NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1120

L.E.

vs.

V.E.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

At an ex parte hearing held on July 26, 2023, a Probate and 

Family Court judge issued a temporary abuse prevention order 

against the defendant (husband) at the request of the plaintiff 

(wife). The docket reflects that the order was not extended and 

that it expired by operation of law. Representing himself, the 

husband nevertheless appealed the issuance of the order. We 

affirm.1

There was an ample basis in the wife's affidavit and 

testimony to support the judge's finding that the wife held an 

objectively reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm by 

the husband. Nothing more was required. See Ginsberg v. 

1 The expiration of the ex parte temporary order does not 

appear to have mooted this appeal. See Wooldrige v. Hickey, 45 

Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
2

Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 142-143 (2006). The husband is 

left to argue that the judge did not sufficiently probe the 

wife's allegations,2 and that, if she had done so, the judge 

would not have credited those allegations. We discern no abuse

of discretion or other error in the degree of scrutiny that the 

judge applied.3

Abuse prevention order 

entered July 26, 2023,

affirmed.

By the Court (Milkey, Sacks & 

Smyth, JJ.4),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: April 26, 2024.

2 For example, the husband argues that closer scrutiny of 

the wife's allegations would have revealed internal 

inconsistencies in them.

3 To ensure that our ruling is not misinterpreted, we note 

that the husband filed a timely motion to terminate the ex parte 

order and the docket appears to reflect that that motion remains 

open. Any recourse the husband has with respect to the relief 

he is seeking would be to pursue that motion. We express no 

view of the merits of that motion or even whether it is moot, 

except to add the following observations. Had the husband's 

motion to vacate been allowed, the husband would have been 

entitled to have copies of the abuse prevention order possessed 

by certain law enforcement officials ordered destroyed. See 

Quinn v. Gjoni, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 414 (2016). See also 

Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 156-157 (1997) (destruction 

of records in statewide domestic violence recordkeeping system 

not required). Full expungement of all records is not relief to 

which the husband would have been entitled absent proof, 

"through clear and convincing evidence that the order was 

obtained through fraud on the court." Quinn, supra at 414 n.14. 

Nothing in the record suggests that the wife committed a fraud 

on the court.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.