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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANDRE D. WHITE

(AC 42471)

Keller, Prescott and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of home invasion, robbery in

the first degree, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree and

tampering with a witness, the defendant appealed to this court. The

defendant’s conviction stemmed from an incident in which he and two

other men, D and L, pursuant to their plan to commit a home invasion

and robbery, followed the victim to his residence, forced him into the

residence at gunpoint and robbed him of various possessions, including

his credit and ATM cards, two rifles, a box of shotgun shells, and a vase

containing approximately $75 in coins. During their investigation, the

police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s residence and to

seize any items that were described in the warrant application and

supporting affidavit as either having been removed from the victim’s

residence or used or worn by the defendant during the commission of

the home invasion. Upon execution of the warrant, the police seized

several items, including a box of 20 gauge shotgun shells and a black

ski mask. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any

and all evidence that the police seized from his residence. The trial

court denied the motion, concluding, inter alia, that the search warrant

was supported by probable cause. During the trial, the state called D,

who testified in detail about the events leading up to and including the

home invasion, and the defendant’s involvement therein. D also testified

that he had entered into a plea agreement with the state, pursuant to

which he pleaded guilty to the crime of burglary in the first degree and

agreed to testify for the state in exchange for a sentence of between

seven and nine years of imprisonment. The plea agreement, which was

admitted into evidence without objection, expressly provided that the

ultimate decision as to the sentence that D received would be decided

by the judge who presided over the defendant’s trial, after consideration

of the credibility of D’s testimony at trial, as well as other factors. On

appeal, the defendant claimed that he was deprived of a fair trial as a

result of prosecutorial impropriety and that the court improperly denied

his motion to suppress the evidence that was seized pursuant to the

search warrant. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that prosecutorial impropriety that occurred during the state’s examination of D and

closing argument deprived him of a fair trial:

a. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the prosecutor’s inquiry during his

redirect examination of D about D’s reasons for entering into the plea

agreement with the state, which elicited testimony from D that the

prosecutor had not made an offer until he was satisfied that D was

being truthful, was not improper; the prosecutor’s inquiry was based

on the evidence and did not suggest that the prosecutor was vouching

for D’s credibility on the basis of facts outside of the record.

b. The defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for

D’s credibility during the state’s rebuttal closing argument was unavailing: the prosecutor’s reference to the fact that D’s plea agreement

required the presiding judge to make a determination of D’s credibility

was based on the evidence and did not suggest to the jury either that

the court already had found D to be credible or that the jury was not

required to evaluate D’s credibility because the court would do so;

moreover, contrary to the defendant’s assertion, certain challenged arguments of the prosecutor concerning D and the plea agreement were not

an attempt by the prosecutor to inject his credibility into the trial or to

ask the jury to trust his professional judgment and integrity when

assessing D’s credibility, as the arguments were properly limited to the

evidence and the rational inferences to be drawn therefrom; furthermore,

the prosecutor did not mischaracterize defense counsel’s arguments

that the state had ‘‘bought and sold’’ D’s testimony and that the prosecutor was supporting perjury, the prosecutor having properly attempted
to refute these challenges to D’s testimony by arguing that because the

plea agreement was contingent on D testifying credibly, it did not logically provide him with a motive to be untruthful, and there was no merit

to the defendant’s contention that the prosecutor vouched for D by

suggesting that, by testifying, he risked being prosecuted for perjury.

2. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that was seized pursuant to the search warrant, the warrant having

been supported by probable cause: the defendant could not prevail on

his unpreserved claim that the facts set forth in the search warrant

affidavit did not provide probable cause to believe that he would have

retained the items sought to be seized in his residence four months

after the home invasion, because the affidavit set forth facts that either

implicated the defendant as a participant in the home invasion or as

being in the company of L, who was known to be a participant, shortly

after the home invasion occurred, it was reasonable to infer that the

defendant may have possessed items taken from the victim’s residence

or that he possessed devices, such as a cell phone, that would have

been used in the commission of the crime, and, on the basis of certain

averments set forth in the affidavit, it was reasonable to infer that, four

months after the home invasion, the defendant probably possessed a

cell phone or a GPS device that he had possessed at the time that the

crime occurred, that he still would have possessed the types of items

that were stolen from the victim and that, in light of the variety of the

items taken, one or more of the items would be kept by the defendant

in his residence, and the judge who issued the search warrant reasonably

could have relied on the training, experience and expertise of the detective affiants in this regard; moreover, the defendant’s contention that

the facts set forth in the affidavit were insufficient to demonstrate that

he was a participant in the home invasion because the facts concerning

his friendship with L and his presence with him at a supermarket on

the morning following the home invasion reflected innocent behavior

that did not give rise to a suspicion that he was a participant was

unavailing, as it was reasonable to infer, in light of other facts in the

affidavit, that the defendant’s act of exchanging approximately $68 in

coins by means of the supermarket’s Coinstar machine, which was

recorded by the store’s surveillance camera, was suspicious and tended

to give rise to probable cause that he possessed evidence related to the

home invasion, and the affidavit reflected that, while the defendant was

cashing in the receipt for the coins, L was at a cash register attempting

to use the victim’s stolen credit card; furthermore, the finding of probable

cause to issue the search warrant did not depend on facts in the affidavit

that tended to demonstrate that the defendant was a perpetrator of the

home invasion, and the affiants presented facts that gave rise to a

probability that the defendant was in possession of items connected

with the home invasion not only due to his participation in the criminal

endeavor but also due to his relationship with and activities with L, who

was identified as a suspect in the crime within hours of its commission.

Argued September 9, 2019—officially released February 11, 2020

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

two counts of the crime of robbery in the first degree,

and with the crimes of home invasion, conspiracy to

commit burglary in the first degree and tampering with

a witness, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Litchfield at Torrington, where the court,

Danaher, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress

certain evidence; thereafter, the matter was tried to the

jury before Dooley, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty,

from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Rocco A. Chiarenza, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were David S. Shepack, former
state’s attorney, and David R. Shannon, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Andre D. White, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a

jury trial, of home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1), robbery in the first degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4), robbery

in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (2), conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-101 (a) (3),

and tampering with a witness in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-151.1 The defendant claims that (1) prosecutorial impropriety that occurred during the prosecutor’s examination of a witness, as well as during the

state’s closing argument, deprived him of his right to a

fair trial, and (2) the court improperly denied his motion

to suppress evidence that was seized pursuant to a

search warrant that was not supported by probable

cause. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following facts.

Early in 2013, the defendant, Henry Le, and Trayvon

Dunning were serving time as inmates at the same correctional facility. During this time, the three men agreed

to commit home invasions following their release from

prison.2 Following the release of the defendant and Le,

Dunning was released on March 28, 2013. Thereafter,

the defendant, Le, and Dunning refined their plan. The

men agreed that they would identify a suitable victim

in public, follow the victim home, and commit a robbery

at his or her residence. In preparation to carry out their

plan, in early April, 2013, they purchased items at a

home improvement store, including masks, gloves, and

zip ties.

Late in the day on April 7, 2013, Dunning was driving

an automobile on Interstate 84 in Hartford, and the

defendant and Le were his passengers. The three men

observed the victim, Peter Brown, who was driving a

BMW sport utility vehicle. The men decided to follow

the victim after observing that he appeared to be alone,

that he was a white male in his forties or fifties, and he

was driving an expensive automobile. The men followed

the victim from Hartford to his residence in New

Hartford.

The victim arrived at his residence at approximately

11:30 p.m. As the victim approached the back door of

his residence, the defendant, Le, and Dunning, all of

whom had their faces concealed, confronted him. The

victim was approached first by two of the three men,

one of whom was brandishing a gun. They ordered the

victim to put his ‘‘hands up.’’ The third man, with his

face covered, then approached the victim from his right

side. The men ordered the victim to give them his wallet

and his cell phone. At gunpoint, the victim complied.

The men then asked the victim whether anyone was
inside his residence and whether he had a dog or an

alarm system. After the victim informed them that

nobody else was at home and that he did not have an

alarm system, the men forced the victim inside his residence.

For the next forty-five to fifty minutes, the defendant,

Dunning, and Le confined the victim to a chair in his

kitchen. They searched the contents of an overnight

bag that the victim had been carrying. They repeatedly

asked the victim if he owned a safe, to which he replied,

no. They removed a credit card and an automatic teller

machine (ATM) card from his wallet. One of the men

demanded the victim’s ATM card’s pin number. The

victim replied that he was only able to remember the

letters corresponding to his pin number, but not the

number itself. Because he was terrified by the circumstances, the victim had difficulty converting the letters

into a number. One of the men ripped a telephone off

the wall and demanded that he provide them with the

number. After the victim provided the pin number, Le

demanded the keys to the victim’s automobile, asked

him where the nearest ATM was located, and left the

residence. Le returned to the victim’s residence a short

time later after having withdrawn funds from the victim’s bank account at an ATM in New Hartford.3

While one of the three men held the victim at gunpoint

in his kitchen, they each took turns ransacking every

room of his residence in search of valuables. The men

brought various items to the kitchen. Thereafter, Dunning parked his automobile in the victim’s driveway.

While the victim continued to be held at gunpoint, as

he had been throughout the entire incident, the men

carried several of the victim’s possessions to Dunning’s

automobile. Among the possessions removed from the

residence were an overnight bag, two long rifles, a box

of shotgun shells,4 camera equipment, a gold watch, a

laptop computer, a hunting knife, and a large vase that

contained approximately $75 in coins.5

After the victim was ordered to turn around, the

defendant, Le, and Dunning exited the residence. They

then quickly fled from the scene in Dunning’s automobile.6 The victim went to his neighbor’s residence to

request help. The victim’s neighbor called 911, and the

police arrived on the scene quickly thereafter.

Following the defendant’s arrest and while he was

awaiting trial on the charges at issue in the present

appeal, he had conversations with others in an attempt

to persuade Dunning not to testify against him. During

a recorded telephone conversation with the mother of

Dunning’s child, a person who was identified at trial as

‘‘Jasmine,’’ the defendant explained that Dunning had

provided the police with a statement that implicated

him. The defendant asked Jasmine to pressure Dunning

not to testify, stating that Jasmine ‘‘don’t like no . . .

snitches.’’ He asked Jasmine to tell Dunning that testi-
fying against the defendant would harm his relationship

with her. He cautioned Jasmine not to let Dunning know

that he called her and stated that, if Dunning knew

about the call, he would ‘‘go back to the court and

tell them.’’

The next day, the defendant attempted to speak with

Jasmine a second time. Instead, he reached her boyfriend by telephone, and Jasmine’s boyfriend did not

permit the defendant to speak directly with her. The

defendant told Jasmine’s boyfriend that it was foolish

for Dunning to cooperate with the prosecution and that

he wanted Jasmine to prevent Dunning from testifying.

He stated that the ‘‘best bet [was for Dunning] to not

testify at all.’’ He explained that if Dunning invoked

his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,

then ‘‘they can’t do shit to him.’’ The defendant also

stated that he would be offered a favorable plea deal

if Dunning refused to testify. The defendant stated that

he could have people ‘‘put hands on’’ Dunning, but he

was ‘‘just trying to save [Dunning] from getting touched

. . . [as he was] not trying to go that route . . . .’’7

Dunning testified on behalf of the state at trial. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

First, the defendant claims that prosecutorial impropriety that occurred during the state’s examination of

Dunning, as well as during the state’s closing argument,

deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We disagree.

The defendant’s unpreserved claim8focuses on the

prosecutor’s examination of Dunning, as well as arguments made by the prosecutor during the state’s rebuttal closing argument. With respect to the examination

of Dunning during trial, the following additional facts

are relevant to the present claim. Dunning was called as

a witness by the state during its case-in-chief. Dunning

appeared in prison garb and, at the very beginning of his

direct examination by the state, the prosecutor elicited

testimony that he was incarcerated as a result of the

role he played in the incident giving rise to the charges

that were brought against the defendant, namely, the

2013 home invasion that occurred in New Hartford.

During his testimony, he stated that he had entered into

a plea agreement with the state pursuant to which he

pleaded guilty to a single criminal offense—burglary in

the first degree—and he agreed to testify in the defendant’s case in exchange for a sentence of between seven

to nine years of imprisonment. Dunning testified that,

at the time of the defendant’s trial, he was awaiting

sentencing. Without objection, a copy of the written

plea agreement was admitted into evidence and read

aloud by the courtroom clerk in the presence of the jury.

In relevant part, it stated that ‘‘the ultimate decision

regarding the sentence [Dunning] receives will be made

by the sentencing judge, the Honorable Kari Dooley,

after consideration of the credibility of his testimony’’
at the defendant’s trial, as well as other factors.

Thereafter, during the state’s case-in-chief, Dunning

testified about the events leading up to and including

the home invasion. In relevant part, he testified that

while he was incarcerated with the defendant and Le,

the three men planned to commit home invasions following their release. Shortly after Dunning was released

on March 28, 2013, he, the defendant, and Le prepared

to carry out their plan by purchasing items at a home

improvement store. On April 7, 2013, accompanied by

the defendant and Le as his passengers, Dunning drove

behind the victim, following him to his residence in

New Hartford. Dunning testified that when he arrived

at the victim’s residence, ‘‘we all jumped out . . . got

on [the victim’s] porch, searched his pockets, got his

stuff, I opened his door, got him inside, sat him down

and we all just searched the house for his stuff.’’ He

stated that, while the victim was held at gunpoint for

approximately forty-five minutes to one hour, he, the

defendant, and Le searched the residence for valuables.9

During this period of time, Le left briefly to visit an

ATM for the purpose of withdrawing money by means

of the victim’s card. Dunning testified that after many

of the victim’s possessions, including guns and camera

equipment, were placed into the trunk of his automobile, he drove away from the scene with the defendant

and Le.

Dunning testified that in July, 2013, he learned that

the police were interested in speaking with him and that

they had executed a search warrant at his residence.

He voluntarily met with the police and, after they

showed him photographs that incriminated him, the

defendant, and Le, he provided a statement about the

events at issue. Dunning provided the police with the

names of the defendant and Le. He testified that, later,

he met with the police once again, was transported to

a police station, and provided the police with a second

statement. He testified that he had ‘‘kind of lied a little

bit’’ in his police statements with respect to whether

he had entered the victim’s residence. He testified that

although he had accurately told the police that he was

with the defendant and Le on the night of the home

invasion and that he drove Le and the defendant to the

victim’s residence, he had inaccurately told the police

in these statements that he had merely waited outside

of the victim’s residence during the commission of the

home invasion. He said that he had been untruthful

about the extent of his role in the crimes because he

was trying to avoid more serious charges.

Defense counsel cross-examined Dunning. Dunning

testified that he was arrested on August 9, 2013, and

charged with several crimes, but that he did not enter

into the plea agreement with the state until March 17,

2017. He testified that, pursuant to the agreement, several charges would not be pursued by the state.10
Defense counsel asked Dunning why it took so long for

him to enter a guilty plea. Dunning explained that he

was looking for the best plea deal that he could obtain

and that he ‘‘took the best option’’ that was made available to him. He stated: ‘‘I wanted to fight and see if I

can get less than they were offering, but it didn’t work.

They kept offering the same thing, so I took the best

route I could.’’

Defense counsel also questioned Dunning about the

two written statements that he had provided to the

police. Dunning agreed with defense counsel that, in

the statements, he had sworn to be truthful but, nevertheless, had misrepresented the extent of his role in

the crimes that took place at the victim’s residence.

Defense counsel asked Dunning when he had first

admitted to the police that he had entered the victim’s

residence. Dunning testified that he made this admission the month prior to the trial, when he had additional

plea negotiations with the state.

During the state’s redirect examination of Dunning,

the prosecutor further questioned him about the circumstances surrounding his plea agreement with the

state. In relevant part, Dunning testified that he was

arrested approximately five months after the home invasion occurred. There was no objection and the following

examination of Dunning then occurred:

‘‘Q. Now . . . were there negotiations between your

attorney and the prosecutor who was handling the case

at that time, to your knowledge?

‘‘A. No.

‘‘Q. No negotiations. Was the state . . . either I or

the other prosecutor who initially handled the case,

willing to enter into an agreement if you weren’t telling

the truth?

‘‘A. Could you repeat the question, please?

‘‘Q. Is the agreement you entered into with the state

. . . contingent upon you telling the truth?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And you never entered into an agreement with

the state until last month, correct?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And is it correct that last month was the first

time you told anyone from the state, police, prosecutor’s

office that you went into that house, correct?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. So, the agreement wasn’t entered into until you

told the state you went into that house?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Are you aware or have you read some of the

police reports about this case?
‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. [D]o you know whether or not the victim was

always claiming three people went in the house?

‘‘A. As far as I know, he said three people were in

the house.’’

Defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning by the prosecutor.

Because the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial

impropriety is based, in part, on the prosecutor’s arguments during the state’s rebuttal closing argument, we

next set forth relevant portions of the arguments

advanced before the jury. During the state’s initial closing argument, the prosecutor did not comment on Dunning’s plea agreement with the state. During the defendant’s closing argument, defense counsel focused on

the issue of Dunning’s credibility, arguing in relevant

part as follows: ‘‘Dunning testified and points the finger

at [the defendant]. What we know is that . . . Dunning

gave a statement early on, close in time to the crime.

Gave a wonderful statement, minimizing his whole participation, basically telling an untruth to the police. In

his second statement [he] still minimized his participation and wasn’t truthful with the police . . . he told

the police he never entered the house. Why did he do

that? I think he said that . . . he thought it would be

less onerous on him and wouldn’t be as serious. If . . .

Dunning admits to a crime in basically August of 2013,

he enters a guilty plea in March of 2017. You remember

I asked him why it took so long for him to enter a plea,

and my interpretation of his body language is he froze.

He didn’t know what to say. . . . Dunning is a convicted felon. . . . Dunning basically told untruths to

the police until he could work a good deal. And a deal

he worked out. A deal that . . . makes Filene’s Basement look like Macy’s. He entered into an agreement

that was entered into evidence with the state of Connecticut. And the first two words are ‘in consideration.’

This is a sales agreement. . . . The testimony changed

hands. In my opinion . . . Dunning’s testimony is completely suspect because it’s purchased. He stole his

testimony. He waived it. He wasn’t stupid. He waited,

knowing that [the state] needed his testimony. You

heard me ask him how many charges he’d been charged

with, and he listed a whole bunch of serious charges.

They’re all going away. In exchange for his testimony,

he goes to jail for no less than seven or more than nine

years. That’s a bargain basement deal. A deal he made

with the state, knowing that it was false, but it worked

out for him. And as a defense lawyer, I say good for him.

Well, as [the defendant’s] lawyer, I say don’t convict a

man based on the testimony of a lie or someone who

sells his testimony. He took . . . almost four years to

enter a plea. . . .

‘‘Dunning’s whole testimony is suspect because . . .
he doesn’t tell the truth close in time to when he first

was interrogated by the police, which was the closest

[point] in time to the crime. He waits . . . looking for

a good deal, and he finally gets one, knowing that [the

defendant], who wasn’t part of the crime, is willing to

go to trial, and they’re going to need his testimony to

convict him.

‘‘[There was evidence that Le received a suspended

sentence after fourteen years served.] Dunning knows

that. He gets a deal of half that time—good for him. He

gets home soon and all he had to do was wait, hold

out and enter into a sales agreement with the state of

Connecticut. They purchased his testimony, he sold it,

and he gets the good deal. He gets the profit.’’

In the state’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor responded to these arguments, in relevant part, as

follows: ‘‘[L]ook how vociferously . . . Dunning was

criticized in this case. . . . Dunning’s testimony, the

state argues, is enough to convict [the defendant] . . .

and [defense counsel] wants to say I bought and sold

that testimony, that I’m supporting perjury. . . . And

what motive does [Dunning] have to lie at this point?

Why would he? [Defense counsel] wants to say it’s

because he’s getting a sweetheart of a deal, this great

deal. He’s back in jail. He’s going to be back in jail from

anywhere from seven [to] nine years, and that’s not up

to me, it’s not based on my recommendation, it’s up to

the judge, who heard his testimony. The judge is in the

best position to evaluate his credibility, his truthfulness.

So, why would he come in here and say it was [the

defendant] . . . ? Why would he do that? And risk getting two more years in jail . . . getting nine years and

seven or getting eight or getting charged with perjury,

false statement? Yet, he did, when he gave his initial

statement, he didn’t tell the police that he went in the

house, but he told the police he was there, he told the

police he was the driver and he told the police who he

was with. Did he minimize his role? Absolutely. Is that

dishonest? Yep. . . . And then some months later,

when the police had him arrested, then he gave another

statement . . . . Did he make a mistake in not telling

100 percent of the truth? Yep. Was that dishonest? Yes.

But do you throw away his entire testimony because

of that? No, you don’t have to. The state’s argument is

you shouldn’t, you shouldn’t. . . . And you’re being

told to discredit totally what [Dunning] said, that that

testimony has been bought and sold by the state. . . .

‘‘Oh, the deal, the deal. [Dunning] waited and waited

and waited until he struck this fabulous deal. . . . I

think it came out and, you now, you guys have to connect the dots to a certain degree. You know you look

at the facts and what reasonable inferences you can

draw from the facts. But . . . Dunning testified . . .

the first time he ever told anyone from law enforcement,

the state’s attorney’s office, or the police that he did in
fact go into that house, and we know that three people

went into the house because that’s what [the victim]

said. The first time, it was only after that point in time

that the deal was struck. So, in deciding whether or

not the state cut some deal with him to lie [with respect

to the defendant] and give false testimony, would you

want the state of Connecticut to enter into and to deal

with somebody who’s assisting, aiding, [going] into that

house, when all of the evidence makes it clear they did?

And that deal that’s in evidence is conditioned on him

being 100 percent truthful. It says something to that

effect. It’s in evidence, you can read it. So, was it that he

was waiting and waiting and waiting until the numbers

were right, or is it that he had to come clean first, to

tell the truth, 100 percent truth or some combination

of the two?

‘‘[Dunning], why would he, if he was going to lie, why

would he come here . . . and he knows the judge is

the one who decides whether he gets between seven

and nine? Why would he come in and say, I was the

one with the gun, holding on [the victim]? Why would

he admit to that? [The victim] can’t . . . identify him

through his gun. He’s making himself look worse so,

in evaluating his credibility, consider that.’’

Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s

argument in this regard.

With respect to the prosecutor’s redirect examination

of Dunning, the defendant argues that, although it was

proper for the prosecutor to disclose the existence of

the plea agreement that the state had entered into with

Dunning, it was a form of improper vouching for the

witness for the prosecutor to have elicited testimony

from Dunning that ‘‘the prosecutor had not made an

offer until he was satisfied that Dunning was telling

the truth.’’ The defendant argues that the prosecutor’s

inquiry about the reasons for the plea agreement and

Dunning’s testimony in response impermissibly suggested that the state had ‘‘verified [Dunning’s] veracity

before reaching an agreement.’’ According to the defendant, ‘‘[t]he state should not have implied or stated

that it would not offer Dunning an agreement until it

believed Dunning was being truthful.’’

With respect to the arguments made by the prosecutor during the state’s rebuttal argument, the defendant

asserts for the first time on appeal that the prosecutor

improperly vouched for Dunning’s credibility in several

ways. The defendant correctly observes that the plea

agreement that was admitted into evidence without any

objection referred to the fact that Judge Dooley, the

judge who presided over the defendant’s trial, would

determine whether Dunning testified credibly at the

defendant’s trial, and, thereafter, the court would make

the ultimate decision regarding the sentence to be

imposed on Dunning. The defendant argues that the

prosecutor’s references to the fact that the court, and
not the prosecutor, would evaluate the credibility of

Dunning’s testimony and whether Dunning was entitled

to the benefit of the plea agreement were improper

because they invoked the integrity of the court in support of Dunning’s credibility. Moreover, the defendant

argues that, although it would have been proper for

the prosecutor to refer to the fact that a judge would

determine whether Dunning had testified credibly, it

was improper for the prosecutor to state that the judge

who was presiding over the defendant’s trial would

make that determination. According to the defendant,

‘‘[t]o tell the jury that this judge, the judge presiding

over the case before the jury, is evaluating [Dunning’s]

credibility undermine[d] the jury’s role as sole judge of

the facts’’ and implicitly suggested that it was not in

the best position to evaluate Dunning’s credibility.

(Emphasis in original.)

The defendant argues that, in addition to bolstering

Dunning’s testimony by referring to the court’s evaluation of his testimony, the prosecutor’s arguments impermissibly suggested that the state would not have

entered into the plea agreement with Dunning unless

he, or the state, had determined that Dunning’s testimony was credible. The defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly referred to the fact that he had not

supported perjury by presenting Dunning’s testimony

and improperly argued that Dunning was not offered

the plea agreement until Dunning had ‘‘come clean first,

[told] the truth, [and was] 100 percent’’ truthful. By

these arguments, the defendant asserts, the prosecutor

essentially turned an evaluation of Dunning’s testimony

or the defendant’s innocence into a referendum on the

integrity of the prosecutor. Thus, the defendant argues

that the prosecutor ‘‘put his own credibility in issue,

implicitly and expressly asking the jury to trust his

professional judgment and integrity in deciding when

to make an offer to Dunning. Although the prosecutor

expressly referred only to when Dunning’s testimony

matched [the version of events to which the victim

testified], the jury may have inferred that his decision

also derived from his or her secret knowledge of facts

not in evidence.’’

Finally, the defendant argues that the prosecutor

improperly vouched for Dunning’s credibility by suggesting that Dunning was credible because he did not

want to risk receiving a longer sentence for having

committed perjury at the defendant’s trial. The defendant argues that, although it would have been proper

for the prosecutor to refer to the plea agreement and

to ask Dunning if he understood the consequences of

breaching the agreement by testifying untruthfully, the

prosecutor’s argument in the present case was improper

because it suggested ‘‘that the prosecutor knows if the

witness is telling the truth or [implied] that he possessed

information not presented to the jury that would enable

him to know if the witness were lying.’’
‘‘In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we

engage in a two step analytical process. . . . We first

examine whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred.

. . . Second, if an impropriety exists, we then examine

whether it deprived the defendant of his due process

right to a fair trial. . . . [T]he defendant has the burden

to show both that the prosecutor’s conduct was

improper and that it caused prejudice to his defense.

. . .

‘‘In determining whether the defendant was deprived

of his due process right to a fair trial, we are guided

by the factors enumerated by [our Supreme Court] in

State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653

(1987). These factors include [1] the extent to which

the [impropriety] was invited by defense conduct or

argument, [2] the severity of the [impropriety], [3] the

frequency of the [impropriety], [4] the centrality of the

[impropriety] to the critical issues in the case, [5] the

strength of the curative measures adopted, and [6] the

strength of the state’s case. . . . [A] reviewing court

must apply the Williams factors to the entire trial,

because there is no way to determine whether the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial unless the

[impropriety] is viewed in light of the entire trial. . . .

The question of whether the defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] . . . depends on

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s

verdict would have been different absent the sum total

of the improprieties.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sinclair, 332 Conn. 204,

236–37, 210 A.3d 509 (2019).

‘‘We are mindful throughout this inquiry, however,

of the unique responsibilities of the prosecutor in our

judicial system. A prosecutor is not only an officer of

the court, like every other attorney, but is also a high

public officer, representing the people of the [s]tate,

who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for

the innocent. . . . By reason of his [or her] office, [the

prosecutor] usually exercises great influence [on]

jurors. [The prosecutor’s] conduct and language in the

trial of cases in which human life or liberty [is] at stake

should be forceful, but fair, because he [or she] represents the public interest, which demands no victim and

asks no conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice

or resentment. . . . That is not to say, however, that

every use of rhetorical language or device [by the prosecutor] is improper. . . . The occasional use of rhetorical devices is simply fair argument. . . . Indeed, this

court give[s] the jury the credit of being able to differentiate between argument on the evidence and attempts

to persuade them to draw inferences in the state’s favor,

on one hand, and improper unsworn testimony, with

the suggestion of secret knowledge, on the other hand.

The state’s attorney should not be put in the rhetorical

straitjacket of always using the passive voice, or contin-
ually emphasizing that he is simply saying I submit to

you that this is what the evidence shows, or the like.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412, 435, 64 A.3d 91 (2013).

In addressing claims of improper vouching, our

Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘it is improper for a

prosecuting attorney to express his or her own opinion,

directly or indirectly, as to the credibility of witnesses.

. . . [H]owever . . . [i]t is not improper for the prosecutor to comment [on] the evidence presented at trial

and to argue the inferences that the jurors might draw

therefrom . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 47, 917

A.2d 978 (2007). ‘‘In claims of improper vouching, our

Supreme Court has noted that the degree to which a

challenged statement is supported by the evidence is

an important factor in determining the propriety of that

statement. The Supreme Court [has] stated that [a] prosecutor may properly comment on the credibility of a

witness where . . . the comment reflects reasonable

inferences from the evidence adduced at trial.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luther, 114 Conn.

App. 799, 812, 971 A.2d 781, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907,

978 A.2d 1112 (2009).

We reject the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s

redirect examination of Dunning suggested to the jury

that, while relying on facts outside of the evidence, the

prosecutor had injected his personal belief that Dunning

was truthful. In the portions of the redirect examination

on which the defendant focuses, the prosecutor elicited

testimony from Dunning that his plea agreement was

contingent on his testifying truthfully, he did not enter

into the plea agreement until the month prior to the

defendant’s trial, he did not tell anyone from the state or

the prosecutor’s office that he had entered the victim’s

residence until the month prior to the defendant’s trial,

and the plea agreement was not finalized until he admitted that he had entered the victim’s residence. We

observe that this line of questioning directly followed

the defendant’s cross-examination of Dunning, during

which defense counsel asked Dunning about the plea

agreement and to explain why he had waited so long

following his arrest to enter a guilty plea, and why, in

his statements to the police, he had been untruthful

about having entered the victim’s residence with the

defendant and Le.

Further, we conclude that there was an evidentiary

basis for all of the prosecutor’s questions. During Dunning’s direct examination, without any objection, the

plea agreement was admitted into evidence. It plainly

stated that the consideration being promised to Dunning by the state was contingent on a finding by the

sentencing judge that Dunning had testified truthfully.

The timing of the plea agreement, which was signed on

March 17, 2017, was readily apparent to the jury, as
well. The agreement was not entered into until shortly

before the defendant’s trial, which began on March 29,

2017. The inquiries or testimony with respect to the

fact that Dunning did not tell anyone from the state or

the prosecutor’s office that he had entered the victim’s

residence until the month prior to the defendant’s trial

and that the plea agreement was not finalized until he

admitted that he had entered the victim’s residence

hardly suggested, as the defendant argues presently,

that the prosecutor had ‘‘verified [Dunning’s] veracity’’

by using a litmus test that was hidden from the jury.

Instead, the reason for the state’s willingness to enter

into the agreement was readily apparent and based on

the evidence. Specifically, during the victim’s testimony, which preceded Dunning’s testimony, he testified

that three masked men had approached him as he was

entering his residence, had held him at gunpoint, had

ransacked his residence, and had left his residence with

many of his possessions. Immediately after asking Dunning about the timing of the agreement, the prosecutor

asked him whether he was aware from the police

reports in this case that ‘‘the victim was always claiming

three people went in the house,’’ to which Dunning

replied, ‘‘[a]s far as I know he said three people were

in the house.’’

The elicited testimony from the victim and Dunning

strongly suggested that the state did not enter into the

agreement until after Dunning’s version of events was

consistent with the victim’s version of events. Because

the prosecutor’s inquiry was based on the evidence and

did not suggest that the prosecutor was vouching for

Dunning on the basis of facts that did not appear in the

record, we conclude that the inquiry was not improper.

Next, we turn to the challenged remarks made by

the prosecutor during the state’s rebuttal closing arguments. To a great extent, the defendant challenges the

propriety of the prosecutor’s references to the terms of

the plea agreement, which was admitted into evidence

without any objection. Essentially, the defendant argues

that, by referring to the fact that the plea agreement

required Judge Dooley to make a determination of Dunning’s credibility, the prosecutor either attempted to

persuade the jury that the court already had found Dunning to be credible or that he suggested that the court,

and not the jury, was the arbiter of Dunning’s credibility.

We conclude, however, that the challenged argument

was based on the evidence. The plea agreement provides that Dunning ‘‘is to cooperate completely and

truthfully in any investigations, hearings, or trials relating to [the defendant], including the giving of truthful

sworn testimony.’’ Additionally, the agreement provides

that Dunning ‘‘understands that the ultimate decision

regarding the sentence he receives will be made by

the sentencing judge, the Honorable Kari Dooley, after

consideration of the credibility of his testimony . . . .’’

Nothing about the prosecutor’s arguments suggested
that, at the time of the trial, the court had made any

type of finding concerning Dunning’s credibility. Nor

did the arguments suggest that the prosecutor had a

personally held opinion concerning Dunning’s credibility. To the contrary, the prosecutor did not stray from

the terms of the plea agreement by informing the jury

that, with respect to the issue of whether Dunning

would be entitled to the benefit of the agreement he

reached with the state, it was up to Judge Dooley to

determine if he was credible and to impose an appropriate sentence.11 The prosecutor explicitly stated, in

accordance with the agreement, that these decisions

with respect to Dunning were not based on his personal

recommendation. Moreover, it belies a rational interpretation of the prosecutor’s arguments concerning Dunning, which were an obvious attempt to persuade the

jury that it should conclude that Dunning was a credible

witness, to suggest that the prosecutor had attempted

to persuade the jury that it was not required to evaluate

Dunning’s credibility because the court would do so.12

The defendant’s arguments also focus on what he

considers to be an attempt by the prosecutor to inject

the prosecutor’s credibility into the trial. According to

the defendant, the prosecutor’s arguments concerning

Dunning intertwined an assessment of Dunning’s credibility with the prosecutor’s own credibility and integrity. For the reasons we already have discussed, we

interpret the prosecutor’s arguments as properly limited

to the evidence and the rational inferences to be drawn

therefrom. At no point did the prosecutor ask the jury,

as the defendant suggests, ‘‘to trust his professional

judgment and integrity in deciding when to make an

offer to Dunning.’’ The argument with respect to the

plea offer was based on the evidence and, in particular,

the testimony that the offer was made only after Dunning presented the state with a version of events that

was consistent with the victim’s version of events and,

thus, accurately reflected his involvement in the

home invasion.

The prosecutor did not mischaracterize the arguments advanced by defense counsel that the state had

‘‘bought and sold’’ Dunning’s testimony and that the

prosecutor was ‘‘supporting perjury.’’ The prosecutor

properly attempted to refute these challenges to Dunning’s testimony by arguing that because the plea agreement was contingent on his testifying credibly, it did

not logically provide Dunning with a motive to be

untruthful in this case. ‘‘[T]he state may argue that its

witnesses testified credibly, if such an argument is

based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. . . . Specifically, the state may argue that a witness has no motive to lie.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v.

Warholic, 278 Conn. 354, 365, 897 A.2d 569 (2006). In

addition, it was within the bounds of fair argument

for the prosecutor to have attempted to refute defense

counsel’s arguments by referring in detail to the evi-
dence that, in his view, supported a finding that Dunning

had testified credibly. ‘‘A prosecutor may urge the jury

to find for stated reasons that a witness was truthful

or untruthful. . . . A prosecutor may also remark on

the motives that a witness may have to lie, or not to

lie, as the case may be. . . . The distinguishing characteristic of impropriety in this circumstance is whether

the prosecutor asks the jury to believe the testimony

of the state’s witnesses because the state thinks it is

true, on the one hand, or whether the prosecutor asks

the jury to believe it because logic reasonably thus

dictates.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Felix, 111 Conn. App.

801, 811–12, 961 A.2d 458 (2008). At no point in his

argument did the prosecutor either expressly or inferentially invite the jury to simply rely on his assessment

of the evidence or to trust a personally held belief on

his part that Dunning was credible. It is unreasonable

to interpret the challenged arguments to suggest that

the prosecutor invited the jury to rely on anything other

than its own evaluation of Dunning’s testimony based

on the evidence and the rational inferences to be

drawn therefrom.13

Finally, the defendant argues that the prosecutor

vouched for Dunning by suggesting that, by testifying,

he risked being prosecuted for perjury. The defendant

asserts that the argument was improper because the

prosecutor suggested ‘‘that [he] knows if the witness

is telling the truth or implie[d] that he possessed information not presented to the jury that would enable him

to know if the witness were lying.’’ This argument is

not persuasive. For the reasons set forth previously in

our analysis of the present claim, we disagree that the

prosecutor’s arguments concerning Dunning’s testimony reasonably could be construed to suggest that

they were based on anything other than the evidence

before the jury, including but not limited to, the testimony of the victim that all three perpetrators had

entered his residence.

The defendant’s claim fails because he has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s redirect examination of

Dunning or his rebuttal closing argument constituted

impermissible vouching for Dunning. Accordingly, we

need not engage in an analysis of the Williams factors

to determine whether the alleged improprieties

deprived him of a fair trial.

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly

denied his motion to suppress evidence that was seized

pursuant to a search warrant that was not supported

by probable cause. We disagree.

It is not in dispute that, on July 30, 2013, the court,

Ginocchio, J., granted an application for a warrant to

search the defendant’s residence14 and to seize any of
the items that were described in the warrant application

as either having been removed from the victim’s residence or used or worn by the defendant during the

commission of the home invasion. As a result of the

execution of the warrant, the police seized several

items, including a box of 20 gauge shotgun shells and

a black ski mask. In applying for an arrest warrant, the

police relied, in part, on items that were seized from

the defendant’s residence, and evidence of the fact that

the police had seized items from the defendant’s residence, including the shotgun shells and the ski mask,

was admitted at trial.

The defendant filed several motions before the trial

court in which he challenged the validity of the search

warrant. We will discuss these motions because the

defendant asserts that they adequately preserved the

claim at issue because the court, in its resolution of

the motions, addressed the issue of whether the search

warrant was supported by probable cause.

Prior to trial, the defendant, at that time a self-represented litigant, filed two motions for a Franks hearing15

in which, in relevant part, he asked the court to suppress

evidence seized from his residence on the ground that

the affidavit submitted to the court in support of the

search warrant application contained false or incomplete information.16 On April 29, 2016, the court,

Danaher, J., held a hearing on the defendant’s motions.

The court stated that, during oral argument in support

of his motions, the defendant argued that the affidavit

in support of the search warrant contained inaccurate

statements. The defendant argued that (1) the allegation

concerning the amount of cash taken from the victim

was not accurate, (2) the allegation that he cashed stolen coins at the supermarket was false because,

according to his review of the store surveillance video,

he does not appear therein, (3) the allegation concerning the value of all items taken from the victim was,

on the basis of his ‘‘findings,’’ not accurate, and (4) the

allegation that Le had used the victim’s credit card at

the store is not accurate because the alleged use of the

card did not occur at ‘‘the exact time’’ reflected in the

surveillance video.

The court observed: ‘‘The defendant further argued

that the same misrepresentations appear in the arrest

warrant, and in addition, paragraph 71 of that warrant

is subject to challenge in that (1) the allegation that

two people are friends on Facebook and that they

entered and exited a store, does not constitute probable

cause, and (2) the affiants were reckless in describing

codefendant . . . Le’s address as 29 Footpath Lane

when, in fact, it was the defendant and not . . . Le

who lived at that address.’’

The court referred to the fact that the defendant had

submitted five exhibits, which included three reports
that reflect Le’s address; an inventory of items seized

from the defendant’s residence; a portion of the search

warrant application being challenged; ‘‘a copy of e-mail

traffic reflecting information about a ‘denied credit card

transaction,’ apparently at a Stop [&] Shop store, on

April 8, 2013, at approximately 10:46 a.m., for a credit

card ending in 2561’’; and a Coinstar machine17 receipt

from the Stop & Shop store in East Hartford showing

that the coins deposited amounted to $68.75 and that

a processing fee of $6.74 was deducted from this total

amount, resulting in a cash value of $62.01.

After setting forth relevant legal principles, the court,

in its written memorandum of decision, set forth the

following analysis with respect to the defendant’s

Franks challenge to the search warrant:18 ‘‘The defendant failed to offer either affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses in support of his

motion, nor did he explain his failure to produce such

evidence. He simply represented that certain allegations

in [the] . . . search warrant affidavit were not correct.

The defendant’s representation that paragraph 36 [of

the search warrant affidavit] does not accurately

recount the amount of cash taken, and that the value

of all items taken [is inaccurate] not only is an unsworn

claim, but it is also insufficient to overturn the finding

of probable cause, as is the unsworn claim that the

‘exact time’ that a codefendant ‘swiped a stolen credit

card’ is incorrect. Similarly, the defendant’s claim that

he was not one of the people depicted in a surveillance

video is also an unsworn claim and so cannot serve to

support the defendant’s motion.

‘‘The court also recognizes that even if the defendant

were to make a substantial preliminary showing that

the affidavits at issue include false statements, made

knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard

for the truth, the defendant cannot prevail on his motion

if the statements at issue are not necessary to the finding

of probable cause. . . .

‘‘Even if the defendant had properly supported his

motion with sworn affidavits and the court were to

exclude the allegations challenged by the defendant,

the court finds that there was ample alternative probable cause evidence. For example, the affidavit asserts

that a vase containing loose change was taken [from

the victim]. . . . The approximate amount of loose

change taken in the robbery was thereafter allegedly

deposited at a Stop [&] Shop store in a Coinstar

machine, the amount deposited was consistent with the

amount stolen, the Stop [&] Shop activity was recorded

[by means of] a surveillance camera, and two educators

from the Woodland School, where the defendant

attended school, positively identified the defendant in

the surveillance camera recording. . . . In addition,

the affidavit alleges that the defendant is associated

with two other individuals, Le and . . . Dunning, and
that there is independent probable cause that Le and

Dunning were involved in the home invasion. The foregoing allegations, alone, establish probable cause sufficient to issue the search warrant that the defendant

challenges.

‘‘The defendant also argued that the affiants were

reckless in asserting that Le lived at 29 Footpath Lane,

East Hartford, the location to be searched. The defendant’s representations are unsworn and, even if they

were properly authenticated, they do not preclude a

finding of probable cause. Even if the affiants had

asserted that . . . Le lived elsewhere, the affiants set

forth the basis for their assertion that the defendant

resided at 29 Footpath Lane . . . and the independent

evidence of the defendant’s involvement in the robbery

supports a finding of probable cause that there was

evidence to be found at the location where the defendant resided, regardless of whether Le also lived at that

same address.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;

footnote omitted.) Thereafter, the court denied the

motion.

Following the court’s ruling, the defendant, appearing

as a self-represented litigant, filed a motion to suppress

any and all evidence seized from his residence. Among

the arguments raised therein, the defendant argued that

‘‘[t]here was no fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found at [his] residence,’’

the facts stated in the warrant application were made

‘‘[falsely] and/or in reckless disregard for the truth

knowingly and intentionally, for the purpose of misleading a judge,’’ the property seized was not described

in the warrant, and ‘‘there was no probable cause for

believing the existence of the grounds on which the

warrant was issued.’’

On June 28, 2016, the court, Danaher, J., held a hearing on the motion. The court provided an oral ruling

on the motion by observing that the substance of most

of the arguments presented by the defendant were previously raised in the context of the defendant’s motions

for a Franks hearing, and the court relied on its earlier

ruling denying those motions. The court observed, however, that the defendant raised an additional claim in

the context of the motion to suppress, which was that

the police had acted outside of the authority granted

to them by the search warrant by seizing from the residence ‘‘his safe.’’ The court referred to various legal

authorities for the proposition that, ‘‘when conducting

a search pursuant to a valid warrant, police are entitled

to search containers that could logically hold the item

or items sought.’’ The court stated: ‘‘In this case, the

warrant permitted the officers to search for and seize

small items such as $200 in cash, memory disks . . .

for a digital camera, and a gold watch. Those items,

which were contained in the warrant, could logically

be concealed in the container/safe that was located on
the defendant’s property. And the police were entitled

to search inside that container, particularly since the

defendant’s brothers identified the safe as belonging to

this defendant.

‘‘Once the safe was opened and was found to contain

contraband specifically described in the warrant, in this

case, stolen shotgun shells, the safe, itself, constituted

evidence of consciousness of guilt and so was properly

subject to seizure.’’

The court further explained its ruling, as follows:

‘‘Consistently throughout the defendant’s argument,

there is a disagreement with certain specific facts that

are set forth in the [affidavit] at issue. Again, there’s

no factual basis that would permit me to conclude that

the allegations in the affidavit are in error. But, beyond

that . . . it’s necessary for any judge, in reviewing a

warrant and determining whether probable cause is

present, to review the totality of the warrant. The warrant is reviewed within . . . the four corners. And, in

putting all those facts together, the court makes a determination as to whether probable cause exists.

‘‘One example, the defendant indicated . . . that

[the allegation that he entered and left] a Stop [&] Shop

is not probable cause of a crime, and that’s true. But,

those facts are not looked at in isolation; they’re looked

at in conjunction with the fact that, not very long after

the robbery . . . the defendant was [accompanying Le

in the supermarket and] . . . there was substantial evidence [that Le] was involved in the robbery. And . . .

Le [pleaded guilty] in connection with [the home invasion] . . . [a]nd has been convicted of . . . carrying

out this home invasion. . . .

‘‘I’ve reviewed the affidavit; I’ve read it in its entirety.

And I have concluded, more than once, that there was

probable cause to support the search.’’ Relying on the

foregoing reasons, the court denied the motion to

suppress.19

Presently, the defendant claims that the search warrant was not based on probable cause for two broad

reasons. First, the defendant argues that, even if there

was probable cause to believe that he possessed some

of the victim’s belongings at the time that the robbery

occurred, the facts presented in support of the search

warrant were insufficient to demonstrate that he would

have retained the victim’s stolen property, for four

months following the home invasion, in his residence

that was searched. Second, the defendant argues that

the facts set forth in the search warrant application

were insufficient to demonstrate that he was a participant in the home invasion. The defendant argues that

the facts presented merely demonstrated that he was

a friend of Le on the social media website ‘‘Facebook’’

and that he and Le were at a supermarket together on

the morning following the home invasion.
As we have discussed previously, the defendant

raised several motions before the trial court in which

he argued that the search warrant application contained

false or incomplete information and asked the court to

suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of

his residence. It appears that, in general terms, the

court interpreted these motions as having raised issues

concerning false or incomplete information in the warrant application and, in rejecting those claims, stated

in general terms that the facts presented were sufficient

to demonstrate probable cause to search the residence.

It does not appear that the defendant distinctly presented or that the court squarely addressed the arguments presented here, which are unrelated to an allegation of false or incomplete information in the search

warrant application. To the extent that the defendant’s

claim is unpreserved, we may review it pursuant to

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823

(1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,

781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), as the defendant requests in

his appellate brief.20 The record provides this court with

an adequate basis to review the claim because it contains the materials presented to Judge Ginocchio when

he granted the search warrant application. The claim

is of constitutional magnitude in that it seeks to vindicate the defendant’s fourth amendment right to be free

from an unreasonable search.

‘‘Whether the trial court properly found that the facts

submitted were enough to support a finding of probable

cause is a question of law. . . . Accordingly, [o]ur

review of the question of whether an affidavit in support

of an application for a search [and seizure] warrant

provides probable cause for the issuance of the warrant

is plenary. . . .

‘‘Both the fourth amendment to the United States

constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut

constitution prescribe that a search warrant shall issue

only upon a showing of probable cause. Probable cause

to search exists if . . . (1) there is probable cause to

believe that the particular items sought to be seized

are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a

particular apprehension or conviction . . . and (2)

there is probable cause to believe that the items sought

to be seized will be found in the place to be searched.

. . . Although [p]roof of probable cause requires less

than proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . .

[f]indings of probable cause do not lend themselves to

any uniform formula because probable cause is a fluid

concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in

particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. . . . Consequently, [i]n determining the existence of probable

cause to search, the issuing [judge] assesses all of the

information set forth in the warrant affidavit and should

make a practical, nontechnical decision whether . . .
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular place. . . . The

determination of probable cause is reached by applying

a totality of the circumstances test. . . .

‘‘The role of an appellate court reviewing the validity

of a warrant is to determine whether the affidavit at

issue presented a substantial factual basis for the [issuing judge’s] conclusion that probable cause existed.

. . . [Our Supreme Court] has recognized that because

of our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause, and mindful of the fact that

[r]easonable minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set of facts] establishes probable cause . . . we

evaluate the information contained in the affidavit in

the light most favorable to upholding the issuing

judge’s probable cause finding. . . . We therefore

review the issuance of a warrant with deference to the

reasonable inferences that the issuing judge could have

and did draw . . . . In evaluating whether the warrant

was predicated on probable cause, a reviewing court

may consider only the information set forth in the four

corners of the affidavit that was presented to the issuing

judge and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. . . .

‘‘Of course, [t]he determination of probable cause to

conduct a search depends in part on the finding of facts

so closely related to the time of the issuance of the

warrant as to justify a belief in the continued existence

of probable cause at that time. . . . Although it is reasonable to infer that probable cause dwindles as time

passes, no single rule can be applied to determine when

information has become too old to be reliable. . . .

Consequently, whether a reasonable likelihood exists

that evidence identified in the warrant affidavit will be

found on the subject premises is a determination that

must be made on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, we

have refused to adopt an arbitrary cutoff date,

expressed either in days, weeks or months, beyond

which probable cause ceases to exist. . . . The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place depends

on a number of variables, such as the nature of the

crime, of the criminal, of the thing to be seized, and of

the place to be searched. . . . [W]hen an activity is of

a protracted and continuous nature the passage of time

becomes less significant.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Hanisko, 187 Conn. App. 237, 245–48, 202 A.3d 375

(2019).

‘‘[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases . . .

should be largely determined by the preference to be

accorded to warrants. . . . Furthermore, [a] reviewing

court should not invalidate a warrant as long as the

inferences drawn by the issuing magistrate are reasonable under all of the circumstances set forth in the

affidavit regardless of whether that court would have
drawn the same inferences.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martinez, 51 Conn.

App. 59, 66–67, 719 A.2d 1213, cert. denied, 247 Conn.

952, 723 A.2d 324 (1998).

First, we address the argument that the affidavit did

not provide probable cause to believe that the items

sought to be seized would be found in the defendant’s

residence four months following the commission of the

home invasion. Among the averments in the thirty-seven

paragraph affidavit, dated July 30, 2013, and sworn to

and submitted by State Police Detectives Laura Kraus

and Jeremy Combes,21 were facts concerning the home

invasion, including the fact that the victim described

three male perpetrators, all of whom were wearing dark

clothing and dark knit caps during the incident. The

affidavit detailed the items taken from the victim,

including but not limited to his credit and ATM cards,

camera equipment, a leather jacket, a large ceramic vase

containing coins, firearms, ammunition, and a knife.

The affidavit further provided that the defendant,

who had a criminal history involving firearms, was

believed to reside at 29 Footpath Lane in East Hartford.

He was identified in an East Hartford supermarket surveillance video from the morning of April 8, 2018. The

officers averred that the defendant was accompanied

by Le in the supermarket. The defendant was seen cashing a receipt for $62.01, which he obtained from a coin

exchange machine. The officers averred that this

amount and the $6.74 fee that is automatically deducted

by the coin exchange machine was close to the estimate

of the value of the coins taken during the home invasion.

At the same time, Le was seen attempting to use the

victim’s stolen credit card at a cash register. Thereafter,

before the two men left the store together, the video

shows that the defendant and Le walked to the customer

service desk, and the defendant handed a cashier a

lottery ticket and exchanged a twenty dollar bill for

smaller denomination currency. The affidavit also

reflected that a review of the defendant’s Facebook

page indicated that he and Le were friends.

There were several averments concerning Le in the

affidavit, including the fact that he had a criminal history and that, in June, 2013, an East Hartford police

officer stopped Le in the course of investigating a motor

vehicle complaint. During a search of the vehicle Le

was operating, the police found shotgun rounds and a

hunting knife, all of which the victim readily identified

as having been taken from him during the home invasion. Le’s arrest for crimes related to the home invasion followed.

Additionally, the affidavit provided as follows:

‘‘[B]ased upon the affiants’ training and experience, the

affiants know that it is common for people traveling to

other locations, potentially unfamiliar to them, to utilize

a GPS device in order to obtain directions to that loca-
tion. Suspects involved in the planning, coordination

and execution of a conspiracy utilize cell phones to

communicate their plans and activities either through

voice contact or SMS (text) messaging. Your [a]ffiants

know that many people carry and use cellular phones

as a part of daily life while traveling, including victims

and suspects. The affiants know that crimes involving

multiple suspects would necessitate communication

between them, and that it is reasonable to believe that

such communication would take place prior to the

crime (pre-planning stage), during the crime (execution

stage), and after the crime (cover-up/flight stage). It is

also reasonable that the suspects may have used cellular

devices to contact each other in order the execute the

details of the crime.’’

The affidavit further stated: ‘‘[B]ased upon the affiants’ training and experience, the affiants know that

persons involved in criminal activity will often elicit

the aid of an accomplice to facilitate the commission

of a crime. That dependent upon the complexity of the

criminal endeavor, pre-planning, and after the execution of the crime(s) persons will frequently change their

place of residence to inhibit the discovery of their activity or . . . use multiple addresses, particularly of their

families, to secret[e] evidence of the crimes they are

involved in, including firearms/weapons and burglary

tools used in the crime. That persons involved in criminal activity who steal large quantities of items will often

hold onto the stolen items for a long period of time.

Persons involved in criminal activity are aware that

police officers check pawn shops for stolen items frequently and will often sell, pawn, and/or disperse the

stolen items in small quantities over a long period of

time in an attempt to inhibit the discovery of evidence

of their crimes. Persons involved in criminal activity

will often keep stolen items as a trophy of their crimes

for days, months, and even years. Persons involved in

criminal activities also give stolen items to close friends

and/or family members as gifts. That based on the patterns of conduct exhibited by . . . Le as it is known

to the affiants it is likely . . . Le was engaged in similar

actions that are intended to inhibit efforts of law

enforcement to discover him or evidence to support

his role in criminal activity. . . .

‘‘[B]ased upon the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the affiants have probable cause to believe that

. . . Le did participate in a home [invasion at the victim’s residence] . . . . That the total estimated value

of items taken including cash from the victim’s bank

accounts, wallet, and loose coin total approximately

$29,163.52. That [the defendant] and . . . Le are

friends on Facebook. That Stop & Shop surveillance

video shows that [the defendant] and . . . Le enter and

exit the store together. That . . . Le attempted to use

[the victim’s] stolen Bank of America card in Stop &

Shop in East Hartford on [April 8, 2013], at approxi-
mately 10:46 a.m. That [the defendant] cashed in coins

in the Stop & Shop Coinstar machine. That evidence

of this will be found at [the defendant’s residence],

which will establish probable cause for the crimes of

home invasion . . . kidnapping in the first degree . . .

threatening . . . robbery in the first degree . . . larceny in the first degree . . . [and] burglary in the first

degree . . . .’’ Among the items that were the subject

of the search warrant were the victim’s belongings that

were taken from his residence, articles of clothing that

were consistent with those worn by the suspects, and

‘‘cell phones and GPS devices.’’

On the basis of the foregoing facts as set forth in the

affidavit, as well as the reasonable inferences to be

drawn therefrom, there was probable cause to conclude

that items connected with the invasion of the victim’s

residence would be found in the defendant’s residence

on July 30, 2013. The defendant argues that the affidavit

lacked any averments to support a finding that he had

a personal interest in the items taken from the victim’s

residence or whether or how the suspects divided the

items taken during the home invasion. Likewise, he

argues that there were no facts alleged to support a

finding that he would keep any items related to the

home invasion for four months.

Because the affidavit set forth facts that either implicated the defendant as a participant in the commission

of the home invasion or as being connected to Le, who

was a participant in the home invasion, shortly after

the home invasion occurred, it was reasonable to infer

that the defendant may have possessed items taken

from the victim or that he possessed devices, such as

a cell phone, that would have been used in the commission of the crime.

Furthermore, on the basis of the averments set forth

in the affidavit, it was reasonable to believe that the

defendant would have possessed these items four

months following the commission of the crime. In light

of the averments concerning the use of cell phones or

GPS devices by criminals, as well as the reasonable

inference that these types of devices typically are

retained and used for months or years, it was not unreasonable to infer that, four months after the home invasion, the defendant probably possessed a cell phone or

a GPS device that he had possessed at the time that

the crime occurred. It was also reasonable to believe

that, at the time that the warrant application was presented to Judge Ginocchio, the defendant still would

have possessed the types of items that were removed

at gunpoint from the victim’s residence. The affiants

stated that criminals who steal many items divide them

among themselves, may retain them for ‘‘days, months,

and even years’’ following the crime, and may transfer

possession of items to friends and family members.

The issuing judge reasonably could have relied on the
training, experience, and expertise of the affiants in

this regard. In light of the variety of items taken, it was

reasonable to suspect that one or more of them would

be kept by the defendant in his residence. In light of the

averments set forth in the warrant application, probable

cause was not dependent on a showing that the defendant was engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded that probable cause

was lacking due to the four months that transpired

between the commission of the crime and the issuance

of the search warrant.

Finally, we address the defendant’s contention that

‘‘[t]he affidavit . . . did not show a nexus between Le

and [him] to suggest that [he] was a participant in the

robbery.’’ The defendant attempts to persuade us that

the facts in the affidavit concerning his friendship with

Le and his presence with Le at the supermarket on the

morning following the home invasion reflected innocent

behavior that did not give rise to a suspicion that he

was a participant in the home invasion. Moreover, the

defendant attempts to downplay the significance of the

fact that the surveillance video from the supermarket

depicted him cashing in a coin exchange machine

receipt. As the defendant argues, ‘‘[c]oins are fungible

items. Many people collect spare change in containers

and cash it in in large quantities . . . . Nor does the

affidavit make any representation about whether $68

worth of coins is an unusual sum at a Coinstar machine.’’

The defendant’s arguments are not persuasive. ‘‘[I]t

is axiomatic that [a] significantly lower quant[um] of

proof is required to establish probable cause [rather]

than guilt. . . . [P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an

actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis

for a showing of probable cause; to require otherwise

would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of

our [citizens] . . . demands. . . . In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not

whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but

the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types

of noncriminal acts.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 701,

916 A.2d 788, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1047, 128 S. Ct. 667,

169 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2007). In light of other facts set

forth in the affidavit, it was reasonable to infer that the

defendant’s act of exchanging coins by means of the

Coinstar machine was suspicious and tended to give rise

to probable cause that he possessed evidence related

to the home invasion. The affidavit reflected that the

defendant was accompanied in the supermarket by Le,

a person who was identified as a suspect in the home

invasion. The video supported a finding that the defendant had cashed approximately $68 in coins. The victim

reported that, only hours earlier, between $75 and $100
in coins was taken from his residence by three men,

all of whom had concealed their identity from him.

While the defendant was cashing in the receipt for the

coins, Le was at a cash register attempting to use the

victim’s stolen credit card.

Additionally, it suffices to observe that the premise

of the defendant’s argument is unsound. At issue is the

validity of a search warrant, not an arrest warrant. A

finding of probable cause to search did not depend on

facts in the affidavit that tended to demonstrate that

the defendant was a perpetrator of the home invasion.

The affiants presented facts that gave rise to a probability of his being in possession of items connected with

the home invasion due to his participation in the criminal endeavor or due to his relationship with and his

activities with Le, who was portrayed as a suspect in

the crime, within hours of the commission of the crime.

On the basis of our review of all of the facts in the

affidavit, we disagree that probable cause was lacking.

Accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails under Golding’s

third prong because he has failed to demonstrate that

a constitutional violation exists and that it deprived him

of a fair trial.22

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 By means of a special interrogatory submitted to the jury, the jury found

that the defendant committed the crimes of home invasion and robbery

with the use of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53-202k. The

defendant received a total effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration,

execution suspended after twenty years, followed by five years of probation.

2

In several telephone conversations, the defendant made statements while

incarcerated that tended to implicate him in the home invasion. Two months

prior to his release, the defendant had a telephone conversation with his

mother in which they discussed financial matters. During the conversation,

the defendant stated, ‘‘I’m coming across a bunch of money when I get out,

that’s why I gotta get out.’’ In a telephone conversation with Le that took

place on March 23, 2013, the defendant referred to his imminent release

from prison. He stated that Dunning was going to be ‘‘ready’’ and that he

would tell Dunning that Le had ‘‘everything set up.’’ In a telephone conversation with his father that occurred on February 7, 2015, while he was incarcerated and awaiting trial, the defendant stated that he had his upcoming case

‘‘in the palm of his hand.’’ The defendant, revealing his knowledge of the

crime, also stated that Le, who had accepted a guilty plea, had ‘‘copped

out’’ and was ‘‘the mastermind.’’

3 Approximately one hour after the defendant, Le, and Dunning left the

crime scene, Dunning used the victim’s ATM card at an ATM in Hartford.

At 2:20 a.m., on April 8, 2013, one of the perpetrators used the victim’s

credit card at a gas station in Manchester. Later in the morning of April 8,

2013, Le, who was accompanied by the defendant, attempted to use the

victim’s credit card at a supermarket in East Hartford.

4 The shotgun shells, as well as a black ski mask, were discovered in the

defendant’s bedroom and seized by the police during a subsequent search

of his residence in East Hartford.

5 Surveillance video from a supermarket in East Hartford showed that,

during the morning of April 8, 2013, the defendant, who was accompanied

by Le, deposited approximately $68 in a coin exchange machine, resulting

in a receipt in the amount of $62.01. During the police investigation of this

case and police questioning of the defendant, the defendant initially ‘‘denied

hanging out’’ with Le and told police investigators that he was not at the

supermarket with Le on April 8, 2013. After the police told the defendant

that witnesses had identified him as being at the supermarket at that time,

the defendant told the police that, at Le’s request, he had accompanied Le

to the supermarket, Le had exchanged coins at the supermarket, and Le
had given him some money.

6 The police later found a pair of gloves in the victim’s yard. DNA testing

of the gloves supported a finding that they had been handled by Dunning

and the defendant’s brother, with whom the defendant resided at the time of

the events underlying this appeal. Prior to the home invasion, the defendant

purchased the gloves and provided them to Dunning.

7 Donald Lavery, a correctional officer, testified that the phrase ‘‘putting

hands [on]’’ is synonymous with assault.

8 Although the defendant did not raise this claim before the trial court,

we may review it because, ‘‘under settled law, a defendant who fails to

preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropriety] need not seek to prevail under

the specific requirements of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567

A.2d 823 (1989), and, similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to

apply the four-pronged Golding test.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 560, 34 A.3d 370 (2012).

9

Initially, Dunning testified that he alone held the victim at gunpoint

during the home invasion. Later, he testified, consistent with the victim’s

testimony, that he had joined Le and the defendant in searching the victim’s

residence for valuables.

10 According to Dunning, he was charged initially with ‘‘home invasion,

burglary one, robbery one, larceny one, threatening one, [and] kidnapping one.’’

11 Part of the defendant’s claim on appeal is based on the fact that Judge

Dooley’s name appeared in the plea agreement, thereby reflecting that she

would be required to determine whether Dunning had testified credibly.

The defendant observes that ‘‘[t]he parties should have redacted the name

of the sentencing judge from the plea agreement,’’ but, nonetheless, states

that he is not raising an independent claim related to their failure to do so.

It suffices to observe that the prosecutor did not engage in improper argument by referring accurately to an agreement that was in evidence, nor did

he invite the jury to draw an unreasonable inference from the agreement.

To the extent that the defendant urges this court, in the exercise of its

supervisory powers over the administration of justice; see, e.g., State v.

Coward, 292 Conn. 296, 315, 972 A.2d 691 (2009) (discussing supervisory

authority); to require courts ‘‘to redact portions of a cooperation agreement

to reduce any implicit vouching and provide appropriate guidance to future

litigants and judges,’’ we decline to do so. We are not persuaded that traditional protections afforded to defendants, which encompass the right to

object to exhibits presented by the state and to request appropriate redactions, do not adequately protect a defendant’s rights with respect to the

issue raised in the present claim.

12 We further observe that, in its jury charge, the court instructed the jury

in relevant part that the court’s role was to state the rules of law, the jurors

were ‘‘the sole judges of the facts,’’ and the jury must find facts solely on

the basis of the evidence. The court also stated: ‘‘The actions of the court

during the trial and ruling on motions or objections by counsel or in comments to counsel or in setting forth the law in these instructions are not to

be taken by you [as] any indication of the court’s opinion as to how you

should determine the issues of fact. If the court has expressed or intimated

any opinion as to the facts, you are not bound by that opinion. What the

verdict shall be is your sole and exclusive duty and responsibility.’’ The court

also provided the jury with lengthy instructions about assessing credibility.

In relevant part, the court stated: ‘‘[Y]ou should size up the witnesses and

make your own judgment as to their credibility and decide what portion

. . . of any particular witness’ testimony you will believe based on these

principles.’’ (Emphasis added.)

13 The prosecutor expressly stated to the jury that he was not in any way

relying on his personal beliefs or anything outside of the evidence presented

at trial. He prefaced his rebuttal argument by stating, in relevant part, as

follows: ‘‘[F]or a prosecutor or a defense attorney to stand up here and say

‘in my opinion,’ be careful. Because what they’re asking you to do, indirectly,

is to say, this person knows a lot. They might know some things that I’m

not privy to—objections, you know, evidence that wasn’t admitted or just

the fact that they’ve been doing this for a long time. . . . And they’re asking

you to basically say, hey, trust me, in my opinion I know, that’s not proper.

If I got up here and said that—well, it would be a big problem for the state,

big problem. So, if I ever accidentally say anything like that, disregard it. I

try very hard not even to use the word ‘I.’ It’s always the state argues,

because I don’t want your verdict to rest on that kind of thing. I want [it]

to rest on the facts and the evidence, not on my opinions or beliefs.’’
14 The affidavit that accompanied the warrant application stated that,

according to postal service records, the East Hartford residence where the

search occurred was registered to Yvette White, who was the defendant’s

mother. Additionally, the affidavit stated that the defendant’s ‘‘Connecticut

Identification Card’’ reflected this East Hartford residence as his address.

15 ‘‘In Franks v. Delaware, [438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d

667 (1978)], the United States Supreme Court held that where the defendant

makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly

and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by

the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is

necessary to the finding of probable cause, the [f]ourth [a]mendment requires

that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. . . . The court in Franks

mentioned only a false statement . . . included . . . in the warrant affidavit; subsequent cases, however, have extended Franks to include material

omissions from such an affidavit. . . . If the ensuing Franks hearing discloses either an intentional or reckless falsehood, the court must excise

that material from the affidavit and judge the probable cause of the affidavit

shorn of that material.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Therrien, 117 Conn. App. 256, 262, 978 A.2d 556, cert. denied, 294

Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 275 (2009).

16 The motions stated in relevant part: ‘‘That the affidavit(s) in this case

prepared and served by the constable . . . knowingly and intentionally, or

with reckless disregard for the truth, made incomplete statements, halftruths, commissions, and dishonest innuendo concerning items necessary

for the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.’’

17 The jury heard testimony from a state police detective that a Coinstar

machine, which resembles an ATM, is located in some stores and, essentially,

for a commission, exchanges coins for a receipt that may be exchanged for

cash in other denominations. She testified that ‘‘[y]ou pour all your coins

into it and [it] tallies up how much the coin is and then it spits out a receipt

and then you take [the receipt] to a cashier or [to] customer service and

you get reimbursed for the . . . cash value of the receipt.’’

18 Because the defendant’s appellate claim is limited to the issue of probable cause as it relates to the search warrant, we need not examine the

court’s analysis with respect to the arrest warrant.

19 In 2016, the defendant, appearing as a self-represented litigant, filed a

motion in which he asked the court to compel the state to provide him with

a copy of a search warrant application for his residence that, in his view,

had been presented by the police to the judicial authority prior to the search

warrant application that was presented to and granted by Judge Ginocchio

in July, 2013. The defendant based his motion on a portion of the supporting

affidavit that stated that the application ‘‘has been presented to the judicial

authority previously.’’ Another portion of the application states that the

application ‘‘has not been presented . . . in any other court to any other

judge or judge trial referee.’’ On November 4, 2016, the court, Schuman, J.,

held a hearing on the motion for disclosure during which it heard testimony

from one of the affiants, Laura Kraus, a state police detective. In relevant

part, Kraus testified that the reference to a prior application was simply a

typographical error.

In denying the motion for disclosure, the court stated that it found Kraus’

testimony to be credible and concluded that there was no prior application

for the state to disclose. The court further noted that, because, in connection

with the motion, the defendant, who was proceeding at that time as a selfrepresented litigant, believed that the inaccuracy in the application was a

basis on which to suppress evidence seized incident to the search, it would

also construe the motion as a Franks motion. Treating the motion as such,

the court concluded that, without the inaccuracy in the application, there

was probable cause to search the defendant’s residence and that ‘‘there

was no intentional or reckless disregard of the truth [or] an intentional

misstatement . . . .’’ Accordingly, the court stated that the grounds set

forth in the motion were not a sufficient basis on which to suppress evidence

seized during the execution of the warrant at the defendant’s residence.

20 Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional

error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim

is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;

(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the

defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the

state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these
conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote

omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40.

21 Kraus and Combes averred that they had been members of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, Division of State Police,

since January, 2006.

22 Alternatively, we also conclude that the defendant’s claim fails under

Golding’s fourth prong. ‘‘Whether a constitutional violation is harmless in

a particular case depends upon the totality of the evidence presented at

trial. . . . If the evidence may have had a tendency to influence the judgment

of the jury, it cannot be considered harmless. . . . Whether such error is

harmless in a particular case depends upon a number of factors, such as

the importance of the [evidence] in the prosecution’s case, whether the

[evidence] was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the [evidence] . . . and, of course, the overall strength

of the prosecution’s case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine the

impact of the evidence on the trier of fact and the result of the trial. . . .

The state bears the burden of proving that the error is harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 156

Conn. App. 537, 560–62, 113 A.3d 103, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 910, 115 A.3d

1106 (2015).

Although the state introduced evidence seized from the defendant’s residence, including shotgun shells and a ski mask, the state has demonstrated

that, in light of the strength of its overall case apart from this evidence, it

is unlikely that this evidence significantly contributed to the verdict reached

by the jury. Relying on our previous discussion of the facts supported by

the evidence, we observe that the state presented testimony from one of

the three perpetrators of the home invasion, Dunning, that the defendant

was one of the perpetrators. The state presented evidence that, prior to his

release from prison, the defendant made statements to his mother that he

would acquire ‘‘a bunch of money’’ once he was released. These statements

strongly corroborated the evidence that the defendant had participated in

the planning and the commission of the home invasion. The state presented

video surveillance evidence that depicted the defendant’s presence with Le,

another person identified as a perpetrator, hours following the home invasion. The surveillance video strongly supported a finding that the defendant

exchanged coins that were stolen from the victim at the same time that Le

was attempting to use the victim’s stolen credit card. Finally, the state

presented evidence of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt by means of

his evasiveness concerning his relationship with Le, his misrepresentations

with respect to cashing coins at the supermarket, and the content of his

telephone conversations with multiple persons during his incarceration

while awaiting trial. As we have discussed previously, in these telephone

conversations, the defendant attempted to threaten Dunning to dissuade

him from testifying against him and made statements concerning Le that

suggested he had knowledge of the planned home invasion. In light of this

other evidence that was not tainted by any alleged impropriety with respect

to the search warrant, we conclude that the admission of the evidence that

was the fruit of the search at issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.