1

Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of

Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful 

Robocalls

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CG Docket No. 17-59

FCC 16-39

To: The Federal Communications Commission

Date: July 3, 2017

Comment of the Federal Trade Commission

INTRODUCTION

American consumers continue to be plagued with unwanted and illegal telemarketing 

calls. The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) extensive study of this problem and its 

vigorous law enforcement efforts have shown that law enforcement alone cannot completely 

solve the problem of illegal calls. Rather, the illegal call problem will require technological 

solutions, and robust call-blocking technology is an integral part of those solutions. 

In 2016, industry came together to form the Robocall Strike Force (“Strike Force”), the 

purpose of which is to “accelerate the development and adoption of new tools and solutions to 

abate the proliferation of illegal and unwanted robocalls,” to promote consumer choice over the 

calls they receive, and to make recommendations on how government can help in these efforts.1 

The Strike Force noted that, while several providers and third parties offer call-blocking 

products, there is no widespread call-blocking solution spanning the networks.2 In order to 

provide proactive call-blocking services to customers, the Strike Force sought clarification from 

the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) that “blocking presumptively illegal calls is 

one of the tools carriers are permitted to use to provide consumers additional relief.”3 In 

 1 ROBOCALL STRIKE FORCE, ROBOCALL STRIKE FORCE REPORT, at 1 (2016) [hereinafter “STRIKE FORCE REPORT I”],

available at https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/Robocall-Strike-Force-Final-Report.pdf.

2 Id. 

3 STRIKE FORCE REPORT I, supra note 1, at 40. 
2

response, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) and Notice of Inquiry 

(“NOI”) on Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls.4 

The NPRM seeks comment on rulemaking proposals that would authorize two categories 

of provider-based call blocking: (1) when the subscriber to a particular telephone number 

requests that calls originating from that number be blocked; and (2) when the originating number 

is invalid, unallocated or unassigned.5 The NOI also seeks information on how best to authorize 

providers to block “presumptively illegal” calls.6 

The FTC has long been a proponent of provider-based call-blocking services as a critical

tool to reduce unwanted calls and robocalls.7 Stopping illegal calls before they reach a consumer 

is the most efficient way to protect a consumer’s privacy and to prevent telemarketing fraud. 

Importantly, provider-based blocking has the potential to stop illegal calls from reaching all endusers, regardless of whether they have a mobile device, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)

service, or a traditional landline telephone. The FTC supports the NPRM’s proposed expansion 

of provider-based call-blocking authority and offers comment in response to specific questions 

raised regarding unwanted calls and other consumer protection concerns. 

I. PROVIDER-BASED CALL BLOCKING IS INTEGRAL TO SOLVING 

THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL CALLS.

Illegal telemarketing calls remain a significant consumer protection problem because they 

repeatedly disturb consumers’ privacy and frequently market fraudulent goods and services that 

cause significant economic harm. An increasing number of complaints to the FTC demonstrate 

continued consumer frustration—in 2015, the FTC received over 3.6 million Do-Not-Call 

complaints, 2.2 million of which involved a robocall.8

 In 2016, those numbers continued to 

climb, and the FTC received over 5.5 million Do-Not-Call complaints, over 3.4 million of which 

involved a robocall.9 The 2016 complaint totals represent a 49% increase over total Do-Not-Call 

 4 Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of 

Inquiry, CG Docket No. 17-59, FCC 17-23 (released Mar. 23, 2017) [hereinafter “NPRM”], published in 82 Fed. 

Reg. 22625 (May 17, 2017). The Notice of Inquiry is part of the NPRM. We sometimes refer to the NOI separately 

from the NPRM within the text in the interest of clarity. 

5 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 11. 

6 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 27-28.

7 See e.g., FTC Staff, Comments Before the Federal Communications Commission on Public Notice DA 14-1700 

Regarding Call Blocking, CG Docket No. 02-278; WC Docket No. 07-135 (Jan. 23, 2015), available at 

https://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2015/01/ftc-staff-comment-federal-communicationscommission; Letter from Chairwoman Edith Ramirez to the Honorable Charles E. Schumer (April 5, 2016) 

(promoting carrier adoption of widespread call-blocking technology).

8 See infra Attachment A.

9 Id. The average total number of Do-Not-Call complaints per month in 2016 was 459,207, and among these were an 

average of 290,734 complaints about robocalls.
3

complaints filed in 2015.10 And the complaints are not letting up: in four of the first five months 

of 2017, the FTC received more than 600,000 Do-Not-Call complaints each month and 61% of 

the monthly complaints—over 300,000—involve robocalls. Illegal calls are, by far, the largest 

category of complaints that the Commission receives from consumers.11 

The FTC has undertaken vigorous law enforcement efforts against those making illegal 

calls. The FTC has brought 131 law enforcement actions against more than 750 companies and 

individuals that the agency alleged were responsible for placing billions of unwanted 

telemarketing calls to consumers in violation of the Do-Not-Call provisions of the Telemarketing 

Sales Rule.12 The FTC has obtained more than $1.5 billion in judgments against these violators

and banned many of them from making robocalls in the future. As just one recent example, in 

January 2017, the Commission filed two lawsuits, FTC v. Ramsey and FTC v. Jones, which shut 

down operations responsible for billions of illegal robocalls that bombarded consumers with 

pitches for home security systems and extended auto warranties.13 The agency also has 

spearheaded coordinated law enforcement initiatives targeting illegal robocalls.14

Increasing levels of Do-Not-Call complaints and rising levels of consumer frustration, 

however, make clear that the FTC’s law enforcement efforts alone cannot completely solve the 

 10 See Id. From October 2013 to September 2014, the FTC received an average of 261,757 Do-Not-Call complaints 

per month, of which approximately 55% (144,550 per month) were complaints about robocalls. See National Do 

Not Call Registry Data Book FY 2014 at 5 (Nov. 2014), available at 

http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-fiscal-year2014/dncdatabookfy2014.pdf. 

11 See Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book for January –December 2016 at 2 (Mar. 2017), available at

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december2016/csn_cy-2016_data_book.pdf (“The Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN) contains more than 13 million 

complaints dating from calendar year 2012 through calendar year 2016. (In addition, the CSN contains over 20 

million Do-Not-Call complaints from this same time period.)”).

12 Among these law enforcement actions, 45 cases focused on companies and individuals collectively responsible for 

many billions of illegal robocalls. A listing of recent actions the FTC has taken against violators of the Do-Not-Call 

provisions, including those sending out illegal robocalls can be found at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/do-not-call-registry/enforcement and https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/do-not-callregistry/robocalls (last visited June 7, 2017).

13 FTC v. Ramsey, 9:17-cv-80032-KAM (S.D. Fl. Jan. 13, 2017), available at 

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/132-3254/justin-ramsey; FTC v. Jones, 8:17-cv-00058 (C.D. Fl. 

Jan. 13, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/152-3152/allorey-inc. 

14 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Florida Attorney General Take Action Against Illegal Robocall Operation (June 14, 

2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/ftc-florida-attorney-general-take-actionagainst-illegal-robocall; Press Release, FTC Leads Joint Law Enforcement Effort Against Companies that Allegedly 

Made Deceptive “Cardholder Services” Robocalls (Nov. 1, 2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2012/11/ftc-leads-joint-law-enforcement-effort-against-companies; Press Release, FTC 

Settlements Put Debt Relief Operations Out of Business (May 26, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2011/05/ftc-settlements-put-debt-relief-operations-out-business; Press Release, FTC Sues to 

Stop Robocalls with Deceptive Credit Card Interest-Rate Reduction Claims (Dec. 8, 2009), available at

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/12/ftc-sues-stop-robocalls-deceptive-credit-card-interest-rate. 
4

growing problem of illegal telemarketing calls. Existing technology makes it inexpensive and 

easy for callers to make an enormous number of calls from anywhere in the world for little cost 

while remaining anonymous. Comprehensive technological solutions are required, and callblocking technology is an integral part of that technological solution.

To spur innovation and potential technological solutions, the FTC led four public 

challenges to tackle unlawful robocalls.

15 Those contests challenged the American public to 

develop innovative methods to block calls, to create a “honeypot” to gather data on calls, to 

analyze honeypot data, and to develop algorithms to predict robocalls. The winner of the first 

Robocall Challenge, a product called “NomoRobo,” has blocked over 239 million calls, is being 

offered directly to consumers by a number of telecommunications providers, and is now 

available as an app on iPhones.16 The challenges demonstrated that call-blocking technology is 

viable, scalable, and capable of working in a real-world setting.17 

Consumers will benefit from the widespread availability of provider-based call-blocking 

solutions. Congress has long recognized that consumers should be free from abusive telephone 

calls that impinge on consumers’ privacy,18 and better call-blocking technology would satisfy 

strong consumer demand for a solution to curb the barrage of unwanted calls.19 In addition, 

widespread call blocking has the potential to drive up costs for illegal telemarketing operations 

and thus reduce the economic incentive to make illegal calls. Currently, the cost of placing large 

numbers of calls is so low that illegal calling operations can blast out millions of calls but still 

make a profit by making sales to the small fraction of call recipients who agree to purchase the 

purported goods or services offered. Call-blocking technology, if implemented on a widespread 

basis, could reduce revenues for illegal telemarketing operations, thereby making it more 

difficult to operate profitably. 

 15 For more information on the FTC’s four public challenges, see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2013/04/ftc-announces-robocall-challenge-winners (describing the first FTC Robocall challenge); 

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/zapping-rachel (describing the Zapping Rachel challenge); 

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/detectarobo (describing the Detectarobo challenge); 

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/robocalls-humanity-strikes-back (describing the Robocalls: Humanity 

Strikes Back challenge).

16 See https://www.nomorobo.com (last visited June 7, 2017) and ROBOCALL STRIKE FORCE, ROBOCALL STRIKE 

FORCE REPORT, at 17-18 (April 28, 2017), available at https://www.fcc.gov/file/12311/download. 

17 See also Comments of Matt Stein at FTC Robocall Summit (Oct. 18, 2012), Tr. at 218-227, available at

www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/robocalls-all-rage-ftcsummit/robocallsummittranscript.pdf.

18 See 15 U.S.C. 6102(a)(3) (directing the Federal Trade Commission to include in the Telemarketing Sales Rule 

provisions prohibiting telemarketers from “undertaking a pattern of unsolicited telephone calls which the reasonable 

consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such consumer’s right to privacy”).

19 Consumers have registered more than 226 million telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry and 

expressed their affirmative choice to stop unsolicited telemarketing calls—consumer demand for a stop to these calls 

is high. See National Do Not Call Registry Data Book FY 2016 at 3 (Dec. 2016), available at 

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-fiscal-year2016/dnc_data_book_fy_2016_post.pdf.
5

II. DEFINING ILLEGAL CALL

As a threshold matter, the FCC seeks comment on how to define the term “illegal 

robocall” for purposes of the NPRM.20 The FCC’s tentative proposal is to adopt the definition 

recommended by the Strike Force: “an ‘illegal robocall’ is one that violates the requirements of 

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, the related FCC regulations implementing the 

Act, or the Telemarketing Sales Rule, as well as any call made for the purpose of defrauding a 

consumer, prohibited under a variety of federal and state laws and regulations, including the 

federal Truth in Caller ID Act.”21 The FTC supports the proposed definition. 

The FCC may also wish to consider broadening the term “illegal robocall” to “illegal 

call.” As the definition conveys, the problematic calls here are not limited to just robocalls, but 

also abusive, fraudulent, or unlawful calls that are “live.” As noted above, while the majority (60 

percent) of Do-Not-Call complaints the FTC receives each month are about robocalls, “live” 

calls still generate hundreds of thousands of complaints each month—provider-based blocking 

would not be complete without the ability to block illegal “live” calls that target numbers

registered on the Do-Not-Call Registry. Further, one of the largest categories of Do-Not-Call 

complaints that the FTC receives are impostor calls. In approximately one-third of those 

complaints,

22 consumers have indicated the call was not a robocall. Expanding the defined term 

to include all illegal calls would allow providers to block campaigns of “live” calls that are 

determined to be unlawful.23 

III. NPRM BLOCKING PROVISIONS

A. Blocking at the Request of the Subscriber to the Originating Number

The FTC supports the FCC’s proposal to codify the Public Notice issued by the FCC’s 

Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau on September 30, 2016 that authorized voice 

service providers to block calls using a spoofed Caller ID number if requested by the subscriber 

to that number.24 The FTC concurs that, where the subscriber to the originating number did not 

consent to their number being spoofed to make outgoing calls, there is a high likelihood both that 

the call is made with the intent to defraud and that no reasonable consumer would want to 

 20 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 13. 

21 Id. 

22 On September 28 2016, the FTC updated its Do-Not-Call complaint intake process to provide a drop-down list of 

possible call categories for consumers to choose from and provided the category “calls pretending to be government, 

business, or family or friends” to capture impostor calls. 

23 In addition, the NPRM questions whether the proposed definition of “illegal robocall” might be too narrow and 

precludes providers from blocking calls that are not lawful because they are prohibited by an anti-stalking law or a 

court order. NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 13. Calls that violate an anti-stalking law or court order would likely be 

covered by the proposed definition because they would be “prohibited under a variety of federal and state laws and 

regulations,” but such calls are also likely to be “live” calls, not just robocalls. 

24 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 14.
6

receive such a call. FTC staff worked with a major provider and federal law enforcement 

partners to help block IRS scam calls that were spoofing well-known IRS telephone numbers. 

The widespread adoption of that practice through the Strike Force’s Do Not Originate trial saw 

nearly a complete cessation of attempts to use the blocked IRS telephone numbers by the 

scammers. Allowing blocking at the request of the subscriber can be particularly useful for 

inbound only numbers such as the IRS telephone numbers that were being spoofed.

The FTC has also received requests for guidance from businesses whose telephone 

numbers have been spoofed and has received Do-Not-Call complaints from consumers whose 

telephone numbers are being spoofed and used in a scam, leading to multiple return calls from 

the individuals targeted by the scam. Short-term blocking of calls made from the spoofed phone 

numbers could provide relief to businesses and individuals who are affected. This type of 

blocking would be most effective and have the least amount of negative impact on consumers, if 

providers could isolate and block calls spoofing a subscriber’s Caller ID, while allowing the 

subscriber’s legitimate calls to go through. Analysis of whether the spoofed calls originate from 

a different provider or take a distinct path across the network would be helpful. The FTC 

encourages providers to communicate to their subscribers that they can request this type of 

blocking if their telephone number is being spoofed and establish a process to verify and grant

such requests.25 

The FCC also seeks comment on issues related to information sharing by providers to 

best effectuate subscriber requests to block their numbers, particularly what measures, if any, the 

FCC should consider to facilitate providers’ sharing such requests with other providers.

26 The 

FTC concurs that information sharing by providers at the subscriber’s request appears to be 

consistent with the FCC’s Customer Proprietary Network Information (“CPNI”) rules. In 

addition, when a subscriber requests that a provider block the subscriber’s number because of 

unlawful spoofing, the subscriber is almost certainly seeking to have the number blocked by as 

many providers as possible. Accordingly, the FTC supports providers’ interpreting a request 

from a subscriber to block outbound calls from the subscriber’s number as a request for the 

provider to share information, consistent with the CPNI rules, with other providers for 

widespread blocking. 

B. Blocking Invalid, Unallocated or Unassigned Numbers

In response to a request from the Strike Force for the FCC to clarify that provider-based

blocking is permissible where the call purports to originate from a number that the provider 

knows to be unassigned, the NPRM proposes three categories of unassigned numbers that 

providers are authorized to block.27 Those categories are: 1) numbers that are invalid under the 

North American Numbering Plan (NANP), including numbers with unassigned area codes; 2) 

 25 The FTC would work to provide consumer guidance to ensure that consumers are aware of the blocking options 

and related assistance available to them from their providers.

26 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 15. 

27 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 16.
7

numbers that have not been allocated by the North American Numbering Plan Administrator 

(NANPA) or the National Number Pool Administrator (PA) to any provider; and 3) numbers that 

the NANPA or PA has allocated to a provider, but the provider has not currently assigned to a 

subscriber (collectively “unassigned” numbers).

28 The FTC supports the NPRM’s proposal to 

authorize provider-based blocking of all three “unassigned” categories—use of these numbers is 

a strong indication that the calling party is spoofing the Caller ID to make an unlawful call as 

part of an effort to defraud a consumer. 

The FTC further supports providers’ sharing information about these “unassigned”

numbers to facilitate call blocking. In response to the FCC’s question regarding whether it 

should mandate that providers share information about “unassigned” numbers to facilitate 

appropriate call blocking,

29 the FTC urges the FCC to consider methods to encourage maximum 

provider-participation in such sharing. 

The FCC also seeks comment on whether end-user consumer consent is necessary for 

provider-based blocking of unassigned numbers.30 The FTC supports the FCC’s proposal not to 

require providers to obtain an opt-in from consumers to block these categories of calls and agrees

it is highly unlikely that consumers would want to receive calls purporting to be from unassigned 

or invalid numbers. 

While the FTC strongly supports expansion of provider-based blocking, we are also 

mindful of minimizing any possible collateral effects to consumers from these efforts. As the 

NPRM notes, Caller ID spoofing of unassigned numbers is often done to make illegal—and in 

many instances fraudulent—calls. Blocking these numbers may drive up the costs incurred by 

callers using unassigned numbers to make illegal calls and reduce the ease with which they can 

spoof Caller IDs. Experience tells us, however, that the fraudsters and telemarketers who make 

illegal calls are likely to regroup and devise another tactic to call consumers. Increased blocking 

of unassigned numbers could result in increased spoofing of valid telephone numbers. When a 

scammer spoofs a legitimate telephone number, the consumer or business which subscribes to 

that number can be bombarded by return calls and complaints. Providers must be ready to assist 

individuals and businesses whose telephone numbers may be unlawfully spoofed by providing 

clear guidance regarding what to do if this happens and prompt action to resolve the issue. 

Examples of actions providers could take include temporarily blocking calls purporting to 

originate from the subscriber’s number or blocking calls that appear to originate from the 

subscriber’s number that do not originate from the subscriber’s carrier. 

 28 The NPRM would enable providers to block calls purporting to originate from these “unassigned” categories 

based on the number’s “unassigned” status and would not require a request from a subscriber. 

29 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 22. 

30 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 25. 
8

IV. NOTICE OF INQUIRY QUESTIONS REGARDING “PRESUMPTIVELY 

ILLEGAL” CALLS

In the NOI, the FCC indicates a willingness to authorize provider-based blocking of 

illegal calls on a wider basis than the categories outlined in the NPRM and calls for the 

development of “objective standards that would indicate to a high degree of certainty that a call 

is illegal.”31 The NOI pointed to the NPRM categories of unassigned numbers as an example of 

the type of objective standards the FCC is seeking for determining a reasonably high degree of 

certainty that a call is illegal.32 The NOI also seeks comment on whether to adopt a safe harbor 

to give providers certainty that they will not be found in violation of the call completion and 

other FCC rules when they engage in provider-based blocking.33 

A. Effective Call-Blocking Requires Flexibility

The FTC urges the FCC to allow for flexibility in developing standards to guide providerbased blocking of “presumptively illegal” calls. Determining whether a call is likely illegal is a 

dynamic process that can require analyzing multiple sets of available data, making reasonable 

judgments based on current and past data, adjusting analysis to stay ahead of illegal call tactics,

and continual development of new techniques to detect illegal calls.34 This dynamic process

necessitates giving providers a measure of flexibility, which can be difficult to capture through a 

fixed set of objective standards. In addition, and as the NOI acknowledges in its discussions 

regarding possible safe harbor provisions, the standards should not serve as a roadmap for the 

makers of illegal calls to circumvent provider call blocking. 

Accordingly, the FTC encourages the FCC to consider developing flexible standards 

incorporating the requisite level of due diligence it expects the providers to engage in before 

blocking a call, rather than a set of rigid standards. For example, the FCC could require that to 

be eligible for any safe harbor for blocking presumptively illegal calls, providers must develop 

an internal protocol that relies on multiple data points for flagging a presumptively illegal call, is 

managed by a dedicated team, and includes an effective mechanism to address inadvertent 

blocking of legitimate callers. 

 31 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 27-28. 

32 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 28.

33 Id.

34 The Strike Force presented examples of efforts that providers undertake as part of this dynamic process to 

determine if a call is illegal, including: “soliciting and reviewing information from other carriers, performing 

historical and real time call analytics, making test calls, contacting the subscriber of the spoofed number, inspecting 

the media for a call (audio play back of the Real Time Protocol stream to understand the context of the call), and 

checking customer complaint sites.” STRIKE FORCE REPORT I, supra note 1, at 40.
9

B. Determining Legality of Telemarketing Robocalls

In seeking input on standards for provider-based blocking, the NOI seeks comment on 

whether some methods more accurately identify illegal calls than other methods.35 One category 

of illegal calls—telemarketing robocalls—can be identified with a relatively high degree of 

certainty. Under the Telemarketing Sales Rule, telemarketing robocalls are illegal unless the 

company has the consumer’s express written consent to receive robocalls from that specific

caller.36 Because the overwhelming majority of consumers do not knowingly consent to receive 

robocalls, legitimate telemarketing operations cannot use robocalls on a widespread basis 

without violating the law.37 Any of the methods used to determine if a call is part of a largescale robocall campaign, combined with verification from consumer complaint data that the 

subject of the calls is telemarketing sales, can be used to identify illegal telemarketing robocalls 

with a high degree of certainty. 

C. Protections for Legitimate Callers

The NOI seeks comment on ensuring protections for legitimate callers whose calls are 

inadvertently blocked through enhanced provider-based call blocking. The FTC supports 

requiring providers to develop clear and specific procedures to address complaints from

individuals and businesses whose calls are inadvertently blocked. The FTC, however, urges the 

FCC to be cautious in establishing a mechanism, such as a white list, to address concerns set 

forth in the NOI such as “high-volume callers that properly obtain prior express consent [who]

might run afoul of call-per-minute restrictions even though all calls made are legal.”38 As 

explained above, from FTC staff’s experience, there are very few telemarketing sales robocall 

campaigns in which the caller has obtained prior express written consent and white lists for 

telemarketers making sales calls or lead generation calls would require providers to assess the 

consent the caller purportedly obtained from the call recipient. Cross-referencing the subject 

matter of the calls described in consumer complaints should help providers to avoid blocking 

robocalls that do not violate the TSR, such as political calls, survey calls, pure informational 

calls, charitable donation calls to current and past donors, and business-to-business calls.39

 35 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 30. 

36 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v). 

37 Both the TSR and the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991

(“TCPA”) prohibit telemarketing robocalls to residential or wireless lines, unless the caller has the express prior 

written consent of the call recipient. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(a)(1)-(3). The TCPA also 

requires consent for calls that fall outside the scope of the TSR’s robocall provisions, such as all charitable calls to 

wireless numbers and all non-sales robocalls to wireless lines. Compare 16 C.F.R. § 310 with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.

38 NPRM, supra note 4, at ¶ 37. 

39 As noted above, calls that do not violate the TSR may still violate the TCPA. 
10

CONCLUSION

The FTC supports the FCC’s efforts to facilitate an expansion of provider-based call 

blocking to curb illegal telemarketing. The suggestions provided in this comment are intended to 

assist with this facilitation, while being mindful of the potential consequences that might arise 

from increased call blocking. The FTC stands ready to provide further information and 

assistance as needed.
ATTACHMENT A
CY 2015 and CY 2016 DNC & Robocall Complaints: By Month

Calendar Year 2015

Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec

Number of DNC 

Registry 

Complaints 282,833 285,063 339,126 341,163 301,065 300,195 322,865 316,044 315,073 312,017 297,305 292,337

Number of DNC 

Prerecorded 

Calls 

Complaints 169,592 170,046 203,169 206,054 177,082 174,890 194,336 187,173 188,320 188,748 167,258 176,533

Percentage of 

DNC 

Prerecorded 

Calls 

Complaints 60% 60% 60% 60% 59% 58% 60% 59% 60% 60% 60% 60%

Calendar Year 2016

Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec

Number of DNC 

Registry 

Complaints 374,507 439,500 486,410 464,708 511,017 514,725 484,584 623,464 557,660 368,586 341,351 343,969

Number of DNC 

Prerecorded 

Calls 

Complaints 234,641 276,042 311,415 295,422 325,943 329,598 313,153 416,914 365,947 218,897 196,978 203,863

Percentage of 

DNC 

Prerecorded 

Calls 

Complaints 63% 63% 64% 64% 64% 64% 65% 67% 66% 59% 58% 59%
CY 2015 and CY 2016 DNC & Robocall Complaints: Totals and Monthly Average

CY-2015 CY-2016

Total # of DNC Complaints 3,687,080 5,510,481

Total # of Pre Recorded Call 

Complaints 2,203,198 3,488,813

Average # of DNC Complaints per 

month 307,257 459,207

Average # of Pre Recorded Call 

Complaints per month 183,600 290,734