No. 85-311 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

DONALD E. BELL, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

DOROTHY BELL, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Linda Harris, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Nye & Meyer; Joan Meyer Nye, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Oct. 10, 1985 

Decided: February 6, 1986 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Dorothy Bell appeals the property division ordered by 

the Yellowstone County District Court in this divorce action. 

The issues on appeal are I whether the District Court 

abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate between 

the parties, and (2) whether the District Court erred in 

denying wife's motion for new trial. We affirm. 

In March 1984, after almost thirty-one years of 

marriage, Donald Bell (respondent) petitioned for the 

dissolution of his marriage to appellant. Respondent is a 

farmer working a relatively small, highly encumbered farm. 

During the marriage, appellant took care of the family home 

and performed various farm chores. Appellant began an 

antique business in 1983 and had sales of approximately 

$3,500 in 1984 in that business. The parties have one child, 

a son, who farms on ].eased land close to the family home and 

helps out on his parents1 farm. The son stated that he 

thought the court should award the farm to his father so that 

he a.nd his father could work on it together. 

Clyde Rader, a trained fa.rmland appraiser, testified 

that the current market value of the Bell farm, allowing for 

a sale within six months, was $300,000. Rader testified that 

that was the top price the Bells could receive. Raderls 

estimate of $300,000 included the fixtures on the farm but 

excluded two mobile homes on the farm. At one point, Rader 

mentioned that the $300,000 estimate was based on a sale for 

cash within a reasonable length of time. Rader also 

mentioned that Bells might receive more money for the farm if 

the buyers arranged for "constructive financing." Woody 

Shore, the vice president/senior loan officer of the Little 
Horn State Bank in Hardin, Montana, testified that he had a 

rough idea of land values in Big Horn County and that a fair 

market value for Bells' irrigated land would be $900 an acre. 

Based on $900 an acre, the farm (including improvements) 

would be worth approximately $300,000. Respondent also 

testified that the current fair market value of the farm was 

$300,000. 

Respondent testified that he owned about $1,600 of 

Farmers Union stock shares but that he would receive the 

value for those stocks only upon his retirement or his 

leaving the county, neither of which he was planning on 

doing. Respondent has also acquired shares of Federal Land 

Rank stock but he will receive no value for that stock until 

he pays off his substantial loan with that bank. Lastly, 

respondent has Big Horn County Electric Cooperative Capital 

Credits of approximately $1,000. These credits are repaid to 

the farmers approximately twenty years after being paid in 

and respondent has received about $58 a year the last three 

years. 

In January 1985, the District Court filed its findings 

of fact, conclusions of law, and a final decree of 

dissolution. The court found that Bells had. assets worth 

$456,374 and total liabilities of $325,762.18, leaving them 

with a net marital estate worth $130,611.82. The Bells have 

farm debts on their la.nd and farm equipment of $319,491.82. 

The court valued the farm land at $300,000. 

In dividing the marital estate, the District Court 

awarded the bulk of the estate to respondent. To respondent, 

the court awarded the farm, the farm equipment, various 

vehicles, and other items for a total value of $426,402. 

Respondent was made responsible for liabilities totaling 
$321,762, leaving him with $104,640 more in assets than in 

liabilities. The court awarded appellant $13,972 in assets 

over and above the liabilities the court made her responsible 

for. To eliminate any disparity in the awards, the court 

ordered the respondent to pay appellant $45,334 with the 

result that each would receive a net award of $59,306. The 

court ordered the respondent to pay $10,306 to appellant 

within sixty days of the decree and to pay 120 monthly 

payments of $292 to appellant. The court ordered that these 

"equity" payments to the wife shall be a lien on the farm 

land, but a lien subservient to the mortgages, and renewals 

of mortgages, on the land. 

In February 1985, appellant filed a motion for new 

trial. The motion was based principally upon what appellant 

termed newly discovered evidence which purportedly rendered 

the property settlement inequitable and impossible of 

performance. The newly discovered evidence was a letter from 

the Little Horn State Bank which declined respondent's 

request for a loan to provide operating expenses and to renew 

respondent's carry-over debt. The letter requested that 

respondent satisfy his existing debt with the bank. The 

trial court denied the motion for new trial and the wife 

appeals from this denial and from the property division. 

Appellant argues that the District Court abused its 

discretion in several ways in distributing the marital 

estate. The standard of review i-s clear. The District Court 

has far reaching discretion in resolving property divisions 

and this Court will not alter the lower court's judgment 

unless we find a clear abuse of discretion. The test for 

abuse of discretion is if the trial court has acted 

arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or 
has exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial 

injustice. In Re the Marriage of Rolfe (Mont. 1985), 699 

Appellant contends that distributing the marital 

estate, the District Court erred by failing to consider the 

factors detailed in S 40-4-202(1), MCA. In part, this 

section states: 

. . . In making apportionment, the court 

shall consider the duration of the 

marriage and prior marriage of either 

party; antenuptial agreement of the 

parties; the age, health, station, 

occupation, amount and sources of income, 

vocational skills, employability, estate, 

liabilities, and needs of each of the 

parties; custodial provisions; whether 

the apportionment is in lieu of or in 

addition to maintenance; and the 

opportunity of each for future 

acquisition of capital assets and income. 

