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No. 19-2366 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In re: Peter Baker 

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On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 

To the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Maryland 

No. 18-cv-3309 

Hon. Peter J. Messitte

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FTC’s Opposition to Emergency Stay Motion 

Petitioner Peter Baker asks the court for an emergency stay of proceedings in the district court, including a trial scheduled to begin January 20, 

2020, pending his pro-se petition for mandamus. For the reasons that follow, 

the motion should be denied. 

Background 

Baker’s mandamus petition arises from an FTC enforcement action to 

halt a real-estate development scam known as Sanctuary Belize. Baker and 

other defendants are charged with bilking consumers of more than $100 million on false promises that empty lots in remote southern Belize were lowrisk investments in a soon-to-be-completed luxury resort development.1

 In 

 

1

 A second pro-se petition for mandamus has been filed by another defendant 

in the case, In re Andris Pukke, No. 19-2353. 
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fact, the investment was risky, the promised luxury amenities never materialized, and the development was little more than a mirage. 

The district court entered an ex-parte temporary restraining order and asset freeze in November 2018. D.Ct. Docket No. 615 at 2. The court then entered an interim preliminary injunction while the parties prepared for an evidentiary hearing held in March 2019. See id. After the hearing and posthearing briefing, the Court entered a preliminary injunction which included a 

discovery schedule and set trial to begin on January 20, 2020.2 Id. at 10-25, 

38-39. 

The Court allowed Baker (and the other defendants) to withdraw $3,000 

per month from frozen funds for living expenses. See D.Ct. Docket No. 649. 

Baker, who lives in California, sought to unfreeze an additional $50,000 to 

cover the expenses of attending the trial. He asked in the alternative to either 

transfer the case for trial in California or stay the proceedings pending his 

appeal of the preliminary injunction. D.Ct. Docket No. 655 at 4. The court 

granted the motion in part, unfreezing $30,000 “to cover travel, incidentals, 

and at least some consultations with counsel.” D.Ct. Docket No. 649 at 1. 

The court also allowed Baker to appear for a Jan. 14, 2020 pretrial confer-

 

2

 Three individual defendants, including Baker, have filed pro-se appeals 

from the preliminary injunction, FTC v. Baker (No. 19-2306), FTC v. Pukke 

(No. 19-2204), and FTC v. Chadwick (No. 19-2387). 
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ence by video, and the Commission provided him and other defendants with 

video facilities in California. See id.; D.Ct. Docket No. 768. 

Not satisfied with those accommodations, Baker filed another motion 

seeking to transfer the case to the Central District of California. See D.Ct. 

Docket No. 670. The court denied the motion, citing the reasons stated in its 

oral denial of a motion to transfer earlier in the case. D.Ct. Docket No. 675 

(citing March 1, 2019 transcript). There, the court considered the FTC’s 

choice of forum as the plaintiff, the forum’s convenience to the parties and 

the witnesses, and the interests of justice, concluding that the interest of justice favored hearing the case in Maryland. March 1, 2019 Tr. at 36-37. 

Baker now petitions the Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to transfer the proceedings below to the Central District of California and also to stay those proceedings pending its decision on the petition. 

Baker Pet. 2. On January 9, 2020, Baker filed an emergency motion to stay 

the district court proceedings pending the resolution of his mandamus petition and the Court directed the Commission to respond.3

 

 

3

 Baker states that his motion is made not only on his own behalf, but also 

“on behalf of the entities that he represents.” Stay Mot. 2. Because Baker is 

not an attorney, he may represent only himself. 
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Argument 

Baker advances one claim: that he will be denied due process if the trial 

is held in Maryland rather than California. Stay Mot. 2. He asserts that none 

of the defendants or their witnesses are from Maryland and argues that because of the asset freeze, he “does not have the resources to put on a proper 

defense across the country,” and that proceeding in Maryland will cause “extreme prejudice toward the defendants.” Id. 

That argument does not address—much less meet—the extraordinary 

showing that Baker must make to obtain a stay pending the Court’s resolution of his mandamus petition. To obtain a stay, Baker must show “(1) that 

he will likely prevail on the merits of the appeal, (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied, (3) that other parties will not be substantially harmed by the stay, and (4) that the public interest will be served by 

granting the stay.” Long v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1970). 

