J-S30002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.I.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1072 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000552-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.I.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1073 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000027-2023

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 3, 2023

S.F. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 3, 2023 decree granting the 

petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to 

involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her daughter, M.I.F., born in May 
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2021 (“Child”).1 Mother further appeals from the April 3, 2023 order changing 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to Section 6351 of the Juvenile 

Act (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375). We affirm the termination decree and dismiss 

the appeal from the goal change order as moot.

We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows. The family 

came to the attention of DHS in May 2021, at the time of Child’s birth, as a 

result of mental health and substance abuse concerns related to Mother. See

N.T., 4/3/23, at 9. Specifically, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”), 

Turning Points for Children, case manager, Michole Allen, testified:

There was a [General Protective Services (“GPS”) report] made 

regarding Mother. It was mostly regarding her mental health. The 

GPS stated that Mother was making odd statements, such as she’s 

an angel. And if the child was a boy, she was going to have sex 

with the child. There was also an allegation of Mother using 

marijuana and PCP throughout her entire pregnancy. The report 

also stated that she was not receiving any type of prenatal care 

during her pregnancy.

Id. As a result, DHS obtained protective custody of Child on May 26, 2021. 

See Order of Protective Custody, 5/26/21.

2

 Upon her discharge from the 

hospital, Child was placed in foster care, where she has remained. See N.T., 

4/3/23, at 9, 36, 66.

____________________________________________

1 By separate decree of the same date, the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of Child’s father, J.T. (“Father”). Father did not file an appeal or 

participate in the instant appeals. We refer to Mother and Father collectively 

herein as “Parents.”

2 For purposes of this matter, we cite to the dependency record, when 

necessary, as it is part of the certified record in this case.
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The court adjudicated Child dependent on August 31, 2021, and ordered 

supervised visitation for Mother. See Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 

8/31/21. The court established a permanency goal of reunification. See 

Permanency Review Order, 11/30/21, at 1; see also Permanency Review 

Orders, 3/1/22, 5/31/22, 8/29/22, & 1/6/23.3 In furtherance of reunification, 

DHS created a single case plan requiring, inter alia, Mother to: maintain her 

mental health, employment, and housing; participate in visitation with Child; 

comply with CUA directives; and sign all necessary consents. See N.T., 

4/3/23, at 12. 

Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted 

permanency review hearings at regular intervals. From November 2021 

through August 2022, the court characterized Mother’s compliance with the 

permanency plan as “full” or “substantial” and her progress toward alleviating 

the causes of Child’s placement as “substantial.” Permanency Review Orders, 

11/30/21, 3/1/22, 5/31/22, & 8/29/22, at 1. In fact, Mother’s visitation 

progressed to unsupervised in March 2022, and overnight in May 2022. See

Permanency Review Order, 3/1/22, at 2; Permanency Review Order, 5/31/22, 

at 2; see also N.T., 4/3/23, at 13, 40. The court additionally noted the 

potential for reunification. See Permanency Review Order, 5/31/22, at 2; 

Permanency Review Order, 8/29/22, at 2. 

____________________________________________

3 The court established a concurrent goal of adoption on January 6, 2023. See 

Permanency Review Order, 1/6/23, at 1.
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However, by January 2023, the court described Mother’s compliance as 

“minimal” and progress as “minimal.” Permanency Review Order, 1/6/23, at 

1. Significantly, after suffering a miscarriage, Mother failed to attend visitation 

from September 2022 until February 2023, and expressed a desire to execute 

documentation to voluntarily terminate her parental rights. See N.T., 4/3/23, 

at 13-16. In December 2022, she additionally forwarded Child’s social security 

card and birth certificate, as well as milestone letters for Child, to Foster 

Mother. Id. at 21, 71-72, 113. Despite Mother then indicating that she had 

an “epiphany” and “wanted reunification,” requesting visitation in February 

2023, Ms. Allen expressed concerns with Mother’s mental health and her 

relationship with Father. Id. at 16-17, 24-25, 63-65. As such, Ms. Allen 

stated that Child could not be safely reunified with Mother. Id. at 26, 35, 63-

64.

On January 19, 2023, DHS filed a petition for the termination of parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), as well as 

a petition for a change of Child’s permanency goal from reunification to 

adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the petitions on April 3, 2023. 

Mother was present and represented by counsel. The Child, then almost two 

years old, was represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”).4 DHS presented 

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4

Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to 

her young age, we find Section 2313(a) satisfied by the representation of 

Attorney Newton. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) 

(holding, “if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the testimony of Ms. Allen, and Child’s foster mother, J.L.E. (“Foster Mother”). 

Additionally, Mother testified on her own behalf.5 

By decree dated and entered April 3, 2023, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Further, by order also dated and entered 

April 3, 2023, the court changed Child’s permanency goal from reunification 

to adoption. Thereafter, on April 30, 2023, Mother timely filed notices of 

appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).6 This Court consolidated 

Mother’s appeals sua sponte on May 17, 2023.

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)?

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because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict 

between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests; as such, the 

mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act [(23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938)]” 

is satisfied). 

We note that Child’s GAL argued in favor of termination. See N.T., 

3/20/23, at 82. He, however, did not submit a brief to this Court.

5 DHS also offered DHS Exhibits 1 through 4, which the court admitted without 

objection. See N.T., 4/3/23, at 7-8. Mother proffered Mother’s Exhibits 1 

through 3, which the court admitted. Id. at 59, 62.

6 On May 19, 2023, the trial court filed a Notice of Compliance with Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925(a), dated May 18, 2023, in which it references its 

reasoning placed on the record.
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3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5)?

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8)?

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)?

6. Whether the trial court erred by determining it to be in ...

[C]hild’s best interest to change the goal from reunification to 

adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (cleaned up).

We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, 

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of 

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When 

applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings 

of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See 

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial 

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may 

not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or 

abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 

2021). An abuse of discretion in this context exists “only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. 

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section 

2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the 

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven 
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enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under 

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section 

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the 

petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (citation 

omitted). 

In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long 

held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only 

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(en banc). Instantly, we will analyze the court’s termination decrees pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b),7 which provides as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

____________________________________________

7 This corresponds with Mother’s first and fifth issues. Given our disposition 

herein, we need not address Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues. See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 
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parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b). 

In order to establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), “[a] petitioner ... must demonstrate by competent, clear and 

convincing evidence, ‘[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.’” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-64 

(citation and footnote omitted). While undefined,

our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the 

needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support. 

Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that 

develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of 

such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and 

association. The performance of parental duties requires that a 

parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance 

in the child’s life. 

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, “[f]ortitude is required, as a parent must act with ‘reasonable 
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firmness’ to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parentchild relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform 

parental responsibilities.” Id. (citation omitted).

In assessing Section 2511(a)(1), trial courts should consider the entire 

history of the case and avoid applying the statutory six-month requirement 

mechanically. C.M., 255 A.3d at 364. However, the General Assembly’s 

emphasis on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

termination petition indicates this timeframe is the “most critical period for 

evaluation” of a parent’s conduct. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592. 

“[T]he question of whether a parent has failed or refused to perform 

parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of 

the case.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977). Thus, “even where 

the evidence clearly establishes a parent has failed to perform affirmative 

parental duties for a period in excess of six months..., the court ‘must examine 

the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to 

determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, clearly 

warrants permitting the involuntary termination [of parental rights].’” L.A.K., 

265 A.3d at 593 (citation omitted). The totality of the circumstances includes 

consideration of the following: “(1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if 

any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the 

child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the 

child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id. As explained by our Supreme Court, 
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“the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to our mandate that courts avoid 

a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of parental 

rights. The law must be applied with the purpose of serving needs and welfare 

of each individual child in his or her particular circumstances.” Id. 

Instantly, with respect to the determination that DHS satisfied the 

statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), the trial court found that Mother evidenced a settled purpose to 

relinquish her parental claim and failed to perform parental duties for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition. N.T., 

4/3/23, at 128-29. The court stated, “Mother in essence relinquished any 

parental claim [and] expressed on more than one occasion that she was not 

in any position, nor does she desire to reunify.” Id. at 128. The court 

continued, “There was nothing in the six months preceding the filing of the 

petitions in this case for either parent to establish that they in any way were 

trying to establish a parental claim to the child. [T]o the contrary, they failed 

to perform parental duties.” Id. at 129. 

Mother acknowledges that, while grieving her loss from a miscarriage, 

she expressed a desire to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. See 

Mother’s Brief at 14. She asserts, however, that in February 2023, she 

requested to resume visitation and had two visits with Child prior to the 

subject hearing. Id. Mother further argues that she was continuing to engage 

in therapy, as confirmed by a letter from her therapist, and had maintained 

housing and employment. Id. at 15.
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Upon review, we are constrained to agree with the trial court. The 

record supports the determination that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing her parental claim to Child and failed to perform parental duties 

in the six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition 

in January 2023. As revealed, Mother ceased visitation with Child from 

September 2022 to February 2023, after suffering a miscarriage. See N.T., 

4/3/23, at 13-14. During this time, she also did not independently reach out 

to see Child or inquire as to how Child was doing. Id. at 20, 27, 70-72. 

Mother explained that she was grieving and “at that time [she] believed that 

was the best decision that a mother could make.” Id. at 111. She “needed 

for [C]hild to be in an environment where she got the love and attention that 

she needed,” and that was “safe.” Id. at 111-12. Ms. Allen confirmed that, 

until February 2023, Mother exhibited an intent to not reunify with Child. Id.

at 22, 62-63. Although Foster Mother wanted Mother to remain involved in 

Child’s life, Ms. Allen stated that Mother “wanted to be known as a surrogate.” 

Id. at 19. 

Indeed, Ms. Allen testified that Mother indicated a desire to sign 

paperwork voluntarily terminating her parental rights (“VOLs”). Subsequent 

to advising Mother to consider this decision further, Mother contacted Ms. 

Allen at the end of October 2022, and reiterated her desire to voluntarily 

terminate her parental rights, as follows:

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Between September of 2022 and February 

of 2023, did you speak with Mother?

MS. ALLEN: Yes.
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[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And what was the nature of your 

conversations with her?

MS. ALLEN: Mother contacted me. And she expressed that she 

wanted to sign VOLs.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: As a result, did you have VOLs drafted?

MS. ALLEN: Not until November.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Why did you wait to have them drafted until 

November?

MS. ALLEN: I informed Mother that I thought she was making an 

impulsive decision. I told her that after suffering the miscarriage, 

I really believe that she needed to take time to just grieve her 

los[s] and consult with her therapist.

And then I told her, you know, after you consult with your 

therapist, after you take some time, contact me. And we’ll talk 

again. Mother contacted me at the end of October of 2022. 

And she stated, “Remember you told me that I should take time 

to think about signing VOLs?” I stated, “Yes.” She stated, “Well 

I still want to sign the paperwork.”

Id. at 15-16. 

Moreover, in December 2022, after contacting Foster Mother for her 

address, Mother sent Child’s social security card and birth certificate, as well 

as milestone letters for Child, to Foster Mother. Id. at 21, 71-72, 113. Foster 

Mother corroborated that Mother did not want reunification at that time. She 

testified, “[Mother] told me to take care of [Child], not to worry about her. 

She told me, during the conversation when she asked for my address, that 

that would be the last time that she would call.” Id. at 72-73. As such, and 

of significance, Ms. Allen recognized that Mother “had not taken steps to take 

and maintain a place of importance in [Child]’s life” from September 2022 to 

February 2023. Id. at 26.
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Once Mother requested visitation in February 2023, she was offered and 

participated in two supervised visits prior to the subject hearing, one in 

February and one in March 2023. Id. at 17-18.8 As recounted by Ms. Allen, 

Mother did not request for such visitation to be expanded. Id.

While Mother never executed documentation to voluntarily terminate 

her parental rights and subsequently expressed a desire for reunification and 

re-engaged in visitation, given Mother’s clear desire to relinquish her parental

role and failure to perform parental duties in the six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the termination petition, we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1). Hence, we do not disturb it.

Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), we next must determine whether termination was proper under 

Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d 

at 267. “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The 

‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond.” Id. (internal citations omitted). As 

our Supreme Court recently explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 

____________________________________________

8 When asked about the visitation schedule, Ms. Allen explained, “Because 

there was no visitation order in the last [c]ourt order from January; she had 

one visit in February and one visit in March.” N.T., 4/3/23, at 17.
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1113 (Pa. 2023), “a court conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis must 

consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from 

severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the parental bond 

is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a 

determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, 

i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare.” K.T., supra (emphasis added).

In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must 

also include consideration of other important factors.” Id. While not inventing 

an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must 

consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record, 

including, but not limited to, “the child’s need for permanency and the length 

of time in foster care...; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and 

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of 

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted); see 

also id. at 1113 n.28. 

In concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves 

Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to 

Section 2511(b), the trial court stated:

With regards to [Section] 2511(b), this court finds that Child does 

not have a parental bond with either Mother or Father in this case. 

Even if Child recently recognized Mom at one of the two visits that 

she had this year, there is no indication of a parent/child bond.
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The last visit -- I believe the testimony was that the visit in March 

ended early after [C]hild -- Mom said Child was exhausted. The 

testimony from the CUA worker is that Child didn’t want to even 

interact with Mom and put a toy in-between [her and] Mother. 

There is no indication of a parent/child bond, which would be 

impossible for Parents to have given their lack of contact with 

Child during Child’s life.

Due to the lack of visitation, it would have been impossible for 

Parents, given that they did not avail themselves for more visits, 

to establish a parental bond. I find that Child would suffer no 

irreparable harm if the rights of Parents were terminated, as Child 

has been having all of [her] needs met by [Foster Mother], who 

has been there for this [C]hild.

I am heartened by the fact that [Foster Mother], and I hope that 

Parents will avail themselves of this, [does] not want to eliminate 

Parents from Child’s life. I would encourage Parents to avail 

themselves of [Foster Mother’s] willingness to have them 

participate in Child’s life.

This is not something that happens every day when we’re in this 

situation in court. And I would encourage Parents to avail 

themselves so they can continue to be present in Child’s life. But 

I do find at this time it’s in Child’s best interest to change the goal 

to adoption, as Child has been in the same home since Child was 

four days of age. Child’s needs are being met by [Foster Mother].

Child has not -- [Parents do not] meet any of Child’s needs. And 

I find that Child, at this young age, it’s very important for Child to 

have permanency. This is a child, it should be noted, that has 

special needs and is receiving various types of therapies that 

Parents are not familiar with.

They don’t know where Child is receiving the therapy at this point. 

There was no testimony that they would be able to care for Child. 

And I find that it would be in Child’s best interest to free Child for 

adoption.

N.T., 4/3/23, at 133-35 (cleaned up; internal punctuation and capitalization 

also corrected).
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Conversely, in arguing a lack of clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

Mother baldly asserts that she wants to visit with Child and reestablish a bond. 

See Mother’s Brief at 19.

Upon review, the record supports the finding that termination favors 

Child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b). Mother’s visitation with 

Child progressed to unsupervised visitation in March 2022, and then to 

overnight, weekend visitation in May 2022. See N.T., 4/3/23, at 13, 40; 

Permanency Review Orders, 3/1/22 & 5/31/22. Ms. Allen acknowledged that, 

“to her knowledge,” such visitation was “appropriate.” N.T., 4/3/23, at 40. 

However, Mother then ceased participation in visitation in September 2022, 

after suffering a miscarriage. N.T., 4/3/23, at 13. While Mother resumed 

supervised visitation in February 2023, Ms. Allen raised the following 

concerns:

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Since September of 2022, how many visits 

had [Mother] had with [Child]?

MS. ALLEN: The two in 2023; the one in February and the one in 

March.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And at this time, would you have concerns 

recommending any sort of unsupervised contact with [Child]?

MS. ALLEN: Yes.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And what are those concerns?

MS. ALLEN: [Child] is no longer familiarized with her mother. At 

the last visit, [Child] wouldn’t even engage in the visit unless Ms. 

[C.], who is [Foster Mother]’s aunt, unless she was in the visitation 
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room. When Ms. [C.] tried to walk out the room, [Child] began 

crying, screaming. She wouldn’t let Mother touch her. So she 

was asked to stay inside. [Child] would not interact with her 

mother throughout the visit. She actually put a toy in-between 

the two of them to separate them.

Id. at 18. 

Significantly, Mother failed to engage in visitation with her young child 

for a period of five months, from the time Child was 16 months old until almost 

two years old. As such, despite any prior visitation and contact, Ms. Allen 

opined that a parent-child bond did not exist between Mother and Child. Id.

at 35-36. She testified that Child “is just not comfortable” with Mother and 

would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. Id. at 26-27. 

Instead, Ms. Allen indicated that Child “is very much bonded with the 

family, with [Foster Mother] and her aunt” and looks to Foster Mother for her 

“daily parental needs.” Id. at 37-38. Notably, Child had been in her current 

pre-adoptive foster home since she was four days old. Id. at 37, 66, 79-89. 

Ms. Allen described, “[Child] is very playful with [Foster Mother]. She’s very 

attached to her.” Id. at 37. Foster Mother further observed, “[Child] is a 

very, very happy little girl.” Id. at 78-79.

Moreover, Foster Mother testified that Child has gross motor delays and 

did not believe that Mother would be able to care for her. She stated, “[Child] 

has gross motor delays. She is not able to walk. ... In addition to physical 

therapy, she does receive occupational therapy and speech therapy. ... And 
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just the care that she requires, I’m not sure if [Parents] would be able to do 

it.” Id. at 79.

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the record corroborates the 

trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights best 

serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare 

pursuant to Section 2511(b). As such, we do not disturb it. Since our review 

confirms that there was a sufficient basis for the involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), we affirm 

the trial court’s decree.

Given our disposition concerning termination, Mother’s appeal from the 

goal change order is moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 

917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 

2002)) (“[E]ven if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be 

moot in light of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees.”).9 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination decree and dismiss 

the goal change order as moot.

Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed as moot. 

____________________________________________

9 Even if not moot, for the reasons we have already discussed throughout this 

memorandum with respect to termination, the record confirms that changing 

Child’s goal to adoption is in her best interest. See In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 

1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011).
J-S30002-23

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Date: 10/3/2023