### No. 81-482 

### INTHE SUPREMECOURTOF THE STATEOF MONTANA 1982

STATEOF MONTBATA, Plaintiff and Respondent,

JOHN ALDIN HUBBARD, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth JudiciaiDistrict, In and for the County of Cascade Honorable Jack Shanstrom,Judgepresiding Counsel of Record: ForAppellant: Sandra

### K. Watts argued, Great Falls,Montana ForRespondent: Hon. Mike Greely,Attorney General,Helena, Montana DorothyMcCarter arqued,AssistantAttorney General,

Helena,Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls,Montana

Submitted: June 23, 

### 1982 Decided: August 25, 1982 Piled:

ClerkMr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant plead guilty to the crime of negligent homicide. The District Court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of ten years imprisonment for negligent homicide and five years for the

use of a weapon incommitting that crime. Defendant appeals from the sentence. This is the second time defendant's case has come before thisCourt. Following an earlymorning shootout in a Great Falls trailer court in which two men were killed, defendant Hubbard and another were tried and convicted of mitigated deliberate homicide and burglary, respectively. We reversed Hubbard's conviction and remanded for a new trial. Statev. Fish etal. (1980), 

### -Mont

# . -

## ,621 P.2d 1072, 37 St-Rep. 2065, On remand, the Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom was substitutedasthe presiding judge. An amended informationwas filed charging Hubbard with negligent homicide. A written plea bargain agreement was signed and filed wherein defendant agreed to plead guilty to the crime of negligent I~omicideand acknowledged the possibility that the statute enhancing the penalty for use of a weapon in that crime might be applied tohim. On May 14, 1981, ahearing was held wherein defendant testified to his state of mind at the time of the crime; expert witnesses testified that defendant was under some duress at that time; and friends and a deputy sheriff testified concerning events that occurred on the night of the crime. Additionally, a psychiatrist at the Montana State Prison testified thathis 1979 diagnosis of defendantasantisocialwas inaccurate. The following day a sentencing hearing was held which included testimony by the district probation and parole officer, a clinical psychologist, defendant's mother and the defendant himself. Following this hearing Judge Shanstrom ruled that the enhancement statute applied to negligent homicide and that none of the exceptions to the statute applied. He sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of ten years imprisonment for negligent homicide and fiveyears for the use of a weapon in that crime. Defendant appeals from this sentence raising the following specifications of

error: (1)Does the statuteenhancing the penalty for use of

a weapon in the commission of a crime apply to negligent homicide? (2)Was defendant denied due process by inclusion of negligent homicide in the enhancement statute? (3) Does the record show that defendant was acting under unusual and substantial duress precluding application of the enhancement statute? (4) Was error committed by the sentencing judge in admitting testimony amounting to retrial of the original charge of deliberatehomicide and in sentencingdefendant on

an incomplete reading of the trialtranscript? (5)Was defendantprejudiced by the 1979diagnosisof defendant asantisocialwhich was later retracted? (6)Does justice require the five-year enhancement to be served consecutively rather than concurrently? The statutes atissue in thiscase are setoutbelow: "46-18-221. Additional sentence for offenses committed with a dangerousweapon. (1)A per-son who has been found guilty of any offense and who, while engaged in the commission of the offense, knowingly displayed, brandished, or otherwise used a firearm, destructive device, as defined in 45-8-332(1), or other dangerous weapon shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the state prison of not less than 2years or more than 10years, except as provided in46-18-222.

"(4) An additional sentence prescribed by this section shall run consecutively to the sentence provided for the offense. "46-18-222.

----- Exceptions tomandatory minimum sentences and restrictions on deferred impostion and sus~ended execution of sentence. All mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the laws of this state and the restrictions on deferred imposition and suspended execution of sentence

# . . .do not apply if:

"(3) the defendant, at the time of the commission of the offense for which he is to be sentenced, was acting under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as would constitute a defense to the prosecution;I' We will combine our discussion of the first and second issuesbecause of their interrelationship. Appellant contends that (1) the legislative history of the above statutes demonstrates a legislative intent to include violent crimes (notnegligent homicide) within the ambit of the legislation, (2) there is legislative intent to exclude result-oriented crimes not committed intentionally like negligent homicide, and (3) that since section 46-18-221 (1) requires that defendant knowingly used a firearm, it cannot be used to enhance a sentence for negligent homicide where

no specific intent is required and to do so violates defendant's procedural due process rights. In construing a statute, the intent of the legisla-ture is controlling. Section 1-2-102, MCA; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co. (1968), 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 668, and cases cited therein. The intention of the legislaturemust first be determined from the plain meaning of the words used, and if interpretation of the statute can be so determined, the courts may not go further and apply any other means of interpretation. Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., supra, and cases cited therein. Where, ashere, the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself and there isnothing leftfor the court to construe. State

### v. Roberts (1980),

## -Mont. 

## ,633 P.2d 1214, 38 St.Rep. 1551. The statute plainly says that "a person who has been found guilty of any offense" and while engaged in the commission of the offense knowingly uses a firearm is subject to an enhanced penalty of two to ten years. There is simply no reason for the use of legislative history to construe a statute where the language is clear and unambiguous on its face. Nor do we see any conflict between the "knowingly" mental state required by the enhancement statute and the "negligently" mental state as it applies to negligent homicide. Negligent homicide is defined asfollows: "Negligent homicide. (1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently." Section 45-5-104, MCA. "Negligently" is defined as: 

### "(37) 'Negligently1--a person actsnegligentlywith respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offensewhen he consciouslydisregards a risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists or when he disregards a risk of which he should be aware that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such a natureand degree that to disregard it involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 'Gross deviation' means a deviation that is considerably greater than lack of ordinary care. Relevant terms such as 'negligent' and 'with negligence' have the same meaning

# ." Section45-2-101 (37)

## ,MCA. "Knowingly" isdefined as:

"(33) 'Knowingly'--a person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of his conduct or that the circumstance exists, A person actsknowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statutedefining an offensewhen he is aware that it is highly probable that such result will be caused by his conduct. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence. Equivalent terms such as 'knowing' or 'with knowledge' have the same meaning

# ." Section 45-2-101 (33)

## ,MCA. A person can knowingly use a firearm and still be negligent by grosslydeviating from the conduct of a reasonable person in a similar situation with regard to the results of his actions. See, Statev. Pierce (No. 81-343, decided July 7, 1982), 

### -Mont, 

## -' -P,2d -1 

### - St.Rep. There is no conflict between these two statutes. We do not find appellant's due process arguments persuasive and much of what was said above applies to this contention also. We have previously held that the statute does not offend due process rights. Statev, Davison (1980), Mont. - 

## - ,614 P.2d 489, 37 St.Rep. 1135. Appellant has cited no authority directly in point forhisconstitutional challenge. We decline to hold the enhancement statute unconstitutional on thisbasis. With regard to the third issue, appellant contendsthat the facts indicate that defendant was under unusual and substantial duress within the meaning of section 46-18- 222(3),MCA, an exception to the enhancement statute. Appellant argues that the jury verdict of mitigated deliberate homicide (which requires "extreme mental or emotional stress," section 45-5-103, MCA) bears this out. Appellant also argues that the following facts indicate defendant was under the requisite amount of duress: defendant had just

seen his friend shot, had been shot athimself, had had a gun pointed 

### in his face, and had wrestled the gun away from itsowner. The District Court found that although there was "a certain amount of duress" in this case, it was not "unusual

or substantial," triggering section 46-18-222, MCA. There

was sufficient evidence in the record to support the District Court's determination, and we uphold it here. The DistrictCourt made the following statements in this regard, addressed to the defendant: "By your own admission you only intended to 'wing' him. You said, 'He shot Dale, so I shot him.' And then the statement was made that you only shot to wound him. Then you made the statement, 'Nobody sticks a gun in my face and gets away with it.' And, 'He deserves to die--he doesn't deserve to live.' 'He killed my friend, so I killed him.' I think that all of these statements, among others, indicate an intent to get even by the use of direct, physical force, a weapon." The defendant also had the presence of mind to temporarily incapacitate the owner of the gun by kicking him in the groin. Finally, defendant shot and killed aman running away from him who posed no immediate threat to him. These facts do not indicate unusual or substantial duress but rather a revengeful attitude on defendant's part, seeking tomake thekiller "pay" for shooting his friend. There was no abuse of discretion by the District Court in so ruling, State v. Metz (1979), - Mont. -

## , 604 P.2d 102, 36 St.Rep. 2261. Next, appellant argues that the sentencing judge erred by admitting testimony which amounted to a retrial on the deliberate homicide charge and by failing to read the entire trial transcript. We willaddress the latterpartof this contention first. The District Court judges of this stateare burdened with heavy case loads as it is. We are loathe tohold that the failureof a DistrictCourtjudge to read everyword of a trial transcriptmandates a reversal, Nor do we find any error in the admission of testimony by the District Court. Such a hearing aswas held here is required by section 46-18-223, MCA, which provides in part: "Hearing todetermine --- application of --exceptions. (1)When the application of an exception provided for in 46-18-222 is an issue, the court shallgrant the defendant a hearing prior to the imposition of sentence to determine the applicabilityof the exception

# ."

To determine whether the defendant was operating under substantial or unusual duress, the District Court must necessarilyconsider the factsleading up to the fatal shootings. This is especially true here since the trial judge was not the sentencingjudge. Appellant's £ifth issue involves whether the defendant was prejudiced with respect to a wrongful diagnosis by Montana State Prison officials on the presentence report. This point is raised because the psychiatrist who prepared the presentence report in 1979 (wherein he diagnosed the defendant as being antisocial) testified at the May 14, 1981hearing thathisdiagnosiswas inaccurate. Appellantclaims error because the District Court considered this report in sentencing the defendant. Appellant refersus to the following language in the court'sorder of May 27, 1981: "The Court, having heard and considered oral arguments together with all of the testimony and evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, thevariouspresentence reports, the diagnostic evaluation from theMontana 

## state Prison an5the transcripts, and being fully advised

# ..

# ." (Emphasis added.) Appellant has cited no authority for this novel assertion, and we reject it. The sentencingjudge heard the psychiatrist testify regarding his mistaken diagnosis, and there is no indication that he did not abide by this testimony. T1-ke mere reference to the report in the court's order is not a sufficientground for reversal. Appellant's final contention alleges error for the District Court's sentence requiring the additional five years to run consecutively, rather than concurrently. Although the present statute requires that the sentence run consecutively (section 46-18-221(4), MCA, supra), at the time this defendant was sentenced the court had discretion to require the enhanced sentence to run concurrently. However, thisgoes tothe equityof the sentence rather than its legality and should be directed to the Sentence Review Board and not this Court, Statev. Metz, supra. Appellant should take up these concerns with the appropriate authority. Affirmed. 

# T~u*e.ditwme Chief JusticeWe concur:Mr. JusticeGene B. Daly dissenting: I am not easily moved to dissent but, "Quifortiter emungit, elicit sanguinem" 

## -- "He who wrings the nose stronglybrings blood." Proverbs XXX, 33. My nose has been stronglywrung. I am not unmindful of the close and constant interaction between "facts" and "law." However, anyjudicial deception that exists is more likely to apply to the facts rather than the law. I have labored with the factsof thiscase since 1978 when I received the assignment to examine a District Court denial of bail todefendantHubbard. My examination produced

a normal young man, employed, etc., no previous record. In short, nothing inthepersonal record would militate against

a reasonable bail. This Court agreed, and we setbail. Thereafter, in 1980, I was assigned Statev. Fish and Hubbard on appeal a£ ter trial. Statev. Fish and Hubbard (198o)t

### -Mont

# . ,621P.2d 1072, 37 St.Kep. 2065. The authorities at the District Court level took an unusually stronq stand against these defendants which was not supported by the trial record. I authored an opinion with a unanimous Court and, among other things, setthe factsstraightbased on thetrialtranscript. A person gets

a feeling reading a trial transcript, where there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, that perhaps things are done that are not compatible with due process or fair play. Thismoved the Court in its reversal toquietly admonish the local officials, "don't do it again." The handling of this matter in the District Court created a sordid mess with the appearance of an effort to restoration of the status quo that existed prior to ourreversal on appeal. So, the sentenceprocedure thatresulted from a broken plea bargain and the unusual sentence has been appealed againtothisCourt. The facts in the majority opinion that presume to have examined thismatter areoutrageously inaccurate. They

are slanted and limited in such a manner as to produce an appearance of extreme criminality and purposeful guiltupon the defendant. This is allindirectdefiance of the facts

as they were found to be from the transcript record of the trial! I willquote a small portion of the appeal decision found reported 621 P.2d at 1078. This was part of the discussion on theaccountability chargeswhich were reversed: "In further support of the accountability theory, the State draws on the 

### time Fish, Hubbard and Lodge were together earlier in the evening and on isolated remarks overheard from them, allegedly of an exceedingly violent nature and that all three were again present at Miller's trailer when Lodge approached the trailer door. Yet, the record is bare of any evidence of anypreparationby any of the three to carry out these alleged threats; no one was armed, not even with a stickor rock. The record ismore compatible with an intentby Fish toengage ina fist fight--to which he admits. The State admits inthe record thatno weapons were found when the vehicles were searched. Miller was the onlyperson armed. We acknowledge thatthere was an uncommon amount of activity that evening that made 

### its way into the record, butwe arecompelled toreject theconclusion reached from thisby theState." (Emphasis added.) The jury alsorejected the theory offered by the State. The entire second issue in the appeal case had todo with Hubbard's state of mind, yet the trial judge on sentence held a new hearing and received evidence WE HELD ON THE APPEAL WAS NOT RELEVANT. The problem that Judge Shanstrom has is that he 

### istrying to give the defendant the maximum in terms of sentence on a minimum record and refused to consult or be guided by our appeal opinion which I insist is the law of the case. The facts simply stated are that defendant Hubbard's judgment may have been faulty initially by permitting his sister to persuade him to join the group, "to make sure there is a fair fight." This eventually led him to the trailer park and theproblems found there. Nevertheless, he

was by the trial record a "bystander." As the trial record ind~cates,none of the young people were armed, not even with a stick. Miller shot through the door and wounded all three persons standing there--one fatally. All retreated except the dead person. Miller came out and fired two rounds in Hubbard's direction, appeared at the side of his

car in the dark, put a gun in his face, and profanely threatened to kill Hubbard. Hubbard wrested the gun from Miller and the rest is history. The point of all this 

### is, in the judge's opinion, thatHubbard atthispoint was notunder unusual or substantialduress. This 

### is contrary to our findings on the original appeal. I would liketomove away from the factsand intothe law applied against the defendant by the lower court, that resulted inan increase of penalty tofifteenyears. The District Court's decision to apply the enhancement statute, section 46-18-221, PICA, and add an extra five years to defendant's sentence for negligent homicide should be reversled on three grounds. First, because the enhancement statute contains a specific intent, "knowingly," it isa contradiction in terms to apply it to a situation where admittedly defendant acted only "negligently." To say that

a person may act "knowingly" and "negligently" at the 

### same time and during the 

### same act creates

### a vague, confusing and arbitrary standard of conduct. Secondly, and more important to due process, the District Court disrupted the plea bargaining process by actively participating in the negotiations. Such actionsby a trialcourthave been condemned in

numerous 

### cases. See, Annot., 10ALR4th 689, etseq. Lastly,

even if the enhancement statuteis applied tothiscase, the evidence does not support the District Court's conclusion that defendant was not acting under sufficient duress to meet the statutory exceptions of the enhancement statute. See, section46-18-222, MCA. The controlling language here 

### is contained in the enhancement statutewhich provides inpart that 

### a person is subjecttoits application if he

# ".

.

# .knowingly displayed, brandished, or otherwise used a firearm

# ..

# ." ThisCourt has held thatwhen the legislature enacted the new criminal code in 1973, it substituted the words "purposely" and "knowingly" for the words "feloniously" and "intentionally." State v. Klein (1976), 169Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75. By definition, then, statutes containing the word "knowingly" contain a specific intent. Also by definition, acting "knowingly" is not acting accidently. State v. Seitzinger (1979), 180Mont. 136, 589 P.2d 655. In contrast, "negligently," by definition, refers to the commission of an 

### act without regard to the actor's intentor knowledge. See definition insection45-2-101(37), MCA.Nevertheless, atthe sentencing hearing the intentof defendant 

### was repeatedly brought into evidence over the objectionof defense counsel. The Statewith theencouragement of theDistrict Court ineffectretrieddefendant for deliberatehomicide. See comment, supra. The District Court rationalized the use of such evidence by trying todistinguish the knowing use of the 

### firearm from the crime committed. This cannot be done simply because it subjects the defendant to proof of 

### a specific intent where admittedly no specific intent is present. In essence, negligent homicide has been redefined 

### as an act committed 

### "knowingly," depriving defendant of his right to equal protection and due process and creating a vague statute. As theWashington Supreme Court stated: 

# ".

. . Statutes which define crimes must be strictly construed according to the plain meaning of their words to assure that citizenshave adequatenoticeof the 

### terms of the law, as required by due process. 'Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment.' Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 68 S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed.2d 840 (1947); Seattlev. Pullman, 82 Wash.2d 794, 797, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973). The word 'knowledge' has anordinary and acceptedmeaning. A statutory redefinition of knowledge to mean negligent ignorance would completely contradict the acceptedmeaning. 

# .."Statev. Shipp (1980), 93Wash.2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322, 1326. Moreover, the DistrictCourt interpreted theenhancement statute in such a way that a penalty 

### is imposed for acts and an intent different from those in the underlying offense. In effect, the District Court has created a separate offense out of the enhancement statute, i.e., knowingly using a firearm or other destructive device. The defendant was then tried for thisoffense atthe sentencinghearing

# . We statedinStatev. Davison (1980), 

### -Mont

# . - I 614 P.2d 489, 37 St.Rep. 1135, that the enhancement statute neither creates nor penalizes a defendant with a separate offense. The 

### District Court's interpretation of the enhancement statute, here, is not reconcilable with the holding in Davison. If the enhancement statute is tobe used, 

### as its

name suggests, to "enhancen the underlying offense, it cannot impose an element of intent separate from the underlyingoffense. As well as misinterpreting the enhancement statute, the DistrictCourt obstructedthepurpose of the defendant's plea bargain by imposing a five-year sentence on top of the ten-year sentence for which defendant originallybargained. Such action by the District Court is in contravention to standards 

### set by the American Bar Association Standards for CriminalJusticewhich 

### limitsthe trialjudge tothe roleof

an impassive moderator. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 14-3.3 (2d ea. 1980). When a plea 

### is influenced by the actions of a judge it cannotbe said tobe voluntary. State

v. Cross (1977), 270 S.C. 44, 240 S.E.2d 514. Plea negotiations should be between adversaries, and the 

### trial judge should not participate for either side since it is his responsibility to determine unbiasedly the voluntariness of theplea. Here, the District Court broke the plea bargain agreement in its bastardization of the enhancement statute. Defendant originally bargained up to the ten-year maximum sentence for negligent homicide. Only through activeparticipation by the District Court was this maximum sentenceincreased by fiveyears. Even if the enhancement statute could be said to apply to thiscase and if the DistrictCourt's participation in the plea negotiations could be considered proper, the District Court nevertheless abused its discretion by concluding that defendant did not come under the statutory exceptions to the enhancement statute. The record simply does not support the conclusion that defendant was not 

### ------------------- acting under unusual and substantialduress. See, State v. Fish and Hubbard, supra. As related inthe factsacknowledged by thisCourt on appeal, the owner of the rifle, Miller, shot two times at defendantmoments before defendanthimself came intopossession of the rifle. Miller had shoved the rifle in defendant's face, threatening to blow his head off. Defendant wrested the rifle away from Miller. Defendant then walked

over to his friend who had just been fatally struck in the neck with shrapnel from Miller's prior shots. Miller began torun away and defendant shotathim toprevent hisescape. Clearly, this evidence of the situation preponderates against the District Court's conclusion that defendant was not under substantial duress at the 

### time of the shooting. The District Court, therefore, abused its discretion. The statutory exception found in section 46-18-222(3), MCA, should apply, and the extrafive-year sentence shouldbe set aside. I have made some broad statements and am mindful of my own frailties. However, it has been my purpose to deal with the facts in an impersonal and objective manner. I have perhaps been too criticalof the lower courtpersonnel.I 

### would like it understood that I 

### do not speak in terms of conscious partiality or prejudgment, as no judge worthy of his office would knowingly permit any cloud of prejudice to darken his understanding or influence his decision.

Justice I 

### fl

Mr. JusticeDaniel J. 

### Shea dissents andwill filea written dissent later.

### Mr. JusticeDaniel J. Sheadissenting:

I join in the dissent of JusticeDaly. It isrefreshing

on occasionto see an opinionno longerbathed in judicial language,but instead addressing the fundamental issues underlying the surface issues. We don't knowpreciselywhy the trial court gave the sentence todefendant. InStatev. Stumpf (1980), Mont

# . - 

### ,609 P.2d 298,weheld that "atrial court's right to exercise itsdiscretion does not mean thata trial court should notdisclose the reasons underlying a discretionary act. Absenti-reasons,the appellate court canonly guess as towhy the trial court made a particulardecision." Here, thebroad statement of the trial court that it relied on the sentencing report,without disclaiming thatreport's inaccuracy, places an appellate court in the impossible situation of not knowingwhether the trial court relied on erroneousparts of the report. A sentence in that situation shouldnot be upheld. InUnited States

### v. Latimer (Ohio1969), 415F.2d 1288, theCourtheld that error in a presentence investigationreport, ifrelied on, is a ground for remanding forresentencing. The

casewas remanded for resentencing because the record - 

### did notdisclosewhether the trial courthad relied on erroneous
or improper information. An eloquent argument in favorof a requirement that judgesgive reasons for their sentences, has beenmade inUnited Statesv. Bazzano (1977),521F.2d 1122, 1132. Fundamental fairness requires that the reasons for a 

### sentencebe setoutwithprecision. Thedefendanthas a right to assurance that a judge was not relying on erroneous information. The record here isdemonstrably lacking in that

assurance. 

# " '"t' !$& * 

# r-"? T

8: 

## %< :r , " ?' ;'&.@"r '1 1.1. '