1



### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON Ja nua ry 9, 200 7 S es sio n
DON NIE E . JOHN SON v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 85-01202 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Judge

No. W2006-02208-C CA-R 3-P D - F iled March 22, 2007

I n 1985, the Petitioner, Donnie E. Johnson, was convicted of the first degr ee m u rd er of his wife, Connie J ohnson. See State v . Johnson , 734 S.W .2d 154, 155 (Tenn. 1987) , cert. de nied , 4 85 U. S. 994, 108 S. Ct

. 1303 (1988). The jury imposed and the trial court a pproved a sentenc e of de ath. Id. Th e c on vic tio n a

nd se nte nc e we re a ff

ir me d on dir e c t a

pp e a l by bo th the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls and the Te nnessee Supreme Court. The Pe t i tioner later soug ht post-conviction relief , which wa s unsucce ssful. See Do nn ie E. J oh ns on v . S

tate , No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1997 W L 1 4 1 8 8 7, at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Mar. 27, 1997), perm. to appeal de nied , (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1997) ; Do n n i e Edwar d Johnson v. State, No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1995 WL603159 (Tenn., O ct. 9, 19 95 ); Do nn ie Ed

war d J oh ns on v . S

tate , No. 02C 01-9111-CR-00237, 1994 WL 90483, at *1 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. , at Jac ks on , M ar. 23 , 1 99 4) ; Do nn ie Ed war d J oh ns on v . S

tate , N o. 02 -S -0 1- 92 07 -C R00041, 1993 WL 61728, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Ma r. 8, 1993). On Ju n e 9 , 2006, Pe tit ion e r Johns on

fi le d a pe tit ion to c omp e l te sti ngof bio log ic a l e vid e nc e a s p ro vid e d b y the Pos tConviction DN A Analy sis Ac t of 2001. The post-c onviction court denie d the petition on October 9, 20 06 . U

po n r e vie w o f t

he re c or d, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Donald E. Da

wson, Nashville, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, Donnie E. Johnson. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a n d Reporter ; Eliz abeth T. Ry an, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION2 F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On Dec ember

8, 1984, Connie J ohnson, the wife of Petiti o n er Do n n i e E. Johnson, was murdere d by

means of suf

focation. See J

ohnson , 7 34 S.W. 2d

a t 15 5. As reci te d b y

our s up re me c ourt , th e fo llo wi ngfa c ts s umm ari zed the pr oo f a s d e ve lop e d at tr ia l.

At the time of Connie J ohnson’s murder , the Petitioner was e mploy ed at a Memphis camping equipment ce nter. Id. Also employ ed at the c enter was Ronni e McCoy , a prisoner on work re lease

. Id. at 156. Ronnie McCoy testi fi ed that Petitioner J ohnson “killed Mrs. J ohnson at [the camping equipment ce nter] in the ear ly eveningof Saturday

Dec ember 8, 1984, the time of death being estim at ed at betwe en 6:30 and 7 p.m.” Id. at 155-156. Ronnie McCoy further explained that “he left [the Petiti o ner] and Mrs. Johnson alone in the office of the c amping cente r while McCoy attended to some chores prepator y to leaving the pl ace of busi ness for the day .” Id. at 156. McCoy stated that he w as gone “for some ten t o fiftee n minutes, and when he returned to the of fice . . . he found Mrs. J ohnson strang led or suffoc ated to death.” Id. I t is undisputed that both the Petitioner and Ronnie McCoy

“collabor ated, willing ly

or ot herw ise, in transporting the body of Mrs. Johnson in her 1981 F ord van f

rom the s ales office to a shoppi ng cente r a f ew miles aw ay .” Id. “ Th e y a lso pla c e d in sid e the va

n h e r br ok e n sp e c ta c le s, he r sh oe s, he r c oat and so me e arr ing s wh ic h h a d b e c ome dislodge d in her strug g le for br eath.” Id. The va n was lef t at the shopping cente r. Id. The Petitioner then transpor

ted McCoy

to the penal f

arm in the Petitioner’s pickup tr uck. Id.

The ne x t morning, Petitioner Johnson contacted his employ er inquiringas to h i s wife’ s wher eabouts. Id. Pe tit ion e r Johns on fu rt he r inf or me d his e mpl oy e r that his wi fe wa s su pp os e d to have g one Christmas shopping on the previous eve ning. Id. P et i t ioner Johnson’s employ er, Mr

. J ames F orce , and his wife a g ree d to assist the Petit ioner in his searc h for his wife

. Id. I n doing so, Mr. and Mrs. F orce found Connie J ohnson’s van in the s hopping center . Upon openingthe van, they found the lifele ss body

of Mrs. Johnson. Id. A l arg e pla sti c g arb a g e ba g ha d b e e n f or c e d into M rs

. J ohnson’s mouth, resulting in he r strangulation and asphy x iation. Id. She bled from the nose and
ear s, and trac es of blood we re later found on a couch in the of

fice wher e her

death oc curr ed. Id. No ignition key s we re fo u n d i n the van. A subse quent sea rch of the Appellant’ s truck re veale d the ignition key s to Mrs. J ohnson’s van along w ith her hairbr ush and some other

persona l items. Id. The ig nition key s were the only set of key s to the van. Id. Duringthe police investig ation, Petitioner J ohnson denied a ny involvement in the death of his wife and at no time ever implicated McCoy

in her de ath. Id

. The Petitioner also denied having any knowledg e of w hen or howhi s wi fe ’s v an had re ache d the shopping cente r. Id at 157. The Pe tit ion e r d id n ot t e sti fy

duri ngthe g uil t ph a se of

his tr ia l. Rathe r, it w a s o nly a t th e pe na lty

ph a se that the Petitioner took the stand and denied killing his wife, plac ing blame on Ronnie McCoy

. Id. at 156. Petitioner J ohnson testified that he wa s the one who le ft McCoy and his wife a lone in the sales office for a fewminutes. Id. He e x plained that he ha d g iven his wife a pproxi mately

$450 that day for Christmas shopping . He be lieved that McCoy had tried to r ob his w ife a nd killed her in the proce ss. Id.A t t h e t i m e o f t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n , t h e P e t i t i o n e r ’ s e x e c u t i o n w a s s c h e d u l e d f o r Oc t o b e r 2 5 , 2 0 0 6

. On 1 O c to b e r 1 9 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e S ixth C irc u it C o u rt o f A p p e a ls e n te re d a n o rd e r sta ying the P e tit io n e r’s e x e c u tio n “u n til f ur t her order of

t hi s cour t

. ” See D o n n ie E . Jo h n so n v . R ic k y B e ll , N o

. 05

- 6 9 2 5 (6 C i r. O ct

. 19 , 20 0 6 ). th
3 Whil e our s up re me c ourt

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t “th e re is n o q ue sti on bu t th a t [Pe tit ion e r D onnie E. J ohnson] or one Ronnie McCoy murdere d [C onnie J ohnson],” our supreme court noted that the two men “c ollaborate d, willingly or otherw ise, in transporting the body of Mrs. Johnson . . . from the s ales office to a shoppi ng cente r a f ew miles aw ay .” Id. The supre me cour t further noted that Petitioner J ohnson’s testimony was “ unconvincing .”

I. P e ti ti one r Jo hnso n’ s R e que st

On J une 9, 2006, Petitioner Do nnie E. Johns on filed, pursua nt to Tennessee Code Anno tate d, se c tio n 4 0- 30 -3 01 , a pe tit ion fo r DN A a na ly sis in t

he She lby County Cr imi na l Co ur

t. 1 I n his petition, J ohnson reque s t ed testing of the g arba g e bagthat was found in Mrs. Johnson’s mouth. Rely ing upon our supreme c ourt’s statement that “ there is no question but that [ Petitioner J ohnson] or one Ronnie McCoy murdere d her,” the Petitioner asser ts that DNA testing of the g arba g e bagcan pr ove the Petitioner’s innoc ence and McCoy ’s g uilt.

Petit i o n er J ohnson asserts that the g arba g e bagis in the possession of the Clerk of Court for the T hirtie t h J udicial District and is in such condition that DNA a naly sis may

be conduc ted. He f urther as serts that the plastic g arba g e baghas neve r bee n subjected to DN A ana ly sis. The Pe tit ion e r f

ur the r m a intain s th at “ [f]o re ns ic DN A a na ly sis of bio log ic a l mate ri a l on

[the pla sti c g arba g e bag ] can establish with prec ision who force d the g arba g e baginto Mrs. J ohnson’s mouth. Specifica lly , skin cells, sweat, saliva and other biolo gi cal material transf err ed fr om the perpe trator on to the g arba g e bagcan a nswer the critica l question [ of who killed Mrs. Johnson, the Petitioner or Ronnie McCoy ].” I n this reg ard, Petitioner Jo h n s o n m ai n tains that “[a]
re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity e xists that ana ly sis of the e vid e nc e wi ll pr od uc e DN A re su lts wh ic h w ou ld have r ender ed the ve rdict ag ainst Mr. J ohnson or his sentence more fa vorable if the re sults had been a vailable at his trial.”

T h e S t at e o f T en n es s ee fi l eda r es p o n s e t o P et i t i o n er J o h n s o n ’s re qu es tfo r D NA t e s t i n g, asser ting that the Petitioner c annot sati s fy p ro n g one of the DNA statute in that e ven if the D NA of Ronnie McCoy

is found on the g arba g e bag , Petitioner J ohnson wou l d s t i l l h av e been cha rg ed and convic ted of the murde r of Conni e J o h n s o n

. Specifica lly , the State ar g ues that, as both men worke d at the location where the plastic g arba g e bagwas store d, t h e fi n d i n g o f the DNA on the g arba g e bag f

rom McCoy

would not exonerate the Petitioner. Additionally , the State contends that any DNA f rom random skin ce l ls from a third par ty would have be en over come by the victim’s DNA.

II. P os t- Co nvi c ti on C our t’ s R uling4

On Octobe r 9, 2006, the post-c onviction court ente red its orde r deny ing post-co n v i cti on DNA testing . The c ourt deter mined that “the pe titioner has fa iled to meet the cr it er i a for DNA Analy sis, under both the man d atory and discre tionary

portions of the Ac t, as outlined in Tenn. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 0-301 et s eq .” Specif ically , the post-conviction cour t found that, “[g]iven the ci rc u m s tance s of the victim’s murder and the e vidence prese nted at trial,” the abse nce of the Pe tit ion e r’ s D NAon

the g arb a g e ba g wo uld

no t c re a te a

re a so na ble pr ob abi li ty

tha t he wo uld either not have bee n prose cu t ed or would not have been c onvicted of his wife ’s murder

. Simi larly , neither w ould the prese n ce of Ronnie McCoy ’s DNA on the g arba g e bagcre ate a
rea sonab l e p ro b ability

that the Petitioner would either not have bee n prosec uted or would not have be en convic ted of the murde r. In rea chingthese c onclusions, the lower c ourt ac knowledg ed that “evide nce pr esente d at trial, indicate d the victim strugg led with her attacker and the violent nature of her

death led he r t o d ep o s i t vomit, s aliva, mucus, blood and pe rhaps other biologica l sp e c ime ns on to t

he ba g .” Ad dit ion a lly , th e g arb a g e bagwa s ta ke n f ro m a pu bli c pla c e and

it i s possible that various DNA sa mples from multiple persons could have bee n d eposited on the ba g prior to the murde r.
Th e l o w e r c o u rt a c kn o w l e d g e d t h a t “ [t ]h e r e i s n o qu e s t i o n t h a t M c C o y w a s i nv olv e d in removingthe victim’s body from the of

fice to her c ar.” I n this rega rd , t h e post-conviction cour t opined that “it i s possible that during this intera ction McCoy may have de posited DNA on the g arb a g e ba g .” Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt c on c lud e d th a t, “ even if th e DN A b e lon g s to Mc Coy , it could have just as easily

been de posited on the g arba g e bagprior t o o r s u b s equent to the murder. Thus, the pre sence of McCoy ’s DNA on t he bagwould not, alone, demonstrate [P ]etit ioner’s innocenc e.”

