UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

AMINU INUWA, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

LONNIE LAWSON, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 21-6115 

(D.C. No. 5:21-CV-00440-C) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Aminu Inuwa, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,1

 petitioned for relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to 

dismiss the petition without prejudice. To appeal this ruling, Mr. Inuwa seeks a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). See Montez v. 

McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867-68 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2000) (a state prisoner bringing a 

§ 2241 claim must obtain a COA before being heard on the merits of the appeal). 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a COA and dismiss the matter. 

*

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Mr. Inuwa appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will 

not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 3, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 1
2 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Inuwa is serving a 23-year sentence for his 2007 convictions for robbery with 

a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In his § 2241 petition, he 

claimed the warden’s failure to apply earned good-time credits to his sentence violated 

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 

The magistrate judge held that Mr. Inuwa had no due process liberty interest in 

earned credits because they may not be applied to his sentence for robbery with a firearm 

under Oklahoma law until April 10, 2026, when he will have served 85 percent of his 

sentence. Inuwa v. Lawson, 2021 WL 3892751, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. July 28, 2021); see 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1(8). The magistrate judge recommended dismissal without 

prejudice because, without a liberty interest, Mr. Inuwa has not suffered a due process 

violation. Inuwa, 2021 WL 3892751, at *2. 

The district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed this matter without 

prejudice. Inuwa v. Lawson, 2021 WL 3906984 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2021). It also 

denied a COA. Dist. Ct. Doc. at 23. 

II. DISCUSSION 

To obtain a COA, a petitioner generally must make “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), by “showing that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). 

Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 2
3 

In his brief, Mr. Inuwa argues that amendments to Oklahoma law in 2015 show he 

has a liberty interest in his earned credits. Aplt. Br., Attachment at 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 n.1. The 

district court rejected this argument, stating Mr. Inuwa “does not identify what law 

changed, and the Court’s research has uncovered no change in [the] laws cited by 

Petitioner that would alter the result reached by [the magistrate judge].” Inuwa, 2021 

WL 3906984, at *1. Here, Mr. Inuwa again does not point to a specific change in the 

statute that would alter the result. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1(8) provides that 

Persons convicted of . . . [r]obbery with a dangerous weapon . 

. . shall be required to serve not less than eighty-five percent 

(85%) of any sentence of imprisonment imposed by the 

judicial system prior to becoming eligible for consideration 

for parole. Persons convicted of [this offense] shall not be 

eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits which 

have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence to less 

than eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed. 

In a footnote at the end of his brief, Mr. Inuwa states, “In approx. 2015, in an effort to 

reduce prison overcrowding, at the behest of former Oklahoma Gov. Mary Fallin[,] Okla. 

Stat. tit[.] 21 § 13.1 was amended by the Okla. State Legislature making certain crimes 

eligible to receive earned sentence credits.” Aplt. Br., Attachment at 8 n.1. But 

according to the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated (2018 and 2021 Cum. Suppl.), the only 

amendments in 2015 were to §§ 13.1(10) and 13.1(16), not § 13.1(8), and those 

amendments did not affect the 85 percent language. 

Also in his brief, Mr. Inuwa quotes from an Oklahoma Department of Corrections 

provision on sentence administration, which appears under the heading “Conditions 

Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 3
4 

Where Credits Are Restricted or Not Awarded” and tracks the statutory language quoted 

above: 

Effective March 1, 2000, 21 O.S., Section 13.1 provided that 

inmates who are convicted of certain crimes must serve 

eighty-five percent (85%) of their sentence of imprisonment 

before becoming eligible for parole consideration and shall 

not be eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits 

which have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence to 

less than 85% of the sentence imposed. Therefore inmates 

serving a sentence for any of the crimes listed below 

committed on or after March 1, 2000 are eligible to earn 

credits during the first 85 [percent] of the sentence; however, 

said credits will not be applied towards the sentence until the 

inmate has served 85% of said sentence. 

Oklahoma Department of Corrections, “Sentence Administration, Section-06 

Classification and Case Management, OP-060211” II.D.1.c. (effective date Oct. 15, 

2020) (attached to Appellant’s brief). The provision then lists the “affected crimes,” 

which include “Robbery with a Dang. Weapon, 21 O.S. § 801 (eff. 3/1/2000),” id., one of 

Mr. Inuwa’s conviction offenses. 

This administrative provision does not help Mr. Inuwa. It states that he “shall not 

be eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits which have the effect of 

reducing the length of the sentence to less than 85% of the sentence imposed.” This 

passage is consistent with the district court’s conclusion that he lacks a state-lawrecognized liberty interest. But even if the statute and administrative provision could be 

read to establish a liberty interest in earned credits, the next passage of the administrative 

provision shows Mr. Inuwa has not been deprived of them: “Therefore inmates serving a 

sentence for any of the crimes listed below committed on or after March 1, 2000 are 

Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 4
5 

eligible to earn credits during the first 85 [percent] of the sentence; however, said credits 

will not be applied towards the sentence until the inmate has served 85% of said 

sentence.” 

Mr. Inuwa argues that “even if the credits are withheld until 85% completion and 

as the Court[’]s [r]uling seems to infer, the fact still remains that a ‘deprivation’ is still 

imminent and will occur because these credits are a vested right, due to the fact petitioner 

has earned them in accordance with the law(s).” Aplt. Br., Attachment at 6-7. This 

argument fails because the administrative provision states only that “credits will not be 

applied . . . until the inmate has served 85% of said sentence,” and Mr. Inuwa has made 

no showing that, once he has served 85 percent of his sentence, his earned credits will not 

be applied. He thus has not shown an imminent deprivation, let alone a deprivation at all 

that would constitute a violation of his due process rights. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 

§ 1 (prohibiting deprivation of a liberty interest). 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mr. Inuwa has not demonstrated that 

reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the district court’s rejection of Mr. 

Inuwa’s due process claim and its dismissal of his § 2241 petition. We therefore deny his 

request for a COA and dismiss this matter. We also deny his request to proceed in forma 

pauperis.

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 5