J-A01011-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: D.J.G., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.J.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 890 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 1693 of 2020

IN RE: D.D.G., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.J.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 891 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 1694 of 2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 9, 2022

Appellant K.J.S. (Mother) appeals from the decree1 granting the petition 

of Lancaster County Children and Youth Services (the Agency) and 

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court issued a single decree listing both docket numbers. See 

Decree, 6/11/21. 
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involuntarily terminating her parental rights to D.J.G. and D.D.G. (collectively,

the Children).2 We affirm. 

The orphans’ court set forth the following findings of fact:

• D.J.G. was born [in] April [of] 2018. D.D.G. was born [in] 

February [of] 2015.

• The parents of the Children are [Mother] and [De.D.G. 

(Father)].

• The Children came into the Agency’s care on March 21, 2019.

• The concerns that caused the Children to be placed by the 

Agency were lack of supervision by Mother, drug use by

Mother, and unstable housing.

• At the time of the adjudicatory hearing which entailed 

placement of the Children at that time, they were in the 

custody of Mother[,] and Father was incarcerated. 

• Mother appeared as an unrepresented party at the disposition 

hearing held on April 25, 2019, as she failed to apply for courtappointed counsel and agreed to represent herself. 

• At the disposition hearing, each parent was granted a child’s 

permanency plan with a primary permanency goal of 

reunification and a concurrent permanency goal of adoption. 

• The goals on the child’s permanency plan for Mother were: (a) 

to remain free from drugs and misuse of alcohol; (b) to remain 

crime-free; (c) to learn and use good parenting skills; (d) to be 

financially stable in order to provide for herself and her 

child[ren]; (e) to obtain and maintain a home free and clear of 

hazards for herself and her child[ren]; and, (f) to maintain an 

ongoing commitment to her child[ren]. 

• On March 8, 2019, Mother tested positive for opiates, 

methamphetamine, and amphetamines, which was prior to the 

placement of the Children at the time of the adjudicatory 

hearing. 

____________________________________________

2 This Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals on July 19, 2021. 
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• The Agency made a referral [for Mother go to] to Family 

Alternatives for two drug and alcohol evaluation[s] but Mother 

failed to attend both appointments. 

• Subsequently, the Agency referred Mother to the Naaman 

Center for a drug and alcohol evaluation and again Mother 

failed to attend [those] appointments. This would have 

transpired after the disposition hearing held on April 25, 2019. 

• Mother testified that she had a drug and alcohol evaluation by 

telephone during [the] COVID[-19 pandemic] but did not know 

the date and did not provide a name for the evaluator. 

• Mother did not receive a report from the evaluator[.] 

• Mother attended White Deer Run Rehabilitation for 27 days 

sometime in October of 2019[.] 

• Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from White Deer Run 

because she was in a relationship with a patient. Mother stated 

the patient was her boyfriend. 

• Subsequently, Mother was transferred to the Lebanon White 

Deer Run for completion of the program. 

• Mother was only at the Lebanon White Deer Run for one day. 

Mother left because she did not like it there, so she failed to 

complete the program. 

• Mother did not enroll in another drug and alcohol rehabilitation 

center. 

• The caseworker reported [at the September 20, 2019

permanency review hearing] that Mother continues to use 

methamphetamine at least once a week. 

• At the review hearing held on August 26, 2020, the caseworker 

stated that she had spoken to Mother just one time. During 

the conversation, Mother told the caseworker that she was 

homeless. [Mother’s sole question to the Agency caseworker 

was to ascertain whether] her parental rights had been 

terminated. 

• As of the time of the September 20, 2019, permanency review 

hearing, Mother had pending drug possession charges, was not 

employed, and was homeless. 
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• [The Agency filed a petition for involuntary termination of 

Mother and Father’s3 parental rights on September 3, 2020.] 

At the time of the termination of parental rights hearing on 

April 22, 2021, Mother was in the Lancaster County Prison and 

she was not in compliance with the goal to remain crime-free. 

• In the course of these cases, Mother never provided any proof 

to the Agency that she was employed or that she had stable 

housing. 

• Mother failed to contact the Agency for a period exceeding six 

months which resulted in [the dependency court making] a 

finding of aggravated circumstances[4] against Mother on 

February 12, 2020. Mother’s visitation with the Children was 

suspended at that time and thereafter no further services were 

offered to Mother by the Agency. 

• Mother did not attend the permanency review hearing held on 

August 26, 2020. 

• Mother failed to appear for the permanency review hearing held 

on September 20, 2019. 

• Mother did not visit with the Children after August 7, 2019. 

• Mother never sent any cards or letters to the Children. 

• Mother testified that she did not visit the Children in 2019 

because she did not have bus passes. 

• Mother also testified that she believed her visits with the 

Children had been canceled because the resource mother told 

her so. However, the resource mother did not tell Mother that 

her visits were canceled, but rather that Mother needed to 

make arrangements with the Agency caseworker for visits. 

• Mother sent a text message to the resource mother on January 

24, 2019. In her text message, Mother told the resource 

____________________________________________

3 Father was served with notice of the April 22, 2021 termination hearing, but 

failed to appear. N.T. Termination Hr’g, 4/22/21, at 4-5. The orphans’ court 

also involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to Children. See Decree, 

6/11/21. However, Father did not file an appeal.

4 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6302, 6351(f)(9). 
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mother that she misses the Children and loves them but Mother 

did not ask to speak to them. 

• Mother would call the resource mother and ask for money for 

a hotel room and for food. 

• Mother claimed that D.D.G. repeatedly told the Children’s 

maternal grandmother that he wants to come live with Mother. 

However, the resource mother supervised all of the . . . 

maternal grandmother’s visits with the Children and D.D.G. 

never made the statements as Mother claimed but in fact 

D.D.G. stated that he wished to remain with the resource 

mother forever. 

• The Children are placed together in a kinship home and the 

resource parents wish to adopt them. 

• The Guardian ad litem[5] supports termination of the parental 

rights. 

• The Children have bonded with the [resource] parents. 

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 9/28/21, at 6-11 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

The orphans’ court held a hearing on the petition to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights on April 22, 2021. Mother participated in 

the hearing via the video conferencing application Lifesize. At the hearing, 

the orphans’ court heard testimony from Robert Pratt, an Agency supervisor;

Tiffany Smith, an Agency caseworker; Mother; and the resource mother.

____________________________________________

5 Gina Carnes, Esq. served as GAL and represented both Children’s legal

interests and best interests at the termination hearing. During the hearing, 

the GAL stated that there was no conflict in those interests, and the orphans’ 

court found that there was no conflict. N.T. Termination Hr’g at 36-37; see 

also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020) (stating 

that where a GAL was appointed to represent both the child’s legal and best 

interests, appellate courts may review sua sponte “whether the orphans’ court 

determined that the child[ren]’s best interests and legal interests did not 

conflict”).
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On June 11, 2021, the orphans’ court issued a decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). 

Mother timely filed notices of appeal and statements of errors 

complained on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The 

orphans’ court filed a responsive opinion. 

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. The Agency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

under 23 Pa.C.S. [] 2511(a)(1) that Mother evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to her children or 

has refused or failed to perform her parental duties for a period 

of six (6) months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition when Mother at all times desired to exercise her 

parental claim to her children and was never provided the 

opportunity to perform her parental duties; the [orphans’] 

court also erred in determining it would be in the children’s best 

interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

2. The Agency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

under 23 Pa.C.S. [] 2511(a)(2) that Mother’s repeated and 

continued incapacity has caused her children to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

her children’s physical and mental well-being when Mother was 

never provided the opportunity to show the Agency that she 

did not have an incapacity and that she could provide essential 

parental care, control and subsistence necessary for the 

children’s physical and mental well-being.

Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (formatting altered). 

Our Supreme Court has explained that

appellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when 

considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 
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they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial 

courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and 

parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 

The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

This Court has explained:
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Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,] which requires a bifurcated 

analysis:

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child.

* * *

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection 

of section 2511(a).

In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1178-79 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). 

Section 2511(a)(2)

We first address Mother’s challenge to the evidence supporting 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother’s Brief at 12-14. Mother 

contends that she does not have a repeated incapacity, and alternatively

claims that if she did, that incapacity did not cause the Children to be without 

proper parental control. Id. at 13. Mother asserts that she is attempting to 

remedy any incapacity she may have by attending rehab. Id. Mother noted 

that she attended White Deer Run Rehabilitation for twenty-seven days out of 

a thirty-day program. Id. at 14. 
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Mother also claims that she stopped attending visitation with the 

Children because the resource mother told her that visitation had been 

cancelled. Id. at 13-14. Mother explained that she will be looking for work 

after she is released from prison and will be staying with her father (i.e., the 

Children’s maternal grandfather). Id. at 13. Mother notes that she is free 

from illegal substances, will stay on maintenance, and that maternal 

grandfather can assist her with child care. Id. 

The Agency responds that Mother engaged in “pervasive and persistent 

substance abuse[,] which resulted in her inability to provide safe housing, 

income, food and clothing for herself and her children.” Agency’s Brief at 13 

(formatting altered). The Agency also argues that Mother’s failure to remain 

in contact with the Agency and her children was proof that Mother had no 

intention to remedy the cause of her incapacity. Id. The GAL/Children’s legal 

counsel did not file a brief. 

Section 2511(a)(2) states:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of 

the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). 
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To satisfy the requirements of [Section] 2511(a)(2), the moving 

party must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. The 

grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, 

but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

Further, this Court has explained:

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct. 

Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not 

emphasize a parent’s refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties, but instead emphasizes the child’s present and 

future need for essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being. 

Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be 

read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable 

home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy 

of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This 

is particularly so where disruption of the family has already 

occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting 

it. 

In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, while sincere efforts to perform parental duties, can 

preserve parental rights under subsection (a)(1), those same 

efforts may be insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under 

subsection (a)(2). Parents are required to make diligent efforts 

toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period 

of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. 
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In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted and 

formatting altered).

Further, this Court has stressed that “a child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities.” Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (citation omitted and formatting altered).

Here, the orphans’ court addressed Section 2511(a)(2) as follows:

Mother’s total lack of contact with the Agency and the Children 

(which led to the finding of aggravated circumstances against 

Mother) is indisputable proof that Mother had no intention of 

attempting to remedy the cause of her incapacity to parent. Her 

incapacity has caused the children to be without essential parental 

care and Mother has no intention of attempting to provide parental 

care.

As discussed above, Mother’s pervasive and persistent substance 

abuse renders her incapable of parenting the Children. During the 

course of this case, Mother never obtained housing which was safe 

and secure for herself, let alone for the Children. Mother was 

unable to obtain a consistent income to provide food and clothing 

for herself and the Children. For nearly a full year after the 

Children were placed, Mother failed to take advantage of the 

services offered by the Agency to assist her in overcoming her 

parenting deficits. Mother is unable to provide the Children a 

nourishing environment for them to flourish and become 

productive members of society. The Agency proved grounds for 

the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.[] § 2511 (a)(2) by clear and convincing evidence.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 16-17. 

Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in 

the orphans’ court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and 

convincing evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights under 
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Section 2511(a)(2). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; see also R.N.J., 985 A.2d 

at 276. 

The record reflects that after Child was placed in kinship care in March 

of 2019, Mother’s permanency plan goals were as follows: (1) to remain free 

from drugs and misuse of alcohol; (2) to remain crime-free; (3) to learn and 

use good parenting skills; (4) to be financially stable in order to provide for 

herself and her children; (5) to obtain and maintain a home free and clear of 

hazards for herself and her children; and, (6) to maintain an ongoing 

commitment to her children. See N.T. Termination Hr’g at 9. 

With respect to drugs and alcohol, permanency supervisor Robert Platt

testified that Mother failed to attend several drug and alcohol evaluations that 

the Agency had scheduled for her. See id. at 9-10. Although Mother testified 

that she had obtained a drug and alcohol evaluation over the phone after the 

start of the COVID-19 pandemic, she never obtained a copy of the written 

evaluation report. See id. at 26-27. Mother testified she completed twentyseven days of a thirty-day drug rehabilitation program, but she left before 

completing the program, after she was transferred to another facility and she 

“did not like it here.” See id. at 30-31. The orphans’ court credited Mr. Platt’s 

testimony that Mother had not addressed her drug and alcohol problem. See

id. at 10. 

Further, Mr. Platt testified that Mother had been arrested for drug 

charges in 2019, and therefore, she had not met her goal to remain crime 

free. See id. at 11. Additionally, Mother testified she that she pleaded guilty 
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to providing false identification to law enforcement in February of 2021. See

id. at 35.

Regarding the goal of financial stability, Mr. Platt explained that while 

the Agency was supervising Mother’s case, Mother did not work with Family 

Alternatives to obtain employment or assistance with transportation to look 

for jobs. See id. at 11-12. Further, Mother did not provide the Agency with 

proof of employment. See id. at 12. As for Mother’s goal to obtain housing, 

Mother never provided the Agency with a lease for a residence. See id. 

Regarding visitation, Mr. Platt testified that Mother’s last visit with the 

Children occurred on August 7, 2019. See id. Additionally, resource mother 

testified that Mother participated in visitation with the Children through the 

Agency for about one month. See id. at 41. Afterwards, Mother failed to 

appear for visitation with the Children and the Agency stopped Mother’s inperson visitation, but there was some phone contact between Mother and the 

Children. See id. The dependency court eventually suspended Mother’s 

visitation. See id. at 20. 

Mother claimed that in 2019, prior to the dependency court suspending

her visitation, resource mother told Mother that further visitation with the 

Children was not permitted. See id. at 27-29. The orphans’ court credited 

resource mother’s testimony that she never denied Mother visitation, but 

rather informed Mother to contact Agency caseworkers to arrange visitation. 

See id. at 41. 
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Under these circumstances, the record supports the orphans’ court’s 

conclusion that Mother’s continued incapacity has caused the Children to be 

without essential parental care and that the causes of that incapacity cannot 

or will not be remedied. See C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 262; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 

1117-18. Although we recognize that Mother attempted to complete at least 

some of her child’s permanency plan goals, her efforts were insufficient to 

preserve her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). See Z.P., 994 A.2d 

at 1117 (stating that a parent’s “efforts may be insufficient to remedy parental 

incapacity under [Section 2511(a)(2)]” (citation omitted)); see also E.A.P., 

944 A.2d at 82 (explaining that “the language in subsection (a)(2) should not 

be read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong, 

continuous parental ties,” particularly when “disruption of the family has 

already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it” 

(formatting altered)). 

Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in 

determining that Mother’s conduct warrants termination under Section 

2511(a)(2). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; see also R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 

Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief. See M.T., 101 A.3d at 1179 

(stating that we may affirm a termination order based on any subsection of 

Section 2511(a)). 

Section 2511(b)

Mother also argues that the orphans’ court erred by terminating 

Mother’s parental rights because no evidence was presented on how the 
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termination would affect the Children.

6

 Mother’s Brief at 15-16. Mother 

contends that she loves her Children and is bonded with them. She 

acknowledges the bond between the Children and the resource family, but the 

Agency did not conduct a bonding assessment. Id. at 15. Mother argues 

there was insufficient evidence in the record for the orphans’ court to “discern 

the effect on the children of permanently severing the parental bond with 

Mother.” Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted). 

The Agency responds that the orphans’ court correctly concluded that 

because of the Children’s young age at the time of kinship placement, there 

was no bond to break, and termination was in the best interest of the Children 

so they could be adopted by the resource parents. Agency’s Brief at 13-14. 

Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

____________________________________________

6 Mother did not include this issue in her statement of questions involved. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is 

stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”). 

However, because this claim is encompassed in Mother’s overall challenge to 

the termination proceedings, we decline to find waiver. See In re C.L.G., 

956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (addressing the trial court’s 

analysis of Section 2511(b) despite the mother’s failure to present a challenge 

under that subsection). 
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“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008 (citation omitted). 

The C.L.G. Court explained that regarding Section 2511(b):

Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. 

The court must also discern the nature and status of the parentchild bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the bond.

Moreover, [t]he court should also consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships to the child, because severing close 

parental ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider 

whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. Most importantly, adequate consideration 

must be given to the needs and welfare of the child.

Id. at 1009-10 (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Further, the 

existence of “some bond” between a parent and a child “does not necessarily 

defeat termination of her parental rights.” Id. at 764. Rather, the question 

is whether the bond between the parent and the child “is the one worth saving 

or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable harm to” the child. Id. 

Further, “[w]hen conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer 
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evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal 

bonding evaluation.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted). 

Here, the orphans’ court explained:

The Guardian ad litem adamantly advocated for the Children. She 

maintained that the Children are flourishing in their kinship home, 

which is a permanent resource for the Children. The Children have 

little to recall about their Mother. If there is no bond to break, 

there will be no damage inflicted upon the Children. Termination 

of the parental rights is in the best interest of the Children.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 18. 

Based on our review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb the 

orphans’ court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve the Children’s needs and welfare. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009-10. 

At the termination hearing, resource mother stated that D.D.G., the 

older child, often refused to speak to Mother on the phone when she called. 

See N.T. Termination Hr’g at 41. Resource mother also testified that D.D.G. 

told her and her partner “all the time” how much he loves them, and that 

D.D.G. has stated that he loves resource mother more than Mother. See id.

at 42. About six months after the Children started living with resource 

parents, D.D.G. stopped talking about his birth parents. See id. at 43-44. 

Further, D.D.G. now refers to his birth parents by their first names and refers 

to resource parents as “Mom” and “Dad.” See id. at 44.

Additionally, the GAL stated that the Children are “very settled in with 

this family, they’re bonded [with resource parents] and it is a kinship resource 

and the older child is six and he does want to remain.” See id. at 37. D.D.G. 
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told the GAL that he wants to stay where he is forever. See id. at 38. The 

GAL explained that because the D.J.G. is four years old, she did not raise the 

topic of his preferences with him. See id. at 37.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record supports the 

orphans’ court’s finding that there was no bond between the Children and 

Mother. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762-64. Likewise, the record supports the 

orphans’ court’s finding that the Children are flourishing in the care of the 

resource parents and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights served 

the best interests of the Children. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009-10. 

Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in applying 

Section 2511(b). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. For these reasons we affirm

the orphans’ court’s decree as to Sections 2511(a) and (b).

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/09/2022