THIRD DIVISION

DILLARD, C. J.,

GOBEIL and HODGES, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be

physically received in our clerk’s office within ten

days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.

http://www.gaappeals.us/rules

June 20, 2019

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A19A0698. THE STATE v. BRIENZA.

A19A0699. BRIENZA v. THE STATE.

DILLARD, Chief Judge.

In Case No. A19A0698, the State appeals from the State Court of Fayette

County’s grant of Tyler Brienza’s motion to exclude the use of certain portions of a

video recorded during his encounter with police, which led to charges of obstruction

of justice. The State argues the trial court erred in suppressing the relevant portion of

the recording after concluding that, at the point it was made, officers lacked

reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue detaining Brienza. This is the second

time this appeal has been docketed with this Court, and in Case No. A19A0699,

Brienza challenges the trial court’s failure to dismiss the State’s appeal for the

reasons that resulted in our prior remand—i.e., the failure to transmit a complete
transcript. For the reasonsset forth infra, we reverse the trial court’s decision in Case

No. A19A0699 and dismiss the State’s appeal in Case No. A19A0698.

1. Case Number A19A0699. Before reaching the merits of the State’s appeal

in Case No. A19A0698, we must first address whether that appeal is properly before

us. 

Brienza was charged by accusation with obstruction of a law-enforcement

officer1and disorderly conduct.

2 He subsequently filed a “motion in limine,” seeking

to exclude “all testimony from any and all state witnesses that resulted from the

prolonged detention and investigation . . . without reasonable articulable suspicion.”

Following a hearing, the trial court granted this motion in a summary order. 

The record in Case No. A19A0698 shows that after the State initially filed its

notice of appeal to the trial court’s grant of Brienza’s motion in April 2017, Brienza

moved three months later, in July 2017, to dismiss the State’s appeal due to a failure

to timely request production of the transcript. But by the time the motion came before

the trial court for argument at a scheduled hearing, the appeal had already been

transmitted to and docketed in this Court as Case Number A18A0213. Accordingly,

1

See OCGA § 16-10-24 (a).

2

See OCGA § 16-11-39.

2
Brienza conceded that the trial court no longer retained jurisdiction to consider his

motion to dismiss, and it was then denied as moot. 

Nevertheless, after the case was docketed with this Court, the State filed a

motion to remand the case because the record had been “mistakenly forwarded . . .

without the entire transcript.” Brienza objected to the State’srequest because it failed

to seek an extension of the 30-day period within which to file the transcript and had

already caused an unreasonable delay of the proceedings,

3

and, then moved for

dismissal of the State’s appeal on those grounds.

4

3

See OCGA § 5-6-39 (a) (3) (“Any judge of the trial court or any justice or

judge of the appellate court to which the appeal is to be taken may, in his discretion,

and without motion or notice to the other party, grant extensions of time for the filing

of[ ] . . . [t]ranscript of the evidence and proceedings on appeal or in any other

instance where filing of the transcript is required or permitted by law[.]”); OCGA §

5-6-42 (“The party having the responsibility of filing the transcript shall cause it to

be filed within 30 days after filing of the notice of appeal or designation by appellee,

as the case may be, unless the time is extended as provided in Code Section 5-6-39.

In all cases, it shall be the duty of the trial judge to grant such extensions of time as

may be necessary to enable the court reporter to complete his transcript of evidence

and proceedings.”).

4

See OCGA § 5-6-48 (c) (“[T]he trial court may, after notice and opportunity

for hearing, order that the appeal be dismissed where there has been an unreasonable

delay in the filing of the transcript and it is shown that the delay was inexcusable and

was caused by such party. In like manner, the trial court may order the appeal

dismissed where there has been an unreasonable delay in the transmission of the

record to the appellate court, and it is seen that the delay was inexcusable and was

caused by the failure of a party to pay costs in the trial court or file an affidavit of

3
In response, this Court denied Brienza’s motion because we lack the authority

to dismiss an appeal on the basis of a delayed filing of a transcript,

5

and in doing so

cited Court of Appeals Rule 20, which provides that

Appellee shall be deemed to have waived any failure of the appellant to

comply with the provisions of the Appellate Practice Act relating to the

filing of the transcript of the evidence and proceedings or transmittal of

the record to this Court, unless objection thereto was made and ruled

upon in the trial court before transmittal and the trial court’s order is

appealed as provided by law.

We did, however, grant the State’s motion to remand the case for completion of the

entire record. 

Upon return of the case to the trial court, Brienza immediately moved to

dismiss the State’s appeal, filing the same motion as before. The court conducted a

hearing,

6

and then denied the motion, finding that the facts did not warrant dismissal.

indigence[.]”).

5

See id.(“No appealshall be dismissed by the appellate court nor consideration

of any error therein refused because of failure of any party to cause the transcript of

evidence and proceedings to be filed within the time allowed by law or order of

court[.]”).

6 Brienza did not include a transcript of this January 2018 hearing with his

cross-appeal. 

4
It is this decision Brienza cross-appeals, arguing that the State’s appeal should have

been dismissed upon remand due to its failure to timely order and file a complete

transcript prior to the direct appeal’s first appearance before this Court. We agree.

OCGA § 5-6-42 provides that when “there is a transcript of evidence and

proceedings to be included in the record on appeal, the appellant shall cause the

transcript to be prepared and filed . . . within 30 days after filing of the notice of

appeal . . . .” And the trial court “may, after notice and opportunity for hearing, order

that the appeal be dismissed [when]there has been an unreasonable delay in the filing

of the transcript and it is shown that the delay was inexcusable and was caused by

such party.”

7

 It is well-established that a delay of more than 30 days is “prima facie

unreasonable and inexcusable, but this presumption is subject to rebuttal if the party

comes forward with evidence to show that the delay was neither unreasonable nor

inexcusable.”8

7

 OCGA § 5-6-48 (c).

8 Kelly v. Dawson Cnty., 282 Ga. 189, 189 (646 SE2d 53) (2007) (punctuation

omitted); accord Gordon v. Dennis, 347 Ga. App. 110, 114 (1) (817 SE2d 561)

(2018); Brandenburg v. All-Fleet Refinishing, Inc., 252 Ga. App. 40, 44 (555 SE2d

508) (2001); Stone v. Boyne, 245 Ga. App. 868, 870 (539 SE2d 209) (2000).

5
When considering a motion to dismiss on grounds of a failure to timely file the

transcript, the trial court must “determine the length of the delay, the reasons for the

delay, whether the appealing party caused the delay, and whether the delay was

inexcusable, and then . . . exercise discretion in deciding whether to dismiss the

appeal.”9 And we will only reverse a trial court’s ruling on such a motion if the court

abused its discretion.10

Here, the trial court explained that it considered “the length of the delay,

whether the appellant requested an extension, the existence of negligence on the part

of the appealing party, and whether such delay reasonably should have been detected

and timely corrected.” In evaluating these considerations, the court made sufficient

findings of fact to demonstrate that it considered the relevant factors delineated in

OCGA § 5-6-48 (c)—i.e., the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether

9 Propst v. Morgan, 288 Ga. 862, 863 (708 SE2d 291) (2011); accord Gordon

v. Dennis, 341 Ga. App. 795, 797 (1) (802 SE2d 77) (2017); see OCGA § 5-6-48 (c)

(“[T]he trial court may order the appeal dismissed where there has been an

unreasonable delay in the transmission of the record to the appellate court, and it is

seen that the delay was inexcusable and was caused by the failure of a party to pay

costs in the trial court or file an affidavit of indigence.”).

10

See Propst, 288 Ga. at 263 (“The trial court’s ruling will be reversed on

appeal only for abuse of discretion.”).

6
the appealing party caused the delay, and whether the delay was inexcusable.11

Additionally, when issuing its order, the trial court at times confused the terms

“unreasonable” and “inexcusable,” seemingly referring to one when it intended to

refer to the other.12 But despite this confusion in terms, the court’s conclusion and

factorsit considered in reaching that conclusion remain the same.13 Nevertheless, we

will use the proper terms when describing and assessing the trial court’s analysis. 

11

See Callaway v. Garner, 340 Ga. App. 176, 180-81 (1) (796 SE2d 906)

(2017) (“[I]n this case, although the trial court’s order does not use the words

‘unreasonable’ or ‘inexcusable,’ the court made sufficient findings of fact to

demonstrate that it considered the relevant factors delineated in OCGA § 5-6-48 (c).

And Georgia courts have affirmed dismissal orders under such circumstances, even

when the trial court did not use the specific terminology outlined in the statute. To do

otherwise would be to elevate form over substance, and that is not something OCGA

§ 5-6-48 (c) requires.” (footnote omitted)); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App.

663, 664 (428 SE2d 671) (1992) (“Although the trial court did not use the specific

terminology delineated in the statute, the trial court’s order indicates that the court

considered those factorsin concluding that the dismissal of the appellants’ appeal was

proper.”).

12 We have previously explained that the “threshold question of whether a delay

in filing a transcript is unreasonable is a separate matter from the issue of whether

such a delay isinexcusable, and refers principally to the length and effect of the delay

rather than the cause of the delay.” Cook v. McNamee, 223 Ga. App. 460, 461 (477

SE2d 884) (1996).

13

See supra note 11.

7
Before proceeding further, we also note that Brienza did not include the

transcript of the trial court’s hearing on the motion to dismiss with his cross-appeal,

and we assume in such instances that the transcript supports the court’s findings of

fact.

14 Our review, therefore, islimited to “determining if, based on the facts it found,

the trial court abused its discretion[.]”

15 But even under that limited review, we

14

See Jenkins v. Edelhertz, 272 Ga. 480, 481 (532 SE2d 94) (2000) (explaining

that, when there is no transcript of a hearing presented for appellate review, we must

assume that the trial court’s findings of fact regarding that hearing are correct);

Sadeghy v. State, 242 Ga. App. 322, 322 (1) (529 SE2d 446) (2000) (“Without a

transcript to review, this court must assume as a matter of law that the evidence

presented at trial supported the court’s findings.” (punctuation omitted)).

15 Burger v. Krueger, 224 Ga. App. 179, 179-80 (480 SE2d 230) (1996); see

Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003) (“[Appellee]

argues that the absence of the motion to dismiss hearing transcript in the appellate

record makes the error harmless, in that we must presume the evidence supported the

trial court’s actions. Even presuming the evidence supported the trial court’s actions,

we must first have the required findings of fact for review so that we know that the

court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion.”); see also Johnson

v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 339, 339-40 (249 SE2d 22) (1978) (“Without a transcript of the

proceedings below, we must assume that the evidence supports the trial court’s

‘Findings of Fact.’ These findings adequately support the trial court’sjudgment as to

the award of alimony.” (citation omitted)); Marsh v. White, 185 Ga. App. 642, 644

(1) (365 SE2d 464) (1988) (“Assuming the evidence supported the findings, as we

must, the finding of fact recited is not, even without additional findings as to how the

changed circumstances adversely affected the child, an insufficient basis, when

considered in context, for the court’s ultimate conclusion that the found and stated

changes in circumstance materially affected the child’s interest and welfare. . . . This

court will affirm that decision if there is reasonable evidence to support it. Inasmuch

as the lower court’s findings are supported as a matter of law, we cannot conclude

8
conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law

that the State’s delay was neither unreasonable nor inexcusable. Therefore, the trial

court erred in failing to dismiss the State’s appeal.

16

The trial court concluded that the delay in filing the transcript was in excess of

30 days. Specifically, the court found that 84 days passed between the time the State

filed its notice of appeal on April 21, 2017, and when it requested the entire transcript

on July 12, 2017. And the court correctly acknowledged that a delay in excess of 30

daysis prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable. Nevertheless, the court concluded

that the length of the delay in this case was not “unreasonable” due to “the [c]ourt’s

heavy caseload,” citing its calendar between the filing of the notice of the appeal and

when the State ordered the entire transcript. The court explained that, during the

relevant time period, 39 days of court were held with four weeks of civil and criminal

that the court abused its discretion.” (citations omitted)).

16 Cf. Hall v. Bussey, 200 Ga. App. 311, 311-12 (408 SE2d 430) (1991) (“[A]

transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal does not appear

in the record. However, the trial court’s order shows that defendant’s appeal was

dismissed because of the lack of specific explanation for the over five-month delay

in filing a trial transcript. . . . Under these circumstances, we cannotsay the trial court

abused its discretion in finding that defendant’s conduct caused the unreasonable and

inexcusable delay in filing the trial transcript. There was no error in the dismissal of

defendant’s appeal.”).

9
trials, 12 criminal arraignment days, seven days of criminal and civil hearings, and

two days of criminal bench trials. And this was the court’s sole reason for declining

to find the length of the State’s delay “unreasonable.” But regardless of whether the

court intended this finding to support a conclusion that the delay was not

“unreasonable,” or whether it made this finding to support its separate and later

conclusion that the delay was not “inexcusable,”17

it supported neither conclusion.

Indeed, the court’s heavy caseload bears no relation to the State’s ability—and its

duty—to request the appropriate transcript for its appeal and then monitor the

progress of that transcript’s preparation.

18

17

See supra note 12 (explaining the distinction between “unreasonable” and

“inexcusable”).

18

See Mercer v. Munn, 321 Ga. App. 723, 726 (1) (742 SE2d 747) (2013)

(“[T]he duty to order the transcript and to monitor timely the progress of the

reporter’s office in transcript preparation is vested upon the appropriate appealing

party.” (punctuation omitted)); Coptic Const. Co. v. Rolle, 279 Ga. App. 454, 455

(631 SE2d 475) (2006) (same); see also Jackson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 217 Ga.

App. 498, 502-03 (2) (458 SE2d 377) (1995) (“At no time did the court reporter have

a duty to inform any party to the trial that the transcript had not been officially

ordered or that it was not being prepared. The statutory duty to file timely a transcript

does not rest with the court reporter; rather the duty to order the transcript and to

monitor timely the progress of the reporter’s office in transcript preparation is vested

upon the appropriate appealing party . . . . It would create an unacceptable and

impractical burden on the court reporter’s office to require them to contact attorneys

or parties and report on the status of all ordered transcripts or to contact attorneys

inquiring whether a transcript was being ordered; we decline to take this opportunity

10
Furthermore, with regard to the reasons and cause for the delay, although the

trial court noted that the State requested “some of the transcript” or “a portion of the

transcript” within two days of filing its notice of appeal,

19

it also found that the State

(1) made no request for an extension, (2) was at least “slight[ly]” negligent (though

the court did not explain why it concluded the negligence was “slight”), and (3)

presented no evidence of any effort to follow up on its requested “portion” of the

transcript and, thus, the “delay should have been corrected.” The court further noted

that the originally requested “portion” of the transcript was eventually filed in the trial

court on July 28, 2017, only after the State’s July 12, 2017 request for the entire

transcript. And the filing of the initially requested “portion” resulted in the

incomplete transmission to this Court and our subsequent remand at the State’s

request. 

to create such an oppressive administrative requirement.”).

19

It is undisputed that the State’s initial notice of appeal requested that the

clerk “omit nothing from the record and shall transmit all transcripts to the Court of

Appeals as part of the record.” We remind the State that OCGA § 5-6-51 suggeststhat

a notice of appeal include the following language: “Transcript of evidence and

proceedings will/will not be filed for inclusion in the record on appeal.” As we have

previously recognized, “[t]his statutory language informs the clerk of the trial court

whether he or she may transmit the record immediately or must wait for the appellant

to file a transcript.” Webb’s Erection, Inc. v. Colonial Pac. Leasing Corp., 345 Ga.

App. 202, 204-05 (2) (812 SE2d 602) (2018).

11
The trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusion that the State’s

delay was not inexcusable, particularly in light of the State’s burden to come forward

with evidence to rebut the presumption that the delay was inexcusable when it far

exceeded 30 days.

20

Instead, these findings show the State was responsible for the

delay by failing to request an extension, was negligent, and made no efforts to check

on the progress of the portion of the transcript it requested, which was not even the

appropriate transcript necessary for the State’s appeal, as evinced by the fact that the

State later requested both preparation of the entire transcript and that this Court

remand the initial appeal for the same reason.

Finally, on the question of prejudice, the trial court summarily concluded that

“no prejudice exists for the slight delay.”

21 Thus, the court declined to dismiss the

20

See Morrell v. W. Servs., LLC, 291 Ga. App. 369, 372 (1) (662 SE2d 215)

(2008) (“In view of the more than 30[-]day delay in the payment of costs and the

absence of any evidence as to why the delay occurred, the trial court was not

authorized to exercise its discretion and deny the motion to dismiss defendants’ notice

of appeal. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.” (punctuation

omitted)); Fun Fit Enterprises v. Halpern Enterprises, 273 Ga. App. 685, 686 (616

SE2d 466) (2005) (holding that denial of motion to dismiss appeal was an abuse of

discretion when costs were not paid until 57 days after notice from court and no valid

excuse was interposed by appealing party).

