Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

v. ) 

) 

GRACO INC., ) 

) 

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC., and ) 

) 

ITW FINISHING LLC, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

------------) 

Civil Case No. 1:11-CV-02239 (RLW) 

OPPOSITION OF PLANTIFF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER VENUE AND TO TRANSFER 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

v. ) 

) 

GRACO INC., ) 

) 

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC., and ) 

) 

ITW FINISHING LLC, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

------------) 

Civil Case No. 1:11-CV-02239 (RLW) 

OPPOSITION OF PLANTIFF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER VENUE AND TO TRANSFER 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 2 of 22

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 

I. THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED ..................................................... 3 

A. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants .................................... 3 

B. Venue Is Properly Alleged in the Complaint ............................................................ 6 

II. THE MOTION TO TRANSFER SHOULD BE DENIED ................................................. 7 

A. Public Interest Factors: Local Interest ..................................................................... 8 

B. Public Interest Factors: Court Congestion and Familiarity with Governing Law .. 9 

C. Private Interest Factors: Plaintiff's Choice of Forum ........................................... 10 

D. Private Interest Factors: Defendants' Choice of Forum ........................................ 11 

E. Private Interest Factors: Where the Case Arose .................................................... 11 

F. Private Interest Factors: Convenience a/the Witnesses and Parties ..................... 13 

G. Private Interest Factors: Access to Evidence ......................................................... 15 

III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 16 

11 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 

I. THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED ..................................................... 3 

A. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants .................................... 3 

B. Venue Is Properly Alleged in the Complaint ............................................................ 6 

II. THE MOTION TO TRANSFER SHOULD BE DENIED ................................................. 7 

A. Public Interest Factors: Local Interest ..................................................................... 8 

B. Public Interest Factors: Court Congestion and Familiarity with Governing Law .. 9 

C. Private Interest Factors: Plaintiff's Choice of Forum ........................................... 10 

D. Private Interest Factors: Defendants' Choice of Forum ........................................ 11 

E. Private Interest Factors: Where the Case Arose .................................................... 11 

F. Private Interest Factors: Convenience a/the Witnesses and Parties ..................... 13 

G. Private Interest Factors: Access to Evidence ......................................................... 15 

III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 16 

11 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 3 of 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

*Bally Gaming, Inc. v. Kappos, 789 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2011) ............................................... .4 

*Boland v. Fortis Construction Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2011) ....................................... .4 

*Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Staffordv. 

Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) ........................................................................................................... .3 

Fanning v. Capco Contractors, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2010) .................................. 8, 15 

FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) .................................................... .12, 14 

FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11,2011) ....................... .13 

FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., Order, No. 1O-cv-2053 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2010) ....................... 12 

FTC v. Mallett, No. 11-cv-01664, 2011 WL 4852228 (D.D.C. 2011) ........................................... .4 

FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff'd, 2011 WL 

6118565 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2011) ................................................................................................. .13 

FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) ................. .13 

FTC v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ......................................... .12 

Gipson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008) ................................................ 6 

GuljOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) .............................................................................. 8 

Icon Indus. Controls v. Cimetrix, 921 F. Supp. 375 (D. La. 1996) ................................................. 7 

Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ................................................. 6, 7 

McCracken v. Automobile Club ofS. Cal., 891 F. Supp. 559 (D. Kan. 1995) ............................... 7 

Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) ............................................................................. .10 

*SECv. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ............................................................ : ...... .3, 4 

Shapiro, LijSchitz & Schram, P.e. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 1998) ........................ .10 

Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2007) .................................................... 10 

III 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

*Bally Gaming, Inc. v. Kappos, 789 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2011) ............................................... .4 

*Boland v. Fortis Construction Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2011) ....................................... .4 

*Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Staffordv. 

Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) ........................................................................................................... .3 

Fanning v. Capco Contractors, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2010) .................................. 8, 15 

FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) .................................................... .12, 14 

FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11,2011) ....................... .13 

FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., Order, No. 1O-cv-2053 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2010) ....................... 12 

FTC v. Mallett, No. 11-cv-01664, 2011 WL 4852228 (D.D.C. 2011) ........................................... .4 

FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff'd, 2011 WL 

6118565 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2011) ................................................................................................. .13 

FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) ................. .13 

FTC v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ......................................... .12 

Gipson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008) ................................................ 6 

GuljOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) .............................................................................. 8 

Icon Indus. Controls v. Cimetrix, 921 F. Supp. 375 (D. La. 1996) ................................................. 7 

Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ................................................. 6, 7 

McCracken v. Automobile Club ofS. Cal., 891 F. Supp. 559 (D. Kan. 1995) ............................... 7 

Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) ............................................................................. .10 

*SECv. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ............................................................ : ...... .3, 4 

Shapiro, LijSchitz & Schram, P.e. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 1998) ........................ .10 

Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2007) .................................................... 10 

III 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 4 of 22

Thayer/Patricof Educ. Funding, L.L. C. v. Pryor Res., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2002) .. .1 0 

us. v. Bowdoin, 770 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2011) .................................................................. .14 

*us. v. H&R Block, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 201 I) ............................................... passim 

us. v. Microsemi Corp., No.l:08-cv-1311, 2009 WL 577491 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2009) ............... 7 

us. ex rei. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'l Constr., Inc., 608 FJd 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ..................... 5 

Administrative Decisions 

Order Denying Respondents' Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of Lab. Corp. of 

Am., FTC Docket No. 9345 (Chappell, A.LJ. Jan. 19,2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9345/11 0 119Iabcorporder.pdf ...................................................... 12 

Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of North Carolina 

Board of Dental Examiners, FTC Docket No. 9343 (Chappell, A.L.J. Jan. 25, 2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/11 0 125aljorddenyrespmo.pdf. ............................................. 12 

Scheduling Order, In the Matter of aSF Healthcare System, FTC Docket No. 9349 (Chappell, 

A.L.l Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d93491111220aIischedord.pdf .................. 11 

Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of ProMedica 

Health System, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9346 (Chappell, A.LJ. Mar. 29, 2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9346111 0329aIi orddenyrespmosethearinglocat.pdf ..................... 12 

Statutes 

Section 13(b) ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) .................................................................. passim 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(I) .................................................................................................................... 6 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) ......................................................................................................................... 6 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ......................................................................................................................... 7 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ......................................................................................................................... 6 

IV 

Thayer/Patricof Educ. Funding, L.L. C. v. Pryor Res., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2002) .. .1 0 

us. v. Bowdoin, 770 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2011) .................................................................. .14 

*us. v. H&R Block, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 201 I) ............................................... passim 

us. v. Microsemi Corp., No.l:08-cv-1311, 2009 WL 577491 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2009) ............... 7 

us. ex rei. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'l Constr., Inc., 608 FJd 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ..................... 5 

Administrative Decisions 

Order Denying Respondents' Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of Lab. Corp. of 

Am., FTC Docket No. 9345 (Chappell, A.LJ. Jan. 19,2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9345/11 0 119Iabcorporder.pdf ...................................................... 12 

Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of North Carolina 

Board of Dental Examiners, FTC Docket No. 9343 (Chappell, A.L.J. Jan. 25, 2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/11 0 125aljorddenyrespmo.pdf. ............................................. 12 

Scheduling Order, In the Matter of aSF Healthcare System, FTC Docket No. 9349 (Chappell, 

A.L.l Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d93491111220aIischedord.pdf .................. 11 

Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of ProMedica 

Health System, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9346 (Chappell, A.LJ. Mar. 29, 2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9346111 0329aIi orddenyrespmosethearinglocat.pdf ..................... 12 

Statutes 

Section 13(b) ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) .................................................................. passim 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(I) .................................................................................................................... 6 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) ......................................................................................................................... 6 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ......................................................................................................................... 7 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ......................................................................................................................... 6 

IV 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 5 of 22

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

FRCP 4(k)(1 )(C) .......................................................................................................................... 5, 6 

FRCP 12(b)(3) ................................................................................................................................. 6 

Federal Court Management Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (June 

2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-binicmsd2011Jun.pl ................................. 9 

v 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

FRCP 4(k)(1 )(C) .......................................................................................................................... 5, 6 

FRCP 12(b)(3) ................................................................................................................................. 6 

Federal Court Management Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (June 

2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-binicmsd2011Jun.pl ................................. 9 

v 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 6 of 22

INTRODUCTION 

In this action, the Federal Trade Commission seeks a temporary restraining order and a 

preliminary injunction preventing Defendants Graco, Inc. ("Graco"), Illinois Tool Works Inc., 

and ITW Finishing Inc. (together, "ITW") from consummating, until completion of an ongoing 

administrative proceeding, an acquisition agreement that would combine the leading industrial 

liquid finishing equipment producers. In that proceeding, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" 

or "the Commission") will consider and determine whether the acquisition is likely to harm 

competition. The pending administrative adjudication will address allegations that the 

acquisition would result in a dominant competitor, as well as concerns that the remaining 

industrial liquid finishing equipment manufacturers are less significant competitors and suffer 

from poorer access to and support from independent distributors-necessary ingredients of 

successful competition in this industry. The administrative trial on the merits will begin on 

May 15,2012. Action by this Court is necessary to preserve the possibility of effective relief by 

preventing consummation of the transaction until the administrative proceeding concludes and to 

prevent interim competitive harm during its pendency. 

Defendants ask this Court to dismiss this action, or in the alternative, to transfer the case 

to the District of Minnesota. l Graco alleges that its ties to the District of Columbia are not 

sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over it, or to establish venue in this Court. In support of 

1 Defendant ITW has now joined in Graco's motion to dismiss or transfer in a pleading served on 

Plaintiff on December 20,2011. This is a puzzling development because during the 

investigation that led to this lawsuit ITW consented to jurisdiction in "all federal districts within 

the United States." Letter from Logan M. Breed, counsel for ITW, to Robert Friedman, Federal 

Trade Commission, Oct. 13,2011, Ex. 1. ITW has offered no basis for its repudiation of its 

earlier consent. Accordingly, the Court should deny ITW's motion to dismiss or transfer. 

INTRODUCTION 

In this action, the Federal Trade Commission seeks a temporary restraining order and a 

preliminary injunction preventing Defendants Graco, Inc. ("Graco"), Illinois Tool Works Inc., 

and ITW Finishing Inc. (together, "ITW") from consummating, until completion of an ongoing 

administrative proceeding, an acquisition agreement that would combine the leading industrial 

liquid finishing equipment producers. In that proceeding, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" 

or "the Commission") will consider and determine whether the acquisition is likely to harm 

competition. The pending administrative adjudication will address allegations that the 

acquisition would result in a dominant competitor, as well as concerns that the remaining 

industrial liquid finishing equipment manufacturers are less significant competitors and suffer 

from poorer access to and support from independent distributors-necessary ingredients of 

successful competition in this industry. The administrative trial on the merits will begin on 

May 15,2012. Action by this Court is necessary to preserve the possibility of effective relief by 

preventing consummation of the transaction until the administrative proceeding concludes and to 

prevent interim competitive harm during its pendency. 

Defendants ask this Court to dismiss this action, or in the alternative, to transfer the case 

to the District of Minnesota. l Graco alleges that its ties to the District of Columbia are not 

sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over it, or to establish venue in this Court. In support of 

1 Defendant ITW has now joined in Graco's motion to dismiss or transfer in a pleading served on 

Plaintiff on December 20,2011. This is a puzzling development because during the 

investigation that led to this lawsuit ITW consented to jurisdiction in "all federal districts within 

the United States." Letter from Logan M. Breed, counsel for ITW, to Robert Friedman, Federal 

Trade Commission, Oct. 13,2011, Ex. 1. ITW has offered no basis for its repudiation of its 

earlier consent. Accordingly, the Court should deny ITW's motion to dismiss or transfer. 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 7 of 22

its motion, Graco relies on cases from this and other circuits analyzing the requirements of 

various long-arm jurisdictional statutes that have no bearing on this matter. The Commission 

brings this action pursuant to a federal statute, Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53 (b), 

which authorizes service of process nationwide. This Circuit could not have spoken more clearly 

when it said that under these circumstances, the inquiry relevant to personal jurisdiction is 

whether the defendant has minimum contact with the United States. When the appropriate legal 

standard is applied, there is no serious question that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the 

Defendants in this case, and that venue is proper in this Court? 

Transfer is also unwarranted. This district is the choice ofthe Plaintiff Federal Trade 

Commission. The dispute is national, affects customers nationwide, and has no greater 

competitive significance in one city than any other. This claim arises in this district because its 

purpose is to protect the Commission's ability to impose effective relief, if appropriate, in an 

ongoing administrative proceeding in this district into the antitrust merits ofthe transaction and 

to prevent interim competitive harm prior to the conclusion of that proceeding. If, as in most 

recent Section l3(b) preliminary injunction cases like this one, the Court proceeds without an 

evidentiary hearing, no third-party witnesses will be inconvenienced. If the Court does hold an 

evidentiary hearing, this district would appear to be as convenient as Minnesota, if not more so, 

for nine-more than half-of the seventeen potential third-party witnesses the Defendants 

identified. Nor can Graco seriously contend that the District is an inconvenient forum when it 

has agreed to litigate any dispute with ITW about the transaction in Delaware, even further from 

Minneapolis than the District of Columbia. 

2 Because ITW joined Graco's motion but did not set forth separate arguments in support of the 

motion, the remainder of this brief addresses Graco's contentions. 

2 

its motion, Graco relies on cases from this and other circuits analyzing the requirements of 

various long-arm jurisdictional statutes that have no bearing on this matter. The Commission 

brings this action pursuant to a federal statute, Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53 (b), 

which authorizes service of process nationwide. This Circuit could not have spoken more clearly 

when it said that under these circumstances, the inquiry relevant to personal jurisdiction is 

whether the defendant has minimum contact with the United States. When the appropriate legal 

standard is applied, there is no serious question that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the 

Defendants in this case, and that venue is proper in this Court? 

Transfer is also unwarranted. This district is the choice ofthe Plaintiff Federal Trade 

Commission. The dispute is national, affects customers nationwide, and has no greater 

competitive significance in one city than any other. This claim arises in this district because its 

purpose is to protect the Commission's ability to impose effective relief, if appropriate, in an 

ongoing administrative proceeding in this district into the antitrust merits ofthe transaction and 

to prevent interim competitive harm prior to the conclusion of that proceeding. If, as in most 

recent Section l3(b) preliminary injunction cases like this one, the Court proceeds without an 

evidentiary hearing, no third-party witnesses will be inconvenienced. If the Court does hold an 

evidentiary hearing, this district would appear to be as convenient as Minnesota, if not more so, 

for nine-more than half-of the seventeen potential third-party witnesses the Defendants 

identified. Nor can Graco seriously contend that the District is an inconvenient forum when it 

has agreed to litigate any dispute with ITW about the transaction in Delaware, even further from 

Minneapolis than the District of Columbia. 

2 Because ITW joined Graco's motion but did not set forth separate arguments in support of the 

motion, the remainder of this brief addresses Graco's contentions. 

2 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 8 of 22

I. THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED 

A. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants 

The contention that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in this case 

is without merit. Graco acknowledges that the Commission brings this action pursuant to 

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), but it quotes selectively from the operative 

language to support its argument. The full relevant language states: 

Any suit may be brought where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or 

transacts business, or wherever venue is proper under section 1391 oftitle 28. In 

addition, the court may, if the court determines that the interests of justice require 

that any other person, partnership, or corporation should be a party in such suit, 

cause such other person, partnership of corporation to be added as a party without 

regard to whether venue is otherwise proper in the district in which suit is 

brought. In any suit under this section, process may be served on any person, 

partnership, or corporation wherever it may be found. 

The "transacts business" language is not, as Graco contends, a jurisdictional limitation. It is, 

instead, a venue provision, which we discuss below. 

By its clear terms, Section 13(b) authorizes service on a defendant wherever he or she 

may be found, including nationwide. The law in this Circuit is clear. When a defendant 

challenges a federal court's personal jurisdiction in an action arising under a federal statute that 

authorizes nationwide service of process, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has 

minimum contacts with the United States. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 

1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stajfordv. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (rejecting the 

requirement that the defendant have substantial contacts with the District of Columbia). The 

D.C. Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle. See, e.g., SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 FJd 1100, 

1106 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("This circuit has held that the requirement of 'minimum contacts' 

with a forum state is inapplicable where the court exercises personal jurisdiction by virtue of a 

federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process .... [Then 1 minimum contacts with the 

3 

I. THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED 

A. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants 

The contention that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in this case 

is without merit. Graco acknowledges that the Commission brings this action pursuant to 

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), but it quotes selectively from the operative 

language to support its argument. The full relevant language states: 

Any suit may be brought where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or 

transacts business, or wherever venue is proper under section 1391 oftitle 28. In 

addition, the court may, if the court determines that the interests of justice require 

that any other person, partnership, or corporation should be a party in such suit, 

cause such other person, partnership of corporation to be added as a party without 

regard to whether venue is otherwise proper in the district in which suit is 

brought. In any suit under this section, process may be served on any person, 

partnership, or corporation wherever it may be found. 

The "transacts business" language is not, as Graco contends, a jurisdictional limitation. It is, 

instead, a venue provision, which we discuss below. 

By its clear terms, Section 13(b) authorizes service on a defendant wherever he or she 

may be found, including nationwide. The law in this Circuit is clear. When a defendant 

challenges a federal court's personal jurisdiction in an action arising under a federal statute that 

authorizes nationwide service of process, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has 

minimum contacts with the United States. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 

1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stajfordv. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (rejecting the 

requirement that the defendant have substantial contacts with the District of Columbia). The 

D.C. Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle. See, e.g., SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 FJd 1100, 

1106 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("This circuit has held that the requirement of 'minimum contacts' 

with a forum state is inapplicable where the court exercises personal jurisdiction by virtue of a 

federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process .... [Then 1 minimum contacts with the 

3 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 9 of 22

United States suffice."). 

This Court has recently and consistently followed Briggs. Boland v. Fortis Construction 

Co., is particularly instructive on this point: 

[The] concept of nationwide service of process may seem at odds with the basic 

due process concerns ofthe personal jurisdiction inquiry. However, this "issue 

has several times been considered by judges in the District Court; each has 

agreed that nationwide service suffers from no constitutional infirmity." 

Accordingly, "when a federal court is attempting to exercise personal jurisdiction 

over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute providing for nationwide 

service of process, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has had 

minimum contacts with the United States." 

Boland v. Fortis Construction Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 80,89 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). At 

least two other opinions on this issue have come from this Court in the past year alone, including 

in an action by the Commission under Section 13(b). In FTC v. Mallett, No. ll-cv-01664, 2011 

WL 4852228, at *3 (D.D.C. 2011), the Court described the Commission's burden in establishing 

personal jurisdiction in a Section 13(b) matter as "relatively light," and held personal jurisdiction 

was established where the defendant resided in the United States and actively solicited business 

in this cOlmtry. Also, in Bally Gaming, Inc. v. Kappas, 789 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2011), this 

Court asserted personal jurisdiction based on the defendant's ties to the United States. 789 F. 

Supp. 2d at 45-46. 

Graco claims that service on it would violate the constitutional requirement that the 

Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfY the Due Process Clause. See Memorandum of 

Law in Support of Graco's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper 

Venue and to Transfer ("Graco's Brief') at 3-4. This Circuit has considered and rejected the 

claim that the Due Process Clause bars exercise by this Court of personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant without minimum contacts with the District. See, e.g., Bilzerian, 378 F.3d at 1106 n.8 

("We also reject [the] contention that, even if § 1692 authorizes the exercise of personal 

4 

United States suffice."). 

This Court has recently and consistently followed Briggs. Boland v. Fortis Construction 

Co., is particularly instructive on this point: 

[The] concept of nationwide service of process may seem at odds with the basic 

due process concerns ofthe personal jurisdiction inquiry. However, this "issue 

has several times been considered by judges in the District Court; each has 

agreed that nationwide service suffers from no constitutional infirmity." 

Accordingly, "when a federal court is attempting to exercise personal jurisdiction 

over a defendant in a suit based upon a federal statute providing for nationwide 

service of process, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has had 

minimum contacts with the United States." 

Boland v. Fortis Construction Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 80,89 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). At 

least two other opinions on this issue have come from this Court in the past year alone, including 

in an action by the Commission under Section 13(b). In FTC v. Mallett, No. ll-cv-01664, 2011 

WL 4852228, at *3 (D.D.C. 2011), the Court described the Commission's burden in establishing 

personal jurisdiction in a Section 13(b) matter as "relatively light," and held personal jurisdiction 

was established where the defendant resided in the United States and actively solicited business 

in this cOlmtry. Also, in Bally Gaming, Inc. v. Kappas, 789 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2011), this 

Court asserted personal jurisdiction based on the defendant's ties to the United States. 789 F. 

Supp. 2d at 45-46. 

Graco claims that service on it would violate the constitutional requirement that the 

Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfY the Due Process Clause. See Memorandum of 

Law in Support of Graco's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper 

Venue and to Transfer ("Graco's Brief') at 3-4. This Circuit has considered and rejected the 

claim that the Due Process Clause bars exercise by this Court of personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant without minimum contacts with the District. See, e.g., Bilzerian, 378 F.3d at 1106 n.8 

("We also reject [the] contention that, even if § 1692 authorizes the exercise of personal 

4 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 10 of 22

jurisdiction over [the defendant], to do so would violate the Due Process Clause because he lacks 

'minimum contacts' with the District of Columbia."). Service of process establishes personal 

jurisdiction when authorized by a statute ofthe United States. See FRCP 4(k)(1 )(C). Section 

13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes service wherever the defendant is "found." Graco does not deny 

that it was served where it was found and does not and cannot deny that it has contacts with the 

United States, which is its principal place of business and home to its headquarters. 

Moreover, Graco actively solicits business in the District of Columbia. Graco sells its 

products nationwide primarily through distributors, and purposefully sells to distributors in this 

district. Graco distributors have stores in this district at which they sell Graco products.3 In 

addition, Graco' s website and its distributors' websites promote Graco products to customers in 

this district.4 Graco's active solicitation of business in the District of Columbia is sufficient to 

confer personal jurisdiction over it on this Court even under the long-arm standard Graco asserts. 

See Us. ex reI. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'! Constr., Inc., 608 FJd 871, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

("minimum contacts" established when the defendant '''purposefully directed [its 1 activities at 

residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to 

those activities.'" (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985»). 

3 See http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/wwg/branchSearchResults.shtrnl?currentAction 

=mapCursor&mapCursor=912&branchSearchSuccess=success.branchsearch (Grainger webpage 

providing driving directions to Grainger store at 331 N St. NE, Washington, D.C.). 

4 See, e.g., http://www.graco.com/lnternet/T PDB.nsf/SearchView/AirProAutomatic (Graco 

webpage showing Graco AirPro Automatic Air Spray Gun, with tab, "Where to Buy," for 

retrieving names of distributors nearest viewer's zip code); 

http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/graco/ecatalog/N -1 zOgjct?xi=xi (distributor webpage 

showing that a search for Graco products identified 44 for sale). 

5 

jurisdiction over [the defendant], to do so would violate the Due Process Clause because he lacks 

'minimum contacts' with the District of Columbia."). Service of process establishes personal 

jurisdiction when authorized by a statute ofthe United States. See FRCP 4(k)(1 )(C). Section 

13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes service wherever the defendant is "found." Graco does not deny 

that it was served where it was found and does not and cannot deny that it has contacts with the 

United States, which is its principal place of business and home to its headquarters. 

Moreover, Graco actively solicits business in the District of Columbia. Graco sells its 

products nationwide primarily through distributors, and purposefully sells to distributors in this 

district. Graco distributors have stores in this district at which they sell Graco products.3 In 

addition, Graco' s website and its distributors' websites promote Graco products to customers in 

this district.4 Graco's active solicitation of business in the District of Columbia is sufficient to 

confer personal jurisdiction over it on this Court even under the long-arm standard Graco asserts. 

See Us. ex reI. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'! Constr., Inc., 608 FJd 871, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

("minimum contacts" established when the defendant '''purposefully directed [its 1 activities at 

residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to 

those activities.'" (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985»). 

3 See http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/wwg/branchSearchResults.shtrnl?currentAction 

=mapCursor&mapCursor=912&branchSearchSuccess=success.branchsearch (Grainger webpage 

providing driving directions to Grainger store at 331 N St. NE, Washington, D.C.). 

4 See, e.g., http://www.graco.com/lnternet/T PDB.nsf/SearchView/AirProAutomatic (Graco 

webpage showing Graco AirPro Automatic Air Spray Gun, with tab, "Where to Buy," for 

retrieving names of distributors nearest viewer's zip code); 

http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/graco/ecatalog/N -1 zOgjct?xi=xi (distributor webpage 

showing that a search for Graco products identified 44 for sale). 

5 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 11 of 22

B. Venue Is Properly Alleged in the Complaint 

Graco also asserts that venue as alleged in the Complaint is improper and asks the Court 

to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which provide for 

dismissal or transfer if there is a defect in venue as it is alleged in the complaint. Graco' s Brief 

at 1-7. The interests of justice, however, usually require a transfer rather than dismissal for 

failure to allege proper venue. See Gipson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 

(D.D.C.2008). 

Venue is proper in the District of Columbia because all three defendants are subject to 

personal jurisdiction in this District, and, therefore, are said to "reside" here. See Kingsepp v. 

Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Section 13(b)(2) allows the Commission 

to bring suit wherever venue "is proper under section 1391 of Title 28." Under Section 1391(b), 

venue is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the 

same state, and a corporate defendant "is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is 

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). As 

set forth above, all defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district because Section 

13(b) permits service upon them anywhere they "may be found," 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and Federal 

Rille of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1 )(C) provides that service of process establishes personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant when authorized by a federal statute. Thus, for purposes of venue, 

Graco is deemed to reside in this district. 

Courts have generally adopted the plain meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1391: If a defendant 

corporation is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction by virtue of a nationwide service of 

process statute, the defendant corporation resides in that district for purposes of venue. 

See McCracken v. Automobile Club olS. Cal., 891 F. Supp. 559, 562-63 (D. Kan. 1995). In 

6 

B. Venue Is Properly Alleged in the Complaint 

Graco also asserts that venue as alleged in the Complaint is improper and asks the Court 

to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which provide for 

dismissal or transfer if there is a defect in venue as it is alleged in the complaint. Graco' s Brief 

at 1-7. The interests of justice, however, usually require a transfer rather than dismissal for 

failure to allege proper venue. See Gipson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 

(D.D.C.2008). 

Venue is proper in the District of Columbia because all three defendants are subject to 

personal jurisdiction in this District, and, therefore, are said to "reside" here. See Kingsepp v. 

Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Section 13(b)(2) allows the Commission 

to bring suit wherever venue "is proper under section 1391 of Title 28." Under Section 1391(b), 

venue is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the 

same state, and a corporate defendant "is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is 

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). As 

set forth above, all defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district because Section 

13(b) permits service upon them anywhere they "may be found," 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and Federal 

Rille of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1 )(C) provides that service of process establishes personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant when authorized by a federal statute. Thus, for purposes of venue, 

Graco is deemed to reside in this district. 

Courts have generally adopted the plain meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1391: If a defendant 

corporation is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction by virtue of a nationwide service of 

process statute, the defendant corporation resides in that district for purposes of venue. 

See McCracken v. Automobile Club olS. Cal., 891 F. Supp. 559, 562-63 (D. Kan. 1995). In 

6 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 12 of 22

Kingsepp, the court had personal jurisdiction over two of the defendant corporations because the 

Clayton Act provides for nationwide service of process and they had minimum contacts with the 

United States. 763 F. Supp. at 25. Therefore, venue was proper in the Southern District of New 

York without regard to those defendants' contacts with that district. Kingsepp, 763 F. Supp. at 

27-28; see also Icon Indus. Controls v. Cimetrix, 921 F. Supp. 375, 376-77, 382 (D. La. 1996) 

(although an apparent departure from traditional notions that venue lies where the defendant 

resides or events giving rise to the litigation occurred, in a Clayton Act case with nationwide 

service of process, the conclusion that venue is appropriate "in any district" "is supported both 

by the wording of the referenced statutes and by the pertinent jurisprudence"). 5 

II. THE MOTION TO TRANSFER SHOULD BE DENIED 

Oraco has also failed to carry its burden of establishing that the Court should transfer this 

matter to the District of Mimlesota. Thus, the Court should deny the motion to transfer. 

Section 1404(a) of Title 28l;\0verns the motion. That statute provides that, "[flor the 

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any 

civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. 

§ l404(a). The party seeking transfer bears a '''heavy burden,'" and '''a court will not order 

transfer mliess the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant.'" Us. v. H&R Block, Inc., 789 

F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (DD.C. 2011) (quoting u.s. v. Microsemi Corp., No.1 :08-cv-1311, 2009 WL 

577491, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2009». 

In considering a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), courts consider both 

public and private factors. The public factors are: '''(1) the local interest in making local 

decisions about local controversies; (2) the relative congestion of the transferee and transferor 

5 As Plaintiff is prepared to demonstrate, the Defendants also meet the "transacts business" test 

for venue. 

7 

,-, 

Kingsepp, the court had personal jurisdiction over two of the defendant corporations because the 

Clayton Act provides for nationwide service of process and they had minimum contacts with the 

United States. 763 F. Supp. at 25. Therefore, venue was proper in the Southern District of New 

York without regard to those defendants' contacts with that district. Kingsepp, 763 F. Supp. at 

27-28; see also Icon Indus. Controls v. Cimetrix, 921 F. Supp. 375, 376-77, 382 (D. La. 1996) 

(although an apparent departure from traditional notions that venue lies where the defendant 

resides or events giving rise to the litigation occurred, in a Clayton Act case with nationwide 

service of process, the conclusion that venue is appropriate "in any district" "is supported both 

by the wording of the referenced statutes and by the pertinent jurisprudence"). 5 

II. THE MOTION TO TRANSFER SHOULD BE DENIED 

Oraco has also failed to carry its burden of establishing that the Court should transfer this 

matter to the District of Mimlesota. Thus, the Court should deny the motion to transfer. 

Section 1404(a) of Title 28l;\0verns the motion. That statute provides that, "[flor the 

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any 

civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. 

§ l404(a). The party seeking transfer bears a '''heavy burden,'" and '''a court will not order 

transfer mliess the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant.'" Us. v. H&R Block, Inc., 789 

F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (DD.C. 2011) (quoting u.s. v. Microsemi Corp., No.1 :08-cv-1311, 2009 WL 

577491, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2009». 

In considering a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), courts consider both 

public and private factors. The public factors are: '''(1) the local interest in making local 

decisions about local controversies; (2) the relative congestion of the transferee and transferor 

5 As Plaintiff is prepared to demonstrate, the Defendants also meet the "transacts business" test 

for venue. 

7 

<-, 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 13 of 22

courts; and (3) the potential transferee court's familiarity with the governing law.'" H&R Block, 

789 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting Bederson v. Us., 756 F. Supp. 2d 28, 46 (D.D.C. 2010)); see also 

Fanning v. Capco Contractors, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 65,69 (D.D.C. 2010). The private interest 

factors are: '''(1) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) the defendant's choice offorum; (3) where 

the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and 

(6) or the ease of access to the sources of proof. '" H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting 

Bederson, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 46); see also Fanning, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 

A. Public Interest Factors: Local Interest 

This case---and the underlying administrative adjudicatory proceeding-relate to an 

acquisition whose competitive effects will reverberate nationwide. The Complaint commencing 

the administrative case alleges that the geographic market relevant to analyzing the acquisition is 

North America. Complaint, In the Matter o/Graco Inc. ~ 32, FTC Docket No. 9350 (Dec. 15, 

2011) (Redacted Public Version), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9350/111215gracoadmincmpt. 

pdf; see also the Complaint in this proceeding at ~ 39. The preliminary injunction hearing 

involves no "local controversy" specific to Minnesota and there is no distinguishing localinterest factor weighing in favor of transferring this proceeding to that jurisdiction. 

The Supreme Court initially formulated the "localized controversy" element of the venue 

transfer standard to avoid having "litigation ... piled up in congested centers," thereby imposing 

an unfair burden on citizens in those communities who had to serve on juries. Gulf Gil Corp. v. 

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). There will be no jury in this preliminary injunction 

proceeding. 

Graco contends that transfer is appropriate because it employs thousands of people in 

Minnesota. See, e.g., Graco's Brief at 2. The relevance of this fact is unclear. Graco does not 

8 

courts; and (3) the potential transferee court's familiarity with the governing law.'" H&R Block, 

789 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting Bederson v. Us., 756 F. Supp. 2d 28, 46 (D.D.C. 2010)); see also 

Fanning v. Capco Contractors, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 65,69 (D.D.C. 2010). The private interest 

factors are: '''(1) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) the defendant's choice offorum; (3) where 

the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and 

(6) or the ease of access to the sources of proof. '" H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting 

Bederson, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 46); see also Fanning, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 

A. Public Interest Factors: Local Interest 

This case---and the underlying administrative adjudicatory proceeding-relate to an 

acquisition whose competitive effects will reverberate nationwide. The Complaint commencing 

the administrative case alleges that the geographic market relevant to analyzing the acquisition is 

North America. Complaint, In the Matter o/Graco Inc. ~ 32, FTC Docket No. 9350 (Dec. 15, 

2011) (Redacted Public Version), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9350/111215gracoadmincmpt. 

pdf; see also the Complaint in this proceeding at ~ 39. The preliminary injunction hearing 

involves no "local controversy" specific to Minnesota and there is no distinguishing localinterest factor weighing in favor of transferring this proceeding to that jurisdiction. 

The Supreme Court initially formulated the "localized controversy" element of the venue 

transfer standard to avoid having "litigation ... piled up in congested centers," thereby imposing 

an unfair burden on citizens in those communities who had to serve on juries. Gulf Gil Corp. v. 

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). There will be no jury in this preliminary injunction 

proceeding. 

Graco contends that transfer is appropriate because it employs thousands of people in 

Minnesota. See, e.g., Graco's Brief at 2. The relevance of this fact is unclear. Graco does not 

8 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 14 of 22

suggest that thousands of its employees will be witnesses who would have to travel if this 

proceeding takes place in this district. Nor does Graco suggest that jobs will be gained or lost in 

the District of Minnesota as a result of this proceeding, or even because ofthe related 

administrative adjudication on the merits. Were future jobs relevant to the motion to transfer, 

Illinois would seem to be a more appropriate venue: It is in Illinois, where ITW is headquartered, 

that jobs are likely to be lost if the acquisition closes. In short, the existence of thousands of 

Graco employees in the District of Minnesota is irrelevant to the Court's consideration ofthis 

motion to transfer. 

B. Public Interest Factors: Court Congestion and Familiarity with Governing Law 

Court congestion is not appreciably different in the District of Minnesota and the District 

for the District of Columbia. The number of cases per judge is higher in Minnesota. Time to 

trial is longer in D.C., but this matter will not go to a full trial in federal district court. Time 

from filing to disposition is approximately the same in the two districts.6 

D.C. courts are far more familiar, however, with the administrative law and procedure 

relevant to this preliminary injunction proceeding than are the courts in Minnesota. While 

federal judges in both districts are familiar with the substantive antitrust merger statutes, this 

proceeding will not include a trial on the antitrust merits of the transaction; that issue is before 

the FTC Administrative Law Judge and will ultimately be resolved by the Commission. The 

administrative issues relevant to this interim proceeding arise routinely in the district for the 

District of Columbia, and much less frequently in the District of Minnesota. 

6 According to June 2011 statistics published by the Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts, the District of Columbia has 269 cases pending per judge, a median time of 38.2 months 

fTOm filing to trial, and a median time of 6.6 months from filing to disposition in civil cases. For 

the District of Minnesota, the same statistics show 593 cases pending per judge, a median time of 

24.6 months from filing to trial, and a median time of 6.8 months from filing to disposition in 

civil cases. http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd20llJun.pl. 

.9 

suggest that thousands of its employees will be witnesses who would have to travel if this 

proceeding takes place in this district. Nor does Graco suggest that jobs will be gained or lost in 

the District of Minnesota as a result of this proceeding, or even because ofthe related 

administrative adjudication on the merits. Were future jobs relevant to the motion to transfer, 

Illinois would seem to be a more appropriate venue: It is in Illinois, where ITW is headquartered, 

that jobs are likely to be lost if the acquisition closes. In short, the existence of thousands of 

Graco employees in the District of Minnesota is irrelevant to the Court's consideration ofthis 

motion to transfer. 

B. Public Interest Factors: Court Congestion and Familiarity with Governing Law 

Court congestion is not appreciably different in the District of Minnesota and the District 

for the District of Columbia. The number of cases per judge is higher in Minnesota. Time to 

trial is longer in D.C., but this matter will not go to a full trial in federal district court. Time 

from filing to disposition is approximately the same in the two districts.6 

D.C. courts are far more familiar, however, with the administrative law and procedure 

relevant to this preliminary injunction proceeding than are the courts in Minnesota. While 

federal judges in both districts are familiar with the substantive antitrust merger statutes, this 

proceeding will not include a trial on the antitrust merits of the transaction; that issue is before 

the FTC Administrative Law Judge and will ultimately be resolved by the Commission. The 

administrative issues relevant to this interim proceeding arise routinely in the district for the 

District of Columbia, and much less frequently in the District of Minnesota. 

6 According to June 2011 statistics published by the Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts, the District of Columbia has 269 cases pending per judge, a median time of 38.2 months 

fTOm filing to trial, and a median time of 6.6 months from filing to disposition in civil cases. For 

the District of Minnesota, the same statistics show 593 cases pending per judge, a median time of 

24.6 months from filing to trial, and a median time of 6.8 months from filing to disposition in 

civil cases. http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd20llJun.pl. 

.9 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 15 of 22

C. Private Interest Factors: Plaintiff's Choice of Forum 

Federal civil procedure grants certain procedural benefits to one side, and other benefits 

to the other. For example, the plaintiff ordinarily selects the fornm, but it also bears the burden 

of proof in the substantive proceeding. Thus, the plaintiff s choice is "a paramount 

consideration" in the determination of any transfer request, ThayerlPatricof Educ. Funding, 

L.L.C. v. Pryor Res., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 21,31 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Sheraton Operating 

Corp. v. Just Corporate Travel, 984 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C. 1997»; the plaintiffs choice is due 

"substantial deference." Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P. C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70-71 

(D.D.C.1998). The plaintiffs choice of forum carries additional weight when a federal antitrust 

agency has chosen its home forum. See H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 78-79 (observing that 

some courts have given "heightened respect" to a choice of venue by a federal antitrust agency) 

(quoting U.S. v. Brown Univ., 772 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1991»; see also Piper Aircraftv. 

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (home fornm); Sierra Club v. VanAntwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 

5,11 (D.D.C. 2007) (same); Thayer/Patrico!, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (same). This district is 

where the FTC has its headquarters, and this district is its "home district." 

Courts give less deference to the plaintiffs choice only if there is no meaningful 

connection between the forum and the controversy. See H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 

Here, the controversy is whether a preliminary injunction should issue to preserve the possibility 

of effective relief regarding the challenged acquisition and to prevent interim competitive harm 

from the acquisition during the pendency of that proceeding. And that acquisition is national in 

scope-it affects this district as well as districts all across the country. 

10 

L 

C. Private Interest Factors: Plaintiff's Choice of Forum 

Federal civil procedure grants certain procedural benefits to one side, and other benefits 

to the other. For example, the plaintiff ordinarily selects the fornm, but it also bears the burden 

of proof in the substantive proceeding. Thus, the plaintiff s choice is "a paramount 

consideration" in the determination of any transfer request, ThayerlPatricof Educ. Funding, 

L.L.C. v. Pryor Res., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 21,31 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Sheraton Operating 

Corp. v. Just Corporate Travel, 984 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C. 1997»; the plaintiffs choice is due 

"substantial deference." Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P. C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70-71 

(D.D.C.1998). The plaintiffs choice of forum carries additional weight when a federal antitrust 

agency has chosen its home forum. See H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 78-79 (observing that 

some courts have given "heightened respect" to a choice of venue by a federal antitrust agency) 

(quoting U.S. v. Brown Univ., 772 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1991»; see also Piper Aircraftv. 

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (home fornm); Sierra Club v. VanAntwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 

5,11 (D.D.C. 2007) (same); Thayer/Patrico!, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (same). This district is 

where the FTC has its headquarters, and this district is its "home district." 

Courts give less deference to the plaintiffs choice only if there is no meaningful 

connection between the forum and the controversy. See H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 

Here, the controversy is whether a preliminary injunction should issue to preserve the possibility 

of effective relief regarding the challenged acquisition and to prevent interim competitive harm 

from the acquisition during the pendency of that proceeding. And that acquisition is national in 

scope-it affects this district as well as districts all across the country. 

10 

L 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 16 of 22

D. Private Interest Factors: Defendants' Choice of Forum 

Minneapolis may be a more convenient forum for Graco's executives than the District of 

Columbia, but given the other circumstances of this case, this should not be an important factor 

in the Court's decision. H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 81 ("When considering the convenience 

ofthe witnesses, courts typically give greater weight to the convenience of non-party witnesses 

than to the convenience of party witnesses."). Moreover, Graco's executives are sophisticated 

businesspeople who operate a far-flung business operation. They surely travel outside 

Minneapolis frequently. As for ITW, the declarant who attested to his support ofthe motion to 

transfer is in Toledo, Ohio, which is closer to the District of Columbia than to Minneapolis. 

E. Private Interest Factors: Where the Case Arose 

Two considerations relevant to venue are where the case arose and the related issue ofthe 

substance of the case. Both support retaining venue in this district. 

First, this is a preliminary injunction proceeding in aid of an ongoing administrative 

action on the antitrust merits of the acquisition, an action that is pending before an FTC 

Administrative Law Judge in the District of Columbia. In a procedural sense, this case arises out 

of that administrative action. That action will continue regardless of where this preliminary 

injunction proceeding is heard. While Graco has announced its intention to move to hold the 

administrative proceeding in Minnesota, Graco's Brief at 8 n.6, it is unlikely to prevail ifit 

chooses to file such a motion. The FTC has one Administrative Law Judge. He has a full docket 

of matters in this district, including a trial scheduled for April. 7 Given his workload here, he is 

unlikely to convene this administrative proceeding outside of this district and has denied recent 

7 Scheduling Order, In the Matter of OSF Healthcare System, FTC Docket No. 9349 (Chappell, 

A.L.J. Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9349/111220aljschedord.pdf. 

11 

D. Private Interest Factors: Defendants' Choice of Forum 

Minneapolis may be a more convenient forum for Graco's executives than the District of 

Columbia, but given the other circumstances of this case, this should not be an important factor 

in the Court's decision. H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 81 ("When considering the convenience 

ofthe witnesses, courts typically give greater weight to the convenience of non-party witnesses 

than to the convenience of party witnesses."). Moreover, Graco's executives are sophisticated 

businesspeople who operate a far-flung business operation. They surely travel outside 

Minneapolis frequently. As for ITW, the declarant who attested to his support ofthe motion to 

transfer is in Toledo, Ohio, which is closer to the District of Columbia than to Minneapolis. 

E. Private Interest Factors: Where the Case Arose 

Two considerations relevant to venue are where the case arose and the related issue ofthe 

substance of the case. Both support retaining venue in this district. 

First, this is a preliminary injunction proceeding in aid of an ongoing administrative 

action on the antitrust merits of the acquisition, an action that is pending before an FTC 

Administrative Law Judge in the District of Columbia. In a procedural sense, this case arises out 

of that administrative action. That action will continue regardless of where this preliminary 

injunction proceeding is heard. While Graco has announced its intention to move to hold the 

administrative proceeding in Minnesota, Graco's Brief at 8 n.6, it is unlikely to prevail ifit 

chooses to file such a motion. The FTC has one Administrative Law Judge. He has a full docket 

of matters in this district, including a trial scheduled for April. 7 Given his workload here, he is 

unlikely to convene this administrative proceeding outside of this district and has denied recent 

7 Scheduling Order, In the Matter of OSF Healthcare System, FTC Docket No. 9349 (Chappell, 

A.L.J. Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9349/111220aljschedord.pdf. 

11 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 17 of 22

motions to hold hearings elsewhere.s The association between this case and the administrative 

proceeding in D.C., which will involve much of the same evidence and testimony and the same 

attorneys for all three parties, weighs strongly in favor of retaining this case in this district. 

Some of the cases cited by Graco in which FTC actions were transferred to a venue of the 

defendant's choice were actions in which there was an indirectly related case in the transferee 

forum. See, e.g., FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., Order, No. 10-cv-2053 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2010) 

(related bankruptcy proceeding in transferee court); FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 

2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (FTC suit challenged a settlement reached in a private action in the 

transferee court); FTC v. Cephalon, 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (related private antitrust 

litigation in transferee court). In this matter, the directly related administrative proceeding is 

underway in this district and weighs in favor of retaining venue here. Moreover, there is no 

directly or indirectly related case pending in the District of Minnesota, and thus no risk of 

incompatible or inconsistent judgments. See Cephalon, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 

Next, Graco asserts that the cause of action in this proceeding accrued in April 2011 in 

Minneapolis, the time and place it and ITW negotiated the Asset Purchase Agreement. See 

Graco's Brief at 5, 14. This case arises, however, out of the possible future consummation of 

that agreement, not the agreement itself. Consummation has not yet occurred-that is why it is 

still possible to obtain a preliminary injunction against it. (Indeed, were consummation set for an 

indefinite time in the distant future, this case likely would not be ripe for decision.) 

S See, e.g., Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of 

ProMedica Health System, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9346 (Chappell, A.L.J. Mar. 29, 2011), 

http://www. ftc. gov I os/adjprol d9346/11 03 29alj orddenyrespmosethearinglocat. pdf; Order 

Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of North Carolina Board 

of Dental Examiners, FTC Docket No. 9343 (Chappell, A.L.J. Jan. 25, 2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adipro/d9343/110125aljorddenyrespmo.pdf; Order Denying Respondents' 

Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of Lab. Corp. of Am., FTC Docket No. 9345 

(Chappell, A.L.J. Jan. 19,2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d93451110119Iabcorporder.pdf. 

1:2 

motions to hold hearings elsewhere.s The association between this case and the administrative 

proceeding in D.C., which will involve much of the same evidence and testimony and the same 

attorneys for all three parties, weighs strongly in favor of retaining this case in this district. 

Some of the cases cited by Graco in which FTC actions were transferred to a venue of the 

defendant's choice were actions in which there was an indirectly related case in the transferee 

forum. See, e.g., FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., Order, No. 10-cv-2053 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2010) 

(related bankruptcy proceeding in transferee court); FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 

2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (FTC suit challenged a settlement reached in a private action in the 

transferee court); FTC v. Cephalon, 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (related private antitrust 

litigation in transferee court). In this matter, the directly related administrative proceeding is 

underway in this district and weighs in favor of retaining venue here. Moreover, there is no 

directly or indirectly related case pending in the District of Minnesota, and thus no risk of 

incompatible or inconsistent judgments. See Cephalon, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 

Next, Graco asserts that the cause of action in this proceeding accrued in April 2011 in 

Minneapolis, the time and place it and ITW negotiated the Asset Purchase Agreement. See 

Graco's Brief at 5, 14. This case arises, however, out of the possible future consummation of 

that agreement, not the agreement itself. Consummation has not yet occurred-that is why it is 

still possible to obtain a preliminary injunction against it. (Indeed, were consummation set for an 

indefinite time in the distant future, this case likely would not be ripe for decision.) 

S See, e.g., Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of 

ProMedica Health System, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9346 (Chappell, A.L.J. Mar. 29, 2011), 

http://www. ftc. gov I os/adjprol d9346/11 03 29alj orddenyrespmosethearinglocat. pdf; Order 

Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of North Carolina Board 

of Dental Examiners, FTC Docket No. 9343 (Chappell, A.L.J. Jan. 25, 2011), 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adipro/d9343/110125aljorddenyrespmo.pdf; Order Denying Respondents' 

Motion to Set Hearing Location, In the Matter of Lab. Corp. of Am., FTC Docket No. 9345 

(Chappell, A.L.J. Jan. 19,2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d93451110119Iabc01:porder.pdf. 

1:2 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 18 of 22

Consummation of the agreement would affect customers nationwide "and not in any district in 

particular." H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d. at 80. This consideration provides no basis for 

preferring the District of Minnesota over any other judicial district. 

F. Private Interest Factors: Convenience of the Witnesses and Parties 

Graco asserts again in this context that holding the preliminary injunction hearing in 

Minneapolis would be more convenient for the third-party witnesses and for both Defendants 

than conducting this proceeding in the District of Columbia. See Graco's Brief Ex. lApp. E; 

Ex. 2, App. B. Of course, there may be no third-party witnesses: In virtually all Section 13(b) 

preliminary injunction proceedings in recent years there has been no live factual testimony.9 

Assuming for the moment that the Court does determine to hold an evidentiary hearing, 

for Graco's potential third-party witnesses as a group as described above, Minneapolis and the 

District of Columbia are about equally inconvenient. Eight of the seventeen, including those in 

Ohio and many in Michigan and Indiana, are closer to D.C. One appears to be equidistant 

between Minneapolis and D.C. And Graco has not shown any concentration of third-party 

witnesses in Minneapolis, so most of the witnesses would have to travel somewhere in order to 

testify if this Court departs from the recent trend and holds an evidentiary hearing. As for the 

Defendants, while one Defendant is located in Minneapolis, the others are several hundred miles 

away in Illinois or Ohio. ITW states that it would be more convenient for its witnesses to travel 

from Chicago or Toledo to Minneapolis than to travel to Washington, See Graco' s Brief, Ex. 2, 

but they will have to travel, likely by plane, in either case. Thus, Graco has not shown that, if 

9 See, e.g., FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 11,2011); FTC 

v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2011); FTC v. Phoebe 

Putney Health Sys., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff'd, 2011 WL 6118565 (11th 

Cir., Dec. 9, 2011). 

13 

Consummation of the agreement would affect customers nationwide "and not in any district in 

particular." H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d. at 80. This consideration provides no basis for 

preferring the District of Minnesota over any other judicial district. 

F. Private Interest Factors: Convenience of the Witnesses and Parties 

Graco asserts again in this context that holding the preliminary injunction hearing in 

Minneapolis would be more convenient for the third-party witnesses and for both Defendants 

than conducting this proceeding in the District of Columbia. See Graco's Brief Ex. lApp. E; 

Ex. 2, App. B. Of course, there may be no third-party witnesses: In virtually all Section 13(b) 

preliminary injunction proceedings in recent years there has been no live factual testimony.9 

Assuming for the moment that the Court does determine to hold an evidentiary hearing, 

for Graco's potential third-party witnesses as a group as described above, Minneapolis and the 

District of Columbia are about equally inconvenient. Eight of the seventeen, including those in 

Ohio and many in Michigan and Indiana, are closer to D.C. One appears to be equidistant 

between Minneapolis and D.C. And Graco has not shown any concentration of third-party 

witnesses in Minneapolis, so most of the witnesses would have to travel somewhere in order to 

testify if this Court departs from the recent trend and holds an evidentiary hearing. As for the 

Defendants, while one Defendant is located in Minneapolis, the others are several hundred miles 

away in Illinois or Ohio. ITW states that it would be more convenient for its witnesses to travel 

from Chicago or Toledo to Minneapolis than to travel to Washington, See Graco' s Brief, Ex. 2, 

but they will have to travel, likely by plane, in either case. Thus, Graco has not shown that, if 

9 See, e.g., FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 11,2011); FTC 

v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2011); FTC v. Phoebe 

Putney Health Sys., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff'd, 2011 WL 6118565 (11th 

Cir., Dec. 9, 2011). 

13 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 19 of 22

relevant, the convenience of the third-party witnesses or the Defendants weighs in favor of the 

transfer of this case. 

In addition, the Defendants themselves selected a nearby venue, Delaware, as the forum 

in which they would litigate any disputes between them about the Asset Purchase Agreement. 

They have not identified any reason why, for purposes of a contract dispute, their preferred 

forum out of all that are possible nationwide is Delaware, but Washington, D.C., which is closer 

to Minneapolis, is inconvenient in this case. 

Moreover, authority in this district holds that the relevant inquiry regarding the 

"convenience of the witnesses" is not whether witnesses are located outside the forum ofthe 

plaintiff s choice, but whether they would be unwilling to testifY in that forum. See Cephalon, 

551 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Graco does not suggest that either the third-party witnesses or 

Defendants' corporate witnesses would be unwilling to testifY in this district and could not be 

compelled to do so. 

Finally, the FTC is located in Washington, D.C., it investigated this matter from its 

offices here, and D.C. is a far more convenient forum for the Plaintiffthan Minneapolis. 

Moreover, trial of this matter in Minneapolis would cost the Federal Trade Commission tens of 

thousands of dollars more than a trial in this district. For Defendants, trial in Washington is 

unlikely to cost significantly more than trial in Minneapolis: While some of their witnesses are in 

Minneapolis, many of their attorneys are in D.C. In a time of severe federal budget constraints, 

imposing substantial unnecessary costs on the government should be avoided if it fairly can be. 

See, e.g., us. v. Bowdoin, 770 F. Supp. 2d 133,140 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Trial in Florida, however, 

would place an additional burden on the Government, whose counsel are located here in the 

District of Columbia. Given the funding emergency facing the Government, the Court declines 

14 

relevant, the convenience of the third-party witnesses or the Defendants weighs in favor of the 

transfer of this case. 

In addition, the Defendants themselves selected a nearby venue, Delaware, as the forum 

in which they would litigate any disputes between them about the Asset Purchase Agreement. 

They have not identified any reason why, for purposes of a contract dispute, their preferred 

forum out of all that are possible nationwide is Delaware, but Washington, D.C., which is closer 

to Minneapolis, is inconvenient in this case. 

Moreover, authority in this district holds that the relevant inquiry regarding the 

"convenience of the witnesses" is not whether witnesses are located outside the forum ofthe 

plaintiff s choice, but whether they would be unwilling to testifY in that forum. See Cephalon, 

551 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Graco does not suggest that either the third-party witnesses or 

Defendants' corporate witnesses would be unwilling to testifY in this district and could not be 

compelled to do so. 

Finally, the FTC is located in Washington, D.C., it investigated this matter from its 

offices here, and D.C. is a far more convenient forum for the Plaintiffthan Minneapolis. 

Moreover, trial of this matter in Minneapolis would cost the Federal Trade Commission tens of 

thousands of dollars more than a trial in this district. For Defendants, trial in Washington is 

unlikely to cost significantly more than trial in Minneapolis: While some of their witnesses are in 

Minneapolis, many of their attorneys are in D.C. In a time of severe federal budget constraints, 

imposing substantial unnecessary costs on the government should be avoided if it fairly can be. 

See, e.g., us. v. Bowdoin, 770 F. Supp. 2d 133,140 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Trial in Florida, however, 

would place an additional burden on the Government, whose counsel are located here in the 

District of Columbia. Given the funding emergency facing the Government, the Court declines 

14 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 20 of 22

at this time to treat it as an unlimited source of monies."). 

For the convenience of the parties to weigh in favor of a transfer, litigating in the 

transferee district must be likely more convenient overall, considering all of the parties, than 

litigating in the forum chosen by the Plaintiff. Given the substantial additional costs for the FTC 

of proceeding in Minneapolis, and the balance in other aspects of the convenience of the parties, 

convenience of the parties does not weigh in favor of a transfer. 

G. Private Interest Factors: Access to Evidence 

Graco argues that most of the evidence in this matter is more accessible in Minneapolis 

than in D.C. See Graco's Brief at 17. This contention does not bear scrutiny. The documentary 

evidence in this case is in electronic form, available to anyone anywhere with authority to access 

it and an internet connection. D.C. counsel for all parties already have access. In an electronic 

world, "location of documents is increasingly irrelevant" to considerations of venue. Fanning, 

711 F. Supp. 2d at 70; see also H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 83. 

Access to third-party witnesses, as already discussed, is not appreciably different in D.C. 

and Minneapolis. Graco's contention essentially reiterates its argument that Minneapolis would 

be more convenient for its company witnesses and, according to ITW, for its witnesses as well. 

This assertion is entitled to no more weight when styled as "Access to Evidence" than when it is 

called "Convenience of the Parties." In both instances, this argument is substantially outweighed 

by considerations relating to the Plaintiff s choice of forum, the substance of the case, and the 

convenience of the third-party witnesses. 

15 

at this time to treat it as an unlimited source of monies."). 

For the convenience of the parties to weigh in favor of a transfer, litigating in the 

transferee district must be likely more convenient overall, considering all of the parties, than 

litigating in the forum chosen by the Plaintiff. Given the substantial additional costs for the FTC 

of proceeding in Minneapolis, and the balance in other aspects of the convenience of the parties, 

convenience of the parties does not weigh in favor of a transfer. 

G. Private Interest Factors: Access to Evidence 

Graco argues that most of the evidence in this matter is more accessible in Minneapolis 

than in D.C. See Graco's Brief at 17. This contention does not bear scrutiny. The documentary 

evidence in this case is in electronic form, available to anyone anywhere with authority to access 

it and an internet connection. D.C. counsel for all parties already have access. In an electronic 

world, "location of documents is increasingly irrelevant" to considerations of venue. Fanning, 

711 F. Supp. 2d at 70; see also H&R Block, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 83. 

Access to third-party witnesses, as already discussed, is not appreciably different in D.C. 

and Minneapolis. Graco's contention essentially reiterates its argument that Minneapolis would 

be more convenient for its company witnesses and, according to ITW, for its witnesses as well. 

This assertion is entitled to no more weight when styled as "Access to Evidence" than when it is 

called "Convenience of the Parties." In both instances, this argument is substantially outweighed 

by considerations relating to the Plaintiff s choice of forum, the substance of the case, and the 

convenience of the third-party witnesses. 

15 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 21 of 22

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny 

Defendants' motions to dismiss this case Of transfer it to the District of Minnesota. 

December 23,2011 

y: 

~~tLL~h.~Rrn·~t~~~s~----__ 

/ Assistant Director 

. ./'/ PETER RICHMAN 

MARC W. SCHNEIDER 

REBECCA P. DICK (D.C. Bar No. 463197) 

BRIAN TELPNER (D.C. BarNo. 462812) 

ROBERT FRIEDMAN 

AMANDA HAMILTON (D.C. Bar No. 499646) 

CATHLIN TULLY 

ANNA CHEHTOVA 

Attorneys 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20580 

(202) 326-2805 

Richard A. Feinstein (D.C. BarNo. 324848) 

Director 

Norman A. Armstrong, Jr. (D.C. BarNo. 459621) 

Deputy Director 

Federal Trade Commission 

Bureau of Competition 

Willard K. Tom (D.C. Bar No. 297564) 

General Connsel 

Federal Trade Connnission 

Attorneys for the Plaintiff 

16 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny 

Defendants' motions to dismiss this case Of transfer it to the District of Minnesota. 

December 23,2011 

y: 

~~tLL~h.~Rrn·~t~~~s~----__ 

/ Assistant Director 

. ./'/ PETER RICHMAN 

MARC W. SCHNEIDER 

REBECCA P. DICK (D.C. Bar No. 463197) 

BRIAN TELPNER (D.C. BarNo. 462812) 

ROBERT FRIEDMAN 

AMANDA HAMILTON (D.C. Bar No. 499646) 

CATHLIN TULLY 

ANNA CHEHTOVA 

Attorneys 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20580 

(202) 326-2805 

Richard A. Feinstein (D.C. BarNo. 324848) 

Director 

Norman A. Armstrong, Jr. (D.C. BarNo. 459621) 

Deputy Director 

Federal Trade Commission 

Bureau of Competition 

Willard K. Tom (D.C. Bar No. 297564) 

General Connsel 

Federal Trade Connnission 

Attorneys for the Plaintiff 

16 
Case 1:11-cv-02239-RLW Document 24 Filed 12/23/11 Page 22 of 22

Clu{TU.ICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23th day of December 2011, I served the attached on 

the following counsel by electronic mail (PDF): 

Richard G. Parker 

O'Melveny & Myers LLP 

1625 Eye Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

RParker@omm.com 

Counsel for Defendant Graco Inc. 

J. Robert Robertson 

Hogan Lovells US LLP 

Columbia Square 

555 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

Robby.Robertson@hoganlovells.com 

Logan Breed 

Hogan Lovells US LLP 

Columbia Square 

555 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

Logan.Breed@hoganlovells.com 

Counsel for Defendants Illinois Tool Works Inc. and 

ITW Finishing LLC 

c· 

< ~--

Amanda Hamilton (DCBN 499646) 

Counsel for Plaintiff 

Federal Trade Commission 

Clu{TU.ICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23th day of December 2011, I served the attached on 

the following counsel by electronic mail (PDF): 

Richard G. Parker 

O'Melveny & Myers LLP 

1625 Eye Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

RParker@omm.com 

Counsel for Defendant Graco Inc. 

J. Robert Robertson 

Hogan Lovells US LLP 

Columbia Square 

555 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

Robby.Robertson@hoganlovells.com 

Logan Breed 

Hogan Lovells US LLP 

Columbia Square 

555 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

Logan.Breed@hoganlovells.com 

Counsel for Defendants Illinois Tool Works Inc. and 

ITW Finishing LLC 

c· 

< ~--

Amanda Hamilton (DCBN 499646) 

Counsel for Plaintiff 

Federal Trade Commission