FIRST DIVISION

							July 15, 2002

Nos. 1-00-1954 and 1-00-3352 (Cons.)

RICHARD McCORRY and BARBARA McCORRY, 	)	Appeal from the

								)	Circuit Court of

		Plaintiffs-Appellants,		)	Cook County

								)

	v.							)

								)

NIHAL GOONERATNE, and EVANGELICAL		)

HOSPITALS CORPORATION, f/k/a Christ	)	

Hospital and Medical Center,			)

								)

		Defendants-Appellees 		)

								)

								)	Honorable		 (Thomas Hurley,      				)	James Varga and

								)	Kathy Flanagan,

		Defendant).				)	Judges Presiding

	JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

	After surgery left Richard McCorry paralyzed, he and his

wife, Barbara McCorry, sued the surgeon, Dr. Thomas Hurley, the

radiologist, Dr. Nihal Gooneratne, and Christ Hospital, where

Hurley performed the surgery.  The trial court granted

Gooneratne's motion for summary judgment because it found no evidence that Gooneratne's alleged negligence had any causal

connection to the injuries. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment in docket number 1-00-1954.  Christ Hospital moved to dismiss one

count of the amended complaint based on the statute of

limitations.  The trial court granted the motion, holding that

the count did not relate back to the original complaint.

Plaintiffs appeal from that ruling in docket number 1-00-3352.  We consolidated the appeals.

	BACKGROUND

	Richard had back pain that prevented him from sitting for

prolonged periods.  The pain steadily worsened through 1993 and

early 1994, to the point that Richard could no longer drive.  In

June 1994 Dr. Andrew Kazaniwskyj admitted Richard to Christ

Hospital for a neurosurgery consultation.  Hurley, a

neurosurgeon, examined Richard and ordered a magnetic resonance

imaging (MRI) test of the upper part of Richard's spine, the part

in his neck.  Gooneratne reported that the MRI showed disc

herniation at two locations.

	Hurley performed the surgery on October 27, 1994.  When

Richard awoke after surgery, Hurley tested his condition and

found Richard unable to move his legs.  Hurley ordered a new MRI. 

Although he discussed the possibility of further surgery with

plaintiffs, he did not recommend surgery, as he had little hope of restoring any function to the legs.  Richard remains

paralyzed.

	Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on October 25, 1996, alleging as follows:

		"On or about June 15, 1994, NIHAL GOONERATNE,

M.D., administered and interpreted diagnostic MRI films

of RICHARD MCCORRY's cervical spine at CHRIST HOSPITAL

	* * *

		*** HURLEY *** [m]isread and misinterpreted the MRI films of the Plaintiff's cervical spine; [and a]pplied additional and unnecessary pressure to the

Plaintiff's spinal cord during surgery ***.

	* * *

		*** GOONERATNE *** [m]isread and misinterpreted

the MRI films of the Plaintiff's cervical spine."

	Plaintiffs claimed that Richard's paralysis resulted from the negligence. Plaintiffs sought to hold Christ Hospital liable based on respondeat superior; they alleged no negligence of Christ Hospital apart from the negligence of the named doctors.

	No. 1-00-1954

	In his deposition Hurley swore that he interpreted the MRI

films himself when he performed the operation. He did not rely on

Gooneratne's report.  Gooneratne moved for summary judgment, and he attached to his motion an excerpt from the transcript of the

deposition.  Plaintiffs missed the initial date for a response to the motion and sought an extension of time.  The trial court

allowed extra time but added that plaintiffs should respond with "Counter-Affidavits only."  After plaintiffs filed their affidavits but no brief, the court denied the motion for summary judgment because Gooneratne failed to supply all relevant portions of Hurley's deposition.

	Gooneratne moved for reconsideration, supporting the motion

with the complete transcript of Hurley's deposition.  By order

dated January 28, 2000, the court set the motion for ruling on February 28, 2000.  Plaintiffs did not seek leave to respond to the motion for reconsideration.  On February 28, 2000, the court

granted the motion for reconsideration and entered summary judgment in favor of Gooneratne.  The court added, "This finding is made pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3204(a) [sic] thus there is no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of this

order."

	Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the judgment and fully briefed the merits of the summary judgment motion.  By order dated April 19, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for

reconsideration, stating that the "summary judgment entered in favor of Dr. Nihal Gooneratne on February 28, 2000 stands."  On

May 16, 2000, plaintiffs moved for a finding that the order denying the motion to reconsider was final and appealable.  The

court granted the motion by order dated May 22, 2000.  Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal for docket number 1-00-1954 on June

2, 2000.  

	Gooneratne asks this court to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal for want of jurisdiction.  Supreme court rules narrowly circumscribe

this court's jurisdiction.  If the appellant fails to comply with

the deadline for appeals provided in Supreme Court Rule 303 (155

Ill. 2d R. 303), this court lacks authority to consider the

appeal.  See Bernhauser v. Glen Ellyn Dodge, Inc., 288 Ill. App. 3d 984, 989, 683 N.E.2d 1194 (1997).  When the trial court finds no reason to delay enforcement or appeal of a judgment that is final with respect to one of multiple parties to a case, the

appellant must file the notice of appeal within 30 days after

disposition of postjudgment motions.  155 Ill. 2d Rs. 303(a)(1),

304(a).

	Here the trial court purported to enter a final judgment in

favor of Gooneratne on February 28, 2000.  The court expressly

found no reason to delay enforcement or appeal, apparently

rendering the judgment immediately appealable under Supreme Court

Rule 304.  155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a); Reyes v. Compass Health Care Plans, 252 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1078, 625 N.E.2d 246 (1993). Plaintiffs filed a timely postjudgment motion for reconsideration, tolling the time for appeal.  Elmhurst Auto Parts, Inc. v. Fencl-Tufo Chevrolet, Inc., 235 Ill. App. 3d 88, 90, 600 N.E.2d 1229 (1992).  Plaintiffs had 30 days from the denial of their motion for reconsideration in which to file the

notice of appeal.  They did not do so.  Instead, they later filed

a motion for a second finding of appealability and filed a notice

of appeal after the court granted that motion.  Even if we

construed the motion for a finding of appealability as a

postjudgment motion, the appeal filed after that finding would

not be timely, because a second successive postjudgment motion

does not toll the time for appeal.  Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 259, 422 N.E.2d 610 (1981).

	Plaintiffs try several different theories to show that the rules authorize this court to hear this appeal.  First plaintiffs suggest that the order dated February 28, 2000, lacked the

finding requisite for appealability under Rule 304(a).  Although

the court found no just reason to delay appeal, the court made

the finding pursuant to a nonexistent "Rule 3204(a)."  In re Application of DuPage County Collector, 152 Ill. 2d 545, 605 N.E.2d 567 (1992), established applicable standards for Rule

304(a) findings.  When the judgment dismisses a count of the

complaint, the court must refer to the judgment's immediate

appealability.  DuPage County, 152 Ill. 2d at 550-51.  Other language found here is unnecessary surplusage with no effect on

appealability.  DuPage County, 152 Ill. 2d at 549-50.  The court here made the finding requisite for immediate appealability.

	Plaintiffs argue that the order dated February 28, 2000, was not a final judgment.  Plaintiffs point out that the trial court here failed to hold a hearing on the summary judgment motion before entering the order of February 28, 2000, and court rules

require such a hearing.

	A judgment is final if it determines the rights of the

parties on some definite part of the litigation.  Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. First Chicago Trust Co. of Illinois, 269 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296-97, 645 N.E.2d 1038 (1995).  The order of February 28, 2000, granted Gooneratne summary judgment on the only claim against him, thereby terminating the litigation

against him.  That order constitutes a final judgment unless it

is void, and it is void only if the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment (People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155, 619 N.E.2d 750 (1993)), or if a party procured the judgment through

fraud (Terra-Nova Investments v. Rosewell, 235 Ill. App. 3d 330, 335, 601 N.E.2d 1109 (1992)).

