APHIS Evaluation of the Classical Swine Fever 

Status of Switzerland and Liechtenstein 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Veterinary Services

August 2009
2

Acronyms

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

BIP Border Inspection Post

BVET Swiss Federal Veterinary Office 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CSF Classical Swine Fever

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer

EC European Commission

EU European Union

FDEA Federal Department of Economic Affairs

FFCU Federal Food Chain Unit

FMD Foot and Mouth Disease

FOEN Federal Office for the Environment

FVO Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission

IVI Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis

OFVA Office of Food and Veterinary Affairs

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

SVD Swine Vesicular Disease

SVS Swiss Veterinary Service

Abbreviations

Agricultural Agreement: Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss 

Confederation on trade in agricultural products.

Additional Agreement: Additional Agreement between the European Community, the 

Swiss Confederation, and the Principality of Liechtenstein extending to the Principality 

of Liechtenstein the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss 

Confederation on trade in agricultural products.

APHIS-defined EU CSF region: The EU Member States of Austria, Belgium, the Czech 

Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and 

the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland).
3

Table of Contents

Executive summary........................................................................................................... 4

Hazard identification........................................................................................................ 6

Release Assessment........................................................................................................... 7

1. Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services ................... 7

2. Disease status in the region................................................................................... 15

3. Disease status of adjacent regions......................................................................... 16

4. Extent of an active disease control program......................................................... 17

5. Vaccination status of the region............................................................................ 17

6. Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk................................................... 17

7. Movement control and biosecurity from higher risk regions................................ 18

8. Livestock demographics and marketing ............................................................... 25

9. Disease surveillance.............................................................................................. 29

10. Diagnostic laboratory capability........................................................................... 31

11. Emergency response capacity............................................................................... 33

12. Discussion of identified risk factors ..................................................................... 38

Risk estimate.................................................................................................................... 45

Annexes............................................................................................................................ 47

Annex 1: 2009 Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, sections 94.24, 94.25, 98.38.... 47

Annex 2: Waste feeding in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. ......................................... 51

Annex 3: Switzerland import and export data 2003-2008............................................ 56

References........................................................................................................................ 57
4

Executive summary

In November 2006, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of the Swiss Confederation 

(Switzerland) requested that the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 

evaluate the classical swine fever (CSF) status of Switzerland and the Principality of 

Liechtenstein. Specifically, the Swiss would like to be able to export pork and pork 

products to the United States, for which both Switzerland and Liechtenstein must be 

considered low risk or free of CSF and free of other highly contagious swine diseases. 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein formed a common veterinary area with an integrated 

veterinary system—the Swiss Veterinary Services (SVS)—in 1924. Switzerland is 

comprised of 20 cantons and 6 half-cantons; Liechtenstein has the same legal position 

with the SVS as a Swiss canton. In June 2002, Switzerland and Liechtenstein entered into 

an agreement with the European Union (EU) whereby they gradually adopted the EU’s 

harmonized import and trade regulations for live animals and animal products. On 1 

January 2009, all border veterinary controls between Switzerland/Liechtenstein and the 

EU were abolished, so that trade in live animals and animal products now occurs under 

the same conditions as for intra-community trade.

This report assesses the CSF status of the common veterinary area formed by Switzerland 

and Liechtenstein and the risk to the United States of opening trade in live swine and 

swine products, including fresh pork, pork products, and swine semen. Since a previous 

APHIS analysis concluded that EU control measures for CSF are effective, this 

assessment focuses on the implementation of such measures in Switzerland and 

Liechtenstein—an approach that is consistent with APHIS evaluations of the CSF status 

of new EU Member States. The format follows World Organization for Animal Health 

(OIE) guidelines for risk assessment and includes a discussion of each of the 11 factors 

for regionalization described in title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, section 92.2 (9 CFR 

92.2). 

The hazard under consideration is the CSF virus. This assessment found no evidence that 

CSF virus currently exists in Switzerland or Liechtenstein and demonstrated no 

immediate and significant risks associated with this hazard. The last CSF cases in 

Switzerland occurred in 1993 in domestic swine and 1999 in wild boar, whereas

Liechtenstein has never reported a CSF outbreak. 

Nonetheless, there is a potential for introduction of CSF virus into Switzerland or 

Liechtenstein. This is primarily because Switzerland and Liechtenstein import substantial 

quantities of pork and pork products from Germany and France, including from areas that 

the European Commission (EC) has restricted due to CSF in wild boar. In addition, it is 

relatively easy for travelers to enter Switzerland with commodities for personal 

consumption derived from domestic swine or wild boar, from both restricted and nonrestricted areas of EU Member States. 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein are situated in the middle of a region that APHIS has 

recognized as low risk for CSF, namely the APHIS-defined EU CSF region. APHIS 

regards the EU Member States in this region as having the same low level of risk due to 

harmonized EC legislation, free trade on the internal common market, and CSF in 

segments of the wild boar population. The APHIS-defined EU CSF region is subject to 

the import conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.24 for breeding swine, pork, and pork 
5

products, and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen. These regulations specifically prohibit 

sourcing of live swine, pork, pork products, and swine semen for export to the United 

States from areas of the EU that are restricted due to CSF in wild boar or domestic swine. 

These regulations also prohibit commingling of commodities for export with 

commodities from the restricted areas.

Similar risk concerns—namely sourcing and commingling of live swine and swine 

products—now apply to Switzerland and Liechtenstein as well. Unlike some EU Member 

States comprising the APHIS-defined EU CSF region, however, the risk of CSF 

introduction into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein through natural movements of wild 

boar, importation or transit of live swine, or vehicular or human traffic is negligible at 

this time. The risk of CSF introduction via commodities for personal consumption is 

similar to that of the surrounding EU Member States.

In summary, the risk profile of the common veterinary area formed by Switzerland and 

Liechtenstein is similar to that of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region, although some 

differences exist. Applying the provisions of 9 CSF 94.24 and 98.38 to Switzerland and 

Liechtenstein would address the risk issues identified in the release assessment and result 

in a level of risk that is equivalent to, or less than, that portion of the EU that is currently 

authorized to export breeding swine, swine semen, and pork and pork products to the 

United States.
6

Hazard identification

The hazard under consideration in this analysis is the CSF virus. CSF, also known as hog 

cholera, is a contagious and economically damaging viral disease of domestic swine and 

wild boar with worldwide distribution. It is caused by the CSF virus of the family 

Flaviviridae, genus Pestivirus [1]. The CSF virus is quite hardy, being stable between pH 

4 and 10 [2] and also stable at low temperatures [3]. The virus would likely remain viable 

even after carcass maturation, and is unlikely to be destroyed by transport or cold storage. 

Laboratory confirmation of infection, essential during an outbreak situation, is 

complicated by the close antigenic relationship of the CSF virus with bovine viral 

diarrhea virus (BVDV) and border disease virus (BVD) [1]. 

The incubation period for CSF is 2-14 days [4]. The virus multiplies in the epithelial 

crypts of the tonsils and may be carried to local lymph nodes and into the bloodstream for 

distribution throughout the body [5]. Blood and all tissues, secretions and excretions of 

sick and dead animals are sources of virus [4]. CSF virus has been recovered from muscle 

and lymph nodes of infected pigs, and high titers of virus have been isolated from bone 

marrow [6]. The disease may also be introduced or spread via infected semen [7].

CSF can spread in epidemic form as well as establish endemic infections in domestic 

swine and wild boar populations. Infection generally spreads directly from pig to pig, but 

products including fresh, frozen, or cured pork can remain infectious to other pigs via the 

oral route [8]. Imported pig products are frequently implicated in the introduction of CSF 

virus into previously disease-free regions, primarily through the practice of swill feeding 

[9]. Researchers have demonstrated that the oral infectious dose of CSF virus is very low 

[10]. Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild animals, and 

inanimate objects such as live-haul trucks [11].

The role of wild boar as a virus reservoir and possible source of infection for domestic 

swine is well known and epidemiological links between CSF infection in wild boar and 

domestic swine have been reported repeatedly in recent years [12, 13]. In countries that 

are free of CSF in domestic swine, epidemics in wild boar are usually started by feeding 

of contaminated human food waste [14]. Abnormal mortality and sometimes obviously 

sick animals are the first indicators of CSF introduction into a wild boar population [14].

Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described, including acute, chronic, 

congenital, and mild manifestations [15, 16]. The acute form involves a disease 

progression of 2-4 weeks and is characterized by high fever, generalized illness, 

hemorrhagic lesions, immunosuppression with secondary infections, and high mortality. 

The chronic form may last 30-90 days before death and usually involves older swine or 

congenitally infected piglets. Congenitally infected piglets may develop symptoms of 

chronic CSF within 3-6 months, or may never develop symptoms but continuously shed 

the virus. Mild CSF is typically seen only in sows and may result from exposure to a low 

virulent strain. Infected sows may show no overt clinical signs but continuously shed

virus to their young and to other swine they contact. 
7

Release Assessment

This release assessment focuses on the CSF status of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, as 

well as pathways for CSF introduction with the potential to impact the assessed status of 

this region. It is organized according to the 11 factors described in 9 CFR 92.2 that 

APHIS uses to evaluate foreign regions for animal disease status. Risk factors or issues of 

concern that directly or indirectly affect the risk estimate are identified under each factor 

and discussed at greater length in Section 12. 

1. Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services

1.1 Organization of the official veterinary services

1.1.1 Background

The Swiss Confederation was founded in 1921 as a defensive alliance among 3 cantons, 

with other cantons subsequently joining the alliance [17-19]. Switzerland currently 

consists of 20 cantons and 6 half-cantons (see Figure 1.1). The Swiss constitution of 1848 

created a central government with limited powers: the cantons and half-cantons assigned 

part of their sovereignty to the confederation but each retained their own constitution, 

parliament, government, and courts. 

Figure 1.1: Map of Switzerland showing cantons
8

The Principality of Liechtenstein is a hereditary constitutional monarchy based on a 

democratic and parliamentary system [20]. Liechtenstein entered into a customs union 

treaty with Switzerland in 1924 that provided the basis for an integrated veterinary 

system, the SVS [17-19]. The two countries form a common veterinary area, with 

Liechtenstein having the same legal position as a canton. 

On 1 June 2002, Switzerland entered into the Agreement between the European 

Community and the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural products (Agricultural 

Agreement) [21]. Annex 11 of the Agricultural Agreement (the Veterinary Annex)

addresses animal health and sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and 

animal products between Switzerland and the EU [21]. The Agricultural Agreement was 

formally extended to Liechtenstein in October 2007 as the Additional Agreement between 

the European Community, the Swiss Confederation, and the Principality of Liechtenstein 

extending to the Principality of Liechtenstein the Agreement between the European 

Community and the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural products (Additional 

Agreement) [22].

1.1.2 Central competent authority

The Swiss Federal Veterinary Office (Bundesamt für Veterinärwesen; BVET), located in 

Bern, is the central competent authority for the SVS [18-20]. The BVET is part of the 

Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA) (see Figure 1.2). The BVET Director is the 

CVO of Switzerland; Liechtenstein has retained its own CVO—who reports to the Swiss 

CVO—and representative to the OIE. 

Figure 1.2: Organization of the Swiss Federal Veterinary Office (BVET)

Federal Department of 

Economic Affairs

Federal Veterinary

Office

Institute of Virology and

Immunoprophylaxis

Controlling

Federal Office of

Agriculture

Federal Food 

Chain Unit

Implementation

Support

International 

Affairs

Monitoring Internal Services Communications

Legal Affairs

Research 

Management

Zoonoses and 

Diagnostics Animal Health

Risk Assessment, 

Animal Diseases, 

Foreign Substances

Food Hygiene Cantonal 

Coordination

Animal Welfare

The BVET provides oversight for animal health, animal welfare, and food safety 

programs within Switzerland and Liechtenstein, regulates the conditions for importation 

of animals and food, and provides border controls for such imports. The BVET also 

supports, coordinates, and supervises enforcement efforts at the cantonal level. The 

cantons are responsible for enforcing federal and cantonal animal health, animal welfare, 

and food safety regulations within cantonal boundaries. 
9

1.1.3 Local veterinary units 

There are 23 cantonal veterinary offices in the SVS, including the Office of Food 

Inspection and Veterinary Affairs (OFVA) in Liechtenstein [18, 19]. Each cantonal 

veterinary service consists of a chief cantonal veterinarian, other full-time and part-time 

cantonal veterinarians, and administrative assistants. The cantonal veterinary services

vary considerably in size, number of personnel, and organizational structure [20]. 

Depending on the canton, the veterinary services may be organized under either the 

Office of Agriculture or Office of Public Health. At a minimum, each cantonal veterinary 

office has divisions for animal health, animal welfare, and food safety. Some cantons 

have district offices staffed by cantonal veterinarians, while others do not.

All cantonal veterinarians and some private veterinarians receive BVET training to 

become official veterinarians, which includes training in both meat inspection and animal 

health controls (see Section 1.3.2) [18-20]. Cantonal veterinarians are therefore all 

official veterinarians, whereas not all official veterinarians are cantonal veterinarians

(some work primarily in private practice). The cantonal veterinary services contract with 

private veterinarians who have passed the official training to perform certain official 

tasks, such as animal health controls or meat inspection. Such veterinarians must be 

employed at least 30 percent time by the cantonal veterinary services and are subject to 

cantonal measures that limit conflicts of interest [23].

The cantonal veterinary services are responsible for enforcement and control of animal 

identification, movement, welfare, and health standards, as well as veterinary drug use 

[20, 24]. Official veterinarians conduct antemortem inspections at slaughter plants and—

along with some non-veterinary technicians—are responsible for meat inspection. Cutting 

plants are controlled by either official veterinarians, food inspectors from the public 

health sector, or both, depending on the cantonal organization. Processing plants, packing 

plants, and export establishments are controlled by food inspectors. 

1.1.4 Administrative unit (AU)

APHIS defines an AU as the smallest administrative jurisdiction that has effective 

oversight of normal animal movements into, out of, and within that jurisdiction, and that, 

in association with national authorities, if necessary, has effective control over animal 

movements and animal diseases locally [25]. An AU is the smallest unit to which APHIS 

can effectively regionalize for animal disease status under its current regulations.

The AU for Switzerland is the area covered by a cantonal veterinary office. Since the 

OFVA is responsible for veterinary controls throughout the entirety of Liechtenstein, 

APHIS cannot recognize any smaller AU within that country. 

1.1.5 Border veterinary inspection

The border veterinary inspection service, which reports directly to the BVET, is 

responsible for veterinary control of imported live animals, animal products, and food of 

animal origin [18, 20]. As a function of the Agricultural Agreement and the Additional 

Agreement, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have gradually adopted import and trade 

regulations equivalent to those of the EC with regard to live animals and animal products 

[21, 22]. Border inspection posts (BIPs) at the Zürich and Geneva airports are ECapproved for border veterinary controls on packed products for human consumption, 
10

products not intended for human consumption, and small animals (including zoo 

animals); Liechtenstein has no approved BIPs [20, 26]. Neither of the Swiss BIPs is 

approved to accept imported swine or other large animals [26]. Border security and 

import controls are described in more detail in Section 7.

1.1.6 Diagnostic laboratories

The Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis (IVI) in Mittelhäusern is the SVS

reference laboratory for CSF [18, 19]. The IVI is attached directly to the BVET (see

Figure 1.1). Switzerland has a network of animal disease diagnostic laboratories but no 

other laboratories or pharmaceutical companies work with CSF virus [20]. The diagnostic 

laboratory system is discussed in more detail in Section 10.

1.2 Legal authority for animal health activities 

1.2.1 Legal framework 

Federal authorities issue legislation pertaining to animal health and public health which 

applies directly to the cantons and Liechtenstein [18, 20]. The primary legal act 

governing the animal health activities of the SVS is the Law of 1 July 1966 on epizootic 

diseases (Animal Health Law) [27]. The BVET issues federal animal health regulations, 

called ordinances, based on the Animal Health Law [24]. All Swiss legislation is 

reproduced in German, French, and Italian, which are official languages of Switzerland

(along with Romansch); German is the official language of Liechtenstein. 

The cantonal veterinary services are responsible for implementing BVET ordinances

[24]. The cantons and Liechtenstein may issue more specific legislation as long as it is 

not less strict than the federal ordinances. BVET ordinances are transposed into 

Liechtenstein law via an official journal that is published twice annually. If necessary, the 

Liechtenstein government can issue their own ordinance prepared by the OFVA under the 

Animal Disease Police Law of 1966 [20].

On 1 June 2002, Switzerland entered into the Agricultural Agreement with the EC [21]. 

By virtue of the Customs Union Treaty of 1924, the market access granted by 

Switzerland applied to Liechtenstein as well. Market access in both directions was 

confirmed in October 2007 via the Additional Agreement, which further integrated 

Liechtenstein into the EC trade control and disease notification systems and gave 

Liechtenstein a seat on the oversight committees for the Agricultural Agreement (the 

Joint Committee on Agriculture) and the Veterinary Annex (the Joint Veterinary Council) 

[22]. The latter meets annually and issues decisions to update the Veterinary Annex as 

necessary [26, 28-31]. All provisions of the Agricultural Agreement, including any 

modifications, apply to Liechtenstein.

Implementation of the Agricultural Agreement necessitated considerable changes to 

Switzerland’s animal health legislation to ensure that Swiss requirements were consistent 

with those of the EC and produced the same results. The primary article of EC legislation 

concerning CSF is Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community 

measures for the control of classical swine fever [32]. Switzerland implemented this 

Directive through the Animal Health Law, the Ordinance of 27 June 1995 on epizootic 

diseases (Animal Health Ordinance)—which provides specific guidance on reporting and 
11

control of highly contagious animal diseases—and two other ordinances (see Table 1.1) 

[21, 22].

Table 1.1: Correspondence of legislation on CSF control 

EC legislation Swiss legislation

• Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 

23 October 2001 on Community 

measures for the control of classical 

swine fever (as amended).

• Law of 1 July 1966 on epizootic diseases (as amended), and 

in particular Articles 1, 1a, and 9a (measures against highly 

contagious epizootic diseases, control objectives) and 57 

(technical implementing provisions, international 

cooperation) thereof;

• Ordinance of 27 June 1995 on epizootic diseases (as 

amended), and in particular Articles 3 (highly contagious 

epizootic diseases), 40 to 47 (disposal and use of waste), 49 

(handling micro-organisms that are pathogenic for animals), 

73 and 74 (cleaning and disinfection), 77 to 98 (common 

provisions concerning highly contagious epizootic diseases), 

and 166 to 121 (detection of swine fever at slaughter, specific 

measure to combat swine fever) thereof;

• Ordinance of 14 June 1999 on the organization of the 

Department of Economic Affairs (as amended), and in 

particular Article 8 (reference laboratory) thereof; and

• Ordinance of 23 June 1999 on the elimination of animal waste 

(as amended).

The EC does not actively inform Switzerland of changes in animal health legislation; 

however, BVET officials attend the meetings of the EC’s Standing Committee on the 

Food Chain and Animal Health and so are familiar with most issues that result in new 

legislation [20]. The International Affairs division of the BVET watches for new EC 

legislation concerning animal health and organizes the transposition into Swiss 

legislation. EC Decisions are not directly applicable to Switzerland as they are for EU 

Member States but transposition can occur in as little as a few hours. 

Correspondence tables for existing EC and Swiss legislation concerning import, export, 

and intra-community trade of live swine, swine semen, and swine products and byproducts are provided in the Veterinary Annex of the Agricultural Agreement [21] and 

the provisions discussed in the pertinent sections of this analysis. When animal or human 

health is at risk, the BVET has the legislative power to immediately issue new legislation

as needed [19].

1.2.3 Waste feeding

Switzerland currently allows feeding of heat-treated catering waste to pigs in accordance 

with specific provisions laid out in the Animal Health Ordinance; other waste feeding is 

prohibited [24]. Premises that heat-treat and feed catering waste must be approved by the 

cantonal veterinary authorities and must be inspected annually by an official veterinarian

[20]. BVET officials indicated that there were about 200 such premises in 2009—

equating to about 6 percent of Swiss pigs—and that the number is declining; the BVET 

plans to prohibit feeding of heat-treated catering waste by July 2011. No swine holdings 

in Liechtenstein are approved to feed heat-treated catering waste. 
12

A brief assessment of the risk of infecting pigs in Switzerland or Liechtenstein with CSF 

virus through legal or illegal waste feeding is attached as Annex 2. This assessment

concludes that strict veterinary oversight, along with severe penalties for noncompliance 

and high producer awareness, substantially limit the likelihood of CSF transmission

through catering waste feeding. In addition, all forms of waste feeding are prohibited on 

certified organic farms—which constitute approximately 20 percent of Swiss pig farms—

and also on farms that produce according to label standards (see Section 8.2). 

Noncompliance can lead to loss of organic status or label premiums, which results in

considerable economic disincentive to illegally feed waste food to swine.

The attached assessment also notes that feeding of heat-treated catering waste is highly 

regulated and that Swiss swine producers and veterinary officials demonstrated a high 

level of awareness of waste feeding regulations. The cantonal veterinary authorities must 

inspect and approve premises that heat-treat and feed catering waste annually. Similarly, 

cantonal public health officials must approve restaurants to send waste food to a heattreatment facility; all such waste must originate in Switzerland (no international food 

waste). Heat-treatment at boiling temperature for 20 minutes must be electronically 

recorded and the records kept for at least 3 years.

1.3 Infrastructure of the official veterinary services

1.3.1 Physical infrastructure

The BVET is located in a newly renovated building, with all staff in one place [19]. The 

cantonal veterinary office facilities appeared clean, well-maintained, and sufficient for 

performance of their functions [20]. Some cantonal offices share facilities with a cantonal 

laboratory or other entity and some of the half-cantons have combined resources to form 

a single cantonal veterinary office.1

 1

The Appenzell-Ausserrhoden (AR) and Appenzell-Innerrhoden (AI) half-cantons share one office, as do 

the half-cantons of Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), Schwyz (SZ), and Uri (UR).

All components of the SVS are electronically linked via email and the internet and also 

share several integrated data management systems [20]. Databases include ISVET, a 

veterinary data information system; TVD, an animal movement data system; FLEKO, a 

meat control data system; and ANIS, an animal identification database. The BVET also 

maintains a password-protected extranet that serves as a digital communication platform 

and information source for official veterinarians.

1.3.2 Personnel resources

In 2007 Switzerland had approximately 2,550 veterinarians, including 145 governmental 

veterinarians (75 at the federal level), 1,580 private veterinarians, and 125 veterinarians 

working in industry or laboratories [19]. Liechtenstein had 2 veterinarians at the OFVA 

and 3 private veterinarians who served livestock producers [20]. The BVET had about 65 

full- or part-time support staff, while the cantonal veterinary offices collectively had 

approximately 150 support staff [18]. The SVS employed 650 private veterinarians parttime as official veterinarians, for meat inspection and animal health control. About 50

non-veterinary meat inspectors worked in export establishments and 250-300 in domestic 

meat establishments.
13

Training and continuing education

Veterinary schools in Zürich and Bern together form the Vetsuisse Veterinary Facility; 

training is 5 years to obtain a veterinary degree [19]. The BVET strongly promotes 

continuing education for its staff and the cantonal veterinary services. Each BVET 

scientific staff member receives an average of 6-8 days of continuing education per year. 

The BVET organizes in-house training in the form of monthly seminars on new legal and 

scientific developments and, together with the IVI, offers bi-weekly seminars on projects 

in progress, external projects, and journal clubs. 

The Implementation Support and Monitoring divisions of the BVET organize annual 

courses and workshops for cantonal veterinary officials—including a mandatory 2-day 

training—on animal health, measures against epizootic diseases, animal movement 

controls, animal welfare, meat hygiene, risk analysis, epidemiology, and other topics 

[19]. The cantonal veterinary services organize continuing education and training for 

their staff, for private veterinarians, and for producers.

Training of official veterinarians

To become an official veterinarian, an applicant must pass a BVET training course 

consisting of 200 hours of lectures covering food safety and veterinary drugs (60 hours), 

animal health (60 hours), animal welfare (40 hours), and international organizations and 

legal rights (40 hours) [18-20]. Applicants also undergo 80 hours of practical training 

with an official veterinarian and take a comprehensive final exam consisting of 3 written 

exams, 1 oral exam, and practical exams on (1) inspection of carcasses at slaughter and 

meat inspection and (2) official veterinary controls. After April 2012, only veterinarians

who have passed this course will be allowed to perform official duties.

Simulation exercises

Switzerland carries out one national or international highly contagious disease simulation 

exercise every 2 years, most recently for avian influenza and FMD [20]. There are also 5-

10 simulation exercises at the cantonal level each year which may be real-time exercises

or exercises at the field or administration level. 

Public education

The BVET has taken action to increase public awareness of CSF—specifically disease 

recognition and knowledge of reporting requirements—including articles in the BVET

magazine, pamphlets for producer and hunting associations, information on the BVET

webpage, and other educational materials used by cantonal veterinary authorities [18].

1.3.3 Financial resources

The BVET and IVI budgets have remained fairly constant in recent years at 37.8 million 

CHF (about 34 million USD) and 8.4 million CHF (about 7.55 million USD), 

respectively [18, 19]. The total allocation represents approximately 0.08 percent of the 

national public sector budget. For comparison, animal production contributes about 1.08

percent of the Swiss gross domestic product annually. The cantonal governments 

collectively designated approximately 2.5 million CHF (about 2.25 million USD) to the 

cantonal veterinary services in 2007, which in turn applied approximately 65 percent, or 

1.6 million CHF (about 1.44 million USD), to the animal health sector.
14

1.3.4 Strategic planning

The BVET has developed a multi-annual national animal health control plan similar to 

those required for EU Member States under EC Regulation 882/2004 [18, 20, 33]. The 

plan lays out specific goals, strategies, and performance indicators, as well as the 

financial frame. The BVET establishes an operational plan each year based on the 

strategic plan; the operational plan includes the specific activities to be performed during 

the year by the different divisions of the BVET. 

One goal of the BVET strategic plan is ISO 9001:2000 certification of the cantonal 

veterinary offices and parts of the BVET [18]. Certification means that the office has 

established a management system, described all processes, and demonstrated that they 

operate according to these processes. Some cantonal veterinary offices are already 

certified while others are working towards certification [20]. The certifying agency is the 

Swiss Association for Quality and Management Systems, an independent organization. 

Some cantonal offices are also ISO 17020 accredited.

1.3.5 Monitoring programs

The BVET is monitored on three levels: in-house, departmental, and parliamentary [18]. 

The Controlling Unit of the BVET performs an annual in-house impact assessment and 

quarterly performance assessments. In addition, the FDEA monitors the performance of 

the BVET based on its mission and relevant current issues. Finally, the Swiss parliament 

reviews the outputs and impact of the BVET and approves the budget accordingly. 

Federal checks on the cantonal level are implemented through the Federal Food Chain 

Unit (FFCU), a group composed of representatives of the FDEA, the Federal Department 

of Agriculture, and the Federal Department of Public Health [18, 20]. The FFCU was 

created to conform to EC Regulation 882/2004 [33], which provides a global uniform 

concept for carrying out official controls to verify compliance. The FFCU has developed 

a multi-annual plan for carrying out controls at the cantonal level and presents a report 

each year to the EC [18]. 

Official veterinarians are required to inspect 10 percent of the holdings in their area each 

year for compliance with animal health, animal welfare, animal identification, and 

veterinary drug ordinances [20]. The specific holdings are chosen at the cantonal level 

based on an analysis of risk and the inspections are carried out using standardized forms. 

Penalties are decided at the cantonal level and range from movement restrictions and 

fines (up to 20,000 CHF or about 17,500 USD) to forced removal of animals and 

imprisonment (up to 6 months). Producer noncompliance is reportedly low. 

1.4 Discussion

The SVS is hierarchically organized with considerable autonomy at the cantonal level. 

There appears to be clear lines of communication, command, and reporting between the 

federal and cantonal veterinary services. Veterinary officials have a good working 

knowledge of pertinent EC and Swiss animal health legislation and regulatory 

procedures, processes, and responsibilities are well defined. Federal guidance and 

cantonal quality management practices—including ISO certification and accreditation—

together promote consistency in the implementation of animal health policies and 

procedures. 
15

For trade and animal disease control purposes, Switzerland and Liechtenstein comprise a 

common veterinary area with harmonized animal health legislation. Federal and cantonal 

veterinary officials have sufficient legal authority, personnel, and financial resources to 

effectively implement and enforce animal health measures. Training and qualification of 

official veterinarians are standardized and the cantons have taken steps to limit conflicts 

of interest for private veterinarians authorized to perform official duties. Systems are in 

place to monitor SVS performance at all levels, as well as producer compliance. 

In implementing the Agricultural Agreement, Switzerland and Liechtenstein adopted 

controls consistent with those prescribed by EC legislation regarding animal health, 

abolished border veterinary controls, and facilitated free trade in agricultural products on 

the EU internal common market. The BVET has enacted legislation that is sufficiently 

similar to that of the EC to produce nearly identical end results. The Swiss regulatory and 

legal systems allow for rapid introduction or amendment of animal health measures, if 

necessary. The BVET has an effective system to monitor for changes in EC animal health 

legislation that require changes in Swiss legislation. 

Feeding of heat-treated catering waste to pigs is strictly regulated and is scheduled to be 

phased out by July 2011. The high degree of regulatory oversight, along with the 

potential for substantial fines, high producer awareness, and the desire to adhere to label 

or organic standards, substantially limit the likelihood of CSF transmission through 

catering waste feeding. 

2. Disease status in the region

2.1 CSF in domestic swine 

Swiss authorities consider Switzerland and Liechtenstein free of CSF [18-20]. The 

disease has never been reported in Liechtenstein and was last detected in Switzerland in 

domestic swine in 1993, after almost 20 years without an outbreak. Five cases were 

reported in 1993: three in the canton Bern and two in the canton Fribourg. An 

epidemiological investigation indicated that CSF was introduced via infected meat that 

was incorrectly heat-treated before it was fed to swine. All outbreaks were resolved by 

stamping out.

2.2 CSF in wild boar

Liechtenstein has never reported CSF in wild boar [20]. A major CSF outbreak in 

Switzerland in wild boar occurred in 1998-99 in the canton Ticino, which lies on the 

southern border of Switzerland [18, 19]. An epidemiological investigation suggested that 

the disease was introduced via infected wild boar from a nearby Italian province, where 

an outbreak was ongoing [34]. 

The Swiss outbreak was controlled via hunting management strategies [18-20]. Officials 

implemented a risk zone and a surveillance zone—hunting was prohibited in the risk 

zone but continued in the surveillance zone for 1 month after the outbreak was detected. 

Hunting targeted toward young animals resumed in both zones after 7 months. The 

outbreak did not spread to other cantons or to domestic pigs, and the last virus-positive 

wild boar was detected in March 1999 [18-20]. Three CSF surveys in wild boar were 

conducted between 2001 and 2005 with negative results, as described in Section 9. 
16

2.3 Other swine diseases

Switzerland last reported SVD and FMD outbreaks in 1974 and 1980, respectively, and 

has never reported an ASF outbreak [4, 19, 35]. APHIS considers Switzerland free of 

these diseases. Liechtenstein has never reported an outbreak of CSF, SVD, or ASF; the 

last FMD outbreak was in 1963-64 [20]. BVET officials indicated that Switzerland and 

Liechtenstein are free of Aujeszky’s disease (pseudorabies), porcine brucellosis, porcine 

reproductive and respiratory syndrome, and transmissible porcine gastroenteritis.

2.4 Discussion

Liechtenstein has never reported a CSF outbreak, whereas the last outbreaks in 

Switzerland occurred over 15 years ago in domestic swine and 10 years ago in wild boar. 

Both time periods exceed OIE recommendations for CSF freedom. The SVS controlled 

the outbreaks in domestic swine and wild boar through stamping out and hunting 

management strategies, respectively, as recommended by the EC and international animal 

health entities. 

3. Disease status of adjacent regions

3.1 Background

Switzerland and Liechtenstein share a common land border across the Rhine River and 

the two are surrounded by EU Member States (see Figure 1.1). Switzerland also borders 

France, Germany, Austria, and Italy, whereas Liechtenstein borders only Austria. 

Recent CSF outbreaks in domestic swine in the EU Member States around Switzerland 

and Liechtenstein have been attributed to contact with infected wild boar [4, 35]. 

Outbreaks occurred in Austria in March 1996, in Italy (Sardinia) in 2003, in France in 

2002, and in Germany in 2006. In addition, CSF virus was detected in wild boar in 

Austria in 2001 and France in 2002, and is thought to be endemic in wild boar on the 

Italian island of Sardinia, in the North Rhine-Westfalia and Rhineland-Palatine regions of 

Germany, and in parts of the Bas-Rhin and Moselle departments in France [36]. None of 

the outbreaks in wild boar or domestic swine has occurred within 100 kilometers of 

Switzerland or Liechtenstein.

The EU Member States around Switzerland and Liechtenstein are part of an APHISdefined EU CSF region (9 CFR 94.0) that APHIS considers low risk for CSF (9 CFR 

94.9, 94.10). One reason for the low-risk designation is that CSF virus is known to 

circulate at low levels in segments of the wild boar population within the defined region, 

with sporadic outbreaks expected in domestic swine. EU Member States are subject to 

harmonized EC legislation concerning animal health and disease control, which includes 

recognition of regions within Member States—including France and Germany—that the 

EC restricts due to CSF in wild boar (see Section 7.1.1). 

3.2 Discussion

CSF infection in free-ranging wild boar is not an immediate concern for introduction of 

the disease into Switzerland or Liechtenstein, since the closest known infected population 

(in Germany) is located over 150 kilometers from the Swiss border. However, CSF in 

wild boar has proven very difficult to eradicate and the infection may spread to other, 

closer populations over time [14]. Wild boar are not considered migratory in nature, but 
17

individual animals may travel substantial distances in search of food, during mating 

season, or in response to hunting or other habitat disruptions. CSF virus may also be 

introduced via wild boar carcasses brought back by hunters, as described in Section 7.

4. Extent of an active disease control program

As described in Section 2, Switzerland has not detected CSF virus in domestic swine 

since 1993, whereas the last case in wild boar occurred in March 1999 (see Section 9 for 

a discussion of surveillance). Liechtenstein has never detected CSF in domestic swine or 

wild boar. Consequently, neither Switzerland nor Liechtenstein currently engages in 

active CSF control. 

5. Vaccination status of the region

Vaccination against CSF is prohibited in both Switzerland and Liechtenstein [20]. The

BVET could authorize vaccination in an outbreak situation, if necessary. 

6. Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk

6.1 General information

Switzerland consists of three distinct geographical regions: the Jura, the Swiss Alps, and 

the Swiss plateau. The Jura is a small mountain range located north of the Alps, which 

covers the western border with France in the cantons of Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, 

Solothurn, Bern, Jura, Neuchâtel, and Vaud (see Figure 6.1). The highest peak in the Jura 

range is 5,643 feet. 

Figure 6.1: Geographical regions of Switzerland

Jura

Swiss Plateau

Swiss Alps

Ticino
18

The Swiss plateau is a large basin that extends from the Jura Mountains to the Alps, 

confined to the southwest by Lake Geneva and to the northeast by Lake Constance and 

the Rhine River. The Swiss plateau flows into Germany through the northern cantons of 

Thurgau and Zürich, as well as parts of Aargau and Schaffhausen. The canton of Geneva, 

along the border with France, also forms part of the Swiss plateau.

The Swiss Alps are situated south of the Swiss plateau and extend across the border into 

southern France, Italy, and Austria. The highest peaks in the Swiss Alps are the 

Dufourspitze (15,202 feet) and the Dom (14,911 feet) in the canton of Valais, along the 

border with Italy. Liechtenstein is situated entirely in the Alps. In the southernmost point 

of Switzerland—the canton Ticino—the Alps descend towards the plains in Italy. 

6.2 Discussion

A large part of the Swiss border consists of mountain ranges, rivers, and lakes. The Alps 

provide a substantial barrier to introduction of CSF virus via free-ranging wild boar from 

Austria and most of Italy, except for the canton of Ticino. The Alps and Lake Geneva 

also substantially limit wild boar movement into Switzerland from southern France. To a 

lesser degree, the Jura Mountains protect against wild boar entering from northern 

France. However, the Swiss plateau provides little barrier to wild boar movements across 

the border from Germany or a small part of southern France. 

7. Movement control and biosecurity from higher risk regions

Under Swiss law, the BVET is responsible for establishing import and export regulations 

and for international agreements. The border veterinary inspection service—which is 

directly attached to the BVET—implements veterinary inspections at the BIPs. The 

cantonal veterinary services implement the provisions of import and export regulations 

such as observation periods and quarantines, official inspections at destination, export 

health certificates, etc. In general, live animals and animal products entering Switzerland 

and Liechtenstein from EU Member States are not subject to border veterinary controls, 

whereas the same commodities from other countries must undergo veterinary inspection 

at an EC-approved BIP. 

7.1. Import controls

7.1.1 Importation from EU Member States

As a function of the Agricultural Agreement and the Additional Agreement, Switzerland 

and Liechtenstein have gradually adopted import and trade regulations that are equivalent 

to those of the EC with regard to live animals and animal products [21, 22]. The primary 

legal acts on the Swiss side are the Animal Health Ordinance and the Ordinance of 18 

April 2007 on the import, transit, and export of animals and animal products. The 

Agreements were fully implemented as of 1 January 2009, at which point all border 

veterinary controls between EU Member States and Switzerland/Liechtenstein were 

abolished [26, 37]. 

Trade in live animals and animal products between Switzerland/Liechtenstein and EU 

Member States now occurs under the same conditions as for intra-community trade [18-

20, 26]. Live animals, semen, ova, and embryos must be accompanied by the appropriate 
19

intra-community trade health certificate, signed by an official veterinarian. Fresh meat 

and other products of animal origin are accompanied by commercial documents only.

Live animals undergo inspection by an official veterinarian at the point of origin; if all 

necessary conditions are fulfilled for the animals and the farm, the official veterinarian 

fills out the live swine health certificate in TRACES2

 2 TRACES – Trade Control and Expert System: an internet-based program that EU Member States use to 

coordinate and track movements of live animals, animal products, and genetic material within the EU. 

, then signs and stamps [38]. 

TRACES notifies the appropriate cantonal veterinary office to expect the shipment. The 

importer must notify the cantonal veterinary office within 24 hours of receipt [39]. 

In keeping with EC requirements, all swine from EU Member States must be kept 

separate for 30 days on the destination farm. However, BVET technical instructions also 

require an official veterinarian to visit the farm and inspect the new animals at least 3 

times during the 30-day period [20, 40], which is more stringent than the random spotchecks required by the EC [41]. 

Previous APHIS risk assessments noted that EC regulations substantially limit the risk of 

CSF spread among EU Member States by restricting movement of live swine, swine 

genetic material (semen, ova, and embryos), and wild boar carcasses from areas where 

CSF is endemic in the wild boar population [42-45]. However, the assessments further 

concluded that CSF outbreaks occurring outside of established control zones pose a risk 

to the intra-community trade and export markets until detection. 

Commission Decision 2008/855/EC specifically prohibits intra-community trade of swine 

genetic material from restricted areas in Germany, France, Slovakia, and Hungary, as 

well as all of Bulgaria [36]. Live swine may move out of restricted areas to other areas 

within the same Member State, contingent upon clinical examination by an official 

veterinarian and a negative serological test for CSF, or to slaughter. Movement of live 

swine to a non-restricted area in another Member State is prohibited. 

Commission Decision 2008/855/EC also requires additional guarantees on fresh pork, 

pork products, and pork preparations from Bulgaria, although trade and/or export of these 

products from the other restricted areas is allowed [36]. Commission Decision 

2006/779/EC prohibits intra-Community trade in live swine, swine genetic material, and 

all but heat-treated pork from Romania [46].

7.1.2 Importation from non-EU countries

Legislative controls

Switzerland and Liechtenstein have also legislation equivalent to that of the EC for

importation of animals and animal products from third countries [18-20, 26]. Since 1 

April 2007, consignments for export to Switzerland or Liechtenstein must be 

accompanied by the corresponding EC-third country certificates. Third countries that the 

EC approves to export to EU Member States may also export to Switzerland and 

Liechtenstein. EC-approved slaughter establishments, cutting plants, and cold storage 

units in third countries are approved for export to Switzerland and Liechtenstein as well.
20

EC regulations allow importation of live swine from Chile, Canada, New Zealand, and 

Iceland; fresh pork, pork products, and fresh meat of farmed non-domestic suidae from 

Australia, Chile, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States; and fresh meat of wild 

suidae from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States [47]. Live swine 

from Chile and Iceland must test negative for CSF and SVD within 30 days of export. EC 

regulations also allow importation of live swine, pork, and pork products from Norway as 

a provision of the European Economic Area Agreement [48]. APHIS recognizes all of 

these countries as free of CSF, with restrictions on exports from Chile as described in 9 

CFR 94.25.

3

 3

Regions listed under 9 CFR 94.25 are in a special category, because even though APHIS has determined 

that the region is free of CSF, one or more of the following conditions occur: (1) the region supplements 

their national pork supply with fresh, chilled, or frozen pork from regions that are not designated in 9 CFR 

94.9 and 9 CFR 94.10 as free of CSF; (2) the region supplements their national pork supplies with pork 

from CSF affected regions that is not processed in accordance with 9CFR Part 94.17; (3) they share a

common land border with CSF-affected regions; or (4) they import live swine from CSF-affected regions 

under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. The full 

text of 9 CFR 94.25 is provided in Annex 1.

The EC also allows importation of swine semen from approved collection centers in 

Canada, New Zealand, and the United States [49]. These countries are approved to export 

swine embryos and ova as well; however, no embryo collection teams in these countries 

were approved at the time this report was written. 

Border inspection points

The EC approved Switzerland’s Geneva and Zürich airport BIPs to conduct border 

veterinary controls on packed products for human consumption, products not intended for 

human consumption, and small animals (including zoo animals), as of 1 January 2009 

[20, 26]. Liechtenstein has no approved BIPs. No Swiss BIP is approved to receive swine 

or other large animals from non-EU countries; these animals must undergo veterinary 

inspection at an EU BIP before entering Switzerland. 

The Swiss airport BIPs are designed to EC specifications as described by Annex II of

Council Directive 97/78/EC [50] and Commission Decision 2001/812/EC [51]. There are 

separate sectors for unloading and inspection of live animals, products of animal origin 

for human consumption, and products of animal origin not intended for human 

consumption [20]. The live animal sector has appropriate facilities for small animal 

restraint and housing, and the product sectors have adequate room for offloading,

examination, sampling, and storage. All employees must go through a clean room with 

changing facilities when entering or exiting any sector. Each sector is cleaned and 

disinfected after unloading and reloading, as are the storage rooms if used.

The BIPs are fully computerized with an online database for registering consignments 

and access to the TRACES system [20]. The BVET informs the BIPs of any changes to

EC or Swiss legislation that impact veterinary inspection at the borders; all import control 

legislation is also posted on the BVET website and maintained in hard copy at the BIPs. 

A manual of procedures provides guidance on the implementation of EC import control 

legislation.
21

BIP inspectors are all veterinarians [20]. The inspectors receive ongoing training on EC 

and Swiss legislation, TRACES, live animal handling, animal welfare, and international 

trade of endangered species (CITES), as well as on-the-job training. In 2008, the Zürich 

BIP received approximately 1,000 live animals (mostly pets) and 10,000 consignments of 

animal products, but no shipments of fresh pork or pork products. 

At the time of the APHIS site visit the Zürich BIP appeared to be operating within the 

scope of available resources, although BIP staff indicated that the workload had increased 

substantially since January 2009 [20]. The veterinary inspectors appeared knowledgeable 

of pertinent EC and Swiss legislation and were confident in their job skills. Both the 

BVET and cantonal officials inspect the BIPs regularly, as does the EC’s Food and 

Veterinary Office [52].

Inspection procedures

Within 24 hours prior to arrival, the BIP receives a faxed copy of the first page of the 

EC’s Common Veterinary Entry Document (CVED) to announce shipments of 

commodities that might require inspection [20]. Customs assigns each consignment a 

combined nomenclature code that indicates whether it must undergo veterinary 

inspection. Of all the consignments flagged for veterinary inspection, 100% undergo a 

document check and a random sample undergo a physical check: 20% of Category I 

items (meat, fresh fish, canned fish, eggs); 50% of Category II items (oysters, lobsters, 

rabbit meat, poultry, wild game); and 1-10% of Category III items (semen, embryos, 

snails). Once a consignment has been inspected and passed, the inspector enters the 

information into TRACES and the relevant cantonal veterinary office is notified to expect 

the shipment; the canton is responsible for any necessary follow-up actions.

Most confiscations occur because of issues with the accompanying documents [20]. 

Confiscated items are loaded onto a truck under supervision, which delivers them to an 

approved disposal establishment for shredding and incineration. The truck driver works 

for the disposal company; s/he signs a manifest at pick-up and brings it to the disposal 

company; after disposal, company officials sign the manifest and return it to the BIP. The 

cantonal veterinary services are responsible for inspecting the transporters and the 

disposal companies.

7.1.3 Volume of import

Switzerland and Liechtenstein import very few live pigs—none from non-EU Member 

States since 1999—in part because there is a 1,000 CHF tariff per pig [20, 53]. New 

genetics are acquired by importing swine semen. Most imported live pigs are specificpathogen free animals from EU Member States—primarily Denmark—that are used for

pharmaceutical research. Approximately 1,000 pigs from France are slaughtered each 

year at a plant that is just inside the Swiss border and the meat is returned to France; the 

Swiss do not consider these to be imported. Pigs imported from non-EU countries are 

subject to a 30-day on-farm quarantine, similar to the observation period described above. 

In contrast, Switzerland and Liechtenstein are net importers of pork meat [53]. Total 

imports ranged between 6.7 and 11.7 million kilograms for 2003-07; in 2008, imports 

increased to 15.3 million kilograms (see Annex 3). Primary source countries are EU 

Member States—Germany, Austria, Italy, and France—as well as Australia and the 
22

United States. In 2006, Switzerland imported 269 kilograms of pork meat from Japan, 

which APHIS does not consider free of CSF. No susceptible commodities were imported 

from Japan in 2007 or 2008, however, and since 2009 harmonized EC and Swiss import 

regulations prohibit pork meat from Japan.

7.2 Export controls

Official veterinarians who receive additional specific training from the BVET are 

authorized to sign export certificates [20]. There is no federal control over export 

certification other than the training and authorization process. Export certificates for 

animal products for human consumption are signed by the cantonal public health 

services, in consultation with the cantonal veterinary services if necessary. 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein export very few live swine, usually less than 50 animals 

per year, primarily for breeding [20, 53]. In some instance, live animal exports are 

arranged by a Swiss export company. An official veterinarian authorized by the BVET 

inspects the animals for export, takes any samples for testing required by the receiving 

country, and completes the health certificate. 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein also export very little pork or pork products, averaging just 

211,000 kilograms annually from 2003-08 [53]. Slaughter plants, cutting plants, cold 

storage units, and other entities must be approved by the EC to export to EU Member 

States, just as they must be approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food 

Safety and Inspection Service to export to the United States [47]. Swiss officials 

indicated that the primary exports are dried meat and specialty sausages [20].

7.3 Transit controls

Swiss animal welfare laws prohibit transit of cloven-hoofed animals—including swine—

through Switzerland by road [18-20]. Animal welfare provisions are not part of the 

Agricultural Agreement or Additional Agreement and are generally more restrictive in 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein than in EU Member States. Transit by train is allowed; 

however, the rail companies no longer transport livestock. 

