J-S02036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JACOB SINGER

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 404 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-45-CR-0002391-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2022

Jacob Singer (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas following his jury trial in 

absentia and convictions of, inter alia, fleeing or attempting to elude a police 

officer (fleeing from police).

1 The jury found Appellant engaged in a “high 

speed chase,” resulting in the higher grading of this offense as a felony of the 

third degree (F3). Appellant avers the trial court erred in denying his request 

to include, in the jury instructions, language from the opinion in In re R.C.Y., 

27 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2011), which addressed the grading enhancement 

and the phrase “high speed chase.” We affirm.

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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a), (a.2)(2)(iii).
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Appellant’s issue requires a detailed review of the underlying facts. The 

trial court aptly summarized:

On September 28, 2019, Trooper [Daniel] Thompson 

observed Appellant driving a motorcycle with an expired 

registration in the area of Route 209 and Municipal Drive in Middle 

Smithfield Township. [N.T., 10/26/20, Courtroom 3, at 24.2] 

Trooper Thompson, in a patrol vehicle, attempted to effectuate a 

traffic stop by activating his lights and siren. Id. at 25. Appellant 

failed to stop. In fact, he continued to travel . . . even as the 

trooper pulled his car into the next lane and drove side-by-side 

with the motorcycle. Id. at 26. As Appellant fled from the officer, 

he accelerated to speeds substantially above the posted speed 

limit.

A second police unit, driven by Corporal [Charles] Phelps and 

also occupied by Trooper [James] Poliskiewicz, stopped traffic 

ahead of Appellant in order to create a safe environment in which 

to stop the motorcycle. ·At that point, Appellant was continuing to 

flee from Trooper Thompson at 70 miles per hour . . . in a posted 

45 mile per hour zone. Id. at 28-29. Corporal Phelps and Trooper 

Poliskiewicz exited their car and, by the positioning of their

vehicle, their physical presence, and the use of lights, flashers, 

and hand signals attempted to stop Appellant. Id. at 28. 

Appellant slowed down for a moment, but then accelerated 

towards the two troopers who were forced to move aside to avoid 

being struck by the motorcycle. Id.

Corporal Phelps and Trooper Poliskiewicz got back into their 

patrol car and went in pursuit. Trooper Thompson also continued 

his pursuit.

While continuing at a high rate of speed, Appellant drove 

through a steady red light and onto Interstate 80. Id. He then 

sped up to 80 miles per hour in a posted 55 mile per hour zone. 

Id. at 31. Trooper Thompson was able to drive ahead of the 

motorcycle to slow down the other lanes of traffic in an attempt 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court explained that due to COVID-19 pandemic protocols, “multiple 

courtrooms were used for trial[,]” and separate transcripts were produced for 

each courtroom’s proceedings. Trial Ct. Op., 4/30/21, at 1-2 n.1.
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to slow the motorcycle and force Appellant to exit the Interstate. 

The tactic worked and Appellant exited at Delaware Water Gap. 

Id. at 30.

Meanwhile, Corporal Phelps and Trooper Poliskiewicz got 

ahead of Appellant on the exit ramp and slowed to a stop in front 

of the motorcycle. Id. Even as Corporal Phelps stopped and 

began to exit his car, Appella[nt] refused to stop or slow down to

a safer speed. Appellant drove into the door of the patrol vehicle, 

fell off his bike, and began to flee on foot. Appellant also failed to 

obey repeated verbal commands to stop. Ultimately, the troopers 

deployed their Tasers and were able to stop Appellant and take

him into custody. Id. at 31. A search incident to the arrest 

revealed that Appellant had a knife, a hypodermic needle, and 

controlled substances in his possession. Id.

Trial Ct. Op. at 1-3.

Appellant was charged with fleeing from police, resisting arrest,3 drug 

offenses, and summary traffic violations. While fleeing from police is generally 

graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree, this count was charged as an 

F3, based on the allegation Appellant “endanger[ed] a law enforcement officer 

. . . due to . . . engaging in a high-speed chase.” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 

3733(a.2)(1), (2)(iii). The case proceeded to a jury trial on October 26, 2020. 

The trial court noted, “The trial was held in absentia because Appellant refused 

to appear despite being given ample opportunity to do so.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3.

The trial court summarized:

At the beginning of the trial, [Appellant’s counsel] submitted 

a point for charge regarding the term “high speed chase,” as used 

in 75 Pa.C.S.[ §] 3733(a.2)(2)(iii)[,] the grading enhancement 

provision of the Fleeing and Eluding statute[.] Specifically, 

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3 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
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counsel [requested the trial court] to include language from the 

Superior Court’s opinion in In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 

2011). [N.T., 10/26/20, Courtroom 7, at 17-18.]. Counsel 

asserted that without the language from R.C.Y. regarding “high

speed chase,” the jury would not sufficiently understand the 

meaning of the enhancement language. Id. at 37. Counsel’s 

request was discussed several times, including during the 

charging conference.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3.

Ultimately, the court denied Appellant’s request to include the language 

from In re R.C.Y. in its jury instruction. Following the jury instructions, but 

before the jury retired to deliberate, Appellant objected “to the fleeing 

instruction as [the trial court] gave it,” again arguing that additional language 

from the In re R.C.Y. decision was necessary.4 N.T., 10/26/20, Courtroom 

3, at 151. The court declined to include that language. Id. at 152.

The jury found Appellant guilty of fleeing from police, specifically finding 

he “[e]ndangered a law enforcement officer . . . by engaging in a high-speed 

chase[.]” Verdict, 10/26/20, at 1. Thus, this count carried the enhanced 

grading of an F3. The jury also found Appellant guilty of resisting arrest, two 

counts of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine and 

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4 Appellant has thus preserved his challenge to the jury instruction for our 

review. See Pa.R.Crim. 647(C) (“No portions of the charge nor omissions 

from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made 

thereto before the jury retires to deliberate. . . .”); Commonwealth v. 

Knight, 241 A.3d 620, 634 (Pa. 2020) (“As [the a]ppellant did not challenge 

the trial court’s jury instructions or the verdict slip before the jury retired to 

deliberate, he has waived his challenge[.]”).
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suboxone), and possession of drug paraphernalia.5 The trial court separately 

found him guilty of ten summary traffic offenses.

On January 15, 2021, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 

three and a half to nine years’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’

probation. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions, but took this 

timely appeal. He subsequently complied with the trial court’s order to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.6

Appellant raises one issue for our review:

Whether the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in denying 

[Apellant’s] Motion to give jury instructions to the jury on In re 

R.C.Y., . . . 27 A.3d 227, 230 ([Pa. Super.] 2011) case at trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

We first note the relevant standard of review:

When reviewing a challenge to jury instructions, the reviewing 

court must consider the charge as a whole to determine if the 

charge was inadequate, erroneous, or prejudicial. The trial court 

has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose 

its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and 

accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. A new trial 

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5 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32).

6 After Appellant’s counsel filed a notice of appeal and the Rule 1925(b) 

statement, Appellant filed, on April 23, 2021, a pro se Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA) petition with the trial court, alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545. On April 28th, the trial court issued notice of 

intent to dismiss the petition, properly pointing out that it lacked jurisdiction 

to consider it. Order, 4/28/21, at 1. See Commonwealth v. Moran, 823 

A.2d 923, 925 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“Once a notice of appeal has been filed, the 

trial court generally lacks jurisdiction to modify its sentence.”). Nevertheless, 

the trial docket does not indicate any further action on this petition.
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is required on account of an erroneous jury instruction only if the 

instruction under review contained fundamental error, misled, or 

confused the jury.

Commonwealth v. Barr, 79 A.3d 668, 672-73 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted).

The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code7 defines the offense of fleeing or 

attempting to elude police officer as follows:

Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring 

his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude 

a pursuing police officer, when given a visual and audible signal 

to bring the vehicle to a stop, commits an offense as graded in 

subsection (a.2).

75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a). This offense is generally graded as a misdemeanor of 

the second degree. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a.2)(1). However, Subsection (a.2) 

provides:

[a]n offense . . . constitutes a felony of the third degree if the 

driver while fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer does 

any of the following:

(i) commits a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving 

under influence of alcohol or controlled substance); [or8]

* * *

(iii) endangers a law enforcement officer or member of 

the general public due to the driver engaging in a high-speed 

chase.

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7 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9805.

8 The jury was also charged with determining whether Appellant was driving 

under the influence of a controlled substance; the jury found he was not. 

Verdict at 1.
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75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a.2)(2)(i), (iii). As stated above, in the case sub judice,

the jury found the second circumstance was established — that Appellant 

“endanger[ed] a law enforcement officer . . . due to . . . engaging in a highspeed chase.” Verdict at 1.

On appeal, Appellant avers the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his point for charge to include reference to the decision in In re 

R.C.Y., 27 A.3d 227. Appellant avers In re R.C.Y. “clarifies the aggravating 

circumstances associated with” fleeing from police, as it “thoroughly discusses 

how a high speed chase is a term of art having a practical, legal meaning, and 

that it was not closely bound to the literal definition of high speed chase.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 14, 15. Appellant states he had argued to the trial court

that “there must be a high level of danger[,] as opposed to regular danger 

that possibly occurs when someone fails to immediately stop when signaled 

to do so” by police. Id. at 15. Appellant then claims “there was no 

testimony . . . that [he] ever put any law enforcement officers or the general 

public in danger of serious bodily injury or death[,]” and in fact, the 

Commonwealth’s evidence showed that “he wasn’t traveling at a dangerous 

rate of speed.” Id. at 16. Appellant observes the Commonwealth did not 

“rebut[ ]” his point for charge, and concludes he would have been acquitted 

of this count “had the jury been properly instructed.” Id. at 11, 16. No relief 

is due.
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Preliminarily, we note the deficiencies in Appellant’s argument. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (argument shall include “such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent”). While the crux of his issue is the jury 

charge’s lack of reference to In re R.C.Y., Appellant fails to explain what 

language or principle from that decision should have been included. Indeed, 

he does not provide any further discussion of In re R.C.Y. than what we have 

summarized above. Appellant does not explain the facts of In re R.C.Y., the 

issues presented, the Superior Court’s analysis, nor the reasons why In re 

R.C.Y. should apply to this case. Furthermore, although Appellant’s issue 

necessarily includes a detailed review of the facts, his brief fails to make any 

mention of the events of September 28, 2019. Instead, his chronological 

“statement of the case” begins with the charges filed against him, omitting 

any reference to the vehicle chase or his apprehension. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 9-10. We remind Appellant’s counsel that the failure to develop an 

argument, with citation to and analysis of relevant authority, waives the issue 

on review. See Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916, 924 (Pa. Super. 

2006).

In any event, the trial court’s opinion — which Appellant likewise fails to 

address on appeal — thoroughly reviewed the In re R.C.Y. decision and 

Appellant’s arguments. For ease of review, we first summarize In re R.C.Y. 

In that case, a police officer observed a juvenile “drive through [a stop sign]

without stopping.” In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 228. The officer “engaged his 
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lights and . . . pursue[d]” the juvenile, who ran through five more stop 

signs[.]” Id. A second officer joined the pursuit, and in the juvenile’s 

protracted attempt to evade apprehension: the juvenile, in his car, struck one 

officer’s car and struck the other officer’s leg, “pinning his leg between the” 

juvenile’s car and the officer’s car; one officer managed to break the juvenile’s 

driver’s window; the injured officer reached through the broken window in an 

attempt to turn off the vehicle; the juvenile continued to drive away, gaining 

speed, with the injured officer’s arm still in the car; and the injured officer 

“had to roll away from the vehicle to avoid being run over.” Id. Next, “a

short chase” ensued, “involving at least two other officers,” and the juvenile 

“was finally apprehended when his vehicle stalled.” Id. Pertinently, the 

evidence showed the juvenile had not traveled faster than 35 miles per hour

during the chase. Id. at 229.

The juvenile was charged with, inter alia, fleeing from police, with the 

enhanced grading of an F3. In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 228-29. The juvenile 

court adjudicated him delinquent on this charge and others. Id. On appeal 

to this Court, the juvenile challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing 

that his less-than-35-miles-per-hour speeds precluded application of the 

enhanced grading provision of Section 3733(a.2)(2)(iii). Id. at 229.

This Court denied relief. First, the panel noted that “high speed” was 

not defined in the statute nor decisional authority. In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 

230. The panel thus looked to the legislative history of Section 
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3733(a.2)(2)(iii), and noted: (1) the grading enhancement was added “in 

response to complaints about chases that endangered the public;” and (2)

“the term ‘high-speed chase’ was intentionally left undefined.” Id. The panel 

then

conclude[d] that the legislature did not intend for the term “highspeed chase” to be construed literally. Rather, it intended that 

“highspeed chase” be a term of art, having a practical, legal 

meaning that was not closely bound by a literal definition. The 

term “high-speed chase,” far from being the primary focus of the 

subsection, was intended to merely require a different level of 

danger from the run-of-the-mill dangers posed by merely failing 

to stop when signaled to do so by a police officer. In other words, 

the legislature included this term to indicate that the enhanced 

penalties applied only in cases where the defendant’s actions 

created an extraordinary danger to the public at large or to police 

officers.

Id.

The In re R.C.Y. panel then determined the juvenile’s “behavior was 

precisely the sort of mischief the legislature intended to remedy by adding 

subsection (iii),” and his “driving tactics . . . were anything but a run-of-themill failure to stop.” In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d at 230-31. The panel thus affirmed 

the enhanced grading of the juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency. Id. at 

231.

In the case sub judice, the trial court found the facts in In re R.C.Y.

were distinguishable from those in this case: In re R.C.Y. did “not involve a 

‘high speed chase’ in the traditional, speed-based sense of that term[,]” and 

thus “additional instructions [were] needed.” Trial Ct. Op. at 10. In this case, 

however, the court reasoned, “there [was] ample evidence of [Appellant] 
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fleeing from and leading the police on a dangerous chase at high speeds[.]” 

Id. Accordingly, “the term ‘high speed chase’ [was] easily understood by [the 

jury] and [thus did] not need amplification or additional definition.” Id. The 

court concluded, “the language from R.C.Y. was unnecessary and would have” 

misled or confused the jury. Id.

We agree with the trial court. Appellant’s bald claim — that “there was 

no testimony . . . that [he] ever put any law enforcement officers or the 

general public in danger of serious bodily injury or death[ and i]n fact, the 

testimony [was] that . . . he wasn’t traveling at a dangerous rate of speed” —

is belied by the record. See Appellant’s Brief at 16. The trial court aptly 

summarized the evidence that in ignoring the officers’ commands to stop: (1)

Appellant fled at 70 miles per hour in a 45-mile per hour zone, and at 80 miles 

per hour in a 55-mile per hour zone; (2) Corporal Phelps and Trooper 

Poliskiewicz, who were on foot, “were forced to move aside to avoid being 

struck by [Appellant’s] motorcycle;” and (3) Appellant “drove into the door of 

[a] patrol vehicle.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3.

Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that in reviewing the jury 

instruction as a whole, it “clearly, adequately, and accurately presented [the 

law] to the jury.” See Barr, 79 A.3d at 672. The court noted the charge was 

consistent with the Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction for fleeing 

from police. Trial Ct. Op. at 8; see Pa. SSJI (Crim) 17.3733 (fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer). The court instructed the jury that four 
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elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant was the 

driver of a motor vehicle; (2) he “was given a visual and audible signal by a 

police officer to . . . stop[;]” (3) he “failed to refused to bring his vehicle to a 

stop or fled or attempted to elude the pursuing police officer[;]” and (4) he 

acted “willfully, or in other words, . . . he was aware of the officer’s signal to 

stop and refused to do so.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7. The court then explained that 

if the jury found the elements of fleeing from police were established beyond 

a reasonable doubt, then it must further determine whether it found beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Appellant “endangered a law enforcement officer or 

member of the general public by engaging in a high speed chase.” Id. On 

balance, the instruction did not mislead or confuse the jury, or include any 

error in conveying the law. See Barr, 79 A.3d at 672. 

Accordingly, we conclude no relief is due on Appellant’s claim, and affirm 

the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/09/2022