In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 19, 2023

S23A0802. CHAMBLISS v. THE STATE.

 PINSON, Justice.

Raymond Chambliss got into an argument at his home with his 

girlfriend, Tonia Herring. During the argument, Herring hit 

Chambliss with an umbrella, and, in response, he retrieved a gun, 

followed her outside, and ultimately shot and killed her. He was convicted of felony murder.1 On appeal, Chambliss raises a number of 

1 The shooting occurred in the early hours of August 3, 2018. On November 12, 2020, a Monroe County grand jury returned an indictment charging 

Chambliss with malice murder of Herring (Count 1), felony murder of Herring 

predicated on the aggravated assault of shooting her (Count 2), felony murder 

of Herring predicated on the aggravated assault of striking her with a handgun 

(Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, to 

wit, murder (Count 4). After a jury trial from March 22 to 24, 2021, Chambliss 

was found guilty of Count 2 only. On March 24, 2021, the trial court sentenced 

him to life. Chambliss, through trial counsel, filed a timely motion for new trial 

on April 16, 2021, and twice amended it through new counsel. After a hearing, 

the trial court denied the motion on March 15, 2023. Chambliss filed a timely 

notice of appeal the same day. His case was docketed to the August 2023 term 

of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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claims. He contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support 

his convictions as a matter of constitutional due process. He claims 

three instructional errors: giving an incorrect charge for simple assault and failing to charge two lesser offenses (misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter premised on reckless conduct, simple battery, 

or battery as a lesser offense of felony murder, and felony involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct). And he contends that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request charges for the 

same two lesser offenses.

Each claim fails. The evidence was sufficient to support the felony murder conviction as a matter of constitutional due process. As 

for the claims of instructional error, Chambliss concedes that each 

is reviewable only for plain error. He has not shown that the given 

instruction on simple assault contained any obvious legal error and 

has not established that the trial court obviously erred by failing to 

charge the lesser offenses of felony or misdemeanor involuntary 

manslaughter. And finally, for that same reason, his claims of ineffective assistance fail: he has not established that counsel performed 
3

deficiently by failing to request charges on lesser offenses that were 

not available to him. So we affirm his conviction.

1. Evidence Presented at Trial

The evidence at trial showed the following. Chambliss and Herring met and began a romantic relationship five or six months before 

her death in August 2018. On the evening of August 2, 2018, 

Chambliss called at least two neighbors looking for Herring, and he 

told one of them that he did not want Herring to return to his home 

that night. According to Chambliss, who testified at trial, Herring 

had been at his home earlier in the day and he had asked her to 

leave because she drank too much alcohol. But after he discovered a 

pill bottle that contained marijuana was missing from his home and 

suspected that Herring had taken it, he called Herring and she 

agreed to come back to the home.

A neighbor was at Chambliss’s home when Herring arrived. 

This neighbor had heard Chambliss and Herring arguing over the 

phone earlier that evening, and the two continued their argument 
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after Herring arrived at the home. During the argument, the neighbor saw Herring hit Chambliss with an umbrella, and the neighbor 

left soon after.

Chambliss testified that after Herring hit him with the umbrella, he got his gun, loaded it, and told Herring to leave. Herring 

went outside, and Chambliss followed her with the gun, shot at the 

ground, and told her to leave his yard. Then, according to Chambliss, 

Herring started “coming at him with the umbrella” again, so he hit 

her in the head with the loaded gun to protect himself from the umbrella, and the gun went off.

Chambliss’s neighbor heard gunshots and ran outside, and

Chambliss asked the neighbor to call 911. As she made the call, the 

neighbor walked toward Chambliss’s house, where she saw him 

holding Herring’s body and telling her to get up.

When officers arrived, Chambliss was still cradling Herring 

and telling her to wake up, but Herring was dead. Chambliss told 

both officers that he hit Herring with a gun and it went off. Officers 

collected evidence at the scene, including a handgun that was found 
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on a sofa in Chambliss’s living room. 

The medical examiner who performed Herring’s autopsy determined that a bullet entered Herring’s face and traveled into her 

brainstem, and that the injury to the brainstem was fatal. Based on 

the soot and stippling around Herring’s gunshot wound, the medical 

examiner determined that the gun was fired six to twelve inches 

away from Herring’s face. The medical examiner explained that this 

was an approximation, and it was possible that the gun could have 

been closer than six inches. But the medical examiner ruled out that 

Herring had suffered a “contact wound,” i.e., a wound that forms 

when the muzzle of the firearm is in contact with the skin when the 

firearm is discharged, due to the absence of searing or burning near 

the entrance wound. 

A GBI firearms examiner determined that the bullet recovered 

from Herring’s body was fired from the gun collected from 

Chambliss’s living room. The firearms examiner found no problem 

with the safety or during the test-fire of the weapon. The firearms 

examiner also conducted an “abuse test,” which is used to determine 
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whether certain actions will cause a firearm to discharge accidentally, and identified one “abuse failure” with the gun: When the 

gun was dropped on its butt from a height of four feet with the safety 

off, the gun discharged immediately.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Chambliss contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his felony murder conviction as a matter of constitutional due 

process. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the 

evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdicts to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In doing 

so, we do not “weigh the evidence on appeal or resolve conflicts in 

trial testimony,” Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 266 (2) (857 SE2d 447) 

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted), but instead defer “to the 

jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” 

Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695 (878 SE2d 502) (2022) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). 
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Viewed in that light, the evidence recounted above supported 

Chambliss’s conviction for felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault of shooting Herring. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) (“A person 

commits the offense of murder, when, in the commission of a felony, 

he or she causes the death of another human being irrespective of 

malice.”); OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (a person commits assault when he

“[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another” or 

“[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension 

of immediately receiving a violent injury”); OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) 

(a person commits aggravated assault when he commits an assault

“[w]ith a deadly weapon”). That evidence authorized the jury to conclude that Chambliss and Herring got into an argument, she hit him 

with an umbrella, and in response, Chambliss retrieved his gun, 

loaded it, told Herring to leave, followed her outside with the gun,

and ultimately shot her in the face, killing her. 

Chambliss contends that the State failed to disprove beyond a 

reasonable doubt his theories of self-defense, defense of habitation, 

and accident. His story at trial was that his gun fired accidentally 
8

after he hit Herring with it to defend himself from her umbrella. But 

“questions about the existence of justification are for a jury to decide,” Corley v. State, 308 Ga. 321, 322 (1) (a) (840 SE2d 391) (2020), 

and the evidence authorized the jury to reject Chambliss’s version of 

events (and therefore his defenses). That evidence included the medical examiner’s testimony that the fatal shot was fired approximately six-to-twelve inches from Herring’s face, and that she did not 

suffer a “contact wound” that would have occurred if the muzzle of 

the gun were in contact with the skin when it was discharged—that 

is, evidence the jury could have thought was “at odds with”

Chambliss’s account at trial that the gun went off on impact with 

Herring’s face. See Ferguson v. State, 297 Ga. 342, 344 (1) (773 SE2d 

749) (2015). And the evidence would also allow the jury to reject the 

theory Chambliss advanced during closing argument, that he could 

have dropped the gun after he struck Herring and it accidentally 

discharged when it fell, either because the jury disbelieved this story 

(which was not even supported by Chambliss’s own testimony) or 

because the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that 
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the bullet would have to travel well over twelve inches from the 

ground to Herring’s face. 

Further, the jury was authorized to reject Chambliss’s theory 

of self-defense on the basis that he could not have reasonably believed that his use of force was necessary to prevent death or great 

bodily injury to himself from Herring’s umbrella. See OCGA § 16-3-

31 (a).2 The jury was also authorized to reject Chambliss’s theory of 

defense of habitation on the basis that it was unreasonable for 

Chambliss to believe that Herring was attempting, making, or had

made an unlawful entry into his home that required deadly force to 

protect against; the evidence showed that she was invited there, left 

the home when Chambliss asked her to, and was leaving when he 

2 OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) states: “A person is justified in threatening or using 

force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes 

that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third 

person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force; however, except 

as provided in Code Section 16-3-23, a person is justified in using force which 

is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily 

injury to himself or herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a 

forcible felony.”
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says she came at him with her umbrella. See OCGA § 16-3-23 (3).3

And, in any event, the jury was authorized to conclude that it was 

unreasonable to believe that his use of force was necessary to protect 

against Herring and her umbrella. See Clark v. State 307 Ga. 537, 

540-541 (1) (837 SE2d 265) (2019) (“The statute [OCGA § 16-3-23]

makes plain that . . . the defendant must have reasonably believed 

that the use of deadly force was necessary.”). 

3. Instructional Errors

Chambliss claims three instructional errors. Because 

3 OCGA § 16-3-23 states: “A person is justified in threatening or using 

force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes 

that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however, such person is justified 

in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily 

harm only if: 

(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner 

and he or she reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made 

for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; 

(2) That force is used against another person who is not a member of the 

family or household and who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has 

unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using 

such force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible 

entry occurred; or 

(3) The person using such force reasonably believes that the entry is 

made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein and 

that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.”
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Chambliss did not object to the trial court’s jury instructions on any 

of the grounds he now argues on appeal, we review these claims for 

plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). To show plain error, Chambliss 

must establish that “(1) the alleged error was not affirmatively 

waived, (2) it was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and (3) it affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which ordinarily means 

showing that it affected the outcome of the trial.” Moore v. State, 315 

Ga. 263, 272-273 (4) (882 SE2d 227) (2022). If an appellant makes 

that showing, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the 

error if it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 273 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted). We address each claimed instructional error in turn.

(a) Simple Assault Instruction

Chambliss contends that the trial court plainly erred when it 

charged the jury that a person commits simple assault when “he attempts to cause a violent injury to another person.” Chambliss’s argument appears to turn on the difference between the text of this 

instruction and the text of OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), which provides 
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that a person commits the offense of simple assault when he 

“[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another.” But 

Chambliss offers no further explanation or authority in support of 

this argument, and we can discern no material difference between 

these slightly different articulations of the offense. So Chambliss 

has not shown either that the trial court committed an obvious error

or that it affected his substantial rights. See Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 

771, 794 (5) (a) (865 SE2d 150) (2021) (concluding the trial court did 

not plainly err, even though it omitted part of a pattern jury instruction, because the defendant did not cite any controlling authority on 

point and therefore did not establish that doing so was a clear or 

obvious error); Hornbuckle v. State, 300 Ga. 750, 754-755 (4) (797 

SE2d 113) (2017) (concluding that the trial court did not plainly err 

by failing to further define terms used in its given jury instruction 

because the trial court gave a complete charge and the defendant 

did not demonstrate that providing additional definitions would 

have affected the outcome of the trial).
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(b) Involuntary Manslaughter Instructions

Chambliss also contends that the trial court plainly erred by 

not instructing the jury on misdemeanor and felony involuntary 

manslaughter. 

(i) Chambliss contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury on misdemeanor (or “lawful act”) involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense. Under OCGA § 16-5-3 (b), a person 

commits misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter “when he causes 

the death of another human being without any intention to do so, by 

the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner likely to cause 

death or great bodily harm.” On appeal, Chambliss contends that

when he struck Herring in the head with the gun, he was acting

“lawfully” in self-defense or defense of habitation, but in an “unlawful manner” because he used excessive force and hit her in a way 

that amounted to reckless conduct, battery, or simple battery.

We have consistently rejected this kind of argument in support 

of instructing the jury on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. 

“[A] defendant asserting justification by self-defense is not entitled 
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to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter under either subsection of OCGA § 16-5-3 on the theory that the defendant 

used excessive force in self-defense.” McIver v. State, 314 Ga. 109, 

134 (3) (f) n.47 (875 SE2d 810) (2022) (citing Saylors v. State, 251 

Ga. 735, 737 (3) (309 SE2d 796) (1983); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 

89, 94 (3) (263 SE2d 131) (1980)). In rejecting this argument, we 

have reasoned that “no crime is committed if the defendant was justified in killing and, if he was not justified, the homicide is not the 

‘lawful act’ required for misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter.”

White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 720 (3) (c) (699 SE2d 291) (2010). See 

also Saylors, 251 Ga. at 737 (3) (same). Just so here. Thus, 

Chambliss has not established that the trial court obviously erred in 

not instructing the jury on “lawful act” involuntary manslaughter.

See White, 287 Ga. at 714, 719-720 (3) (c) (concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter based on his contention that he acted lawfully 

in self-defense when he pushed the victim and caused her to hit her 

head, which led to her death); Saylors, 251 Ga. at 735-736, 737 (3)
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(concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction 

on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter based on his contention 

that he acted lawfully in self-defense when he stabbed the victim at 

a high school reunion).

(ii) Chambliss also contends that the trial court should have 

instructed the jury on felony (or “unlawful act”) involuntary manslaughter. See OCGA § 16-5-3 (a) (“A person commits the offense of 

involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act 

when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a 

felony,” and, “upon conviction thereof, shall by punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years.”). See 

also OCGA § 16-1-3 (5) (defining “felony,” in relevant part, as “a 

crime punishable . . . by imprisonment for more than 12 months”). 

Chambliss argues that this charge was supported by slight evidence 

that he committed the misdemeanor of reckless conduct by hitting 

Herring with a loaded gun, which caused her death. 
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But again, the law does not support Chambliss’s theory. Striking Herring with the loaded gun would not be merely misdemeanor

reckless conduct. See OCGA § 16-5-60 (b).4 That specific act would 

amount to aggravated assault, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2),5 a felony, 

see OCGA § 16-5-21 (b). See also Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. 229, 230 

(1) (637 SE2d 393) (2006) (concluding there was sufficient evidence 

to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault where 

the evidence showed the defendant struck the victim in the head 

with a gun). And if an act causing death is a felony, a requested 

charge on felony involuntary manslaughter is properly denied, even 

when the same conduct could also amount to a lesser, misdemeanor 

offense, such as the reckless conduct Chambliss says the evidence 

4 Under OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), “[a] person who causes bodily harm to or 

endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act or omission will cause 

harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes 

a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would 

exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

5 Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [i.e., “[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury,” 

OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2)]...[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or 

instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”
17

supports. See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 363-364 (3) (882 SE2d 

289) (2022) (concluding the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter predicated on the misdemeanors of discharging a firearm while under the 

influence of drugs or alcohol, OCGA § 16-11-134, and discharging a 

firearm on the property of another, OCGA § 16-11-104, where the 

same conduct amounted to the felony of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon); Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 474 (2) (821 SE2d 761) 

(2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by 

not instructing the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter 

based on the misdemeanor of reckless conduct because the appellant 

“ignore[d] the fact that all of these acts, under the facts of this case, 

constitute felonies”); Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 427-428 (3) (811 

SE2d 392) (2018) (holding that the trial court did not obviously err 

in failing to charge the jury on appellant’s “convoluted theory of involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct” where the acts 

underlying his reckless conduct argument amounted to felonies). Be-
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cause Chambliss was not entitled to a jury instruction on felony involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct (specifically, hitting Herring in the face with the loaded gun), the trial court did not 

obviously err in not giving this instruction, and Chambliss has not 

established plain error.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Chambliss contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to request jury charges on 

misdemeanor and felony involuntary manslaughter, the same jury 

instructions addressed in Division (3) (b) above. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s 

performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). “To satisfy the deficiency 

prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney ‘performed 

at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.’” Reese 
19

v. State, 317 Ga. 189, 199 (4) (891 SE2d 835) (2023) (citation omitted). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show “that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result 

of the trial would have been different.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 

771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022). As discussed in Division 3 (b), 

Chambliss has failed to show that he was entitled to jury instructions on the lesser offenses of felony and misdemeanor involuntary 

manslaughter, so he also has not established that his trial counsel

performed deficiently by failing to request these instructions. See

Matthews v. State, 311 Ga. 531, 545-546 (4) (a) (858 SE2d 718) (2021)

(“The failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

(punctuation and citation omitted)).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.