2013 IL 115728



### IN T HE
SUPRE M E C OUR T
OF
TH E ST ATE OF IL LI NOI S

(Doc ket No. 115728)
THE VENTURE—NE WBERG-P E RI NI
, STONE & WEBSTER, Appellant, v. THE I L L I NOI S WORKERS ’ COMPENSATI ON
COMMI SSI ON (Ronald Da ug herty , Appellee ).

Opinion filed Dece mber 19, 2013.

CHI EF J USTI CE GARMAN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices F r e e ma

n , T h o ma s , K a

r me ier, Bur

ke, and Theis concur

red in the judgme nt and opinion.
J ustice Kilbride dissented, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Ronald Daug herty wa s a m em b er o f P l u m b ers & Pipef itters Union L ocal 137 (L ocal 137) based in Springf ield, I llinois

. Due to a lack of available work in his l o cal are a, Daug herty took a position with The Venture —Newbe rg -Perini, Stone & Webster (Ve nture) located approximately 200 miles from his home. Da u gh erty had temporar ily reloc ated to a near by motel for the job and was seriously injured in an automobile acc ident on his way to work. As a result, Daug herty

soug ht worker s’ compensation benefits. ¶ 2 The arbitrator found that Daug herty failed to show that the injury

arose out of and in the co u rs e o f his employ ment. The I llinois Workers’ Compensatio n Commi ssion (Commissi on) reve rsed the arbitrator’s conclusion. On administrative revie w, the circ uit court of Sang amon County set aside the Commi ssion’s finding

. The appellate
court reve rsed the circ uit court’s judgme nt, fi n d i n g that Daug herty

was a “traveling employ ee” at the time of the injury

. The appellatecourt denied Venture ’s petition for rehe aring

, but g rante d

cer tification pursuant to Rule 315(a)

, and this court g rante d Venture ’s petition f or leave to appe al. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). For the foll owing rea sons, we reve rse the judgme nt of t he appellate
court a nd aff irm the circ uit court’s judg ment.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 At t h e t ime of the acc ident, Da u gh er t y wa s a re s i d en t o f

Springf ield, I llinois

, and was a pipefitter and member of L ocal 137, working out of Springf

ield. Members of L ocal 137 wer e permitted to take jobs outside the local territory

, b u t o nly when no work was available locally

. Due to a lack of available work in the local are a, Daug herty took a position with Venture at a plant located in Cordova, I llinois

, located about 200 miles from Springf ield. Whil e working at the C ordova plant, Daug herty was ex pecte d to work 7 d ay s a week, 12 hours a day

. Due to the distance and long ho u rs , Da u gherty and his fellow union member, T o d d McGill, decide d to stay at a local motel. ¶ 5 Daug herty and McGill first repor ted to work at the Cordova plant

on Marc h 23, 2006. After completing work that day

, the men went to L y nwood L odg e to spe nd the night. The motel was located about 30 miles from the Cordova plant. The men wer e schedule d to resu m e work at 7 a.m. the following d ay

. Around 6 a.m. the next morning

, McGill was driving Daug herty to work in McGill’s pickup truck. The vehicle s k i d ded on ice while crossing an overpa ss, and Daug herty suffe red serious injuries. As a result of this acc ident, Daug herty
soug ht worker s’ compensation benefits. ¶ 6 Daug herty ’s position with the Cordova plant was to be tempora ry

. Under L ocal 137’s n o rm al p olicy

, members are terminated at the compl etion of a job and are expected to seek a new position. Daug herty had worke d for Cordova on four o t h er short-term positions i n the two year s prior to the ac cident. ¶ 7 Daug herty testified that it was his un d er s t an d i n g that Venture

wanted worke rs to be within an hour’s drive of the plant, so that they

wer e available for work when neede d. Daug herty ’s cowor ker, McGill, also testified t h at Ve nture did not direc t worke rs wher e to stay and that, while Venture desired its employ ees to be located close
to the plant, the worke rs wer e not require d to reloc ate to be closer to the plant. An employ ee of Vent u re, Anthony Cahill, testified that Venture derive d a benef it from worke rs residing within the local
g eog raphic are a due to emer g ency labor needs. Venture
, howeve r, did

-2-not d i re ct worke rs wher e to stay or what route to take to work. Daug herty was not reimburse d for trave l expenses or compe n sated for tra vel time. Cahill noted t hat onl y exis ting employ ees who were transfe rre d to another location wer e compensa ted for trave l expenses. ¶ 8 The arbitrator conclude d that Daug herty had fa iled to prove that his injuries arose out of and in the course of his em p l o y m ent. The arbitrator also found that Daug herty did not qualify for the trave ling employ ee e x ception. ¶ 9 I n a divided decision, the Commi ssion revers ed t h e ar bitrator’s decision, concluding that while ordinarily an acc ident occur ring while an employ ee trave ls to work is not considere d t o b e o n e that arises out of and in the course of employ ment, two exceptions applied here

. First, the Co m mission found the acc ident occur red within the

course of Daug herty ’s employ ment beca

use Daug herty ’s course or method of t rave l was determin ed by the demands and ex ige ncies of the j o b

, rathe r than his persona l pref ere nce. The Commi ssion acknow ledge d that Daugherty was not require d to stay in the local

are a, but found that “as a prac tical matter,” Daug herty neede d to have stay ed within a rea sonable commuting distance fr o m the plant. Second, the Commi ssion found that Daug herty wa s a “traveling employ ee” at the time of the a ccide nt. ¶ 10 On adminis t ra t i v e re v i ew , t h e ci rc u i t co u rt found that the

Commi s s ion misconstrued or misapplied I llinois law and set aside the Commi ssion’s finding s. The appellate court reve rsed. 2012 I L App (4th) 110847WC

. Relying o n t h is court’s decision in W right v. Industrial Comm’n
, 62 I ll. 2d 65, 69 (1 9 7 5), the majority of the appellate court found that Daug herty qualified as a “tr av el i ng employ ee” and that his inju ry arose out of the course of his employ ment. J ustice Hudson dissented, finding that Daug herty ’s injury

, occur

ring d u ri ng his commute to work, did not arise out of and in the course of his employ ment. The dissent also disag ree d with the majority ’s application of the trave ling e mploy ee e x ception.

¶ 11 ANALYSI S ¶ 12 Venture argues t h at t h e ap p el l at e co u rt err ed in reve rsingthe

circ uit court. First, Venture maintain s t h at Daug herty was not a trave ling employ ee. Venture focuse s on the rele vant fac ts, noting that Daug herty was a temporar y empl oy ee and Venture did not send Daug herty to work at the Cord o v a plant. Venture also disputes the Commi ssion’s finding that Daug herty was acting under the direc tion

-3-or control of Venture when he chose to reloc ate cl o s er to the work site and wa s injured on the wa y to work. ¶ 13 Da u gh er t y , h o we v er , ar gu es that the Commi ssion’s findings

should be upheld under both exceptions. Daug herty ’s position is that he was a trave ling empl oy ee beca use he was an employ ee who was trave ling awa

y from his home community for his employ er. Daug herty also maintains that his injury arose o u t of and in the

course of his e mploy

ment beca

use Daug herty ’s course of trave l w as deter mined by the demands and exigenc ies of the job, rathe r than his
persona l prefe renc e. ¶ 14 T h e parties also dispute the ap p l i ca b l e s t an d ar d o f re v i ew

.

“B efor e a rev iewing court may overturn a decision of the Commi ssion, the court must find that the awa rd was contra

ry to la w

or that the Commi ssion’s fac tual deter minations wer e ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. [C itation.] On questions of law, revie w is de novo , and a court is n o t b ound by the decision of the Commi ssion. [C itation.] On questions of fac t, the Commi ssion’s decision is ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e only if the

rec ord discloses that the opposite conclusion clea rly is the proper result.” Bee lman Trucking v. Illinois W orkers’ Compens a tion Comm’n
, 233 I ll. 2d 364, 370 (2009). Be cause Daug herty ’s argument fails under either standard, howeve r, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute reg ardingthe standar d of re view.

¶ 15 Trave ling Employ ee ¶ 16 “The g ener al rule is that an i n j u ry i n cu rr ed by an employ ee in
g oing to or returning from the place of employ ment does not arise out of or in the cour s e of the employ ment and, hence

, is not compensa ble.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 86 I ll. 2d 534, 537 (1981). This c ourt has explained the purpose behind this rule, noting that “the emp loy ee’ s trip to and from work is the product of his own decision as to where he wants to live, a matter in which his e mploy er ordinarily has no interest.” Sjostrom v

. Sproule

, 33 I ll. 2d 40, 43 (1965). ¶ 17 An ex ce p t i o n ap p l i es , h o we v er , wh en t h e employ ee is a

“traveling employ ee.” “[C] ourts g ener al ly reg ard employ ees whose duties require them to trave l awa y from their employ er’ s premises (trave ling employ ees) differ ent l y from other employ ees when considering whether an injury arose o u t of and in the course of employ ment.” W right v. Industrial Comm’n
, 62 I ll. 2d 65, 68 (1975); Hoffman v. Industrial Comm’n , 109 I ll. 2d 194, 199 (1985).