7.4 Veterinary control of passenger traffic

Per Swiss officials, all border crossings into Switzerland and Liechtenstein are controlled 

by the Swiss customs service [18, 20]. Swiss officials estimate that more than 1 million 

persons cross the Swiss border each day. 

Switzerland joined the Schengen Area in December 2008, which consists of most EU 

Member States, Iceland, and Norway [54]. Liechtenstein is not currently part of the 

Schengen Area but is expected to join on 1 November 2009. Routine customs controls—

i.e., controls on persons for the mere reason that they cross the border—are not permitted

within the Schengen Area. Consequently, identity and customs checks on travelers 

crossing the borders of participating countries by road, rail, or air are not routinely carried 

out. However, the Swiss customs service continues to conduct spot checks on travelers 

from other Schengen countries based on an analysis of risk. 

Until Liechtenstein becomes part of the Schengen Area the Austria-Liechtenstein border 

crossing—an external Schengen border—is continuously manned by Swiss customs and 

border guards [55]. An interim arrangement involving video surveillance of border 
23

crossings has allowed the Liechtenstein-Switzerland border to remain open without onsite immigration and customs checkpoints. 

Customs inspection at the Swiss airports is based on self-declaration, although there is no 

declaration form to fill out as for the United States [20]. Travelers from EU Member 

States may carry personal consignments of meat, milk, and derived products; products of 

animal origin are prohibited from most other countries. Posters and pamphlets promoting 

public awareness of prohibited commodities are prominently displayed at the airports. 

After retrieving their baggage, travelers exit through doorways marked either “nothing to 

declare” or “goods to declare” [20]. Declared items are inspected on the “goods to 

declare” side, whereas baggage is randomly inspected on the “nothing to declare” side. 

Customs officers may choose to inspect 100 percent of passenger luggage from flights 

that are considered high risk based on the country of origin of the flight or the travelers. If 

prohibited commodities are found, the traveler may voluntarily dispose of them in 

specially marked locked bins. The customs service keeps a list of confiscated items, 

which are disposed of as for items confiscated at the BIP. The confiscation rate is less 

than 1 percent [18]. Custom agents refer undeclared items requiring veterinary inspection 

to the BIP. 

7.5 Discussion

Swiss BIPs are well equipped and appear to be operating within the scope of available 

resources; the veterinary inspectors are knowledgeable of pertinent EC and Swiss 

legislation and confident in implementing inspection procedures. Switzerland and 

Liechtenstein have adopted import and trade regulations concerning live animals and 

animal products that are equivalent to the EC regulations that apply to all EU Member 

States. Consequently, the baseline risk of CSF introduction into Switzerland or 

Liechtenstein through import or trade is similar to that of an EU Member State. However, 

Switzerland has implemented additional measures that protect against the introduction of 

CSF via import, transit, and trade of live animals, as discussed below. 

Other potential pathways for disease introduction include (1) import and trade of animal 

products; (2) incoming vehicular and human traffic; and (3) agricultural commodities for 

personal consumption. In each of these cases, the probability of CSF introduction into 

Switzerland depends in large part on the ability of the surrounding EU Member States to 

detect CSF outbreaks in domestic swine and wild boar. As noted in Section 3, the 

APHIS-defined EU CSF region is considered low risk for CSF, in part because CSF is 

endemic in segments of the wild boar population and CSF outbreaks are expected to 

occur at a low level in the domestic swine population. Previous assessments have found 

that, once detected, the control measures for CSF outbreaks in domestic swine described 

in EC regulations are effective [56]. 

7.5.1 Import and transit of live swine

Harmonized EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of swine from five non-EU 

countries, all of which APHIS considers free of CSF. However, in recent years 

Switzerland has only imported swine from EU Member States. Sourcing of swine from 

EU Member States is subject to EC restrictions on movement from areas affected with 

CSF in wild boar. The number of imported swine is very low, in part due to the high 
24

tariff; most are for pharmaceutical research and therefore isolated from the general swine 

population. All imported swine are subject to official inspections while under official 

observation (if from EU Member States) or quarantine (if from other countries). 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein have also prohibited the transit of cloven-hoofed animals 

by road for animal welfare reasons; although transit is permitted by rail, the railways no 

longer carry livestock. The low number of imported swine, the import controls in place, 

and the lack of transit of live swine combine to substantially limit the risk of CSF 

introduction via this pathway. 

7.5.2 Import and trade of swine products

Switzerland and Liechtenstein are net importers of pork and pork products. Harmonized 

EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of fresh pork, pork products, fresh meat of 

farmed non-domestic suidae, and fresh meat of wild suidae from very few non-EU 

countries, all of which APHIS regards as free of CSF. Switzerland and Liechtenstein 

import pork and pork products primarily from EU Member States, mainly Germany, 

Austria, and France. With the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, there are no 

restrictions on sourcing of these commodities from areas of the EU that are affected by 

CSF in wild boar. Undetected outbreaks in these areas could allow slaughter of infected 

swine and introduction of the virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein via fresh pork.

Switzerland and Liechtenstein allow importation of swine semen from EU Member 

States, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Theoretically, the non-EU countries 

approved to export swine semen could also export embryos and ova; however, there are 

currently no EC-approved embryo collection teams in these countries. EC regulations 

prohibit movement of semen, embryos, and ova from areas of EU Member States that are 

affected by CSF in wild boar or domestic swine. These factors together limit the risk of 

introducing CSF via swine genetic material.

7.5.3 Incoming vehicular and human traffic

As discussed in Section 3, Switzerland shares land borders with Germany and France, 

both of which have regions restricted due to CSF in wild boar. There is considerable rail 

and road traffic from these countries into Switzerland and, since all are part of the 

Schengen Area, neither vehicles nor passengers are subject to routine customs 

inspections. Live-haul trucks must be cleaned, but not disinfected, after each transport. 

Sporadic outbreaks in domestic swine occur in areas where CSF is endemic in wild boar; 

since the virus can spread via fomites such as vehicle tires and clothing, undetected 

outbreaks pose a risk for CSF introduction. Introduction of CSF virus by this pathway is 

therefore theoretically possible, particularly in the event of an undetected outbreak in 

domestic swine. However, factors such as the low number of imported swine—and hence 

incoming live-haul trucks—somewhat limit the risk of introducing CSF by this pathway.

7.5.4 Agricultural commodities for personal consumption

Land border crossings into Switzerland are controlled by the Swiss customs service, 

without veterinary control per se. Travelers from EU Member States may transport 

agricultural commodities, including pork and pork products, for personal consumption. 

The Swiss customs service does not routinely inspect incoming road or rail traffic since 

Switzerland joined the Schengen Area, except for at the Austria-Liechtenstein border. 
25

Since CSF virus can be present in fresh pork and some pork products, undetected 

outbreaks in EU Member States pose a risk for CSF introduction. 

Travelers from non-EU Member States may not transport agricultural commodities, 

including pork and pork products, into Switzerland. Customs inspection at Swiss airports 

is primarily based on self-declaration, with targeted inspection based on risk. Signs 

indicating prohibited items and prominently placed amnesty bins may decrease the 

amount of prohibited commodities unintentionally carried across the border.

EC regulations prohibit hunters from removing wild boar carcasses from CSF-affected 

regions of EU Member States where hunting is allowed. Switzerland and Liechtenstein 

rely on compliance with this provision to prevent CSF introduction via hunted wild boar. 

The Swiss customs service does not routinely inspect for hunted wild boar in vehicles 

coming into Switzerland and wild boar carcasses submitted for trichinosis testing are not 

routinely tested for CSF. 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing

8.1 Census information

8.1.1 Domestic swine

In 2009, Switzerland had approximately 11,500 swine holdings with 1.6 million pigs, of 

which about 150,000 were sows (see Table 8.1) [20]. Liechtenstein had an additional 

1,758 pigs on 15 premises. In general, large breeding farms in Switzerland average 150 

sows, whereas large fattening farms average 1,000 pigs. Pig production is concentrated in 

eastern Switzerland in the cantons of Thurgau and St. Gallen, and also in central 

Switzerland in the cantons of Luzern and Bern (see Figure 8.1) [20]. Per Swiss officials, 

there are few backyard pig holdings in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 

Table 8.1: Switzerland swine census data

Number of farms Number of swine

Swine facilities (total) 11,487 1,631,593

Nucleus herds 43 3,200

Multipliers 150 11,000

Production (farrowing) 5,400 137,000

Finishers 9,400 1,300,000

8.1.2 Wild boar

Swiss officials estimate the wild boar population in Switzerland to be between 25,000-

66,000 animals and growing, based on hunting statistics and expert knowledge [18, 20]. 

Predictive modeling shows that the Swiss Alps create a temporally stable subdivision of 

the wild boar population with 80 percent of the animals located to the north of the 

mountains and the remainder to the south (see Figure 8.2) [57-59]. The number of adult 

animals killed has cycled around 2,800 per year since 2000, whereas the number of 

young animals (yearlings and juveniles) killed has increased from approximately 1,280 to 

3,710 over the same time period [57]. In 2007, young animals accounted for almost 57 

percent of the hunted wild boar, up from 32 percent in 2000. There are very few wild 

boar in Liechtenstein, since the habitat in the Alps is not favorable for wild boar [20].
26

Figure 8.1: Geographic distribution of domestic swine

Pigs per km2

< 13

151 - 300

> 300

13 - 150

Figure 8.2: Probability of wild boar occurrence (modeled data)
27

8.2 Production and marketing 

Swine production is highly integrated, with sales arranged by contract with 2-3 main 

dealers [20]. Feeder pigs move from breeding facilities to fattening farms when they 

weigh about 20 kilograms and are slaughtered at roughly 90-110 kilograms. There are no 

marketing centers or auctions for swine. The BVET approves persons or holdings which 

have the potential to trade, collect, and/or export live animals [18]. These approvals are 

for a limited time and must be renewed.

The Swiss swine industry has some of the strictest animal welfare regulations in Europe 

[20]. Farrowing crates are prohibited and outdoor access is encouraged. Feed is expensive 

because the government protects Swiss production with heavy subsidies, including levies 

on imports. All farms have to comply with the welfare code but there are premiums of up 

to 25 CHF per pig produced on farms that are especially welfare friendly, to encourage 

such systems. The premiums are paid by the supermarkets, which entitles them to use a 

special label on meat and other products. Producers are required to conform to the label 

standards and are inspected 1-2 times per year for compliance. 

Swine on farms visited by an APHIS team in April 2009 had free access to outdoor pens 

[20]. Biosecurity was minimal: employees did not shower or change clothes prior to 

working with the pigs, and feed trucks and other vehicles had free access to areas 

adjacent to outdoor pens. There were few exterior fences or other barriers to prevent 

contact with wild boar or entry of unauthorized vehicles or persons. 

8.3 Animal and herd identification

The BVET has issued an ordinance dictating that animals for food production be 

traceable across all production, processing, and sales stages [18]. Each entity in the 

production chain (breeder, feeder, etc) must be able to provide information to cantonal 

authorities about the origin and destination of the animals and derived products (i.e., be 

able to trace one step forward and one step back).

The BVET has also issued detailed technical instructions on animal identification, 

holding registration, and movement controls [20, 24]. Since 1 April 2000, pigs must be

identified within 5 days of birth with a single eartag that indicates the registration number 

of the birth premises. The registration numbers for both Switzerland and Liechtenstein 

begin with the ISO code for Switzerland. The SVS uses an electronic database called 

TVD to store information about each registered swine holding—even single-animal 

holdings—as well as slaughter plants. Each holding must also keep an on-farm register of 

movements, births, and deaths. 

8.4 Internal movement controls

The SVS currently tracks swine movements through a system of paper records [20, 24]. 

Most swine movements are directly from holding to holding or to slaughter. The owner 

or seller must fill out a movement control document (Begleitdokument) before the 

transport occurs. The document includes information on the holding of origin, the 

registration number, the type of animals, the destination, and the health status of the 

animals. A copy of the document must remain with both the buyer and seller for 3 years. 

An APHIS site visit team found minor discrepancies and omissions on movement control 

documents at swine holdings and a slaughter plant [20]. At present, no copy goes to the 
28

BVET or the cantonal veterinary authorities. No health certificates are required for 

animal movement within Switzerland or Liechtenstein. Swiss officials are in the process 

of modifying the TVD database to enable tracking of all swine movements, as is 

currently done for cattle; this capability is anticipated by January 2011. 

8.5 Veterinary oversight

Official veterinarians are required to inspect 10 percent of the holdings in their area each 

year for compliance with animal health, animal welfare, animal identification, and 

veterinary drug ordinances [20]. Producers may also contract with the Swine Health 

Service—a semi-private organization sponsored by the Swiss pig producers association—

which monitors swine health and helps farmers with management and health issues. 

Producers would contact their private veterinarian or the Swine Health Service if there 

was a drop in production or the pigs appeared unhealthy.

8.6 Slaughter practices

In 2009 there were 699 slaughter plants in Switzerland, of which 674 were approved for 

swine slaughter [20]. Approximately 112 cutting plants and 177 processing plants were 

approved for pork. In 2008, Switzerland slaughtered 2,645,288 pigs with a carcass 

confiscation rate of 0.16 percent. There are no swine slaughter plants in Liechtenstein; 

most swine from Liechtenstein are slaughtered in Switzerland. 

All cattle, swine, and poultry are slaughtered under veterinary control and approximately 

95 percent are slaughtered in establishments that are approved for export to the EU [18]. 

All slaughter plants must have a quality management system in place that follows Hazard 

Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles. Biosecurity at a large swine 

slaughter plant visited by an APHIS team in April 2009 was very good.

No slaughter plants for game animals are currently approved for export [18, 19]. The 

farmed game industry in Switzerland and Liechtenstein is small; game is usually shot on 

the premises and processed in small plants supervised by the cantonal veterinary services. 

Hunted game is eviscerated by the hunters and the meat consumed in local households 

and restaurants; wild boar for human consumption must be tested for trichina worms. 

8.7 Discussion

The swine industry in Switzerland and Liechtenstein is small, highly integrated, and well 

regulated. The economic incentives for swine producers to adhere to Switzerland’s strict 

animal welfare regulations and to follow organic or “natural” production practices limit 

intentional feeding of untreated waste food. Veterinary oversight is considerable and the

official inspection process is thorough. 

Good herd registration and animal identification systems are in place. The current paperbased swine movement control system does not allow federal or cantonal veterinary 

officials to efficiently track individual swine movements or the number of swine on each 

holding; however, the system is sufficient for traceback in the event of an animal disease 

emergency, and improvements are expected by 2011. 

In recent years, Switzerland has witnessed a considerable increase in its wild boar 

population. At the same time, outdoor rearing on pasture has become increasingly 

popular because of extra compensation for organically produced meat or compliance with 
29

animal welfare requirements that are promoted as incentives for farmers. The probability 

of contact between domestic swine and wild boar—and perhaps disease transmission—

has therefore increased as well, particularly considering the general lack of perimeter

fencing and other biosecurity measures. 

9. Disease surveillance

9.1 Active surveillance

9.1.1 Domestic swine

As noted in Section 2, there is no national surveillance plan for CSF in domestic swine or 

wild boar in Switzerland or Liechtenstein [18-20]. The last active survey of domestic 

swine occurred in 2001, when the SVS sampled 41,124 breeding sows from 2,540 herds; 

all tested negative for CSF [18]. The majority of testing since that time has been for 

import or export of domestic swine, or for boars entering artificial insemination centers

(see Table 9.1).

9.1.2 Wild boar

The SVS conducted active surveillance in wild boar in the surveillance and risk zones 

established during the CSF outbreak in the canton of Ticino [18, 20]. From May 1998 to 

January 2000, 1,294 wild boar that were shot or found dead were tested for CSF. One 

animal from the surveillance zone was seropositive, whereas 179 of 528 wild boar (34%) 

from the risk zone were virus-positive and an additional 162 wild boar were seropositive 

[60]. During the first hunting season, seropositive animals were found in all age groups, 

but 12 months later only animals over 1 year of age had antibodies. The last viruspositive wild boar was detected in March 1999.

