If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re S.N.B., Minor.

ANGELA BITKOWSKI,

Petitioner-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

April 30, 2019

v No. 345763

Oakland Circuit Court

S.N.B., Family Division

LC No. 2018-862515-DL

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and FORT HOOD and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order of disposition referring her to 

Wolverine Human Services for placement and care. The trial court had previously acquired 

jurisdiction over respondent after she had entered a plea of admission to truancy, MCL 

712A.2(a)(4), and incorrigibility, MCL 712A.2(a)(3). After respondent violated her probation by 

refusing to remain in a nonsecure placement and to refrain from using controlled substances, 

contrary to a court order, the trial court placed respondent with Wolverine Human Services. We 

affirm. 

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A trial court’s findings of fact at a juvenile dispositional hearing are reviewed for clear 

error and the ultimate order of disposition itself is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v 

Brown, 205 Mich App 503, 504-505; 517 NW2d 806 (1994); In re Ricks, 167 Mich App 285, 

295; 421 NW2d 667 (1988). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome 

falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” In re Kerr, 323 Mich App 407, 411; 917 
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NW2d 408 (2018), quoting People v Lee, 489 Mich 289, 295; 803 NW2d 165 (2011). “A 

finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 

264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). This Court also reviews de novo “issues of statutory interpretation, 

as well as family division procedure under the court rules . . . .” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 

120, 131-132; 809 NW2d 412 (2011), quoting In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 536; 711 NW2d 

426 (2006). 

II. MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PETITION

Respondent and petitioner first contend that the trial court erred in denying petitioner’s 

motion to withdraw the petition because, even though both petitioner and respondent wanted the 

court to dismiss the petition, the court did not follow the parties’ wishes. We disagree.

The trial court has the discretion to enter any order of disposition that is “appropriate for 

the welfare of the juvenile and society” after the juvenile admits to an offense and the court 

acquires jurisdiction over the juvenile. MCR 3.943(E)(1); MCL 712A.2(a)(2) and (3); MCL 

712A.18(1). Potential dispositions range from a warning, probation, community service or

placement in a private institution as was the case here. MCL 712A.18(1)(a) to (m). One of the 

dispositional orders that the court may consider is dismissing the petition. MCL 712A.18(1)(a). 

Whatever its decision, the court must enter an order of disposition that is “appropriate for the 

welfare of the juvenile and society in view of the facts proven and ascertained[.]” MCL 

712A.18(1). When entering an order of disposition, the trial court must “articulate on the record 

the reasons for [its] disposition of the case.” In re Chapel, 134 Mich App 308, 315; 350 NW2d 

871 (1984).

The trial court had the discretion to grant or deny petitioner’s motion to withdraw the 

petition, as that discretion was afforded the court by MCL 712A.18(1)(a),1 but it denied the 

motion after determining that dismissing the petition would not be “appropriate for the welfare of 

the juvenile and society . . . .” Instead the trial court placed respondent in a secure, private 

institution, Wolverine Human Services, which is permitted under MCL 712A.18(1)(d). Further, 

evidence offered before the trial court supported that determination. Respondent had a long 

history of substance abuse, which included using crystal methamphetamine, cocaine, LSD, and 

marijuana. Respondent also had a history of self-harm and during these proceedings concerns 

were raised that she had harmed herself with a razor. Respondent also had unresolved mental 

health issues that resulted from previous trauma. She had also engaged in inappropriate sexual 

relationships with older men. For example, respondent was being sexually molested by an older 

crystal methamphetamine dealer who was giving her free crystal methamphetamine. 

Respondents’ parents were investigated by Child Protective Services (CPS) regarding allegations 

 1 We acknowledge that the Legislature amended MCL 712A.18, effective June 12, 2018, to 

provide that once the court acquires jurisdiction over a juvenile, it “shall order the juvenile 

returned to his or her parent if the return of the juvenile to his or her parent would not cause a 

substantial risk of harm to the juvenile or society.” 2018 PA 58 (emphasis added). The court’s 

order of disposition in this case was entered August 27, 2018. 
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of physical and verbal abuse but these allegations were not substantiated and respondent

subsequently stated that she made the allegations while high on crystal methamphetamine. 

