### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN

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Marcus Bernar d Washington, Ap pellant
v. The State of Texas , Appellee

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4444444444 FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299T H JUDICIAL DIST RICT

NO. 0980499, HONORABLE JON N. WISSE R, JUDGE PRESIDING

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Appellant Marcus Bernard Washington was convi cted o f sexual assault of a child. SeeTex. P enal C ode A nn. § 22.011( a)(2) (A) (West Supp. 2000). The trial court ass essed appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for twelve years. In eleven points of error, appellant
asse rts the trial court

err ed during jury

selec tion and in

the admiss ion of e vidence . We will
overr ule appe llant’spoints of error and

aff irm the judgment. In his first point of

error , appellant complains that the trial court re versibly err ed in denying his challenge for ca use of veni remember Merr ick. Eve n if the trial c ourt er rs in denying a defend ant’s challenge of a veniremember for cause, to preserve error , the defendant must (1) u se allof his peremptory challenge s, (2) ask for a nd be refused ad diti onal p eremp tory challenges, and (3) be forced to take a n identified objectionable juror whom defendant would2

not otherwise have accepted had the tr

ial cour t grant ed his c hallengefor c ause o r gra nted him additional perem ptory c halle nges. Colella v . State , 915 S.W.2d 834, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); More no v. State , 587 S. W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979 ); Wolfe v. State , 1 7 8 S.W.2d 274, 281 (Tex . Crim. App. 1 944); Garcia v. State , 16 S.W.3d401, 408 ( Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pe t. ref’d). Here, although appellant’s c hallenge for ca use of venire member M errick
was overruled and appe llant exerc ised a p eremptor y challe nge aga inst Merrick, ex hauste d his perem ptory challen ges, and was de nied addi tional ch allenge s, co unsel mer ely stated that he was required to accept “one or two objectionable jurors ” without identifying and naming the objectionable juror or

jurors. By not identifying and naming the ob jecti onabl e juror o r jurors whom he was required to accept for jury s ervice, appellant f ailed to preser

ve for appellate r

eview the complaint he has presented. Appellant’sfirst point of e rror isoverruled.

In his second point of er

ror, appe llant assertsthat the trial court re versibly err ed by granting the S tate’s challenge for cause of veniremember Christensen. When the trial c ourt grantsthe State’s challenge of a venirememberfor caus e, to obtain rever sal even if the r uling
was erroneous , an ap pellant must show tha t the error actually deprived him of a fair and im partia l jury. Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 562 (Tex . Crim. App. 1 999); Brooks v. State , 990 S.W.2d 278, 28 9 (Tex . Crim . App . 1999). T he err oneous excusing of a veniremember challengedfor caus e by the State will call for rever sal only if the r ecord shows t hat the error deprived the appellant of

a law fully c onsti tuted jury. Jones v. State , 982 S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex. Cr im. App . 1998). A ppell ant’s argu men t com plain s only of the co urt’s ruli ng. Appellant does not arg ue tha t the a llege d error dep rived h im of a fair and im partia l jury. T he record does not3

show that the al le ged error deprived him of a lawfully constituted jury. Appellant’s s econd point of error

is overruled. In his th ird poi nt of error, appellant urges that the “trial court er

red in overr

uling appellant’s Batson objec tion to th e Stat e’s perem ptory st rike of v enirem emb er Stew art.”
On a ppeal of a Batson chall enge, t his C ourt mu st appl y a “cle ar error” stan dard of review
. Lopez v