Table 9.1: CSF testing in domestic swine and wild boar 2001 – 2008

Year

Domestic swine Wild boar

Serology Virus 

isolation

No. 

positive Serology Virus isolation

Antibody 

positive

Virus 

positive

2001 325 15 0 976 190 55 0

2002 394 33 0 692 25 4 0

2003 395 13 0 849 2 2 0

2004 346 12 0 322 3 0 0

2005 414 11 0 321 12 0 0

2006 492 18 0 148 2 0 0

2007 669 34 0 126 0 0 0

2008 718 35 0 197 0 0 0

The BVET conducted three serologic surveys of hunted wild boar throughout 

Switzerland between 2001 and 2005; each survey was designed to detect 1 percent CSF 

prevalence with 95 percent confidence [18, 59]. The first survey (November 2001 –

February 2002) found 8 of 628 samples positive on ELISA, whereas the second survey 

(November 2002 – February 2003) found 20 of 1,239 samples positive in initial screening 

[18]. However, only 2 samples from each survey were confirmed positive, resulting in 

prevalence estimates of 0.32 and 0.16 percent, respectively. All four positive samples 

originated from wild boar over 2 years old from Ticino, which suggests that they 
30

acquired the infection during the 1998-99 outbreak in that area. The third survey (August 

2004 – February 2005) found no positive results among 708 samples tested [18, 58]. 

9.2 Passive surveillance

9.2.1 Domestic swine

Passive CSF surveillance in domestic swine is primarily based on clinical suspicion [18, 

20]. Suspect cases are usually identified and samples submitted by pathology laboratories 

or the Swine Health Service. Animals typically exhibit acute symptoms consistent with 

CSF, chronic disease, or abortion. From 2003 through September 2007, 171 specimens 

from suspect clinical cases were submitted to the IVI; all tested negative. The number of 

suspect cases has declined considerably in recent years, from a high of 50 in 1999 to 16 

in 2008 (see Figure 9.1).

The BVET and the cantonal veterinary services organize training for official and private 

veterinarians, as well as producers, on animal health topics including CSF (see Section 

1.3.2). The BVET produces and distributes informational pamphlets on CSF in French, 

German, and Italian [61]. An APHIS site visit team noted that, although official 

veterinarians appeared well-informed about CSF, swine producers were not familiar with 

the clinical signs or symptoms [20]. Producers indicated that they would call their private 

veterinarian if there was a drop in production or the pigs appeared unhealthy. 

9.2.2 Wild boar

Passive surveillance in wild boar is ongoing through hunter submissions [18, 20]. Hunters 

are required by law to report any wild boar found dead to an official veterinarian, who 

retrieves the carcass and submits it for pathology and CSF testing; carcasses are also 

tested for African swine fever (ASF). Between 2001 and September 2007, 5 specimens 

from suspect clinical cases in wild boar were submitted to the IVI and tested negative.

Figure 9.1: Suspect CSF cases 1999 – 2008

CSF

ASF

Some cantons—including Ticino and the northern cantons of Zürich, Basel, and 

Aargau—require CSF testing of all hunted wild boar [20]. Samples are taken by official 

veterinarians during meat inspection (required for trichina testing) and sent to the IVI, 
31

which pays for the testing (see Table 9.1). BVET officials indicated that they would 

implement a mandatory CSF surveillance plan in wild boar if the virus was detected in 

wild boar within 100 km of the Swiss border.

9.3 Discussion

CSF virus was last detected in domestic swine in 1993 and in wild boar in March 1999. 

Virus isolation becomes rare when the incidence of new infection is low, because the 

CSF virus cannot be detected for more than a few weeks following infection [62]. In 

contrast, seroprevalence is detectable at low incidence levels since antibodies can be 

detected for the lifetime of the animal [13, 62]. The lack of positive findings on the 

serological survey conducted in 2004-05 suggests that CSF virus was no longer 

circulating in wild boar in Switzerland at that time. 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein depend primarily on passive surveillance to detect a CSF 

outbreak in domestic swine or wild boar. This a potential issue for the SVS, since a CSF 

outbreak has not occurred in many years. Long-term absence of a disease can result in 

inexperience in recognizing disease signs, unfamiliarity with reporting requirements and 

procedures, and complacency regarding the possibility of the disease occurring. APHIS 

noted a low level of awareness of the clinical signs of CSF among swine farmers and a 

low level of biosecurity on swine farms, two factors that could enable a CSF outbreak to 

establish and spread prior to detection. 

The SVS is addressing this issue through training and outreach activities focused on 

producers and private veterinarians. In the event of an outbreak, the emergency response 

plan includes provisions for CSF-specific training and outreach for veterinary 

professionals, animal keepers, the hunting community, and the general public (see

Section 11).

10. Diagnostic laboratory capability

10.1 Overview

The IVI is the Swiss reference laboratory for CSF and other former OIE List A diseases 

[18-20]. It is located in Mittelhäusern, near the capital Bern, and is the only facility in 

Switzerland approved to conduct diagnostic testing for CSF. The BVET and the IVI also 

sponsor CSF research at the laboratory.

The Swiss government provides a budget of 8 million CHF (about 7 million USD), which 

covers the cost of running the facility [20]. Additional funding is provided for facility 

upkeep. Approximately 39 governmental employees and 20-25 doctoral and post-doctoral 

students work at the IVI. Laboratory personnel receive continuing education and annual 

training, and IVI officials teach courses at the Swiss veterinary schools on CSF in 

domestic swine and wild boar. The IVI also offers an annual course on CSF and other 

highly contagious diseases for official veterinarians.

10.2 Biosafety

The IVI laboratory is a biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) facility, built in 1992 [20]. 

Administrative offices are located in a separate building outside of the main laboratory 

facilities. All structures are modern and well-maintained, with up-to-date equipment. The 

laboratory is surrounded by fields and a high fence, with key-card access only. Entrance 
32

into the BSL-4 facility occurs through a series of airlocks. Persons exiting the BSL-4 

facility are required to avoid contact with susceptible animals for at least 3 days. 

The IVI has developed an extensive biosafety manual that provides principles and 

instructions for employees and visitors [63]. The IVI underwent both internal and 

independent biosafety reviews in 2007 that concluded that the institute is safe for 

humans, animals, and the environment in its normal operation as well as in a major 

animal health incident [64].

10.3 Diagnostics

All samples for CSF testing from Switzerland and Liechtenstein are sent to the IVI for 

diagnostic testing [20]. Tests are conducted according to OIE standards and include:

o Conventional RT-PCR (2 tests)

o Real-time RT-PCR

o Cell culture with immunoperoxidase staining

o Antibody ELISA (4 tests)

o Virus neutralization test

o Immunohistochemistry

o Sequencing of isolates

o Animal inoculation

Laboratory officials follow a flow chart when testing samples for CSF, with a guaranteed 

turn-around time of 6-8 hours for preliminary PCR results if the sample is of sufficient 

quality [20]. Initial testing is by real-time RT-PCR and cell culture. If the sample is 

positive using real-time RT-PCR, follow up is by conventional RT-PCR and sequencing 

to rule out ruminant pestiviruses (BVDV and BVD). If the sample is negative using realtime RT-PCR, the laboratory would wait for the results of cell culture. Samples testing 

positive for CSF are sent to the Institut für Virologie der Tierärztlichen Hochschule in 

Hannover, Germany, for confirmatory testing, as specified by the Agricultural Agreement

[21].

In the event of a CSF outbreak, the IVI would initially process surveillance samples using 

a sensitive ELISA [20]. Available ELISAs include commercial test kits by IDEXX as 

well as an in-house ELISA that is performed using standard methodology [65]. The IVI 

has the capacity to process 3,000 serum samples (ELISA) per day and 200 PCR per day 

on blood; tests on organ samples take longer. Procedures are in place to increase capacity 

in response to a disease outbreak [20]. 

The IVI uses an electronic laboratory information management system to track samples 

from receipt through final diagnosis and reporting of results [20]. The laboratory reports 

test results by email and hard copy to (1) the person who submitted the sample, such as a 

cantonal veterinary officer; and (2) a defined group of people at the BVET 

(Implementation and Monitoring groups). 

10.4 Quality assurance

The IVI is ISO 17025 accredited and inspected to renew accreditation every 2 years; the 

next inspection is scheduled for January 2011 [20]. The Bern veterinary office inspects 

annually for compliance with biosafety regulations—most recently in April 2009—as 
33

well as animal health and welfare regulations. The IVI participates in EU ring tests and 

other proficiency testing organized by foreign quality assessment providers.

10.5 Discussion

The IVI is modern and well-equipped, with well-trained scientific, technical, and 

administrative staff. Samples in the laboratory can be easily tracked from receipt to final 

diagnosis and reporting. Security is excellent and there is little likelihood that CSF virus 

could be accidentally carried out of the laboratory. Although Switzerland hosts a major 

pharmaceutical industry, no other facility is approved to work with live CSF virus. 

The IVI provides a full range of tests for the diagnosis and confirmation of CSF. 

Diagnostic procedures are equivalent, though not identical, to those specified for EU 

Member States in Commission Decision 2002/106/EC of 1 February 2002 approving a 

Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods, and criteria 

for evaluation of the laboratory test for the confirmation of classical swine fever [66]. 

Tests have been validated and include well-regarded commercial test kits used in many 

countries as well as tests developed by IVI personnel. Good quality control and quality 

assurance programs are in place. APHIS concludes that the IVI would quickly diagnose

an index case of CSF if proper samples were submitted. 

11. Emergency response capacity

The BVET has developed detailed emergency response procedures for CSF and other 

highly contagious animal diseases. Copies of applicable legislation and ordinances are 

available through the BVET website, as is information for animal keepers and the general 

public [67]. Information for federal and cantonal veterinary officials—including 

descriptions of responsibilities, detailed flowcharts, and technical instruction—is 

available on password-protected pages [68]. Each canton supplements the official 

response plan with lists of responsible personnel, specific implementation procedures, 

and contracts with other response entities in providing the infrastructure for emergency 

response. Information concerning the legal authority for emergency response, disease 

reporting requirements, response measures in domestic swine and wild boar, and funding 

for the response is summarized below. 

11.1 Legal authority

As discussed in Section 1, the Animal Health Law provides legal authority for control 

and eradication of CSF in Switzerland [27]; implementing measures are set forth in the 

Animal Disease Ordinance [69]. These legal acts provide official veterinarians the 

authority to restrict movement of animals and animal products to prevent disease spread, 

to access private property in order to carry out disease control and eradication measures, 

and to dispose of diseased or suspect animals as needed. The Animal Health Law also 

authorizes the BVET to issue technical instructions regarding animal disease control and 

eradication measures, and provides for federal oversight of implementation at the 

cantonal level.

The Animal Health Law provides for assessment of penalties for noncompliance with 

applicable animal health provisions: the maximum specified penalty for deliberate 

noncompliance is a fine of 20,000 CHF (17,500 USD) and 8 months in jail, whereas the 
34

maximum penalty for negligence is a fine of 6,000 CHF (5,250 USD) or 2 months in jail

[27]. Penalty amounts are determined by the cantonal courts.

Liechtenstein has enacted separate but equivalent legal provisions for control and 

eradication of CSF, and is otherwise fully integrated into the Swiss animal disease 

emergency response plans [20]. The role of Liechtenstein in emergency response is the 

same as the role of a Swiss canton. 

11.2 Reporting requirements

Under the Animal Health Law and Ordinance, all individuals who keep, care for, or 

handle animals are obligated to report signs or suspected signs of a disease outbreak to a 

private or official veterinarian [27, 69]. Private veterinarians must report to an official 

veterinarian, who in turn must notify the chief cantonal veterinarian, and on to the BVET. 

The BVET is obligated to inform the EC, other trading partners, and pertinent 

international entities if a case is confirmed. The BVET and the cantonal veterinary office 

are also required to inform the public of any outbreaks of highly contagious animal 

disease. Switzerland is fully integrated into the electronic animal disease notification 

system (ADNS) used by the EC and EU Member States [20].

Hunters and any other individuals who suspect the occurrence of CSF in free-living wild 

boar are obligated to report their suspicion immediately to an official veterinarian or 

cantonal veterinarian [27, 69]. The chief cantonal veterinarian must notify BVET 

immediately of any suspect or confirmed cases. The chief cantonal veterinarian is also 

responsible for informing the cantonal hunting office and for ensuring that information 

flow to the hunting community is established. 

11.3 Response coordination

The BVET is responsible for coordinating all highly contagious animal disease response 

measures and is the ultimate decision-making authority in emergency response situations

[27, 69]. Federal authorities may establish a panel of experts as an advisory body, which 

would consist of technical experts as well as cantonal and industry representatives. The 

cantonal veterinary offices are responsible for carrying out the actual response measures, 

including imposing movement restrictions in cases of suspected CSF occurrence. 

If CSF is confirmed, crisis centers are established at both the national and cantonal levels

[68, 69]. The national crisis center serves as the national coordinating and advisory body 

for emergency response activities and is responsible for analyzing outbreak information 

and developing recommendations for response strategies. The national crisis center also 

coordinates implementation of response measures through the cantonal veterinarian(s).

The cantonal crisis center serves as the central coordinating body for emergency response 

activities at the cantonal level and is responsible for coordinating the activities of the 

various entities involved in the response (veterinary services, civil defense, police, etc). 

The national and cantonal crisis centers collaborate to define disease control zones, 

coordinate disposal of carcasses and hazardous materials, and manage public relations.
35

11.4 Response measures

11.4.1 CSF suspected in domestic swine

Individuals who suspect the occurrence of a highly contagious animal disease are 

obligated to ensure that no animals, goods, or people leave the suspected affected 

premises until the disease suspicion is officially confirmed or ruled out [27, 69]. The 

chief cantonal veterinarian assigns an official veterinarian to investigate the suspected 

case and officially confirm or rule out disease suspicion [68]. The official decision on 

whether or not it is truly a suspect case is reported by telephone to the chief cantonal 

veterinarian. If the official veterinarian rules out CSF, the movement restrictions are 

lifted; if suspicion is confirmed, the official veterinarian renews the movement 

restrictions on the holding, initiates an epidemiological investigation, and collects 

samples for diagnostic testing. The restrictions are lifted if the test results are negative; 

otherwise, additional response measures are implemented as described below. 

11.4.2 CSF confirmed in domestic swine

If laboratory results confirm CSF on a holding, movement restrictions remain in place: 

unauthorized movement of animals from the holding is prohibited and access to the 

animals restricted to authorized persons only [68]. Informational notices are posted at the 

affected premises describing the restrictions in place and the penalties for noncompliance. 

An official veterinarian continues the epidemiological investigation using a standardized 

questionnaire and coordinates collection of additional clinical specimens for laboratory 

testing. The national crisis center carries out further epidemiological analysis using the 

information collected by the official veterinarian as well as animal registration and 

movement data.

Veterinary authorities establish a 3 km radius protection zone and 10 km radius 

surveillance zone around the affected holding and restrict movement of swine, persons, 

and goods within these zones [68, 69]. All herds within the zones that have susceptible 

animals are subject to veterinary inspection, including collection of clinical specimens. 

The national crisis center develops surveillance protocols that are implemented by the 

cantons. A cantonal veterinarian can authorize movement of animals to a designated 

slaughter facility, or to another herd within the same zone, provided that all herds in the 

zone have been inspected and no additional cases of CSF detected. Animal transport 

vehicles within the protection and surveillance zones must be cleaned and disinfected 

after each use.

Pigs on the affected holding(s) are culled under official supervision and the meat of 

recently slaughtered pigs is traced and destroyed [68]. Under Swiss law, the carcasses 

and meat are considered Category I material and as such must be rendered and then 

incinerated in approved establishments (this is more restrictive than EC regulations) [27]. 

There are two main disposal facilities, one each in eastern and western Switzerland [20]. 

Cleaning and disinfection of affected premises is carried out under the supervision of a 

cantonal veterinarian according to technical instructions issued by the BVET [68].

