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Filed 10/1/21 Dababneh v. Lopez CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

MATTHEW DABABNEH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PAMELA LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

C088848

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-

00238699-CU-DF-GDS)

In a letter complaint to the chair of the California Assembly Rules Committee, 

Pamela Lopez reported that Assembly member Matthew Dababneh pushed her into a 

bathroom at a 2016 party in Las Vegas, blocked the door, and masturbated while urging 

her to touch him. On the same day she mailed the letter, Lopez called a press conference 

to announce that she had submitted the complaint to the Assembly, described the incident 

and stated that she had spoken to friends privately about it at the time. Also on the same 

day, the Los Angeles Times published an article entitled “California assemblyman 

accused of forcing lobbyist into bathroom and masturbating.” In the article, Lopez
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provided more detail about the incident, including that Dababneh said he could not 

believe what he had just done. Dababneh resigned from the Legislature at the beginning 

of January 2018.

Dababneh sued Lopez for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, alleging that she made knowingly false public statements. Lopez brought a 

special motion to strike Dababneh’s complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 

425.16, California’s anti-SLAPP law.

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 The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that 

Lopez’s statements to the press were not privileged.

We conclude that Lopez’s statements to the press regarding her report to the 

Legislature come within the privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d),

for a “fair and true report” of a “legislative” proceeding, and accordingly cannot provide

a basis for an action for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 The 

trial court’s order is reversed with directions to grant the special motion to strike.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a letter dated December 4, 2017, to Ken Cooley, the chair of the Assembly 

Rules Committee, Lopez stated: “I am writing to report that I was sexually assaulted by 

Assembly Member Dababneh.”

Lopez continued: “It is not my intention to report every detail of what happened 

in this letter, but here is a brief description. [¶] On January 16, 2016, Mr. Dababneh and 

I were two of the many invited guests at a party to celebrate two mutual friends who were 

planning to get married. Most of the guests in attendance were political professionals, 

1 “SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ” (Jarrow 

Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1.)

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
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including many colleagues and associates I have known for years. I should have had no 

reason to fear for my safety. When I went to the bathroom after being at the party for a 

few hours, I felt the weight of a body push me into the restroom. I heard the door slam 

behind us. When I turned around, I saw that it was Matt Dababneh. He stood blocking

the door and began to masturbate and move toward me, urging me to touch him. It was a 

terrifying experience. During the time he blocked me in that room, my instincts were 

focused on escaping without any physical contact and in a way that would not cause a 

scene. Before the ordeal ended, he told me not to tell anyone.”

“Although a number of press reports have placed this event in Sacramento, it 

actually occurred at a private venue inside a Las Vegas Hotel. I went along with the 

assumption that it happened in Sacramento because I realized that correcting this 

assumption would likely have led to the identification of Mr. Dababneh and I was not 

ready to take this step.”

Lopez stated that she decided to name Dababneh after members of an Assembly 

subcommittee, including Cooley, encouraged women to come forward.

A week earlier, on November 27, 2017, Cooley spoke at a hearing of the 

Assembly Subcommittee on Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation Prevention and 

Response. Cooley stated that “[t]he Assembly strongly encourages all individuals to 

report any incidents of harassment, discrimination, or retaliation. I hear--I understand 

that people are afraid to report, but this is the area where we need to go where it can be 

brought forward. Ultimately, this institution needs to set a tone that this is just--it is 

unacceptable--and that if people see it or encounter it, they need to say something.”

At the hearing, Cooley described the process under the Assembly sexual 

harassment policy wherein a complaint, verbal or in writing, could be submitted to 

various government officials, including any member of the Rules Committee. When a 

complaint is received, the matter is assessed. The Assembly provides all parties due 

process and aims to reach reasonable conclusions based on the evidence collected. The 
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Assembly has a duty to investigate and take corrective action. When a policy violation is 

alleged, the chief administrative officer of the Assembly and the human resources 

director will review the facts to determine next steps. This can include investigation by 

an independent attorney or by the human resources staff. The investigator interviews 

witnesses and gathers facts to determine if the allegation is substantiated. If the 

allegation is substantiated, corrective measures are taken depending on the seriousness of 

the violation from verbal counseling to suspension without pay, demotion, or additional 

training. The final step is to inform the complainant of the outcome of the investigation,

but not provide specific information on the corrective measures.

The same day that Lopez submitted the letter to the Assembly, she gave a press 

conference. Lopez stated at the outset: “I’m here to announce that this morning I 

submitted a report to the Assembly Rules Committee identifying that I was sexually 

assaulted in January of 2016 by Assembly Member Matt Dababneh.”

At the press conference, Lopez further described the circumstances that she said

made her come forward, including that Cooley “urged women who have been sexually 

harassed within the California political community to step forward and speak to the 

legislature and seek redress through their processes” and “[t]his is a moment of collective 

action. Many women have stepped forward and said, ‘Me too. I’ve been sexually 

harassed,’ or, ‘I’ve been sexually assaulted in my workplace.’ And it’s taken courage for 

them to do that.”

At the press conference Lopez was asked, “Could you just confirm where the 

incident happened? I believe in the letter to Ken Cooley it was in Las Vegas. Can you 

tell us after that happened, did you speak to anyone around you -- to anyone around you 

about it after that?”

