IN TH E UNITED STATES DISTRIC T COUR T 

F O R TH E NORTHER N DISTRIC T O F GEORGI A 

ATLANT A DIVISION 

FEDERA L TRAD E COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

T H E PRIMAR Y GROU P INC., a 

corporation f/k/a A Primary Systems 

Group Inc. also d/b/a Primary 

Solutions and PSA Investigations, 

GAI L DANIELS , individually and as 

an officer of TH E PRIMAR Y 

GROUP INC., 

Defendants. 

ORDE R 

Presently pending before this Court are: (1) the FTC's Motion for 

Permission to File Motion for Entry of Default Judgment [Doc. 73]; (2) the FTC's 

Motion for Summary Judgment Against Al l Defendants^ [Doc. 78]; (3) Defendant 

Gail Daniels' Motion for the Court to Correct its Ruling [Doc. 92]; and (4) the 

FTC's Motion to Extend the Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 110". 

^ On March 11, 2016, this Court granted the FTC's Motion to Dismiss June 

Fleming as a party defendant in this action [Doc. 108]. Accordingly, the FTC's 

Motion for Summary Judgment as to Ms. Fleming is DENIE D AS MOOT. 

CIVI L ACTIO N FIL E 

NO. 15-CV-1645-MHC 

Case 1:15-cv-01645-MHC Document 112 Filed 05/19/16 Page 1 of 52
I . PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATIO N 

A. The Complaint and Temporary Restraining Orders 

This litigation began on May 11, 2015, when Plaintiff Federal Trade 

Commission ("the FTC") filed a Complaint under Section 13(b) of the Federal 

Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and Section 814 ofthe Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16921 ("FDCPA"), to obtain temporary, 

preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, 

restitution, refund of monies paid, disgorgement of ill-gotten monies, and other 

equitable relief for alleged deceptive acts or practices committed by Defendants as 

they engaged in the process of purported debt collection from consumers. Compl. 

for Permanent Inj. and Other Equitable Relief [Doc. 1]. The FTC also filed an ex 

parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") to, inter alia, temporarily 

freeze Defendants' assets, enjoin Defendants from transferring, concealing, or 

disposing of assets, and require Defendants to make an accounting of their present 

financial condition.^ PL's iix Parte Mot. for TRO [Doc. 5^. 

On May 11, 2015, this Court issued an ex parte TRO pursuant to Rule 65(b) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon the request of the FTC which, inter 

alia, froze a number of Defendants' assets, provided the FTC with immediate 

^ An Order sealing the FTC's filings was issued by the Court on May 11, 2015, and 

the seal entered by that Order dissolved on May 15, 2015. Order [Doc. 6". 

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access to Defendants' business premises, and granted expedited discovery to 

determine the existence and location of assets and documents pertinent to the 

allegations ofthe Complaint. TRO Order [Doc. 8]. The TRO also ordered 

Defendants to appear at a hearing on June 4, 2015, at 10:00 A.M . to show cause 

why the Court should not issue a preliminary injunction against Defendants until a 

fmal ruling is issued on the Complaint. Id. at 27. A stipulation modifying the 

terms of the TRO was filed on May 21, 2015, which lifted the freeze on two 

accounts belonging to then-Defendant June Fleming ("Ms. Fleming"). Stipulation 

Modifying TRO [Doc. 15]. Under the provisions of Rule 65(b), the original TRO 

expired on May 26, 2015.^ See Order of May 27, 2015 [Doc. 21]. Pursuant to the 

FTC's motion, the TRO was reinstated on May 28, 2015, with an expiration date of 

June 8, 2015. Order of May 28, 2015 [Doc. 24]. 

Prior to the June 4, 2015, hearing on the FTC's motion for a preliminary 

injunction. Defendant Gail Daniels ("Ms. Daniels"), acting pro se, began a series 

of filings in both this Court and in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in an 

effort to thwart the FTC and this Court from proceeding with the litigation. Ms. 

Daniels filed two "emergency motions" which sought to unfreeze funds from an 

^ The TRO erroneously stated that the original ex parte TRO's duration would 

extend beyond the fourteen-day time limit imposed by Rule 65(b), and the Order 

entered May 27, 2015, corrected that error. 

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account in her husband's name and to complain about the FTC's conduct, a motion 

to dissolve the TRO, and a motion to recuse the undersigned. [Docs. 16-17, 23, 

25.] Those motions were denied [Docs. 24, 31], but the Court advised Ms. Daniels 

that, to the extent she had evidence that she lacked sufficient funds to pay living 

expenses, she should bring that evidence with her to the preliminary hearing. 

Order of May 28, 2015 [Doc. 24] at 5-6. 

Prior to the hearing, Ms. Daniels contacted the Court's staff to report that 

she may not attend. Because of Ms. Daniel's pro se status, and the Court's 

concem that she may not have been apprised of the adverse consequences of her 

failure to attend, the Court entered an Order on June 3, 2015, explaining the 

potential negative ramifications of her absence. Order of June 3, 2015 [Doc. 30'. 

Included in that Order was the following: 

Because Defendant Daniels is proceeding pro se, this Court is taking 

the additional step of informing her of the potential negative 

consequences of her failing to appear at the hearing. In addition, 

Defendant Daniels should be aware that, under Local Rule 

83.E(2)(b)(I) of this Court, a corporation cannot be represented in 

court by a corporate officer who is not an attomey licensed to practice 

law in Georgia and that failure to comply with this rule could result in 

a default being entered against the corporate party. So, while the 

individual Defendants have the right to represent themselves at the 

hearing in this matter, they cannot represent the interests of the 

corporate Defendant. 

This Court again urges Defendant Daniels to appear at the hearing on 

the preliminary injunction and to retain counsel to represent 

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Defendants in the future. Defendant Daniels is instructed to refrain 

from continuing to attempt to contact this Court or its staff ex parte. 

I f counsel or a pro se litigant seeks court action, the appropriate 

procedure is to put the request in writing, in the form of a motion, file 

the motion with the Clerk's office, and serve the opposing party or 

party's counsel. See FED. R. CiV. P. 5; LR 5.1 and 5.2, NDGa.; see 

also LR 7.4, NDGa. ("Communications to judges seeking a ruling or 

order, including an extension of time, shall be by motion and not by 

letter. A letter seeking such action ordinarily will not be treated as a 

motion. Counsel [and pro se litigants] shall not provide the Court with 

copies of correspondence among themselves relating to matters in 

dispute."). I f Defendant Daniels desires a telephone conference with 

the Court, she must first contact counsel for Plaintiff and both sides 

together must be on the call before this Court will be able to address 

any immediate issue. 

Order of June 3, 2015, at 3-4. 

B. The Preliminary Injunction and Default of The Primary Group 

On June 4, 2015, the Court conducted a full-day hearing on the FTC's 

motion for a preliminary injunction, at which the FTC was present and represented 

by counsel and Ms. Daniels appeared pro se. Tr. of Prelim. Inj. Hr'g [Doc. 47". 

Both sides presented evidence by way of testimony and exhibits. Ms. Daniels was 

again advised by the Court that she could not represent The Primary Group, Inc., 

the corporate defendant, that she should retain counsel in this matter, and that the 

Court would unfreeze assets to enable her to retain an attorney. By Order dated 

June 5, 2015, this Court approved a stipulation that unfroze funds from a number 

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of accounts in order to enable Ms. Daniels and Ms. Fleming to have sufficient 

living expenses. Stipulation Modifying TRO [Doc. 35^. 