Respondent was given the opportunity to remain on probation in a nonsecure facility, but

violated probation by leaving the facility to use marijuana. According to Heather Kirchner, the 

juvenile caseworker, respondent placed herself in “an extremely dangerous situation” as she was 

in a car where the driver was being injected with heroin while driving. 

Kirchner repeatedly recommended that the court place respondent in a private institution 

because she was concerned that a shorter, nonsecure program would not be sufficient to provide 

respondent with the help that she needed. The evidence demonstrated that respondent had a 

history of relapsing when afforded personal freedom. Moreover, according to the record,

returning home was not a viable option for respondent because her father was highly aggressive 

and defensive during family therapy sessions. Respondent’s medical providers were also 

concerned about claims that respondent’s parents were involved in abusing alcohol and 

prescription medication in the home, and that respondent would be subjected to a “toxic” 

environment if she returned home. 

The trial court considered the services that petitioner would offer respondent if the 

petition was withdrawn, but concluded that those were inadequate to address respondent’s issues. 

Because respondent had not been able to address her personal issues while in a nonsecure 

facility, the court was justified in its concern that she would not be able to resolve any of her 

personal issues while living at home. Moreover, it is apparent from the record that the trial court 

was also justifiably concerned that returning home would result in a “substantial risk of harm to 

[respondent].” MCL 712A.18(1). Specifically, the trial court stated, on the record, that it was in 

respondent’s best interests to participate in a program that would address her extensive substance 

abuse and trauma as opposed to returning home. Therefore, the court did not err when it denied 

petitioner’s motion to withdraw the petition and placed respondent in a secure, private 

institution.

Respondent and petitioner both contend that petitioner should have been allowed to 

voluntarily dismiss her petition under MCR 2.504, but that contention is without merit. MCR 

2.504 allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a case either unilaterally or by an agreement with 

all parties. In addressing whether a court rule should apply to a juvenile proceeding, this Court 

has stated that:

This Court interprets court rules using the same principles that govern the 

interpretation of statutes. Our purpose when interpreting court rules is to give 

effect to the intent of the Michigan Supreme Court. The language of the court 

rule itself is the best indicator of intent. If the plain and ordinary meaning of a 

court rule’s language is clear, judicial construction is not necessary. [In re 

McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich App 436, 446; 861 NW2d 303 (2014) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).]

MCR 3.901(A)(1) provides that the provisions in subchapters 3.900, 1.100, and 8.100 of the 

Michigan Court Rules govern juvenile proceedings. Furthermore, MCR 3.901(A)(2) makes it 

expressly clear that “[o]ther Michigan Court Rules apply to juvenile cases in the family division 

of the circuit court only when this subchapter specifically provides.” Consequently, this Court 
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has repeatedly held that it is improper to apply a general civil court rule to child protective 

proceedings if that court rule has not specifically been incorporated by MCR 3.901 et seq. See 

In re Collier, 314 Mich App 558, 569; 887 NW2d 431 (2016) (holding that MCR 2.603, the rule 

pertaining to defaults, is not among the rules specifically incorporated into juvenile proceedings, 

and therefore, not applicable); In re PAP, 247 Mich App 148, 153-154; 640 NW2d 880 (2001) 

(holding that summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116 does not apply to proceedings 

involving the termination of parental rights). Subchapter 3.900 of the Michigan Court Rules 

does not mention subchapter 2.500. Therefore, the trial court could not have allowed petitioner 

to voluntarily dismiss her petition under MCR 2.504 because that provision does not apply to 

juvenile proceedings under the court rules. The court did not abuse its discretion by concluding 

otherwise.2 

III. PLACEMENT IN A SECURE FACILITY

Respondent and petitioner also contend that the trial court erred in placing respondent in 

a secure private institution because there was a less restrictive means available that would 

appropriately address respondent’s trauma and substance abuse issues. We disagree. 

The trial court had the discretion to enter an order of disposition for respondent that is 

“appropriate for the welfare of the juvenile and society in view of the facts proven and 

ascertained[,]” which includes placement in a secure, private facility. MCL 712A.18(1)(d). 

However, if the court has jurisdiction over the juvenile pursuant to MCL 712A.2(a)(2) to (4), that 

juvenile “shall not be detained in any secure facility designed to physically restrict the 

movements and activities of alleged or adjudicated juvenile offenders unless the court finds that 

the child willfully violated a court order and the court finds, after a hearing and on the record, 

that there is not a less restrictive alternative more appropriate to the needs of the child.” MCL 

712A.15(3). Further, the court is required to consider imposing increasingly severe sanctions 

only in subsequent dispositions:

In making second and subsequent dispositions in delinquency cases, the 

court must consider imposing increasingly severe sanctions, which may include 

imposing additional conditions of probation; extending the term of probation; 

imposing additional costs; ordering a juvenile who has been residing at home into 

an out-of-home placement; ordering a more restrictive placement; ordering state 

wardship for a child who has not previously been a state ward; or any other 

conditions deemed appropriate by the court. [MCR 3.943(E)(2).]

 2 Further supporting our conclusion, MCL 712A.11, the provision in the Probate Code, MCL 

712A.1 et seq., governing the filing of petitions, does not expressly allow for the withdrawal of a 

petition once the court has acquired jurisdiction. Additionally, MCL 712A.2a(1) provides that 

“if the court has exercised jurisdiction over a juvenile under [MCL 712A.2(a) or (b)] jurisdiction 

shall continue for a period of 2 years beyond the maximum age of jurisdiction conferred under 

section 2 of this chapter, unless the juvenile is released sooner by court order.” (Emphasis 

added.) 
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The record indicates that the court complied with the requirements of MCL 712A.15(3). 

As noted above, the trial court had the discretion under MCL 712A.18(1)(d) to place respondent 

in a private, secure institution. While that discretion was limited by MCL 712A.15(3), the record 

demonstrates that the court properly found that respondent had willfully violated a court order 

and that there was not a less restrictive alternative which was more appropriate. Respondent 

admitted to willfully leaving Holy Cross without permission to smoke marijuana, thereby 

violating her court-ordered probation. At the subsequent dispositional hearing, the court 

considered whether to place respondent at home or in a secure facility, Wolverine Human 

Services. However, the court determined that the less restrictive alternative, a nonsecure 

placement at home, would not be appropriate because respondent had refused to remain in an 

unsecure placement and to refrain from using drugs. The court determined that it was more 

appropriate for respondent to participate in a program that would address respondent’s 

“extensive substance abuse and trauma.” Notably, according to Kirchner, respondent’s 

placement at Wolverine Human Services provided “intensive trauma-based therapy, substance 

abuse therapy, family therapy” and a school so respondent could keep up with her education. 

The court found that placement with Wolverine Human Services was the “least restrictive 

setting[]” that would be most appropriate for respondent’s care. While respondent contends that 

the trial court erred because the court made no effort to rehabilitate respondent in the community,

as mentioned earlier in this opinion, it is abundantly clear from the record that the trial court was 

concerned that substantial harm would befall respondent if she were returned to the community 

given her past behavior and the people that she was affiliating with to support her addiction. 

MCL 712A.18(1). Therefore, because the record demonstrates that respondent had willfully 

violated a court order and that a less restrictive alternate placement at home was not more 

appropriate, the court did not abuse its discretion in placing respondent in a secure facility. MCL 

712A.15(3). 

Finally, the record also demonstrates that the court complied with MCR 3.943(E)(2). The 

court initially placed respondent in a nonsecure facility at Holy Cross. Even though Kirchner

recommended placement at Wolverine Human Services at the first dispositional hearing, the 

court did not follow that recommendation and decided to place respondent in the less restrictive 

alternative. The court only considered a more restrictive placement at Wolverine Human

Services at a subsequent dispositional hearing after respondent violated the terms of her 

probation and placed herself in a situation of extreme danger. Therefore, the court satisfied the 

requirements of MCR 3.943(E)(2) because the court only imposed increasingly severe sanctions 

after the first disposition. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola