immediately appealable 

collateral order. See Personette v. Kennedy (In re Midgard Corp.), 

204 B.R. 764, 768-69 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997). Here, Sitka does 

not even cite that case, which is against the clear weight of 

authority among circuit courts. Sitka has failed to sufficiently 

develop an argument for why the district court's order at this 

interlocutory stage is immediately appealable. In its brief, Sitka 

almost exclusively attacks the merits of the district court's 

abstention decision. On the jurisdictional question, the brief 

merely asserts that a bankruptcy court's decision not to abstain 

is "immediately appealable" and incomprehensibly cites to an array 

of cases without making any effort to explain how those cases would 

apply to allow an immediate appeal. Accordingly, any contrary 

argument here is waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 

1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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We therefore lack jurisdiction over the district court's 

dismissal of Sitka's appeal of the bankruptcy court orders. See 

In re Popkin, 105 F.3d at 1250; In re Am. Colonial, 758 F.2d at 

803. 

We comment, however, that the district court's 

conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the 

bankruptcy court's orders themselves were not final was plainly 

correct. 

We also note that the district court held in No. 10-1847 

(one of Sitka's many bankruptcy appeals related to this action), 

that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Stern v. Marshall, 

131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the bankruptcy court could not adjudicate 

the Trustee's fraudulent conveyance claim against Sitka. Sitka 

appears to argue that, in doing so, the district court held that 

the court lacks "jurisdiction" over the fraudulent conveyance 

action and that it must be dismissed, barring removal of Sitka's 

lawsuit at issue in this case challenging the Trustee's actions in 

pursuing that fraudulent conveyance claim. Without expressing any 

view as to the merits of the district court's Stern analysis, we 

emphasize that we read the district court to have held only that 

the underlying fraudulent conveyance claim must be heard by the 

district court (an Article III court), and not that there is a 

lack of federal jurisdiction here. Despite the district court's 
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urging, it is not clear from the record whether any party has filed 

a motion for withdrawal of the reference to the bankruptcy court. 

See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5011. It may be that the bankruptcy court 

is proceeding to consider the claim and issue proposed findings of 

fact and conclusions of law, which the district court would review 

de novo. That course would be permissible. See Exec. Benefits 

Ins. Agency v. Arkinson, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2170 (2014). 

Alternatively, the parties could consent to have the claim decided 

by the bankruptcy court. See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. 

Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015). In the course of considering 

this removed action on remand, the bankruptcy court, in 

consultation with the parties, is of course free to clarify the 

posture of the Trustee's fraudulent conveyance claim. 

We warn appellants about taking frivolous appeals and 

filing briefs which are nearly incomprehensible and fail to 

meaningfully address the pertinent issues. Should such conduct 

continue, it will be sanctioned. Costs are awarded to the Trustee. 

Dismissed.