MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2021 ME	3

Docket: SRP-20-13

Argued: November	18,	2020

Decided: January	14,	2021

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

ANTHONY	S.	LENG

CONNORS,	J.

[¶1]		Anthony	S.	Leng	appeals	from	his sentence	after	pleading guilty to	

the	intentional	and	knowing	murder	of	his	wife.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§ 201(1)(A)

(2020).		He	argues	that	the	sentencing	court	(Cumberland	County,	Horton,	J.)	

misapplied the	 first	 step	 of	 the	 sentencing	 analysis	 required	 by	 statute,	see

17-A M.R.S.	§ 1252-C	(2018),

1 by	not	adequately comparing the	circumstances	

of	 his crime	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 other	 defendants	 who	 had	 committed	

similar	murders.		We	affirm	Leng’s	sentence.

 1		In	2019,	Maine’s	sentencing	statutes	were	repealed	and	replaced.		See P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	§§	A-1,	

A-2 (emergency,	effective	May	16,	2019).		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1252-C	(2018),	which	was	in	effect	at	

the	time	of	Leng’s	crime,	was	replaced	by 17-A	M.R.S.	§ 1602(1)(2020).		The	differences between	the	

statutes	had	no	effect	on the	trial	court’s	sentence or	this	appeal.		See State	v.	Treadway,	2020 ME 127,	

¶	13	n.4,	--- A.3d	---.
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I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		The	following	undisputed	facts	are	drawn	from	the	State’s	summary	

of	the	evidence	that	it	would	have	presented	had	the	matter	proceeded	to	trial.

See State v.	Lord,	2019	ME	82,	¶	3,	208 A.3d 781;	M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	11(b)(3),	(e).

[¶3]		On	 January	 7,	2018,	shortly	before	10:00	 p.m.,	Leng	 and	his	wife

arrived	home	after	watching	a	football	game	at	a	friend’s	house.		Their	ten- and	

fifteen-year-old	sons were	already	home.		Almost	immediately	after	Leng	and	

his	wife entered	 the	 kitchen,	 their	younger son,	who	was	in	 the	living	 room,	

heard	a	single	gunshot	followed	by	more	gunshots.		He	heard	his	mother	say	

“ah,”	believed he	heard	her	fall to	the	floor,	and	heard	his	father	crying.		He also

smelled	the	odor	of	gun powder.		The	younger	son	went	into	the	kitchen	where	

he	saw	his	father standing	by	the	refrigerator.		He	then	saw his	mother	lying on	

the	floor next	to	blood	and	a	gun,	and	he screamed.

[¶4]	 	The older	 son,	who	was	 upstairs	 getting	 ready	 to	 take	 a	 shower,	

heard	his	parents	arrive	home	and	then	almost	immediately	heard	a	gunshot,	a	

pause,	and	then	more	gunshots.	 He	ran	downstairs	where	he	saw	his	brother	

in	the	living	room	with	his	head	buried	in	the	couch.		The	older	son	asked	his	

father	what	he	had	done, to	which	Leng replied,	“I	just	killed	your	mother.”		The	

older	son	picked	up	his	brother	and	ran	outside.		Once	outside,	the	older	son	
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went	to	the	door	that	led into	the	kitchen	and	looked	through the	window.		He	

saw	his	mother	lying	on	her	stomach	on	the	floor	with	her	empty	hands	by	her	

side and his	father’s	gun on	the	floor near	his	mother.		The	older	son	called	9-1-1	

and	told	the	operator	that	his	father	had	killed	his mother	and	that	he	and	his	

brother	were	hiding	outside.		He	stayed	on	the	line	until	police	arrived, at	which	

time	both	children ran	barefoot	to	the	police.

[¶5]	 	After	 shooting his	 wife,	 Leng	 also	 called	 9-1-1.	 	 He	 provided	 the	

address	but	answered	no	further	questions	and	made	wailing	sounds.		From	the	

time	the	first	9-1-1	call	was	placed	until	his	surrender	to	police,	Leng	remained

alone in	the	house	for	fifteen	minutes.

[¶6]		When	police	entered	the	home,	they	found	the	victim	lying	on	her	

right	side	on	 the	kitchen	 floor.		Her	purse	was	still	on	her	arm, and	her	keys	

were	under	her	body.		The	victim	had	a	knife	in	her	right	hand	and	eight	other	

knives grouped	around	her	head	and	on	top	of	her	hair.		When	the	police	found	

the handgun on	the	floor	near	the	victim, the	slide was in	a locked	back	position,	

indicating	 that	 all	 of	 the	 ammunition	 in	 the	 gun	 had	 been	 spent,	 and	 a

manually-activated	red	dot	laser	was	in	 the	on	position.		The police collected	

ten	casings	and	 ten	bullets	or	bullet	 fragments,	and	 they	discovered	multiple	

bullet	holes	less	than	six	inches	above the	floor	in	the	cabinet	door	next	to	the	
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victim’s	head.		Shards	from	the	cabinet	door	were	found	on	the	victim’s	hair	and	

coat.

[¶7]	 	 The	 victim’s	 autopsy revealed	 that	 she	 had	 died	 as	 a	 result	 of	

multiple	gunshot	wounds	 to	her	head	and	neck.		Of	 significance, the	medical	

examiner	 determined	 that	 one	 of	 the	 six	 shots	 that	 struck	 the	 victim	 had	

entered	 the	 right	 side	 of	 her face,	 which	 was	 the	 side	 facing	 the	 floor	 when	

police	arrived	and	was	the	only	wound	that	travelled	in	a	“slightly	right	to	left	

and	 downward”	 path.	 Based	 on the	 medical	 examiner’s	 report,	 witnesses’	

reports	of	a	pause	between	gunshots,	and	the	physical	evidence	at	the	scene,	

police	determined	 that	 the	 victim	was	 first	 shot	when	 she	was	in	an	upright	

position	and	then	shot	several	more	times	after	she	had	collapsed	to	the	floor.

[¶8]		On	January	16,	2018,	the	State	filed	a	complaint	charging	Leng	with	

murdering	his	wife, to	which	he	pleaded	not	guilty.		In	February	2018,	Leng	was	

indicted	by	 the	grand	jury	 on	 one	count	 of	intentional	and	 knowing	murder,	

17-A	M.R.S.	§ 201(1)(A).

[¶9]		In	September 2019,	after	the	State	agreed	to	recommend	a	sentence	

not	 to	 exceed	 forty	 years in	 prison,	 Leng	 changed	 his	 plea	 to	 guilty.	 	 After	
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following	 the	 procedure	 prescribed	 in	 M.R.U.	 Crim. P.	 11(b)-(e),	 the	 court	

accepted	Leng’s	guilty	plea.2

[¶10]	 	 The	 court	 held	 a	 sentencing	 hearing	 three	 months	 later.	 It

considered	the	parties’	oral	arguments; the	parties’	written memoranda,	which

referenced	sentences	in	seven	other	cases	that	either	the	State or Leng,	or	both,

deemed	 comparable; a	 statement	 from	 Leng accepting	 responsibility for	 the	

murder and	apologizing	to	his	children; and	several victim	impact	statements.3

[¶11]		With	respect	to	the	basic	sentence,	the	parties	differed	markedly	

in	 their recommendations. The	 State	 urged a	 basic	 sentence	 of	 sixty	 years’	

imprisonment,	arguing that	the	presence	of	children	during	the	murder	would	

justify	 the	imposition	 of	a	life	 sentence; Leng	committed	 the	 “ultimate	act	 of	

domestic	violence”	after	years	of	threatening	to	kill	the	victim, just	as	she	was	

preparing	 to	 leave	 him; and	 his	 staging	 of	 the	 crime	 scene	 to	 create	 the	

appearance	 that the	 victim	 was responsible	 for	 her	 own	 murder was	

 2		During	the	Rule	11	hearing,	the	court	asked	Leng twice whether	he	understood	that	his	sentence	

could	 range	 anywhere	 between	 the	 minimum	 mandatory	 sentence	 of	 twenty-five	 years’	

imprisonment	to	the	agreed-upon	“cap”	of	forty	years, to	which	Leng	repeatedly	answered	that	he	

understood.	 See M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	11(c)(1);	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1251(1)	(2018).

3		The	adult	daughter	of	Leng and	the	victim	submitted	a	written	letter	to	the	court	describing	the	

physical	and	verbal	abuse	that	Leng	had	inflicted	on	the	daughter during	her	childhood.		The	court	

referred	 to	 this	letter	at	sentencing	when	discussing	 the	effect that	 the	 victim’s	death	had	on	her	

children.
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particularly	 “cruel	 and	 callous.”	 	In	 contrast,	Leng	urged	 the	 court	 to	 set	 the	

basic	 sentence	 at	 thirty-five	 years’	 imprisonment,	 citing	 several	 comparable	

cases	and	arguing	that	“[t]his	was	not	a	life	sentence	case.”		The	State	and	Leng	

recommended	final	sentences	of	forty	years	and	thirty	years,	respectively.

[¶12]		In	pronouncing	its	sentence,	the	court	began	with	the	purposes	of	

sentencing,	drawing	special	attention	to	the	goals	of	eliminating	inequalities	in	

sentencing	 by	 considering	 sentences	 imposed	 in	 similar	 cases,	 encouraging	

individualization	of	sentencing,	and	recognizing	“domestic	violence	as	a	serious	

crime.”	 	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 § 1151	 (2018).4	 	The	 court	 also	 acknowledged	 that	 the	

minimum	mandatory	sentence	for	murder	is	twenty-five	years’	imprisonment	

and	that	the	maximum	sentence	is	life	imprisonment,	which,	the	court	noted,	

could	have	been	imposed	here	where	the	crime	was	the	murder	of	a	parent	in	

the	presence	of	that	parent’s	children.

[¶13]	 	After	 these	 remarks,	 the	 court	 set	 the	 basic	 sentence	 at	 fifty	 to	

fifty-five	 years.	 	 In	 formulating	 the	 basic	 sentence,	 the	 court	 took	 into	

consideration	several	factors:	(1)	the	murder	was	a	crime	of	domestic	violence;

(2)	Leng’s previous	threats	to	kill	the	victim	could	be	taken	as	evidence	that	he	

 4		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	 §	1151	 (2018)	was	 repealed	and	 replaced	with 17-A	M.R.S.	 §	1501	(2020).		

P.L. 2019,	ch.	113,	§§	A-1,	A-2.
7

had	formulated	the	intent	to	murder	the	victim	before	that	day; (3)	Leng	shot	

the	 victim	 several	 times,	 including	 after	 she	 had	 fallen	 to	 the	 floor; (4)	 the	

victim’s	children	were	not	only	present	in	the	home	at	the	time	of	the	murder	

but	saw	their	mother’s	lifeless	body	on	the	floor	as	they	left	the	house	in	a	panic;

and	(5) Leng	staged	 the	crime	scene	 to	make	it	appear	as	 though	he	acted	in	

self-defense, thereby	casting	blame	on	the victim	for	her	own	death. The	court	

stated	 that in	 addition	 to	 the	 basic	 sentences	 in	 the	 cases	 presented	 by	 the	

parties,	 it also	 considered	 a	 case over	 which	 it	 had	 presided	 involving	 a	

conviction	for	domestic-violence-related murder	in	the	presence	of	children in	

which the	court	had	set	the	basic	sentence	at	fifty	to	fifty-five	years.

[¶14]	 	 After	 considering	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 factors,	 the	 court	

arrived	 at	 a	 final	 sentence	 of	 forty	 years in	 prison.

5	 	 The	 court	 stated that	

although	 the	 forty-year	 sentence	 was	 “entirely	 appropriate	 in	 this	 case,	 the	

sentence	in	the	absence	of	a	plea	agreement	might	have	been	more.”

[¶15]		Leng	applied	to	the	Sentence	Review	Panel,	seeking	leave	to	appeal	

from	 his	 sentence	 on	 the	 assertion that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 setting	 the	 basic	

 5	 	 The	 court	 also	 ordered	 Leng	 to	 pay	 $5,100	 to	 the	 Victims’	 Compensation	 Fund	 for	

reimbursement	of	the	victim’s	funeral	expenses.
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sentence, leading	 to	 an	 excessive	 final	 sentence.	 	 The	 Panel	 granted	 his	

application.		See M.R.	App.	P.	20;	15	M.R.S.	§§	2151-2153	(2020).

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶16]		Leng	argues	that	the	court	failed	to	conduct	a	proper	comparison	

of	the	circumstances	of	his crime	to	similar	murders.		He	asserts that the	court’s	

reliance	upon	a	single	case	over	which	the	court	had	presided	is	inadequate	and	

does not	serve	the	goal	of	consistency	in	sentencing.

A. Standard	of	Review

[¶17]		In	a	murder	case,	the	sentencing	court	employs a	two-step	process.		

