J. A04011/16 

2016 PA Super 125 

DOMINICK D. DiPAOLO :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

TIMES PUBLISHING COMPANY, D/B/A 

ERIE TIMES NEWS, CYBERINK, LP, 

D/B/A GOERIE.COM, LISA THOMPSON, 

EDWARD PALATELLA JR., AND 

MICHAEL MACIAG, 

:

:

:

:

: No. 1713 WDA 2014 

:

 Appellants :

Appeal from the Order, October 10, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County 

Civil Division at No. 14004-2011 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., AND SHOGAN, J. 

OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 15, 2016 

 Appellants, Times Publishing Company, d/b/a Erie Times News 

(“Times”); Cyberink, LP, d/b/a GoErie.com (“Cyberlink”); Lisa Thompson 

(“Thompson”); Edward Palatella Jr. (“Palatella”); and Michael Maciag 

(“Maciag”) appeal from the October 10, 2014 order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas that granted the motion to compel of appellee, Dominick D. 

DiPaolo (“Judge DiPaolo”). We affirm. 

 The record reflects that Judge DiPaolo, a magisterial district judge, 

filed a three-count complaint alleging libel with respect to a series of print 

and online articles and blogs published on November 14, 2010; 

November 28, 2010; April 16, 2011; and April 17, 2011. Times and 
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Cyberlink are business entities that publish the Erie Times News

newspaper and GoErie.com, an online newspaper. These business entities 

employ the individual appellants Thompson, Palatella, and Maciag as 

reporters, journalists, writers, and/or bloggers. 

 The events that gave rise to this appeal took root on October 28, 

2010, when the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General 

(“Attorney General”) initiated an action against Unicredit America 

Incorporated (“Unicredit”), an Erie-based debt-collection company. The 

complaint alleged that Unicredit engaged in certain debt-collection activities 

that violated various Pennsylvania consumer-protection laws, as well as the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The Attorney General also averred 

that Unicredit improperly filed numerous civil actions in Judge DiPaolo’s 

magisterial district office and then obtained judgments against most of the 

defendant debtors. The Attorney General further alleged that in an attempt 

to pressure the defendant debtors to satisfy judgments, Unicredit conducted 

fake post-judgment proceedings in a fake courtroom presided over by a fake 

judge. 

 Court proceedings in the Unicredit case took place before Erie County 

Court of Common Pleas Judge Michael E. Dunlavey on November 2, 2010 

and November 10, 2010. Those proceedings resulted in significant press 

coverage, including articles published in the Erie Times News and on 

GoErie.com. It was the publication of those articles that caused 
J. A04011/16 

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Judge DiPaolo to file his three-count defamation complaint, which he later 

amended, against the appellants. 

 Count I of Judge DiPaolo’s amended complaint alleges libel against 

appellants Times, Cyberlink, Palatella, and Thompson for the following 

statements written by Palatella and Thompson and published by Times and 

Cyberlink in print and online on November 14, 2010:

a. “Probe of Erie debt collector Unicredit widens;”

b. “Federal agents, Dunlavey and even one of 

Unicredit’s former clients have taken notice of 

the information surfacing in the case, which 

according to what Dunlavey said in court, could 

include a look at the practices in the office of 

Erie 6th Ward District Judge Dominick DiPaolo;” 

and 

c. “The chief counsel of the State Supreme 

Court’s Judicial Conduct Board, Joseph J. 

Massa Jr., declined to comment on whether 

violations cited by Dunlavey would be 

investigated.” 

Amended complaint in civil action, 12/28/11 at 23-24, ¶¶ 137-138 (Docket 

#11). 

 Judge DiPaolo alleged that these statements harmed his reputation 

because they explicitly state or suggest that the Unicredit probe was 

widened to include Judge DiPaolo and that Judge Dunlavey had stated in 

court that Judge DiPaolo could and/or should be investigated for his role in 

that case by either Judge Dunlavey himself, the Attorney General’s office, 

federal agents, or the Judicial Conduct Board. (Id. at 24, ¶ 139). 
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Judge DiPaolo further alleged that Judge Dunlavey never stated that 

Judge DiPaolo could, would, or should be the target of an investigation and 

that Judge Dunlavey only stated that he defended Judge DiPaolo’s actions 

and that he believed that Judge DiPaolo’s office had relied on Unicredit’s 

representation. (Id. at 24, ¶ 140.) 

