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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 51 6- CV Pablo TORRE S , Appellant
v . Adriana SIERRA , Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 1, Webb County , Texas Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 20 06 -C VH -0 02 20 4- C1 Honora ble Alvino Be n Morales, Judge Presiding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Fe bruar y 11, 2009 AFF I RMED Pa blo To rr e s a

pp e a ls the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r g ra nti ng Ad ri ana Sie rr a ’s mot ion fo r c on te mpt , sanctions, and attorney s fee s. Torre s co n t ends t hat the trial c ourt’s orde r er roneously altere d the div isi on of pr op e rt y ma de in t he pa rt ie s’ fi na l de c re e of div or c e and div e ste d him of tit le to p ro pe rt

y that he wa s awa

rded in the de cre e. We af firm the trial c ourt’s orde r.04

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- 2- B ACKG ROUND I n Dec ember

of 2006, Sierra

filed a pe tition for divorce, a nd Torre s s u b sequently

filed a counter -petition for divorc e. On Apr il 2, 2007, the par ties filed an a g ree ment incident to the divorce containing a division of t he marital estate. W ith reg ard to the pr operty in question, the ag ree ment provided: Assets to Pablo Torres

Th e hu sb and , Pa

blo To rr e s, is to re c e ive the fo llo wi nga s h is s ole and se pa rate proper ty , and shall own, possess, a nd enjoy that proper

t y , and Adr iana Sierr a p art i t i o n s , qu i t c l a i m s , a s s i g n s an d c o n v e ys t o P a

b l o T o r r e s t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p e rt y: H-1. An undivided 100 per cent interest in the following proper ty , subject to the Oper ating Trust Ag ree ment for J ointly Owned Prope rty afte r Divorc e sig ned in a c c or da

nc e wi th t

he te rm s o f t

his a g re e me nt ( up on

pa y me nt o f $ 70 ,0 00 .0 0 to pe tit ion e r)
. Up on pa

y me nt, inc lud ing bu t not limit e d to any e sc ro w f un ds , p re pa id i n s u ra n ce , u t i l i t y

d ep o s i t s , k ey s , h o u s e p l an s , h o m e s ec u ri t y ac ce s s an d

co d e, gar age do or op e ne r, wa

rr anti e s and

se rv ic e c on tr a c ts, and

tit le a nd c los ingdo c ume nts : Le g a l D e s c r i p t i o n : Lo t 3 9 , B l o c k 0 3 , S o n t e r r a D e S anIs i dr o U n i t III , Webb County , Texas Otherw ise known as: 1512 Serene Drive, L are do, Texas 78045 The a g ree ment contemplated the sale of the property by awa rding Sierra $70,000.00 to be paid by Torre s “on t he day of di vorce or closing whiche ver is later .” The final divorce decr ee a pproved the ag ree ment and incor

porate d it by

ref eren ce ; h o we ver, the decr ee r equire d all of the ter ms of the ag ree ment, including the pay ment of monies from one par ty to another, to be perf

ormed by October 2, 2007, possibly due to the leng th of time that had alre ady lapsed be tween the date the a g ree ment was sig ned (A

pril 2, 2007) and the date the dec ree was sig ned (Septe mber 11, 2007). On Oc tob e r 3 1, 20 07 , Sier

ra fi le d a mot ion fo r c on te mpt , s anc tio ns , a nd a tto rn e y s f

e e s,
asser ting that Tor

res ha d failed to pa

y her the $70,000.00 awa

rded to he r. Sierra reque sted that the trial court or der the sale of the proper ty at 1512 Serene Drive (the “Property ”) as a sanc tion so that Sierra could rec eive her $70,000.00 to the ex tent the s ales procee ds y ielded that amount. The order04

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- 3- g ranting Sierra’ s motion, which was s igne d on Marc h 27, 2008, stated that the c ase w as announc ed
on the court’s docket on Fe bruar y 13, 2008 and was subsequently set for status on Marc h 10, 2008, and ag ain on Marc h 25, 2008. T h e cl er k ’s record c ontains a notice of rese t on the court’s ow n motion, st ating that the ca se wa s rese t to March 10, 2008, on the “STATUS AS TO B ANK L OAN TO TH E RE SPO ND EN T PA B L O T ORRES .” Th e no tic e fu rt he r s ta te d th a t if

“ no ba nk loa n [w a s] approve d for the Respondent Pablo T orre s; the n” the court would hear Sierra’ s motion on March 25, 2008. The trial c ourt’s orde r aw ar d s Sierra the Property “for the purpose of

placingthe home on the re al estate marke t for immediate sa le.” The order further awar ds Sierra the first $95,000.00 from the sa le s p ro c e e ds , w hic h in c lud e d th e $7 0, 00 0.00 paymen t plus sanc tio ns . A ft e r t he pa y me nt t o Sierra, a portion of the sale s proce eds wa s order ed to be used to pay two outstanding loa

ns, and the
rema ining ba lance of t he sales proce eds was order ed to be paid to Torres. Tor res timely appea led the trial cour

t’s order
. D I S CUS S I ON Al tho ug h T or

re s a g re e s th a t a

tr ia l c ourt

ha s th e a uth or ity to e nf or c e the div isi on

of pr op e rt y made in a de cre e, Torr es conte nds that the trial cour t’s order in this case er

roneously amende d, modified, altere d, or chang ed the division of prope rty in the decr ee in violation of sec tion 9.007(a) of the Te x as F am i ly

Code. Com

pa re T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 9.006 (Ve rnon 2006) ( authorizing trial court to ente r orde rs enf orcing, as s i s t ing in implementation of, or clar ifying divor ce de cre e), with T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 9
. 0 0 7 (a ) ( Ve rn o n 2 0 0 6 ) (p ro h i b i t i n g t ri al co u rt fr o m am en d i n g, modify ing, a ltering , or chang ing decr ee) . Torre s argues that the trial c ourt’s orde r divested him of the title to the Property . We disag ree .04

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- 4- The Te x as F amily

Code allows the par

ti es t o a divorc e to enter

into a written ag ree ment
c o n c e r n in g th e d iv is io n o f p r o p erty . T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 7.006(a) (Ve rnon 2006). When an ag ree ment executed by

the par ties is incorporate d into a divorce decr ee, the parties a re bound by

the ag ree ment which is interpre ted under g ener al contra ct law. Sc hwa rtz v . S c hwa rtz , 247 S.W .3d 804, 80 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 8, no pe t.) ; Bishop v. Bishop , 74 S.W
. 3 d 8 7 7 , 879 (Tex. App.—San An ton io 2 00 2, no pe t.) . Wh e n c on str uin g su c h a

n a g reemen t, t

he c ourt mus t lo ok

to t he pa rt ie s’ intentions as they

are manifested in the w ritten ag ree ment. Bishop , 74 S.W .3d at 879-80. T o r r e s ar g u e s t h a tt h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e aw ar d e d h i m 1 0 0 p e r c e n to w n e r s h i p o f t h e P r o p e rt y; there fore , the subsequent or der a war ding the Property to Sierra a nd transfe rringtitle to her was a n alteration of or cha

ng e to the dec ree . Sierra c ounters that the a war d o f o wn er s h i p t o Torre s was conditioned upon his timely pay ment of $70,000.00 to Sierra

. I n in te rp re tin g wh e the r t

he pa y me nt to Sie rr a wa s a c on dit ion pr e c e de nt to To rr e s’ s r ig ht t o
owner s h i p o f the Proper

ty , we look to g ener al principles of contra ct interpre tation. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevino , 202 S.W .3d 811, 814 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied)
. Whether a c erta in contrac tual provision contains a c ondition prece dent “must be g ather ed fr om the contra ct as a

whole and f

rom the intent of the pa

rties.” Id . at 815. I n th is c a se , th e awa

rd of the Pr op e rt

y wa s expr e ssl y ma de su

bje c t to “ the Op e ra

tin g Tr us t Ag re e me nt f

o r Jo i n t l y O w n e d P r o p e rt y a f t e r D i v o r c e s i g n e d

i na c c o r d an c e w i t h t h e t e r m s o f thi s ag ree ment (upon pay

ment of $70,000.00 to p etitioner).” Although it does not a ppear that an Oper ating Trust Ag ree ment was sign ed , this provision of the parties’ a g ree ment contemplates the joint owne rship of the Property until S ierra

was pa id. Moreover , the ag ree ment expressly conditions Torre s’s rig ht to rec eive the title a nd closing documents to the Property upon his pa y ment o f t he04

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- 5- $70,000.000. Se e Ro be rts v . Clar k , 188 S.W .3d 204, 210-11 (Tex
. App.—Tyler 2002, pet. denied) (conc luding pa

y ment was a

condition prec edent to deliver y of title documents ). Be cause Torre s failed to satisfy

the condition prec edent, title to the Property never vested in him. See Continental Oil Co. v. L a n e W

o od & Co. , 4 43 S.W. 2d 69 8, 70 2 ( Te x. 19 69 ) ( no tin g wh e re de liv e ry is
c on dit ion e d on pa y

me nt, tit le do e s n ot p a ss a bs e nt t he pa y me nt) ; W eek ley Hom es, Inc . v. Je nnings , 936 S.W .2d 16, 18 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (noting party not entitled to compel rig hts absent fulfillment of condition pr ece dent). Acc ording ly , the trial court’s order awa rding the Pr op e rt y to S ie rr a fo r the so le purp os e of pla c ing the ho me on the re a l e state mark e t f or imm e diate
s a l e d i d n o tc h an g e o r

a l t e r t h e d e c r e e o r

d i v e s tT o r

r e s o f h i s i n t e r e s ti nt h e P r o p e rt y. C ONCL US I ON The trial c ourt’s orde r is aff irmed. Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice