In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-13-00277-CR 

ALVIN RAY COOPER, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 242nd District Court 

Hale County, Texas 

Trial Court No. A19357-1211, Honorable Edward Lee Self, Presiding 

 

May 6, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Alvin Ray Cooper was convicted of forgery and sentenced to eighteen months 

confinement in a state jail facility. He seeks to overturn that conviction by contending 

that 1) the trial court submitted an inaccurate accomplice witness instruction to the jury, 

and 2) the evidence, excluding that uttered by accomplices, failed to connect him to the 

offense. We affirm the judgment. 

Appellant was convicted of forging a check in the amount of $500 written on the 

account of his employer, Floydada Livestock, Inc. According to the record, he picked up 
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Joel Santos, a fellow employee, and drove to Mr. Payroll in Plainview, Texas in his dark 

green, four-door truck. Able Vasquez and Steven Posada allegedly accompanied them. 

Santos testified that appellant filled out the check, gave it to him to cash, and then 

Santos cashed it and gave all the money to appellant.

Sufficiency of the Non-Accomplice Evidence

Appellant contends that the non-accomplice evidence failed to connect him to the 

offense. We disagree and overrule the issue.

In addressing appellant's complaint, we eliminate the accomplice testimony and 

examine the rest of the record to see if there is evidence tending to connect the 

defendant to the commission of the crime charged. Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 

361 (Tex. 2001). The evidence does not have to directly tie appellant to the offense or 

be sufficient by itself to establish his guilt for same. Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 

462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). It need only "'link the accused in some way to the 

commission of the crime and show that rational jurors could conclude that this evidence 

sufficiently tended to connect [the accused] to the offense.'" Simmons v. State, 282 

S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), quoting Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). So too may it be circumstantial. Gaston v. State, 324 S.W.3d 

905, 909 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). 

Evidence of record here discloses that appellant worked for the company that 

owned the account against which the checks were written, that he did odd jobs including 

janitorial work for the business, and that he had "free access" to the buildings. Joel 

Santos, his purported compatriot in the scheme, also worked at the same business. 

Additionally, Santos and appellant engaged in several recorded telephone 
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conversations wherein appellant could be heard saying such things as 1) "What did you 

say?" when Santos told him that he had been asked about the "checks", 2) Santos 

having to protect him, 3) his being unable to help Santos if he (appellant) was in jail), 4)

his offering financial help to Santos, 5) his asking if Santos had said anything about him 

(appellant); and 6) wishing he had not brought any others in, and believing he should 

have left it to himself, Vasquez, and Santos. Combined, this was ample evidence 

linking appellant "in some way to the commission of the crime" for which he was 

prosecuted. 

Accomplice Witness Instruction 

Next, appellant asserts that the trial court submitted an accomplice witness 

instruction to the jury that misapplied the law. That is, the court instructed the jury that 

“[e]vidence is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice if that evidence 

tends to connect the defendant, Alvin Ray Cooper, with the commission of any offense 

that may have been committed.” (Emphasis added). Using the word "any" was error, 

according to appellant, because the evidence must tend to connect him to the particular 

offense with which he was charged. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (West 

2005) (stating that a conviction cannot rest upon the testimony of an accomplice unless 

it is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense 

committed). While we agree that the passage was an inaccurate statement of the law, 

we nonetheless find it harmless.

 No one objected to the inaccuracy at trial. Therefore, it can be considered 

reversible error only if it caused appellant egregious harm. See Gelinas v. State, 398 

S.W.3d 703, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Furthermore, harm is egregious if it denied 
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the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). And, in making that assessment, we consider 1) the entire jury charge, 2) 

the state of the evidence including contested issues, 3) arguments of counsel, and 4) 

any other relevant information in the record. Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d at 705-06. 

With that said, we turn to the record before us.

Immediately following the contested instruction appeared other statements. The 

first specified that “[e]vidence is not sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an 

accomplice if the evidence merely shows an offense was committed.” (Emphasis 

added). Via the second, the jurors were told that they could “find the defendant guilty 

on the testimony of Joel Santos only if . . . [they] believe[d] that the testimony of Joel 

Santos is true and shows the defendant is guilty, and there is evidence, other than the 

testimony of Joel Santos, that tends to connect the defendant, Alvin Ray Cooper, with 

the commission of the crime charged against him . . . .” (Emphasis added). These 

passages informed the jury that the non-accomplice evidence had to tie the accused to 

the crime for which he was charged, not simply "any" crime. 

Furthermore, while the State mentioned the contested statement in its closing 

argument, the State also referred to the paragraph immediately below it which 

instructed the jury that the evidence had to connect appellant to the charged offense. 

To that, we add the non-accomplice evidence linking appellant to the offense, which 

evidence we described in the first issue addressed above. 

Simply put, the totality of the record fails to illustrate that the misstatement in 

question caused egregious harm. So, we overrule the issue. 
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Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

Brian Quinn 

Chief Justice

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