alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 4 (Wednesday, January 7, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 835]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-342]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. ER98-937-000]


Carolina Power & Light Company; Notice of Filing

December 31, 1997.
    Take notice that on December 4, 1997, Carolina Power & Light 
Company (CP&L), tendered for filing a Service Agreement for Short-Term 
Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service executed between CP&L and the 
following Eligible Transmission Customer: Williams Energy Services 
Company. Service to the Eligible Customer will be in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of Carolina Power & Light Company's Open 
Access Transmission Tariff.
    Copies of the filing were served upon the North Carolina Utilities 
Commission and the South Carolina Public Service Commission.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20426, 
in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 18 CFR 385.214). All such 
motions or protests should be filed on or before January 12, 1998. 
Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants 
parties to the proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must 
file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the 
Commission and are available for public inspection.
David P. Boergers,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-342 Filed 1-6-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### James CARWILE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Timothy Wayne GILBERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. T-372, T-373.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 15, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 10.43 2013 10-K






AMENDMENT TO
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”), is effective this 1st day of January, 2014 (the “Effective Date”) by and between Janine Steiner Jovanovic, an individual resident of the State of Texas (the “Executive”) with a residence at [***], and RealPage, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Employer”), having its chief offices at 4000 International Parkway, Carrollton, Texas 75007. 
WHEREAS, Executive and Employer entered into that certain Amended and Restated Employment Agreement dated August 1, 2012 (the “Employment Agreement”); and 
WHEREAS, Executive and Employer now wish to amend the Employment Agreement as of the Effective Date. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual agreements set forth below, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
	
			
	1.
	 
	Executive shall be entitled to receive, upon termination of employment following a Change In Control (as defined in the Plan) or a Business Combination Transaction, in addition to all other compensation payable under this Agreement following such Change In Control or Business Combination Transaction, all employee benefits to which Executive was entitled immediately prior to such termination, fully paid for the term of the severance Executive is entitled to upon such termination under this Agreement, plus a lump sum payment equal to Executive’s target annual bonus amount.  

	2.
	 
	Executive shall be entitled to receive $3,500 per annum in medical benefits to be used toward medical expenses, including annual physical examinations.

	3.
	 
	Except as set forth herein, the Employment Agreement is hereby ratified and confirmed.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, intending to be legally bound, have executed this Amendment to Employment Agreement on the Signature Date. 
	
					
	 
	REALPAGE, INC.
	 

	 
	/s/ Stephen T. Winn 
	 

	 
	By: Stephen T. Winn 
	 

	 
	Its: President and Chief Executive Officer 
	 






	
					
	 
	Effective Date: 1/1/14
	 

	 
	/s/ Janine Steiner Jovanovic
	 

	 
	Janine Steiner Jovanovic, an individual
Exhibit 13.1
 Certification
Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Exchange Act
   /s/ Tom Albanese
    
    /s/ Guy ElliottName:
    
    Tom Albanese
    
    Name:
    
    Guy ElliottTitle:
    
    Chief executive
    
    Title:
    
    Chief financial officerDate: 15 March 2011
    
    Date: 15 March 2011




---



##### 



Certification
Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Exchange Act
   /s/ Tom Albanese
    
    /s/ Guy ElliottName:
    
    Tom Albanese
    
    Name:
    
    Guy ElliottTitle:
    
    Chief executive
    
    Title:
    
    Chief financial officerDate: 15 March 2011
    
    Date: 15 March 2011
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7428

ROBERT EDWARD PATTERSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (7:07-cv-00344-jlk)

Submitted: February 21, 2008 Decided: February 26, 2008

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Edward Patterson, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Mozley Harris,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Robert Edward Patterson seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court

is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that

Patterson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny

Patterson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis as moot. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2537

JACQUELINE REESE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA95-3487-S)

Submitted: April 8, 1997 Decided: May 15, 1997

Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jacqueline Reese, Appellant Pro Se. Gregory Lee VanGeison, ANDERSON, COE & KING, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order granting summary

judgment to the Appellee in this diversity action alleging breach

of a disability insurance contract. We have reviewed the record and

the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Reese v.

New York Life Ins. Co., No. CA-95-3487-S (D. Md., Sep. 24, 1996).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 23.1

                                                               DELOITTE & TOUCHE


Independent Auditors' Consent

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on
Form S-1 (Commission File No.: 333-60858) and in the Registration Statement on
Form S-8 (Commission File No.: 333-49072) of Sentigen Holding Corp. and
Subsidiaries of our report dated February 4, 2002 included in the Annual Report
on Form 10-K of Sentigen Holding Corp. and Subsidiaries for the year ended
December 31, 2001.


/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

March 29, 2002
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 16

- 00576

- CV
Hidalgo County Emergency Service Foundation and Rosbel Salinas v. Rachel Mejia and Juan Luevano
On Appeal from the 93rd District Court of Hidalgo County , Texas Trial Cause No. C

- 2469

- 16

- B

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be REVERSED and the cause REMANDED t o the trial court . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED and REMANDED for furthe r proceedings consistent with its opinion . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appell ee s

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. June 7, 2018
#### Joseph John FICHERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-27.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 18, 1971.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Record, Palm Beach County; Vaughn J. Rudnick, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### STATE of Florida, ex rel., UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Relator, v. Carl C. DURRANCE, as Judge of the Circuit Court In and For the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 73-253.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 28, 1973.

*113W. Robert Mann of Mann, Fay & Price, Bradenton, for relator.

No appearance for respondent.

ORDER ON SUGGESTION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

PER CURIAM.

The relator, Unigard Insurance Company, was a joint defendant with James Sum-merall, its insured, in a wrongful death action. The case proceeded to trial and plaintiffs were awarded a $150,000.00 judgment, jointly and severally, against defendants, upon which final judgment was entered. Subsequent to entry of the final judgment defendant insurance company filed a cross-claim, pursuant to Williams v. Banning, Fla.App.1972, 259 So.2d 725, to limit its coverage to $25,000.00, which was the coverage provided under its insurance policy with codefendant insured. Both defendant Summerall, in a counterclaim, and plaintiffs, in an answer to the cross-claim, asserted that defendant insurance company was liable in excess of its policy limits due to bad faith failure to settle and negligent defense. Subsequent to these pleadings, defendant insurance company (relator here) filed its notice of appeal of the final judgment, on behalf of both defendants. After notice of appeal was filed, the lower court set supersedeas, and relator posted the required bond. Relator then filed, in the lower court, a motion under Rule 1.-140(b), 30 F.S.A., to prevent the trial judge from proceeding with the aforesaid post-trial motions. This motion was denied and relator brought this Suggestion for Writ of Prohibition.

Relator contends here, as it did below, that once the notice of appeal was filed from the final judgment and supersedeas posted, the lower court lost jurisdiction to proceed with the post-trial motions relating to “excess coverage.”

It appears to this court that it would be expedient that all matters involved in this case, including “excess coverage,” be determined in one appeal. Rather than determining whether or not the lower court in fact has jurisdiction to proceed on the post-trial motions while this appeal is pending (which would involve issuing the rule nisi and a consequent delay) we determine it propitious to temporarily relinquish jurisdiction in the appeal from the final judgment styled James Lester Summerall and Unigard Insurance Company v. Richard J. King, et al. Case No. 72-807, in order that the trial judge may proceed forthwith to decide the matters raised in the cross-claim and subsequent pleadings, but only insofar as they deal with the aforesaid “excess coverage” issues. After such determination the clerk of the lower court shall, with reasonable dispatch, certify to this court a copy of any order entered thereon.

The Suggestion for Writ of Prohibition is, therefore, denied and jurisdiction is hereby temporarily relinquished for the above stated purpose.

LILES, A. C. J., and McNULTY and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                          44,748
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   83,538
<ALLOWANCES>                                       885
<INVENTORY>                                     73,656
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               211,802
<PP&E>                                         301,535
<DEPRECIATION>                                 146,888
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 429,945
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           84,793
<BONDS>                                         82,871
<COMMON>                                        20,585
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     206,172
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   429,945
<SALES>                                        284,569
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               288,464
<CGS>                                          204,366
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  204,366
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,024
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   140
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,724
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 46,272
<INCOME-TAX>                                    18,050
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             28,721
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (1,083)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    27,638
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.31
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00
        

</TABLE>
EX-10.22



 Exhibit 10.22 

Spousal Consent Letter 
 To: ShanghaiMed
iKang, Inc 
 I, Baoming Li (ID No. 440620196107155453), legal spouse of Boquan He (ID No. 442000601107545), have acknowledged and carefully read the
following agreements signed by Boquan He: 
 Loan Agreement (signed on Jan.12, 2011); Exclusive Call Option Agreement (signed on Mar. 17, 2008); Exclusive
Business Cooperation Agreement (signed on Apr. 27, 2007); Power of Attorney (signed on Mar.17, 2008); Share Pledge Agreements (signed respectively on Mar. 17, 2008 and Jan.12, 2011). 

I hereby agree and promise that the 50% equity interest in Shanghai iKang Guobin Holding Co., Ltd. (the “Equity”) held by my legal spouse and
registered is his name will be disposed in compliance with the aforesaid agreements. 
 I fully understand the content and the meaning of the aforesaid
agreements and further promise that no action in conflict with such agreements will be taken, including but not limited to claiming the Equity to be the personal property of me or my legal spouse, or our community property, or the distributable
heritage of me or my legal spouse. I hereby unconditionally and irrevocably waive any right, power or interest granted by applicable laws upon such Equity. 
  


	
	 /s/ Li Baoming

	
	Signature
	
	 November 26, 2013

	
	Date
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 36 (Monday, February 24, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 8247]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4461]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
[FEMA-1159-DR]


Washington; Amendment to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster for the 
State of Washington, (FEMA-1159-DR), dated January 17, 1997, and 
related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 6, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Magda Ruiz, Response and Recovery 
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, 
(202) 646-3260.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of a major disaster for the State 
of Washington, is hereby amended to include the following areas among 
those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the 
catastrophe declared a major disaster by the President in his 
declaration of January 17, 1997:

    The counties of Asotin, Jefferson, Pend Oreille and Whatcom for 
Individual Assistance (already designated for Public Assistance and 
Hazard Mitigation).

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance No. 83.516, Disaster 
Assistance.)
Lacy E. Suiter,
Executive Associate Director, Response and Recovery Directorate.
[FR Doc. 97-4461 Filed 2-21-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-02-P
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 23-0288

_________________

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MONTANA, and 

SAMUEL DICKMAN, M.D., on behalf of 

themselves and their patients, 

 Plaintiffs and Appellees,

 v.

STATE OF MONTANA, by and through AUSTIN 

KNUDSEN, in his official capacity as Attorney 

General, the MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF 

PUBLIC HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 

and CHARLIE BRERETON, in his official 

capacity as Director of the Department of Public 

Health and Human Services,

 Defendants and Appellants.

O R D E R

_________________

Upon consideration of Appellees’ unopposed motion for an extension of time and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellees are granted an extension of time up to 

and including January 29, 2024, in which to prepare, file, and serve their answer brief in 

the captioned matter.

Electronically signed by:

Beth Baker

Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 3 2023

11/03/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0288
In the Matter of 

ECM BioFilms, Inc., 

ORIGINAL 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF ADMlNlSTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 

DOCKET NO. 9358 

a corporation, also d/b/a 

Enviroplastics lnternationa4 

Respondent. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER REQUIRING EXPEDITED RESPONSE 

On April21, 2014, Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Complaint Counsel filed an 

Emergency Motion for Protective Order ("Motion") requesting a ruling in advance of certain 

nonparty depositions scheduled to begin onAptil28, 2014. Respondent is hereby ORDERED to 

file any response to the Motion, on an expedited basis, by 10:00 a.m., April23, 2014. 

ORDERED: 

Date: April21, 2014
The Honorable James Maxwell Moody, United States Distric t 1 Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. ___________ No. 96-3512

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas Robert J. Gray, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: January 7, 1997 Filed: January 21, 1997

___________ Before McMILLIAN, HENLEY and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM.
Robert J. Gray appeals his nine-month sentence imposed by th e District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas after he pleade d 1 gui ltyto aiding and abetting in wrecking a train, in violation of 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 19 92 and 2. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v
. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and was granted leave to withdraw. Gray did not avail himself of the opportunity to file a pro se supplementa l brief. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
Althou ghGray argues that his sentence should have include d probation, an option authorized by U.S. Sentencing Guideline s Manual § 5C1.1(c)(3) (1995), the district court was within its-2-

discretion to impose imprisonment. The district court speci fically noted at sentencing its option s under Guidelines § 5C1.1(c)(2) and (3), and also stated that the sentence should be fair and just , reflect the seriousness of the crime, and deter others from similar conduct in the future. Thus, contrary to Gray's contention, th e district court considered the sentencing options and stated reasons for the sentence. The district court was not required to st ate its re ason for choosing the particular point within the sentencin g range, because the applicable range did not span more than 2 4 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1); United States v. Garrido , 38 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ehret , 885 F.2 d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 106 2 (1990).
Havi ng carefully reviewed the record, we find no othe r nonfrivolous issues for appeal. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0434

Filed January 10, 2018

DAVID McCULLOUGH,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Humboldt County, Kurt J. Stoebe, 

Judge.

David McCullough appeals the dismissal of his postconviction-relief 

application on statute-of-limitations grounds. AFFIRMED. 

Charles J. Kenville of Kenville Law Firm, P.C., Fort Dodge, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2

MULLINS, Judge.

David McCullough appeals the dismissal of his postconviction-relief 

application on statute-of-limitations grounds. He requests that we apply the 

doctrine of equitable tolling to exempt him from the three-year statutory time bar 

contained in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2016). Bypassing the State’s errorpreservation concerns, we repeat our position that the doctrine of equitable 

tolling does not apply to section 822.3. See, e.g., Long v. State, No. 16-1220, 

2017 WL 2684345, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017); Harrington v. State, No. 

16-0953, 2017 WL 2684340, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017); James v. 

State, 858 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). 

We affirm the ruling of the district court without further opinion pursuant to 

Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(a), (c), and (e). 

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1





Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350








The undersigned, Donald H. Hosmer, Co-President and Co-Chief Executive Officer of Royale Energy, Inc., a California corporation (the "Company"), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, hereby certifies that:





(1) the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











Date:  September 2, 2010
By:
/s/ Donald H. HosmerDonald H. Hosmer, Co-President and Co Chief Executive Officer