## APHIS Evaluation of the Classical Swine Fever
Status of Switzerland and Liechtenstein

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Veterinary Services

August 20092 A cronyms

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

BI P Border Inspection Post

BVET Swiss Federal Veterinary Office

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CSF Classical Swine Fever

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer

EC European Comm ission

EU European Union

FDEA Federal Department of Economic Affa irs

FFCU Federal Food Chain Unit

FMD Foot and Mouth Disease

FOEN Federal Office for the Environment

FVO Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission

IVI Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis

OFVA Office of Food and Veterina ry Affairs

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

SVD Swine Vesicular Disease

SVS Swiss Veterinary Service

Abbreviations

Agricultural Agreement: Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural pro ducts

. Additional Agreement : Additional Agreement between the European Communit y, the Swiss Confederation, and the Principality of Liechtenstein extending to the Principality of Liechtenstein the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss
Confe deration on trade in agricultural products

. APHIS

- defined EU CSF regio n: The EU Member States of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Repub lic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland).3 Table of Contents

Executive summary

................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 4

Hazard identification

................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 6

Release Assessment

................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 7

1. Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the vet erinary services

................... 7
2. Disease status in the region

................................ ................................ ................... 15
3. Disease status of adjacent regions

................................ ................................ ......... 16
4. Extent of an active disease control program

................................ ......................... 17
5. Vaccination status of the region

................................ ................................ ............ 17
6. Separ ation from adjacent regions of higher risk

................................ ................... 17
7. Movement control and biosecurity from higher risk regions

................................ 18
8. Livestock demog raphics and marketing

................................ ............................... 25
9. Disease surveillance

................................ ................................ .............................. 29
10. Diagnostic laboratory capability

................................ ................................ ........... 31
11. Emergency response capacity

................................ ................................ ............... 33
12. Discussion of identified risk factors

................................ ................................ ..... 38

Risk estimate

................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 45

Annexes

................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 47

Annex 1: 2009 Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations , sections 94.24, 94.25, 98.38.

... 47 Annex 2: Waste feeding in Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

................................ ......... 51 Annex 3: Switzerland import and export data 2003

- 2008.

................................ ........... 56

References

................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 574 Executive summary In November 2006, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of the Swiss Confederation ( Switzerland ) requested that the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
evaluate the classical swine fever (CSF) status of Switzerland and the Principality of
Liechtenstein. Specifically, the Swiss would like to be able to export pork and pork products to the United States, for which both Switzerland and Liechtenstein m ust be
consider ed low risk or free of CSF a nd free of other highly contagious swine diseases.

Switzerland and Liechtenstein formed a common veterinary area with an integrated veterinary system

— the Swiss Veterinary Services (SVS)

— in 1924. Switzerland is comprised of 20 c antons and 6 half

- cantons ; Liechtenstein has the same legal position
with the SVS as a Swiss canton. In June 2002, Switzerland and Liechtenstein entered into an agreement with the European Union (EU) whereby they gradually adopted the EU’s
harmonized impor t and trade regulations for live animals and animal products. O n 1 January 2009, all border veterinary controls between Switzerland/Liechtenstein and the
EU were abolished, so that t rade in live animals and animal products now occur s under
the same conditi ons as for intra

- community trade.

T his report assesses the CSF status of the common veterinary area formed by Switzerland
and Liechtenstein and the risk to the United States of opening trade in live swine and swine products, including fresh pork , pork prod ucts, and swine semen . Since a previous APHIS analysis concluded that EU control measures for CSF are effective, this

assessment focuses on the implementation of such measures in Switzerland and
Liechtenstein

— an approach that is consistent with APHIS evalu ations of the CSF status
of new EU Member States. Th e format follows World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines for risk assessment and includes a discussion of each of the 11 factors for regionalization described in title 9, Code of Federal Reg ulations , section 92.2 (9 CFR 92.2).

The hazard under consideration is the CSF virus. Th is assessment found no evidence that
CSF virus currently exists in Switzerland or Liechtenstein and demonstrated no immediate and significant risks associated with thi s hazard. The last CSF cases in
Switzerland occurred in 1993 in domestic swine and 1999 in wild boar , whereas Liechtenstein has never reported a CSF outbreak.

Nonetheless, the re is a potential for introduction of CSF virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein . This is primarily because Switzerland and Liechtenstein import substantial quantities of pork and pork products from Germany and France, including from areas that the European Commission (EC) has restricted due to CSF in wild boar . In addition, it is relatively easy for travelers to enter Switzerland with commodities for personal consumption derived from domestic swine or wild boar, from both restricted and non

restricted areas of EU Membe r States.

Switzerland and Liechtenstein are situated in the middle of a region that APHIS has recognized as low risk for CSF , namely the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region. APHIS regards the EU Member States in this region as having the same low level of risk du e to harmonized EC legislation

, free trade on the internal common market , and CSF in segments of the wild boar population

. The APHIS

- defined EU CSF region is subject to the import conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.24 for breeding swine, pork, and pork5 produ cts, and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen. These regulations specifically prohibit sourcing of live swine, pork, pork products, and swine semen for export to the United
States from areas of the EU that are restricted due to CSF in wild boar or domestic swine.
T he se regulations also prohibit commingling of commodities for export with
commodities from the restricted areas.

Similar risk concerns

— namely sourcing and commingling of live swine and swine products

— now apply to Switzerland and Liechtenstein as well. U nli ke some EU Member
States comprising the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region, however, the risk of CSF introduction into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein through natural movements of wild boar, importation or transit of live swine, or vehicular or human traffic is negligible at this time . The risk of CSF introduction via commodities for personal consumption is
similar to that of the surrounding EU Member States

. In summary , the risk profile of the common veterinary area formed by Switzerland and
Liechtenstein is sim ilar to that of the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region , although some
differences exist . Applying the provisions of 9 CSF 94.24 and 98.38 to Switzerland and
Liechtenstein would address the risk issues identified in the release assessment and result
in a level of risk that is equivalent to, or less than, that portion of the EU that is currently authorized to export breeding swine, swine semen, and pork and pork products to the
United States.6 Hazard identification The hazard under consideration in this analysis is the CSF virus. CSF, also known as hog cholera, is a contagious and economically damaging viral disease of domestic swine and wild boar with worldwide distribution. It is caused by the CSF virus of the family Flaviviridae, genus Pestivirus [1]

. The CSF virus is quite hardy, being stable between pH
4 and 10 [2] and also stable at low temperatures [3] . The virus would likely remain viable even after carcass maturation, and is unlikely to be destroyed by transport or cold storage. Laboratory confirmation of infection, essential during an outbreak situation, is complicated by the close antigenic relationship o f the CSF virus with bovine viral
diarrhea virus (BVDV) and border disease virus (BVD) [1]

. The incubation period f or CSF is 2

- 14 days [4] . The virus multiplies in the epithelial crypts of the tonsils and may be carried to local lymph nodes and into the bloodstream for distribution throughout the bod y [5] . Blood and all tissues, secretions and excretions of
sick and dead animals are sources of virus [4] . CSF virus has been recovered from muscle and lymph nodes of infected pigs, and high titers of virus have been isolated from bone

marrow [6] . The disease may also be introduced or spread via infected semen [7]

. CSF can spread in epidemic form as well as establish en demic infections in domestic swine and wild boar populations. Infection generally spreads directly from pig to pig, but products including fresh, frozen, or cured pork can remain infectious to other pigs via the
oral route [8] . Imported pig products are frequently implicated in the introduction of CSF virus into previously disease

- free regions, primarily through the practice of swi ll feeding [9] . Researchers have demonstrated that the oral infectious dose of CSF virus is very low [10] . Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild animals, and inanimate objects such as live

- haul trucks [11]

. The role of wild boar as a virus reservoi r and possible source of infection for domestic swine is well known and epidemiological links between CSF infection in wild boar and domestic swine have been reported repeatedly in recent years [12, 13] . In countries that are free of CSF in domestic swine, epidemics in wild boar are usually started by feeding
of contaminated human food waste [14] . Abnormal mortality and sometimes obviously sick animals are the first indicators of CSF introduction into a wild boar population [1 4]

. Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described, including acute, chronic, congenital, and mild manifestations [15, 16] . The acute form involves a disease progression of 2

- 4 weeks and is characterized by high fever, generalized illness, hemorrhagic lesions, immunosuppression with secondary in fections, and high mortality. The chronic form may last 30

- 90 days before death and usually involves older swine or congenitally infected piglets. Congenitally infected piglets m ay develop symptoms of
chronic CSF within 3

- 6 months, or may never develop symptoms but continuously shed
the virus. Mild CSF is typically seen only in sows and may result from exposure to a low virulent strain. Infected sows may show no overt clinical sig ns but continuously shed virus to their young and to other swine they contact.7 Release Assessment
This release assessment focuses on the CSF status of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, as well as pathways for CSF introduction with the potential to impact th e assessed status of this region. It is organized according to the 11 factors described in 9 CFR 92.2 that APHIS uses to evaluate foreign regions for animal disease status. Risk factors or issues of
concern that directly or indirectly affect the risk estim ate are identified under each factor and discussed at greater length in Section 12.

1. Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services

1.1 Organization of the official veterinary services

1.1.1 Background

The Swiss Confederation wa s founded in 1921 as a defensive alliance among 3 cantons

, with other cantons subsequently joining the alliance [17

- 19] . Switzerland currently
consists of 20 cantons and 6 half

- cantons ( see Figure 1.1 )

. The Swiss constitution of 1848

creat ed a central government with limited powers : the cantons and half

- cantons assigned part of their sovereignty to the confederation but each retained their own constitution, parliament, government, and courts

. Figure 1.1 : Map of Switzerland showing canton s8 The Principality of Liechtenstein is a hereditary constitutional monarchy based on a democratic and parliamentary system [20] . Liechtenstein entered into a customs union treaty with Switzerland in 1924 that provided the basis for an integrated veterinary system , the SVS [17

- 19] . The two countries form a common veterinary area, with Liechtenstein having the same legal position as a canton.

On 1 June 2002, Switzerland entered into the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural products ( Agricultural Agreement ) [21] . Annex 11 of the Agricultural Agreement (the Veterinary Annex ) addresses animal health and sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and animal products between Switzerland and the EU [21] . The Agricultural Agreement was formally extended to Liechtenstein in October 2007 as the Addition al Agreement between the European Community, the Swiss Confederation, and the Principality of Liechtenstein extending to the Principality of Liechtenstein the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural pro ducts (Additional Agreement) [22]

. 1.1.2 Central competent authority

The Swiss Federal Veterinary Office (Bundesamt für Veterinärwesen; BVET ) , located in Bern, is the central competent authority for the SVS [18

- 20]

. The BVET is part of the Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA) ( see Figure 1.2 ). The BVET Director is the
CVO of Switzerland; Liechtenstein has retained its own CVO

— who reports to the Swiss
CVO

— and representative to the OIE.

Figure 1.2 : Organization of the Swiss Federal Veterinary Office (BVET)

Federal Department of

Economic Affairs

Federal Veterinary Office Institute of Virology and

Immunoprophylaxis

Controlling Federal Office of Agriculture Federal Food Chain Unit

Implementation Support International

Affairs Internal Services Communications Monitoring Legal Affairs

Research Management Zoonoses and

Diagnostics Animal Health

Risk Assessment, Animal Diseases, Foreign Substances Food Hygiene Cantonal
Coordination Animal Welfare

The BVET provides oversight for animal health, animal welfare, and food safety programs within Switzerland and Liechtenstein, regulates the conditions for importation of animals and food, and provides border con trols for such imports. The BVET also supports, coordinates, and supervises enforcement efforts at the cantonal level. The cantons are responsible for enforcing federal and cantonal animal health, animal welfare, and food safety regulations within cantonal boundaries.9 1.1.3 Local veterinary units

There are 23 cantonal veterinary offices in the SVS, including the Office of Food Inspection and Veterinary Affairs (OFVA) in Liechtenstein [18, 19]

. Each cantonal veterinary service consists of a chief cantonal veterinar ian , other full

- time and part

- time
cantonal veterinar ians , and administrative assistants. The cantonal veterinary services vary considerably in size, number of personnel, and organizational structure [20]

. Depending on the canton, the veterinary services may be organized under either the Office of Agriculture or Office of Public Health. A t a minimum, each cantonal veterinary
office has divisions for anima l health, animal welfa re, and food safety. Some cantons have district offices staffed by cantonal veterinarians, while others do not.

All cantonal veterinarians and some private veterinarians receive BVET training to
become offic ial veterinarians, which in cludes training in both meat inspection and animal
health controls ( see Section 1.3.2) [18

- 20]

. Cantonal veterinarians are therefore all official veterinarians, whereas not all official veterinarian s are cantonal veterinarians (some work primarily in private practice )

. The cantonal veterinary services contract with private veterinarians who have passed the official training to perform certain official tasks, such as animal health controls or meat ins pection

. Such veterinarians must be employed at least 30 percent time by the cantonal veterinary services and are subject to
cantonal measures that limit conflicts of interest [23]

. The cantonal veterinary services are responsible for enforcement and control of animal identification, movemen t, welfare, and health standards, as well as veterinary drug use [20, 24]

. Official veterinarians conduct antemortem inspections at slaughter plants and

— along with some non

- veterinary technicians

— are responsible for meat inspection. Cutting plants are controlled by either official veterinarians, food inspectors from the public health sector, or both, depending on the cantonal organization. Processing plants, packing plant s, and export establishments are controlled by food inspectors.

1.1.4 Administrative unit (AU)

A PHIS defines an AU a s the smallest administrative jurisdiction that has effective oversight of normal animal movements into, out of, and within that jurisdicti on, and that, in association with national authorities, if necessary, has effective control over animal movements and animal diseases locally [25]

. An AU is the smallest unit to which APHIS can effectively regionalize for animal disease status under its current regulations.

The AU for Switzerland is the area covered by a cantonal veterinary office . S ince the
OFV A is responsible for veterinary controls throughout the entirety of Liechtenstein, APHIS cannot recognize any smaller AU within that country.

1.1.5 Border veterinary inspection

The border veterinary inspection service, which reports directl y to the BVET , is responsible for veterinary control of imported live animals, animal products, a nd food of animal origin [18, 20]

. As a function of the Agricultural Agreement and the Additional Agreement, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have gradually adopted import and trade

reg ulations equivalent to those of the EC with regard to live animals and animal products [21, 22] . B order inspection posts (BIPs) at the Zürich and Geneva airports are EC

approved for border veterinary controls on packed products for human consumption,10 products not intended for human consumption

, and small animals (including zoo animals) ; Liechtenstein has no approved BIPs [20, 26]

. Neither of the Swiss BIPs is approved to accept imported swine or other large animals [26]

. Border security and import controls are described in more detail in Section 7.

1.1.6 Diagnostic laboratories

The Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis (IVI) in Mittelhäusern is the S VS reference laboratory for CSF [18, 19]

. The IVI is attached directly to the BVET ( see Figure 1.1)

. Switzerland has a network of animal disease diagnostic laboratories but no other laboratories or pharmaceutical companies work with CSF virus [20]

. The diagnostic laboratory system is discussed in more detail in Section 10.

1.2 Legal authority for animal health activities

1.2.1 Legal framework

Federal authorities issue l egislation pertaining to animal health and public health which applies directly to the cantons and Liechtenstein [18, 20]

. The primary legal act governing the animal health activiti es of the SVS is the Law of 1 July 1966 on epizootic
diseases (A nimal Health Law ) [27] . The BVET issues f ederal animal health regulations,
called o rdinances , based on the Animal Health Law [24]

. All Swiss legislation is reproduced in German, French, and Italian, which are official language s of Switzerland (along with Romansch) ; German is the official language of Liechtenstein.