Lopez answered: “Yes. The event occurred at a celebration, a friend’s celebration 

of a wedding in Las Vegas. And I did speak to friends privately after that. I was hurt and 

scared, and so I reached out to the people who love me, some of my closest friends and 
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family members, and talked about my experience with them. [¶] I was also terrified of 

being shunned or retaliated against if the Capitol community knew what happened to me. 

So I -- I made my closest friends and loved ones swear -- swear to secrecy.”

Lopez was asked, “And I know you’ve been through this, but if you can just kind 

of recap what happened that day.” Lopez responded: “Yes. I was celebrating a wedding 

with friends. I had no reason to think that I was unsafe. It was a wonderful, festive 

event. And I went to the restroom and I felt a body, a large body, rush up behind me, use 

the weight of their body to push me into the restroom, and I heard the door slam behind 

us. [¶] I spun around and realized that I was face to face with Matt Dababneh, and that 

he had very quickly exposed himself and begun masturbating. I started backing up, and 

he moved toward me while he was masturbating, and in explicit terms told me to touch 

his genitals while he was masturbating. [¶] And I remember thinking, Oh, my God. 

What do I do? What do I do? I thought: Make it very clear that I do not want to be here, 

and that there is no misunderstanding. And so I said several times ‘No, I will not touch 

you. No, I will not touch you.’ ”

On the same day as the press conference, the Los Angeles Times published an 

article titled “California assemblyman accused of forcing lobbyist into bathroom and 

masturbating.” (<https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-matt-dababneh-harassment20171204-story.html> [as of Sept. 30, 2021].) The article began: “Sacramento lobbyist 

Pamela Lopez has claimed that, in 2016, Democratic Assemblyman Matt Dababneh 

followed her into a bathroom, masturbated in front of her and urged her to touch him. 

Dababneh has strongly denied the allegation. [¶] ‘It was Matt Dababneh,’ Lopez told the 

Times in a November interview. [¶] Lopez jolted the California political world seven 

weeks ago when she first shared her account of an encounter in Las Vegas, joining more 

than 140 women as they denounced in an open letter a ‘pervasive’ culture of sexual 

harassment and misconduct in the state Capitol. [¶] Lopez had not publicly accused 
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Dababneh until Monday, when she formally filed a complaint with the Assembly and 

named him at a news conference.”

The article reported that Lopez described the encounter with Dababneh as follows: 

“Lopez said she felt a large body following her into a single-use bathroom. She said it 

was Dababneh, who is more than 6 feet tall and sturdily built. [¶] ‘The weight of that 

body was pushing me into the restroom. I heard the door slam behind me,’ Lopez said. 

‘I spun around and by the time I had gotten myself spun around, I saw that I was facing 

Matt Dababneh and he had unzipped his pants and exposed himself and had begun to 

masturbate.’ [¶] Lopez said she backed away from him, her mind racing with the 

realization of what was happening. ‘The panic was just immense,’ she said. [¶] Lopez 

said Dababneh demanded that she touch his genitals.

“ ‘I remember thinking, at the very least, make it very clear you don’t want to be 

here,’ she said. ‘Don’t say anything to allow him to misinterpret your refusal as you 

being shy or coquettish.’ [¶] She said she stated firmly she would not touch him, and 

repeated it multiple times. She said he then asked her to touch him elsewhere, even just 

rest her arm on him. Lopez said she interpreted the request as a type of attempted 

negotiation. Again, she refused. She said that Dababneh then ejaculated into the toilet. 

The whole encounter lasted less than five minutes, Lopez said.

“Lopez said that Dababneh immediately expressed regret and disbelief. She said 

he told her, ‘I can’t believe I just did that.’ [¶] Lopez said she pointed him toward the 

door. She said that, as he exited, Dababneh told her not to say anything. She said she 

turned the request back on him, raising her voice: ‘Don’t you tell anyone this 

happened.’ ”

On June 25, 2018, the chief administrative officer informed Lopez by letter that an 

independent attorney had investigated her allegations, interviewing 52 witnesses and 

Lopez, and made factual findings in a confidential report substantiating that it was more 

likely than not the facts Lopez alleged did occur. This conduct was found to violate the 
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Assembly policy against sexual harassment. Dababneh appealed and, on August 24, 

2018, Cooley informed Lopez that, after a thorough review and evaluation, the appeal 

was denied.3

On August 14, 2018, Dababneh filed a complaint for defamation and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress arising out of Lopez’s accusation of sexual assault. 

Dababneh alleged that “on or about December 4, 2017, Lopez filed a false complaint with 

the California State Assembly, in which she alleged that, on the evening of January 16, 

2016, while at the friends’ party, Dababneh pushed Lopez into a bathroom and 

masturbated in front of her while urging her to touch him.” Dababneh further alleged 

that, “on the same day, December 4, 2017, Lopez conducted a news conference in 

Sacramento, at which she made the same false allegations against Dababneh. In the news 

conference, Lopez again fabricated that Dababneh followed her into a restroom, exposed 

himself, masturbated, and asked her to touch him.”

In Dababneh’s cause of action for defamation, he alleged that Lopez “made false 

and defamatory statements about Plaintiff including that Plaintiff pushed her into a 

bathroom, masturbated in front of her and urged her to touch him. [¶] . . . Those 

statements were false and known to Lopez to be false when made. The statements were 

made publicly and in a variety of ways, including to various news media and in a press 

conference on December 4, 2017 held at K Street Consulting in Sacramento. These false 

statements were published and re-published to the general public.” Dababneh alleged 

3 We deferred ruling on Dababneh’s request for judicial notice of documents from a writ 

proceeding he instituted to require the Assembly to set aside its decision. We now deny 

the request. These documents were not presented to the trial court and are irrelevant to 

the issues on appeal. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 

434, 444, fn. 3; Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 

625-626.) 
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that Lopez “acted maliciously, with knowledge that the statements in the press 

conference and complaint filed with the California State Assembly were false.” 

Dababneh’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress incorporated 

the facts alleged in his defamation claim and did not allege additional facts giving rise to 

his claim of emotional distress.

On October 25, 2018, Lopez filed an anti-SLAPP motion under section 425.16 of 

the Code of Civil Procedure. Lopez argued that the “two instances of speech” alleged in 

Dababneh’s complaint—Lopez’s written complaint to the Assembly and the press 

conference—were absolutely protected under subdivision (e)(1) and (2) of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 425.16. Lopez further argued that her speech was related to an issue of 

public concern, i.e., exposure and eradication of sexual misconduct, within the meaning 

of subdivision (e)(3) of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Lopez also contended 

that Dababneh could not establish a probability of prevailing on his claim that Lopez’s 

statements were false and unprivileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivisions (b), (c) 

and (d).

In opposition, Dababneh submitted a declaration stating that none of the conduct 

Lopez described occurred and the claims she made, including in statements to the press,

were categorically false. Dababneh argued that Lopez’s statements at the press 

conference and in the Los Angeles Times article were not privileged under any 

subdivision of section 47. Dababneh further contended that Lopez’s anti-SLAPP motion 

should be denied because he could demonstrate a likelihood that he could prevail on his 

defamation claim because Lopez knowingly made false statements that he sexually

assaulted her.

On December 6, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on Lopez’s anti-SLAPP 

motion and took the matter under submission. On January 16, 2019, the court issued a 

ruling. The court noted that Dababneh appeared to concede that Lopez’s statements to 

the Assembly and the press alleged in his complaint arose from activity protected by the 
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anti-SLAPP statute. The court observed that Lopez’s statements to the press were “at the 

very least” on a matter of particular public interest—sexual harassment in the 

workplace—and concerned a public figure. The court also noted that Lopez’s letter to 

the Assembly was submitted to a legislative body. The court concluded that “[t]herefore,

the primary question presented here is whether Plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient 

to support a judgment in his favor” on either or both of his claims of defamation and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The trial court found that Dababneh, as a public figure, was required to prove that 

a defamatory statement was made with “ ‘actual malice,’ ” i.e., that Lopez knew that her 

statements that Dababneh assaulted her were false or she made them with reckless 

disregard whether they were true or not. The court concluded that establishing Lopez 

knew her statements were false “is essentially one and the same” as establishing that they 

were false. “Thus, in this case, a finding of ‘falsity’ includes a finding of ‘actual 

malice.’ ”

The trial court noted that Dababneh submitted a declaration swearing that he never 

used the restroom and never masturbated in front of Lopez. Reasoning that “the matter 

comes down to a credibility determination” as to whether Dababneh or Lopez is telling 

the truth, the court found that Dababneh’s declaration, which the court said it must accept 

as true in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, was sufficient evidence alone to support a 

finding that Dababneh had a probability of establishing that Lopez’s statements were 

false.

The court rejected Lopez’s contention that her statements at the press conference 

fell within the protection of section 47, subdivision (b), for statements made in a 

legislative proceeding. The court concluded Lopez’s complaint letter qualified for this

privilege but the press conference did not.

The court also disagreed with Lopez that her statements to the press were 

privileged under section 47, subdivision (d), as a “fair and true” report in a 
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communication to a public journal of a legislative proceeding. The court noted that the

privilege also applies to accurate descriptions of the allegations in a complaint filed in a 

civil lawsuit regardless of the truth of the allegations, if it is clear the complaint is being 

described. The court concluded the privilege did not apply because Lopez’s statements to 

the press did not describe a legislative proceeding, i.e., the Assembly’s revision of its

sexual harassment policy, but rather her allegations of sexual assault. Further, the trial 

court reasoned that publication of the contents of preliminary pleadings such as a 

complaint before any judicial action had been taken were not privileged, in order to 

discourage a scheme to file a complaint to publicize its contents and then drop the action.

Finally, the trial court found that Lopez’s statements did not qualify for the limited 

common interest privilege “which applies only to communications made without malice,” 

because Dababneh had “presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a probability of 

success on his claims, which requires a showing of malice.”

Thus, the court granted Lopez’s anti-SLAPP motion as to her complaint to the 

Assembly but denied the motion regarding her statements to the press.

DISCUSSION

Anti-SLAPP Statute

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), provides that a cause 

of action arising from any act “in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free 

speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection 

with a public issue” is subject to a special motion to strike “unless the court determines 

that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on 

the claim.” 

Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (e), defines the phrase “ ‘act 

in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or 

California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ ” to include “(1) any written or 

oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or 
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any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or 

writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, 

executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any 

written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum 

in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of 

the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech 

in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” 

Application of the anti-SLAPP statute involves a two-step process: “ ‘First, the 

court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged 

cause of action is one arising from protected activity. . . . If the court finds such a 

showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a 

probability of prevailing on the claim.’ [Citation.]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 

683, 712; Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 378 (Burrill), disapproved on 

another ground in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396, fn. 11.) We review the trial 

court’s ruling denying Lopez’s anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Burrill, supra,

217 Cal.App.4th at p. 382.)

Dababneh does not dispute that the statements alleged in his complaint constituted 

protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Further, there is no 

dispute that Lopez’s complaint to the Assembly is privileged under Civil Code section 

47, subdivision (b).4 Thus, this appeal concerns only the second prong of the antiSLAPP analysis and Lopez’s statements to the press.

