* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 29 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ACORN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, OFFICER ROBERT SAND and OFFICER CHRISTINE CHESTER,

Defendants, and GARY L. SCHROEDER, MEADOWBROOK MOBILE HOME PARK, SANDRA GINGLES and CORONADO VILLAGE MOBILE HOME COUNTRY CLUB,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 98-2074 (D.C. No. CIV-97-287-LFG/RLP)

(D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellant ACORN (Association of Community Organizat ions for Reform Now, Inc.), a nonprofit membership corporation organized “to further the interests of people of low and moderate incomes,” Appellant’s Br. at 1, appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment on its civil rights claims. After “review[ing] the district court's grant of summary judgment de n ovo, applying the same standard used by the district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c),” Novell, Inc. v. Federal Ins.
Co. , 141 F.3d 983, 985 (10th Cir. 1998) we affirm. ACORN seeks to organize tenants of private mobile home parks by entering the parks and going door-to-door to provide information and to solicit membership and funds. In Albuquerque, New Mexico, ACORN repeatedly sent agents to defendant-appellees Meadowbrook Mobile Home Park an d Coronado Village Mobile Home Country Club, private parks which have no-solicitation policies. ACORN's activities prompted tenants of the parks to complain to defendantsappellees Gary L. Schroeder and Sandra Gingles, the park managers. Eventually, Schroeder and Gingles contacted the police. Defend ants Richard Saul and-3-

Christine Chester, Albuquerque police officers, iss ued a trespass notification and arrested an individual who refused to leave the Cor onado park. Claiming that the mobile home parks, the managers, the individual police officers, and the City of Albuquerque had violated its rights to free speech, freedom of association, due process, and equal prot ection, ACORN filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a thorough and t houghtful Memorandum Opinion and Order, the district court entered summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the mobile home parks and managers, as pri vate defendants, were not liable under § 1983 because they were not acting un der color of state law; and (2) the police officers and the City were not liable be cause ACORN failed to make an affirmative showing that a municipal defendant had violated a clearly-established statutory or constitutional right. ACORN appealed. This court, however, granted ACORN ’s motion to dismiss the municipal defendants on July 16, 1998. At issue in this appeal, therefore, is the entry of summary judgment in favo r of the private defendants only. We agree with the district court that ACORN’s claim against these defendants is similar to the one made by plaintiff in Pino v. Higgs , 75 F.3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1996) and that, accordingly, summary jud gment is the appropriate disposition of the matter. As we have stated,-4-

“[i]n order to hold a private individual liable und er § 1983, it must be shown that the private person was jointly engaged w ith state officials in the challenged action, or has obtained significa nt aid from state officials, or that the private individual’s conductis in some other way chargeable to the state.” Id. at 1465 (quoting Lee v. Town of Estes Park , 820 F.2d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 1987)). We are “‘disinclined’” to find state actio n “where a private party is simply reporting suspected criminal activity to state offi cials who then take whatever action they believe the facts warrant.’” Pino , 75 F.3d at 1465 (quoting Lee , 820 F.2d at 1115). Moreover, we reject ACORN’s contention that its cla im would have survived summary judgment if the court had analyzed the state action requirement under the rationale of Marsh v. Alabama , 326 U.S. 501, 505-09 (1946). In that case, a private company effectively operated as the municipal government. It owned the streets, sidewalks, and business block; p aid the sheriff; owned and managed the sewage system; and owned the building w here the United States post office was located. See id. at 502-03. The Court determined that the company town was the “functional equivalent” of a municipality. Browns v. Mitchell , 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969). The private owner of the two mobile home parks invo lved in this appeal has not assumed “all of the attributes of a state-creat ed municipality,” exercised “semi-official municipal functions as a delegate of the State,” or performed “the-5-

full spectrum of municipal powers.” Hudgens v. NLRB , 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner , 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972)). These parks do not fall within the Marsh “company town” exception to the rule that the Firs t Amendment constrains only governmental action. We have reviewed the record in this matter and disc ern no reversible error.
We AFFIRM.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge