COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Willis and 

 Retired Judge Whitehurst*

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

WILLIAM E. VAUGHN 

v. Record No. 0669-94-1 OPINION BY 

 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS JUNE 27, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

 Stephen A. Dunnigan for appellant. 

 Denise A. Dunn, Assistant Commonwealth's 

Attorney (Office of the Commonwealth's 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 William E. Vaughn appeals his conviction for violating § 421 

of the Newport News City Code, which prohibits "outside storage 

of goods, materials and equipment." Vaughn argues that because 

"goods, materials and equipment" are not defined in § 421, the 

statute is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. 

 While Vaughn correctly contends that the Newport News City 

Code does not define "goods, materials, and equipment," a fair 

reading of § 421 in its entirety and in conjunction with the 

language in the city's zoning ordinance shows that § 421 is 

reasonably definite in its scope as to the prohibited conduct 

and, therefore, not unconstitutionally vague. For this reason, 

we affirm. 

 The pertinent facts which are not disputed are that Vaughn 

 

 * Retired Judge Alfred W. Whitehurst took part in 

consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code 

§ 17-116.01. 
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had numerous items, including appliances, pieces of wood, pipes, 

and other miscellaneous items, stored outside on his business 

property. Vaughn, whose property is zoned Retail Commercial, 

received a written notice of and notice to correct the violations 

within fifteen days. More than two months later, he received a 

summons for failing to abate the violations. 

 The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative 

enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient definiteness 

and certainty that "ordinary people can understand what conduct 

is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 

and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 

352, 357 (1983). This Court has further explained that 

"[a]lthough absolute precision is not required, a law must afford 

a reasonable degree of certainty so that a person is not left to 

guess at what conduct is prohibited." Turner v. Jackson, 14 Va. 

App. 423, 433, 417 S.E.2d 881, 888 (1992). 

 While § 421 does not define "goods, material and equipment," 

it permits outside storage of goods, materials and equipment as a 

matter of right only in manufacturing zoning districts and, with 

the issuance of a special exception, in a C2-A zoning district. 

Vaughn's property is zoned neither Manufacturing nor C2-A. 

Section 421 further delineates exceptions to the section's 

provisions and lists a number of situations where outside storage 

of goods, materials, and equipment is legislatively declared as 

not to be included within the term "outside storage." Thus, 

§ 421 affords an individual reasonable notice as to what is and 
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what is not prohibited by the ordinance. 

 Moreover, §§ 402, 412, and 1402 provide that the prohibition 

of "outside storage" would not extend to any "goods, materials, 

and equipment" that would ordinarily be associated with permitted 

uses, as an "accessory use," in other zoning districts. Section 

1402(C) provides as follows: 

 Accessory uses. Any use customarily incidental or 

accessory to any of the above uses is permitted in this 

district when clearly established as an accessory use 

to a permitted use. 

This language or similar language is included in every other 

zoning classification in the city's zoning ordinance. 

Accordingly, stock or inventory could be stored in the rear of 

Vaughn's premises because it is zoned Retail Commercial. 

Contrary to Vaughn's contention, a swing set would not be 

prohibited in the backyard of a residence, because swing sets are 

incidental to residential use. However, appliances, pieces of 

wood, pipes, and the other miscellaneous items located on 

Vaughn's property are not accessory to any permitted use of his 

property. 

 Vaughn's argument overlooks the inclusive nature of the 

statutory scheme of the city's zoning ordinance, i.e., that only 

where exceptions are made within § 421 or where "outside storage" 

of other objects is made to fall outside the purview of § 421 via 

other sections in the ordinance, can such "goods, material and 

equipment," be stored outside of one's premises. Put simply, the 

city's zoning ordinance prohibits the outside storage of anything 
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except as otherwise stated within its sections. By negative 

inference, the statutory scheme creates a prohibition which 

allows the ordinance's primary purpose to be carried out without 

specifically enumerating every single item which the city did not 

want stored outside. Vaughn's argument, were it accepted, would 

put in doubt all similar zoning ordinances which are inclusive in 

nature. 

 Section 402 states that "[n]o land shall be used except for 

a purpose permitted in the district in which such land is 

located." The ordinance makes clear that only uses specifically 

enumerated within a zoning district are permitted without a 

special use permit. The Supreme Court of Virginia has approved 

inclusive zoning ordinances which specify uses which are 

permitted in the respective zones and do not specify those uses 

which are prohibited therein. Board of Supvrs. v. Gaffney, 244 

Va. 545, 549-50, 422 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1992). Vaughn's property 

is not in a manufacturing zoning district. He has no special 

exception for the subject parcel and he has not argued that the 

goods stored on his property are "accessory" to a permitted use. 

 In conclusion, we hold that § 421, taken as a whole and in 

conjunction with the language in the city's zoning ordinance, 

affords a reasonable degree of certainty and is not 

unconstitutionally vague. 

 Affirmed.