No. 11-10375-EE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

______________________________

POLYPORE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Respondent.

______________________________

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL ORDER

OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

______________________________

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

(PUBLIC VERSION)

______________________________

WILLARD K. TOM

General Counsel

RICHARD FEINSTEIN JOHN F. DALY

Director, Bureau of Competition Deputy General Counsel for Litigation

CATHARINE MOSCATELLI MICHELE ARINGTON

Assistant Director Attorney

MORRIS BLOOM Office of the General Counsel

Deputy Assistant Director Federal Trade Commission

Bureau of Competition 600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 326-3157
No. 11-10375-EE, Polypore International, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission

C-1 of 1

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Respondent Federal Trade Commission certifies that, to best of its

knowledge, the Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure

Statement previously submitted by the petitioner in this case pursuant to 11th Cir.

R. 26.1 is complete.
i

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The Federal Trade Commission agrees with the petitioner that oral argument

may aid in the Court’s resolution of this case.
ii

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ......................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 

Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

B. Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1. The battery separator industry .........................4

2. Daramic and Microporous competed in the deep-cycle 

market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3. Daramic and Microporous competed in the motive 

market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4. Microporous was bidding for SLI business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

5. Microporous was expanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
iii

6. Daramic acquired Microporous to eliminate 

competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

C. The Commission’s Decision and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

D. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

I. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND A SECTION 7

VIOLATION IN THE DEEP-CYCLE, MOTIVE, AND SLI

BATTERY SEPARATOR MARKETS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission’s Finding 

that the Acquisition Eliminated Competition Between

Microporous and Daramic in the Deep-Cycle Market. . . . . . 30

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission’s Finding 

that Entry by Entek Would Be Unlikely to Alleviate the

Anticompetitive Effects of a Merger to Monopoly in the 

Motive Market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

C. The Commission Properly Analyzed the Competitive 

Effects of the Acquisition in the SLI Market. . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

1. Legal authority supports the Commission’s analysis 

of Microporous as an actual competitor. . . . . . . . . . . . 41

2. Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s 

factual findings that the acquisition eliminated an 

actual competitor and harmed competition in the 

SLI market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3. The Commission properly concluded that the 

acquisition eliminated a potential competitor in 

violation of Section 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
iv

II. THE COMMISSION’S FINAL ORDER OF DIVESTITURE 

IS PROPER AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
v

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES PAGE

Abex Corp. v. FTC,

420 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC,

540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

*Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC,

534 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 37, 53, 54, 57

Colonial Stores, Inc. v. FTC,

450 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.,

246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29

*FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists,

476 U.S. 447, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 24

FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co.,

352 U.S. 419, 77 S. Ct. 502 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc.,

938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
vi

Ford Motor Co. v. United States,

405 U.S. 562, 92 S. Ct. 1142 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA,

623 F.3d 1229 (8th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp.,

717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp.,

665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42, 44

*Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC,

327 U.S. 608, 66 S. Ct. 754 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 54

Mahon v. USDA,

485 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,

638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 52

RSR Corp. v. FTC,

602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,

402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
vii

Seeburg Corp. v. FTC,

425 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Simms v. Apfel,

530 U.S. 103, 120 S. Ct. 2080 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc.,

7 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30, 34

United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.,

908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

353 U.S. 586, 77 S. Ct. 872 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

*United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

366 U.S. 316, 81 S. Ct. 1243 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

*United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,

376 U.S. 651, 84 S. Ct. 1044 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 42, 46

United States v. Engelhard Corp.,

126 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,

415 U.S. 486, 94 S. Ct. 1186 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
viii

*United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,

418 U.S. 602, 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 49, 51, 52

*United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,

374 U.S. 321, 83 S. Ct. 1715 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 44, 52, 53

Vidiksis v. EPA,

612 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. FTC,

657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

FEDERAL STATUTES 

Clayton Act

15 U.S.C. § 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

15 U.S.C. § 21(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 54

Federal Trade Commission Act

15 U.S.C. § 21(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

15 U.S.C. § 45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 61

15 U.S.C. § 45(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 60

15 U.S.C. § 45(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

RULES AND REGULATIONS

16 C.F.R. § 2.41(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
ix

16 C.F.R. § 2.51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

MISCELLANEOUS 

Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,

IV Antitrust Law ¶ 912a (3d ed. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 44, 49

Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 

V Antitrust Law ¶ 1123a (3d ed. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & John Solow, 

IIB Antitrust Law ¶422 (3d ed. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

U.S. Department of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger 

Guidelines § 1.0 (1992, rev. 1997), available at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

U.S. Department of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger 

Guidelines § 5.1 (2010), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
x

GLOSSARY

For ease of reference, the following abbreviations and citation forms are

used in this brief:

Op. Commission’s Opinion

IDF Initial Decision Finding of Fact

D- FTC Document Number

PX Complaint Counsel Exhibit

RX Polypore Exhibit

Tr. Transcript of Trial Testimony before the Administrative Law Judge

IH Investigational Hearing

Br. Brief for Petitioner

OE Original Equipment (also referred to as “OEM”)

* In Camera Material
1

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Petitioner would have this Court believe that this is a case primarily about

potential competition. It is not. This is a case about a merger that eliminated

actual competition between rival firms that, until the acquisition, generated lower

prices for customers in three relevant markets. Though petitioner accuses the

Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) of ignoring evidence, in

fact, it is petitioner that omits mention of significant record evidence – including

petitioner’s own regular course-of-business documents, testimony of its own

employees, and testimony of all of the major customers – that strongly supports the

Commission’s conclusions that the acquisition was reasonably likely to harm

competition in these markets. While petitioner clearly would have preferred that

the Commission reach a different conclusion, it has not shown that the

Commission erred. To the contrary, substantial evidence supports the

Commission’s decision on liability, and the divestiture order was well within the

Commission’s discretion to fashion a remedy to restore the competition lost

through this unlawful acquisition.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is a petition to review a Final Order of the Commission, entered

pursuant to Section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b), and Section 5(b)
2

of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). This Court

has jurisdiction to review the Order pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(c) and 45(c).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether substantial evidence supports the Commission’s findings that

the acquisition was likely substantially to lessen competition in the deep-cycle and

motive battery separator markets.

2. Whether the Commission properly analyzed the likely anticompetitive

effects of the acquisition in the SLI battery separator market. 

3. Whether the Commission’s final divestiture order is within the bounds

of its discretion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition

Below

This is a petition to review a final divestiture order that the Commission

issued following an administrative adjudication under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 45. It involves the acquisition by Polypore International, Inc.

(“Polypore”) of Microporous L.P. (“Microporous”), Polypore’s only competitor in

two relevant markets and a significant competitive threat in a third market. 

The Commission issued its administrative complaint on September 9, 2008,

charging that: (i) Polypore’s acquisition of Microporous may substantially lessen
3

competition or tend to create a monopoly in relevant markets for several types of

battery separators, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and

Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Count I); (ii) Polypore entered into an

unlawful joint marketing agreement with manufacturer Hollingsworth & Vose

(“H&V”) to forestall H&V’s entry into a separator market in violation of Section 5

of the FTC Act (Count II); and (iii) Polypore monopolized the alleged relevant

markets, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, by executing contracts with large

customers that would preclude or deter Microporous from competing effectively

(Count III). D-1.

An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) presided over a four-week

evidentiary hearing, producing a record including 5,590 pages of trial testimony

and over 2,100 exhibits. The record was later reopened and a hearing conducted to

receive additional evidence proffered by Polypore. On February 22, 2010, the ALJ

issued a 376-page Initial Decision, holding that the acquisition was reasonably

likely to substantially lessen competition in four relevant markets, and that the

noncompete provisions in Polypore’s joint marketing agreement with H&V

constituted an unlawful market allocation agreement. The ALJ concluded that

Complaint Counsel had failed to establish their claims of monopolization and

attempted monopolization in any of the four relevant markets, and therefore
4

dismissed Count III. As a remedy for Count I, the ALJ ordered complete

divestiture of all the acquired assets. In connection with Count II, the ALJ ordered

Polypore to terminate the noncompete provisions of its marketing agreement with

H&V and to cease and desist from entering into other such unlawful agreements. 

D-341.

Polypore appealed the ALJ’s decision on Count I to the Commission, but did

not appeal any aspect of the ALJ’s decision on Count II. After full briefing and

argument, and based on its de novo review of the record, the Commission

unanimously affirmed liability in three of the alleged battery separator markets –

deep-cycle, motive, and starter-lighter-ignition (“SLI”) – but reversed the ALJ’s

ruling that the acquisition was unlawful in one market – that for uninterruptible

power source (“UPS”) separators. The Commission issued a Final Order

containing a modified divestiture order and a cease and desist provision regarding

Polypore’s unlawful agreement with H&V. D-368.

B. Statement of Facts

1. The battery separator industry.

This case involves a consummated merger of two of the only three firms that

produce and sell battery separators for flooded lead-acid batteries in North

America. Polypore, through its Daramic division, manufactures battery separators
1

 The rubber additive in CellForce is ground-up Ace-Sil, which is another

Microporous separator typically used in high-end industrial products not at issue

here. D-341 at 17 (IDF 45).

5

– microporous membranes incorporated into batteries to prevent electrical short

circuits, D-341 at 22 (IDF 81) – used for a variety of applications, including 

(i) deep-cycle batteries for products such as golf carts, floor scrubbers, and scissor

lifts, id. at 13 (IDF 19); (ii) motive power batteries for mobile industrial products

such as forklifts, id. at 14 (IDF 25); (iii) SLI batteries for automotive applications

such as cars, trucks, buses, boats, and jet skis, id. at 15 (IDF 32); and (iv) UPS

products such as backup stationary batteries for computer and telecommunication

systems, id. (IDF 35). Prior to the acquisition of Microporous, Daramic produced 

a variety of PE separators for these applications, and operated two plants in the

United States and five foreign plants. Id. at 14, 16 (IDF 28, 38-39, 41). 

Microporous (previously known as Amerace) manufactured two products for

deep-cycle and motive applications: Flex-Sil, a rubber separator for deep-cycle

batteries, and CellForce, a PE-based separator with a rubber additive to improve

performance, sold primarily for motive batteries but also for deep-cycle

applications. Id. at 17, 67, 69 (IDF 45, 372, 387). Microporous also developed

and was marketing a PE separator for use in SLI applications.1

 Id. at 73-74 (IDF

429-33). At the time of the acquisition, Microporous operated one plant in Piney
6

Flats, Tennessee, and had completed construction of a plant in Feistritz, Austria. 

Id. at 17, 125 (IDF 43-44, 778).

Daramic and Microporous were the only North American suppliers of deepcycle battery separators, with market shares of approximately 10% and 90%

respectively. Id. at 66, 68 (IDF 371, 385). They were also the only North

American suppliers of motive battery separators, with market shares of

approximately 90% and 10% respectively. Id. at 68, 71 (IDF 386, 410). The only

other firm that supplied flooded-lead acid battery separators to customers in North

America, Entek, sold only SLI separators. Id. at 73 (IDF 428). Entek had

previously sold motive separators, but exited that business a decade ago. Id. at 95,

165 (IDF 578, 1040). 

Battery separators are sold to firms that manufacture flooded lead-acid

batteries. Some customers are large companies with multinational operations,

while other are relatively small. Four of the largest customers are Exide (primarily

SLI and deep-cycle batteries), JCI (primarily SLI but also deep-cycle batteries),

EnerSys (industrial, including motive, batteries), and East Penn Battery (batteries

for all four applications). Id. at 18-20 (IDF 49-59, 65-66). Other customers

include Trojan Battery (deep-cycle batteries), U.S. Battery (primarily deep-cycle

batteries), Crown Battery (batteries for all four applications), Douglas Battery
2

 Due to the uniquely high levels of antimony in deep-cycle batteries,

separators used in these batteries must have the ability to suppress antimony

migration from the positive to the negative plates in order to prevent cycle

reduction and, ultimately, battery failure. Separators that are made of rubber or

include a rubber additive are the most effective in preventing the transfer of

antimony between the lead plates and, therefore, in reducing antimony poisoning. 

D-341 at 30-31 (IDF 136-40). 

7

(deep-cycle and motive batteries), and Bulldog Battery (motive batteries). Id. at

19-22 (IDF 60-64, 67-80).

2. Daramic and Microporous competed in the deep-cycle

market.

Daramic worked for many years to develop a separator to compete with

Microporous’s Flex-Sil in the deep-cycle market. Daramic introduced its first

deep-cycle separator in 2002, then, in 2005, introduced an improved deep-cycle

separator, Daramic HD, that provided the same “rubber effect” as Flex-Sil. Id. at

77-80 (IDF 457-61, 472-76, 481-82); PX1791-001.2

 Deep-cycle customers

initially used Daramic HD in a limited way, but expanded their use over time. 

D-341 at 85 (IDF 512); Tr. 1209-13 (Roe). U.S. Battery, for example, tested

Daramic HD in 2005, and indicated a desire to switch “four (4) new product

lines . . . away from rubber [i.e., Flex-Sil],” to Daramic HD, including a “midlevel” golf cart battery. PX0557-002; D-341 at 80 (IDF 480). U.S. Battery later

increased its purchases of Daramic HD and continued to extend its use of Daramic
8

HD to additional battery models. D-341 at 85 (IDF 514-15); Tr. 369-70

(Gillespie).

Exide also began switching from Flex-Sil to Daramic HD for its deep-cycle

batteries in 2005, and continued to convert additional batteries from Flex-Sil to

Daramic HD. D-341 at 83, 85 (IDF 502-03, 513, 517-18); Tr. 368-79 (Gillespie). 

Exide now uses both Flex-Sil and Daramic HD as substitutes in its most common

golf cart battery, which accounts for 80% of Exide’s deep-cycle sales. Tr. 2941-44

(Gillespie). In December 2007, Daramic submitted a comprehensive supply

proposal to Exide, proposing that Exide completely switch from Flex-Sil to

Daramic HD for its golf cart batteries, including its original equipment batteries. 

Tr. 1788-89* (Roe). Shortly thereafter, Daramic reported that Exide was “looking

to convert another size from Amerace to Daramic.” PX0222-001*.

Trojan Battery, Microporous’s biggest deep-cycle customer, also recognized

the potential of using Daramic HD as a “second source to ensure supply and

competitive pricing.” PX1651; Tr. 181-84 (Godber); D-341 at 87 (IDF 531). 

Trojan Battery tested Daramic HD and qualified it for its batteries in its Pacer line

of golf-carts, in which it had been using Flex-Sil, and has determined that 25% of

its deep-cycle batteries could use Daramic HD. D-341 at 88, 90 (IDF 534, 546);

Tr. 171-73 (Godber).
9

Microporous responded to this competition from Daramic by reducing the

price of Flex-Sil. D-341 at 79, 86, 88-89 (IDF 470, 520-29, 535-42). The three

largest purchasers of deep-cycle separators – Trojan, U.S. Battery, and Exide –

repeatedly used the threat of switching to Daramic HD to get better prices from

Microporous. Tr. 379, 406 (Gilchrist). In 2005, for example, the possibility that

U.S. Battery would shift some of its purchases from Flex-Sil to Daramic HD

prevented Microporous from discontinuing a material rebate program that U.S.

Battery enjoyed. PX0509; Tr. 3912-13 (McDonald). On three occasions between

2006 and 2007, Exide used the availability of Daramic HD as leverage to get lower

prices for Flex-Sil from Microporous. Tr. 2945-53(Gillespie). Trojan Battery also

repeatedly used the threat of switching to Daramic HD as leverage to obtain price

reductions from Microporous. Tr. 190-92, 199-207, 212-15 (Godber). 

Competition from Daramic HD also caused Microporous to begin offering its

customers deep-cycle separators made from CellForce as a lower-cost alternative

to Flex-Sil. D-341 at 89 (IDF 543-44); Tr. 1953-54 (Wallace); Tr. 3949

(McDonald). 

3. Daramic and Microporous competed in the motive market.

Daramic and Microporous were also vigorous competitors in the motive

market, resulting in lower prices for customers. In 2003, Daramic reported, “we
10

have a new polyethylene competitor entering the North American market. MicroPorous Products (Amerace) . . . have attacked all the large manufacturers and to

keep from losing business, we have adjusted prices as needed which has eroded our

margins.” PX0153-002. Daramic responded to this competition from

Microporous by lowering the prices of its motive separators to East Penn, EnerSys,

and others. D-341 at 96-98 (IDF 583-95); PX0243-001* (Daramic lowered prices

“to fight the aggressive offers of Amerace”); Tr. 1254-67 (Roe); Tr. 2121-22,

2164-66* (Axt). Competition from Daramic likewise prompted Microporous to

lower the price (or refrain from increasing the price) of its motive separators. D341 at 98-100 (IDF 597, 607-08); RX0210-001; Tr. 2313-14 (Burkert); Tr. 3516-

17 (Benjamin).

Daramic continued to feel the pressure of competition from Microporous up

until the time of the merger. In the fall of 2007, Daramic responded to this

competition by developing what it called the “MP Plan,” the goal of which was to

secure long-term agreements with customers that Daramic identified as at risk of

shifting sales of separators, including motive separators, to Microporous. Daramic

offered these customers contracts that would freeze prices in 2009 and limit future

price increases. D-341 at 131-32 (IDF 820-22); PX0258; PX0255*; Tr. 1285-94

(Roe). In November 2007, EnerSys responded to Daramic’s announcement of
11

price increases for its motive separators by stating that, because of the availability

of Microporous, “[u]nfortunately for Daramic, these types of ploys will have no

success in future negotiations with EnerSys.” RX0768-001*; Tr. 2342-44*

(Burkert) (“banking on having Microporous as a supplier, . . . I could just walk

away and say no, I’m not signing a contract, I don’t need to buy from you”); D-341

at 98 (IDF 598-99).

Where Daramic did not face competition from Microporous, however, it

insisted on higher prices. In an internal email regarding Exide (which was bound

by an exclusive contract with Daramic until 2010, Tr. 2966 (Gillespie)), a Daramic

sales executive wrote to his colleague that Daramic should be prepared to push for

a price premium, noting that “[s]ince they can’t go to Amerace, we can negotiate a

little tougher.” PX0843-001.

4. Microporous was bidding for SLI business.

Daramic and Entek had long been the only two suppliers of SLI battery

separators in North America, with sales split evenly between the two. D-341 at 73,

75 (IDF 426, 439). In 2003, JCI approached Microporous about supplying SLI

separators, because it felt that Daramic and Entek “needed competition to improve

their pricing and their performance.” Tr. 2698-99 (Hall); D-341 at 106-07 (IDF

655-56, 660-61). When Daramic learned that Microporous was bidding on a
3

 JCI’s decision had little to do with Microporous’s development or

manufacturing capabilities, but instead reflected its concern that Daramic might

acquire Microporous and that a trade dispute between Daramic and Microporous

could delay Microporous’s installation of necessary capacity by the end of 2008. 

D-341 (IDF 691-93); Tr. 2697-2701 (Hall).

12

portion of JCI’s SLI business, it used the threat of cutting off supply to JCI in

Europe to secure a supply contract with JCI. D-341 at 107-10 (IDF 663,

667, 677-78). JCI continued to work with Microporous, however, to develop an

SLI separator and qualified Microporous’s PE SLI separators for its batteries in

2007. Id. at 111 (IDF 684-90). JCI ultimately entered into a supply contract with

Entek for its SLI requirements after its exclusive contract with Daramic expired in

2008.3

 D-341 at 117-18 (IDF 734, 736).

In 2007, Exide began working with Microporous to develop Microporous as

an SLI supplier in North America and Europe. D-341 at 112-14 (IDF 694-710);

Tr. 2965-79 (Gillespie). Microporous and Exide entered into a memorandum of

understanding (“MOU”), in which Microporous represented that it would supply

substantial volumes of SLI separators to Exide beginning in 2010. PX1080. 

Microporous sent SLI separator samples to Exide for testing, exchanged drafts of a

supply agreement with Exide, and continued to meet and consult with Exide

regarding a supply contract for SLI separators. Tr. 443-49* (Gilchrist); Tr. 2973-

76 (Gillespie). The MOU expired at the end of 2007, and the parties renewed the
13

agreement in February 2008. RX0403; PX0392-001. Exide “had full intention

that we were going to be buying Microporous [SLI] separators in 2010.” Tr. 2976

(Gillespie).

In the fall of 2007, East Penn Battery also approached Microporous and

indicated that it was interested in entering into a long-term contract with

Microporous for the supply of SLI separators. D-341 at 115 (IDF 717-19); Tr.

4006-18 (Leister). Microporous’s work with East Penn was brought to a halt by

the acquisition. Tr. 3722-23 (Trevathan).

Microporous’s activities in the SLI market did not go unnoticed by Daramic

and Entek. D-341 at 74, 110, 129-30 (IDF 435-36, 681, 805-09). In 2006, Entek

identified the possibility that Microporous would receive JCI’s support to become

a third SLI supplier as one of the things it most feared its competitors would do to

change the competitive landscape. PX1832-026-27*; Tr. 4517* (Weerts). By

2007, Daramic believed that Microporous was a serious competitive threat and had

the potential to capture as much as 20 to 25 million square meters (“msm”) of

Daramic’s SLI business in 2009 and an even larger share in 2010. PX2078. 

Daramic’s head of sales warned that, “unlike prior years, we have a true legitimate

big competitor entering the market (MP) and for sure they will capture volume at

whatever it takes.” PX0238-001; Tr. 1301-08 (Roe).
14

The competitive threat from Microporous influenced Daramic’s SLI pricing. 

Estimating that it was at risk of losing to Microporous 1 msm of automotive and

500,000 square meters of motive separator sales at East Penn Battery, Daramic (as

part of its “MP Plan”) offered East Penn a contract that would freeze 2009 prices

and limit future price increases. PX0258-002; D-341 at 131-32 (IDF 820-22). A

market share chart prepared by Daramic assigned Microporous an initial 4%

market share for SLI. PX0264-003. Microporous itself projected that it would

gain a 6% share of the SLI market by 2010. PX0080-060*.

5. Microporous was expanding.

Before the acquisition, Microporous was in the process of expanding its

production capacity in both the United States and Europe. D-341 at 123-27 (IDF

769-790). Microporous built a new plant in Feistritz, Austria, with two PE lines

that could produce either CellForce separators or pure PE SLI separators. PX0742-

007; Tr. 330-32 (Gilchrist); Tr. 4558-60 (Gaugl); Tr. 3714 (Trevathan). The

Feistritz plant was scheduled to commence operating in March 2008 (and, indeed,

did commence operations in March 2008, one week after the acquisition closed). 

D-341 at 195 (IDF 1266); PX0078-025*; Tr. 333-35 (Gilchrist); Tr. 4603 (Gaugl). 

Microporous was also planning to install an additional PE line at its Piney Flats

plant, which could likewise produce either CellForce or pure PE separators for SLI. 
15

Tr. 3722, 3731-32 (Trevathan). Microporous ordered the long-lead time

equipment for that line, but the equipment had not been installed at the time of the

acquisition, and subsequently remained uninstalled (thus, it is referred to in this

case as the “line in boxes”). D-341 at 195 (IDF 1268-69); Tr. 4561-65 (Gaugl).

This expansion would remedy capacity constraints at the Piney Flats plant,

both because it would add a new line at Piney Flats, and because Microporous was

going to shift the production of CellForce for its foreign customers from Piney

Flats to the Feistritz plant, thereby freeing up additional capacity for North

American customers. D-341 at 126-27 (IDF 788, 795); Tr. 3774 (Trevathan). As a

result of this planned expansion, Microporous was able to commit additional North

American CellForce sales to EnerSys, Trojan Battery, and U.S. Battery, and had

entered into discussions with other customers to sell additional volumes of

CellForce. D-341 at 127 (IDF 796-97); PX1741-004; PX0080-011*; Tr. 224-27

(Godber); Tr. 344, 401-03 (Gilchrist). 

6. Daramic acquired Microporous to eliminate competition.

For years, Daramic executives had viewed Microporous as a competitive

threat that was harming Daramic’s margins. D-341 at 96, 98, 120-21 (IDF 582,

596, 750-59). In 2003, the President of Daramic put Microporous at the top of his

list of possible acquisitions, describing the benefit to Daramic as “[e]liminate price
16

competition.” PX0932. In March 2005, Daramic’s head of sales sent a

memorandum to Daramic’s then-CEO explaining the advantages and

disadvantages of acquiring Microporous. He warned that, if Daramic did not

acquire Microporous, Microporous “may continue their plans for a second line

resulting in either our loss of current customers or further reduction in our market

pricing, hence loss of margins.” PX0433-004.

When Polypore’s new CEO arrived in mid-2005, Daramic’s Vice President

advised him that Microporous “represent[s] a threat to Daramic for the future

(construction of a second line, former discussion they had with JCI . . . ). Their

first line cost us year, in price concession and loss of business. The

second line could cost us another .” PX2242-001*. Internal Daramic

emails from 2005 also show that Daramic executives were concerned about

Microporous’s expansion plans and more vigorous competition in both the motive

and SLI markets. PX0168-002 (“Amerace is a real threat for our business, not only

in the industrial market, but, later, in the automotive market, because there is no

doubt that JCI and EXIDE will contact them for a deal, when our contracts

expire.”); PX0694-001 (“The bottom line is that Amerace can be another Entek:

building plants to exclusively supply EnerSys, JCI, East Penn and so forth.”). In

August 2006, Daramic’s departing CEO wrote to his successor that Microporous
4

 “EBITDA” refers to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and

amortization. Tr. 1398-99 (Toth).

17

“will be a problem for Daramic. They have acquired momentum and it will be

very difficult to stop them unless the BOARD will approve its purchase at any

price. . . .” PX0167.

In October 2007, Daramic presented its due diligence for a proposed

acquisition of Microporous to Polypore’s Board of Directors. An analysis

prepared for the Board shows that Daramic continued to view the acquisition as a

profitable alternative to competition in the motive and SLI markets. D-341 at 136-

42 (IDF 853-85). Daramic projected that, without the acquisition, its volume

would fall by in 2008, in 2009, and in 2011. PX0738-

004*. Daramic also projected that, absent the acquisition, it would lose 

in 2008, in 2009, and in 2010 from

competition with Microporous. Id. at 8*. Daramic estimated that it faced a “5-year

EBITDA4

 loss of by fighting against MP Phase III; “[e]xcess supply and

market price erosion;” and “Daramic market share loss of .” PX0738-010*. 

Daramic’s General Manager and Vice President wrote in his notes for the

presentation that, without the acquisition, Daramic would have to “[l]ower prices

by beginning in 2008 on of IND [industrial] volume to avoid MP

phase 3.” Id. at 4*. The Board presentation also described benefits and synergies
18

from the acquisition. These included “[i]mplement price increase to noncontract customers on industrial products in 2010 – generating 

incremental EBITDA.” Id. at 7*. With respect to the deep-cycle market, the stated

benefits included “increase in market price.” Id.* Daramic’s 2008 budget also

projected that, absent the acquisition, Daramic would lose increasing amounts of

business to Microporous and would be forced to reduce prices, but with the

acquisition, Daramic could increase the price of Microporous’s CellForce and

industrial products. PX0823-013*.

Microporous’s assessment of its value to Polypore was more succinct:

Any offer must take into account the significant strategic

implications of what Daramic gains by owning MPLP:

• Total control of deep cycle markets (no competitor)

• Total control of industrial markets (no competitor)

• Regains complete upper hand in automotive with no new

competitor being introduced

* * * 

This is a “strategic” play on Daramic’s part . . . based on

 . . . the prospects of taking Daramic’s most dangerous

competitor out of play.

PX1104-001.

Consistent with the price increases projected in Daramic’s documents,

approximately six months after Polypore acquired Microporous, it began to

announce broad-based price increases 

. D-341 at 91-93, 100-01, 145-47
19

(IDF 552-63; 611-15, 897-916). Daramic’s announced price increases were as

high as . Id. at 147 (IDF 913-

915). As a representative for Bulldog Battery, a motive customer, testified,

“[t]here was no way to try to negotiate a lower price. There was no place to go.” 

Tr. 3522, 3525-26 (Benjamin).

C. The Commission’s Decision and Order

The Commission affirmed liability on the deep-cycle, motive, and SLI

markets, but reversed liability in the UPS market. The Commission agreed with

the ALJ that the evidence supports defining four distinct relevant product markets

because, due to differing functionality and performance characteristics, separators

made for one of the four end uses are not reasonably interchangeable with

separators made for another end use. D-368 (Op. 11-18). With regard to the deepcycle market, the Commission rejected Polypore’s argument that Flex-Sil

constitutes its own relevant market, based on evidence showing that, before the

acquisition, Daramic HD competed with, and constrained the price of,

Microporous’s Flex-Sil separators. Id. at 14-15. The Commission also agreed

with the ALJ that the relevant geographic market is North America, based on

evidence showing, among other things, that separator suppliers are able to price

discriminate based on a customer’s geographic location, and that North American
5

 The term “uncommitted entrant” comes from the U.S. Department of

Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.0 (1992, rev. 1997), available at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf, which state that

“[u]ncommitted entrants are capable of making such quick and uncommitted

supply responses that they likely influenced the market premerger, would influence

it post-merger, and accordingly are considered as market participants at both

times.” The Horizontal Merger Guidelines were revised in 2010 and no longer use

that terminology, see infra at 43 n.9, but the analysis is the same under either

version. D-368 (Op. 9 n.17).

20

customers do not consider foreign supply a reasonable competitive alternative to

local supply due primarily to higher costs and quality concerns. Id. at 18-19.

The Commission also found that Daramic and Microporous were the sole

participants in the deep-cycle and motive markets. The Commission rejected

Polypore’s argument that Entek is an uncommitted entrant in those markets,

because the evidence does not show that Entek is in a position to provide a rapid

and effective supply response to the exercise of market power by Daramic in the

deep-cycle or motive markets.5

 D-368 (Op. 23-25).

In addition, the Commission found that Microporous was competing for SLI

business, seeking to challenge Daramic’s and Entek’s hold on that market. Not

only was Microporous actively bidding for SLI business, but it had made

meaningful progress toward a supply agreement with Exide, which fully intended

to purchase SLI separators from Microporous. The Commission also found that

Daramic itself (and Entek as well) perceived Microporous as a serious competitive
21

threat in the SLI market. Id. at 20-22.

The Commission did not agree, however, with the ALJ’s conclusion that

Microporous was a participant in the UPS market because, unlike in the SLI

market, Microporous had not developed a commercially viable separator to offer

North American customers, no customer had come close to qualifying a

Microporous UPS separator, and there is no indication that Daramic perceived

Microporous as a competitive threat in the UPS market. Id. at 22-23.

The Commission concluded that the acquisition was a presumptively

unlawful merger to monopoly in the deep-cycle and motive markets. It also held

the acquisition presumptively unlawful in the SLI market, because it eliminated an

actual participant that was actively competing for business and constraining

Daramic’s prices, and returned the highly-concentrated SLI market to a duopoly

controlled by long-term incumbents. The Commission found that liability in the

SLI market could be premised in the alternative on the elimination of actual or

perceived potential competition. Id. at 26-27.

The Commission did not rest on a presumption of illegality, however, but

also found that direct evidence of anticompetitive unilateral effects in the deepcycle and motive markets, and unilateral and coordinated effects in the SLI market,

strengthened Complaint Counsel’s already compelling prima facie case. Among
22

other things, the evidence showed that pre-acquisition competition between

Daramic and Microporous resulted in lower prices and that Daramic was motivated

to acquire Microporous at least in part to eliminate competition. The Commission

also found that, following the acquisition, Daramic promptly announced postacquisition price increases that were consistent with those projected in its preacquisition documents. In addition, the Commission found that anticompetitive

coordinated effects in the SLI market are likely, based both on the presumption of

coordination in a merger to duopoly in a market with high barriers to entry and

evidence showing pricing transparency in that market. Id. at 27-32.

Turning to Polypore’s rebuttal evidence, the Commission concluded that the

record does not support Polypore’s argument that entry by Entek or others

(including Asian firms referenced by Polypore) would counteract any potential

anticompetitive effects from the acquisition. The Commission found that there are

substantial barriers to entry in the relevant markets. With regard to Entek, the

Commission found that it has shown little interest in re-entering the motive market;

even if it did re-enter the motive market, cost and price considerations make it

unlikely that it would be in a position to constrain Daramic’s pricing; and the

lengthy time required to test and qualify motive separators make it even less likely

that entry by Entek would alleviate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in
23

that market. Id. at 33-35.

 To restore the competition lost through the acquisition, the Commission

ordered Polypore to divest all of the assets it acquired from Microporous, including

the plant in Feistritz, Austria, and granted ancillary relief. The Commission found

that divestiture of the Feistritz plant, although located outside the North American

market, is necessary to provide the acquirer of the divested assets the ability to

compete effectively within the North American market, by relieving capacity

constraints that Microporous remedied by constructing the Feistritz plant, and by

giving the acquirer the same advantages of a global supply that Microporous was

able to offer its customers once it constructed the Feistritz plant. The Commission

also required Polypore to terminate the noncompete provisions of its marketing

agreement with H&V and to cease and desist from entering into other such

unlawful agreements. Id. at 36-42; D-368 (Final Order).

D. Standard of Review

“The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence,

shall be conclusive.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). Reviewing courts may not “make [their]

own appraisal of the [evidence], picking and choosing ... among uncertain and

conflicting inferences.” FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454, 106

S. Ct. 2009, 2015 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Schering-
24

Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1063 (11th Cir. 2005)) (“we do not review

the record to draw our own conclusions that we measure against an administrative

agency”). Rather, “the court must accept the Commission’s findings of fact if they

are supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 454, 106

S. Ct. at 2015-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Review of the Commission’s legal analysis and conclusions is de novo,

“although even in considering such issues the courts are to give some deference to

the Commission’s informed judgment.” Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at

454, 106 S. Ct. at 2016; accord Colonial Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 733, 740

n.14 (5th Cir. 1971) (“even when the Commission’s findings are framed in terms

of legal conclusions, their presumptive validity is considerable”).

Remedial provisions are subject to an abuse of discretion standard, because

“the Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to

cope with the unlawful practices in this area of trade and commerce.” Jacob Siegel

Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611, 66 S. Ct. 754, 760 (1946). The Commission is “the

expert body to determine what remedy is necessary,” and “the courts will not

interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the

unlawful practices found to exist.” FTC v. Nat’l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428, 77
25

S. Ct. 502, 509 (1957) (quoting Jacob Siegel, 327 U.S. at 612-13, 66 S. Ct. at 760). 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Despite Polypore’s efforts to characterize this as a case primarily about

potential competition, this is a case about the loss of actual competition between

Daramic and Microporous in the deep-cycle, motive, and SLI markets that

produced lower prices for customers in each of those markets. Polypore seeks to

sustain its fiction by relegating its discussion of the deep-cycle and motive markets

– markets in which Daramic and Microporous were indisputably current (and the

only) participants – to the back end of its brief, and by mischaracterizing the

Commission’s analysis of competitive effects in the SLI market. We do not accept

Polypore’s invitation to distort the Commission’s analysis and, therefore, address

the issues in the sequence that the Commission’s Opinion did – addressing first the

deep-cycle and motive markets in which Microporous was an established,

vigorous, sole competitor to Daramic, then addressing the SLI market where recent

entry by Microporous was beginning to disrupt an entrenched duopoly. 

Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that the acquisition

eliminated competition between Microporous and Daramic in the deep-cycle

market. Polypore argues that the Commission should be reversed because it

ignored evidence that Polypore believes supports a Flex-Sil-only relevant product
26

market. But, in fact, it is Polypore that ignores evidence in this case. Polypore

makes little mention, for example, of the evidence showing that customers viewed

Daramic’s deep cycle separator (Daramic HD) and Microporous’s Flex-Sil as

substitutes for each other. Nor does Polypore mention the considerable evidence

showing that customers repeatedly used the availability of Daramic HD to get

lower prices for Flex-Sil. This evidence firmly supports the Commission’s

conclusion that the acquisition likely substantially lessened competition in the

deep-cycle market in violation of Section 7. (Part I.A.)

Substantial evidence also supports the Commission’s conclusion that the

acquisition likely substantially lessened competition in the motive market in

violation of Section 7. Although Polypore argues that entry by Entek will

constrain Daramic’s exercise of market power, the record shows otherwise. The

Commission did not, as Polypore contends, base its conclusion on subjective

assertions by Entek concerning its interest in entering the motive market, but

instead based its decision on objective considerations, including evidence showing

that, even if Entek did enter, its pricing is unlikely to be competitive with

Daramic’s pricing. (Part I.B.)

The Commission also properly concluded that the acquisition harmed

competition in the SLI market by eliminating a significant competitive threat to
27

Daramic’s and Entek’s long-standing duopoly in that market. Contrary to

Polypore’s argument, controlling legal authority and substantial evidence support

the Commission’s finding that Microporous was an actual competitor in the SLI

market. The evidence shows, among other things, that Microporous was bidding

for SLI business, Microporous was on the verge of securing an SLI supply

agreement with Exide, and the threat of losing SLI business to Microporous led

Daramic to lower prices to East Penn battery, one of its SLI customers. The

Commission correctly recognized that liability in the SLI market could, in the

alternative, be premised on the loss of potential competition. (Part I.C.)

Finally, the Commission’s order of divestiture follows textbook Section 7

principles, is fully supported by the record, and is well within the bounds of the

Commission’s discretion. Although Polypore questions the Commission’s

authority to require divestiture of the plant in Feistritz, Austria, it is well

established that the Commission, in the exercise of its broad remedial authority,

may order divestiture of assets outside the relevant market if divestiture of those

assets is necessary to restore competition within the relevant market – which the

Commission found is the case here. (Part II.)
28

ARGUMENT

I. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND A SECTION 7

VIOLATION IN THE DEEP-CYCLE, MOTIVE, AND SLI BATTERY

SEPARATOR MARKETS.

Section 7 of the Clayton Act is “designed to arrest in its incipiency ... the

substantial lessening of competition from the acquisition by one corporation” of

the stock or assets of a competing corporation. United States v. E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589, 77 S. Ct. 872, 875 (1957). Section 7 does not

require certainty, but instead prohibits acquisitions that create a “a reasonable

probability that the proposed transaction would substantially lessen competition in

the future.” FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991); see

Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 423 (5th Cir. 2008); FTC v. H.J.

Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Even in a consummated merger,

the ultimate issue under Section 7 is whether anticompetitive effects are reasonably

probable in the future, not whether such effects have occurred at the time of trial. 

United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505-06, 94 S. Ct. 1186,

1197-98 (1974). 

The government can establish a presumption of liability by defining a

relevant product and geographic market and showing that the acquisition will lead

to undue concentration in that market. Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1218. The
29

government can bolster a prima facie case based on market structure with evidence

showing that anticompetitive effects are likely, including the ordinary course of

business documents of the merging parties recognizing the pre-acquisition

competition between them and anticipating that the merger will end it. H.J. Heinz,

246 F.3d at 717. Evidence that sheds light on the strategic objectives of the

merging parties is also probative of likely competitive effects. Graphic Prods.

Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1573 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[e]vidence of

intent is highly probative . . . because knowledge of intent may help the court to

interpret facts and to predict consequences”).

Substantial evidence in this case supports the Commission’s findings that

there is a reasonable probability that Polypore’s acquisition of Microporous

substantially lessened competition in the deep-cycle, motive, and SLI separator

markets. The Commission’s decision was based not only on presumptions drawn

from market share and concentrations levels (though those by themselves support a

finding of liability), but also on strong evidence showing a likelihood of

competitive harm, including the loss of pre-acquisition competition as well as postacquisition price increases. 
30

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission’s Finding that the

Acquisition Eliminated Competition Between Microporous and

Daramic in the Deep-Cycle Market.

In this appeal, Polypore does not dispute that Daramic and Microporous

were the only suppliers of deep-cycle battery separators in North America before

the acquisition, and that, as a result of the acquisition, Daramic now controls 100%

of the supply of deep-cycle separators. Nor does Polypore dispute that, before the

acquisition, Daramic HD competed with Microporous’s CellForce for deep-cycle

applications, which competition has now been eliminated. Instead, Polypore

argues that the Commission’s decision that the acquisition lessened competition in

the deep-cycle market should be reversed because the Commission “largely

ignored” or failed to give “adequate weight” to evidence that Polypore believes

supports a Flex-Sil-only relevant product market, and because the competition

between Daramic HD and CellForce was (Polypore claims) “insubstantial” “niche

competition.” Polypore’s arguments have no basis in law or fact.

As this Court has observed, “[d]efining a relevant product market is

primarily a process of describing those groups of producers which, because of the

similarity of their products, have the ability – actual or potential – to take

significant amounts of business away from each other.” U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v.

Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 995 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
31

omitted). Products are properly considered to be in the same relevant market if

evidence shows that customers view them as substitutes and could switch from one

to the other in response to a small but significant price increase. See United States

v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1305-08 (11th Cir. 1997). Substitution for the

purpose of defining a relevant market does not, however, require complete

interchangeability between products – a point that Polypore concedes. Br. 45

(stating that this is a “legal truism”); D-368 (Op. 14). Furthermore, because “[t]he

definition of a relevant market is essentially a factual question,” the factfinder’s

determinations on this issue “are accorded great deference.” Engelhard, 126 F.3d

at 1305 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, ample evidence – including the merging parties’ ordinary

course of business records, testimony of Polypore’s own employees, and testimony

of the customers – supports the Commission’s (and the ALJ’s) findings that

Daramic HD, Flex-Sil, and CellForce were functionally interchangeable, that

Daramic HD competed against both Flex-Sil and CellForce in the deep-cycle

separator market, and that this competition caused Microporous to reduce its

prices. 

Tucker Roe, Daramic’s Vice-President of Worldwide Sales and Marketing,

made the point clearly in an internal 2007 e-mail: “HD is for deep cycle
32

application. This is golf cart, marine and floor scrubber. This is the market of

Amerace’s Flex-Sil.” PX0316-002; D-341 at 81 (IDF 489). Daramic held itself

out to customers as an alternative to Flex-Sil, advertising that HD matched the

antimony poisoning retardation of Flex-Sil, and Daramic’s product testing

supported this claim. D-341 at 80-82 (IDF 483, 490-93); PX0423-002; Tr. 1202-

03 (Roe); Tr. 4839* (Whear). Customers such as U.S. Battery and Exide

concurred that HD and Flex-Sil are substitutes for each other. D-341 at 84-84 (IDF

502-05); Tr. 1971-72 (Wallace) (testing by U.S. Battery showed “comparable”

results for Flex-Sil and HD); Tr. 2062-63 (Qureshi) (“they are identical in

performance”); Tr. 2932-33 (Gillespie) (Exide regards HD and Flex-Sil as

“substitutes for each other”). 

As discussed in detail above, the evidence shows that deep-cycle customers

switched ever-increasing amounts of their separator purchases from Flex-Sil to

Daramic HD. See supra at 7-8. With regard to U.S. Battery, for example, Daramic

reported, “[w]e should continue to see more of their deep-cycle business headed

our way. [U.S. Battery] appreciates that we developed a competing product for

rubber . . . [and] sees their benefit as having two suppliers in order to manage costs

while maintaining product performance. Meanwhile, we benefit by continuing to

gain incremental volume (and taking it away from Microporous Products) in a
33

market where we are relatively new entrants.” PX0557-003; see PX1710-001

(“Amerace found out that we are taking their market share with our Daramic HD,

for the golf cart business. . . . Exide is switching already half a million sqm from

the Flexil [sic] to us”); PX0321-002 (“Daramic expects to increase sales of

Daramic HD separators by 63% over prior year and meet or exceed 2007 budgeted

sales volume”). 

There is also ample evidence that Daramic HD repeatedly constrained

Microporous’s pricing of Flex-Sil (evidence that Polypore omits mention of in its

brief). See supra at 9. Daramic itself recognized that HD was constraining

Microporous’s prices, writing in 2007, “We know we can price the product where

we want to either get business or cause Amerace to reduce theirs.” PX0329-001. 

At the same time, Daramic recognized that “[w]e must continue to improve our

service on HD or we stand a good chance of losing golf car business back to

Amerace FlexSil.” PX0413-005.

Disregarding this evidence, Polypore argues that the Commission’s decision

must be reversed because the Commission “largely ignored” evidence that Flex-Sil

was generally viewed as a higher-quality product, and customers purchased only

limited quantities of Daramic HD despite Flex-Sil’s significantly higher price. But

the Commission did not ignore this evidence. Rather, the Commission carefully
6

 The Court observed: “Simpler evidence of supply and demand

substitution, like proof that producers in the submarket had actually increased or

decreased their sales in response to corresponding price changes in the broader

market, would also suffice. As we have pointed out, however, U.S. Anchor failed

to meet its burden of proving interdependent market behavior by this method as

well.” U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 998-99.

34

considered whether these factors warrant separate relevant markets and determined

(as did the ALJ) that they do not, in light of the considerable evidence showing that

Daramic HD competed against and constrained Microporous’s pricing of Flex-Sil. 

D-368 (Op. 14-15, 27-28); D-341 at 227-30. Contrary to Polypore’s contention,

Br. 42, U.S. Anchor does not stand for the broad proposition that evidence of

perceived quality differences and pricing disparities between otherwise

interchangeable products warrants defining separate relevant markets. In that case,

the Court’s decision finding separate relevant markets was driven by the total

absence of evidence that the demand for or pricing of “premium” anchors was in

any way influenced by the availability of lower-priced “generic” alternatives. U.S.

Anchor, 7 F.3d at 996-99.6

 That is not the case here. 

There is likewise no merit to Polypore’s characterization of Daramic HD as

a product suitable for only a small segment of the deep-cycle market. Even if one

were to accept Polypore’s contention that HD is categorically unsuitable for any

OE application – notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, Tr. 1934-35 (Wallace);

Tr. 1788-89* (Roe) – OE is a far smaller segment of the deep-cycle battery market
35

than replacement batteries. Tr. 357-58, 608-09 (Gilchrist) (replacement batteries

are approximately 85% of the market); PX0433-002 (Daramic estimated that the

split is 70% replacement, 30% OE); Tr. 3091-92 (Gillespie) (Exide’s batteries are

90 % aftermarket, 10% OE). Exide’s VP of global procurement testified that the

reason Exide has not yet sought to qualify Daramic HD for its OE batteries is that

it takes time to qualify a new separator and “we go for the biggest bang for the

buck first” – i.e., its replacement batteries – “not go for the smallest volume with

the littlest bang first.” Tr. 3090-91 (Gillespie). Polypore’s contention that

Daramic HD is suitable only for an insignificant “niche” of the deep-cycle market

is further belied by its 2007 budget, which targeted a share for Daramic HD at

Trojan Battery in 2009, complete conversion of Exide’s replacement batteries to

HD and qualification for Exide’s OEM batteries, and an increase of its market

share at U.S. Battery to . PX0263-008*.

Nor is there merit to Polypore’s attempt to dismiss the elimination of

competition between HD and CellForce as involving too insubstantial an amount

of commerce to matter. Br. 46. Not only does this proposition lack legal support,

it is factually inaccurate as well. Competition from Daramic HD led Microporous

to begin offering the less expensive CellForce to its customers for deep-cycle

applications. D-341 at 89 (IDF 543-44); Tr. 1953-54 (Wallace). Because of
36

capacity constraints, however, Microporous was able to provide only limited

amounts of CellForce to deep-cycle customers. D-341 at 88 (IDF 537); Tr. 193-95

(Godber). At the time of the merger, that capacity constraint was about to end,

with the completion of Microporous’s Austrian plant (which would immediately

free up capacity at its Piney Flats plant for North American customers), and the

planned installation of an additional PE line at Piney Flats. See supra at 14-15. 

The record shows that Trojan Battery had plans to move a considerable

amount of its Flex-Sil batteries to CellForce once the Austrian plant began

operating, and had determined that Daramic HD could be used in all applications

that used CellForce. D-341 at 90 (IDF 546-48); PX0080-011*; Tr. 173, 224-27

(Godber). Prior to the acquisition, JCI was also engaged in discussions with

Microporous to supply CellForce separators for its golf cart batteries to have an

alternative to Daramic HD, because JCI wanted to “see competition.” Tr. 2704-07

(Hall); D-341 at 84 (IDF 506). This is significant competition, eliminated by the

acquisition, that Polypore ignores. 

This evidence firmly supports the Commission’s conclusion that the

acquisition likely substantially lessened competition – including competition

between Daramic HD and Flex-Sil – in the deep-cycle market.
37

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission’s Finding that

Entry by Entek Would Be Unlikely to Alleviate the

Anticompetitive Effects of a Merger to Monopoly in the Motive

Market.

With regard to the motive market, Polypore does not dispute that Daramic

and Microporous were its only participants, that Daramic’s and Microporous’s

products competed with each other and this competition led to lower prices, or that

the acquisition eliminated this competition and gave Daramic a monopoly. The

anticompetitive effects of such an acquisition are obvious, and the only defense

that Polypore offers is that entry by other firms (specifically, Entek) will constrain

Daramic’s exercise of market power.

For entry to counteract the likely harm from a merger that enhances market

power, such entry must be of a sufficient scale to constrain the merged entity’s

prices. Chicago Bridge, 534 F.3d at 429. “The more concentrated the market and

the greater the threat posed by the challenged practice, the more convincing must

be the evidence of likely, timely and effective entry.” Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert

Hovenkamp & John Solow, IIB Antitrust Law ¶ 422, at 91 (3d ed. 2006); see

United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[i]f the

totality of . . . [the] evidence suggests that entry will be slow and ineffective, then

the . . . court is unlikely to find the prima facie case rebutted”). The Commission

carefully considered Polypore’s arguments and the evidence relating to this issue
38

and agreed with the ALJ that entry – either new entry or expansion by Entek – is

unlikely to constrain the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition. D-368 (Op. 33-

35); D-341 at 270-87. Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding.

Although Polypore makes passing reference to small separator

manufacturers that “spring up around the world from time to time,” Br. 48

(referencing Asian firms), it makes no real effort to dispute the Commission’s

findings that there are substantial barriers to entry in the relevant markets, see

D-341 at 148-56 (IDF 924-30, 932-63, 973-75), and that these barriers are even

greater for Asian firms due, among other factors, to higher production and

transportation costs and supply chain risks, see id. at 52, 57-58, 62, 167-68 (IDF

288-89, 314-19, 349, 1057-63). Rather, Polypore challenges the Commission’s

conclusion that entry by Entek is not likely to alleviate the anticompetitive effects

of this merger to monopoly in the motive market, arguing that the Commission did

not properly consider “objective economic realities.” Br. 50.

Contrary to Polypore’s contention, however, the Commission did not base

its conclusion regarding the prospects of entry by Entek on subjective assertions by

Entek concerning its interest in entering the motive market. The Commission

instead based its decision on objective factors, including cost and price

considerations, Entek’s strategic decision to focus on SLI production, and its past
39

actions in declining numerous opportunities to re-enter the motive market. D-368

(Op. 24-25, 35); see Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve

Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1269 (5th Cir. 1981) (“objective” evidence regarding

likelihood of entry includes “evidence of a market’s profitability or of the previous

behavior of a firm”). 

The record shows, for instance, that Entek has pursued a strategy of

 D-341 at 70 (IDF 398). An Entek representative

testified that the thicker industrial (i.e., motive) separators are more costly and 

difficult to produce, and that 

Tr. 4503-04*, 4515-16* (Weerts); D-341 at 163 (IDF 1029-30). Since exiting the

motive separator market, Entek has repeatedly declined customer requests that it

supply non-SLI separators. D-341 at 69-70, 164 (IDF 395-97, 1032-34). While

Entek has had some recent discussions with customers about the possibility of

providing motive separators, Entek does not even have such products available,

much less tested, and it has indicated that if it did produce industrial separators, 

 Id. at 165-65 (IDF

1035-37, 1041-43); PX1902-001*; Tr. 4508-09* (Weerts); Tr. 3040, 3129-30*

(Gillespie); Tr. 2350-55, 2446-48 (Burkert). The evidence also shows that the time
40

required to test and qualify motive separators is particularly lengthy, lasting from

two to three years. D-341 at 161, 164-65 (IDF 1011-14, 1038, 1044); PX0568*,

Tr. 2490-91, 2522-23* (Gagge); Tr. 3037-39* (Gillespie).

On this record, the Commission properly found that Entek is unlikely to

enter the motive market and that, even if it did, entry would not be sufficient to

constrain Daramic’s post-acquisition pricing. The Commission’s finding that entry

would not likely offset the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition is further

supported by the fact that, at the time of the administrative proceedings (more than

two years after the acquisition), and after Daramic’s imposition of substantial price

increases for its separators, see supra at 18-19, neither Entek nor any other firm

had entered the motive market. Nothing cited by Polypore remotely justifies

reversing the Commission’s findings on this issue.

C. The Commission Properly Analyzed the Competitive Effects of

the Acquisition in the SLI Market.

Polypore’s various arguments as to why this Court should reverse the

Commission’s analysis of the acquisition’s anticompetitive effects in the SLI

separator market hinge on its contention that the Commission improperly treated

Microporous as a current participant in the SLI market, rather than merely a
7

 Polypore goes particularly far afield in claiming that its arguments about

the SLI market somehow warrant reversal of the Commission’s decision in its

entirety, including its independent conclusions that the acquisition substantially

lessened competition in the deep-cycle and motive markets in violation of Section

7. Br. 40-41. As demonstrated above, the Commission properly found an

unlawful merger to monopoly in each of those markets, and nothing in Polypore’s

arguments regarding the SLI market has any bearing on those findings.

41

potential competitor. Polypore is wrong.7

1. Legal authority supports the Commission’s analysis of

Microporous as an actual competitor.

Polypore contends – without citing any legal support for the proposition –

that the reasons given by the Commission for treating Microporous as a participant

in the SLI market, D-368 (Op. 20-22), are not relevant to the question of whether it

was a current competitor. Br. 21. Controlling legal authority demonstrates

otherwise. In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the Supreme Court found

that a merger violated Section 7 where, prior to the acquisition, the acquired firm

had made efforts to sell in the relevant market and those efforts, even though

unsuccessful, had induced the acquiring firm to reduce its prices in that market. 

376 U.S. 651, 659, 84 S. Ct. 1044, 1048-49 (1964) (“We would have to wear

blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific Northwest to get into the

California market, though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso's

business attitudes within the State.”). As the Court later explained in United States

v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., “[t]he merger declared unlawful in El Paso
8

 See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, V Antitrust Law ¶ 1123a, at

60 (3d ed. 2006) (“Just before the acquisition, Pacific Northwest . . . had made

strenuous efforts to obtain certain contracts to supply natural gas to meet new

demands in the California market. Although Pacific Northwest failed to win those

contracts, El Paso secured them only by substantially reducing its previously

quoted price and by improving its service. Thus, the acquisition of Pacific

Northwest removed not merely a potential but also an actual competitor.”).

42

removed not merely a potential, but rather an actual, competitor.” 418 U.S. 602,

625 n.24, 94 S. Ct. 2856, 2871 n.24 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).8

In Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second

Circuit followed El Paso in affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction that

prevented a merger between LTV and Grumman, manufacturers of aircraft

products, even though the Defense Department had not ordered any A-7 aircraft for

two years and had no plans to purchase any from LTV. The court observed that

“[w]hether or not [LTV] will sell more A-7’s to the Defense Department, the fact

remains that it was properly found to be competing.” Id. at 12. The court held that

the fact that LTV’s recent efforts had not resulted in any sales “does not lessen the

competitive significance of [LTV’s] capacity and desire to make it. ‘Unsuccessful

bidders are no less competitors than the successful ones.’” Id. at 13 (quoting El

Paso, 376 U.S. at 661, 84 S. Ct. at 1049). 

As the Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise explains:

[T]he distinction between “actual” and “potential”

competition is readily exaggerated. For example, a firm
9

 The U.S. Department of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines 

§ 5.1 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf, state that

the agencies will analyze as current market participants “firms that currently

supply products in the relevant market, as well as firms not currently selling in the

market that are likely to provide rapid and effective supply responses to the

exercise of market power by current sellers without incurring significant sunk

costs.”

43

that has submitted bids against the dominant firm but

loses is clearly an “actual” competitor, perhaps even

forcing the dominant firm to lower its bid in the face of a

rival bidder. 

Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, IV Antitrust Law ¶ 912a, at 59 (3d ed.

2006).9

 Contrary to Polypore’s contention, the facts found by the Commission

concerning Microporous’s participation in the SLI market (discussed in the

following section) fit squarely within these legal authorities’ conception of actual

competition.

There is likewise no merit to Polypore’s contention that a market structurebased presumption of illegality applies only to mergers that “significantly increase

concentration” in an already concentrated market. Br. 26. Acceptance of that

argument would mean that elimination of a new rival – who may not yet have

many, or any, sales, despite a present effect on the market – cannot, as a matter of

law, be deemed presumptively unlawful. Contrary to Polypore’s assertion, United

States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 83 S. Ct. 1715 (1963), provides

no support for such a rule. The Court there spoke of a “significant increase in
44

concentration” because that was the factual scenario before it. But the Court made

clear that, “if concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even

slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual

deconcentration is correspondingly great.” 374 U.S. at 365 n.42, 83 S. Ct. at 1742

n.42. The Areeda & Hovenkamp treatise addresses this point as well:

The acquisition by an already dominant firm of a new or

nascent rival can be just as anticompetitive as a merger to

monopoly. . . . [T]he acquisition eliminates an important

route by which competition could have increased in the

immediate future. It thus bears a very strong

presumption of illegality that should rarely be defeated.

Areeda & Hovenkamp, IV Antitrust Law ¶ 912a, at 59-60; see also Grumman, 665

F.2d at 15 (“In a concentrated market expected to see . . . the share of the dominant

firm decrease, the District Court was properly concerned with maintaining small

aggressive competitors in the market.”). 

Polypore’s argument that the Commission improperly relied on a

presumption of illegality fails in another important respect: contrary to Polypore’s

contention, the Commission’s decision did not rest solely on a presumption of

competitive harm based on market structure. Instead, the Commission found that

other evidence of anticompetitive effects (including evidence showing that

Daramic responded to Microporous’s activities in the SLI market by offering price

concessions to a customer it deemed at risk, see supra at 14) supports a conclusion
45

that the acquisition likely substantially lessened competition in the SLI market. D368 (Op. 27-32).

2. Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s factual

findings that the acquisition eliminated an actual

competitor and harmed competition in the SLI market.

Polypore’s criticisms of the Commission’s conclusions about the

acquisition’s effects in the SLI market boil down to disagreements with the way in

which it resolved factual disputes on the record before it. That the Commission

took a different view of the evidence than that urged by Polypore does not,

however, demonstrate error that warrants reversal. 

Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Microporous

was a participant in the SLI market. As discussed above, not only was

Microporous competing for SLI business, it had made meaningful progress toward

supply arrangements with JCI and Exide, two of the largest SLI battery

manufacturers in the world with significant manufacturing facilities in North

America. The record shows that Microporous developed and qualified an SLI

separator for JCI, after JCI approached Microporous about becoming a third SLI

supplier for the specific purpose of making the market more competitive. See

supra at 11-12. Although Polypore, in this appeal, adamantly refuses to deem

these activities “bidding” for SLI business, see Br. 22-23, its own officials viewed
46

the matter differently. At trial, Daramic’s head of sales testified unequivocally that

he learned “Microporous was bidding on a portion of JCI’s SLI business.” Tr.

1237, 1248-50 (Roe); PX0244. Mr. Roe further testified that he viewed

Microporous as a viable competitor for SLI separators and a threat for JCI’s

business. Tr. 1307-08 (Roe). In fact, Microporous did not merely bid for SLI

business; it actually made some (albeit limited) sales of SLI separators. PX0131-

067 (“[i]n 2005, MPLP sold approximately 500,000 square meters of separators to

U.S.-based automotive SLI customers”); Tr. 3795-96 (McDonald) (Microporous

sold SLI separators developed for JCI to Voltmaster). Although Microporous’s

efforts to supply SLI separators to JCI did not, ultimately, result in a supply

contract, “[u]nsuccessful bidders are no less competitors than the successful ones.” 

El Paso, 376 U.S. at 661, 84 S. Ct. at 1049.

The evidence also establishes that, from 2007 up until the time of the

acquisition, Microporous and Exide were in serious discussions for an SLI supply

contract. See supra at 12-13. Contrary to Polypore’s claim that these discussions

had “stalled,” Br. 23, Microporous and Exide had renewed their MOU shortly

before the acquisition, RX0403, and Exide’s representative at trial made it clear

that Exide “had full intention that we were going to be buying Microporous

separators in 2010,” Tr. 2976 (Gillespie) – referring specifically to SLI separators
10 RX0401 (also in evidence as PX0092) was not a Board document at all,

as Polypore suggests, but rather was a letter from Mr. Heglie to Mr. Gilchrist that

was never adopted by the full Board. Tr. 433-434* (Gilchrist).

47

(and contravening Polypore’s claim that it is unclear what types of separators

Exide was planning to purchase from Microporous, Br. 24).

There is likewise no merit to Polypore’s attempt to dismiss Microporous’s

discussions with East Penn Battery in the fall of 2007 as relating to “unspecified

applications.” Br. 24. The evidence clearly shows that East Penn Battery

approached Microporous specifically about the possibility of a contract “for the

supply of PE SLI separators.” Tr. 4016-17 (Leister); D-341 at 115 (IDF 717-19). 

Although Microporous did not commit to supplying East Penn Battery at that time

because of “the uncertainty with the Daramic transaction,” PX2300-029* (Heglie

IH at 188), the threat of losing SLI business to Microporous nonetheless induced

Daramic to offer more favorable pricing terms. D-341 at 131-32 (IDF 820-22);

PX0258. 

Polypore is also incorrect in asserting that Microporous’s Board of Directors

ordered Microporous’s CEO not to pursue SLI business. Br. 25. Both Michael

Gilchrist, former CEO and President of Microporous, and Eric Heglie, former

owner and Board member of Microporous, testified that nothing in the document

referenced by Polypore (RX0401)10 prevented Microporous from pursuing
11 See supra at 20 n.5 (explaining the term “uncommitted entrant”).

48

economically attractive SLI opportunities, and that, absent the acquisition,

Microporous intended to supply SLI separators to Exide. D-341 at 128 (IDF 799-

803); PX2300-023, 25, 31* (Heglie IH at 153-54, 183, 197); Tr. 454-55*

(Gilchrist); Tr. 3753 (Trevathan). 

This evidence amply supports the Commission’s findings that Microporous

was a current competitor in the SLI market. It shows that Microporous had a plan

to enter the SLI market, had the capability to do so, was bidding for SLI business

(indeed was on the verge of securing a supply agreement with Exide), and that

these factors constrained Daramic’s pricing for at least one SLI customer. Not

only does the scant evidence cited by Polypore fail to show otherwise, but its

argument that the Commission erred by treating Microporous as an actual

competitor is belied by the testimony of its own economic expert, who agreed at

trial that Microporous was an uncommitted entrant – i.e., properly analyzed as a

current participant – in the SLI market.11 Tr. 5413-14* (Kahwaty); D-341 at 104

(IDF 638). 

3. The Commission properly concluded that the acquisition

eliminated a potential competitor in violation of Section 7.

In its ruling, the Commission further recognized that the factors that

supported its conclusion that Microporous was a vital new actual competitive force
49

in the SLI market also showed that, even if not deemed an actual competitor,

Microporous was, at the very least, uniquely poised as a potential competitor in the

SLI market. D-368 (Op. 27 n.41). Contrary to Polypore’s insinuations, this was

not a recognition of “weakness,” Br. 29, but an acknowledgment of the close

relationship between actual and potential competition. See Areeda & Hovenkamp,

IV Antitrust Law ¶ 912a, at 59. In any event, the potential competition doctrine

provides a solid alternative basis for the Commission’s ruling, as Microporous

easily satisfies the established elements as both a perceived and actual potential

entrant to the SLI market.

Polypore does not dispute the validity of the perceived potential competition

theory. In Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court identified the elements of a

Section 7 claim based on the perceived potential competition theory:

[A] merger may be unlawful [1] if the target market is

substantially concentrated, [2] if the acquiring firm has

the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive

to render it a perceived potential de novo entrant, and [3]

if the acquiring firm’s premerger presence on the fringe

of the target market in fact tempered oligopolistic

behavior on the part of existing participants in that

market.

418 U.S. at 624-25, 94 S. Ct. at 2871. 

There is no dispute that the first of these elements is satisfied here. Nor can

there be any doubt that the second element is satisfied. As discussed above,
12 Polypore’s claim that Microporous lacked sufficient experience or

reputation in the production of SLI separators, Br. 33, is contravened by testimony

from JCI’s representative that JCI was “comfortable with the capability of

Microporous to develop SLI separator production capability” becaue Microporous

was producing separators with a proven technology. Tr. 2872-73* (Hall).

50

Daramic’s own documents show that it viewed Microporous as a potential –

indeed, an all but certain – entrant in the SLI market and a serious competitive

threat to its SLI business.12 The potential threat from Microporous was such that,

in 2005, Daramic’s then-CEO warned Polypore’s and Daramic’s management:

“The bottom line is Amerace can be another Entek: building plants to exclusively

supply EnerSys, JCI, East Penn and so forth.” PX0694-001. By 2007, it had

become clear to Daramic that the competitive threat from Microporous imperiled

Daramic’s SLI business. PX2078 (projecting that Microporous would capture as

much as 20 to 25 million square meters of Daramic’s SLI business in 2009 and

more in 2010); Tr. 1301, 1307-08 (Roe). As Daramic’s head of sales wrote in

November 2007, “unlike prior years, we have a true legitimate big competitor

entering the market (MP) and for sure they will capture volume at whatever it

takes.” PX0238-001; see D-341 at 74, 129-30 (IDF 435, 809). There is also no

question that the prospect of losing SLI business to Microporous prompted

Daramic to offer more favorable pricing terms to East Penn Battery – satisfying the

third element of the perceived potential competition theory. D-341 at 131-32 (IDF
13 Contrary to Polypore’s contention, Br. 34-36, the Commission never

suggested that Daramic’s price concessions to Crown Battery and Douglas under

the “MP Plan” related to SLI separators. 

14 The Supreme Court in Marine Bancorporation did not, as Polypore

claims, “refuse to approve” the actual potential competition doctrine. The Court

did not reach that question because it found that preconditions for application of

that theory were not present. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633, 638-39, 94

S. Ct. at 2875, 2878. See Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir.

2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has identified actual potential competition as

51

820-22).13 Polypore suggests in this appeal that its concern about the potential

loss of East Penn’s “automotive” business to Microporous might not have related

to SLI separators after all. Br. 34. This contention is belied, however, by

testimony that Daramic offered these price concessions after learning of

Microporous’s visit with East Penn Battery – a visit that involved discussions

about “a long-term contract for the supply of PE SLI separators.” Tr. 4016-17

(Leister); Tr. 1289-90 (Roe). 

Thus, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s conclusion that the

acquisition eliminated perceived potential competition in the SLI market, in

violation of Section 7. This being so, Polypore’s arguments about the

Commission’s purported errors in applying the actual potential competition theory

are beside the point. Moreover, these claims of error are also wrong. 

Although the Supreme Court has not conclusively ruled on whether a merger

may violate Section 7 under the actual competition theory,14 other courts –
a “plausible theor[y] of § 7 liability”).

52

including the Fifth Circuit before the circuit split – have accepted that theory. See

Mercantile Texas Corp., 638 F.2d at 1265 (“We believe that the doctrine has

logical force and is consonant with the language and policy of the Clayton Act.”);

Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 977-78 (8th Cir. 1981). Under this

doctrine, there must be proof that: (1) Microporous had “available feasible means

for entering” the SLI market without the acquisition, and (2) “those means

offer[ed] a substantial likelihood of producing deconcentration of that market.” 

Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633, 94 S. Ct. at 2875. 

The first of these elements has already been amply demonstrated. The

second is also satisfied by evidence showing, among other things, that Exide

intended to commence purchases of SLI separators from Microporous by January

1, 2010 (i.e., immediately after expiration of Exide’s exclusive contract with

Daramic), Tr. 2966, 2968-69, 2976 (Gillespie), and that both Daramic and

Microporous projected market share gains by Microporous in the SLI market. 

PX0264-003; PX0080-060*. Polypore’s claim that Microporous’s projection of a

6% share of the SLI market by 2010 is not sufficiently deconcentrating to warrant

liability is squarely at odds with the Supreme Court’s statement in Philadelphia

Nat’l Bank that, “if concentration is already great, the importance of preventing
53

even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual

deconcentration is correspondingly great.” 374 U.S. at 365 n.42, 83 S. Ct. at 1742

n.42.

The record thus amply supports the Commission’s findings that Polypore’s

acquisition of Microporous, at the very least, eliminated a significant potential

competitor poised to disrupt Daramic’s and Entek’s long-standing duopoly in the

SLI market.

II. THE COMMISSION’S FINAL ORDER OF DIVESTITURE IS

PROPER AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED.

The purpose of relief in a Section 7 case is to restore competition lost

through the unlawful acquisition. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,

573 n.8, 92 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 n.8 (1972). Complete divestiture is generally the

most appropriate way to restore competition lost through an unlawful acquisition. 

See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328-29, 81 S.

Ct. 1243, 1251-52 (1961) (“DuPont”); Chicago Bridge, 534 F.3d at 441. “[O]nce

the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a

violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor.” 

DuPont, 366 U.S. at 334, 81 S. Ct. at 1254 (footnote omitted); see Ford Motor Co,

405 U.S. at 573, 92 S. Ct. at 1149; Chicago Bridge, 534 F.3d at 441.

The manner and scope of divestiture orders are subject to the Commission’s
15 Polypore’s arguments for limiting divestiture are not aided by the cases it

cites. Br. 52, 57. In none of those cases did the court disturb the Commission’s

order of complete divestiture, but modified only ancillary provisions found to be

overbroad. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1976);

Seeburg Corp. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 124, 129-30 (6th Cir. 1970); Abex Corp. v. FTC,

420 F.2d 928, 933 (6th Cir. 1970). 

54

discretion. See 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (granting the Commission the power to order

divestiture “in the manner and within the time fixed by said order”); Jacob Siegel

327 U.S. at 611, 66 S. Ct. at 760 (Commission has “wide discretion in its choice of

a remedy”). In the exercise of that discretion, the Commission may order

divestiture of assets outside the relevant market where divestiture of those assets is

necessary to restore competition within the relevant market. See Chicago Bridge,

534 F.3d at 441-42; RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1326 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979).15

To restore competition lost through the acquisition, the Commission

properly exercised its broad discretion and ordered Polypore to divest all the assets

it acquired from Microporous, including the plant in Feistritz, Austria, that

Microporous built before the acquisition. D-368 (Op. 36-41). Polypore objects

only to the divestiture of the Feistritz plant, arguing that this requirement is

“logically incompatible” with the Commission’s finding of a North American

geographic market and “bears no reasonable relation” to restoring competition in

the relevant markets. Br. 53. Polypore’s arguments do not withstand scrutiny.

The Commission explained in great detail why, based on the record
16 Polypore asserts that the passage of time since the Commission issued its

decision renders “unfounded” the Commission’s concerns about the length of time

it would take for the “line in boxes” to become operational and to qualify material

produced on that line. Br. 55-56 n.10. But it is not at all apparent why this would

55

evidence, divestiture of the Feistritz plant, although located outside the North

American market, is necessary to restore the competition eliminated by the

acquisition and provide the acquirer of the divested assets the ability to compete

effectively within the North American market. D-368 (Op. 38). The Commission

found that, when Microporous produced CellForce for its foreign customers at its

Piney Flats plant, capacity constraints limited its ability to compete for additional

business in North America. See Tr. 2126-27 (Axt); Tr. 276 (Godber). Once the

Feistritz plant was under construction, Microporous became a more vigorous

competitor in North America, because it was able to commit to additional North

American CellForce sales to customers. D-341 at 126-27, 196-97 (IDF 787, 795-

97, 1277, 1280); PX1741-004*; Tr. 224-27 (Godber); Tr. 401-03 (Gilchrist). The

Commission found that, absent the divestiture of the Feistritz plant, an acquirer is

likely to face the same capacity constraints that Microporous faced before it

constructed the Feistritz plant. D-368 (Op. 38-39). The Commission considered

whether a divestiture package consisting of Piney Flats plus the “line in boxes”

would suffice to provide the acquirer with enough capacity to compete effectively,

but determined that it would not. Id. at 39.16
be so. At the time of trial, equipment purchased for that line had not been installed

and was sitting in boxes in Austria and Piney Flats. D-341 at 130 (IDF 813). 

Moreover, the Commission also found divestiture of the “line in boxes” to be

insufficient for reasons other than timeliness.

56

The Commission also found that a divestiture package that includes the

Feistritz plant is necessary to allow the acquirer to offer customers benefits that are

important to them, including multiple plants as insurance against supply

disruptions and, of particular importance, the ability to provide a local supply for

customers’ global operations. See D-341 at 196 (IDF 1272-79); Tr. 225-26

(Godber); Tr. 309-10 (Gilchrist); Tr. 2108-09, 2129-31 (Axt); Tr. 2969-70

(Gillespie); Tr. 4602 (Gaugl). With construction of the Feistritz plant,

Microporous was able to offer its customers the insurance of multiple plants and

the cost advantages associated with global operations, and this, the Commission

found, made Microporous a more a effective competitor for North American

customers. D-368 (Op. 39-40). The Commission determined that divestiture of

the Piney Flats plant alone, even with the “line in boxes,” would not restore the

more attractive competitor lost through the unlawful acquisition. Id. at 40. 

It is readily apparent from this discussion that, contrary to Polypore’s

contention, inclusion of the Feistritz plant in the package of assets to be divested is

reasonably related to the remedy’s purpose of restoring the competition lost

through this unlawful acquisition, and thus is well within the Commission’s broad
57

remedial authority. The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed the breadth of the

Commission’s authority to fashion a divestiture package sufficient to restore

competition that has been eliminated by a merger in Chicago Bridge, 534 F.3d at

441-42. In that case, the court affirmed a Commission order requiring the

divestiture of assets for building water tanks, although the relevant product market

was cryogenic tanks, because cryogenic tank sales were irregularly timed and

water tank sales would provide the regular income stream needed for the

divestiture buyer’s viability. Here, the relationship between the divestiture of the

Feistritz plant and the goal of fully restoring competition is even more direct,

because the Feistritz plant is itself an asset that made Microporous a more

attractive supplier, and therefore a more effective competitor, for customers in the

relevant markets.

Polypore argues, as it did before the Commission, that divestiture of Piney

Flats alone should be an adequate divestiture package because Microporous was an

effective competitor with just the Piney Flats plant and because the Piney Flats

plant currently has excess capacity. The Commission rejected these arguments,

however, finding that divestiture of the Piney Flats plant alone would not provide

the acquirer with the same competitive strength that Microporous had once it

constructed its Feistritz plant. Polypore fails to show that the Commission’s
58

judgment in this regard amounts to an abuse of discretion. Moreover, contrary to

Polypore’s contention, Br. 55, the Commission did not ignore the additional

capacity provided by the “line in boxes,” but expressly considered whether a

divestiture package consisting of Piney Flats plus the “line in boxes” would suffice

to provide the acquirer with enough capacity to compete effectively, and found that

it would not. D-368 (Op. 39-40).

There is also no merit to Polypore’s argument that the Commission erred in

failing to explain why selling the Piney Flats plant to a foreign separator

manufacturer with expertise in the relevant product markets would not be a fully

adequate remedy. Br. 56. Polypore never raised that issue when opposing

divestiture of the Feistritz plant in the proceedings before the agency, either during

the trial before the ALJ or in its appeal to the Commission. Having failed to raise

this argument in the administrative proceedings, Polypore should not be allowed to

raise it now as a basis to attack the Commission’s divestiture order. See Vidiksis v.

EPA, 612 F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2010) (court refused to consider

arguments challenging penalty imposed by EPA that were not raised before the

agency); Mahon v. USDA, 485 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Under

ordinary principles of administrative law, a reviewing court will not consider

arguments that a party failed to raise in timely fashion before an administrative
17 Contrary to Polypore’s claim that Amer-Sil is one such European

manufacturer with experience in the relevant product markets, Br. 56, Amer-Sil

does not manufacture PE or rubber battery separators. It manufactures PVC

separators. D-341 at 166 (IDF 1051-52).

59

agency.”) (quoting Simms v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 113, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 2087

(2000)). 

More problematic, however, is that limiting the pool of eligible acquirers

would undermine at the outset the Commission’s objective to provide “the greatest

likelihood that the asset package will restore competition and be sufficiently viable

to readily attract an acceptable buyer.” D-368 (Op. 37). There is no evidence in

the record (due largely to the fact that this argument was not raised below)

indicating whether existing Asian or European manufacturers would be interested

in acquiring the Piney Flats plant.17 In addition, eliminating candidates without

overseas plants from consideration (because, with Piney Flats alone, they would

not have the global operations that customers desire) could, among other things,

foreclose motivated and acceptable buyers that might otherwise have been

interested in acquiring the entire divestiture package. 

The merits of Polypore’s proposition, and the suitability of any particular

acquirer for the Microporous assets, are more appropriately examined when

Polypore submits an application for Commission approval of a proposed

divestiture in accordance with the agency’s established procedures. See 16 C.F.R.
60

§ 2.41(f). The Commission’s divestiture process assures that all necessary facts

regarding the specific acquirer to which Polypore proposes to divest are considered

at a time contemporaneous with any such proposal. If Polypore can demonstrate

that a proposed acquirer does not need the full asset package to restore the

competition lost as a result of the acquisition, it has the option of seeking

reopening and modification of the Final Order, pursuant to the Commission’s

established process for doing so. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); 16 C.F.R. § 2.51. At this

juncture, it is impossible to predict which buyers might ultimately emerge for the

divestiture assets. It is therefore reasonable to require Polypore to offer the

divestiture package to the broadest possible pool of candidates, as provided by the

terms of the Final Order.

Elsewhere in its brief, Polypore argues that the errors it asserts justify

reversal of the Commission’s Final Order and Opinion in its entirety. As

demonstrated above, however, the Commission properly concluded that the

acquisition likely substantially lessened competition in the deep-cycle, motive, and

SLI markets, warranting a divestiture order. Indeed, the Commission’s findings

that the acquisition violated Section 7 in the deep-cycle and motive markets

independently justify full divestiture, including divestiture of the Feistritz plant,

because the evidence regarding the importance of having a supplier with multiple 
61

plants and a global presence came from Microporous’s pre-acquisition deep-cycle

and motive customers.

In any event, under no circumstances would it be appropriate to reverse

Paragraph VII of the order, which requires Polypore to undo the agreement with

H&V found to be unlawful in connection with Count II of the complaint, and to

refrain from entering into similar agreements. D-368 (Final Order at 24-25). 

Polypore did not appeal to the Commission the ALJ’s ruling that the conduct

alleged in Count II violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, nor did it

appeal that aspect of the remedy. D-345. Accordingly, Polypore is precluded from

seeking reversal of this part of the Final Order in this appeal.
62

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review should be denied and the

Commission’s Final Order affirmed and enforced.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLARD K. TOM

General Counsel

RICHARD FEINSTEIN JOHN F. DALY

Director Deputy General Counsel for Litigation

Bureau of Competition

CATHARINE MOSCATELLI

Assistant Director /s/Michele Arington 

MORRIS BLOOM MICHELE ARINGTON

Deputy Assistant Director Attorney

Bureau of Competition Office of the General Counsel

Federal Trade Commission

600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20580

June 17, 2011 (202) 326-3157
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation set forth in

Fed. R. App. 32 (a)(7)(B), in that it contains 13,734 words, excluding the parts of

the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) and 11th Cir. R 32-4.

 /s/Michele Arington 

MICHELE ARINGTON
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 17, 2011, the original and six copies of the

foregoing Brief for Respondent Federal Trade Commission were sent to the Clerk

of the Court by overnight courier service, and one copy was served upon petitioner

Polypore International, Inc. by first class mail to:

Paul T. Denis

Steven G. Bradbury

Dechert LLP

1775 I Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

 /s/Michele Arington 

MICHELE ARINGTON