NO. 13-16819 

(Consolidated with Nos. 13-16918, -16919, -16929, -16936, -17028 & -17097) 

In the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit

ANGEL FRALEY, et al., 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

C.M.D., et al., 

 Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

JO BATMAN, et al., 

 Objectors-Appellants, 

v. 

FACEBOOK, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM U.S. DISTR. CT. FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

(HON. RICHARD SEEBORG, U.S. DISTR. J.) 

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY 

Of Counsel: 

JESSICA RICH

 Director 

Bureau of Consumer Protection 

 March 20, 2014 

JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN

 General Counsel

JOHN F. DALY

 Deputy General Counsel for Litigation

IMAD D. ABYAD

 Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 

Washington, DC 20580 

(202) 326-2375 

iabyad@ftc.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 

INTEREST OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ........................................ 2 

STATUTORY BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 4 

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................... 6 

I. COPPA’s Express Preemption Provision Is Inapplicable ....................... 6 

II. Appellants’ State Law Claims Are Not Subject to 

 Implied Preemption ................................................................................. 8 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 13 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page

Arizona v. United States, 

 __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) ............................................................... 13 

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 

 505 U.S. 504 (1992)......................................................................................... 7 

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,

 507 U.S. 658 (1993)......................................................................................... 7 

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,

 373 U.S. 132 (1963)......................................................................................... 8 

Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 

 514 U.S. 280 (1995)......................................................................................... 9 

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 

 529 U.S. 861 (2000)......................................................................................... 8 

Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 

 575 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 7 

Hines v. Davidowitz,

 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ........................................................................................... 9 

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 

 518 U.S. 470 (1996)......................................................................................... 7 

Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm’n of City and 

 County of San Francisco, 

 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982) ............................................................................ 6 

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 

 331 U.S. 218 (1947)................................................................................. 11, 13 

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 

 537 U.S. 51 (2002) ..................................................................................... 8, 10 

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Cases (Cont’d) Page

United States v. Artist Arena LLC, 

 No. 1:12-cv-07386-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012) ........................................... 3 

United States v. Playdom, Inc., 

 No. SA-cv-11-0724 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2011) ............................................... 3 

United States v. RockYou, Inc., 

 No. 3:12-cv-01487-SI (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012) ........................................... 3 

United States v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 

 No. 08-cv-10730 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) .................................................... 3 

United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., 

 No. 06-cv-6853 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2006) ........................................... 3 

Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 

 __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) ............................................................... 10 

Wyeth v. Levine, 

 555 U.S. 555 (2009)..................................................................................... 4, 9 

Statutes & Regulations

Pub. L. 105-277, title XIII, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998) ....................................... 2 

 § 1303(d) .......................................................................................................... 7 

15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et seq. ........................................................................................... 1 

15 U.S.C. § 6501(1) ............................................................................................... 5, 7 

15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) ........................................................................................... 5, 7 

15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)........................................................................................... 2, 5 

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Statutes & Regulations (Cont’d) Page

15 U.S.C. § 6502(c) ............................................................................................... 2, 5 

15 U.S.C. § 6502(d) ........................................................................................... 5, 7, 8 

15 U.S.C. § 6504(a) ................................................................................................... 5 

15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1) ............................................................................................. 12 

15 U.S.C. § 6505(a) ................................................................................................... 2 

16 C.F.R. Part 312 .................................................................................................. 3, 5 

Miscellaneous

64 Fed. Reg. 22750 (Apr. 27, 1999) .......................................................................... 5 

64 Fed. Reg. 59888 (Nov. 3, 1999)............................................................................ 3 

67 Fed. Reg. 18818 (Apr. 17, 2002) .......................................................................... 3 

70 Fed. Reg. 21104 (Apr. 22, 2005) .......................................................................... 3 

78 Fed. Reg. 3972 (Jan. 17, 2013) ............................................................................. 3 

144 Cong. Rec. S8482 (July 17, 1998) ...................................................................... 2 

144 Cong. Rec. S11657 (Oct. 7, 1998) ................................................................ 4, 12 

S. 2326, 105th Cong. (1998) ..................................................................................... 10 

S. 2326: Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 

 Hearing before Senate Subcommittee on Communications, 

 S. Hrg. 105-1069 (Sept. 23, 1998) ....................................................... 2, 10, 11 

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Miscellaneous (Cont’d) Page

Federal Trade Commission, 

Implementing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 

 Act: A Report to Congress (February 2007) .................................................... 3 

