1523054 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

COMMISSIONERS: Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman 

Terrell McSweeny 

) 

In the Matter of ) 

) DOCKET NO. CUber Technologies, Inc., ) 

a corporation. ) 

) 

COMPLAINT 

The Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”), having reason to believe that Uber 

Technologies, Inc. (“Respondent” or “Uber”), a corporation, has violated the Federal Trade 

Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is 

in the public interest, alleges: 

1. Respondent Uber is a Delaware corporation with its principal office or place of business at 

1455 Market St. #400, San Francisco, California 94103. 

2. The acts and practices of Respondent alleged in this Complaint have been in or affecting 

commerce, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 

RESPONDENT’S BUSINESS PRACTICES 

3. Since at least 2010, Respondent has distributed a mobile software application (the “App”) 

that connects consumers who are transportation providers (hereinafter “Uber Drivers” or 

“Drivers”) with consumers seeking those services (hereinafter “Riders”). Respondent 

markets different versions of the App to Riders and Drivers. Respondent also operates a 

website at www.uber.com. 

4. Riders book transportation services from an Uber Driver using a publicly available version of 

the App that can be downloaded to a smartphone. When a Rider requests transportation 

through the App, the request is conveyed to a nearby Uber Driver signed into the App. 

5. Uber Drivers are consumers who use the App to locate Riders in need of transportation. 

Respondent recruits and approves consumers to become Uber Drivers, sets the rates that 

Drivers charge for providing transportation, and collects a portion of the fares that Drivers 

charge for each ride. Drivers decide when they are available to accept ride requests and use 

the App to determine which ride requests they will accept. 
 

 

6. When a consumer signs up to become an Uber Driver, Respondent collects personal 

information about the consumer, including the consumer’s name, email address, phone 

number, postal address, profile picture, Social Security number, driver’s license information, 

bank account information (including domestic routing and bank account numbers), vehicle 

registration information, and insurance information. 

7. Respondent also collects and stores a variety of personal information from Riders, including, 

among other things, names, email addresses, postal addresses, profile pictures, and detailed 

trip records including precise geolocation information. 

8. Respondent collects precise geolocation information about both Riders and Drivers in real 

time. When a Rider requests transportation services and has authorized Respondent to 

collect such information, Respondent collects precise geolocation information from the 

Rider’s device. During a trip, Respondent collects precise geolocation information from the 

Rider’s device if the Rider has provided consent for Respondent to do so. Respondent also 

collects such information about the route of the trip from the Driver’s mobile device and 

associates the trip information with the Rider. 

9. As of December 2014, there were more than 160,000 active Uber Drivers using the App. As 

of December 2015, Riders had completed more than 1 billion rides using Respondent’s 

services. In 2015, Respondent had over $1.5 billion in total revenues. 

RESPONDENT’S INTERNAL ACCESS TO CONSUMER PERSONAL INFORMATION 

10. In November 2014, Respondent was the subject of a number of widely disseminated news 

reports concerning allegations of improper access and use of consumer personal information, 

including geolocation data. One article, published on November 17, 2014, reported that an 

Uber executive had suggested Respondent should hire “opposition researchers” and 

journalists to look into the “personal lives” of journalists who criticized Respondent’s 

business practices. On November 18, 2014, another article described an internal aerial 

tracking tool, referred to as “God View,” that displayed the personal information of Riders 

using Respondent’s services. These reports were widely circulated in the press and caused 

considerable consumer uproar. 

11. In an effort to respond to consumer concerns, on November 18, 2014, Respondent issued a 

statement, which has been continuously posted on Respondent’s website and was widely 

disseminated in the press, describing Respondent’s policies concerning access to Rider and 

Driver data. Respondent stated: 

Uber has a strict policy prohibiting all employees at every level from 

accessing a rider or driver’s data. The only exception to this policy is for a 

limited set of legitimate business purposes. Our policy has been 

communicated to all employees and contractors.... 

The policy is also clear that access to rider and driver accounts is being 

closely monitored and audited by data security specialists on an ongoing 

basis, and any violations of the policy will result in disciplinary action, 

including the possibility of termination and legal action. 

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(Exhibit A.) 

12. Despite Respondent’s representation that its practices would continue on an ongoing basis, 

Respondent has not always closely monitored and audited its employees’ access to Rider and 

Driver accounts since November 2014. Respondent developed an automated system for 

monitoring employee access to consumer personal information in December 2014 but the 

system was not designed or staffed to effectively handle ongoing review of access to data by 

Respondent’s thousands of employees and contingent workers. 

13. In approximately August 2015, Respondent ceased using the automated system it had 

developed in December 2014 and began to develop a new automated monitoring system. 

From approximately August 2015 until May 2016, Respondent did not timely follow up on 

automated alerts concerning the potential misuse of consumer personal information, and for 

approximately the first six months of this period, Respondent only monitored access to 

account information belonging to a set of internal high-profile users, such as Uber 

executives. During this time, Respondent did not otherwise monitor internal access to 

personal information unless an employee specifically reported that a co-worker had engaged 

in inappropriate access. 

RESPONDENT’S AMAZON S3 DATASTORE 

14. As part of its information technology infrastructure, Respondent uses a third-party service 

provided by Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) called the Amazon Simple Storage Service (the 

“Amazon S3 Datastore”). The Amazon S3 Datastore is a scalable cloud storage service that 

can be used to store and retrieve large amounts of data. The Amazon S3 Datastore stores 

data inside of virtual containers, called “buckets,” against which individual access controls 

can be applied. 

15. Respondent relies on the Amazon S3 Datastore to store a wide variety of files that contain 

sensitive personal information. These files include, among other things, full and partial backups of Uber databases. The database back-ups contain a broad range of Rider and Driver 

personal information, including, among other things, names, nicknames, email addresses, 

postal addresses, phone numbers, unique device identifiers, trip records, geolocation 

information, and driver’s license numbers. The files also include documents provided by 

Uber Drivers, such as vehicle registration receipts, proof of insurance documents, and images 

of driver’s licenses. 

RESPONDENT’S SECURITY STATEMENTS 

16. From at least July 13, 2013 to July 15, 2015, Respondent disseminated, or caused to be 

disseminated, a privacy policy that expressly applied to Respondent’s websites and Apps and 

contained the following statements regarding the security measures Respondent used to 

protect the personal information it collected from consumers: 

The Personal Information and Usage Information we collect is securely 

stored within our databases, and we use standard, industry-wide, 

commercially reasonable security practices such as encryption, firewalls 

and SSL (Secure Socket Layers) for protecting your information—such as 

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any portions of your credit card number which we retain (we do not 

ourselves retain your entire credit card information) and geo-location 

information. 

(Exhibit B.) 

17. In numerous instances, Respondent’s customer service representatives offered assurances 

about the strength of Respondent’s security practices to consumers who were reluctant to 

submit personal information to Uber, including but not limited to the following: 

“Your information will be stored safely and used only for purposes you’ve authorized. 

We use the most up to date technology and services to ensure that none of these are 

compromised.” 

“I understand that you do not feel comfortable sending your personal information via 

online. However, we’re extra vigilant in protecting all private and personal 

information.” 

“All of your personal information, including payment methods, is kept secure and 

encrypted to the highest security standards available.” 

(Emphases added.) 

RESPONDENT’S SECURITY PRACTICES 

18. Respondent has engaged in a number of practices that, taken together, failed to provide 

reasonable security to prevent unauthorized access to Rider and Driver personal information 

stored in the Amazon S3 Datastore. Among other things, Respondent: 

a. Failed to implement reasonable access controls to safeguard data stored in the 

Amazon S3 Datastore. For example, Respondent: 

i. until approximately September 2014, failed to require programs and 

engineers that access the Amazon S3 Datastore to use distinct access keys, 

instead permitting all programs and engineers to use a single AWS access 

key that provided full administrative privileges over all data in the 

Amazon S3 Datastore; 

ii. until approximately September 2014, failed to restrict access to systems 

based on employees’ job functions; and 

iii. until approximately September 2015, failed to require multi-factor 

authentication for individual account access, and until at least November 

2016, failed to require multi-factor authentication for programmatic 

service account access, to the Amazon S3 Datastore; 

b. Until at least September 2014, failed to implement reasonable security training 

and guidance; 

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c. Until approximately September 2014, failed to have a written information security 

program; and 

d. Until at least November 2016, stored sensitive personal information in the 

Amazon S3 Datastore in clear, readable text, including in database back-ups and 

database prune files, rather than encrypting the information. 

19. Respondent could have prevented or mitigated the failures described in Paragraph 18 

through relatively low-cost measures. 

20. Respondent’s failure to provide reasonable security for consumers’ personal information 

stored in its databases, including geolocation information, created serious risks for 

consumers. 

2014 DATA BREACH 

21. As a result of the failures described in Paragraph 18, on or about May 12, 2014, an intruder 

was able to access consumers’ personal information in plain text in Respondent’s Amazon S3 

Datastore using an access key that one of Respondent’s engineers had publicly posted to 

GitHub, a code-sharing website used by software developers. The publicly posted key 

granted full administrative privileges to all data and documents stored within Respondent’s 

Amazon S3 Datastore. The intruder accessed one file that contained sensitive personal 

information belonging to Uber Drivers, including over 100,000 unencrypted names and 

driver’s license numbers, 215 unencrypted names and bank account and domestic routing 

numbers, and 84 unencrypted names and Social Security numbers. The file also contained 

other Uber Driver information, including physical addresses, email addresses, mobile device 

phone numbers, device IDs, and location information from trips the Uber Drivers provided. 

22. Respondent did not discover the existence of the breach until September 2014. 

23. Respondent initially sent breach notification letters to 48,949 affected Uber Drivers in 

February 2015. In May and July of 2016, Uber learned of more individuals affected by the 

breach, including approximately 60,000 additional Uber Drivers whose unencrypted names 

and driver’s license numbers were accessed. Uber sent additional breach notification letters 

to these affected Uber Drivers in June and August of 2016. 

2016 DATA BREACH 

24. On or about November 14, 2016, Respondent learned of another breach of consumer 

personal information stored in Uber’s Amazon S3 Datastore. Once again, intruders gained 

access to the Amazon S3 Datastore using an access key that an Uber engineer had posted to 

GitHub. This time, the key was in plain text in code that was posted to a private GitHub 

repository. However, Uber granted its engineers access to Uber’s GitHub repositories 

through engineers’ individual GitHub accounts, which engineers generally accessed through 

personal email addresses. Uber did not have a policy prohibiting engineers from reusing 

credentials, and did not require engineers to enable multi-factor authentication when 

accessing Uber’s GitHub repositories. The intruders said that they accessed Uber’s GitHub 

page using passwords that were previously exposed in other large data breaches, whereupon 

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they discovered the access key in plain text. The intruders downloaded 16 files from 

Respondent’s Amazon S3 Datastore between October 13, 2016 and November 15, 2016. 

These files contained unencrypted consumer personal information relating to U.S. Riders and 

Drivers, including, among other things, approximately 25.6 million names and email 

addresses, 22.1 million names and mobile phone numbers, and 607,000 names and driver’s 

license numbers. Nearly all of the exposed personal information was collected before July 

2015 and stored in unencrypted database backup files. 

25. Respondent discovered the breach on or about November 14, 2016, when one of the attackers 

contacted Respondent claiming to have compromised Uber’s “databases” and demanding a 

six-figure payout. 

26. Respondent paid the attackers $100,000 through the third party that administers Uber’s “bug 

bounty” program. Respondent created the bug bounty program to pay financial rewards in 

exchange for the responsible disclosure of serious security vulnerabilities. However, the 

attackers in this instance were fundamentally different from legitimate bug bounty recipients. 

These attackers did not merely identify a vulnerability and disclose it responsibly. Rather, 

the attackers maliciously exploited the vulnerability and acquired personal information 

relating to millions of consumers. 

27. Respondent failed to disclose the breach to affected consumers until November 21, 2017, 

more than a year after discovery of the breach. Furthermore, the November 2016 breach 

occurred in the midst of a nonpublic investigation by the Commission relating to 

Respondent’s data security practices, including, specifically, the security of Respondent’s 

Amazon S3 Datastore. Despite the pendency of this investigation, Respondent failed to 

disclose the existence of the breach to the Commission until November 2017. 

COUNT 1 

28. As described in Paragraph 11, Respondent has represented, directly or indirectly, expressly 

or by implication, that internal access to consumers’ personal information is closely 

monitored and audited by data security specialists on an ongoing basis. 

29. In truth and in fact, as described in Paragraphs 12 - 13, Respondent has not closely 

monitored and audited internal access to consumers’ personal information by data security 

specialists on an ongoing basis. Therefore, the representation set forth in Paragraph 28 is 

false or misleading. 

COUNT 2 

30. As described in Paragraphs 16 - 17, Respondent has represented, directly or indirectly, 

expressly or by implication, that it would provide reasonable security for consumers’ 

personal information stored in its databases. 

31. In truth and in fact, as described in Paragraphs 18 - 27, Respondent did not provide 

reasonable security for consumers’ personal information stored in its databases. Therefore, 

the representation set forth in Paragraph 30 is false or misleading. 

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32. The acts and practices of Respondent as alleged in this Complaint constitute unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the 

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 

THEREFORE, the Federal Trade Commission this _____ day of ___________________, 

2018, has issued this Complaint against Respondent. 

By the Commission. 

Donald S. Clark 

Secretary 

SEAL: 

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