	Plaintiffs have not argued that fraud contributed to the judgment.  Our supreme court in Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 531, 759 N.E.2d 509 (2001), held that a judgment is

not void for want of jurisdiction as long as the court has both

subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the

parties. Plaintiffs, who sought the circuit court's adjudication of their claims, do not dispute its subject matter jurisdiction

or its personal jurisdiction over them.  Accordingly, the

judgment in favor of Gooneratne entered on February 28, 2000, was

a valid final judgment disposing of the claim against him.  Any

error or irregularity in its entry cannot affect its validity as

a final judgment.  See Miller v. Balfour, 303 Ill. App. 3d 209, 216, 707 N.E.2d 759 (1999).

	Next, plaintiffs claim that they could not appeal until the court added Rule 304(a) language to the order denying their

motion for reconsideration.  Rule 303(a)(1) provides that parties

have 30 days from disposition of the posttrial motion in which to

appeal.  155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).  The rules do not require a

second finding of appealability in the order denying any

posttrial motion.  Waters v. Reingold, 278 Ill. App. 3d 647, 652 n.5, 663 N.E.2d 126 (1996), overruled on other grounds, Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill. 2d 6, 8-9, 694 N.E.2d 562 (1998).  The order denying a motion for

reconsideration is not itself appealable, and it is not a

judgment.  Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 258.  As Rule 304(a) requires the finding of appealability only for final judgments, the judgment

against one of several parties becomes appealable with the

disposition of the postjudgment motion without any separate

finding of appealability for the order concerning the

postjudgment motion.  Therefore the lack of Rule 304(a) language

in the order denying the motion for reconsideration had no effect

on the time for appeal.

	The time for appeal began when the court denied the

postjudgment motion by order dated April 19, 2000.  The trial

court lost jurisdiction 30 days later, on May 19, 2000. In re Marriage of Breslow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 41, 49, 713 N.E.2d 642 (1999).  But plaintiffs moved for addition of Rule 304(a) language to the order denying the postjudgment motion.  The court

entered an order dated May 22, 2000, granting the request for

appealability language.  Plaintiffs now contend that Gooneratne's counsel appeared in court and argued the merits in response to

the motion for additional language, without challenging the

court's jurisdiction, thereby revesting the court with

jurisdiction.

	The record includes no transcript of the hearing on the

motion, and the court's order makes no reference to the arguments of the parties.  Thus, the record does not support plaintiffs' claim that Gooneratne's counsel argued the merits, failed to

contest the court's jurisdiction, or even appeared at the

hearing.  We cannot presume that we have authority to decide an

appeal on the basis of a record insufficient to show our

jurisdiction. See Nenadic v. Grant Hospital, 75 Ill. App. 3d 614, 625, 394 N.E.2d 527 (1979).

	Moreover, even if Gooneratne appeared and argued against the

motion for a finding of appealability, the conduct would not

revest the trial court with jurisdiction.  In Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 256, the trial court entered judgment for Conde Sears and

Gerald Sears moved to reopen the judgment on grounds that he did

not have notice of a prior hearing that led to the judgment.  The

court denied the motion.  Nearly 30 days later Gerald moved again

to reopen the judgment, adding facts not mentioned in the prior

motion.  Months later the court held a hearing in which the

parties presented evidence concerning notice of the prior

hearing.  The court again denied the motion to reopen the

judgment and Gerald appealed.  He argued that Conde revested the

court with jurisdiction by presenting evidence in the hearing

held months after the court lost jurisdiction.  Our supreme court

rejected the argument, noting that the parties did not retry the

case.  Nothing in Conde's actions treated the judgment in her

favor as anything less than a valid, binding judgment.  Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 260.

	Similarly, nothing in Gooneratne's actions treated the

judgment in his favor as anything less than a valid judgment, as

he, like Conde, sought to uphold the validity of the judgment. 

His participation without raising a jurisdictional objection

here, like Conde's in Sears, did not revest the trial court with jurisdiction.  Because plaintiffs failed to file a notice of appeal between April 19, 2000, and May 19, 2000, we lack

jurisdiction to consider the appeal in docket number 1-00-1954.

	No. 1-00-3352

	In November 1999 the trial court permitted plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, adding a count addressed specifically

to Christ Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged that the hospital:

	"a.	failed to have in effect a policy requiring prompt transmittal of radiologists' findings to surgeons

in cases of emergent post-operative MRI

evaluations;

	b.	failed to have in effect a sufficient or a written policy requiring prompt transmittal of

radiologists' findings to surgeons in cases of

emergent post-operative MRI evaluations;

	c.	failed to timely perform and interpret RICHARD McCORRY's post-operative MRI on 10-27-94;

	d.	failed to accurately interpret RICHARD McCORRY's post-operative MRI on 10-27-94."

	Christ Hospital moved to dismiss the count, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the new claims.  The trial court

agreed with Christ Hospital and dismissed the count.  At

plaintiffs' request, the court later added a finding of no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the dismissal. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal, so Rule 304(a) gives us

jurisdiction to decide the appeal in docket number 1-00-3352.

	We review de novo the decision to dismiss the count. Shaker & Associates, Inc. v. Medical Technologies Group, Ltd., 315 Ill. App. 3d 126, 131, 733 N.E.2d 865 (2000).  Oddly, we would review for abuse of discretion if the trial court had denied plaintiffs leave to amend based on the statute of limitations (see Cochran v. Perry County Road District No. 1, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1094,  695 N.E.2d 65 (1998)), but because the court here permitted the

amendment and then dismissed the count based on the statute of

limitations, we review the judgment de novo. 

	The applicable statute of limitations requires filing of the

complaint within two years of the date on which the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury for which they seek

compensation.  735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1994).  The limitations

period begins to run when a plaintiff has sufficient information to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether

actionable conduct caused the injury, even if the plaintiff lacks knowledge of a specific person's negligent conduct.  Walters v. Marion Memorial Hospital, 217 Ill. App. 3d 744, 746, 577 N.E.2d 915 (1991).  Thus, the limitations period does not begin anew each time pretrial discovery reveals that unsued persons may be

liable or that other theories of liability may apply.

	The surgery on October 27, 1994, left Richard paralyzed.

Plaintiffs do not allege or argue that they discovered that actionable conduct may have caused the injury at any later date

before the filing of the lawsuit.  Accordingly, the limitations

period for their claims in this lawsuit expired on October 27,

1996, two days after they filed their original complaint.  The

claim in the amended complaint, filed in December 1999, came too

late unless the count relates back to the original complaint.

	According to section 2-616(b) of the Code of Civil

Procedure:

		"The cause of action *** set up in any amended

pleading shall not be barred by lapse of time under any

statute *** limiting the time within which an action

may be brought ***, if the time prescribed or limited

had not expired when the original pleading was filed,

and if it shall appear from the original and amended

pleadings that the cause of action asserted *** grew

out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the

original pleading, *** and for the purpose of

preserving the cause of action, *** an amendment to any

pleading shall be held to relate back to the date of

the filing of the original pleading so amended."  735

ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 1998).

	The later claim "grew out of the same *** occurrence" as the

claim in the original complaint if the original complaint

provided the defendant with all of the information necessary for preparation of the defense for the claim asserted later. 

Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 222 Ill. App. 3d 559, 563, 584 N.E.2d 257 (1991).  The later claim relates back if the original complaint directs the defendant's attention to the facts on which the plaintiff bases the later claim. Williams, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 563.

	Here, nothing in the original complaint indicated any

problem in the transmittal of radiologists' findings to surgeons. 

A defense to the original claim in no way prepared Christ

Hospital to defend its policies regarding transmittal of

radiology reports.  In subparagraphs a and b quoted above from

the amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Christ Hospital negligently failed to have a sufficient written policy requiring

prompt postoperative transmittal of such reports to surgeons. 

These allegations involve conduct by different persons at times

different from the occasions of the negligent acts alleged in the

original complaint.  Because the original complaint did not

direct Christ Hospital's attention to the allegedly negligent conduct of its officers responsible for instituting and enforcing

policies for transmittal of radiological reports to surgeons, the

allegations of subparagraphs a and b in the amended complaint do

not relate back to the original complaint. See Weidner v. Carle Foundation Hospital, 159 Ill. App. 3d 710, 713, 512 N.E.2d 824 (1987); Kennedy v. King, 252 Ill. App. 3d 52, 56, 623 N.E.2d 955 (1993).

	In subparagraphs c and d of the count added to the amended

complaint, plaintiffs allege that Christ Hospital's employees failed to interpret the postoperative MRIs accurately and

promptly.  The original complaint included the charge that agents

of Christ Hospital misinterpreted MRIs.  But the original

complaint makes no reference to postoperative MRIs, and does not

even assert that Richard had an MRI after the operation.  While

several paragraphs in the original complaint refer to "the MRI

films" without further specification, all such references appear

after the factual assertion that "[o]n or about June 15, 1994,

NIHAL GOONERATNE, M.D., administered and interpreted diagnostic

MRI films of RICHARD MCCORRY's cervical spine."  Thus the

original complaint drew the hospital's attention to the June 15

MRI and alerted the hospital to the need to defend the

interpretation of that set of MRI films.

	Preparation of a defense to the original complaint would not

have included a defense of the interpretation of postoperative

MRI films.  The defense can defeat a claim based on the

postoperative MRI by proving that the alleged misinterpretation

and delayed transmittal had no effect on plaintiffs' injuries.  If Richard suffered irreversible paralysis in the surgery, any

misinterpretation or delay in transmittal of the post-operative MRIs had no effect on his condition.  But if a second surgery

shortly after the initial surgery stood a good chance of

correcting the paralysis, the misinterpretation or delay in the

transmittal of the postoperative MRIs might have a causal

connection to Richard's current condition.  Nothing in the

original complaint suggested that a second surgery might have

corrected Richard's paralysis, and nothing in the original

complaint alerted the hospital to the need to search for evidence

concerning the potential reversibility of the paralysis.  Because

the preparation of a defense to the allegations of delay and

misinterpretation of postoperative MRIs would involve an

investigation into facts completely irrelevant to the defense

against the original complaint, the new allegations do not relate

back to the original complaint.  See Cammon v. West Suburban Hospital Medical Center, 301 Ill. App. 3d 939, 947, 704 N.E.2d 731 (1998).

	Plaintiffs claim that McArthur v. St. Mary's Hospital of Decatur, 307 Ill. App. 3d 329, 717 N.E.2d 501 (1999), and Figueroa v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 288 Ill. App. 3d 921, 681 N.E.2d 64 (1997), require a different result.  We

disagree.  In McArthur the original complaint included allegations that several defendants misinterpreted specified

sonograms and X rays, but the count against the hospital charged

only a failure to preserve sonograms.  The amended complaint

charged the hospital with misinterpreting the same sonograms and X rays identified in the original complaint.  The original

complaint adequately directed attention to facts concerning the

sonograms and X rays and alerted the hospital to the potential

need to defend the interpretation of those sonograms and X rays. 

The court explicitly distinguished cases of amended complaints

including charges that the plaintiffs had not directed against any defendants in the original complaint.  See McArthur, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 335.  The original complaint here did not charge any defendant with misinterpretation of postoperative MRI films, as the complaint did not mention such films.

	In Figueroa the original complaint alleged that the defendant treated the plaintiff's pregnancy negligently, especially after the delivery.  The court found the complaint

broad enough to alert the defense to the need to explain all of

its treatment of the plaintiff through the birthing process, both before and after delivery.  An investigation into the plaintiff's postdelivery condition would involve an investigation into the

causes of that condition, including her predelivery condition and

the treatment she received during the birthing process.  

	As the trial court here observed, the Figueroa decision appears to reward vagueness in the original complaint.  Here,

however, plaintiffs specifically identified the June 15 MRI films as the subjects of defendants' negligent misinterpretation.  The complaint alerted the defense to the need to defend the

interpretation of only the films specifically identified, and the complaint did not even mention any other films.  The complaint

entitled defendants to presume that plaintiffs intended to refer back to the films already specified, when plaintiffs in later paragraphs alleged negligent misinterpretation of "the MRI

films."  Figueroa and McArthur do not require reversal of the judgment here.

	Plaintiffs also argue that Christ Hospital had notice of the significance of the postoperative MRI films because its doctors

ordered the MRI immediately following the surgery, once they

realized Richard was paralyzed.  Christ Hospital's doctors examined the MRI to determine what had gone wrong in Richard's

surgery.  Thus, two years before plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, Christ Hospital knew that the postoperative MRIs provided

significant evidence concerning Richard's injury.

	An amended complaint that differs materially from the

original complaint may relate back, as long as the defendant had clear notice of the facts included in the amendment prior to the

expiration of the limitations period.  Williams, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 563.  Thus, where discovery completed during the limitations

period alerts the defendant to facts supporting a new claim, a later amendment including the new claim may relate back to the

original filing.  Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc., 143 Ill. 2d 44, 48, 570 N.E.2d 327 (1991).  The rationale for permitting relation

back "is that a defendant will not be prejudiced by an amendment

so long as 'his attention was directed, within the time prescribed or limited, to the facts that form the basis of the

claim asserted against him.'" Boatmen's National Bank v. Direct Lines, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 88, 102, 656 N.E.2d 1101 (1995), quoting Simmons v. Hendricks, 32 Ill. 2d 489, 495, 207 N.E.2d 440 (1965).  That is, the defendant must have notice not only of the operative facts, but also of the plaintiff's intention to assert a claim on the basis of those facts.  A defendant's investigation outside  the context of litigation does not help an amendment relate back

to the original complaint, because the investigation cannot

inform the defendant of the intention of the plaintiff or anyone else to assert liability on the basis of the facts found in the

investigation.

	Here, the hospital's records of a postoperative MRI do not

inform the hospital that plaintiffs intend to claim that the hospital misinterpreted the MRIs.  Thus, the defendants' postoperative investigation into the cause of Richard's paralysis

does not make the belated amendment relate back to the original

complaint.

	Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court should estop the hospital from raising the statute of limitations as a defense

because the hospital failed to respond promptly to all discovery

requests, including requests for depositions.  "Equitable estoppel arises through a party's voluntary conduct whereby he is

precluded from asserting his rights against another who in good

faith relied on such conduct and was thereby led to change his position to his detriment."  Ciers v. O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1049, 675 N.E.2d 210 (1996).  When a plaintiff seeks estoppel of a defendant who asserts that a

limitations period bars the claim, the plaintiff generally cannot

rely on acts occurring after the period has ended.  Ciers, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 1049.  The plaintiff cannot have relied on such acts when he delayed presenting his claim.

	Here the statutory period ended two days after plaintiffs filed their complaint, and before plaintiffs began the discovery process. Plaintiffs cannot have relied on the conduct of any discovery in delaying amendment of the complaint until the

expiration of the limitations period.  The trial court had no basis for applying equitable estoppel to preclude Christ Hospital

from raising the statute of limitations as a defense.  

	Count III of the amended complaint, concerning Christ

Hospital's liability for misinterpretation and delay in

transmittal of postoperative MRIs, does not arise from the same

occurrences as those set out in the original complaint.  Because

the amended count does not relate back to the original complaint,

we affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss count III of the amended complaint.	

	We lack jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' untimely appeal from the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gooneratne.  Because the original complaint did not provide Christ Hospital with all

of the facts needed for preparation of the defense to the claims asserted in the amended complaint, count III of the amended

complaint does not relate back to the original complaint.  The

trial court correctly dismissed count III as untimely.  Therefore

we dismiss the appeal in docket number 1-00-1954 and we affirm

the judgment in docket number 1-00-3352.

	No. 1-00-1954: , Appeal dismissed.

	No. 1-00-3352:, Affirmed.

	McNULTY, J., with COHEN, P.J., and COUSINS, J., concurring.