I n c as e n umber S16 95 6 t he D ef endan t pl ed gu i l t y t o f

ai l ur e t o app ear an d re cei ved a one- y ear s ent enc e t hat 1
h e d o e s n o t ap p e a l. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma rc h 28 , 200 7

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CARROLL CARSON SANDERS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Car terCounty Nos. S16907, S16939, S 16956 RobertE. Cup p, Jud ge

No. E2006-00574-CC A-R3- CD 

### - F ile d M ay 10, 200 7

The De fe n d ant, C arr oll Carson Sanders, pled guilty in two case s to eig ht counts of theft ove r $10,000, five c ounts of theft over $1000, and one c ount of theft over $500. The pa

rties ag ree d to an eff ective se ntence of t en y ear s, with the t rial court to deter mine the manner

of ser vice of the ten-y ear sentenc e, followe d by

five y ear s of probation. After a sentenc ing hear ing, the trial court or dere d the Def endant to ser

ve his eff ective ten-y ear

sentenc e in the De partment of Corr ection. On a ppeal, the Def endant c ontends that the trial court err ed when it de nied him a n alternative sentenc e. Concluding the re e xists no e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Gene . G. Scott, J r., Johns on City , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Carr oll Carson Sanders.

Robert E. C o o p er , J r., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; J ennife r L . Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Anthony

W. C lark, District Attorne y Gene ral; Ke nneth C. Ba ldwin, Assistant Di s t rict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION I. F acts

This case arises f

rom the sentenc ing in c ase numbe rs S 16907 and S 16939. I n case number 1 S16907, th e D e f

e n d an t p le d

g u il ty to tw o c o u n ts o f

th e f t o v e r $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , w it

h ana g r e e d

e ffe ctive sentenc e of f

ive y ear s. I n case number S16939, the De fenda nt pled g uilty

to six counts of thef

t over $10,000, five counts of t heft over $1000, and one count of thef t over $500 with an a g ree d eff ective sentenc e of te n y ear s followed by five y ear s of supervise d probatio n

. T h e par ties ag ree d that the2

sentenc es in the two ca ses should run conc urre ntly with the m anner of service to be dete rmined by the tr ia l c ourt

. The following evidenc e wa s prese nted at a sentenc ing hear ing: Rober t Gobble testified that he wa s a constable in Eliz abethton whe re the Def endant owne d a busi ness. Gobble be came friends with the Def

endant, a nd the Def

endant a sked Gobble to invest in a business that the Def endant wa s fo rm ing . T he De fe nd ant tol d Gob ble that for e ve ry $1 00 0 tha t he inv e ste d in th e c omp any he wo uld g e t on e pe rc e nt b a c k f

ro m th e c omp any

. Go bb le inv e ste d $ 10 ,0 00 , w hic h th e De fe nd ant s a id w ou ld entitle him to ten perce nt of the compa ny . Gobble also gave the De fenda nt $2000 in ex chang e for a 1965 F ord two-door

hardtop car that was supposedly in A rizona. Gobble then g ave the Def endant $10,000 to purcha se Corvettes on whic h they could make a

profit when the Def

endant resold them to a de a le r i n A ri zon a . A dd iti on a lly , G ob ble wa s cha rg e d $20 00 fo r t

he lig ht b ill on

the bu sin e ss, which he e x pecte d would be paid by the Def endant. Gobble was never reimburse d for that bill by the Def endant.

Gobble testified that the D efe ndant left Carter County two or three wee ks after

he g ave the Def endant the mone y

for the Corve ttes. The De fenda nt never told Gobble that he was leaving , and, the nig ht b ef

o re he lef t, he told Gobble that he wa s moving e very thing f or the business into a building whe re the business was opening. Gobble dis cover ed the Def endant had left t own when he went t o t he shop and the Def endant’ s house the next day and ther e wa s no one at e ither plac e. Someone told Gobble that he sa w the Defenda

nt leaving that afte rnoon with a U- Haul truc k and a tr a ile r. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Go bb le te sti fi e d tha t he e nte re d in to a pa rt ne rs hip wi th t

he De fe nd a nt. He a lso said that he thoug ht that the 1965 For d that the Def endant told him he could purc hase f or $2000 was wor

th betwee n $13,000 and $16,000. Gobb l e ag ree d that the Def endant wor

ked on Gobble’s c ar a

nd char g ed him only

for pa rts, providing the labor f

or fr ee.

Howar d Ensor testified that he met the Def endant whe n the Def

endant se rvice d some ca

rs for him. Ensor r ec al l ed t hat the De fenda nt wanted to set up a

motor sports business and nee ded

some m o n e y

. E n s o r

g a v e th e D e f

e n d an t $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 , an d

th e D e f e n d an t g a v e h im

th e h o u s e th a t t

he Def endant wa s living in as collate ral. Ensor the n g ave the Def endant $25,000 in cash for the business. Ensor also g ave the Def endant $12,000 for a

Cadillac and $500 to tra

nsport the ca

r, but En so r n e ve r r e c e ive d th e c ar. En so r state d tha t he g a ve the De fe nd ant t he mon e y a pp ro xima te ly

six

wee ks befor e the De fenda nt left Carter

County . Ensor said that, ac cording to his ag ree ment with the D e f e n d an t , h e w a s t o r e c e i v e $ 1 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h f r o m t h e b u s i n e s s , b u th e n e v e r r e c e i v e d an y m o n e y. On cr oss-examination, Ensor te stified that he g ave the Def endant over $52,000, $40,000 of which was investment in a business. I n total, E nsor was expecting to r ece ive for his investment $3500 per month for as long as the business wa s in operation.

Gar y Cole testified that he met the D efe ndant when he was tr y i n g t o purcha se a truc k. A mutual friend told Cole that the Defenda nt had a truc k for sa le for $9500. When Cole we nt to look

a t th e tr uc k, the De fe nd ant s a id t

hat he ha d ju st s old the tr

uc k bu t that he re c e ive d s imi lar t ru c ks “ a ll th e ti me

. ” Co le to ld th e D e f e n d an t h e w o u ld b e in te r e s te d in a tr u c k

. A f e w d ay s late r, the De fe nd ant c a lle d Co le and tol d h im that he ha d a

tr uc k f or him fo r $95 00

. Th e De fe nd ant tol d Co leW e n ot e t h at on J u n e 7, 2005, t h e G en er al As s embl y a men ded T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 35- 2
1 0 2 (6), - 1 1 4 , - 2 1 0 , - 4 0 1

. See 2 0 0 5 T enn. P ub

. A ct s ch. 35 3 , §§ 1, 5, 6, 8. H o wever, t he am end ed co d e sect i o ns are ina p p lica b le to the D e fen d a n t’s ap p e a l.

3 that he wa nted $4000 as a deposit for the truck. The De fenda nt then asked Cole if he wanted a nother work truc k, and Cole said “y es.” I n total, Cole ga ve the De fenda

nt $11,000 for truc ks that he neve r
rec eived. When conf

ronted b y C o l e, t h e De fenda nt told C ole that he ha d mailed him a ca shier’s chec k for the mone y . On cr oss-examination, Col e agree d that he wa s g oing to pa y the Def endant le ss t ha n th e tr uc ks we re wo rt

h. He a lso sa id t

hat th e De fe nd ant f

ixed the fr on t e nd of

on e of his tr uc ks in e xch ang e fo r C ole re mov ingso me stumps fr om t he De fe nd ant’ s b us ine ss.

Dan B owman, an investigator with the Hig hway Patrol, testified that he wa s the investigator in this case. He said that the business involved in this case wa s East Tenne ssee Motor Sports, but the business was not lice nsed with the motor vehicle commission. As part of hi s i nvestig ation, I nvestig ator B owman contac ted the police in Ar izona who informed him that the Def endant ha d committed simi lar c rimes ag ainst forty victims in Ariz ona for

a total theft of 1.5 million dollars. The investigator es t i m ated that the total amount of money taken by the Def endant in this case was approximately

$183,000.

I nvestig ator B owman testified that he spoke wit h the Defenda nt about these e vents, and the De fe nd ant e xpla ine d th a t he ha d be e n arr e ste d in Ar izon a fo r ob ta ini ngmon e y un de r f a lse pr e te ns e s. The De fenda

nt alleg ed that he g ave a lot of m o n ey

to a man name d “Stoner” in Arizona for

a uto mob ile s, and

“ Sto ne r” wa s n ot able to p ro du c e tho se ve hic le s. Th e De fe nd ant j us tif ie d h is conduct in Carte r County , stating that he had to pay off his debt in Arizona.

Th e pr e se nte n c e r e p o r

t r e f l e c te d th a t th e De fe nd ant h a d tw o p ri or fe lony c on vic tio ns and

that, at the time of the he aring , he was serving a seven-y ear prison sentenc e, followed by seven y ear s of probation, in Arizona.

Ba sed upon this evidence and the a rg uments of counse l, the tria l c o u r t denied the De fenda

nt’s reque st for probation in li g ht of the De fenda nt’s prior cr iminal hist ory and af ter finding among other things that the Def

endant lacke d potential for reha bilitation and that society neede d to be protec ted fr om p os sib le futur e c ri min a l c on du c t by the De fe nd ant.

II. Ana lys is
On appe al, the De fenda

nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it denied hi s reque st for an alternative sentenc e. When a defe ndant challeng es the leng th, r ang e, or the manne r of se rvice of a sentenc e, it is the duty

of this court to conduc t a de novo review of the re cord w ith a presumption that “the de terminations made by the cour t f rom which the a

ppeal is take n are corr ect.” T.C.A. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003) . This presumption is “conditioned upon the af firmative showing in the re cord that 24

the tr ia l c ourt

c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s and a ll r e le va nt f a c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s. ” State

v. Ros s, 49 S.W. 3d 83 3, 84 7 (T e nn

. 20 01 ); State v. Pe ttu s, 98 6 S.W. 2d 54 0, 54 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1 9 9 1 ). The pre sumption does not apply to the leg al conclusions rea ched by the trial court in se ntencinga def endant or to the deter

minations made by

the trial court that a

re pr edicated upon uncontrove rted fac ts. State v. Dea n, 76 S.W .3d 352, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001); State v. Butler , 900 S.W .2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Smith, 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). I n conductinga de novo r eview of a sente nce, w e must consider: (a) any evidenc e rece ived at the trial and/or sentenc ing he aring ; (b) the pr esente nce repor t; (c) the principles of

sentenc ing; ( d) the a

rg uments of counse l relative to sente ncing altern ati ves; (e) the nature and cha rac teristics of the of

fense ; (f) a

ny mitigating or enha

nceme nt fac tors; (g ) any

statements made by

the def endant on his or her ow n behalf ; and (h) the defe ndant’s po te nti a l or

la c k of pot e nti a l for re ha bil itatio n or tr e a tme nt. Se e T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0 ( 20 06 ); State v. Taylor, 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The pa rty challeng ing a

sentenc e imposed by the trial cour

t has the burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is e rrone ous. T.C.A. § 40-35-401 (2 00 6) , Se nte nc ingCom m’ n Cmts.

I f our r eview r e f

le c ts that the trial court followe d the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r ha v i n g gi v en due c onsideration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and principles set out under the s entenc ing law, and made findings of fac t that are adequa tely supported by the re cord, the n we m ay n o t m odify the sentenc e, eve n if we w ould have pr efe rre d a diffe rent result. State v

. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In the ca se under submissi on, the re cord de monstrates that the trial court car efully and thoroug hly

considere d rele vant sentenc ing pr inciples. Acc ording ly we ap p l y t h e pre sumption t hat the trial c ourt’s sentenc ing deter minations are c orre ct. See T.C.A. § 40- 35-401(d)

.
I nd et er m i n i n g wh et h er t o gra n t o r de n y p ro b at i o n , th e t ri al co u rt m ay co n s i d er t h e f o l l o wi n g: the circ umstances of the offense; t he defenda nt’s criminal re cord; ba ckg round and soc ial history ; the defe ndant’s phy sical and me ntal health; the dete rre nt effe ct on ot h er criminal ac tivity ; and the likelihood that probation is in the best interests of both the public and the de fenda nt. State v. Parker, 932 S.W .2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The De fenda nt bear s the burden of

establishing suitabilit y for pr obation. T.C.A. § 40-35-303( b); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. Sentence s involving

c on fi ne me nt s ho uld

be ba se d u

po n th e fo llo wi ngc on sid e ra tio ns :
(A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty by restra ining a

defe ndant who has

a lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is ne cessa ry to a void de prec iating the seriousne ss of the off ense or
c on fi ne me nt i s pa

rt ic ula rl y su ite d to pr ov ide an e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less restrictive than c onfinement have fr equently or re cently

been

a pp lie d uns uc c e ssf

ull y to t he de fe nd ant.

T.C.A. § 40-35-103 (2006). Additionally , the principles of sentenc ing ref lect that t h e sentence should be n o g reater than that deserve d for the of fense committed and should be the lea st severe5

measure nece ssary

to achieve the purposes for which the s entenc e was imposed. See T.C.A. § 40- 35-103(2) , (4). F urther, the potential or lac k of potential for the re habi l i t at i o n or trea tment of the defe ndant should be considere d in de termining the sentenc e alternative or leng th of a term t o be imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-103(5)

.
The De fenda

nt asserts that the tria l court er red be cause it impro p erly considere d his prior criminal history

and did not heavily

weig h the fa ct that alter

natives to incar cer ation have not be en used with him. Further , the Def endant a sserts that the victims in this case deser ve re stitut ion, and he ca n only do that if he is not incarc erated. We find the De fenda nt’s contentions unpersua sive. The Def endant is curr ently serving a seven- y ear sentenc e in Arizona for similar cr imes for whic h he owe s victims a total of 1.5 milli on dollars. Afte r being char g ed with those crimes, but prior to pleading g uil ty , the De fe nd ant c a me to Te nn e sse e and sto le $1 83 ,0 00 . I t is un lik e ly that w ith in a

ny re a so na ble time frame any

of the victims will rece ive the re stitut ion to whic h they are entitled. Fur

ther, the tria l court found that the Def

endant lac ked potential for rehabilitation beca use he r epeatedly

committed sim ila r c ri me s. F ina lly , the tr ia l c ourt fo un d that so c ie ty ne e de d to be pr ote c te d f ro m th e De fe nd a nt. We c on c lud e that th e re c or d su pp or ts the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s and that th e tr ia l c ourt

wa s w e ll w ith in its discretionary

power s when it denied the Def en dant an a lternative se ntence . Acc ording ly , we conclude that the Def

endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

III. Conclusi on

We a g ree with the judgme nt of the trial court. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the De fendant’s sentenc e.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE