### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIRD DISTRICT , AT AUST IN
NO. 03-01-00077-CV
Nanc i L. Mac Far

lan e; Sus an T. W ar re n; and P laq ues Plus , Inc., A ppel lan ts

v. Curt Fr iedland d/b/a Curt Fr

iedland & Associates; Cur t Friedl and, Individually; Spr ott, Inc ., d/b/a C entur y 21 Sp ro tt & Ass ociates; J ack N. Sprott, Individually; and Bonnie Kuvet, Individually, Appell ees

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98T H JUDICIAL DIST RICT NO. 95-12242, H ONORABLE MARY PEARL WILLIAMS, JUDGE PRESIDING
Appell ants, Nanc i L. Ma cFar lane, Su san T . Wa rr en, and their busi ness, Plaques Pl

us, Inc. (together “

Mac Far l ane”), app eal dist rict -c ou rt or der s dismissing their action agai nst appel le es Curt Fri edl and (i ndi vi dual l y and doi ng b usi ne ss a s Cu

rt Fried land

& Asso ciat es) , S pr ot t , I nc. (d oing busi nessas Ce n tur y 21 Sp rott &

A ss oci ate s) , J ack N . Sprott , and Bonn ie Kuvet (t ogether “F ri edl and”) an d overrul i ng th ei r m otion to rei nstate thei

r caus e. On appeal, MacFarl ane contends that the dis

trict court (1) in

appropriately

exerci sed the court’s in

herent power

to dis mi ss, (2) abused th e cou rt’ s d i screti on i n d i sm i ss i ng MacF arl an e’ s c l ai m s, a nd (3) erred

i n f ai l i ng to rein stat e MacFarlane’s claims. We w ill re ver se t he dist rict -c ou rt or der s and re mand t he ca us e fo r further pro ceedings.1 B ecause various zoning classifications are refer red to in th is opinion, simplified

descriptions of t he cl assif icat ion s fo llo w. Co mme r cial zoni ng ( “ CS” ) is full commercial zoning withoutspecial restrictions. Local retai l ( “ LR ” ) all ow s l es s c om

merci al activity th an CS bu t m ore thanlimite d offic e (“ LO” ), which is the most confiningcommercial-zoning status relevant her e. Commercial zoning with conditional overlay (“ CS-CO” ) is commercial zoning, but with special restr ictions designed to address any unique characteristics of the pr operty. A conditional overlay (“ CO” ) places additional restrictions or requirements on a p articular property subject to a zoning designation.

2 SeeTex. B us. & Com. Code Ann. § 17. 46(b) (West 1987). Section 17 .4 6 of the business and commerce code was amended in 2001. SeeAct of May 27, 2001, 77t h Le g. , R. S. , ch. 962, § 1, sec. 17. 46(b), 2001 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1820, 1821-22 (West) (to be codified as anamendment to Tex. B us. & Com. Code Ann. § 17. 46 (b)). B ecause the changes are neither substantivenor deal with deceptive trade pr actices at issue here, we cite to the former version of the code for convenience. 2

FACTUAL AND P

ROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 199 4, Mac Far lane pu rc hase d pr op er t y in Austin t o h ouse Pl aque s Pl us, In c., a busi nessengaged i

n the f abrication of trophi es and a war ds. Mac Far lane cl ai ms that Curt Fri edl and,
a pr op er t y appr aiser , a nd Ja ck S pr ot t and B onnie Ku vet , r ealt or s involved in the t ra nsac t ion,
re pr ese nt ed o n numer ou s o cca sions t hat t he pr op er t y was zo ned byth e C i ty of Austin (“

the Ci ty”)
as “l im ited off ic e,” all owing c omm

ercia l use, and would be suitabl e for Plaques Plus. Based on these assurances, MacFarl

ane purch ased the property, pay

i ng co mmercial value, and be gan c ond uct ing busi ness. Se v eral

mon th s l ate r, M ac Fa rlan e d i sc ov er ed th at th e C i ty considered the propert y zoned for residential

purpo ses only

, rendering her i

n noncompl

ian ce with ci ty zonin g laws. Mac Far lane fi

le d sui t in 1995, cl

ai mi ng rel ia nce on Friedl

and’ s m i sre pr ese nt at ions
re gar ding t he zo ning classificat ion, 1 t hat t he misrep re sent at ions violat ed t he T exas Dec ept iveTrade PracticesAct (“DTPA”) 2 or were negli gent mi srepresentations , and t hat t he misrepr ese nt at ions constituteda bre ach

of f i duciary duty. The case

was set for trial

in January 1998, but the distri ct3 No recor d was made of the dismissal hearing; therefor e, any testimony refer red to in

this opinion was presented at the reinstatement hearing. 3 courtordered the cause ab ated “until s uch tim e as Plaint iff

s have app lied for t he co rr ect zo ning t o t he Cit y Co unc il and have r ece ived a final dec ision fro m the C ity o f Aust in reg ar ding t hat zo ning appl i cation.” In

the sp ri ng of 199 8, M ac Fa

rlan e h i red Bru ceMe l ton (“Mel to n”), an en gi n eer w i th
ex perien ce i n zon i n g m atte rs , to obtai

n the proper

zoni ng. H er attorney , Bobb

y Tay l or (“Ta y l or”), testifi ed3 that Melton was t o info r m him wh en zo ning wa s c o mple t e s o t ha t T aylo rco uld set t he case fo rt r ial. OnNovem ber 11, 1998, the Ci

ty approved comm

ercia l zonin g with c ondi

t iona l overlay (“CS -CO ”) on firs t re ading
. The Ci ty requi res that second and thi

rd readin gs take place wit hin 36 1 d ays of

f i rs t rea di ng i n or de r f ora zoni ng ch ange to take eff

ect. The conditi onal

overlay required Mac Far lane t o ( 1) sign a restr ictiv e covenant that she would not pro test rezoning to LR-CO if he r us e of the propert y c eased

f or m oreth an n i n ety da y s a n d ( 2) pr ovi de

f i el d n otes f or th e p rop er ty being zone d. Bec aus e the requi rem en ts were not completed by Novemb er 15 , 199 9, Mac Farlane’s zoni ng-chan ge applic ation ex

pired. Tay l orand his leg al assist ant , Annie Ca mpo s (“C ampo s”) , t est ifi ed t o t he freq uent and continuouscontact MacFarl ane m ai ntain ed wi th them throughout t he zo ning pr oc ess, t hus a sser t ing her di l i gen ce i n ob tai n i n g th e p rop er zon i n g a n d s atisf y i n g th e conditions of

the a ba temen t order. Mel to n testif ie d that appell

ant Susan W

arren “s tayed on h

im ,” although h

e contradicted

himse lf by also sa y i n g th at M ac Fa rlan e “di d n ot ke epv er

y cl ose con tact wi th me .” Cam

pos test if ie d t hat she4 Campos and Taylo r test ified tha t there was extensive fire and smoke damage to the

office, including the floors, ceilings, walls, air conditioning and heating systems, and wiring; all office eq ui pm en t, inc luding

co mputers

with legal files were destroyed and damaged. Taylor took only criminal files and the files set for trial with him to his temporar y location. The remainder of the recover ed files were chemically treated to pr event their destruction. 4 relay ed in form ation am ong Me l ton , Ta yl

or , and MacFar lane. Melton co rro bora ted Campos’s freq uent contact with hi

m. Cam pos test if ie d that she c alled Me lto n t o inq uire abo ut t he st at us o f the
zo ningproces s “ ev ery

two to t hre e m

onths
. . . or if the c lient ca lled and a ske d wha t t he status was orle t me know that

sh e w as h av i n g di f f i cul ty com m un i ca ti n g w i th Bruce Mel

to n, I would cal

l B ruce Me l to n . . . ; or if we h

adn’t hea rd any thin g, I would try and c al l h

is off ic e.” Cam

pos relay ed he r co nver sat ions to MacFarl ane an d Tayl or, and if the con ver sat ion wa s pa rt icular ly si gnificant , she pla ced a n ote i n Ma cF arl an e’ s f i l e. De sp i te th i s c on siste n t com m un i ca ti on , b oth Tay l or an d C am pos testifi ed that t he y we r e n ev er mad e a wa r e t ha t CS
- CO zo ning ha d r ec eiv ed firs t - r ea din g a pp r o va l; Tayl or stat ed that hi s f

irst notice of thi s occurrence waswhen Fri edland f il ed the motion t o dismi

ss on Jul y 7, 2000. A fi re at Taylor’s offi

ce in mid-De cember 199 9, which wa s lat er at t ribut ed t o a rso n, gr ea t ly dis rup t ed his la

w practice. Tayl

or moved reco vered fi

les i nto st orag e and conducte d busi ness as best he coul

d from a temporary l

ocation until

he resum ed practici ng i n hi s partial ly refurb is hed off ic e in Marc h, 2000. 4 Ta

y l or a n d C am pos testi f i ed th at th ei r c om m un i ca ti on wi th Ma cF ar lan e d id not cease duri

ng the post-fi

re period. Cam

pos test if ie d that on J an uary 4, 2000, Melton told her that he needed si

xteen to twe n ty-tw o m orewe ek s to compl

ete the zonin

g process. Melton testif

ie d that he f ormal iz ed this dis cussi on by sendi ng a proposed contract for addi tional servi ces t o M acFa rlane in care of Tay

lor. Tayl or received the

contract on Ja

nua ry 7 a nd f orwa rde d i t to MacF arl

an e. M el ton5 On October 11, 1999, a new city ordinance became effective allowing for applications to cond uct ma nufacturing activi

ties in LR zoned areas. Although MacF arlane never applied for a permit under this ordinance, there is no evidence in the recor d that she was aware of this option. 5 testifi ed t hat he l ast sp okewi

th M ac Fa rlan e i n e i the r J an ua ry orFebruary

, and that she n

ever si gned
or re tur n ed th e c on tra ct. Up on dis co ve r ing t ha t Ma cF ar lan e h ad so ld t he pr o pe r t y o n Ap r il 3, Fr ied lan d, o n Ju ly 7, fil ed a mot ion t o d ismi ss Ma cFar lane’s a ct ion fo r w ant of p ro sec ut ion, alleging t hat Mac Far lane (1) never foll

owed t hrough with the CS-CO zon i n g, a n d th at th e ti me to do so ha d e xp ire d; ( 2) did not seek proper zonin

g under the terms of a n

ewl y e nacted ci ty ordin ance; 5 (3 ) failed t o s upp lement dis co very or i n f orm appe l l ee s of

th e statu s of

th e z oni n g p roc es s af

ter th e a b atemen t order; (4 ) aban doned her cau ses o f act ion whe n she so ld t he pr op er t y; and ( 5) t he case ha d been pendi ng unde r these ci rcumstances fo rfive yea r s a nd sho uld be dis miss ed pu r su an t t o T ex as Ru le o f Civ il Procedu re 165a. Af

ter rec ei vi ng the moti on t o d ismi ss, Mac Far lane sch edul ed th e ca se f

or a Fe bruary 26, 2001, tri

al . Howev

er, the di stri ct court gran

ted the motion to dis m i ss. Mac Far lane f

i l ed a m oti on to re insta t e, ar guing t hat t he de lay in bringing the cas e t o t rial was not int entional or the res ul t of conscious i

nd i f f ere nc e b ut was d ueto the obs tac l esTay

l orfaced when he was t he vict im of ars on. Furtherm ore, Ta ylor t est ifi

ed t hat he was unde r t he impress ion t hat t he zo ning mat t er was st ill being processed, asMe l

ton had no t co nveyed infor matio n t o t he co nt ra ry t o him; t hus t he aba t ement order
was not sat isfied. Cha ra ct er izing t he dismissal as o ne “ba se d o n P laint iffs’ failu r e t o pr o se cu t e t he ir cla ims f or r eli ef f

or due dil

ige nce,” the di strict court deni ed MacFarl

ane’s motion to reinstate.6 By three is sues, Mac Farl ane co nt ends t hat t he dist rict co ur t er re d in gr ant ing Fri edl and’s

motion to dism

is s and i n den yi ng he r motion to reins

tate. STANDARD OF REVIEW Trial cou rtspos se ss

th e a uth ori ty to di sm i ss a c as e f orwant of p ro sec ut ion p ur sua nt to both i nh ere nt p ower an

d the p rovi si

ons of Rul e 1 65a

of t he Tex as R

ul es of Ci vi l Procedu re. See Tex. R. C i

v. P. 165 a (p erm

i tti ng di sm i ss al f or(1 ) f ai l ur e to a pp ea r a t h ea ri n g or trial, (2 ) f

ai l ur e to me et t ime sta ndar ds p ro mulgat ed bysupr em e court, an

d (3) l ack of dil i gen ce); State v. Rotello , 671 S.W.2d 507, 508-09 (Tex. 1984) (st ating tha t t rial court hasin

herent power

to dis mi ss f or lack of due dil i gen ce); Veteran’s Land

Bd. v. Williams , 543 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1976) (st ating tha t Rule 165a is n ot ex cl us i v e a uth ori ty for trial court ’s di sm

is sal power, but t hat

cou rt al so h as i n h er en t pow er to dism iss su i t f or f ai l ur e to pros ecute

wi th d ue d ili genc e wit hou t st at ut or y or ru le aut hor ity) ( citing Bevil v. Johnson , 30 7 S. W.2d 85, 87 ( Tex. 195 7)) ; see also Burton v. Hoff

man , 959 S.W.2d351, 353 (Tex. App.—Austi

n 1998, no pet.). T he di sm is sal procedures under Rul e 165a arecumulat ive and independe nt. Tex. R. Civ. P . 16 5a( 4); Will iams , 543 S. W.2d at 90 . Furthermore, the trial
cou rt ’s in herent pow er to dism

iss a su it fo r failure t o p ro sec ut e wit h due diligence is se par at e and apart f rom th e statutory

authority und er Ru l e 165 a. Williams , 543 S.W .2d at 90; Burton , 959 S.W.2d at 353. We review a t r ia l cou rt’ s acti on on a m oti on to d

i sm i ss a c au se f or wa nt of pros ecution

and the co urt ’s fai

lure to reinstate t he cause

under a cl

ear-abuse-of-discretion standard, t he central i

ssuebei ng whether an appel

la nt exerci sed

reasonabl

e di li gence, n ot whether i

t intende d to ab andon i

ts cl ai m s. MacGr

egor v. Ri ch , 94 1 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997) (citin g Williams , 5436 This allegation apparently arises fr om language in the district court’ s “ Order of

Dismissa l, ” reciti ng that the c our t “ consider ed[] th e Defen dants’ Joint Motion to Di smiss .
. . based on Plaintiffs’ failu

re to prosecute the ir claims for relief with due diligence. ” Th e re cord contains neither district-cour t findings of fact nor conclusions of law. 7 S.W.2d at 9 0) . A trial cou rt a b us es i ts di scre ti on

i f i ts deci si on is

arbi trary, unreasonab le , and wi thout referen ce t o a ny guiding r ules a nd pri nc i pl es. Goodev. Shoukfeh , 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) (quot in g Mercedes-Benz Cre

dit Corp. v. Rhyne , 925 S. W.2 d 66 4, 666 (T ex. 199 6)) . The d ec i si on as to whether

a tri al courtabuse d i

ts di scre tion i s m ade on a ca se-b y-cas e b asis, con sideri

ng th e en tire history o f the c ase . F

DIC v. Kendrick

, 8 97 S .W. 2d 4 76, 481 -8 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —Amar ill o 1 995 , no wri t) (s tati ng f urt her t hat no single fact or is disposit ive); Olin Corp. v. Coastal Water Auth. , 849 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex . A

pp .—H ouston

[1 st D i st. ] 1 99 3, n

o wr i t) ( ap pe llat e c o ur t r ev iew s r ec o r d in its e nt iret y to det er mine

whet her dismissal is app ro pr iate ). Where , a s her e, t he re co rd co nt ains no fi ndi ngsof f act or co ncl

usi ons of l aw and the tria

l cou rt di d n ot s tate its r eas ons for t he dismissal, t he order o f dism

is sal mus t be affir med if

an y l egal theory i s su pported b y the re cord. City of Houston v. Thomas , 838 S.W .2d 296 , 297 (Tex. A pp.—H ouston [1s

t Di st.] 1992 , no wri

t). DISCUSSI ON Adequate Notice of Grounds for Dismissal By her fi rst iss ue , Ma cF ar lan e a r gu es t ha t t he dis t r ict co ur t ab us ed he rdis cr et io n in dismissing

MacFarlan

e’s cause by

in vokin g the court ’s i

nhe rent dismi ssal power an d di sm i ss i ng f or f ail ure to prosecute with due dili gence. 6 MacFarlan

e contends t hat the so le ba sis of Friedl and’s
m oti on wasTex as R

ul e of Ci vi l Procedu re 165 a(2). SeeTex. R. Ci v. P. 1 65a (2) (“ A ny ca se not dis posedof wi

thin tim e standards promul

gated by t he Su pr eme Court under i ts Adm in is trat iv e Rul es7 The Texas Supreme Court’ s Rulesof Judici al Adminis tration state

that “ [d]istrict courts

. . . should, so far a

s rea sonably possib le , ensure that all cases are brought to tr ial or final disp osition
. . . within 18 months from appear ance date” for a civil jur y trial and “ [w]ithin 1 2 months from appearance da te” for a civil nonjury tr ial. Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6, repr inted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. , tit. 2 subtit. F app. (West 19 98) (emphas is adde d). Although th is case has bee

n pending for longer than 18 months, the rule does not mandate dismissal after the time period has elapsed; the plain language of the rule indicates that the supreme court contemplated and pr ovided for those occasions wher e it is not r easonable to di spose of a case with in 18 mont hs. 8 ma y be pl aced on t he di smi

ssal docket.”) . She ass er t s t ha t by ple ad ing fo rdis miss al u nd er Ru le 165a (2), F ri edl

and di d not i nv oke the di stri ct court’s

i nh eren t di sm i ssa l power. Al thoughone

pa rag raph of Fr i edl an d’ s m oti on to dis mi ss urged the di strict

cou rt to dism iss the c l ai m s “ [p]urs

uan t to Tex. R. C i

v. P., R ul e 165 a . . . a s Plaint iff

s have f ai l ed to prose cu

te t his c l ai m wi thany al acrity, as direct ed by the Cou rt ” and specificall y asserted that MacFarlane’s
cause had b een pen

din g for a “ti me period . . . far

outs ide t he t ime sta ndar ds p ro mulgat ed by t he TexasSupreme Court

i n i ts Rul es of Judi cial Ad m i nistration,” 7 Fried land, elsew her e in the mot ion, al le ged t hat Mac Far lane had no t diligent ly pursu ed he r z oning request and f ai le d to suppl em

ent her responsesto previ

ous l y prop oun de d di sc ove ry req ue sts . The m

oti on f urth er a ccus ed MacF arl an e of aband oning her ca

us e o f ac t io n a nd t he r ea l pr o pe r t y invo lve d. T he mo t io n’s pr aye rge ne r ally requestedthat t he m

ot ion “ be granted, and t hat [MacFarlane’s] clai ms aga inst [ Fried land] be dis mi ssed i n thei r entirety , without prejudi ce to [r efi li ng] of sam

e.” The m

ot ion thus did n ot argue f ordis miss al solely

on the ba si s of Rul e 165 a(2 ). Ev en

thou gh Fr i edl an d m en ti one d the l

ac k of adheren ce to the supreme cour t’s t im e standards, th e th

ru st o f his pleadings was t hat Mac Far lane9

fai le d to dil ige ntly pursue her cl

ai ms , as partial

ly evi denced by the passage

of a lengthy

period of ti

me . T his was suf

fic ien t t o place MacFarlan

e on not ice that she was i n danger of havi

ng her cause dis mi ssed f orgeneral la ck of di li gence i n prosecutin

g it. Texas courts construe pleadi ngsliber ally in f av orof the pleader and requi re only that t he pl

eader give t he oppos i

ng pa rty su f f i ci en t i nf orm ati on wi th whi ch to prepare

a res pons e. Cf. Roark v. Allen , 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Te x. 198 2) ( “ A pe ti ti on is su f f i ci en t i f i t gi ve s f ai r an d a de qua te n oti ceof the f ac ts u pon whi ch the pl eader base s his c laim. The pur pos e of t his r ule i s to gi

ve the opp osi

ng p arty i nf orma tion suf f i ci en t to enab l e hi

m to prepare
a defens e. ”) . We hold t hat Fried land’s p leadings wer e su ffi cient t o p ut Mac Far lane on no t ice o f the grounds under whi

ch Fri edl and sought di sm

is sal and overrule MacFarl

ane’s fi rst issue. Appropriatenes s of Dismissal Because abuse of

dis cretion i s the correct st andard of rev ie wf or b oth di sm i ss al f or wa nt o f pr o se cu t io n an d t he o ver ru ling o f a motion to reinstate, we co nsider Mac Far lane’s s eco nd and t hir d is sue s t og et he r . Ma cF ar lan e’ s s ec o nd iss ue ar gu es t ha t ( 1) she us ed du e d ilige nc e in pur suing th e r equ irement s o f t he ab at eme nt o r de r , an d ( 2) an y de lay in t he pu r su it o f he rcla ims between January and A ugust 2000 w as j us ti f

i ed , as the de l ay wa s n ot i nte nti ona l or th e re sul

t of conscious in

dif feren ce but was ca

us ed b y th e i m pe di men ts to practici

ng l aw that Tayl

or experien

ced
as a result of the arso n of hi s of fi ce. MacFarl

ane contends

that for these reasons, di sm is sal was im proper under either Rul

e 165a(2) or t he court’s in herent power. By h

er third issue, Mac Far lane argues t hat the sam

e fac ts maki ng di sm is sal an ab use of di scretion also make the di strict co urt’ s fai lure to r einstat e an abuse of di scretion. We wil l sustain MacFarlan

e’s second and third i ssues.10

Effect of the Abatement Order

Al thoughwe believe t hat Mac Far lane used due diligen ce in pro secuting her claim

s, we baseour holding prim arily on t he fact t hat t he district c our t d ism issed MacFarlane’s ca se wh ile the court ’s ab atemen

t o rder was stil

l i n ef fect. Because di

sm is sal is the most seve

re penal ty, we viewthi s ca se m

i ndf ul of the m andate of Tex . R. Ci

v. P. 1
. Rul e 1 provides

that t he purpo se of the Rules o f Civil P r o ce du r e is t o o bt ain a fa ir, jus t , an d e qu it ab le adj udic at io n o f rig ht s u nde r e st ablish ed pr incip les o f substantive l aw . The tens i on between t he o bje ct ive o f rule 1 and the i nhe rent power o f the tri al

judg e t o c ont ro l the cou rt ’s docket may

be i mpossi ble to r esolv

e wi th absol ute p rec isi

on, but a just r es o lut io n o f ca se s g en er ally p r efe r s t r ial o ve rdis miss al. Olin , 849 S.W.2d at 858.

The di stri ct court ne i

ther l i f ted nor modi

f i ed th e ab atem

en t order. “An

ab at eme nt is
a pr es en t suspension o f all

pr oc eed ings in a

suit . T he ca se is held in su spe nded animatio n and ma y be re vived whe n t he reas on f or aba temen t is rem oved . Duri

ng a ba temen t, the court and the

parties
are prohibited from proceeding in any manner .” Campbell v. Kosarek , 4 4 S .W. 3d 6 47, 650 (T ex. App.—Dal

la s 2001, pet. denied) (em phasis added) (in

ternal cit at io ns o mit t ed )
. I nd ee d, t his Court hasrec og nized t ha t it i s i m proper to di sm

i ss a cas e tha t has be en ab ated, b ut rathe r the tri al court sho uld “ret ain it su spe nded upo n t he do cke t , su bject t o be re vived if and whe n t he ca use of a bat ement is removed.” Dyches

v. Ellis , 199 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. Civ . App.—Austi n 1947, no writ ); accord Messmer v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. , 97 2 S .W .2d 77 4, 7 78 (Tex . A

pp .—C orp usCh

ri sti 1998, no p et ); In re Kimb all Hill Homes Tex., Inc ., 96 9 S. W .2d 522 , 52 7 (T ex . A

pp. —H ous ton [1 4th Dist. ] 19 98, or ig. pr oc eeding) ; America Online, Inc. v. Williams , 958 S.W.2d 268, 272 (T ex. App. —Ho ust on [ 14t h Dist. ] 19 97, no p et .) ; Per mane nte Me d. Ass ’n v. Johnson , 917 S.W.2d515,11

517 (T ex. App .—Wa co 199 6, o rig. p ro ceed ing); Lumberm ens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Garza , 777 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex . App.—Corpu s Ch ri sti 1989, ori g. procee di

ng)
. However, court s hav e recognized an
exce pt ion, sta

ti n g th at d i sm i ss al i s prop er wh en “ a p l ai n ti f f f ai l s to cor re ct a de f ec t or i m pe di men t to su it after an ab atemen

t has been granted.” 3V, Inc. v JTS Ent ers. , Inc. , 40 S. W.3 d 53 3, 540 (T ex. A pp. —H ous ton

[14th D i st.] 2000 , no pet.); Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces C ounty Bail Bond

Bd. , 1 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christ i 198 8, no writ ); M&M Const. Co. v. Great Am. I ns. Co. , 747 S.W .2d 552 , 554-5 5(Tex . App.—Corpu s Ch ri sti 1988, n o wri t). A lthough 3V

, Garcia -Marroqu in , a nd M& M Construction eac h recognize t h at a n is olated situ at ion co uld exist wher eby dis miss al d ur ing t he ab at eme nt pe r io d w o uld be appropriate, dis mi ssal wa s no t de eme d p r o pe rin any of t he cas es. 3V

, 40 S. W.3d at 543 -54 4; Garcia -Marroqu in , 1 S. W.3d at 374 ; M & M Constr. , 747 S.W.3dat 555. Sim il arly , no exception a

ppli es here that would perm

it the di strict court to dis

mi ss the case. The order specif

ie d that t he cau se wa s a b ate d “unt il such t ime as Plaint iff s have applie d for the correct zoning to the Ci ty Counci l a nd ha ve recei ved a final decision f

rom th e C i ty of Austi n regardi ng that zoni

ng appl ic ation.” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Fri edl and an

d MacFarl

ane disagree o ve rwh at pr ec ise zo ning st at us wa s r eq uir ed t o sa t isfy t he dis t r ict
- co ur t o r de r , an d t he o r de rit se lf pr ovi des no guida

nce i n thi s regard. Al

l pa rties agree that MacFa

rlan e was to exhaust her ad m i n i strati v e r em ed i es , but b y af f i da v i t, Mac Far lane test if

ied that she pursued CS zo ni ng because it was t he o nly zoning st at us t hat wou l d n ot s everely li mi t her business ; thus, t o MacFarlane, CS zoni ng was the “ correct zon

i ng” requi red b y the a ba temen t order.12 Fri edl and ass erted t hat

a f i na l rul i ng on any zoning designation , not specif ical ly CS zoni ng, would sa

tis f y the term s of the a ba temen t order. Re l y i ng

ont his inter pr et at ion, Fried land argued that MacFarl ane squan

dered an opp ortu n i ty to sa ti sf y th e a b atemen t order wh en sh e f ai l ed to act withi n 361 day s f rom Novem

ber 19, 1998, when the C ity tentativel y a pproved CS-CO zoni

ng. Fried land furt her re lied on t he testi mony of M el ton an d A ntoni o Gonza l es (“Gonz ales” ), the City’s
case ma nager i n ch arge of MacF arlan

e’s zoni ng appl ic ation. Gonzales test if

ied that CS-CO zo ning al lowed Mac Far l ane to fu l l y operate h

er b usi ne ss. Mac Far lane disa gr eed beca use t her e wa s no ex plic it wri

tten prov i sion gua ran teei ng h er the use of th ree-h orsepowe r m ach i nery required b

y h er busi ness, and Me l

ton a ck now l edge d that he w oul

d n ot be su rpr i se d if non e of the d ocum en ts be f ore t he di str i ct c our t s tate d th at t hr ee - ho r se po we ren gin es co uld be us ed be ca us e t he Cit y’s zo ning is “c onfus in g. ” Ta y l or te sti f i ed th at M el ton ’s i n f orm i n g h i m th at th e z oni n g p roc es s w as

com pl ete would serve as the trigger mech an i sm f or g oi n g to tri al . How ever, by

MacF arl an e’ s i nte rpreta ti on of t he aba t ement or der , p ro per zo ning was never obt ained; t hus t he requis ite event never occurred that wo uld ca use her t o mo ve t he dist rict co ur t t o lift t he aba t ement or der and se t t he ca us e fo rt r ial. MacFarlane’s ex

pe cta ti on th at h er ca se wa s sti ll in a state of suspensi on until proper zo ni

ng was obtaine d was reasonab le
.

Fried land al so argues that Mac Far lane effe ct ive ly aba nd o ne d h er cla ims w he n sh e s o ld th e p rop er

ty b ec au se sh e l acke d s tan

di n g to pur sue a

zon i n g c h an ge f or th e p rop er ty and there f

ore co uld not satisf

y the a ba temen t order. Because an ac t io n is r ev ive d w he n t he ca us e o f ab at eme nt is removed, Fri

edl and i s i nc orrect. Dyches , 199 S.W.2d at 696. Mac Far lane’s a lleged lac k o f sta nding13

be f ore t he Cit y t o pu r su e t he zo ning ch an ge may ha ve o bvia t ed t he ab at eme nt bu t did no t ne ce ss ar ily
re n der her

ca us e of ac ti on moot. Furtherm ore, Mac Far lane t est ifi

ed t hat she w ou ld have be en leer y of signing t he condi tional overlay ’s restricti

ve coven ant becaus e i

t “would l

im it ourfuture abi

li tiest o mar ket t he property .” Sh e fu r t he ro bse rve d t ha t CS
- CO zo ning wo uld “se ve r ely limit our business ,” pr eclud ing her from expan

din g and from conducting certain aspects of the busin ess ou t side t he building located
on the property , as the outsi de portion of

the pro p er t y wo ul d r ema in z o ne d L R. E ss en t iall y, MacFarlane’s aff

ida vi t indi cated that pursuin

g CS-CO zoni

ng through f

in al passage would saddle her with a zonin

g stat us that w ould unacceptably in hi bi t her business

pract ices. We do not dec i de wh

i ch party ’sconstructi on of

the a ba temen t order i s the most reasonabl e. The order i s c l ea

rl y su b j ec t to di f f er i n g i n te rp re ta ti on s of

wh at n ee de d to oc cu

r to ter m i n ate the abatement. By

an y con str uc ti on , M ac Fa

rlan e’ s c au se wa s sti l l su b j ec t to t he aba t ement order at t he t ime is was di sm is sed. Under the f

acts of thi s case, we h

old that the dis

trictcourt erred i n di sm i ssi ng MacF arlane’s

action wi thout f i rst reconsideri

ng or l i f tin g the ab atem en t order. MacFarlane’s Diligence

Fried land ar gue s t hat Mac Far lane ad mits t hat she t oo k no affirmative a ct ion in t he dis trictcourtbetween the ti

me that Me lt o n r eq ue st ed ad dit io na l fun ds —J an ua ry 20 00 —a nd t he t ime he f i l ed hi s m oti on to dis mi ss—Jul y 7, 2000,—thus ref

le cting a la ck of di li gence i n pros ecution on MacFarlane’s part for at least this ei ght-month period. Friedl and als o ur ges t his Co ur t t o e xamine t he ca se ’s en ti re d i stri ct-c ourt h i story si nc e i ts f i l i ng i n 1 995 . The di stri

ct-c ourt orde r doe s n

ot refl ect
a pa rti cul ar p eri

od of i na cti on on whi ch the c ourt bas ed h

er dec i sion to di sm

i ss. See Ellmossallamy14

v. Huntsman , 83 0 S .W .2d 29 9, 3 00 (Tex . A

pp .—H ouston

[1 4th Dis t.] 1992, no writ) (stating that
re viewing co ur t ’s fo cu s mu st “e ss en t ially be di rected at t hat

period of ti

me ” on whi

ch trial court based it s de ci si on t o dis miss )
. Ho we ve r , in order t o place an

y pa rticular period of i

nacti vi ty i n the proper perspectiv

e, weexam

i ne the con tex t of the w hole ca se. Id. (citi

ng Rotello , 67 1 S. W.2d at 509 ; Fedco Oil Co. v. Prid

e R efi ning Co. , 7 87 S .W. 2d 5 72, 573 (T ex. App. —Ho ust on [ 14t h Dist .] 199 0, no wri t)). The pas sag e of

tim e al one d oes n ot nece ssa

ri l y i ndi cate a l ack of dil i gen ce. See, e.g. , Fedco , 787 S.W.2d at 574-75 (holdi ng that even

thoughcase ha

d been pendi ng f or eight y ears, dis mi ssal was abuse of d i scre tion be caus e rec ord establ i shed ap pel l an t ma de di l i gen t ef f ort to brin

g cas e to tria

l). We need not furt her discu ss t he ci rcumstances surroundi

ng the ab atemen

t o rder, ot her t han t o o bser ve t hat Mac Far lane’s a ct ion wa s aba t ed bythe dis trictcou rt i n J an ua ry 199 8 to a l l ow her t o se ek a z o ning ch an ge fo rhe rpr o pe r t y. T he r e w as ac t io n by the Ci ty i n Novem ber 1998 ten tati v el y ch an gi n g th e p rop er ty ’s zon i n g to a c l as si

f i ca ti on th at M ac Fa rlan e n owas se r t s w as st ill
unac cep t ab le t o he r, but which had t he effect of k eep ing her zo ning-c hange app licatio n befo re t he Ci ty at le ast until

Novem ber 1999. In De cem be r 19 99, MacF arl

an e’ s a ttorn ey , wa s th e v i cti m of ar so n. Al though he tried to ha nd l e h i s c l i en ts’ bu si ne ss f rom a tem porar y l oca ti on wi th out c om

pl ete ac ce ss to hi s f il es, he was not able to return to hi s off

ic e un t il lat e M ar ch 20 00 an d s t ill did no t ha ve full use of his files, many of whi ch were i n tem porary storage. D

uri ng J an uary 2000, th erewa s c on

tact wi th Mel to n, whi ch Tay l or te sti f i ed l ed h i m to bel i ev e tha t ei ghte en to twenty

-two more

weeks woul

d be requi re d t o compl ete the zonin

g chan ge.15 Of significance he re is the fact t hat t he aba t ement ord er su sp en di n g acti v i ty in the case
un t il “a fin al d ec isio n fr o m t he Cit y o f Au st in re gar ding [the] zonin

g applic ation” was s

til l i n pl ace. We f urth er ob serv e that a

rs on i s n ot an eve ryda y occ ur re nce fo r a lawyer, and so me latit ude must be al lowed f or th e di sr upti on an d c onf us i on that a fi re causes to the day-to-day operation of a l aw off ic e. A t r ial c o ur t ’s r igh t t o dis miss a s uit fo rfailu r e t o pr o se cu t e it wit h d ue dilig en ce “is not an unb ridl ed discr et ion, bu t a ju dic ia l di sc retion sub je ct to review.” Ellmossallamy , 8 30 S .W. 2d a t 301 (c iting William T. Jarvis Co. v. Wes-Tex Grain Co. , 548 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Civ . App.—Waco 1977, wri t ref ’d n .r.e.)). Th e specifi

c and un usual ci rcumstances of this case l ead us to conclud e t ha t Ma cF arl an e h as demon strate d th

e d i l i gen ce n ec es sa ry to en ti tl e h er to h er da y i n cou rt. CONCLU SION We sustain MacFarl

ane’s second and thi

rd issues, reverse the district co urt ’s order s, and r emand t his cau se t o t he dist rict co ur t for furt her pr oc eed ings co nsist ent wit h t his op inion.

______________

_________________________ ____ Lee Yeakel, Justice Bef ore Chi ef J

ustice A boussie, Justices

Yeakel and Pury ear Reversed a

nd Rem anded File d: January

17, 2002 Do No t Publis

h