1 ... T he H o no rab l e B arb ara N ell erm o e, p resid i ng jud ge of t he 45 t h J ud i cial D i st rict C o urt, B ex ar C o un t y, T ex as, co nd uct ed t he heari ng o n t he p l ea t o t he juri sdi ct i o n and o ral l y d eni ed i t ; ho wever, t he H o no rable D avi d A
. B erchel m ann J r. sig n e d the w ritten o rd e r. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 7- 00 83 7- CV CI TY OF SAN AN TON IO , Appellant
v . TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMP ANY & F erna ndo Her nandez Appellee s Fr om the 131st J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2005-CI -11523 Honora ble David A. B erc helmann Jr., J udg e Presiding 1 Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Dissenting opinion by : Catherine Stone, Chief Justi ce Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: J anuar y 14, 2009 REVERSED AND RENDERED This is an interlocutory

appea l from an or der de ny ing the City of San Antonio’s plea to the jurisdiction. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 51 .0 14 (8 ) ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 08 ). Th e City appea ls, contending the t rial court err ed in denying its plea because it did not waive g overnme ntal04

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- 2- immunit y . We r ever se the trial court’s order denying the City ’s plea to the jur isdiction and rende r judgme nt dismi ssing the c ause f or lac k of subject matter

jurisdiction. B ACKG ROUND This claim conce rns the condition of a n ap p ro x i mately six -foot-w ide g rassy

strip of land (“the parkw ay ”) loc ated be tween a sidewalk at Central Catholic Hig h School a nd the curb a

butting Dallas Stree t in San Antonio, Tex as. The City owns a rig ht-of-w ay on the par kway and has a storm drain pipe be low it. I n J uly 2003, Fe rnando Her

nandez, a high school employ ee acting in the course and scope of his e mploy

ment, drove a Bobc at trac tor onto the parkw ay . Her nandez was injure d when he and the B obcat “ fell into the hole t h at wa s cre ated whe n the ea rth bene ath the B obcat c ollapsed.” He rn and e z ma de a wor kers ’ c omp e ns a tio n c la im that w a s p a id b y the hig h s c ho ol’ s w or

ke rs ’
c omp e ns a tio n c arr ie r, Te xas M utu a l Ins ur anc e Com pa ny (“ TM I C” ). TM I C the n f ile d s uit a g a ins t the City as He rnande z’s subroge e, cla iming the Ci t y wa s re sponsible for the injuries. See T EX AS L A BOR C ODE ANN . § 417.001(b) ( Ver non Supp. 2008). Herna ndez intervene d s ee k i n g damag es exceedingthose paid by

TMI C. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the g round that it had not waived g overnme ntal immunit y . S OVE RE I GN I M M U N I TY Sovereig n immunit y deprive s a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dept. of Parks & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 1 33 S.W. 3d

21 7, 22 4 ( Te x. 20 04 ). A g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty is g e ne ra lly immune from suit unless the immuni t y i s wa i v ed b y the L eg islature. City of Dallas v. Reed , 258 S.W .3d 620, 622 (Tex. 2008)
. The Texas L eg islature has provided a limit ed waiver of immunit y for tor t c la ims ari sin g fr om a c on dit ion or us e of re a l pr op e rt

y “ if the g ov e rnme nta l un it w ou ld, we re it04

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- 3- a private per son, be liable to the c laimant.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 101.021(2) (Ve rnon 2005). The se pre mises liabilit y claims take two f

orms, ordinary

premises de fec t or specia l defe ct, depe nding on the condition of the prope rty
. See id. § 101.022 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). I n an ordina

ry premises liability claim and in a claim for g ross neg lige nce, the duty owed by the g overnme ntal unit is t he same duty owed by a private landowne r to a lice nsee, which requir es
a land ow ne r n ot t o in

jur e a lic e ns e e by

wi llf ul, wa nto n o r gross ly

ne g lig e nt c on du c t and

to u se ordinary car e to war

n or make rea sonably

safe a dang erous c ondition of which the owne r has a ctual knowledg e. State Dept. of Highways & Public Transp. v. P ayne , 838 S.W .2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992) (o p . o nre h ’g) (c i t i n g T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 101.022(a) ). To establish a wa iver of immunit y in a ordinary premises defec t case , “the plaintiff must show the gove rnmental e ntity had actua l knowledg e ‘of

the dang erous c ondition at the time of the ac ciden t , n o t m er el y of the possibili ty

that a dange rous conditi on c[ould] develop.’ ” City of C or sic an a v . S

te war t , 249 S.W .3d 412, 413-14 (Te x . 2008) (quoting City of Dallas v. Thompson , 210 S.W .3d 601, 603 (Tex. 2006)). To establish a wa iver of immunit y based on g ross neg lige nce, the plaintiff must show: (1) the ac t or omission, when viewed objec tively from the a ctor’s standpoint, involves an e x treme deg ree of risk,
c o n s id e r in g th e p r o b a

b il it y an d ma g n it

u d e o f th e p o te n ti a l h ar

m to o th e r s , an d ( 2 ) the actor has actua l, subjective aw are ness of t h e risk involved, but never theless proc eeds w ith conscious indiffer ence to the rig hts, safety , or we lfare of others. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender , 968 S.W .2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1998). I f the a ssertion is that a spec ial defe ct exist s, the duty owed by the g overnme ntal unit is t hat owed by a private landowner to an invitee, whic h require s an owne r to use ordina ry car e to re duce04

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- 4- or eliminate unrea sonable risks of harm of which the owner is a war e or rea sonably should be awa re. Ree d , 2 5 8 S
. W
. 3 d

at 6 2 2 (c i t i n g Payne , 838 S.W .2d at 237). TMI C and Her

nandez alleg ed both ordinar y and spec ial defe cts, as we ll as g ross neg lige nce, as base s for a waiver of immunit y . The City contends it e stablished there was no wa iver a s a matter of l aw because , among other thi ng s (1) it did not have ac tual knowledg e of a dang erous c ondition likely to cause the injury

alleg ed at the t ime of t he accident; (2) any defe ct on the parkway was not a spec ial defe ct; and (3) it was not g rossly neg lige nt. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226. The plaintiff has the burden to alleg e facts demonst rating jurisdiction and we c onstrue the pleading s liberally

in its favor. Id. W h en a plea to the jurisdiction cha lleng es the e x istence of jur isd ic tio na l f

a c ts, a s th e City ’s pl ea do es here , th e tr ia l c ourt re vie ws the re le va

nt e vid e nc e to deter mine whether

a fa ct issue exist s. See id. at 227. I f the e vidence raises a fac t question on jur isd ic tio n, the tr ia l court c ann ot g ra nt the ple a and

the iss ue mus t be re so lve d b y the tr ie r o f f

a c t. Id. a t 22 7- 28 . I f the e vid e nc e is un dis pu te d or fa ils to ra ise a fa c t qu e sti on , th e tr ia l c ourt mus t r ule
on the pl ea as a matter of law. Id
. at 2 2 8
. W e re v i ew t h e tr i al co u rt ’s ru l i n g de novo
. Id . We take as true a ll evidence favor able to the nonmovant a nd indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e in its favor. Id . Simi larly , whether

a condition is a “spe cial def ect” is a q u est ion of law, whic h we r eview de

novo . Ree d , 258 S.W .3d at 622. D I S CUS S I ON The Ci t y d oes not dispute that TMI C and Her nandez met the jurisdictional pleading require ments. All parties submitted evidence in support of and opposed t o the plea. T he dispositive04

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- 5- issues in this appeal ar e whe ther the e vidence befor e the tria l court ra ised a fa ct question reg arding the City ’s ac tual knowledg e of the dang erous c ondition that caused He rnande z’s injury or of the extreme deg ree of risk it posed and whe ther the de fec t on the parkw ay was a specia l defe ct. Ordinary Prem ises Def

ect – Actual Know ledge Th e City argue s th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e be fo re the tr ia l c ourt that it a c tua lly kn e w the sin kh ole exis ted before Herna

ndez’s acc ident. See Ste wart, 24 9 S.W. 3d a t 41 4- 41 5; Thompson , 210 S.W .3d
a t 60 2. Th e City ’s kn ow le dg e tha t de te ri or a tin g c on dit ion s b e low the s urf a c e mig ht at so me tim e in the future r esult in a sinkhole is insufficient to establish waiver of immunity
. See id. Taking ap p el l ee s ’ evide nce a s true and indulg ing a ll inferenc es there from in their fa vor, the e vidence established: •in 2000, David I

banez, the hig h school’s chie f of maintena nce, notice d the g round was sepa rating from the building s and the sidewa lks were sliding aw ay •I banez investig ated a

nd conclude d the main storm drain unde r the pa rkw ay was damag ed •I banez believe d there was a cave rn under

the par kway constituting a ha zard •high sc hool repre sentatives ca lled the City but obtained no re lief •in 2002, the storm drain collapse d causinga sinkhole on the pa rkwa y •in Janu ary 20 02 , th e City

re sp on de d, bu t me re ly

did a “ patc h jo b” on

the dr a in •I banez enter ed the sinkhole a nd saw the ma in storm drain had c ollapsed and notice d oth e r d a ma g e d p or

tio ns of the dr a in •I banez informed the City

worke rs that the entire pipe nee ded to be r eplac ed, but was told the pipe was only

g oing to be patche d beca use of other

priority jobs •I banez complained to City worke rs about the “ lousy ” patc h job and told the su pe rv iso r t hat w ith ou t pr op e r r e pa ir s th e re wo uld be ano the r s ink

ho le04

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- 6- •w he n the City patc he d the pip e and fi lle d in t he fi rs t si nk

ho le , it le ft the pa rk wa y in a hazar dous condition beca use i t failed to level the are a and left dirt clods, conc rete , and oth e r d e br is •high sc hool repre sentatives ca lled the City numerous times to reque st the City return and cle an up the pa

rkwa y •when the City

failed to ret u rn t o level par kway and cle an up debr is from repa ir of fi rs t si nk ho le , H e rn and e z wa s to ld t o ta ke c are of it •in J uly 2003, Her

nandez drove a Bobcat trac tor onto the parkway to level it and clea

r the de br is •while Her

nandez was on the parkw ay in the Bobc at, the par

kway collapsed, the front of the B obcat f

ell two to two-and-one -half f eet into a sinkhole, and Hernande z was inj ur e d b y

the wh ipl a sh ingmot ion

c a us e d b y the fa ll •the sec ond sinkhole was seve ral fe et awa y from the f

irst one

• a f t e r t h e s e c o n d

s i n kh o l e a

p p e ar e d , h i g h s c h o o l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c a l l e d t h e C i t y, which later

came to the acc ident site T h i s ev i d en ce d o es n o tra i s e a f ac ti s s u e o nt h e C i t y ’s ac tu al kn o wl ed ge. “A ct u al kn o wl ed ge
re qu ir e s k no wl e dg e that the da

ng e ro us c on dit ion e xiste d at the tim e of the a c c ide nt, a s o pp os e d to constructive know ledg e which c an be e stablished by fac ts or infere nces that a dang erous c ondition could develop over time.” Ste war t , 249 S.W .3d at 414-15. In Ste war t , the supreme court he ld the City of Corsicana ’s knowledg e of pr evious floods on a roadway crossing , knowledg e of a crossing flooded one mile upstream, and know ledg e of inc lement we at h er i n the ar ea, w as not ac tual kn ow le dg e tha

t th e c ro ssi ng fr om wh ic h sev e ra l indi vid ua ls w e re sw e pt a

wa y wa s f loo de d at th e tim e the ac cident occ urre d. Id
. Simi larly , the s upreme court he ld in Thompson t h at a c i t y ’s kn o wl ed ge that a floor c over plate could loosen and raise up over time a nd neede d inspection and maintena nce to p re ve nt i t w a s not the ty pe of a c tua l kn ow le dg e re qu ir e d f or lia bil ity in a pr e mis e s d e fe c t c la im. 21 0 S. W.3 d at 60 3. Th e City ’s kn ow le dg e in t his c a se is a

na log ou s to the g ov e rnme nta l e nti tie s’04

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- 7- knowledg e in Ste war t and Thompson
. Whil e the City may have be e n wa rn e d th a t a

se c on d s ink

ho le
wa s li ke ly , th a t di d n ot c onst it ute a c tua l kn ow le dg e of the da ng e ro us c on dit ion . T he law c le a rl y require s the sinkhole to have de veloped a nd the City to be awa

re of its ex istence. A ccor dingly , we h o l d t h e r e i s n o f

a c t i s s u e o na c tu a l kn o w l e d g e s o a s t o c o n s t i tu t e a w a i v e r o f t h e C i t y’ s i m m u n i t y. The dissent sug g ests a fa ct issue ex i s ts with reg ard to a ctual knowledg e bec ause I banez b e li e v e d th a t a s e c o n d s inkh o le w a s li k ely and expr e s s e d h is c o n c e r

nto Ci ty w o r k e r s . We respe ctf u l l y disag ree . The re cord e stablishes Ibanez’s wa rning came eig hteen months befor e the appea ranc e of the second sinkhole. The rec ord fur ther e stablishes that until Hernandez drove the Bobc at onto the par

kway , neither the City

nor any one else had knowledg e of the sec ond sinkhole. Gross Negligence For g ross neg ligen ce t o ex ist, the act or omission at issue must invol ve an e x treme de g ree of risk and the actor

must have ac tual, subjective a war en es s o f t h e risk involved. Ellender , 968 S.W. 2d a t 92 1. Th e e xtre me ri sk pr on g of g ro ss n e g lig e nc e is n ot s a tis fi e d b y a re mot e po ssi bil ity of injury or eve n a sig nificant proba bility of minor har

m, but only

by the l ikelihood of serious injury to the plaintiff. Moriel , 8 79 S.W. 2d a t 22. Th e e vid e nc e , ev e n whe n co ns ide re d in the lig ht m os t favor able to TMI C and Her nandez, establishes the City was aware of a risk of injury beca use of the debris lef t on the parkw ay

and the irregularity of the g round. As for the risk of a

second sinkhole, there is no evidence the City knew it exist ed; rather, the e v i d en ce i s t h at t he City knew e ighte en months before the sec ond sinkhole develope d that I banez believe d there would be anothe r sinkhole. This is not evidence of

an ac t or omission i nvolving a n extreme deg ree of risk or of actua l, subjective
awa rene ss of the risk. Ac cording ly , the City did not waive immunity

based on g ross neg lige nce.04

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- 8- Special Def

ect TMI C and Her

nandez also conte nd there was no wa iver of immunit y beca use the pa rkwa y or the sinkhole ther eon wa s a s p ec i al d ef ec t and the City

knew or should have re asonably

known
a bo ut i t. Th e City c on te nd s the c on dit ion wa s no t a sp e c ia l de fe c t a s a ma tte r of law. We a g re e wi th the City
. Special def

ects “ are defe cts of the s am e kind or c lass as ‘e x cavations or obstructions on highw ay s, roads, or stre ets’ that pre sent an ‘une x pecte d and unusual d an g er to ordina ry users of roadw ay s.’” Ree d , 2 5 8 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 2 2 (q u o t i n g Harris County v. Eaton , 5 7 3 S. W. 2 d 1 7 7 , 1 7 9 ( T e x. 1978) and State v. Rodriguez , 985 S.W .2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)). A spec ial defe ct nee d not be on the s urfa ce of the road itself, Payne , 83 8 S.W. 2d a t 23 8 n. 3, bu t ne e d o nly be su ff ic ie ntl y related to the stree t. See City of El Paso v. Chacon , 14 8 S.W. 3d 41 7, 42 2- 23 (T e x. Ap p. –E l Pa so 20 04 , p e t. d e nie d) (a

na ly zingstatus of

sid e wa lk) . N e ve rt

he le ss, the de fe c t is a

sp e c ia l de fe c t “ on ly if [i t] pose[s] a threat to the ordinary users of a particular roadwa y .” Payne , 838 S.W .2d at 238 n. 3; see Re ed , 258 S.W .3d at 622. Even if w e ass u m e, as as s erted by TMI C and Her

nandez, that pedestria ns would use t he parkway for ing ress a

nd eg ress fr om the roadw ay to the sidewalk or that the par kway was a n extension of the sidewalk, Hern andez, unl ike an or dinary pedestria n on the sid e wa lk o r p ark

wa y , w a s d ri vin g a B ob c a t on th e sit e . Ano rm a l us e r o f t he “ ro a dw ay ” in t

his situation would be a pede strian using the par kway for ing ress a

nd eg ress from the roadw ay to the actua l sidewalk, not someone using a B obcat to leve l and clea r the “ roadw ay ” of de bris. Th e a uth or iti e s c ite d b y TM I C and He rn and e z do no t a lte r o ur de c isi on . In e a c h o f t

ho se
case s, the “user ” wa s employ ing the are a in question in an ordinar y manner . See Cit

y of Austin v. Rangel , 1 84 S.W. 3d

37 7, 38 4 ( Te x. Ap p. –A us tin 20 06 , n o pe t.) (h old ing c ity wa ive d immun ity in04

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- 9- suit by pedestria

n who claimed open meter box on sidewalk wa s special de fec t where normal user of ro a dw ay wa s p e de str ian o n s ide wa lk) ; Chacon , 148 S.W .3d at 422-23 (holdingcity waived immunit y in suit by pedestria n who claimed hole in sidewalk wa s special de fec t where pedestria ns
we re no rm a l us e rs of

sid e wa lk) ; Mo rsev . S

tat e , 905 S.W .2d 470, 475-76 (Te x . App.–Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (holdingcity waived immuni ty in suit broug ht by pare nt of decea sed driver who claimed shoulder

drop-of f abutting roadw ay

constituted special de fec t; driver wa s ordinary user of roadw ay ) . Acc ording ly , we hold the City has not w aived immunit y based on the alleg ation of spec ial defe ct. Her

nandez was not a

n o rd i n ar y

user of the par kway and ther efor e, as a

matter of la

w, the sinkhole on the parkw ay

was not a spe cial def

ect. C ONCL US I ON We sustain the Cit y ’s sec ond, third , an d fourth is sues. We need not a ddress the City ’s
re ma ini ngiss ue s a s th e se are sim ply a dd iti on a l ba se s fo r re ve rs a l. We h old the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingthe City ’s ple a

to t he jur isd ic tio n b e caus e th ere is no b a sis up on wh ic h to fi nd

the City waived immunity . Acc ording ly , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s judg ment and re nder judgment dismiss ing the claims ag ainst the City for wa nt of subject matter

jurisdiction.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice