Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1607-CR-1662 | September 19, 2017 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Victoria L. Bailey

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Racquel Postiglione,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 19, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1607-CR-1662

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G06-1504-F5-14728

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Racquel Postiglione (“Postiglione”) appeals the trial court’s restitution order 

entered following her conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in 
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bodily injury.1 Postiglione argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

ordering her to pay $18,451.33 in restitution to the victim, contending that she 

did not cause the victim’s injuries for which restitution was ordered. 

Concluding that, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, there was 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom to show that the victim incurred 

medical costs as a result of Postiglione’s crime, we find no abuse of discretion 

and affirm the trial court’s order of restitution.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 

Postiglione to pay $18,451.33 in restitution to the victim.

Facts

[3] Around 1:00 a.m. on April 24, 2015, Postiglione and three male friends, 

including her boyfriend, Christopher Shafer (“Christopher”),2 and his brother, 

Michael Shafer (“Michael”), went into the Alley Cat bar (“the bar”) in Broad 

Ripple. Postiglione and her companions had already consumed varying levels 

of alcohol prior to arriving at the bar. The bartender, Matthew Marcuccilli 

(“Marcuccilli”), noticed Postiglione and the others as they walked in the bar 

because they were “very loud” and “clearly intoxicated.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 13). 

Marcuccilli “immediately decided not to serve them” any alcohol and instead 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.

2 During the trial, some of the witnesses referred to Christopher as Nicholas or Nick.
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served them water. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 13). Marcuccilli considered Postiglione to be 

“the rudest” of the group as she was “screaming profanities” and “[s]lurs” and 

“bothering” customers. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14). After Postiglione and the others 

caused multiple “confrontations” and “squabbles” with other customers, 

Marcuccilli asked them to leave the bar. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18). They, however, 

“kept sneaking back in” the bar, and Marcuccilli asked them to leave another 

three times. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). 

[4] Eventually, Marcuccilli, with a small, wooden bat in hand, hit the bat on the 

bar and threatened to call the police if Postiglione and her friends did not 

permanently leave the bar. Marcuccilli signaled to Joe Kelly (“Kelly”), who 

worked across the street from the bar and was a regular customer, that he 

needed help in getting Postiglione and her friends to leave the bar. Marcuccilli, 

with Kelly behind him, walked Postiglione and her friends to the door. As 

Postiglione walked out, she yelled, “I’ll kick that white bitch’s ass[,]” 

referencing another female customer. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 52). Once Postiglione and 

the others were out the door and had walked down the alley, Marcuccilli 

returned to the bar to work, and Kelly stood in the doorway for several minutes. 

[5] Shortly thereafter, Michael came back to the door of the bar, and Kelly, who 

was still in the doorway, directed him back into the alley. Kelly walked 

Michael down the alley near a dumpster, and Michael “took off running” 

towards his two male companions. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 77). Postiglione then came 

out from behind the dumpster, “got in [Kelly’s] face[,]” and started 

“screaming” at him. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 77). Postiglione grabbed Kelly’s beard with 
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both hands, put her feet on his thighs, and tried to “rip [his] beard out.” (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 78). Kelly, who felt “extreme[] pain[],” grabbed the top of his beard so 

Postiglione would not rip it out. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 78). In an attempt to get 

Postiglione to let go of his beard, he grabbed, but did not pull, Postiglione’s hair 

and threatened to “rip her hair out” if she did not let go of his beard. (Tr. Vol. 2 

at 78). Michael and Christopher came up and tried to pull Postiglione and 

Kelly apart and then repeatedly punched Kelly. Kelly did not punch back or hit 

anyone. As Postiglione was “latched onto” Kelly and the others were pulling 

on them, Kelly “lost his balance[,]” fell to the ground, and broke his leg. (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 101). As Kelly was on the ground, Christopher kicked him in the face 

and Michael “stomped” multiple times on Kelly’s ankle, causing it to break. 

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 79). Postiglione and the others laughed at him and told him that 

he was going to jail. 

[6] Eventually, an employee of the bar, Maurice James (“James”), arrived in the 

alley and pulled Michael off Kelly. James heard Postiglione yelling, “trailer 

trash” and thought he saw her “kicking [Kelly] in his legs” while he was on the 

ground. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 140-41). Kelly was unable to walk and struggled to sit up 

against a fence. As he did so, he felt that “both places on [his] leg were 

definitely hurting very bad[ly].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 79). Thereafter, the police 

arrived and arrested Postiglione and Christopher but not Michael because he 

had run away. Postiglione was “verbally combative” with the police and gave 

“smart aleck remarks.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 166). Kelly was taken to the hospital. He 
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suffered a broken leg, a broken ankle, and abrasions on his face. Kelly later had 

a surgery to insert two screws in his ankle.

[7] The State jointly charged Postiglione, Michael, and Christopher with Level 5 

felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. Specifically, the State alleged 

that the serious bodily injury was a broken bone in Kelly’s left leg. 

[8] In May 2016, the trial court held a bench trial, in which Postiglione and her codefendants were tried jointly. The State presented testimony from Marcuccilli 

and Kelly regarding the facts above. It also presented testimony from other bar 

employees and the responding police officers. 

[9] Postiglione testified on her own behalf. She acknowledged that she had 

verbally argued with another customer and that she had used “combative 

speech.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 240). She admitted that she had been asked to leave the 

bar but denied that she had been escorted out of the bar. Postiglione also 

denied that she had hit or kicked Kelly’s leg. Her defense at trial was that Kelly 

was the initial aggressor and that she had acted in self-defense. Specifically, she 

testified that Kelly had yelled “slurs” at her from down the alley and that she 

had yelled back at him. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 243). She also testified that, as Kelly had 

gotten closer to her, he had “spit at [her], kind of like a sprinkler[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 

at 243). Postiglione testified that Kelly had spit at her three or four times “to 

get a rise out of [her]” and “to provoke” her. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 243-44). 

Additionally, she testified that Kelly had hit her jaw with an “open fist” and 

opined that Kelly had “knowingly just hit [her] enough to knock [her] off [her] 
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feet a bit.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 244). Postiglione testified that Kelly had also 

delivered “a blow to the back of [her] head[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 244). Postiglione’s 

counsel argued that Kelly was mad at Postiglione because she was an outsider 

at the bar and had gotten into an argument with a regular customer and that 

Postiglione was not the initial aggressor.3 

[10] Before entering its verdict, the trial judge stated that “in listening to this case, . . 

. it. . . [was] pretty clear . . . that this [wa]sn’t one which you c[ould] find a 

whole lot of nuance or come up with some Solomonic resolution as to what 

[had] really happened.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 72). He added that it had “been a while 

since [he had] heard a court trial in which one side or the other [had] clearly 

lied to the Court.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 72). The trial judge further stated that “out of 

the people that [had] testified, [he] [had] believed [Postiglione] the least.” (Tr. 

Vol. 3 at 72). The judge elaborated that it had “been a while since [he’d] had 

somebody come in and try to snow the Court as much as they ha[d] with extra 

verbiage and not answering things, and put[ting] things a particular way.” (Tr. 

Vol. 3 at 72). The trial judge pointed out that the existence of Kelly’s injuries 

was “undisputed” but that the dispute rested in “[h]ow they [had] occurred[.]” 

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 72). The judge stated that it was clear that Postiglione and Kelly 

were “engaged in mutual combat” but stated that she was not the person who 

had “inflicted the blows to the extent of the damage[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 75). The 

 

3

 Michael’s defense was also self-defense. He testified that he did not want to fight Kelly and that he had 

engaged Kelly because he was trying to protect Postiglione from Kelly, who—according to Michael’s 

testimony—had grabbed her and had thrown her on the ground. Michael also denied that he had stomped 

on Kelly’s ankle. Christopher’s defense was that he was not involved in the situation between Postiglione 

and Kelly.
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trial court found Postiglione guilty of the lesser-included offense of Class A 

misdemeanor battery. The judge stated that Michael and Christopher were 

“defending the person with the mouth” and found them not guilty. (Tr. Vol. 3 

at 74-75). 

[11] During the sentencing hearing, the parties disagreed about how restitution 

should be handled. The State introduced: (1) State’s Sentencing Exhibit 1, a 

restitution statement from the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute to show that it 

had paid $15,000.00 from the Violent Crime Compensation Fund toward 

Kelly’s medical bills; and (2) State’s Sentencing Exhibit 2, a list of Kelly’s 

medical bills totaling $33,451.33. State’s Exhibit 2 included medical bills, from 

varied dates, for the following: ambulance services; radiology services; 

crutches; anesthesia services; and hospital services. Kelly testified that he had 

had one surgery for his injuries and that it had taken him approximately six 

months to recover from his injuries. 

[12] Postiglione’s counsel argued that Postiglione should not have to pay the 

restitution requested because Kelly’s medical bills were a result of his broken 

leg, and Postiglione “did not cause the broken leg.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 93). Her 

counsel also argued that the trial court, by convicting Postiglione of the lesser 

included misdemeanor battery, had determined that she was not “responsible 

for the broken leg.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 93). Postiglione’s counsel, however, 

acknowledged that Kelly could seek restitution in civil court. 
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[13] The State responded the restitution was proper because Postiglione was found 

guilty of battery causing bodily injury to Kelly. Citing to Lowden v. State, 51 

N.E.3d 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, the State argued that the injury 

to Kelly did not have to be foreseeable and that, because Postiglione was found 

guilty of battery, she was responsible for any injury that resulted from her 

crime.4 

[14] The trial court acknowledged the State had originally charged Postiglione with 

battery resulting in serious bodily injury and that the court had found her guilty 

of battery resulting in bodily injury. At the end of the hearing, the trial court 

took the matter of restitution under advisement. The trial court then imposed a 

one (1) year sentence suspended to non-reporting probation, and it ordered 

Postiglione to complete 100 hours of community service. 

[15] Thereafter, the trial court entered its restitution order and ordered Postiglione to 

pay $18,451.33 in restitution to Kelly. Specifically, the trial court determined 

that Kelly had incurred $33,451.33 in medical expenses, noted that Kelly had 

received $15,000.00 from the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute’s Violent Crime 

Compensation Fund, and ordered Postiglione to pay the remaining $18,451.33 

 

4

In Lowden, our Court reviewed the aggravated battery statute when addressing the defendant’s jury 

instruction argument. Specifically, the defendant argued that the State was required to prove that the 

defendant “knew his conduct would lead to serious bodily injury.” Lowden, 51 N.E.3d at 1222. We rejected 

the defendant’s argument and held that “the severity of the injury [wa]s not an element of the prohibited 

conduct, but a result of it.” Id. at 1223. We explained that, “the State was required to prove only that [the 

defendant] knowingly or intentionally inflicted injury upon [the victim] and not that [the defendant] knew he 

would cause serious bodily injury.” Id.
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in restitution to Kelly. In its order, the trial court gave the following “support 

of its ruling[:]”

1. [Postiglione] was found guilty of battery, a [C]lass [A] 

misdemeanor, for physically striking Joseph Kelly. The Court 

made the equitable ruling of not convicting [Postiglione] of the 

more serious Class C [sic] felony battery resulting in serious 

bodily injury, because the evidence suggested these injuries were 

more likely inflicted by [Postiglione’s] co-defendants, Christopher 

Schafer and Michael Schafer.

2. The battery committed by [Postiglione], however, started the 

fracas and the codefendants[’] actions were not a separate, 

intervening action which might have removed [Postiglione’s] 

responsibility for restitution.

3. The injuries sustained by Joseph Kelly were reasonably 

foreseeable and a direct consequence of the acts initiated by 

[Postiglione].

(App. Vol. 2 at 6). Postiglione now appeals.

Decision

[16] Postiglione argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to 

pay $18,451.33 in restitution to Kelly, contending that she did not directly cause 

Kelly’s injury for which he sought restitution. 

[17] Pursuant to the restitution statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-50-5-3, a trial court has 

authority to “order [a defendant] to make restitution to the victim of the crime[.]” 

IND. CODE § 35-50-5-3(a) (emphasis added). The trial court “shall base its 

restitution order upon a consideration of . . . [among other things,] . . . medical 

and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a 
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result of the crime[.]” I.C. § 35-50-5-3(a)(2) (emphasis added). “Although the 

[restitution] statute does not define the term ‘victim,’ [the Indiana Supreme] 

Court has held that restitution is properly payable to ‘those shown to have 

suffered injury, harm or loss as a direct and immediate result of the criminal 

acts of a defendant.’” Sickels v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1010, 1013 (Ind. 2013) 

(quoting Reinbold v. State, 555 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ind. 1990), overruled in part on 

other grounds by Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995)). 

[18] “The principal purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and to 

impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused.” 

Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied. “Restitution also 

serves to compensate the offender’s victim.” Id. An order of restitution lies 

within the trial court’s discretion and will be reversed only where there has been 

an abuse of discretion. Kays v. State, 963 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 2012). A “trial 

court abuses its discretion in ordering restitution ‘only if no evidence or 

reasonable inferences therefrom support the trial court’s decision[.]’” Archer v. State, 

--N.E.3d--, 2017 WL 3882430, *3 (Ind. Sept. 6, 2017) (quoting Little v. State, 839 

N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)) (emphasis added by Archer).

[19] Postiglione does not challenge her Class A misdemeanor battery conviction; 

thus, she does not dispute that she knowingly or intentionally touched Kelly in 

a rude, insolent, or angry manner, resulting in bodily injury to Kelly. See I.C. § 

35-42-2-1. She also does not dispute that: (1) Kelly sustained injuries in his 

encounter with Postiglione and her co-defendants; (2) Kelly incurred medical 

bills totaling $33,451.33 as a result of his injuries; and (3) the State presented 
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evidence to show that he had incurred those medical bills. Instead, Postiglione 

suggests that Kelly’s medical costs were all related to Kelly’s broken ankle 

injury and his surgery for that ankle fracture, and she contends that “the State 

failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that [she] caused the injury to Mr. 

Kelly [that] required him to have surgery.” (Postiglione’s Br. 7). She asserts 

that Kelly’s ankle injury was caused by Michael stomping on it and contends 

that there was “no evidence that [her] criminal conduct caused Michael to 

stomp repeatedly on Mr. Kelly’s ankle[.]” (Postiglione’s Br. 9). She seems to 

argue that Kelly could not be considered her victim because she did not directly 

or solely cause his specific ankle injury.

[20] Postiglione, however, ignores the fact that Kelly had a broken leg in addition to 

a broken ankle and that Kelly broke his leg as he fell to the ground with 

Postiglione latched onto him. Furthermore, the medical bills included in State’s 

Exhibit 2 included medical bills that were related to all of Kelly’s injuries. 

These medical bills, which were incurred on various dates, included ambulance 

services, radiology services, crutches, anesthesia services, and hospital services. 

[21] More importantly, the restitution statute and case law do not require that a 

victim’s injury or loss be directly or solely “caused” by a defendant; instead, 

they require the victim’s injury or loss be a “result of” the defendant’s crime. 

See, e.g., I.C. § 35-50-5-3(a)(2); Archer, 2017 WL 3882430 at *3; Sickels, 982 

N.E.2d at 1013. 
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[22] Our supreme court has explained that “the word ‘victim’ in the statutes 

authorizing restitution has not been construed so narrowly as to limit the 

payment of restitution only to the person or entity actually subjected to the 

commission of the crime” and further explained that a victim could include 

third parties, such as survivors of a murder victim, as long as they had “shown 

to have suffered injury, harm or loss as a direct and immediate result of the 

criminal acts of a defendant.” Reinbold, 555 N.E.2d at 470. In Reinbold, our 

supreme court held that the trial court had acted within its discretion when it 

ordered a defendant to pay the victim’s “funeral and burial expenses incurred 

by [the victim’s] family, as well a figure designated as child support for the two 

minor children [the victim had] left.” Id. at 471. The Reinbold Court held that 

“[t]hese monetary losses born by these parties were the result of appellant’s 

criminal acts, and the trial court [had] acted within its statutory authority when 

ordering restitution for their recompense.” Id. (emphasis added).

[23] More recently, in Archer, our supreme court reviewed the issue of restitution 

and the evidence necessary to support a trial court’s restitution order. Archer, 

2017 WL 3882430 at *3. In that case, a defendant stole a car, and, when the 

car was found five hours later, it had some damage and red paint on various 

places on the car. Id. at *1. The defendant pled guilty to auto theft, and the 

trial court ordered her to pay $5,240.32 in restitution to the victim for the spraypaint damage to the victim’s car. Id. On direct appeal, the defendant argued 

that the trial court had abused its discretion by ordering her to pay restitution 

because there was no evidence to show that the defendant “herself [had been] 
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the one who [had] spray-painted the victim’s vehicle.” Id. at *3. Another panel 

of our Court agreed and held, among other things, that “insufficient evidence 

supported the restitution order because the record did not show that the spraypaint damage was attributable to the theft.” Id. at *2. Our Indiana Supreme 

Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court’s restitution order. Id. at *3. 

The Archer Court explained that appellate courts may find an abuse of 

discretion in a trial court’s restitution order “only if no evidence or reasonable 

inferences therefrom support the trial court’s decision[.]” Id. (emphasis in original 

and internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Archer Court held that 

reasonable inferences supported the trial court’s restitution order at issue and 

reasoned as follows:

Here, there is sufficient evidence that the spray-painting is a 

result of the underlying auto theft. Archer pled guilty to auto 

theft; that is, she “knowingly exert[ed] unauthorized control over 

the motor vehicle of [the victim] . . . with the intent to deprive the 

person of the vehicle’s value or use.” (App. 16.) The record 

reveals that [the victim’s] vehicle was stolen. When it was 

recovered five hours later, Archer was driving the vehicle and it 

had fresh red paint all over its front and sides as well as covering 

the vehicle’s VIN. While it is true that no one testified that 

Archer was the one who spray-painted the vehicle, it can be 

reasonably inferred that Archer is responsible for that damage. 

For instance, it is a reasonable inference that the purpose of the 

paint was to change the vehicle’s appearance and/or conceal the 

VIN so it would not be recognized as stolen, facilitating the 

crime. Also, Archer was driving the vehicle only five hours after 

it was stolen so it is reasonable to infer that Archer was 

responsible for the painting, even if she wasn’t the person who 

actually sprayed the vehicle. Indeed, Archer stole the vehicle and 
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is responsible for the damage done to it while it was in her 

custody and control, including the spray-painting.

Id. at *3.

[24] Here, the trial court, when ordering restitution, explained that Postiglione had 

“started the fracas” and that her “codefendants[’] actions were not a separate, 

intervening action which might have removed [her] responsibility for 

restitution.” (App. Vol. 2 at 6). The trial court specifically found that Kelly’s 

injuries were a result of or a “direct consequence of the acts initiated by 

[Postiglione].” (App. Vol. 2 at 6). Based on our supreme court’s guidance in 

Archer and the purpose of restitution, we conclude that, in this specific case, the 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom support the trial court’s 

restitution order. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s restitution order 

requiring Postiglione to pay $18,451.33 in restitution to Kelly.

[25] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.