UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 18

Present: The

Honorable

James V. Selna

Karla J. Tunis Not Present

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter 

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present Not Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment as to Count 1 of the Amended Compliant (fld 2-

13-12. #165) ; 

Denying Defendants Usman and Farooq Vakil’s Motion for

Summary Judgment or Alternatively for Partial Summary

Judgment (Dld 2-13-12, #167, duplicated at #168) ; and 

Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants Lights of America,

Farooq Vakil and Usman Vail’s Motion for Summary Judgment (fld

2-13-12, #170, corrected at #182) 

The Court is presented with three cross-motions for summary judgment brought by

(1) Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), (2) Defendant Lights of America, Inc.

(“LOA”), and (3) Defendants Usman Vakil and Farooq Vakil. 

 FTC charged LOA and the Vakils (collectively, “Defendants”) with three

violations of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §

45, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair

or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” FTC also seeks monetary relief

pursuant to section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). (First Amended Compl.

(“FAC”) ¶¶ 1, 98, Docket No. 42.) FTC alleges that Defendants deceptively marketed

LOA’s Light Emitting Diode (“LED”) lamps (the “LED Lamps”) by overstating their

claimed light output and lifetime, without substantiation. (FAC ¶¶ 90-95.) LOA’s

product packaging claimed the LED Lamps would “replace” certain wattage lamps,

would last for 30,000, 20,000, or 15,000 hours, would last 15, 10, or 7 times longer than

an incandescent blub, and promised consumers, “You’ll never change your light bulbs

again.” (Id.) FTC alleges that these statements were unsubstantiated, false, and

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

1

 The Court has reviewed all evidentiary objections and considers only admissible evidence in

deciding these Motions. To the extent that the parties move in limine to exclude evidence to which

there was no evidentiary objection, the Court will address that evidence in the order regarding the

motions in limine. CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 2 of 18

deceptive. (Id.)

FTC moves for summary judgment on Count One, which alleges that LOA violated

Section 5(a) by representing, expressly or by implication, that the LED Lamps would

provide light output equivalent to particular watt incandescent light bulbs, when in fact

this claim was false or unsubstantiated. (FAC ¶¶ 90-91; FTC’s Notice of Mot. and MSJ,

Docket No. 165; FTC’s Mot. Br., Docket No. 164.) LOA opposes the Motion. (LOA’s

Opp’n Br., Docket No. 192.)

LOA moves for summary judgment on all three Counts. In Count Two, FTC

alleges that LOA violated Section 5(a) by representing, expressly or by implication, that

their LED lamps would provide a purported level of light output in lumens, when in fact

the claim was false or unsubstantiated. (FAC ¶¶ 92-93; LOA’s Notice of Mot. and MSJ,

Docket No. 170; LOA’s Mot. Br., Docket No. 184.) In Count Three, FTC alleges that

LOA violated Section 5(a) by representing, expressly or by implication, that the LED

Lamps would last a specified number of hours, when in fact this claim was false or

unsubstantiated. (FAC ¶¶ 94-95; LOA’s Notice of Mot. and MSJ; LOA’s Mot. Br.) FTC

opposes the Motion. (FTC’s Opp’n Br., Docket No. 197.)

Defendants Usman and Farooq Vakil, the co-owners of LOA, a closely held

corporation, jointly move for summary judgment on all three Counts. (Notice of Mot.

and MSJ, Docket No. 167.) FTC opposes the Motion. (FTC’s Vakil Opp’n Br., Docket

No. 190.) 

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS FTC’s Motion, GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES in PART LOA’s Motion, and DENIES the Vakils’ Motion.1

 

I. Legal Standard

A. The FTC Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

2

 FTC does not assert any unfairness claims. (FTC’s Opp’n Br., p. 13.)

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Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or

affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). In this case, FTC asserts that LOA’s marketing

of the LED Lamps was deceptive.2

 To prove deception, the FTC must show that LOA

made (1) a representation, omission or practice that, (2) was likely to mislead consumers

acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the representation, omission, or

practice was material. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000)). FTC is not required to show that all

consumers were deceived; rather, the FTC must show that LOA’s marketing material

made “misrepresentations in a manner likely to mislead reasonable consumers.” 

Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 929, n. 12 (“The existence of some satisfied customers does not

constitute a defense under the FTCA.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); cf.

Southwest Sunsites v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that materiality

in the third factor of the Section 5 violation test requires a showing that the deceptions

“are likely to cause injury to a reasonable relying consumer”). The FTC need not prove

consumer reliance or consumer injury to establish a Section 5 violation. FTC v.

Braswell, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42976, *12-13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2005) (citing FTC

v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, “in

cases brought under Section 5 and Section 12 of the FTC . . . ‘advertising capable of

being interpreted in a misleading way should be construed against the advertiser.’” FTC

v. Gill, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1045-46 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Resort Car Rental Sys.,

Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1974)). 

To show that a representation is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably

under the circumstances, the FTC must prove either that LOA lacked a reasonable basis

for its claims or that the claims were false. FTC v. Medlab, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1079

(N.D. Cal. 2009); see also FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994)

(holding that FTC can show a statement is misleading for purposes of a Section 12 claim

by proving the statement was unsubstantiated or false). For an advertiser to have a

“reasonable basis” for its claim, “it must have had some recognizable substantiation for

the representation prior to making it in the advertisement.” FTC v. Direct Mktg.

Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 298 (D. Mass. 2009) (emphasis supplied). 

Defendants have the burden of establishing what substantiation they relied on for their

product claims. Id. (quoting FTC v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2006)). 

The type of advertising claim determines what constitutes a “reasonable basis” for the

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

3

 Claims using specific figures or facts, rather than generalized descriptions of the product’s

capabilities, require a high level of substantiation, such as scientific or engineering tests. In re

Thompson Med., 104 F.T.C. 648, at *72 (1984) (cited with approval in Pantron I, 33 F.3d at 1095-96)).

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 4 of 18

claim. Thompson Med. Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1986).3

Finally, to determine whether the claim at issue is material, courts consider

whether the representation is likely to affect a consumer’s “choice of, or conduct

regarding, a product.” Medlab, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. Express claims are presumed to

be material. Pantron I, 33 F.3d at 1096. Furthermore, a claim is material if it concerns

the purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost of the product. Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d

783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). 

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, read in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, indicates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Material facts are

those necessary to the proof or defense of a claim, and are determined by referring to

substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding

a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

The moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a material

fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. If the moving party satisfies its initial burden,

the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials” of the moving

party’s pleadings, but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Furthermore, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, if the

nonmoving party does not make a sufficient showing to establish the elements of its

claims, the Court must grant the moving party’s motion. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

4

 Although there is some dispute as to when LOA began using the “replaces” claim on its

packaging, (FTC’s Combined Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law in Support of

MSJ (“CSUF”), ¶ 28, Docket No. 204), images of the product packaging make clear that the claims were

made as early as 2007, (Declaration of Kimberly L. Nelson (“Nelson Decl.”), Exs. E, Docket No. 198-

1). The precise date on which the claims were first used has not been established. (See also Nelson

Decl., Exs. B-D (including date-stamped product packages from 2008 and 2009); Ex. A (Mr. Halliwell’s

Certification of Records of Regularly Conducted Activity).) 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 5 of 18

Where the parties have made cross-motions for summary judgment, as they have in

this case, the Court must consider each motion on its own merits. Fair Hous. Council v.

Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will consider each

party’s evidentiary showing, regardless of which motion the evidence was tendered

under. See id. at 1137.

“In determining any motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment,

the Court may assume that the material facts as claimed and adequately supported by the

moving party are admitted to exist without controversy except to the extent that such

material facts are (a) included in the ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ and (b)

controverted by declaration or other written evidence filed in opposition to the motion.” 

Local Rule 56-3. 

 

II. Discussion

The Court first addresses FTC and LOA’s Motions for Summary Judgment,

discussing each Count in the civil complaint separately. Then, the Court turns to the

Vakils’ Motion. 

A. FTC and LOA’s Motions for Summary Judgment

1. COUNT ONE

In Count One, FTC alleges that LOA made false or unsubstantiated statements on

its product packaging that the LED Lamps would “replace” certain wattage lamps. From

sometime in 20074

 until February 2009, LOA marketed and sold the LED Lamps with

packaging that claimed a particular LED Lamps “replaces” a certain wattage bulb, e.g.,

“replaces 20 watts” or “replaces 45 watts.” (CSUF ¶¶ 26-28.) During this time, the

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 6 of 18

packaging made no other claims related to the amount of light produced, other than

indicating that a particular lamp would emit either “bright white light” or “warm white

light.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 45.) The other claims on the package related to energy use, energy

savings, efficiency, and longevity. (Id. ¶ 46.) 

Both FTC and LOA move for summary judgment on this Count. The Court must

consider what a reasonable consumer would understand the “replaces” wattage claim to

mean, whether the claim was material, and whether LOA lacked substantiation or a

reasonable basis to make the “replaces” wattage claim. 

As a threshold matter, LOA argues that the “replaces” wattage claims are not

actionable because they are opinions based on the products’ appearance. (LOA’s Mot.

Br., p. 17 (citing FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Oct. 14, 1983, reprinted in In re

Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)).) LOA reasons that because the

“replaces” wattage claim is based on lamps’ appearance, it qualifies as an “appearance”

claim, which is not pursued under the FTC Policy Statement. (See id.) The Court

disagrees that the “replaces” wattage claim is an “appearance” claim because LOA’s

advertising does not merely state that the LED Lamps “may appear to be as bright as a 20

watt incandescent bulb”; rather, they state that the LED Lamp “replaces 20 watts.” The

latter is the type of specific, numerical claim that is actionable under the FTC Policy

Statement. See In re Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. at 174. Further, it is the type of

claim that requires greater substantiation than a generalized appearance claim. See In re

Thompson Med., 104 F.T.C. 648, at *72.

The parties dispute what the “replaces” wattage claim means to a reasonable

consumer. LOA contends that the “replaces” wattage claim indicated that the LED

Lamps would fit into the same screw-in light sockets and light up using the same power

source as an incandescent bulb. (LOA Mot. Br., p. 19.) This interpretation, however,

ignores the wattage claim and considers the word “replaces” in a vacuum. A reasonable

consumer reading the LED Lamp package purporting to “replace[] 45 watts” would

expect the product to provide a comparable amount of light as a 45-watt light bulb,

thereby making a suitable replacement for a 45-watt light bulb. LOA argues that because

there were no standards for measuring LED light output in late 2007 when the LED

Lamps were first designed, the “replaces” wattage claim could not have implied a wattage

or lumen equivalence. (LOA Mot. Br., p. 19.) LOA’s argument, however, presupposes

that the average consumer would be sufficiently apprised of the limitations on LED lamp

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

5

 Dr. Houser opines that even if the Walmart focus group had been conducted as a controlled

experiment, it would be inappropriate to rely on a human factors experiment since wattage equivalency

is rooted in photometric measurement. (Houser Report, Houser Decl., Ex. B ll. 1067-1070, Docket No.

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 7 of 18

testing to discredit the plain meaning of the claim. The Court cannot make this

assumption. In sum, the “replaces” wattage claim expressly, or at least implicitly,

connotes a comparable brightness or light output to the wattage indicated. 

The Court also finds that the “replaces” wattage claim is material. Because the

“replaces” wattage claim appears to be an express claim, it is per se material. Pantron I,

33 F.3d at 1096. However, even if it is an implied claim, it is material because it relates

to the efficacy of the product, Novartis Corp., 223 F.3d at 786, and it concerns a central

characteristic of the product that bears on a consumers choice to purchase it, Medlab, 615

F. Supp. 2d at 1081.

The central dispute regarding Count One is whether the “replaces” wattage claim

lacked substantiation or a reasonable basis at the time LOA made the claim. LOA argues

that even if the “replaces” claim connotes a light output or brightness equivalency, the

claims were substantiated by the following evidence: (1) feedback from unidentified WalMart employees regarding the relative brightness of the LED Lamps compared to

fluorescent or incandescent lights; (2) naked eye comparisons of LED and incandescent

lamps by Mr. Brian Halliwell, LOA’s Vice President of Sales and Marketing; and (3) test

results from independent testing laboratory Lighting Science, Inc. (“LSI”), which first

tested LOA’s products in December 2008. (LOA’s Opp’n Br., pp. 10-11, Docket No.

192; LOA’s Statement of Unconverted Facts and Conclusions of Law in Support of MSJ

(“LOA’s SUF”) ¶¶ 22-24, Docket No. 187; Declaration of Dr. Ram S. Ronen (“Ronen

Decl.”) ¶¶ 25-27, Docket No. 174.) 

First, LOA argues that the claims are substantiated by the observations of

unidentified Wal-Mart employees who looked at prototypes for four candelabra-style

LED Lamps. See Declaration of Brain S. Halliwell (“Halliwell Decl.”) ¶ 18, Docket No.

178.) Ostensibly, the employees thought the LED lamps were brighter than the

incandescent lamps to which they were compared, though there is no record of the

employees’ responses or the questions they were asked. (Id.) While human eye

comparisons may be a factor in determining the relative brightness or light output of two

lamps, ad hoc testing alone is likely insufficient to support a wattage equivalency claim.5

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

198-18.)

6

 At the hearing, LOA presented a slide that stated “Deposition confirms that [Mr. Halliwell’s]

initial visual comparisons occurred in 2007 before lamps for [sic] reviewed by Wal-Mart associates.

–Halliwell Decl. [sic], Dkt. No 166-13, 125:1-146:8.” (Slide 16) (emphasis in original). However, Mr.

Halliwell’s deposition testimony merely establishes that Mr. Halliwell compared the LED Lamps before

he sent them to the Walmart focus group. Mr. Halliwell did not state that he compared the lights in

2007, nor does did he assert that he compared the lights prior to making the product claims. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 8 of 18

See In re Thompson Med., 104 F.T.C. 648, at *72 (finding that specific, numerical claims

warrant a more searching examination). Even if the Court accepted that naked eye

comparisons in focus groups could be sufficient to substantiate a comparable wattage

claim, LOA’s testing was inadequate to substantiate its claims because (1) LOA has not

established that the Walmart employees observed the LED lamps prior to LOA using the

“replaces” claims on its product packaging; (2) LOA has not established that the LED

Lamp prototypes observed were the same or functionally equivalent to the final products;

(3) LOA has not described the testing conditions for this comparison (e.g. whether the

employees looked at the lamps in a lit or unlit room, whether they viewed them once or

several times); and (4) it is undisputed that the Walmart employees looked at only four of

the fourteen lamps that had “replaces” claims at issue. LOA cannot extrapolate from

these “test results” regarding four products to find substantiation for all fourteen of its

product claims. In sum, this “testing” does not constitute a material basis for the

“replaces” claims. Moreover, it became clear at oral argument that focus groups could

have been conducted in a manner consistent with social science research, but this was not

done. 

Second, LOA argues that Mr. Halliwell’s comparison of the LED and incandescent

lamps substantiated the “replaces” claims; however, Mr. Halliwell 

does not indicate which LED Lamps he evaluated, whether the LED Lamps were

prototypes or final products, or whether he tested all 14 LED Lamps at issue. (See

Halliwell Decl. ¶ ¶ 18-20; LOA’s Mot. Br., p. 5.) Further, Mr. Halliwell does not state

when he conducted this side-by-side comparison, other than to say it was “before about

February 2008,”6

 and thus there is no evidence that Mr. Halliwell compared the lamps

prior to LOA making these claims on its product packages. (Notice of Errata to Halliwell

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

7

 LOA also argues that pictures of the LED and incandescent lamps compared show “there is no

reasonable disagreement that LOA’s LEDs are as bright or brighter than the incandescent bulbs to which

the LEDs were compared.” (LOA’s Mot. Br., p. 5 (citing Declaration of Ashish Dudheker (“Dudheker

Decl.”), Exs. 1-21, Docket No. 171).) However, LOA does not specify to which photo it is referring,

and the only photo seeming to compare LED and incandescent lamps is void of any labeling. Thus, the

Court is in the dark as to which lamp is which. Moreover, from these photos it is not evident that the

two lamps have equivalent brightness or light emission. In fact, this photo highlights the fact that an ad

hoc comparison by a lay person is insufficient to substantiate a wattage equivalency claim. 

8

 Although LOA claims that the CALiPER test results corroborate its claims, LOA also moves in

limine to preclude introduction of this evidence. (Mot. in Limine, Docket No. 220.) This Motion is set

for May 7, 2012. The Court considers the CALiPER test results in the cross-motions for summary

judgment but notes that FTC is entitled to summary judgment on Count One independent of this

evidence. Further, if LOA sought to raise admissibility issues at the summary judgment phase, it should

have filed an evidentiary objection. 

9

 The earliest CALiPER tests were completed on August 28, 2008, (Halliwell Decl., Ex. 7),

while the earliest LSI test results were prepared for LOA on December 17, 2008, (Halliwell Decl., Ex.

6).

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Decl., p. 1, Docket No. 232.)7 Thus, even if human eye comparisons were sufficient to

substantiate LOA’s claims, LOA has not established that Mr. Halliwell or the Walmart

focus group observed all fourteen LED Lamps prior to LOA using the “replaces” wattage

claims on its product packaging. Accordingly, neither of these comparative observations

meet the substantiation requirement under Section 5(a). 

Third, LOA argues that Mr. Halliwell’s “qualitative” study of the brightness of the

LED Lamps was confirmed by quantitative testing, both in the CALiPER8

 and LSI tests. 

Importantly, the CALiPER and LSI test results were not available before LOA began

using the “replaces” wattage claims, and thus neither of these tests show that LOA had a

“reasonable basis” for its claims prior to making them.9

 

Further, during the hearing, FTC urged the Court to reject evidence regarding the

relative lumen levels of the LED Lamps and incandescent bulbs. To be sure, the Court’s

tentative and final orders are not predicated on comparative lumen analysis. Rather, the

Court examined the relative Center Beam Candle Power (“CBCP”) measurements, which

FTC and LOA’s experts agree is a helpful comparison in determining the relative

brightness of an LED and incandescent bulb. (Ronen Decl. ¶¶ 25-26; Declaration of Dr.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

10 CBCP values in the CALiPER report are based on intensity at nadir (0-degree angle).

11 Dr. Houser disputes this. As discussed infra, the CBCP does not measure “brightness” in a

vacuum; one must consider the beam angle of a lamp or bulb to determine the relative “brightness” of

two lamps. 

12 LOA objects generally to Dr. Houser’s opinions. (LOA’s Evidentiary Objections, Docket No.

214.) At least to the extent the Court relies on Dr. Houser’s opinions, he is adequately credentialed and

has the ability to express opinions under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court

overrules the objections to that extent.

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 10 of 18

Kevin Houser (“Houser Decl.”) ¶ 15, Docket No. 198-16.) LOA’s expert witness Dr.

Ronen opines that for directional lighting, as opposed to general purpose lighting, the

Center Beam Candle Power (“CBCP”) measurement of a lamp is a more accurate

measure that the total lumens for purposes of determining whether an LED Lamp

“replaces” a certain wattage incandescent bulb. (Ronen Decl. ¶¶ 25-26.) The DOE

defines CBCP as “the luminous intensity at the center of a beam, expressed in candelas.” 

(CALiPER Report, Ronen Decl., Ex. B.)10 Dr. Ronen asserts that the CBCP measures the

“brightness” of a lamp at the center of its beam of light.11 (Id. ¶ 26.) Dr. Ronen states

that the LSI and CALiPER tests indicate that the brightness of the LED Lamps is greater

than their purported incandescent equivalents because the CBCP of the LED Lamps was

“in all cases greater” than the CBCP measurement of the same wattage incandescent

lamps. (Id. ¶¶ 22-27 (citing excerpts of the CALiPER and LSI tests at Exs. B-D.) Dr.

Ronen opines that flood lamps such as those tested in the CALiPER and LSI tests are

“clearly directional,” and he concludes that the CBCP results support a finding that the

LED Lamps “are brighter in the direction pointed than the incandescent bulbs with which

they were compared.” (Ronen Decl. ¶¶ 17, 27.) However, Dr. Ronen does not explain

how, if at all, he accounted for the differing beam angles in the LED flood Lamps and

incandescent flood lamps that he compared. 

FTC’s expert witness Dr. Kevin Houser opines that a CBCP measurement is only a

reliable measure of brightness if one takes into account the geometric distribution of the

emitted light, e.g., the beam spread, beam angle, and beam lumens.12 (Houser Decl. ¶

15.) Dr. Houser asserts that Dr. Ronen’s analysis of the CBCP measurement is

fundamentally deficient because it fails to account for differing beam angles among the

lamps. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 15-23, 57.) Indeed, Dr. Houser notes, incandescent lamps with the

same wattage and same initial lumens can generate dramatically different CBCPs

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Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

13 Dr. Ronen does not explicitly discuss the LSI testing other than to list results a table he

prepared in his expert report. However, comparing the CBCP measurement for the LED Lamps to

incandescent lamps at a comparable beam angle, it is evident that the CBCP measurement of the

incandescent lamps greatly exceed the LED lamps. (See LSI Test, Ronen Decl., Ex. C; Houser Decl. ¶¶

20-21.)

14 Mr. Halliwell’s analysis of the CALiPER and LSI test results is similarly flawed because it

does not account for the beam angles of the lamps. (Halliwell Decl. ¶ 27; Houser Decl. ¶ 57.) 

Furthermore, Mr. Halliwell does not purport to be an expert in the field of lighting and LED technology,

and thus he is unqualified to present expert opinions regarding the comparative CBCP measurements of

the LED and incandescent lamps. Indeed, Mr. Halliwell has specifically disclaimed expertise in the

field. (See Halliwell Depo. 219:14-25, Declaration of Kimberly Nelson (“Nelson Decl.”), Ex. H,

Docket No. 198-1.) 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 11 of 18

depending on the beam angle. (Id. ¶ 16.) Thus, a CBCP measurement is meaningless

without accounting for the geometric distribution of the emitted light. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Dr.

Houser asserts that Dr. Ronen incorrectly compared LOA Lamps, which have beam

angles ranging from 12.6 degrees to 25 degree, to a GE flood lamp that has a beam angle

of approximately 55 degrees, and thus Dr. Ronen’s comparative CBCP ratings were

flawed and misleading. (See id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Dr. Houser posits that one attains more

meaningful results by comparing lamps with comparable beam angles. For example, Dr.

Houser compared one LED Lamp purporting to “replace[] 45 watts,”

which has a beam angle of 12.6 degrees, to a 45-watt GE PAR38 lamp, which has a beam

angle of 12 degrees. (Id. ¶ 22.) The LED Lamp had a CBCP that was 88.7 percent less

than the CBCP of the 45-watt incandescent lamp. (Id.) Thus, LOA’s wattage

equivalence claims are not supported by the CALiPER or LSI13 testing or by objective

photometric comparison using CBCP. (Houser Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, 15-23.)14 Dr. Ronen’s

opinions do not meet the requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and they do not

amount to evidence sufficient to create a material issue of fact. Before conflicting expert

opinions can create a material issue of fact, there must be an admissible opinion. Claar v.

Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502, 504-505 (9th Cir. 1994); Major League Baseball

Props. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290, 310-312 (2d Cir. 2008).

The Court has authority to grant equitable monetary relief for Section 5 violations

pursuant to section 13(b) of the FTC Act. Pantron I Corp., 33 at 1102 (finding that

Section 13(b) confers to courts the power to order restitution or any ancillary relief

necessary to accomplish complete justice for FTC Act violations); see Stefanchik, 559

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 #:8417
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

15 FTC concedes that an offset would be appropriate on its restitution claim, though FTC

maintains that it would be inappropriate to offset disgorgement relief. (FTC’s Reply Br., p. 15 & n. 18.)

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 12 of 18

F.3d at 931 (reviewing the district court’s granting of equitable monetary relief under the

FTC Act for an abuse of discretion). To the extent that FTC seeks equitable monetary

relief under Count I, there are multiple issues of fact which preclude summary judgment

or summary adjudication on the issue. These include the appropriate period of recovery,

the products covered (such as flood lamps), and the amount and appropriateness of any

offset for actual consumer benefit afforded by the LEDs consumers purchased.15 

2. COUNT TWO

In Count Two, FTC alleges that LOA made false or unsubstantiated statements

regarding the light output in lumens generated by the LED Lamps. (FAC ¶¶ 92-93.) It is

undisputed that LOA based all of its claims regarding the light output emitted by its LED

Lamps on the testing reports it obtained by LSI and OnSpex. (FTC’s SDF ¶ 79; Halliwell

Decl. ¶¶ 32-34.) The FTC has not challenged the reliability of these tests, nor has it

argued that these tests are insufficient to substantiate LOA’s lumen claims. Accordingly,

LOA is entitled to judgment on this Count as a matter of law. 

3. COUNT THREE

In Count Three, FTC alleges that LOA made three types of false or unsubstantiated

claims regarding the lifetime of the LED Lamps: (1) that the LED Lamps would last

30,000 hours; (2) that the LED Lamp “LASTS 15 TIMES LONGER than 2,000 hour

Incandescent bulbs”; and (3) that “You’ll never change your light bulbs again.” (LOA’s

Mot. Br., pp. 10-12; FTC’s Opp’n Br., p. 8) (emphasis in original). LOA concedes that it

made the 30,000-hour claim on its packaging until August 2009. (LOA’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law (“LOA’s SUF”) ¶ 43, Docket No. 198.) After

August 2009, LOA reduced its lifetime claims to 20,000 hours, and then further reduced

them to 15,000 hours around December 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 50.) LOA has the burden of

identifying the substantiation for each of these claims. Only LOA moves for summary

judgment on this Count.

With regard to the 30,000-, 20,000-, and 15,000-hour “lifetime” claims, there is a

genuine issue of fact as to whether LOA had adequate substantiation for these claims in

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 13 of 18

light the LED landscape when LOA began marketing its products. It is undisputed that

LOA purchased the individual LEDs used in its early generation LED Lamps from

ParaLight. (FTC’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“FTC’s SDF”) ¶ 33, Docket No. 198.) 

LOA alleges that ParaLight engineers, who were familiar with LOA’s intended use of the

LED components, told LOA that the estimated life of the LEDs was 30,000 hours,

provided that the LED Lamps were made in accordance with LOA’s design. (Halliwell

Decl. ¶ 25; Declaration of Aijaz Taj (“Taj Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A at p. 1.) LOA designed

the Lamps to operate at a current of no greater than 20 mA and at temperatures of no

more than 65 degrees celsius. (Halliwell Decl. ¶ 25; Taj Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A at p. 1.) 

However, there is a question of fact as to whether all the LED Lamps were made in

conformity with the temperature and current limitations, as Mr. Taj notes it is possible

that some of the lamps manufactured in ParaLight’s Shanghai factor were driven beyond

the current threshold, thus potentially compromising the lifetime of the lamp. (Taj Decl.

¶ 9.) Furthermore, although LOA alleges that a writing evidences ParaLight’s lifetime

estimate for the LEDs, the writing LOA refers to is a one-line email stating, “[w]e

estimate our LED life is 30000 hr.” (Taj Decl., Ex. A.) The email does not specify

which LEDs it refers to, it does not mention the effect of current or temperature on the

LED lifetime, and it does not define the “lifetime” of an LED. (Id.) 

More fundamentally, there is little agreement on the understanding of “lifetime” at

the time LOA made the 30,000-, 20,000-, and 15,000-hour claims. Neither Halliwell nor

Taj stated that they discussed their understanding of LED “life” with ParaLight before

relying on ParaLight’s opinion to substantiate the 30,000 hour claim. (See Halliwell

Depo., 215-221; Taj Depo. 193-94.) In fact, even Mr. Taj and Mr. Halliwell diverge of

the meaning of (LED) “life.” While Mr. Taj suggests that the “life” of the LED lamp

expires when it loses 50 percent of its brightness, (Taj Depo 193:2-14), Mr. Halliwell

testified that “life” of an LED lamp expires only when the light output becomes zero, or

in other words, when the light goes out completely, (Halliwell Depo. 215:24-216:18;

221:16-19). Thus, under Mr. Halliwell definition, the time during which a LED lamp

operates at 49% or even 1% would be considered part of the lamp’s “lifetime.”

 

According to Dr. Houser, Mr. Halliwell’s understanding of “lifetime” was not

reasonable even in 2007 when he began marketing the LED Lamps. (Houser Report, ll.

528-543.) Dr. Houser opines that as early as 2005, it was generally understood in the

lighting industry that the operable “lifetime” of an LED lamp expired once it fell below

50 percent of its initial value. (Id.) By fall 2007, he adds, the de facto standard for

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

16 It is undisputed that under the L70 standard, at least one of the LED Lamps, the PAR 38,

would have only had a 10,000-hour lifetime. (FTC’s SDF ¶ 46; Halliwell Decl. ¶ 46, Ex. 27 at 4 (LOA273); Ex. 28 at 1.)

17 While Dr. Houser does not proffer any expert opinion on the 15,000-hour claim directly, his

analysis demonstrates that there is at least a genuine question of fact regarding the 15,000-hour claim. 

LOA has not made a prima facie case regarding the 15,000-hour claim, and thus it is not entitled to

summary judgment on that representation. 

18 Dr. Houser also notes that LOA’s testing was inadequate because it only tested a product for

1,000 hours and extrapolated a “lifetime” claim without accounting for the exponential depreciation

after the first 1000 hours. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 14 of 18

defining LED lifetime was “L70,” which indicates the time in hours it takes an LED

product to depreciate to 70 percent of initial light output.16 (Houser Report, ll. 158-59.) 

There is also a dispute as to whether LOA properly relied on the lifetime of the LED

component rather than considering the LED Lamp product as a whole. LOA’s expert Dr.

Cowley asserts that LOA appropriately relied on a longevity assessment of the LED

rather than the lamp itself because their were no standards or tests for predicting or

evaluating LED lamp life at the time. (Declaration of Michael Cowley (“Cowley Decl.”)

¶¶ 11-12.) Dr. Houser disagrees. He posits that by fall 2007, it was widely recognized

that LEDs should be evaluated as integrated lighting products, rather than just the

component parts. (Halliwell Decl. ¶¶ 9; Houser Decl., Ex. B ll. 190-204.) Thus, he

concludes that a claim based solely on the lifetime of the LED could not adequately

support a lifetime claim regarding the LED Lamp. Dr. Houser concludes that the data

LOA relied upon from ParaLight was not sufficient in depth or breadth to support the

lifetime claim; he posits that LOA should have obtained additional test and engineering

data. (Houser Decl. ¶ 32, Ex. B ll. 602-619.) 

Finally, Dr. Houser concludes that LOA’s 30,000- and 20,000- hour claims were

grossly inflated, pointing to a test of LOA’s integrated LED Lamps that showed a rapid

decline in lumen output in the first 961 hours. (Houser Decl. ¶ 33, Houser Report ll. 698-

716.)17 He posits that had LOA’s products been tested for more than 961 hours, the LED

Lamps would have continued to decline, making lifetime claims of more than a few

thousand hours unsupportable and false. (Houser Decl. ¶ 33, Ex. C-M; Houser Report ll.

698-716.)18 Additionally, Dr. Houser asserts that LOA improperly used data regarding

particular products to support its life claims on its other product, failing to take into

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 15 of 18

account the specifics of the design and construction of the other products. (Houser Decl.

¶ 34.)

Thus, there is at least a genuine issue of fact as to (1) the level of substantiation

attainable on the “lifetime” claims given the state of LED technology; and (2) whether

LOA had adequate substantiation for any of its three “lifetime” claims. Given these

genuine issues regarding the “lifetime” claims, there are necessarily genuine issues

regarding the statement that the LED Lamp “LASTS 15 TIMES LONGER than 2,000

hour Incandescent bulbs,” because this statement indirectly claims that the LED Lamp

lasts 30,000 hours. Accordingly, the same issues regarding substantiation are implicated. 

With respect to the LOA’s third claim, “That you’ll never change your light bulbs

again,” LOA argues this statement is mere puffery and therefore not actionable. LOA

makes out its prima facie case that a reasonable consumer reading this statement in

conjunction with the specific “lifetime” hours claim would not likely be deceived into

thinking the LED Lamp would literally last a lifetime. In fact, even the highest hours

claim on LOA’s packaging–30,000 hours–is approximately 27 years, which plainly

exceeds the remaining lifetime of many consumers. Moreover, consumers are not likely

to rely on this information because it has the ring of hyperbole. See Cook, Perkiss &

Liehe, Inc. v. Northern Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990)

(describing puffery as vague or highly generalized claims that are “so exaggerated as to

preclude reliance by consumers”) (internal quotations omitted). FTC does not set forth

any evidence challenging LOA’s claim. Accordingly, LOA is entitled to summary

judgment on Count III with respect to this statement.

In sum, for the foregoing reasons, (1) FTC is entitled to summary judgment on

Count I; (2) LOA is entitled to summary judgment on Count II; and (3) there are genuine

issues of material fact as to all claims under Count III, except the claim that “You’ll never

change your light bulb again,” which LOA has established was mere puffery, and thus

LOA is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 

B. The Vakils’ Motion for Summary Judgment

FTC also charged LOA’s co-owners, Farooq and Usman Vakil, with three counts

of violating the FTC Act. (FAC ¶¶ 8-9.) The Vakils move for summary judgment as to

all claims. Usman founded LOA in 1978 and he has been a senior executive with LOA

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 #:8421
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

19 The Vakils incorrectly argue that FTC must show actual knowledge of the deceptive claims to

establish their individual liability for equitable injunctive relief. (Vakils’ Mot. Br., pp. 3-4, 10-11.) As

the Court discussed previously in its order denying the Vakils’ Motion to Dismiss, FTC need not show

the Vakils had knowledge of the deceptive acts to show liability for injunctive relief. (Order, Docket

No. 87 (discussing FTC v. Garvey, 383 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2004); FTC v. Network Servs. Depot,

Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1138 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2010)).) 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 16 of 18

since that time. (Id. ¶ 8; Vakils’ Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law

(“Vakils’ SUF”) ¶ 1.) He is presently LOA’s Chairman of the Board of Directors and

President. (FAC ¶ 8.) Usman also has a 51 percent ownership interest in LOA. (Id.) 

Farooq, LOA’s minority shareholder, joined LOA in 1980 and has served as Executive

Vice President since 1981. (Vakils’ SUF ¶ 27; Declaration of Farooq Vakil (“Farooq

Decl.”) ¶ 4, Docket No. 167-1.) It is undisputed that Usman is responsible for all

operations of the company, oversees the company’s engineering and marketing

departments, and shares responsibility with his brother, Farooq, for overseeing LOA’s

human resources. (SUF ¶ 7; Declaration of Usman Vakil (“Usman Decl.”) ¶¶ 4, 9,

Docket No. 167-6.) 

In this case, FTC seeks equitable injunctive relief and equitable monetary relief (or

restitution) from the Vakils for their violations of Section 5(a). To prove liability for

injunctive relief, FTC must show that the Vakils (1) participated in the acts in question or

(2) had authority to control the activities at issue.19 FTC v. Garvey, 383 F.3d 891, 900

(9th Cir. 2004). To prove liability for restitution, FTC must show that the Vakils had

actual knowledge of the material misrepresentations, were recklessly indifferent to the

truth or falsity of the misrepresentations, or were aware of a high probability of fraud and

intentionally avoided knowledge of the truth. Id. 

1. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

FTC has presented sufficient evidence to show that there is at least a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether Usman and Farooq Vakil had the ability to control

the activities in question. 

“Authority to control the company can be evidenced by active involvement in

business affairs and the making of corporate policy, including assuming the duties of a

corporate officer.” FTC v. Am. Standard Credit Sys., 874 F. Supp. 1080, 1089 (C.D. Cal.

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 #:8422
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 17 of 18

1994). In this case, both individuals served as corporate officers. Usman, the majority

shareholder and President of LOA, concedes that he made the decision to enter the LED

lamp market, set the prices for the LED Lamps, oversaw the marketing and engineering

departments, oversaw the daily operations of LOA, and exercised authority in ordering

changes to the LED Lamp packaging. (Vakils’ SUF ¶¶ 7-9, 17, 19.) Farooq, the

minority shareholder and Executive Vice President of LOA, oversaw at least some

aspects of LOA’s marketing of the LED Lamps. For example, Farooq sought verification

of the LED Lamp’s compatibility with the LEDs furnished by LOA’s suppliers. (FTC’s

Statement of Genuine Disputes of Fact (“FTC Vakil SGD”), ¶ 31; Exs. 22-24.) Farooq

also exercised control in accepting the 20,000-hour lifetime claims on the LED Lamp

product packaging, deciding to discontinue certain claims, and directing the production of

new product packaging to reflect the modified claims. (FTC Vakil SGD, Ex. 30.) 

Accordingly, there is at least a genuine dispute as to whether Usman and Farooq

exercised control over the activities at issue. 

2. RESTITUTION

FTC has presented sufficient evidence to show that a trier of fact could reasonably

infer that Usman and Farooq Vakil had actual knowledge of the material

misrepresentations in the claims, that they were recklessly indifferent to the truth or

falsity of the claims, or that they were aware of a high probability of fraud in the claims

and purposefully avoid knowledge of their falsity.

Although the Vakils argue that the knowledge requirement looks at the defendant’s

subjective state of mind, (Vakils’ Mot. Br., p. 9), “reckless indifference” is analyzed

objectively. That is, a defendant is recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of a

statement if the defendant knew or should have known that there was an unjustifiably

high risk that the statement was untrue. Network Servs. Depot, 617 F.3d 1140, n. 12. 

Moreover, a defendant’s degree of participation in the affairs of the company is probative

of the defendant’s knowledge. FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 574 (7th

Cir. 1989). 

In this case, there is evidence suggesting that Usman and Farooq may have been

recklessly indifferent to the veracity of the product claims. For example, LOA’s engineer

Aijaz Taj testified that Usman was at the LOA facility every day and spoke with Mr. Taj

nearly every day. (FTC’s Vakil SDF, Ex. 3 at 25:4-12, 40:18-25, 41:25-42, 110:16-17.) 

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 #:8423
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. SACV 10-1333 JVS (MLGx) Date April 25, 2012 

Title FTC v. Lights of America Inc., et al. 

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 18 of 18

Mr. Taj testified that he frequently spoke with Usman about problems with the LED

Lamps and “the pricing or the performance of the LED’s and the reports, if they were

negative.” (Id. at 103:23-104:1, 157:9-14.) Furthermore, both Usman and Farooq

received emails from three of its largest clients, Costco, Sam’s Club, and Walmart,

complaining that the LED Lamps were failing prematurely. (FTC’s SDF ¶ 16(e), Exs.

17, 18 (Usman only), 19 (Usman only), 31.) In December 2008, Farooq forwarded

Usman an email from Unity Microelectronics (“Unity”), which had conducted “burn in

testing” and had prepared an LOA bulb life testing report. (FTC’s SDF ¶ 6.) The test

results undermined LOA’s 30,000-hour lifetime claim, showing that in just 961 hours, the

intensity of the light had decayed by 47%, 48%, and 32% for three of the LED Lamps. 

(Id. at LOA-00031611_00016.) These test results and complaints from LOA’s biggest

retail customers likely put the Vakils on notice of at least a potential falsity in LOA’s

claims. That Usman and Farooq claim to have never read these emails or Unity’s test

results does not vitiate the knowledge link; indeed, it may show that Usman and Farooq

were recklessly indifferent to the veracity of LOA’s claims. 

In sum, FTC has marshaled sufficient evidence to show that Usman and Farooq

Vakil may be liable for equitable injunctive and monetary relief under section 5(a) of the

FTC Act. The Vakils have failed to show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact

as to their ability to control the activities at issue or their knowledge of the

misrepresentations. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, FTC’s Motion is GRANTED. LOA’s Motion is

GRANTED with respect to Count II and DENIED with respect to Count I and Count III,

except regarding the claim that “You’ll never change your light bulb again,” on which

LOA’s Motion is GRANTED. The Vakils’ Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

00 : 00

Initials of Preparer kjt

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