1 At the time of the arson, Angela and Roy Nelson were married but separated. Following

this incident, the Nelsons obtained a divorce.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROY D. NELSON Appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County

No. 21727 Lynn W. Brown, Judge

No. E1997-00021-SC-R11-CD - Decided May 2, 2000

FOR PUBLICATION

This is an appe al from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute applies only when an individual other than t he arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that the ag gravat ed arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as theresult of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-302 (a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court o f Criminal Appeals. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judg ment of the Court

of Criminal Appeals i

s Affirmed. B ARKER , J., deli v ered the opinion of the court, in which A NDERSON , C.J., and D ROWOTA , B IRCH , and H OLDER , JJ. joined. Donald E. Spurrell, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Roy D. Nelson. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION On the evening of June 3, 1994, the defenda

nt, Roy D. Nelson, e

ntered the basem

ent o f Angela Nelson’s house and poured gasoline on the floor. 1 As he walked up the stairs to the residential portion of the house , the defendant li

t a cigarette whi

ch ig nited t he gasoline fumes causing an explosion that rocked the brick house from its foundation as well as a fire. The defendant2 This Court heardoral argument in this case on March 28, 2000 in Winchester, Tennessee, as part of the S.C.A .L.E.S. (Supreme Co urt Advancing Le

gal Education for

Students) project

. -2- was admitted to the hospital later that e vening where he was treated for first, second, and third degree burns he sustained in the explosion and fire. The defendant was indicted and convicted for aggra vated arson on the grounds that he suffered serious bodily injur y, thus triggering application of the aggravated arson statute. The defendan tappealed arguing that the aggravated arson statute applies only when some individual other than the arsonist s

ustains a serious bodily injury. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgmentof

the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal on this issue. 2 DISCUSSION When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court must not apply a construction apa rt from the wor ds of the statute. See Fletcher v. State , 9 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tenn. 1999). The aggravated ar

son statute at issue

in this case provid

es: A person commits aggravated arson who commits arson as defined in § 39-14-301 or 39-14-303 . . . [w]hen any person, including firefighters and law e nforcement officials, suffers serious bodily injury as a result of the fire or explosion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302(a)(2) (1997). The criminal code further define

s “person” to

include “the singular and plura

l and means and inc

ludes any individual

. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 106(a)(27) (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, the

plain language of

the aggravated

arson statute includes not only victims of aggravated arson but also the perpetrator of the act of arson. The de fenda nt asserts, howev er, that the langu

age and history of

section -302(a) (2) is ambiguous, and that if the Gen eral Assembly inte

nded for the aggr

avated arson sta

tute to apply where the arsonist is

injured, it would have clearly stated so. For this argument, the defendant relies on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602(a) (1997) which m ake s it a criminal offe

nse to intentionally

prevent or obstruct a law enforcement officer “from effecting a stop, fr isk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the defendant.” We d o not agree, however, from this statutory language that magic words like “including the defendant” must be explici tly in corporated into a ll statutes to impose criminal liability for aggravated offenses. By broadly defining “person” in se ction -106(a)(27), the General Assembly has already established t he sc ope of “person” to include defendants. Consequently, the extra statutory language suggested by the defendant is red u ndant. Thus, whether or not “ including the defendant” was written explicitly into section -602(a), defendants would be implicitly included pursuant to the statutory definition of “person.” We note that if the General Assembly intended to limit th e class of persons for which co nvictions for aggravated offenses may be h

ad it could have do

ne so. Indeed, thr

oughout the3 See, e.g. , Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(a)(1)-(2), -13-304(a)(3)-(4), -13-305(a)(4) , -13-

402(a)(2), -13-403(a)(2), -13-502(a)(2), -13-504(a)(2), - 14-404(a)(2) (1997). -3- cri minal code, the General Assembly has limited application of aggravated offense stat utes t o situations involv i ng “victims” or ind ividuals other tha

n the defendant. 3 Because the General Assembly has not seen fit to limit section - 302(a)( 2) to persons other than the defendant as it has don e in so many other sections of the criminal code, we are not inclined to depart from the pl ai n language of the statute. The defendant, though, argues that “any person” cannot be so broa d a s to include the defendant because any defendant in a structure destroyed by arson automatically commit s aggravated arson simply by his or her p resence in the structure. Compare

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302(a)(1) (1997) (providing that aggravated arson occurs when one or more persons is present in the structure that is the target

of arson). The defendant also contends that the General Assembly could not have been concerne

d with injury to the a

rsonist. We disagree. The Court of Criminal Ap

peals astutely observed that “[m]ore so than the other offenses in the criminal code which are aggra

vated by some lev el of bodily injury, arson as a general proposition creates a dangerous exigency which has the potential to endanger [not

only the criminal, b

ut a lso] any targeted individual, members of the public, and rescue personnel.” The presence of an arsonist in a building that he or she has targeted or an arsonist who is injured during th e course of an arson inevitably requires the assistance of rescue personnel,and it

is well within the province

of the General A

ssembly to impose a h

eightened penal

ty for the risk to which these public servants are exposed. CONCLUSION We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Cri

minal Appeals. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Roy D. Nelson.