Filed 7/2/14 Castellon v. Balbigy CA2/8 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION EIGHT 

JUDITH CASTELLON, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

NADER BALBIGY; 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B245122 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. LD062461) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Steff Padilla, Christine Ewell and Virginia Keeny, Judges. Affirmed. 

Nader Balbigy, in pro per, Appellant. 

 No appearance by Respondent. 

__________________________ 
2 

 Nader Balbigy appeals from the family law court’s domestic violence restraining 

order that prohibited him from having contact with his wife and children. We affirm that 

order. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 On August 10, 2012, the trial court issued a domestic violence restraining order 

against Nader Balbigy in connection with the marital dissolution proceeding brought by 

his wife, Judith Castellon. Distilled, that order commanded Balbigy to refrain from 

contacting, stalking, or harassing Castellon and their three children. 

 At the hearing on Castellon’s application for that order, Balbigy admitted that he 

was already subject to a restraining order that resulted from his earlier no contest plea to a 

criminal domestic violence charge. The trial court reviewed the criminal court’s 

restraining order and pointed out that the criminal court had not checked off the box that 

would have allowed Balbigy to have contact with his children. 

 Castellon claimed that Balbigy had, in violation of the criminal court restraining 

order, contacted the children to say negative things about her and pressure them into 

living with him, stalked her on Facebook through a fictional identity, checked up on her 

eBay activities, and had threatened to harm three of her relatives. Balbigy admitted that 

he had contacted his children by phone and in person, had been following Castellon on 

Facebook, obtained records of her cell phone activity because his name was on the 

account, examined her eBay activities, and secretly recorded a conversation he had with 

her. 

 Castellon said she wanted an order that would allow Balbigy to see the children 

during monitored visits with a therapist in order to address the emotional abuse they 

suffered from his conduct. The trial court granted the restraining order and was in the 

process of awarding visitation on that basis when Balbigy interrupted and said he did not 

want visitation. The trial court said it was “sorry for your children because they love 

you.” The trial court then issued a five-year restraining order against Balbigy that 

applied to his wife and children. 
3 

DISCUSSION

 Under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (Fam. Code, § 6200, et seq.), the 

family law court can issue restraining orders either ex parte or after notice and a hearing 

to enjoin a party from, among other things, stalking, threatening, harassing, making 

annoying phone calls, contacting, or disturbing the peace of the other party and, if 

applicable, their family or household members. (Fam. Code, §§ 6320, 6340.) We review 

the trial court’s order under the abuse of discretion standard and examine the record to 

determine whether the order is supported by substantial evidence. (Burquet v. 

Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143.) 

 We recognize that Balbigy has represented himself throughout these proceedings, 

but he is still bound to follow the rules and principles that govern the presentation of facts 

and arguments in appellate briefs. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-

1247.) These include: presenting the facts fully and completely, and not in a one-sided 

manner; providing an adequate record that permits meaningful appellate review; and 

making cogent and intelligible arguments that cite both the record and applicable legal 

authority. (Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1374.)1

Balbigy has, for the most part, failed to meet these obligations. His opening 

appellate brief consists primarily of a one-sided attempt to reargue the facts that led to his 

domestic violence conviction and to discredit Castellon’s fitness as a mother through 

charges of infidelity and other misconduct. He does not offer by way of citation to 

authority or otherwise any meaningful legal argument why the trial court erred. The most 

we can discern from his brief is the contention that the family law restraining order was 

based on the fact that the criminal court’s restraining order mistakenly excluded him from 

seeing his children, an error that he contends was corrected eight months after the family 

law restraining order was issued. 

 

1 Castellon’s failure to file a respondent’s brief does not relieve Balbigy of these 

obligations. (Burquet v. Brumbaugh, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141, fn. 1.) 
4 

This contention suffers from several defects. First, neither the original criminal 

law restraining order nor the supposed modified order is in the appellate record, 

precluding meaningful appellate review. Second, it does not acknowledge that the trial 

court had an independent evidentiary basis for its order based on Castellon’s evidence 

and Balbigy’s admissions concerning the nature and extent of his conduct in regard to 

both Castellon and his children. Finally, the purported modification or clarification of the 

criminal law restraining order occurred long after the family law restraining order issued, 

and we review the trial court’s ruling based on matters before it at the time of the hearing. 

(Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2.)2

DISPOSITION

The family law court’s restraining order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her 

costs on appeal. 

 RUBIN, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

 BIGELOW, P. J. 

 FLIER, J. 

 

2 To the extent the trial court might have relied on the criminal law restraining 

order, Balbigy is free to seek modification of that order based on changed circumstances. 

(Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) We also note that during oral argument Balbigy referred 

to other family law proceedings in this case. Those matters were not before us and we 

express no opinion concerning their effect or ultimate disposition should they be 

appealed.