IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40359

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SPENCER SALCEDO, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Spencer Salcedo on two counts of using a means of 

interstate commerce to knowingly attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or 

coerce a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity and two counts of using a 

means of interstate commerce to knowingly attempt to transfer obscene matter 

to a minor under the age of 16. Salcedo appeals his conviction on the counts 

involving transfer of obscene material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470, arguing 

both that the image at issue was not obscene and that he did not intend to 

transfer the image to any minor under the age of 16. We affirm. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 10, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I

This case arises from an undercover sting operation conducted by a 

partnership between the Corpus Christi Police Department’s Internet Crimes

Against Children Unit and the United States Department of Homeland 

Security. The goal was to locate individuals with sexual interest in minors and 

prevent them from contacting actual children. As part of the operation, 

undercover Corpus Christi Police Officer Alicia Escobar posted an 

advertisement on Craigslist that conveyed, in coded language, that Escobar 

wanted to recruit someone to teach her (fictitious) daughters how to have sex.

Salcedo contacted Escobar using Craigslist’s email system. The two then 

exchanged a series of text messages. Over the course of the conversation, 

Salcedo confirmed that he was “into YOUNGER,” implying that he was 

sexually interested in children, and requested a “pic” of Escobar’s daughters, 

who she told him were 11 and 14 years old. Escobar sent him a photograph of 

the “daughters,” who were actually two youthful-looking police officers with 

their faces partially cropped out of the photograph. Escobar asked Salcedo for 

his age and information about the size of his penis, which Salcedo provided. 

Immediately after, Salcedo asked “But do they [know] what’s going on[?]”

Escobar said “Oh ya they wanna learn . . . . what can you teach them and is 

tomorrow ok?” She then said “So I can get them ready. . . . Can I see a pic?”

Salcedo responded with a photograph of a man prominently displaying 

his erect penis, which occupied the foreground of the image. Impliedly, it was 

a photo of himself, but Salcedo had in fact downloaded the image from the 

internet. He also texted, “I can teach them real good.” Escobar asked, “Can I 

show the girls?” and Salcedo agreed. Later in their exchange of text messages, 

Escobar told Salcedo she had showed her daughters the picture and they were 

excited, and he responded, “Oh really thats [sic] awesome.[ ] Now I’m excited.” 

After Salcedo and Escobar made plans to meet the next morning, Salcedo asked 

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her what the daughters said about the picture, and she described the reactions 

of the fictitious children.

The next day, Salcedo was arrested without incident in his car at the 

motel where he and Escobar had arranged to meet. He was charged in a 

superseding indictment with two counts of using a means of interstate 

commerce to knowingly attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor 

to engage in unlawful sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and 

two counts of using a means of interstate commerce to knowingly attempt to 

transfer obscene material to a minor under age 16, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1470.1 The government filed a voluntary bill of particulars in 

exchange for Salcedo’s promise to withdraw his motion to dismiss the 

superseding indictment, specifying that “[r]egarding Count Three and Four of 

the Indictment, the obscene matter referred to is an image of an erect penis.”

After a two-day jury trial, Salcedo moved for judgment of acquittal on 

the obscenity counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing 

that “the Government did not prove that . . . the picture of the penis was 

obscene material [or that Salcedo] . . . attempted to transfer any type of obscene 

material to any minor.” The district court denied the motion, Salcedo rested 

his case, and the jury found Salcedo guilty on all four counts. The district court 

granted Salcedo a downward variance from the Guidelines range, sentencing 

him to concurrent terms of 168 months in prison and five years of supervised 

release, for the first and second counts, and 60 months in prison and three 

years of supervised release, for the third and fourth counts, with a $100 special 

 

1 18 U.S.C. § 1470 provides that “[w]hoever, using the mail or any facility or means of 

interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly transfers obscene matter to another individual 

who has not attained the age of 16 years, knowing that such other individual has not attained 

the age of 16 years, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more 

than 10 years, or both.”

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assessment per count. Salcedo appeals the denial of his motion for judgment of 

acquittal on the obscenity counts.

II

Although we review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de 

novo, we are “highly deferential to the verdict.”2 We “will affirm if a reasonable

trier of fact could conclude the elements of the offense were established beyond 

a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the 

verdict.”3

These well-settled principles differ in the context of obscenity. “While the 

definition of obscenity is a legal conclusion, whether a work qualifies as 

obscenity vel non as applied to the facts of a particular case is a question of 

fact.”4 Because of the First Amendment implications of obscenity laws, 

however, we must exercise “independent constitutional judgment as to the 

obscenity of the materials in question.”5

Our caselaw does not settle what this “independent constitutional 

judgment” entails. At a minimum, “an appellate court could refuse to uphold a 

fact-finder’s determination of obscenity where it would be ‘wholly at odds’ with 

Miller—e.g., where a jury based an obscenity conviction ‘upon a defendant’s 

 

2 United States v. McCall, 553 F.3d 821, 830 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. 

Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 816 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)).

3 Id. (quoting United States v. McDowell, 498 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2007)).

4 United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 782 (5th Cir. 2005). 5 Id. at 779; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 506 (1984) 

(“[A]lthough under Miller v. California, the questions of what appeals to ‘prurient interest’ 

and what is ‘patently offensive’ under the community standard obscenity test are ‘essentially 

questions of fact,’ [Miller] expressly recognized the ‘ultimate power of appellate courts to 

conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary.’” (quoting Miller v. 

California, 413 U.S. 15, 25, 30 (1973))); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974) (“[I]t 

would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion in 

determining what is ‘patently offensive.’”).

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depiction of a woman with a bare midriff.’”6 Albeit in unpublished decisions, 

we have repeatedly affirmed obscenity-related convictions because a 

reasonable juror applying contemporary community standards could 

determine that the material at issue satisfied Miller’s second prong.7 But 

Salcedo urges us to conduct something closer to a de novo review of whether 

the photograph at issue was obscene, arguing that sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

review does not comport with our responsibility to independently safeguard 

the First Amendment’s protections. We need not fully resolve what degree of 

scrutiny is appropriate. Instead, as we will explain, even a de novo review of 

the photograph establishes its obscenity under section 1470.

III

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1470 requires proof that the defendant 

knowingly attempted to transfer obscene material to a minor under the age of 

16 through the mail or any means of interstate or foreign commerce.8 Section 

1470 allows for conviction even where the minor was fictitious, as in this law 

enforcement operation, so long as the defendant attempted to engage in 

conduct that otherwise would have been prohibited if the minor were real.9

A

Salcedo first challenges the jury’s determination that the image he sent 

Escobar was obscene. Miller v. California established a three-part test for 

 

6 United States v. Guthrie, 720 F. App’x 199, 202 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting 

Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161).

7 See id. at 203 (“[A]a reasonable fact-finder applying contemporary community 

standards could determine that the videos transmitted . . . were ‘patently offensive 

representations’ of masturbation or ‘lewd exhibition of the genitals.’” (alteration omitted)); 

United States v. Kirkpatrick, 662 F. App’x 237, 240 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[W]e 

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the videos depicted ‘sexual conduct’ 

in a ‘patently offensive way’ within the meaning of the Miller obscenity test.”). 

8 18 U.S.C. § 1470.

9 See United States v. Rudzavice, 586 F.3d 310, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2009). 

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whether material is obscene and therefore unprotected by the First 

Amendment:

(a) whether the average person, applying 

contemporary community standards, would find that 

the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 

interest;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 

offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 

the applicable state law; and

(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.10

Because 18 U.S.C. § 1470 does not further define obscenity, we look to 

Miller’s three-pronged definition to determine whether Salcedo attempted to 

transfer obscene material to a minor under the age of 16.11 Salcedo solely 

contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support the second prong—that the 

photograph depicted, “in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 

defined by the applicable . . . law.” The Supreme Court has since clarified that

“[a]lthough the phrase ‘contemporary community standards’ appears only in 

the ‘prurient interest’ prong of the Miller test, . . . the ‘patently offensive’ prong 

of the test is also a question of fact to be decided by a jury applying 

contemporary community standards.”12 “Community standards” are assessed 

in terms of what is obscene to the average adult in a given community, not the 

average minor.13

Further, where, as here, the relevant statute does not further define 

obscenity, we look under the second prong to whether the allegedly obscene 

material falls within “patently offensive representations or descriptions of that 

 

10 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

11 See Rudzavice, 586 F.3d at 315; accord Kirkpatrick, 662 F. App’x at 238.

12 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 576 n.7 (2002) (citation omitted). 13 See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297 (1978). 

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specific ‘hard-core’ sexual conduct given as examples in Miller.”14 Miller

singled out “[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate 

sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated” and “[p]atently offensive 

representations or depictions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd 

exhibitions of the genitals.”15 The government argues that the image Salcedo 

sent Escobar was, at a minimum, a patently offensive lewd exhibition of the 

genitals. We agree.