21

In this final portion of the trial court’s order, it concluded that “[g]iven the

totality of the circumstances, the [c]ourt finds that while the delay may have been

slightly unreasonable, the delay is not inexcusable as no prejudice exists.” This

12
appeal. It bearsrepeating that, asthe Supreme Court of Georgia hasitself recognized,

a delay in excess of 30 days is prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable.22 Here, the

trial court correctly acknowledged as much; but the party with the burden of coming

forward with evidence to rebut the presumption that the delay of 84 days was

unreasonable and inexcusable was the State.

23 And the court did not make any

contradicts the court’s earlier finding that the delay was not “unreasonable.” The

effect of the delay is, of course, related to whether or not the delay was unreasonable,

not inexcusable. See supra note 12; see also Callaway, 340 Ga. App. at 179 (1)

(“This Court will also consider any delay in transmitting the appellate record

unreasonable when it may affect an appeal by: (a) directly prejudicing the position of

a party by allowing an intermediate change of conditions or otherwise resulting in

inequity; or (b) causing the appeal to be stale, such as, by delaying just disposition of

the case, by preventing placement of the case on the earliest possible appellate court

calendar, or by delaying the docketing of the appeal and hearing of the case by an

appellate court.”).

22 Kelly, 282 Ga. at 189; Gordon v. Dennis, 347 Ga. App. 110, 114 (1) (817

SE2d 561) (2018); Callaway, 340 Ga. App. at 179 (1).

23

See Kelly, 282 Ga. at 189 (“[T]his presumption is subject to rebuttal if the

party comes forward with evidence to show that the delay was neither unreasonable

nor inexcusable.”); Gordon, 347 Ga. App. at 114 (1) (“The presumption that the delay

was inexcusable can be rebutted by evidence that the delay was not caused by the

appellant.”); Callaway, 340 Ga. App. at 179 (1) (“[T]his presumption is subject to

rebuttal if the party comes forward with evidence to show that the delay was neither

unreasonable nor inexcusable.” (punctuation omitted)); see also Webb’s Erection,

Inc., 345 Ga. App. at 203-04 (1) (“[T]he appellants bore the burden of presenting

evidence rebutting the presumption that their 70-day delay in paying costs was

unreasonable.”).

13
findings of fact that the State presented any such evidence.24 Rather, the court made

findings of fact supporting the presumption that the delay was unreasonable and

inexcusable because the State (1) did not request an extension, (2) was negligent, and

(3) did not present evidence of monitoring the portion of the transcript that it

requested, which, again, was not even the correct transcript because the State

apparently needed the entire transcript for its appeal.

25

Additionally, the trial court summarily concluded that Brienza was not

prejudiced by the delay, and we must assume that thisfinding was correct.

26 Thatsaid,

24

See Gordon, 347 Ga. App. at 114 (1) (“Appellants are not accountable for

delays caused by clerks of court or court reporters after the transcript has been

ordered properly; appellants are held accountable only for delays that they cause.

Thus, for example, a delay in the filing of a transcript is excusable when there is

evidence that it was caused by the ‘backlog’ of the court reporter rather than by an act

or omission of the appellant.” (citations & punctuation omitted)); Brandenburg, 252

Ga. App. at 44 (holding that presumption was rebutted when appealing party

presented evidence that delay was caused not by it but by the insurance carrier).

25 Cf. Allan v. Jefferson Lakeside, L.P., 333 Ga. App. 222, 225 (1) (775 SE2d

763) (2015) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in dismissing notice of

appeal when appealing party presented evidence that delay was due to reasonable, if

erroneous, belief that it had paid entirety of the costs associated with preparation of

the requested transcript; because appellant timely ordered transcript,made reasonable

inquiriesinto status of its preparation, and made timely payment of bill received from

clerk after transcript was requested, delay was not inexcusable).

26

See supra notes 14-15 & accompanying text.

14
a delay is unreasonable if it affects an appeal “either by directly prejudicing the

position of a party by allowing an intermediate change of conditions or otherwise

resulting in inequity, or by causing the appeal to become stale, for instance by

delaying docketing and hearing in this [C]ourt.”27

Indeed, as we have repeatedly

recognized, “justice delayed for even one day isjustice denied to the litigant who was

successful in the lower court and who is entitled to his judgment unless the case is

properly reversed.”28 And here, the initial docketing of this appeal was discernibly

delayed when the State’s notice of appeal was filed on April 10, 2017, but the case

was not docketed with this Court until some five months later on August 22,

2017—and was then remanded at the State’s request.

29

27 Adams v. Hebert, 279 Ga. App. 158, 159 (630 SE2d 652) (2006); accord

Postell v. Alfa Ins. Corp., 332 Ga. App. 22, 25 (2) (a) (i) (772 SE2d 793) (2015);

Ashley v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 327 Ga. App. 232, 235 (1) (758 SE2d 135)

(2014); Bush v. Reed, 311 Ga. App. 328, 331-32 (a) (715 SE2d 747) (2011).

28 Callaway, 340 Ga. App. at 179 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Ne. Ga.

Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Healthsouth Rehab. Hosp. of Forsyth Cty., LLC, 347 Ga. App. 852,

859 (1) (821 SE2d 68) (2018).

29

See Postell, 332 Ga. App. at 26 (2) (a) (i) (holding that four-and-a-halfmonth delay was unreasonable and delayed docketing in this Court); Ashley, 327 Ga.

App. at 235-37 (1) (holding that eight-month delay caused appeal to be docketed at

least one term later than it should have been docketed); McAlister v. Abam-Samson,

318 Ga. App. 1, 6-7 (2) (733 SE2d 58) (2012) (concluding that delay resulted in

docketing for a later term of court); Pistacchio v. Frasso, 314 Ga. App. 119, 122 (723

15
Because the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law,

the trial court erred in denying Brienza’s motion to dismiss the State’s appeal. We

therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment in Case No. A19A0699.

SE2d 322) (2012) (“The [three-month] delay here discernibly delayed docketing of

the record in the appellate court and prevented an appellate decision on the merits at

the earliest possible date.”); Bush, 311 Ga. App. at 332 (a) (holding that ten-month

delay “prevented the case from being docketed and heard in the earliest possible

appellate termof court”); Morrell, 291 Ga. App. at 374 (2) (holding that 51-day delay

caused delay of appeal from one term to another); Adams, 279 Ga. App. at 159

(concluding that 150-day delay resulted in delayed docketing from one term to

another); Galletta v. Hillcrest Abbey W., Inc., 185 Ga. App. 20, 22 (1) (363 SE2d

265) (1987) (explaining that, in a prior case, a four-month delay in filing a transcript

“obviously” and “discernibly” delayed docketing of the record in Court of Appeals);

see also CT. OF APPEALS R. 12 (“The Court has three terms of court per year. Cases

are docketed to a term as required by the Constitution of the State of Georgia and as

otherwise required by law. The docket will specify the specific term to which a case

is docketed. Cases docketed to a specific term must be decided before the expiration

of the following term. The Court’s terms . . . are as follows: (1) the December term

begins the first Monday in December and ends March 31 the following year; (2) the

April term begins the first Monday in April and ends July 17; (3) the August term

beginsthe first Monday in August and ends November 18.”); Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Tax

Assessors v. Love, 289 Ga. App. 252, 254 (656 SE2d 576) (2008) (“[When] the delay

in filing the transcript does not discernibly delay the docketing of the record in the

appellate court, and does not prevent an appellate decision on the merits at the earliest

possible date, the delay is not unreasonable.”). See generally OCGA § 24-2-220

(providing for matters to be judicially recognized); Thompson v. Cheatham, 244 Ga.

117, 118 (1) (259 SE2d 62) (1979) (“Our courts will take judicial notice of all Acts

of the General Assembly and the organization and terms of court.” (citations

omitted)).

16
2. Case Number A19A0698. In light of our holding in Case No. A19A0699, we

dismiss the State’s appeal. 

Judgment reversed in Case No. A19A0699. Appeal dismissed in Case No.

A19A0698. Gobeil and Hodges, JJ., concur.

17