UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-5091

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

BRIAN DEAN SOLES, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., 

Senior District Judge. (1:00-cr-00285-NCT-2) 

Submitted: June 4, 2009 Decided: July 2, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Richard L. Cannon, III, CANNON LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Greenville, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Brian Dean Soles pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to one count of bank robbery, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) and was sentenced 

in February 2001 to 32 months’ imprisonment followed by three 

years of supervised release. Soles began serving his term of 

supervised release on December 20, 2002. On December 19, 2005, 

the date on which Soles’ term of supervised release was set to 

expire, a petition was filed in the district court alleging a 

violation of supervised release. Soles had been arrested and 

taken into custody on state charges in North Carolina, and a 

federal detainer was lodged with state authorities. Soles, 

however, was not arrested by the United States Marshal’s Service 

until August 20, 2007. After a hearing on September 20, 2007, 

the district court revoked Soles’ supervised release and 

sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment and twenty-four 

months’ supervised release. 

 On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel questions, 

however, whether Soles was entitled to a hearing under Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1 promptly after his arrest in North Carolina and 

whether the twenty-one-month period of time between Soles’ 

December 2005 arrest and the September 2007 revocation hearing 

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violated Soles’ constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy 

trial. Counsel also questions whether the district court should 

have awarded Soles sentencing credit for 506 days he spent in 

state custody and questions whether Soles’ sentence upon 

revocation is plainly unreasonable. We affirm. 

 We review for plain error counsel’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32.1 claim and the claims of constitutional and statutory speedy 

trial violations because Soles did not raise these issues in the 

district court. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). We discern no plain error. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 applies only to those in custody solely 

for the violation of their supervised release. See United 

States v. Pardue, 363 F.3d 695, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Further, the Rule is only triggered when the defendant is taken 

into federal custody for the violation of his supervised 

release. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A). Soles 

was not taken into federal custody for a violation of his 

supervised release until August 20, 2007, and we conclude that 

the month-long period between Soles’ federal arrest and the 

revocation hearing was reasonable. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(b)(2). 

 Additionally, Soles had no Sixth Amendment right to a 

speedy trial because supervised release revocation proceedings 

are not stages of a criminal prosecution. See United States v. 

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Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. 

House, 501 F.3d 928, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. 

Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United 

States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 

‘full panoply of rights’ due a defendant in a criminal 

prosecution does not apply to revocation hearings for parole, 

for probation, or for supervised release.” (citations omitted)); 

United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 491-92 (1st Cir. 2005) 

(Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial does not extend to 

supervised release revocation proceedings). 

 Counsel’s claim of Speedy Trial Act error is likewise 

without merit. The Speedy Trial Act provides, in relevant part, 

that any “information or indictment charging an individual with 

the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days 

from the date on which such individual was arrested or served 

with a summons in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). However, the “goal of the 

Speedy Trial Act is to mandate an orderly and expeditious 

procedure for federal criminal prosecutions by fixing specific, 

mechanical time limits within which the various progressions in 

the prosecution must occur.” United States v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 

425, 427 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted) (emphasis added). As supervised release revocation 

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proceedings are not stages in the criminal prosecution, the 

Speedy Trial Act has no applicability to them. 

 Counsel also questions whether the district court 

should have awarded Soles sentencing credit for 506 days he 

spent in state custody. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2006), a 

“defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of 

imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention 

prior to the date the sentence commences.” Section 3585(b), 

however, does not permit a district court to determine credit at 

sentencing. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992). 

Rather, only the Attorney General, through the Bureau of 

Prisons, may compute sentencing credit. Id. at 334-35. 

Therefore, as counsel correctly concedes, the district court was 

without authority to order the Bureau of Prisons to give Soles 

credit for time he served in North Carolina. Moreover, at the 

revocation hearing, the government’s attorney indicated that 

Soles may have received credit against his state sentence for 

the time he spent in state custody. If so, Soles was not 

entitled to have credit already applied to his state sentence 

counted a second time and applied to his federal sentence for 

violating the terms of his supervised release. See McClain v. 

Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993). 

 Counsel questions whether Soles’ sentence upon 

revocation is plainly unreasonable. We will affirm a sentence 

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imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within 

the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly 

unreasonable. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first assess the sentence for 

unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and 

substantive considerations that we employ in our review of 

original sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to 

take into account the unique nature of supervised release 

revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39. If we conclude that a 

sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm the sentence. Id.

at 439. Only if a sentence is found procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable will we “decide whether the sentence 

is plainly unreasonable.” Id. 

 A supervised release revocation sentence is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the 

Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors that it is permitted to consider in a 

supervised release revocation case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Such a sentence is substantively 

reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for 

concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up 

to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. A sentence 

is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously 

unreasonable. Id. at 439. 

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 Soles’ 12-month prison sentence and 24-month period of 

supervised release do not exceed the applicable maximums set by 

statute, and the district court properly calculated the advisory 

policy statement range and sentenced Soles within that range. 

Because the district court did not explain why it imposed a 

twelve-month prison sentence, the sentence is at least arguably 

unreasonable. However, we easily conclude that Soles’ sentence 

is not “plainly” unreasonable because the sentence was within 

the recommended policy statement range and the record does not 

contain any basis upon which to conclude that the imposed 

sentence is clearly or obviously unreasonable. 

 Finally, we cannot review counsel’s claim that the 

district court erred by imposing the 36-month term of supervised 

release in Soles’ original sentencing, as we lack jurisdiction 

to examine the original sentencing proceeding in which the 36-

month term was imposed. See United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 

115, 117-18 (4th Cir. 1998). If Soles found the term 

objectionable, he should have raised this claim on direct 

appeal. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Soles, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

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review. If Soles requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Soles. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED