[Cite as State v. Hudson, 2013-Ohio-647.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MARION COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 9-12-38 

 v. 

LARRY DEAN HUDSON, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 11-CR-0647 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: February 25, 2013 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Jeff Ratliff for Appellant 

Brent W. Yager for Appellee 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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PRESTON, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Larry Dean Hudson, appeals the Marion County 

Court of Common Pleas’ judgment entry of conviction and sentence stemming 

from his failure to provide notice of his change of address for purposes of his 

sexual offender registration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} On September 26, 1996, Hudson was convicted of gross sexual 

imposition in the Court of Common Pleas for Marion County, Ohio in Case 

Number 96-CR-0207, a felony of the fourth degree.1

 Hudson was sentenced to a 

term of six (6) months in prison with the sentence to run consecutively to a twelve 

(12) month prison term imposed in Marion County Common Pleas Court Case 

Number 95-CR-0090. 

{¶3} At the time of Hudson’s 1996 conviction, Ohio was operating under 

the federally mandated Jacob Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071, et seq., codified 

in Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950. 

{¶4} The Ohio General Assembly passed H.B. 180, the State’s version of 

the federally mandated Megan’s Law, with an effective date of July 1, 1997. On 

that date, Hudson was still serving the term of imprisonment for gross sexual 

imposition imposed in 1996. Therefore, he was subject to the provisions of the 

new Megan’s Law pursuant to the newly enacted O.R.C. § 2950.04(A). 

 

1

 The procedural history of this case comes directly from the parties’ stipulation of facts. (Doc. No. 39). 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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{¶5} While still incarcerated, Hudson was notified by the Ohio Department 

of Rehabilitation and Corrections and the trial court that his sex offender 

registration status would be determined pursuant to the 1997 version of O.R.C. § 

2950.09(C)(1). 

{¶6} On October 21, 1997, the trial court determined, without a hearing, 

that Hudson was not a sexual predator. Other than the court order issued on 

October 21, 1997, no other court or parole board has ever held a hearing to 

determine Hudson’s duty to register as a sex offender. 

{¶7} On or about October 30, 1997, Hudson was notified by the Marion 

County Sheriff’s Office that he would be required to register as a sexually oriented 

offender upon his release from prison; that he would be required to register for a 

period of ten (10) years; and, that he was required to register with the Sheriff’s 

office by November 5, 1997. 

{¶8} Since October 1997, Hudson had served four (4) additional prison 

terms, including terms of incarceration of four (4) years, six (6) months, eight (8) 

months and fourteen (14) months for convictions stemming from non-sex offenses 

in 2000, 2006, 2007, and 2010. No additional duties to register as a sex offender 

were imposed on Hudson in any of these subsequent convictions. 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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{¶9} Since his initial registration date, Hudson had registered with the 

Marion County Sheriff’s Office and has signed several notices of explanations of 

duties to register. 

{¶10} On March 31, 1999, Ohio’s 1998 H.B. 565 became effective, which 

was codified under newly enacted O.R.C. § 2950.07(D). 

{¶11} On August 1, 2008, Ohio’s version of the federally mandated Adam 

Walsh Act became effective. Subsequently, the Ohio Attorney General designated 

Hudson as a Tier II sex offender. Hudson was notified that he would have to 

register for twenty-five (25) years with verification every 180 days after the initial 

registration. 

{¶12} On June 2, 2011, Hudson was released from prison on a 2010 

conviction. He registered at his sister’s address at 412 East Farming Street, 

Marion, Ohio as his residence with the Marion County Sheriff’s Office. He was 

informed by the Agency that he was required to comply with the provisions of the 

Adam Walsh Act. 

{¶13} On August 23, 2011, the Marion County Sheriff’s Office in 

conjunction with the U.S. Marshall’s Office conducted a county-wide sweep to 

check sex offender registrations. On arriving at Hudson’s registered residential 

address, it was discovered he had not lived there for more than one (1) month. 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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{¶14} Hudson failed to notify the Marion County Sheriff’s Office that he 

was no longer residing at 412 East Farming Street, Marion, Ohio. 

{¶15} On the annual verification date for Hudson’s sex offender 

registration, Hudson did not appear at the Sheriff’s office to verify his registration 

information. When Hudson failed to appear on September 1, 2011, a certified 

letter was sent to his registered address of 412 East Farming Street, Marion, Ohio 

advising him that he was required to complete his annual verification by 

September 14, 2011. Hudson again failed to appear. 

{¶16} On December 15, 2011, Hudson was arrested by officers of the 

Marion County Sheriff’s Office. He advised the arresting officers that he failed to 

notify the Sheriff’s Office of the change of address as he was homeless on leaving 

his sister’s residence. 

{¶17} The only conviction that could impose a duty upon Hudson to 

register as a sex offender was his 1996 conviction for gross sexual imposition.2

{¶18} On December 21, 2011, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted 

Hudson on Count One of failure to provide notice of change of address in 

violation of R.C. 2950.05(A), a third degree felony, and Count Two of failure to 

verify sex offender registration in violation of R.C. 2950.05(A), a third degree 

felony. (Doc. No. 1). 

 

2

 This ends the portion of facts stipulated to by the parties herein. (Doc. No. 39). 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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{¶19} On December 27, 2011, Hudson was arraigned and entered a plea of 

not guilty. (Doc. No. 5). 

{¶20} On February 22, 2012, Hudson filed a motion to dismiss the 

indictment arguing that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender 

since his ten-year registration period had already expired. (Doc. No. 16). 

{¶21} On March 1, 2012, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to 

Hudson’s motion to dismiss, arguing that Hudson was a “sexually oriented 

offender,” by operation of Megan’s Law enacted in R.C. 2950.04(A)(1), and 

required to register for ten years per R.C. 2950.07(B)(3). (Doc. No. 22). The 

State further argued that Hudson’s ten-year registration period was tolled while he 

was incarcerated on unrelated offenses pursuant to R.C. 2950.07(D), enacted by 

H.B. 565 and effective March 31, 1999. (Id.). According to the State, Hudson’s 

registration period will not expire before October 2013. (Id.). 

{¶22} On March 13, 2012, Hudson filed a memorandum in opposition to 

the State, arguing that the application of R.C. 2950.07(D)’s tolling provision, 

effective after his conviction, would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. 

Constitution and Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. (Doc. No. 26). 

{¶23} On April 24, 2012, the trial court overruled Hudson’s motion to 

dismiss. (Doc. No. 32). 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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{¶24} On May 24, 2012, the trial court held a change of plea hearing. 

(Doc. No. 43). Upon the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed the indictment; 

Hudson waived the requirement for an indictment; and, Hudson pled no contest to 

a bill of information charging him with one count of failure to provide notice of 

change of address in violation of R.C. 2950.05(A), a third degree felony. (Doc. 

Nos. 34, 38, 43). The parties entered a written stipulation of facts for the trial 

court to adopt along with Hudson’s no contest plea to the bill of information. 

(Doc. No. 39). The trial court found Hudson guilty and sentenced him to two 

years of community control. (Doc. No. 43). The trial court stayed Hudson’s 

sentence pending appeal. (Doc. No. 36). On June 6, 2012, the trial court filed its 

judgment entry of conviction and sentence. (Doc. No. 43). 

{¶25} On July 5, 2012, Hudson filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 48). 

Hudson now appeals raising two assignments of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

The tolling provision contained in O.R.C. §2950.07(D) is 

unconstitutional as it violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 

Constitution because (1) the General Assembly did not express a 

clear declaration that the tolling provision would be applied 

retroactively, and (2) the tolling provision is punitive as it 

applies to pre-1998 H.B. 565 offenders. 

{¶26} In his first assignment of error, Hudson argues that his ten-year 

registration period under Megan’s Law commenced on his release from prison, 

October 29, 1997, and therefore, terminated on October 29, 2007. Hudson argues 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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that R.C. 2950.07(D), which tolls the registration period for any time during which 

the offender is re-incarcerated and was effective subsequent to his conviction (on 

March 31, 1999), does not apply retroactively; and, if it does, violates Section 28, 

Article II of the Ohio Constitution, the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 

{¶27} This case requires both the interpretation of a statute and a 

determination regarding its constitutionality, which are issues of law we review de 

novo. State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, ¶ 8 (statutory 

interpretation); City of Akron v. Callaway, 162 Ohio App.3d 781, 2005-Ohio4095, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.). (constitutionality); Andreyko v. City of Cincinnati, 153 Ohio 

App.3d 108, 2003-Ohio-2759, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.) (same). De novo review is 

independent, without deference to the lower court’s decision. See Ohio Bell Tel. 

Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 (1992). 

{¶28} “‘An enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be 

constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional, it must appear 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are 

clearly incompatible.’” State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1998), quoting 

State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142 (1955), paragraph one of 

the syllabus. “That presumption applies to amended R.C. Chapter 2950 * * * and 

remains unless [the appellant] establishes, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 

statute is unconstitutional.” State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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¶ 12, citing Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 409; Roosevelt Properties Co. v. Kinney, 12 

Ohio St.3d 7, 13 (1984). 

{¶29} Notwithstanding the presumption of constitutionality, Section 28, 

Article II of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from 

retroactively impairing a vested, substantive right. Consilio, 2007-Ohio-4163, at ¶ 

9, citing State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, ¶ 13. However, the 

General Assembly may make legislation retroactive if it is merely remedial in 

nature. Id., citing State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm., 132 Ohio St. 537, 542 

(1937). Statutes are presumed to apply prospectively unless expressly declared to 

be retroactive. LaSalle at ¶ 14, citing R.C. 1.48 and Van Fossen v. Babcock & 

Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 105 (1988); Ferguson, 2008-Ohio-4824, at ¶ 15, 

citing Hyle v. Porter, 117 Ohio St.3d 165, 2008-Ohio-542, ¶ 10. 

{¶30} To determine whether a statute may be applied retroactively requires 

a two-part test. Consilio at ¶ 10; Ferguson at ¶ 13. First, the reviewing court must 

determine, as a threshold matter, whether the General Assembly expressly made 

the statute retroactive. Consilio at ¶ 10, citing LaSalle, at ¶ 14, citing Van Fossen, 

36 Ohio St.3d 100, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; Ferguson at ¶ 13-

14. “The General Assembly’s failure to clearly enunciate retroactivity ends the 

analysis, and the relevant statute may be applied only prospectively.” Consilio at 

¶ 10; Ferguson at ¶ 13. If the statute is retroactive, though, the reviewing court 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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must then determine whether it is substantive or remedial in nature. Consilio at ¶ 

10, citing LaSalle at ¶ 14; Ferguson at ¶ 13. 

{¶31} As amended by Am. Sub. H.B. 565, R.C. 2950.07(D), the tolling 

provision at issue here, provided: 

The duty of an offender to register under this chapter is tolled for 

any period during which the offender is returned to confinement for 

any reason or imprisoned for an offense when the confinement or 

imprisonment occurs subsequent to the date determined pursuant to 

division (A) of this section. The offender’s duty to register under this 

chapter resumes upon the offender’s release from confinement or 

imprisonment. 

(Emphasis added) (Eff. 3-30-99). R.C. 2950.07(A), referenced in division (D) 

above, provided for the commencement date of the registration requirements 

codified in R.C. Sections 2950.04, 2950.05, and 2950.06. R.C. 2950.07(A) 

described the type of offender for whom the registration requirement commenced 

as “an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to, or has been convicted of or 

pleaded guilty to, a sexually oriented offense * * *.” (Emphasis added) (Eff. 3-30-

99). R.C. 2950.04, which codified the actual duty to register, provided: 

(A) Each offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to, or has 

been convicted of or pleaded guilty to, a sexually oriented offense 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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and who is described in division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section 

shall register with the sheriff of the following applicable county and 

at the following time: 

(1) Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was 

committed, if the offender is sentenced for the sexually oriented 

offense to a prison term, a term of imprisonment, or any other type 

of confinement and if, on or after July 1, 1997, the offender is 

released in any manner from a prison term, term of imprisonment, or 

confinement, within seven days of the offender’s coming into any 

county in which the offender resides or temporarily is domiciled for 

more than seven days, the offender shall register with the sheriff of 

that county. 

(Emphasis added) (Eff. 3-30-99). 

{¶32} Hudson acknowledges that the Ohio Supreme Court has already 

determined that the General Assembly intended R.C. 2950.04(A) to apply 

retroactively and that the registration requirements found in Megan’s Law are 

remedial in nature. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 410-413. Nevertheless, Hudson argues 

that the General Assembly did not expressly state that R.C. 2950.07(D) was to 

apply retroactively; and therefore, R.C. 1.48’s presumption of prospective 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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application governs. Hudson relies heavily upon the Ohio Supreme Court’s 

decision in Hyle v. Porter in support of his position. 2008-Ohio-542. 

{¶33} In Hyle v. Porter, the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed the retroactivity 

of R.C. 2950.031, which prohibited convicted sex offenders from residing within 

1,000 feet of any school premises. 2008-Ohio-542, at ¶ 4. The statute provided 

that: 

No person who has been convicted of, is convicted of, or has 

pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to either a sexually oriented 

offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense or 

a child-victim oriented offense shall establish a residence or occupy 

residential premises within one thousand feet of any school 

premises. 

Id. Hyle, the chief legal officer of Green Township, obtained a permanent 

injunction prohibiting Porter, a convicted sex offender, from continuing to occupy 

his residence that was located within 1,000 feet of a school premises. Id. at ¶ 5. 

Porter appealed the trial court’s injunction, but the appellate court affirmed 

holding that R.C. 2950.031 could be applied retroactively to sex offenders, like 

Porter, who bought his home and committed his offense before the effective date 

of the statute. Id. at ¶ 6. 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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{¶34} On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Hyle argued that the General 

Assembly expressed its intent to apply R.C. 2950.031 retroactively because: (1) 

the statute used both present and past tense verbs to describe the convicted sex 

offenders; to wit: “[n]o person who has been convicted of, is convicted of, has 

pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to [specified categories of sexual offenses] * * 

*”; and (2) “R.C. Chapter 2950 as a whole supports the General Assembly’s 

retroactive intent.” Id. at ¶ 11, 23. Amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio 

argued that the statute’s phrase “shall establish a residence or occupy residential 

premises” describes two categories of prohibited behavior and that unless the term 

“occupy” was interpreted to mean “continue to occupy,” the phrases “shall 

establish a residence” and “occupy residential premises” were redundant. Id. at ¶ 

12. Therefore, the Attorney General argued that the statute applied to sex 

offenders who purchased their homes before or after the effective date of the 

statute. Id. 

{¶35} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments, however. 

The Court determined that the statute’s use of past and present tense verbs to 

describe the types of sex offenders and the statute’s description of the prohibited 

acts presented a mere “suggestion of retroactivity” rendering the statute 

“ambiguous” and was not a “clear declaration of retroactivity * * * sufficient to 

overcome the presumption of prospective application” Id. at ¶ 13 (emphasis sic). 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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The Court also rejected Hyle’s argument that R.C. Chapter 2950 as a whole was 

enough to convey the legislature’s intent to make R.C. 2950.031 retroactive, 

because it would reverse R.C. 1.48’s presumption of prospective application. Id. 

at ¶ 23. 

{¶36} In a subsequent case, however, the Ohio Supreme Court determined 

that the legislature intended the S.B. 5 amendments to R.C. Chapter 2950 to apply 

retroactively. State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824. The statutes 

at issue in Ferguson were former R.C. 2950.07(B)(1), which provided for a lifetime designation of “sexual predator,” as well as the concomitant duty to register; 

former R.C. 2950.04(A), which provided increased registration requirements; and, 

former R.C. 2950.081, which expanded the community-notification requirements. 

Id. at ¶ 8-10. 

{¶37} The Court’s retroactivity analysis in Ferguson differed from its 

retroactivity analysis in Hyle. Initially, the Court in Ferguson, consistent with its 

analysis in Hyle, examined the text of R.C. 2950.04(A)(1) and determined that the 

General Assembly intended it to be applied retroactively, because the statute 

specifically stated that it applied “[r]egardless of when the child-victim oriented 

offense was committed.” Id. at ¶ 16-17. With respect to R.C. 2950.07(B)(1) and 

R.C. 2950.081, though, the Court determined that the General Assembly intended 

these provisions to be retroactive without relying upon any express language in the 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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sections themselves. Id. at ¶ 18-25; Id. at ¶ 48-50 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 

Instead, the Court reasoned that the General Assembly intended retroactive 

application of these provisions since the Court had interpreted the former statute 

governing sex-offender classifications, R.C. 2950.09(C)(1), as retroactive in Cook, 

and none of the S.B. 5 amendments altered this interpretation. Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶38} Hudson urges this Court to follow the Ohio Supreme Court’s 

retroactivity analysis in Hyle and not its retroactivity analysis in Ferguson. 

Hudson’s arguments notwithstanding, R.C. 2950.07(D) is distinguishable from 

R.C. 2950.031, at issue in Hyle; and therefore, Ferguson is instructive. R.C. 

2950.07(D) does not merely use present and past verb tenses to describe the type 

of sex offenders for whom the statute applies like R.C. 2950.031; but rather, R.C. 

2950.07(D) both indirectly and directly incorporates R.C. 2950.04(A)’s duty to 

register, which duty the Ohio Supreme Court already found retroactive in Cook. 

{¶39} R.C. 2950.07(D) begins by stating that “[t]he duty of an offender to 

register under this chapter * * *” thereby indirectly incorporating R.C. 

2950.04(A). Thereafter, R.C. 2950.07(D) directly incorporates R.C. 2950.04(A) 

via R.C. 2950.07(A). R.C. 2950.031, on the other hand, did not directly 

incorporate the registration requirement in R.C. 2950.04(A). Furthermore, unlike 

R.C. 2950.031, which was enacted in its entirety as a separate, additional 

prohibition for sex offenders by S.B. 5, R.C. 2950.07(D) was enacted by H.B. 565 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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as part of an already-existing statutory registration scheme. Also, unlike R.C. 

2950.07(D), R.C. 2950.031 contained its own remedial mechanism. R.C. 

2950.031(B). The fact that R.C. 2950.031 was enacted in its entirety by S.B. 5 

and contained its own remedial mechanism without reference to another statutory 

provision may very well explain why the Court in Hyle required a clear expression 

of retroactive intent within the statutory provision itself. 

{¶40} Like the statutory provisions at issue in Ferguson, our retroactivity 

analysis of R.C. 2950.07(D) does not begin on a blank slate. 2008-Ohio-4825, at ¶ 

21. The General Assembly was certainly aware of the Court’s interpretation of 

R.C. 2950.04(A) in Cook when it enacted R.C. 2950.07(D). Id. at ¶ 22, 25. The 

registration requirement that R.C. 2950.07(D) tolls had already been declared 

retroactive. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 410. By directly incorporating the retroactive 

registration requirement in R.C. 2950.04(A), the General Assembly sufficiently 

expressed its intent to make R.C. 2950.07(D) retroactive as well. This language is 

more expressive of the General Assembly’s retroactive intent than the language 

contained in former R.C. 2950.081 and 2950.07(B)(1) found retroactive in 

Ferguson. Accordingly, we conclude that the General Assembly intended R.C. 

2950.07(D) to be applied retroactively. 

{¶41} Next, we must determine whether R.C. 2950.07(D) is substantive or 

remedial in nature. Consilio, 2007-Ohio-4163, at ¶ 10, citing LaSalle, 2002-Ohio-
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4009, at ¶ 14; Ferguson, 2008-Ohio-4824, at ¶ 13. The Court of Appeals for the 

Second District has already determined that R.C. 2950.07(D) is remedial in nature. 

State v. Hancock, 2d Dist. No. 24653, 2012-Ohio-1435, ¶ 10. In concluding that 

R.C. 2950.07(D) is remedial in nature, the Court in Hancock reasoned: 

Given that the ten-year registration and address verification 

requirements in the “Megan’s Law” version of R.C. Chapter 2050 

can be applied retroactively, Cook, supra, we conclude that the 

tolling provision extending the ten-year period when an offender is 

re-incarcerated is likewise remedial in nature. 

Id. 

{¶42} We agree with the Second District that if the registration requirement 

itself is remedial, then a tolling provision that further effectuates the remedial 

purpose of that requirement is also remedial in nature. In enacting Megan’s Law, 

the General Assembly declared: 

[s]exual predators and habitual sex offenders pose a high risk of 

engaging in further offenses even after being released from 

imprisonment, a prison term, or other confinement and that 

protection of members of the public from sexual predators and 

habitual sex offenders is a paramount governmental interest. 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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R.C. 2950.02(A)(2). Consequently, the primary remedial purpose behind the sex 

offender registration law was to protect the public by providing notification of 

potential sex offenders living in their neighborhood. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 

416, citing former R.C. 2950.02(B). The General Assembly also provided law 

enforcement with tools to help prevent sex-offender recidivism. Id. Contrary to 

Hudson’s arguments, the General Assembly’s intent of protecting the public is not 

served while the offender is imprisoned—the intent was to protect the public upon 

the offender’s release from imprisonment when the offender is living in the 

community. The tolling provision furthers this remedial purpose by providing 

notification to the public when it matters most—when the sex-offender is released 

from prison and living in the community. Absent the tolling provision, the public 

is deprived of the safety benefit of the full ten-year registration period for sex 

offenders, like Hudson, who are subsequently re-incarcerated. Furthermore, the 

General Assembly’s purpose of reducing sex-offender recidivism is thwarted 

absent the tolling provision. For these reasons, we conclude, like the Second 

District, that R.C. 2950.07(D) is remedial in nature. 

{¶43} Since R.C. 2950.07(D) is remedial in nature, it does not violate 

Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and it was properly applied to 

Hudson in this case. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 411, citing Van Fossen, 36 Ohio 

St.3d at 107. 
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{¶44} Hudson’s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss as 

the tolling provision of former O.R.C. §2950.07(D) violated 

Appellant’s rights to due process of law. 

{¶45} In his second assignment of error, Hudson argues that R.C. 

2950.07(D) violated his right to procedural due process, because he was not 

provided notice that his registration duty would be extended by any time he was 

incarcerated for an unrelated, non-sex crime. Hudson also argues that his only 

meaningful opportunity to challenge his continued registration duty was to violate 

the law, which is a denial of due process. 

{¶46} As an initial matter, we note that Hudson did not raise this issue 

before the trial court; instead, he focused on the retroactive application of S.B. 10, 

The Adam Walsh Act (AWA), and the retroactive application of R.C. 2950.07(D)’s 

tolling provision under Megan’s Law, as amended by H.B. 565. (Doc. No. 16). In 

its memorandum in opposition to Hudson’s motion to dismiss, the State conceded 

that the AWA could not be applied to Hudson in light of State v. Williams, 129 

Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374. (Doc. No. 22). Nevertheless, the State 

contended that Hudson still had to comply with the 10-year registration 

requirement under Megan’s Law and that Hudson’s 10-year registration period had 

not expired by virtue of R.C. 2950.07(D)’s tolling provision. (Id.). In response, 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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Hudson argued that, as applied to him, R.C. 2950.07(D) violated the Ex Post Facto 

Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 

(Doc. No. 26). 

{¶47} Now, on appeal Hudson raises several procedural due process 

arguments. The failure to raise an issue in the lower court waives all but plain 

error on appeal. State v. Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 416 (1993), citing State v. 

Moreland, 50 Ohio St.3d 58 (1990) and State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277 (1988). 

Nevertheless, the denial of basic procedural due process amounts to plain error 

under Crim.R. 52(B). Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 35-36 (10th 

Dist.1991). See also State v. Coe, 153 Ohio App.3d 44, 2003-Ohio-2732, ¶ 19 

(4th Dist.). Consequently, we will review Hudson’s procedural due process 

claims. 

{¶48} The right to procedural due process is protected by the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 

Constitution. State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, ¶ 6. A sex 

offender must demonstrate that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property 

interest as a result of the registration requirement to trigger protections under these 

clauses. Id., citing Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd., 90 

Ohio St.3d 176, 181 (2000). Although due process is “‘flexible and calls for such 

procedural protections as the particular situation demands,’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 

471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972), the basic requirements of procedural due process 

are notice and an opportunity to be heard. Hayden, 2002-Ohio-4160, at ¶ 6, citing 

State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 459 (1996). 

{¶49} R.C. 2950.03 provides for notice to convicted sex-offenders of their 

duty to register; to provide notice of a change in their residence address or in their 

school, institution of higher education, or place of employment address, as 

applicable, and register the new address; and, to periodically verify their residence 

address or their school, institution of higher education, or place of employment 

address, as applicable. R.C. 2950.03(B). 

{¶50} The record indicates that Hudson was provided with such notice on 

multiple occasions, including: October 30, 1997, August 13, 2003, November 24, 

2004, December 9, 2004, July 13, 2005, September 21, 2005, April 26, 2006, 

September 11, 2006, May 7, 2007, August 17, 2007, September 2, 2008, February 

6, 2009, August 5, 2009, May 20, 2010, and June 15, 2011. (Joint Ex. 7). The 

parties also stipulated that, on June 2, 2011 upon his release from prison, Hudson 

registered his sister’s address at 412 East Farming Street, Marion, Ohio as his 

residence with the Marion County Sheriff’s Office. Now, on appeal Hudson 

alleges that he thought his duty to register ended on October 29, 2007—yet the 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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notices he received and his own actions refute that claim. Consequently, we are 

not persuaded that Hudson lacked notice of his continued duty to register. 

{¶51} Finally, Hudson argues that he was deprived procedural due process 

because he could not challenge his continued duty to register without violating the 

law. Hudson cites State v. Cowan in support of his argument. 103 Ohio St.3d 

144, 2004-Ohio-4777. The classification in Cowan is strikingly different than the 

classification at issue in this case. In Cowan, R.C. 955.22 empowered a deputy 

dog warden, an executive officer, to classify the defendant’s dogs as “vicious 

dogs” without any hearing after the defendant’s neighbor merely alleged that the 

defendant’s dogs bit his wife. 2004-Ohio-4777, at ¶ 1, 11. Unlike the executive 

officer’s classification in Cowan, Hudson’s sexual offender classification stemmed 

from his 1996 conviction for gross sexual imposition. Consequently, unlike the 

executive classification in Cowan, Hudson’s classification occurred only after he 

was afforded full procedural due process; namely, a trial on the merits. Therefore, 

the facts sub judice are distinguishable from the facts in Cowan. 

{¶52} Moreover, we note that Hudson was not entitled to a hearing to 

challenge his initial duty to register as a sexually oriented offender since that duty 

attached as a matter of law. Former R.C. 2950.04(A)(1) and R.C. 2950.07(B)(3); 

Hayden, 2002-Ohio-4169, paragraph two of the syllabus. Hudson’s continued

obligation to register as a sexual offender per R.C. 2950.07(D) also attached as a 
Case No. 9-12-38 

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matter of law. Since Hudson was not entitled to a further hearing to challenge his 

initial duty to register as a sexual offender, we conclude that he was not entitled to 

a further hearing to challenge his continued obligation to register per R.C. 

2950.07(D) since that continued duty also attached as a matter of law and 

stemmed from Hudson’s original conviction. 

{¶53} Hudson’s second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

{¶54} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jlr