No. 19- 

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————— 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

PETITIONER

v.

CREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC AND MICHAEL BROWN

————— 

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

————— 

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

AND APPENDIX 

————— 

ALDEN F. ABBOTT* 

General Counsel 

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel 

for Litigation 

MICHAEL BERGMAN

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

MATTHEW M. HOFFMAN

Attorneys 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-2505 

aabbott@ftc.gov 

* Counsel of Record

 
(I) 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 53(b), the Commission may sue those who 

violate the laws under its purview in federal district court. 

The statute authorizes district courts in such cases to issue 

“a permanent injunction.” Seven courts of appeals have 

held that district courts exercising that authority may 

enter an injunction that requires defendants to return to 

the victims of their wrongdoing funds obtained through 

their illegal activity. One has held the opposite. 

The question presented is: 

Whether Section 13(b) authorizes district courts to enter an injunction that orders the return of unlawfully obtained funds. 
II 

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 

The caption contains the name of all the parties in the 

court of appeals. 

 
III 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page

Opinions Below ...................................................................... 2

Jurisdiction ............................................................................. 2

Statutes Involved ................................................................... 2

Statement ............................................................................... 2

Reasons For Granting The Petition ................................. 10

I. This Case Presents A Square Circuit Split 

On An Important And Recurring Issue. ............... 11

II. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Is Incorrect. ...... 13

III. The Question Presented Merits Plenary 

Review And This Case Is The Ideal Vehicle 

To Resolve It. ............................................................ 22

Conclusion ............................................................................ 26

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Court of Appeals Opinion 

(Aug. 21, 2019) ................................................................ 1a 

District Court Opinion 

(June 26, 2018) ............................................................. 65a 

District Court Judgment 

(June 26, 2018) ........................................................... 101a 

District Court Final Judgment and Order 

(June 26, 2018) ........................................................... 103a 

Relevant Statutory Provisions ...................................... 135a 
IV 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page 

Cases: 

California v. American Stores Co., 

495 U.S. 271 (1990) .................................................. 15, 16 

FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 

875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989) ...................................... 3, 17 

FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 

654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011) ........................................ 4, 11 

FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 

624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) ........................................... 4, 11 

FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 

401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) .................................. 4, 12 

FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 

668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982) .............................. 3, 12, 17 

FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 

838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016 ............................................... 3 

FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2014) ..................... 4, 12 

FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 

931 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1991) .............................. 3, 12, 17 

FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 

748 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1984) ............................ 3, 12, 17 

Kansas v. Nebraska, 

135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) .............................................. 19, 20 

Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) ................... 11, 23, 24 

Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) .............................. 16

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 

516 U.S. 479 (1996) .............................................. 8, 18, 19 

Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) ................................ 20 

Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 

361 U.S. 288 (1960) ...................................... 4, 5, 8, 15, 21 
V 

NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 

416 U.S. 267 (1974) ........................................................ 20 

North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 

456 U.S. 512 (1982) ........................................................ 17 

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 

22 U.S. 738 (1824) .......................................................... 14 

Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 

328 U.S. 395 (1946) .................................... 4, 5, 10, 15, 20 

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 

332 U.S. 194 (1947) ........................................................ 20 

SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 

133 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................................ 24 

SEC v. Manor Nursing, 

458 F.2d 1082 (1972) ....................................................... 16 

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 

446 F.2d 1301 (1971) ....................................................... 16 

Texas Dept. of Housing & Community 

Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 

135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) .................................................... 17 

United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 

427 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2005) ...................................... 19, 20 

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 

Co-Op., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) .......................................... 20 

United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 

438 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2006) ...................................... 20 

 
VI 

Statutes, Court Rules, Legislative Materials: 

Federal Trade Commission Act 

15 U.S.C. 45(a) ................................................................. 2 

15 U.S.C. 45(b) ........................................................... 2, 20 

15 U.S.C. 45(l) ...................................................... 7, 12, 21 

15 U.S.C. 53(b) ........................................................... 3, 20 

15 U.S.C. 56 ...................................................................... 1 

15 U.S.C. 57a .................................................................. 20 

15 U.S.C. 57b .................................................................... 8 

15 U.S.C. 57b(a) ............................................................. 13 

15 U.S.C. 57b(e) ..................................................... 8, 9, 21 

28 U.S.C. 2462 ...................................................................... 23 

29 U.S.C. 217 .......................................................................... 5 

42 U.S.C. 6972(a) ................................................................. 18 

7th Cir. R. 40(e) ...................................................................... 7 

Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 10 (1994) ........................................ 17 

Pub. L. 109-455, § 3 (2006) .................................................. 17 

S. Rep. No. 93-151 (1973) ...................................................... 3 

S. Rep. No. 103-130 (1993) .................................................. 17 

Other Authorities: 

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ............................ 14 

FTC, Semiannual Federal Court Litigation Status 

Report (June 30, 2019) .................................................. 13 

1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies (2d ed. 1993) 

§ 1.1 ................................................................................. 15 

§ 2.9 .................................................................................. 15 

1 Howard C. Joyce, A Treatise on the Law 

Relating to Injunctions (1909) 

§ 2 .................................................................................... 15 

 § 2a ................................................................................... 15 
VII 

2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity 

Jurisprudence: As Administered in 

England and America (1836) 

§ 861 ................................................................................. 14 

§ 862 ................................................................................ 14 

 
(1) 

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States ————— 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

PETITIONER

v. 

CREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC AND MICHAEL BROWN

————— 

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

————— 

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

The Federal Trade Commission, pursuant to the authority of 15 U.S.C. 56(a)(3)(A), respectfully petitions for a 

writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.1

————— 

 

1

 The Commission rarely exercises its authority to represent itself 

before this Court, having done so only four times previously since 

Congress granted that authority 44 years ago. The Commission takes 

this step now not only because the decision of the court of appeals is at 

odds with the holdings of seven other circuits and this Court’s precedents, but also because of the extraordinary importance of the issue 

presented. The decision of the court of appeals threatens the FTC’s 

ability to carry out its mission by eliminating one of its most important 

and effective enforcement tools. 
2 

OPINIONS BELOW 

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-63a) 

is reported at 937 F.3d 764. The opinion of the district court 

(App., infra, 65a-99a) is reported at 325 F. Supp. 3d 852. 

JURISDICTION 

The judgment of the court of appeals, accompanied by a 

denial of rehearing, was entered on August 21, 2019. On 

November 8, 2019, Justice Kavanaugh extended the time 

within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and 

including December 19, 2019. The jurisdiction of this Court 

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 

STATUTES INVOLVED 

Pertinent provisions of the Federal Trade Commission 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., are reproduced in the appendix to 

the petition (App., infra, 135a-143a). 

STATEMENT 

This case presents a square conflict among the circuits, 

explicitly acknowledged by the court below, on a recurring 

issue of law essential to effective enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 

1. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in or affecting commerce, and 

“empower[s] and direct[s]” the Federal Trade Commission 

to “prevent” such conduct. 15 U.S.C. 45(a). Before 1973, 

the Commission generally could enforce these prohibitions 

only through administrative proceedings, in which the 

Commission’s sole remedy was an order to cease and desist 

from the unlawful practices. 15 U.S.C. 45(b). 

In 1973, Congress added Section 13(b) to the FTC Act, 

giving the Commission new authority to enforce Section 5 

directly in federal district courts. Section 13(b) authorizes 
3 

two distinct types of lawsuits. The bulk of the statute is 

devoted to actions for “a temporary restraining order or a 

preliminary injunction” in aid of an administrative proceeding. 15 U.S.C. 53(b). For example, when the Commission 

reviews the legality of a merger, Section 13(b) authorizes it 

to seek a preliminary injunction blocking the merger pending the completion of administrative proceedings. See, e.g., 

FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 353-

354 (3d Cir. 2016). 

Section 13(b) also provides that “in proper cases the 

Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the court 

may issue, a permanent injunction” directly in federal 

district court. 15 U.S.C. 53(b). This proviso authorizes the 

Commission to file standalone enforcement actions without 

also undertaking an administrative proceeding. Congress 

added Section 13(b) to give the Commission the ability “to 

merely seek a permanent injunction in those situations in 

which it does not desire to further expand upon the prohibitions of the Federal Trade Commission Act through the 

issuance of a cease-and-desist order,” and it expected that 

by allowing such actions “Commission resources will be 

better utilized, and cases can be disposed of more efficiently.” S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 31 (1973). 

 2. Until the decision in this case, the courts of appeals 

(including the Seventh Circuit) had uniformly held for 

more than 35 years that a district court’s authority to grant 

a permanent injunction under Section 13(b) includes the 

authority to require wrongdoers to return money that they 

illegally obtained.2

 Those decisions follow from this Court’s 

 

2

 See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982); FTC v. 

U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984); FTC v. 

Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571-572 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC v. 

Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-1315 (8th Cir. 
4 

decisions in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 

(1946), and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 

U.S. 288 (1960), holding that a district court exercising 

authority to enjoin violations of a regulatory statute may 

order violators to return their unlawful gains absent a clear 

congressional directive to the contrary. 

Porter addressed a federal rent control statute that authorized the government to sue for a “permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order” to 

enforce the statute. 328 U.S. at 397. The Court held that 

the district court’s remedial authority under the statute 

was not limited to prohibiting future violations; it also 

included the authority to order the refund of unlawfully 

collected rents. Ibid.

The Court explained that by authorizing an injunction, 

the statute invoked the district court’s equitable jurisdiction, which made “all the inherent equitable powers of the 

District Court . . . available for the proper and complete 

exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 398. Those powers 

“assume an even broader and more flexible character” 

where the statute protects the public interest, and may be 

limited only by “a clear and valid legislative command,” 

expressed “in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference.” Ibid.

Applying those principles, the Court found it “readily 

apparent” that the district court could enter an injunction 

that required the return of illegally collected rents. Ibid. 

“Nothing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a 

suit for an injunction than the recovery of that which has 

 

1991); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th 

Cir. 2005); FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 

2010); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 2011); 

FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 890-892 (4th Cir. 2014). 
5 

been illegally acquired and which has given rise to the 

necessity for injunctive relief.” Id. at 399. 

In Mitchell, the Court applied the same principles to 

uphold a monetary judgment entered under a provision of 

the Fair Labor Standards Act that empowered district 

courts to “restrain” violations. See 29 U.S.C. 217. The 

Court explained that “[w]hen Congress entrusts to an 

equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a 

regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete 

relief in light of the statutory purposes.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. 

at 291-292. The Court found it insignificant that the labor 

statute did not include the additional phrase “other order,” 

as the rent-control statute in Porter did. That clause was 

not necessary to the monetary judgment, but simply provided “confirmation” of the district court’s authority to 

order the payment of wages lost as a result of the violation. 

Id. at 296. 

3. The Commission depends heavily on Section 13(b) in 

carrying out its mandate to protect consumers and competition. It brings dozens of cases every year seeking a permanent injunction and the return of illegally obtained 

funds. As a result of Section 13(b) cases, the Commission 

has returned billions of dollars to consumers who have 

fallen victim to a wide variety of illegal scams. In some 

cases, courts order defendants to return money directly to 

consumers. Other times, the court orders money to be paid 

to the Commission itself, which then attempts to distribute 

recovered funds to injured consumers. Agency records 

show that from 2016 to 2019, the Commission returned 

approximately $977 million directly to consumers in Sec-
6 

tion 13(b) cases. Billions more were returned to consumers 

directly from defendants.3

4. This case arises out of a scam perpetrated by respondents Michael Brown and his company, Credit Bureau 

Center, LLC. Respondents offered consumers a “free” 

credit report, but those who accepted were unwittingly 

enrolled in a credit-monitoring service for $30 per month. 

Respondents drove consumers to their websites through an 

affiliate that posted bogus ads for rental apartments on 

Craigslist. The ads and subsequent emails falsely offered 

desirable properties at attractive prices and instructed 

applicants to obtain a credit report from respondents. 

Duped consumers submitted more than 500 complaints to 

the FTC, other law enforcement agencies, and the Better 

Business Bureau, and suffered over $6 million in losses. 

The Commission sued under Section 13(b), seeking to 

halt continuing violations and return the unlawful gains to 

consumers. The district court awarded summary judgment 

to the Commission. It entered a permanent injunction 

barring future violations of the FTC Act and requiring 

respondents to repay $5.2 million, the net amount they 

took from consumers after deducting amounts recovered 

from settling codefendants. App., infra, 103a-134a. 

The district court directed that those sums be used to 

compensate injured consumers as “restitution.” App., 

infra, 88a-89a. The judgment specifies that the money 

“may be deposited into a fund administered by the Commission or its designee to be used for equitable relief, including consumer redress and any attendant expenses for 

 

3

 When it is not possible to identify victims, or distribution costs 

would exceed the available funds, the FTC remits money to the Treasury. In the 2016-2019 period, that happened with about $15 million, a 

small fraction of the funds recovered under Section 13(b). 
7 

the administration of any redress fund.” Id. at 127a. If 

“direct redress to consumers is wholly or partially impracticable or money remains after redress is completed,” the 

Commission may seek court approval to apply any remaining money to “other equitable relief ” reasonably related to 

Brown’s unlawful practices. Ibid. Only if funds remain 

after that may they “be deposited to the U.S. Treasury.” 

Ibid.

5.a. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding 

of liability but reversed the monetary judgment. The court 

overruled its longstanding precedent to hold that Section 

13(b) does not authorize monetary relief. The court acted 

pursuant to a circuit rule permitting a panel to overrule 

circuit precedent or create a circuit split so long as a majority of the active judges does not vote for rehearing en 

banc. See 7th Cir. R. 40(e). The court acknowledged that its 

decision created a split with the seven other courts of appeals that have held that Section 13(b) authorizes monetary relief. App., infra, 3a n.1, 39a. 

Examining Section 13(b)’s authorization to enter “a 

permanent injunction,” the court thought it “obvious” that 

“[r]estitution isn’t an injunction.” App., infra, 12a. The 

court described an injunction as a “forward-facing” remedy 

and restitution as “a remedy for past actions.” Id. at 14a. It 

contrasted the language of Section 13(b) with two other 

provisions of the FTC Act, Sections 5(l) and 19, which it 

characterized as “backward-facing methods to obtain monetary relief for past injury.” Id. at 17a. 

 Section 5(l) authorizes the Commission to seek civil 

penalties against parties that violate an administrative 

cease-and-desist order and permits courts in such cases to 

award “mandatory injunctions and such other and further 

equitable relief as they deem appropriate.” 15 U.S.C. 45(l). 
8 

Section 19 authorizes courts to order relief “necessary to 

redress injury” against persons who (1) violate a Commission rule; or (2) have been ordered to cease and desist from 

illegal practices in an administrative proceeding. 15 U.S.C. 

57b. Although Section 19 specifies that its remedies are “in 

addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of 

action” available to the Commission, 15 U.S.C. 57b(e), the 

court did not believe that the savings clause prevented it 

from relying on Section 19’s remedies to find that monetary relief is unavailable under Section 13(b). In the court’s 

view, such relief would “effectively nullif[y]” Section 19, and 

it thus declined to read the savings clause to authorize 

what it described as “that self-defeating effect.” App., 

infra, 19a. 

The court next considered the holdings in Porter and 

Mitchell that Congress authorizes monetary remedies 

when it empowers district courts in enforcement lawsuits 

to issue an “injunction” or to “restrain” violations. App., 

infra, 20a-23a, 29a-33a. It concluded that those decisions 

were no longer binding because they had been undermined 

by this Court’s later decision in Meghrig v. KFC Western, 

Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). Meghrig held that the citizen-suit 

provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

(RCRA) did not allow a private party to recover costs incurred to clean up previously contaminated land. The court 

read Meghrig as having adopted a “more limited understanding of judicially implied remedies” than the one espoused in Porter and Mitchell. App., infra, 31a. In particular, whereas Mitchell instructed courts to “provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes,” 361 U.S. at 

292, after Meghrig, the court of appeals believed that “an 

exploration of statutory purpose is no longer the Supreme 

Court’s polestar in cases raising interpretive questions 
9 

about the scope of statutory remedies.” App., infra, 32a. 

The court viewed this case as “materially indistinguishable” from Meghrig. Id. at 38a. 

b. Chief Judge Wood, joined by Judges Rovner and 

Hamilton, dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. 

App., infra, 41a-63a. They disagreed with the panel’s conclusion that Congress’s use of the term “injunction” necessarily excludes an order of restitution. Rather, they opined, 

injunctions “come in all shapes and sizes” and may require 

a party to undertake affirmative acts, including “an order 

requiring the enjoined party to return ill-gotten gains, or 

to pay money into a court escrow account, or otherwise to 

turn over property.” Id. at 42a, 43a. 

The dissent argued that the multiple enforcement 

mechanisms provided in the FTC Act do not preclude 

reading Section 13(b) to authorize monetary relief. Rather, 

agencies have “broad discretion in their choice of which of 

several authorized procedural tools they wish to use as 

they carry out their mission.” App., infra, 45a. The dissent 

found that Section 19’s savings clause (15 U.S.C. 57b(e)) 

“says it all: the non-exhaustive examples of relief Congress 

chose to mention in one section do not limit what a court 

may or may not include pursuant to another section—for 

instance, a 13(b) injunction.” App., infra, 62a. Similarly, the 

“other and further equitable relief ” clause in Section 5(l) 

simply “clarifies that courts have a wide range of equitable 

relief available to them” to enforce a cease-and-desist order in addition to the limited mandatory injunction. Ibid.

The dissent disagreed with the panel’s analysis of Meghrig. App., infra, 52a-55a. It noted that Meghrig involved 

private plaintiffs suing under a very different statutory 

scheme, and that even in that context Meghrig “did not 

purport categorically to exclude from injunctive relief an 
10 

order to make payments.” Id. at 54a. The dissent concluded 

that “[t]he majority’s interpretation upends what the agency and Congress have understood to be the status quo for 

thirty years, and in so doing grants a needless measure of 

impunity to brazen scammers like the defendant in this 

case.” Id. at 62-63a. 

 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 

The court of appeals’ decision creates a square circuit 

split on an important and recurring question: whether, in a 

suit brought under Section 13(b), a district court may order 

a defendant to both cease its illegal practices and return 

the money it gained as a result of those practices. The 

resolution of that question is critically important to the 

Commission’s ability to carry out its consumer protection 

and antitrust enforcement missions. The court of appeals’ 

decision neuters Section 13(b) within the Seventh Circuit 

and makes the remedies available to the Commission depend on the happenstance of geography. 

The court of appeals’ analysis of Section 13(b) is incorrect. The court’s cramped view that injunctions are strictly 

limited to prohibitions on future misconduct contradicts 

historical understanding of that remedy. Courts and commentators have understood since the founding era that 

injunctions may serve reparative purposes and may include an order requiring the defendant to yield up wrongfully acquired property. That principle informs the controlling decisions in Porter and Mitchell that a statute permitting an injunction invokes “all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court,” including the power to award 

monetary relief. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398. Porter and Mitchell were the law of the land when Congress added Section 

13(b) to the FTC Act, and they remain good law after Me-
11 

ghrig, which involved private litigation under a statute very 

different from Section 13(b). 

The Court should grant this petition notwithstanding 

the grant of certiorari in Liu v. SEC, No. 18-1501, which 

involves whether disgorgement under the securities laws is 

an equitable remedy in light of this Court’s decision in 

Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), that such orders are 

penal in nature. The answer to that question will not resolve whether Section 13(b) authorizes district courts entering a permanent injunction against illegal conduct to 

order that money taken by that conduct be returned to 

consumers. The question here is distinct from the question 

in Liu, will not be resolved in that case, and warrants independent review. 

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS A SQUARE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON AN 

IMPORTANT AND RECURRING ISSUE. 

The decision of the court of appeals has unsettled the 

longstanding and uniform judicial interpretation that Section 13(b) authorizes district courts to enter injunctions 

requiring the return of illegally obtained funds. The court 

of appeals acknowledged that it was creating a circuit split 

when it held “that section 13(b)’s permanent-injunction 

provision does not authorize monetary relief.” App., infra, 

40a. Every other court of appeals that has decided that 

issue has held the opposite. 

Specifically, the First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, 

Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that Section 

13(b) authorizes district courts to enter injunctions that 

include monetary relief. See FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, 

Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2010); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 367 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In sum, Section 13(b) of the FTC Act permits courts to award not only 

injunctive relief but also ancillary relief, including mone-
12 

tary relief.”); FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 890-892 (4th Cir. 

2014) (“[B]ecause there is no affirmative and clear legislative restriction on the equitable powers of the district 

court, ordering monetary consumer redress is an appropriate ‘equitable adjunct’ to the district court’s injunctive 

power.”); FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 

1312, 1314-1315 (8th Cir. 1991); FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 

668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, 

Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[Section] 

13(b)’s grant of authority to provide injunctive relief carries with it the full range of equitable remedies, including 

the power to grant consumer redress.”); FTC v. U.S. Oil & 

Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984). Unlike the decision below, those courts have continually applied this Court’s decisions in Porter and Mitchell to uphold that authority. 

The issue is critically important: the ability to seek an 

injunction that requires the defendant to return illegally 

obtained funds to consumers is essential to the effective 

enforcement of the FTC Act and other laws enforced by 

the Commission. Stripping district courts of that authority 

would reduce Section 13(b) to a stop sign and would effectively reward fraudsters for their illegal conduct. 

Contrary to the court of appeals’ view, neither Section 

5(l) nor Section 19 of the FTC Act is an adequate alternative to requiring the return of unlawful gains under Section 

13(b). Section 5(l) allows civil penalties, but only against 

parties who have already been ordered by the Commission 

to cease and desist in an administrative enforcement proceeding and who then violate that order. See 15 U.S.C. 

45(l). It does not allow courts to order the return of gains 

from the original misconduct that led to the cease-anddesist order. Section 19 is also of limited utility. Although it 
13 

authorizes district courts to redress harm to consumers 

from violations of FTC rules, 15 U.S.C. 57b(a)(1), many 

cases do not involve rule violations. Section 19 also allows 

district courts to redress consumer harm in certain cases 

against defendants who have gone through the administrative process and been ordered to cease and desist from 

unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 15 U.S.C. 57b(a)(2). 

That remedy would be illusory in most of the cases that the 

Commission brings under Section 13(b) because defendants would dissipate their ill-gotten gains long before the 

Commission ever got to court. In suits under Section 13(b), 

the district court may freeze assets at the outset of litigation, but Section 19 does not provide similar protection. 

The issue is also recurring. The FTC brings dozens of 

cases each year seeking injunctions that return funds to 

consumers under Section 13(b). As of mid-2019, 55 such 

cases were pending in district courts.4

 The question presented here is integral to all of them. Three pending appellate cases raise the same issue, as do two currently pending 

petitions seeking certiorari in this Court. See FTC v. Hoyal 

& Assocs., No. 19-35668 (9th Cir.); FTC v. Abbvie, Inc., No. 

18-2621 (3d Cir.); FTC v. Dorfman, No. 19-11932 (11th Cir.); 

cert. petitions in Publishers Bus. Serv., Inc. v. FTC, No. 19-

507 & AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, No. 19-508. 

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS INCORRECT. 

1. The court of appeals’ decision rests on the proposition that “injunction” plainly refers only to forward-looking 

relief and necessarily excludes an order to return money 

 

4

 See generally FTC, Semiannual Federal Court Litigation Status 

Report, June 30, 2019, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/ 

quarterly-litigation-status-report/semiannual_litigation_report_6-30-

19.pdf. 
14 

improperly obtained in the past. It is “obvious,” the court 

held, that “[r]estitution isn’t an injunction.” App., infra, 

12a. That narrow reading of “injunction” was error. 

Contrary to the court of appeals’ reading, it has long 

been understood that an injunction can provide for restitution or other forms of monetary relief to undo harm caused 

by the defendant’s conduct. The leading legal dictionary 

defines “injunction” as “[a] court order commanding or 

preventing an action” and notes that the term encompasses 

a “reparative injunction” which “requir[es] the defendant 

to restore the plaintiff to the position that the plaintiff 

occupied before the defendant committed a wrong.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 904-905 (10th ed. 2014). Indeed, 

the understanding that injunctions may both prohibit future misconduct and remedy past harm by requiring the 

restoration of wrongfully obtained property dates at least 

to the earliest days of the Republic. Justice Story, for example, explained that although injunctions are “generally 

preventative and protective, rather than restorative,” they 

are “by no means confined to the former,” and “may contain a direction to the party defendant to yield up . . . lands 

or other property, constituting the subject-matter of the 

decree, in favor of the other party.” 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in 

England and America §§ 861-862, at 154-155 (1836). Applying that principle in Osborn v. Bank of the United 

States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824), the Court affirmed an injunction 

that forbade enforcement of a state tax law against the 

Bank and directed the state to return money improperly 

seized from the Bank under that law. Id. at 870-871. 

An early-20th-century commentator similarly explained 

that injunctions may “in some cases be used to reinstate 

the rights of persons to property of which they have been 
15 

deprived,” and that “a preventative and a mandatory injunction” can be “made to co-operate so that by a single 

exercise of equitable power an injury is both restrained 

and repaired.” 1 Howard C. Joyce, A Treatise on the Law 

Relating to Injunctions §§ 2, at 5; 2a, at 7 (1909). In the 

modern era, the leading scholar on remedies, Professor 

Dobbs, agrees that an injunction “may attempt to prevent 

harm, or to compel some form of reparation for harm already done,” and that “some injunctive orders both repair 

and prevent harm.” 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies

§§ 1.1, at 7; 2.9, at 225 (2d ed. 1993). Professor Dobbs specifically notes that an injunction may compel restitution. 

Id. § 1.1, at 7. 

Porter and Mitchell rest on the same principles. As the 

Court explained, “[n]othing is more clearly a part of the 

subject matter of a suit for an injunction than the recovery 

of that which has been illegally acquired and which has 

given rise to the necessity for injunctive relief.” Porter, 395 

U.S. at 399. It therefore requires an affirmative expression 

of Congress “in so many words, or by a necessary and 

inescapable inference,” to exclude that authority when 

Congress has authorized an injunction. Id. at 398; Mitchell, 

361 U.S. at 291. As further discussed below, those principles were well established when Congress granted district 

courts the authority to enter “a permanent injunction” in 

Section 13(b), but Congress did not place any limit on the 

grant of authority. The court of appeals, on the other hand, 

disregarded the established understanding by reading 

“injunction” to exclude monetary remedies. 

This Court has continued to recognize the broad nature 

of injunctions in cases decided after Porter and Mitchell. In 

California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990), for 

example, the Court held that an order requiring divestiture 
16 

of unlawfully acquired assets is a form of “injunctive relief” 

under the Clayton Act. The Court explained that “[o]n its 

face,” a statute authorizing “injunctive relief ” was broad 

enough to encompass an order requiring a company to 

divest itself of illegally acquired assets. Id. at 281. The 

statute stated “no restrictions or exceptions to the forms of 

injunctive relief ” that could be awarded, but instead expressed “Congress’ intention that traditional principles of 

equity govern the grant of injunctive relief.” Ibid. The 

“plain text” of the statute therefore authorized divestiture. 

Id. at 282. As the dissent in this case correctly observed, 

“[a]n order of divestiture is almost identical to an order 

requiring equitable restitution: both require the wrongdoer 

to turn over property that was unlawfully obtained.” App., 

infra, 44a. The court of appeals’ decision, by contrast, 

cannot be squared with American Stores. 

2. When Congress passes a law, it is presumed to understand how courts have interpreted existing laws using 

the same or similar language. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 

U.S. 575, 580-581 (1978). By the time Congress adopted 

Section 13(b) in 1973, this Court’s decisions in Porter and 

Mitchell were settled law. In addition, the Second Circuit 

had recently held that the authority to enter a “permanent 

or temporary injunction” in the securities laws authorized 

district courts to order the return of ill-gotten gains. See 

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-1308 

(1971); SEC v. Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d 1082, 1103-1105 

(1972). Congress would have understood that a statute 

empowering district courts to enter “a permanent injunction” in Section 13(b) would be interpreted the same way. 

Further, when Congress amends a statute but chooses 

not to alter an existing statutory interpretation “then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly dis-
17 

cerned.” North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 

535 (1982). In 1994, Congress undertook a thorough review 

of the FTC Act in connection with a reauthorization of the 

Commission. By then, multiple courts of appeals had recognized that Section 13(b) authorizes orders to return illgotten gains to consumers.5

 Congress amended Section 

13(b) to expand its venue provisions and authorize nationwide service of process, but did not alter the permanent 

injunction clause. See Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 10 (1994). 

That is “convincing support for the conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified the unanimous holdings of the 

Courts of Appeals.” Texas Dept. of Housing & Community 

Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 

2507, 2520 (2015). Indeed, the relevant Senate Report 

notes that Section 13(b) “authorizes the FTC to file suit to 

enjoin any violation of the FTC [Act]” and “obtain consumer redress,” and explained that the expansion of venue and 

service of process provisions were intended to “assist the 

FTC in its overall efforts.” S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 15-16 

(1993). 

By 2006, when still more courts of appeals had recognized that Section 13(b)’s authority encompasses monetary 

relief, Congress amended Section 5 to give the FTC authority over aspects of foreign commerce and stated in the 

statute that the new authority would include “[a]ll remedies available to the Commission . . . including restitution 

to domestic or foreign victims.” Pub. L. 109-455, § 3 (2006) 

(codified at 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(4)). By then, courts had ordered 

such relief under Section 13(b) hundreds of times, as Congress would have been well aware. 

 

5

 See H.N. Singer, 668 F.2d at 1112-1113; U.S. Oil & Gas, 748 F.2d at 

1432, 1434; Amy Travel Serv., 875 F.2d at 571-72; Sec. Rare Coin, 931 

F.2d at 1314-15. 
18 

In the decision below, however, the court of appeals 

summarily rejected those strong indications of legislative 

intent, thereby overriding the principles of statutory interpretation the Court has repeatedly set out. App., infra, 

19a-20a. That was error. 

3. The court of appeals further erred in its conclusion 

that this Court’s decision in Meghrig undermined Porter

and Mitchell and that an order returning ill-gotten gains to 

consumers under Section 13(b) is “materially indistinguishable” from the relief sought in Meghrig. App., infra, 

32a-33a, 38a. 

Meghrig involved a lawsuit filed by a private landowner 

against a prior owner to recover the costs of environmental 

cleanup under a provision of RCRA that permits such a 

suit where contamination presents “an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 

U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B). In such cases, the statute authorizes 

courts to “restrain” persons who contributed to pollution or 

order them to “take such other action as may be necessary.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)). 

When the case was filed, the landowner had already 

cleaned up the land, and the environmental contamination 

therefore presented no danger. The Court held that on 

those facts the statute “does not contemplate the award of 

past cleanup costs,” and that once the land had been remediated, the statute “quite clearly excludes waste that no 

longer presents such a danger.” Id. at 485-486, 488. 

Meghrig does not undermine Porter and Mitchell or 

control this case for several reasons. First, unlike statutes 

that authorize permanent injunctions without qualification 

(like Section 13(b) and those at issue in Porter and Mitchell), RCRA limits a court’s remedial authority to cases of 

imminent and substantial danger. The lawsuit in Meghrig 
19 

failed that statutory condition for suit because the land had 

already been decontaminated; the plaintiff sought “a remedy that compensates for past cleanup efforts.” Id. at 486. 

No similar situation existed in Porter and Mitchell or in 

this case, where the illegal scheme was ongoing at the time 

of suit. Indeed, Meghrig expressly declined to address 

whether “a private party could seek to obtain an injunction 

requiring another party to pay cleanup costs which arise 

after a RCRA citizen suit has been properly commenced.” 

Id. at 488. As the dissent in this case correctly noted, Meghrig “did not purport categorically to exclude from injunctive relief an order to make payments.” App., infra, 54a. 

Second, Meghrig involved a private plaintiff, not (as in 

Porter and Mitchell, and here) a government enforcement 

action. As the Third Circuit noted in rejecting the claim 

that Meghrig limits remedies in government enforcement 

cases, the money sought by the plaintiff “resembles traditional damages far more than . . . restitution.” United 

States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 

2005). 

Third, RCRA’s citizen-suit injunctive provision is integrally tied into “the extensive remedial scheme” that might 

have been disrupted by allowing monetary relief for already-remediated land. Id. at 231-232. That was not the 

case in Porter or Mitchell. 

Finally, nothing in Meghrig purports to undermine the 

principles established in Porter. Although the Court did not 

accept a government argument that relied partly on Porter, 

see Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487, it did not suggest that it was 

overruling or limiting the earlier decision. And since Meghrig was decided, the Court has relied upon Porter without qualification multiple times. In particular, in Kansas v. 

Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015), the Court relied on Porter
20 

in support of its authority to impose a monetary remedy 

under its equitable authority to apportion interstate water 

rights. Id. at 1052-1053, 1057. The Court noted that 

“[w]hen federal law is at issue and ‘the public interest is 

involved,’ a federal court’s ‘equitable powers assume an 

even broader and more flexible character than when only a 

private controversy is at stake.’” Id. at 1053 (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398); see also United States v. Oakland 

Cannabis Buyers’ Co-Op., 532 U.S. 483, 496-497 (2001); 

Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000). 

In light of these factors, other courts of appeals have 

correctly held that “Meghrig did not overrule or limit 

Porter and Mitchell.” United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 

F.3d 1052, 1057 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006); accord Lane Labs, 427 

F.3d at 232 (finding no “indication, either in Meghrig or 

since, that the Court has abandoned the holdings of Porter

and Mitchell”). In this case, the court of appeals erred by 

relying on Meghrig rather than the directly controlling 

authorities of Porter and Mitchell. 

4. The court of appeals further erred in its conclusion 

that the remedies created by two other enforcement provisions of the FTC Act mean that injunctions under Section 

13(b) cannot order defendants to return money they took 

from consumers. App., infra, 15a-16a. 

The FTC Act gives the Commission multiple ways to 

enforce the laws under its authority: by rulemaking, 

through the administrative cease-and-desist process, and 

through direct enforcement actions in federal court. See 15 

U.S.C. 57a (rulemaking); 45(b) (administrative enforcement); 53(b) (direct action). The choice between those 

enforcement mechanisms lies “in the informed discretion of 

the administrative agency.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 

194, 203 (1947); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 
21 

U.S. 267, 294 (1974). The court of appeals misapplied that 

principle by effectively ruling that when Congress allows a 

type of relief under one statutory enforcement mechanism, 

it necessarily withholds such relief from other mechanisms. 

Section 5(l) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(l), serves the sole 

purpose of supplementing the Commission’s administrative 

enforcement authority. It allows the Commission to sue for 

relief only against violators of a cease-and-desist order 

entered through the administrative process and provides 

remedies tailored for such violations, including civil penalties, “mandatory injunctions,” and “other and further equitable relief.” Ibid. The court of appeals erred in holding 

that without similar clauses Section 13(b) cannot support 

an order returning money to consumers. App., infra, 15a16a. That is the very approach this Court rejected in 

Mitchell when it held that a statute authorizing an injunction need not also provide for “other order[s]” to justify 

monetary relief. 361 U.S. at 296. 

The court of appeals was likewise wrong to hold that 

the monetary relief authorized by Section 19 limits the 

scope of Section 13(b). Congress stated expressly that the 

“[r]emedies provided” in Section 19 “are in addition to, and 

not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided 

by State or Federal law. Nothing in [Section 19] shall be 

construed to affect any authority of the Commission under 

any other provision of law.” 15 U.S.C. 57b(e). Given that 

savings clause, Section 19 cannot properly be read to limit 

the remedies available under Section 13(b). 

Nor does reading Section 13(b) to authorize monetary 

remedies render the procedural requirements to obtain 

monetary relief under Section 19 (as described by the court 

of appeals, App., infra, 16a-17a) “largely pointless.” App., 

infra, 17a. To the contrary, the two sections support the 
22 

Commission’s prerogative to choose among the enforcement tools Congress has provided by balancing power 

between the courts and the Commission depending on 

which route the agency takes. When the Commission opts 

for direct action under Section 13(b) to end illegal practices 

and return money to consumers, it cedes to the court the 

determination whether there has been a violation. By contrast, if the Commission chooses to proceed under Section 

19, it retains plenary authority to determine that a particular practice should be prohibited (through rulemaking) or 

that particular conduct is illegal (through the administrative process), but in exchange for having to satisfy the 

procedural requirements of Section 19 before seeking 

judicial redress. The court of appeals’ decision upends that 

balanced remedial scheme by crippling Section 13(b) and 

requiring the Commission to obtain consumer redress only 

via Section 19. That was error. 

III.THE QUESTION PRESENTED MERITS PLENARY REVIEW 

AND THIS CASE IS THE IDEAL VEHICLE TO RESOLVE IT. 

The question presented here is also presented by the 

petitions in No. 19-508, AMG Capital Management v. FTC, 

and No. 19-507, Publishers Business Services v. FTC. In 

his response to the AMG petition, the Solicitor General 

acknowledges that the circuit split would “ordinarily warrant this Court’s review,” but recommends that the Court 

hold that petition based on a perceived “overlap” between 

the issue here and the question presented in No. 18-1501, 

Liu v. SEC (petition granted Nov. 1, 2019).6 The Court 

should not hold this petition but grant it and hold AMG

 

6

 The Solicitor General’s brief in opposition in No. 19-507, Publishers 

Business Services, Inc. v. FTC, recommends that the petition be 

denied or in the alternative held for Liu. 
23 

pending resolution of this case. The question presented 

here is ripe for review, distinct from Liu, and unlikely to be 

answered by the Court’s disposition of that case. At the 

same time, the circuit split has a continuing adverse effect 

on the Commission’s ability to protect consumers, and this 

case presents an ideal vehicle to resolve it. 

1. The question presented in Liu is: “Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission may seek and obtain 

disgorgement from a court as ‘equitable relief ’ for a securities law violation even though this Court has determined 

that such disgorgement is a penalty.” That question follows 

from the Court’s recent decision that “SEC disgorgement 

constitutes a penalty” within the meaning of the 5-year 

statute of limitations for civil penalties, 28 U.S.C. 2462. 

Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1638 (2017). Whether SEC 

disgorgement is properly considered an “equitable” remedy in light Kokesh will not resolve the question here, namely, whether the authority in Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to 

enter a “permanent injunction” authorizes an order to 

return to consumers money illegally taken from them. 

Indeed, the petitioners’ merits brief in Liu demonstrates that the issues presented there will not determine 

the outcome here. The brief ’s argument focuses on (1) the 

SEC’s statutory authority to obtain “disgorgement”; (2) 

the Court’s decision in Kokesh that SEC disgorgement is 

penal; (3) whether penal remedies are within the traditional scope of equity; and (4) the effect of holding in Liu’s 

favor. Liu Pet. Br. 15-19 & 35-40, 19-26, 26-33, 40-43. To 

make the case that SEC disgorgement orders are penal 

and not “equitable,” the brief takes pains to distinguish 

disgorgement orders that do not return money to victims 

from orders that provide restitution to injured parties. Id.

at 6, 25, 30-31, 34 & n.16. 
24 

Unlike the SEC disgorgement orders at issue in Liu, 

neither this Court nor any other has held that orders including monetary relief under the FTC Act are punitive. 

Indeed, the judgments in Liu and this case starkly illustrate the differences between SEC disgorgement and the 

relief awarded under Section 13(b). The court in Liu ordered $26.7 million in disgorgement and did not require 

that the SEC use the money to compensate injured investors.7 Liu Pet. App. 62a. Here, by contrast, the judgment 

directs that the monetary relief be used for “consumer 

redress and any attendant expenses for the administration 

of any redress fund.”8 Such compensatory orders are typical in Section 13(b) cases; as discussed above, virtually all 

of the money the FTC recovers is repaid to injured consumers. 

Thus, no matter how the Court resolves its holding in 

Kokesh that SEC disgorgement is a penalty with the contention that relief under the securities laws must be “equitable,” the decision in Liu will not answer whether Section 

13(b) authorizes district courts to order monetary relief for 

compensatory purposes. 

2. That question has been definitively answered in eight 

circuits, with only the decision below diverging from the 

others.9 It is ripe for review now. The issue has been thor-

 

7

 That approach appears typical of SEC disgorgement cases. In 

Kokesh, this Court observed that “in many cases, SEC disgorgement is 

not compensatory” and that courts have required disgorgement “regardless of whether the disgorged funds will be paid to such investors 

as restitution.” 137 S. Ct. at 1644 (quoting SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 

F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1997)). 

8

 The order provides for disgorgement to the Treasury only as a last 

resort. App., infra, 127a. 

9

 The question is pending in one court with no binding precedent on 

the issue, see FTC v. Abbvie Inc., No. 18-2621 (3d Cir.). 
25 

oughly examined in multiple decisions in the courts of 

appeals for more than 30 years and is unlikely to benefit 

from further percolation. Because it will not be answered 

in Liu, holding this petition would serve no purpose other 

than delay while a serious impediment to Commission 

enforcement persists. 

Until the split is resolved, the FTC Act will mean one 

thing in the Seventh Circuit and something different in 

seven other circuits. In the Seventh Circuit, unlike the 

others, Section 13(b) will be useless to return money taken 

from consumers by scam artists like respondents. The 

circuit split will also cause unnecessary and timeconsuming litigation over forum: defendants have already 

sought to force enforcement cases against them into courts 

in the Seventh Circuit. The upshot is Commission resources spent on procedural fencing rather than enforcement action. Given the consequences to Commission enforcement and to the consumers it seeks to protect, the 

Court should not delay resolution of the issue, but should 

grant the petition in this case. 

If—following Liu—the Court were simply to remand 

this case (and AMG), the split and its consequences to 

consumers would likely persist for years with little prospect of righting itself. 

3. This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve the circuit 

split. The issue was squarely presented and dispositive in 

the court of appeals and there are no procedural or other 

impediments to its resolution in this Court. The same is not 

true in the other pending petitions. In Publishers Business 

Services, the petitioners waived the issue by failing to raise 

it properly below. See Brief in Opp’n, No. 19-507, at 4. 

Although the petition in AMG would otherwise present an 

appropriate vehicle, the Solicitor General’s view that the 
26 

case be held pending Liu makes this case the most suitable 

candidate for review. The best course would be to grant the 

Commission’s petition and hold AMG pending its resolution. 

CONCLUSION 

The petition should be granted. 

Respectfully submitted, 

ALDEN F. ABBOTT

General Counsel 

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel 

for Litigation 

MICHAEL BERGMAN

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

MATTHEW M. HOFFMAN

Attorneys 

 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

DECEMBER 2019