In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-22-00127-CV 

________________________

TASLEEM UDDIN SIDDIQUI AND TURIFF INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

D/B/A IDEAL MOTORS, APPELLANTS 

 

V. 

 

NEXTGEAR CAPITAL, INC., APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Number 3 

Tarrant County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2021-006827-3, Honorable Mike Hrabal, Presiding 

 

October 27, 2022 

 

OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

Tasleem Uddin Siddiqui and Turiff International, Inc., d/b/a Ideal Motors,

(collectively Turiff) filed a restricted appeal from a domesticated foreign summary 

judgment. The Hamilton County, Indiana Superior Court signed the summary judgment 

in January of 2018. Through it, the court awarded NextGear Capital, Inc. damages 

against Turiff. NextGear petitioned to domesticate the instrument on October 12, 2021,
2

under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (the Act). See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001–35.008. Allegedly, Turiff did not receive notice of those 

efforts until after the domesticated document was formally abstracted. That resulted in it 

filing a notice of restricted appeal on February 24, 2022, and contending that NextGear 

failed to comply with the provisions of the Act. We reverse.

1 

Restricted Appeal Generally

To prevail in a restricted appeal, an appellant must establish that (1) he filed notice 

of the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment under attack was signed; (2) 

he was a party to the underlying suit; (3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted 

in the judgment complained of and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or 

requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face 

of the record. See Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); 

see also TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 30. Our determination of whether the appellant satisfied 

these elements is limited to considering the four corners of the appellate record before 

us. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Mew, No. 07-13-00300-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 

3539, at *4 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 1, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, dispute is 

limited to the third and fourth elements mentioned above. We address them in turn.

Nonparticipation 

Turiff contends that it satisfied the third element of Pike-Grant. NextGear contends

it did not because the judgment debtors participated in the Indiana hearing that resulted

1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we are obligated to apply 

its precedent in the event of a conflict between the precedents of that court and this court. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 41.3.
3

in the summary judgment. The same dispute underlies NextGear’s motion to dismiss, as 

well. We agree with Turiff.

To reiterate, the third element concerns an appellant proving that he “did not 

participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of.” Pike-Grant, 447 

S.W.3d at 886. What is meant by the “judgment complained of” lies at the heart of the 

controversy before us. NextGear believes it references the Indiana judgment, while Turiff 

argues that it is the Texas judgment resulting from the domestication process. Our 

decision in Lawrence Sys., Inc., ex rel. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Superior 

Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994, writ denied), provides the 

answer.

In Lawrence Systems, we discussed how the Act is actually an enforcement 

statute. Id. at 208. This was so because the primary reason for filing a foreign judgment 

in Texas was to enforce it. Id. We further observed that enforcing a foreign judgment 

under the statute constituted an “‘action’” or “‘judicial proceeding which, if prosecuted

effectively, results in a judgment.’” Id. (quoting Garcia v. Jones, 147 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 

Civ. App.—El Paso 1940, writ dism’d)). That led us to conclude that filing a foreign 

judgment under the Act “has the effect of initiating an enforcement proceeding and 

rendering a final Texas judgment simultaneously.” Id. (emphasis added); accord

Moreno v. Halperin, No. 05-20-00858-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9879, at *3–4 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20, 

22 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied)) (stating the same); Tigh v. De Lage Landen 

Fin. Servs., 545 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (stating the 

same). If filing the foreign judgment in accordance with the Act immediately results in a 
4

Texas judgment, logically then, the “judgment complained of” when the judgment debtor 

appeals is the Texas judgment instantly created. And, the proceeding from which the 

instantly created Texas judgment arose must be that initiated upon filing of the foreign 

judgment under the Act. So, to the extent that NextGear suggests the pertinent hearing 

contemplated by the third element is that held in the foreign state resulting in the foreign 

judgment, it is mistaken.2 

No one disputes Turiff’s nonparticipation in the hearing that occurred under the Act 

upon NextGear’s filing the Indiana judgment. Indeed, how could Turiff. There was no 

actual hearing but merely filing the foreign mandate coupled with the immediate receipt 

of a Texas judgment. Nor did Turiff file a post-judgment motion attacking the Texas 

decree or a request for fact-finding and legal conclusions. So, we conclude that the two 

appellants satisfied the third element of Pike-Grant.

Error on the Face of the Record

Next, Turiff mentions two purported errors apparent on the face of the record. One 

relates to compliance with the Act’s notice requirements while the other involves defects 

in an affidavit. We address the latter, for it is dispositive, and, in doing so, sustain the 

contention.