The cantonal veterinary se rvices are responsible for implementing BVET o rdinances [24] . T he cantons and Liechtenstein may issue more specific legislation as long as it is
not less strict than t he f ederal ordinances. BVET o rdinances are transposed into Liechtenstein law via an official j ournal that is published twice annually. If necessary, the Liechtenstein government can issue their own o rdinance prepared by the OFVA under the Animal Disease Police Law of 1966 [20]

. On 1 June 2002, Switzerland entered into the Agricultural Agreement with the EC [21]

. By virtue of the Customs Union Tr eaty of 1924, the market access granted by Switzerland applied to Liechtenstein as well. Market access in both directions was
confirmed in October 2007 via the Additional Agreement , which further inte grated
Liechtenstein into the EC trade control and disea se notification systems and gave Liechtenstein a seat on the oversight committees for the Agricultural Agreement (the Joint Committee on Agriculture) and the Veterinary Annex (the Joint Veterinary Council) [22] . The latter meets annually and issues decisions to updat e the Veterinary Annex as

necessary [26, 28

- 31] . All provisions of th e Agricultural Agreement, including any modifications, apply to Liechtenstein.

Implementation of t he Agricultural Agreement necessitated considerable changes to Switzerland’s animal health legislation to ensure that Swiss requirements were consistent
with those of the EC and produced the same results. The primary article of EC legislation concerning CSF is Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever [32]

. Switzer land implemented this
Directive through the Animal Health Law , the Ordinance of 27 June 1995 on epizootic
diseases ( Animal Health Ordinance )

— which provides specific guidance on reporting and11 control of highly contagious animal diseases

— and two other ordina nces ( s ee Table 1.1) [21, 22]

. Table 1.1: Correspondence of legislation on CSF control

EC legislation Swiss legislation

**•** Council Directive 2001/89/EC of

23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine feve r (as amended). **•** Law of 1 July 1966 on epizootic diseases (as amended), and in particular Articles 1, 1a, and 9a (measures against highly contagious epizootic diseases, control objectives) and 57 (technical implementing provisions, international cooperatio n) thereof;

**•** Ordinance of 27 June 1995 on epizootic diseases (as

amended), and in particular Articles 3 (highly contagious epizootic diseases), 40 to 47 (disposal and use of waste), 49 (handling micro

- organisms that are pathogenic for animals), 73 and 74 (c leaning and disinfection), 77 to 98 (common provisions concerning highly contagious epizootic diseases), and 166 to 121 (detection of swine fever at slaughter, specific measure to combat swine fever) thereof;

**•** Ordinance of 14 June 1999 on the organization o f the

Department of Economic Affairs (as amended), and in particular Article 8 (reference laboratory) thereof; and

**•** Ordinance of 23 June 1999 on the elimination of animal waste

(as amended).

Th e EC does not actively inform Switzerland of changes in animal health legislation ; however, BVET officials attend the meetings of the EC’s Standing Committee on the
Food Chain and Animal Health and so are familiar with most issues that result in new legislation [20] . The International Affairs division of the BVET watches for new EC legislation concerning animal health and organizes the transposition into Swiss legislation . EC Decisions are no t directly applicable to Switzerland as they are for EU Member States but transposition can occur in as little as a few hours.

Correspondence tables for existing EC and Swiss legislation concer ning import, export,
and intra

- c ommunity trade of live swine, swine semen, and swine products and by

products are provided in the Veterinary Annex of the Agricultural Agreement [21] and the provisions discussed in the pertinent sections of this analysis. When animal or human health is at risk, the BVET has the legislative power to immed iately issue new legislation
as needed [ 19]

. 1.2.3 Waste feeding

Switzerland currently allows f eeding of heat

- treated catering waste to pig s in accordance
with specific provisions laid out in the Animal Health Ordinance ; other waste feeding is prohibited [24]

. Premises that heat

- treat and feed cater ing waste must be approved by the cantonal veterinary authorities and must be inspected annually by an official veterinarian [20 ]

. BVET officials indicated that there were about 200 such premises in 2009

— equ ating to about 6 percent of Swiss pigs

— and that the number is declining ; the BVET plans to prohibit feeding of heat

- treated catering waste by July 2011. No swine holdings
in Li echtenstein are approved to feed heat

- treated catering waste

.12 A brief assessment of the risk of infecting pigs in Switzerland or Liechtenstein with CSF virus through legal or illegal waste feeding i s attached as Annex 2

. Th is assessment conclude s that str ict veterinary oversight, along with severe penalties for noncompliance and high producer awareness, substantially limit the likelihood of CSF transmission through catering waste feeding

. In addition, a ll forms of waste feeding are prohibited on
certified organic farms

— w hich constitute approximately 20 percent of Swiss pig farms

— and also on farms that produce according to label standards ( see Section 8.2)

. Noncompliance can lead to loss of organic status or label premiums , which results in
considerable econ omic disincentive to illegally feed waste food to swine.

The attached assessment also note s that feeding of heat

- treated catering waste is highly regulated and that Swiss swine producers and veterinary officials demonstrated a high
level of awareness of wa ste feeding regulations

. The cantonal veterinary authorities must inspect and approve premises that heat

- treat and feed catering waste annually

. Similarly, cantonal public health officials must approve r estaurants to send waste food to a heat

treatment fac ility ; all such waste must originate in Switzerland (no international food waste). Heat

- treatment at boiling temperature for 20 minutes must be electronically
recorded and the record s kept for at least 3 years.

1.3 Infrastructure of the official veterinary services

1.3.1 Physical infrastructure

The BVET is located in a newly renovated building, with all staff in one place [19] . The
cantonal veterinary office facilitie s appeared clean, well

- maintained, and sufficient for performance of their functions [20]

. Some cant onal offices share facilities with a cantonal laboratory or other entity and s ome of the half

- cantons have combined resources to form a single cantonal veterinary office. 1

1 The Appenzell

- Ausserrhoden (AR) and Appenzell

- Innerrhoden (AI) half

- cantons share one office, as do
the half

- cantons of Nidwalden (NW) , Obwalden (OW), Schwyz (SZ), and Uri (UR). All components of the SVS are electronically linked via email and the internet and also share several integrated data management systems [20]

. Databases include ISVET, a veterinary data information system; TVD, an animal movement data system; FLEKO, a meat control data system; and ANIS, an animal identification database. The BVET also maintains a password

- protected extranet that serves as a digital communication platform
and information source for official veter inarians.

1.3.2 Personnel resources

In 2007 Switzerland had approximately 2,550 veterinarians

, including 145 governmental veterinarians (75 at the federal level), 1,580 private veterinar ians , and 12 5 veterinarians working in industry or laboratories [19]

. Liechtenstein had 2 veterinarians at the OFVA and 3 private veterinarians who served livestock producers [20]

. The BVET had about 65
full

- or part

- time support staff, while the cantonal veterinary offices collectively had approximately 150 support staff [18]

. The SVS employed 650 private veterinarians part

time as official veterinarians, for meat inspection and animal health co ntrol. A bout 50

non

- veterinary meat inspectors worked in export establishments and 250

- 300 in domesti c meat establishments

.13 Training and continuing education

Veterinary schools in Zürich and Bern together form the Vets uisse Veterinary Facility; training is 5 years to obtain a veterinary degree [19] . The BVET strongly promotes continuing education for its staff and the cantonal veterinary ser vices . Each BVET scientific staff member receives an average of 6

- 8 days of continuing education per year.
The BVET organizes in

- house training in the form of monthly seminars on new legal and scientific developments and

, together with the IVI

, offers bi

- w eekly seminars on projects in progress, external projects, and journal clubs.

The Implementation Support and Monitoring divisions of the BVET organize annual courses and workshops for cantonal veterinary officials

— including a mandatory 2

- day training

— on a nimal health, measures against epizootic diseases, animal movement controls, animal welfare, meat hygiene, risk analysis, epidemiology, and other topics [19] . The cantonal veterinary services organize continuing education and training for their staff, for private veterinarians, and for producers

. Training of official veterinarians

To become an official veterinarian, an applicant must pass a BVET training course consisting of 200 h ou rs of lectures covering food safety and veterinary drugs (60 h ou rs), animal health (60 h ou rs), animal welfare (40 h ou rs), and international organizations and legal rights (40 h ou rs) [18

- 20] . Applicants also undergo 80 h ou rs of practical training
with an official veterinarian and take a comprehensive final exam consisting of 3 written exams, 1 oral exam, and practical exams on (1) inspection of carcasses at s laughter and meat inspection and (2) official veterinary controls. After April 2012, only veterinarian s who ha ve passed this course w ill be allowed to perform official duties.

Simulation exercises

Switzerland carries out one national or international high ly contagious disease simulation exercise every 2 years , most recently for avian influenza and FMD [20] . There are also 5

- 10 si mulation exercises at the cantonal level each year which may be real

- time exercise s or exercises at the field or administration level.

Public education

The BVET has taken action to in crease public awareness of CSF

— specifically disease recognition and kno wledge of reporting requirements

— in cluding articles in the BVET magazine

, pamphlets for producer and hunting associations

, information on the BVET webpage

, and other educational materials used by cantonal veterinary authorities [18]

. 1.3.3 Financial resources

The BVET and IVI budgets have remained fairly constant in recent years at 37.8 million
CHF (about 34 million US D) and 8.4 million CHF (about 7.55 million USD)

, respectively [18, 19] . The total allocation represent s approximately 0.08 percent of the national public sector budget. For comparison, a nimal production contributes about 1.08 percent of the Swiss gross domestic product annually. The canton al government s collectively designated approximately 2.5 million CHF (about 2.25 million USD) to the cantonal veterinary services in 2007 , which in turn applied approximately 65 percent, or
1.6 million CHF (about 1.44 million USD) , to the animal health sec tor.14 1.3.4 Strategic planning

The BVET has developed a multi

- annual national animal health control plan similar to those required for EU Member States under EC Regulation 882/2004 [18, 20, 33] . The plan lays out specific goals, strategies, and performance indicators, as well as the financial frame. The BVET establishes an operational plan each year based on the

s trategic plan; the operational plan includes the specific activities to be performed during the year by the different divisions of the BVET.

One goal of the BVET strategic plan is ISO 9001:2000 certification of the cantonal veterinary offices and parts of the BVET [18]

. Certification means that the office has established a management system, described all processes, a nd demonstrated that they operate according to these processes. S ome canton al veterinary office s are already
certified while others are working towards certification [20]

. The certifying agency is the Swiss Association for Quality and Management Systems, an independent organization.
Some cantonal offices are also ISO 17020 accredited.

1.3.5 Monitoring programs

The BVET is monitor ed on three levels: in

- house, departmental, and parliamentary [18]

. The Controlling Unit of the BVET performs an an nual in

- house impact assessment and

quar terly performance assessments. In addition, t he FDEA monitors the performance of
the BVET based on its mission and relevant current issues . Finally, the Swiss parliament reviews the outputs and impact of the BVET and approves the budget accordingly.

Federal checks on the cantonal level are implemented through the Federal Food Chain Unit (FFCU), a group composed of representatives of the FDEA , the Federal Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Department of Publi c Health [18, 20] . The FFCU was created to conform to EC Regulation 882/2004 [33] , which provides a global uniform concept for carrying out official controls to verify compliance. The FFCU has developed
a multi

- annual plan for carrying out controls at the cantonal level and presents a report each year to the EC [18]

. Official veterinarians are required to inspect 10 percent of the holdings in their area each year for compliance with anima l health, animal welfare, animal identification, and veterinary drug ordinances [20] . The specific holdings are chosen at the c antonal level based on an analysis of risk and the inspections are carried out using standard ized form s

. Penalties are decided at the cantonal level and range from movement restrictions and fines (up to 20,000 CHF or about 17,500 USD) to forced removal of animals and imprisonment (up to 6 months). Producer n oncompliance is reportedly low.

1.4 Discussion

The SVS is hierarchically organized with considerable autonomy at the cantonal level.
There a ppear s to be clear lines of communication, command

, and report ing between the
federal a nd cantonal veterinary services . Veterinary officials have a good working knowledge of pertinent EC and Swiss animal health legislation and regulatory procedures, processes, and responsibilities are well defined. Federal guidance a nd cantonal quality management practices

— including ISO certification and accreditation

— together promote consistency in the implementation of animal health policies and procedures.15 For trade and animal disease control purposes, Switzerland and Liechtenstei n comprise a common veterinary area with harmonized animal health legislation. Federal and cantonal veterinary officials have sufficient legal authority , personnel, and financial resources to effectively implement and enforce animal health measures

. Traini ng and qualification of official veterinarians are standardized and the cantons have taken steps to limit conflicts of interest for private veterinarians authorized to perform official duties. Systems are in place to monitor SVS performance at all levels, as well as producer compliance

. In implementing the Agricultural Agreement, Switzerland and Liechtenstein adopted controls consistent with those prescribed by EC legislation regarding animal health, abolished border veterinary controls, and facilitated fr ee trade in agricultural products on
the EU internal common market. The BVET has enacted legislation that is sufficiently similar to that of the EC to produce nearly identical end results. The Swiss regulatory and legal systems allow for rapid introduction or amendment of animal health measures, if

necessary. The BVET has an effective system to monitor for changes in EC animal health legislation that require changes in Swiss legislation.

Feeding of heat

- treated catering waste to pigs is strictly regulated and is scheduled to be phased out by July 2011. T he high degree of regulatory oversight, along with the potential for substantial fines , high producer awareness, and the desire to adhere to label or organic standards, substantially limit the likelihood of CSF transmission through catering waste feeding

.

2. Disease status in the region

2.1 CSF in domestic swine

Swiss authorities consider Switzerland and Liechtenstein free of CSF [18

- 20] . The
disease has never been reported in Liechtenstein and wa s last detected in Switzerland in domestic swine in 1993, after almost 20 years without an outbreak. Five cases were reported in 1993: three in the canton Bern and two in the canton Fribourg. An epidemiologic al investigation indicated that CSF was introduced via infected meat that
was in correctly heat

- treated before it was fed to swine

. All outbreaks were resolved by stamping out.

2.2 CSF in wild boar

Liechtenstein has never reported CSF in wild boar [20]

. A major CSF outbreak in
Switzerland in wild boar occurred in 1998

- 99 in the canton Ticino, which lies on the
southern border of Sw itzerland [18, 19] . An epidemiolog ical investigation suggested that
the disease was introduced via infected wild boar from a nearby Italian province , where an outbreak was ongoing [34]

. The Swiss outbreak was controlled via hunting management strategies [18

- 20]

. Officials implemented a risk zone and a surveillance zone

— hunting was prohibited in the risk
zone but continued in the surveillance zone for 1 month after the outbreak was detected. Hunting ta rgeted toward young animals resumed in both zones after 7 months. The outbreak did not spread to other cantons or to domestic pigs, and the last virus

- positive
wild boar was detected in March 1999 [1 8

- 20] . Three CSF surveys in wild boar were
conducted between 2001 and 2005 with negative results , as described in Section 9.16 2.3 Other swine diseases

Switzerland last reported SVD and FMD outbreaks in 1974 and 1980, respectively, and has never reported a n ASF outbreak [4, 19, 35] . APHIS considers Switzerland free of
thes e diseases. Liechtenstein has never reported an outbreak of CSF, SVD, or ASF; the
last FMD outbreak was in 1963

- 64 [20]

. BVET o fficials indicated that Switzerland and Liechtenstein are free of Aujeszky’s disease ( pseudorabies) , porcine brucellosis, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome , and transmissible porcine gastroenteritis

. 2.4 Discussion

Liechtenstein has never repor ted a CSF outbreak, whereas the last outbreaks in
Switzerland occurred over 15 years ago in domestic swine and 10 years ago in wild boar. Both time periods exceed OIE recommend ations for CSF freedom. The SVS controlled
the outbreaks in domestic swine and w ild boar through stamping out and hunting management strategies, respectively, as recommended by the EC and international animal
health entities.

