2015 UT App 51

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF K.L.S., A PERSON UNDER 

EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

C.L.S.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20141050-CA

Filed February 26, 2015

Sixth District Juvenile Court, Manti Department

The Honorable Paul D. Lyman

No. 1086595

Lawrence H. Hunt, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN

and KATE A. TOOMEY.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 C.L.S. (Father) appeals the order terminating his parental 

rights to K.L.S. We affirm. 

¶2 “[T]o overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the result 

must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the 

appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We “review the 
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20141050-CA 2 2015 UT App 51

juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the clearly 

erroneous standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 

680. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, in light of the 

evidence supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of 

the evidence. Id. Therefore, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s 

decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not 

engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 

¶ 12.

¶3 Father raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims that 

the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s 

findings supporting termination. Next, he states that he was not

represented by counsel at the termination trial, but he does not 

assert any claim of error based upon that fact.

¶4 Father was represented by court-appointed counsel until 

he released his counsel at a review hearing on November 12, 

2013. The juvenile court found that Father

has been fully informed of his right to be 

represented by Counsel at every stage of this case 

along with the right to employ his own Counsel or 

to again request appointed Counsel. [Father,] since 

November 12, 2013, has chosen to represent 

himself at all hearings. [Father] did not seek or 

obtain Counsel for the termination proceedings 

and has chosen to act pro se at today’s termination 

hearing.

Given the juvenile court’s factual findings regarding 

representation by counsel, which are not disputed on appeal, 

there is no basis to review any issue related to the fact that 

Father was not represented by counsel at the termination trial. 

¶5 When an appellant in a child welfare proceeding seeks to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding or 

conclusion, “the appellant must include in the record a transcript 
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20141050-CA 3 2015 UT App 51

of all evidence relevant to” the challenged finding or conclusion. 

Utah R. App. P. 54(b). Absent an adequate record on appeal, we 

cannot address the issues raised and we must “assume the 

regularity of the proceedings below.” In re L.D., 2005 UT App 

501U, para. 2 (per curiam) (quoting State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 

688, 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). Because Father did not provide a 

transcript to support his insufficiency of the evidence claim, we 

must assume that the findings and conclusions are supported by 

sufficient evidence. 

¶6 The juvenile court concluded that several grounds 

supported termination of Father’s parental rights. Under Utah 

Code section 78A-6-507, the finding of a single enumerated 

ground will support termination of parental rights. Utah Code 

Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012). Therefore, it is sufficient if 

the evidence supports any of the grounds for termination found 

by the juvenile court. The court found that K.L.S. was neglected 

by Father, see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(b), and that Father was an unfit 

or incompetent parent, see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(c). The court further 

found that K.L.S. had been in an out-of-home placement under 

the supervision of the juvenile court and the Division of Child 

and Family Services (DCFS), see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(i), that 

Father had “substantially neglected, willfully refused, or has 

been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that 

caused the children to be in an out-of-home placement,” see id.

§ 78A-6-507(1)(d)(ii), and that “there is a substantial likelihood 

that [Father] will not be capable of exercising proper and 

effective parental care in the near future,” see id. § 78A-6-

507(1)(d)(iii). The court also found that Father failed in his 

parental adjustment. See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(e). Finally, the court 

found that it was in the best interest of K.L.S. to terminate 

Father’s parental rights, see id. § 78A-6-506(3), and that DCFS had 

made reasonable efforts to provide services to Father in an 

attempt at reunification, see id. § 78A-6-507(3)(a).
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20141050-CA 4 2015 UT App 51

¶7 In his petition on appeal, Father does not challenge the 

juvenile court’s determination that he experienced a failure in his 

parental adjustment. Because this unchallenged grounds is 

sufficient to establish grounds for termination of parental rights, 

we need not consider Father’s challenge to the remaining 

grounds found by the juvenile court. 

¶8 Father challenges the best interest determination by 

asserting that the State presented evidence only that K.L.S. was 

loved and cared for by the foster parent and failed to present 

other evidence as to the considerations stated in Utah Code 

section 78A-6-509(1)(a). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1)(a) 

(LexisNexis 2012) (stating that the court shall consider, but is not 

limited to, “the physical, mental, or emotional conditions and 

needs of the child”). Having already determined that the 

juvenile court’s findings of fact are supported by sufficient 

evidence, we also determine that those factual findings support 

the best interest determination. The juvenile court found that in 

the prospective adoptive home, K.L.S. was loved and cared 

for; he was bonded and safe; he had been provided with the 

stability that he needs to be happy and successful; his physical 

and emotional needs were appropriately addressed; the home 

was safe and drug free; the foster parent had the financial ability 

to care for and meet K.L.S.’s needs; and the foster parent was in 

good health, had family support to care for K.L.S., and was 

willing to adopt K.L.S. and to treat him as her own child. These 

factual findings amply support the best interest determination 

and meet the requirements of section 78A-6-509(1)(a).

¶9 Because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the 

evidence,” we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating 

Father’s parental rights. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 

435.