4

(See Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 363-364 (Hagberg) 

[“section 47[, subdivision ](b) privilege applies to complaints to governmental agencies 

requesting the agency investigate or remedy wrongdoing”]; Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 

64 Cal.App.4th 356, 368 [§ 47, subd. (b), [cl. ](3) applies to employee’s sexual 

harassment complaint to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission].)
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We first consider whether Lopez’s statements to the press and in the article were 

privileged under section 47, subdivision (b), clause (1), the legislative proceeding 

privilege, and/or subdivision (d), the fair and true reporting privilege. On that issue, 

“[d]efendants bear the burden of proving the privilege’s applicability. [Citation.]” 

(Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 278 (Hawran); Laker v. Board of 

Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 769.) But Dababneh 

“retains the burden to show, under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, that he 

has a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claim.” (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 769.) A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if a privilege precludes 

liability on a defamation claim. (Ibid.) Thus, if a challenged statement is privileged, the 

trial court should grant the anti-SLAPP motion. (Ibid.; see also Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 

37 Cal.4th 1048, 1065.)

Because there is no factual dispute over the content of the statements Lopez made 

at the press conference and in the Los Angeles Times article, whether the privilege is 

applicable is a question of law. (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 278-279.)

Legislative Proceeding Privilege

Section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a “privileged publication” is one made 

“[i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official 

proceeding authorized by law . . . .” Construing section 47, subdivision (b) privilege in 

the context of a judicial proceeding, the California Supreme Court has held that the 

privilege “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial 

proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the 

objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the 

action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).)

Lopez acknowledges that “the litigation privilege does not always apply to 

statements made about litigation to the general public through the press.” Indeed, in 

Argentieri v. Zuckerberg (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 768 (Argentieri), the court held there must
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be “sufficient nexus between the statement and the litigation. Specifically, the statement 

must ‘achieve the objects of the litigation,’ which requires that it ‘be connected with, or 

have some logical relation to the action.’ ” (Id. at p. 785; Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 

pp. 219-220.) “It therefore must ‘function as a necessary or useful step in the litigation 

process and . . . serve its purposes.’ [Citation.] ‘This is a very different thing from 

saying that the communication’s content need only be related in some way to the subject 

matter of the litigation . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 785-

786.) 

In Argentieri, Facebook and its founder, Mark Zuckerberg, brought a malicious 

prosecution action against, among others, Paul Argentieri, an attorney for Paul Ceglia, 

whose suit contending he had entered into a written contract with Zuckerberg giving 

Ceglia an 84 percent ownership interest in Facebook was dismissed as a fraud on the 

court and because Ceglia had spoliated evidence. (Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 772-773.) General counsel for Facebook e-mailed a release to the press stating that 

attorneys for Ceglia pursued his suit knowing that it was based on forged documents. 

(Ibid.) After the malicious prosecution action was dismissed against Argentieri, he sued 

claiming he was defamed by the e-mail. (Id. at p. 773.) Argentieri’s suit was dismissed 

on an anti-SLAPP motion. (Ibid.) The trial court based its decision in part on a 

determination that the e-mail was covered by the litigation privilege under section 47, 

subdivision (b). (Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.)

The appellate court disagreed, finding that the e-mailed press release was not a 

“useful step” in the malicious prosecution action. (Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 786.) The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the press release furthered the 

goal of the lawsuit to “set the public record straight” regarding Ceglia’s fraud and to hold 

his lawyers accountable. (Ibid.) The court characterized this argument as “nothing more 

than saying they wanted the world to know their view of the dispute—which does not 

further the litigation itself.” (Id. at pp. 786-787.)
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We find a parallel with Lopez’s press conference to announce her complaint to the 

Assembly. As described above, Lopez’s complaint set in motion a process which led to 

an investigation by an independent attorney, who interviewed witnesses and submitted a 

report that Lopez’s claims were more likely than not substantiated. Dababneh appealed 

and the Assembly denied the appeal. Lopez’s press conference was not a “useful step” in 

this process. Rather, the press conference served to let the world know of her complaint 

to the Assembly naming Dababneh, as well as highlight the significance and 

circumstances of her decision to speak out as part of the “Me Too” movement, which did 

not further the Assembly’s process of assessing, investigating and reaching a

determination on Lopez’s sexual harassment complaint.

In Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th 256, the court expressed a similar view 

regarding a press release a company issued after an internal investigation implicating its 

chief financial officer in mishandling research and development of a diagnostic test for 

Down syndrome, which led the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 

commence an investigation. (Id. at pp. 263-264.) When the chief financial officer sued

alleging defamation and other causes of action, the defendants brought an anti-SLAPP 

motion, arguing in part that the press release was absolutely privileged under section 47, 

subdivision (b), i.e., statements made in an official proceeding. (Hawran, supra, 

209 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.)

The Hawran court said, “[i]t is questionable whether a press release so widely 

disseminated to the public at large . . . can meet the requirements of the official 

proceeding privilege.” (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 283.) The court cited 

Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, in which the court declined to apply the 

litigation privilege in section 47, subdivision (b), to press conferences or press releases, 

“explaining that the ‘ “connection or logical relation” which a communication must bear 

to litigation in order for the privilege to apply, is a functional connection,’ i.e., the 

communication must ‘function as a necessary or useful step in the litigation process and 
15

must serve its purposes’ [citation] and ‘cannot be satisfied by communications which 

only serve interests that happen to parallel or complement a party’s interests in the 

litigation,’ including vindication in the court of public opinion [citation].” (Hawran, 

supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 283.)

Lopez, however, argues that subdivision (b), clause (1) of section 47 regarding 

statements made in legislative proceedings is broader than the litigation privilege found 

in section (b), clause (2). Lopez principally relies on Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

(1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 277 (Scott). In Scott, the city manager of Santa Monica alleged 

that the defendants published letters containing defamatory statements about his character

and performance at city council proceedings. (Id. at pp. 282-284.) 

The Scott court noted that, under the legislative proceeding privilege codified in 

section 47, “[a]bsolute immunity attaches to statements made before a legislative body, 

and the existence of malice on the part of the declarant will not defeat the privilege 

[citation] when it is shown that the statement which is alleged to be defamatory bears 

some connection to the work of the legislative body.” (Scott, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 285.) The court said: “In the instant case, the allegedly defamatory statements have a 

clear connection with the work of the legislative body (the Santa Monica City Council) in 

that they relate to the retention of an employee whose appointment and removal, as well 

as continuing review of his performance and qualifications, were the responsibility of the 

city council. The reading of the letters at the city council meeting was privileged, as was 

the distribution of copies of the letters to members of the audience (including the press) 

attending the council meeting.” (Id. at pp. 285-286, fn. omitted.) 

The court did not apply the legislative proceeding privilege to certain statements 

made outside the council chambers. Rather, the court found that these particular

statements were not libelous, because “ ‘it is settled law that mere expression of opinion 

or severe criticism is not libelous, even though it adversely reflects on the fitness of an 

individual for public office.’ [Citation.]” (Scott, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 290.)
16

The Scott court also addressed the principle that the section 47 privilege applies to 

statements made to achieve the objective of the relevant proceeding and offered this 

statement on how the legislative proceedings privilege operates differently. “[W]e 

recognize that the immunity historically afforded to legislators does not impose a 

restriction that the statements made by a member of a legislative body are protected only 

if they are directed toward achieving the object of the legislation. Rather, the rule 

appears well settled that the general immunity afforded legislators extends to all that is 

spoken or done in the course of legislative proceedings. [Citation.]” (Scott, supra,

37 Cal.App.3d at p. 288.) “The immunity attaches also to interested members of the 

public who wish to address themselves to matters pending before a legislative body. 

[Citations.] Since we hold that the statements made and copies of the letters distributed 

at the city council meeting were privileged, plaintiff’s predication of liability upon their 

utterance and/or distribution at that time must fail.” (Ibid.)

In sum, Scott does not address the legislative proceeding privilege outside of the 

proceedings themselves, including statements made at a press conference, as here, to 

inform the public of a complaint submitted to the Legislature. Rather, Scott stands for the 

principle that the legislative proceeding privilege is interpreted broadly to statements by 

legislators and members of the public who wish to address matters before the legislative 

body. The privilege applies not just to statements directly related to the proceeding but 

all that is spoken or occurs during the proceeding. (People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo (2013) 

214 Cal.App.4th 921, 944 [“Civil Code section 47 subdivision (b)[, clause ](1) declares 

as absolutely privileged any publication made in any legislative proceeding”]; but see 

Frisk v. Merrihew (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 319, 324 [“What has been said relative to 

judicial proceedings is applicable with equal force to other official proceedings 

authorized by law, such as the school board meeting in question. Thus, the determinative 

issue in this case is not whether the defamation took place on a privileged occasion, but 
17

whether the defamatory statement was made to achieve the object of the meeting 

convened to discuss the school budget”].)

Lopez also cites Cayley v. Nunn (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 300 (Cayley), which 

involved the application of the litigation privilege to a dispute between neighbors about a 

height variance sought by the Nunns from the city council to add a bedroom over the 

garage and opposed by the Cayleys because they claimed it would block their view. (Id. 

at p. 302.) The Cayleys sued the Nunns alleging they circulated petitions presented to the 

city council to evidence neighborhood support for their position and in doing so made 

slanderous comments to potential signers that the Cayleys had tapped the Nunns’ 

telephone. (Ibid.) 

The Cayley court held that the litigation privilege applies to city council 

proceedings, citing Scott. (Cayley, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 303.) The court 

continued that “communications made prior to legal action itself are privileged if they 

have some logical connection to the suit and are made to achieve the objects of the 

litigation.” (Id. at pp. 303-304.) The privilege applies outside the courtroom and 

embraces preliminary conversations that “are in some way related to or connected to the 

pending or contemplated action.” (Id. at p. 304.) To accomplish the purpose of the 

privilege and as an adjunct to the right of access to judicial and quasi-judicial 

proceedings, private parties and interested persons must be able to confer, marshal 

evidence and prepare materials for presentation in the proceeding “ ‘ “unchilled by the 

thought of subsequent judicial action against such participants; provided always, of 

course, that such preliminary meetings, conduct and activities are directed toward the 

achievement of the objects of the litigation or other proceedings. . . .” ’ ” (Ibid., italics 

added.)

