United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

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No. 23-30005

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United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Sidney Joseph, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:99-CR-238-1

______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Graves, and Wilson, Circuit 

Judges.

James E. Graves Jr., Circuit Judge:

Appellant Sidney Joseph appeals the district court’s order instructing the Bureau of Prisons to transfer funds from his inmate account to cover 

his restitution payments. We AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 20, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 23-30005

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BACKGROUND

In 2001 Appellant was found guilty on multiple counts of bank 

robbery, carjacking, and various weapons charges. Appellant was sentenced 

to 462 months of imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release and 

was ordered to make restitution payments to the two banks for a total of 

$24,025.00. Specifically, the sentencing district court ordered that: “[t]he 

payment of the restitution of $24,025.00 shall begin while the defendant is 

incarcerated. Upon release from imprisonment, any unpaid balance shall be 

paid at a rate of $400.00 per month.” Appellant’s conviction and sentence 

were affirmed, and up and until the order at issue in this appeal, Appellant 

had paid $2,772.03 in restitution leaving a balance of $21,252.97. 

However, Appellant had accumulated $18,217.83 in his inmate trust 

account, and in 2022 the government moved for an order directing the 

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to turn the money over to the clerk of court as 

payment towards his restitution liability. The district court appointed 

counsel who provided a response, to which the government replied. 

The district court granted the government’s motion and ordered that 

$17,817.83 be turned over for payment of restitution with $400 remaining in 

Appellant’s inmate trust account. This appeal resulted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court’s statutory construction is reviewed de novo. United 

States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Lara v. Cinemark 

USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 2000)). 

A “district court’s decision to issue a turnover order is reviewed for 

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Rand, 924 F.3d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 2019)

(citing Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
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“It may be reversed only if the court has acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary 

manner.” Id. (citation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion “if it 

bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence.” Id. (citing United States v. Clayton, 613 F.3d 

592, 595 (5th Cir. 2010)). 

DISCUSSION

The district court granted the government’s request for a turnover 

order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c), 18 U.S.C. § 3556, and the Mandatory 

Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The MVRA 

provides that: “[a]n order of restitution under this section shall be issued and 

enforced in accordance with section 3664.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(d). Section 

3664 provides that “[a]n order of restitution may be enforced by the United 

States in the manner provided for in subchapter C of chapter 227 and 

subchapter B of chapter 229 of this title; or [] by all other available and 

reasonable means.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i), (ii). Subchapter B of 

chapter 229 includes 18 U.S.C. § 3613.

Section 3613(a), entitled “enforcement[,]” provides that “[t]he 

United States may enforce a judgment imposing a fine in accordance with the 

practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment under 

Federal law or State law. . . [and] a judgment imposing a fine may be enforced 

against all property or rights to property of the person fined, except [for three 

exceptions].” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a). Section (c) provides that a fine imposed 

pursuant to this title “is a lien in favor of the United States . . . as if the liability 

of the person fined were a liability for a tax assessed under the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1986.” Id. § 3613(c). Accordingly, there is no dispute that 

the United States had a lien on Appellant’s property upon the entry of 

judgment in 2001. 
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On appeal, Appellant argues that (1) according to the statute the lien 

had expired; (2) the district court’s order was not pursuant to any federal or 

state law; and (3) the district court was not entitled to seize all of Appellant’s 

wages. 

I. Statutory interpretation

Statutory interpretation always begins with the text of the statute. 

United States v. Koutsostamatis, 956 F.3d 301, 306 (5th Cir. 2020). The 

relevant statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3613 are below.

Subsection 3613(b) is entitled “termination of liability” and states 

that: 

The liability to pay restitution shall terminate on the date that 

is the later of 20 years from the entry of judgment or 20 years 

after the release from imprisonment of the person ordered to 

pay restitution. In the event of the death of the person ordered 

to pay restitution, the individual’s estate will be held 

responsible for any unpaid balance of the restitution amount, 

and the lien provided in subsection I of this section shall 

continue until the estate receives a written release of that 

liability.

18 U.S.C. § 3613(b). Subsection (c) is entitled “lien” and states: “[t]he lien 

arises on the entry of judgment and continues for 20 years or until the liability 

is satisfied, remitted, set aside, or is terminated under subsection (b).” 18 

U.S.C. § 3613(c). 

Appellant argues that the two subsections should be construed 

separately, specifically that § 3613(b) operates to terminate liability, and 

§ 3613(c) operates to terminate the lien. Accordingly, under his reading of 

subsection (c), the lien on his property expired upon the earlier of the two 

dates. For him, that is 20 years from the judgment date. He argues that the 

opposite interpretation would render “for 20 years or” superfluous. He goes 
No. 23-30005

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on to argue that if congress intended for it to be the later of the two 

requirements, that it would have included those words just as it did in 

subsection 3613(b). 

The text of the statute belies Appellant’s contention for multiple 

reasons. First, both subsections are under one section, that of 3613. Second, 

the title of subsection (b) specifically says “termination of liability” while the 

title of subsection (c) does not, indicating that the two could be read as 

coterminous as to termination. Third, subsection (c) gives explicit reference 

to subsection (b). This is supported by the end of subsection (b) where it 

states: “the lien provided in subsection (c) of this section shall continue until 

the estate receives a written release of that liability.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b). 

Here, congress has used “lien” and “liability” interchangeably, giving us 

further indication that reading the two subsections together is the correct 

interpretation. Finally, this reading makes sense because—to Appellant’s 

contention that congress could have specifically included “the later of” in 

subsection (c) for the two dates—if the subsections are read together, there 

is no need for this inclusion; and second, if congress intended it to be the 

earlier of the two dates, it likewise could have so specified.

Further, if we were to agree with Appellant’s argument that 

subsection (c) mandates that the lien expires on the earlier of the two dates, 

that would result in a nonsensical outcome. See Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 

177, 181 (5th Cir. 2002) (invoking the “common mandate of statutory 

construction to avoid absurd results”). Subsection 3613(b) provides that “in 

the event of the death of the person ordered to pay restitution, the 

individual’s estate will be held responsible for any unpaid balance of the 

restitution amount, and the lien provided in subsection (c) of this section 

shall continue until the estate receives a written release of that liability.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3613(b). Adopting Appellant’s construction would result in a 

nonsensical outcome because it would make no sense that if the person who 
No. 23-30005

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owes restitution (debtor) dies, their estate would be held responsible for the 

unpaid balance of the restitution in accordance with the lien until they receive 

a written release, but if the debtor lives, he is released from the restitution 

requirement after 20 years. Accordingly, the district court did not err in 

finding that the lien had not terminated, and in granting the turnover order.

II. Federal or state law

Appellant next argues that the district court’s order was not issued 

“in accordance with” any federal or state law as is required by § 3613(a). To 

recap, the MVRA authorizes an order of restitution to be enforced in a 

manner provided by § 3613 or “by all other available and reasonable means.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i), (ii). Section 3613 states that the “United 

States may enforce a judgment imposing a fine in accordance with the 

practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment under 

Federal law or State law.” Appellant may be correct that § 3613(a) requires 

a federal or state enforcement statute, however § 3613(a) also authorizes 

enforcement “[n]otwithstanding any other [f]ederal law[.]” We have 

previously found this provision to override any conflicting sections or federal 

laws. “This court has interpreted this ‘notwithstanding’ clause as signal[ing] 

a clear Congressional intent to override conflicting federal law.” United 

States v. Elashi, 789 F.3d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Cf. 

Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) (“[T]he use of such a 

‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the 

provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of 

any other section.”). Further, even assuming the district court did not have 

sole authority under § 3613(a), the MVRA provides for enforcement “by all 

other available and reasonable means.” The district court could have 

reasonably read this provision to include a court order. Accordingly, the

district court did not base “its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” Rand, 

924 F.3d at 142. Hence, there was no abuse of discretion.
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III. Garnishment of wages

Finally, for the first time on appeal, Appellant argues that the district 

court erred by not limiting the turnover order in accordance with the 

exception(s) in § 3613(a). However, Appellant has forfeited this argument by 

raising it for the first time on appeal. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 

397 (5th Cir. 2021). (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the 

first instance in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on 

appeal—or by failing to adequately brief the argument on appeal.”). “As we 

have held, if a litigant desires to preserve an argument for appeal, the litigant 

must press and not merely intimate the argument during the proceedings 

before the district court. If an argument is not raised to such a degree that the 

district court has an opportunity to rule on it, we will not address it on 

appeal.” F.D.I.C. v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1327 (5th Cir. 1994). See Thomas v. 

Abebe, 833 F. App’x 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2020) (on appeal from a motion to 

dismiss). For the first time on appeal, Thomas raised a new argument that 

defendants had been properly served, and accordingly, the district court 

should have entered a default judgment against those defendants. Our court 

held that (1) Thomas never filed proof of service, and (2) that in any case, 

Thomas failed to raise his issues with the court below and his arguments were 

thus waived. The court came to this conclusion even where the appellees did 

not argue forfeiture in their brief.1 See also Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 

183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). Leverette appealed the district court’s 

order granting judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) to the Appellee, 

contending, for the first time on appeal, that our court should apply a riskutility analysis to determine if the product was defective. Even where the 

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1 The Appellees argued only that Thomas had not preserved his issues for appeal 

because there was no citation to the record and no discussion or explanation of the case law 

cited, not that Thomas failed to raise the issue in the district court.
No. 23-30005

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Appellee did not argue forfeiture, our court held that we “will not allow a 

party to raise an issue for the first time on appeal merely because a party 

believes that he might prevail if given the opportunity to try a case again on a 

new theory.” Id. 

Although these cases arise from a motion to dismiss and a JMOL 

motion after a trial, the underlying premise of forfeiture aptly applies. 

Appellant asks us to consider their new argument that the Consumer 

Protection Credit Act exception in § 3613(a) is sufficient to overturn the 

district court’s order. Our court “cannot allow a party to raise an issue for 

the first time on appeal” merely because they believe that they may prevail 

on a new theory never raised before the district court. Leverette, 183 F.3d at

342. “If an argument is not raised to such a degree that the district court has 

an opportunity to rule on it, we will not address it on appeal.” F.D.I.C. v. 

Mijalis, 15 F.3d at 1327. See also Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 

180, 185 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that a party waives an argument when they 

fail to argue or brief it to the district court and statements made at high levels 

of generality do not sufficiently preserve the argument for decision).

Appellant’s argument is forfeited. 

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court.