-4-¶ 18 I f a t ra v el i n g em p l o y ee i s i njured, the court then consider s whether the employ ee’ s activity was compensa ble. W right

, 62 I ll. 2d
at 69. This court has found that injuries arising from three cate g ories of acts are compensa

ble: (1) acts the employ er instructs the employ ee to perf orm; (2) acts which the employ ee has a common l aw or statutory duty to perf

orm while performing duties for his employ er; (3) acts which the employ ee might be rea sonably expected to perf orm incident to h i s assi g ned duties. Daug herty argues that the third
cate g ory applies here. C onsidering the t hird cate g ory , this court has found that trave l ing employ ees may be compensa ted for injuries incurre d while perf

orming an act they wer e not specific ally instructed
to perf orm. The act, ho we v er, must have arisen out of and in the

co u rse of his employ

ment. To make this deter mination, the cour t considers the rea sonablene ss of the act and whether it might have

rea sonably

been f orese en by

the employ er. ¶ 19 The parties primarily rely on two case s: W right

, 62 I ll. 2d 65, and Chicago Bridge &Iron, Inc . v. Industrial Comm’n , 248 I ll. App. 3d 687 (1993). I n W

right

, an emp l o y ee , My

rtis Wright, was a field

ere ction supervisor who was freque ntly requi red to trave l to out-ofstate locations and stay there for months a t a time. W

right

, 62 I ll. 2d
at 6 7. I n addition to his hourly wag e, Wright rec eived per diem fo r trave ling expenses as well as mileag e reimburse ment. Id

. Wright was working at a job site locate d i n T en n essee and had rente d a motel

room l o cated near the job site. Id

. On a Saturday afte rnoon, Wright

was killed in a car acc ident. Id

. Testimony during the t ri al showed that it was unclea

r as to wher e Wright was trave ling at the time of the

acc ident. Id

. at 68. This court found that the trave ling employ ee exception a

pplied, noting that “[i] t would be inconsistent to de prive

an employ ee of benef

its of workmen’ s compensation simply beca use he must trave l to a specific location for a period of time to fulfill the
t er m s o f his employ

ment and y et g rant the benef its to another employ ee be cause he continuously trave ls.” Id . at 69. ¶ 20 I n C

h i ca g o B r i d

g e & Ir o n , Da n n y Reed was hired by the employ er and wa s “per iodically require d” to trave l to various job sites out of state. C

h i ca g o B r i dge & Iron
, 248 I ll. App. 3d at 688. Reed had worke d exclusiv el y fo r the employ er for 19 y ear s, but his employ ment was not continuous, as he was terminated at the e nd of

eac h temporar

y job and rehire d as nece ssary

. Id

. at 692-93. Reed was compe n s at ed for mileag e when trave ling to work sites. Id

. at 689. One such job site was lo ca t ed i n Minnesota, and Reed stay ed in a motel near t h e j o b site. Id

. Reed was injured i n a car accide nt when

-5-driving from the m o tel to the job location. Id

. The appellate court found that the traveling employ ee e x ception applied. Id . at 694. ¶ 21 Courts in I llinois have considere d a varie ty of other examples of

trave ling employ ees, i n cludi ng trave ling salesmen ( Urban v. Industrial Comm’n
, 34 I ll. 2d 159 (1966)) ; a fi el d mecha nic who
t raveled to service heavy -duty equipment ( Howell Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 78 I ll. 2 d 5 6 7 (1 980)); a direc tor of health service s for a reg ional office of educa tion who
trave led to meet with loc al schools ( Hoffman v. Industrial Comm’n

, 109 I ll. 2d 194 (1985)) ; a union officia l who trave led to attend hear ings an d neg otiate on behalf of his union ( District 141, International Ass’n of

Machinists & Aerospace W orkers v. Industrial Comm’n
, 79 I ll. 2d 544 (1980)) ; a b an k manag er trave ling betwee n two bank branc hes (

Kertis v. Illinois W

orkers’ Co mp ensat ion Comm’n
, 2013 I L App (2d) 120252WC ); and a truck driver ( Potenzo

v. Illinois W

orkers’ Compensation Comm’n
, 378 I l l

. App. 3d 113 (2007))

. ¶ 22 Prior t o ap p l y i n g W r i g h t an d C

h i ca go Bridge & Iron to the instant case , it is helpful t o revie w t he relevant fa cts. In rea chingits conclusion, the Commi ssion made the following finding s of fac t: (1) Daug herty testified that it was his understanding that Venture wanted worke rs to be within a

n hour’s trave ling distance from the plant; (2) union wo rk ers wer e not reimburse d for trave l acc ommodations or compensated for trave l time for positions taken outside their local territory (and Venture did not reimburse Daug herty for his trave l for this job); (3) Daugherty was not require d to take the job at the Cordova plant and would not have been permitt ed t o t ake the job if his local union had a job available

, as union worke rs could take jobs outside their local territory only if jobs wer e not available within the local territory ; (4) Daug herty had worke d on four short-term projec ts for Venture in 2004 and 2006, and at the end of eac h projec t, he was laid off a nd no longe r considere d an employ ee of Venture ; ( 5) Todd M cGill

, a fellow union member who share d a motel roo m wi t h Da ug herty and was driving the truck involved in the acc ident,
t est ified that Venture did not make motel arr ang ements, tell them wher e to stay or pay for trave l expenses. McGill also testified that he

was not require d to reloc ate closer to the work site, but acknow ledg ed that Venture desired its employ ees to be located c loser to the plant. ¶ 23 Wright was a perma nent employ ee who was reg ularly require d by his employ er to trave l out of state. Wright’s employ er reimburse d him with per diem and mileag e expenses. Reed, the pl aint iff in

-6-Chic a g o B r i dge & Iron
, was not a permanent employ ee, but he had worke d exclusively for the employ er for 19 y ear s. L ike Wright, Reed

was reimburse d for his mileag e expenses and was “re quired” to trave l for the position. Fur

thermore

, i n each of the rema ining case s cited above, the empl o y ee was reg ularly employ ed and direc ted by his or her employ er to trave l to a remote lo ca tion. Urban v. Industrial Comm’n
, 34 I ll. 2d 159 (1966); Howell Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 78 I ll. 2d 567 (1980); Hoffman v. In d u s trial Comm’n
, 109 I ll. 2d 194 (1985); District 141, International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace W orkers v. In dustrial Comm’n
, 79 I ll. 2d 544 (1980); Kertis v. Illinois W orkers’ Compensation Comm’n
, 2013 I L App (2d) 120252WC ; Potenzo v. Illinois W orkers’ Compensation Comm’n , 378 I ll. App. 3d 113 (2007). ¶ 24 Un l i k e t h e plaintiff in W right

, Daug herty was not a per manent employ ee of the employ er. Nor was Daug herty working for Venture

on a long- term exclusive basis. He had worke d only four other shortterm Venture projec ts over the two y ear s preceding the acc ident. Fur thermore

, nothing in D aug herty ’s contra ct require d him to trave l
out of his union’s territory t o take the position with Venture

. As Daug herty testified, h e made the persona l decision that the benef its of the pay outweig hed the persona l c ost of trave ling. Daugherty was hired to work at a

specific location and wa s not directed by Venture
to trave l awa

y from this work site to another location. Rather, 1 Daug herty mere ly trave led from the premises to his residing location,

as did all other employ ees. Fi nally

, Venture did not reimburse Daug herty for his trave l expenses, nor did it as s i s t Daughe rty in making his travel arr ang ements. Due to these fac ts, the Commi ssion’s conclusion that Daug herty was a trave ling employ ee was ag ainst the manifest we ight of

the evidenc e. ¶ 25 Not only does the case law fa il to support Daugherty ’s position

that he qualified for the trave lin g employ ee exception, but the appellate court position raises serious policy conce rns. For example, while an employ ee who chooses to reloc ate closer to a temporar y job site can r ece ive bene fits if injured on the wa y to work, an employ ee

Daug her ty argue s that Vent

ure ’s hom e “em

plo y m ent pre m is es ” w as in 1 Wil m ing to n, I ll ino is

, while this job lo ca ti on w as in Cor dov a, I ll ino is

. Reg ar dles s of whethe r Vent ure ’s hom e lo ca

ti on w as in Wilmi n gt on, D aug her ty w as hire d so le ly to per fo rm w or k at the Cor dov a job si te

. There fo re , this is the pre m is es at which Da

ughe rt y w as em plo y ed.

-7-who perma nently resides close to the j o b site is not entitled to benef its if injured on the way

to work. ¶ 26 Be ca u s e we co n cl u d e t h at Da u gh er t y wa s n o t a traveling

employ ee at the t i m e of t he accident, we need not consider whether the injury was c ompensable.

¶ 27 Demands & Ex ige ncies of the J ob ¶ 28 The Commi ssion also found that the acc ident occur red within the

course of Daug herty ’s employ ment beca

use Daug herty ’s course or method of t ra v el was deter mined by the demands and ex ige ncies of the job, rathe r than his per sonal pref ere nce. ¶ 29 I n Sjostrom v. Sproule

, 33 I ll. 2d 40 (1965), this court considere d

a case wher e the plaintiff was injured in a car acc ident on the way to work. The court found that the injuries wer e co m p en sable beca use “the plaintiff’s injuries ar o s e o u t of and in the course of his employ ment since his trip to wor k was ‘de termined by

the demands of his employ

ment rathe r than persona l fac tors.’ ” See Unger v. Continental Assurance Co.
, 107 I ll. 2d 79, 87-88 (1985) (discussing Sjostrom ). Simi lar to this case , the plaintiff was riding in a car driven by the plaintiff’s cowor

ker. Howeve r, unlike the prese nt case , a supervisor direc ted the plaintiff and the cowor ker to ride toge ther and the employ ees w ere reimburse d for tra vel costs. ¶ 30 I n Chicago Bridge & Iron
, the app el l at e court also consider ed

whether Reed’s injury arose out of and in the course of employ ment when he was injured while trave ling to work. The court noted that the
proper test is whether the “cour se or method of trave l is deter mined b y t he demands or exigenc ies of the job rathe r than by his o wn persona l pref

ere nce as to wher e he chooses to live.” Chicago Bridge & Iron, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 248 I ll. App. 3d 687, 693 (1993). I n that case , howeve r, the court found that Reed, the plaintiff, was not acting in the course of employ ment beca

use the employ er did not direc t Reed’s route to work, and Reed was fre e to choose any route in tr aveling to work. The court also noted that while Reed was

re i m bursed for trave l expenses, he was not paid for time s p en t t ra v el i n g

. There fore

, the court conclude d that Reed was not in th e

course of employ

ment when the injury

occur red. ¶ 31 Unlike the plaintiff in Sjostrom
, Daug herty ’s course and method

of trave l was not direc ted by Venture

. Whil e Daug herty ’s decision to stay at a motel c loser to the work site was a logic al one, a s the work site was 200 miles from his home, it was a persona l decision. Nothing in Daug herty ’s contra ct require d him to trave l out of his union’s

-8-territory to take the position wit h Venture

. Instead, it was Daug herty ’s persona l pref ere nce to acc ept the position and the trave l distance that it entailed. The Commi ssion rec og nized th a t V e nture did
not require Daug herty to reloc ate cl o s er to the job site. Whil e Daug herty testified that it was his understanding that Venture wanted worke rs to be within an hour’s trave ling distance from the plant, there

was no evidenc e that this was require d or even sug g ested by Venture

. Daug herty ’s cowor

ker, McGill, test i fi ed that Venture did not tell them wher e to sta

y and that he was not r equire d to r eloca te closer to the work site. Also unlike the plaintiff in Sjos t r o m , Daug herty and McGill we re n o t instructed to ride toge ther, but made the persona l decision to do so in order to save money

. ¶ 32 Da u g herty is much more simil ar to Reed in Chicago B r i d g e & Iron
, as Daug herty was fre e to ch o o s e h is own route to work. Even

more persua sive than in Chicago Bridge & Iron
, Venture d i d not reimburse Daug herty for trave l costs. Daugh er t y was simply no differ ent from any other employ ee who has t o d ri ve to work on a daily basis. There fore

, the Commi ssio n ’s finding that Daug herty ’s method of t rave l was d eter mined by the demands and ex ige ncies of the job, rathe r than his persona l pref ere nce, was ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evide nce.

¶ 33 CONCL USI ON ¶ 34 Whil e there is no question that Daug herty was seriously injured, the fac ts of this case do not support Daug herty ’s argument that he

was entitled to worke rs’ compensation benef its. Daugherty made the
persona l decision to accep t a t empora ry position with Venture at a plant located approximately 200 m i les from his home. Venture did
not direc t Da u gh er t y to acc ept the position at Cordova, and Daug herty acc epted this temporar y position with full k n o wl ed g e of the commute it involved. Daug herty was not a tra

veling employ ee. ¶ 35 Additionally

, Daugher t y ’s co u rs e or method of trave l was not

deter mined by the demands and exigenc ies of the job. Ven t u re did
not reimburse Daug herty for trave l expenses or time spent trave ling. Venture did not direc t Daug herty ’s trave l o r re q u i re him to take a

cer tain route to work. I nstead, Daug herty made the persona l decision
to acc ept the position at Cordova and the additional trave l and trave l risks that it entailed. ¶ 36 The appellate court judgme nt is reve rs ed an d t h e ci rcuit court

judgme nt affir

med.

-9-¶ 37 Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed.

¶ 38 Circuit court judg ment aff irmed.

¶ 39 J USTI CE KI L BRI DE, dissenting : ¶ 40 I ag ree wi t h t h e ap p el l at e co u rt ’s j u d gm en t af fi rming the Commi ssion’s conclusion that Daug herty qualified for workers ’
compensation benef

its beca use he was a “traveling employ ee” at the time of the incident and his injuries arose out of and in the course of his emp l oy

ment. Be cause the majority reve rses that judgme nt and reje cts the Commissi on’s dec ision, Idissent. ¶ 41 I nitially

, unlike the majority

, I would clea rly state that a manife st weig ht of the evidenc e standard ap p l i es here

. See supra ¶ 14 (dec iding not to resol v e t h e parties’ dispute reg arding the proper stan d ar d o f revie w). A revie wing court is permitted to reve rse the Commi ssion’s decision only when the awa rd is contra

ry to law or the Commi ssion’s fac tual findin gs wer e ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. Whil e l ega l questions are subject to de novo revie w, qu es t i ons of fac t are subject to a manifest weig ht of the evidenc e standard. Bee lman Trucking v. Illinois W orkers’ Compensat i o n Comm’n
, 233 I ll. 2d 364, 370 (2009). E l ab o rating on the proper standard of revie w, this court explained that “if undisputed fac ts upon any issue permit more than one rea sonable infere nce, t h e deter mination of such issues prese nts a question of fa ct , and the conclusion of the Commi ssion will not be disturbed on revie w unless it is contr ar y to the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e.” Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm’n , 129 I ll. 2d 52, 60 (1989). ¶ 42 Her e, the parties d i s agr ee o n wh et her the employ er, V enture

Newbe rg , expect ed or require d Daug herty to stay within a cer tain proxi mity to the employ

ment site, and the rec ord contains testimony that permits differ ent rea sonable infere nces on this point, supporting application of the manifest weig ht of the standard. Caterpill ar Tractor Co.
, 129 I ll. 2d at 60. I n ad d i tion, the arbitrator and the Commi ssion rea ched opposite conclusions afte r re v iewing the evidenc e, demonstrating that rea sonable infe r e n c e s f r o m the evidenc e

c o u ld rea sonably yield differ ent conclusions. This provides a d d it io n a l justification for application of a manifest weight of the evidenc e standard. See Illinois Valley Irrigation, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 66 I l l

. 2 d 234, 239 (1977) (apply ing manifest weig ht of evidenc e standard when arbitrator and the Commi ssion rea ched contra ry conclusions).

-10-¶ 43 Thus, I believe a manifest weig ht of the evidenc e standard a pplies in this case

. Under this defe rential s tandar d, a revie wing court may

reve rse the Commi ssion’s decision only if the re co rd discloses that the opposite conclusion clea rly is the prope r result. Bee lman Trucking , 233 I ll. 2d at 370. ¶ 44 An employ ee is entitled to worke rs’ compensation benef its for an injury only if the injury arises out of and in t h e course of his employ ment. 8 2 0 I L CS 305/2 (West 2008); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 131 I ll. 2d 478, 483 (1989). Gene rally

, an injury i n cu rr ed by an employ ee trave ling to or from his place of employ ment is not recove rable beca use it does not arise out of or in the course of the employ ment. Commonwealth Edi s on Co. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 86 I ll. 2d 534, 537 (1981). The justification for this ge nera l rule is that “the employ ee’ s trip to a nd from work is the product of his own decision as to where he wants to live, a matter in which his e mploy er ordinarily has no interest.” Sjostrom v

. Sproule

, 33 I ll. 2d 40, 43 (1965). ¶ 45 An exception to this rule applies, howeve r, when the employ ee is

classified as a “traveling employ ee.” This well-e stablished exception applies to employ ees who are require d to trave l awa y from their employ er’ s premises. Hoffman v. Industrial Comm’n
, 109 I ll. 2d 194, 1 9 9 (1 985); W

right v. Industrial Comm’n
, 62 I ll. 2d 65, 68 (1975) ; Cox v. Il linois W

orkers’ Compensation Comm’n
, 406 I ll. App. 3d 541, 545 (2010). Nonethele ss, as with all employ ees, a trave ling employ ee’ s injuries are compensa ble only if they arise out of

and in the cour se of his employ

ment. Hoffman , 109 I ll. 2d at 199. ¶ 46 I n rele vant part, acts that an em p l o y ee m i gh t b e re as o n ab ly

expected to perf

orm incident to his assig ned duties are considere d to arise out of and in the course of employ ment. W right

, 62 I ll. 2d at 69. More specifica lly

, in the contex t of a trave ling empl o y ee , this court has ex plained that “[t] he test for determining whether an injury to a trave ling employ ee arose out of and in the course of his employ ment is the reas o n ab leness of the conduct in which he was eng ag ed and whether it might normally be antici p ated or fore seen by the employ er.” W

right

, 62 I ll. 2d at 69-70 (citing David W exle r & Co. v. Industrial Comm’n
, 52 I ll. 2d 506, 5 1 0 (1 9 7 2)). Cognizant of the defe re n t i al standard of revie w and the law g overning the “traveling employ ee” ex ce p t ion, I now detail the evidenc e considere d by the Commi ssion. ¶ 47 At the time of the incident, Daug herty was employ ed by Venture

Newbe rg , a company based in Wi l mington, I llinois

. Venture

-

-11-Newbe rg contra cted with Ex elon Gene rati on Company
, L L C, to provide skilled trade smen for maintenanc e or repa ir work at p o wer plants owned and opera

ted by Ex elon. Ty

pically

, Venture -Ne wber g filled Ex elon openings wit h l ocal union trade smen. When positions could not be fi l l ed l ocally

, Venture -Ne wber g posted the jobs with
remote union locations. Thus, wh en local union trade smen wer e unavailable

, Venture -Ne wb er g filled the positions with trade smen who lived outside the are a. Nec essar ily

, these individuals must trave l
to rea ch the distant work site. ¶ 48 This is prec isely what occur red here

. At the time of the incident, Daug herty was a member of L ocal 137 and a pipefitter with 30 y ear s’ experience

. Daug herty lived in Springf ield, I llinois

, o v er 2 00 miles

awa y from Ex elon’s Cordova plant. Be tween 2004 and 2006, Daug herty worke d on multipl e occa sions for Venture -Ne wberg at

v a r io u s Ex elon-owne d power plants throug hout I llinois

, incl u d in g th e Co rdova plant, the L aSalle plant, and the Clint on plant. Venture

Newbe rg hired Daug herty on a temporar y basis for eac h projec t, and his temporar

y employ ment terminated u pon completion of eac h projec t. Ba sed on this wo rk history

, Daug herty had passed the require d backgro und chec k and acquir ed the specia liz ed skills

nece ssary for that ty

pe of w ork. ¶ 49 I n Marc h 2006, Venture -Ne wburg was unable to fill a position at

the Cordova plant locally and soug ht remote union worke rs. Daug herty bid f

or the job and was selec ted by Venture -Ne wburg for temporar y assig nment to a position at the Cordova plant. The position require d Daugherty

to work 12-hour

day s, seven da

y s a we ek. ¶ 50 Daug herty testified that Venture -Ne wburg require d its wo rk er s

to be “ava ilable at just a phone call.” Dau gh erty explained that he neede d to stay wi t hin a cer tain distance from the plant beca use Venture -Ne wburg might ask him to work ear ly or to work late. Daug herty further testified that he was require d to stay within an hour of the plant to fulfill his job duties, and he chose to stay at a motel approximately 30 miles awa y from th e Cordova plant. Daug herty ’s

cowor ker, Todd McGill, confirme d that Venture -Ne wber g emphasized the benef

it of an employ ee being local or g eog raphic ally close. I n co n t rast, Venture -Ne wber g denied that Daug herty was require d to stay within an h o u r of the plant. Venture -Ne wburg

, howeve r, conce ded that it benef itted from having worke rs who wer e willing an d able to stay within the g eog raphic location of the employ ment site.

-12-¶ 51 Ul t i m at el y , Daug herty and McGill first worke d at the Cordova plan t fo r a 12-hour shift on Marc h 23, 2006. The men stay ed overnig ht at a hotel about 30 miles awa y from the plant. At around 6

a.m. the next day

, the two men wer e involved in a traff ic acc ident on their way to the Cordova plant, and Daug herty s u ff ere d signific ant injuries. ¶ 52 R ev i ew i n g t h i s ev i d ence, I ag ree with the Commi ssion t h at

Daug herty

should be considere d a trave ling employ ee at the time he sustained his injuries. There can be no question that Daugherty

, who lived over 200 miles aw ay from the Cordova

plant work site, had to trave l awa

y fr o m his employ er’ s premises in Wil mington, I llinois

. Even assuming, as the majority conclude s in a footnote with no leg al analy si s , t hat Cordova, I llinois

, the location of the plant, should be considere d his employ er’ s premises ( supra ¶ 24 n.1), Daug herty would have had to trave l to that site beca use he lived 200 miles awa y in Springfie ld. ¶ 53 Moreove r, E x el o n co n t ra cted with Venture -Ne wber g with the

express purpose to obtain qualified nonlocal trade smen from remote union locations beca

use of the lack of available qualified local union trade smen. I n other words, Ex el o n and Venture -Ne wber g agree d to hire union trade smen from outside of the are a who would nece ssarily b e r equir ed to travel to the are a to work. In fac t, as Daug herty ’s experience reve als, he was require d to trave l over 200 miles to rea ch
t h e Cordova plant to complete the job he was hired by Ventu re

Newbe rg to perf

orm. By definition, then, Daug herty was require d to trave l from hi s em ploy er’ s premises and qualifies as a trave ling employ ee. See W

right

, 62 I ll. 2d at 68 (trave ling employ ee exception appli es to employ ees who are require d to trave l awa y from their employ er’ s premises). ¶ 54 Of course, concluding that Da u g herty was a trave ling e mploy ee

d oes not end the requisite inquiry

. Daugherty can rec eive worke rs’
compensation benef

its for his injuries only if they arose out of and in the course of his employ

ment. Hof f ma n , 109 I ll. 2d at 199. As this
court has explained, a trave ling employ ee’ s injuries arose out of and in the course o f his employ ment if he was eng ag ed in rea sonable conduct at t h e time of his injury and his employ er might normally anticipate o r foresee that conduct. W right

, 62 I ll. 2d at 69-70. Her e, Daug herty wa s i n

jured as he trave led in a vehicle to the Cordova plant from the motel wher e he was staying while he completed his temporar y wor k assig nment outside of his local are a. This conduct

was entirely rea sonable, and his employ er, who hired Daug herty with

-13-the ex press purpose to trave l to a remote work sit e, certai n l y woul d have anticipated it. Cons equently

, in acc ordanc e with the test articulated by t h i s co u rt in W right

, Daug herty ’s injuries arose from and in the cour se of his employ ment. W right , 62 I ll. 2d at 68. ¶ 55 T h e ap p el l at e co urt here rea ched the same conclusion. As t h e

appellate court found, “Ve nture-N ewbe rg must have anticipated that [Daug herty ], rec ruited to work at E x elon’s fac ility over 200 miles from [hi s] home, would b e required to trave l and arr ang e for convenie nt lodging in order to perf orm the duties of his job, and that it was rea sonable a

nd fore seea

ble that he would trave l a direc t route from the lodge at which he was staying to Ex elon’s fac ility .” 2012 I L App (4th) 110847WC, ¶ 15. ¶ 56 The majority reve rses the appellate court’s judg ment and reje cts

the Commi ssi o n ’s assessment of the evidenc e and its rela ted deter mination that Daug herty was entitled to worke rs’ compensation benef its. Supra ¶ 2. Wit hout ever actua lly sta t ing it, the majority implicitl y holds that an opposite conclu s i o n is clea rly evident from the rec ord. Supra ¶ 14 (dec lining to identify the proper standard of revie w but decla

ring that Daug herty ’s argument fails under both a de

novo standard and the more defe rential manifest weig ht of the evidenc e standa

rd). ¶ 57 For the fore g oing rea s o n s , I cannot ag ree

. Instead, I believe the

Commi ss i o n ’s conclusion is not contra ry to the manifest weight of the evidenc e, and the appellate court’s judgme nt rea ch i n g t he same conclusion should be aff

irmed. Ac co rd ingly

, I respe ctfully dissent.

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