 Judge DiPaolo averred that the November 14, 2010 published 

statements were made with actual malice because (i) Thompson and/or 

Palatella attended the November 10, 2010 hearing and heard what 

Judge Dunlavey said; (ii) appellant Thompson and/or Palatella subsequently 

reviewed the November 10, 2010 hearing transcript and read what 

Judge Dunlavey said; (iii) a November 11, 2010 article written by Thompson 

accurately summarized the November 10, 2010 court proceeding; 

(iv) Thompson and/or Palatella admitted that they reviewed the Judicial 

Conduct Board’s website and knew that that board investigates judges for 

alleged unethical or illegal conduct; (v) Thompson and/or Palatella reviewed 

the Unicredit case docket and knew no other hearing occurred after the 

November 10, 2010 proceeding and November 14, 2010, the date the article 

was published. (Id. at 25, ¶ 142(a)-(g).) 

 Count II of Judge DiPaolo’s amended complaint alleges libel against 

Times, Cyberlink, Thompson, and Palatella for statements written by 

Thompson and Palatella and published by Times and Cyberlink in print and 

online on November 28, 2010, and then subsequently republished in articles 
J. A04011/16 

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written by Thompson and Palatella and dated December 13, 2010; 

December 21, 2010; December 22, 2010; and February 9, 2011. The 

following allegedly defamatory statements were published after a hearing 

before Judge Dunlavey on Unicredit’s motion for reconsideration for 

post-trial relief on November 22, 2010: 

a. the headline “Legal Ruling Questioned, 

Unicredit Lawyer: Debt collector, judge not 

involved with Kickback;” 

b. The statement that “Dunlavey said it appeared 

Unicredit established a ‘ghost system of justice’ 

by first obtaining judgment against debtors in 

the wrong venue – mainly Erie 6th Ward 

District Judge Dominick DiPaolo’s office – and 

then using those judgments and sham court 

proceedings in Unicredit’s offices to extract 

payments from debtors;” and 

c. The unfair republication of [Unicredit’s 

Attorney Krista] Ott’s defamatory, but 

judicially privileged, statement that “there is a 

kickback scheme involving Unicredit and 

Magisterial District Judge DiPaolo’s office” with 

additional sting caused by the aforesaid 

headline and statement. 

Id. at 26-27, ¶ 146(a)-(c). 

 Judge DiPaolo alleged that these statements were defamatory because 

they stated or suggested, and appellants’ readers understood them to mean, 

that Judge Dunlavey had issued a ruling that found Judge DiPaolo was 

involved in a kickback scheme with Unicredit; that Judge Dunlavey said or 

suggested that Judge DiPaolo was involved in Unicredit’s “ghost system of 

justice”; and that Judge DiPaolo was actually involved in a kickback scheme 
J. A04011/16 

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with Unicredit. (Id. at 27, ¶ 148.) Judge DiPaolo further alleged that

Judge Dunlavey never ruled, found, or otherwise stated or suggested that he 

believed that Judge DiPaolo was involved in a kickback scheme with 

Unicredit. (Id. at 27-28, ¶ 149.) 

 Judge DiPaolo averred that the November 28, 2010 published 

statements were made with actual malice because, among other things, 

Thompson and/or Palatella read and reviewed Judge Dunlavey’s 

November 10, 2010 court order, as well as Attorney Ott’s motion for 

reconsideration of that order, and one or both of those appellants had 

knowledge of the Unicredit case generally, so that they would have known 

that the statements published in the November 28, 2010 article were false. 

 Finally, Count III of Judge DiPaolo’s amended complaint alleges libel 

against Times, Cyberlink, Thompson, Palatella, and Maciag for approximately 

32 statements written by Thompson and Palatella and published by Times 

and Cyberlink in print and online on April 16, 2011 and April 17, 2011,1 that 

harmed Judge DiPaolo’s reputation because they stated or suggested, and 

their readers understood them to mean: 

a. That Judge DiPaolo had intentionally captioned 

those Unicredit cases that he heard to conceal 

that the creditors and/or debtors in those 

cases were out of his jurisdiction; 

 

1

 These statements were also alleged to have been published on an April 16, 

2011 blog post and on Unicredit’s web page. (Amended complaint in civil 

action, 12/28/11 at 29, ¶ 155 (Docket #11).) 
J. A04011/16 

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b. That Judge DiPaolo improperly heard cases in 

which his relatives were a party; 

c. That Judge DiPaolo had extended judicial 

favors to Unicredit based on an attenuated 

familial relationship; 

d. That Judge DiPaolo applied practices in his 

office that differed from other Magisterial 

District Judges in an improper effort to help 

Unicredit; 

e. That a Judge had stated that “DiPaolo takes 

relatives[’] cases;” 

f. That a Judge or the Attorney General had 

called Judge DiPaolo’s practices 

“unconscionable;” and 

g. That Judge DiPaolo had knowledge of a 

jurisdictional deficit in the Unicredit-related 

cases filed in his office, that he had a duty to 

raise that jurisdictional deficit, and that he did 

not do so because he was related to one of 

Unicredit’s principals. 

Id. at 30, ¶ 157. 

 Judge DiPaolo alleged that Thompson, Palatella, and/or Maciag 

intentionally misquoted and/or mischaracterized the proceedings and public 

records upon which they based these statements and, therefore, made the 

statements with actual malice. (Id. at ¶¶ 158-159.) 

 During discovery in this case, Judge DiPaolo served interrogatories and 

requests for production on appellants. With respect to each alleged 

defamatory publication, Judge DiPaolo requested that appellants “[i]dentify 

each and every source who provided content used in the article and describe 
J. A04011/16 

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the information provided by each source;” “[i]dentify and provide every note 

or set of notes reflecting the conversation had between the source identified 

[] and the person with whom that source spoke;” and “[i]dentify and provide 

any documents referred to in creating the article and state for what content 

within the document, if any, relied upon that document in whole or in part.” 

(Motion to compel, 4/10/14 Exhibit A (Docket #37).) Appellants objected to 

these specific interrogatories and requests for production on the basis of 

privilege under the Pennsylvania Shield Law2 and/or the qualified First 

Amendment privilege, also known as the journalist’s privilege. Thereafter, 

Judge DiPaolo filed his first motion to compel contending, among other 

things, that he requested appellants’ notes, unpublished drafts, and 

 

2

 § 5942. Confidential communications to news 

reporters. 

(a) General rule. -- 

No person engaged on, connected with, 

or employed by any newspaper of 

general circulation or any press 

association or any radio or television 

station, or any magazine of general 

circulation, for the purpose of gathering, 

procuring, compiling, editing or 

publishing news, shall be required to 

disclose the source of any information 

procured or obtained by such person, in 

any legal proceeding, trial or 

investigation before any government 

unit. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5942. 
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documents referred to in creating the articles “because those notes, drafts, 

and documents are likely to provide insight into the state of knowledge of 

the reporters prior to their writing the [a]rticles and the mindset of the 

reporters in their writing the [a]rticles.” (Id. at 5, ¶ 25.) Judge DiPaolo 

further averred that he “requires this information to meet the actual malice 

standard of liability required by the United States Constitution.” (Id. at 

¶ 26.) At oral argument on the motion, Judge DiPaolo agreed to narrowly 

tailor his discovery requests so that appellants could determine the 

applicability of the Shield Law and/or the qualified First Amendment 

privilege. 

 Subsequently, Judge DiPaolo sent a second set of interrogatories and 

requests for production to appellants. In response to those interrogatories, 

appellants identified notes of appellant Thompson.3 Additionally, during 

Palatella’s deposition, Palatella testified as to the existence of a spreadsheet 

that he prepared with appellant Maciag that compiled data from public court 

records to determine the identity and/or number of debtors sued by 

Unicredit who did not live within Judge DiPaolo’s magisterial district. 

Thereafter, Judge DiPaolo filed a second motion to compel production of 

 

3

 Appellants did not produce appellant Thompson’s notes because, they 

contend, Judge DiPaolo did not request them in his second set of 

interrogatories and requests for production of documents and DiPaolo did 

not establish facts necessary to overcome the journalist’s privilege. 

(Defendants’ response in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to compel, 7/28/14 

at 3, ¶¶ 12-13 (Docket #49).) 
J. A04011/16 

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appellants’ notes, unpublished drafts, and documents referred to in creating 

the articles subject to redaction of confidential informants and a privilege 

log. The request necessarily includes the notes Thompson took at the 

November 10, 2010 hearing, as well the spreadsheet prepared by Palatella 

and Maciag. The trial court granted Judge DiPaolo’s motion. This appeal 

followed. 

 Appellants raise two issues for our review: 

A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

FINDING THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE NOTES 

PREPARED BY APPELLANT, THOMPSON, 

APPELLEE HAD MADE A SHOWING SUFFICIENT 

TO OVERCOME THE JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE 

UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 

B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

FINDING THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE 

REPORTERS’ RESOURCE MATERIALS AND 

SPREADSHEET, APPELLEE MADE A SHOWING 

SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE JOURNALIST’S 

PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 

Appellants’ brief at 2-3. 

 Preliminarily, we note that the order granting Judge DiPaolo’s motion 

to compel is appealable as a collateral order. 

[I]n general, discovery orders are not final, and are 

therefore unappealable. However, discovery orders 

involving privileged material are nevertheless 

appealable as collateral to the principal action 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313 (“Collateral Orders”). 

Rule 313(a) states that “[a]n appeal may be taken 

as of right from a collateral order of [a] . . . lower 

court.” 
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A collateral order is an order separable 

from and collateral to the main cause of 

action where the right involved is too 

important to be denied review and the 

question presented is such that if review 

is postponed until final judgment in the 

case, the claim will be irreparably lost. 

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). A discovery order is collateral only 

when it is separate and distinct from the underlying 

cause of action. 

Generally, discovery orders involving purportedly 

privileged material are appealable because if 

immediate appellate review is not granted, the 

disclosure of documents cannot be undone and 

subsequent appellate review would be rendered 

moot. 

Rhodes v. USAA Casualty, 21 A.3d 1253, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 119 A.3d 351 (Pa. 2015) (internal case law citations and quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Accordingly, we will review the trial court's order granting 

Judge DiPaolo’s motion to compel. See id., quoting Berkeyheiser v. 

A-Plus Investigations, Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1123-1124 (Pa.Super. 2007) 

(“Pennsylvania courts have held that discovery orders involving potentially 

confidential and privileged materials are immediately appealable as collateral 

to the principal action.”). 

 Generally, when reviewing the propriety of a discovery order, our 

standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rhodes, 

21 A.3d at 1258 (citations omitted). To the extent that we are presented 

with questions of law, our scope of review is plenary. Id.
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 The discovery order at issue compels the media appellants to produce 

documents in Judge DiPaolo’s defamation suit against them. 

“Defamation is a communication which tends to 

harm an individual’s reputation so as to lower him or 

her in the estimation of the community or deter third 

persons from associating or dealing with him or her.” 

Elia v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 430 Pa.Super. 

384, 634 A.2d 657, 660 (1993). Only statements of 

fact, not expressions of opinion, can support an 

action in defamation. Id. In a defamation case, a 

plaintiff must prove: “(1) The defamatory character 

of the communication; (2) its publication by the 

defendant; (3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) the 

understanding by the recipient of its defamatory 

meaning; (5) the understanding by the recipient of it 

as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) special 

harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication; 

and (7) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.” 

Porter v. Joy Realty, Inc., 872 A.2d 846, 849 n. 6 

(Pa.Super. 2005), quoting, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a). 

See also, Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 

878 A.2d 63 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

Moore v. Cobb-Nettleton, 889 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

 Here, no dispute exists that Judge DiPaolo, as a magistrate, is a public 

official or a public figure. 