The court shall also consider the 

contribution or dissipation of value of 

the respective estates and the 

contribution of a spouse as a homemaker 

or to the family unit . . . 

This section only requires the District Court to consider the 

enumerated factors, and the court is not required to make a 

finding of fact as to each factor. See In Re Marriage of 

Sell (Mont. 1981), 630 P.2d 222, 38 St.Rep. 956; In Re 

Marriage of Caprice (1978), 178 Mont. 455, 585 P.2d 641. We 

find that the District Court's findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, taken as a whole, demonstrate that the 

court adequately considered the factors set forth in 

5 40-4-202, MCA. 

Appellant also charges that the District Court abused. 

its discretion in valuing the farm land and in failing to 

place a value on certain assets (Federal Land Bank stock, 

Farmers Union Credits, Big Horn County Electric Cooperative 

Capital Credits). Appellant complains that the court's 
valuation of the farm land was based upon Clyde Ra.derls 

estimate of what the land would bring in a "cash" sale. 

Rader's testimony, as a whole, shows that his estimate was 

not based on a "distress" sale but rather on what be believed 

was the fair market value of the land. The testimony of 

Rader, respondent and Woody Shore provides an adequate basis 

for the court's valuation of the land. Furthermore, the 

court explained its reasons for not placing a value on 

certain assets and the evidence supports a finding that these 

assets had little or no value to respondent. 

Appellant also complains that the District Court abused 

its discretion in failing to order the sale of the farm and 

the division of the proceeds between the parties. This Court 

has established a policy 

that a family farm or a ranch should be 

kept intact and operated as a unit upon a 

marriage dissolution whenever there is a 

reasonable means of providing a wife her 

equitable share of the marital property 

short of selling the land. 

Gomke v. Gomke (Mont. 1981), 627 P.2d 395, 396, 38 St.Rep. 

578L, 578N; citing In R.e Marriage of Jacobson (19?9), 183 

Mont. 517, 600 P.2d 1183. The policy is especially valid 

where, as here, the parties1 child desires to take over the 

farm and family members "want to insure the continuity of a 

family heritage." Gomke, at 397; see also In Re Marriage of 

Knudson (1980), 186 Mont. 8, 606 P.2d 130. 

Here, the lower court order provided that appellant 

will receive her equitable share of the marital property. 

Under the order, the respondent must make a $10,306 payment 

to appellant by March 22, 1985 and monthly payments 

thereafter. We note that appellant does not complain that 

respondent did not make the initial payment. Furthermore, 
from the record it appears that the monthly payments of $292 

are within respondent's ability to pay. The lower court's 

plan results in a fifty-fifty split of the marital estate 

between the parties and provides that appellant will have a 

lien on the farm in the amount of the payments. We have 

approved similar plans in both Gomke and Knudson. In light 

of the foregoing, we find that the lower court provided a 

reasonable means of giving the wife her equitable share of 

the marital property and that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing respondent to buy out 

appellant's interest in the land. 

Appellant also quarrels with the lower court's 

valuation of certain farm equipment and other assets. We 

need only state that there is sufficient evidence to support 

the valuations placed on the marital estate assets. 

Finally, the appellant contends that the District Court 

erred in denying her motion for new trial. In February 1985, 

appellant filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly 

discovered evidence. This evidence was a letter from 

respondent's bank to respondent declining to loan him more 

money or to renew his carryover debt. The letter also 

requested him to liquidate his present loan at the bank. 

Appellant was apparently contending that respondent would 

have to sell the farm to pay off the loan and she would not 

receive her equitable share of the farm because her interest 

was subject to the mortgages on the land. In March 1985, the 

lower court held a hearing and testimony was given by the 

parties on appellant's motion. From other documents in the 

record, it appears that respondent may have refinanced the 

debt on the farm with a loan from the Farmers Home 

Administration. 
Although appealing the denial of her motion for new 

trial, appellant has not provided this Court with a 

transcript of the hearing on the motion. In denying the 

motion, the lower court specifically referred to the parties' 

testimony at the hearing. "It is the duty of a party seeking 

review of a judgment to present this Court with a record 

sufficient to enable us to pass upon the question raised." 

Harrington v. Harrington (1979), 181 Mont. 541, 542, 594 P.2d 

319, 320; citing e.g., Rule 9, M.R.App.Civ.P. Appellant has 

failed her duty as to this issue. We cannot consider the 

merits of this issue without a satisfactory record of the 

evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for new 

trial. Therefore, the wife's appeal is dismissed as to this 

issue. See Harrington, supra, and Yetter v. Kennedy (1977) , 

175 Mont. 1, 571 P.2d 1152. 

This Court has considered respondent's request for 

attorney's fees and costs on appeal and the same is denied. 

Affirmed.