No. 15-1056 

In the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Third Circuit 

______________________________ 

DANIEL BOCK, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PRESSLER & PRESSLER, LLP, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

______________________________ 

On Appeal from the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 

Case No. 2:11-cv-07593 

_____________________________________ 

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE AND AFFIRMANCE 

____________________________________ 

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein 

 General Counsel 

Theodore (Jack) Metzler 

 Attorney 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-3502 (telephone) 

(202) 326-2477 (facsimile) 

tmetzler@ftc.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae 

Federal Trade Commission

Meredith Fuchs 

General Counsel 

To-Quyen Truong 

 Deputy General Counsel 

John R. Coleman 

Assistant General Counsel 

Nandan M. Joshi 

Kristin Bateman 

Counsel 

Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau 

1700 G Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20552 

(202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

(202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................ ii 

GLOSSARY .................................................................................................. viii 

INTEREST OF AMICI ..................................................................................... 1 

BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 2 

A. Statutory Framework .......................................................................... 2 

B. The Debt Collection Process ............................................................... 4 

C. Facts and Proceedings Below ............................................................. 6 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 11 

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 14 

Filing a Debt-Collection Lawsuit Without Meaningful Attorney 

Involvement Violates the FDCPA. .............................................................. 14 

A. The FDCPA prohibits attorney debt collectors from making 

misrepresentations in litigation. ....................................................... 14 

B. Filing a debt-collection lawsuit without meaningful attorney 

review unlawfully misrepresents the attorney’s involvement in 

the case............................................................................................... 16 

C. The Pressler attorney’s four-second review did not constitute 

meaningful attorney involvement. ................................................... 23 

1. Setting up a review process does not excuse the attorney 

from exercising professional judgment. ..................................... 24 

2. No attorney exercised professional judgment here. .................. 25 

D. The Constitution does not prevent the FDCPA from barring 

misrepresentations that attorneys make in debt-collection 

litigation. ........................................................................................... 30 

1. Attorney debt collectors have no First Amendment right to 

make misrepresentations in debt-collection litigation. ............. 30 

2. Federalism principles do not preclude Congress from 

regulating attorney debt collectors’ litigation conduct. ............. 32 

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 34 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a)(7) 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 31.1(c) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page(s) 

Armstrong Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong Cnty. Mem’l Hosp.,

185 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999) ........................................................................ 31

Avila v. Rubin,

84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996) ................................................. 17, 18, 20, 22, 24

Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 

242 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2001) ........................................................................ 30

Berg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 

2009 WL 901011 (N.D. Ill. 2009) .............................................................. 31

Boyd v. Wexler, 

275 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001) ................................................................ 24, 26

Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr.,

464 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2006) ........................................................................ 3

Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 

404 U.S. 508 (1972) ................................................................................... 31

Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.,

550 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2008) ...................................................................... 28

Clomon v. Jackson, 

988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................................................. 17, 24

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,

132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) .................................................................................. 29

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C.,

-- F. Supp. 3d --, 2015 WL 4272275 (N.D. Ga. 2015) ........................... 21, 32

Crossley v. Lieberman,

868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989) ....................................................................... 18

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Delawder v. Platinum Fin. Servs. Corp.,

443 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ....................................................... 32

E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,

365 U.S. 127 (1961) ..................................................................................... 30

FTC v. Check Investors, Inc.,

502 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 3

Garcia-Contreras v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, 

2010 WL 4962940 (M.D.N.C. 2010) ......................................................... 32 

Gerber v. Citigroup, Inc.,

2009 WL 248094 (E.D. Cal. 2009)............................................................ 32

Gonzalez v. Kay, 

577 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................... 17

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991) ..................................................................................... 33

Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp.,

569 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2009) ............................................................... 31, 32 

Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 

453 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................... 28

Heintz v. Jenkins,

514 U.S. 291 (1995) ...................................................................... 2, 14, 15, 16

Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A.,

674 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................... 32

Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 

-- F.3d --, 2015 WL 3953754 (3d Cir. 2015) ............................................... 21

Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A.,

783 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 11, 14, 15

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Kistner v. Law Office of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC,

518 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................... 17

Leis v. Flynt, 

439 U.S. 438 (1979) .................................................................................... 33

Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay PC,

650 F.3d 993 (3d Cir. 2011) ...................................................... 17, 18, 19, 20

Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 

321 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003) ................................................................. 20, 26

Nielsen v. Dickerson, 

307 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2002) .................................................... 17, 18, 25, 26

Sial v. Unifund CCR Partners,

2008 WL 4079281 (S.D. Cal. 2008) .......................................................... 32

Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc.,

953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992) .................................................................... 28

United Mine Workers v. Pennington,

381 U.S. 657 (1965) ..................................................................................... 30

United States v. Parker,

108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997) .......................................................................... 33

Statutes 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) .................................................................................... 2, 16 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) ........................................................................................ 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) ........................................................................................ 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) ........................................................................................ 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1692d ............................................................................................ 2 

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15 U.S.C. § 1692e ............................................................................. 2, 3, 14, 21 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) .................................................................................. 3, 20 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(9) .................................................................................. 3, 20 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) .................................................................................3, 21 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) ...................................................................................... 15 

15 U.S.C. § 1692f ............................................................................................. 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) ...................................................................................... 29 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) ................................................................................. 29 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(d) ...................................................................................... 15 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) ........................................................................................ 3 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) ........................................................................................ 4 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) ......................................................................................... 4 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l(b) ..................................................................................... 1, 4 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d) ..................................................................................... 1, 4 

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) .....................................................1 

Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(a), 120 Stat. 1966 (2006) .................................. 15 

Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2305(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) ................................ 15 

Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986) ....................................................... 2 

Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874 (1977) ..................................... 2 

Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 814, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) ................................................1 

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Rules 

Fed. R. App. P. 29(a) .......................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) .................................................................................. 19 

N.J. Rule of Court 1:4-8 ................................................................................ 19 

N.J. Rule of Court 1:4-8(a)(3) ...................................................................... 19 

N.J. Rule of Court 1:21-1 ............................................................................... 19 

Other Authorities 

ABA Informal Op. 1368 (1976) ............................................................... 24, 26 

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ........................................................... 15 

Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & 

Assocs., P.C., No. 1:14-cv-02211 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2014) (ECF No. 1) ...... 4

Debt Collection (Regulation F),

78 Fed. Reg. 67,848 (Nov. 12, 2013) ............................................................ 4 

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of 

Change (2009) ......................................................................................... 4, 5

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting 

Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration (2010) ...... 6, 22

Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying 

Industry (2013) ............................................................................................ 5 

FTC Staff Commentary, 

53 Fed. Reg. 50,097 (Dec. 13, 1988) ........................................................... 15 

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Gov’t Accountability Office, Credit Cards – Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt Collection 

Marketplace and Use of Technology (2009) ..................................... 5, 6, 27

H.R. Rep. No. 99-405 (1985) .................................................................... 2, 16 

Joint Opinion: Opinion 48 of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of 

Law and Opinion 725 of Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics 

(2012) ......................................................................................................... 24 

Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of 

Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 

6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 257 (2011) .................................................................. 22 

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GLOSSARY 

Bureau or CFPB Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

Commission or FTC Federal Trade Commission 

FDCPA Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

NARCA Br. Brief of National Association of Retail 

 Collection Attorneys (NARCA) et al. as amici 

 curiae (filed July 12, 2015) 

Pressler Br. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Pressler & 

 Pressler, LLP (filed July 5, 2015) 

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INTEREST OF AMICI 

 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade 

Commission, agencies of the United States, file this brief pursuant to 

F.R.A.P. 29(a). 

 This case concerns the application of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (FDCPA or the Act) to debt-collection law firms that mass-file 

collection lawsuits without any meaningful attorney review. The Bureau 

and the Commission have a substantial interest in protecting the 

consumers affected by these suits. Congress established the Bureau “to 

protect consumers from abusive financial services practices,” see Pub. L. 

No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010), and the Commission has long 

been responsible for protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive trade 

practices. Congress vested the Bureau with authority to enforce the FDCPA 

and to prescribe rules implementing the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692l(b), (d). 

The Commission similarly has authority to enforce the FDCPA—an 

authority it has exercised since the statute’s enactment in 1977, see Pub. L. 

No. 95-109, § 814, 91 Stat. 874, 881-82 (1977)—and over the last several 

decades has studied, and issued numerous reports on, the debt collection 

industry. Both agencies accordingly have a substantial interest in the issue 

presented in this case. 

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BACKGROUND 

A. Statutory Framework 

 1. Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to “eliminate abusive debt 

collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). To achieve that 

goal, the Act creates a wide range of consumer protections, including broad 

prohibitions on harassing or abusive collection practices; false or 

misleading representations; and unfair or unconscionable debt-collection 

methods. Id. §§ 1692d-1692f. 

 These prohibitions apply to third-party debt collectors that collect 

debts from individual consumers. See id. §§ 1692a(3), (5), (6). As 

originally enacted, the Act exempted debt-collecting attorneys from its 

coverage, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. at 875, because Congress 

believed “that bar associations would adequately police attorney 

violations.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-405, at 6 (1985). That, however, “prove[d] 

not to be the case,” and Congress accordingly repealed the attorney 

exemption in 1986. Id.; Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986). The Act 

thus now applies to “lawyers engaged in litigation.” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 

U.S. 291, 294 (1995). 

 2. As relevant here, the Act prohibits debt collectors from “us[ing] 

any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection 

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with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Within that “broad 

category of prohibited conduct,” the Act provides a non-exclusive list of 

“examples of specific practices that are prohibited.” FTC v. Check 

Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2007). Those specifically 

prohibited practices include making a “false representation or implication 

... that any communication is from an attorney,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), 

“us[ing] ... any written communication ... which creates a false impression 

as to its source, authorization, or approval,” id. § 1692e(9), and using “any 

false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any 

debt,” id. § 1692e(10). 

 In this Court, whether a communication is misleading in violation of 

§ 1692e “should be analyzed from the perspective of the least sophisticated 

debtor.” Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2006). This 

standard ensures that the Act “protect[s] all consumers, the gullible as well 

as the shrewd, the trusting as well as the suspicious.” Id. (quotations 

omitted). At the same time, the standard does not permit “liability for 

bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations.” Id.

 3. The FDCPA gives consumers a private right of action to sue for 

violations of the law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). The Act also authorizes the 

Bureau, the Commission, and several other agencies to enforce its 

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requirements. Id. §§ 1692l(a), (b). Pursuant to that authority, the Bureau 

has brought an enforcement action against a debt-collection law firm that 

allegedly filed hundreds of thousands of collection suits against consumers 

without meaningful attorney involvement. Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. 

Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., No. 1:14-cv-02211 (N.D. Ga. 

July 14, 2014) (ECF No. 1) (motion to dismiss denied July 14, 2015). 

The Act also empowers the Bureau to issue advisory opinions and to 

prescribe rules “with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors.” 

Id. §§ 1692k(e), 1692l(d). In November 2013, the Bureau issued an advance 

notice of proposed rulemaking on debt collection, which sought comment 

on various issues relating to debt-collection litigation. Debt Collection 

(Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848, 67,877 (Nov. 12, 2013). 

B. The Debt Collection Process 

When creditors are unable to collect defaulted debts, they often sell 

them to debt buyers, typically as part of a large portfolio of debts sold for a 

percentage of the combined debts’ face value. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 

Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change 3 (2009) (“FTC 

2009 Report”).1 When a creditor sells a portfolio of debts, it may transfer 

 

1 Available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/

collecting-consumer-debts-challenges-change-federal-trade-commissionworkshop-report/dcwr.pdf. 

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only an electronic spreadsheet showing basic account information. See id. 

at 22. Debt buyers only rarely receive underlying account documents along 

with the portfolio; sellers generally disclaim the accuracy of the account 

data they transfer; and sale contracts often limit buyers’ access to 

supporting documentation. Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Structure and 

Practices of the Debt Buying Industry iii (2013) (“FTC 2013 Report”).2 The 

debt-buying industry has grown in recent years. Id. at 12. 

