The Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern

1

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-2976

 

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United

States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Parmoto Richard Purvis, *

*

Appellant. *

 

Submitted: March 12, 1997

 Filed: May 29, 1997

 

Before FAGG and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,1

District Judge.

 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Parmoto Purvis was tried before a jury and convicted

in the Southern District of Iowa of numerous drug

offenses stemming from his leadership role in the

distribution of large amounts of cocaine, cocaine base,

and methamphetamine. Specifically, the jury found that

Purvis had engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise

(“CCE”) from 
The court imposed a life sentence on the CCE conviction, a forty-year,

2

concurrent sentence on Purvis’s two distribution convictions, a five-year consecutive

sentence for the first conviction under section 924(c)(1), and two consecutive twentyyear sentences for the second and third convictions under section 924(c)(1). To avoid

double jeopardy, the court imposed no additional sentence on the conspiracy conviction

which related to the same facts as the CCE conviction. Similarly, the court did not

impose a sentence as to one section 924(c)(1) conviction because both it and a different

section 924(c)(1) conviction for which the court imposed the statutorily-mandated

sentence were predicated on the same drug-trafficking offense. 

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April 1, 1994 through August 16, 1995 in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 848(a), (c) (1994); conspired to distribute

controlled substances during that same period in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994); distributed cocaine

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994); and on

at least four occasions carried a firearm during and in

furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994). The court sentenced Purvis

to a prison sentence of life plus forty-five years. On 2

appeal, Purvis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

to support three of his convictions under section

924(c)(1) and the court’s computation of the drug

quantities for sentencing purposes. We affirm the

convictions and sentence.

I.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the

jury verdict and resolve all evidentiary conflicts in

favor of the government. United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d

1101, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1996). We uphold the jury

verdict if there is an interpretation of the evidence
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that would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

Purvis argues that the evidence is insufficient to

convict him on three of the four firearm charges. We

disagree. The evidence at trial, consisting primarily of

testimony from other members of the conspiracy, fairly

established the following facts. Purvis 
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played on the poverty, homelessness, and general

disfranchisement of numerous people to establish himself

as the leader of an organization that, among other

activities, distributed large quantities of cocaine,

cocaine base, and methamphetamine. Purvis’s home, where

many of the co-conspirators stayed, served as the center

of operations. In addition to large amounts of drugs and

cash stored in the house and garage, Purvis kept an

extensive arsenal of firearms at his home. The guns were

kept loaded and readily accessible and were used

routinely to protect the drugs, cash, and stolen property

that flowed through the house. Purvis assigned certain

persons to act as security forces, guarding the single

entrance to the house and stationing themselves in

windows to keep watch over the area outside the house.

He also set up a security camera that enabled persons

inside the house to monitor what was happening outside.

In order to sustain the convictions for “carrying” a

firearm in violation of section 924(c)(1), the government

must prove that Purvis “bore the firearm on or about his

person during and in relation to a drug trafficking

offense.” United States v. White, 81 F.3d 80, 83 (8th
 We note that each of the firearm charges was submitted to the jury under only 3

the “carry” prong of section 924(c)(1), under the theory that Purvis either carried or

aided and abetted in the carrying of a firearm during the commission of a drugtrafficking offense. In his brief, Purvis relies heavily on Bailey v. United States, 116

S. Ct. 501 (1995), which clarifies the meaning of the “use” prong of section 924(c)(1).

Although Bailey provides some guidance in this case insofar as it recognizes the

common-sense limits on a key term in the statute, our obligation here is to decide

whether Purvis can stand convicted of carrying firearms, the only question presented

to the jury. Thus, if the evidence were insufficient to support the “carry” convictions,

we would have to reverse the convictions regardless of whether the same evidence

could have supported convictions under the “use” prong of the statute. Cf. United

States v. Miner, 108 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding section 924(c)(1)

conviction despite flawed instruction under “use” prong where jury instructed on both

“use” and “carry” prongs and under specific facts it was “inescapably clear” that

properly-instructed jury would have convicted defendant of carrying firearm).

5

Cir. 1996). In addition to general testimony that

3

Purvis instructed 
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various people under him to regularly carry guns to

protect the criminal operation, there is more than

sufficient evidence that Purvis carried a firearm on the

specific occasions to which his convictions relate.

Further, contrary to Purvis’s assertions, there is also

ample evidence to connect the carrying of the guns to his

specific drug-trafficking crimes. 

Purvis’s first firearm conviction was predicated on

events which took place on a night in early 1994. Purvis

and several other persons were in the middle of a drug

sale inside the house when they were interrupted by a

loud commotion taking place outside. Several men, at

least one of whom was armed with a gun, were threatening

a woman who was connected to Purvis either as one of his

drug customers or as one of his distributors. The men

were upset because the woman had “ripped them off.”

Purvis testified that he picked up his gun, a loaded, 9mm

revolver, which was within ready reach during the drug

transaction. Purvis put the gun in the back of his pants

and proceeded outside. One of Purvis’s associates,

carrying a loaded shotgun that belonged to Purvis,

provided Purvis with backup. Purvis was able to diffuse

the situation by paying the men a small sum of money.

Purvis then went back inside, still armed, and completed

the drug transaction. The jury obviously disbelieved

Purvis’s claim that the altercation outside and the

associated display of weapons had no relationship to

drug-trafficking activity. We have no trouble upholding

the jury’s finding that Purvis carried a firearm that

night during and in furtherance of a drug-trafficking

crime.

Purvis was also found guilty of carrying a firearm on

a night soon thereafter when he sold cocaine base to an
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undercover federal agent. Purvis’s girlfriend, also

actively engaged in the drug operations, testified that

both she and Purvis had loaded firearms readily available

during that particular transaction. According to his

girlfriend, Purvis had the same loaded 9mm revolver

available on the desk at which the drug deal took place.

His girlfriend, following Purvis’s instruction to have

ready access to a gun at all times for “protection,”

observed the transaction while keeping her gun, a loaded

.380 pistol, “within a hand’s reach.” Again, it was

certainly reasonable for the jury to 
Purvis claims error with the court’s admission of evidence that he violently

4

attacked one of his co-conspirators. Purvis argues that the testimony constitutes

impermissible evidence of prior bad acts and should have been excluded under Rule

404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. His argument fails because the proof offered

8

conclude that Purvis either carried or aided and abetted

in the carrying of a firearm in connection with the sale

of a controlled substance on that occasion.

The final firearm conviction Purvis challenges is

predicated on the overarching drug conspiracy and is

based on weapons that were seized by state police during

a search of Purvis’s garage during the course of the

conspiracy and in the midst of this federal

investigation. There is detailed trial testimony from

his co-conspirators stating that firearms were an

essential part of the criminal activity led by Purvis and

connecting the weapons seized to the drug conspiracy.

Purvis argues that because no drugs were seized during

the search, there is nothing to link the weapons to drug

trafficking; he then goes on to assert that even if the

police had discovered drugs in the garage, the mere

storage of weapons in the vicinity of drugs is not enough

to establish a firearm violation under section 924(c)(1).

While Purvis’s arguments have some merit in the abstract,

he ignores the essential fact that the weapons seized do

not constitute the entire evidentiary basis for the

charge. Rather, the recovered weapons corroborate the

extensive testimony linking Purvis to the firearms

offense. After fully reviewing that testimony in light

of the weapons seized by police and identified by coconspirators, we affirm Purvis’s conviction for carrying

a firearm in the course of a drug conspiracy.4
by the government formed the basis of a substantive count in the indictment against

him. The indictment charged that Purvis carried a firearm in violation of section

924(c)(1) when he shot and threatened to kill a co-conspirator whom Purvis believed

had stolen drug money and personal property related to the drug operation. Because

the evidence constituted direct proof in support of Purvis’s fourth (and unchallenged)

firearm conviction, there can be no question as to its relevance and the district court did

not err in permitting the government to introduce evidence of the attack.

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II.

Purvis argues that the district court erred in

calculating the drug quantity as part of determining

Purvis’s base-offense level for sentencing. A court’s

drug-quantity determination is a factual finding that we

review under the clearly erroneous standard. United

States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir. 1994).

Determining the drug quantities involved in this case is

potentially challenging for two reasons. First, in

contrast to the large scale of the operation, the

government’s investigation recovered only a very small

amount of drugs as a result of its investigation. Thus,

as is sometimes the case, the court had to approximate

the drug quantities involved based on witnesses’

testimony rather than rely on the actual amounts of

recovered substances. See, e.g., United States v. Logan,

54 F.3d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1995) (when the amount of

drugs seized does not reflect the scale of the offense,

the district court may approximate the quantity).

Second, the probation office’s presentence report relied

in part on information provided by confidential

informants whose testimony was not part of the trial

record. To avoid unfairness in the calculation from the

latter, however, the court specifically stated:
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I’m not taking into account amounts based

strictly on information related in the

presentence report concerning confidential

informants’ materials, but I am relying on the

trial testimony. The trial testimony was

obviously heavily challenged by effective crossexamination by defense counsel, but

nevertheless, the jury found credible the

testimony of numerous co-conspirators who

testified against Mr. Purvis and found Mr.

Purvis’s explanation and testimony not

believable. 

I find that the credible evidence, based on

witnesses called by the government at trial,

supports the presentence report findings that

very substantial amounts of controlled substance

are attributable to Mr. Purvis as the leader of

an organization that was distributing cocaine,

crack cocaine, and methamphetamine.
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(Sentencing tr. at 16:7-17:1.) The court then

specifically found Purvis responsible for approximately

ten kilograms of each of the three substances, slightly

less than the amounts calculated in the presentence

report. After careful review, we are satisfied that the

district court based its calculation on proper evidence

and that its determination is amply supported by the

trial testimony.

III.

In short, Purvis’s convictions and sentence are

affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.