NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JESUS FELIPE HOLGUIN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0233 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2014-121864-001 SE

The Honorable Virginia L. Richter, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Christopher M. DeRose 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Peter C. Rosales 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Donn Kessler joined. 

W I N T H R O P, Judge: 

¶1 Jesus Felipe Holguin (“Appellant”) appeals his convictions 

and sentences for possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. 

He argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress 

the evidence against him. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 At approximately 11:30 p.m. on May 8, 2014, Phoenix police 

officers Louisoder and Yoder were on patrol in a fully marked Chevrolet 

Tahoe when they observed Appellant riding his bicycle. To the officers’ 

knowledge, Appellant had committed no crimes or traffic infractions; 

nonetheless, without activating the Tahoe’s lights or siren, Officer Yoder 

pulled the vehicle over to the side of the road next to Appellant, and Officer 

Louisoder rolled down his window and asked Appellant if he would be 

willing to talk to him.2 Appellant replied, “Sure.”

 

1 In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we 

examine only the evidence submitted at the suppression hearing. State v. 

Aguilar, 228 Ariz. 401, 401, ¶ 2, 267 P.3d 1193, 1193 (App. 2011) (citation 

omitted). We view the facts presented in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the court’s ruling, State v. Mendoza-Ruiz, 225 Ariz. 473, 474 n.1, 

¶ 2, 240 P.3d 1235, 1236 n.1 (App. 2010); State v. Walker, 215 Ariz. 91, 94, 

¶ 16, 158 P.3d 220, 223 (App. 2007) (citations omitted), and resolve all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v. Olson, 134 Ariz. 114, 116, 

654 P.2d 48, 50 (App. 1982). 

2 Officer Louisoder, who testified at the hearing on Appellant’s 

motion to suppress, asserted that he engaged Appellant as part of his 

routine patrol activity and in furtherance of the city’s community-based 

policing policy, which encourages building relationships between law 

enforcement officers and residents of the neighborhoods they patrol. 
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶3 Officer Louisoder then exited the Tahoe, approached 

Appellant, and shined his flashlight on Appellant. Officer Yoder eventually 

also stepped out of the vehicle, and at approximately that time, he activated 

the vehicle’s rear red-and-blue lights to alert any approaching motorists. 

¶4 Meanwhile, Officer Louisoder asked Appellant if he had any 

weapons in his possession.3 Appellant responded that he possessed a knife. 

Officer Louisoder asked Appellant whether he could see Appellant’s

identification. Appellant agreed, and handed his identification to Officer 

Louisoder, who handed it to Officer Yoder. Appellant also volunteered that 

he believed he was subject to an outstanding arrest warrant for unpaid 

traffic tickets.

¶5 Officer Louisoder asked if he could pat Appellant down for 

weapons, and Appellant again responded affirmatively. Officer Louisoder 

found the knife Appellant had mentioned, but nothing else. Meanwhile, 

Officer Yoder had run Appellant’s identification through the Motor Vehicle 

Department’s database, which confirmed that an outstanding warrant 

existed for Appellant’s arrest. The officers took Appellant into custody. A 

search of Appellant’s backpack4 revealed a small case containing a green 

glass pipe and a plastic bag containing two baggies of a substance later 

determined to be methamphetamine.5

¶6 The State later charged Appellant by indictment with Count 

I, misconduct involving weapons (for possessing the knife while being a 

prohibited possessor), a class four felony; Count II, possession or use of a 

dangerous drug (the methamphetamine), a class four felony; and Count III, 

possession of drug paraphernalia (the pipe), a class six felony. 

 

3 Officer Louisoder asserted this was a question the officer routinely 

asked as a safety precaution in encounters with members of the public. 

4 Officer Louisoder testified that Appellant agreed to allow the officers 

to search his backpack. It appears from the record that Appellant consented 

to that search before his arrest; however, the record is not entirely clear on 

that point. 

5 Officer Louisoder could not recall the Tahoe’s spotlight being 

activated until just before his search of Appellant’s backpack. 
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶7 Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress all evidence related

to the officers’ search—including the knife, methamphetamine, and glass 

pipe—claiming a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution and the Arizona Constitution.6 In response, 

the State argued the officers’ initial contact with Appellant had been 

consensual and therefore had not violated Appellant’s rights.

¶8 On February 10, 2015, the trial court held an evidentiary 

hearing, receiving testimony from Officer Louisoder and Appellant.7 At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, 

 

6 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article 2, Section 8, of the Arizona Constitution prohibit unreasonable 

searches and seizures. State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 463, 724 P.2d 545, 549 

(1986); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure 

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 

and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”), XIV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8 (“No 

person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, 

without authority of law.”). In general, the federal and state protections are 

coterminous, except in cases involving warrantless home entries. State v. 

Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22 n.3, ¶ 19, 170 P.3d 266, 271 n.3 (App. 2007). We 

therefore rely on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in reviewing the trial 

court’s suppression ruling.

7 Appellant testified that, when he was first stopped, the street was 

“really dark,” with only “one light post or two light posts for the whole 

street,” and the officers shined “a big spotlight” on him and advised him he 

was being stopped for failure to have a front headlight on his bicycle, a fact 

he disputed. Appellant also maintained the officers activated the Tahoe’s

flashing “blue-and-red lights” as the vehicle stopped, and that Officer 

Louisoder ordered him to stop with his handlebars turned toward the 

officer and “stay in that position with my hands on my handle [bars] and 

the bike between me.” He stated he complied with the officer’s order and 

did not feel free to leave. When asked if he had weapons, he admitted 

having “a knife that I use as a box cutter at work.” He testified the officer 

then patted him down for weapons. Appellant made inconsistent 

statements regarding whether the officer took his identification without his 

consent, although he acknowledged voluntarily advising the officer he 

“might have a warrant for nonpayment.”
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

5

reasoning that the evidence supported the conclusion that the officers’ 

contact with Appellant was consensual. 

¶9 Before trial, the trial court granted a motion to sever Count I 

from Counts II and III, and trial proceeded on the two remaining counts.8

After a two-day trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged on both 

counts. The trial court determined Appellant had six prior felony 

convictions committed on five occasions, and sentenced him to a less-thanpresumptive term of eight years’ incarceration in the Arizona Department 

of Corrections for Count II and a concurrent, presumptive term of 3.75 

years’ incarceration for Count III. 

¶10 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and 

Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12–120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13–4031 (2010), 

and 13–4033(A) (2010). 

ANALYSIS 

¶11 Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial 

motion to suppress. He maintains that, from the outset of the encounter, a 

reasonable person in his position would not have believed he was at liberty 

to leave; accordingly, everything that followed was the product of an illegal 

stop. 

¶12 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for 

an abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, but review de novo

constitutional and legal issues. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 445, ¶ 62, 94 

P.3d 1119, 1140 (2004); see also Walker, 215 Ariz. at 94, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d at 223 

(reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for “clear and 

manifest error” (citation omitted)). We accord great deference to the trial 

court’s credibility determinations because that court is in the best position

to observe the demeanor of the testifying witnesses. See State v. Olquin, 216 

Ariz. 250, 252, ¶ 10, 165 P.3d 228, 230 (App. 2007). We will affirm the trial 

court’s decision if correct for any reason supported by the record. See 

Aguilar, 228 Ariz. at 403, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d at 1195; State v. Ahumada, 225 Ariz. 

544, 545, ¶ 5, 241 P.3d 908, 909 (App. 2010). 

¶13 A consensual encounter between law enforcement and a 

member of the public does not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns, 

even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual of 

criminal activity. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“Our cases make 

 

8 After trial, the court dismissed Count I on motion of the State. 
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

6

it clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer 

approaches an individual and asks a few questions.”); State v. Hummons, 

227 Ariz. 78, 80, ¶ 7, 253 P.3d 275, 277 (2011) (“Law enforcement officers 

have wide latitude to approach people and engage them in consensual 

conversation.” (citation omitted)); State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, 13, ¶ 7, 3 

P.3d 392, 395 (App. 2000) (stating that police may “approach and question 

people without implicating the Fourth Amendment, provided that the 

interaction is consensual” (citations omitted)). Law enforcement officers 

are also free to request a person’s identification. Hummons, 227 Ariz. at 80, 

¶ 7, 253 P.3d at 277 (citations omitted); see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (“No 

seizure occurs when police ask questions of an individual, ask to examine 

the individual’s identification, and request consent to search his or her 

luggage—so long as the officers do not convey a message that compliance 

with their requests is required.”).

¶14 “The test [for whether an encounter is consensual] is whether, 

in light of all the circumstances, the police conduct would ‘have 

communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore 

the police presence and go about his business.’” Wyman, 197 Ariz. at 13, 

¶ 7, 3 P.3d at 395 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)); 

see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439 (“We adhere to the rule that, in order to 

determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court 

must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to 

determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a 

reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ 

requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. That rule applies to 

encounters that take place on a city street . . . .”).

¶15 Accordingly, police generally do not “seize” an individual 

when the person agrees to a mere request to talk or to answer questions, 

absent the use of physical force or a show of authority. See State v. Gonzalez, 

235 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 8, 330 P.3d 969, 971 (App. 2014); United States v. Orman, 

486 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007), disagreed with on other grounds by State v. 

Serna, 235 Ariz. 270, 275, ¶¶ 20-22, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (2014); see also Wyman, 

197 Ariz. at 13, ¶ 8, 3 P.3d at 395 (noting that an agreement to an officer’s 

initial request to speak to a defendant was consensual, in part because the 

officer “did not draw his gun or otherwise physically compel a response”

(citation omitted)).

¶16 The record, construed in the light most favorable to affirming, 

see Mendoza-Ruiz, 225 Ariz. at 474 n.1, ¶ 2, 240 P.3d at 1236 n.1, supports the 

trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s encounter with the officers was 

consensual and not occasioned by physical force or an improper show of 
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

7

authority. According to Officer Louisoder, Officer Yoder pulled the Tahoe 

to the curb next to Appellant, rather than in front of him, and did not restrict 

his movement; the Tahoe maintained its normal speed when it pulled over; 

the officers never activated the siren and no light was initially turned on 

Appellant; without using a bullhorn or speaker, Officer Louisoder rolled 

his window down and asked rather than commanded Appellant to speak 

with him; Appellant expressly agreed to stop and speak with the officer; it 

appears only Officer Louisoder exited the vehicle initially; and although the 

officer did at that point shine his flashlight on Appellant, the Tahoe’s 

overhead red-and-blue lights were never activated, and no indication exists 

that either officer produced his badge, drew his gun, or threatened 

Appellant in any way.9 Appellant later expressly agreed to produce his 

identification, volunteered he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, 

and expressly agreed to a pat-down for weapons10 and to permit Officer 

Louisoder to search his backpack.11 Although Appellant’s version of the 

events differs from Officer Louisoder’s on some points, we defer to the trial 

court’s determinations of the credibility of the officers and the 

 

9 In his reply brief, Appellant states, “It is interesting to note that even 

Officer Louisoder seemed to agree with the characterization of driving 

around in the police vehicle; ‘stopping people and talking to them’ was part 

of a ‘show of authority.’” In the portion of the transcript Appellant cites for 

this statement, defense counsel on cross-examination interjected the term 

“showing that authority” while asking the officer a question about 

community policing. Although the officer did not expressly disavow 

defense counsel’s terminology, the officer also did not expressly adopt it, 

but simply agreed it was “important to make your presence known in the 

community.”

10 Because Appellant gave his express consent, the pat-down appears 

to comport with our supreme court’s holding in Serna. See 235 Ariz. at 276, 

¶ 28, 331 P.3d at 411 (holding that, in circumstances in which police wish to 

search a person with whom they are engaged in a consensual encounter, 

“absent consent, an officer may frisk an individual only when the officer 

possesses both a reasonable suspicion that the person to be searched has 

engaged or is about to engage in criminal activity and a reasonable belief 

that the person is armed and dangerous“ (emphasis added)).

11 Officer Louisoder testified that Appellant was free to leave until the 

officers learned of the status of the arrest warrant. 
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

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reasonableness of the inferences they drew. See id. at 475, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d at 

1237.

¶17 As for the subsequent search of Appellant’s backpack—which 

yielded both the methamphetamine and the glass pipe—the search is 

supported by Appellant’s express consent to the search. See State v. Guillen, 

223 Ariz. 314, 317, ¶ 11, 223 P.3d 658, 661 (2010) (“One long recognized 

exception to the warrant requirement is consent.” (citations omitted)).12

¶18 The primary case relied upon by Appellant is distinguishable. 

In State v. Canales, 222 Ariz. 493, 217 P.3d 836 (App. 2009), this court 

determined a defendant was objectively not free to leave after a deputy 

“immobilized” his vehicle by parking directly behind it, making it 

“physically impossible . . . to terminate the encounter by leaving,” and 

flooded the defendant’s vehicle with light. Id. at 495, ¶¶ 7–8, 217 P.3d at 

838. Appellant argues the presence of a fully marked police vehicle is a 

“mobile ‘show of authority,’” especially if the police vehicle’s rear red-andblue lights are at some point activated, and should be treated as similar to 

immobilizing a person’s vehicle while shining a spotlight into it, as 

happened in Canales. He cites no authority to support such reasoning, 

however, and we find none. Moreover, as Appellant acknowledges, law 

enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment merely by 

approaching an individual on the street and asking him if he is willing to 

answer some questions, see Wyman, 197 Ariz. at 13, ¶ 7, 3 P.3d at 395, and 

the police officers who approached him did not block his only exit from the 

scene, as happened in Canales, nor did they activate the overhead red-andblue lights. 

¶19 Because the record supports the conclusion that the initial 

contact between the police officers and Appellant was consensual—at least 

until the police confirmed a warrant existed for Appellant’s arrest and 

 

12 Pursuant to the doctrine of inevitable discovery, the search might 

also be supported by Officer Louisoder’s testimony that an inventory 

search occurred after the officers confirmed Appellant had a warrant for his 

arrest and took Appellant into custody. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 

371-73 (1987); State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 558-62, ¶¶ 12-33, 169 P.3d 651, 

654-58 (App. 2007) (stating that although a search of the defendant’s vehicle 

did not fit within the search incident to arrest exception, the evidence was 

admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine because it would 

inevitably have been discovered during the inventory search that would 

have taken place after the car was impounded). 
STATE v. HOLGUIN 

Decision of the Court 

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placed him in custody—the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s 

motion to suppress the evidence against him. 

CONCLUSION 

¶20 Appellant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.