This growth in debt buying has fueled increases in debt-collection 

lawsuits because debt buyers “often use collection law firms as their 

primary tool for recovery.” Gov’t Accountability Office, Credit Cards—Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt 

Collection Marketplace and Use of Technology 41 (2009) (“GAO Report”).3 

Although no precise nationwide figures are available, the number of debtcollection lawsuits filed across the country “is widely recognized to be very 

large.” Id. Indeed, such suits comprise a majority of many state-court 

dockets. Id. 

These collection suits have generated significant consumer-protection 

concerns. Consumers often fail to respond to such suits, resulting in high 

 

2 Available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/

structure-and-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf. 

3 Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09748.pdf. 

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rates of default judgments. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Repairing a Broken 

System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and 

Arbitration 7 (2010) (“FTC 2010 Report”).4 This has caused heightened 

concern about “debt collectors often fil[ing] suits with weak evidence 

supporting the alleged debt.” GAO Report at 41. Further, when consumers 

do respond, participating in the litigation can be “particularly costly” 

because collectors are often unprepared to proceed—and consumers thus 

must “once again ... bear the costs of taking off work and coming to court” 

for rescheduled hearings. FTC 2010 Report at 14. 

C. Facts and Proceedings Below 

 1. This case arises out of a debt-collection lawsuit that DefendantAppellant Pressler & Pressler, LLP (Pressler) filed against Plaintiff-Appellee 

Daniel Bock, Jr. (Bock). That lawsuit concerned a defaulted debt that Bock 

owed on an HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., credit card account. Appx. 72-73, 

80. HSBC had sold the account to The Bureaus Investment Group, and the 

account was later sold again to Midland Funding, LLC (Midland). Appx. 

263; see id. 80. Midland, a large debt buyer and regular client of Pressler, 

enlisted Pressler to collect the debt on Midland’s behalf. Appx. 126. 

 

4 Available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/

federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-staff-reportrepairing-broken-system-protecting/debtcollectionreport.pdf. 

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 The pertinent facts are undisputed. Pressler, a law firm specializing 

in collecting consumer debts, employs a highly automated process to bring 

collection suits against consumers. See Appx. 124-39. The firm first 

receives from the client a spreadsheet or text file containing basic 

information about the debts it will collect. Appx. 126-27. Non-attorney 

personnel and various computer programs then run “scrubs” to check for 

missing personal data, invalid addresses, any related claims in Pressler’s 

system, records showing that a debtor is bankrupt or deceased, and similar 

issues. Appx. 127-31. Nothing in the record indicates that the process 

involved any steps designed to ascertain whether the spreadsheet 

accurately represented the amounts that consumers owed when the debt 

was referred to Pressler. 

Based on that largely automated review, the firm sent Bock a 

collection letter demanding payment. Appx. 72, 77. The letter advised that, 

“[a]t this time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the 

particular circumstances of your account.” Appx. 77. 

 After Bock did not respond, the firm set in motion its process for 

filing a lawsuit against him. See Appx. 73, 131-32. Pursuant to that 

process, other teams of non-attorney personnel, again aided by computer 

programs, performed similar “scrubs” to check again for missing 

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information, bankruptcies, or deaths, and also to confirm that the initial 

letter was sent, that the statute of limitations had not expired, that there 

was no unresolved “‘dispute’ code,” and that the suit would be filed in the 

right venue. Appx. 132-34. Non-attorney personnel then populated a 

template summons and complaint with the debtor’s information. Appx. 

134-35. 

 At this point, the results of this process were sent to an attorney. An 

“automatic feed process” displayed the draft complaint on one computer 

screen, with the electronic data from the client displayed on a second 

monitor. Appx. 135. The sole attorney responsible for filing the firm’s New 

Jersey lawsuits, Ralph Gulko, compared the two screens. Appx. 70, 135, 

221. Gulko attested that his review consisted of ensuring that the 

information in the summons and complaint was “the same information that 

was received from the client,” and checking whether there had been any 

post-referral credits or address changes. Appx. 70. 

 For the complaint against Bock, the firm’s computer records show 

that Gulko’s review lasted four seconds. Appx. 193. That same day, Gulko 

also reviewed 672 other complaints, approving all but 10 of them. Appx. 

193. That volume was not unusual. Gulko reviews an average of 300 to 

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400 complaints per day, and some days reviews as many as 1,000. Appx. 

221. 

 Based on his review, Gulko approved the complaint for filing. Appx. 

137-38. Other than Gulko’s four-second scan, no other attorney ever 

reviewed the case against Bock before the complaint was filed. Bock 

initially responded to the complaint pro se, and requested evidence of the 

outstanding bill, which the complaint listed as $8,021.57 plus interest. See

Appx. 80, 82. Bock eventually retained counsel, and the parties settled for 

$3,000. Appx. 98. 

2. After retaining counsel, Bock filed this suit against Pressler in the 

U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Appx. 40. Bock’s 

complaint alleged that Pressler violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on “false, 

deceptive, or misleading” debt-collection practices by filing a debtcollection suit that appeared to be from an attorney even though no 

attorney had meaningfully reviewed it. Appx. 46. 

 In the order now on appeal, the district court granted summary 

judgment to Bock and denied Pressler’s motion for summary judgment. 

Appx. 4-5, 6-30. The court acknowledged that, in the context of debtcollection letters, “[i]t is well established that one cannot, consistent with 

the FDCPA, mislead the debtor regarding meaningful ‘attorney’ 

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involvement.” Appx. 15 (quotations omitted). The court concluded that 

this well-established doctrine also applies when an attorney files a debtcollection complaint because “[t]he language of [the statute] ... contains 

nothing suggesting a distinction between attorney letters and civil 

complaints for these purposes.” Appx. 19. Thus, when a debt-collection 

law firm files a complaint, it represents that “an attorney is working 

vigorously on the creditor’s behalf, is reasonably knowledgeable about the 

creditor’s case against the debtor, and has exercised his or her professional 

judgment.” Appx. 26. “If, in fact, the attorney who signed the complaint is 

not involved and familiar with the case against the debtor,” then those 

representations are false—and “the debtor has been unfairly misled and 

deceived within the meaning of the FDCPA.” See id. 