State	v.	Hayden,	2014	ME	31,	¶	17,	86	A.3d	1221;	17-A	M.R.S.	§§	1201(1)(A),	

1252-C	 (2018).6	 	“In	 the	 first	 step,	 the	 court	 determines	 the	 basic	 period	 of	

incarceration,	 and	 in	 the	 second,	 the	 maximum	 period	 of	 incarceration.”		

Hayden,	2014	ME	31,	¶	17,	86	A.3d	1221.		We review	the	determination	of	the	

basic	 sentence	 for	misapplication	 of	legal	principles and	abuse	 of	 the	court’s	

sentencing	power.		State	v.	Nichols,	2013	ME	71,	¶	13,	72	A.3d	503.

 6	 	Title	 17-A	M.R.S.	 §	 1201(1)(A)	 (2018)	was	 repealed	and	 replaced	 by	17-A	M.R.S.	 §	 1602(2)	

(2020).		P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	§§	A-1,	A-2.
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B. Comparable	Cases

[¶18]		To	determine	the	basic	period	of	incarceration,	a	sentencing court	

considers	“the	particular	nature	and	seriousness	of	 the	offense	as	committed	

by	the	offender.”		17-A	M.R.S.	§	1252-C(1).		The	court	“examines	the	crime,	the	

defendant’s	conduct	in	committing	it,	and	looks	at	other	sentences	for	similar	

offenses.”		Hayden, 2014 ME 31, ¶ 18, 86 A.3d 1221 (alteration and quotation

marks omitted).	 	 Consideration	 of	 comparable	 sentences,	 however,	 is	 at	 the	

discretion	of	the	court.		Nichols,	2013	ME	71,	¶¶ 16-20,	72	A.3d	503;	see	also	

State	 v.	 Stanislaw,	 2013	 ME	 43,	 ¶	 21,	 65	 A.3d	 1242 (stating	 that	 the	 court	

examines,	at	its	discretion, other	sentences for	similar	offenses);	State	v.	Basu,	

2005	ME	74,	¶	23,	875	A.2d	686 (stating	 that	 the	court	may consider	similar	

conduct	 of	 other	 offenders	in	deciding	 the	basic	sentence).		 “[T]here	may	be	

times	 when	 appropriate	 case	 comparisons	 would	 advance	 the	 sentencing	

principle	 of	 eliminating	 significant	 unjustified	inequalities	in	 sentences,”	 but	

“[t]he	 court	 has	 wide	 discretion	 in	 determining	 the	 sources	 and	 types of	

information	to	consider	when	imposing	a	sentence.”		State	v.	Reese,	2010	ME 30,	

¶	28,	991	A.2d	806.

[¶19]		Leng’s	contention that	the	sentencing	court	relied	on	only	one	case	

is	not	supported	by	the	record.		Although	the	court’s	commentary	during this	
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part	of	the	analysis	was	brief,	the	court expressly	stated	that	it	had	considered	

the	basic	sentences	in	 the	cases	presented	by	 the	parties	as	well	as	a	similar	

case	over	which	the	court had	presided.		The	court	was	not required,	however,

to	conduct	a	comparison of	Leng’s	case	to	similar	cases at	all—let	alone	provide	

an exhaustive	 enumeration	 of	 analogous	 cases—before	 setting	 the	 basic	

sentence.	 See Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 20, 72 A.3d 503 (“While	it	is	permissible	

for	 the	sentencing	court	 to	consider	comparable sentences	at	 the	 first	step	if	

appropriate,	neither	the	statute	nor	our	case	law	mandate	it.”).		Thus,	we	find	

no	error.

C. Sentencing

[¶20]	 The	term	 of	imprisonment	imposed for	a	conviction	for murder	

can	range	from	twenty-five	years to	life.	 17-A	M.R.S.	§ 1251	(2018).7		“When	a	

court	imposes	a	basic	sentence	at	or	near	the	maximum,	it	does	not	misapply	

sentencing	 principles	 if	 it	 finds	 the	 defendant’s	 conduct	 most	 serious	 as	

compared	 to	 other	means	 of	 committing	 the	 crime	within	 that	 same	 range.”		

Hayden, 2014 ME 31, ¶ 18, 86 A.3d 1221 (alterations	 and	 quotation	 marks	

omitted).

 7	 	 Title	 17-A	M.R.S.	 §	 1251	 (2018)	 was	 repealed	 and	 replaced	 by	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1603	 (2020).

P.L. 2019,	ch.	113,	§§	A-1,	A-2.
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[¶21]		Here,	 the	court	properly	considered	 the	presence	of	the	victim’s	

children	 at	 the	murder	in	setting	 the	basic	sentence at	 the	higher	end	 of	 the	

range.		In	State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 46, 995 A.2d 243, we observed that	

children	exposed	to	violence are	at risk	of	physical,	neurological,	psychological,	

and	developmental	harm. Because	of	the	“severe	collateral	impact	on	children,”	

we	stated	that	the	presence	of	children	at	or	close	to	the	scene	of	a	murder	is	

“an	aggravating	circumstance	that	could	raise	a	defendant’s	homicidal	conduct	

to	 ‘most	 serious.’”	 	 Id. (quoting	 State	 v.	 Hutchinson,	 2009 ME	 44,	 ¶	 42,	

969 A.2d 923).	 	 We	 recently	 reaffirmed	 this	 principle	 in	 State	 v.	 Weyland,	

2020 ME 129,	 ¶	 36,	 240	 A.3d	 841,	 in	 which	 we	 concluded	 that	 “children	

witnessing	 ‘horrific	 violence’	 exacted	 upon	 one	 parent	 by	 another	 is	 a	

significant	factor	in	a	sentencing	decision.”		See	also State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45,

¶¶ 38-39, 89 A.3d 132;	Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 28, 72 A.3d 503.

[¶22]	 	 Next,	 the	 court	 appropriately	 recognized	 that	 the	 domestic	

violence	nature	of	the	murder	was	a	factor	to	be	given	special	consideration in	

sentencing.		See	Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 29, 72 A.3d 503 (concluding that murder

committed as an act of domestic violence is “an objective factor properly

considered in the first step of the sentencing analysis”).		Effective	two	months	

before	Leng	murdered	his	wife,	 the	Legislature	amended	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1151,	
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establishing as	 a goal	 of	 sentencing “[t]o	 recognize	 domestic	 violence	 as	 a	

serious	 crime	 against	 the	 individual	 and	 society.”	 	 P.L.	 2017,	 ch.	 105,	 §	 3	

(effective	 Nov. 1,	 2017)	 (codified	 at	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1151(9)	 (2018)).		

Acknowledging the	recent	statutory	amendment,8 the	sentencing	court	stated	

that it	 “intend[ed]	 to	 keep	 that	 particular	 goal	 of	 sentencing	 in	 mind	 as	 [it]	

proceeded	with	the	analysis.”

[¶23]		Finally,	the	court	properly	considered	other	factors	in	setting	the	

basic	sentence,	including	that	Leng	had	threatened	to	kill	his	wife on	numerous	

occasions before	he	murdered	her, thereby	demonstrating	that	he	had	formed	

the intent	to	commit	murder	at	some	earlier	time, and	that	he	had staged	the	

crime	scene	to	make	the	victim	of	his	abuse	appear	to	be	the	aggressor.

[¶24]	 	 In	 sum,	 the	 court	 followed	 proper	 sentencing	 procedures,	

appropriately	exercised	its	discretion	in	determining	the	sources	and	types	of	

information	 to	 consider, and thoughtfully	 considered	 the	 relevant	 facts	 and	

sentencing	principles	in determining	Leng’s	sentence.

The	entry	is:

Sentence affirmed.

 8	 	 Notably,	 several	 months	 after	 the	 murder	 occurred,	 the	 Legislature	 repealed	 and	 replaced	

17-A M.R.S.	§ 1251,	prescribing	the	length	of	a	sentence	for	a	murder	conviction,	to	require	courts	to	

“assign	 special	 weight”	 when	 the	 victim	 was	 “a	 family	 or	 household	 member”	 and	 “a	 victim	 of	

domestic	violence	committed by	the	convicted	person.”		P.L.	2017,	ch.	374,	§	1	(effective	Aug. 1, 2018)	

(codified	at	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 1251(2)(C)	(2018)).
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James	R.	Gioia,	Esq.,	Fairfield	&	Associates,	P.A.,	Portland,	and	Peter	J.	Cyr,	Esq.

(orally),	Law	Offices	of	Peter	J.	Cyr,	Portland,	for	appellant	Anthony	S.	Leng

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Donald	W.	Macomber,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.

(orally),	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2018-201

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY