NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

EDWARD JAMES YOUNG, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0416

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201500836

The Honorable Steven F. Conn, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Alice Jones

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Defender’s Office, Kingman

By Eric Devany

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Maurice Portley1 joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Edward James Young appeals his convictions and 

sentences for possession of dangerous drugs for sale (methamphetamine),

a class 2 felony under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-

3407(A)(2) (Supp. 2016), possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony

under A.R.S. § 13-3415(A) (2010), and endangerment, a class 6 felony under 

A.R.S. § 13-1201(A) (2010).

2 On appeal, he raises various challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his possession and endangerment 

convictions. We reject these arguments, and affirm his convictions and 

sentences. 

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Possession Convictions

¶2 Young first argues the State presented insufficient evidence 

to support his convictions on the possession counts because, first, the police 

did not find any methamphetamine on him or in his car, nor were his

fingerprints found on the plastic bags containing the methamphetamine, 

and, second, aside from evidence regarding the weight of the 

methamphetamine, the State failed to present any other evidence 

demonstrating he had possessed methamphetamine for sale, such as “a 

scale, a ledger, or cash.” Applying de novo review, we reject both 

arguments. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011)

 

1The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Court 

of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2The jury also convicted Young of unlawful flight from 

pursuing law enforcement vehicle, a class 5 felony. He does not, however, 

challenge that conviction on appeal. 
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

3

(appellate court reviews trial court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion de novo and 

in light most favorable to sustaining the verdict) (citation omitted).

¶3 A motion for a judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 20 is appropriate only if no substantial evidence 

warrants a conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20; see West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16, 

250 P.3d at 1191 (substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons 

could accept as sufficient to support conclusion of a defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt). In reviewing a Rule 20 motion, the question is 

whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16, 250 

P.3d at 1191. Substantial evidence can be both direct and circumstantial. Id.

¶4 Here, the State presented substantial evidence Young 

possessed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. As discussed in 

more detail below, after Young failed to stop for a traffic stop, Detectives

J.V. and D.S. pursued Young by car until Young crashed his car. See infra

¶¶ 10-11. Young then got out of his car and ran away from the Detectives. 

Detective J.V. chased Young on foot, and Detective D.S. followed Young by 

car and then also chased Young by foot. Both detectives testified that while 

Young was running away they saw him “throw” an object, which Detective 

J.V. testified “was like throwing a baseball from the outfield to home plate.”

After the detectives arrested Young and drove him to the police station they 

returned and searched the area where Young had thrown the object. They 

then discovered plastic bags of methamphetamine on the roof of a house, 

weighing a total of 38 grams. Detective J.V. also testified that, in his 

experience, people do not “stash” drugs on a rooftop and he had previously

chased other people who have “thrown their drugs, discarded their drugs 

on the roof of a residence.”

¶5 Although Young’s fingerprints were not found on any of the 

plastic bags containing the methamphetamine, the forensic scientist who 

examined the bags for fingerprints explained that obtaining fingerprints 

from plastic bags was difficult. The forensic scientist testified that the size 

of the bags, the thickness of the plastic, and the nature of the substance in 

the bag could “inhibit” the chance of finding a fingerprint. She then 

explained that in this case, the condition of the bags along with the nature 

of the substance contained in the bags made it “much less likely” to find 

any fingerprints.

¶6 Given the foregoing evidence, a reasonable jury could have 

found Young had possessed the methamphetamine and paraphernalia

even though the detectives found the bag of methamphetamine on a 
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

4

rooftop, and despite the absence of fingerprints. See A.R.S. § 13-105(34)

(Supp. 2016) (“’Possess’ means knowingly to have physical possession or 

otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property.”).

¶7 Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s finding that 

Young possessed the methamphetamine for sale. Sergeant B.H., a 

supervisor in the narcotics unit who worked on drug sales investigations 

for over six years, testified about drug sales. He explained that finding

scales, a “pay/owe ledger,” and cash in a drug sales investigation did not 

make it “more likely” he was dealing with a drug sales case in contrast to 

sales cases in which he had found only methamphetamine. Detective B.H.

also testified that “extra baggies” are an indicator of possession for sale and, 

further, it was common for persons to both use and sell methamphetamine. 

His testimony thus undercut Young’s claim the methamphetamine was for 

personal use only. Additionally, Detective J.V. testified the largest bag of 

methamphetamine they found on the roof weighed 28 grams, a saleable 

amount, and the bags collectively amounted to “three eightballs” also a 

“commonly sold amount.”

¶8 As Young points out, some of the circumstances that support 

a conviction for possession of drugs for sale (such as a scale, a ledger, or 

cash) were not present here, nonetheless, as discussed, see supra ¶¶ 6-7, 

substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding he possessed the 

methamphetamine for sale. See State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 221, 223-24, ¶¶ 

11-15, 245 P.3d 906, 908-09 (App. 2011) (sufficient evidence supported 

conviction for sale of methamphetamine even though evidence was also 

consistent with possession for personal use; substantial evidence “is not 

insubstantial simply because reasonable persons might have drawn a 

different conclusion from the evidence”); State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 

778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989) (on a review of the sufficiency of evidence 

appellate court will not reweigh the evidence).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Endangerment Conviction

¶9 Finally, Young argues the State presented insufficient 

evidence that he endangered another person pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

1201(A) (2010). Specifically, he argues “even though the [S]tate presented 

evidence of [his] driving behavior and the circumstances of the alleged 

chase, its evidence was insufficient as to show that ‘another person’ . . . 

identified or not—was actually present and was subject to a substantial risk 

of imminent death or physical injury.” We disagree.
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

5

¶10 Under A.R.S. § 13-1201(A), “[a] person commits 

endangerment by recklessly endangering another person with a substantial 

risk of imminent death or physical injury.” This requires that another 

person be placed in an “actual” substantial risk of death or physical injury. 

State v. Doss, 192 Ariz. 408, 411, ¶ 7, 966 P.2d 1012, 1015 (App. 1998). Here, 

the State presented substantial evidence Young had recklessly endangered 

“another person.” Detectives D.S. and J.V. testified that after they attempted 

to execute a traffic stop, Young sped away and drove through a stop sign.

Detective D.S. further testified Young started “veering around other 

motorists” in a business district and passed a motorist on the right side even 

though there was no lane to the right of the motorist.

¶11 Then, as Young was fleeing southbound he passed a van, also 

driving south, by driving “head-on” towards another car into the 

northbound lane—and Detective J.V. testified the other car “had to stop to 

avoid being struck by [Young’s] vehicle.” The detectives briefly lost sight 

of Young after he drove through a four-way stop sign traveling at about 65 

miles per hour but regained sight of him when he “collided into [a] 

makeshift rock wall” at a home occupied by a woman and her son.

¶12 Young argues the foregoing evidence was insufficient 

because Detective D.S. acknowledged that during “the [car] chase” Young 

passed the car on the right “without going off the road,” no one was at the 

four-way stop that he drove through at 65 miles per hour, and neither

Detective J.V. nor Detective D.S. testified as to how far away the car was 

when Young “traveled toward [it] head-on,” or how forcefully Young 

crashed into the rock wall. Young’s arguments, however, are an attempt to 

have this court reweigh the evidence, which is not appropriate for us to do.

Guerra, 161 Ariz. at 293, 778 P.2d at 1189 (appellate court does not reweigh 

the evidence).

¶13 Additionally, despite the evidence Young cites, a jury could 

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Young’s high-speed veering in 

a business district around other cars, speeding in the wrong lane, and his 

eventual crash into the wall at about 65 miles per hour, placed the motorists

and those present in the home in an actual substantial risk of imminent 

death or physical injury. See State v. Villegas-Rojas, 231 Ariz. 445, 446-48, ¶¶ 

4, 7-10, 296 P.3d 981, 982-84 (App. 2012) (sufficient factual basis of 

endangerment under A.R.S. § 13-1201(A) when defendant entered plea 

admitting that, while intoxicated, he drove 111 miles per hour with a 

passenger, cut off semi-truck driver, and officer had observed defendant

both driving at a high rate of speed and making aggressive unsafe lane 

changes).
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Young’s convictions and 

sentences.