J-S41019-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

AS TRUSTEE FOR WAMU MORTGAGE 

PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATE FOR 

WMALT 2006-AR4 TRUST, 

: 

: 

: 

: 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

: 

 Appellee : 

: 

 v. : 

: 

MARK NORRIS, : 

: 

 Appellant : No. 2366 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order July 18, 2013, 

Court of Common Pleas, Chester County, 

Civil Division at No. 12-07040 

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and MUNDY, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2014 

Mark Norris (“Norris”) appeals from the order of court granting the 

motion for summary judgment filed by U.S. Bank, N.A. (“U.S. Bank”). 

Following our review, we affirm. 

 The facts underlying this dispute are straightforward. In January 

2006, Norris executed an adjustable rate note, secured by a mortgage on 

property located at 103 Jacobs Drive, Coatesville, Pennsylvania. The lender 

in this transaction was NetBank. In October 2011, Norris ceased making 

payments on this mortgage obligation. In July 2012, U.S. Bank, to whom 

the mortgage had been assigned, filed a foreclosure complaint. The 

complaint was served on Norris, and he subsequently filed an answer 

thereto. On April 9, 2013, U.S. Bank filed its motion for summary judgment 
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and Norris filed a brief in opposition thereto. The trial court granted U.S. 

Bank’s motion on July 18, 2013, awarding it an in rem judgment of 

$354,297.96 plus interest and other costs collectible pursuant to the terms 

of the mortgage. Trial Court Order, 7/18/13. This timely appeal follows. 

 Norris presents the following seven issues on appeal: 

1. Do copies of [p]ublic records and non-verified 

bookkeeping establish [s]tanding to warrant 

instant [sic] action? 

2. Can un-substantiated parties ([U.S. Bank]) gain 

standing as a ‘real’ ‘party in interest’ from other 

un-substantiated parties (Mortgage Electronic 

Registration System)? 

3. Do the matters of the assignment of the mortgage 

warrant verification and substantiation as to the 

validity, accuracy and authenticity of said 

assignment, to establish standing? 

4. Does [Norris] have the right to face [U.S. Bank] 

before a jury, in the matter of the foreclosure, to 

obtain a fair determination on the issues in 

dispute by the preponderance of the evidence? 

5. Does [U.S. Bank] have the burden to prove claim 

and standing as a/the party in interest, entitled to 

collect on or to enforce the terms of the 

‘[c]ontract’/’[n]ote’? 

6. Did said summary judgment order entered by 

[the trial court] afford [Norris] due process in the 

law? 

7. Will The Honorable Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

afford the Constitutional protections of due 

process in the law? 

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5. 
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 We begin with our well-established scope and standard of review: 

Our scope of review of an order granting summary 

judgment is plenary. We apply the same standard as 

the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to 

determine whether there exists a genuine issue of 

material fact. We view the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as 

to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

must be resolved against the moving party. Chenot 

v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 60–61 

(Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). 

***

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 

are not bound by the trial court's conclusions of law, 

but may reach our own conclusions. Id. We will 

disturb the trial court's order only upon an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion. ‘Judicial discretion 

requires action in conformity with law on facts and 

circumstances before the trial court after hearing and 

consideration.’ Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, 

the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the 

issue for decision, it misapplies the law, exercises its 

discretion in a manner lacking reason, or does not 

follow legal procedure. Id. (citation omitted). 

McCausland v. Wagner, 78 A.3d 1093, 1099-1100 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Four of Norris’ issues challenge U.S. Bank’s standing to file this action. 

Norris argues that U.S. Bank did not adequately prove the assignment of the 

mortgage and note from NetBank to it, and therefore that U.S. Bank lacked 

standing to bring the foreclosure action against him. Appellant’s Brief at 8-

9. The trial court found that U.S. Bank satisfactorily established its standing 

by attaching to the complaint a copy of the assignment of the mortgage to 

U.S. Bank. Trial Court Order, 7/18/13, at n.1. 
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 A plaintiff in a foreclosure action is required to set forth, in the 

complaint, all assignments of the mortgage. Pa.R.C.P. 1147(a)(1). This 

Court has previously held that setting forth the chain of assignments of a 

mortgage in the complaint was critical to establishing standing in a 

foreclosure action. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupori, 8 A.3d 919, 

922 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding allegations by a purported mortgagee that it 

owned the subject mortgage and that there was a pending assignment to 

that mortgagee were sufficient to establish standing for foreclosure action);

see also US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 993 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Here, U.S. Bank set forth the assignment of the mortgage from NetBank to it 

and stated that “the assignment is in the process of being formalized.” 

Complaint, 7/11/12, at ¶ 1(d). This language is nearly identical to the 

language we found adequate in Lupori, and so we conclude that it 

adequately establishes the assignment of the mortgage from NetBank to 

U.S. Bank. Lupori, 8 A.3d at 922. 

 Furthermore, with regard to the note, in JP Morgan Chase Bank, 

N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258 (Pa. Super. 2013), this Court held that a note 

secured by a mortgage is a negotiable instrument under the Pennsylvania 

Uniform Commercial Code and as such, “the chain of possession by which [a 

party] come[s] to hold the [n]ote [is] immaterial to its enforceability by the 

[party].” Id. at 1266. To have standing to bring a foreclosure action on 
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property used to secure a note, a party need only establish actual 

possession of the note. Id. 

On appeal, Norris argues that U.S. Bank was required to produce the 

original documents making the assignment of the mortgage and note to it 

and that U.S. Bank could not rely on copies thereof. Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. 

However, Norris cites no authority to support his claim that the original 

documents must be produced to establish the assignment of a mortgage or 

note, and we know of none. Indeed, in Mallory, we held that to establish 

standing, the assignment need not even be recorded or finalized, so long as 

the bank avers that it is the owner of the mortgage and that an assignment 

is pending. Mallory, 982 A.2d at 994.1

 We therefore find no merit to 

Norris’ claim. 

 The remaining issues that Norris set forth in his statement of questions 

involved seem to challenge the grant of summary judgment as violating his 

due process rights and a purported right to put his dispute before a jury. 

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5. We will not pass upon the merits of these claims. 

 

1

 The only argument Norris presents in support of his claims regarding 

standing are seven quotations from this Court’s decision in Murray, 

completely unmoored from any discussion of how the quotes apply to the 

facts of his case. We note briefly that the situation in Murray was different, 

as in Murray, the mortgagor claimed not only that the chain of possession 

of the mortgage and note was defective, but he also disputed the 

mortgagee’s actual possession of the note. Murray, 63 A.3d at 1266. It 

was upon finding that the evidence revealed a genuine issue as to whether 

the mortgagee actually possessed the note that this Court reversed the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment. 
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Norris has not presented, much less developed, any argument in support of 

these claims, and so we find them waived. See Giant Food Stores, L.L.C. 

v. THF Silver Spring Dev., L.P., 959 A.2d 438, 444 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(“The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that each question an 

appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent 

authority. ... Failure to do so constitutes waiver of the claim.”). 

 Finally, on or about June 9, 2014, Norris filed a motion asking this 

Court to set aside the sheriff’s sale that occurred on May 15, 2014, on the 

basis that this matter was still pending on appeal when the sheriff’s sale 

occurred. We deny this motion. 

 Order affirmed. Motion denied. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/8/2014