* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

OCT 29 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ACORN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE,

OFFICER ROBERT SAND and

OFFICER CHRISTINE CHESTER,

Defendants,

and

GARY L. SCHROEDER,

MEADOWBROOK MOBILE HOME

PARK, SANDRA GINGLES and

CORONADO VILLAGE MOBILE

HOME COUNTRY CLUB,

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 98-2074

(D.C. No. CIV-97-287-LFG/RLP)

(D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform

Now, Inc.), a nonprofit membership corporation organized “to further the interests

of people of low and moderate incomes,” Appellant’s Br. at 1, appeals the district

court’s entry of summary judgment on its civil rights claims. After “review[ing]

the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard

used by the district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c),” Novell, Inc. v. Federal Ins.

Co., 141 F.3d 983, 985 (10th Cir. 1998) we affirm.

 ACORN seeks to organize tenants of private mobile home parks by entering

the parks and going door-to-door to provide information and to solicit membership

and funds. In Albuquerque, New Mexico, ACORN repeatedly sent agents to

defendant-appellees Meadowbrook Mobile Home Park and Coronado Village

Mobile Home Country Club, private parks which have no-solicitation policies. 

ACORN's activities prompted tenants of the parks to complain to defendantsappellees Gary L. Schroeder and Sandra Gingles, the park managers. Eventually,

Schroeder and Gingles contacted the police. Defendants Richard Saul and
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Christine Chester, Albuquerque police officers, issued a trespass notification and

arrested an individual who refused to leave the Coronado park. 

Claiming that the mobile home parks, the managers, the individual police

officers, and the City of Albuquerque had violated its rights to free speech,

freedom of association, due process, and equal protection, ACORN filed this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a thorough and thoughtful Memorandum

Opinion and Order, the district court entered summary judgment on the grounds

that (1) the mobile home parks and managers, as private defendants, were not

liable under § 1983 because they were not acting under color of state law; and (2)

the police officers and the City were not liable because ACORN failed to make an

affirmative showing that a municipal defendant had violated a clearly-established

statutory or constitutional right.

ACORN appealed. This court, however, granted ACORN’s motion to

dismiss the municipal defendants on July 16, 1998. At issue in this appeal,

therefore, is the entry of summary judgment in favor of the private defendants

only. 

We agree with the district court that ACORN’s claim against these

defendants is similar to the one made by plaintiff in Pino v. Higgs , 75 F.3d 1461

(10th Cir. 1996) and that, accordingly, summary judgment is the appropriate

disposition of the matter. As we have stated, 
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“[i]n order to hold a private individual liable under § 1983, it must be

shown that the private person was jointly engaged with state officials

in the challenged action, or has obtained significant aid from state

officials, or that the private individual’s conduct is in some other way

chargeable to the state.”

 Id. at 1465 (quoting Lee v. Town of Estes Park , 820 F.2d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 

1987)). We are “‘disinclined’” to find state action “where a private party is simply

reporting suspected criminal activity to state officials who then take whatever

action they believe the facts warrant.’” Pino , 75 F.3d at 1465 (quoting Lee , 820

F.2d at 1115).

Moreover, we reject ACORN’s contention that its claim would have

survived summary judgment if the court had analyzed the state action requirement

under the rationale of Marsh v. Alabama , 326 U.S. 501, 505-09 (1946). In that

case, a private company effectively operated as the municipal government. It

owned the streets, sidewalks, and business block; paid the sheriff; owned and

managed the sewage system; and owned the building where the United States post

office was located. See id. at 502-03. The Court determined that the company

town was the “functional equivalent” of a municipality. Browns v. Mitchell , 409

F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969).

The private owner of the two mobile home parks involved in this appeal has

not assumed “all of the attributes of a state-created municipality,” exercised

“semi-official municipal functions as a delegate of the State,” or performed “the
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full spectrum of municipal powers.” Hudgens v. NLRB , 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976)

(quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner , 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972)). These parks do not

fall within the Marsh “company town” exception to the rule that the First

Amendment constrains only governmental action. 

We have reviewed the record in this matter and discern no reversible error. 

We AFFIRM.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock

Circuit Judge