On June 8, 2015, the Court entered an Order granting the FTC's motion for 

preliminary injunction. Order [Doc. 36]. The Preliminary Injunction enjoined 

Defendants from engaging in conduct that violates the FDCPA, froze certain assets 

of Defendants (with the exception of the assets released from the prior freeze 

order), ordered the retention of certain of Defendants' assets and records by 

financial institutions and third parties, and ordered that Defendants prepare and 

deliver to the FTC completed financial statements and a full accounting of assets 

held outside the United States. Id. The Order was set to expire in ninety days 

unless extended by order of the Court upon consent of the parties or for good 

cause. Id. 

On June 8, 2015, Ms. Daniels filed her Answer to the Complaint along with 

a Counterclaim against the FTC [Doc. 39]. Ms. Fleming filed her Answer to the 

Complaint the same day [Doc. 41]."^ Another stipulation unfreezing certain assets 

Ms. Fleming is the mother of Ms. Daniels. Although listed as a corporate officer 

for The Primary Group, it became evident to this Court that Ms. Fleming had no 

active role in the company or in any of the allegations that formed the basis for the 

complaint or the preliminary injunction in this case. Frankly, it appears that Ms. 

Daniels has used her mother's name in corporate documents without her mother's 

direct knowledge and certainly with no intention that her mother participate in the 

debt collection business. As the Court eventually relieved Ms. Fleming of any 

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of Ms. Daniels and Ms. Fleming was approved by the Court on June 19, 2015. 

Stipulation Modifying Permanent Inj. [Doc. 43]. Pursuant to the FTC's Motion for 

Clerk's Entry of Default as to The Primary Group [Doc. 55], the Clerk entered 

default as to The Primary Group on August 7, 2015. 

C. Ms. Daniels' Refusal to Participate in the Discovery Process and Her 

Claims of Medical Incapacity 

For the majority of this litigation, the FTC had difficulty engaging in 

discovery due to Ms. Daniels' continuing efforts to avoid responding to discovery 

requests. On June 24, 2015, the FTC filed its proposed Preliminary Report and 

Discovery Plan after numerous efforts to seek Ms. Daniels' input into the plan 

were unsuccessful. PL's Prelim. Report & Disc. Plan [Doc. 45]. By Order dated 

August 19, 2015, the Court gave Ms. Daniels until August 31, 2015, to either file 

her own version of the report or to show cause in writing why the FTC's version 

should not be adopted. Order [Doc. 56]. Ms. Daniels failed to respond,^ so the 

Court adopted the FTC's report on September 2, 2015. Order [Doc. 59]. 

obligation to participate in discovery in this case and the FTC has now dismissed 

her as a party defendant, the Court will not refer to Ms. Fleming throughout the 

remainder of this Order. 

^ On August 19, 2015, Ms. Daniels sent an email to the Court's courtroom deputy, 

with copies to the FTC's counsel, indicating that she was suffering from medical 

problems and would "get a note and forward it to the judge next week." She did 

not follow up within the promised time period with a note from a medical 

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On July 16, 2015, the FTC served three sets of interrogatories and one set of 

a request for production of documents on Ms. Daniels. PL's Mot. to Compel [Doc. 

63], Attach. A, ^ 12. Ms. Daniels failed to respond to the discovery requests, citing 

health issues. I d Tj^j 12-14. On August 25, 2015, the FTC attempted to arrange the 

deposition of Ms. Daniels at a convenient time and offered to work around any of 

her health problems (e.g., to conduct short deposition sessions or to work around 

any treatment schedules). Id. ^ 15. Ms. Daniels responded that she was 

hospitalized. Id. On September 4, 2015, the FTC served a notice of deposition on 

Ms. Daniels, who indicated that she would not attend and would not discuss any 

alternative time when she could appear. I d ^ 16. The Court entered an order 

extending the preliminary injunction for an additional ninety days, in large 

measure due to the FTC's difficulty in obtaining discovery responses from Ms. 

Daniels.^ Order [Doc. 60;. 

professional indicating that she was physically unable to respond to this Court's 

Orders. Sept. 2, 2015, Order [Doc. 59] at 2, n.l . 

At the same time that she was failing to comply with the FTC's discovery 

requests due to alleged health issues, Ms. Daniels actively pursued at least two 

appeals from this Court's orders: (1) a petition for a writ of mandamus to the 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals asking that this Court's TRO and order denying 

recusal be voided, which petition was denied on July 27, 2015. Order, In re: Gail 

Daniels, 11th Cir. No. 15-12395 [Doc. 51]; (2) aNotice of Appeal ofthe Court's 

preliminary injunction order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit filed July 13, 2015 [Docs. 48, 49], which was transferred to the Eleventh 

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On September 18, 2015, the FTC filed a motion to compel disclosures, 

discovery responses, and deposition testimony [Doc. 63], and this Court ordered 

Ms. Daniels to respond by September 30, 2015, or the motion would be deemed 

unopposed. Order [Doc. 64]. It was further ordered that, if Ms. Daniels asserted 

that she had an existing medical condition that presented an inability to appear for 

a deposition or respond to the FTC's discovery requests, she should file a motion 

to stay these requirements with supporting documentation from a Georgia licensed 

medical professional that provides a medical basis for the inability to presently 

comply with any of these mandates, and to specify a date upon which responses 

could be made.^ Id. 

On October 2, 2015, Ms. Daniels filed a "Motion of Notice of Medical 

Excuse for Gail Daniels and June Fleming and to Dismiss the Complaint Against 

June Fleming and a Demand for Jury Trial in Al l and Every Possible Hearing, and 

to Address Some New Concerns." [Doc. 65.] In her motion, Ms. Daniels 

Circuit Court of Appeals, Order, FTC v. The Primary Group, Fed. Cir. No. 15-

1820 [Docs. 52, 58], and subsequently dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals for want of prosecution, Order, FTC v. The Primary Group, 11th Cir. No. 

15-13947-F [Doc. 67]. 

^ Ms. Daniels was further advised that sending unsubstantiated emails to the 

Court's staff alleging that she had a medical condition that preclude her from 

complying with this Court's orders or the FTC's discovery requests were not 

sufficient to justify continued non-compliance. 

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contended that she suffers from several conditions, including iritis (which affects 

her vision), breathing problems, myasthenia gravis, and post-traumatic stress 

disorder, and that she suffered a recent stroke. Id. at 1-2. She attached a letter 

from Dr. Aji t Nemi, the Medical Director of Lotus Vision, who stated that Ms. 

Daniels is under his care for iritis in both eyes and the photophobia due to her eye 

condition "may cause difficulty reading or typing for extended period of time." I d 

at 4. Llowever, Dr. Nemi provided no certification that Ms. Daniels could not 

attend a deposition or have someone assist her in responding to the FTC's written 

discovery requests. 

Ms. Daniels also attached a portion of her discharge information from a 

hospitalization at North Fulton Hospital from August 23-27, 2015, for a "transient 

ischemic attack," which the discharge instructions defines as a "warning stroke" 

that does not cause lasting damage to the brain. I d at 5-11. She was discharged to 

her home with a diagnosis of acute iritis in both eyes, including the following 

instructions: "resume home activity," "avoid heavy, strenuous physical activity for 

24 hours after [the catheter] is removed," "avoid sports or activities that can cause 

injury or bleeding," "stay active," and "try to get at least 30 minutes of activity on 

most or all days." I d at 5-6, 10. Once again, there was nothing in any ofthe 

submissions that precluded Ms. Daniels from sitting in a deposition or from 

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responding to ttie FTC's written discovery requests with assistance from a reader 

and/or typist in the event her vision impedes her ability to read the requests and/or 

type responses to those requests. By Order dated October 2, 2015, the Court 

extended the discovery period until November 15, 2015; ordered Ms. Daniels to 

cooperate with the FTC and to appear for her deposition (and to allow her to bring 

an individual to assist with the reading of any documents); ordered Ms. Daniels to 

respond to the FTC's written discovery requests (providing her with alternatives 

for responding in the event she was unable to type her responses); and denied the 

motion for medical excuse. Order [Doc. 66]. 

On October 13-14, 2015, Ms. Daniels filed a second and third motion to 

provide medical excuse, a motion to dismiss the complaint, and a motion "ask[ing^ 

the judge to review the transcripts to correct verbal damageing (sic) inaccuracies 

and to review the law and to read the FTC guidelines and cases with the FTC and 

collection agencys (sic) concerning adding and enjoining a personal defendant to a 

corporate lawsuit and what element of proof that must exist." [Docs. 69 & 70.' 

Once again, Ms. Daniels failed to provide a certification of a Georgia medical 

practitioner that she was unable to participate in this litigation. The only letters 

submitted were: (1) from Dr. Mary Cox, who stated that Ms. Daniels has been 

under her care, has chronic shortness of breath, and becomes frequently winded 

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after long monologues [Doc. 70 at 10]; and (2) from a nurse practitioner named 

Pamela Tinsley, who opined that Ms. Fleming could not "attend" a civil case at 

this time due to "multiple medical issues." Id. at 7, 10. Ms. Daniels' motions 

were denied on November 3, 2015. Order of Nov. 3, 2015 [Doc. 74]. 

On October 14, 2015, Ms. Daniels sat for her deposition. Dep. of Gail F. 

Daniels taken Oct. 14, 2015 [Docs. 79-1 & 79-2]. However, again in 

contravention of the Court's prior order, Ms. Daniels made no effort to comply 

with the FTC's written discovery requests and did not serve any discovery requests 

upon the FTC within the discovery period. The Court again extended the 

preliminary injunction for another ninety days. Order of Nov. 24, 2015 [Doc. 77^. 

That same day, the FTC filed its motion for summary judgment. PL's Mot. for 

Summ. J. [Doc. 78^. 

On November 30, 2016, Ms. Daniels filed a number of motions: (1) "Motion 

to Temporarily Stay Al l Legal Action Against Defendants Because of Medical 

Problems the Defendant Not (sic) to Respond Properly" [Doc. 84] ("Motion to 

Stay"); (2) "Motion to Compel the Plaintiffs [sic] Attorney to Answer and the 

Court to Answer the Following Questions Conceming this Case Against Al l the 

Defendant (sic). So They Will Know How to Defend Themselves" [Doc. SV 

("Motion to Compel"); (3) "Motion to Set Emergency Hearing to Impeach the 

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Plaintiffs Expert Witness and Plaintiffs Attomey for Lying to the Court and for 

the Court to Look at the Surveilance (sic) with the Plaintiffs to Immediately 

Dissmiss (sic) this Case, to Escalate These Finding to Plaintiffs (sic) Superiors" 

[Doc. 82] ("Motion for Hearing"); and (4) "Motion to Stay to Allow Defendant to 

Properly Defend Themselves By Allowing Them Time to Do Depositions i f 

Necessary on Michael Goldstein Two Bank Employees and 2 of the Plaintiffs (sic) 

Witnesses, (sic) When Medically Able Before Any Judgement (sic) or Conclusion" 

;DOC. 83] ("Second Motion to Stay"). 

On December 16, 2015, pursuant to Ms. Daniels' email request, this Court 

conducted a conference call with Ms. Daniels and counsel for the FTC. 

Notwithstanding this Court's continual efforts, it was apparent both prior to the call 

and during the call that Ms. Daniels was unable or unwilling to understand that she 

has continually violated the orders of this Court. Although this Court does not 

doubt that Ms. Daniels suffers from one or more medical conditions and has had 

prior hospitalizations, aside from her own protestations of her inability to 

participate in this case, she failed to produce any independent medical evidence 

that her condition prevents her from responding to the FTC's motions or this 

Court's Orders. 

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Nevertheless, in continued recognition of Ms. Daniels' pro se status, and to 

provide her with one last opportunity to come into compliance with the Court's 

Orders, by Order dated December 18, 2015, the Court granted her an extension of 

time until January 22, 2016, to either: (1) file her response to the FTC's motion for 

summary judgment, or (2) file an opinion from an independent Georgia licensed 

medical professional that indicates that she suffers from a specific medical 

condition that prevents her from personally or with assistance responding to the 

FTC's motion for summary judgment and, if such is the case, state the date by 

when Daniels can prepare and file such a response. Order of Dec. 18, 2015 [Doc. 

89]. Ms. Daniels was also instructed that a failure to respond to the FTC's 

Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Tried 

"Doc. 78-2], supported either by specific citations to evidence, by a valid objection 

to the admissibility of the alleged fact, or by pointing out that the FTC's citation 

does not support the alleged fact, will result in such facts deemed as admitted by 

this Court in accordance with its local rules. Id,; see also LR 56. l(B)(2)(a)(2), 

NDGa. The Court denied the remainder of her motions and extended the 

preliminary injunction for an additional ninety days. Orders of Dec. 18, 2015 and 

Jan. 13,2016 [Docs. 89,91]. 

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On January 14, 2016, Ms. Daniels filed another notice of appeal to the 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals from the Court's most recent orders. Notice of 

Appeal [Doc. 93]. That appeal was later dismissed for want of prosecution. 11th 

Cir. No. 16-10194-F, Order of Apr. 4, 2016 [Doc. 109]. 

On January 25, 2016, Ms. Daniels filed a "Medical Document for Gail 

Daniels and June Fleming with statement from family members to the judge." 

[Doc. 100.] For the most part, the "statemenf constituted a criticism of the actions 

of the FTC and attached three summary statements by physicians as to Defendant 

Daniels' medical condition: 

(1) A letter from Dr. C. Dirk Williams, stating that Ms. Daniels suffers 

from "ongoing medical problems including Parkinson's disease and 

Major Depression and PTSD" and "is unable to perform any tasks 

regarding represensation [sic] in court and answering any questions." 

[Doc. 100 at 4.] 

The "statement" also contained the following: " I am begging you to examine 

your behavior as a judge and recuse yourself [sic] it is more clear that you are 

against my family and doing everything unlawfull [sic] to fulfill the FTC screw up. 

It is your job to be impartial. . . ." [Doc. 100 at 2 (capitalization omitted).] The 

Court denied this second motion to recuse on February 12, 2016 [Doc. 104^. 

