NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-7136

JEROND L. BELTON, Claimant-Appellant,

v.
R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee. Jerond L. Belton , of Durham, North Carolina, pro se. Brian S. Smith , Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justic e, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler , Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Steven J. Gillingham , Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were Michael J. Timinski , Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and Amanda R. Blackmon , Attorney, United States Department of Vete rans Affairs, of Washington, DC. Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Judge John J. Farley, III (Retired)NOTE: This dispositio n is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-7136 JEROND L. BELTON, Claimant-Appellant,

v. R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretar y of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

____________________________ DECIDED: August 29, 2007

____________________________ Before NEWMAN and MO ORE, Circuit Judges , and FARNAN, District Judge

. ∗ PER CURIAM. Jerond J. Belton appeals the decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affi rming a 2005 decision of the B oard of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) that upheld a Regional Office (RO) denial of se rvice connection for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTS D). Belton v. Nicholson , No. 05-2893 (Vet. App. Oct. 27, 2006). We affirm the Veterans Court decision wit h respect to Belton’s statutory interpretation arguments and due process claims. BACKGROUND Belton served on active duty from October 1965 to October 1968, including a tour of duty in Vietnam from Apri l 1966 to March 1967. Belton ’s service records do not

* Hon. Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Delaware , sitting by designation.report any combat related injuries or tr eatment for psychiatric problems and his entrance and severance examinations did not list complaints or diagnoses of psychological conditions. In 1992, Belton fil ed a claim for service connected benefits for PTSD and submitted a letter that detailed treat ment at a VA center for PTSD related to his combat experience in Vietna m. He also submitted an additional letter stating that he was awarded the Combat Inf antrymen Badge, the Purple Heart, and Bronze Star Medal for his Vietnam service. The VA subseq uently investigated discrepancies between Belton’s official service records and the info rmation he provided in support of his claim. Unable to verify that Belton was subject to any stressor during military service or that he received awards indicative of combat expe rience, the RO denied service connection for PTSD in April 1994. Belt on filed a Notice of Disagr eement in 1995 and additional statements, including th ird-party witness letters, to corrob orate his assertions regarding stressors he was exposed to during service. The RO conducted further investigation to verify that these third-party statements s upported Belton’s claim of involvement in combat after transfer to the 25th Infantry Division. Afte r additional unsuccessful efforts to verify that Belton experienced com bat and received combat-related awards, a diagnosis of anxiety was made and the RO issued a supplemental determination continuing its earlier denial of service connec tion. The Board upheld the RO’s denial of service connection. 1 In affirming, the Board consi dered (among the evidence of record) an unsigned November 2001 report by a field ex aminer, as well as other field reports that detail numerous VA effort s to contact third parties for the purpose of verifying

1 Evidently this case comes to us a fter a fourteen year appeal process, two SOCs, five SSOCs, three Board decisions, and two visits to the Veterans Court.

2007-7136 2several submitted statement s. The Veterans Court upheld the denial of service connection for PTSD. ANALYSIS We have exclusive jurisdiction to “review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof” by the Veterans Court “and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisi ons, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (c). Belton asserts that the Bo ard’s consideration of th e unsigned November 2001 field examiner’s report is contrary to the requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) 2 and prejudicially denied Belton “one review on appeal to the Secret ary” and a review of “all evidence and material of record” under the statut e. Specifically, Belton alleges that the Board accepted a secret, unsigned report over a signed May 2001 field examination report as the basis for its dec ision without allowing argument or a hearing. The decision of the Veterans Court does not explicitly interpret section 7104( a), but rather states that “The appellant relies exclusively on the lack of a signature by the field examiner; however, as noted by the Secret ary, there is no regulatory requirement that the field examiner’s report contain a signature, and the appellant has poin ted to no other authority requiring as much.” Although Belton argues that c onsideration of the unsigned report violates section 7104(a), no reasonable c onstruction of this st atute indicates that

2 38 U.S.C § 7104 provides: (a) All questions in a matter which under section 511(a) of this title is subject to decision by the Secretar y shall be subject to one review on appeal to the Secretary. Final decis ions on such appeals shall be made by the Board. Decisions of the B oard shall be based on the entire record in the proceeding and upon consideratio n of all evidence and material of record and applicable provisi ons of law and regulation.

2007-7136 32007-7136 4 it requires that evidence considered by the Board bear a signature. Likewise, we know of no other statute or regulatio n that requires a VA field exam iner’s report be signed if it is to be considered by the Board in a service-connection proceeding. Belton also asserts that initial Board consideratio n of the unsigned document violates his due process rights to “one review on appeal to the Secretary” by making a decision on evidence he describes as secretly submitted to the Board. The Veterans Court noted that, to the ext ent Belton’s arguments regarding the Board’s errors raised due process concerns in the altering of veteran records for appeal, these vague assertions of constitutional impropriety that lacked legal support were insufficient to make out a due process violation. Belton’s due process arguments on appeal suffer the same deficiency. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.