Baker’s motion presents a cursory argument on the merits of his mandamus petition but it does not argue that he is likely to prevail on the merits, as 

the first factor requires him to show, and it does not address the other three 

factors at all. Standing alone, Baker’s failure to address the requirements for 

the relief he seeks is reason enough to deny his stay motion. 
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Indeed, Baker’s burden on the first factor—success on the merits—is particularly high. Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary circumstances. In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing 

Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976)). It is available 

only when there are no other means by which the relief sought could be 

granted, id., and may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re Catawba 

Indian Tribe, 973 F.2d 1133, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992). The party seeking mandamus relief carries the heavy burden of showing both that (1) there is no 

other adequate means to attain the relief requested and (2) the entitlement to 

such relief is clear and undisputable. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 

449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). “In short, only exceptional circumstances amounting 

to a judicial usurpation of power will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 

2003) (cleaned up). 

Further, this Court established long ago that mandamus is almost never 

appropriate to override a district court’s decision on a motion to transfer. See 

In re Ralston Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002, 1005 (4th Cir. 1984). The transfer 

decision is “committed to the discretion of the district court,” and it therefore 

“cannot be said that a litigant’s right to a particular result is clear and undisputable,” as is required for mandamus. Id. at 1004-1005 (cleaned up). 
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In addition, because the ruling on a transfer motion can be challenged on 

appeal from a final judgment, “it is difficult to say that [the petitioner] has 

no other adequate means to attain the relief it desires.” Ralston Purina, 726 

F.2d at 1005 (cleaned up). Accordingly, to qualify as “exceptional circumstances” that would justify mandamus to review a transfer decision, the district court’s decision must go beyond “a mere abuse of discretion” and instead “amount to a ‘judicial usurpation of power.’” Id. at 1006 (quoting Allied Chemical, 449 U.S. at 35). As a result, mandamus is not appropriate 

even if the district court’s venue decision “does not withstand analysis.” Id. 

Baker’s motion does not approach the high bar set by Ralston Purina. 

Although he asserts that the District of Maryland is “the wrong Jurisdiction,” 

that it is “3000 miles away from his home,” and that he cannot “put on a 

proper defense” there, he fails to mention the substantial accommodations 

made by the district court to facilitate his meaningful participation in the trial, allowing him to use $30,000 of frozen funds to attend the trial and arranging for his remote participation in the pretrial conference. D.Ct. Docket 

Nos. 649, 768. 

Nor does he address the district court’s reasons for denying his motion to 

transfer. “District courts within this circuit consider four factors when deciding whether to transfer venue: (1) the weight accorded to plaintiff's choice of 
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venue; (2) witness convenience and access; (3) convenience of the parties; 

and (4) the interest of justice.” Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015). The 

district court considered those factors, noting that the FTC’s choice of forum 

was entitled to some weight, and while Maryland was a less convenient forum for the defendants and some witnesses, it was convenient for the FTC 

and no less convenient for witnesses who are in neither D.C. nor California. 

March 1, 2019 Tr. at 36-37. The court stated that the “key component” in its 

denial of the motion to transfer was the interest of justice, based on the overlap between the Sanctuary Belize case and a related FTC case with which it 

is consolidated, the court’s familiarity with the earlier case, and the interests 

of judicial economy that would be served by avoiding duplicative trials. Id.

at 37. Neither Baker’s emergency motion nor his petition for mandamus 

shows that the district court’s consideration of those factors was an abuse of 

discretion, much less that it was a “judicial usurpation of power.” 

Baker’s failure to show that he is likely to prevail in his petition for a writ 

of mandamus directing the district court to transfer the underlying matter to 

California is in itself fatal to his stay motion. And he has not even addressed 

the other factors required to grant a stay while the Court considers his petition. See Long, 432 F.2d at 979. The stay should therefore be denied. 
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January 15, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

 ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel 

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel 

 

s/Theodore (Jack) Metzler 

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

Attorney 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-3502 

tmetzler@ftc.gov 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on January 15, 2020, I filed the foregoing using the 

Court’s appellate CM-ECF system, and served appellant by U.S. mail at the 

following address: 

Peter Baker 

100 Lido Park Dr. #32 

Newport Beach, CA 92663 

January 15, 2020 s/Theodore (Jack) Metzler 

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

Attorney 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

 (202) 326-3502