[Cite as State v. Young, 2020-Ohio-4943.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-19-1189 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201901089 

v. 

Nicole L. Young DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: October 16, 2020 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Drew E. Wood, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

MAYLE, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Nicole L. Young, appeals the August 16, 2019 

judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, convicting her of theft and 

ordering restitution to the victim of $49,014. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

trial court judgment; however, we remand this matter to the trial court to enter a nunc pro 
2.

tunc judgment correcting the amount of restitution to $49,114, as calculated in the court’s 

August 7, 2019 order. 

I. Background 

{¶ 2} The victim in this case, J.P., is a 50-year-old woman who was born with 

cerebral palsy. She is employed as a college-level English instructor, but she has 

physical limitations, rendering her in need of assistance with such things as 

transportation, household chores, errands, and some personal care. In 2014, J.P. 

advertised for a caregiver on her church Facebook page. Nicole Young responded, and 

J.P. hired her. 

{¶ 3} J.P. orally agreed to pay Young $200 per week. Once a week, she and 

Young went to an ATM so J.P. could withdraw cash to pay Young. Because it was 

difficult for J.P.—who is wheelchair bound—to reach the machine and make the 

withdrawal herself, she would give Young her bank card and personal identification 

number (“PIN”), and Young would make the withdrawal for her. J.P. would ask Young 

to withdraw $300—she gave $200 to Young and kept $100 for spending money. Of that 

$100 spending money, J.P. paid $60 a week to a woman who cleaned her house. J.P.’s 

other bills and expenses were paid either electronically or via credit card. J.P. did most 

of her shopping on Amazon and other websites, and for some period of time, she used a 

grocery delivery service. 

{¶ 4} As J.P. grew to trust Young, she would allow Young to take her bank card 

and go to the ATM by herself to make the weekly $300 withdrawal. Young would give 
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J.P. the cash and the receipt, and J.P. would give $200 to Young. Perhaps once or twice a 

month, J.P. may have needed additional cash for such things as dinner, trips to the movies 

with friends, or for very infrequent travel—she estimated that she went on weekend trips 

no more than three or four times over the four-year period she employed Young. Young 

was the only person who had access to J.P.’s bank card and PIN.

{¶ 5} In March of 2018, J.P. suffered a depressive episode for which she took a 

three-month leave of absence from work. She became very weak and her health declined 

to the point that she could no longer live independently. In July of 2018, she was 

admitted to a rehabilitation center and prepared to move into an assisted living facility. 

At this point, she no longer required Young’s services. 

{¶ 6} In preparation for moving into an assisted living facility, J.P.’s brother and 

niece reviewed her finances to determine how she would pay her living expenses. They 

brought to her attention that the balance in her bank account was much lower than it 

should have been, and they noticed numerous suspicious ATM withdrawals. J.P.’s niece 

reviewed her monthly bank statements line-by-line and discovered that cash was being 

withdrawn far more frequently than once a week. She flagged the suspicious transactions 

on the bank statements, and J.P. reviewed them to determine which transactions were 

authorized and which were not. 

{¶ 7} J.P. contacted the Oregon police department. Young was questioned and 

admitted to stealing money from J.P. The Oregon police also brought to J.P.’s attention 
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additional suspicious use of her bank card for the purchase of such things as groceries 

and Halloween costumes. 

{¶ 8} Young was indicted on January 17, 2019, on one count of theft from a 

person in a protected class, a violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) and (B)(3), a felony of the 

second degree. On June 3, 2019, Young entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included 

offense of theft, a violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) and (B)(2), a felony of the fourth 

degree. The trial court requested a presentence investigation report and continued the 

matter for a restitution hearing, which took place on August 5, 2019. 

{¶ 9} On August 7, 2019, the trial court issued a detailed order, concluding that 

J.P.’s economic loss was proven to be $49,114. The matter proceeded to sentencing on 

August 15, 2019, at which time it sentenced Young to three years’ community control 

and ordered her to pay restitution to the victim of $49,014.1

 Young’s conviction and 

sentence were memorialized in a judgment journalized on August 16, 2019. 

{¶ 10} Young appealed. She assigns the following errors for our review: 

I. The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution 

based on indefinite information, and did not provide a detailed explanation 

of the basis for its decision. 

 

1

 The state made a $100 mathematical error in one of the exhibits admitted at the 

restitution hearing. This error was acknowledged at the hearing, and the trial court took it 

into account in its August 7, 2019 order when it found economic loss of $49,114. But it 

appears that this was overlooked in its August 16, 2019 judgment. This error can be 

corrected in a nunc pro tunc entry. 
5.

II. The restitution ordered by the court was based on insufficient 

evidence, and/or was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

II. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 11} Young raises two assignments of error, in essence asking us to review the 

trial court’s restitution order under three separate standards of review: abuse of 

discretion, sufficiency of the evidence, and manifest weight of the evidence. We begin 

by clarifying that “the proper standard of review for analyzing the imposition 

of restitution as a part of a felony sentence is whether the sentence complies 

with R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” State v. Collins, 2015-Ohio-3710, 41 N.E.3d 899, ¶ 31 

(12th Dist.). This means that “in reviewing the order for restitution, we must determine 

whether the restitution imposed was contrary to law, rather than reviewing for an abuse 

of discretion.” State v. Cantrill, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1047, 2020-Ohio-1235, ¶ 87; 

State v. Becraft, 2017-Ohio-1464, 89 N.E.3d 218, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (“[I]nstead of applying 

an abuse of discretion standard, * * * the proper standard of review for analyzing the 

imposition of restitution as a part of a felony sentence is whether * * * it is clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law.”). 

{¶ 12} Under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), a “court may base the amount of restitution it 

orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence 

investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing 

property, and other information, provided that the amount the court orders as restitution 

shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and 
6.

proximate result of the commission of the offense.” If the offender, victim, or survivor 

disputes the amount of restitution, the court must hold a hearing. Id. At the restitution 

hearing, the victim bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 

amount of economic loss attributable to the offender’s conduct. State v. Isaacs, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27414, 2017-Ohio-7637, ¶ 10. See also State v. Scurlock, 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-15-1200, 2017-Ohio-1219, ¶ 53 (recognizing that victim bears burden to 

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of restitution to which he or she is 

entitled). The offender must be permitted to cross-examine witnesses concerning the 

amount of restitution sought. State v. Benko, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011388, 2019-

Ohio-3968, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 13} “To be a lawful order, the amount of the restitution must be supported by 

competent, credible evidence from which the court can discern the amount of the 

restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.” (Internal citations and quotations 

omitted.”) State v. Wright, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1242, 2018-Ohio-2599, ¶ 18. The 

victim’s loss may be supported through documentary evidence or testimony, including 

that of the victim. Collins at ¶ 33. The victim’s testimony alone may be sufficient to 

establish his or her economic loss. Benko at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 14} Because Young advances the same arguments in support of both 

assignments of error—simply tailoring her arguments based on the various erroneous 

standards of review she asserts—we will address both assignments together under the 

proper standard. 
7.

A. The state presented testimony and documentary evidence 

in support of J.P.’s economic loss. 

{¶ 15} At the restitution hearing, the trial court heard testimony from J.P., Young, 

and R.F.—Young’s neighbor who helped care for J.P. to some degree when Young was 

suffering from a hernia. Additionally, the state offered into evidence J.P.’s itemized 

monthly bank statements (Exhibits 1-4) and a spreadsheet summarizing authorized and 

unauthorized withdrawals made from J.P.’s accounts during 2016, 2017, and 2018 

(Exhibit 5). 

{¶ 16} At the hearing, J.P. provided the information summarized above in the 

background section. She also went through her bank statements month-by-month and 

explained which withdrawals she deemed “authorized,” which she deemed 

“unauthorized,” and her reasons for characterizing them as such. 

{¶ 17} J.P. testified that the first unauthorized withdrawal occurred in February of 

2016, approximately two years after Young’s employment began. While J.P. conceded 

that she could not be absolutely certain which transactions were authorized and which 

were unauthorized, she described the method she used for identifying the unauthorized 

transactions. Briefly stated, J.P. assumed that one weekly withdrawal of $300 was 

authorized. Generally, where more than one withdrawal occurred in a day or when 

multiple withdrawals took place very close in time, she deemed those withdrawals 

unauthorized. Because she acknowledged that she may at times have needed more cash 

during any given month, she allowed for at least one additional cash withdrawal as being 
8.

potentially “authorized.” Also, the majority of the withdrawals were in increments of 

$200 or $300; where a smaller amount was withdrawn, she assumed it was authorized. 

J.P. noted that her card had been used at grocery stores in amounts that far exceeded her 

usual grocery store spending, but she did not seek restitution for those charges. And 

where she was unsure whether a withdrawal was authorized or unauthorized, she gave 

Young the benefit of the doubt. She insisted that she had not asked for restitution in an 

amount greater than what Young stole from her. 

{¶ 18} The exhibits admitted by the state showed that when Young first began 

stealing from J.P. in 2016, there were months where no unauthorized withdrawals 

occurred. Where there were unauthorized withdrawals in 2016, they ranged from $200 to 

$1,500 per month. In 2017, there was one month with no unauthorized withdrawals. The 

remainder of the year, the monthly unauthorized withdrawals ranged from $900 to $3,800 

per month. And in 2018, there were unauthorized withdrawals every month, ranging 

from $2,100 to $3,600 per month. J.P. could think of no reason that she would need this 

much extra money in a month. 

{¶ 19} Significantly, J.P. testified that during her three-month depressive episode 

that started in March of 2018, she rarely left the house; she mainly stayed home watching 

television or staring at the wall. Nonetheless, $300 withdrawals were being made 

numerous times a week, totaling anywhere from $2,400 to $3,600 per month. 

{¶ 20} Young testified that while she has no idea how much money she stole from 

J.P., she did not steal the amount claimed. She maintained that by 2016, J.P. had 
9.

increased her compensation to $300 per week instead of $200—an assertion that J.P. 

denied. Young also claimed that she suffered from a hernia that ultimately required 

surgery, and for “a good solid year,” her neighbor, R.F., assisted in J.P.’s care. Young 

insisted that J.P. agreed to pay R.F. $50 per day approximately four days a week during 

that time, totaling $10,400. J.P. agreed that R.F. helped care for her “a couple of times” 

and was paid, but it was not on a regular basis—it was occasional. 

{¶ 21} Young also claimed that she shopped for groceries for J.P. and paid cash. 

She estimated paying $500 to $800 per month in cash for J.P.’s groceries. She conceded 

that for some period of time, J.P. had a grocery service, and J.P.’s bank statements 

showed some grocery purchases on her bank card. In fact, J.P.’s bank statements showed 

grocery purchases every month except one for the period of January of 2017, until 

Young’s termination. And contrary to Young’s testimony, J.P. testified that she only 

“occasionally” paid cash for groceries. 

{¶ 22} R.F. testified that about a year and one-half ago, Young asked her if she 

wanted to go to work with her. R.F. said she would. For the most part, she did not help 

care for J.P.—“[Young] did it kind of on her own”; R.F. “was just kind of there.” 

Sometimes R.F. would help Young transfer J.P. from the car into her wheelchair or help 

take off her shoes and put them away. She gave J.P. a shower during her depressive 

episode. And she sometimes helped shop for J.P.; she claimed that when she did, 

groceries were paid for in cash. R.F. explained that while recovering from hernia 

surgery, Young still went to J.P.’s home, but R.F. just did more than she usually did. 
10. 

R.F. did this for about a year and was paid roughly $200 per week. She never spoke with 

J.P. about being compensated—she spoke with Young who said she would talk to J.P. 

about it. R.F. was never paid directly by J.P.—she was paid by Young. 

B. The trial court issued a detailed decision explaining its restitution order. 

{¶ 23} The trial court issued a detailed order on August 7, 2019, summarizing the 

evidence and making numerous findings of fact and assessments of the witnesses’ 

credibility. It observed that J.P.’s testimony was “cogent, credible, and frank,” and she 

admitted when she did not know an answer with certainty. The court found that it was 

more likely than not that J.P.’s figures were true. She “was able to identify by use of the 

bank records which withdrawals were for [Young’s] compensation, and gave [Young] the 

benefit of the doubt on various monthly withdrawals.” 

{¶ 24} The court explained that it had granted “little weight” to Young’s 

testimony, and it specifically rejected Young’s claim that by 2016, J.P. agreed to pay her 

$300 per week. The court found that J.P. had rebutted this assertion. It emphasized that 

Young offered no basis for establishing and calculating the amount that she stole from 

J.P., whereas J.P. was able to identify these amounts based on bank records. 

{¶ 25} Additionally, the court said that it had attributed “little weight” to R.F.’s 

testimony. It found that the $200 per week that R.F. received was the same $200 per 

week that J.P. testified was the agreed-upon compensation for her caregiver, and it 

observed that R.F. had admitted that Young always paid her. In other words, the trial 
11. 

court did not believe that J.P. agreed to pay two caregivers when Young was unable to 

work. 

{¶ 26} The court concluded that J.P.’s economic loss was $49,114—$49,104 as 

reflected in the state’s amended Exhibit 5, plus $10 for ATM fees that were not included 

in Exhibit 5 but which appeared in the bank statements. 

C. The trial court’s restitution award is not clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law. 

{¶ 27} Young argues that the court’s restitution award should be reduced because 

J.P.’s economic loss was unclear and was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 

She maintains that (1) the court should have accepted Young’s claim that her 

compensation was increased to $300 per week in 2016, which, for 124 weeks, would 

have reduced J.P.’s economic loss by $12,400; (2) the court should have subtracted out 

R.F.’s compensation of $200 per week for a year, which would have reduced the 

economic loss by another $10,400; (3) the court should have assigned weight to Young’s 

testimony that J.P. paid $75 per week in cash for gas and groceries, totaling $9,300 over a 

period of 124 months2

; and (4) the court should have excluded from the restitution 

amount the $60 per week that J.P. paid in cash to her house cleaner, totaling $7,400 over 

a period of 124 months. Young claims that the trial court’s decision “does not describe in 

detail how it came to its conclusion as [to] the amount of [J.P.’s] losses.” She insists that 

 

2

 Young did not testify to this; this assertion was made in her sentencing memorandum. 
12. 

the court simply accepted the calculations from the state’s Exhibit 5 “without addressing 

the disputed evidence,” and “did not explain what evidence [it] found persuasive.” 

{¶ 28} In calculating a victim’s economic loss, “[t]he reliability of the evidence 

and the credibility of the witnesses is for the trial court, as trier of fact, to determine.” 

Isaacs, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27414, 2017-Ohio-7637, at ¶ 10. The trial court need 

not “itemize or otherwise explain how it arrived at the amount of restitution it orders, so 

long as the trial court can discern the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of 

certainty from competent, credible evidence in the record.” (Internal citations and 

quotations omitted.) State v. Patton, 4th Dist. Highland No. 18CA9, 2019-Ohio-2769, 

¶ 26. 

{¶ 29} Here, despite Young’s arguments to the contrary, the trial court fully 

explained how it calculated restitution, and it made specific credibility determinations 

that further explained the rationale for its award. In arguing that the court did not 

describe its award in detail and did not address the disputed evidence, it appears that 

Young has overlooked the trial court’s August 7, 2019 order where it did just that—

described its award in detail and addressed the disputed evidence. 

{¶ 30} The court specifically explained that it believed J.P.—not Young—with 

respect to the amount of Young’s compensation. It rejected Young’s claim that J.P. 

agreed to pay R.F. $200 per week for a year on top of Young’s compensation. The court 

believed J.P.’s testimony that her cleaning person was paid $60 per week from her $100 

spending money that she withdrew each week. And even Young conceded at the hearing 
13. 

that there was no reliable way for her to estimate how much cash she spent on groceries 

for J.P.—J.P. had a grocery service for some period of time and Young acknowledged 

that she sometimes used a bank card for J.P.’s groceries. In fact, the bank statements 

show monthly grocery store purchases for 11 out of 12 months in 2017, and every month 

in 2018, ranging from $125 to $1,400 per month. 

{¶ 31} In Scurlock, we upheld the amount of a restitution award despite the fact 

that the victim “did not know, with certainty, the amount of money in the [safe deposit] 

box on the day [the defendant] removed its contents.” State v. Scurlock, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-15-1200, 2017-Ohio-1219, ¶ 54. Here, too, J.P. could not say with certainty how 

much Young stole from her, but she was certain that she had not overestimated the 

amount and, in fact, had likely underestimated it. Moreover, the trial court—which had 

the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify—made clear that it did not believe Young or 

R.F. Accordingly, we find that its restitution award was supported by competent, 

credible evidence, J.P.’s economic loss was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, 

and the restitution award was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. 

{¶ 32} We find Young’s two assignments of error not well-taken.

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 33} Young’s two assignments of error misstate the applicable standard of 

review. Reviewing her arguments under the proper standard—R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)—

we find that the trial court’s restitution award was not clearly and convincingly contrary 

to law. The victim’s economic loss was proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
14. 

based on her testimony and supporting bank statements, and the court’s findings were 

supported by competent, credible evidence. We find Young’s assignments of error not 

well-taken. 

{¶ 34} We affirm the August 16, 2019 judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas, but we remand this matter to the trial court so that the court may enter a 

nunc pro tunc judgment correcting the amount of restitution to $49,114, as reflected in its 

August 7, 2019 order. Young is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed 

and remanded. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.