alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
lJNI1 t V STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON. D C. 20580 

June 17,2004 

Jonathan L. Kempner 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Mortgage Bankers Association 

191 9 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20006-3404 , 

Re: Stipulated Final Judgrnent and Order as to Fairbanks Capital Corp. and Fairbanks 

Capital Holding Corp, reached in United States of America v. Fairbanks Capital 

Corp., et al., Civil Action No. 03-12219 (DPW) (D. Mass.) 

Dear Mr. Kempner: 

Thank you for your letter regarding the Comission's recent settlement with Fairbanks 

Capital Holding Corp. and Fairbanks Capital Corp. (collectively, "Fairbanks"). You have asked 

for the Commission's position regarding the scope of the Order and the application of the 

provisions contained therein to other mortgage servicing companies that were not a party to the 

agreement. I am pleased to provide you with the following staff guidance. Please understand 

that these are the views of the staff and do not constitute a formal Commission opinion. 

The Federal Trade Commission often enters into consent orders with individuals and 

companies that the Commission has reason to believe have violated the FTC Act or other laws 

enforced by the Commission. In general, consent orders enjoin the defendants from violating the 

law in the future, for example, by prohibiting the alleged unfair or deceptive practices. 

Moreover, to protect the public from those who have demonstrated a propensity to violate the 

law, these orders often contain provisions that place additional constraints upon a wrongdoer that 

do not necessarily apply to other businesses that have not engaged in violations. See FTC v. 

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965) ("The Commission is not limited to 

prohibiting the illegal practices in the precise form in which it is found to have existed in the 

past. Having been caught violating the [FTC] Act, respondents must expect some reasonable 

fencing in."). These "fencing-in" provisions have legal force only against the defendants who 

signed the order and anyone with whom those defendants act in concert. The Commission's 

consent order with Fairbanks reflects the Commission's views of the specific remedies necessary 

to resolve the particular allegations against that company. 
Jonathan L. Kempner 

May 18,2004 

Page 2 

By way of example, Part V of the Fairbanks order enjoins the defendants from assessing 

or collecting certain fees -that may be otherwise authorized and permitted by law -except as 

provided in the order. This section includes specific conditions and time frames for the 

imposition of such fees. The provision is not intended to impose a Federal rule or standard 

requiring all mortgage servicers to abide by the enumerated requirements. Rather, it serves the 

dual purposes of protecting consumers from further deception by the defendants, and providing 

specific guidance to the defendants on complying with the order. It should be noted that this 

provision expires after five years. 

Thank you for your inquiry. 

Sincerely, 

ociate Director 

ision of Financial Practices
#### Sarah E. WILLIS, Appellant, v. James H. WILLIS, Jr., Appellee.

No. 71-293.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 25, 1971.

On Rehearing Nov. 10, 1971.

*60J. A. McClure, Jr., of McClure & Tur-ville, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

John L. Riley of Riley, Davis, Schowe & Saltsman, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

MANN, Judge.

The trial judge, on petition for modification, increased the support allowance for each child from $15 per week to $20. The husband’s income had nearly doubled in the three years since the divorce, but the wife was also employed and could contribute. The order of modification recites that the wife has bought a new car and joined the country club, and that she ought to bear a part of the responsibility for supporting the children. There is a certain legislative logic in this view, but the judicial precedents which bind us forbid its application. Florida is one of the states which places the entire burden of supporting the children on the father if he has the means to support them. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for further consideration in the light of Dworkis v. Dworkis, Fla.App.1959, 111 So.2d 70 and Fekany v. Fekany, 1935, 118 Fla. 698, 160 So. 192. See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 324, 336.

We find that oral argument would serve no useful purpose and it is therefore dispensed with pursuant to F.A.R. 3.10e, 32 F.S.A.

LILES, J., concurs.

PIERCE, C. J., dissents.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

MANN, Judge.

The appellee, in his petition for rehearing, contends that our opinion, if right when filed, is wrong now because Chapter 71-241, Laws of Florida, our new law relating to dissolution of marriage, provides that “In any action or proceeding in which an appeal was pending or a new trial was ordered prior to the effective date of this act, the law in effect at the time of the order sustaining the appeal or the new trial governs the appeal, the new trial, and any subsequent trial or appeal.” *Ibid.,*§ 21(3).

Were we to recede from reversal and affirm, the mandate upon our opinion would not be an “order sustaining the appeal.” Were we to persist in reversal on the grounds stated in the original opinion, our order would sustain the appeal, and we would be in error for failure to follow the legislative mandate.1 Accordingly, we sustain the appeal, reverse and remand with directions to proceed in accordance with Chapter 71-241. Thus we avoid error by sidestepping paradox.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with Laws of Florida, Chapter 71-241.

LILES, J., concurs.

PIERCE, C. J., dissents.

1

. See Quine, The Ways of Paradox, c. 1 (1966).
<PAGE>
                   HYDRON TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

         Exhibit (11) - Statement Re: Computation of Earnings Per Share

                                 Three Months Ended         Six Months Ended
                                      June 30,                  June 30,
                              ------------------------  ------------------------
                                  1997         1996         1997         1996
                              -----------  -----------  -----------  -----------
Primary:
Average shares outstanding     24,099,069   22,650,938   24,099,069   22,639,816
Net effect of dilutive stock
 options - based on the
 treasury stock method using
 average market price               5,944      245,815       65,837      164,565
                              -----------  -----------  -----------  -----------
Totals                         24,105,013   22,896,753   24,164,906   22,804,381
                              ===========  ===========  ===========  ===========
Net income                    $    36,251  $   267,197  $   125,937  $ 1,082,869
                              ===========  ===========  ===========  ===========
Per share amount              $      0.00  $      0.01  $      0.01  $      0.05
                              ===========  ===========  ===========  ===========
Fully diluted:
Average shares outstanding     24,099,069   22,650,938   24,099,069   22,639,816
Net effect of dilutive stock
 options - based on the
 treasury stock method using
 quarter-end market price           6,838      245,815       66,285      334,029
                              -----------  -----------  -----------  -----------
Totals                         24,105,907   22,896,753   24,165,354   22,973,845
                              ===========  ===========  ===========  ===========
Net income                    $    36,251  $   267,197  $   125,937  $ 1,082,869
                              ===========  ===========  ===========  ===========
Per share amount              $      0.00  $      0.01  $      0.01  $      0.05
                              ===========  ===========  ===========  ===========
#### ALLEN B. CRAMER, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Donald C. DOUGLAS and Shula Douglas, his wife, Appellees.

No. 72-407.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 14, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ERIN SPRINGER,

Appellant,

v.

ROBERT SPRINGER,

Appellee.

No. 4D20-550

[December 31, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Victoria L. Griffin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562015DR002404.

Chet E. Weinbaum of the Law Office of Chet E. Weinbaum, Fort Pierce, 

for appellant.

Leslie Brady-Alten of Leslie Brady-Alten, P.A., Port St. Lucie, for 

appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Randall Mark HARRINGER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-499.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Oct. 19, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 777 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 777

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To reauthorize programs authorized under the Debbie Smith Act of 2004.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Debbie Smith Reauthorization Act of 
2019''.

SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION.

    Section 2 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (34 
U.S.C. 40701) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``including'' and 
                inserting ``prioritizing, to the extent practicable 
                consistent with public safety considerations''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (8), by striking ``including'' and 
                inserting ``in particular,'';
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the 
                end;
                    (B) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting ``; and''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(8) provide assurances that the DNA section of the 
        laboratory to be used to conduct DNA analyses has a written 
        policy that prioritizes the analysis of, to the extent 
        practicable consistent with public safety considerations, 
        samples from homicides and sexual assaults.'';
            (3) in subsection (c)(3)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``2014 through 
                2019'' and inserting ``2019 through 2024''; and
                    (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``2014 through 
                2019'' and inserting ``2019 through 2024''; and
            (4) in subsection (j), by striking ``2015 through 2019'' 
        and inserting ``2019 through 2024''.

SEC. 3. TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

    Section 303(b) of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2004 (34 
U.S.C. 40722(b)) is amended by striking ``2015 through 2019'' and 
inserting ``2019 through 2024''.

SEC. 4. SEXUAL ASSAULT FORENSIC EXAM GRANTS.

    Section 304(d) of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2004 (34 
U.S.C. 40723(d)) is amended by striking ``2015 through 2019'' and 
inserting ``2019 through 2024''.

            Passed the House of Representatives October 23, 2019.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
116th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 777

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To reauthorize programs authorized under the Debbie Smith Act of 2004.
```
#### Michael Boly, Respondent, *vs.*Anton Lake, Appellant.

1. Practice, *civil*— Trial—Evidence—Unstamped *agreements.*— A written agreement, not stamped as the law requires, is admissible in evidence upon a. stamp being affixed and cancelled.

*Appeal from, Jefferson Circuit Court.*

*John L. Thomas fy*Bro, for Appellant.

*202I. The contract, offered in evidence by-plain tiff, was not admissible, not being stamped according to law. The contract by act of.congress is invalid. ('Bump Int. Rev. Laws, 813, § 158, and note a.)

II. Even if the respondent had a right to put a stamp on at the trial, he could only do so upon proof, that either the stamp was *forgot*ten at the time, or for some other reason it was omitted with no fraudulent intent. (Whitehill vs. Shiclde, 43 Mo., 537.)

*Jos. J.*Williams, for Respondent.

I. The plaintiff was properly permitted at the trial to stamp the contract offered in evidence by him. (Boehne vs. Murphy, 46 Mo., 57.)

Napton, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court

This was a suit originating before a justice of the peace to recover $ 60, due on a contract to dig a well, in which the contractor agreed to get water for $50 in dirt, and two and one half dollars per foot for blasting, and if no water was obtained there was to be no pay.

The issue, as to whether water was obtained, was submitted to the jury, and found for plaintiff, both before the justice and in the Circuit Court.

The instructions asked by defendant were all given.

The. only point in the case is, that a written agreement, which was not stamped as the law required, was allowed to go in evidence upon a stamp being affixed and cancelled.

Upon the authority of Whitehill vs. Shickle, 43 Mo., 537, and Boehne vs. Murphy, 46 Mo., 57, the judgment is affirmed.

The other judges concur.
IIB 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7502 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 11, 2020 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 101 South 16th Street in Clarinda, Iowa, 

as the ‘‘Jessie Field Shambaugh Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 7502 RFS

1 SECTION 1. JESSIE FIELD SHAMBAUGH POST OFFICE 

2 BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 101 South 16th Street in 

5 Clarinda, Iowa, shall be known and designated as the 

6 ‘‘Jessie Field Shambaugh Post Office Building’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

10 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Jessie Field 

11 Shambaugh Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 10, 

2020. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
UNITED STATES

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                             _______________________

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT
                             _______________________

                     PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
                         SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported):

                               April 4, 2011

                       Diamond Hill Investment Group, Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             (Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)

                                      Ohio
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation)

             000-24498                              65-0190407
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Commission File Number)         (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)

      325 John H. McConnell Blvd, Suite 200, Columbus, Ohio         43215
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Address of Principal Executive Offices)                    (Zip Code)

Registrant's Telephone Number, Including Area Code:   (614) 255-3333

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)

<PAGE>

Item 8.01.    Other Events
----------   --------------------------------------------

     The following is a summary of assets under management as of March 31,
2011 (in millions):


	By Investment Vehicle
	---------------------

Separate Accounts	 	$  3,631
Mutual Funds 			   4,390
Sub-Advised Mutual Funds	   1,021
Private Investment Funds	     208
                                --------
Total			       	$  9,250

	By Investment Strategy
	----------------------
Small Cap			$  1,006
Small-Mid Cap		             317
Select				     390
Large Cap 			   5,095
Long-Short		           2,263
Strategic Income		     179
				--------
Total			        $  9,250


                                    SIGNATURE
                                    ---------

     Pursuant to the  requirements  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,
the registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed  on its  behalf
by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                        DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.


Date: April 4, 2011	                    By: /s/ James F. Laird
                                            -------------------------------
                                            James F. Laird, Chief Financial
                                            Officer and Secretary
GREGORY JUNKIN
,
Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Respondent. ___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 15

- 3846

Opinion filed February 19, 2016.

Petition for Belated Appeal

-- Original Jurisdiction

. Gregory Junkin, pro se , Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for bela ted appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated

appeal from the December 20, 2014, Order Denying Post

- Conviction Relief in Leon

County Circuit Court case number 2009CF2174. Upon issuance of mandate in this2 cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for

treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D). If petitioner qualifies

for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on

appeal.

WOLF, ROWE, and B ILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-19-00065-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV-2019-00043-JP

Before Bassel, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Womack, J.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

VICTOR DUNN, Appellant

V.

THE LANDING AT LITTLE ELM, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant’s brief was originally due on April 18, 2019. On that date, we 

received the “(Temporary) Brief of Appellant,” which contained none of the 

requisites listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1.

On April 23, 2019, we notified Appellant that his brief had not been filed as the 

appellate rules require. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.6(a). We stated that we could dismiss 

the appeal for want of prosecution unless, within ten days, Appellant filed with the 

court an appellant’s brief and an accompanying motion reasonably explaining the 

brief’s untimely filing and why an extension was needed. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 

38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b). On May 10, 2019, Appellant filed a late response that was a 

duplicate of his first temporary brief.

Because Appellant has failed to file a compliant brief even after we afforded an 

opportunity to explain the initial failure, we dismiss the appeal for want of 

prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), 43.2(f).

Per Curiam

Delivered: May 16, 2019
#### Edward H. ROBERTSON, III, and Christine Robertson, Man and Wife, Edward H. Robertson, III, Father and Administrator of Lise Robertson and Carolyn Robertson, Minors, Rebecca Robertson v. Walter NORWOOD, Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company.

No. 4178.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

April 6, 1970.

Montgomery, Barnett, Brown & Read, Wood Brown, III, New Orleans, for Walter Norwood and Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance ¿o., movers, defendants-appel-lees.

Frank C. O’Halloran, Jr., and Charles R. Maloney, New Orleans, for Edward H. Robertson, III, Christine Robertson and others, opponents, plaintiffs-appellants.

Before REDMANN, BARNETTE and DOMENGEAUX, JJ.

REDMANN, Judge.

Appellee moves to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the motion for devolu-tive appeal filed February 9, 1970 and appeal bond filed March 4, 1970 were too late as an appeal from a judgment signed November 12, 1969.

The motion and bond were timely filed under LSA-C.C.P. 2087(2), because filed within 90 days of the trial court’s refusal on December 12, 1969 of a timely filed application for a new trial. That application, filed November 20, 1969, was timely under C.C.P. art. 1974 because filed within three days of a re*510quired notice of judgment which was mailed November 17, 1969- Notice was required, C.C.P. art. 1913, because the case was taken under advisement by the trial court, as the court’s minutes of November 10, 1969 show.

Accordingly the motion to dismiss is denied.