alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-20110

Conference Calendar

 

LINROY DAVIS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JERRY GREEN; DAVE SNOOK,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-93-CV-336

- - - - - - - - - -

February 12, 1998

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Linroy Davis, Jr., Texas prisoner #585951, appeals from the

judgment for the defendants in his prisoner civil-rights action. 

Davis requests appointment of counsel on appeal; his motion is

DENIED. Davis contends that he was unable to obtain disciplinary

records after requesting them; that the defendants violated

prison rules; that defendant Green assaulted him in violation of

the Eighth Amendment; that the defendants discriminated against

him and were deliberately indifferent to his safety; that a
No. 97-20110

-2-

witness who was under subpoena failed to appear at trial; that

the jurors in his trial were unfair; that summary judgment was

inappropriate in his case; and that the district court erred by

failing to appoint counsel to represent him.

Davis has failed to brief for appeal his contention that he

was unable to obtain disciplinary records. Grant v. Cuellar, 59

F.3d 523, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1995). Davis’s contention that

summary judgment was inappropriate is without a factual basis;

his case went to trial. We cannot review Davis’s contentions

implicating the evidence at his trial or the alleged unfairness

of the jury; Davis has failed to provide us with a trial

transcript, as it is his duty to do. Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d

22, 26 (5th Cir. 1992). Davis did not seek appointment of trial

counsel; the district court need not have appointed counsel sua

sponte. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 811 F.2d 260, 261

(5th Cir. 1986).

Davis’s appeal is frivolous and therefore is dismissed. We

caution Davis that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him

or on his behalf will invite the imposition of sanctions. To

avoid sanctions, Davis is further cautioned to review any pending

appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are

frivolous.

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
___________ No. 95-3360

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * v. * * Loren M. Welsand, also known as * Appeal from the United States Larry Willson, * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Appellant, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Sarah Welsand, also known as * Sarah Willsend, * * Defendant. *

___________ Submitted: March 28, 1996 Filed: April 3, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, LOKEN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
In 1993, Loren M. Welsand was convicted of various federal offenses and or dered to pay restitution. The government subsequently institute d this fraudulent-conveyance action alleging that Welsand had fraudulently convey ed his vendor's interest in monthly contract payments to hi s dau ghter, in an effort to keep the payments from being levied upon t o satisfyhis remaining restitution obligation. Welsand repeatedly failed to respond to the gov ernment's discovery requests, and ultimately delayed the discovery process in this action for more than a year. In a second

### The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, Chief Judge, United State s 1 

### District Court for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and re commendation of the Honorable Jonathan G. Lebedoff, Unite d States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. -2- order comp elling discovery, the district court warned Welsand that if he 1 failed to comply fully with the government's requests, default judgmen t wou ld be entered against him. When Welsand failed to produce all th e docume nts that had been requested, the district court entered defaul t judgment in favor of the government.

We do not believe the district court abused its discretion i n entering default judgment against Welsand when he failed to fully comply with the court's seco nd discovery order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (authorizing such a sanction when party "fails t o obey an order to provide
or permit discovery"); Comiskey v. JFTJ Corp. , 989 F.2d 1007, 1009 (8t h Cir. 1993) (standard of review); cf. Lorin Corp. v. Goto & Co. , 700 F.2d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 1983) (dismissal with prejudice warranted wher e plaintiff failed to comply fully with court's order to "make discovery," and provided only incomplete answers to interrog atories and small fraction of requested documents).
Accordingly, we affirm.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
No. 10077.

#### Radebaugh *v.*Gabriel.

Decided March 3, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Franklin county.

*Mr. Clarence M. Addison*and *Mr. John F. Fergus,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. J. A. Miles*and *Mr. E. W. McCormick,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Shauck, C. J., Crew and Spear, J. J., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Farmer Bros. Co. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2011,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Patrick G. Criteser, Interim Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: May 10, 2011



/s/ Patrick G. CriteserPatrick G. CriteserInterim Co-Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)


A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5

       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1997 
<PERIOD-END>                  JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                        3,935,495
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 1,238,555
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   3,083,680
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              9,189,834
<PP&E>                        1,115,976
<DEPRECIATION>                334,689
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                12,561,230
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         1,957,313
<BONDS>                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      247,968
<OTHER-SE>                    19,231,566
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  12,561,230
<SALES>                       5,048,705
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              5,266,310
<CGS>                         1,934,563
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 1,934,563
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              3,203,811
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            0
<INCOME-PRETAX>               127,937
<INCOME-TAX>                  2,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           125,937
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  125,937
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0.01
        


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32(a)


             CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                           (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dataram Corporation, a New Jersey
corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 31,
2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Report"), John H. Freeman, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, does
hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



December 13, 2010                      /s/ John H. Freeman
                                   _____________________________________
                                   John H. Freeman
                                   President and Chief Executive Officer

[A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Dataram Corporation and will be retained by Dataram
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.]
#### Ernest G. TRAPAGA, Appellant, v. Luisa Moreno TRAPAGA, Appellee.

No. 73-288.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 31, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Theodore CONRAD a/k/a Steve Rogers.

No. 60818.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 13, 1977.

In re: Theodore Conrad a/k/a Steve Rogers applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and stay order.

Writ denied. No error in the ruling of the trial judge.
#### The BANK OF PASCO COUNTY, a Florida banking corporation, Appellant, v. Ballard BEASLEY and Mary M. Beasley, his wife, Appellees.

No. 71-19.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 17, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1972.

Robert D. Sumner, of Barnes, Sumner & Tyner, Dade City, for appellant.

David A. Davis, Bushnell, for appellees.

LILES, Acting Chief Judge.

On January 15 and December 30, 1963, appellees borrowed $10,000 and $24,000 respectively from the Bank of Pasco County to purchase certain stock. The stock was pledged as collateral security. The two notes evidencing the transactions were signed by the Beasleys and by one Jack Harkins. Two Thousand Dollars was paid on the $10,000 note, and that note was can-celled and a new note in the amount of $8,000 was issued.

Jack Harkins died in 1964 and his estate was probated in Tennessee. Since no other payments were made on the notes, the Bank filed a claim against the estate of Jack Harkins in Tennessee. A judgment was obtained against the estate for the full amount unpaid on the two notes, being $32,000, plus interest, fees and costs of suit. The estate paid the Bank $17,854.85 as partial payment of said judgment. On *24September 27, 1967, the Bank sold the stock pledged as security on the notes for $37,852.50. These funds were distributed as follows: To the estate of Jack Harkins $17,854.85 as reimbursement for moneys paid; to the Bank for the unpaid balance of the loan $19,145.87; to the Beasleys the excess money $851.78.

On September 8, 1969, the Beasleys brought suit against the Bank for conversion of the stock because of failure to give notice of sale as required by Fla.Stat. 685.-02, F.S.A. Beasleys further alleged that the Bank wrongfully reimbursed the estate the sum of $17,854.85. The Bank answered denying the wrongful disbursement of funds and set forth that Jack Harkins endorsed the note for the accommodation of the Beasleys, and was therefore entitled to reimbursement.

The trial court entered a summary judgment as to liability against the Bank on the basis that notice of the sale of the stock was not given in accordance with Fla.Stat. 685.02, F.S.A. The court then entered a summary final judgment against the Bank on December 9, 1970, holding as a matter of law that the Bank had no right to reimburse the estate of Jack Harkins out of the proceeds of the sale of stock. The Bank brings this appeal.

It appears to this court that the trial court erred in basing its ruling on Fla.Stat. 685.02, F.S.A. This statute was repealed by Chap. 65-254, Laws of Florida 1965, effective January 1, 1967, enacting the Florida Uniform Commercial Code. The sale of the stock in question took place on September 27, 1967, and was therefore governed by the Florida Uniform Commercial Code.

The summary judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.PEDRO JULIAN MONTOYAGONZALEZ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-5136 (N.D. Oklahoma) (No. 4:14-CV-00640-GKF-TLW and 4:12-CR-00023-GKF-1)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY

Before HARTZ , TYMKOVICH , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

Defendant Pedro Julia n Montoya-Gonzalez pleaded gu ilty in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to the char ge of reentry of a deported alien in viola tion of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment. After our dismissal of his appeal for failure to prosecute, he filed a pro se

motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request (1) credit for the 27 days Defe ndant was incarcerated after

his arrest but before he was taken into fe deral custody, and (2) a downward departure

based on the “fast-track” early-disposition program, see United States v. Luna-Acosta , FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 10, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 715 F.3d 860, 861 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The so-called ‘fast track’ program allows a defendant, upon motion of th e government, to obtain up to a four-level downward departure from his offense level in exchan ge for pleading guilty pursuant to an early disposition program.”); USSG § 5K3.1. The district court denied the motion because it was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) and Defendant now seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal that denial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring COA to appeal denial of § 2255 motion). We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. Motions under § 2255 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See id. § 2255(f). This court dismissed Defendant’s direct appeal on July 8, 2013, because he had failed to pay the filing fee or file a proper motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ( ifp ). The limitations period started to ru n on October 6, 2013, upon expiration of the 90-day period for filing a petition for cer tiorari in the United St ates Supreme Court. See Clay v. United States , 537 U.S. 523, 532 (2003). De fendant submitted his § 2255 motion more than a year later, on October 13, 2 014. In district court he asserted that his motion was timely because he had only recen tly found a case supporting his argument, but the district court explaine d that this discovery was irre levant under § 2255(f). In his appellate brief, Defendant does not contest th e district court’s timeliness ruling and has3 not offered any basis for overcoming the stat utory bar. We therefore DENY the request

for a COA and DISMISS the a ppeal. We also DENY the motion for leave to proceed ifp. Appellant is ordered to pay the filing fe e to the district court forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OFINDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

        Wehave issued our reports dated March 14, 2007, accompanying the consolidated financialstatements (which report includes an explanatory paragraph related to the adoption ofStatement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (R), effective January 1, 2006) andSchedule II and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal controlover financial reporting included in the Annual Report of Bradley Pharmaceuticals, Inc.on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006. We hereby consent to the incorporationby reference of said reports in the Registration Statements of Bradley Pharmaceuticals,Inc. on Forms S-3 (File No. 333-75997, effective July 29, 1999, File No. 333-74724,effective March 20, 2002, File No. 333-110312, effective December 10, 2003, and File No.333-111078, effective December 11, 2003), Forms S-8 (File No. 333-75382, effectiveDecember 18, 2001, and File No. 333-112456, effective February 2, 2004) and Form SB-2(File No. 333-60879, effective August 18, 1998). 

GRANT THORNTON LLP 

New York, New York
MYL_EX10.4(d)_2013.12.31-10K




Exhibit 10.4(d)


Privileged and Confidential


Award #                             


MYLAN INC.
2003 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN
NOTICE OF AWARD OF RESTRICTED STOCK UNITS


[Name] (the “Participant”) has been granted, effective as of the grant date, an award of restricted stock units (the “Award”) payable in shares of common stock (the “Shares”) of Mylan Inc. (the “Company”) pursuant to the Company’s 2003 Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended to date (the “Plan”). The Award is subject to the terms and conditions set forth below and in the Plan, which is a part of this Notice.


1.Number of Restricted Stock Units (RSU’S): [ __ ], where 1 RSU is equal to the right to receive [ __ ] Share.


2.Vesting: Restrictions on the RSUs lapse (and shares will be released to the Participant) in accordance with the vesting schedule, subject to the terms of the Plan and this Notice.


3.Forfeiture: Subject to Sections 7.03 and 7.04 of the Plan, if the Participant’s employment with the Company or any of its subsidiaries terminates for any reason, all RSUs shall be forfeited and returned to the Company, and all rights of the Participant with respect to such RSUs shall terminate.


4.Limitation Of Liability Of The Committee And Board Of Directors: The Participant agrees that the liability of the officers and the Board of Directors of the Corporation to the Participant under this Agreement shall be limited to those actions or failure to take actions which constitute self-dealing, willful misconduct or recklessness.


5.Governing Law: This Notice shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
#### J. H. TALTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-2228.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 23, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1978.

Chandler R. Muller of Muller & Kirkcon-nell, Winter Park, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Basil S. Diamond, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

BASKIN, NATALIE, Associate Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence involving two counts of knowingly committing a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child under the age of fourteen years. Appellant asserts his Motion for Discharge under the speedy trial rule should have been granted and that the State’s Amended Motion to Extend Speedy Trial Period should have been denied. We affirm the trial court’s rulings.

On March 8, 1977, prior to the expiration of time permitted under Speedy Trial Demand, the court orally granted the State’s Amended Motion to Extend Speedy Trial Period on the basis of exceptional circumstances. The court entered its written order nunc pro tunc on April 27, 1977. In the absence of a valid extension, speedy trial time would have expired by midnight March 11, 1977.

*687Addressing ourselves to the timeliness of the trial court’s order extending speedy trial time, we find that the order was entered before the speedy trial period had run. *State ex rel. Smith v. Rudd,*347 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Although Appellant contends that speedy trial time must be extended pursuant to *written*order of the court, duly rendered, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 does not require that an order be entered in any particular form. The court’s oral ruling was reported and entered in writing at a later time. We agree with the court in *State ex rel. Wilhoit v. Wells,*356 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), that the preparation, execution and filing of a formal written order reciting exceptional circumstances is the preferred course. That course was followed in this case. We are satisfied that the oral ruling was timely.

The trial court’s finding that exceptional circumstances existed was a matter within its discretion. *State ex rel. Mullins v. Swigert,*345 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). No abuse of discretion has been shown.

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)
  In connection with the Annual Report of Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended April 25, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Annual Report), I, Bernard Goldstein, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that:
 
 (1)The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
 
 /s/ Bernard Goldstein
 Bernard Goldstein
 Chief Executive Officer
  June 29, 2004
  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. and will be retained by Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States Magistrate Judge for 1

the Northern District of Iowa, who presided over the case with

Morrow's written consent pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b).

___________

No. 96-2378

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Northern District of Iowa.

*

John Mitchell Morrow, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: September 10, 1996

 Filed: September 16, 1996

___________

Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

John Mitchell Morrow pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of failure

to file an income tax return. The District Court sentenced him to six

1

months of imprisonment and a year of supervised release. The court also

ordered Morrow to pay a $1,000 fine and a $25 assessment.

Morrow appeals. He argues that the District Court abused its

discretion in imposing a term of imprisonment rather than a sentence of

probation. We conclude that Morrow's sentence to a six-month term of

imprisonment is not reviewable since it is within the guideline range to

which he stipulated. See United States v.
-2-

Dugan, 912 F.2d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding sentence within

applicable guideline range not reviewable on appeal). Moreover, even if

Morrow's sentence were reviewable, when we consider his criminal history

it is clear that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in

ordering prison rather than probation.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.