III. Th e P ost-Conviction DNA A nalysi s Act The Post-Conviction DNA Analy sis Act of 2001 provides that a person c onvicted of
cer tain enumer ated c ri m es , i n cl u d ing f irst deg ree murder, ma

y , at any time , file a pe tition reque sting for ensic DN A an al y s is of any evidenc e (1) in the possession or control of the prosec ution, law enfor ceme nt, laboratory , or cour t, and (2) that is related to the inve stigation or prosec ution which resulted in the judg ment of convic tion and which may contain biolog ical evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30- 303 (2003). The Act provide s no statutory time limi t and g ives petitioners the opportunity to reque st analy sis at “any time,” whethe r or not su ch a request was made at trial. Gr iff

in v . S tate , 1 82 S.W. 3d

79 5, 79 9 ( Te nn. 2 00 6) . Apo st- c on vic tio n c ourt is obligated to order

DNA a naly sis when the petitioner ha s met ea ch of the followingfour
c on dit ion s: (1) A re asonable probability exis ts t h at t he petitioner w ould not have bee n prosec uted or c onvicted if exculpatory results had been obtained throug h DNA
ana ly sis ; (2) The e vidence is stil l in ex istence a nd in suc h condition that DNA ana ly sis may be conduc ted;5

(3) The e vidence was ne ver pr eviously s u b j ec ted to DNA a

naly sis or was not subjected to the a

naly sis that is now r eq uested whic h could re solve an issue not resolved by

previous ana ly sis; and (4) The a

pplication for a

naly sis is m ade f

or the purpose of demonst ra t ing innocenc e and not to unre asonably delay t h e execution of sentenc e or administration of justice.

T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 30 4 ( 20 03 ); se e als o G rif fin , 1 82 S.W.3d

a t 79 8. Ad dit ion a lly , if

DN A a na ly sis would have produce d a more favor able ve rdict or se ntence if the re sults had been available at the proce edi n gs l ea d i ng up to the conviction or sente nce, the n the post-conviction cour t may order DN A a na ly sis wh e n t he pet iti on e r m e e ts the same c on dit ion s. T. C.A . § 40 -3 0- 30 5 ( 20 03 ); see als o Gr iff

in , 1 82 S.W. 3d

a t 79 8. I n e ith e r i ns tanc e , s ome ph y sic a l e vid e nc e mus t be ava ila ble and in a pr oper c ondition to enable a DN A ana ly sis. T.C.A. § 40-30-304(2); § 40- 30-305(2)

. “I f the state c ontests the prese nce of any qualifying c riteria a

nd it is apparent that e ach prer equisite ca

nnot be established, the [post-conviction] court has the a uthority to dism iss the petition.” Ma rc us Nix on v . S tate , No. W2005-02158-CCA-R3-WM, 2006 W L851764, at *3 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. , at J ac k s o n , Ap r. 3 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g W ill iam D. Bu

for d v . S tate , No. M2002- 02180-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 W L1937110, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr

. 24, 2003), p erm. to appeal denied, ( T e n n

. , 2 0 0 3 ) )

. T h a t is , a p e ti ti o n e r ’ s f a il u r e to me et any

of the qualifying c riteria is fatal to the action. Bu for d , N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 2 1 8 0

- CC A

- R3

- PC , 2 0 0 3 WL 1937110, at *6.

Th e po st -con vict ion

c ourt is a ff or de d c on sid e ra

ble dis c re tio n in

de te rm ini ngwh e the r t o g rant a petitioner re lief under

the Act, a

nd the scope of appe llate r eview is limited. See Se dley Al le yv . S tate , No. W 2 0 0 4 -01204-CC A-R3-PD, 2004 WL1196095, at * 4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, May

26, 2004), perm. to appeal de nied , (Tenn., O ct. 4, 2004), cert. de nied , 54 4 U .S. 9 5 0 , 1 2 5 S

. C t

. 1 6 9 5 (2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g J ac k J ay Sh utt le v . S

tate , N o. E2 00 3- 00 13 1- CCA -R 3- PC, 2004 WL 199826, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Kn o x v i l l e, De c. 16, 2003), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. A

pr. 2, 2004) ( citation omitted)). In making its d ec i s i o n, the post-conviction cour t must conside r all the ava ilable evidenc e, includingthe evidenc e pre sented at trial and any stipulations of fact made by either pa rty

. Id. The l o wer court may also consider

the opinions of this Co u rt an d th e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u rt o n d ir e c t a

p p e a l o f th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s c o n v ic ti ons or the appe als of the pe titioner’s prior post-c onviction or habe as cor pus actions. Id. O na

p p e lla te revie w, this Court will not reve rse unless t h e j u d gm en t of the lower court is not supported by
s u b s t anti al evidenc e. Id. (c i t i n g W ill ie Tom En sle

y v . S tate , N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 6 0 9

- C C A

- R 3- PC, 2003 WL 1868647, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 11, 2003) ).

IV . Sa ti sfyi ng t he St at ut or y C r it e r ia

A. Existence of Evid ence and P rior Test ing of Evid ence6

The lowe r cour

t found that the plastic g arba g e bagwas still in ex istence a nd had neve r been subje cted to DNA testing. The lowe r cour t noted that “[i] t is somewhat unclea r to this court wh e the r t he e vid e nc e in q

ue sti on is s til l in

a c on dit ion

that w ou ld a llo w i t to be su bje c te d to DNA Ana ly sis.” We would observe that no expert tes timony was off ere d by the Petitioner at the hear ing w ith reg ard to this issue. Nonethele ss, while acknow ledg ing the “unknown” condition of the bagat the pre sent, the cour t assumed “the ba g is in suit able c ondition for testing.”

As th er e has not been suffic ient proof to contr adict the f inding of the lower

court that the
sampl e is s uf

fi c ie nt f or DN A t e sti ng , th is C ourt

wi ll p re sume t hat biolo g ic a l e vid e nc e sti ll e xists and is of suff

icient quantity an d co n d i t i o n to be tested for purposes of e valuatingthe statutory criter ia. SeeT.C.A. § 40-30-304( 2),(3) ; § 40-30-305(2) , (3).

B. R e as ona ble P r oba bili tyof D iffer e ntRe sult The Post-Conviction DNA Analy sis Act was e nacte d in rec og nition of the possi b ility that a per son has bee n wrong fully convicted o r sentenc ed. Sh utt le , N o. E2 00 3- 00 13 1- CCA -R 3- PC, 20 04 WL19 98 26 , at *5 (c itatio n o mitte d) . In th is r e g a rd , th e po st- c on vic tio n co urt is to a ssume that the “DN A ana ly sis will reveal e x culpatory results in the court’ s determination as to whe ther to o r d e r D N A te s ti ng .” Id. The Petitioner asse rts, relying upon pr ior dec isions of this C ourt, see ge ne ra lly Sh utt le , No. E2003-00131- CCA-R3-PC, 2004 W L199826, at *1, that t he deter mination of whether

a par ticular c ase me ets the re asonable pro b ability standard is not base d on the ty pe of e vidence that was used to obtain th e co n v i ct i on, nor on the stre ng th of the State’s
case . Rath er , h e contends that what is decisive under the re asonable probability standard is the probative v al ue of the evidenc e soug ht to be tested or, in other words, the sig nificanc e that exculpatory

DNA test re sults would have in the ca se.
Continui ng , Petitioner J ohnson argues that the lowe r cour t, although rec i ting the
rea sonable probabi l i t y l anguag e of the statute, “e rrone ously imposed a hig her, a ctual innoce nce burden.” I n support of this contention, P etitioner Johns on cites to the lower court’s state ment

“ me re ly e xcu lpator

y re su lts wi tho ut c omp ari so n to Mc Coy wo uld no t e sta bli sha re a so na ble pr o b a b il it y th a t p r o s e c u to r ’ s [s ic ] w o u ld f o r e g o th e ir p r o s e c u ti o n o f p e ti ti o n e r o r that a jury
wo uld have a c qu itt e d h im o f t his c ri me .” Pe tit ion e r Johnsona sse rt s th a t th e “ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity” sta nd ard do e s not re qu ir e the a

pp lic ant to s ho w that f

a vo ra ble te st r e su lts wi ll w ho lly
e xonerate him

or pr ov e his “ a c tua l inno c e nc e ,” or e ve n th a t th e te sts are lik e ly to c ome ba c k in his favor. Petitioner John s o n further asser ts that the lower c ourt improperly based the “re asonable probability ” re quirement on the stre ng th of the State’s c ase. F urthermor e, in support
o f h i s reque st for DNAtesting, the Petitioner asserts that the e vidence , i.e., the plastic g arba ge bag , is “c le ar ly ‘ li n k e d to th e c o mm is s io n o f th e c r im e

. ’ ” H e c o n te n d s th a t th e lo w e r c o u rt w as require d to pr esume that DNA f rom this evidence would have c ome from Ronnie McCoy and not the Petitioner. He f

urther c oncludes that if the D NA evide nce f rom the pl as t i c garb ag e bag comes from Ronn ie M c Co y , th e nth e r e is a r e a s o n a b le p r o b a b il it y th a t P e ti ti o n e r

w o u ld n o t h a ve been pr osecute d o r co n v i cted be cause there would be DNAevidenc e that he did not touch the murder w eapon.7

I n both Alley I and Alley II
, t h is Court recog nized that “[a] ‘re asonable probability ’ of a dif fe re nt r e su lt e xists wh e n th e e vid e nc e a t is su e , in thi s c a se po te nti a lly

fa vo ra ble DN A r e su lts , undermines c onfidenc e in the outcome of the prosec ution.” Sedle yAl le yv . S tate , No. W2006- 01179-CCA-R3-PD , 2 0 0 6 W L1703820, at *9 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, June 22, 2006), perm. to appeal de nied, (T e nn . Jun e 27 , 2 00 6) ; S e d l e y A l le y v . Stat e , No. W2004-01204-CCAR3- PD, 20 04 WL11 96 09 5, a t *9 ; see, e .g., State v. W orkman , 11 1 S.W. 3d 10 , 18 (T e nn . Cr im. App. 2002). Notwithstanding its consideration o f t h e “potentially favor able” DNA testing results, the re viewing court c annot ig nore the exis ti n g ev i d ence. See A lley , No. W2004-01204- CCA -R 3- PD, 20 04 WL11 96 09 5, at *9. T hat is , th e c on vic te d d e fe nd ant r e qu e sti ngpo stconviction DNA a

naly sis is not provided a presumption of innoce nce, a nd the re viewingcourt need not ig nore a ll the other proof supporting the conviction.

1. Thi rd-P arty Evidence

I n its order, the post-c o n v i ct i on court, re cog nizi ng this Court’s holdi ng in Alley II , aff irmed the State’s posit i o n t hat a c omparison with a third-pa rty ’s DNA is not per

mitted under the Act. In this reg ard, the Petitioner raises numer ous challeng es to this Court’s h o l ding that the Post-Convi ction DNA Ana ly sis Act scope e x cludes third-pa rty evidenc e.
T his Court held, in Alley II , th a t “ [t ]h e A c t’ s r e a c h is li mi te d to th e p e r f o rmanc e of D NA
an al y s i s which compa

res the pe titioner’s DNA to samples taken fr om biologica l specimens g ather ed at the time of

the offe nse.” Alley , No. W2006-01179-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 W L 1 7 0 3820 at *9. The r esults o f DN A t es t i n g must stand alone and do not enc ompass a spec ulative nationwid e s ea rch for the possibility of a third pa

rty perpe trator. The Petitioner asserts that the

“ AlleyRule cre ates obstac les to full participation by ar t i fi ci ally limit ing the scope of

the DNA Ac t’ s e nq

uir y to no t in c lud e the re a l- wo rl d p os sib ili ty of an o utc ome -c ha

ng ing -t hir d- pa rt y matc h

. ” H e a d d it io n a ll y c o n te n d s th a t the AlleyRule is contrary to the holding of

the United St a te s Su p r e me Co u rt in Ho l me s v. South Carolina , 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. C t. 1727 (2006), and violates established princ iples of proc ed u ral due proce ss. This Court addressed a nd reje cted the Petitioner’s conc erns in Alley , No. W2006-01179-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 1703820, at *8-9.

Fur ther, it does not appe ar that the po s t -c o n v iction court applied the holding in Alley II
, ref err ed to by

the Petitioner as the Alley II Rule, in the prese nt case . The post-c onviction court distinguished the situation in Alley II , wher e petitioner soug ht to compare DNA samples found
on c e rt a in e vid e nc e to D NAsampl e s o f u nk no wn thi rd pa rt ie s, to t he si tu a tio n in

the pr e se nt c a se wher e the Petitioner see ks to compare rec overe d DNA with DNA samples taken fr om a potential
acc omplice at the time of the orig inal prosec ution, i.e. , R o n n ie McCoy . Whil e the lowe r cour t
a c kn o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e P o s t

- C o n v i c t i o n D N A A n a l y s i s A c t d i d n o t a p p e ar t o p e r

m i t the DN A t o be c omp are d to tha

t of Ronnie Mc Coy , th e c ourt a ssume d th a t McC oy ’s DNA wa s ava ila ble to be tested a

nd that DNA a

naly sis would show Ronnie M cC o y ’s DNA on the g arba g e bag . The lower c ourt’s pre sumptions were made with the acknow ledg ments tha t M cC o y could not be fo rc e d to pr ov ide a

ne w DNA sampl e and

tha t it wa s n ot c le ar t

hat th e e xistin g sampl e s w e re in such condition for a

compar ison due to their ag e.8 2. Evi de nc e of P e ti ti one r ’s G uilt A summary

of the e x i s t i n g evidenc e supportingthe Petitioner’s identification as the pe rp e tr a tor

of the vic tim ’s mur de r i s a s f oll ow s:
1. Th e Pe t i t i o n e r

an d t h e v i c t i m w e r e m ar

r i e d an d h a d e xp e r i e n c e d

d i f f i c u l t i e s in the ir marr ia g e . T he vic tim , Conn ie John so n, ha d p re vio us ly thr e a te ne d to se pa

rate from the Petitioner. 2. Ronnie McCoy

testified that, on t h e ev ening of De cembe r 8, 1984, he ha d left the P etitioner and Mr s. J ohnson alone in the off ice at the campingcente r for
a pp ro xima te ly

te n to fi ft e e n mi nute s. Whe n M c Coy ret urn e d to the of fi c e , M rs

. J ohnson was dea d.

3. Th e Pe tit ion e r a

nd Ronnie Mc Coy

tr ans po rt e d th e bo dy

of Connie John so n in Mrs. J ohnson’s van a

nd left the va

n with the d ece ased’ s body in a shopping cente r pa rk inglot

. 4. The Petitioner and Ronnie Mc Coy place d Mrs. J ohnson’s g lasses, shoes, c oat and ea rring s in the van.

5

. T h e P et i t i o n er

co n t ac t edBa rry

P fi s t er at 9 : 0 0 p

. m

. o nS at u rd ay ev en i n g, inq u ir in g a b o u t h is w if

e

. Sp e c if ic a ll y , h e in f

o r me d Pf is te r th a t h is w if

e was g oing to m e e t hi m at th e sa le s o ff ic e and a sk e d Pf ist e r t o in fo rm

he r t hat he wa s o n h is
w ay.
6. The Petitioner drove to the place of employ ment of a f

ormer g irlfriend be tween 7 : 3 0 an d 8 : 0 0 p

. m

. o nS at u rd ay

ev en i n g.
7. The Petitioner conta cted his employ er the next m orni n g m ak i n g an inquiry as to the wher eabouts of his wife

. 8. Mr s. John so n’ s v an c on ta ine d n o ignit ion ke y s. Mrs

. J oh ns on ’s ig nit ion ke y s, the only set, and o ther pe rsonal items wer e found be hind the seat of the Petitioner’s truck.

9. I n his state ment to the police, the Petitioner never mentioned Ronnie McCoy as a su sp e c t in th e de a th o f t

he vic tim . Ind e e d, the Pe tit ion e r f ir st i mpl ic a te d Ro nn ie Mc Coy a t th e pe na lty

ph a se of his tr ia l, o nly

a ft e r b e ingfo un d guil ty

of the fi rs t9

de g re e mur de r o f h is w if

e . T he Pe tit ion e r o ff

e re d n o e xplanatio n as to wh y he did not report Mc Coy ’s involvement in the homicide until the penalty phase.

Th is C ourt

fu rt he r r e c og nize s th a t th e re is n o d isp ute tha t bo th t he Pe tit ion e r a

nd Ronnie McCoy wer e pre sent at the time the body of the victim was tra

nsported.

3. Review of L ower Court’s F ind ings The post-c onvi ct i o n court concluded that “ [g]iven the evidenc e pre sented at trial and the circ umstances surr ounding the victim’s death . . . , t h i s co u rt ca n not say that the pre sence of Mc Coy ’s DN A o n th e garbag e ba g us e d to su ff oc a te the vic tim , if

kn ow n p ri or

to t ri a l, w ou ld have pr eclude d the prosec ution or conviction o f p et i t i o n er f or the murde r of his wife .” The court added that “this court ca

n not say that, even if

exculpatory

results wer e produc ed, the c onfidenc e in the outcome of the prosec ution of petitioner’s ca se would be unde rmined.”

I n rea ch i n g i t s conclusion, t he lower court c onsidered the fac t that “the g arba g e bagthat
wa s u se d to su ff

oc a te the vic timwa s ta

ke n f ro m th e pe tit ion e r’ s o ff

ic e , a pu bli c pla c e .” Thus , t h e c o u rta c kn o w l e d g e d

t h a tD N A s am p l e s f

r o mnu m e r o u s p e r s o n s , i n c l u d i n g R o n n i e M c C o y, co u ld have be en deposited on the g arba g e bag . Additionally , it is probable that Ronnie McCoy ’s DNA wa s deposited on the g arba g e bagduring his admitted involvement in the trans fe r o f t he victim’s b o d y
. Given McCoy ’s employ ment at the ca

mping c enter

and his involvement in the t ra n s f e r o f t h e v i ct i m ’s b o dy , i ti s p ro b ab l e t h atR o n n i e M cC o y ’s DN A i s o nt h e ga rb age b ag. Thus, consideringthese fa cts, this Court, as found b y t h e l o wer court, c annot conc lude that the prese n ce o f M cC o y ’s DNA on the g arba g e bagwould have le d the State to fore g o prosec ution
and /or re su lte d in

the Pe tit ion e r n ot b e ingc on vic te d. Mo re ov e r, thi s Co urt , as found by the po stc on vic tio n c ourt , c ann ot c on c lud e tha t th e pr e se nc e of

Ronnie Mc Coy ’s DN A o n th e pla sti c g arba g e b a g w o u ld

h av e r e n d e r e d

th e Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s v e r d ic t o r s e n te n c e mo r e f

a v o r a ble. Ac c or din g ly , th is C ourt

c on c lud e s th a t th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt ha s n ot a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in d en yi n g p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nDN A a n al y s i s o nt h e p l as t i c ga rb age b ag.
C. Mot ivation of

Bringin g P etition The post-c onviction concluded that it “ha[d] serious quest i o n s reg ardingthe motivations of the pe tit ion e r f

or ra isi ngthi s is su e a t th is t ime .” Whil e a c kn ow le dg ingthat a pe tit ion for po stconviction DNA a

naly sis may

be broug ht at any

time, the post-convi ct i o n court noted that the item which P et itioner now see ks to have tested ha s been a vailable since befor e the Petitioner’s trial. The post-c onviction court fur ther noted that the p re s en t p et i tion was the first attempt by Pe ti ti o n e r , s in c e th e p a s s a g e o f th e Po s t- Co n v ic ti o n D N A A n a ly s is A c t in 2 0 0 1 , to have the plastic g arba g e bagtested. Given the fac t tha t the Petitioner’s re quest was made four months prior to his scheduled e x ecution, the post-c o n v i cti on court found the motivation in bringing the petition suspect. Notwithstanding the se conc erns, the c ourt ac cepte d defe nse counse l’s asser tions reg ardingthe evolution of DNAtesting.10 CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon our r eview of the re cord be fore us, inclu d i n g t h e Petitioner’s brie f and the State’s re s p o n s e, we c onclude that the post-c onviction court prope rly considere d all of the evidenc e bef

ore it. More over, w e conc lude that the re cord supports the post-conviction cour t’s conclusions that the Petitioner fa iled to establi s h that (1) a rea sonable proba

bility exis ts that the Petition er wo u l d not have be en prose cuted or convicted if

exculpatory

results had be en obtained thr ou g h D NAana ly sis and (2 ) a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity e xists that ana ly sis of

the e vid e nc e wi ll produce DNA r esults which would have rende red the Petitioner’s v er d i ct or sente nce mor e favor able if the results had be en ava ilable at the proc eeding s leadingto the judgme nt of conviction. See T.C.A. §§ 40-30-304( 1), -305( 1). Ac cording ly , the post-conviction cour t did not
e rr by de nyingthe Pe tit ion e r’ s r e qu e st f or DN A a na ly sis

. The judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAV ID G. H AYE S , J UDGE