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Filed 9/13/23 L.D. v. R.T. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(El Dorado)

----

L.D.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095257

(Super. Ct. No. PC20210444)

This case arises out of a dispute between neighbors, L.D. and R.T., over whether 

L.D. and her husband have too many animals, and whether the presence of these animals 

is creating a nuisance. That underlying dispute, however, is not at issue in this appeal. 

At issue here is whether the trial court properly issued a civil harassment restraining order 

against R.T., who took photos and videos of L.D. on a daily basis, often staring at her for 

nearly 10 minutes at a time from her fence line, and who, by his own admission, had 

1,428 videos of L.D. and her property and animals on his cell phone.

R.T. contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s implied 

finding that R.T.’s conduct would have caused a reasonable person to suffer substantial 

emotional distress; (2) the trial court erred in issuing the restraining order because R.T. 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was lawfully defending himself and
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his family from an environmental trespass; (3) the trial court prejudicially abused its 

discretion and violated R.T.’s due process rights by declining to receive and consider all 

of his evidence, and disallowing cross-examination of L.D.; (4) the order requiring R.T. 

to relinquish his firearm violates his right to bear arms; and (5) L.D. committed the tort of 

abuse of process by seeking the restraining order. 

We affirm. As we explain, R.T.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 

forfeited and, in any event, fails on the merits. The evidence is more than sufficient to 

support a conclusion that R.T.’s conduct would have caused a reasonable person to suffer 

substantial emotional distress. R.T.’s assertion that he should have prevailed because he 

was defending himself and his family from an environmental trespass also fails. While 

we agree he has a constitutional right to petition the government for a redress of 

grievances, and he was apparently taking the pictures and videos in connection with 

complaints filed with various governmental agencies and in preparation for filing a 

lawsuit, the trial court impliedly found his course of conduct extended beyond what was 

necessary to document the conditions across the street. This finding is also supported by 

substantial evidence. With respect to R.T.’s remaining claims, his due process rights 

were not violated by any evidentiary rulings made by the trial court, his Second 

Amendment challenge to the order requiring him to relinquish his firearm is forfeited, 

and whether L.D. committed an abuse of process is not the proper subject of this appeal. 

BACKGROUND

L.D. petitioned the trial court for a civil harassment restraining order against R.T. 

on August 18, 2021. The petition was not made a part of the appellate record. 

A contested hearing on the petition was held the following month. At the hearing, 

L.D. testified that she lives in Placerville with her husband, on a piece of property that is 

zoned for horses and other animals. When they moved onto the property, they also 

brought horses, goats, a cow, a camel, an ostrich, and other animals, including various 

birds. R.T. lives across the street. At first, “he was really nice” and “brought his 
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grandkids over to see the camel,” but eventually he and another neighbor started taking 

videos of L.D.1 

L.D. testified that R.T. took pictures and videos of her every day. As she 

described: “Every time I start my tractor to feed my animals, or clean, or anything his 

garage would go up, and he would come out and take pictures or video, and I knew this.” 

This made L.D. “very uncomfortable” because she was often at the property by herself, 

her cell phone did not have reception at the property, and her internet connection was not 

reliable. L.D. testified: “I’m so stressed out. I don’t even want to go outside. I don’t 

want to get up in the morning. I -- I’m so stressed out. I’m seeing -- I had to go see a 

counselor, and I had to have some anxiety medicine.” L.D. continued: “I shouldn’t have 

to live where I don’t even want to go outside because . . . he literally will stand there on 

the other side of my fence on the street and stare at me for like -- not joking . . . almost 10 

minutes -- not saying a word.” L.D. testified that R.T.’s conduct was also preventing her 

from sleeping because she had been stalked in the past, “so it brought all that back up.” 

L.D. further testified that R.T. complained about her animals with various entities, 

including the fire department, and had also sought a restraining order of his own, which 

was denied. R.T.’s petition for the restraining order apparently recited how many birds 

she had, which also concerned L.D. because, as she explained, “where my birds are, . . . 

you can’t see in my house unless you’re on my back porch.” 

R.T.’s prior petition for a restraining order was not admitted into evidence.

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However, L.D.’s attorney informed the trial court that R.T. also submitted, in connection 

with that prior petition, an hourly log of L.D.’s activities. L.D.’s attorney noted that this 

1

 The reporter’s transcript is entirely capitalized. All quotations from that transcript omit 

the capitalization except where required by standard rules for capitalization.

2

 R.T. offered to show it to the trial court during the hearing, but the trial court 

responded: “That case is over.” 
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log was attached to L.D.’s petition and asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the 

item. The trial court did not specifically rule on the request for judicial notice, but stated 

it did receive the log and “did read it.” L.D.’s counsel then argued: “To find out that 

he’s keeping, like, an hourly log of her. It’s really kind of creepy. And video taping [sic] 

her all day long and putting notes about it. And it’s not -- I’ve never seen such a thing 

before. And if somebody goes to this extent, it’s worrisome.” As mentioned, L.D.’s 

petition, to which this log was apparently attached, was not made a part of the appellate 

record.3 

The trial court then heard from R.T., who confirmed that he lived across the street 

from L.D. and was taking videos of her. R.T. testified: “They moved in, and they 

brought in approximately 70 animals, I think, she said. My count was 26 horses, a camel, 

a brahma cow, a cow and a baby cow, four baby horses -- or Shetland ponies, three pigs, 

four alpacas, 32 birds.” R.T. testified that the animals were all on L.D.’s property, but 

the big animals were located, as he put it, “right on the street -- 70 feet from my garage 

door.” R.T. added: “The bottom line is they brought in a zoo, and they don’t --.”

At this point, the trial court interrupted to ask R.T. whether he had called animal 

control. R.T. answered: “I’ve gotten animal control. I’ve gotten air quality. I’ve gotten 

solid waste. I’ve gotten code enforcement, and I’m working with [an El Dorado County 

supervisor].” R.T. continued: “They moved in there. And as -- as they moved in there, 

we started getting hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of flies. The horses, and the 

cows, the camels, all that -- they’re right in front -- 70 feet from my house. [¶] They 

don’t clean out the pens; they just leave the -- and they say it’s common practice. They 

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 R.T. twice moved to augment the record with “a 16-page written log description of 

[the] videos” he took of L.D. and her property. We denied both motions, noting “there is 

no indication that the materials were filed or lodged in the superior court.” Whether this 

log is the same log referred to at the hearing is unclear.
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just leave the manure there and the -- and the horses walk all over it and get it all 

powdery. The next thing you know, we have clouds and clouds like she’s burning over 

there but it’s not burning, it’s urine and manure clouds just flying in the air. [¶] I have --

1,428 videos of this situation that we’re living in.” 

The trial court asked R.T. why he was taking these videos. R.T. answered: 

“Because I’m inundated with all these flies. I have the videos to show, if you’d like to 

see? I have -- I have videos on -- right on my phone; I can show you the flies, and I 

can --.” The trial court interrupted: “I get the fact that her animals draw flies.” A short 

time later, the trial court also stated: “I’m not going to look at all your stuff,” adding: “I 

understand what you’re saying. I’ve got it.” Returning to the reason he was taking the 

videos, R.T. stated that he was taking the videos “to get evidence for future litigation” 

and “get this problem taken care of.” R.T. continued: “We cannot live -- it’s inhuman. 

We walk out the door and we’re covered in flie[s] and we’re covered in dust. We have to 

take a bath every time we walk out the door. If I walk out to water my plants, I get 

covered in dust from this situation. [¶] They’ve failed to -- to negate the dust issue. 

They’ve failed to negate the -- the fly issue. They’ve failed to negate the -- the smell 

issue.” 

R.T. then claimed that L.D. intentionally drove a tractor containing animal waste 

in front of his house so he could “get a whiff of it.” L.D. denied this. R.T. further

claimed that L.D. was not properly caring for the animals, saying: “She’s gone for nine 

days; nobody takes care of these animals, and they haven’t been fed, and we learn these 

things by -- by videotaping the -- the dust and things.” L.D. denied these assertions as 

well. 

The trial court ultimately ruled: “The Court will grant an order at this time for a 

period of one year under the following terms and conditions. [¶] You’re not to annoy, 

harass, threaten, stalk, follow, molest, disturb the peace, keep under surveillance, or block 
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the movements of this individual. You’re not to have a firearm or ammunition for a 

period of one year.” 

DISCUSSION

I

Sufficiency of the Evidence

R.T. contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s implied 

finding that his conduct would have caused a reasonable person to suffer substantial 

emotional distress. This contention is forfeited and, in any event, fails on the merits.

Code of Civil Procedure4section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “A person 

who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary 

restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this 

section.” Subdivision (b) of this section defines “ ‘[h]arassment’ ” to include “a knowing 

and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, 

or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct 

must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 

distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” 

(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) Subdivision (b) also provides, in relevant part: “ ‘Course of 

conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, 

however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an 

individual . . . . Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of 

‘course of conduct.’ ” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) An order after hearing prohibiting 

harassment shall issue “[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

unlawful harassment exists.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).)

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 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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We review a trial court’s issuance of a civil harassment restraining order for abuse

of discretion. (See Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 849-850.) With exceptions

not relevant here, such an abuse will not be found where the findings necessary to support

the challenged order are supported by substantial evidence. (See Bixby v. Pierno (1971)

4 Cal.3d 130, 150; Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137-1138.) “In 

assessing whether substantial evidence supports the requisite elements of willful 

harassment, as defined in . . . section 527.6, we review the evidence before the trial court 

in accordance with the customary rules of appellate review. We resolve all factual 

conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all 

legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is 

supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” 

(Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)

An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a factual 

finding is required to set forth all material evidence supporting the finding, not merely 

their own evidence; failure to do so forfeits the issue. (See Foreman & Clark Corp. v.

Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) Moreover, an appellant’s opening brief is required to 

“[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record.” (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), italics added.) R.T.’s statement of facts provides 

only his version of the dispute with L.D. and cites almost exclusively to his “video log,” 

which is not part of the appellate record. This one-sided recitation of facts based 

primarily on matters outside the record runs afoul of these rules of appellate procedure. 

R.T. “is not exempt from the foregoing rules because he is representing himself on appeal 

in propria persona. Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. 

[Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the 

same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba

(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) R.T.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence is therefore forfeited.
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In any event, based on our review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence 

supports the trial court’s implied finding that R.T.’s course of conduct would have caused

a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. L.D. testified that R.T. took 

photos and videos of her on a daily basis, often staring at her for nearly 10 minutes at a 

time from her fence line. By R.T.’s own admission, he had 1,428 videos of L.D. and her 

property and animals on his cell phone. He also took notes regarding her activities on a 

log. And when he filed for a restraining order of his own, he knew the precise number of 

birds L.D. had inside her house, information that L.D. explained would only be known by 

being on her back porch. L.D. further testified that she was often at the property by 

herself, her cell phone did not have reception at the property, and her internet connection 

was not reliable, adding to her level of concern. Given these circumstances, we have no 

difficulty concluding that R.T.’s behavior would have caused a reasonable person to 

suffer substantial emotional distress.

II

R.T.’s Lawful Defense Claim

R.T. also claims the trial court erred in issuing the restraining order because he 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was lawfully defending himself and

his family from an environmental trespass. Not so.

As a preliminary matter, most of R.T.’s briefing on this issue attempts to establish 

that L.D.’s “ ‘Zoo Operation’ ” constituted an environmental trespass on his property. He 

claims he proved the elements of such a trespass before the trial court. However, the 

matter before the trial court was not whether L.D.’s animals unlawfully interfered with 

R.T.’s possessory interests in his property by drawing flies, emanating odors, and sending 

dust across the street. Instead, the only matter before the trial court below was whether a 

restraining order should issue based on R.T.’s conduct. That conduct was him coming 

out to photograph and record video of L.D. on a daily basis. At the hearing, he admitted 

engaging in this conduct and testified that he was doing so “to get evidence for future 
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litigation.” That is apparently what R.T. means by “protecting my family from intrusive 

environmental trespass.” He also asserts this conduct is “constitutionally protected.” 

R.T. does not argue on appeal, however, that the restraining order infringes on his First 

Amendment right to petition the government by preventing him from taking photos and 

video in furtherance of making complaints to the various governmental entities and 

ultimately filing a lawsuit. Instead, he asserts his constitutional “right of self[-]defense” 

and “[h]appiness pursuant to [the] California Constitution” outweighed L.D.’s interests in 

restraining his conduct. This argument is forfeited for failure to provide reasoned 

argument or citations to relevant authorities. (See Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 

224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1539; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-

785.)

In any event, to the extent that R.T. had a potentially viable constitutional defense 

below, it was based on the fact that he was taking the photos and video in connection 

with petitioning activity. R.T. has a fundamental constitutional right to file complaints 

with the various administrative agencies and/or file a lawsuit seeking to enjoin what he 

considers to be both a nuisance and an environmental trespass. (See Smith v. Silvey

(1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 400, 406.) However, unlike the improperly enjoined activities in 

Smith v. Silvey, i.e., contacting such agencies, the restraining order here prevents R.T. 

from annoying, harassing, threatening, stalking, following, molesting, disturbing the 

peace, keeping under surveillance, or blocking L.D.’s movements. It does not prevent 

him from making complaints against L.D. with any governmental agencies. Nor does it 

specifically prevent him from collecting evidence against her by means of taking photos 

or video. He simply cannot do so in an annoying, harassing, or threatening manner, or 

stalk her movements, or keep her under surveillance. This in no way infringes on R.T.’s 

constitutional right to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
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Simply put, R.T.’s harassing conduct went far beyond filing complaints and 

collecting necessary evidence in preparation for litigation. The trial court impliedly so 

found. Such a finding is also supported by substantial evidence.

III

Claims of Evidentiary Error

R.T. further asserts that the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion and 

violated his due process rights by declining to receive and consider all of his evidence 

and disallowing cross-examination of L.D. He is mistaken.

First, the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether proffered 

evidence is relevant. (People v. Diamond (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 798, 801.) The trial 

court heard from R.T., expressly credited his testimony that L.D.’s animals draw flies, 

and impliedly accepted his other assertions about the animals, saying: “I understand what 

you’re saying. I’ve got it.” However, as previously explained, the matter before the trial 

court was not whether L.D.’s animals drew flies, emanated odors, and sent dust across the 

street. For that reason, the trial court declined to “look at all [of R.T.’s] stuff,” apparently 

referring to R.T.’s videos and video log and his correspondence with the various 

administrative agencies. The trial court also interrupted R.T. when he tried to explain his 

prior request for a restraining order against L.D., saying: “That case is over.” This 

proffered evidence was simply not relevant to whether R.T.’s conduct amounted to 

harassment. There was no abuse of discretion.

Second, contrary to R.T.’s assertion on appeal, the trial court did not disallow 

cross-examination of L.D. R.T. did not ask to cross-examine L.D. at the hearing. Nor 

did the trial court generally rule that cross-examination would not be allowed. R.T.’s 

assertion is therefore forfeited. (See JMS Air Conditioning & Appliance Service, Inc. v. 

Santa Monica Community College Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 945, 962, fn. 6.)
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IV

Second Amendment Claim

R.T. has also forfeited his Second Amendment challenge to the order requiring 

him to relinquish his firearm. Again, an appellant must support each assertion of error 

with reasoned argument and citations to relevant authorities; failure to do so results in 

forfeiture of the claim. (Lewis v. City of Benicia, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1539; 

Badie v. Bank of America, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) R.T. devotes a single 

page of his opening brief to his Second Amendment claim and does not cite or discuss a 

single case relevant to this issue. The claim is forfeited.

V

Purported Abuse of Process

Finally, R.T. devotes another single page of his opening brief to attempting to 

demonstrate that L.D. committed the tort of abuse of process. Whether such a tort has 

been committed is not the proper subject of this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. No costs are awarded.

 /s/

Horst, J.*

We concur:

 /s/

Hull, Acting P. J.

 /s/

Mauro, J.

*

Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.