. State , 940 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997), pet. ref’d , 954 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Hernandez v. New York , 500 U.S. 352, 364-65 (1991) . In applying this standa r d, we must review all of the ev idence in the light most favorable to the district cour t’s ruling and t

he n determine if the ruling was clearly er roneous. I f, afte r reviewing all the evidence, we canno t say th at the trial c ourt’s ruling was clearly erroneous , we must uphold the ruling even i f this C ourt wou ld h av e we igh ed theev ide nc e d if

fe re ntl y ha d we been sitting a s the tr

ier of fact. Lopez , 940 S.W.2d at 390. For us to conclude that the trial court’s dec ision was clearly err oneous, we must be left with a “ defini te and firm conviction t hat a m istake has been committed.” Varga s v. State , 838 S.W.2 d 552, 5 54 (Te x. Cri m. A pp. 199 2). Great defer

ence to the trial court’s r uling is especially appropr iate in the review of a Batson challenge because the credibility of the pros ecutor’s e xplanation is the heart of the matter and the trial cour t i s in the best position to make that judgment. Mandujano v. State , 966 S.W.2d 8 16, 819 ( Tex. App.—Austin 1 998, pe t. re f’d)(foo tnote
om itte d). Appellant is African-American. One African-American ser ved on the jury. Four Africa n-Am erican v enirem emb ers were p eremp toril y chal lenge d by t he St ate. Three of these venirem emb ers were challen ged because they or their closerelatives had been charged with or convictedof offe nses similar to the offensealleged in this case. Challenges for reasons such a s these have been he ld to be race-ne utral. Emerso n v. State , 8 51 S. W. 2d 26 9, 27 2 ( Te x. Cr im.4

App. 1993); Varga

s v. State , 838 S.W.2d at5 55; Garcia v. State , 833 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. App .—D allas 1 992), aff’d , 868 S .W.2d 337 (T ex. Cri m. A pp. 199 3).

The State challenged Stewart, an Africa n-America n, because his wi fe was a
r egistered

nurse. T he St ate al so chal lenge d perem ptoril y a phy sician and a n urse, neith er o f whom w as Africa n-American . At the trial cour t’s di recti on, the pros ecutor resp onded to appel lant’s Batson objection. She stated therewas no medical or DNA evidence which the S tate could offer in the trial of this cas e. She said the State fe lt that peopl e in the medic al field or those closely related to pe ople in the medical field would be concerned about the absenceof medical and D NA evide nce and mo re likelythan other veniremembers to question the abs ence of such medi cal and DN A ev idenc e. At trial, d efense co unsel’s resp onse to the S tate’s explanation was, “I

don’t th ink there’s suffi cient reason for s trikinghim.” In s im ila r circumstances when the Statecould not off er medica l testimony in

a sexual assa

ult prosecution, the perem ptory c halle nge of a re gistere d nurse w as held race-neut ral. Emerson , 851 S.W.2d at 272. On appeal, appellant argues thatif Stewart hadserved as a juror he could not have discussed the ev idenc e or the l ack of ev idenc e in th e case w ith h is wi fe. While this may be true, it was S tew art’s associ ation wit h his w ife and his knowledge of her profession asa registered
nurse gained pr

ior to trial that led the State to its belief that hewould be more likely than other venirem emb ers to question the absence of medical and DNA evidence in a sexual as sault case. On appeal, appellant also complains of dis parat e treatment between Stewart and veniremember Fisher, who was white. The validity of his complaint is not supported by the5

record. We are unable to determine from the recor d before us that Fisher worked in the medical field or was related to anyone who di d. Although th e rec ord indi cate s that ve nirem emb ers completed a questionnaire conce rning their background and employment, no questionnaires were included in the app ellate record . During v oir dire, Fisher

stated that: “I am an assis tant coach for a youth sof

tball team and I used to be a pre- K teacher an d an Austin school bus driver.” Mo reover, although appellant claims that Fisher was “in the strike zone,”it appears the trial judge correctly determined that she was not. The last veniremember selected to ser ve as a juror w as veni remem ber thi rty-five. Fisher was veniremember thirty-nine and did not serve
as a juror. Fur

thermore, the disparity issuewas not raised in the trialcourt b efore the trial c ourt ruled. The State offered a plausible expl anatio n for its peremptory challenge of veniremember Stewart. The trial court’sruling was not clearly err oneou s; we over rule appel lant’s t hird po int o f error.

In his appellate brief

, appellant has combinedfor argument his fourth, fif th, sixth, and seventh points of er

ror in which he asserts that the tr ial court committed reversible e rror in admitting in evidence “extraneous acts e vidence ” over his “relevanc y,” “Rule404(b) ,” “Rule 403,” and lack

of proper n otice obj ections . A summary of the per tinent ev idence i s necessar y. Appellant, who was thirty -two year s old, lived with his sister, Marita Washington and her three young children in a three bedroom apartment. Sixteen-year-old P.M. was
occas ionally

emp loyed to bab y-sit M arita’s children. On the night the offense was committed, P. M. was baby-sitting the children while Marita had gone out to cel ebrat e her birthday. On that6

night, two young fr

iends of Marita’s childr en came to spend t he nig ht. Th e tw o youn g visi tors
were accompanied by their fo urteen-y ear-old si ster, J.D . J.D. ha d not know n P.M ., but decided to stay with P. M. and listen to music and play cards. P.M. had met appellant but she understood he would not beat home that e vening. J.D. did not know appe llant. Laterin the evening, appellant came home. Still later, appellant left the apartment and retur ned bringing wine co olers for P .M. and J. D. to drink . The gir ls dra nk the alc oholic beverage provided by appellant. Appellant asked J. D. how old she was. J.D. did not answer but P. M. said J.D. was sixteen. Appellant asked J .D. how she would r eact if an older guy did something to her i f

sh e r ea lly

was si xte enye ar s o ld. App el lant c ha lle nge d J .D. to prove that she
was sixte e n, and said he could tes t her to see if s he was sixteen. Appellant then gave J.D. an open-m outh inti mat e “boy friend-gi rl friend t ype of k iss.” J.D . “froze up and m oved b ack.”

P. M. and J. D. continue d to liste n to music. Appellant remained in theroom with th em. Appellant kept touching the girls, tr ying to converse with them, trying to kiss them, and acting in a “fl irtati ous” w ay tow ard J. D. J.D . was n ervous, t remb ling , and he r knees w ere shaking. Appellant told her to stop shaking her knees buts heco ul d n ot

“c on trolit
. ” W he n P
. M. left theroom, app ellant ca me close to J.D. and “hovering over ” her told her he w ould not h urt her as he p ut his hand down inside the front of her pants. P.M. came back into the room int er ru pti ng w hat a

ppe lla nt wa s d oin g to J. D. The girls continue d to listen to music and appellant continued to harassJ.D. about provin g her age. After expressing his belief that J.D. could not handle him, he t urned hi s attention toward P.M. Appellant star ted “mess ing with” P.M. and repea tedlytold her he wanted7

to tell her s ome th in g. To a ve rt ap pe ll ant’ s a

tt enti on , P .M. go t u

p a nd ente re d the bathro om. Appellant follow ed P.M . into the ba throom , turned out t he lig ht, and shut t he doo r. Appellant took P.M .’s cloth es dow n and p enetrat ed her va gina w ith h is peni s. Appellant did not ejac ulate in her va gina but “ it was like right on the outside area. ” Appellant then gave P.M. a towel and told her to cl ean herself up because he did not wan t to have any kids.

While appellant andP.M. were in the bathroom, J.D. answered a telephon e call that was for P.M. J.D. knocked on the bathroom door telling P.M. that she had a call bu t P
. M. didnot an swer. When P.M. came out of the bathroom, unlike when she entered, her T-shirt was hanging over

he rs ho r ts . P. M. then made a call to her friend David. Appellant came to the door
an d ge st ur ed with hishand f

or J. D. t o c ome with

him. Bei ng a

ppr eh en si ve , J .D. didnot go to see what appellant wanted. J.D. “was kind of more worried about whatwas wrong withP. M.

. . . s he was ac ting dif

fer ent.” J .D. tes tified “ she [ P.M.] jus t wanted to get away—from there at least.” The girls went to a conveniencestore and met P.M.’s frie nd, David.

During the time appellant’s misconduct was taking place, the younger c hildren
were in ano ther roo m. Marita’s boyfriend, a Fort Hood serviceman, came to the apartment but stayed in Marita’s bedroom or in the living room watching a basketball game on television.

Appellant contended at trial and contends on appeal thatJ.D.’s tes timony about appellant placing hi s hand inside J.D .’s pants was erroneously adm itted over hi s objections. The State argued at trial and

maintains on appeal t

hat the c omplained of

evidenc e was admiss ible
as th e “ sa me transaction contextualevide nce,” be cause it s adm ission was n ecessary for “ the ju ry to evaluat e the evi dence in its proper c ontext ins tead of having to e valuate it in a vacuu m.” The8

trial court o verruled appel lant’s objections. In explaining its r uling, the court noted that cases like this are deter

mined on the cr

edibility o f the witne ssesand evidence that aids thejury in t

his respect shoul d be ad mi tted. T he cou rt found this ev idenc e “cont extua l . . . showing the context in which the offensewas comm itted.” The court also f ound that it showed ap pellant’ s intent , an excepti on to TexasRule of Evi dence 4 04(b). SeeTex. R. Evid. 404(b). The cour t went on to find that this evidence, although prejudicial, was not unfair ly prejudicial and that its probative value outweighed any prejudice.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has made a distinction between “background contextual evidence” and “same trans action contextual evidence.” Rogers v. State , 853 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Te x. Cri m. A pp. 199 3); Mayes v. State , 816 S .W.2d 79, 86-8 7 (Tex . Crim . App . 1991); Kiser v. State , 893 S. W.2d 277, 283 (Tex . App.—Houston [ 1st Dist. ] 1995, pet. ref’d). In this case, there has been no suggestion that the evidence complained of was admissible as background

contextual evidence. The controversy between appellant and the State is whether the evidence complained of by appellant was same transactional contextual evidence
. “S ame transaction

contextual evidence” has been defined as evidenc e that “impar ts to the trier of f

act information essential to unders tanding the context and circumstances of events which, although legally separate of

fenses, are blended or inter woven.” Comach o v. State , 864 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); accor d Jackson v. State , 927 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, no pe t.); Norr

id v. State , 925 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no pe t.)
. “As such, it is admissible, not for the pur pose of showing cha

racte r conf

ormity, bu

t to illuminate the nature of the cr

ime alleged.” Comacho , 864 S.W.2d at 532; accor

d Norr id , 925 S.W.2d at9

349. “[W]here the offense is one continuous trans action, or another offense is a part of the case
on trial or blended

or closely interwoven there with, proof of all the facts is proper. [] Necessity, then, seems to be one of the re asons behind admitting evidence of the accus ed’s acts, words and conduct at the time of the comm ission of the offense .” Mayes , 816 S. W.2d at 86- 87 n.4; accord Rogers , 853 S.W.2d at 33.

From our s ummary of the evidenc e, it is appar ent that J.D .’s testimony about which appellant co mplai ns, although evidence of a separate bad act or offense, was evid ence so blended and interwoven with the other evidence thatit was essential for the jury’ s understanding of the circu mstances and the c ontext of events including the charged off ense. The entire episode
was a continuous transac tion—a course of sexual a buse of the two g irl s. We h old t hat J.D .’s testimony that appellant put his hand into the front of her pants was “s ame transaction contextual evidence.” Same transaction contextual evidenc e is relevant under Texas Rule of Evidence 401. Tex. R. Evid. 401; Lockh art v. Stat e , 847 S .W.2d 568, 57 1 (Tex . Crim . App . 1992); Broussard

v. State , 999 S.W.2d 477 , 480- 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 4th Dist.] 1999, pe t. ref’d); Smith v. State , 949 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d ). Evidence of the context is almost always admissible so that a jury may have the offense placed in its proper setting so that all ev idenc e ma y be real istic ally e valua ted. Skiller n v. State , 890 S.W.2d 849, 865 (Tex. App .—A ustin 1994, p et. ref’d). Q uestio ns of relev ance sho uld b e left largely to the trial court relying upon its o wn observations and experience, and its decis ion will not be reversed absentan abu se of disc retion
. Id . Evidenc e of oth er cr imes, or bad actsthat a

defendant may10

have committed, cann ot b e introduced at the guilt-innocence phaseof trial to show that the defendant

acted in co nf or mity wi thhi s c ri min al naturean d the re fo reco mmitte d the crime for which he is on tria l. Lockhart , 847 S. W.2d at 570; Montgomer y v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ( op. on reh’g) ; Abdnor v. St ate , 808 S.W.2d476, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). However, bad act or e xtraneous offenseevidence may be ad mitt ed for other purposes. Tex. R . Evid . 404(b).

Altho ugh Rule 404 (b) enumerates specific pu rposes for which oth er crimes, wrongs, or acts are admissible, the Rule’s list of other purposes is “neither mutually exclusive
norcollective ly exhaust ive.” Mo ntgomery , 810 S.W.2d at 388. One of the other pur poses unenumerated in Rule 404( b) fo r which bad

act or extra neous o ffe nse ev idence i s admiss ible is
sa me transact ion co ntext ual ev idenc e. Nelso n v. State , 864 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Rogers , 853 S.W.2d at 33; Barber

v. State , 989 S.W.2d822, 831 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref

’d). Rare ly will the prejudicial value render inadmissible any evidence that proves the conte xt of th e offense. Lockhart , 847 S.W.2d at 571- 72; Mann v. State , 718 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. C rim. A pp. 198 6).

Rule 404(b)’srequirement that the State give a defenda nt reas o nable noti ce before trial of its intention to off er evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or

acts does not

apply when the other crimes, wrongs, or

acts arise“in the same transaction. ” Tex. R. Evid 4 04(b) ; Brow n v. State , 978 S.W.2d

708, 712 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, p et. ref’d); Hodge v. St ate , 940 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1997, pet. ref ’d). Becaus e the complained of evidence was sa me transaction

contextual evidence, the State did not need to give adva nce notice that it would offer11

such evide nce. However, upon first lear ning of this evidence the weekend be foretrial, the State gave noti ce to app ellant’ s couns el.

We holdthat t he tria l court did n ot abu se its d iscreti on in overrul ing ap pella nt’s relevance, Rul e 404(b ), Rul e 403, a nd not ice ob jecti ons to the S tate’s o ffer and th e Cou rt’s admission of evidence that appellant put his hand ins ide the front of J.D .’s pants. A ppell ant’s fourth, f ifth, sixth, and s eventh points of err or are over

ruled. In his eighth point of

error , appellant urges that the “trial court rever sibly erred in ov errulin g appe llant ’s objec tion to M anley ’s testi mo ny th at he d idn’t file cases he believed
were false.” Austin police Detective Brian M anley, who had formerly been in the Chi ld Abu se Division, investi gated thi s case. In cross- examination, defense counse l as ke d Manl ey to name the wit nesses he h ad int erview ed in h is inv estiga tion
. Ma nley n ame d P.M ., P.M .’s mot her, J.D ., Marita Washington, Columbu s Har per, and a ppell ant. M anley had al so referred P.M . to D r. Beth Nauert, a physician at the Children’ s Advocacy Center, and Manley had read Dr. N auert’s report. Defens e counsel then asked Manley: Q. Okay. Now then, in your investigation of child ab use repor ts, do you sometimes find that they are false? A. I have fou nd th em t o be fals e in th e past, y es. Q. Okay. Is there any particula r pattern that develops that you notice when they turn out to be false? A. Not necessar

ily a pattern. Th ere c an be multiple reas ons a c hild would ch oos e t o do so meth inglik e this , y ou k now . Appell ant’s compl aint relates to t he prosecutor’s redirect-exami nation as follo ws:12

Q. Okay. And in case s where you belie ve that th e repo rt of child abu se to b e false --in those particular c ases you don’t f ile the case, do you? A. No, we do not. [Prosecut or]: No oth er questions. [Defense Counsel] : Well, I’ m sorry , Your Honor , I was extre mely slow on that. What we basic al ly n ow have is a witness expres sing an opinion about the truthfulness orfalseness . I just got a little star tled on that. I would object to that last que stion an d answer and as k that it bestric ken. He doe sn’t g et to express an opinion about whether something is true or f alse, and that a ppears to be what the question and answer elicited. [Prosecut or]: You r Hon or, I didn ’t ask that particular question, and Mr. Green in his original cross -examination asked the detective if in the past he’s believed some cases to be false accusations. THE C OUR T: Okay. We’ll overrule the objection. Appellant argues: “Since he [ Manley] also testified he f iled this case, this was
an opinion that the allegations were true, i. e., the State’s witnesses were telling the truth and the defense witnesses were not.” Although M anley may have filed charges in this case, he did not testify that he actually f

iled the charges in this pa rticular cas e. A defendant must timely object to preserve an er ror in the admissionof evidence. Tex. R. App. P. 33 .1(a)(1) ; Dinkins v. State , 894 S. W.2 d 33 0, 355 (T ex . Cr im. App . 1 995 ). An objection should be made as soon as the ground for objec tion becom es appare nt. Dinkins , 894 S.W.2d at 355 . In genera l, thi s occurs w hen th e evid ence is a dm itte d. Id . Therefo re, if a question clearly calls for a n objec tion able resp onse, a d efendan t shou ld m ake an o bject ion b efore the witness respon ds
. Id .; Ethington v. St ate , 819 S .W.2d 854, 85 8 (Tex . Crim . App . 1991);13

Angelo v. State , 977 S.W.2d 169, 179 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’ d). Here, the que stion
was asked, answered, and the witness passed, before the objec tion was made. Defense counsel acknowledged his tardy objection. The e rror claimed on ap peal was no t pres erved for a ppellate review by a timely trial objection. Appellant’s eighth point of err or is overr

uled. In points of

error nine, ten, and eleven, appellant complains that the trial court , at the punishment phase of trial, erred in admitting in evidence State’s Exhibits 2, 4, an d 4A
. Appellant waived a jury at the punishment phase of trial and elected to have the trialcourt assess his punishment. For the trial court’s cons ideration in asses sing appellant’s punis hment, the State offered exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 4A as evide nce of app ellant’ s prio r criminal rec ord. These e xhibits were offered to show that appellant had been convictedin A rkansas of t he felon y offense o f a terrorist ic act. Appe llant not on ly conten ds that t hes e exhibit s were e rron eously a dmitted in evi dence but also that the exhibits do not show beyond a reasonabledoubt that he was the Marcus Washington who w as convicted in Arkansas. Theref ore, h e argues t he tria l court ’s consid eratio n of the Arkan sas conv icti on w as harm ful and reversibl e error.

We will first consider State’s Exh ibits 4 and 4A. These exhibits include several documents pertai ning to C ause N um ber 97-2 in the C ircuit Co urt of Pulaski C ounty, A rkansas, which were authenticated by the clerk of the circuit court by signa ture and seal of the court. One of the includ ed docum ents is a judgment reflecting that a Marcus Washington was convicted on July 3, 1997, of

the offense of

a terr orist ic act. Washington

was place d on pro bation f or sixty mont hs. The judgment gives Washington’s birth date as March27, 1965. The document setting the conditions of probation gives his social secur ity number as 555-08-0545 and his addr ess as1 The State’ s brie f cor rectl y notes i n grea

ter de tail the identifiers f ound in Exhibits 4 and 4A that match other evidence in the record: The defen dant n amed in t he judgment in Pulaski Count y, Arkan sas, is Marcus Washington, whose date of birth was March 27, 1965. His mother testified in the ins tant cas e th at he was 34 years of age in May of 1999. R.R .I V: 1,4. His addressaccording to the “Conditions of release on probation” docum ents dated “7-3-97” in SX4-A was 6 05 M asterson Pass #1111, Austin, Texas, and his social security number was 555-08-0545, the sa me social security number and add r ess shown in his Calcasieu Lumber Company records . S.X4-A, p. 6, DX2, p. 5. His sister tes tified that the appella nt had moved in

to her a partment in

Dec emb er

199 6. R.R .I V: 5, 27. The victim testified that the appellant’s sis ter Marita’s apar tment was at 605 Masterson Pass in

Austin and that t he app ellan t had m oved i n aroun d Janua ry or Februar

y of 1997. R.R.III: 10, 13, 15. The appellant’s Calcasieu records show that he w as em ploy ed at O ne Sou rce Lum ber, 400 Eas t 13 th, NLR, AR, from Ja nuary 1991, to December 1996, and that his reas on for leaving was “moved to A ustin .” DX 2-pp. 6, 9 . The i nform ation in SX 4-A indicates that the Mar cus Washington in that case had been ar rested on March 23, 1996, and released on bon d. SX4 -A, p. 1 5. An arr est r eport i n the sa

me exhibit sh ows that Marcus Was hin gton was arrested in Austin, Texas on J une 18, 1997, and extradited in Pulaski County Cause numberedvarious ly a s CR 97000002, 97-000002, and CR 97-2. SX4-A, pp. 1, 10, 14. The Calcasieu records indicate that Marcus Washington was hired effe ctive May 27, 1997 and dismissed effec tive June 17, 1997, because he “was arres ted and did not call.” DX2-pp 4 04. Th e State submits that the evidence proves that the Marcus Washingt on convicte d in Cause CR 97- 000002 in the Circu it C ourt of Pul aski, A rkansas, i s the ap pella nt. 14 605 Ma ster Pass # 1111, A ustin , Texas 78725 . Several docum ents in Exhi bit 4 bear a sig nature of Marcus Was hin gto n. The tr ia l c our t c ompa re d th es e s ign at

ur es with ap pe lla nt’ s k now n signat ure on State’s Ex hibit 3 an d found the sign ature on the docu ments w ere appellant’s. Appellant’s signature, his soci al securi ty nu mb er, date of birth, and address f

ound in Exhib its 4 and 4A correspond and match other evidenc e in the record. 115 The trial court did n ot err in adm itting S tate’s E xhibits 4 and 4A even though those exhibits were not connected t o appella nt by fin gerpr

int identif

ication. The eviden ce is sufficient to prove beyond a rea sonable do u bt that appellant was the Marcus Washington convictedin Cause Number 97-2 in Pulaski County, Ark ansas . The trial cour t could properly consid er appel lant’s p rior A rkansas co nvict ion i n assessin g puni shm ent.

We n ow c onsid er appel lant’s c om plain t relat ing t o Exh ibit 2. Sta te’s Exhibit2
was a finge rpri nt card bearing appel lant’ssignatu re and social s ecur ity number. An attached page shows a “ch arged offense of T ER RO RIST IC A CT 2CT S” and “TE RR OR ISTIC TH RE AT EN ING .” The only purported authenticat ion shown on this exhibit is a Pulaski County, Arkansas, Notary Public’shandwritten statement “Subsc ribed an d swo rn to be fore me, this 24th day of M arch 199 9.” There is insuff icient authentication and evidence to connec t this doc ume nt wi th t

he judgme nt i n St at e’ s Ex hib its 4 and 4 A. Stat e’s Exhibit 3 was a fingerprint card of appellant’s f inger prin ts made by a fingerprint

expert who testi fied he h ad m ade th e card at the time of trial. The expert testif ied that a ppellant also signed the card. The expert also tes tified that appellant’s f ingerprints on Exhibit3 matched the fingerprints on State ’s Ex hibit 2. St ate’sExhibit 2 was no t prope rly authenticatedor con

nected t o the judgment i n State’ s Exhib it 4, an d should not have been admitted in evidence. However, Exhibit 2 did not furnish any additional detr imental evidence again st appella

nt. The e rror

in admitting Exhibi t 2 in evide nce did no t subst antially affec t appel lant’s rights and m ust be d isregarde d. SeeTex. R. App. P. 44.2 (b). Appe llant’s nint h, tenth, and eleventh points of error a re overr uled.16 The judgment is affirmed.

Carl E. F. Dally, Justice Befor e Jus tices J ones, B. A. Smith and Dally * Affirmed Filed: December 14, 2000 Do N ot Publi sh

* Before Carl E. F. Dally, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by ass ignment. SeeTex. G ov’t C ode A nn. § 74 .003(b) (W est 199 8).