UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4797

GREGORY BUTLER,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-01-161-AW)

Submitted: March 10, 2003

Decided: April 1, 2003

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Fred Warren Bennett, Booth Marcus Ripke, BENNETT &

NATHANS, L.L.P., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas M.

DiBiagio, United States Attorney, James M. Trusty, Assistant United

States Attorney, Stephanie A. Gallagher, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Gregory Butler appeals his conviction and sixty-three month sentence following a jury trial on charges of participating in a conspiracy

to distribute marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). Butler challenges

three separate evidentiary rulings by the district court as individually

and cumulatively prejudicial. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

This Court reviews a district court’s decision concerning the

admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion and will not find

an abuse unless a decision was "arbitrary and irrational." United

States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.

186 (2002). The district court is afforded wide discretion in "determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial." United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1377 (4th Cir. 1996). 

Butler’s first challenge, concerning the testimony of Dwayne McCallum1

 and Special Agent David Buckel of the Drug Enforcement

Agency, is unpersuasive. Butler challenges their testimony regarding

a post-conspiracy drug sting in which McCallum introduced Agent

Buckel to his suppliers in the conspiracy as "Greg Butler" as prejudicial. However, the prosecution is entitled to introduce evidence of

uncharged criminal conduct to the extent it is probative; e.g., "where

it ‘furnishes part of the context of the crime.’" United States v. Mark,

943 F.2d 444, 448 (4th Cir. 1991). Testimony from Buckel and

McCallum provided evidence of Butler’s awareness of the conspiracy

and that it was supplied through McCallum’s connections, who

acknowledged his name and thus were inferentially aware of his participation in the conspiracy. Further, based on the district court’s cura1Although Butler’s brief refers to McCallum as "McCullam," because

the trial transcript identifies the witness as McCallum, we adopt that

spelling. 

2 UNITED STATES v. BUTLER
tive instruction and because Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) "should not be read

so broadly as to disallow the presentation of extrinsic evidence that

is probative of a material issue in a case," United States v. Smith

Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 531 (4th Cir. 1985), we find

no error in the admission of this testimony. 

We find Butler’s challenge to Agent Buckel’s testimony on crossexamination as impermissible vouching to be specious. While the

United States may not vouch for the credibility or trustworthiness of

one of its witnesses, or elicit testimony to that effect, United States

v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (4th Cir. 1993), Buckel did not opine

as to McCallum’s credibility, and the United States did not offer the

testimony. See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir.

1997). Furthermore, even if the statement was improper, the fact that

Butler’s counsel invited the error forecloses review. See Joseph v.

Angelone, 184 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying invited error

doctrine to statements elicited during cross-examination). 

Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to limit Butler’s cross-examination. See United States v. Cropp,

127 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 1997) (providing standard of review). A

defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine

witnesses who are cooperating with the United States about potential

sources of bias. Id. However, the court retains the discretion to place

reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about,

among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion, repetition, or

relevance. Delware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986). Butler’s counsel had already obtained McCallum’s admission to a past

affiliation with a motorcycle gang, and his proffer failed to suggest

either that McCallum was lying about no longer being a member of

the gang or that McCallum, as a past or current member, would be

likely to falsely accuse Butler. In light of that proffer, the district

court properly prohibited further questioning regarding this wholly

unsupported theory of bias. 

Accordingly, because we find no error in any of the district court’s

decisions,2 we affirm Butler’s conviction. Further, as we have dis2To the extent Butler alleges cumulative error, a cumulative error analysis applies only when there are two or more actual errors; it does not

apply to the cumulative effect of non-errors. See Moore v. Reynolds, 153

F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th Cir. 1998). 

UNITED STATES v. BUTLER 3
pensed with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process, we therefore deny Butler’s

motion for oral argument.

AFFIRMED

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