The court concluded “it is clear that the alleged slanderous statements were made 

during preliminary conversations while defendants were marshalling evidence and 

preparing for their presentation at the city council meeting. Therefore, defendants’ 
18

statements cannot be considered irrelevant to the proceedings and they were directed 

toward the achievement of the objects of the proceeding.” (Cayley, supra,

190 Cal.App.3d at p. 304; see also Dean v. Friends of Pine Meadow (2018) 

21 Cal.App.5th 91, 107-108 [“ ‘ “The privilege extends beyond statements made in the 

proceedings, and includes statements made to initiate official action” ’ ”]; 1-800 

Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 586-587 [“the ‘litigation 

privilege’ as statutorily applied to legislative proceedings” applied because “the entire 

thrust of [defendant’s] activity was to enable the enactment of legislation, by soliciting 

other interested parties to pursue it, and assisting them with information and expertise”].)

Cayley does not aid Lopez. To the contrary, the case undermines Lopez’s position 

that the legislative proceeding privilege is broader than the litigation privilege. Cayley 

applied the litigation privilege to proceedings before a legislative body (the city council) 

and adhered to the requirement that a privileged communication must be directed toward 

the achievement of the object of the litigation or other proceeding. (Cayley, supra,

190 Cal.App.3d at p. 304.) Moreover, Cayley involved marshaling evidence and 

preparing for a presentation to the city council, not announcing to the press after the fact 

that a complaint had been submitted to a legislative body.

Lopez places great emphasis on broad statements in Cayley that “[t]o partake in 

the privilege a publication need not be pertinent, relevant or material in a technical sense 

to any issue in the proceedings. [Citations.] The privilege is denied to any participant in 

legal proceedings only when the matter is so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter that 

no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. [Citation.]” (Cayley, 

supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 304.) However, in Nguyen v. Proton Technology Corp. 

(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 140, the court said: “Whatever the pre-Silberg merits of these 

expansive views, we think they are clearly outdated in view of the limitations quoted 

from that case.” (Id. at p. 149, fn. omitted.)
19

We conclude that Lopez’s statements to the press were not privileged under 

section 47, subdivision (b), because they were not made to achieve the objective of her 

sexual harassment complaint submitted to the Assembly, but rather to announce her 

complaint to the public and publicize her view of the dispute.

Fair and True Reporting Privilege

We come to a different conclusion regarding the privilege under section 47, 

subdivision (d)(1), which provides in relevant part that a privileged publication includes 

one made “[b]y a fair and true report in, or a communication to, a public journal, of (A) a 

judicial, (B) legislative, or (C) other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in 

the course thereof . . . .” The privilege extends “to both a fair and true report in and a 

communication to a public journal concerning judicial, legislative or other public 

proceedings.” (J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 

247 Cal.App.4th 87, 97 (J-M Manufacturing).) As with the privilege under section 47, 

subdivision (b), the fair and true reporting privilege “forecloses a plaintiff from showing 

a probability of prevailing on the merits” in opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion. 

(Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 787; J-M Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 98.) 

However, “[u]nlike the litigation privilege, the fair and true reporting privilege 

pertains specifically to communications to the press, and it requires that the report be fair 

and true, not that it actually further the underlying [proceeding].” (Argentieri, supra, 

8 Cal.App.5th at p. 787; Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 

226, 241-242 (Sipple).) 

“ ‘The privilege applies if the substance of the publication or broadcast captures

the gist or sting of the statements made in the official proceedings.’ [Citation.]” (Burrill, 

supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 398.) “ ‘[T]he publication is to be measured by the natural 

and probable effect it would have on the mind of the average reader [citations]. The 

standard of interpretation to be used in testing alleged defamatory language is how those 
20

in the community where the matter was published would reasonably understand it 

[citation]. In determining whether the report was fair and true, the article [or broadcast] 

must be regarded from the standpoint of persons whose function is to give the public a

fair report of what has taken place. The report is not to be judged by the standard of 

accuracy that would be adopted if it were the report of a professional law reporter or a 

trained lawyer [citation].’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 787; 

J-M Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 100.)

“In evaluating the effect a publication has on the average reader, the challenged 

language must be viewed in context to determine whether, applying a ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ test, it is reasonably susceptible to the defamatory meaning alleged by the 

plaintiff: ‘ “[A] defamatory meaning must be found, if at all, in a reading of the 

publication as a whole.” [Citation.] “This is a rule of reason. Defamation actions cannot 

be based on snippets taken out of context.” ’ ” (J-M Manufacturing, supra, 

247 Cal.App.4th at p. 100; McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987)

189 Cal.App.3d 961, 975-976 (McClatchy) [the defendant “does not have to justify every 

word of the alleged defamatory material that is published,” defendant’s “responsibility 

lies in ensuring that the ‘gist or sting’ of the report—its very substance—is accurately 

conveyed”].) “ ‘Only if the deviation is of such a “substantial character” that it 

“produce[s] a different effect” on the reader will the privilege be suspended. [Citation.] 

News articles, in other words, need only convey the substance of the proceedings on 

which they report, as measured by the impact on the average reader.’ [Citation.]” 

(Carver v. Bonds (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328, 351-352; Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 790.) 

“ ‘The fair report privilege is required because of the public’s need for information 

to fulfill its supervisory role over government. Thus, reports of official proceedings are 

not privileged “merely to satisfy the curiosity of individuals,” but to tell them how their 

government is performing.’ ” (McClatchy, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 975.) Courts 
21

have liberally construed the fair and true reporting privilege. (Sipple, supra,

71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 240-241; J-M Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 101; 

Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 416, 431 (Healthsmart).) 

We conclude that the fair and true reporting privilege applies to Lopez’s press 

conference and to the statements attributed to her in the Los Angeles Times article. As 

Lopez stated at the beginning of the press conference, the purpose of the conference was 

to announce that she had submitted a complaint to the Assembly Rules Committee that 

she was sexually assaulted by Dababneh. The facts of that assault that Lopez related at 

the press conference are substantively the same as in her letter to the committee: at a prewedding party at a Las Vegas hotel, Dababneh pushed Lopez into a restroom, blocked the 

door, and masturbated while urging her to touch him. At the press conference, Lopez

related her initial reluctance to name Dababneh and the circumstances that overcame that 

reluctance, including urging by the committee chair, Cooley, and other legislators for her 

to come forward and promising a fair process if she did. Lopez’s complaint also stated 

that she was stepping forward because Cooley encouraged her to do so.

Similarly, the Los Angeles Times article begins with the news item that Lopez had 

named Dababneh in a complaint to the Assembly (“Lopez had not publicly accused 

Dababneh until Monday, when she formally filed a complaint with the Assembly and 

named him at a news conference”) and reported her allegations in the complaint 

(“Sacramento Lobbyist Pamela Lopez has claimed that, in 2016, Democratic 

Assemblyman Matt Dababneh followed her into a bathroom, masturbated in front of her 

and urged her to touch him.”) In the article, Lopez described that circumstances and 

events that led her to submit a complaint to the Assembly, a subject also referenced in her 

complaint.

In sum, the gist and sting of Lopez’s statements at the press conference and in the 

article are substantively the same as the allegations in her complaint to the Assembly. 

The average reader would reasonably interpret Lopez’s statements to the press as 
22

conveying that she had named Dababneh in a complaint alleging that he had forced her to 

watch him masturbate. Moreover, Lopez’s statements at the press conference and in the 

article about her complaint included an explanation why she overcame her reluctance to 

report Dababneh to the Assembly, thereby informing the public “ ‘how their government 

is performing.’ ” (McClatchy, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 975.)

Dababneh counters that “ ‘gist and sting’ ” cases are inapposite because he “does 

not contend that Lopez described the Report inaccurately” in statements to the press. 

Dababneh argues that “Lopez told the press that Dababneh had assaulted her as a fact 

independent of the Report.” Dababneh cites Healthsmart, in which the court said “[a]n 

attorney may not . . . make defamatory allegations in a complaint and then report the 

same alleged facts, as facts, to the media with impunity.” (Healthsmart, supra,

7 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.) “[S]tatements are privileged if they are fair and true reports 

about the proceedings or of what was said in the proceedings. [Citations.] There is thus

a critical difference between communicating to the media what is alleged in the 

complaint and communicating the alleged facts without reference to the complaint.” 

(Ibid.) “The issue is whether the average viewer or listener of the media reports would 

understand the . . . statements as communications about the [underlying] complaint 

(which would be privileged) or as facts (which would not).” (Id. at pp. 435-436.)

We find that Lopez’s statements to the press were not made as statements of fact 

without reference to her complaint to the Assembly and the average reader would 

understand her statements to refer to her complaint. Healthsmart, in fact, is instructive. 

Dababneh argues, for example, that a “passing reference” to Lopez’s complaint in the 

Los Angeles Times article “is separated by a dozen paragraphs from Lopez’s lengthy 

narrative about the assault.” In Healthsmart, the defendant’s initial statement in a 

television news report referred to “a conspiracy among the hospitals and doctors that ‘we 

allege in the complaint,’ ” but “his subsequent statements do not mention the complaint 

or allegations . . . .” (Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) Noting that the news 
23

reporter referred to the defendant as the attorney for the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit 

and the report included background references to the suit, the court concluded that “[t]he 

average person watching the report in its entirety would reasonably understand that 

[defendant’s attorney] was referring to the allegations in the lawsuit he filed on [his 

client’s] behalf. Although some statements, when viewed in isolation, could be 

understood to communicate the allegedly defamatory matter as facts, not mere allegations 

of facts, when the media reports are viewed in their entirety and in the context in which 

they were made, the only reasonable conclusion is that the statements refer to allegations 

made in the [underlying] complaint.” (Ibid.)

In this instance, both the press conference and the news article begin with a 

reference to Lopez’s complaint to the Assembly that Dababneh sexually assaulted her. 

As mentioned, Lopez stated at the outset that the purpose of the press conference was to 

announce her sexual assault allegations against Dababneh. The headline of the article 

summarized its substance as “California assemblyman accused of forcing lobbyist into 

bathroom and masturbating.” Lopez’s complaint to the Assembly, the press conference 

and the publication of the article all occurred on the same day. The publication of the

article—as indicated by its headline and introductory paragraph—was triggered by 

Lopez’s complaint to the Assembly. As in Healthsmart, when Lopez’s statements to the 

press are viewed in their entirety and in the context in which they were made, these

statements would reasonably be understood to refer to the allegations in her complaint to 

the Assembly.

There is a marked contrast between the present circumstances and those in 

Hawran where the court found the fair and true reporting privilege did not apply to a 

press release. (Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.) In that case, the press release 

announced the completion of an internal investigation by a corporation’s special litigation 

committee, summarized its conclusions, listed remedial measures, announced the 

termination or resignation of various officers (including Hawran), identified new interim 
24

officers, and referred to a future presentation to the SEC. (Ibid.) The court found the 

“press release does not mention the subject SEC investigation, much less ‘capture[ ] [its] 

substance, . . . “gist” or “sting” . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The press release, including the 

alleged defamatory allegations about Hawran’s resignation and denial of wrongdoing, did 

not “report on, summarize or describe the SEC proceeding,” its history, or any statements 

made in the course of an SEC proceeding or investigation. (Id. at p. 281.) The press 

release simply reported the results and consequences of the company’s internal 

investigation. (Ibid.) Though the release referred to a presentation to the SEC, it did not 

describe the presentation. (Ibid.) The court concluded that nothing in the release “gives

us the ‘gist’ of the SEC’s charges, if any, or the proceedings before it.” (Ibid.) 

Here, Lopez’s complaint to the Assembly is the focus of her press conference and

the Los Angeles Times article and, as Dababneh concedes, the gist or sting of that 

complaint is accurately described in her statements to the press on both occasions. (See 

Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 789-790.)

Dababneh also contends the fair and true reporting privilege should be rejected 

because “Lopez’s press statements added numerous ‘material facts,’ including that 

Dababneh had ‘expressed regret and disbelief’ afterwards and that Lopez had told friends 

about the assault immediately after it happened.”5 We disagree. Assuming arguendo that 

5 Dababneh also cites to the fact section of his brief where he referred to Lopez stating at 

the press conference that “Dababneh had sexually harassed and abused other women.” 

Dababneh, however, failed to allege in his complaint that Lopez defamed him by false 

statements to the press that he sexually harassed other women. “On review of a special 

motion to strike pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16, we must take the 

complaint as it is. [Citation.]” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 

1263 [where plaintiff contended in opposition to anti-SLAPP motion that defendant 

defamed her in a radio interview by a false statement that she had had an abortion,

“whatever possible merit that claim may have, [plaintiff] failed to include it in her 

complaint”].)
25

these are “material facts,” Lopez stated in her letter of complaint to the Assembly that 

“[i]t is not my intention to report every detail of what happened,” and provided a “brief 

description.” In other words, the allegations in the complaint were not presented as a 

detailed description of the alleged assault. We find the additional details of the assault

communicated to the press do not change the gist or sting of the allegations of complaint 

and are therefore privileged.6 

In Sipple, the plaintiff contended that “ ‘most of the statements in the article—and 

all of the most damaging ones—are simply absent from the court proceedings.’ ” (Sipple, 

supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) The court found “[t]he article, although it expands on 

specific incidents of abuse, does not change the gist or sting of the courtroom statements

or the complexion of the affair.” (Ibid.) Likewise here, Lopez’s statements to the press, 

including that Dababneh expressed regret after the assault and that she disclosed the 

assault to friends at the time it happened, expand on the brief description of the incident

in Lopez’s complaint to the Assembly but do not alter the gist or sting of her allegations.

6 Dababneh cites Lyon v. Fairweather (1923) 63 Cal.App. 194, 197-198, for the 

proposition that the “fair report privilege [is] inapplicable to [an] article which included 

paragraphs that ‘do not purport to state any fact or facts developed in the judicial 

proceeding which the article purports to report.’ ” However, in Handelsman v. San 

Francisco Chronicle (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 381, the court cited Lyon as stating the “well 

recognized principle that an alleged libelous article must be considered in its entirety 

. . . .” (Id. at p. 388; Lyon, supra, 63 Cal.App. at p. 197.) Handelsman also stated the 

“well recognized rule” that a report “substantially in accord” with the alleged defamatory 

matter in a judicial complaint is entitled to the fair and true reporting privilege. 

(Handelsman, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at p. 386.) A report that captures “the gist, the sting” 

of the libelous charge, as measured “by the natural and probable effect it would have on 

the mind of the average reader” is a fair and true report. (Id. at p. 387.)
26

Because Lopez’s statements to the press were absolutely privileged under section 

47, subdivision (d), Dababneh cannot establish a probability of prevailing on his 

defamation claim.7 (J-M Manufacturing, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The collapse of Dababneh’s defamation claim spells the demise of his claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, which arises from Lopez’s statements 

regarding the alleged sexual assault. (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 34.) 

“As the state Supreme Court observed, ‘ “to allow an independent cause of action for the 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on the same acts which would not 

support a defamation action, would allow plaintiffs to do indirectly what they could not 

do directly. It would also render meaningless any defense of truth or privilege.” ’ ” 

(Ibid., quoting Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 234, 245; see also 

Flynn v. Higham (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 682; Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, 

Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 579.)

7 Because we hold the absolute privilege applies, we have no occasion to consider 

whether the statements were made with actual malice or the Noerr-Pennington doctrine

applies and do not address the parties’ arguments on these issues. (Healthsmart, supra, 

7 Cal.App.5th at p. 437.)
27

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with 

directions to grant Lopez’s special motion to strike and to conduct further proceedings in 

accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Lopez shall recover her costs 

on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

 /s/

RAYE, P. J.

We concur:

 /s/

ROBIE, J.

 /s/

MAURO, J.