[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-11606

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00936-CEM-TBS

WILLIAM A. WHITE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM BERGER, SR., 

ERIC THOMPSON, 

DONALD ESLINGER, 

RONALD SHAW, 

SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, 

 Defendants - Appellees,

JOSEPH KLINGER, et al.,

 Defendants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(September 15, 2017)

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Before HULL, WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

William White, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of 

his claims that defendants William Berger, Sr., Eric Thompson, Donald Eslinger, 

Ronald Shaw, and Seminole County, Florida violated his constitutional rights by 

confining him in unduly harsh isolation conditions. On appeal, White argues that 

the district court erred in dismissing his claims against Berger and Thompson on 

qualified immunity grounds, against Seminole County for failure to adequately 

plead municipal liability, and against Eslinger and Shaw for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. After careful review, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment with regard to Berger, Thompson, and Seminole County, but vacate the 

judgment as to Eslinger and Shaw.

I. BACKGROUND

White is a federal inmate who was previously incarcerated at the John E. 

Polk Correctional Facility (the “prison”) in Seminole County, Florida. The prison

is owned and operated by Seminole County. White filed suit against two United 

States Marshals (defendants Berger and Thompson), two Seminole County law 

enforcement officials (defendants Eslinger and Shaw), and Seminole County itself, 

alleging that he was subject to inhumane and unconstitutional conditions of 

confinement while he was held in isolation at the prison. According to White’s 

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third amended complaint (the “complaint”), although he was a federal inmate for 

whom the U.S. Marshals were responsible, he was placed at the prison under a 

contract between the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) and Seminole 

County. 

White alleged that he was placed in an isolation unit at the prison after he 

declined a plea offer in a pending criminal matter. According to the complaint, 

White’s first isolation cell was 7 feet by 7 feet, had an open sewage drain in the 

floor that functioned as a toilet, and was continuously filmed by a video camera 

that broadcast live footage of the cell to a public area of the facility at all times, 

even when White was using the sewage drain. The cell contained a bed made of 

cinderblock, had no windows, and was growing mold. It also featured two 

painfully bright double-bulbed lights that were left on 24 hours a day. While in 

isolation, White was permitted no more than three hours of outside recreation and

only two showers each week. He would go weeks or months without a shave or 

haircut.

White further alleged that he spoke to Shaw seeking to remedy his harsh 

confinement conditions. Shaw informed him that Berger and Thompson were 

directing him, Eslinger, and Seminole County to maintain those conditions. 

Thompson, by contrast, told White’s attorney that Eslinger, Shaw and the County 

were in control of White’s treatment. After receiving disciplinary action for 

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calling his housing conditions stupid, White was transferred to a new cell and 

threatened by a corrections officer who drew a taser, threatened to torture White, 

and made sexual threats. The corrections officer was suspended for two weeks as a 

result of these acts.

White alleged that as a result of this mistreatment, he rapidly lost weight (51 

pounds in total), suffered physical pain in his head and eyes, and was unable to 

sleep. He was unable to eat or drink water for a week. At one point, he was 

transferred to a medical unit, where he was advised that he may have suffered 

kidney and liver damage. White also developed rickets, which caused chips to fall 

off his teeth as a result of a lack of exposure to sunlight. The medical staff advised 

corrections officers that the conditions in the isolation units were endangering his 

health, but the prison staff only intensified their torture of White when he returned. 

White was thereafter denied all outside recreation and ability to communicate with 

counsel. In total, White was in isolation for six months before being transferred 

out. 

Also, according to the complaint, Berger, the U.S. Marshal for the Middle 

District of Florida, was aware of conditions in the isolation units because the

USMS contracted with Seminole County for the housing of federal prisoners at the 

facility. In addition, Berger was aware of the conditions because White sent 

Berger a letter informing him of them. White further alleged that Thompson, the 

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Supervising Deputy U.S. Marshal for the Orlando office, was “personally aware” 

of the isolation conditions and “personally direct[ed], in conjunction with the other 

defendants, that . . . [White] be housed” in those conditions. Third Amended 

Compl., Doc. 79 at 8.1

 Eslinger, the Sheriff of Seminole County, “personally 

authorized both the [isolation] conditions . . . and, the infliction of those conditions 

specifically upon [White].” Id. Shaw, the Captain in charge of security at the 

facility, “personally discussed and reached an agreement with [] Eslinger and [] 

Thompson to” subject White to harsh conditions, and Shaw “personally committed 

and directed others” to do so. Id. According to the complaint, Shaw explicitly 

discussed his role in White’s treatment with White. 

White filed suit against Berger, Thompson, Eslinger, Shaw, and Seminole 

County, alleging that his conditions of confinement violated the First, Fourth, 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. White’s First Amendment 

claims were based on a conversation in which Shaw allegedly told White that he 

was being mistreated because of his “First Amendment speech associations, and/or 

religious views.” Id. at 10. The district court treated the pro se claims against 

Berger and Thompson as though they were raised under Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), while treating the remaining claims as though 

they were raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed with 

 1 Citations to “Doc. __” refer to numbered docket entries in the district court record in 

this case.

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prejudice the claims against Berger, Thompson, and Seminole County for failure to 

state a claim, and dismissed without prejudice the claims against Eslinger and 

Shaw for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prisoner Litigation 

Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e.

2

 White now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss de novo. 

MSP Recovery, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 835 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2016). In 

doing so, we accept the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 

693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).

We review de novo a district court’s interpretation and application of the 

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th 

Cir. 2015). We review the district court’s factual findings regarding exhaustion for 

clear error. Id. A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if this court, after 

reviewing all of the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1377 (11th Cir. 2008).

 2 The facts relevant to White’s efforts to exhaust administrative remedies are discussed in 

Section III.C, infra.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against Berger and Thompson

In Bivens, the Supreme Court determined that federal officials may be sued 

directly under the Constitution for violations of an individual’s constitutional 

rights. 403 U.S. at 397. Like state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal 

officials sued under Bivens may raise the defense of qualified immunity. See 

Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 1998). In determining 

whether government officials acting in their discretionary capacity are entitled to 

qualified immunity, we ask whether the officials violated “clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 

Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The district court granted qualified immunity to Berger and Thompson on 

White’s Bivens claims because White failed to plead their personal participation in 

any violation of his constitutional rights. On appeal, White does not argue that he 

properly pled Berger and Thompson’s personal participation in his mistreatment; 

instead, he argues that Bivens permits claims against federal officials analogous to 

claims against individuals raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which does not require 

that defendants have personally participated in constitutional violations. In 

White’s view, the district court should not have dismissed his claims against 

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Berger and Thompson because he adequately pled their neglect in preventing the 

alleged conspiracy, a claim under § 1986. For the reasons that follow, we 

disagree.3

Section 1986 provides:

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs 

conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are 

about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in 

preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if 

such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or 

his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, 

which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented.

Section 1986 claims are derivative of claims raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 

permitting liability against individuals who are aware of—but did not participate 

in—a conspiracy prohibited by § 1985, and failed to take action to stop the 

conspiracy. Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Section 1985(3)—the portion of § 1985 that most closely tracks White’s 

allegations—in turn prohibits “two or more persons” from conspiring to “depriv[e], 

either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection 

of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” For a 

 3 Berger and Thompson argue that White has waived his § 1986 argument by failing to 

raise it in the district court. While White did not specifically identify § 1986 in his response to 

Berger and Thompson’s motion to dismiss, he did assert that Berger and Thompson had personal 

knowledge of a conspiracy to confine him in unconstitutional conditions and failed to take any 

action to relieve those conditions. Construing White’s pro se response liberally, as we must, we 

find that White’s argument below is sufficiently similar to the kind of liability envisioned by 

§ 1986 that he has not waived his argument for purposes of this appeal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

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conspiracy to be actionable under § 1985(3), it must “be motivated by some racial, 

or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Park, 120 

F.3d at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Assuming for purposes of this case that Bivens permits § 1986 analogue 

claims, we conclude that White has not stated such a claim because he has not 

adequately pled that his treatment was motivated by racial or other class-based 

animus. Id. Section 1985(3) does not permit liability for conspiracies based on 

any discriminatory motive. Rather, it protects individuals from conspiracies to 

harm them motivated by their membership in “classes having common 

characteristics of an inherent nature—i.e., those kinds of classes offered special 

protection under the equal protection clause.” Childree v. UAP/GA CHEM, Inc., 

92 F.3d 1140, 1147 (11th Cir. 1996). Liability under § 1985(3) requires 

“something more” than the plaintiff’s membership in a “group of individuals who 

share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors.” Bray 

v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993).

The complaint makes only a conclusory allegation that White was subjected 

to harsh conditions in the isolation unit because of his political speech and 

religious views. While § 1985(3) may protect against conspiracies motivated by 

religious discrimination, White has not plausibly pled that he was mistreated based 

on his religion. The complaint does not even identify the religious beliefs that 

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supposedly resulted in White’s mistreatment, nor does it identify any individuals 

who harbored animus against him for his religious beliefs. White’s only factual 

allegation with regard to religious discrimination is that Shaw told him that he was 

being treated as he was “in part” because of his “First Amendment speech 

associations, and/or religious views.” Third Amended Compl., Doc. 79 at 10. 

With regard to religious discrimination, the complaint lacks “facial plausibility” 

because it does not contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Because White has not adequately pled the existence of a conspiracy to harm 

him cognizable under § 1985(3), his assertion that he has adequately pled a § 1986 

analogue claim under Bivens—to the extent such a claim is even permitted—fails. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of his claims against Berger and 

Thompson.

B. Claims Against Seminole County

White next challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claims against 

Seminole County. Claims brought under § 1983 are subject to limitations on 

municipal liability. Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 

2016). Municipal liability under § 1983 obtains only where “the municipality has 

officially sanctioned or ordered” the constitutional violation at issue. Id. (internal 

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quotation marks omitted). A municipality may be liable for an official policy 

enacted by its legislative body, or where its policymakers have acquiesced in a 

longstanding standard operating procedure, or where an entity with “final 

policymaking authority” ratifies the unconstitutional decision of a subordinate. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Although a plaintiff need not identify a final 

policymaker at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must “allege a policy, practice, or 

custom of the [municipality] which caused” the constitutional violation. Id. at 

1280.

The district court dismissed White’s claims against Seminole County 

because the complaint did not allege any “policy, practice, or custom” that resulted 

in White’s mistreatment. On appeal, White argues that he was not required to 

plead a “policy, practice, or custom” of the County because his mistreatment was 

the natural consequence of the County’s construction of a prison containing 

isolation cells with no windows, bright lights that could not be turned off, sewage 

drains in lieu of toilets, and a video camera system that broadcast the cells to the 

public. There are, however, no exceptions to the “policy, practice, or custom” 

requirement for municipal liability. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 483 (1986) (“We hold that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—

and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from 

among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing 

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final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”). However, a singular 

action taken by a government official can constitute an official policy giving rise to 

municipal liability if the official has final policymaking authority for the 

municipality. See, e.g., id.

Reframed properly, then, White’s argument is that the County’s construction 

of the isolation chambers itself was an official government policy that caused a 

violation of White’s constitutional rights. The problem with White’s argument is 

that—even assuming the decision to construct the isolation chambers was made by 

an individual with final policymaking authority—the complaint does not suffice to 

meet the strict causation standard applicable in municipal liability cases. “Where a 

claim of municipal liability rests on a single decision, not itself representing a 

violation of federal law and not directing such a violation, the danger that a 

municipality will be held liable without fault is high.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. 

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 408 (1997). A plaintiff must, therefore, allege that his injury 

“flows from the municipality’s action, rather than from some other intervening 

cause.” Id. at 409. To prevent municipal liability “from collapsing 

into respondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link between the 

policymaker’s [allegedly] inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged.” 

Id. at 410.

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Here, mere construction of the isolation units is insufficient to support a 

claim of municipal liability. Legitimate law enforcement functions support 

virtually all of the cells’ features. The presence of a camera in the cells and the 

need for constant lighting, for example, can be important for the prison to monitor 

particularly dangerous inmates at all hours. See, e.g., Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 

1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that placement of plaintiffs in solitary 

confinement with no outdoor exercise time, though harsh, was a rational and 

constitutional “response to the substantial threat posed by the plaintiffs”). 

Although we have concerns about White’s allegations, which we must take as true

at this stage of the proceedings, that his cell was being broadcast to a public area of 

the prison, the complaint contains no facts suggesting that those broadcasts were a 

function of the prison’s construction. Liberally construing White’s pleadings, then,

the crux of his claims is that these conditions were gratuitously imposed upon him 

even though he posed none of the risks the isolation units might have been

designed to contain and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the 

harmful effects isolation had on him. As alleged, the “moving force” behind the 

alleged constitutional deprivation was not the construction of the isolation cells—

the features of which may well have had legitimate purposes—but was instead the 

decision of certain individuals to use the isolation cells to inflict extreme and 

unnecessary punishment on White. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 

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694 (1978). The district court therefore properly dismissed White’s claims against 

Seminole County.

C. Claims Against Eslinger and Shaw

Finally, the district court dismissed White’s claims against Eslinger and 

Shaw for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the PLRA, a prisoner 

may not file a § 1983 action “until such administrative remedies as are available 

are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). When a state provides a grievance 

procedure for prisoners, an inmate alleging that he has suffered from illegal prison 

conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under the 

state’s procedure before pursuing a § 1983 suit. Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1210. 

Under the PLRA, an inmate must properly exhaust administrative remedies, 

meaning he must comply with the “critical procedural rules” governing the 

grievance process. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a remedy 

must be “available” before it must be exhausted, and to be available, a remedy 

must be “capable of use for the accomplishment of [its] purpose.” Id. (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is 

treated as a matter in abatement, and deciding such a motion is a two-step process: 

First, if the court determines from the plaintiff’s version of the facts that the 

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his remedies, then the case must be dismissed. Id.

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Second, if the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step, then the court 

must make specific findings to resolve the disputed factual issues related to 

exhaustion. Id. Once the court makes such findings, it then decides whether the 

prisoner has exhausted available administrative remedies.4

 Id. The burden of 

proving a failure to exhaust is on the defendants. Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1210.

The district court dismissed without prejudice White’s claims against 

Eslinger and Shaw for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the 

second prong of the test.

5

 The court determined that the Seminole County 

Sheriff’s Office had an inmate grievance procedure that White failed to complete. 

That procedure required inmates to submit an initial Inmate Request form 

explaining the reason for the grievance. If the inmate’s grievance was not 

resolved, the inmate was then required to submit a Request for Administrative 

Remedy form, which would be investigated by prison officials. Eslinger and Shaw 

rely upon the grievance documents found in White’s file at the prison, which 

included three initial Inmate Request forms, two complaining of his isolation and 

one complaining that he had not received a “regular shower.” Inmate Request 

 4 When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the 

court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376.

5 On appeal, Eslinger and Shaw argue that the district court also should have dismissed 

White’s complaint under the first prong of our exhaustion test. But nothing in White’s complaint 

and evidentiary submissions, standing alone, establishes that the prison had an available 

administrative remedy. Indeed, White’s Fourth Affidavit states he was told that conditions of 

confinement are not grievable. 

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Forms, Doc. 123-4. White’s file from the prison also contained a single completed 

Request for Administrative Remedy form—dated approximately ten months after 

White’s Inmate Request forms with regard to his confinement—concerning 

misplacement of a newspaper he had purchased. 

White concedes that he did not submit the necessary grievance form, but he 

contends that he was denied the forms by prison officials. He submitted affidavits 

attesting that he attempted to obtain “grievance forms” (presumably, a Request for 

Administrative Remedy form) on May 25 and again on May 26, 2014, both orally 

and in writing, but was told by a Lieutenant Heath that his condition of 

confinement issues were not “grievable,” and that he was “denied forms.” In 

another affidavit, White stated that he submitted numerous Inmate Request forms 

that were not present in the file submitted by Eslinger and Shaw, including the 

form that led to his conversation with Lieutenant Heath. That form, according to 

White, contained specific allegations about his conditions of confinement, 

including the lack of outdoor recreation, lack of routine access to showers and 

shaving materials, constant exposure to bright lights, constant video surveillance, 

the sewer drain, the lack of windows, and the lack of hot water. Indeed, the 

earliest Inmate Request form placed in the record by Eslinger and Shaw suggests 

that White had previously submitted two Inmate Request forms that are not in the 

record, noting: “This is my third form. I was told the first two were thrown out for 

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lack of a signature.” May 22 Inmate Request Form, Doc. 123-4 at 1. According to 

White, he was repeatedly denied Request for Administrative Remedy forms during

his six months in isolation. 

The district court concluded that White failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. The court determined that White’s claims that he was denied grievance 

forms were not credible because White (1) provided neither the “pertinent dates” 

on which he asked for and was denied the relevant forms, and did not identify the

“specific issues” he was told were “not grievable,” (2) did not pursue any 

administrative remedies during a several month period when he was at a different 

correctional facility, and (3) actually did file the relevant form months after his 

isolation ended when he complained about a missing newspaper. D. Ct. Order, 

Doc. 144 at 11-12. In the alternative, the district court held that even if White was 

denied access to the Request for Administrative Remedy forms prior, he could 

have filed one once the forms became available to him several months after his 

isolation ended.

The district court relied on factually incorrect or legally erroneous

considerations in determining that White failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

First, White submitted evidence of virtually all of the specific details that the 

district court said were missing. The court determined, in part, that White was not 

credible because he failed to identify the dates on which he asked for forms and 

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was denied them and the specific complaints he was told were not grievable. But 

White submitted a sworn affidavit stating that he asked for and was denied 

grievance forms on May 25 and 26, 2014, and that on May 26 Lieutenant Heath 

informed him that conditions of confinement issues were not grievable. Another of 

his affidavits indicated that the Inmate Request form that prompted White’s 

conversation with Lieutenant Heath contained the same complaints that White 

included in his letter to the U.S. Marshal. The letter to the Marshal, in turn, 

includes White’s complaints about virtually all of the conditions described in the 

complaint. The district court’s finding that White provided only “bald assertions”

because he did not specify dates or details concerning his attempts to obtain the 

relevant forms is belied by the record, and was therefore clearly erroneous.

Second, the district court’s conclusion that White failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies because he failed to pursue any after he was transferred 

out of the prison near the end of December 2014 improperly shifted the burden of 

proof. Eslinger and White bore the burden of establishing that White failed to 

exhaust his available administrative remedies. Dimanche, 783 F.3d at 1210. But 

they have failed to place in the record—nor does the record contain—any evidence 

suggesting that any administrative remedies were available to White when he was 

no longer incarcerated at the prison. The district court misapplied the law in 

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penalizing White for failing to take advantage of remedies the defendants failed to 

prove were available to him. 

Third, the district court’s alternative conclusion, that White was obligated to 

file a Request for Administrative Remedy form months after his isolation ended,

when the form became available to him while he was temporarily back at the 

prison between March and April of 2015, is also inconsistent with our law. The 

parties agree that White was removed from isolation in November 2014. The 

record shows that a Request for Administrative Remedy form became available to 

White in April 2015, when he filed such a form concerning a missing newspaper. 

The prison’s policy, however, required grievances to be filed within ten days of the 

events giving rise to the grievance. The record contained no evidence that there 

was a “good cause” exception—or any other exception—to this policy. “[A]n 

administrative procedure is unavailable when . . . it operates as a simple dead end.” 

Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016). “When the facts on the ground 

demonstrate that no [] potential [relief] exists, the inmate has no obligation 

to exhaust the remedy.” Id. Here, White had no obligation to file an out-of-time 

grievance that could not have resulted in relief, according to the prison’s policy. 

The district court therefore erred in concluding that White failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies because he did not file a grievance when the relevant form 

became available to him in April 2015.

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To be sure, the fact that White eventually filed a Request for Administrative 

Remedy form on an issue unrelated to his isolation conditions is a factor that the 

district court may determine bears on White’s credibility. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at

1377. The district court made such a determination here, and doing so was not 

error. Regardless, the district court’s order concluding that White failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies cannot be sustained based on the credibility determination 

alone because the court’s credibility finding was based on clear errors concerning 

the contents of the record. That being so, we cannot say that White’s substantial 

rights were unaffected by the district court’s errors. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. We 

therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of White’s claims 

against Eslinger and Shaw.6

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm district court’s dismissal with prejudice 

of White’s claims against Berger, Thompson, and Seminole County. We vacate 

 6 White also appeals the district court’s decision to strike for a failure to comply with 

local rules a report written by Dr. Eric Ostrov assessing White’s mental state. We need not 

decide whether the district court properly struck the report because any error was harmless and 

could not have affected White’s substantial rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. The district court 

dismissed White’s claims against Berger, Thompson, and Seminole County, and we now affirm 

that decision, on grounds wholly unrelated to the subject matter of Dr. Ostrov’s report. The only 

dispositive issue left open by this court’s decision is Eslinger and Shaw’s motion to dismiss. For 

all issues except exhaustion, that motion turns exclusively on the sufficiency of the third 

amended complaint, and Dr. Ostrov’s report has nothing to do with whether White appropriately 

exhausted administrative remedies. Hence, at this point in the case, any error in excluding Dr. 

Ostrov’s report was harmless. Moreover, White is not prohibited from re-filing Ostrov’s report 

as an exhibit to a future motion or response for which the report has relevance. 

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the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of White’s claims against Eslinger 

and Shaw.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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