Restrictions imposed on an affected herd are lifted after cleaning and disinfection, 

although the herd remains subject to restrictions in place for the zone in which the herd is 

located. Protection zone restrictions can be lifted 30 days after the last affected herd is 
36

culled, provided that all herds in the zone have been serologically tested with negative 

results. After the protection zone is removed, any remaining surveillance zone restrictions 

apply. The surveillance zone measures can be lifted after a representative number of 

herds have tested negative for CSF, but no earlier than the protection zone measures are 

removed.

After CSF occurrence, free-range swine holdings can be repopulated after sentinel piglets 

have been introduced onto the holding and serologically tested twice three weeks apart 

with negative results [68]. Other types of holdings can be repopulated after completion of 

the same sentinel piglet testing procedure, or immediately. In the latter case, the herd is 

subject to specific restrictions for at least 60 days: direct contact of the swine with swine 

from other herds is prohibited and transfer of swine between the herd and any other herd 

is prohibited. These restrictions are lifted only after a representative number of the pigs 

have been serologically tested with negative results.

11.4.3 CSF in wild boar

Emergency response to CSF in free-living wild boar is a collaborative effort among 

numerous entities, including the BVET, the IVI, cantonal veterinary and emergency 

response personnel, the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN), the cantonal office 

responsible for hunting oversight (cantonal hunting office), and hunting associations. 

The roles and responsibilities of each entity are described in technical instructions 

developed by the BVET in conjunction with the FOEN [70]. Based on outbreak 

experiences in Switzerland and neighboring countries, the response plan incorporates 

both geographic and temporal components. 

The BVET is responsible for coordinating response actions at the national level, while the 

cantonal veterinary services are responsible for carrying out response actions [67, 70]. If 

CSF infection in wild boar is confirmed, the BVET activates the national crisis center, 

which in turn defines disease and surveillance zones, coordinates response in the cantons, 

and initiates data collection and analysis. The national crisis center is also charged with 

developing a plan for eradicating CSF from the wild boar population. 

During the initial (epidemic) phase of the outbreak, the chief cantonal veterinarian

prohibits hunting or feeding of any wild animals and orders biosecure disposal of all 

CSF-positive or -suspect wild boar carcasses [67, 70]. The chief cantonal veterinarian

orders biosecurity measures on pig farms to prevent contact between domestic swine and 

wild boar—such as penning of free-range pigs—and prohibits movement of domestic 

swine and swine semen, ova, and embryos from the disease and surveillance zones. The 

chief cantonal veterinarian can also close wild animal passages to adjacent areas.

During the second (transition) phase, response measures remain substantially the same 

except that hunting of wild boar piglets and yearlings is allowed [67]. The carcasses of all 

wild boar hunted or found dead must be taken to a veterinary control post, where an 

official veterinarian takes samples for CSF testing. Hunting by owners of domestic swine 

is prohibited, as is hunting that involves driving animals over long distances. The chief 

cantonal veterinarian provisionally confiscates all carcasses until they test negative for 

CSF on both serology and virology. Any carcass that tests positive, as well as any CSFsuspect carcass, is disposed of under official supervision. 
37

During the final (end) phase, wild boar populations are managed in accordance with the 

guidance developed by the FOEN. Measures applicable to domestic swine remain the 

same; however, the requirement for penning of domestic swine may be lifted [67]. The 

chief cantonal veterinarian provisionally confiscates the carcasses of wild boar until 

specimens from the carcasses test negative for CSF on virology; if positive, the carcass is 

disposed of under official supervision. 

11.5 Funding, indemnity, and compensation

Funding for federal emergency response measures is through the BVET annual budget 

and the BVET can request additional governmental funds if needed [20, 69]. Animal 

losses due to a highly contagious animal disease—including animals that died or were 

subject to mandatory culling or slaughter—are covered by federal indemnity, up to 90% 

of the appraised value of the animal; funding is through the FDEA. Additional 

compensation may be provided by the cantons and other sources, such as insurance

agencies. 

Emergency response funding at the cantonal level is provided by the individual cantons, 

usually through a designated fund to which producers must contribute annually; the 

amount is based on the number of animals and may be matched by the government [20]. 

Cantons are responsible for paying for cleaning and disinfection of premises and the costs 

of response to CSF detection in wild boars. The cantons may pay premiums for hunted

wild boar when hunting is ordered as a disease control measure.

11.6 Discussion

Switzerland and Liechtenstein have a well-organized and comprehensive system in place 

for responding to suspected or confirmed outbreaks of CSF and other highly contagious 

animal diseases. Federal law requires reporting of suspected and confirmed cases of CSF 

and provides sufficient authority for necessary response actions by veterinary officials. 

Laws, ordinances, and technical instructions clearly define the roles and responsibilities 

of veterinary officials and other response personnel, lines of communication and 

reporting, and the specific actions to be taken. Flow charts on the BVET extranet guide 

the response actions and are available to all veterinary officials.

The Swiss response plans for CSF in domestic swine and wild boar conform closely to 

control measures established in Council Directive 2001/89/EC [32] and Commission 

Decision 2002/106/EC [66]. Central elements include establishing crisis centers at the 

national and local levels, zoning to prevent CSF spread, and stamping out. The technical 

instructions for eradication of CSF in wild boar follow EC recommendations with regard 

to hunting strategies [14]. Official veterinarians at both the federal and cantonal levels 

were familiar with the contingency plans and the actions required of them in the event of 

suspicion or confirmation of CSF.

As discussed in Section 8, all swine holdings in Switzerland and Liechtenstein must be 

registered in the national premises identification and movement control database. 

Mandatory registration of swine holdings facilitates identification of holdings subject to 

specific emergency response measures in the surveillance and protection zones. Holding 

registration and the Swiss movement control system also facilitate trace-forward and 

trace-back investigations in an outbreak situation. 
38

Switzerland and Liechtenstein follow EC guidelines in maintaining restrictions for at 

least 30 days after the last affected herd is culled. However, APHIS is concerned that 30 

days is insufficient time to ensure freedom from the disease. Historically, CSF has 

recurred in several EU Member States shortly after restrictions were removed and the 

movement of swine commenced. For example, in December 2001 a CSF outbreak was 

confirmed in Spain 83 days after depopulation of an affected herd, 22 days after release 

of movement restrictions [56]. Similarly, an outbreak in Luxembourg occurred 56 days 

after depopulation of an affected herd, 27 days after release of movement restrictions. In 

both instances, the new CSF outbreak was epidemiologically linked to the previously 

affected herd. 

APHIS addressed this concern for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region through previous 

regulations that prohibit export of live swine, swine products, and swine semen from 

areas where CSF outbreaks have occurred in domestic swine to the United States until 6 

months after cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises [71, 72].

12. Discussion of identified risk factors

12.1 Pathways for disease introduction

The preceding 11-factor assessment identified five main pathways by which CSF virus 

could be introduced into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein (see Figure 12.1). However, 

introduction of CSF by the identified pathways would only affect export risk to the 

United States if the domestic swine population of Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein 

became infected and the infection was not detected prior to export. The timeframe for 

detection of a CSF incursion is thus of interest in this analysis. 

No recent data exists to directly assess elapsed time between introduction of CSF virus 

into a herd and detection of an outbreak by the SVS. However, some forms of CSF are 

difficult to detect in live animals or on post-mortem examination without laboratory 

testing; for example, carrier sows that were exposed to low virulence CSF strains are 

capable of shedding virus for substantial periods of time without clinical signs. The SVS 

relies almost entirely on passive surveillance to detect a CSF outbreak and conducts very 

little serological surveillance in either domestic swine or wild boar. Detection could 

therefore be substantially delayed in the absence of overt clinical signs. 

Physical inspection of individual swine presented for live export, slaughter, or collection 

of genetic material is sufficient to detect clinically affected animals. However, such 

inspection is unlikely to detect subclinical or persistent infection, which may be more 

apparent at the herd level. CSF virus can remain viable through carcass maturation, 

transport, and storage, and may be present in genetic material as well. 

Consequently, if CSF is introduced into the domestic swine population in Switzerland 

and/or Liechtenstein, the potential exists for it to remain undetected long enough for 

export of infected live animals, pork, pork products, or genetic material to the United 

States. The likelihood of CSF introduction via the pathways shown in Figure 12.1 and the 

associated export risk are discussed below. 
39

Figure 12.1: Pathway assessment for virus introduction and subsequent export

12.2 Natural movement of wild boar 

12.2.1 Central risk issue

Infected wild boar from neighboring EU Member States could introduce CSF virus into 

Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein. Direct or indirect contact with infected wild boar could 

spread the disease to domestic swine, creating the potential for export of infected swine 

or swine products to the United States. 

12.2.2 Risk factors and existing mitigation measures 

The likelihood of infected wild boar introducing CSF virus depends primarily on the CSF 

status of wild boar populations in neighboring countries and the extent to which natural 

barriers prevent movement of wild boar into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein. 

Liechtenstein borders with Austria, which has not reported CSF in wild boar since 1996. 

Switzerland shares common land borders with Germany and France, both of which 

contain areas restricted by the EC due to CSF in the wild boar population (see Section 3). 

The Alps provide a substantial barrier to wild boar movement into Liechtenstein and the 

Jura Mountains somewhat limit wild boar movement into Switzerland from northern 

France. In contrast, wild boar can cross the border from Germany fairly easily in the area 

of the Swiss plateau (see Section 6). The majority of Swiss pig production occurs in 

cantons forming the Swiss plateau (see Section 8.1), including those along the SwissGerman border, and few measures are in place on pig farms to prevent contact with wild 

boar (see Section 8.2). 

Pork, pork 

products

Infected swine 

products

Susceptible 

domestic 

population

Pork and pork 

products

Virus-infected 

commodities 

to the U.S.

Waste 

feeding

Genetic 

material

Market 

distribution

Infective virus 

in waste 

products

Infected live Import or trade

swine

Susceptible 

wild boar 

population

Breeding 

herd

Direct or indirect 

contact

Export

Import 

or trade

Production 

herd

Infected wild 

boar in source 

country

Migration

Incoming 

vehicular or 

human traffic

Infective virus 

on vehicles or 

clothing

Import, 

transit or 

trade

from an 

affected 

area

Products for 

personal 

consumption

Legal or 

illegal entry

Export

On-farm 

exposure

Waste 

feeding

Live swine

Genetic 

material

Slaughter and 

packing

Export
40

However, the CSF-affected areas of Germany and France are over 150 kilometers to the 

north of the Swiss border, which is considerably farther than wild boar usually range (see 

Section 3). Consequently, APHIS considers the risk of live wild boar introducing CSF 

into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein to be negligible at this time. Swiss officials have 

plans in place to increase CSF surveillance in wild boar and, if necessary, implement 

fencing and other biosecurity measures on pig farms, if infected wild boar are detected 

within 100 kilometers of the Swiss border (see Section 9.2.2). 

12.3 Import or transit of infected live swine

12.3.1 Central risk issue

Infected live swine could enter Switzerland or Liechtenstein legally through import or 

transit; there appears to be little incentive for illegal importation of live swine. Imported 

live swine may be intended for breeding, production (i.e. fattening and slaughter), 

research, or direct slaughter. 

12.3.2 Risk factors and existing mitigation measures 

The likelihood of import or transit of live swine introducing CSF virus depends primarily 

on the provisions of harmonized EC and Swiss legislation concerning the importation and 

transit of swine, the efficacy of limiting importation from CSF-affected regions, and 

Swiss import and transit practices. 

EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of swine from five non-EU countries, all of 

which APHIS considers free of CSF (see Section 7.1.2). However, in recent years 

Switzerland has only imported swine from EU Member States, primarily for 

pharmaceutical research or direct slaughter (see Section 7.1.1). EC legislation prohibits 

export and trade of live swine from holdings within areas restricted due to CSF in wild 

boar or domestic swine. 

The number of swine imported into Switzerland and Liechtenstein is very low, in part 

due to a high tariff on live swine (see Section 7.1.3). All imported swine are subject to 

multiple official inspections while undergoing a 30-day observation period (if from EU 

Member States) or quarantine (if from other countries), which would likely detect 

clinically affected animals. Switzerland and Liechtenstein have prohibited the transit of 

swine and other cloven-hoofed animals by road for animal welfare reasons; transit by rail 

is permitted, but the railways no longer carry livestock (see Section 7.3). 

Since Switzerland and Liechtenstein import very few live swine, require substantial 

veterinary oversight of the live swine that are imported, and essentially prohibit transit 

across either country, the risk of CSF introduction by this pathway is negligible.

12.4 Import of infected swine products

12.4.1 Central risk issues

Imported swine products such as fresh pork, pork products, semen, embryos, and ova 

could introduce CSF virus into Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein. Wild boar carcasses and 

meat, as well as meat products, could also introduce CSF virus. The latter are most likely 

to be carried into Switzerland or Liechtenstein for personal consumption, as discussed in 

Section 12.6 below.
41

12.4.2 Risk factors and existing mitigation measures

The likelihood of infected swine products introducing CSF virus depends primarily on 

the provisions of harmonized EC and Swiss legislation concerning the importation of 

swine products, the efficacy of limiting importation from CSF-affected countries and 

regions of EU Member States, the ability of EU Member States to detect CSF outbreaks 

in domestic swine and wild boar, and Swiss import practices. 

Semen, embryos, and ova

APHIS considers the non-EU countries from which EC and Swiss regulations allow 

importation of swine genetic material to be free of CSF (see Section 7.1.2). EC 

legislation prohibits movement of swine semen, embryos, and ova out of areas of EU 

Member States that are restricted due to CSF in wild boar or domestic swine (see Section 

7.1.1). After the CSF outbreaks in EU Member States in 1997-98 that involved dispersal 

through semen, the EC revised and strengthened legislation concerning CSF control and 

oversight of collection centers. Consequently, APHIS considers the risk of CSF 

introduction through infected semen, embryos, or ova to be very low. 

Fresh pork and pork products

Switzerland and Liechtenstein are net importers of pork and pork products. Harmonized 

EC and Swiss regulations allow importation of these commodities from very few non-EU 

countries, all of which APHIS regards as free of CSF (see Section 7.1.2). However, 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein import primarily from EU Member States, including 

substantial quantities from Germany and France. Fresh pork and pork products could be 

sourced from areas within these countries—or within other EU Member States—that are 

otherwise restricted due to CSF in wild boar, since neither the EC nor Switzerland 

prohibit trade of fresh pork and pork products from these areas (see Section 7.1.1). 

New CSF outbreaks in domestic swine are most likely to occur in and around restricted 

areas of EU Member States [73]. Such outbreaks may remain undetected for some time 

as discussed above; in addition, domestic swine incubating CSF or infected with a low 

virulence strain may not show overt clinical signs that would preclude slaughter for 

human consumption. Since fresh pork and pork products sourced from infected swine can 

harbor CSF virus, the potential exists for such commodities—particularly if sourced from 

restricted areas of EU Member States—to introduce CSF virus into Switzerland or 

Liechtenstein. 

EC control measures for CSF prohibit trade in fresh pork and pork products from areas 

within EU Member States that are experiencing CSF outbreaks in domestic swine [32], 

including all of Romania [46]. Trade may resume 30 days after culling the last affected 

herd; however, CSF outbreaks have occurred in the same area shortly after restrictions 

were lifted, suggesting that 30 days is not sufficient to ensure disease freedom (see 

Sections 11.4.2 and 11.6). 

On the other hand, few CSF outbreaks in domestic swine have occurred recently in or

around CSF restricted areas of the EU from which sourcing of pork and pork products is 

allowed—3 in 2007, 4 in 2008, and none to date in 2009 [35, 74]. Affected EU Member 

States are required to conduct serological surveillance in domestic swine and wild boar 

residing in and around restricted areas, which increases the likelihood of detecting an 
42

outbreak. All domestic swine must undergo veterinary inspection at slaughter, which is 

likely to detect clinically affected animals. These factors limit the risk of CSF virus in 

fresh pork and pork meat. 