 Applying these principles, the court concluded that Pressler violated 

the FDCPA. As the court explained, “[w]hatever reasonable attorney review 

may be, a four-second scan is not it.” Appx. 7. According to the court, 

“Gulko’s rapid look-over of the complaint ... cannot really be considered a 

careful review of the complaint, let alone an exercise of the professional 

skills of a lawyer.” Appx. 29. 

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

Under the FDCPA, an attorney who lends his name to a debtcollection effort must actually be meaningfully involved in the case to avoid 

misleading the consumer about his role. This basic requirement—long 

recognized in the context of debt-collection letters—applies equally when 

attorney debt collectors file debt-collection lawsuits against consumers. 

A. This Court has held that misrepresentations that attorneys make 

in debt-collection pleadings violate the FDCPA. Kaymark v. Bank of 

America, N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2015). This precedent—which 

Pressler does not even cite—forecloses Pressler’s contention that the 

FDCPA does not apply to attorney debt collectors’ litigation activities. 

B. It is well established—by this Court and other courts of appeals—

that an attorney may not send debt-collection letters under his name unless 

the attorney has actually been meaningfully involved in deciding to send 

the letter. This is because the attorney’s imprimatur conveys that an 

attorney, acting as an attorney, has reached a professional judgment about 

the consumer’s case—an impression that is false if the attorney has not 

actually had any meaningful professional involvement. This “gets the 

debtor’s knees knocking” and makes him more likely to pay up. 

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 These basic principles apply with full force when, instead of sending 

debt-collection letters, attorneys file debt-collection lawsuits in court. 

Indeed, a formal document filed in court—which necessarily requires the 

involvement of a licensed professional—only heightens the impression that 

an attorney is meaningfully involved. 

Pressler contends that misrepresentations about an attorney’s 

involvement no longer matter once a lawsuit is filed because the fact of the 

suit alone—not the attorney’s backing—is what pressures the consumer to 

pay. Not so. There is a world of difference between a suit filed by an 

attorney exercising professional judgment and a suit that an attorney 

merely rubber-stamps. The understanding that a complaint reflects the 

judgment of a licensed professional can make the least sophisticated 

consumer more likely to accede to the demand for payment. By contrast, 

the consumer may be more likely to question the debt and to raise any 

defenses in court if he knew no attorney had meaningfully assessed the 

merits of the case. Moreover, an attorney who has had no meaningful 

involvement in a case cannot possibly know whether he will actually pursue 

the litigation, or even if there is any valid basis for doing so. Pressler is 

therefore wrong to contend that the “sense of urgency” that a rubberstamped complaint creates is entirely “legitimate.” 

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C. No attorney at Pressler meaningfully reviewed Bock’s case before 

filing suit against him. The undisputed evidence shows that an attorney 

spent a total of four seconds approving the suit against Bock—a level of 

review that does not constitute meaningful involvement under any 

conceivable standard. 

Nor does the firm’s automated review process justify that cursory 

review. While an attorney may rely on automated processes, he still must 

make the ultimate professional judgment that filing suit is appropriate. No 

attorney exercised any such judgment here. Instead, the attorney’s foursecond review consisted entirely of ministerial checks. Reaching a 

professional judgment, moreover, requires at least some inquiry into the 

validity of the debt—simply being told by the client that a debt is overdue 

generally is not enough. Nothing in the record indicates that any such 

inquiry occurred here. 

D. Finally, Pressler cannot avoid its obligations under the FDCPA by 

resorting to the Constitution. The First Amendment does not give attorney 

debt collectors a right to make misrepresentations in debt-collection 

litigation. Nor do federalism principles preclude Congress from regulating 

attorney debt collectors’ litigation conduct. 

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14 

ARGUMENT 

Filing a Debt-Collection Lawsuit Without Meaningful Attorney 

Involvement Violates the FDCPA. 

A. The FDCPA prohibits attorney debt collectors from making 

misrepresentations in litigation. 

The FDCPA broadly bars debt collectors from “us[ing] any false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. This prohibition applies to 

attorney debt collectors attempting to collect debts through litigation. As 

the Supreme Court held twenty years ago, the FDCPA “applies to the 

litigating activities of lawyers.” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294. This Court 

accordingly held in Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A., that 

misrepresentations that debt collection attorneys make in pleadings 

“constitute[] actionable misrepresentation under the [FDCPA],” just like 

any other misrepresentation in connection with a debt. 783 F.3d at 171-72 

(upholding § 1692e claim based on misrepresentation in foreclosure 

complaint). 

Kaymark—which Pressler does not cite, much less attempt to 

distinguish—forecloses Pressler’s contention that attorney debt collectors’ 

“litigation activities” are exempt from the FDCPA. (See Pressler Br. 11-18.) 

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15 

But even putting Kaymark aside, Pressler’s arguments still fail.5 Contrary 

to Pressler’s contention (at 13), Heintz leaves no room to doubt that the 

FDCPA regulates attorney debt collectors’ litigation activities: The Court in 

Heintz explained that “[i]n ordinary English, ... tr[ying] to obtain payment 

of consumer debts through legal proceedings” qualifies as “‘attempt[ing]’ to 

‘collect’ those consumer debts,” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294 (citing Black’s Law 

Dictionary 263 (6th ed. 1990)); noted that the Act contained no “litigationrelated[] exemption,” id. at 294-95; refused to “read the statute as 

containing an implied exemption for those debt-collecting activities of 

lawyers that consist of litigating,” id. at 295; and rejected an argument that 

the Act did not regulate “the practice of law” or “tasks of a legal nature,” id.

 

5 Kaymark specifically rejects one of the precise arguments that Pressler 

makes here (at 27)—that “a complaint, because it is directed to the court, is 

not a communication to the consumer subject to [the FDCPA],” Kaymark, 

783 F.3d at 178 (emphases in original). Kaymark thus also forecloses 

Pressler’s amici’s attempt to rely on 1988 FTC Staff Commentary opining 

that a pleading is not a “communication” under the FDCPA, 53 Fed. Reg. 

50,097, 50,101 (Dec. 13, 1988). (See NARCA Br. 4-5.) That commentary is 

obsolete in any event because Congress subsequently amended the FDCPA 

to provide that “formal pleading[s]” are not “communications” for purposes 

of two specific provisions of the Act that are not at issue here. Those 

amendments show that Congress did not “want[] to exclude formal 

pleadings from the protections of the FDCPA under any of its other

provisions,” Kaymark, 783 F.3d at 177 (emphasis added). See Pub. L. No. 

109-351, § 802(a), 120 Stat. 1966, 2006 (2006) (adding 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692g(d)); Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2305(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-425 

(1996) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)). The FTC, moreover, joins this 

brief and agrees that pleadings are covered under the FDCPA. 

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at 297. Indeed, the Court noted, some members of Congress had “proposed 

alternative language designed to keep litigation activities outside the Act’s 

scope, but that language was not enacted.” Id. at 298 (emphasis added). 

Moreover, there is no support for Pressler’s contention (at 11-13) that 

Congress intended to cover attorney debt collectors only as necessary “to 

eliminate unfair competition” between attorneys and lay collectors 

performing “non-litigation activities.” Congress also amended the Act to 

cover attorneys because, “[a]s a result of the attorney exemption, 

consumers are harmed.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-405, at 3 (1985) (emphasis 

added). Further, excluding litigation activities from the Act’s requirements 

would allow unscrupulous attorney debt collectors to “competitively 

disadvantage[]” other attorney debt collectors “who refrain from using 

abusive debt collection practices”—in contravention of the FDCPA’s express 

purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 

B. Filing a debt-collection lawsuit without meaningful attorney 

review unlawfully misrepresents the attorney’s involvement in 

the case. 

When an attorney debt collector files a debt-collection lawsuit 

without meaningfully reviewing it first, he engages in a deceptive debtcollection practice in violation of the FDCPA. 

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1. It is well established—by this Court and other courts of appeals—

that sending a dunning letter signed by an attorney or on attorney 

letterhead violates the FDCPA’s prohibition on deceptive debt-collection 

activities if no attorney was meaningfully involved. See, e.g., Lesher v. Law 

Offices of Mitchell N. Kay PC, 650 F.3d 993, 1003 (3d Cir. 2011); Gonzalez 

v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 604-07 (5th Cir. 2009); Kistner v. Law Office of 

Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008); Avila v. 

Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1996); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 

1314, 1320-21 (2d Cir. 1993). This is because such letters “imply that an 

attorney, acting as an attorney, is involved in collecting [the consumer’s] 

debt,” Lesher, 650 F.3d at 1003 (emphasis added)—that is, that the 

attorney “has become professionally involved in the debtor’s file,” Gonzalez, 

577 F.3d at 604 (quotations omitted); has some “genuine involvement in 

the process through which the letter was sent,” Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 

F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); and “has reached a 

considered, professional judgment” about how to manage the consumer’s 

case, Avila, 84 F.3d at 229. Where the attorney has not actually been 

meaningfully involved in the process, those representations are false. 

Such false representations can have a significant impact on 

consumers. An attorney’s imprimatur “conveys authority and credibility.” 

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Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989). A consumer will 

be “inclined to more quickly react to an attorney’s threat than to one 

coming from a debt collection agency,” given “the special connotation of the 

word ‘attorney’ in the minds of delinquent consumer debtors.” Avila, 84 

F.3d at 229. Thus, “if a debt collector ... wants to take advantage of [that] 

special connotation,” it must “at least ensure that an attorney has become 

professionally involved in the debtor’s file.” Id.

2. These principles apply with full force when an attorney signs a 

debt-collection complaint. As with a debt-collection letter, the attorney’s 

signature on the complaint conveys that the attorney has been meaningfully 

involved in reviewing the debtor’s case and has reached a professional 

judgment that filing suit is appropriate. Cf., e.g., Nielsen, 307 F.3d at 635 

(“genuine involvement”); Avila, 84 F.3d at 229 (“considered, professional 

judgment”). And given the close association between attorneys and formal 

legal documents, the least sophisticated consumer will naturally 

understand that an “attorney, acting as an attorney, is involved in 

collecting [the] debt,” Lesher, 650 F.3d at 1003 (emphasis added), and has 

exercised his professional judgment in deciding to file suit. 

Rules of court confirm that it is eminently reasonable for the least 

sophisticated consumer—or any consumer—to understand a complaint 

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from an attorney in this way. Under rules like New Jersey Rule of Court 

1:4-8 (a state-law equivalent to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11), an 

attorney who signs a complaint expressly represents that he has conducted 

“an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” and concluded that “the 

factual allegations have evidentiary support.”6 N.J. R. Ct. 1:4-8(a)(3); see 

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (similar). An attorney can make that 

representation only if he has, in fact, meaningfully reviewed the case.7 

Under court rules, moreover, only an attorney can file a complaint on 

behalf of a creditor. See N.J. R. Ct. 1:21-1. This further confirms that the 

 

6 The New Jersey rule also permits the lawyer to certify, “as to specifically 

identified allegations,” that the allegations “are either likely to have 

evidentiary support or they will be withdrawn [if warranted].” N.J. R. Ct. 

1:4-8(a)(3). The complaint against Bock contained no such “specifically 

identified allegations.” See Appx. 80. But even if it did, it would not 

matter. Such allegations would not change the fact that “the least 

sophisticated debtor, upon receiving” a complaint filed by an attorney, 

would “reasonably believe that an attorney has reviewed his file and has 

determined that he is a candidate for legal action,” Lesher, 650 F.3d at 

1003. 

7 Contrary to Pressler’s suggestion (at 22-25, 42), the claim here is not 

that the FDCPA punishes violations of state court rules. Rather, the FDCPA 

provides that attorney debt collectors cannot misrepresent their 

involvement in a debt-collection case. Rules of court simply confirm that, 

in signing a complaint, an attorney represents that he has had some 

meaningful involvement in the case. Pressler similarly errs in suggesting 

(at 17-18, 20) that Bock’s claim would have the “absurd” result of making 

debt-collection attorneys owe “non-client” consumers a duty to work 

diligently on a case. The FDCPA imposes on debt collectors a duty not to 

use false or deceptive means to collect debts—a duty that is hardly “absurd.” 

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attorney’s involvement is not a mere formality. In invoking the power of 

the court, the attorney represents that he is “acting as an attorney,” Lesher, 

650 F.3d at 1003, and exercising professional judgment—not just affixing 

his name and bar number to his client’s demand for payment. 

3. Pressler does not dispute that a complaint signed by an attorney 

represents that the attorney was meaningfully involved. Instead, it 

contends that such representations are not deceptive when made in a 

complaint because “real attorneys” have filed a “real suit.” (Pressler Br. 

30.) This misses the point. 

First, even though a complaint signed by a real attorney may be 

“‘from’ attorneys in the literal sense of that word, some degree of attorney 

involvement is required before a [communication] will be considered ‘from 

an attorney’ within the meaning of the FDCPA.” Miller v. Wolpoff & 

Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Avila, 84 F.3d 

at 229. Thus, where an attorney signs a complaint without having been 

meaningfully involved, he violates § 1692e(3)’s prohibition on making a 

“false representation or implication ... that any communication is from an 

attorney.”8 The attorney’s misrepresentations about his involvement also 

 

8 In the same vein, the attorney also violates § 1692e(9)’s prohibition on 

“creat[ing] a false impression as to [a communication’s] source, 

authorization, or approval.” Cf. Avila, 84 F.3d at 229. 

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violate §§ 1692e’s and 1692e(10)’s general prohibitions on using deceptive 

means to collect debts. 

Second, the fact that a complaint is a “real suit” does not make the 

misrepresentations about the attorney’s involvement any less misleading. 

Pressler contends (at 28-29) that such misrepresentations are misleading 

only to the extent they create a “false sense of urgency” that “litigation [is] 

imminent.” Not so. Misrepresentations about an attorney’s involvement 

also “falsely lead[] the consumer to believe that a lawyer has reviewed the 

debtor’s account and assessed the validity of the creditor’s position.” 

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., -- F. 

Supp. 3d --, 2015 WL 4272275, *17 (N.D. Ga. 2015). This false impression 

can make a big difference in how consumers respond. A consumer misled 

into believing that the complaint against him reflects an attorney’s 

professional judgment is apt to be more intimidated—and thus less likely to 

defend against the suit and more likely to accede to the demand for 

payment.9 By contrast, absent that misrepresentation, the consumer will be 

more likely to question the debt and to identify and raise the full range of 

 

9 Whether Pressler’s misrepresentations had this effect on Bock is 

irrelevant. “[T]he specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually 

confused or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated debtor would 

be.” Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, -- F.3d --, 2015 WL 3953754, *3 (3d Cir. 

2015) (emphasis in original). 

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his defenses in court. This can be especially important where, as here, the 

party seeking payment is not the original creditor, but a debt buyer. The 

consumer has no way to know whether that debt buyer actually owns the 

debt and is entitled to payment—but the attorney’s imprimatur will make 

the least sophisticated consumer less likely to question that fundamental 

fact. 

Besides, Pressler can hardly claim that a rubber-stamped complaint 

creates a sense of urgency that is entirely “legitimate.” (See Pressler Br. 

29.) An attorney who has had no meaningful involvement in a case cannot 

possibly know whether he will actually pursue the litigation, or even if there 

is any valid basis for doing so. Indeed, attorney debt collectors commonly 

adjourn or dismiss collection suits if the consumer responds. FTC 2010 

Report 21-22; see also Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: 

Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and 

Courts, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 257, 295 (2011) (empirical study finding that 

over 60 percent of debt-collection suits were dismissed when the 

consumer-defendant appeared). The FDCPA does not permit an attorney 

to “get the debtor’s knees knocking,” Avila, 84 F.3d at 229, with a rubberstamped complaint any more than with a rubber-stamped debt-collection 

letter. 

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C. The Pressler attorney’s four-second review did not constitute 

meaningful attorney involvement. 

The undisputed evidence shows that Pressler violated the FDCPA 

when it filed a debt-collection complaint against Bock after an attorney 

spent a total of four seconds reviewing the case. The Court need not decide 

here precisely what steps an attorney must take to ensure that the 

representations that he makes when filing a debt-collection complaint—that 

he has been meaningfully involved in the case and reached a professional 

judgment that filing suit is warranted—are not deceptive. Under any 

conceivable standard, four seconds is not enough to become meaningfully 

involved and form a professional judgment about the appropriate action to 

take. For that reason, Pressler’s representation that an attorney had done 

so was deceptive and violated the FDCPA. 

Pressler and its amici claim, however, that the firm’s “complex review 

process that was created and implemented by attorneys” enabled Gulko to 

meaningfully review “virtually identical” collection actions so quickly. 

(Pressler Br. 34; NARCA Br. 8-11.) But attorneys’ involvement in setting up 

the firm’s process does not excuse them from reaching a professional 

judgment about individual debtors’ cases, and the undisputed evidence 

shows that no attorney exercised any such professional judgment here. 

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1. Setting up a review process does not excuse the attorney 

from exercising professional judgment. 

It is already established that it is not enough for the attorney simply 

to “approve[] the procedures according to which [dunning] letters [are] 

sent.” Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1317; accord Avila, 84 F.3d at 228-29. For his 

representations of meaningful involvement to be accurate, the attorney 

“must be directly and personally involved.” Avila, 84 F.3d at 228. That is 

not to say that the attorney must do everything himself. An attorney may 

delegate “part of the review process to a paralegal or even a computer 

program”—but only if “the ultimate professional judgment concerning the 

existence of a valid debt is reserved to the lawyer.” Boyd v. Wexler, 275 

F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Professional responsibility tenets confirm that lawyers who set up a 

process and delegate tasks must still exercise professional judgment 

themselves. The American Bar Association has advised that delegation is 

proper only if the attorney “personally exercises the care and independent 

judgment required to see that each letter sent is accurate and appropriate 

as to the account of the debtor when it is sent.” ABA Informal Op. 1368 

(1976). New Jersey likewise requires lawyers who send dunning letters to 

“individually review[] the file, ma[k]e appropriate inquiry, and exercise[] 

professional judgment.” Joint Opinion: Opinion 48 of Committee on the 

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Unauthorized Practice of Law and Opinion 725 of Advisory Committee on 

Professional Ethics (2012) (emphasis added).10 There is of course no 

reason that attorneys’ obligations would be any less when they file debtcollection complaints. 

2. No attorney exercised professional judgment here. 

a. The undisputed evidence shows that no attorney at Pressler 

exercised any professional judgment in filing suit against Bock. The 

attorney who reviewed the complaint against Bock merely (1) confirmed 

that the information in the summons and complaint was “the same 

information that was received from the client” and (2) checked for credits 

or address changes. Appx. 70. Such ministerial review “did not call for the 

exercise of professional judgment.” Nielsen, 307 F.3d at 636 (concluding 

that attorney did not exercise professional judgment where he merely 

“identif[ied] missing data, typographical errors, and debtors whom he had 

already sent letters” and ascertained whether debtor had filed for 

bankruptcy or lived in a particular state). 

b. Moreover, reaching a professional judgment requires at least some

inquiry into whether the consumer actually owes the debt, and thus 

 

10 Available at http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/ethics/acpe/

acp725_1.html. 

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whether there is a reasonable basis to allege as much in a complaint. See, 

e.g., Nielsen, 307 F.3d at 638 (finding FDCPA violation where attorney 

represented meaningful involvement even though he “made no 

independent, professional assessment of the delinquency and validity of 

any debt”); accord Boyd, 275 F.3d at 648 (requiring attorney who 

represents meaningful involvement to make “professional judgment 

concerning the existence of a valid debt”); Miller, 321 F.3d at 304 (similar); 

cf. also ABA Informal Op. 1368 (1976) (“[I]t is not enough that the lawyer 

rely upon the client’s certification of the ‘validity’ of the account. The 

lawyer must take responsibility for the reasonable accuracy of each letter.”). 

What that inquiry entails may vary based on the circumstances, but in 

general “merely being told by a client that a debt is overdue is not enough.” 

Miller, 321 F.3d at 304. Nothing in the record indicates that any such 

inquiry occurred here—in either the firm’s “lengthy review process” 

(Pressler Br. 6) or Gulko’s four-second scan. See Appx. 69-71, 124-39. 

Pressler objects (at 47) that it was entitled to “rely on the file provided 

by [its] client.” But even assuming that an attorney in some circumstances 

could reasonably rely on the type of summary data provided here, the 

attorney must at a minimum make a professional judgment that such 

reliance is reasonable. No record evidence indicates that any Pressler 

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attorney reached such a professional judgment here. Pressler suggests that 

it relies on its history with Midland (Appx. 70-71)—but the data here did 

not originate with Midland; it originated with an HSBC credit card account. 

And the firm does not claim to have taken any steps, beyond checking for 

missing information in individual files, to evaluate the reasonableness of its 

nearly unshakeable assumption that the summary data reflected valid 

debts. That lapse was particularly unreasonable here. By the time Pressler 

obtained the information about Bock’s debt, that information had been 

transferred three times—from HSBC to a debt buyer, from that debt buyer 

to Midland, and from Midland to Pressler. See Appx. 80, 126, 263. Such 

transfers of consumer debt information can entail high risk of error. As a 

recent Government Accountability Office report found, when a debt is 

transferred, “there are numerous areas in which account integrity could be 

compromised,” as “important account information ... may not always be 

transferred” with the debt. GAO Report 44. 

Pressler suggests (at 47-48) that having to assess the validity of the 

debt unfairly subjects attorney debt collectors to higher standards than 

those imposed on lay collectors. But the rules are the same for everyone: 

No debt collector, attorney or not, may make misrepresentations when 

collecting debts—and lay collectors cannot falsely claim that an attorney 

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has reached a professional judgment any more than an attorney can. In any 

event, this Court has observed that “attorney debt collectors warrant closer 

scrutiny” given that they may exercise “certain privileges—such as the 

ability to file a lawsuit—not applicable to lay debt collectors.” CampuzanoBurgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2008). 

Pressler further contends (at 47-49) that case law entitles it to take its 

client’s summary data at face value—but the cases it cites do not address 

what an attorney must do to avoid misrepresenting his level of involvement 

in a particular matter. Rather, those cases at most hold that the FDCPA 

imposes no independent duty on debt collectors generally to investigate the 

validity of a creditor’s claim before attempting to collect it. See, e.g., Smith 

v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1032 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he 

statute does not require an independent investigation of the debt referred 

for collection.” (quotations omitted)). They in no way suggest that an 

attorney may represent that he has formed a professional judgment about a 

case even if he has conducted no inquiry into the debt’s validity.11 

 

11 Pressler similarly misses the point in citing cases holding that filing suit 

without the immediate means to prove one’s claims does not violate the 

FDCPA. (See Pressler Br. 45.) Those cases, too, say nothing about what an 

attorney must do to avoid misrepresenting his involvement in a case. 

Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit recognized in Harvey v. Great Seneca 

Financial Corp., suing without having “in hand the means to prove [the] 

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 Finally, Pressler also errs in contending (at 46) that it was entitled “to 

assume that the claim against Bock was valid” because Bock did not 

respond to the initial letter that Pressler sent him. There could be any 

number of reasons why a consumer would not respond—for example, 

because mail is not delivered or opened, or because the consumer is too 

busy or unsophisticated to respond in time. It is therefore not reasonable 

to assume that a debt is valid just because a consumer does not respond. 

 Nor does §1692g give attorney debt collectors a right to assume a 

debt’s validity. Section 1692g requires debt collectors, upon first contacting 

a consumer, to provide a notice with certain information about the debt and 

the consumer’s rights, including the right to dispute the debt within thirty 

days. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). That notice advises that “unless the 

consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity 

of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by 

the debt collector.” Id. § 1692g(a)(3). But, contrary to Pressler’s 

contention, this provision only gives consumers a right to receive this 

notice; it does not give debt collectors any right to assume a debt’s validity. 

Cf. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670 (2012) 

 

claims” is a different matter from “fail[ing] to undertake a reasonable 

investigation” into the claims. 453 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2006). 

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(explaining that “[t]he only ... right [that similar disclosure provision in 

another consumer-protection statute] creates is the right to receive the 

statement, which is meant to describe the ... protections that the law 

elsewhere provides” (emphases in original)). Nor does any other FDCPA 

provision give debt collectors that right—much less the right to represent 

that an attorney is meaningfully involved in a case, even though the 

attorney has reached no professional judgment about the debt’s validity. 

D.The Constitution does not prevent the FDCPA from barring 

misrepresentations that attorneys make in debt-collection 

litigation. 

1. Attorney debt collectors have no First Amendment right 

to make misrepresentations in debt-collection litigation. 

Nothing in the First Amendment or the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 

gives individuals a constitutional right to make misrepresentations in 

litigation. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, an individual is generally 

“immune from liability for exercising his or her First Amendment right to 

petition the government” for redress of grievances. Barnes Found. v. Twp. 

of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing E. R.R. Presidents 

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United 

Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)). But the FDCPA does 

not punish debt collectors for exercising their right to petition courts for 

redress of unpaid debts. It simply prohibits debt collectors from making 

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31 

false or deceptive representations when doing so. “[I]mposing FDCPA 

standards of accuracy and fairness on a state court filing” does not 

“constitute[] any genuine burden” on the “First Amendment right to 

petition.” Berg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 07-c4887, 2009 WL 901011, *6 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 

Besides, “[m]isrepresentations ... are not immunized when used in 

the adjudicatory process.” Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 

404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). Thus, Noerr-Pennington and the First 

Amendment do not preclude liability where a “party urging [government] 

action did so by bribery, deceit or other wrongful conduct.” Armstrong 

Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 185 F.3d 154, 162 (3d 

Cir. 1999). Although no antitrust liability will attach, “[t]he remedy for 

such conduct rests with laws addressed to it.” Id. The FDCPA—which 

specifically prohibits using deceptive means to collect debts—is just such a 

law.12

It is thus no surprise that courts have consistently concluded that “the 

First Amendment does not shield lawyers engaged in litigation from 

FDCPA liability.” Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 616 

 

12 Because Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply at all here, 

Pressler’s discussion (at 37-38) of the “sham” exception to NoerrPennington immunity is a red herring. 

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(6th Cir. 2009); accord Frederick J. Hanna, 2015 WL 4282252, at *11-12;

Berg, 2009 WL 901011, at *6; Gerber v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 07-0785, 2009 

WL 248094, *3-5 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Sial v. Unifund CCR Partners, No. 08-

cv-0905, 2008 WL 4079281, *5 (S.D. Cal. 2008). And contrary to 

Pressler’s contention (at 37), the Eighth Circuit did not conclude otherwise 

in Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Quite the opposite: The court expressly acknowledged that 

“representations ... in debt collection pleadings” may violate the FDCPA in 

some circumstances. Id. at 818. 

2. Federalism principles do not preclude Congress from 

regulating attorney debt collectors’ litigation conduct. 

Pressler’s suggestion (at 19-20) that the Tenth Amendment reserves 

to states the right to regulate attorney conduct is likewise unavailing. 

Pressler does not and could not dispute that the FDCPA’s prohibition on 

using deceptive means to collect debts—in litigation or otherwise—is a valid 

exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, 

courts have consistently so held. See, e.g., Hartman, 569 F.3d at 617; 

Garcia-Contreras v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, No. 1:09CV761, 2010 WL 

4962940, *13-15 (M.D.N.C. 2010), report and recommendation rejected in 

part on other grounds, 775 F. Supp. 2d 808 (M.D.N.C. 2011); Delawder v. 

Platinum Fin. Servs. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 2d 942, 951 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 

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33 

And where “Congress acts under one of its enumerated powers—here its 

power under the Commerce Clause—there can be no violation of the Tenth 

Amendment.” United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1997) 

(quotations omitted). By the same token, it is no matter that “the licensing 

and regulation of lawyers” has historically been left to the states, Leis v. 

Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979), because “Congress may legislate in areas 

traditionally regulated by the States,” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 

460 (1991). 

Case: 15-1056 Document: 003112044301 Page: 42 Date Filed: 08/13/2015
34 

CONCLUSION 

The district court’s judgment should be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Dated: August 13, 2015 /s/ Kristin Bateman 

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein 

 General Counsel 

Theodore (Jack) Metzler 

 Attorney 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-3502 (telephone) 

(202) 326-2477 (facsimile) 

tmetzler@ftc.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae 

Federal Trade Commission

Meredith Fuchs 

General Counsel 

To-Quyen Truong 

 Deputy General Counsel 

John R. Coleman 

Assistant General Counsel 

Nandan M. Joshi 

Kristin Bateman 

 Counsel 

Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau 

1700 G Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20552 

(202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

(202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau 

Case: 15-1056 Document: 003112044301 Page: 43 Date Filed: 08/13/2015
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a)(7) 

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure 29(d) and 32(a)(7)(B) in that it contains 6,982 

words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a 

proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14-point 

Georgia. 

Dated: August 13, 2015 /s/ Kristin Bateman 

 

Kristin Bateman 

 Attorney for Amicus Curiae

 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

 1700 G Street, NW 

 Washington, D.C. 20552 

 (202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

 (202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Case: 15-1056 Document: 003112044301 Page: 44 Date Filed: 08/13/2015
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 31.1(c) 

 

I hereby certify that the text of the electronic brief filed by the 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on August 13, 2015, is identical to 

the text in the paper copies mailed on August 13, 2015. I further certify that 

the electronic submission was scanned for viruses using System Center 

Endpoint Protection by Microsoft version 4.8.204.0 and, according to the 

program, is free of viruses. 

Dated: August 13, 2015 /s/ Kristin Bateman 

 

Kristin Bateman 

 Attorney for Amicus Curiae

 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

 1700 G Street, NW 

 Washington, D.C. 20552 

 (202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

 (202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Case: 15-1056 Document: 003112044301 Page: 45 Date Filed: 08/13/2015
No. 15-1056 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk 

of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit by 

using the appellate CM/ECF system on August 13, 2015. I have also caused 

seven paper copies of the brief to be sent to the Clerk’s Office by UPS. 

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users 

and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. 

Dated: August 13, 2015 /s/ Kristin Bateman 

 

Kristin Bateman 

 Attorney for Amicus Curiae

 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

 1700 G Street, NW 

 Washington, D.C. 20552 

 (202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

 (202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Case: 15-1056 Document: 003112044301 Page: 46 Date Filed: 08/13/2015