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(2) A letter from Dr. R. Ahmad stating that Ms. Daniels has been a patient 

since 2007, is seeking treatment for Major Depression and PTSD, has 

"Parkinsonism" disease and other health issues, and has problems 

with short-term memory loss. [Doc. 100 at 5.' 

(3) A letter from Dr. Ajit Nemi stating that Ms. Daniels was last seen on 

November 24, 2015, has iritis in both eyes, has had decreased visual 

acuity, and is under the care of a retina specialist. [Doc. 100 at 6. 

None of these physicians indicated that Ms. Daniels suffers from "a specific 

medical condition that prevents her from personally or with assistance responding 

to the FTC's motion for summary judgmenf and, if such was the case, "the date 

by when Daniels can prepare and file such a response." See Order of Dec. 18, 

2015 [Doc. 89], at 10. Indeed, notwithstanding her purported medical conditions, 

Ms. Daniels continued to file appeals from this Court's orders. 

On February 5, 2016, the Court received an email request from Ms. Daniels 

requesting an "immediate court hearing or phone conversation" relating to her 

medical situation. On February 5, 2016, this Court entered an Order scheduling a 

hearing for February 22, 2016, directing Ms. Daniels to personally appear at the 

hearing, and permitting her to appear with a relative or family member to assist 

her. Order of Feb. 5, 2016 [Doc. 103]. 

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On Febraary 22, 2016, this Court conducted a hearing. Contrary to the 

Court's Order, Ms. Daniels did not personally appear at the hearing. The Court 

called Ms. Daniels so that she could appear by telephone conference. Ms. Daniels 

simultaneously requested more time in which to respond to the allegations against 

her in this case and relief from filing any response due to her various medical 

conditions. 

In one last effort to provide Ms. Daniels with the opportunity to file any 

documents or other evidence she may have to contest the FTC's motion for 

summary judgment and the allegations made against her in this case, this Court, by 

Order dated February 22, 2016, granted Ms. Daniels an additional fourteen (14) 

days, to and through March 7, 2016, to file any additional evidence she may have 

in support of her contentions. Order of Feb. 22, 2016 [Doc. 106]. It has been 

nearly three months since that order, and Ms. Daniels has failed to file anything 

further in support of her claims. 

I I . THE FTC'S MOTIO N FOR PERMISSION TQ FILE A MOTIO N 

FOR ENTRY QF DEFAULT JUDGMENT [Doc. 73] 

Prior to filing its motion for summary judgment as to all Defendants, the 

FTC sought permission to file a motion for default judgment against Defendant 

The Primary Group [Doc. 73]. A corporation may not appear in Court unless it is 

represented by counsel. Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit I I Men's Advisory 

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Council 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993); see also LR 81.3E(2)(I), NDGa. ("Ifthe client 

is a corporation, that [] corporation may only be represented in court by an attomey 

. . . ."). This Court on more than one occasion advised Ms. Daniels that she could 

not represent The Primary Group herself and that the Court would release funds to 

enable her to retain an attorney for the corporation. Ms. Daniels has not followed 

up on the Court's direction and has not retained separate counsel for The Primary 

Group. 

However, given that the Court is granting the FTC's Motion for Summary 

Judgment as against The Primary Group and entering a Permanent Injunction 

against all remaining Defendants, and the fact that The Primary Group is in 

essence the alter ego of Ms. Daniels in operating a debt collection business, the 

Court DENIES AS MOO T the FTC's motion for permission to file a motion for 

entry of default judgment as to The Primary Group. See, e.g., SoHs v. Supporting 

Hands, LLC, No. CIV 11-0406 JB/KBM, 2013 WL 1897822, at *11 (D.N.M. Apr. 

30, 2013) (denying as moot motion for default judgment when Court 

simultaneously grants summary judgment against the same party); Waco 

Scaffolding-Columbus v. Kastra Painting, Inc., No. 2:ll-cv-116, 2012 WL 

1229937, at *4 (S.D, Ohio Apr. 12, 2012) (same); Burrell v. James River Bus 

18 

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Lines, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:01CV652, 2002 WL 32366011, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 29, 

2002) (same). 

Ill - MS. DANIELS' MOTIO N FQR THE COURT TO CORRECT ITS 

RULIN G [Doc. 921 

Ms. Daniels' motion filed January 14, 2016 [Doc. 92], seeks two remedies. 

First, she again attempts to have this litigation stayed because of her eye condition 

and prior hospitalizations, attaching the same physician summary letters that were 

attached in previous unsuccessful motions. As stated above, Ms. Daniels has 

provided no medical records accompanied by physician certification that establish 

that she cannot participate in this case by responding to court orders or to the 

FTC's multiple requests for discovery. Second, Ms. Daniels requests that the 

discovery period be reinstated so that she can serve discovery requests upon FTC 

investigator Michael Goldstein. Again, Ms. Daniels has been given numerous 

opportunities to both serve discovery upon the FTC in this case as well as present 

documents supporting her own legal position. 

Consequently, Ms. Daniels' Motion for the Court to Correct Its Ruling [Doc. 

92] is DENIED. 

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I V. T HE FTC'S MOTIO N FOR SUMMAR Y JUDGMENT [Doc. 781 

A. FINDINGS OF FACT^ 

1. Defendant Gail Daniels started the business of The Primary Group under the 

trade name Primary Solutions in 2012 based on a friend's recommendation, 

although she had no prior experience with the business of debt collection. 

Tr. of Prelim. Inj. Hr'g held June 4, 2015 [Doc. 47] ("Tr.") at 141. 

2. On April 25, 2012, Ms. Daniels filed Articles of Incorporation for A Primary 

Systems Group Inc., which entity was incorporated that day by the Georgia 

Secretary of State. Decl. of Michael B. Goldstein, attached as FTC Ex. 

PXOl [Doc. 5-3] ("Goldstein Decl.") Tj 15 & Attach. A. On August 17, 

^ At the outset, the Court notes that, as this case is before the Court on the FTC's 

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court views the evidence presented by the 

parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and has drawn all 

justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matshushita Elec. Indus. 

Co. V. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Sunbeam TV Corp. v. 

Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2013). In addition, 

the Court has excluded assertions of facts by either party that are immaterial or 

presented as arguments or legal conclusions or any fact not supported by citation to 

evidence (including page or paragraph number). LR 56.1B(1), NDGa. Further, the 

Court accepts as admitted those facts in the moving party's statement of material 

facts that have not been specifically controverted with citation to the relevant 

portions of the record by the opposing party. LR 56.1B(2), NDGa. As stated 

above, despite the Court having provided her with numerous opportunities to 

present evidence in this case and to refute the FTC's Statement of Material Facts as 

to Which There is No Genuine Issue to Be Tried [Doc. 78-2], Ms. Daniels has 

declined those opportunities. 

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2012, Ms. Daniels filed a trade name application with Cobb County, 

Georgia, to use the name "Primary Solutions Investigations." Id. 

3. Ms. Daniels has held herself out as the Chief Financial Officer and Secretary 

of The Primary Group and as Manager, Vice President, and Treasurer of The 

Primary Group in applying for corporate bank accounts. Goldstein Decl. 

TITI 16-19, 46 & Attachs. B, D, E, R, & V. Ms. Daniels considers herself as 

the President of the company. Dep. of Gail Daniels taken Oct. 14, 2015 

[Docs. 79-1 & 79-2] ("Daniels Dep.") at 10-11. 

4. Ms. Daniels controlled the finances of The Primary Group and had signatory 

authority over its bank accounts. Goldstein Decl. ^^j 34-62 & Attachs. O-P, 

R, V, & Y-Z. 

5. Ms. Daniels drew approximately $6,500 per month from the revenues of The 

Primary Group as compensation for her personal expenses. Tr. 143, 165-66. 

6. During the operation of The Primary Group, Ms. Daniels was directly 

involved in the financial aspects of the business and in monitoring the 

actions of her employees, including retaining the power to hire and fire 

them, and was kept apprised of problems with the business. Id. at 144-48, 

165. 

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7. Because Ms. Daniels refused to cooperate in responding to discovery 

requests from the FTC, the precise total amount of revenues received by The 

Primary Group is unknown. 

8. During the period from May 28, 2014, until May 14, 2015, it is Icnown that 

The Primary Group's payment processor received revenues of $586,000 for 

processing 8,053 payments. I d at 177-78; Third Supp. Decl. of Michael B. 

Goldstein [Doc. 78-11] ("Third Goldstein Deck") at 1| 5. 

9. Ms. Daniels testified that the revenues of The Primary Group since 2012 

totaled $980,000. Daniels Dep. at 72-73; see also Financial Statement of 

Corporate Def, attached as Ex. 7 to the FTC's Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. 78-

7] at 3. 

10. Although Ms. Daniels also testified that her company refunded monies to 

consumers "all the time," she could not recall how much money was in fact 

refunded to consumers. Daniels Dep. at 71. There is no evidence in the 

record of any consumer refunds. 

11. Ms. Daniels hired a manager with prior debt collection experience who in 

tum employed Cecil Presley ("Mr. Presley") and others as collection agents. 

Tr. 65, 142-43. 

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12. According to Mr. Presley, The Primary Group originally had an office on 

Johnson Ferry Road where there were about four collection agents, but many 

ofthe employees were terminated because of "poor debt collection 

practices." I d at 68, 128-29. 

13. The business then moved to an office on Elkins Road and Mr. Presley was 

promoted to Assistant Manager in charge of the initial and rebuttal scripts 

that were used by approximately eight collection agents who made contact 

with consumers. I d at 129. 

14. Because business was expanding, a move was made to offices at Cambridge 

Square, where there were at least seventeen actual collection agents. Tr. 

129. Once again, some agents were terminated for conducting improper 

collection practices. I d 

15. The Primary Group's collection agents accessed scripts on an electronic 

computer screen for use in conversations with consumers; the hard copies of 

those scripts were found at the company's business premises. I d at 52, 54; 

Second Supp. Decl. of Michael B. Goldstein [Doc. 28-2] ("Second Goldstein 

Decl") TITI9-23. 

16. In none ofthe electronic or hard copy scripts used by collection agents in 

discussions with consumers, nor in any of the digital recordings captured on 

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The Primary Group's computers, was there an identification of The Primary 

Group as a debt collector attempting to collect a debt. Second Goldstein 

Decl. 10-17, 28, 31-35 & Attachs. B, C, & R-T; Decl. of Gailyn 

Portelance [Doc. 78-8] ^ 9. 

The Court has reviewed fourteen declarations of consumers who were 

contacted by representatives of The Primary Group either by telephone or 

through text messages during the period from May 2013 through April 2015. 

Consumer Decls. [Docs. 5-31 through 5-44]. The Court has also reviewed 

the hard copy and electronic scripts and instructions to collection agents 

found at The Primary Group business premises. Second Goldstein Decl., 

Attachs. B-F, L-P, R-X. These declarations and scripts reveal the following 

false and deceptive practices committed by agents of The Primary Group: 

a. Misrepresentations that the representatives of The Primary 

Group are agents, inspectors, investigators, or process servers. 

b. Misrepresentations that the consumer has committed a crime or 

that a pending legal action existed against the consumer. 

c. Misrepresentations conceming the consequences of failing to 

pay a debt, including the threat of civil litigation or criminal 

prosecution. 

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d. Threats made to consumers to have their wages garnished or 

their property seized. 

e. Improper contacts with consumers' family members or third 

parties such as employers or co-workers in an effort to pressure 

the consumers to pay off their alleged debt. 

f. Failure to make required disclosures under the FDCPA, 

including failure to disclose that the caller or texter is 

attempting to collect a debt (or that any information obtained 

will be used for that purpose), and failure to provide the debtor 

with the proper validation notice to verify the existence of the 

debt. 

18. Representatives of The Primary Group were also trained in how to rebut 

inquiries and questions from consumers; the scripts used to do so also 

contained misrepresentations about pending judicial proceedings. Second 

Goldstein Deck, Attachs. B, K, S, T, W. 

19. There is no evidence in the record that The Primary Group ever filed a 

lawsuit against a consumer or had a reasonable basis for claiming that any 

creditor would file such a lawsuit. 

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20. The Primary Group also never provided consumers with written information 

conceming the procedure by which consumers could dispute purported 

debts. 

21. During her testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing, Ms. Daniels 

contended that the majority ofthe consumers who completed sworn 

declarations were lying about the contacts received from The Primary 

Group; however, Ms. Daniels has presented no evidence to contradict those 

declarations during the course of this litigation. 

22. None ofthe consumers who submitted declarations indicated that they 

actually sent funds to The Primary Group for the payment of any debt. 

B. SUMMAR Y JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. " FED. 

R. Crv. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions ofthe 

record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

Mere assertions that the declarations supporting the FTC's motion are not 

credible cannot defeat the FTC's motion for summary judgment. FTC v. Instant 

Resp. Systems, LLC, No. 13 Civ. 00976(ILG)(VMS), 2015 WL 1650914, at *6 

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2015) (citation omitted). 

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fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "Credibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 

inferences from the facts are jury functions," and cannot be made by the district 

court in considering whether to grant summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); see also Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 

Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). 

I f a movant meets its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must 

present evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact or that the 

movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. In 

determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to defeat a motion for 

summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment, "and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn" in 

favor of that opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Herzog v. Castle 

Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). A fact is "material" only ifi t 

can affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the goveming legal principles. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence would 

permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id, 

" I f the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must 

deny the motion and proceed to trial." Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246. But, "[wjhere 

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Case 1:15-cv-01645-MHC Document 112 Filed 05/19/16 Page 27 of 52
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party," summary judgment for the moving party is proper. 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

C. DISCUSSION 

Section 5 ofthe FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 

or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). To establish Section 5 liability, the 

FTC must prove that "(1) there was a representation; (2) the representation was 

likely to mislead customers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the 

representation was material." FTC v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 

2003). 

Because the prirnary purpose of § 5 is to protect the consumer public 

rather than to punish the wrongdoer, the intent to deceive the 

consumer is not an element of a § 5 violation. . . . Instead, the 

"cardinal factor" in determining whether an act or practice is 

deceptive under § 5 is the likely effect the promoter's handiwork will 

have on the mind ofthe ordinary consumer. 

FTC V. Freecom Commc'ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

In enacting the FDCPA, Congress sought "to eliminate abusive debt 

collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who 

refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 

disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against 

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debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The FDCPA applies to "debt 

collectors," defined as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 

commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the 

collection ofany debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or 

indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692a(6). Accordingly, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using "any 

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. In determining whether a debt 

collector's communication is deceptive, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the 

"least-sophisticated consumer" standard "to ensure that the FDCPA protects all 

consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd." LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 

601 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). A violation ofthe 

FDCPA is deemed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of the FTC 

Act. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 577 

(2010). 

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act provides that "in proper cases the [FTC] may 

seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction" for 

violations of "any provision oflaw enforced by the FTC." 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 

Even if a defendant's unlawful conduct has ceased, a permanent injunction may 

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still be appropriate "i f the defendant's past conduct indicates that there is a 

reasonable likelihood of further violations in the future." FTC v. USA Fin., LLC, 

415 F. App'x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The injunction must 

bear a reasonable relation to the defendant's unlawful practices. Litton Indus., Inc. 

V. FTC, 676 F.2d 364, 370 (9th Cir. 1982). 

After a careful review ofthe record evidence in this case, it is clear that the 

overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence establishes as a matter oflaw that Ms. 

Daniels, through The Primary Group, made material false and deceptive 

representations likely to mislead consumers about the nature of the debts allegedly 

owed to creditors and failed to provide consumers with disclosures required under 

the FDCPA. The evidence supporting the entry of a permanent injunction to bar 

The Primary Group and Ms. Daniels from participating in the debt collection 

business is undisputed. 

The monetary penalty requested by the FTC in this case is $980,000, the 

total amount of revenues Ms. Daniels has admitted The Primary Group received in 

this case. The Court notes that the FTC has presented no evidence of even one 

consumer who actually remitted funds to The Primary Group for the payment of 

monies owed to creditors and whose debts were not reduced or paid off. The Court 

expressed its concem about the absence of evidence on the monetary penalty issue 

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at the preUminary injunction hearing to the FTC's counsel, who responded that the 

FTC was still developing evidence in this regard. See Tr. 25-27. Indeed, none of 

the fourteen consumers who submitted declarations in this case complain of any 

personal funds sent to The Primary Group and the Court assumes that, if there were 

additional complaints filed against Defendants by consumers who lost money 

through funds transmitted to Defendants, the FTC would have brought this to the 

Court's attention. 

Nevertheless, this Court is well aware that the FTC's efforts at further 

exploration ofthe monetary harm imposed upon consumers based upon Ms. 

Daniels' unlawful conduct were thwarted in substantial part by her unwillingness 

to participate in discovery. Moreover, given Ms. Daniels' representation in her 

deposition that all ofthe corporate documents have "disappeared," Daniels Dep. at 

115, the failure to award monetary relief as a part of any permanent injunction 

would permit Defendants to profit from their own misconduct and their failure to 

retain or identify relevant documents. In addition, given Ms. Daniels' failure to 

comply with the preliminary injunction order for a full accounting of assets outside 

the United States, it is unknown whether all accounts that may have revenue from 

the business of The Primary Group have been located. 

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The Eleventh Circuit has held that the district court's range of equitable 

powers under section 13(b) of the FTC Act includes the power to grant both 

restitution and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. FTC v. Gem Merchandising 

Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996). The purpose of disgorgement is "not to 

compensate the victims of fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten 

gain." I d at 470 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Ch. 1978)).^^ 

"We conclude that section 13(b) permits a district court to order a defendant to 

disgorge illegally obtained fiinds. To hold otherwise would permit a defendant to 

retain such funds simply by keeping poor records. Such a result would permit 

unjust enrichment and undermine the deterrence function of section 13(b)." I d 

In FTC V. Washington Data Resources, Inc., 704 F.Sd 1323 (11th Cir. 2013), 

the Eleventh Circuit adopted the holding of a number of other circuits that have 

found a damages award based upon net revenue rather than profit proper under 

section lS(b). 

We agree with our sister circuits and today hold that the amount of net 

revenue (gross receipts minus refunds) rather than the amount of 

profit (net revenue minus expenses) is the correct measure of unjust 

gains under section lS(b). We echo the Second Circuit's sentiment 

In Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), 

the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

rendered prior to October 1, 1981. 

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that "defendants in a disgorgement action are not entitled to deduct 

costs associated with committing their illegal acts." 

I d at 1327 (quoting FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.Sd 359, 375 (2d Ch. 

201D); see also FTC v. Direct Mlcg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.Sd 1, 14-16 (1st Cir. 

2010); FTC v. Kuykendall, 371 F.Sd 745, 765-67 (10th Ch. 2004); FTC v. Febre, 

128 F.2d 530, 536 (7th Cir. 1997). Therefore, based upon precedent in this Circuit, 

the Court will order judgment against Defendants in the amount of $980,000, 

which represents the amount of known revenue received by Defendants as a result 

of their illegal activity. 

Accordingly, this Court GRANTS the FTC's Motion for Summary 

Judgment [Doc. 78] and enters a Permanent Injunction against Defendants The 

Primary Group and Gail Daniels as set forth in detail below. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, for the above reasons, I T IS HEREBY ORDERED as 

follows: 

(1) The FTC's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Default Judgment 

[Doc. 73] is DENIED AS MOOT; 

Given the entry of a Permanent Injunction, the FTC's Fourth Motion to Extend 

the Preliminary Injunction [Doc. UO] is DENIED AS MOOT. 

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Case 1:15-cv-01645-MHC Document 112 Filed 05/19/16 Page 33 of 52
(2) Ms. Daniels' Motion for the Court to Correct Its Ruling [Doc. 92] is 

DENIED; 

(3) The FTC's Fourth Motion to Extend the Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 

110] is DENIED AS MOOT; 

(4) The FTC's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 78] as to former 

Defendant June Fleming is DENIED AS MOOT; and 

(5) The FTC's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 78] as to Defendants 

The Primary Group and Gail Daniels is GRANTED, and the 

following PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND EQUITABLE 

RELIEF shall issue forthwith against Defendants The Primary Group 

and Gail Daniels: 

PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF 

DEFINITIONS 

For the purposes of this Order, the following definitions shall apply: 

A. "Consumer" means any person. 

B. "Debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation to pay money 

arising out of a transaction, whether or not such obligation has been 

reduced to judgment. 

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C. "Debt collection activities" means any activities of a debt collector to 

collect or attempt to collect, directly or indirectly, a debt owed or due, 

or asserted to be owed or due, another. 

D. "Debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of 

interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose 

of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or 

attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 

asserted to be owed or due another. The term also includes any 

creditor who, in the process of collecting its own debts, uses any name 

other than its own which would indicate that a third person is 

collecting or attempting to collect such debts. The term also includes 

any person to the extent such person receives an assignment or 

transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating 

collection of such debt. 

E. "Defendants" means The Primary Group and Gail Daniels, 

individually, collectively, or in combination. 

F. "Financial-related product or service" means any product, 

service, plan, or program represented, expressly or by 

implication, to: 

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1. provide any consumer, arrange for any consumer to 

receive, or assist any consumer in receiving, an 

extension of consumer credit; 

2. provide any consumer, arrange for any consumer to 

receive, or assist any consumer in receiving, credit 

repair services; or 

3. provide any consumer, arrange for any consumer to 

receive, or assist any consumer in receiving, any 

secured or unsecured debt relief product or service. 

G. "FTC" means the Federal Trade Commission. 

H. "Person" means a natural person, an organization or other legal 

entity, including a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, 

limited liability company, association, cooperative, or any other group 

or combination acting as an entity. 

I. "Secured or unsecured debt relief product or service" means, with 

respect to any mortgage, loan, debt, or obligation between a person 

and one or more secured or unsecured creditors or debt collectors, any 

product, service, plan, or program represented, expressly or by 

implication, to; 

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1. negotiate, settle, or in any way alter the tenns of payment or 

other terms of the mortgage, loan, debt, or obligation, including 

but not limited to, a reduction in the amount of interest, 

principal balance, monthly payments, or fees owed by a person 

to a secured or unsecured creditor or debt collector; 

2. stop, prevent, or postpone any mortgage or deed of foreclosure 

sale for a person's dwelling, any other sale or olher collateral, 

or otherwise save a person's dwelling or other collateral from 

foreclosure or repossession; 

3. obtain any forbearance or modification in the timing of 

payments from any secured or unsecured holder of any 

mortgage, loan, debt, or obligation; 

4. negotiate, obtain, or arrange any extension of the period of time 

within which the person may 

(a) cure his or her default on the mortgage, loan, debt, or 

obligation; 

(b) reinstate his or her mortgage, loan, debt, or obligation; 

(c) redeem a dwelling or other collateral; or 

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(d) exercise any right to reinstate the mortgage, loan, debt, or 

obligation or redeem a dwelling or other collateral; 

5. obtain any waiver of an acceleration clause or balloon payment 

contained in any promissory note or contract secured by any 

dwelling or other collateral; or 

6. negotiate, obtain, or arrange 

(a) a short sale of a dwelling or other collateral; 

(b) a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure; or 

(c) any other disposition of a mortgage, loan, debt, or 

obligation other than a sale to a third party that is not the 

secured, or unsecured loan holder. 

The foregoing shall include any manner of claimed assistance, 

including, but not limited to, auditing or examining a person's 

application for the mortgage, loan, debt, or obligation. 

ORDER 

A. BAN ON DEBT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES 

I T IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants, whether acting directly 

through any other person, are permanently restrained and enjoined from: 

1. Participating in debt collection activities; and 

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2. Advertismg, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, selling, or 

buying, any consumer or commercial debt or any consumer 

information relating to a debt. 

B. PROHIBITED REPRESENTATIONS 

IT IS FURTHE R ORDERED that Defendants and their officers, agents, 

employees, and attorneys, and those persons or entities in active concert or 

participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this Order by personal 

service, facsimile transmission, email, or otherwise, whether acting directly or 

through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with 

the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale or sale of any financialrelated product or service, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from: 

1. Misrepresenting or assisting others in misrepresenting, 

expressly or by implication, any material fact, including but not 

hmited to: 

a. The terms or rates that are available for any loan or other 

extension of credit; 

b. Any person's ability to improve or otherwise affect a 

consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit rating 

or ability to obtain credit; 

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That any person can improve any consumer's credit 

record, credit history, or credit rating by permanently 

removing negative information from the consumer's 

credit record, credit history, or credit rating, even where 

such information is accurate and not obsolete; 

Any aspect of any secured or unsecured debt relief 

product of service, including but not limited to, the 

amount of savings a consumer will receive from 

purchasing, using, or enrolling in such secured or 

unsecured debt relief product or service; the amount of 

time before which a consumer will receive settlement of 

the consumer's debts; or the reduction or cessation of 

collection calls; 

That a consumer will receive legal representation; 

T hat a particular outcome or result from a financialrelated product or service is guaranteed, assured, highly 

likely or probable, or very likely or probable; 

The nature or terms of any refund, cancellation, 

exchange, or repurchase policy, including, but not limited 

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to, the hkehhood of a consumer obtaining a full or partial 

refund, or the circumstances in which a full or partial 

refhnd will be provided to the consumer; and 

h. Any other fact material to consumers concerning any 

financial-related product or service, such as: the total 

costs; any material restrictions, limitations, or conditions; 

or any material aspect of its performance, efficacy, nature 

or central characteristics; and 

2. Advertising or assisting others in advertising credit terms other 

than those terms that actually are or will be arranged or offered 

by a creditor or lender. 

C. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCLOSING CONSUMMER 

INFORMATIO N 

I T IS FURTHE R ORDERE D that Defendants and their officers, agents, 

employees, and attorneys, and those persons or entities in active concert or 

participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this Order by personal 

service, facsimile transmission, email, or otherwise, whether acting directly or 

through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, are permanently 

restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly: 

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1. Failing to provide sufficient consumer information to enable the 

FTC to administer efficiently consumer redress. I f a 

representative of the FTC requests in writing any information 

related to redress, Defendants must provide it, in the form 

prescribed by the FTC, within fourteen (14) days. 

2. Disclosing, using, or benefitting from consumer infomiation, 

including the name, address, telephone number, email address, 

social security number, other identifying information, or any 

data that enables access to a customer's account (including a 

credit card, bank account, or other financial account) of any 

person that any Defendant obtained prior to entry of this Order 

in connection with the collection of attempted collection of any 

debt. 

3. Failing to destroy such consumer information in all forms in 

their possession, custody, or control within thirty (30) days after 

receipt of written direction to do so from a representative ofthe 

FTC. 

4. Provided, however, that consumer information need not be 

disposed of, and may be disclosed, to the extent requested by a 

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govemment agency or required by a law, regulation, or court 

order. 

D. MONETAR Y RELIEF 

I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment in the amount of nine 

hundred eighty thousand dollars ($980,000.00) is entered in favor of the FTC and 

against Defendants The Primary Group and Gail Daniels, jointly and severally, as 

equitable monetary relief, with post-judgment interest at the legal rate. 

The monetary judgment set forth in Section II.D is enforceable against any 

asset owned jointly by, on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in trust by or for, any 

Defendant, whether held as tenants in common, joint tenants with or without the 

right of survivorship, tenants by the entirety, and or community property. 

A l l money paid pursuant to this Order shall be deposited into a fund 

administered by the FTC or its agents to be used for equitable relief, including, but 

not limited to, consumer redress, and any attendant expenses for the administration 

of any redress fund. If a representative ofthe FTC decides that direct redress to 

consumers is wholly or partially impracticable or money remains after redress is 

completed, the FTC may apply any remaining money for such other equitable 

relief (including consumer information remedies) as it determines to be reasonably 

related to Defendants' practices alleged in the Complaint. Any funds not used for 

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such equitable relief shall be deposited to the United States Treasury as equitable 

disgorgement. Defendants shall have no right to challenge the FTC's choice of 

remedies under this Section and shall have no right to contest the manner of 

distribution chosen by the FTC. 

The judgment entered pursuant to this Section is equitable monetary relief, 

solely remedial in nature, and not a fme, penalty, punitive assessment, or forfeiture. 

Defendants are hereby required, unless they have done so already, to fumish 

the FTC with their taxpayer identifying number and/or social security number, 

which may be used for collecting and reporting on any delinquent amount arising 

out of this Order, in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 7701. 

E. ORDER ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants obtain aclmowledgments of 

receipt of this Order as follows: 

1. Defendant Gail Daniels, within seven (7) days of entry ofthis 

Order, must submit to the FTC an acknowledgment of receipt 

ofthis Order sworn under penalty of perjury. 

2. For ten (10) years after entry of this Order, Defendant Gail 

Daniels, for any business that such Defendant, individually or 

collectively with any other person, is the majority owner or 

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controls directly or indirectly, and Defendant The Primary 

Group, must deliver a copy of this Order to: (1) all principals, 

officers, directors, and LLC managers and members; (2) all 

employees, agents, and representatives who participate in 

conduct related to the subject matter of this Order; and (3) any 

business entity resulting from any change in structure as set 

forth in the Section titled Compliance Reporting. Delivery 

must occur within seven (7) days of entry of this Order for 

current personnel. For all others, delivery must occur before 

they assume their responsibilities. 

3. From each individual or entity to which Defendants deliver a 

copy of this Order, Defendants must obtain, within thirty (30) 

days, a signed and dated acknowledgment of receipt of this 

Order. 

F. COMPLIANCE REPORTING 

I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants make timely submissions to 

FTC: 

1. One year after entry of this Order, each Defendant must submit 

a compliance report, swom under penalty of perjury. 

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Defendant The Primary Group must: (i) identify the 

primary pliysical, postal, and email address and telephone 

number, as designated points of contact, which 

representatives of the FTC may use to communicate with 

such Defendant; (ii) identify all of that Defendant's 

businesses by all of their names, telephone numbers, and 

physical, postal, email, and Intemet addresses; (iii) 

describe the activities of each business, including the 

products and services offered, the means of advertising, 

marketing, and sales, and the involvement of such 

Defendant; (iv) describe in detail whether and how such 

Defendant is in compliance with each Section of this 

Order; and (v) provide a copy of each Order 

Acknowledgment obtained pursuant to this Order, unless 

previously submitted to the FTC; 

Additionally, Defendant Gail Daniels must: (i) identify 

all telephone numbers and physical, postal, email, and 

Internet addresses, including all residences, which 

representatives of the FTC may use to communicate with 

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such Defendant; (ii) identify all business activities, 

including any business for which Defendant Daniels 

performs services whether as an employee or otherwise 

and any entity in which Defendant Daniels has any 

ownership interest; and describe in detail Defendant 

Daniels' involvement in each such business, including 

title, role, responsibilities, participation, authority, 

control, and any ownership. 

For ten (10) years after entry of this Order, Defendant Daniels 

must submit a compliance notice, swom under penalty of 

perjury, within fourteen (14) days of any change in the 

following: 

a. Defendant Daniels must report any change in (i) any 

designated point of contact; or (2) the structure of The 

Primary Group or any entity that Defendant Daniels has 

any ownership interest in or directly or indirectly controls 

that may affect compliance obligations arising under this 

Order, including: creation, merger, sale, or dissolution of 

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the entity or any subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that 

engages in any acts or practices subject to this Order, 

b. Additionally, Defendant Daniels must report any change 

in: (i) name, including aliases or fictitious name, or 

residence address; or (ii) title or role in any business 

activity, including any business for which Defendant 

Daniels performs services whether as an employee or 

otherwise and any entity in which Defendant Daniels has 

any ownership interest, and identify its name, physical 

address, and Intemet address, if any. 

3. Each Defendant must submit to the FTC notice of the filing of 

any bankruptcy petition, insolvency proceeding, or any similar 

proceeding by or against it within fourteen (14) days of its 

filing. 

4. Any submission to the FTC required by this Order to be swom 

under penalty of perjury must be true and accurate and comply 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, such as by concluding: " I declare under 

penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of 

America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed 

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on: " and supplying tlie date, signatory's fnll name, 

title (if applicable), and signature. 

5. Unless otherwise directed by a FTC representative in writing, 

all submissions to the FTC pursuant to this Order must be 

emailed to DEbrief@ftc,gov or sent by overnight courier (not 

the U.S. Postal Service) to: Associate Director for Enforcement, 

Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20580. The 

subject line must begin: FTC v. The Primary Group, et al, FTC 

Matter No. XI50046. 

G. RECORDKEEPING 

I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that each Defendant must create certain 

records for ten (10) years after entry ofthe Order, and retain each such record for 

five (5) years. Specifically, Defendant The Primary Group and Defendant Gail 

Daniels, for any business in which Defendant Daniels is a majority owner or 

directly or indirectly controls, must maintain the following records: 

1. Accounting records showing the revenues from all products or 

services sold, all costs incurred in generating those revenues, 

and the resulting net profit or loss; 

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2. Personnel records showing, for each person providing services, 

whether as an employee or otherwise, that person's: name, 

addresses, and telephone numbers; job title or position; dates of 

service; and, if applicable, the reason for termination; 

3. Records of all consumer complaints and refund requests, 

whether received directly or indirectly, such as through a third 

party, and any response; 

4. Al l records necessary to demonstrate full compliance with each 

provision of this Order, including all submissions to the FTC; 

and 

5. A copy of each unique advertisement or other marketing 

material. 

H . COMPLIANCE MONITORIN G 

I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purpose of monitoring 

Defendants' compliance with this Order: 

1. Within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a written request from a 

representative of the FTC, Defendant Daniels must: submit 

additional compliance reports or other requesied information, 

which must be swom under penalty of perjury; appear for 

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depositions; and produce documents, for inspection and 

copying. The FTC is also authorized to obtain discovery, 

without ftirther leave of court, using any ofthe procedures 

prescribed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 29, 30 

(including telephonic depositions), 31, 33, 34, 36, 45, and 69. 

2. For matters concerning this Order, the FTC is authorized to 

communicate directly with Defendant Daniels. Defendant 

Daniels must permit representatives ofthe FTC to interview 

any employee or other person affiliated with The Primary 

Group or Defendant Daniels who has agreed to such an 

interview. The person interviewed may have counsel present, 

3. The FTC may use all other lawful means, including posing, 

through its representatives, as consumers, suppliers, or other 

individuals or entities, to Defendants or any individual or entity 

affiliated with Defendants, without the necessity of 

identification or prior notice. Nothing in this Order limits the 

FTC's lawful use of compulsory process, pui-suant to Sections 9 

and 20 ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.C, §§ 49, 57b-l, 

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4. Upon written request from a representative of the FTC, any 

consumer reporting agency must furnish consumer reports 

conceming Defendant Daniels, pursuant to Section 604(1) of 

the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(l). 

I. ENTR Y OF JUDGMEN T 

IT IS FURTHE R ORDERE D that there is no just reason for delay of entry 

of this judgment, and that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the 

Clerk immediately shall enter this Order as a fmal judgment as to Defendants The 

Primary Group and Gail Daniels. 

J . RETENTIO N O F JURISDICTION AND CLOSUR E O F CASE 

FIL E 

IT IS FURTHE R ORDERE D that this Court retains jurisdiction of this 

matter for purposes of constmction, modification, and enforcement of this Order. 

The Clerk is DIRECTE D to close the fde of this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERE D this A ^da y of May, 2016. 

MAR K H. COHEN 

United States District Judge 

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