Waste feeding controls in Switzerland and Liechtenstein further limit the likelihood of 

exposure of domestic swine to infected pork and pork products (see Section 1.2.3 and 

Annex 2). Less than 2 percent of swine holdings in Switzerland—and none in 

Liechtenstein—feed heat-treated catering waste. The swine industry is small, highly 

integrated, and well regulated. Producers receive premiums for adhering to organic or 

label standards, which prohibit waste feeding, so there is considerable economic 

disincentive to illegally feed non-treated waste food to swine. Overall, the likelihood of 

CSF introduction via legally imported pork or pork products, with subsequent exposure 

of domestic swine or wild boar, is low. 

Nonetheless, additional measures may be necessary to prevent commingling of pork and 

pork products destined for export with those sourced from an affected country or region. 

APHIS addressed this concern for EU Member States in previous regulations by 

prohibiting the export of fresh pork and pork products, as well as live swine and swine 

semen, from areas with CSF outbreaks in domestic swine until at least 6 months after 

cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises.

12.5 Incoming vehicular or human traffic

12.5.1 Central risk issue

Fomites such as vehicle tires and clothing could introduce CSF virus into Switzerland 

and/or Liechtenstein from CSF-affected regions, potentially resulting in exposure of the 

swine population. (Introduction of CSF virus via commodities for personal consumption 

is discussed in Section 12.6 below.)

12.5.2 Risk factors and existing risk mitigation measures

The likelihood of CSF introduction via this pathway depends primarily on the magnitude 

of traffic from CSF-affected regions, biosecurity measures in place for commercial and 

non-commercial traffic, customs inspection procedures, and Swiss import and transit 

practices.

Switzerland shares land borders with Germany and France, both of which contain regions 

restricted by the EC due to CSF in wild boar (see Section 3). There is considerable rail 

and road traffic from these countries into Switzerland and Liechtenstein, without routine 

customs inspection—except for at the Austria-Liechtenstein border—or standard 

biosecurity measures at the border. Harmonized EC and Swiss legislation requires that 

live-haul trucks be cleaned, but not disinfected, after each transport. Introduction of CSF 

virus by this pathway is therefore theoretically possible, particularly in the event of an 

undetected outbreak in domestic swine. 

However, Switzerland imports very few live swine, transit of live swine across the 

territory by road is prohibited, and transit by rail does not occur, all of which limit the 

potential for virus transmission on commercial vehicles. In addition, few CSF outbreaks 

in domestic swine have occurred in neighboring EU Member States in recent years [35, 

74], which limits the potential for virus transmission on clothing or non-commercial 
43

vehicles. APHIS therefore considers the risk of incoming vehicular or human traffic 

introducing CSF virus via to be negligible. 

12.6 Commodities for personal consumption

12.6.1 Central risk issue

Commodities for personal consumption derived from domestic swine or wild boar could 

introduce CSF virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein, potentially resulting in exposure 

of the domestic swine population. 

12.6.2 Risk factors and existing mitigation measures

The likelihood of CSF introduction via this pathway depends primarily on EC and Swiss 

policies regarding allowable commodities for personal consumption, the magnitude of 

traffic from CSF-affected regions, and customs practices at points of entry. 

Land border crossings into Switzerland are controlled by the Swiss customs service, 

without veterinary control per se. Travelers from EU Member States may carry

agricultural commodities, including pork and pork products, for personal consumption

(see Section 7.4). The Swiss customs service does not routinely inspect incoming road or 

rail traffic since Switzerland joined the Schengen Area, except for at the AustriaLiechtenstein border. Travelers from non-EU Member States may not bring agricultural 

commodities into Switzerland, including pork and pork products. Customs inspection at 

Swiss airports is primarily based on self-declaration, with targeted inspection based on 

risk. 

Considering these restrictions, the likelihood of travelers from EU Member States 

carrying personal consignments of susceptible commodities into Switzerland is greater 

than travelers from other countries. Pork and pork products for personal consumption that 

originate from EU Member States are subject to the same mitigating factors discussed in 

Section 12.4, including the limitations on waste feeding. APHIS therefore considers the 

likelihood of CSF introduction via pork or pork products for personal consumption, with 

subsequent exposure of domestic swine or wild boar through waste feeding, to be low. 

Wild boar carcasses imported by hunters could also introduce CSF virus into Switzerland 

or Liechtenstein. EC legislation prohibits hunters from removing wild boar carcasses 

from restricted areas, if hunting is allowed. The Swiss customs service does not routinely 

inspect for wild boar carcasses in vehicles entering Switzerland and carcasses tested for 

trichina worms are not routinely tested for CSF (see Section 7.4). Nonetheless, the 

probability of the specific chain of events occurring that would lead to CSF introduction 

via the carcass of an infected wild boar that was hunted in and illegally removed from a 

restricted area is very low. The possibility of CSF introduction via homemade products of 

wild boar cannot be excluded, however.

12.7 Summary

The preceding release assessment has demonstrated no immediate risk issues associated 

with CSF in the common veterinary area comprised of Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 

However, several concerns remain that stem from the provisions of harmonized EC and 

Swiss legislation concerning sourcing of live swine and swine commodities, as well as 

Swiss import practices. The harmonized legislation allows sourcing of pork and pork 
44

products from areas of EU Member States—including Germany and France—that are 

restricted due to CSF in wild boar. The harmonized legislation also allows resumption of 

trade after a CSF outbreak in domestic swine within 30 days of cleaning and disinfection 

of the last affected premises, which may be insufficient time to ensure disease freedom. 

In APHIS’ estimation, these provisions may increase the risk of CSF introduction into 

Switzerland and/or Liechtenstein, depending on the ability of affected EU Member States 

to detect a CSF outbreak in domestic swine. Once detected, EC control measures appear 

sufficient to quickly contain and eradicate the outbreak. However, infected herds pose a 

risk to the internal common market—including Switzerland and Liechtenstein—and the 

export market until detected. The harmonized EC and Swiss legislation also creates the 

potential for commingling of live swine, pork, and pork products for export to the United 

States with such commodities from restricted areas of EU Member States. Finally, the 

Schengen Agreement and associated lack of routine customs inspections at the Swiss 

border may increase the likelihood of CSF introduction through commodities for personal 

consumption, particularly wild boar carcasses and derived products. 

In light of these factors, the likelihood of CSF introduction into Switzerland and/or 

Liechtenstein appears similar to many EU Member States within the APHIS-defined EU 

CSF region. The potential for exposure of domestic swine within Switzerland or 

Liechtenstein to CSF virus in imported infected commodities is somewhat mitigated by 

prevailing attitudes toward waste feeding, the relatively small number of premises 

authorized to heat treat and feed catering waste, and the comparatively large number of 

farms on which waste feeding is prohibited according to organic or label standards.
45

Risk estimate

The preceding assessment of the 11 factors specified in 9 CFR 92.2 has found no 

evidence that CSF currently exists in Switzerland or Liechtenstein and demonstrated no 

immediate and significant risks associated with this disease. Nonetheless, there is a

potential for introduction of CSF virus into Switzerland or Liechtenstein. This is 

primarily because Switzerland and Liechtenstein import substantial quantities of pork and 

pork products from Germany and France, without prohibiting sourcing from restricted 

areas. In addition, most road and rail traffic from EU Member States into Switzerland is 

not subject to customs inspection since Switzerland joined the Schengen Area. It is 

therefore easy for travelers to transport commodities for personal consumption that are 

derived from domestic swine or wild boar, from both restricted and non-restricted areas 

of EU Member States. 

In implementing the Agricultural Agreement, Switzerland and Liechtenstein adopted EC 

regulations and controls regarding animal health, abolished border veterinary controls, 

and facilitated free trade in agricultural products on the EU internal common market. 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein are situated in the middle of a region that APHIS has 

recognized as low risk for CSF, namely the APHIS-defined EU CSF region. APHIS 

regards the EU Member States in this region as having the same low level of risk due to 

harmonized EC legislation and free trade on the internal common market, factors that 

now apply to Switzerland and Liechtenstein as well.

The APHIS-defined EU CSF region is subject to the import conditions specified in 9 

CFR 94.24 for breeding swine, pork, and pork products, and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine 

semen. 9 CFR 94.24 prohibits sourcing of live swine, pork, and pork products for export 

to the United States from areas of the EU that are restricted due to CSF in wild boar or 

domestic swine. This regulation also prohibits commingling of live swine, pork, and pork 

products for export with such commodities from restricted areas. 9 CFR 98.38 prohibits 

sourcing of swine semen for export to the United States from areas of the EU that are 

restricted due to CSF in wild boar or domestic swine, as well as commingling of donor 

boars with live swine from restricted regions.

The prohibition on sourcing from areas of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region that are 

restricted due to CSF in domestic swine extends until at least 6 months after cleaning and 

disinfection of the last affected premises. This stipulation was included to address 

APHIS’ concerns regarding reoccurrence of CSF in domestic swine if restrictions are 

removed after 30 days, as allowed by EC regulations (see Section 12.4.2). The 

regulations also address APHIS’ concerns regarding commingling of pork and pork 

products for export to the United States with such commodities sourced from restricted 

areas within the APHIS-defined EU CSF region. 

The same risk concerns regarding sourcing and commingling of live swine and swine 

products apply to Switzerland and Liechtenstein since they implemented the Agricultural 

Agreement and Additional Agreement. Unlike some EU Member States that comprise the 

APHIS-defined EU CSF region, the risk of CSF introduction into Switzerland and/or 

Liechtenstein through natural movements of wild boar, importation or transit of live 

swine, or vehicular or human traffic is negligible. The risk of CSF introduction via 
46

commodities for personal consumption is similar to that of other Schengen Area 

countries, which includes most EU Member States.

Consequently, the risk profile for the common veterinary area formed by Switzerland and 

Liechtenstein is similar to that of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region. Applying the 

provisions of 9 CSF 94.24 and 98.38 (see Annex 1) to Switzerland and Liechtenstein 

would address the risk issues discussed in Section 12 and result in a level of risk that is 

equivalent to, or less than, that portion of the EU authorized to export breeding swine, 

swine semen, and pork and pork products to the United States.
47

Annexes

Annex 1: 2009 Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, sections 94.24, 94.25, 98.38.

§ 94.24: Restrictions on the importation of pork, pork products, and swine from the APHIS-defined EU 

CSF region.

 (a) Pork and pork products. In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this part, fresh pork 

and pork products imported from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions:

 (1) The pork or pork products must not have been derived from swine that were in any of the following 

regions or zones, unless the swine were slaughtered after the periods described:

 (i) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) as one in which classical swine 

fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region;

 (ii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of detection of classical 

swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted 

zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months following 

depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and disinfection of 

the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or

 (iii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of 

classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted 

zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.

 (2) The pork and pork products must not have been commingled with pork or pork products derived from 

other swine that were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of 

this section, unless the other swine were slaughtered after the periods described. Additionally, the pork and 

pork products must not have been derived from swine that were commingled with other swine that were in 

any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the 

swine from which the pork or pork products were derived were slaughtered after the periods described.

 (3) The swine from which the pork or pork products were derived must not have transited any region or 

zone described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the swine were moved 

directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact 

upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless the swine were slaughtered after the periods described.

 (4) No equipment or materials used in transporting the swine from which the pork or pork products were 

derived from the farm of origin to the slaughtering establishment may have been used previously for 

transporting swine that do not meet the requirements of this section, unless the equipment and materials 

have first been cleaned and disinfected.

 (5) The pork and pork products must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an official of the 

competent veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State who is authorized to 

issue the foreign meat inspection certificate required by §327.4 of this title, stating that the applicable 

provisions of paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section have been met.20

 (b) Live swine. In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this title, live swine imported 

from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions:

 (1) The swine must be breeding swine.

 (2) The swine must not have been in any of the following regions or zones, unless the swine are exported 

to the United States after the periods described:

 (i) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) as one in which classical swine 

fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region;

 (ii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of 

classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a 

restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months 
48

following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and 

disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or

 (iii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of 

classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted 

zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.

 (3) The swine must not have been commingled with other swine that have at any time been in any of the 

regions or zones described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(iii) of this section, unless the swine are 

exported after the periods described.

 (4) The swine must not have transited any region or zone described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through 

(b)(2)(iii) of this section, unless the swine were moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed 

means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless 

the swine are exported after the periods described;

 (5) No equipment or materials used in transporting the swine may have been used previously for 

transporting swine that do not meet the requirements of this section, unless the equipment and materials 

have first been cleaned and disinfected.

 (6) The swine must be accompanied by a certificate issued by a salaried veterinary officer of the 

competent veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State, stating that the 

conditions of paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this section have been met.21

 (c) The certificates required by paragraphs (a)(5) and (b)(6) of this section must be presented by the 

importer to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival, upon arrival of the swine, pork, or pork products 

at the port.

20 The certification required may be placed on the foreign meat inspection certificate required by §327.4 of 

this title or may be contained in a separate document.

21 The certification required may be placed on the certificate required by §93.505(a) of this chapter or may 

be contained in a separate document

§ 94.25: Restrictions on the importation of live swine, pork, or pork products from certain regions free of 

classical swine fever.

 The regions listed in paragraph (a) of this section are recognized as free of classical swine fever (CSF) in 

§§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) but either supplement their pork supplies with fresh (chilled or frozen) pork 

imported from regions considered to be affected by CSF, or supplement their pork supplies with pork from 

CSF-affected regions that is not processed in accordance with the requirements of this part, or share a 

common land border with CSF-affected regions, or import live swine from CSF-affected regions under 

conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. Thus, there 

exists a possibility that live swine, pork, or pork products from the CSF-free regions listed in paragraph (a) 

of this section may be commingled with live swine, pork, or pork products from CSF-affected regions, 

resulting in a risk of CSF introduction into the United States. Therefore, live swine, pork, or pork products 

and shipstores, airplane meals, and baggage containing pork or pork products, other than those articles 

regulated under parts 95 or 96 of this chapter, may not be imported into the United States from a region 

listed in paragraph (a) of this section unless the requirements in this section, in addition to other applicable 

requirements of part 93 of this chapter and part 327 of this title, are met.

 (a) Regions subject to the requirements of this section: Chile and the Mexican States of Baja California, 

Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chihuahua, Nayarit, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Yucatan.

 (b) Live swine. The swine must be accompanied by a certification issued by a full-time salaried 

veterinary officer of the national government of the region of export. Upon arrival of the swine in the 

United States, the certification must be presented to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival. The 

certification must identify both the exporting region and the region of origin as a region designated in 

§§94.9 and 94.10 as free of CSF at the time the swine were in the region and must state that:

 (1) The swine have not lived in a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;
49

 (2) The swine have never been commingled with swine that have been in a region that is designated in 

§§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;

 (3) The swine have not transited a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF unless 

moved directly through the region to their destination in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal intact 

upon arrival at the point of destination; and

 (4) The conveyances or materials used in transporting the swine, if previously used for transporting 

swine, have been cleaned and disinfected in accordance with the requirements of §93.502 of this chapter.

 (c) Pork or pork products. The pork or pork products must be accompanied by a certification issued by a 

full-time salaried veterinary officer of the national government of the region of export. Upon arrival of the 

pork or pork products in the United States, the certification must be presented to an authorized inspector at 

the port of arrival. The certification must identify both the exporting region and the region of origin of the 

pork or pork products as a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as free of CSF at the time the pork or 

pork products were in the region and must state that:

 (1) The pork or pork products were derived from swine that were born and raised in a region designated 

in §§94.9 and 94.10 as free of CSF and were slaughtered in such a region at a federally inspected slaughter 

plant that is under the direct supervision of a full-time salaried veterinarian of the national government of 

that region and that is eligible to have its products imported into the United States under the Federal Meat 

Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) and the regulations in §327.2 of this title;

 (2) The pork or pork products were derived from swine that have not lived in a region designated in 

§§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;

 (3) The pork or pork products have never been commingled with pork or pork products that have been in 

a region that is designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as affected with CSF;

 (4) The pork or pork products have not transited through a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as 

affected with CSF unless moved directly through the region to their destination in a sealed means of 

conveyance with the seal intact upon arrival at the point of destination; and

 (5) If processed, the pork or pork products were processed in a region designated in §§94.9 and 94.10 as 

free of CSF in a federally inspected processing plant that is under the direct supervision of a full-time 

salaried veterinary official of the national government of that region.

§ 98.38: Restrictions on the importation of swine semen from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region.

 In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this part, swine semen imported from the 

APHIS-defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions, except as noted in paragraph (h) of this 

section with regard to swine semen imported from Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, or 

the United Kingdom:

 (a) The semen must come from a semen collection center approved for export by the competent 

veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State.

 (b) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that was in any of the following regions 

or zones, unless the semen was collected after the periods described:

 (1) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) of this chapter as one in which 

classical swine fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region;

 (2) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of 

classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a 

restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months 

following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and 

disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or

 (3) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of 

classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted 

zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.
50

 (c) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that was commingled with swine that at 

any time were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section, 

unless the semen was collected after the periods described.

 (d) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that transited any region or zone 

described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section during the periods described, unless the donor 

boar was moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal 

determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless the semen was collected after the 

periods described;

 (e) The donor boar must be held in isolation for at least 30 days prior to entering the semen collection 

center.

 (f) No more than 30 days prior to being held in isolation as required by paragraph (e) of this section, the 

donor boar must be tested with negative results with a classical swine fever test approved by the World 

Organization for Animal Health.

 (g) No equipment or materials used in transporting the donor boar from the farm of origin to the semen 

collection center may have been used previously for transporting swine that do not meet the requirements 

of this section, unless such equipment or materials have first been cleaned and disinfected.

 (h) Except for semen collected from swine in Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, or the 

United Kingdom, before the semen is exported to the United States, the donor boar must be held at the 

semen collection center and observed by the center veterinarian for at least 40 days following collection of 

the semen, and, along with all other swine at the semen collection center, exhibit no clinical signs of 

classical swine fever.

 (i) The semen must be accompanied by a certificate issued by a salaried veterinary officer of the 

competent veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State, stating that the 

provisions of paragraphs (a) through (h) of this section have been met.3

3 The certification required may be placed on the certificate required under §98.35(c) or may be contained 

in a separate document.
51

Annex 2: Waste feeding in Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

Background

Switzerland allows feeding of heat-treated catering waste to pigs in accordance with 

specific provisions laid out in the Animal Health Ordinance; other forms of waste feeding 

are strictly prohibited [24]. Premises that heat-treat and feed catering waste must be 

approved by the cantonal veterinary authorities and must be inspected annually by an 

official veterinarian [20]. BVET officials indicated that there were about 200 such 

premises in 2009—equating to about 6 percent of Swiss pigs—and that the number is 

declining; the BVET plans to prohibit feeding of heat-treated catering waste by July 

2011. No swine holdings in Liechtenstein are approved to feed heat-treated catering 

waste. 

This report addresses both legal and illegal waste feeding in Switzerland as it relates to 

the risk of exposure to CSF virus in catering waste. APHIS gathered information on 

catering waste feeding regulations and CSF risk from various sources, including (1) 

interviews with national and cantonal veterinary officials, veterinarians, and livestock 

farm personnel; (2) visits to swine farms in Switzerland; (3) catering waste feeding 

regulations; and (4) an animal health risk assessment on catering waste feeding prepared 

by the BVET. 

Legal waste feeding

Overview

Swiss regulations require that animal byproducts, including catering waste, be used or 

recycled to the extent possible, while avoiding adverse effects on human and animal 

health and the environment [75]. Animal byproducts are defined as animal carcasses not 

intended for human consumption, products of animal origin, and food scraps. Food scraps 

are defined as waste food from establishments that produce food for human consumption, 

such as restaurants, catering establishments, and kitchens (both large kitchens and 

household kitchens). 

In this assessment, the term catering waste is used to refer to food scraps as defined in the 

ordinance. Catering waste in Switzerland arises in private households and restaurants and 

is disposed of as municipal waste, by composting, or by feeding to pigs or poultry [76]. 

In addition, catering waste from restaurants is used for biogas production. 

Feeding of catering waste to swine in Switzerland is strictly regulated. Regulations 

pertaining to the collection, processing, and use of catering waste as animal feed in 

Switzerland are designed to minimize exposure of farm animals to waste contaminated 

with disease agents [76]. Catering waste fed to animals must be heat treated to inactivate 

disease agents. In addition, feeding of catering waste to farm animals requires 

authorization to do so from the appropriate cantonal office [75]. Authorizations require 

an initial inspection of the premises by the canton and annual follow-up inspections to 

assess compliance with applicable regulations.
52

Authorizations

Cantonal authorizations for animal byproduct disposal facilities must meet federal 

regulatory requirements as described in the Ordinance on the disposal of animal 

byproducts [75]. The authorizations must specify the purpose of the facility; the category 

of animal byproduct authorized for disposal; the maximum authorized capacity of the 

operation, taking into account transport, receiving, storage, and processing capacities; and 

any other applicable conditions or constraints. The authorization can be granted for a 

maximum of 10 years. Renewal is contingent upon demonstration of physical and 

operational compliance with regulatory requirements. 

Authorizations are valid for only the specified facility [75]. Authorizations include the 

requirement that the total amount of animal byproducts disposed of at the facility each 

year be reported to cantonal authorities by January 31st of the following year. The total 

amount must be broken down by category, type of waste, deliverer, and receiver. 

Authorizations can be revoked for noncompliance with requirements or not correcting 

deficiencies in a timely manner. Cantonal veterinary officials inspect premises authorized 

to feed heat-treated catering waste on an annual basis.

Facilities authorized to dispose of animal byproducts must establish, document, and 

maintain a system of controls based on principles of risk analysis and critical control 

point monitoring [75]. The documentation must be available for inspection by 

appropriate federal and cantonal officials, and must be retained for at least 3 years.

Sourcing 

For the purposes of regulation, animal byproducts, including catering waste, are classified 

into one of three risk categories [75]. Handling and processing requirements for animal 

byproducts vary depending on the category to which the byproducts are assigned. Most 

catering waste is assigned to the lowest risk category, Category 3, which can be used in 

animal feed if certain handling and processing requirements are met. However, kitchen 

and catering waste from international transport vehicles is considered Category 1 

materials and must be incinerated; feeding of Category 1 material to swine is prohibited. 

Feeding of catering waste that originates from a region or premises that is subject to 

restrictions imposed in response to an animal disease outbreak is also prohibited.

Cantonal public health authorities authorize restaurants and other establishments to 

supply heat-treatment and biogas facilities [20]. Suppliers must pass inspection annually 

and must retain records of the volume and type of catering waste provided for at least 3 

years. Heat-treated catering waste is often mixed with other organic waste before being 

fed to pigs. 

Transportation

Containers and other equipment used to transport animal byproducts must be leak proof, 

corrosion resistant, and easy to clean. Vehicles and reusable containers and other 

equipment that comes into contact with animal byproducts must be cleaned and 

disinfected after use, and kept clean until next use. 

Transport documents for animal byproducts must be completed in triplicate: the original 

accompanies the consignment to its destination to be retained by the recipient, and one 

copy each is retained by the sender and the transporter. The documents must specify the 
53

date of collection; a description of the materials; the appropriate risk category 

classification; animal species (only for Category 3 material to be used for feed); weight; 

name, contact information, and, if applicable, premises number of the source premises; 

and the name, contact information, and premises number of transporter and recipient.

Operational requirements

Individuals who dispose of animal byproducts are obligated to ensure that the disposal 

does not result in disease spread [75]. Containers and equipment used in handling animal 

byproducts must be well maintained and cleaned regularly. Animal byproducts must be 

processed to inactivate all disease agents. Specifically, Category 3 waste materials must 

be sterilized under pressure or heated to boiling temperature for at least 20 minutes before 

feeding to swine. Heat treatment parameters, in particular temperature and duration, must 

be continuously monitored and recorded. Measurement equipment must be regularly 

calibrated. Processed materials must be disposed of in a manner that prevents their 

contamination. 

Regulations require that animal byproducts be clearly identified by category and that 

animal byproducts of different categories be kept separate [75]. Each facility is 

authorized for disposal of only one category of animal byproduct and is prohibited from 

maintaining physical or operational associations with facilities authorized for disposal of 

other categories of animal byproducts. 

Disposal facilities must be located in a building area separate from farm animal holdings, 

slaughter facilities, or food facilities, and must be located away from public streets [75]. 

The facility must be fenced or otherwise made inaccessible to unauthorized personnel or 

animals, with a documented pest management plan. For facilities on premises on which 

farm animals are kept, the facility layout and operations must include measures to keep 

the processing facility separate from the animal holding area. Direct or indirect contact 

between farm animals and vehicles or containers used for raw animal byproducts is 

prohibited. Processed animal byproducts may be routed to an animal feeding area through 

a closed line. 

The facility layout should provide for separation of "clean" and "dirty" work areas, and 

for preventing contamination of processed animal byproducts. Procedures must be 

established to control personnel movement between the clean and dirty areas. Personnel 

working in the dirty area of the facility are permitted to enter the clean area only after 

changing their work clothes and changing or disinfecting their footwear. Any equipment 

to be moved from the dirty to the clean area must first be cleaned and disinfected. 

Compliance

As noted above, cantonal veterinary authorities conduct annual inspections of premises 

that are authorized to heat treat and feed catering waste. In addition, in 2006 the BVET 

assessed regulatory compliance in an evaluation of 56 premises randomly selected from 

among a total of 218 premises authorized to feed catering waste to swine [76]. The 

BVET analysis found that 36 percent of the premises met all BVET criteria for regulatory 

compliance. The BVET estimated that the likelihood of farm animals on the remaining 

premises being fed inadequately treated catering waste was "high". As a result of this 

analysis, Swiss authorities strengthened the regulatory controls on feeding of heat-treated 
54

catering waste. BVET officials indicated that most violations in 2008 were minor and 

would not have resulted in inadequate heat treatment of catering waste [20].

Summary

Feeding of heat-treated catering waste is limited in scope, with few approved premises in 

Switzerland and none in Liechtenstein, and is scheduled to be phased out by 2011. 

Feeding of heat-treated catering waste is highly regulated, with annual inspections of 

both heat-treatment facilities and restaurants that supply the catering waste. All catering 

waste supplied to heat-treatment facilities must originate in Switzerland. The parameters 

for heat treatment or sterilization are adequate to destroy CSF virus; however, not all 

catering waste is adequately treated before feeding. Mixing heat-treated waste with other 

organic waste before feeding may dilute any disease agent present. Since heat-treatment 

and biogas facilities are often located on premises with livestock, the potential exists for 

exposure and contamination.

Illegal waste feeding

The prevalence of illegal feeding of catering waste to swine, and its impact on the risk of 

swine being infected with CSF virus through catering waste feeding, are unknown. 

Feeding of catering waste to swine, including food scraps, is strictly prohibited except for 

heat-treated waste on approved premises as described above [27, 69]. Penalties for 

noncompliance include up to 20,000 CHF or 6 months in jail. 

The swine industry in Switzerland and Liechtenstein is small, highly integrated, and well 

regulated [20]. Veterinary oversight is considerable and the official inspection process is 

thorough. Premises inspections for compliance with animal movement, animal welfare, 

animal feed, and pharmaceutical regulations all provide opportunities for official 

veterinarians to detect and report illegal catering waste feeding. 

An APHIS site visit team found no evidence of illegal catering waste feeding to farm 

animals and Swiss officials indicated to APHIS that illegal catering waste feeding is not 

prevalent in Switzerland or Liechtenstein [20]. The team found very high levels of 

awareness among farm owners and employees, private and official veterinarians, and 

federal and cantonal veterinary officials that waste feeding is prohibited on premises not 

specifically authorized to feed heat-treated catering waste, and is scheduled to be 

prohibited on all premises in 2011 [20]. 

All swine producers in Switzerland and Liechtenstein are required to comply with a strict 

animal welfare code [20]. Supermarkets pay producers a premium of up to 25 CSF per 

pig produced on farms that are particularly welfare friendly, which entitles the 

supermarket to place a special label on the pork and pork products. Participating 

producers are required to conform to the label standards, including no waste feeding, and 

are inspected 1-2 times per year for compliance. All forms of waste feeding are 

prohibited on certified organic farms—which constitute approximately 20 percent of 

Swiss pig farms—and also on farms that produce according to label standards. 

Noncompliance can lead to loss of organic status or label premiums. 
55

Conclusions

The frequency with which pigs are exposed to CSF through catering waste used as animal 

feed depends on the quantity of contaminated foodstuffs present and how the waste is 

processed. The requirement that catering waste supplied to heat-treatment facilities 

originate in Switzerland and the high degree of regulatory oversight limit the likelihood 

of CSF virus in raw catering waste. If CSF were introduced—for example, through 

imported pork or pork products—the BVET assessment indicates that the likelihood of 

heat treatment failing to inactivate the virus was and perhaps still is relatively high. 

Nonetheless, considering that few pigs receive heat-treated catering waste and that the 

likelihood of raw catering waste supplied to heat-treatment facilities containing CSF 

virus is low, APHIS concludes that the risk of exposure of pigs in Switzerland to CSF 

virus via feeding of heat-treated catering waste is very low. 

The prevalence of illegal feeding of catering waste to swine is unknown. The high degree 

of veterinary oversight of swine farms, severe penalties for noncompliance with the ban 

on feeding non-treated catering waste to pigs, and high producer awareness likely limit 

the volume of waste fed illegally. Noncompliance can also lead to loss of organic status 

or label premiums, resulting in considerable economic disincentive to illegally feed waste 

food to swine. Illegal feeding of non-treated waste food originating in Switzerland carries 

very little risk for CSF transmission. The likelihood of imported commodities—including 

homemade preparations from wild boar meat—carrying CSF virus is greater. However, 

imported commodities likely comprise only a small fraction of waste food illegally fed to 

swine. Considering these factors, APHIS concludes that the risk of exposure of pigs in 

Switzerland and Liechtenstein to CSF virus via illegal waste feeding is low.
56

Annex 3: Switzerland import and export data 2003-2008.

Table 3A: Imported fresh, chilled, and frozen pork (kg) 2003-08 

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total 9,741,058 11,663,218 7,962,374 6,728,621 7,220,193 15,339,107

Germany 5,749,040 7,172,023 5,645,134 5,181,311 4,806,733 10,803,912

Austria 3,903,880 4,385,780 2,210,290 1,435,363 1,430,077 3,020,779

Italy 42,261 33,932 35,664 43,578 61,423 222,733

Australia 31,036 35,675 24,734 21,806 22,866 15,003

United States 3,060 8,953 18,769 15,693 17,340 37,378

France 4,422 7,499 18,694 1,756 859,262 1,114,173

Slovakia 0 0 5,083 27,904 0 0

Hungary 7,122 1,173 1,766 0 1,783 4,384

Spain 0 10 1,728 599 1,354 66,624

United Kingdom 0 0 480 0 0 0

Czech Republic 230 0 32 0 9,042 29,557

Denmark 0 16,417 0 0 201 22,781

Estonia 7 0 0 0 0 0

Belgium 0 1,426 0 0 9,167 23

Slovenia 0 330 0 0 0 0

Japan 0 0 0 269 0 0

Netherlands 0 0 0 0 31 36

Poland 0 0 0 0 0 926

Portugal 0 0 0 342 914 798

Table 3B: Exported fresh, chilled, and frozen pork (kg) 2003-08

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total 54,678 443,866 137,658 182,001 163,191 287,731

Germany 0 0 82,742 95,873 118,354 202,677

Cote d’Ivoire 21,843 396,425 0 26,559 0 54,443

Italy 0 0 15,391 21,903 25,119 29,048

France 0 0 500 0 374 1,560

Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 1 3

Romania 31,331 15,460 39,025 37,666 18,728 0

United Arab Emirates 0 26,594 0 0 0 0

United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 13 0

Hungary 0 5,387 0 0 0 0

Japan 0 0 0 0 602 0

Austria 1,504 0 0 0 0 0
57

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