2015 IL App (1st) 142421

No. 1-14-2421 

Opinion filed January 9, 2015

Third Division 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re SHERMAINE S., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

Shermaine S., a Minor, 

Respondent-Appellant). 

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County. 

No. 14 JD 768 

The Honorable 

Stuart Katz, 

Judge, presiding. 

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JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Pucinski and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Respondent contends the habitual offender provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 

(705 ILCS 405/5-815 (West 2012)) is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the 

United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportional penalties clause of 

the Illinois Constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970, art I., § 11). The gist of his argument is that (i) the 

mandatory sentencing provision violates the eighth amendment by precluding the sentencing 

court from taking into consideration individualized factors about the minor, including the 
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offender's youth and attendant characteristics as delineated by the United States Supreme 

Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012), and (ii) taking 

away the sentencing court's discretion violates the proportionate penalties clause of the 

Illinois Constitution, which mandates a court consider rehabilitation in imposing a sentence. 

We are compelled to affirm based on existing precedent set forth some 35 years ago in 

People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67 (1980). 

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, respondent, 17-year-old Shermaine S., was convicted of robbery 

for taking an iPhone. Shermaine was adjudicated a delinquent minor and, because this was 

his third offense, sentenced as a habitual juvenile offender and committed to the Department 

of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) until his twenty first birthday as required by section 5-815(f) of the 

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2012)). 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On March 7, 2014, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for Shermaine, 

who was 16 years old at the time. The petition alleged that Shermaine stole an iPhone from 

Ashley Bradley and charged him with one count each of robbery, theft from person, and 

simple battery. The State proceeded on one count of robbery and entered nolle posequi on the 

other two counts. On March 13, 2014, the State gave notice of its intent to charge Shermaine

as a habitual juvenile offender under section 5-815 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-815 (West 

2012)), based on Shermaine's two prior adjudications for burglary. 

¶ 5 At trial, Ashley Bradley testified that on March 6, 2014, she was walking home at about 

11:30 a.m. near 46th Street and Lake Park Avenue, Chicago. As Bradley listened to music on 

her iPhone, a person she identified as Shermaine grabbed her from behind and reached for 

her phone, which she was carrying in her right hand. Bradley turned around and looked at 
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Shermaine's face for a "good two seconds." She said Shermaine told her to give him the 

phone but she resisted and tried to pull away. Shermaine then twisted her right arm, threw her 

to the ground, took the phone along with a Target bag she was holding in her left hand, and 

ran off. Bradley and a man standing nearby ran after Shermaine west on 46th Street and saw 

Shermaine turn right and head north on Woodlawn Avenue when they lost sight of him. 

Bradley used the man's cell phone to call the police. 

¶ 6 A few minutes later, two Chicago police officers, Isaac Lee and Arturo Martinez, arrived 

in a marked squad car. The bystander who had assisted Bradley left the scene and was not 

questioned by the police. Bradley described the perpetrator as an 18- to 21-year-old African 

American male, 5 feet 8 inches to 6 feet tall, with a light to medium build, dreadlocks, dark 

skin, and wearing a long, black coat. Lee and Martinez drove Bradley around the area, and 

within about five minutes, Bradley saw Shermaine on the street and when he was about 15 

feet away told the officers, "That's him." 

¶ 7 Officer Lee testified that Shermaine was walking briskly, but when he saw the squad car, 

he turned and started to run away. The officers followed Shermaine to a vacant lot, where 

Lee got out of the car and chased Shermaine on foot. Lee followed Shermaine to the back of 

an apartment building at 4335 South Berkeley. Lee said that as Shermaine went up the back

steps, he saw Shermaine drop something into the vacant lot next door. Lee continued to 

pursue Shermaine, who was banging on the apartment door but was unable to gain entry. Lee 

arrested Shermaine on the apartment's porch landing. Lee later retrieved the object

Shermaine dropped, Bradley's cell phone. 

¶ 8 Shermaine testified that on March 6, 2014, he was visiting his aunt at her second-floor 

apartment at 4335 South Berkley. He left the apartment sometime before noon, and as he was 
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walking to meet his mother, a man that Shermaine recognized from the neighborhood 

approached and offered to sell him a cell phone for $30. Shermaine said he "knew there was 

something to it, but [he] just bought" it anyway because he needed a phone. Shermaine

continued walking. When he got to Drexel Avenue, Shermaine saw a university security 

police car nearby, got worried because he knew the phone was "not legit," turned around and 

started walking back to his aunt's apartment. He said a police squad car then drove up and 

almost hit him. Shermaine starting running back to his aunt's apartment building, with the 

police car in pursuit. Shermaine went to the back of the apartment and banged on the door, 

but no one opened it. Shermaine threw the phone away and was placed under arrest. 

Shermaine denied having gone to 46th Street and Park Avenue that day, said he had never 

seen Ashley Bradley before the trial, and denied stealing her cell phone. On crossexamination, Shermaine stated that he could not identify the person from whom he bought 

the cell phone or remember what the man was wearing but described him as about his own 

age, with a similar hair style and hair color. 

¶ 9 The jury found Shermaine guilty on one count of robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the 

State argued that Shermaine should be sentenced as a habitual juvenile offender based on two 

dispositions for burglary in 2012 and 2013. Certified copies of court date summaries for the 

two prior adjudications were entered into evidence. Defense counsel acknowledged that the 

trial judge was "limited in discretion in this matter," because the prerequisites were met to 

sentence Shermaine as a habitual juvenile offender. 

¶ 10 Before sentencing Shermaine, the trial judge acknowledged he received Shermaine's 

social investigation report. The report stated, among other things, that in 2007, Shermaine 

was removed from his mother's custody for about a year in response to a report of child 
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endangerment. Shermaine's father had numerous arrests and served time in the Department of 

Corrections, and Shermaine's mother was arrested for prostitution in 2012 and received a 

sentence of three months' supervision. Shermaine also had numerous contacts with law 

enforcement for various offenses, including battery, burglary, and possession of a stolen 

motor vehicle. In 2011, Shermaine was shot in the leg while standing on a friend's porch. 

Shermaine was living with his mother in Gary, Indiana, and the whereabouts of his father 

were unknown. The report indicated that Shermaine loves his parents but that because of 

frequent fights with his mother, including physical violence against her, he has lived

elsewhere for periods of time. 

¶ 11 The circuit court found that it was in best interest of Shermaine and the public for 

Shermaine to be adjudged a ward of the court and that his parents were unfit or unable to care 

for him. The court also found, based on Shermaine's prior dispositions, that he was a habitual 

juvenile offender and sentenced him to a mandatory term of commitment to the DJJ until his 

twenty first birthday. 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Shermaine contends the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act violates the eighth 

amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the 

Illinois Constitution because it removes the trial court's discretion in sentencing minors who 

are adjudicated habitual juvenile offenders. Shermaine relies primarily on the Supreme Court 

decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), to argue that removal of 

discretion violates the eighth amendment, which requires "a sentencer [to] follow a certain 

process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a 

particular penalty." Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. Shermaine asserts that it also violates the 
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proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, which mandates a court consider 

rehabilitation in imposing a sentence. 

¶ 14 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the eighth 

amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the 

Illinois Constitution do not apply to juvenile proceedings initiated by a petition for 

adjudication of wardship. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 520-21 (2006). The court 

explained that both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause apply only 

to the criminal process, "that is, to direct actions by the government to inflict punishment." 

Id. at 518. The court concluded that an adjudication of wardship was not criminal in nature 

and therefore, was not a direct action by the State to inflict punishment within the meaning of 

the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause. Id. at 520-21. But, as another 

panel of this court held in In re A.P., 2014 IL App (1st) 140327, ¶ 13, even if the eighth 

amendment and proportionate penalties clause applied to the Act, the habitual offender 

provision is constitutional based on current precedent. 

¶ 15 Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, subject to de novo review. People 

v. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d 452, 466 (2011). Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. 

Id. To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish 

that it violates the constitution. Id. If reasonably possible, this court will construe a statute so 

as to affirm its constitutionality. People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007). Accordingly, 

we will resolve any doubt as to the construction of a statute in favor of its validity. People v. 

Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7 (2010). A challenge to the facial validity of a statute is the 

most difficult challenge to mount successfully because an enactment is invalid on its face

only if no set of circumstances exists under which it would be valid. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d at 466. 
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A statute's invalidity in one set of circumstances does not suffice to prove its facial invalidity. 

In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d 517, 536-37 (2006). “Thus, so long as there exists a situation in which 

a statute could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail. [Citation.]" (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d at 466. 

¶ 16 Eighth Amendment 

¶ 17 The eighth amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 

prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment for criminal offenses that are 

disproportionate in relation to the offense committed or the status of the offender. U.S. 

Const., amend. VIII. The eighth amendment's ban on excessive sanctions flows from the 

basic principle that criminal punishment should be graduated and proportioned to both the 

offender and the offense. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132. S. Ct. at 2463. To determine whether a 

punishment is so disproportionate as to be “cruel and unusual,” a court must look beyond 

history to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 

¶ 18 Shermaine contends the habitual juvenile offender provision in section 5-815 of the Act

violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, because it imposes a 

mandatory sentence without considering whether it is disproportionate in relation to the 

offense committed. Section 5-815 provides: 

"(a) Definition. Any minor having been twice adjudicated a delinquent minor for 

offenses which, had he been prosecuted as an adult, would have been felonies under 

the laws of this State, and who is thereafter adjudicated a delinquent minor for a third 

time shall be adjudged an Habitual Juvenile Offender where: 
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 1. the third adjudication is for an offense occurring after adjudication on the

second; and 

 2. the second adjudication was for an offense occurring after adjudication on the 

first; and

 3. the third offense occurred after January 1, 1980; and 

 4. the third offense was based upon the commission of or attempted commission 

of the following offenses: first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary 

manslaughter; criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault; 

aggravated or heinous battery involving permanent disability or disfigurement or 

great bodily harm to the victim; burglary of a home or other residence intended for 

use as a temporary or permanent dwelling place for human beings; home invasion; 

robbery or armed robbery; or aggravated arson. 

Nothing in this section shall preclude the State's Attorney from seeking to 

prosecute a minor as an adult as an alternative to prosecution as an habitual juvenile 

offender.

 * * * 

(f) Disposition. If the court finds that the prerequisites establishes in subsection 

(a) of this Section have been proven, it shall adjudicate the minor an Habitual 

Juvenile Offender and commit him to the Department of Juvenile Justice until his 

21st birthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized 

absence. However, the minor shall be entitled to earn one day of good conduct credit 

for each day served as reductions against the period of his confinement. Such good 

conduct credits shall be earned or revoked according to the procedures applicable to 
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the allowance and revocation of good conduct credit for adult prisoners serving

determinate sentences for felonies." 705 ILCS 405/5-815 (West 2012). 

¶ 19 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the mandatory sentencing provision of the Act 

does not violate the eighth amendment. People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67 

(1980). Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 

263 (1980), which upheld a Texas recidivist statute that prescribed life imprisonment after 

conviction of three felonies, the Illinois Supreme Court in Chrastka held that sentencing a 

habitual juvenile offender to a mandatory minimum sentence of commitment until the age of 

21 years did not violate the eighth amendment. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 81-82. Specifically, the 

court concluded that "[s]tate legislatures have traditionally been allowed wide latitude in 

setting penalties for State crimes [citation], and we do not believe that the disposition 

authorized here rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment by any stretch of the 

imagination." Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 81-82. 

¶ 20 Shermaine acknowledges the holding in Chrastka, as well as its recent application in In 

re A.P., 2014 IL App (1st) 140327 (holding that habitual juvenile offender provision of the 

Juvenile Court Act did not violate the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause 

of the Illinois Constitution), but contends that Chrastka and Rummel, on which it relies are 

"out of step" with current case law and should be reconsidered in light of recent United States 

Supreme Court decisions recognizing expansive eighth amendment protections for minors 

found guilty of crimes. 

¶ 21 In a series of decisions over the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has 

determined that the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment 

prevents imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed by juveniles (Roper v. 
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Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005)), a sentence of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses (Graham v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010)), and a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole 

for homicide committed by a juvenile (Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). In each of 

these cases, the Supreme Court relied on the results of scientific and sociological studies 

documenting the fundamental differences between juvenile and adult offenders convicted of 

the same crimes. As summarized by the Court in Miller:

“First, children have a ‘ “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 

responsibility,” ’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. 

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S. Ct. 1183. Second, children ‘are more vulnerable ... to 

negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers; 

they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the ability to 

extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child's 

character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult's; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions 

less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ Id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. 1183." 

Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 

¶ 22 Miller, on which Shermaine primarily relies, involved two 14-year-olds convicted of 

murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller, 567 U.S. 

at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. In reaching the conclusion that mandatory life sentences without 

the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violated the eighth amendment, the Supreme 

Court relied on a confluence of “categorical bans on sentencing practices based on 

mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty” (id. 

at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2463) and prohibitions on “mandatory imposition of capital punishment, 
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requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details 

of his offense before sentencing him to death.” Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463-64. 

¶ 23 The Court emphasized that a mandatory life sentence without parole for a juvenile did not 

allow for consideration of the offender's age and "its hallmark features—among them, 

immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. Id. at ___, 132. S.

Ct. at 2468. The Court concluded that "in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer 

misses too much if he treats every child as an adult." Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 

¶ 24 Shermaine contends that like the mandatory life sentence in Miller, the habitual juvenile 

offender provision of the Act violates the eighth amendment because it only allows one 

sentence—incarceration until the juvenile's twenty first birthday—and precludes the court 

from considering other factors, including the offender's youth, his or her potential for 

rehabilitation, the circumstances of the offense, and his or her family environment. 

Shermaine asserts that the Court's holding in Miller supports a finding that a mandatory 

sentencing provision like the one applied to habitual juvenile offenders under the Act violates 

the eighth amendment. 

¶ 25 Miller, however, is factually distinguishable and does not support deviating from 

precedent established in Chrastka, which, as an appellate court, we are required to follow. In 

Miller, and the cases it relies on, Roper, and Graham, the defendants were under the age of 

18, but were tried as adults in the criminal system. Conversely, Shermaine, who was also 

under the age of 18, was sentenced as a juvenile under the Act. Further, the Miller Court did 

not hold that the eighth amendment prohibited any mandatory penalties but, rather, only 

mandatory life sentences. While Shermaine was given a mandatory sentence of commitment 
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until the age of 21, that sentence is far less egregious than the sentence of life in prison 

without the possibility of parole that the trial court gave to the Miller defendant. 

¶ 26 Like the respondents in Chrastka, Shermaine was sentenced as a habitual juvenile 

offender to a mandatory minimum sentence of commitment until he is 21 years old as a result 

of recidivism. As an appellate court, we are required to follow supreme court precedent on an 

issue "unless and until that conclusion is revisited by our supreme court or overruled by the 

United States Supreme Court." People v. Fountain, 2012 IL App (3d) 090558, ¶ 23. 

Although the United States Supreme Court has in recent years addressed the eighth 

amendment rights of juveniles tried as adults, it has not similarly addressed the rights of 

juveniles like Shermaine who are tried in the juvenile court system. Further, the Illinois 

Supreme Court has not revisited its holding in Chrastka. Because it is still applicable, we 

must follow the holding in Chrastka and find that Shermaine's commitment to the DJJ until 

the age of 21 does not violate the eighth amendment. 

¶ 27 Proportionate Penalties Clause 

¶ 28 Shermaine contends that even if the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act does 

not violate the eighth amendment, the court should still find a violation of the proportionate 

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The proportionate penalties clause, which is 

similar to but not identical with the eighth amendment, provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be 

determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of 

restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const., 1970 art. I, § 11. The second 

requirement of the clause, that penalties must have the objective of restoring the offender to 

useful citizenship, was added to the 1970 Constitution. People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, 

¶ 39. Citing Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, Shermaine contends that by emphasizing 
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rehabilitation, Illinois's proportionate penalties clause provides greater protection than the 

eighth amendment. In Clemons, our supreme court stated, "The convention record indicates 

that the framers intended, with this additional language, to provide a limitation on penalties 

beyond those afforded by the eighth amendment." Id. ¶ 39. 

¶ 29 Shermaine relies on People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002), to contend that Illinois 

emphasizes rehabilitation and provides greater protection to juvenile offenders than the 

federal constitution. In Miller, the defendant, a 15-year-old, was convicted of two counts of 

first degree murder on an accountability theory when he served as a lookout in a shooting 

that resulted in two murders. Id. at 330-31. The convergence of three statutes mandated a 

natural life sentence, but the trial court refused to sentence the 15-year-old offender to life in 

prison and instead sentenced him to 50 years in prison. Id. at 343. Our supreme court 

affirmed, holding held that the multiple-murder sentencing statute, when converged with the 

automatic transfer statute and the accountability statute, was unconstitutional under the 

eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution when 

applied to a 15-year-old offender convicted of multiple murders under a theory of 

accountability, because the sentence "eliminate[d] the court's ability" to consider the 

defendant's "age or degree of participation [in the crime]." Id. at 342. The court stated that 

"[o]ur decision is consistent with the long-standing distinction made in this state between 

adult and juvenile offenders," noting that "Illinois led the nation with our policy towards the 

treatment of juveniles in first forming the juvenile court, and, traditionally, as a society we 

have recognized that young defendants have greater rehabilitative potential." Id. at 341-42. 

¶ 30 Miller is distinguishable, however, and thus Shermaine's reliance on it to support his 

claim of a violation of the proportionate penalties clause is misplaced. First, Miller does not 
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address the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act. Unlike the defendant in Miller, 

Shermaine was not tried as an adult and was not subject to a natural life sentence without the 

possibility of parole. 

¶ 31 More importantly, however, is that despite the statement in Clemons that the 

proportionate penalties clause "provide[s] a limitation on penalties beyond those afforded by 

the eighth amendment," our supreme court has held, in numerous cases, both before and after 

Clemons, that the Illinois proportionate penalties clause is co-extensive with the cruel and 

unusual punishment clause. People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106; In re Rodney H., 

223 Ill. 2d at 518. Thus, because in Chrastka, our supreme court held that sentencing a 

habitual juvenile offender to a mandatory minimum sentence of commitment until the age of 

21 years did not violate the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause

provides co-extensive protections, we also reject Shermaine's challenge to the habitual 

juvenile offender provision under our state constitution. 

¶ 32 As an appellate court, we are required to follow supreme court precedent on an issue 

"unless and until that conclusion is revisited by our supreme court or overruled by the United 

States Supreme Court." People v. Fountain, 2012 IL App (3d) 090558, ¶ 23. Unless and until 

our supreme court decides to revisit its holding in Chrastka, we must follow its conclusion 

and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We note, however, that the mandatory 

sentencing provision of the Act, which removes all discretion of the trial court in sentencing 

certain repeat juvenile offenders, is ripe for reconsideration. Illinois has been a national 

leader in the field of juvenile justice since the Illinois legislature enacted “An Act to regulate 

the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children” (1899 Ill. Laws 

131)—or the Illinois Juvenile Court Act—on July 1, 1899. The first juvenile court in the 
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country was located in Chicago across the street from Hull House, an effective and 

prominent social service agency founded by social reformer Jane Addams. It was Addams

who rallied the movement for a separate juvenile justice system, which would remove 

children from being tried and imprisoned by the adult criminal system. And it was Addams 

who cautioned, “social advance depends as much on the process through which it is secured 

as upon the result itself.” Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 133 (1922). 

¶ 33 During the intervening decades, however, the pendulum has swung back and forth on the 

legal system's handling of juvenile offenders as adults. Recent research on the effect that the 

unique qualities and characteristics of youth may have on juveniles' judgment and actions

warrants reconsideration of some provisions of the Act, particularly those that remove or 

reduce the trial judge's discretion in considering some of those qualities and characteristics in 

sentencing a juvenile. We must ask ourselves whether precluding a trial judge’s discretion

wrongly deprives juveniles of what Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Graham v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. at 79, called “the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and selfrecognition of human worth and potential.” 

¶ 34 As our supreme court recently noted in People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, in 

discussing automatic transfers of juveniles to adult court, "[w]hile modern research has 

recognized the effect that the unique qualities and characteristics of youth may have on 

juveniles' judgment and actions [citation], the automatic transfer provision does not. Indeed, 

the mandatory nature of that statute denies this reality." Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 111. 

The court "strongly urge[d] the General Assembly to review the automatic transfer provision 

based on the current scientific and sociological evidence indicating a need for the exercise of 

judicial discretion in determining the appropriate setting for the proceeding in these juvenile 
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cases." Id. We suggest that similar reconsideration is necessary in the context of the Act’s 

habitual offender provision to ensure preservation of the fundamental purpose of juvenile 

proceedings—the child’s rehabilitation, treatment, and welfare. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.