The parties disagree on what material we may consider in assessing the 

image’s obscenity. The government urges us to consider the photograph “taken 

together” or “in conjunction” with the text messages that Salcedo concurrently 

sent Escobar. Salcedo counters that because the government limited itself in 

its voluntary bill of particulars to proving obscenity in “an image of an erect 

penis,” we may only consider whether the photograph itself is patently 

offensive without looking to additional context from Salcedo’s text-message 

conversation with Escobar. Our caselaw is not wholly clear as to whether a jury 

is permitted to consider context from outside allegedly obscene material in 

assessing whether the material itself meets the “patently offensive” prong.16

 

14 See United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1155 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing United States 

v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)). 

15 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.

16 See Kirkpatrick, 662 F. App’x at 240 (considering the “explicit chats” sent with 

allegedly obscene videos in considering whether the videos appealed to the prurient interest, 

then solely analyzing whether the videos were patently offensive without reference to the 

explicit messages); cf. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1363–67 (5th Cir. 

1980) (considering the first and third Miller prongs in relation to a work as a whole, but 

appearing to analyze the “patently offensive” prong in the context of specific portions of 

allegedly obscene works).

The government cites United States v. Rogers, an unpublished Seventh Circuit case, 

for the proposition that “[w]hether . . . a picture or a sentence is obscene cannot be judged in 

the abstract, but rather only in the context of its setting, its use, and its audience.” See United 

States v. Rogers, 474 F. App’x 463, 468 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting R.A.V. v. City 

of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 427 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Putting aside Rogers’s 

persuasive force as a non-precedential, out-of-circuit opinion citing a Supreme Court 

concurrence in a different context that did not itself establish governing law, it is nevertheless 

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We conclude that even devoid of the context provided through the text 

messages, the photograph was a patently offensive, lewd exhibition of the 

genitals that meets Miller’s second prong. Although Miller and its progeny do 

not define “lewd exhibition of the genitals,” we agree with the Third Circuit 

that such an exhibition involves “showing, evincing, or showing off,” in a 

manner “sexually unchaste or licentious,” “suggestive of or tending to moral 

looseness,” or “[inciting] to sensual desire or imagination.”17

The Supreme Court has observed that “nudity alone is not enough to 

make material legally obscene.”18 Salcedo attempts to extract from this a 

principle that even where a representation of an erect penis is the focal point 

of an image, the image categorically cannot be obscene unless it has other 

features rendering it patently offensive. To be sure, we have often affirmed 

findings of obscenity based on representations of male genitalia coupled with 

other sexual acts.19 We find no support in our caselaw, though, for a categorical 

rule that some other depiction of sexual activity is required to transform an 

image from “nudity alone” into a patently offensive, lewd exhibition of the 

genitals. In fact, we previously characterized an image of an erect penis as an 

“obscene picture” without further discussion.20 This is not to say, of course, that 

every such image is necessarily patently offensive under Miller’s second 

 

clear that Rogers’s commentary on the importance of “context” does not extend to our inquiry 

here. While Rogers looked to concurrent text messages alongside an allegedly obscene image 

to conclude that the image depicted sexual conduct, see id. at 468, it looked solely to the image 

itself to determine whether it was patently offensive, see id. at 470.

17 See United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise, Sched. No. 287, 230 F.3d 649,

657 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961)).

18 Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161; see Penthouse Int’l, 610 F.2d at 1365.

19 See Guthrie, 720 F. App’x at 200–03; Kirkpatrick, 662 F. App’x at 240; Ragsdale, 

426 F.3d at 774.

20 See United States v. Hughes, 618 F. App’x 770, 773 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 

Hughes addressed this issue only in passing, and, as an unpublished decision, is not binding 

on our panel. We reference it only to demonstrate the absence of a stringent rule of the sort 

Salcedo proposes. 

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prong—but no bright-line principle establishes that without more, an image of 

erect male genitalia can never constitute a patently offensive, lewd exhibition 

of the genitals.

Looking solely to the photograph itself, and exercising our independent 

constitutional judgment, we are convinced that the photograph Salcedo sent 

Escobar was a patently offensive, lewd exhibition of the genitals.21 As this is 

the only portion of the Miller test Salcedo challenges, we conclude that the 

material was obscene, as required for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1470.

B

Salcedo also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support finding 

that he intended to transfer the image to any minor under the age of 16, as 

18 U.S.C. § 1470 also requires. As we have explained, Salcedo sent Escobar the 

image over the course of a text-message conversation. When Salcedo asked 

Escobar “But do [the daughters know] what’s going on[?],” Escobar responded 

with a series of text messages stating “Oh ya they wanna learn . . . . what can 

you teach them and is tomorrow ok? So I can get them ready . . . . Can I see a 

pic?” Salcedo then sent the image, accompanied by a text message stating, “I 

can teach them real good.” Salcedo does not argue that he was entrapped by 

Escobar’s request for a “pic”; rather, he solely contests the sufficiency to 

support the jury’s finding that he intended to transfer the image to the 

 

21 Salcedo suggests that because the relevant inquiry is whether the image would be 

patently offensive in the eyes of Corpus Christi’s community, we should give significant 

weight in our independent constitutional analysis to Officer Escobar’s testimony that an 

image of an erect penis may not necessarily be obscene to an adult in the relevant community. 

We do not take Escobar to have testified that she did not find this particular image obscene. 

In any event, if we are to give weight to contemporary community standards in conducting 

our independent constitutional judgment, this suggests that we should also account for the 

jury’s determination that the photograph was obscene. To the extent that we incorporate 

contemporary community standards into our analysis, then, we are further convinced that 

the evidence was sufficient to conclude that the photograph was obscene by the contemporary 

standards of a member of the Corpus Christi community.

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daughters. Here, we are bound by the typical standard of review for a challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence: Salcedo must show that no reasonable jury 

could conclude that he had intended to transfer the image to minors below the 

age of 16.22

Although Salcedo concedes that the use of an adult intermediary does 

not sever a defendant’s intent to transfer an image to minors under section 

1470, he argues that the evidence only supports that he intended to transfer 

the image to Escobar, not to the two fictitious children.23 He argues that he 

sent the image to Escobar in response to her request for a “pic,” and that he 

only later agreed to her request for permission to show the image to her 

daughters. He submits that the only way for a reasonable jury to read the 

texting exchange between himself and Escobar is that she was “interviewing” 

him for her “sex-tutor” request, she asked if she could have a picture, and he 

sent it to her to convince her that he was suitable, accompanied by the words 

“I can teach them real good.”24 He also suggests that the fact that Escobar then 

asked if she could “show the girls” indicates that at the time, she did not 

understand him to have sent it to her as an intermediary to transfer it to the 

minors.

 

22 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 892 F.3d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 2018). 

23 Salcedo also argues that for him to have intended to “transfer” the image to the two 

minors under section 1470, he must have intended to convey “possession and control” over 

the image to the minors. He relies heavily on our decision in Sealed Appellee 1 v. Sealed 

Appellant 1, 767 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2013), which interpreted “transfer” as used in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4245. It is unclear why the meaning of “transfer” in section 4245—which allows the 

government to hold a commitment hearing on a prisoner’s mental condition when the 

prisoner has objected to being “transferred to a suitable facility for care or treatment”—

should apply with equal force in the context of section 1470. Further, even Sealed Appellee 1

rejected the notion that a “transfer” is “restricted in meaning to only physical conveyances or 

a change in physical location.” See id. at 422. We therefore decline Salcedo’s invitation to 

consider a definition of “transfer” that is limited purely to possession and control.

24 Salcedo also notes that when he was questioned after his arrest, he was asked 

whether he told “the mom” to show the picture to the daughters, and he said that the mother 

was the one who asked whether she could show it to them. 

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We disagree. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that when Escobar asked Salcedo “So I can get them ready . . . . Can 

I see a pic?,” Salcedo interpreted it as an invitation for him to provide a picture 

of his genitals to “groom” the daughters for their sexual encounter, and sent 

Escobar the picture with the intent that she serve as an intermediary to 

transfer it to the minors. The same evidence may support other, less 

incriminating conclusions—but we may not override the jury’s sound judgment 

based solely on the fact that there are alternate interpretations.25 In sum, 

Salcedo has not shown insufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

determination that he was guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1470 of attempting to 

transfer obscene material to minors under the age of 16. 

IV

We affirm Salcedo’s conviction.

 

25 See United States v. Fulton, 914 F.3d 390, 400 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that we 

ask “only whether the jury’s decision was rational, not whether it was correct” (quoting 

United States v. Lewis, 774 F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2014)).

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