3. Disease status of adjacent regions

3.1 Background

Switzerland and Liechtenstein share a common land border across the Rhine River and
the two are surrounded by EU Member States ( see Figure 1 .1 ). Switzerland also borders France, Germany, Austria, and Italy, whereas Liechtenstein borders only Austria.

Recent CSF outbreaks in domestic swine in the EU Member Sta tes around Switzerland
and Liechtenstein have been a ttributed to contact with infected wild boar [4, 35]

. Outbreaks occurred in Austria in March 1996 , in Italy (Sardinia) in 2003, in France in 2002, and in Germany in 2006. In addition, CSF virus was detected in wild boar in Austria in 2001 and France in 2002, and is thought to be endemic in wild boar on the
Italian island of Sardinia

, in the North Rhin e

- Westfalia and Rhineland

- Palatine regions of Germany , and in parts of the Bas

- Rhin and Moselle departments in France [36] . None of
the outbreaks in wild boar or domestic swine has occurred within 1 00 k ilometers of
Switzerland or Liechtenstein.

The EU Member States around Switzerland and Liechtenstein are part of an APHIS

defined EU CSF region (9 CFR 94.0) that APHIS considers low risk for CSF (9 CFR 94.9, 94.10). One reason for the low

- risk designat ion is that CSF virus is known to circulate at low levels in segments of the wild boar population within the defined region, with sporadic outbreaks expected in domestic swine. EU Member States are subject to harmonized EC legislation concerning animal hea lth and disease control, which includes recognition of regions within Member States

— including France and Germany

— that the
EC restricts due to CSF in wild boar ( see Section 7.1.1).

3.2 Discussion

CSF infection in free

- ranging wild boar is not an immediate concern for introduction of the disease into Switzerland or Liechtenstein, since the closest known infected population (in Germany) is located over 150 k ilometers from the Swiss border. However, CSF in wild boar has proven very difficult to eradicate and t he infection may spread to other, closer populations over time [14] . Wild boar are not considered migratory in nature, but17 individual animals may travel subs tantial distances in search of food, during mating season, or in response to hunting or other habitat disruptions. CSF virus may also be introduced via wild boar carcasses brought back by hu nters, as described in Section 7

.

4. Extent of an active disease c ontrol program

As described in Section 2, Switzerland has not detected CSF virus in domestic swine since 1993, whereas the last case in wild boar occurred in March 1999 ( see Section 9 for
a discussion of surveillance ). Liechtenstein has never detected CSF in domestic swine or
wild boar. Consequently, neither Switzerland nor Liechtenstein currently engages in
active CSF control.

5. Vaccination status of the region

Vaccination against CSF is prohibited in both Switzerland and Liechtenstein [20] . The
BVET could authorize vaccination in an outbreak situation , if necessary

.

6. Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk

6.1 Genera l information

Switzerland consists of three distinc t geographical regions: the Jura , the Swiss Alps, and the Swiss plateau. The Jura is a small mountain range located north of the Alps , which
covers the western border with France in the cantons of Basel

- St adt, Basel

- Landschaft,
Solothu rn , Bern, Jura, Neuchâtel, and Vaud ( see Figure 6.1 ). The highest peak in the Jura range is 5,643 feet.

Figure 6.1: Geographical regions of Switzerland

Jura Swiss Plateau

Swiss Alps

Ticino18 The Swiss plateau is a large basin that extends from the Jura Mountains to the Alps, confined to the southwest by Lake Geneva and to the northeast by Lake Constance and the Rhine River. The Swiss plateau flows into Germany through the northern cantons of Thurgau and Zürich, as well as parts of Aargau and Schaffhausen. The can ton of Geneva, along the border with France, also forms part of the Swiss plateau.

The Swiss Alps are situated south of the Swiss plateau and extend across the border into southern France, Italy, and Austria. The highest peaks in the Swiss Alps are the
Duf ourspitze (15,202 feet) and the Dom (14,911 feet) in the canton of Valais, along the border with Italy. Liechtenstein is situated entirely in the Alps. In the southernmost point
of Switzerland

— the canton Ticino

— the Alps descend towards the plains in Italy.

6.2 Discussion

A large part of the Swiss border consists of mountain ranges, rivers, and lakes. The Alps provide a substantial barrier to introduction of CSF virus via free

- ranging wild boar from Austria and most of Italy, except for the canton of Tici no. The Alps and Lake Geneva also substantially limit wild boar movement into Switzerland from southern France. To a lesser degree, the Jura Mountains protect against wild boar entering from northern France. However, the Swiss plateau provides little barri er to wild boar movements across the border from Germany or a small part of southern France.

7. Movement control and biosecurity from higher risk regions

Under Swiss law, the BVET is responsible for establishing import and export regulations
and for in ternational agreements . T he border veterinary inspection service

— which is directly attached to the BVET

— implements veterinary inspections at the BIPs . T he cantonal veterinary services implement the provisions of import and export regulations
such as observ ation periods and quarantines, official inspections at destination, export health certificates, etc. In general, live animals and animal products entering Switzerland and Liechtenstein from EU Member States are not subject to border veterinary controls,
wh ereas the same commodities from other countries must undergo veterinary inspection
at an EC

- approved BIP.

7.1. Import controls

7.1.1 Importation from EU Member States

As a function of the Agricultural Agreement and the Additional Agreement, Switzerland

a nd Liechtenstein have gradually adopted import and trade regulations that are equivalent to those of the EC with regard to live animals and animal products [21, 22] . The primary legal acts on the Swiss side are the Animal Health Or dinance and the Ordinance of 18 April 2007 on the import, transit , and export of animals and animal products

. The Agreements were fully implemented as of 1 January 2009, at which point all border veterinary controls b etween EU Member States and Switzerland /Liechtenstein were abolished [26, 37]

.
T rade in live animals and animal products between Switzerland /Liechtenstein and EU
Member States now occurs under the same conditions as for intra

- community trade [18

- 20, 26]

. Live animals, semen, ova, and embryos must be accompanied by the appropriate19 intra

- community trade health certificate, signed by an official veterinarian. Fresh meat and other p roducts of animal origin are ac companied by commercial documents only

. Live animals undergo inspection by an official veterinarian at the point of origin ; if all

necessary conditions are fulfilled for the animal s and the farm, the official veterinarian
fills out the live swine health ce rtificate in TRACES 2

2 TRACES

– Trade Control and Expert System: an internet

- based program that EU Member States use to coordinate and track movements of live animals, animal products, and genetic material within the EU. , then signs and stamps [38]

. TRACES notifies the appropriate cantonal veterinary office to expect the shipment. The importer must notify the cantonal veterinary office within 24 hours o f receipt [39]

. In keeping with EC requirements, a ll swine from EU Member States must be kept separate for 30 days on the destination farm

. However, BVET technical instructions also requir e an official veterinarian to visit the farm and inspect the new animals at least 3 times during the 30

- day period [20, 40] , which is more stringent than the random spot

checks required by the EC [41]

. Previous APHIS risk assessments noted that EC regulations substantially limit the risk of
CSF spread am ong EU Member States by restricting movement of live swine, swine genetic material (semen, ova, and embryos)

, and wild boar carcasses fro m areas where CSF is endemic in the wild boar population [42

- 45]

. However, the assessments further concluded that CSF outbreaks occurring outside of established control zones po se a risk
to the intra

- community trade and export markets until detection.

Commission Decision 2008/855/EC specifically prohibits intra

- community trade of swine genetic material from restricted areas in Germany, France, Slovakia, and Hungary, as
well as a ll of Bulgaria [36] . Live swine may move out of restricted areas to other areas within the same Member State, contingent upon clinical examination by an official veterinarian and a negative serologi cal test for CSF , or to slaughter

. Movement of live
swine to a non

- restricted area in another Member State is prohibited.

Commission Decision 2008/855/EC also requires additional guarantees on fresh pork, pork products, and pork preparations from Bulgaria , although trade and/or export of these products from the other restricted areas is allowed [36] . Commission Decision 2006/779/EC prohibits intra

- Community trade in live swine, swine genetic materia l, and
all but heat

- treated pork from Romania [46]

. 7.1.2 Importation from non

- EU countries

Legislative controls

Switzerland and Liechtenstein have also legislation equivalent to that of the EC for import ation of animals and animal products from third countries [18

- 20, 26] . Since 1 April 2007, consignments for export to Switzerland or Liechtenstein must be accompanied by the corresponding EC

- third country certificates. Third countries that the EC approves to export to EU Member States may also export to Switzerland and
Liechtenstein. EC

- approved slaughter establishments, cutting plants, and cold storage
units in third countries are approved for export to Switzerland and Liechtenstein as well

.20 EC regulations allow import ation of live swine from Chile, Canada, New Zea land, and
Iceland ; fresh pork, pork products, and fresh meat of farmed non

- domestic suidae from Australia, Chile, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States; and fresh meat of wild suidae from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States [47]

. Live swine from Chile and Iceland must test negative for CSF and SVD within 30 days of export. EC regulations also allow importation of live swine, pork, and pork products from Norway as a provision of the European Economic Area Agreement [48]

. APHIS recognizes all of
these countries as free of CSF , wi th restrictions on exports from Chile as described in 9
CFR 94.25

. 3

3 Regions l isted under 9 CFR 94.25 are in a special category, because even though APHIS has determined that the region is free of CSF, one or more of the following conditions occur: (1) the region supplements their national pork supply with fresh, chilled, or frozen pork from regions that are not designated in 9 CFR 94.9 and 9 CFR 94.10 as free of CSF; (2) the region supplements their national pork supplies with pork from CSF affected regions that is not processed in accordance with 9CFR Part 94.17; (3) they share a
common land border with CSF

- affected regions; or (4) they import live swine from CSF

- affected regions under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. The full
text of 9 CFR 94.25 is provided in Annex 1. The EC also allows import ation of swine semen from approved collection centers in Canada, New Zealand, and the United States [49]

. These countries are approved to export swine embryos and ova as well; however, no embryo collection teams in these countries were approved at the time this report was written.

Border inspection points

The EC approved Switzerland’s Geneva and Z ü rich airp ort BIPs to conduct border veterinary controls on packed products for human consumption, products not intended for human consumption

, and small animals (including zoo animals) , as of 1 January 2009 [20, 26]

. Liechtenstein has no approved BIPs. No Swiss BIP is approved to receive swine or other large animals from non

- EU countries ; these animals must undergo veterinary inspection at a n EU BIP before entering Switzerland.

The Swiss airport BIPs are designed to EC specifications as described by Annex II of
Council Directive 97/78/EC [50] and Commission Decision 2001/812/EC [51] . There are separate sectors for unloading and inspection of live animals, products of animal origin for human consumption, and products of animal origin not intended for human consumption [20] . The live animal sector has appropriate facilities for small animal restraint and housing, and the product sectors have adequate room for offloading, examination, sampling, and storage. All employees must go through a clean room with changing facilities when entering or exiting any sector. Each sector is cleaned and disinfected after unloading and reloading, as are the storage rooms if used.

The BIPs are fully computerized with an online database for registering consignments and access to the TRACES system [20] . The BVET in fo rms the BIPs of any changes to EC or Swiss legislation that impact veterinary inspection at the borders; all import control legislation is also posted on the BVET website and maintained in hard copy at the BIPs. A manual of procedures provides guidance on the implementation of EC import control legislation.21 BIP inspectors are all veterinarians [20] . The inspectors receive ongoing training on EC and Swiss legislation, TRACES, live animal handling, animal welfare, and international trade of endangered species (CITES), as well as on

- the

- job training. In 2008, the Zürich BIP received approximately 1,000 live animals (mostly pets) and 1 0,000 consignments of animal products, but no shipments of fresh pork or pork products.

At the time of the APHIS site visit the Zürich BIP appeared to be operating within the scope of available resources, although BIP staff indicated that the workload had increased substantially since January 2009 [20] . The veterinary inspectors appeared knowledgeable of pertinent EC and Swiss le gislation and were confident in their job skills. Both the BVET and cantonal officials inspect the BIPs regularly, as does the EC’s Food and Veterinary Office [52]

. Inspection procedures

Within 24 hours pri or to arrival, t he BIP receives a faxed copy of the first page of the EC’s Common Veterinary Entry Document (CVED) to announce shipments of commodities that might require inspection [20] . Customs assigns each consignment a combined nomenclature code that indicates whether it must undergo veterinary inspection. Of all the consignments flagged for veterinary inspection, 100% undergo a document check and a random sample undergo a physical check: 20% of Category I items (meat, fresh fish, canned fish, eggs); 50% of Category II items (oysters, lobsters, rabbit meat, poultry, wild game); and 1

- 10% of Category III items (semen, embryos,

s nails). Once a consignment has been inspected and passed, the inspector enters the information into TRACES and the relevant cantonal veterinary office is notified to expect the shipment; the canton is responsible for any necessary follow

- up actions.

Most c onfiscations occur because of issues with the accompanying documents [20]

. Confiscated items are loaded onto a truck under supe rvision, which delivers them to an approved disposal establishment for shredding and incineration. The truck driver works for the disposal company; s/he signs a manifest at pick

- up and brings it to the disposal company; after disposal, company officials si gn the manifest and return it to the BIP. The cantonal veterinary services are responsible for inspecting the trans porters and the disposal companies

. 7.1.3 Volume of import

Switzerland and Liechtenstein import very few live pigs

— none from non

- EU Member
St ates since 1999

— in part because there is a 1,000 CHF tariff per pig [20, 53]

. New genetics are acquired by importing swine semen. Most imported live pigs are specific

pathogen free animals from EU Member States

— primarily Denmark

— that are used for pharmaceutical research. Approximately 1,000 pigs from France are slaughtered each year at a plant that is just inside the Swiss border and the meat is returned to France; the Swiss do not consider these to be imported. Pigs imported from non

- EU countries are subject to a 30

- day on

- farm quarantine, similar to the observation period described above.

In contrast, Switzerland and Liechtenstein are net importers of pork meat [53] . Tot al imports ranged between 6.7 and 11.7 million kilograms for 2003

- 07; in 2008, imports
increased to 15.3 million kilograms ( see Annex 3 ). Primary source countries are EU
Member States

— Germany, Austria, Italy, and France

— as well as Australia and the22 United States . In 2006, Switzerland imported 269 kilograms of pork meat from Japan

, which APHIS does not consider free of CSF . No susceptible commodities were imported from Japan in 2007 or 2008, however, and since 2009 h armonized EC and Swiss import regulations prohibit pork meat from Japan

. 7.2 Export controls

Official veterinarians who receive additional specific training from the BVET are authorized to sign export certificates [20] . There is no federal control over export
certification other than the training and authorization process. Export certificates for animal products for human consumption are signed by the cantonal public heal th
services , in consultation with the cantonal veterinary services if necessary.

Switzerland and Liechtenstein export very few live swine, usually less than 50 animals per year, primarily for breeding [20, 53]

. In some instance, live animal exports are arranged by a Swiss export company. An official veterinarian authorized by the BVET inspect s the animals for export , take s any samples for testing required by the receiv ing country

, and complete s the health certificate.

Switzerland and Liechtenstein also export very little pork or pork products, averaging just 211,000 kilograms annually from 2003

- 08 [53] . Slaughter plants, cutting plants, cold storage units, and other enti ties must be approved by the EC to export to EU Member States, just as they must be approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture ’s Food Safety and Inspection Service to export to the United States [47]

. Swiss officials indicated that the primary exports are dried meat and specialty sausages [20]

. 7.3 Transit controls

Swiss animal welfare laws prohibit transit of cloven

- hoofed animals

— including swine

— through Switzerland by road [18

- 20] . Animal welfare provisions are not part of the Agricultural Agreement or Additional Agreement and are generally more restrictive in Switzerland and Liechtenstein than in EU Member States. Transit by tra in is allowed; however, the rail companies no longer transport livestock.

7.4 Veterinary control of passenger traffic

Per Swiss officials, a ll border crossings into Switzerland and Liechtenstein are controlled by the Swiss customs service [18, 20] . Swiss officials estimate that more than 1 million persons cross the Swiss border each day.

Switzerland joined the Schengen Area in December 2008, which consists of most EU Member States, Iceland, and Norway [54] . Liechtenstein is not currently part of the Schengen Area but is expected to join on 1 November 2009. Routine customs controls

— i.e., controls on persons for the mere reason that they cross the border

— are not permi tt ed within the Schengen Area. Consequently, identity and customs checks on travelers crossing the borders of participating countries by road, rail, or air are not routinely carried

out. However, the Swiss customs service continues to conduct spot checks on travelers from other Schengen countries based on an analysis of risk.

Until Liechtenstein becomes part of the Schengen Area the Austria

- Liechtenstein border crossing

— an external Schengen border

— is continuously manned by Swiss customs and border guards [55] . An interim arrangement involving video surveillance of border23 crossings has allowed the Liechtenstein

- Switzerland border to remain open without on

site immigration and customs checkpo ints.

Customs inspection at the Swiss airports is based on self

- declaration, although there is no
declaration form to fill out as for the United States [20] . Travelers from EU Member States may carry personal consignments of meat, milk, and derived products; products of animal origin are prohibited from most other countries. Posters and pamphlets promoting public awareness of pro hibited commodities are prominently displayed at the airports

. After retrieving their baggage, travelers exit through doorways marked either “nothing to declare” or “goods to declare” [20]

. Declared items are inspected on the “goods to declare” side, whereas baggage is randomly inspected on the “nothing to declare” side. Customs officers may choose to inspect 100 percent of passe nger luggage from flights that are considered high risk based on the country of origin of the flight or the travelers. If prohibited commodities are found, the traveler may voluntarily dispose of them in specially marked locked bins . T he customs service ke eps a list of confiscated items, which are disposed of as for items confiscated at the BIP. The confiscation rate is less than 1 percent [18]

. Custom agents refer undeclared items requiring veterinary inspection
to the BIP.

7.5 Discussion

Swiss BIPs are well equipped and appear to be operating within the scope of available resources; the veterinary inspectors are know ledgeable of pertinent EC and Swiss legislation and confident in implementing inspection procedures. Switzerland and Liechtenstein have adopted import and trade regulations concerning live animals and animal products that are equivalent to the EC regulatio ns that apply to all EU Member States. Consequently, the baseline risk of CSF introduction into Switzerland or Liechtenstein through import or trade is similar to that of an EU Member State. However, Switzerland has implemented additional measures that pro tect against the introduction of CSF via import, transit, and trade of live animals, as discussed below.

Other potential pathways for disease introduction include (1) import and trade of animal products; (2) incoming vehicular and human traffic; and (3) a gricultural commodities for personal consumption. In each of these cases, the probability of CSF introduction into Switzerland depends in large part on the ability of the surrounding EU Member States to
detect CSF outbreaks in domestic swine and wild boar. As noted in Section 3, t he
APHIS

- defined EU CSF region is considered low risk for CSF, in part because CSF is endemic in segments of the wild boar population and CSF outbreaks are expected to
occur at a low level i n the domestic swine population . Previous assessments have found that, once detected, the control measures for CSF outbreaks in domestic swine described in EC regulations are effective [56]

. 7.5.1 Import and tr ansit of live swine

Harmonized EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of swine from f ive non

- EU countries, all of which APHIS considers free of CSF. However, in recent year s Switzerland has only imported swine from EU Member States

. Sourcing of swine from
EU Member States is subject to EC restrictions on movement from areas affected with
CSF in wild boar. The number o f imported swine is very low, in part due to the high24 tariff ; most are for pharmaceutical research and therefore isolated from the general swine population . All imported swine are subject to official inspections while under official
observation (if from EU Member States) or quarantine (if from other countries).

Switzerland and Liechtenstein have also prohibited the transit of cloven

- hoofed animals by road for animal welfare reasons; although transit is permitted by rail, the railways no longer carry livest ock. The low number of imported swine, the import controls in place,
and the lack of transit of live swine combine to substantially limit the risk of CSF introduction via this pathway.

7.5.2 Import and trade of swine products

Switzerland and Liechtenstein are net importers of pork and pork products. Harmonized EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of fresh pork, pork products, fresh meat of
farmed non

- domestic suidae, and fresh meat of wild suidae from very few non

- EU countries, all of which APHIS reg ards as free of CSF. Switzerland and Liechtenstein import pork and pork products primarily from EU Member States, mainly Germany, Austria, and France. With the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, there are no restrictions on sourcing of these commodities fr om areas of the EU that are affected by
CSF in wild boar . Undetected outbreaks in these areas could allow slaughter of infected
swine and introduction of the virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein via fresh pork.

Switzerland and Liechtenstein allow import ation of swine semen from EU Member States, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Theoretically, the non

- EU countries approved to export swine semen could also export embryos and ova; however, there are currently no EC

- approved embryo collection team s in these countries. EC regulations prohibit movement of semen, embryos, and ova from areas of EU Member States that are affected by CSF in wild boar or domestic swine

. These factors together limit the risk of introducing CSF via swine genetic material.

7.5.3 Incoming vehicular and human traffic

As discussed in Section 3, Switzerland shares land borders with Germany and France, both of which have regions restricted due to CSF in wild boar. There is considerable rail
and road traffic from these countries into Switzerland and, since all are part of the Schengen Area, neither vehicles nor passengers are subject to routine customs inspections. Live

- haul trucks must be cleaned, but not disinfected, after each transport. Sporadic outbreaks in domestic swine oc cur in areas where CSF is endemic in wild boar; since the virus can spread via fomites such as vehicle tires and clothing, undetected outbreaks pose a risk for CSF introduction. Introduction of CSF virus by this pathway is therefore theoretically possible, particularly in the event of an undetected outbreak in
domestic swine. However, factors such as the low number of imported swine

— and hence incoming live

- haul trucks

— somewhat limit the risk of introducing CSF by this pathway.

7.5.4 Agricultural commodities for personal consumption

Land border crossings into Switzerland are controlled by the Swiss customs service, without veterinary control per se. Travelers from EU Member States may transport agricultural commodities, including pork and pork products, for p ersonal consumption. The Swiss customs service does not routinely inspect incoming road or rail traffic since Switzerland joined the Schengen Area, except for at the Austria

- Liechtenstein border.25 Since CSF virus can be present in fresh pork and some pork p roducts, undetected outbreaks in EU Member States pose a risk for CSF introduction.

Travelers from non

- EU Member States may not transport agricultural commodities, including pork and pork products , into Switzerland . Customs inspection at Swiss airports
is primarily based on self

- declaration, with targeted inspection based on risk. Signs indicating prohibited items and prominently placed amnesty bins may decrease the amount of prohibited commodities unintentionally carried across the border.

EC regulations prohibit hunters from removing wild boar carcasses from CSF

- affected regions of EU Member States where hunting is allowed. Switzerland and Liechtenstein rely on compliance with this provision to prevent CSF introduction via hunted wild boar.
The Swiss cust oms service does not routinely inspect for hunted wild boar in vehicles coming into Switzerland and wild boar carcasses submitted for trichinosis testing are not routinely tested for CSF.

8. Livestock demographics and marketing

8.1 Census information

8.1 .1 Domestic swine

In 2009, Switzerland had approximately 11,500 swine holdings with 1.6 million pigs, of
which about 150,000 were sows ( see Table 8.1) [20] . Liechtenstein had an additio nal 1,758 pigs on 15 premises. In general, l arge breeding farms in Switzerland average 150 sows, whereas large fattening farms average 1,000 pigs. Pig production is concentrated in
eastern Switzerla nd in the cantons of Thurgau and St. Gallen, and also in central Switzerland in the cantons of Luzern and Bern ( see Figure 8.1) [20]

. Per Swiss officials, there are few backyard pig holdings in Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

Table 8.1: Switzerland swine census data

Number of f arms Number of s wine
Swine f acilities (total) 11,487 1,631,593
Nucleus h erds 43 3,200 Multipliers 150 11,000 Production (f arrowing) 5,400 137,000
Finishers 9,400 1,300,000

8.1.2 Wild boar

Swiss officials estimate the wild boar population in Switzerland to be between 25,000

- 66,000 animals and growing, based on hunting statistics and expert knowledge [18, 20]

. Predictive mode ling shows that t he Swiss Alps create a temporally stable subdivision of the wild boar population with 80 percent of the animals located to the north of the mountains and the remainder to the south ( see Figure 8.2) [57

- 59] . The number of adult animals killed has cycled around 2,800 per year since 2000, whereas the number of young animals (yea rlings and juveniles) killed has increased from approximately 1,280 to 3,710 over the same time period [57] . In 2007, young animals accounted for almost 57 percent of the hunted wild boar, up f rom 32 percent in 2000. There are very few wild
boar in Liechtenstein , since the habitat in the Alps is not favorable for wild boar [20]

.26 Figure 8.1: Geographic distribution of domestic swine

Pigs per km 2

< 13

151

- 300

> 300 13

- 150

Figure 8.2: Probability of wild boar occurrence (modeled data)27 8.2 Production and marketing

Swine production is highly integrated, with sales arranged by contract with 2

- 3 main
dealers [20] . Feeder pigs move from breeding facilities to fattening farms when they weigh about 20 kilograms and are slaughtered at r oughly 90

- 110 kilograms. There are no marketing centers or auctions for swine. The BVET approves persons or holdings which have the potential to trade, collect, and/or export live animals [18] . These approvals are
for a limited time and must be renewed.

The Swiss swine industry has some of the strictest animal welfare regulations in Europe [20] . Farrowing crates are prohibited and outdoor access is encouraged. Feed is expensive because the government protects Swiss production with heavy subsid ies, including levies on imports. All farms have to comply with the welfare code but there are premiums of up to 25 CHF per pig produced on farms that are especially welfare friendly, to encourage such systems. The premiums are paid by the supermarkets, wh ich entitles them to use a special label on meat and other products. Producers are required to conform to the label standards and are inspected 1

- 2 times per year for compliance.

Swine on farms visited by an APHIS team in April 2009 had free access to ou tdoor pens [20] . Biosecurity was minimal: employees did not shower or change clothes prior to working with the pigs, and feed t rucks and other vehicles had free access to areas adjacent to outdoor pens. There were few exterior fences or other barriers to prevent contact with wild boar or entry of unauthorized vehicles or persons.

8.3 Animal and herd identification

The BVET has is sued an ordinance dictating that animals for food production be traceable across all production, processing, and sales stages [18]

. Each entity in the production chain (breeder, feeder, etc) must be able to provide information to cantonal
authorit ies about the origin and destination of the animals and derived products (i.e., be able to trace one step forward and one st ep back)

. The BVET has also issued detailed technical instructions on animal identification, holding registration, and movement controls [20, 24]

. Since 1 April 2000, pi gs must be identified within 5 days of birth with a single eartag that indicates the registration number of the birth premises. The registration numbers for both Switzerland and Liechtenstein begin with the ISO code for Switzerland. The SVS uses an electro nic database called TVD to store information about each registered swine holding

— even single

- animal holdings

— as well as slaughter plants. Each holding must also keep an on

- farm register of movements, births, and deaths.

8.4 Internal movement controls

The SVS currently tracks swine movements through a system of paper records [20, 24]

. Most swine movement s are directly from holding to holding or to slaughter. The owner

or seller must fill out a movement control document ( Begleitdokument ) before the transport occurs . T he document includes information on the holding of origin, the registration number, the type of animals, the destination, and the health status of the
animals. A copy of the document must remain with both the buyer and seller for 3 years.

An APHIS site visit team found minor discrepancies and omissions on movement control documents at swine holdings and a slaughter plant [20]

. At present, no copy goes to the28 BVET or the cantonal veterinary authorities. No health certificates are required for
animal movement within Switzerland or Liecht enstein. Swiss officials are in the process of modifying the TVD database to enable tracking of all swine movements, as is currently done for cattle; this capability is anticipated by January 2011.

8.5 Veterinary oversight

O fficial veterinarians are requi red to inspect 10 percent of the holdings in their area each year for compliance with animal health, animal welfare, animal identification, and veterinary drug ordinances [20] . Producers may also contract with the Swine Health
Service

— a semi

- private organization sponsored by the Swiss pig producers association

— which monitor s swine health and helps farmers with management and healt h issues. Producers would contact their private veterinarian or the Swine Health Service if there was a drop in production or the pigs appeared unhealthy.

8.6 Slaughter practices

In 2009 there were 699 slaughter plants in Switzerland, of which 674 were ap proved for swine slaughter [20] . Approximately 112 cutting plants and 177 processing plants were approved for pork. In 2008, Sw itzerland slaughtered 2,645,288 pigs with a carcass confiscation rate of 0.16 percent. There are no swine slaughter plants in Liechtenstein;
most swine from Liechtenstein are slaughtered in Switzerland.

All cattle, swine, and poultry are slaughtered under veterinary control and approximately 95 percent are slaughtered in establishments that are approved for export to the EU [18]

. All slaughter plants must have a quality management system in place that follows Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HAC C P) principles. Biosecurity at a large swine slaughter plant visited by an APHIS team in April 2009 was very good.

No s laughter plants for game animals are currently approved for export [18, 19] . The farmed game industry in Switzerland and Liechtenstein is small; game is usually shot on the premises and processed in small plants supervised by the cantonal veterinary services

. Hunted game is eviscerated by the hunters and the meat consumed in local households
and restaurants ; wild boar for human consumption must be tested for trichin a worms

. 8.7 Discussion

The swine industry in Switzerland and Liechtenstein is small

, highly integrated , and well regulated

. The economic incentive s for swine producers to adhere to Switzerland’s strict animal welfare regulations and to follow organic or “natural” production practices limit intentional feeding of untreated waste food. Veterinary oversight is considerable and the official inspection process is thorough.

Good herd registration and animal identification systems are in place. The current paper

based swine movement control system does not allow federal or cantonal veterinary officials to efficiently track individual swine movements or the number of swine on each holding; however, the system is sufficient for traceback in the event of an animal disease emergency, and improvements are expected by 2011.

In recent years, Switzerland has witnessed a considerable increase in its wild boar population . A t the same time, outdoor rearing on pasture has become increasingly popular because of extra compensation for organically produced meat or compliance with29 animal welfare requirements that are promoted as incentives for farmers . The probability
of contact between domestic swine and wild boar

— and perhaps disease transmission

— has therefore increased as well, particularly considering the general lack of p erimeter fencing and other biosecurity measures.

9. Disease surveillance

9.1 Active surveillance

9.1.1 Domestic swine

As noted in Section 2, there is no national surveillance plan for CSF in domestic swine or
wild boar in Switzerland or Liechtenstein [18

- 20] . The last active survey of domestic swine occurred in 2001, when the SVS sampled 41,124 breeding sows from 2,540 herds;
all te sted negative for CSF [18]

. The majority of testing since that time has been for import or export of domestic swine , or for boars entering artificial insemination center s ( see Table 9.1).

9.1.2 Wild boar

The SVS conducted active surveillance in wild boar in the surveillance and risk zones established during the CSF outbreak in the canton of Ticino [18, 20] . From May 1998 to January 2000, 1,294 wild boar that were shot or found dead were tested for CSF . One animal from the surveillance zone was seropositive, whereas 179 of 528 wild boa r (34%)
from the risk zone were virus

- positive and an additional 162 wild boar were seropositive [60] . During the first hunting season, seropositive animals were found in all age groups, but 12 months later only animals over 1 year of age had antibodies. The last virus

positive wild boar was detected in March 1999.

Table 9.1: CSF testing in domestic swine and wild boar 2001

– 2008

Year Domestic swine Wild boar

Serology Virus
isolation No. positive Serology Virus
isolation Antibody positive Virus positive
2001 325 15 0 976 190 55 0
2002 394 33 0 692 25 4 0
2003 395 13 0 849 2 2 0
2004 346 12 0 322 3 0 0
2005 414 11 0 321 12 0 0
2006 492 18 0 148 2 0 0
2007 669 34 0 126 0 0 0
2008 718 35 0 197 0 0 0

The BVET conducted three serologic surveys of hunted wild boar throughout Switzerland between 2001 and 2005; each survey was designed to detect 1 percent CSF prevalence with 95 percent confidence [18, 59] . The first survey (November 2001

– February 2002) found 8 of 628 samples positiv e on ELISA, whereas the second survey (November 2002

– February 2003) found 20 of 1,239 samples positive in initial screening [18] . However, only 2 samples from each survey were confirmed positive, resulting in prevalence estimates of 0.32 and 0.16 percent, respectively. All four positive samples originated from wild boar over 2 years old from Ticino, which suggests th at they30 acquired the infection during the 1998

- 99 outbreak in that area. The third survey (August
2004

– February 2005) found no positive results among 708 samples tested [18, 58]

. 9.2 Passive surveillance

9.2.1 Domestic swine

Passive CSF surveillance in domestic swine is primarily based on clinical suspicion [18, 20] . S uspect cases are usu ally identified and samples submitted by pathology laboratories or the Swine Health Service. Animals typically exhibit acute symptoms consistent with CSF, chronic disease, or abortion. From 2003 through September 2007, 171 specimens from suspect clinical c ases were submitted to the IVI; all tested negative. The number of suspect cases has declined considerably in recent years, from a high of 50 in 1999 to 16
in 2008 ( see Figure 9.1).

The BVET and the cantonal veterinary services organize training for offici al and private veterinarians, as well as producers, on animal health topics including CSF ( see Section 1.3.2). The BVET produces and distributes informational pamphlets on CSF in French, German, and Italian [61] . An APHIS site visit team noted that, although official veterinarians appeared well

- informed about CSF, swine producers were not familiar with the clinical signs or symptoms [20] . Producers indicated that they would call their private veterinarian if there was a drop in production or the pigs appeared unhealthy.

9.2.2 Wild boar

Passive surveillance in wild boar is ongoing through hunter submissions [18, 20] . Hunters are required by law to report any wild boar found dead to an official veterinarian , who
retrieves the carcass and submits it for pathology and CSF testing ; carca sses are also tested for African swine fever (ASF) . Between 2001 and September 2007, 5 specimens from suspect clinical cases in wild boar were submitted to the IVI and tested negative.

Figure 9.1: Suspect CSF cases 1999

– 2008

CSF

ASF

Some cantons

— including Tici no and the northern cantons of Zürich, Basel, and Aargau

— require CSF testing of all hunted wild boar [20] . Samples are taken by official veterinarians during meat inspection (required for trichina testing) and sent to the IVI,31 which pays for the testing ( see Table 9.1). BVET officials indicated that they would implement a mandatory CSF surveillance plan in wild boar if the virus w as detected in
wild boar within 100 km of the Swiss border.

9.3 Discussion

CSF virus was last detected in domestic swine in 1993 and in wild boar in March 1999. Virus isolation becomes rare when the incidence of new infection is low, because the
CSF virus cannot be detected for more than a few weeks following infection [62] . In contrast, seroprevalence is detectable at low incidence levels since antibodies can be
detecte d for the lifetime of the animal [13, 62]

. The lack of positive findings on the serological survey conducted in 20 04

- 05 suggests that CSF virus was no longer circulating in wild boar in Switzerland at that time

. Switzerland and Liechtenstein depend primarily on passive surveillance to detect a CSF outbreak in domestic swine or wild boar. This a potential issue for t he SVS, since a CSF outbreak has not occurred in many years. Long

- term absence of a disease can result in inexperience in recognizing disease signs, unfamiliarity with reporting requirements and procedures, and complacency regarding the possibility of the disease occurring. APHIS noted a low level of awareness of the clinical signs of CSF among swine farmers and a low level of biosecurity on swine farms, two factors that could enable a CSF outbreak to establish and spread prior to detection.

The SVS is add ressing this issue through training and outreach activities focused on producers and private veterinarians. In the event of an outbreak, the emergency response plan includes provisions for CSF

- specific training and outreach for veterinary professionals, an imal keepers, the hunting community, and the general public ( see Section 11).

10. Diagnostic laboratory capability

10.1 Overview

The IVI is the Swiss reference laboratory for CSF and other former OIE List A diseases [18

- 20] . It is located in M ittelhä usern, near the capit a l Bern, and is the only facility in Switzerland approved to conduct diagnostic testing for CSF. The BVET and the IVI also

sponsor CSF research at the laboratory.

The Swiss government provides a budget of 8 million CHF (about 7 million USD), which covers the cost of running the facility [20] . Additional fundi ng is provided for facility upkeep. Approximately 39 governmental employees and 20

- 25 doctoral and post

- doctoral students work at the IVI. Laboratory personnel receive continuing education and annual training, and IVI officials teach courses at the Swiss v eterinary schools on CSF in
domestic swine and wild boar. The IVI also offers an annual course on CSF and other highly contagious diseases for official veterinarians.

10.2 Biosafety

The IVI laboratory is a biosafety level 4 (BSL

- 4) fac ility, built in 1992 [20]

. Administrative offices are located in a separate building outside of the main laboratory
facilities. All structures are m odern and well

- maintained , with up

- to

- date equipment. The laboratory is surrounded by fields and a high fence , with key

- card access only

. Entrance32 into the BSL

- 4 facility occurs through a series of airlocks. Persons exiting the BSL

- 4 facility are required to avoid contact with susceptible animals for at least 3 days.

The IVI has developed an extensive biosafety manual that provides principles and instructions for employees and visitors [63] . The IVI underwent both internal and independent biosafety review s in 2007 that concluded that the institute is safe for humans, animals, and the environment in its normal operation as well as in a major
animal health incident [64]

. 10.3 Diagnostics

All samples for CS F testing from Switzerland and Liechtenstein are sent to the IVI for diagnostic testing [20]

. Tests are conducted according to OIE standards and include :

o Conventional RT

- PCR (2 tests)

o Real

- time RT

- PCR

o Cell culture with immunoperoxidase staining

o Antibody ELISA (4 tests)

o Virus neutralization test

o Immunohistochemistry

o Sequencing of isolates

o Animal inoculation

Laboratory officials fol low a flow chart when testing samples for CSF , with a guaranteed

turn

- around time of 6

- 8 hours for preliminary PCR results if the sample is of sufficient quality [20] . Initial testing is by real

- time RT

- PCR and cell culture. If the sample is positive using real

- time RT

- PCR, follow up is by conventional RT

- PCR and sequencing
to rule out ruminant pestiviruses (BVDV and BVD) . If the sample is negative using real

time RT

- PCR, the laboratory would wait for the results of cell culture. Samples testing positive for CSF are sent to the Institut für Virologie der Tierärztlichen Hochschule in Hannover, Germany

, for confirmatory testing, as s pecified by the Agricultur al Agreement [21]

. In the event of a CSF outbreak, the IVI would initially process surveillance samples using
a sensitive ELISA [20] . Available ELISAs include commercial test kits by IDEXX as
well as an in

- house ELISA that is performed using standard methodology [65]

. The IVI has the capacity to process 3,000 serum samples (ELISA) per day and 200 PCR per day
on blood ; tests on organ samples take longer. Procedures are in place to inc rease capacity in response to a disease outbreak [20]

. The IVI uses an electronic laboratory information management system to track samples from receipt through final diagnosis and reporting of results [20] . The laboratory reports

t est results by email and hard copy to (1) the person who submitted the sample, such as a cantonal veterinary officer; and (2) a defined group of people at the BVET (Implementation and Monitoring groups).

10.4 Quality assurance

The IVI is ISO 17025 accredited and inspected to renew accreditation every 2 years; the next inspection is scheduled for January 2011 [20] . The Bern veterinary office inspects annually for compliance with biosafety regulations

— most recently in April 2009

— as33 well as animal health and welfare regulations. The IVI participates in EU ring tests and other proficiency testing organized by foreign quality assessment providers.

10.5 Di scussion

The IVI is modern and well

- equipped, with well

- trained scientific, technical, and administrative staff. Samples in the laboratory can be easily tracked from receipt to final diagnosis and report ing . Security is excellent and there is little likeli hood that CSF virus could be accidentally carried out of the laboratory. Although Switzerland hosts a major pharmaceutical industry, no other facility is approved to work with live CSF virus.

The IVI provides a full range of tests for the diagnosis and co nfirmation of CSF. Diagnostic procedures are equivalent, though not identical, to those specified for EU
Member States in Commission Decision 2002/106/EC of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods, and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory test for the confirmation of classical swine fever [66]

. Te sts have been validated and include well

- regarded commercial test kits used in many
countries as well as tests developed by IVI personnel

. Good quality control and quality

ass urance programs are in place. APHIS concludes that the IVI would quickly diagnose
an index case of CSF if proper samples were submitted.

11. Emergency response capacity

The BVET has developed detailed emergency response procedures for CSF and other highly contagious animal diseases. Copies of applicable legislation and ordinances are

a vailable through the BVET website, as is information for animal keepers and the general public [67]

. Information for federal and cantonal veterinary officials

— including descriptions of responsibilities, detailed flowcharts, and technical instruction

— is available on password

- protected pages [68]

. Each canton supplements the official response plan with lists of responsible personnel, specific implementation procedures,
and con tracts with other response entities in providing the infrastructure for emergency

response

. Information concerning the legal authority for emergency response, disease reporting requirements, response measures in domestic swine and wild boar, and funding
fo r the response is summarized below.

11.1 Legal authority

As discussed in Section 1, the Animal Health Law provides legal authority for control
and eradication of CSF in Switzerland [27] ; implementing measures are set forth in the
Animal Disease Ordinance [69] . These legal acts provide official veterinarians the authority to restrict movement of animals and animal products to prevent disease spread, to access private property in order to carry out disease control and eradication measures, and to dispose of diseased or suspect ani mals as needed. The Animal Health Law also
authorizes the BVET to issue technical instructions regarding animal disease control and
eradication measures , and provides for f ederal oversight of implementation at the
cantonal level

. The Animal Health Law prov ides for assessment of penalties for noncompliance with applicable animal health provisions: the maximum specified penalty for deliberate noncompliance is a fine of 20,000 CHF (17,500 USD) and 8 months in jail, whereas the34 maximum penalty for negligence is a fine of 6,000 CHF (5,250 USD) or 2 months in jail [27]

. Penalt y amounts are determined by the cantonal courts.

Liechtenstein has enacted separ a te but equivalent legal provisions for control and
eradication of CSF , and is otherwise f ully integrated into the Swiss animal disease emergency response plans [20] . The role of Liechtenstein in emergency response is the

same as the role of a Swiss canton.

11.2 Reporting requirements

Under the Animal Health Law and Ordinance, all individuals who keep, care for, or
handle animals are obligated to report signs or suspected signs of a disease outbreak to a private or official veterinarian [27, 69] . Private veterinarians must report to an official veterinarian, who in turn must notif y the chief cantonal veterinarian , and on to the BVET. The BVET is obligated to inform the EC, other trading part ners, and pertinent international entities if a case is confirmed. The BVET and the cantonal veterinary office are also required to inform the public of any outbreaks of highly contagious animal disease. Switzerland is fully integrated into the electronic animal disease notification system (ADNS) used by the EC and EU Member States [20]

. Hunters and any other individuals who suspe ct the occurrence of CSF in free

- living wild boar are obligated to report their suspicion immediately to an official veterinarian or
cantonal veterinarian [27, 69] . T he chief cantonal veterinarian must notify BVET immediately of any suspect or confirmed cases. The chief cantonal veterinarian is also responsible for informing the cantonal hunting office and for ensuring that information flow to the hunting community is established.

11.3 Response coordination

The BVET is responsible for coordinating all highly contagious animal disease response

measures and is the ul timate decision

- making authority in emergency response situations [27, 69]

. Federal authorities may establish a panel of experts as an advisory body, which
would consist of technical experts as well as cantonal and industry representatives. The

c antonal veterinary offices are responsible for carrying out the actual response measures, including imposing movement restrictions in cases of suspected CSF occurrence.
If CSF is confirmed, crisis centers are established at both the national and cantonal levels [68, 69] . The national crisis center serves as the national coordinating and advisory body for emergency response activities and is responsible for analyzing outbreak information and developing recommendations for response strategies. The national crisis center also coordinates implementation of response measures through the cantonal veterinarian(s).
The cantonal crisis center serves as the central coordinatin g body for emergency response activities at the cantonal level and is responsible for coordinating the activities of the various entities involved in the response (veterinary services, civil defense, police, etc).
The national and cantonal crisis centers c ollaborate to define disease control zones, coordinate disposal of carcasses and hazardous materials, and manage public relations.35 11.4 Response measures

11.4.1 CSF suspected in domestic swine

Individuals who suspect the occurrence of a highly contagious animal disease are obligated to ensure that no animals, goods, or people leave the suspected affected premises until the disease suspicion is officially confirmed or ruled out [27, 69] . The
chief cantonal veterinarian assigns an official veterinarian to investigate the suspected

case and officially confirm or rule out disease suspicion [68] . The official decision on whether or not it is truly a suspect case is reported by telephone to the chief cantonal
veterinarian . If the official veteri narian rules out CSF , the movement restrictions are lifted; if suspicion is confirmed, the official veterinarian renews the movement restrictions on the holding, initiates an epidemiological investigation, and collects samples for diagnostic testing. The r estrictions are lifted if the test results are negative; otherwise, additional response measures are implemented as described below.

11.4.2 CSF confirmed in domestic swine

If laboratory results confirm CSF on a holding, movement restrictions remain in pla ce: unauthorized movement of animals from the holding is prohibited and access to the
animals restricted to a uthorized persons only [68] . I nformational notices are posted at the affected premises describing the restrictions in place and the penalties for noncompliance.
An official veterinarian continues the epidemiological investigation using a standardized questionnaire and coordinates collection of additional clinical specimens for laboratory testing. The national crisis center carries out further epidemiological analysis using the information collected by the official veterinarian as well as animal registration and
movement data.

Veterinary authorities establish a 3 km radius pr otection zone and 10 km radius
surveillance zone around the affected holding and restrict movement of swine , persons, and goods within these zones [68, 69]

. All herds within the zones that have susceptible animals are subject to veterinary inspection, including collection of clinical specimens. The national crisis center develops surveillance prot ocols that are implemented by the

cantons. A cantonal veterinarian can authorize movement of animals to a designated slaughter facility, or to another herd within the same zone, provided that all herds in the zone have been inspected and no additional case s of CSF detected. Animal transport vehicles within the protection and surveillance zones must be cleaned and disinfected
after each use.

Pigs on the affected holding (s) are culled under official supervision and the meat of recently slaughtered pigs is tra ced and destroyed [68] . Under Swiss law, the carcasses and meat are considered Category I material and as such must be rendered and then incinerated in approved establishments (t his is more restrictive than EC regulations ) [27]

. There are two main disposal facilities, one each in eastern and western Switzerland [20]

. Cleaning and disinfection of affected premises is carried out under the supervision of a cantonal veterinarian according to technic al instructions issued by the BVET [68]

. Restrictions imposed on an affected herd are lifted after cleaning and disinfection

, although the herd remains subject to restrictions in place for the zone in which the herd is
located. P rotection zone restriction s can be lifted 30 days after the last affected herd i s36 culled, provided that all herds in the zone have been serologically tested with negative results. After the protection zone is removed , any remaining surveillance zone restrictions apply. The surveillance zone measures can be lifted after a representative number of herds have tested negative for CSF, but no earlier than the protection zone measures are removed

. After CSF occur rence, free

- range swine holdings can be repopulated after sentinel piglets have been introduced onto the holding and serologically tested twice three weeks apart with negative results [68] . Other types of holdings can be repopulated after completion of the same sentinel piglet testing procedure, or immediately. In the latter case, the herd is subject to specifi c restrictions for at least 60 days: direct contact of the swine with s wine from other herds is prohibited and transfer of swine between the herd and any other herd is prohibited. These restrictions are lifted only after a representative number of the pigs have been serologically tested with negative results.

11.4.3 CSF in wi ld boar

Emergency response to CSF in free

- living wild boar is a collaborative effort among numerous entities, including the BVET, the IVI, cantonal veterinary and emergency response personnel, the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) , the cantonal off ice responsible for hunting oversight (cantonal hunting office), and hunting associations. The roles and responsibilities of each entity are described in technical instructions developed by the BVET in conjunction with the FOEN [70] . Based on outbreak experiences in Switzerland and neighboring countries, the response plan incorporates both geographic and temporal components.

The BVET is responsible for coordinating response actions at the national level, while the
cantonal veterinary services are responsible for carrying out response actions [67, 70] . If
CSF infection in wild boar is confirmed, the BVET activates the national crisis center, which in turn defines disease and surveillance zones, coordinates response in the cantons

, and initiates data collection and analysis. The national crisis center is also charged with developing a plan for eradicating CSF from the wild boar population.

During the initial (epidemic) phase of the outbreak, the chief cantonal veterinarian prohib its hunting or feeding of any wild animals and orders biosecure disposal of all
CSF

- positive or

- suspect wild boar carcasses [67, 7 0] . The chief cantonal veterinarian
orders biosecurity measures on pig farms to prevent contact between domestic swine and
wild boar

— such as penning of free

- range pigs

— and prohibits movement of domestic swine and swine semen, ova, and embryos from the dis ease and surveillance zones. The chief cantonal veterinarian can also close wild animal passages to adjacent areas.

During the second (transition) phase, response measures remain substantially the same except that hunting of wild boar piglets and yearlings is allowed [67]

. The carcasses of all wild boar hunted or found dead must be taken to a veterinary control post , where an official veterinarian takes samples for CSF testing

. Hunting by owners of domestic swine is prohibited, as is hunting that invol ves driving animals over long distances. The chief
cantonal veterinarian provisionally confiscates all carcasses until they test negative for CSF on both serology and virology. Any carcass that tests positive, as well as a ny CSF

suspect carcass, is dispose d of under official supervision.37 During the final (end) phase, wild boar populations are managed in accordance with the guidance developed by the F OEN . Measures applicable to domestic swine remain the same; however, the requirement for penning of domestic swine may be lifted [67] . The
chief cantonal veterinarian provisionally confiscates the carcasses of wild boar until specimens from the carcasses test negative for CSF on virology ; if positive, the carcass is disposed of under official supervision.

11.5 Funding, indemnity, and compensation

Funding for federal emergency response measures is through the BVET annual budget and the BVET can request additional governmental funds if needed [20, 69] . Animal losses due to a highly contagious animal disease

— including animals that died or were subje ct to mandatory culling or slaughter

— are covered by federal indemnity, up to 90% of the appraised value of the animal; funding is through the FDEA . Additional compensation may be provided by the cantons and other sources, such as insurance agencies

. Emerg ency response f unding at the cantonal level is provided by the individual cantons

, usually through a designated fund to which producers must contribute annually; the amount is based on the number of animals and may be matched by the government [20]

. Cantons are responsible for paying for cleaning and disinfection of premises and the costs of response to CSF detection in wild boars . The cantons may pay premiums for hunt ed
wild boar when hunting is ordered as a disease control measure.

11.6 Discussion

Switzerland and Liechtenstein have a well

- organized and comprehensive system in place for responding to suspected or confirmed outbrea ks of CSF and other highly contagious
animal diseases. Federal law requires reporting of suspected and confirmed cases of CSF and provides sufficient authority for necessary response actions by veterinary officials. Laws, ordinances, and technical instruct ions clearly define the roles and responsibilities of veterinary officials and other response personnel, lines of communication and reporting, and the specific actions to be taken. Flow charts on the BVET extranet guide the response actions and are availab le to all veterinary officials.

The Swiss response plan s for CSF in domestic swine and wild boar conform closely to
control measures established in Council Directive 2001/89/EC [32] and Commission
Decision 2002/106/EC [66]

. Central elements include establishing crisis centers at the national and local levels, zoning to prevent CSF spread, an d stamping out. The technical instructions for eradication of CSF in wild boar follow EC recommendations with regard to hunting strategies [14]

. Of ficial veterinarians at both the federal and cantonal levels were familiar with the contingency plans and the actions required of them in the event of suspicion or confirmation of CSF.

As discussed in Section 8 , all swine holdings in Switzerland and Liecht enstein must be registered in the national premises identification and movement control database. Mandatory registration of swine holdings facilitates identification of holdings subject to specific emergency response measures in the surveillance and protec tion zones. Holding registration and the Swiss movement control system also facilitate trace

- forward and

trace

- back investigations in an outbreak situation.38 Switzerland and Liechtenstein follow EC guidelines in maintaining restrictions for at least 30 day s after the last affected herd is culled. However, APHIS is concerned that 30 days is insufficient time to ensure freedom from the disease. Historically, CSF has
recurred in several EU Member States shortly after restrictions were removed and the

movement of swine commenced. For example, in December 2001 a CSF o utbreak was
confirmed in Spain 83 days after depopulation of an affected herd, 22 days after release
of movement restrictions [56] . Similarly, an outbreak in Luxembourg occurred 56 days after depopulation of an affected herd, 27 da ys after release of movement restrictions

. In both instances, the new CSF outbreak was epidemiologically linked to the previously
affected herd.

APHIS addressed this concern for the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region through previous regulations that prohibit ex port of live swine, swine products, and swine semen from
areas where CSF outbreaks have occurred in domestic swine to the United States until 6
months after cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises [71, 72]

.

12. Discussion of identified risk factors

12.1 Pathways for disease introduction

The preceding 11

- factor assessment identified five main pathways by which CSF virus could be introduced into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein ( see Figure 12.1). However,
int roduction of CSF by the identified pathways would only affect export risk to the United States if the domestic swine population of Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein became infected and the infection was not detected prior to export. The timeframe for
detect ion of a CSF incursion is thus of interest in this analysis.

No recent data exists to directly assess elapsed time between introduction of CSF virus into a herd and detection of an outbreak by the SVS. However, some forms of CSF are
difficult to detect in live animals or on post

- mortem examination without laboratory testing; for example, carrier sows that were exposed to low virulence CSF strains are capable of shedding virus for substantial periods of time without clinical signs. The SVS
relies almost ent irely on passive surveillance to detect a CSF outbreak and conducts very little serological surveillance in either domestic swine or wild boar. Detection could therefore be substantially delayed in the absence of overt clinical signs.

Physical inspection of individual swine presented for live export, slaughter, or collection of genetic material is sufficient to detect clinically affected animals. However, such inspection is unlikely to detect subclinical or persistent infection, which may be more apparent at the herd level. CSF virus can remain viable through carcass maturation, transport, and storage, and may be present in genetic material as well.

Consequently, if CSF is introduced into the domestic swine population in Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein, t he potential exists for it to remain undetected long enough for export of infected live animals, pork, pork products, or genetic material to the United States. The likelihood of CSF introduction via the pathways shown in Figure 12.1 and the associated expo rt risk are discussed below.39 Figure 12.1: Pathway assessment for virus introduction and subsequent export

12.2 Natural movement of wild boar

12.2.1 Central risk issue

Infected wild boar from neighboring EU Member States could introduce CSF virus into
Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein. Direct or indirect contact with infected wild boar could spread the disease to domestic swine, creating the potential for export of infected swine or swine products to the United States.

12.2.2 Risk factors and existing m itigation measures

The likelihood of infected wild boar introducing CSF virus depends primarily on the CSF status of wild boar populations in neighboring countries and the extent to which natural barriers prevent movement of wild boar into Switzerland and /or Liechtenstein.

Liechtenstein borders with Austria, which has not r eported CSF in wild boar since 1996

. Switzerland shares common land borders with Germany and France, both of which contain areas restricted by the EC due to CSF in the wild boar populat ion ( see Section 3 ). The Alps provide a substantial barrier to wild boar movement into Liechtenstein and the
Jura Mountains somewhat limit wild boar movement into Switzerland from northern France. In contrast, wild boar can cross the border from Germany fa irly easily in the area of the Swiss plateau ( see Section 6 ). The majority of Swiss pig production occurs in cantons forming the Swiss plateau ( see Section 8.1) , including those along the Swiss

German border, and few measures are in place on pig farms to p revent contact with wild boar ( see Section 8.2)

. Pork, pork products

Infected swine

products Susceptible
domestic population Pork and pork products

Virus

- infected
commodities to the U.S.

Waste feeding

Genetic
material Market
distribution Infective virus

in waste products Import or trade Infected live

swine

Susceptible
wild boar population

Breeding
herd Direct or indirect

contact

Export

Import
or trade Production
herd

Infected wild
boar in source country Migration Incoming
vehicular or
human traffic Infective virus
on vehicles or

clothing Import,
transit or

trade

from an
affected

area

Products for

personal consumption Legal or illegal entry Export On

- farm

exposure

Waste feeding Live swine

Genetic
material Slaughter and

packing

Export40 However, the CSF

- affected areas of Germany and France are over 150 kilometers to the north of the Swiss border, which is considerably farther than wild boar usually range ( see Section 3 ). Consequently, APHI S considers the risk of live wild boar introducing CSF into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein to be negligible at this time. Swiss officials have plans in place to increase CSF surveillance in wild boar and, if necessary, implement fencing and other biosecu rity measures on pig farms, if infected wild boar are detected
within 100 k ilometers of the Swiss border ( see Section 9.2.2 ).

12.3 Import or transit of infected live swine

12.3.1 Central risk issue

Infected live swine could enter Switzerland or Liechtenst ein legally through import or transit; there appears to be little incentive for illegal importation of live swine. Imported live swine may be intended for breeding, production (i.e. fattening and slaughter), research, or direct slaughter.

12.3.2 Risk fact ors and existing mitigation measures

The likelihood of import or transit of live swine introducing CSF virus depends primarily on the provisions of harmonized EC and Swiss legislation concerning the importation and transit of swine, the efficacy of limiti ng importation from CSF

- affected regions, and Swiss import and transit practices.

EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of swine from f ive non

- EU countries, all of which APHIS considers free of CSF ( see Section 7.1.2 ). However, in recent years
Switze rland has only imported swine from EU Member States, primarily for pharmaceutical research or direct slaughter ( see Section 7.1.1)

. EC legislation prohibits export and trade of live swine from holdings within areas rest ricted due to CSF in wild
boar or dom estic swine

. The number of swine imported into Switzerland and Liechtenstein is very low, in part due to a high tariff on live swine ( see Section 7.1.3 ). All imported swine are subject to multiple official inspections while undergoing a 30

- day observation period (if from EU Member States) or quarantine (if from other countries), which would likely detect clinically affected animals. Switzerland and Liechtenstein have prohibited the transit of
swine and other cloven

- hoofed animals by road for animal welfare reasons; transit by rail is permitted, but the railw ays no longer carry livestock ( see Section 7.3 ).

Since Switzerland and Liechtenstein import very few live swine, require substantial veterinary oversight of the live swine that are imported, and essenti ally prohibit transit across either country, the risk of CSF introductio n by this pathway is negligible.

12.4 Import of infected swine products

12.4.1 Central risk issues

Imported swine products such as fresh pork, pork products, semen, embryos, and ova

co uld introduce CSF virus into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein. Wild boar carcasses and meat, as well as meat products, could also introduce CSF virus. The latter are most likely to be carried into Switzerland or Liechtenstein for personal consumption, as d iscussed in
Section 12.6 below.41 12.4.2 Risk factors and existing mitigation measures

The likelihood of infected swine products introducing CSF virus depends primarily on the provisions of harmonized EC and Swiss legislation concerning the importation of

sw ine products, the efficacy of limiting importation from CSF

- affected countries and regions of EU Member States, the ability of EU Member States to detect CSF outbreaks
in domestic swine and wild boar , and Swiss import practices

. Semen, embryos, and ova

A PHIS considers the non

- EU countries from which EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of swine genetic material to be free of CSF ( see Section 7.1.2 ). EC legislation prohibits movement of swine semen, embryos, and ova out of areas of EU
Member States t hat are restricted due to CSF in wild boar or domestic swine ( see Section
7.1.1 ). After the CSF outbreaks in EU Member States in 1997

- 98 that involved dispersal through semen, the EC revised and strengthened legislation concerning CSF control and oversight of collection centers. Consequently, APHIS considers the risk of CSF introduction through infected semen, embryos, or ova to be very low.

Fresh pork and pork products

Switzerland and Liechtenstein are net importers of pork and pork products. Harmonized EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of these commodities f rom very few non

- EU countries, all of which APHIS regards as free of CSF ( see Section 7.1.2 ). However, Switzerland and Liechtenstein import primarily from EU Member States, including
substant ial quantities from Germany and France. Fresh pork and pork products could be
sourced from areas within these countries

— or within other EU Member States

— that are otherwise restricted due to CSF in wild boar, since neither the EC nor Switzerland prohibit tr ade of fresh pork and pork products from these areas ( see Section 7.1.1 ).

New CSF outbreaks in domestic swine are most likely to occur in and around restricted
areas of EU Member States [73]

. Such outbreaks may remain undetected for some time as discussed above; in addition, d omestic swine incubating CSF or infected with a low
virulence strain may not show overt clinical signs that wo uld preclude slaughter for human consumption . Since fresh pork and pork products sourced from infected swine can harbor CSF virus, the potential exists for such commodities

— particularly if sourced from
restricted areas of EU Member States

— to introduce CSF virus into Switzerland or
Liechtenstein.

EC control measures for CSF prohibit trade in fresh pork and pork products from areas within EU Member States that are experiencing CSF outbreaks in domestic swine [32]

, including all o f Romania [46]

. Trade may resume 30 days after culling the last affected
herd ; h owever, CSF outbreaks have occurred in the same area shortly after restrictions were lifted, suggesting that 30 days i s not sufficient to ensure disease freedom ( see Sections 11.4.2 and 11.6 )

. On the other hand, few CSF outbreaks in domestic swine have occurred recently in or around CSF restricted areas of the EU from which sourcing of pork and pork products is
allowed

— 3 in 2007, 4 in 2008, and none to date in 2009 [35, 74]

. Affected EU Member States are required to conduct serological surveillance in domestic swine and w ild boar residing in and around restricted areas, which increases the likelihood of detecting an42 outbreak. All domestic swine must undergo veterinary inspection at slaughter, which is likely to detect clinically affected animals. These factors limit the ri sk of CSF virus in fresh pork and pork meat.

W aste feeding controls in Switzerland and Liechtenstein further limit the likelihood of exposure of domestic swine to infected pork and pork products ( see Section 1.2.3 and
Annex 2 ) . Less than 2 percent of swin e holdings in Switzerland

— and none in
Liechtenstein

— feed heat

- treated catering waste. The swine industry is small, highly integrated, and well regulated. Producers receive premiums for adhering to organic or label standards, which prohibit waste feeding, s o there is considerable economic disincentive to illegally feed non

- treated waste food to swine. Overall, the likelihood of CSF introduction via legal ly imported pork or pork products, with subsequent exposure of domestic swine or wild boar, is low.

Nonet heless, additional measures may be necessary to prevent commingling of pork and pork products destined for export with those sourced from an affected country or region. APHIS addressed this concern for EU Member States in previous regulations by prohibitin g the export of fresh pork and pork products, as well as live swine and swine semen, from areas with CSF outbreaks in domestic swine until at least 6 months after cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises.

12.5 Incoming vehicular or human tra ffic

12.5.1 Central risk issue

Fomites such as vehicle tires and clothing could introduce CSF virus into Switzerland
and/or Liechtenstein from CSF

- affected regions, potentially resulting in exposure of the swine population. (Introduction of CSF virus via c ommodities for personal consumption is discussed in Section 12.6 below.)

12.5.2 Risk factors and existing risk mitigation measures

The likelihood of CSF introduction via this pathway depends primarily on the magnitude
of traffic from CSF

- affected regions, biosecurity measures in place for commercial and

non

- commercial traffic, customs inspection procedures, and Swiss import and transit practices.

Switzerland shares land borders with Germany and France, both of which contain regions restricted by the EC due to CSF in wild boar ( see Section 3 ). There is considerable rail and road traffic from these countries into Switzerland and Liechtenstein, without routine customs inspection

— except for at the Austria

- Liechtenstein border

— or standard biosecurity measures at the border. Harmonized EC and Swiss legislation require s that
live

- haul trucks be cleaned, but not disinfected, after each transport. Introduction of CSF virus by this pathway is therefore theoretically possible, particularly in the event of an
undetected outbreak in domestic swine.

However, Switzerland imports very few live swine, transit of live swine across the territory by road is prohibited, and transit by rail does not occur, all of which limit the potential for virus transmission on commercial vehic les. In addition, few CSF outbreaks in domestic swine have occurred in neighboring EU Member States in recent years [35, 74] , which limits the potential f or virus transmission on clothing or non

- commercial43 vehicles. APHIS therefore considers the risk of incoming vehicular or human traffic introducing CSF virus via to be negligible.

12.6 Commodities for personal consumption

12.6.1 Central risk issue

Commod ities for personal consumption derived from domestic swine or wild boar could introduce CSF virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein, potentially resulting in exposure of the domestic swine population.

12.6.2 Risk factors and existing mitigation measures

T he likelihood of CSF introduction via this pathway depends primarily on EC and Swiss policies regarding allowable commodities for personal consumption, the magnitude of
traffic from CSF

- affected regions, and customs practices at points of entry.

Land bord er crossings into Switzerland are controlled by the Swiss customs service, without veterinary control per se. Travelers from EU Member States may carry agricultural commodities, including pork and pork products, for personal consumption ( see Section 7.4 )

. The Swiss customs service does not routinely inspect incoming road or rail traffic since Switzerland joined the Schengen Area, except for at the Austria

Liechtenstein border . Travelers from non

- EU Member States may not bring agricultural
commodities into S witzerland, including pork and pork products . C ustoms inspection at Swiss airports is primarily based on self

- declaration, with targeted inspection based on
risk.

Considering these restrictions, the likelihood of travelers from EU Member States carrying p ersonal consignments of susceptible commodities into Switzerland is greater than travelers from other countries. Pork and pork products for personal consumption that originate from EU Member States are subject to the same mitigating factors discussed in
Se ction 12.4, including the limitations on waste feeding. APHIS therefore considers the likelihood of CSF introduction via pork or pork products for personal consumption, with subsequent exposure of domestic swine or wild boar through waste feeding, to be lo w. Wild boar carcasses imported by hunters could also introduce CSF virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein. EC legislation prohibits hunters from removing wild boar carcasses from restricted areas, if hunting is allowed. The Swiss customs service does no t routinely inspect for wild boar carcasses in vehicles entering Switzerland and carcasses tested for
trichina worms are not routinely tested for CSF ( see Section 7.4) . Nonetheless, the probability of the specific chain of events occurring that would lead to CSF introduction via the carcass of an infected wild boar that was hunted in and illegally removed from a restricted area is very low. The possibility of CSF introduction via homemade products of
wild boar cannot be excluded , however

. 12.7 Summary

The p receding release assessment has demonstrated no immediate risk issues associated with CSF in the common veterinary area comprised of Switzerland and Liechtenstein. However, several concerns remain that stem from the provisions of harmonized EC and
Swiss le gislation concerning sourcing of live swine and swine commodities, as well as Swiss import practices. The harmonized legislation allows sourcing of pork and pork44 products from areas of EU Member States

— including Germany and France

— that are
restricted due t o CSF in wild boar. The harmonized legislation also allows resumption of trade after a CSF outbreak in domestic swine within 30 days of cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises, which may be insufficient time to ensure disease freedom.

In A PHIS’ estimation, these provisions may increase the risk of CSF introduction into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein, depending on the ability of affected EU Member States to detect a CSF outbreak in domestic swine. Once detected, EC control measures appear sufficient to quickly contain and eradicate the outbreak. However, infected herds pose a
risk to the internal common market

— including Switzerland and Liechtenstein

— and the export market until detected. The harmonized EC and Swiss legislation also creates t he potential for commingling of live swine, pork, and pork products for export to the United States with such commodities from restricted areas of EU Member States. Finally, the Schengen Agreement and associated lack of routine customs inspections at the S wiss border may increase the likelihood of CSF introduction through commodities for personal consumption, particularly wild boar carcasses and derived products.

In light of these factors, the likelihood of CSF introduction into Switzerland and/or
Liechten stein appears similar to many EU Member States within the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region. The potential for exposure of domestic swine within Switzerland or Liechtenstein to CSF virus in imported infected commodities is somewhat mitigated by prevailing attitu des toward waste feeding, the relatively small number of premises authorized to heat treat and feed catering waste, and the comparatively large number of farms on which waste feeding is prohibited according to organic or label standards.45 Risk estimate

The preceding assessment of the 11 factors specified in 9 CFR 92.2 has found no evidence that CSF currently exists in Switzerland or Liechtenstein and demonstrated no immediate and significant risks associated with this disease. Nonetheless, the re is a potential for introduction of CSF virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein . This is primarily because Switzerland and Liechtenstein import substantial quantities of pork and pork products from Germ any and France, without prohibiting sourcing from restricted areas. In addition, most road and rail traffic from EU Member States into Switzerland is not subject to customs inspection since Switzerland joined the Schengen Area. It is therefore easy for tra velers to transport commodities for personal consumption that are derived from domestic swine or wild boar, from both restricted and non

- restricted areas
of EU Member States.

In implementing the Agricultural Agreement, Switzerland and Liechtenstein adopte d EC regulations and controls regarding animal health, abolished border veterinary controls, and facilitated free trade in agricultural products on the EU internal common market. Switzerland and Liechtenstein are situated in the middle of a region that APH IS has recognized as low risk for CSF , namely the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region. APHIS regards the EU Member States in this region as having the same low level of risk due to harmonized EC legislation and free trade on the internal common market, factors tha t now apply to Switzerland and Liechtenstein as well.

The APHIS

- defined EU CSF region is subject to the import conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.24 for breeding swine, pork, and pork products, and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen. 9 CFR 94.24 prohibits sourcing of live swine, pork, and pork products for export
to the United States from areas of the EU that are restricted due to CSF in wild boar or domestic swine. This regulation also prohibits commingling of live swine, pork, and pork products for export with suc h commodities from restricted areas. 9 CFR 98.38 prohibits sourcing of swine semen for export to the United States from areas of the EU that are restricted due to CSF in wild boar or domestic swine, as well as commingling of donor
boars with live swine fro m restricted regions.

The prohibition on sourcing from areas of the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region that are restricted due to CSF in domestic swine extends until at least 6 months after cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises. This stipulation was included to address APHIS’ concerns regarding reoccurrence of CSF in domestic swine if restrictions are removed after 30 days, as allowed by EC regulations ( see Section 12.4.2). The regulations also address APHIS’ concerns regarding commingling of por k and pork products for export to the United States with such commodities sourced from restricted
areas within the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region.

The same risk concerns regarding sourcing and commingling of live swine and swine products apply to Switzerland and Liechtenstein since the y implemented the Agricultural Agreement and Additional Agreement . Unlike some EU Member States that comprise the
APHIS

- defined EU CSF region, the risk of CSF introduction into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein through natural mo vements of wild boar, importation or transit of live swine, or vehicular or human traffic is negligible. The risk of CSF introduction via46 commodities for personal consumption is similar to that of other Schengen Area countries, which includes most EU Membe r States.

Consequently, the risk profile for the common veterinary area formed by Switzerland and
Liechtenstein is similar to that of the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region. Applying the provisions of 9 CSF 94.24 and 98.38 ( see Annex 1 ) to Switzerlan d and Liechte nstein
would address the risk issues discussed in Section 12 and result in a level of risk that is equivalent to, or less than, that portion of the EU authorized to export breeding swine, swine semen, and pork and pork products to the United States.47 An nexes

Annex 1: 2009 T itle 9
, Code of Federal Regulations , sections 94.24 , 94.25, 98.38.

§ 94.24: Restrictions on the importation of pork, pork products, and swine from the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region.

(a) Pork and pork products. In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this part, fresh pork and pork products imported from the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions:

(1) The pork or pork products must not have been derived from swine that were in any of the fol lowing regions or zones, unless the swine were slaughtered after the periods described:

(i) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) as one in which classical swine fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region;

(ii) A restricted zone in the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region established because of detection of classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competen t veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or

(iii) A res tricted zone in the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority o f the Member State.

(2) The pork and pork products must not have been commingled with pork or pork products derived from other swine that were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the other swine were slaughtered after the periods described. Additionally, the pork and pork products must not have been derived from swine that were commingled with other swine that were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) th rough (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the swine from which the pork or pork products were derived were slaughtered after the periods described.

(3) The swine from which the pork or pork products were derived must not have transited any region or

zo ne described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the swine were moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unl ess the swine were slaughtered after the periods described.

(4) No equipment or materials used in transporting the swine from which the pork or pork products were derived from the farm of origin to the slaughtering establishment may have been used prev iously for transporting swine that do not meet the requirements of this section, unless the equipment and materials
have first been cleaned and disinfected.

(5) The pork and pork products must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an official of th e competent veterinary authority of the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region Member State who is authorized to issue the foreign meat inspection certificate required by §327.4 of this title, stating that the applicable provisions of paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section have been met. 20

(b) Live swine. In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this title, live swine imported
from the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions:

(1) The swine must be breeding swi ne.
(2) The swine must not have been in any of the following regions or zones, unless the swine are exported to the United States after the periods described:

(i) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) as one in which c lassical swine fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region;

(ii) A restricted zone in the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection un til the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months48 following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and
disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or

(iii) A restricted zone in the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of t he zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.

(3) The swine must not have been commingled with other swine that have at any time been in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(iii) of this section, unless the swine are exported after the periods described.

(4) The swine must not have transited any region or zone described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(iii) of this section, unless the swine were moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless the swine are exported after the periods described;

(5) No equipment or materials used in tran sporting the swine may have been used previously for transporting swine that do not meet the requirements of this section, unless the equipment and materials
have first been cleaned and disinfected.

(6) The swine must be accompanied by a certificate is sued by a salaried veterinary officer of the competent veterinary authority of the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region Member State, stating that the conditions of paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this section have been met. 21

(c) The certificates required by paragraphs (a)(5) and (b)(6) of this section must be presented by the importer to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival, upon arrival of the swine, pork, or pork products at the port.

20 The certification required may be placed on the foreign meat inspection certificate required by §327.4 of this title or may be contained in a separate document.

21 The certification required may be placed on the certificate required by §93.505(a) of this chapter or may be contained in a separate document

§ 94. 25: Restrictions on the importation of live swine, pork, or pork products from certain regions free of
classical swine fever.

The regions listed in paragraph (a) of this section are recognized as free of classical swine fever (CSF) in §§94.9(a) and 94. 10(a) but either supplement their pork supplies with fresh (chilled or frozen) pork imported from regions considered to be affected by CSF, or supplement their pork supplies with pork from
CSF

- affected regions that is not processed in accordance with the r equirements of this part, or share a
common land border with CSF

- affected regions, or import live swine from CSF

- affected regions under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. Thus, there exists a possib ility that live swine, pork, or pork products from the CSF

- free regions listed in paragraph (a) of this section may be commingled with live swine, pork, or pork products from CSF

- affected regions, resulting in a risk of CSF introduction into the United Sta tes. Therefore, live swine, pork, or pork products and shipstores, airplane meals, and baggage containing pork or pork products, other than those articles regulated under parts 95 or 96 of this chapter, may not be imported into the United States from a reg ion listed in paragraph (a) of this section unless the requirements in this section, in addition to other applicable requirements of part 93 of this chapter and part 327 of this title, are met.

(a) Regions subject to the requirements of this section: C hile and the Mexican States of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chihuahua, Nayarit, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Yucatan.

(b) Live swine. The swine must be accompanied by a certification issued by a full

- time salaried veterinary of ficer of the national government of the region of export. Upon arrival of the swine in the United States, the certification must be presented to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival. The certification must identify both the exporting region and t he region of origin as a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as free of CSF at the time the swine were in the region and must state that:

(1) The swine have not lived in a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;49 (2) The swine have never been commingled with swine that have been in a region that is designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;

(3) The swine have not transited a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF unless moved directly through th e region to their destination in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal intact upon arrival at the point of destination; and

(4) The conveyances or materials used in transporting the swine, if previously used for transporting swine, have been clean ed and disinfected in accordance with the requirements of §93.502 of this chapter.

(c) Pork or pork products. The pork or pork products must be accompanied by a certification issued by a
full

- time salaried veterinary officer of the national government of the region of export. Upon arrival of the pork or pork products in the United States, the certification must be presented to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival. The certification must identify both the exporting region and the region of orig in of the pork or pork products as a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as free of CSF at the time the pork or pork products were in the region and must state that:

(1) The pork or pork products were derived from swine that were born and raised in a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as free of CSF and were slaughtered in such a region at a federally inspected slaughter plant that is under the direct supervision of a full

- time salaried veterinarian of the national government of that region and tha t is eligible to have its products imported into the United States under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) and the regulations in §327.2 of this title;

(2) The pork or pork products were derived from swine that have not lived in a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;

(3) The pork or pork products have never been commingled with pork or pork products that have been in a region that is designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;

(4) The pork o r pork products have not transited through a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF unless moved directly through the region to their destination in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal intact upon arrival at the point of destinat ion; and

(5) If processed, the pork or pork products were processed in a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as free of CSF in a federally inspected processing plant that is under the direct supervision of a full

- time salaried veterinary official of the national government of that region.

§ 98.38: Restrictions on the importation of swine semen from the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region.

In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this part, swine semen imported from the
APHIS

- defined EU C SF region must meet the following conditions, except as noted in paragraph (h) of this section with regard to swine semen imported from Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, or the United Kingdom:

(a) The semen must come from a semen colle ction center approved for export by the competent veterinary authority of the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region Member State.

(b) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that was in any of the following regions or zones, unless the semen was collected after the periods described:

(1) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) of this chapter as one in which classical swine fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region;

(2) A restricted zo ne in the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or

(3) A restricted zone in the APHIS

- defin ed EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.50 (c) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that was commingled with swine that at any time were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section, unless the semen was collected after the periods descri bed.

(d) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that transited any region or zone described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section during the periods described, unless the donor boar was moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless the semen was collected after the periods described;

(e) The donor boar must be held in isolation for at least 30 days pri or to entering the semen collection

center.

(f) No more than 30 days prior to being held in isolation as required by paragraph (e) of this section, the donor boar must be tested with negative results with a classical swine fever test approved by the Wo rld Organization for Animal Health.

(g) No equipment or materials used in transporting the donor boar from the farm of origin to the semen collection center may have been used previously for transporting swine that do not meet the requirements
of this section, unless such equipment or materials have first been cleaned and disinfected.

(h) Except for semen collected from swine in Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, or the United Kingdom, before the semen is exported to the United State s, the donor boar must be held at the semen collection center and observed by the center veterinarian for at least 40 days following collection of the semen, and, along with all other swine at the semen collection center, exhibit no clinical signs of
class ical swine fever.

(i) The semen must be accompanied by a certificate issued by a salaried veterinary officer of the competent veterinary authority of the APHIS

- defined EU CSF region Member State, stating that the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (h ) of this section have been met. 3

3 The certification required may be placed on the certificate required under §98.35(c) or may be contained in a separate document.51 Annex 2: Waste feeding in Switzerland and Liechtenstein

. Background

Switzerland allow s feeding of heat

- treated catering waste to pig s in accordance with specific provisions laid out in the Animal Health Ordinance ; other forms of waste feeding

are strictly prohibited [24] . Premises that heat

- treat and feed catering waste must be approved by the cantonal veterinary authorities and must be inspected annually by an
official veterinarian [20] . BVET officials indicated that there were about 200 such premises in 2009

— equating to about 6 percent of Swiss pigs

— and that the number is declining; the BVET plans to prohibit feeding of heat

- treated catering waste by July 2011. No swine holdings in Liechtenstein are approved to feed h eat

- treated catering

waste.

This report addresses both legal and illegal waste feeding in Switzerland as it relates to the risk of exposure to CSF virus in catering waste. APHIS gathered information on catering waste feeding regulation s and CSF risk from various sources, including (1) interviews with national and cantonal veterinary officials, veterinarians, and livestock farm personnel; (2) visits to swine farms in Switzerland; (3) catering waste feeding regulations; and (4) an animal health risk assessme nt on catering waste feeding prepared by the BVET.

Legal waste feeding

Overview

Swiss regulations require that animal byproducts, including catering waste, be used or recycled to the extent possible, while avoiding adverse effects on human and animal
he alth and the environment [75] . Animal byproducts are defined as animal carca sses not intended for human consumption, products of animal origin, and food scraps. Food scraps
are defined as waste food from establishments that produce food for human consumption, such as restaurants, catering establishments, and kitchens ( both large k itchens and
household kitchens )

. In this assessment, the term catering waste is used to refer to food scraps as defined in the ordinance. Catering waste in Switzerland arises in private households and restaurants and is disposed of as municipal waste, by composting

, or by feeding to pigs or poultry [76]

. In addition, catering waste from r estaurants is used for biogas production.

Feeding of catering waste to swine in Switzerland is strictly regulated. Regulations pertaining to the collection, processing, and use of catering waste as animal feed in Switzerland are designed to minimize expo sure of farm animals to waste contaminated with disease agents [76] . Catering waste fe d to animals must be heat treated to inactivate disease agents. In addition, feeding of catering waste to farm animals requires authorization to do so from the appropriate cantonal office [75] . Authorizations require an initial inspection of the premises by the canton and annual follow

- up inspections to

assess compliance with appl icable regulations.52 Authorizations

Cantonal authorizations for animal byproduct disposal facilities must meet f ederal regulatory requirements as described in the Ordinance on the disposal of animal byproducts [75] . The authorizations must spe cify the purpose of the facility ; the category of animal byproduct authorized for disposa l; the maximum authorized capacity of the operation, taking into account transport, receiving, storage, and processing capacities; and any other applicable conditions or constraints. The authorization can be granted for a maximum of 10 years. Renewal is co ntingent up on demonstration of physical and operational compliance with regulatory requirements.

Authorizations are valid for only the specified facility [75] . Authorizations include the requirement that the total amount of animal byproducts disposed of at the facility each year be reported to canton al authorities by January 31 s t of the following year. The total amount must be broken down by category, type of waste , deliverer, and receiver. Authorizations can be revoked for noncompliance with requirements or not correcting deficiencies in a timely manner. Cantonal veterinary offi cials inspect premises authorized
to feed heat

- treated catering waste on an annual basis.

Facilities authorized to dispose of animal byproducts must establish, document, and maintain a system of controls based on principles of risk analysis and critical co ntrol point monitoring [75] . The documentation must be available for inspec tion by appropriate f ederal and cantonal officials, and must be retained for at least 3 years.

Sourcing

For the purposes of regulation, animal byproducts, including catering waste, are classified into one of three risk categories [75] . Handling and processing requirements for animal byproducts vary depending on the category to wh ich the byproducts are assigned. Most catering waste is assigned to the lowest risk category, Category 3, which can be used in animal feed if certain handling and processing requirements are met. However, kitchen and catering waste from international trans port vehicles is considered Category 1
materials and must be incinerated; feeding of Category 1 material to swine is prohibited. Feeding of catering waste that originates from a region or premises that is subject to restrictions imposed in response to an a nimal disease outbreak is also prohibited.

Cantonal public health authorities authorize restaurants and other establishments to supply heat

- treatment and biogas facilities [20] . Suppliers must pass inspection annually and must retain records of the volume and type of catering waste provided for at least 3 years. Heat

- treated catering waste is often mixed with other organic waste b efore being fed to pigs.

Transportation

Containers and other equipment used to transport animal byproducts must be leak proof, corrosion resistant, and easy to clean. Vehicles and reusable containers and other equipment that comes into contact with anima l byproducts must be cleaned and disinfected after use, and kept clean until next use.

Transport documents for animal byproducts must be completed in triplicate: the original

accompan ies the consignment to its destination to be retained by the recipient, and one copy each is retained by the sender and the transporter. The documents must specify the53 date of collection; a description of the materials; the appropriate risk category classification; animal species (only for Category 3 material to be used for f eed); weight; name, contact information, and, if applicable, premises number of the source premises;
and the name, contact information, and premises number of transporter and recipient.

Operational requirements

Individuals who dispose of animal byproducts are obligated to ensure that the disposal does not result in disease spread [ 75] . Containers and equipment used in handling animal byproducts must be well maintained and cleaned regularly. Animal byproducts must be processed to inactivate all disease agents. Specifically, Category 3 waste materials must be sterilized under pressur e or heated to boiling temperature for at least 20 minutes before feeding to swine. Heat treatment parameters, in particular temperature and duration, must be continuously monitored and recorded. Measurement equipment must be regularly
calibrated. Processe d materials must be disposed of in a manner that prevents their
contamination.

Regulations require that animal byproducts be clearly identified by category and that animal byproducts of different categories be kept separate [75] . Each facility is authorized for disposal of only one category of animal byproduct and is prohibited from maintaining physical or operational associations with facilities authorized for disposal of other categories of animal byproducts.

Disposal facilities must be located in a building area separate from farm animal holdings, slaughter facilities, or foo d facilities, and must be located away from public streets [75]

. The facilit y must be fenced or otherwise made inaccessible to unauthorized personnel or animals, with a documented pest management plan. For facilities on premises on which farm animals are kept, the facility layout and operations must include measures to keep the pr ocessing facility separate from the animal holding area. Direct or indirect contact
between farm animals and vehicles or containers used for raw animal byproducts is prohibited. Processed animal byproducts may be routed to an animal feeding area through

a closed line.

The facility layout should provide for separation of "clean" and "dirty" work areas, and for preventing contamination of processed animal byproducts. Procedures must be established to control personnel movement between the clean and dirty ar eas. Personnel working in the dirty area of the facility are permitted to enter the clean area only after changing their work clothes and changing or disinfecting their footwear. Any equipment to be moved from the dirty to the clean area must first be clea ned and disinfected.

Compliance

As noted above, cantonal veterinary authorities conduct annual inspections of premises that are authorized to heat treat and feed catering waste. In addition, in 2006 the BVET assessed regulatory compliance in an evaluatio n of 56 premises randomly selected from among a total of 218 premises authorized to feed catering waste to swine [76] . The BVET analysis found that 36 percent of the premises met all BVET criteria for regulatory compliance. The BVET estimated that the likelihood of farm animals on the remaining premises being fed inadequately treated cater ing waste was "high". As a result of this analysis, Swiss authorities strengthened the regulatory controls on feeding of heat

- treated54 catering waste. BVET officials indicated that most violations in 2008 were minor and
would not have result ed in inadequate heat treatment of catering waste [20]

. Summary

Feeding of heat

- treated catering waste is limited in scope, with few approved p remises in Switzerland and none in Liechtenstein, and is scheduled to be phased out by 2011. Feeding of heat

- treated catering waste is highly regulated, with annual inspections of
both heat

- treatment facilities and restaurants that supply the catering wast e. All catering waste supplied to heat

- treatment facilities must originate in Switzerland. The parameters for heat treatment or sterilization are adequate to destroy CSF virus; however, not all catering waste is adequately treated before feeding. Mixing he at

- treated waste with other organic waste before feeding may dilute any disease agent present. Since heat

- treatment and biogas facilities are often located on premises with livestock, the potential exists for exposure and contamination.

Illegal waste feed ing

The prevalence of illegal feeding of catering waste to swine, and its impact on the risk of swine being infected with CSF virus through catering waste feeding, are unknown. Feeding of catering waste to swine, including food scraps, is strictly prohibit ed except for
heat

- treated waste on approved premises as described above [27, 69] . Penalties for noncompliance include up to 20,000 CHF or 6 months in jail.

The swine industry in Switzerland and Liechtenstein is small, highly integrated, and well regulated [20] . Veterinary oversight is considerable and the official inspection process is thorough. Premises inspections for compliance with animal movement, animal welfare, animal feed, and pha rmaceutical regulations all provide opportunities for official veterinarians to detect and report illegal catering waste feeding.

An APHIS site visit team found no evidence of illegal catering waste feeding to farm
animals and Swiss officials indicated t o APHIS that illegal catering waste feeding is not prevalent in Switzerland or Liechtenstein [20] . The team found very high lev els of awareness among farm owners and employees, private and official veterinarians, and federal and cantonal veterinary officials that waste feeding is prohibited on premises not specifically authorized to feed heat

- treated catering waste, and is schedul ed to be prohibited on all premises in 2011 [20]

. All swine producers in Switzerland and Liechtenstein are required to comply with a strict
animal welfare code [20] . Supermarkets pay producers a premium of up to 25 CSF per pig produced on farms that ar e particularly welfare friendly, which entitles the supermarket to place a special label on the pork and pork products. Participating producers are required to conform to the label standards, including no waste feeding, and are inspected 1

- 2 times per year for compliance. All forms of waste feeding are prohibited on certified organic farms

— which constitute approximately 20 percent of Swiss pig farms

— and also on farms that produce according to label standards. Noncompliance can lead to loss of organic status or label premiums.55 Conclusions

The frequency with which pigs are exposed to CSF through catering waste used as animal feed depends on the quantity of contaminated foodstuffs present and how the waste is processed. The requirement that catering waste su pplied to heat

- treatment facilities originate in Switzerland and the high degree of regulatory oversight limit the likelihood of CSF virus in raw catering waste. If CSF were introduced

— for example, through imported pork or pork products

— the BVET assessment indicates that the likelihood of heat treatment failing to inactivate the virus was and perhaps still is relatively high. Nonetheless, considering that few pigs receive heat

- treated catering waste and that the likelihood of raw catering waste supplied to heat

- treatment facilities containing CSF virus is low, APHIS concludes that the risk of exposure of pigs in Switzerland to CSF virus via feeding of heat

- treated catering waste is very low.

The prevalence of illegal feeding of catering waste to swine is un known. The high degree of veterinary oversight of swine farms, severe penalties for noncompliance with the ban on feeding non

- treated catering waste to pigs, and high producer awareness likely limit
the volume of waste fed illegally . Noncompliance can also lead to loss of organic status or label premiums, resulting in considerable economic disincentive to illegally feed waste food to swine. Illegal feeding of non

- treated waste food originating in Switzerland carries very little risk for CSF transmission. Th e likelihood of imported commodities

— including homemade preparations from wild boar meat

— carrying CSF virus is greater. However, imported commodities likely comprise only a small fraction of waste food illegally fed to swine. Considering these factors, APH IS concludes that the risk of exposure of pigs in Switzerland and Liechtenstein to CSF virus via illegal waste feeding is low.56 Annex 3: Switzerland import and export data 2003

- 2008.

Table 3A : Imported fresh, chilled, and frozen pork (kg) 2003

- 08

Year 20 03 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total 9,741,058 11,663,218 7,962,374 6,728,621 7,220,193 15,339,107 Germany 5,749,040 7,172,023 5,645,134 5,181,311 4,806,733 10,803,912
Austria 3,903,880 4,385,780 2,210,290 1,435,363 1,430,077 3,020,779 Italy 42,261 33,932 35,664 43,578 61,423 222,733
Australia 31,036 35,675 24,734 21,806 22,866 15,003
United States 3,060 8,953 18,769 15,693 17,340 37,378
France 4,422 7,499 18,694 1,756 859,262 1,114,173
Slovakia 0 0 5,083 27,904 0 0 Hungary 7,122 1,173 1,766 0 1,783 4 ,384 Spain 0 10 1,728 599 1,354 66,624 United Kingdom 0 0 480 0 0 0 Czech Republic 230 0 32 0 9,042 29,557
Denmark 0 16,417 0 0 201 22,781

Estonia 7 0 0 0 0 0 Belgium 0 1,426 0 0 9,167 23
Slovenia 0 330 0 0 0 0 Japan 0 0 0 269 0 0

Netherlands 0 0 0 0 31 36
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 926 Portugal 0 0 0 342 914 798

Table 3B : Exported fresh, chilled, and frozen pork (kg) 2003

- 08

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total 54,678 443,866 137,658 182,001 163,191 287,731 Germany 0 0 82,742 95,873 118,354 202,6 77
Cote d’Ivoire 21,843 396,425 0 26,559 0 54,443 Italy 0 0 15,391 21,903 25,119 29,048

France 0 0 500 0 374 1,560 Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 1 3

Romania 31,331 15,460 39,025 37,666 18,728 0
United Arab Emirates 0 26,594 0 0 0 0 United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 13 0 Hungary 0 5,387 0 0 0 0 Japan 0 0 0 0 602 0

Austria 1,504 0 0 0 0 057 References

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