[T]he appropriate standard of fault depends on 

whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure. If 

the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, and 

the statement relates to a matter of public concern, 

then to satisfy First Amendment strictures the 

plaintiff must establish that the defendant made a 

false and defamatory statement with actual malice. 

In contrast, states are free to allow a private-figure 

plaintiff to recover by establishing that the defendant 

acted negligently rather than maliciously. 
J. A04011/16 

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American Future Systems, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Eastern 

Pennsylvania, 923 A.2d 389, 400 (Pa. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1076 

(2007) (citations and parentheticals omitted). 

The term “actual malice” (sometimes shortened to 

“malice”) is a term of art that refers to a speaker’s 

knowledge that his statement is false, or his reckless 

disregard as to its truth or falsity. Thus, it implies at 

a minimum that the speaker “‘entertained serious 

doubts about the truth of his publication,’ . . . or 

acted with a ‘high degree of awareness of . . . 

probable falsity.’” Masson v. New Yorker 

Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 510, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 

2429, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (quoting St. Amant 

v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 

1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); Garrison v. 

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 

L.Ed.2d 125 (1964)). This term “should not be 

confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent 

or a motive arising from spite or ill will.” Id. 

American Future Systems, Inc. 923 A.2d at 395 n.6. 

 Here, appellants contend that the trial court erred in ordering 

compelled disclosure of Thompson’s notes and the resource materials used 

and spreadsheet prepared by Palatella and Maciag because Judge DiPaolo 

did not overcome the journalist’s privilege (also known as the qualified First 

Amendment privilege) under the First Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. We note that despite claiming the potential applicability of the 

Pennsylvania Shield Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5942(a), to these documents in the 

proceedings below, appellants advance no such argument on appeal. We 

further note that the shield law, unlike the journalist’s privilege, is an 

absolute privilege that protects a journalist from compelled disclosure of a 
J. A04011/16 

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confidential source. In interpreting the shield law, our supreme court has 

held that a plaintiff may discover unpublished documentary information 

gathered by the media to the extent that that documentary information does 

not reveal the identity of a confidential source. Hatchard v. 

Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 532 A.2d 346, 351 (Pa. 1987). The 

purpose of the shield law is to maintain a free flow of information to the 

news media. Id.

 Likewise, the reporter’s privilege was designed to protect freedom of 

the press by insuring the free flow of information to reporters. Davis v. 

Glanton, 705 A.2d 879, 885 (Pa.Super. 1997) (citation omitted). Thus, 

there exists a stark distinction between the need for disclosure of materials 

that identify or could lead to the identification of confidential sources from 

the need for disclosure of materials created during the editorial process. The 

following aptly examines the dichotomy: 

In libel actions, the right of a plaintiff to discover into 

the editorial process is a distinct issue from 

discovery of a journalist’s confidential sources. 

Courts have generally protected discovery of 

confidential sources because of the effect disclosure 

of such sources would have on a journalist’s conduct. 

“Disclosure of confidential sources is . . . more 

onerous than inquiry into the editorial process in that 

it can significantly affect journalistic conduct.” 

Marian E. Lindberg, Note, Source Protection In 

Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 Colum. L. 

Rev. 338, 362 (1981). Furthermore, “compelled 

disclosure of confidential sources might chill the flow 

of information so essential to the freedom and 

effectiveness of the press.” Mize v. McGraw-Hill, 

86 F.R.D. 1, 4 (S.D. Tex. 1980). This “chilling effect” 
J. A04011/16 

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on the free flow of information that discovery may 

have impinges on the public’s interest in news 

dissemination in contravention of the First 

Amendment. 

The balance between a plaintiff’s need for disclosure 

of either confidential sources or the editorial process, 

and the public’s First Amendment interest in the free 

flow of information was explained in Mize, decided 

shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States 

decision in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S. 

Ct. 1635, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115, (1979): 

The availability of the requested material 

through alternative discovery 

distinguishes the inquiry into the editorial 

process from the disclosure of a 

confidential source of information. Direct 

disclosure of the editorial process 

exposes the thoughts, considerations, 

and state of mind of editors and writers. 

At best, indirect evidence is a mere 

shadow of the editorial process. In 

contrast, the identity of a source of 

information may be ferreted out without 

direct disclosure by the press. Through 

vigorous discovery, a plaintiff may 

narrow down the field of possible sources 

and finally pinpoint the actual source. 

Where the plaintiff is aware of who knew 

about the transaction or event to which 

the allegedly libelous statement refers, 

his task of pinpointing the source is 

simplified. Thus, the plaintiff’s need for 

disclosure of confidential sources may be 

slighter than his need for compelled 

disclosure of the editorial process. 

At the same time, the publisher’s and the 

public’s interests in the confidentiality of 

sources surpasses their interest in the 

confidentiality of the editorial process. 

In Herbert, the Supreme Court 

explained that disclosure of the editorial 
J. A04011/16 

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process would aid in the free flow of 

information. It would have this effect 

because editors would decide against 

publishing material they knew to be 

false, if they anticipated that their 

conversations concerning the material 

might be disclosed in the course of a law 

suit. Since publication of false 

information would be discouraged, the 

public’s interest in the free flow of 

truthful information would be served. 

Mize, 86 F.R.D. at 3. 

Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. (In re 

Madden), 967 F.Supp. 142, 146 (W.D.Pa. 1997), rev’d and remanded on 

other grounds, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998). See also Hatchard, 532 

A.2d at 349 (recognizing that the First Amendment does not bar a plaintiff 

from inquiring into the editorial processes of the media defendant 

responsible for publishing a defamatory statement because the plaintiff is 

entitled to discover information that permits a meaningful inquiry into 

whether the statement was made maliciously or recklessly). 

 In order to overcome the reporter’s privilege, the movant must 

demonstrate (1) that the information sought is material, relevant, and 

necessary; (2) a strong showing that the information cannot be obtained by 

alternative means; and (3) that the information is crucial to the movant’s 

case. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716-717 (3d Cir. 1979). 

 Here, Judge DiPaolo does not seek disclosure of a confidential source 

or materials that could lead to the identity of a confidential source; rather, 
J. A04011/16 

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he seeks disclosure of documents related to the editorial process that he 

contends he needs in order to prove actual malice in his defamation action. 

 Preliminarily, we note that prohibiting disclosure of the information 

sought by Judge DiPaolo would not further the goal of the reporter’s 

privilege, which is to insure the free flow of information to reporters, 

because this case does not involve a confidential source who provided 

information to appellants. To the contrary, appellants created the 

information sought during their own editorial process in connection with 

writing and publishing the articles that are at the heart of Judge DiPaolo’s 

defamation action against them. As a result, compelled disclosure would not 

result in a chilling effect because it would have no impact on any future 

confidential source’s decision to provide information to a reporter. 

 Additionally, the information sought goes to Thompson’s, Palatella’s, 

and Maciag’s states of mind. Because Judge DiPaolo must prove actual 

malice in his defamation action against appellants, Thompson’s notes and 

the resource materials used and the spreadsheet created by Palatella and 

Maciag during the editorial process are material, relevant, necessary, and 

crucial to Judge DiPaolo’s defamation case against them. 

 Finally, this information cannot be obtained by alternative means. 

Thompson’s notes constitute her personal record of the Unicredit case based 

on her experience and perception. As a result, Thompson’s personal record 

cannot be obtained from anyone other than Thompson. Likewise, the 
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resource materials and spreadsheet compilation are personal to Palatella and 

Maciag because they chose what debtors’ cases to include and what 

methodology to employ in their analysis in order to ascertain their own 

meaning of the data. Consequently, the resource materials and spreadsheet 

cannot be obtained from anyone other than Palatella and Maciag. 

 We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding 

that Judge DiPaolo overcame the reporter’s privilege and its resulting order 

granting Judge DiPaolo’s motion to compel. 

 Order affirmed. 

 Bender, P.J.E. joins the Opinion 

 Shogan, J. files a Dissenting Opinion. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/15/2016