2 In arriving at this conclusion, we recognize both NextGear’s citation to Whitehead v. Bulldog 

Battery Corp., 400 S.W.3d 115 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g), and the Dallas 

appellate court’s focus on participation in the hearing conducted in the foreign state. Why the Whitehead

court did that went unexplained. Indeed, in that court doing so, it can be said it ignored guidance provided 

by its own precedent, that is, Moncrief, 805 S.W.2d at 22. Moncrief, like our decision in Lawrence Systems

and that of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Tigh, described domestication as its own action resulting in 

its own Texas judgment. Indeed, heeding Moncrief required the Whitehead court to actually focus on the 

proceeding initiated in Texas through filing the foreign judgment, not the proceeding conducted outside this 

State resulting in the foreign judgment itself. Moreover, Whitehead loses its applicability at bar given Tigh

and the fact of its issuance by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. Again, the latter’s precedent controls given 

that the appeal came to us from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. 
5

Compliance with the components of the Act are essential to having a valid Texas 

judgment. In re Chapman, 973 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.). 

One such component obligates the judgment creditor or his attorney to “file with the clerk 

of the court an affidavit showing the name and last known post office address of the 

judgment debtor and the judgment creditor.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 35.004(a). Our legislature defined an “affidavit” as “a statement in writing of a fact or 

facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer authorized to administer 

oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office.” TEX. GOV’T CODE 

ANN. § 312.011(1). In addition to satisfying the elements of that definition, the document 

must also illustrate that the facts contained reflect the affiant’s personal knowledge, see

Kerlin v. Arias, 274 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Tayob v. Quarterspot, Inc., 

No. 05-15-00897-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12633, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 28, 

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.), and are true. Tayob, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12633, at *7–8. 

If no basis from which to infer personal knowledge is shown, then the purported affidavit 

is deficient. Id.

Here, the face of the record reveals the presence of an affidavit. Apparently,

Turiff’s attorney executed it. It states as follows:

I am the attorney for the judgment creditor in a judgment rendered by the 

Superior Court of Hamilton County, Indiana on January 17, 2018. An 

authenticated copy of the judgment has this day been filed with the clerk of 

the above-captioned court.

. . . . [parties’ addresses omitted]

The purpose of this affidavit is so that notice of the filing of the foreign 

judgment can be given to the judgment debtors.
6

Missing is any statement that the facts represented within it are true. Nor did the affiant

either aver that she had personal knowledge of its content or provide basis from which 

that knowledge may be inferred. It leaves us to wonder whether the information was 

obtained personally or from a third party who imparted it to legal counsel. Simply put, 

information garnered via hearsay or a third-party is not within one’s personal knowledge. 

See, e.g., Trostle v. Combs, 104 S.W.3d 206, 214 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) 

(observing that the affiant lacked personal knowledge of the purported facts because 

“Nassour . . . learned of Comb’s remarks through Shields recounting of the conversation”

as opposed to the remarks being overheard by Nassour or made to him). Consequently, 

NextGear’s affidavit is deficient.

Indeed, a sister court held the same when reviewing a nearly identical instrument

filed in proceeding under the Act. In Tayob, the challenged affidavit provided the following 

recitations:

I am the attorney for the judgment creditor in a judgment dated September 

2, 2014, rendered by the General District Court in Commonwealth of 

Virginia. An authenticated copy of the judgment has, this day, been filed 

with the Clerk of the above captioned Court.

See Tayob, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12633, at *8. The affiant attorney also included 

Tayob’s name, last known post office address, and a New Jersey address for Quarterspot

and concluded by describing the purpose of the affidavit. This led the Tayob court to 

deem the affidavit insufficient since it did “not even purport to state that the facts it 

contains are based on [the affiant’s] personal knowledge and does not show any basis 

for her knowledge of the facts.” Id. It mattered not that the document met the minimal 

requirements of the statutory definition of an affidavit, for such definition did not excuse 

the need for personal knowledge. Id. 
7

Filing an affidavit with the clerk of the court providing the parties’ names and 

addresses is mandatory under the Act. That was not done here given the deficient

affidavit. So, error appears on the face of the record thereby satisfying the fourth 

requirement of Pike-Grant. See Dana v. Diamante Mbrs. Club, No. 05-20-00827-CV, 

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 347, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 19, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(finding error on the face of the record when judgment creditor failed to meet the Act’s

requirements by failing to file notice of the filing or present the trial court with a proper 

affidavit authenticating the filing). 

We reverse judgment and render judgment denying NextGear Capital, Inc.

recovery against Turiff International, Inc. and Tasleem Uddin Siddiqui upon its live petition 

to domesticate the Indiana judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(c) (stating that a court of 

appeals may reverse the trial court’s judgment in whole or part and render the judgment 

that the trial court should have rendered). This is done without prejudice to NextGear 

again attempting to domesticate the judgment in accordance with the Act. We further 

deny NextGear’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

 

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice