NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0729n.06 F iled: Novem ber 25, 2008 No. 07-3345 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. WARR EN L EE B ACK, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T FO R THE S OUTHERN DI STRI CT OF O H IO O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: NO RRIS, RO G ER S, a nd K ETHL ED G E, C ir c uitJudg e s. ALAN E. N ORRIS, C ircuit Judge. This single- issue appea l conce rns the dec ision of the district court per

mitti ng defe ndant Warren L ee Ba ck to re prese nt himself at trial. The jury returne d a g uilty verdic t on all eig hteen counts of a superse ding indictment. On appeal, defendant c ontends that the district court should have su a s po nteorder ed a psychiatric or psy cholog ical examination, which would have reve aled tha t h e was incompe tent to choose self -re prese ntation due to mental illness. For the r easons outlined in this opinion, we hold that the district court conduc ted the prope r inquiry befor e allowingdefe ndant to repr esent himself. I. On Novembe r 11, 2005, a g rand jury re t u rn ed a two- count indictment char g ing de fenda nt with bank robbe ry , 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & (d), a nd car ryi n g a fi re ar m i n relation to a crime of violence, 18 U .S.C. § 924(c) (1). Def endant filed his motion seeking self-r epre sentation on OctoberNo. 07-3345

United States v. Bac k

- 2 - 10, 2006, less than a month bef ore the return of a super seding indictment, which included sixt een

a dd iti on a l c ounts . In h is m oti on , d e fe nd ant ma int a ine d that he un de rs too d th e ri sk s o f h is r e qu e st, having had “sig nificant e x posure to the Criminal J ustice Sy stem.” He also noted that he ha d a GED , some colleg e, under stood the “seve rity ” of the char g es, and r outinely visited the law librar

y . The d is tr ic t c o u rt h e ld a h e ar in g o n O c to b e r 2 0

. D e f e n d an t to ld th e c o u rt, “ I ’ m awar e of

ce rta in a p p e a la b le r ig h ts th a t I

g iv e u p b a s e d u p o ne r r o r s th a t I ma y ma k e o r an y s ta n d b y c o u n sel may m ake.” He a cknowledg ed whe n questioned that he kne w the cha rg es involved mandatory minimum sentenc es. Al t h o ug h the district court c autioned def endant that se lf-re prese ntation was a “pe rilous undertaking ,” he stood fir m. F or his pa

rt, appointed counsel told the court that he had been impre ssed by

his client’s “knowle dg e and his skills.” The district c ourt g rante d the motion after offe ring further

cautions but without inquiring into defe ndant’s compe tency . The c ourt assig ned

a pp oin te d c ouns e l to sta

y on a s st and by c ouns e l. On Dec ember

1, 2006, the district court he ld a pre trial hea ring

. At this point, defenda nt had been r e - ar

r a ig n e d o n th e s u

p e r s e d in g in d ic tm e n t. T h e tr ia l b e g an o n D e c e mb e r 1 1

. I t e n d e d in a mistrial after the jury

was pe rmitt ed t o h ear a tape d conver sation that included information about defe ndant’s cr iminal recor d. The secon d t ri al l ast ed a w eek. I n the cour se of his self- repr esentation, defenda nt filed written motions, lodged nume rous objections, and, a fter his c on v i ct i on, prepa red a sentenc ing memorandum. The proba tion officer

who pre pare d the pre -sentenc e re port noted that d e f e n d a nt ha d a history of me nta l il lness, inc lud ingbip ola r d iso rd e r f

or wh ic h h e ha d r e c e ive d me dic a tio n. He ha d a lsoNo. 07-3345

United States v. Bac k

- 3 - attempted suicide during prior inca rce rations. At sentenc ing, the district court obser ved that defe ndant might ne ed psy cholog ical asse ssment and ca re w hile incar cer ated. The district cour

t sentence d defe ndant to a total of 2,782 months of imprisonment, impos ed an $1,800 asse ssment, and orde red de fenda nt to pay restitution of $128,109. II. The United States Supre me C o urt has made clea r that an a ccuse d, if “c ompetent,” ha s the

c on sti tut ion a l rig ht to se lf -r e pr e se ntatio n. Ho we ve r, a de fe nd ant mus t mak e that c ho ic e kn ow ing ly

and int e lli g e ntl y , w hic h th e Cou rt e xpla ine d in

the se te rm s: W hen an a c c us e d ma

na g e s h is o wn

de fe ns e , h e re lin qu ish e s, a s a pure ly fa c tua l ma tte r, many of the tr a dit ion a l be ne fi ts a sso c ia te d wi th t he ri g ht t o c ouns e l. For this r e a s o n , in

o r d e r to r e p r e s e n t h im s e lf

, th e a c c u s e d

mu s t k n o w in g ly and int e lli g e ntl y

fo rg o th os e re lin qu ish e d b e ne fi t s . A l t h o u gh a d e f e n d a nt ne e d n ot h ims e lf have the sk ill and

e xpe ri e nc e of

a lawy e r i n o rd e r c omp e tent ly and int e lli g e ntl y

to choose se lf-re prese ntation, he should be made awa re of the dang ers a

nd disadvantag es of se lf-re prese ntation, so that the re cord w ill establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with ey es open. He re , we eks bef

or e tr ia l, [d e fe nd ant] c le arl y and un e qu ivo c a lly

de c lare d to the trial judg e that he w anted to re prese nt himself and di d n o t want counsel. The rec ord affirmatively

shows that [defendant] was literate, compete nt, and understanding , and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed fr ee w ill. The trial judge had wa

rned [defe ndant] that he thought it was a mistak e n o t t o acc ept the assistance of counse l, and that [ defe ndant] would be required to follow all the g round ru le s o f t ri a l pr oc e dure . We ne e d ma ke no ass ess ment of

ho w w e ll o r p oo rl y [defendant] had master ed the intrica cies of the hear say rule and the California c ode provisions that gove rn cha lleng es of potential jurors on voir dire . For his technica l le g a l kn ow le dg e , a s su c h, wa s n ot r e le va nt t o a n a sse ssm e nt o f h is k

no wi nge xer c ise of the rig ht to defend himself.

Fa re tta v . Ca lif

or nia , 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) ( citations and punctuation omit ted).No. 07-3345

United States v. Bac k

In D usk y v . Uni t ed St at es , 362 U

. S. 402 ( 19 60 ) , t he C our t he l d “ t hat t he s t andar d f or c om pet enc e t o s t and t r i al 1 i s wh et her t he def

endan t ha s ‘ s uf

f i ci ent pre s ent abi l i t y t o cons ul t wi t h h i s l awy er wi t h a r eas onabl e deg r ee of r at i onal un ders t andi ng ’ an d had ‘ a r at i onal as wel l as f act ual un ders t andi ng of t he procee di ng s ag ai ns t hi m. ’ ” G od i nez v. M or an , 50 9 U

. S. 38 9 , 39 6 (19 9 3 ). (quo t i ng D usk y ) - 4 - Def endant f aults the district court for not order ing a competenc y

hear ing be fore g ranting the motion for self-r epre sentation. Even if that mistake could be e x cused, he maintains that his conduct during his f

irst tr ial acte d as a red flag to the judge and should ha ve resulted in a

n o rd er for psy cholog ical testing afte r the mistrial

. As s u p port for his position, defenda nt points out that he shifted bac k and forth betwee n the first and third per son when talking about himself and a cted in a “g randiose” manner

consistent with psy chotic par anoia. As he puts it in his brief to this court, “A de c isi on [to re pr e se nt on e se lf

] b y a de fe nd ant fa c ing lif e in pr iso n on 18 c ounts plu s e nh anc e me nts itself should be a re ason to at l east doubt his competenc y , at l east to the degr ee that a compe tency evaluation by

a psy chiatrist and/or psycholog ists shoul d be conduc ted.” The Supreme court’s r ece nt holding in Indiana v. Edwards , 128 S.Ct . 2379 (2008), indicates that a de fe nd ant w ho pr oc e e ds pr o se may ne e d to mee t a hig he r s tand ard of c omp e te nc y

tha n me re ly that neede d to stand trial. Howeve r, the re cord in this case does no t gi v e u s reason to find that 1 de fe nd ant fe ll within the po te nti a l gr ay are a be tw e e n co mpe te nc y to sta nd tr ia l and c omp e te nc y

to self-r epre sent. Def

endant’ s competenc y

to stand trial was ne ver in que stion, and nothing in the Court’s rec ent opinion sugg ests that a disparity betwee n these two c ompetency standards c reates an ob lig a tio n th a t th e tr ia l c ourt inq uir e int o the de fe nd ant’ s c omp e te nc y to pr oc e e d pr o se in e ve ry c a se in which a de fenda

nt wishes to do so.No. 07-3345

United States v. Bac k

- 5 - Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

po sse sse s th e statut or

y a uth or ity to o rd e r a c omp e te nc y

he ari nga t any

tim e prior to sentenc ing “ if there is reasona ble cause to believe that the de fenda nt may prese ntly be suffe ring from a mental disease or defe ct rende ring him menta lly incompetent to the extent that he is una ble to u nd e rs tand the natur e and

c on se qu e nc e s o f t

he pro ceed ing s a g a ins t hi m or to a ssi st proper ly i n h i s d ef

en s e. ” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Prior to such a hear ing, the court may

order a psy chiatric or psy cholog ical examination of defe ndant. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). How ever , defe ndant fails to point to any

thing in the r ecor d that would indicate that “ there [was] rea sonable c ause” for the district court t o s u s p ec t that he wa s mentally incompetent other

than the g ener al asser

tion that he

ac te d in a “ g r an d io s e ” ma n n e r d u r in g th e f

ir s t tr ia l. A s r e c o u n te d a

b o v e , th e d is tr ic t c ourt posed questions simi lar to those cited w ith approval in Fa re tta be fo re g ra nti ngde fe nd ant t

he ri g ht t o repr esent himself: Def endant is aw are of and unde rstands th e nature and ser iousness of the cha rg es a g a inst h im, a s w e ll a s th e po te nti a l r ang e of the se nte nc e he may

fa c e if he is c on vic te d o f t

ho se c ha rg e s. De fe nd ant i s f

ul ly compe te nt t o ma

ke the de c isi on

to repr esent himself. He has obviously invested sig nificant time in lega l rese arc h and he e xhibi te d a c le ar un de rs tand ingof the statut e s h e is a c c us e d o f v iol a tin g , a s w e ll as familiarity with the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the advisory nature of thos e Gu id eli nes . De fend ant als o u nd ers tan ds th at h is deci si on to repr ese nt h ims e lf will lim it the bases upon which he may be able to pursue an a

ppeal f rom any c on vic tio n a

nd any se nte nc e that ma

y be imp os e d a ft e r t

ri a l. Clearly , the district court wa s awa re of the inquiry

require d when a

defe ndant see ks to repre sent himself and ther e is nothing in the r ecor d to sug g est either that the court fa iled to conduct such a n inquiry or that the de cision it reac hed constituted er ror. We would be re miss if we did not addre ss defe ndant’s conte ntion that seeking to proce ed pro

s e , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n c o n f

r o n t e d w i t h s e r i o u s c h ar g e s , i n h e r e n t l y r a i s e s t h e qu e s t i o no f c o mp e t e n c y.No. 07-3345

United States v. Bac k

- 6 - As the Supreme Court ha s made c lear , while a criminal defendant who proce eds pro se m ay , like any oth e r pr o se lit ig ant, have a fo ol fo r a c lie nt, that do e s no t me an that he or sh e is pr esu mp tiv e ly inc omp e te nt: We do not mea

n to sug g est, of cour se, that a c ourt is require d to make a c ompetency de te rm inatio n in

e ve ry c a se in wh ic h a def

e nd ant se e ks to ple a d g uil ty or to w a ive his rig ht t o counsel. As in any criminal ca se, a c ompetency deter mination is necessar

y only when a court ha s rea son to doubt the defenda nt’s competenc e. Godinez , 509 U.S . at 401 n.13. I n this case, e ven af ter the indictment wa s supersede d with an additional six teen counts, the district c ourt had no rea son to que stion de fenda nt’s competenc e. At the hea ring on the orig inal motion, defenda nt was told of the g overnme nt’s intent to seek additional char g es but elec ted to proce ed re g ardl es s . Al s o , befor e his second tr ial beg an, def endant acknow ledg ed that he r ealized that he wa s fac ing 210 y ear s of incar cer ati o n . Whil e def endant’ s decision may

have be en ill-advised, t h e d i s t ri ct court did enoug h to asce rtain that def endant wa s capa ble of unde rstanding the conse quence s of his course of ac tion. Finally , defe ndant takes issue with r estrictions place d upon standby counsel by

the district court. S pecif

ically , he contends that standby counsel should have be en per mitted to si t at counsel ta ble wi th h im. Our re vie w of the re c or d indi c a te s tha t def e nd ant ha d ampl e op po rt

un ity to c on su lt with standby counsel. Moreove r, t he dis trict court indi cate d to defe ndant that he c ould have standby

c ouns e l jo in h im b ut o nly in t he ro le of fu ll- fl e dg e d co un se l. Th is co ur t has pr e vio us ly he ld t

hat a tr ia l c ourt ha s d isc re tio n n ot t o a llo w a “ hy br id” re pr e se ntatio n w he re a pp oin te d c ouns e l pe rf

or ms some of the f

unctions of trial counse l while the def endant pe rfor

ms others. Un ite d S

tat es v . M os e ly ,No. 07-3345

United States v. Bac k

- 7 - 81 0 F .2 d 9 3, 97-98 ( 6th

Cir . 1 98 7) . In s ho rt , th e dis tr ic t c ourt a c te d w e ll w ith in i ts d isc re tio n in

or c he str a tin g the c on du c t of the tr ia l. III . Th e jud g me nt i s aff

irm ed

.