### IN THE CO URT OF APPEALS OF TE NNE SS EE AT NASHVILL E Sep te m be r 28 , 20 11 Ses si on

NEAL LO VLACE a nd NORMA J EAN LOVLACE

v. TI MOTH Y KEVI N COPLEY A N D 

### BET H COPLEY

D i r e c t A p p e a l f

r o m t h e C h a n c e r y C o u r t f o r H i c k m a n C o u n t y N o . 0 6

- 1 2 8

- C R o b b i e T

. B e a l , J u d g e

N o . M 2 0 1 1

- 0 0 1 7 0

- C O A

- R 3

- C V

- F i l e d F e b r u a r y 3 , 2 0 1 2

S E P A R A T E C O N C U R R E N C E A N D P A R T I A L D I S S E N T

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A L A N E

. H I G H E R S , P

. J

. , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t a n d d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t

.

I concur with the result reache d in this case , but I disag ree with some of the re asoning and there fore write sepa

rate ly

.
Be cause the proce dure in this case is difficult to follow, I offe r a brief time-line of the event s of particula r sig nificanc e.
1. Minor child born on September 4, 2002, to J err

y and B eth Rochelle. 2. L arr y Roc h el l e an d wi fe (later Mrs. L ovlace ) wer e adoptive pare nts of J err y Rochelle. 1 3. J err y and Be th Rochelle wer e divorce d on April 20, 2004, and Be t h marrie d Timothy Kevin Copley

on J anuar

y 15, 2005.

T est imony

of Mr s. Lo vlace , cl ar if

ying adopt ive st at us o f t he b iol ogical fa the r o f t he minor chi ld: 1

Q. All ri ght. So now, when tha t

- - when he wit hdr ew his con sen t, when David Roch el le , your
son - - and he was ado pte d, t oo, wa sn’ t h e? A. He was

. Q. By y ou? A. Yes. Q. So you un der st and as a mothe r t he l ove one ca n ha ve for an ado pte d ch il d? A. Yes.4

. M r. C o p ley attempted to adopt the minor child. J err y Rochelle, the biological fathe r, conse nted but then withdrew his consent in J anuar

y 2006. 5. Mrs. Copley terminated contac t betwee n the L o vlace s and the minor child in Fe bruar y 2006. 6. The L ovlace s filed a pe tition for gr andpar ent visitation on April 24, 2006. 7. An “Ag ree d Orde r” was enter ed on May 15, 2006, providing fo r g randpa rent visitation. 8. Mr. Copley adopted the minor child on Marc h 24, 2009. The order provided that the adoption did not alter or modify g randpa rent visitation rig hts. 9. The L ovlace s filed a petition for contempt and to modify their visitation order on Marc h 9, 2009. 1 0

. T he Copley s soug ht to suspend or terminate the L ovlace s’ visitation with the minor child.

There are numerous other proce edin g s and events in the rec ord, but these are the primary fac ts leading to this controversy

. Although there are issues perta ining to contempt and attorney fee s, the underly ing issue is whether g randpa rent visitation should be permitted and the standard to be applied in a petition to modify by the g randpa

rents. I ag ree with J udg e Stafford’ s dispositi on of the issues perta ining to contempt and attorney fee s.

J udg e Stafford finds the L ovlace s are g randpa rents for purposes of the Gra ndpare nt Visitation Statute. I ag ree

.
J udg e S taffor d finds t h at t h e “Ag ree d Orde r” is valid notwithstanding the subsequent adoption of the minor child. Iag ree

.
J udg e Staffor d vaca

tes and re mands the matter f or fur ther c onsideration. I

ag ree

.
J udg e Stafford holds that the same s t an d ar d applies to the g randpa rents’ petition to modify that would apply in an initial proce eding to g rant visitation to the g randpa rents, namely , they must again show substantial harm to the child for failure to g rant visitation. I disag ree

. They have crosse d that threshold and they are not require d to cross it over and over eac h time they seek to modify visitation.

J udg e Stafford states: “B eca use Tenne ssee has a s t at u t e that specific ally allows for g randpa rent visitation and provides us the standard to be used in making that deter mination, we conclude that the statute does not limit that standard only to the initial visitation deter mination; we conce de that there is no statutory standard for a subsequent requ es t to modify grandparent visitation .” (Emphasis supplied). This statement, of course , is inconsistent. I f there is “no statutory standard” for a petition to modify , then it is fruitless to arg ue that the statute “does not limit that standard only to the initial visitation determination.” I f the statute doe s not speak to it, the statute does not spea k to it.

-2-The case of Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137 (Tenn. 2002), is instructive here

. Although it dealt

with custody involving a pare nt and non-par ent, and our case involves visitation involving a pare nt and non-pa

rent, the Supre me Court clea rly makes a distinction between the standa rd applied in a

n initial deter

mination and a modification

. The same common-sense deter mination should apply here

.
To hold that g randpa

rents who have alrea dy

crosse d the “substantial har m” threshold (w hether by consent or otherwise) must cross it ag ain eac h time they seek to modify their visitation would impose a chilling eff

ect on their

eff ort to maintain a re lationship with t he minor child.

The c ourt should r equire a showing of mater ial chang e of c ircumstance s in order to modify , along with a consider ation of the be st interest of the c hild.

AL AN E. HI GHERS, P.J ., W.S

.

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