No. 14-15672 

In the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit 

______________________________ 

MARIA HERNANDEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

WILLIAMS, ZINMAN & PARHAM, P.C., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

______________________________ 

On Appeal from the 

United States District Court for the District of Arizona 

Hon. Stephen M. McNamee 

Case No. 2:12-cv-00731 

_____________________________________ 

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT AND REVERSAL 

_____________________________________ 

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein 

General Counsel 

David C. Shonka 

Principal Dep. General Counsel 

Burke W. Kappler 

Colin Hector

Thomas E. Kane 

Attorneys 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-2043 (telephone) 

(202) 326-2477 (facsimile) 

bkappler@ftc.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae 

Federal Trade Commission

Meredith Fuchs 

General Counsel 

To-Quyen Truong 

 Deputy General Counsel 

Nandan M. Joshi 

Senior Litigation Counsel 

Kristin Bateman 

Attorney 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

1700 G Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20552 

(202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

(202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 

GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................ vii 

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................................................................. 1 

STATEMENT ............................................................................................................ 2 

A. Statutory Background ................................................................................... 2 

B. The Debt Collection Process ......................................................................... 5 

C. Facts and Procedural History ........................................................................ 7 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 9 

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 12 

Section 1692g(a) applies to each debt collector’s initial communication 

with a consumer about a debt, not just the first debt collector’s initial 

communication. ................................................................................................ 12 

A. There Is No Textual Basis for Interpreting § 1692g(a) to Apply Only 

to the First Debt Collector’s Initial Communication with a Consumer. ..... 13 

1. Section 1692g(a) applies to “a debt collector,” not “the initial 

debt collector.” ...................................................................................... 13 

2. “The initial communication” under § 1692g(a) refers to each debt 

collector’s initial communication, not just the first debt 

collector’s initial communication. ........................................................ 15 

B. Section 1692g’s Legislative History and Purposes Make Clear that 

the Provision Applies to Each Debt Collector’s Initial 

Communication with a Consumer. ............................................................. 20 

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C. The CFPB’s and FTC’s Interpretation of the Act Warrants Deference...... 28 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 30 

STATUTORY APPENDIX .................................................................................... A1 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a)(7) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

CASES 

Balvage v. Ryderwood Improvement & Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 

642 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................ 28 

Bank of Am. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 

309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 28 

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 

430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 27 

Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 

460 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) ....................................................................... 18, 20 

Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 

406 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................ 19 

Gale v. First Franklin Loan Servs., 

701 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................. 13 

I.C.C. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 

315 U.S. 373 (1942) ............................................................................................. 14 

Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 

516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) ................................................................................... 19 

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 

559 U.S. 573 (2010) ............................................................................................... 2 

Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 

693 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................. 17 

Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 

681 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................. 19 

Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 

559 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................................................................. 18 

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Shimek v. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., 

374 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 25 

Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 

953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992) .............................................................................. 25 

Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 

984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993) .............................................................................. 17 

Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 

869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989) .............................................................................. 27 

Terran v. Kaplan, 

109 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1997) ....................................................................... 20, 27 

Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc.,

-- F. 3d --, 2014 WL 2870174 (9th Cir. June 25, 2014) ....................................... 20 

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 

718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) .............................................................................. 14 

Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 

437 U.S. 443 (1978) ............................................................................................. 29 

STATUTES 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 

 Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 814, 91 Stat. 874, 881-82 (1977) ................................ 2, 29 

12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B) ....................................................................................... 28 

12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)(H) ............................................................................................ 1 

12 U.S.C. § 5481(14) ................................................................................................. 1 

12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) ................................................................................................... 1 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) ................................................................................................... 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) ................................................................................................... 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) ............................................................................................... 18 

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15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) ................................................................................................. 3 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) .............................................................................................3, 6 

15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) ............................................................................................... 14 

15 U.S.C. § 1692d ............................................................................................... 4, 14 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e ............................................................................................... 4, 14 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) ...................................................................................... 14, 16 

15 U.S.C. § 1692f ................................................................................................ 4, 14 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) .......................................................................... 1, 4, 12, 13, 21 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) ........................................................................................... 22 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) ........................................................................................... 25 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) ........................................................................ 4, 21, 22, 24, 25 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) ................................................................................................. 5 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) .......................................................................................... 5, 28 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l ..................................................................................................... 29 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) ..............................................................................................1, 5 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l(b) ..............................................................................................1, 5 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l(b)(6) ........................................................................................... 28 

15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d) ....................................................................................... 1, 5, 28 

REPORTS

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—

CFPB Annual Report 2014 (2014) .....................................................................2, 3 

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Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 2010: Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (2010) ............................................................................................... 3 

Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 2011: Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (2011) ............................................................................................... 3 

Federal Trade Commission, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of 

Change (2009) ....................................................................................... 5, 6, 18, 23 

Federal Trade Commission, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying 

Industry (2013) .............................................................................................. 23, 24 

Government Accountability Office, Credit Cards—Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt Collection 

Marketplace and Use of Technology (2009) ............................................. 7, 23, 24 

Kaulkin Ginsburg, Global Debt Buying Report—Experts Analyze the 

Worldwide Debt Buying Market (2006) ............................................................... 23 

Urban Institute, Delinquent Debt in America (2014) ................................................ 3 

OTHER

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) ................................................................... 14 

Debt Collection (Regulation F), 

78 Fed. Reg. 67,848 (Nov. 12, 2013) ...................................................... 3, 5, 6, 24 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a) .............................................................. 1 

National Consumer Law Ctr., Fair Debt Collection (7th ed. 2011) ....................... 24 

S. Rep. No. 95-382 (1977) ....................................................................... 1, 5, 19, 20 

Statements of General Policy or Interpretation—Staff Commentary On the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 

53 Fed. Reg. 50,097 (Dec. 13, 1988) ................................................................... 29 

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GLOSSARY 

Bureau or CFPB Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

Commission or FTC Federal Trade Commission 

FDCPA Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

WZP Williams, Zinman & Parham, P.C. (Appellee) 

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) and the 

Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission), agencies of the United States, 

file this brief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a). 

The CFPB is charged with “regulat[ing] the offering and provision of 

consumer financial products and services under the Federal consumer financial 

laws,” which include the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or the Act). 

12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(a), 5481(12)(H), 5481(14). The FDCPA authorizes the Bureau 

to enforce the Act and to “prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by 

debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692l(b), (d). This case concerns a provision of the 

FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), that requires debt collectors to provide consumers 

certain information about their alleged debts and their rights either in the debt 

collector’s initial communication with the consumer or within five days thereafter. 

This provision is critical in protecting consumers from improper attempts to collect 

debts that consumers do not actually owe. See S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977). 

The Bureau therefore has a substantial interest in this Court’s interpretation of that 

provision. 

The FTC joins the Bureau in this brief. The FTC is the federal agency with 

primary responsibility for protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive trade 

practices, including through enforcement of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a). 

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The FTC has had the authority to enforce the FDCPA since the statute’s enactment 

in 1977, see Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 814, 91 Stat. 874, 881-82 (1977), and has 

studied, and issued numerous reports on, the debt collection industry over the past 

several decades. The Commission thus also has an interest in the issue presented 

in this case. 

STATEMENT 

A. Statutory Background 

1. Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to “eliminate abusive debt 

collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); see also Jerman v. 

Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 577 (2010). The 

Act was Congress’s response to “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, 

deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors,” which 

Congress found to have contributed “to the number of personal bankruptcies, to 

marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692(a). 

Harmful debt collection practices remain a significant concern today. The 

Bureau receives more consumer complaints about debt collection practices than 

about any other issue. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act—CFPB Annual Report 2014 9, 10 (2014) (“CFPB 2014 

Report”), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_fair-debt-collectionCase: 14-15672 08/20/2014 ID: 9212526 DktEntry: 14 Page: 10 of 42
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practices-act.pdf. The FTC for many years has likewise received more complaints 

about the debt collection industry than any other. See, e.g., Federal Trade 

Commission, Annual Report 2011: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 4 (2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissionannual-report-2011-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/110321fairdebtcollect

report.pdf; Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 2010: Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act 4 (2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/P104802fdcpa2010

annrpt.pdf; Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848, 67,851 (Nov. 12, 

2013) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking). Last year, over one-third of the 

complaints that the Bureau received involved debt collectors’ attempts to collect 

debts that consumers claimed they did not owe. CFPB 2014 Report at 12, 13. 

Debt collectors’ practices affect millions of Americans: Over 77 million 

Americans have had debts in collections. Urban Institute, Delinquent Debt in 

America 7 (2014), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413191-Delinquent-Debtin-America.pdf. 

The FDCPA is the key federal statute protecting these consumers. The Act 

regulates a broad range of debt collection activities by third-party debt collectors 

that collect debts from individual consumers. The Act does not apply to 

commercial debts or to creditors who collect their own debts in their own names. 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(5), (6). Among other things, the Act forbids debt collectors 

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from employing harassing, oppressive, or abusive practices; making misleading or 

deceptive representations; and using unfair or unconscionable means to collect 

debts. See id. §§ 1692d–1692f. 

2. As relevant here, the Act also requires debt collectors to send consumers 

“validation notices” containing certain information about their alleged debts and 

consumers’ rights. Id. § 1692g(a). A debt collector must send this notice “[w]ithin 

five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the 

collection of any debt,” unless the required information was “contained in the 

initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt.” Id. § 1692g(a). The 

validation notice must disclose “the amount of the debt” and “the name of the 

creditor to whom the debt is owed,” and must advise the consumer of her rights to 

dispute the debt and to request “the name and address of the original creditor, if 

different from the current creditor.” Id. If the consumer disputes the debt in 

writing within thirty days of receiving such a notice, the debt collector must “cease 

collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector 

obtains verification of the debt” and mails the consumer a copy of that verification. 

Id. § 1692g(b). By the same token, if the consumer makes a written request for the 

name and address of the original creditor within that thirty-day period, the collector 

must cease collection efforts until it sends the consumer that information. Id. 

Congress explained that this validation requirement was a “significant feature” of 

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the law that aimed to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning 

the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already 

paid.” S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977). 

3. To ensure compliance, the FDCPA gives consumers a private right of 

action to sue for violations of the law and to recover actual and statutory damages 

as well as attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). The Act also authorizes the 

Bureau, the Commission, and several other agencies to enforce its requirements. 

Id. §§ 1692l(a), (b). 

The Bureau also has significant additional authorities in implementing the 

Act: The Bureau may issue advisory opinions interpreting the law and may 

prescribe rules under the Act “with respect to the collection of debts by debt 

collectors.” Id. 1692k(e), 1692l(d). The Bureau is the first agency to have general 

rulemaking authority under the FDCPA. Pursuant to that authority, the Bureau 

issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on debt collection in November 

2013. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848 (Nov. 12, 2013). 

B. The Debt Collection Process 

The typical debt collection process begins when a company to whom a 

consumer owes a debt—such as a credit card issuer, telecommunications company, 

or medical provider—determines that an account is past due. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 

Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change 2 (2009) (“FTC 2009 

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Report”), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/collectingconsumer-debts-challenges-change-federal-trade-commission-workshopreport/dcwr.pdf. At that point, creditors will usually first attempt to collect the 

debt on their own. Id. The FDCPA has limited application at this stage because, 

as noted above, the statute does not apply to creditors who collect their own debts 

in their own names. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

If the creditor’s in-house collection efforts are unsuccessful, the creditor may 

then enlist the help of a third-party debt collector—usually six months to a year 

after it started its own collection attempts. FTC 2009 Report at 3. In particular, 

the creditor may place the account with a third-party collector that will attempt to 

collect the debt on the creditor’s behalf. See id. Alternatively, instead of—or 

after—placing a debt with a third-party collector to recover on the creditor’s 

behalf, a creditor may sell the debt to a debt buyer, typically as part of a portfolio 

of debts that are sold for a percentage of the combined debts’ face value. Id. 

When a creditor sells a portfolio of debts, it may transfer only an electronic 

spreadsheet showing basic account information. See id. at 22. The debt buyer may 

then collect the debts itself, hire third-party collectors to collect for it, resell some 

or all of the debts to another buyer, or some combination of these things. Id. at 3. 

It is common for a debt to be sold a number of times—or to be placed for 

collection with multiple collectors—over a period of years. Id. at 4; Debt 

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Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848, 67,856 (Nov. 12, 2013). By the 

time collection efforts end, three, four, or even more collectors may have attempted 

to collect any given debt.1

 

C. Facts and Procedural History 

 In December 2011, defendant debt collector Williams, Zinman & Parham 

(WZP) sent a letter to the plaintiff in this case, Maria Hernandez, seeking to collect 

a debt she had incurred with A-L Financial Corp. Dist. Ct. ECF No. 48 ¶¶ 2, 4; 

Dist. Ct. ECF No. 58 ¶¶ 2, 4. That letter generally included the information listed 

in § 1692g(a) but failed to indicate that any request for verification or for original 

creditor information must be made in writing. See Dist. Ct. ECF No. 46-1. This 

was WZP’s first and only communication with Hernandez. See Dist. Ct. ECF No. 

58 ¶¶ 5, 7; Dist. Ct. ECF No. 48 ¶ 7. These facts are not in dispute. 

Hernandez filed suit against WZP in the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Arizona. Appellant’s Excerpts of Record (ER) 19. Hernandez alleged that 

WZP violated § 1692g by failing to advise in its December 2011 letter, or within 

five days thereafter, that any request for verification or for original creditor 

information must be made in writing. Dist. Ct. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 36-44. 

 

1

 See Gov’t Accountability Office, Credit Cards—Fair Debt Collection Practices 

Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt Collection Marketplace and Use of 

Technology 29 (2009) (“GAO 2009 Report”), http://www.gao.gov/new.items

/d09748.pdf. 

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Hernandez and WZP filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ER 23-24. 

In its briefing on those motions, WZP did not argue that the December 2011 letter 

contained the information required by § 1692g, but rather argued that it had no 

obligation to comply with § 1692g because its December 2011 letter was not “the 

initial communication” that Hernandez had received about the debt. Dist. Ct. ECF 

Nos. 45, 55, 57. In particular, WZP contended, the “initial communication” that 

triggered § 1692g’s notice requirement had come from a different debt collector, 

Thunderbird Collection Specialists, that had previously contacted Hernandez about 

the same debt. Dist. Ct. ECF No. 45 at 2. WZP claimed that because Thunderbird 

had sent Hernandez a notice that complied with § 1692g (an allegation that 

Hernandez disputes), and because WZP was “a subsequent debt collector,” WZP 

had “no further notice obligation under the FDCPA.” Id. at 5. 

 The district court granted summary judgment for WZP, concluding that 

§ 1692g(a)’s notice requirements “do not apply to WZP’s letter because it was not 

the initial communication that Hernandez had received on the alleged debt.” Order 

at 6, 14 (ER 9, 17). According to the district court, the statute’s plain text 

“contemplated only one initial communication with a debtor on a given debt”—

namely, the initial communication from the initial debt collector. Order at 6 (ER 

9). In the district court’s view, regardless of whether the initial debt collector sent 

a notice that complied with § 1692g(a), a subsequent debt collector like WZP had 

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no obligation to send a notice under that provision. Order at 7-8, 12 (ER 10-11, 

15). 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

Section 1692g(a) requires “a debt collector” to “send the consumer a written 

notice containing” certain specified information either in “the initial 

communication” or “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a 

consumer in connection with the collection of any debt.” By imposing this 

requirement on “a debt collector,” Congress indicated that each debt collector that 

attempts to collect a debt from a consumer must provide the required notice. The 

district court, however, impermissibly narrowed § 1692(a)’s reach to only the first 

of what is often many debt collectors that handle a particular debt. That narrow 

interpretation has no basis in the statute’s text or purposes. 

A. Section 1692g(a) unambiguously imposes its notice requirement on “a 

debt collector,” a term that encompasses all debt collectors, whether the first, 

second, or umpteenth to attempt to collect a particular debt. The district court 

nonetheless held that § 1692g(a) does not apply to subsequent debt collectors 

because only an initial debt collector sends “the initial communication” that 

triggers the provision’s notice requirement. That was error. The phrase “the initial 

communication” is most naturally read—and has been read by this Court and 

Congress—to refer to each debt collector’s initial communication with a consumer. 

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In rejecting this interpretation, the district court cited its “obligation ... to 

apply the statute as Congress wrote it.” Order at 6 (ER 9). But the district court’s 

interpretation in fact requires multiple revisions to the text that Congress wrote. 

The district court reasoned that § 1692g(a)’s phrase “the initial communication 

with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt” plainly referred to 

the first communication ever made to a consumer about a particular debt. But the 

first communication ever made about a debt typically comes from the creditor—an 

entity that generally is not subject to the FDCPA’s requirements. The district 

court’s conclusion thus requires reading “the initial communication” as the first 

communication about a debt ever made by a debt collector subject to the FDCPA. 

Its conclusion also requires reading the generic term “a debt collector” in 

§ 1692g(a) to mean “the specific debt collector that first contacted the consumer 

about a particular debt.” Revising the statutory text in these ways is wholly 

unwarranted, particularly given that § 1692g(a) can naturally be read to apply to 

“the initial communication” of any debt collector—initial or subsequent—that 

contacts a consumer about a debt. 

B. The purposes of § 1692g make abundantly clear that Congress intended 

for every debt collector that contacts a consumer to provide the required notice. 

Congress enacted § 1692g to eliminate the problem of debt collectors attempting to 

collect the wrong amounts from the wrong consumers. To that end, the provision 

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requires debt collectors, upon initially contacting a consumer, to provide the 

consumer a validation notice containing key information about her debt and her 

rights, and gives the consumer thirty days after receiving that notice to dispute the 

debt and to obtain the identity of the original creditor. If the consumer exercises 

that right, the collector must halt collection efforts until it verifies the debt or 

provides the requested information. For these requirements to serve their purpose, 

they must apply to initial and subsequent debt collectors alike. 

When a new debt collector takes over collecting a debt, § 1692g’s 

protections are just as important as when the first debt collector began collection 

efforts. The consumer may have paid, or successfully disputed the debt with, a 

previous debt collector. Or the new collector may have obtained inaccurate 

information. If § 1692g did not obligate subsequent debt collectors to allow 

consumers to dispute the debt, consumers could not raise and resolve these sorts of 

issues. By the same token, if subsequent debt collectors were exempt from 

§ 1692g, they would have no obligation to disclose the original or current creditor 

to the consumer—information that consumers need to be able to recognize a debt 

and assess whether they in fact owe it. 

Exempting subsequent debt collectors from § 1692g would also create a 

loophole that could nullify § 1692g’s debt-validation protection altogether. When 

a consumer disputes a debt with an initial debt collector, nothing in the FDCPA 

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prevents the creditor from simply passing the debt to a second debt collector to 

collect, even where no one has verified the debt. If the second debt collector had 

no independent obligation to send consumers a validation notice, consumers would 

be unable to stop attempts to collect disputed, unverified debts—the precise 

problem that Congress designed § 1692g to prevent. 

C. Section 1692g’s text and purposes leave no doubt that the provision 

requires each debt collector, not just the initial debt collector, to send a validation 

notice in or after its “initial communication” with a consumer. To the extent there 

remains any ambiguity, however, the Court should defer to the longstanding views 

of the principal federal agencies charged with implementing and enforcing the 

FDCPA—that each debt collector that contacts a consumer about a debt must 

comply with § 1692g. 

ARGUMENT 

SECTION 1692g(a) APPLIES TO EACH DEBT COLLECTOR’S INITIAL 

COMMUNICATION WITH A CONSUMER ABOUT A DEBT, NOT JUST 

THE FIRST DEBT COLLECTOR’S INITIAL COMMUNICATION. 

 Section 1692g(a) requires “a debt collector” to “send the consumer a written 

notice containing” certain specified information “[w]ithin five days after the initial 

communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, ...

unless the [required] information is contained in the initial communication or the 

consumer has paid the debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). By its terms, § 1692g(a)’s 

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notice requirements apply equally to each debt collector—whether the first, the 

last, or anywhere in between—that contacts the consumer about a debt. Yet the 

district court held that only the very first communication that a consumer ever 

receives about a debt qualifies as an “initial communication” that triggers 

§ 1692g(a)’s notice requirement—and therefore that only the first debt collector 

that contacts the consumer need comply with the provision. That conclusion finds 

no support in the statute’s text or structure, is wholly incompatible with the 

provision’s legislative history and purposes, and fails to account for the deference 

owed to agency interpretations of the provision. 

A. There Is No Textual Basis for Interpreting § 1692g(a) to Apply Only to the 

First Debt Collector’s Initial Communication with a Consumer. 

Section 1692g(a) applies to “a debt collector,” not “the initial debt collector” 

or “the first debt collector.” Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the 

provision’s reference to “the initial communication” does not limit the provision’s 

reach to only the first debt collector that attempts to collect a particular debt. 

1. Section 1692g(a) applies to “a debt collector,” not “the initial debt 

collector.” 

By its terms, § 1692g(a) imposes its notice obligation on “a debt collector.” 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (emphasis added). This language is broad. As this Court has 

explained, the indefinite article “a” has “generalizing force.” Gale v. First 

Franklin Loan Servs., 701 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2012). It “means ... ‘any.’” 

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14 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, the term “a debt collector” in 

§ 1692g(a) is properly read to mean any debt collector. 

Indeed, throughout the FDCPA, Congress used the phrase “a debt collector” 

to impose obligations and prohibitions on all debt collectors, regardless of their 

place in the life cycle of a debt. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (barring “a debt 

collector” from contacting third parties about a consumer’s debt); id. § 1692d 

(barring “a debt collector” from engaging in harassing, oppressive, or abusive 

conduct); id. § 1692e (barring “a debt collector” from using deceptive means to 

collect a debt); id. § 1692f (barring “a debt collector” from using unfair or 

unconscionable means to collect a debt). Although the statute distinguishes 

between debt collectors’ initial and subsequent communications, see 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e(11), it nowhere distinguishes between initial and subsequent debt 

collectors. If Congress had intended to make such a distinction—and to limit 

§ 1692g(a)’s notice requirements to “the initial debt collector”—it would have said 

so explicitly. Cf. I.C.C. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 315 U.S. 373, 380 

(1942) (“It is reasonable to suppose that if Congress had intended to make such a 

distinction, it would have said so more explicitly.”); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 

Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Had 

Congress intended to include such a limitation, it would have said so expressly and 

unambiguously, as it did [elsewhere in the statute].”). 

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2. “The initial communication” under § 1692g(a) refers to each debt 

collector’s initial communication, not just the first debt collector’s 

initial communication. 

In limiting § 1692g(a)’s reach to initial debt collectors, the district court did 

not address the breadth of the term “a debt collector,” but instead focused on the 

term “the initial communication.” According to the district court, “the initial 

communication” under § 1692g(a) refers not to the initial communication between 

a given debt collector and a consumer (as the CFPB and FTC, like Hernandez, 

maintain), but rather only to the initial communication that a consumer ever 

receives about a particular debt. See Order at 6 (ER 9) (concluding that 

§ 1692g(a)’s requirements “do not apply to WZP’s letter because it was not the 

initial communication that Hernandez received on the alleged debt”). Thus, the 

district court reasoned, because only the initial debt collector will send that initial 

communication, only the initial debt collector need comply with the provision. See 

id. This reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny. 

a. First, the district court was wrong to suggest that the provision’s use of 

the singular “the” when referring to “the initial communication” implies that there 

is “only one initial communication with a debtor on a given debt.” Order at 6 (ER 

9) (emphasis omitted). It is undisputed that there can be only one communication 

that is “the initial communication.” But that does not answer the question 

presented here: Is that one “initial communication” (i) the (single) initial 

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16 

communication that a consumer ever receives about a debt or (ii) the (single) initial 

communication that “a debt collector” subject to the provision sends about a debt? 

The provision’s use of the singular is entirely consistent with understanding “the 

initial communication” to refer to the first communication that a particular debt 

collector sends about a given debt. 

b. The district court made a similar error in seeking support for its 

interpretation in another FDCPA provision, § 1692e(11). Section 1692e(11) 

requires debt collectors to make certain disclosures in “the initial written 

communication” with a consumer, and certain other disclosures in “subsequent 

communications.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). According to the district court, this 

provision indicates that Congress expressly mentioned subsequent communications 

when it intended for the statute to cover them. See Order at 6 (ER 9). This misses 

the point. Hernandez, like the Bureau and the Commission, does not maintain that 

§ 1692g(a) covers “subsequent communications,” but that it covers initial

communications, whether they be from an initial debt collector or a subsequent 

one. Section 1692e(11) addresses subsequent communications from the same debt 

collector and in no way suggests that a subsequent debt collector’s initial 

communication does not constitute an “initial communication” within the meaning 

of the Act. On the contrary, Congress’s decision to distinguish between initial and 

subsequent communications in § 1692e(11) suggests that its failure to distinguish 

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between initial and subsequent debt collectors in § 1692g (or in any other 

provision) reflected its intent to treat those collectors the same. 

c. Finally, although the district court purported to base its interpretation on 

the statute’s unambiguous language, its interpretation in fact inappropriately 

engrafts onto the provision entire phrases that appear nowhere in its text. Cf. Pac. 

Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 693 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(explaining that court could not “read into the statute words not explicitly inserted 

by Congress” (quoting Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020 

(9th Cir. 1993))). 

At the outset, as noted above, the district court would read “a debt collector” 

as “the first debt collector to contact the consumer about a debt.” 

Moreover, the district court’s interpretation requires “the initial 

communication” to be read as “the initial communication from the initial debt 

collector.” The district court implies that that textual revision is unnecessary 

because the phrase “the initial communication with a consumer in connection with 

the collection of any debt” plainly refers only to the first communication ever made 

about a given debt. That logic misses the mark. If the provision referred only to 

that initial communication, it would not cover even the initial communications 

from initial debt collectors like Thunderbird. In almost all cases, the very first 

communication about a given debt does not come from a debt collector at all but 

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from the creditor to whom the consumer owes the debt.2 See FTC 2009 Report at 

2. Creditors, however, generally are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA. 

Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, if 

the provision applied only to the very first communication ever made about a given 

debt as the district court suggested, it would apply only to creditors’ initial 

communications. But creditors have no obligation to comply with § 1692g(a). 

Thus, interpreting “the initial communication” to refer to the first communication 

ever made about a debt would deprive § 1692g of virtually all practical effect—a 

result that Congress could not possibly have intended. Cf. Clark v. Capital Credit 

& Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have 

consistently rejected interpretations that would render a statutory provision ... a 

nullity.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)). To avoid that result, the 

district court’s conclusion requires “the initial communication” to be read as “the 

initial communication from the initial debt collector” or “the initial communication 

ever made by a debt collector.” 

d. Interpreting “the initial communication” to refer to each debt collector’s 

initial communication with a consumer about a given debt does not require these 

 

2

 A “communication” under the FDCPA is not limited to communications from 

debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (defining “communication” as “the 

conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person 

through any medium”). 

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sorts of textual distortions. Although the provision does not expressly specify 

whose initial communication triggers the notice requirement, the most natural 

reading is that it refers to the initial communication from the entity to which the 

second half of the sentence refers—“a debt collector.” Indeed, that interpretation 

is consistent with how this Court and other courts of appeals, as well as the 

enacting Congress, have described the provision. See, e.g., Riggs v. Prober & 

Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing § 1692g(a) as requiring 

“a debt collector” to send a written notice “within five days of the debt collector’s 

initial attempt to collect any debt” (emphasis added)); Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. 

Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that provision requires debt 

collector to send notice “within five days of its initial communication with the 

consumer” (emphasis added)); Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 

417 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ursuant to § 1692g(a), a debt collector must include a 

validation notice in its initial communication to the debtor or must send a 

validation notice within five days of its initial communication.” (emphasis added)); 

S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 8 (1977) (“Within 5 days after contacting a consumer, the 

debt collector must [send the required notice].”); id. at 4 (“[A]fter initially 

contacting a consumer, a debt collector must sen[d] him or her written notice 

stating the name of the creditor and the amount owed.”). Moreover, only that 

interpretation accords with the statute’s remedial purposes, which requires it to “be 

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20 

construed liberally in favor of the consumer,” Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., 

Inc., -- F.3d --, 2014 WL 2870174, at *6 (9th Cir. June 25, 2014); accord Clark, 

460 F.3d at 1176. 

B. Section 1692g’s Legislative History and Purposes Make Clear that the 

Provision Applies to Each Debt Collector’s Initial Communication with a 

Consumer. 

Interpreting § 1692g(a) to apply to each debt collector’s initial 

communication is not only more faithful to the provision’s text, it also far better 

comports with the provision’s purposes. This Court has explained that it will 

“construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, 

will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning 

of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally 

expressed legislative policy.” Clark, 460 F.3d at 1169 (internal quotations 

omitted). Examining the “general purpose” and “expressed legislative policy” of 

the FDCPA leaves no doubt that § 1692g applies to the initial communications of 

initial and subsequent debt collectors alike. 

Congress enacted § 1692g to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt 

collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the 

consumer has already paid.” S. Rep. No. 95-382 at 4 (1977); see also, e.g., Terran 

v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 1997). Section 1692g promotes that 

purpose by requiring debt collectors, upon first contacting a consumer, to send the 

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consumer a notice with key information about her debt and her rights, and by 

giving consumers the right to dispute the debt and to request the identity of the 

original creditor within thirty days after receiving that notice. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692g(a), (b). If a consumer exercises that right, the debt collector must halt all 

collection efforts until it responds to the consumer with verification of the debt or 

the identity of the original creditor, as requested. Id. § 1692g(b). 

Exempting subsequent debt collectors from these requirements would 

undercut § 1692g’s purpose in at least three ways, while at the same time doing 

nothing to protect debt collectors’ legitimate collection efforts. Furthermore, 

WZP’s proposed interpretation—under which a subsequent debt collector would be 

excused from sending a validation notice only if the prior debt collector had 

complied with § 1692g(a)—would present these same problems and also create 

administrative difficulties for debt collectors as well as courts. 

1. First, interpreting § 1692g to apply only to initial debt collectors would 

preclude consumers from obtaining verification of a debt at a critical time in the 

debt collection process. Such an interpretation would exempt subsequent debt 

collectors not only from § 1692g(a)’s notice requirement, but also from 

§ 1692g(b)’s requirement to verify disputed debts before trying to collect them. 

Section 1692g(b) gives consumers the right to dispute and obtain verification of a 

debt from the debt collector only during the thirty days after they receive a notice 

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under § 1692g(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (giving consumers right to dispute 

and obtain verification “within the thirty-day period described in [§ 1692g(a)]”); 

id. § 1692g(a)(3) (referring to “thirty days after receipt of the notice”). Thus, if 

subsequent debt collectors need not send a notice under § 1692g(a), they would 

likewise have no obligation under § 1692g(b) to verify a debt that the consumer 

disputes. 

This would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the validation right in 

protecting consumers from attempts to collect debts that they do not owe. When a 

subsequent debt collector begins to collect a debt, the need for validation can be 

just as great as when the first debt collector began to collect the debt. Facts may 

have changed since the first debt collector began its collection efforts: The 

consumer may have paid, or settled the account with, an earlier debt collector. Or 

she may have successfully disputed the debt. New fees and interest charges may 

have been added to the claimed amount due. In addition, transferring the debt may 

have introduced inaccuracies in the data, or the new collector may simply contact 

the wrong consumer. If consumers could not dispute the debt with the subsequent 

debt collector, they would have no way to raise and resolve these sorts of issues, 

short of defending a lawsuit. 

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These concerns are not hypothetical. It is common for multiple debt 

collectors to attempt to collect a single debt over several years.3

 When a new debt 

collector takes over collecting a debt, there is a real risk that the new collector will 

have inaccurate information. A recent GAO report found that when a debt is 

transferred, “there are numerous areas in which account integrity could be 

compromised .... For example, important account information—such as the result 

of disputed account investigations, consumer complaints about billing errors, and 

information on settlement agreements and identity theft—may not always be 

transferred.” GAO 2009 Report at 44. Market experts, too, have acknowledged 

the risk of inaccuracies in the data that subsequent debt collectors obtain. Kaulkin 

Ginsburg 2006 Report at 31-32. Those risks increase the more times a debt is 

transferred. Id. 

Moreover, consumers dispute debts frequently. A recent FTC report 

estimated that consumers disputed more than one million debts a year. See FTC 

2013 Report at 38 (explaining that the one million estimate likely understated the 

number of disputes). The basis of consumers’ disputes runs the gamut: 

 

3

 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying 

Industry 1 (2013) (“FTC 2013 Report”), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/reports/structure-and-practices-debt-buying-industry/

debtbuyingreport.pdf; FTC 2009 Report at 4; GAO 2009 Report at 26, 29 (2009); 

Kaulkin Ginsburg, Global Debt Buying Report—Experts Analyze the Worldwide 

Debt Buying Market 29 (2006) (“Kaulkin Ginsburg 2006 Report”), 

http://www.kaulkin.com/expertise/pdfs/reports/global_debt_buying_report_

2006.pdf. 

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Consumers may have previously paid, disputed, or settled the debt; the debt may 

have resulted from identity theft or may belong to the consumer’s family member 

or someone with a similar name; or the creditor or a debt collector may have 

miscalculated interest, misapplied past payments, or charged inappropriate fees. 

Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848, 67,860 (Nov. 12, 2013); 

National Consumer Law Ctr., Fair Debt Collection 11 (7th ed. 2011). 

Despite the prevalence of disputes and these numerous possibilities for error, 

subsequent debt collectors often do not know about the disputes that consumers 

lodged with earlier collectors, or the results of those disputes. When debts are 

transferred to a subsequent debt collector, transferors rarely provide that new 

collector with the dispute history information. FTC 2013 Report at 37; see also 

GAO 2009 Report at 44. This, of course, can result in attempts to collect the 

wrong amount from the wrong consumer—the precise problem that Congress 

designed § 1692g to prevent. To serve its purposes, that provision thus must apply 

with full force when a debt is transferred to a new debt collector. 

2. Second, applying § 1692g only to initial debt collectors would create a 

loophole that could strip consumers of their ability to stop attempts to collect debts 

they do not owe. The FDCPA bars a debt collector that receives a dispute under 

§ 1692g(b) from continuing to attempt to collect the disputed debt until the debt is 

verified. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). But courts have held that a debt collector has no 

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affirmative obligation to verify the debt in response to the consumer’s dispute so 

long as it halts its collection efforts. See, e.g., Shimek v. Weissman, Nowack, Curry 

& Wilco, P.C., 374 F.3d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 2004); Smith v. Transworld Sys., 

Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1031-32 (6th Cir. 1992). And nothing in the FDCPA prevents 

a creditor from enlisting a second debt collector to collect a disputed debt without 

verifying it first. If § 1692g did not apply to subsequent debt collectors, the new 

debt collector would have no obligation to verify the debt under § 1692g(b) and 

could pursue collection unhindered—even though no one ever responded to the 

consumer’s dispute. 

3. Third, in addition to eroding consumers’ dispute rights in these ways, 

applying § 1692g only to initial debt collectors would deprive consumers of 

information they need to manage their debts. In particular, § 1692g gives 

consumers the right to request, in the thirty days after receiving a notice under 

§ 1692g(a), the name and address of the “original creditor,” i.e., the creditor from 

whom they incurred the alleged debt. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(5), (b). Because 

debts are frequently sold even before they become delinquent, the entity seeking 

payment at any given time may not be the original creditor, but rather someone that 

the consumer does not recognize. Consumers therefore need information about the 

original creditor to be able to identify a debt and assess whether they in fact owe it. 

Similarly, consumers also need to know the name of the current creditor—another 

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important fact that § 1692g(a) requires debt collectors to disclose—to track whom 

they have paid off when they remit payment to a debt collector. If subsequent debt 

collectors were not subject to § 1692g, they would have no obligation to provide 

consumers this crucial information. 

4. Limiting § 1692g to apply only to the initial communications of initial 

debt collectors not only would undermine the provision’s effectiveness in all these 

ways, it would also do nothing to protect debt collectors’ legitimate collection 

efforts. Requiring subsequent debt collectors to comply with § 1692g puts them on 

the same footing as initial debt collectors: They must send consumers a notice and 

respond to requests for verification or original creditor information before 

continuing to collect on a debt. Complying with these requirements does not 

preclude initial or subsequent debt collectors from collecting valid debts or 

otherwise place undue burdens on those collectors’ legitimate collection activities. 

5. In short, the district court’s interpretation exempting subsequent debt 

collectors from § 1692g would undermine the provision’s effectiveness while 

alleviating no undue burdens on debt collectors. Below, WZP advanced a slightly 

different interpretation, under which a subsequent debt collector would be excused 

from § 1692g’s requirements only if the initial collector had sent a proper 

validation notice. Dist. Ct. ECF No. 45 at 5. This interpretation would do nothing 

to preserve § 1692g’s effectiveness and would add yet another problem on top: It 

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27 

would be difficult for debt collectors—and courts—to administer.4 Under this 

interpretation, to determine whether it had to follow § 1692g, a subsequent debt 

collector—and a court reviewing its actions after the fact—would have to assess 

whether the first collector sent a notice, whether that notice conveyed all the 

required information in the appropriate form, and whether the notice otherwise 

complied with the statute. See, e.g. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 

1078, 1080-82 (9th Cir. 2005) (assessing whether notice violated § 1692g by 

stating that debt would be assumed valid unless dispute was made “in writing”); 

Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 

that validation notice “must be large enough to be easily read and sufficiently 

prominent to be noticed”); Terran, 109 F.3d at 1432-34 (assessing whether other 

statements in validation notice unlawfully overshadowed § 1692g disclosures). 

 

4

 In addition to creating practical difficulties, this proposed interpretation is also 

wholly divorced from the statute’s text. Although WZP’s district court briefing did 

not parse how the statutory text supported its reading, WZP perhaps meant to rely 

on the fact that a debt collector need not send a notice under § 1692g(a) where “the 

[required] information [was] contained in the initial communication.” But this 

exception could at most excuse a subsequent debt collector from sending a § 1692g 

notice if the initial collector had included the required information in its initial 

communication. There would be no textual basis to excuse the subsequent debt 

collector from sending the notice if the first collector had satisfied § 1692g by 

sending a notice within five days after its initial communication. And, of course, 

there is no plausible reason why Congress would have made subsequent debt 

collectors’ obligations turn on whether the initial collector had sent its notice in its 

initial communication or five days later. 

 

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28 

Interpreting § 1692g in accordance with its overriding purposes to apply to all debt 

collectors avoids these difficulties of administration. 

C. The CFPB’s and FTC’s Interpretation of the Act Warrants Deference. 

For the reasons set forth above, the text, legislative history, and purpose of 

§ 1692g make clear that the provision requires all debt collectors, not just initial 

debt collectors, to send a validation notice in or soon after their “initial 

communication” with a consumer. To the extent that the Court is left with any 

doubt, however, it should defer to the views of the federal agencies charged with 

implementing and enforcing the statute. 

This Court “give[s] ‘great weight’ to any reasonable construction of a 

regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with its enforcement,” including 

where that interpretation is conveyed in an amicus brief. Bank of Am. v. City & 

Cnty. of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 563 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Balvage v. 

Ryderwood Improvement & Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 642 F.3d 765, 776 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[A]n agency’s litigation position in an amicus brief is entitled to deference if 

there is no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s 

fair and considered judgment on the matter.” (internal quotations omitted)). 

Congress vested authority for administering the FDCPA in the CFPB, which is 

empowered not only to enforce the Act, but also to promulgate regulations and to 

issue advisory opinions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(e), 1692l(b)(6), (d); see also 12 

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U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B) (addressing deference due to CFPB interpretations of 

federal consumer financial law). Its interpretation of the Act is therefore entitled to 

deference. 

Moreover, the views expressed in this brief are consistent with the 

longstanding interpretation by the FTC, which has had authority to enforce the 

FDCPA since the statute’s enactment, and which now shares concurrent 

enforcement authority with the CFPB. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 

Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 814, 91 Stat. 874, 881-82 (1977); 15 U.S.C. § 1692l. In 

Staff Commentary promulgated after notice and comment in 1988, the FTC 

indicated that subsequent debt collectors, like initial debt collectors, had to comply 

with § 1692g: “An attorney who [qualifies as a debt collector] must provide the 

required notice [under § 1692g], even if a previous debt collector (or creditor) has 

given such a notice.” Statements of General Policy or Interpretation—Staff 

Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 

50,100 (Dec. 13, 1988). Deference is particularly warranted here in light of this 

longstanding, consistent interpretation. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 

437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (deferring to “longstanding and consistent administrative 

interpretation”). 

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30 

CONCLUSION 

For the above reasons, the district court erred in concluding that WZP had 

no obligation to comply with § 1692g(a) because it was not the first debt collector 

to attempt to collect Hernandez’s debt. The order granting summary judgment to 

WZP and denying summary judgment to Hernandez on that basis should be 

reversed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Dated: August 20, 2014 /s/ Kristin Bateman 

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein 

General Counsel 

David C. Shonka 

Principal Dep. General Counsel 

Burke W. Kappler 

Colin Hector 

Thomas E. Kane 

Attorneys 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-2043 (telephone) 

(202) 326-2477 (facsimile) 

bkappler@ftc.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae 

Federal Trade Commission

Meredith Fuchs 

General Counsel 

To-Quyen Truong 

 Deputy General Counsel 

Nandan M. Joshi 

Senior Litigation Counsel 

Kristin Bateman 

 Attorney 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

1700 G Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20552 

(202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

(202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

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A1 

STATUTORY APPENDIX 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Validation of debts 

(a) Notice of debt; contents 

Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection 

with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following 

information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid 

the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing— 

(1) the amount of the debt; 

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of 

the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the 

debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing 

within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is 

disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy 

of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or 

judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirtyday period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name 

and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 

(b) Disputed debts 

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day 

period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion 

thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the 

original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any 

disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt 

or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a 

copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original 

creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities 

and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue 

during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) of this section unless the 

consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion 

of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of 

the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication during the 

30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the 

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A2 

consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the 

original creditor. 

(c) Admission of liability 

The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section 

may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer. 

(d) Legal pleadings 

A communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be 

treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection (a) of this 

section. 

(e) Notice provisions 

The sending or delivery of any form or notice which does not relate to the 

collection of a debt and is expressly required by Title 26, title V of GrammLeach-Bliley Act [15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 et seq.], or any provision of Federal or 

State law relating to notice of data security breach or privacy, or any regulation 

prescribed under any such provision of law, shall not be treated as an initial 

communication in connection with debt collection for purposes of this section. 

Case: 14-15672 08/20/2014 ID: 9212526 DktEntry: 14 Page: 40 of 42
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a)(7) 

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 29(d) and 32(a)(7)(B) in that it contains 6,961 words, 

excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally 

spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14-point Times New Roman. 

Dated: August 20, 2014 /s/ Kristin Bateman 

 

Kristin Bateman 

 Attorney for Amicus Curiae

 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

 1700 G Street, NW 

 Washington, D.C. 20552 

 (202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

 (202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Case: 14-15672 08/20/2014 ID: 9212526 DktEntry: 14 Page: 41 of 42
No. 14-15672 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the 

Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the 

appellate CM/ECF system on August 20, 2014. 

Participants who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the 

appellate CM/ECF system. 

I further certify that one of the participants in the case is not a registered 

CM/ECF user. I have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail, postage 

prepaid, or have dispatched it to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery 

within three calendar days to the following non-CM/ECF participant: 

Marshall Meyers 

Weisberg & Meyers LLC 

Suite 602 

5025 N. Central Ave. 

Phoenix, AZ 85012 

Dated: August 20, 2014 /s/ Kristin Bateman 

 

Kristin Bateman 

 Attorney for Amicus Curiae

 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

 1700 G Street, NW 

 Washington, D.C. 20552 

 (202) 435-7821 (telephone) 

 (202) 435-7024 (facsimile) 

kristin.bateman@cfpb.gov 

Case: 14-15672 08/20/2014 ID: 9212526 DktEntry: 14 Page: 42 of 42