Federal Trade Commission, 

Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (June 1998) ........................................ 2 

Protecting Children’s Privacy Under COPPA: A Survey 

 on Compliance, FTC Staff Report (April 2002) .............................................. 3 

Protecting Kids’ Privacy Online: Reviewing the COPPA Rule, 

 FTC Public Roundtable (June 2, 2010) ........................................................... 3 

The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step 

 Compliance Plan for Your Business, 

 FTC Business Guide (July 2013)..................................................................... 3 

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INTRODUCTION 

 In this case, a putative class claimed that Facebook’s program “Sponsored 

Stories”—wherein Facebook users’ names and images are allegedly deployed for 

advertisements without their consent—violates California’s privacy and unfair 

competition laws. Facebook agreed to a settlement with class counsel, but a 

number of class members objected to the terms of that settlement. They argued, 

among other things, that the settlement “does not ensure valid parental consent to a 

minor’s participation in Sponsored Stories.” Op. 12. The district court dismissed 

that objection in part because, in its view, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 

Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et seq., may “bar any efforts by plaintiffs to use 

state law to impose a parental consent requirement for minors over the age of 13.” 

Op. 13.1

 The Federal Trade Commission submits this amicus brief to oppose that 

view of federal preemption. Nothing in COPPA’s language, structure, or 

legislative history indicates that Congress intended for that law to preempt state 

law privacy protections for people outside of COPPA’s coverage, including 

teenagers. 

 

1

 “Facebook forbids children under age 13 from using its site.” Facebook, Inc.’s 

Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final 

Approval of Class Action Settlement [Dkt. #351] (hereinafter, Facebook Memo 

ISO Final Settlement) at 24. Thus, the subclass of Facebook users to whom a state 

law parental consent requirement would apply consists of teenagers. 

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INTEREST OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

 The Federal Trade Commission, an independent agency of the United States 

Government, protects consumer interests by, among other things, enforcing 

consumer protection laws and conducting studies of industry-wide consumer 

protection issues. One such study formed the basis for the legislative efforts that 

culminated in COPPA’s enactment. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy 

Online: A Report to Congress (June 1998); 144 Cong. Rec. S8482 (July 17, 1998) 

(Statement of Senator Bryan). The legislation “drew heavily from the 

recommendations and findings of the FTC’s June [1998] report on Internet 

privacy.” S. 2326: Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Hearing 

before Senate Subcommittee on Communications, S. Hrg. 105-1069 (Sept. 23, 

1998) (hereinafter Senate Hearing on COPPA) at 3 (Statement of Senator Burns).2

 Congress assigned principal responsibility for COPPA’s enforcement to the 

FTC and authorized the Commission to promulgate implementing regulations. See

15 U.S.C. §§ 6505(a), 6502(b)(1), 6502(c). Pursuant to this congressional 

mandate, the FTC has promulgated its Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule 

 

2

 COPPA was enacted as Title XIII of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 728-735 

(Oct. 21, 1998), reprinted at 144 Cong. Rec. H11240-42 (Oct. 19, 1998) (Codified 

at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506). 

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(COPPA Rule), 16 C.F.R. Part 312. See 64 Fed. Reg. 59888 (Nov. 3, 1999).3

 The 

FTC has brought numerous enforcement actions for violations of its COPPA Rule 

since it took effect in April 2000.4

 The FTC has also conducted various studies 

and workshops and has issued a number of reports concerning the impact of the 

legislation (and its implementing regulations) on businesses and consumers.5

 In short, the FTC has a strong interest in the proper construction and 

application of COPPA, including its preemptive impact. Moreover, the views of 

the agency tasked with administering a statute are relevant to any judicial inquiry 

into the preemptive effect of that statute. “While agencies have no special 

 

3

 The COPPA Rule has been amended a number of times since then, most recently 

in 2013. See 78 Fed. Reg. 3972 (Jan. 17, 2013); 70 Fed. Reg. 21104 (Apr. 22, 

2005); 67 Fed. Reg. 18818 (Apr. 17, 2002). 

4 See, e.g. United States v. Artist Arena LLC, No. 1:12-cv-07386-JGK (S.D.N.Y. 

Oct. 3, 2012) (consent decree) (music fan clubs and newsletters); United States v. 

RockYou, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-01487-SI (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012) (consent decree) 

(online slideshow); United States v. Playdom, Inc., No. SA-cv-11-0724 (C.D. Cal. 

May 24, 2011) (consent decree) (online virtual worlds); United States v. Sony 

BMG Music Entertainment, No. 08-cv-10730 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (consent 

decree) (music fan websites); United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06-cv-6853 

(SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2006) (consent decree) (social networking site). 

5 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Implementing the Children’s Online 

Privacy Protection Act: A Report to Congress (February 2007); Protecting 

Children’s Privacy Under COPPA: A Survey on Compliance, FTC Staff Report 

(April 2002); The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step 

Compliance Plan for Your Business, FTC Business Guide (July 2013); Protecting 

Kids’ Privacy Online: Reviewing the COPPA Rule, FTC Public Roundtable (June 

2, 2010). 

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authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress, they do 

have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer and an attendant ability 

to make informed determinations about how state requirements may pose ‘an 

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 

of Congress’.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576-77 (2009) (citations omitted). 

That said, the Commission takes no position on the ultimate merits of this case and 

limits its views here to the question of whether COPPA preempts state law 

protections of teenagers’ online privacy. 

STATUTORY BACKGROUND 

 In the words of its principal sponsor, COPPA is designed “(1) to enhance 

parental involvement in a child’s online activities in order to protect the privacy of 

children in the online environment; (2) to enhance parental involvement to help 

protect the safety of children in online fora such as chatrooms, home pages, and 

pen-pal services in which children may make public postings of identifying 

information; (3) to maintain the security of personally identifiable information of 

children collected online; and (4) to protect children’s privacy by limiting the 

collection of personal information from children without parental consent.” 144 

Cong. Rec. S11657 (Oct. 7, 1998) (Statement of Senator Bryan). 

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 To meet those objectives, Congress directed the FTC to adopt detailed 

regulations governing the collection and use of personal information from and 

about children online. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1); see 64 Fed. Reg. 22750 (Apr. 27, 

1999) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); 16 C.F.R. Part 312 (COPPA Rule). The 

statute declares it “unlawful for an operator of a website or online service directed 

to children, or any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal 

information from a child, to collect personal information from a child in a manner 

that violates [those FTC] regulations.” 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1).6

 Two provisions define COPPA’s preemptive scope for purposes of this case. 

First, the statute’s express preemption clause provides: 

No State or local government may impose any liability for 

commercial activities or actions by operators in interstate or foreign 

commerce in connection with an activity or action described in this 

chapter that is inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or 

actions under this section. 

15 U.S.C. § 6502(d). Second, COPPA defines the term “child” to mean “an 

individual under the age of 13.” Id. § 6501(1). Because COPPA addresses only 

 

6

 The statute authorizes the FTC to bring enforcement actions for violations of its 

COPPA Rule in the same manner as for other FTC rules defining unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 6502(c). In addition, COPPA authorizes state attorneys general to enforce 

compliance with the COPPA Rule by filing actions in federal district courts after 

serving prior written notice upon the FTC when feasible. Id. § 6504(a). 

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the welfare of “children,” that statutory definition circumscribes the substantive 

coverage of this statutory scheme. 

ARGUMENT 

 The district court rightly recognized that “COPPA requires an operator of a 

website or online service to obtain parental consent before it collects or uses the 

personal information of a child, but only where the child is under the age of 13.” 

Op. 12-13 (citations, quotation marks, and alteration brackets omitted). But the 

court also stated that, because Congress did not extend COPPA’s provisions to 

teenagers, the statute “may well” be construed to bar the States from enacting any 

protections for teenagers. Id. Because the court made that statement in dismissing 

objections to a proposed settlement, the statement cannot be viewed as a decision 

on the merits. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm’n of City and County 

of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). Nonetheless, the statement is 

wrong and should be rejected. Nothing in the language, structure, or legislative 

history of COPPA evinces a congressional intent to displace state protections of 

teenagers’ online privacy in their entirety. 

I. COPPA’s Express Preemption Provision Is Inapplicable

 The district court apparently based its suggestion of COPPA preemption on 

the statute’s express preemption provision. See Op. 13 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 

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§ 6502(d)). While that provision obviously displaces “at least some state law,” a 

court “must nonetheless ‘identify the domain expressly pre-empted’ by that 

language.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996) (quoting Cipollone 

v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)); accord Gordon v. Virtumundo, 

Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009). That “task of statutory construction must 

in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily 

contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. 

Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). 

 That language suggests no congressional intent to preempt protections for 

teenagers. Section 6502(d) defines the class of preempted “commercial activities 

or actions by operators” as those taken “in connection with an activity or action 

described in this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) The term “chapter” refers to the 

COPPA statute in its codified form—i.e. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (“chapter 91—

children’s online privacy protection”).7

 Each of the relevant provisions in that 

statute addresses activities involving “children” or “a child.” E.g., 15 U.S.C. 

§ 6502(a)(1). And COPPA specifically defines “child” as “an individual under the 

age of 13.” 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1). As to those individuals, no State “may impose 

 

7

 As originally enacted, the preemption provision referred to “an activity or action 

described in this title.” Pub. L. 105-277, title XIII, § 1303(d), 112 Stat. 2681-732 

(Oct. 21, 1998). 

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any liability * * * that is inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or 

actions under this section.” Id. § 6502(d). The preemption provision does not, 

however, address state law protections for the online activities of teenagers. Those 

activities, by definition, fall outside the statute’s scope, and there is thus no 

“treatment” of them with which state law may be “inconsistent.” 

 The district court’s contrary suggestion—seemingly based on the express 

language of the statute—is thus patently wrong. The court simply misconstrued 

the phrase “treatment of those activities and actions” in section 6502(d) as 

referring to the online activities and actions of all minors, regardless of age. But 

that view improperly reads the modifier “described in this chapter” out of the 

preemption provision. 

II. Appellants’ State Law Claims Are Not Subject to Implied Preemption 

 Of course, even in the absence of express preemption, state law may still be 

preempted, by implication, under the principles of conflict preemption. See 

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (“Congress’ inclusion of an 

express pre-emption clause ‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles’.”) (quoting Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 

861, 869 (2000)). Conflict preemption applies where it is “impossible” for a 

private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, see, e.g., Florida 

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Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where 

state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 

purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 

(1941). But neither circumstance is present in this case. 

 First, “[i]mpossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense,” Wyeth, 555 

U.S. at 573, and it is plainly inapplicable here. A private party can readily comply 

both with COPPA’s protections for children under 13 and with any state law 

requirement applicable to teenagers, given that those two categories of minors are 

mutually exclusive. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995) 

(“[I]t is not impossible for petitioners to comply with both federal and state law 

because there is simply no federal standard for a private party to comply with.”). 

 Second, state teenage parental consent requirements would not obstruct “the 

full purposes and objectives of Congress” in enacting COPPA. Hines, 312 U.S. at 

67. In arguing otherwise, Facebook stressed below that an initial Senate version of 

the COPPA bill would have extended the definition of “child” to some minors 

older than 13, and it suggested that Congress’ subsequent decision to exclude 

teenagers from COPPA’s scope implies that Congress wished to nullify all statelaw protections for teenagers as well. See Facebook Memo ISO Final Settlement, 

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at 23-24.8

 But that inference is wholly unwarranted. As the Supreme Court has 

explained in analogous contexts, “[i]t is quite wrong to view” a federal decision 

not to regulate a particular subject area “as the functional equivalent of a [decision] 

prohibiting all States and their political subdivisions from adopting such a 

regulation.” Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 65; see also Williamson v. Mazda Motor of 

America, Inc., __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011). 

 There is also nothing in the legislative history of COPPA to support an 

inference of preemption. Although some congressional witnesses proposed 

distinctions in the rules that should govern younger children and teenagers, no 

witness suggested that teenagers needed no protection whatsoever under any 

source of law. See, e.g., Senate Hearing on COPPA, at 13 (Statement of FTC 

Chairman Robert Pitofsky) (“It may very well be that you would want to have 

different rules, for example, opt-in as opposed to opt-out, with 13- to 16-yearolds”); 31 n.8 (Statement of Deirdre Mulligan, Center for Democracy and 

Technology) (“We are working with the Subcommittee to craft privacy protections 

 

8

 That Senate bill would have extended the definition of “child” to those “under the 

age of 16.” Although the bill would have required “verifiable parental consent” for 

children under the age of 13, as the statute currently does, it would have demanded 

only “reasonable efforts to provide the parents with notice and an opportunity to 

prevent or curtail the collection or use of personal information collected from 

children over the age of 12 and under the age of 17.” S. 2326, 105th Cong. 

§§ (2)(1), 3(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (1998). 

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for older minors that will respect their privacy and assure their First Amendment 

interests are protected”); 40 (Statement of Kathryn Montgomery, Center for Media 

Education) (“the bill must provide adequate and age-appropriate privacy 

protections for teenagers (13-16). * * * Teenagers do not suddenly become more 

privacy savvy once they turn 13.”). Moreover, the FTC—on whose analysis 

COPPA was based—viewed the legislation as providing only “a basic level of 

privacy protection for children.” Id. at 12 (Prepared Statement of Robert Pitofsky, 

Chairman, Federal Trade Commission). Thus, COPPA’s legislative history 

reveals, at most, Congress’ reluctance to subject teenagers’ online activities to the 

same regulations as the activities of younger children as a matter of federal law. 

But it manifests no intent to preempt all state regulation of that field. See also

infra at 12-13. 

 To the contrary, COPPA was enacted in the shadow of state privacy laws—

including state protections that are particular to minors—that had existed for nearly 

a century. See Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Digital Democracy et al., at 8-12; 

Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center, at 3-6. Having 

thus decided to “legislate[] * * * in a field which the States have traditionally 

occupied,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), Congress 

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can hardly have intended to displace this vast body of state statutory and common 

law beyond the limited scope of preemption set forth expressly in section 6502(d). 

 Indeed, COPPA expressly contemplates a significant role for the States in 

protecting children’s online privacy—by authorizing them to enforce the statute’s 

implementing regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1) (authorizing state attorneys 

general to bring civil actions for violations of the COPPA Rule). Although this 

provision is directed at enforcement of the federal statute, Congress’ carve-out of a 

state role in enforcement of even COPPA’s own implementing regulations 

illustrates its view of the States as partners in its endeavor “to protect the privacy 

of children in the online environment,” 144 Cong. Rec. S11657 (Oct. 7, 1998) 

(Statement of Senator Bryan), rather than as potential intruders on an exclusively 

federal arena. In other words, state law protections of teenagers’ online privacy 

complement—rather than obstruct—Congress’ “full purposes and objectives” in 

enacting the statute. 

 Finally, “field preemption” principles are also inapplicable, for essentially 

the same reasons. For such “field preemption” principles to apply, the “framework 

of regulation [must be] ‘so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to 

supplement it’,” or there must exist “a ‘federal interest ... so dominant that the 

federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 

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subject’.” Arizona v. United States, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) 

(quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). Again, COPPA and its implementing Rule 

manifestly do not constitute a regime of online privacy regulations “so pervasive 

* * * that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” Rice, 331 U.S. at 

230, particularly as to teenagers, who fall outside of COPPA’s scope. 

CONCLUSION

 This Court should reject the district court’s erroneous views of COPPA 

preemption, irrespective of how it otherwise decides this case. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

Of Counsel: 

JESSICA RICH

 Director 

Bureau of Consumer Protection 

 March 20, 2014 

JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN

 General Counsel

JOHN F. DALY

 Deputy General Counsel for Litigation

/s/ Imad Abyad 

IMAD D. ABYAD

 Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 

Washington, DC 20580 

(202) 326-2375 

iabyad@ftc.gov

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

 I certify that this amicus brief complies with the type-volume limitations of 

Fed. R. App. P. 29(d) and 32(a)(7)(B)(i), because it contains 2,880 words, 

excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 

 I also certify that this brief complies with the typeface and type style 

requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5)(A) and 32(a)(6), respectively, because it 

has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, using the Microsoft Word 

2010 word-processing system, the Times New Roman type style, and 14-point font 

size. 

 /s/ Imad Abyad 3/20/2014 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on March 20, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing 

brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit, using the Court’s Appellate CM/ECF system. All participants in 

this case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will, therefore, be 

accomplished by the Court’s Appellate CM/ECF system. 

 /s/ Imad Abyad 3/20/2014 

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