United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-20324

Michael L. Stout, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

William Stephens; Brad Livingston; Joni White; Rissie 

Owens; David Gutierrez, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CV-2152

Before Smith, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Michael L. Stout, Texas prisoner # 601193, filed a civil rights 

complaint asserting that his right to due process was violated by errors in the 

calculation of his initial parole eligibility date. The district court dismissed 

the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 20, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

because Stout does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 

parole or parole procedures. The district court also denied Stout leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, certifying that the appeal was not 

taken in good faith. By moving to appeal IFP, Stout challenges the district 

court’s certification. See McGarrah v. Alford, 783 F.3d 584, 584 (5th Cir. 

2015). “An appeal is taken in good faith if it raises legal points that are 

arguable on the merits and thus nonfrivolous.” Id. 

Stout asserts that Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.150(a) gives rise 

to a liberty interest in release on parole. He asserts also that a provision in the 

Texas Administrative Code contains mandatory language giving rise to a 

liberty interest. 

We have determined repeatedly that Texas law and regulations do not 

create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole. See Johnson v. 

Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 1997) (“It is . . . axiomatic that because 

Texas prisoners have no protected liberty interest in parole they cannot 

mount a challenge against any state parole review procedure on procedural 

(or substantive) Due Process grounds.”); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 

768 (5th Cir. 1997) (“In Texas, it is entirely speculative whether an inmate 

will actually obtain parole, inasmuch as there is no right to be released on 

parole.”); see also Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 2000) 

(“Because it is entirely speculative whether a prisoner will be released on 

parole, the court has determined that there is no constitutional expectancy of 

parole in Texas. Therefore, any delay in Malchi’s consideration for parole 

cannot support a constitutional claim.” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). Accordingly, Stout’s assertion that state officials should 

have backdated his parole eligibility date as to one of his two consecutive 

sentences does not involve a protected liberty interest. See Malchi, 211 F.3d 

at 957.

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Stout has failed to show that his appeal involves legal points arguable 

on their merits. See McGarrah, 783 F.3d at 584. Accordingly, his IFP motion 

is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh v. 

Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 n.24 (5th Cir. 1997); see also 5th Cir. R. 42.2. 

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