J-S59037-14

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, 

STEVEN GOLDBERG, STEVEN 

GOLDBERG SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP, 

ARNOLD WINICK, AND DAVID PAYNE, 

 Appellants 

 v.

MEYER-CHATFIELD CORP., 

 

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MEYER-CHATFIELD CORP. 

 v.

BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP; 

STEVEN GOLDBERG AND DAVID PAYNE 

Appellants 

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

 

No. 1092 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, 

Civil Division, at No(s): 2013-30326 & 2013-29858 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014 

 Bank Financial Services Group (BFS), Steven Goldberg, Arnold Winick, 

and David Payne (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from two orders entered 

by the trial court. First, Appellants appeal from the March 17, 2014 “Interim 

Order for Special Injunction” entered in favor of Meyer-Chatfield and against 

Appellants. Appellants also appeal from an order entered on March 26, 

2014, by which the trial court denied Appellants’ “Motion Demanding a 
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Hearing under PA.R.Civ.P. 1531(f)(1) and Motion to Dissolve Injunction 

under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1531(c).” Upon review, we vacate the order entered on 

March 17, 2014, and remand to the trial court for additional proceedings. 

 The trial court summarized the facts underlying this case. 

 Meyer-Chatfield is in the business of providing bank-owned 

life insurance (“BOLI”), which is a highly specialized financial 

product. BOLI is a single premium life insurance contract 

specifically designed for banks to earn tax free income, among 

other benefits. Since its beginning in 1992, Meyer-Chatfield has 

been engaged in the design, marketing, sales and servicing of 

BOLI products to the banking community nationwide. MeyerChatfield has developed highly sophisticated programs to 

analyze and meet the needs of its existing customers and to 

identify, cultivate and establish strategic relationships and 

contractual and business relationships with new customers. 

Meyer-Chatfield has expended substantial time, money, and 

effort to recruit, train and supervise a team of professional 

marketing and sales consultants to carry out its programs. 

 On March 3, 2003, Steven Goldberg executed a sales 

representative agreement with Meyer-Chatfield (the “Goldberg 

Contract”). Goldberg became an extremely successful BOLI 

salesperson, earning in excess of $2 million in commissions in 

multiple years. [The contract included a non-compete 

agreement.] 

***

 The Goldberg Contract was entered into for an initial (1) 

year term from March 7, 2003 to March 7, 2004 (the “Term”), 

and was automatically renewed every year thereafter “unless 

either party notified the other party in writing at least three (3) 

months prior to the end of the Term or any renewal thereof that 

it elects to terminate [the Goldberg Contract], in which event 

[the Goldberg Contract] shall expire upon the expiration of the 

then current renewal term.”
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 Arnold Winick became a BOLI sales representative for 

Meyer-Chatfield in 2002 and teamed up with Goldberg. Although 

Winick did not have a contract with Meyer-Chatfield, he, much 

like Goldberg, was a beneficiary of extensive and ongoing 

training from Meyer-Chatfield and became an extremely 

successful BOLI salesperson. 

 On August 16, 2013, Goldberg left Meyer-Chatfield and 

went to work for Bank Financial Services Group (“BFS”), which is 

a direct competitor of Meyer-Chatfield’s. Winick followed 

Goldberg to BFS, along with numerous other employees,

including David Payne, Joseph Byrd and David Schwartz.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/2014, at 1-3.

On October 2, 2013, Meyer-Chatfield filed a complaint and petition for 

preliminary injunction against Appellants. On October 7, 2013, BFS, 

Goldberg, the Steven Goldberg Sole Proprietorship, Winick and Payne filed a 

complaint for declaratory judgment and a special/preliminary injunction 

against Meyer-Chatfield. The two matters were later consolidated. 

A hearing was held on October 18, 2013. At that hearing, the trial 

court permitted counsel to argue why “interim injunctive relief would be 

appropriate in this case.” N.T. 10/18/2013, at 3. No testimony was taken, 

and the trial court took the matter under advisement.

The next hearing was held on January 29, 2014. The parties 

confirmed that they were trying to work through discovery disputes and had 

also begun settlement negotiations. Appellants brought their witnesses and 

were prepared to proceed with the hearing; however, Appellants then 

argued that Meyer-Chatfield brought a surprise expert witness, forensic 
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analyst Louis Cinquanto, and asked for a protective order with respect to his 

testimony. The trial court denied that request, and due to Cinquanto’s 

schedule, permitted him to testify first. 

The trial court summarized that testimony as follows. 

... Meyer-Chatfield hired Louis Cinquanto to perform a forensic 

computer investigation. Cinquanto, who testified at the January 

29, 2014 hearing in this matter, is a certified computer forensic 

examiner and Chief Operations Officer and senior forensic 

examiner at Cornerstone Legal Consultants, a litigation 

consulting firm that performs computer preservation, analysis, 

expert testimony, and trial presentation services. Cinquanto 

conducted an in-depth investigation of the computer records of 

Goldberg, Winick, Byrd and Schwartz. Meyer-Chatfield alleges 

that the discovery of this investigation demonstrates that 

Goldberg, Winick, Byrd and Schwartz unlawfully accessed, 

downloaded and copied Meyer-Chatfield’s confidential and 

proprietary information and data from its computers shortly 

before leaving Meyer-Chatfield to join BFS. Furthermore, 

Cinquanto testified about how the former Meyer-Chatfield 

employees used methods to conceal their activities on their 

computers, including finding a program used to erase temporary 

files on the computer Goldberg used at Meyer-Chatfield. 

In addition, Cinquanto testified that analysis of Payne’s 

computer showed that Payne used a “drop box,” which is a 

service that allows the sending and receiving of data or files by 

way of the internet. In addition, Payne used a flash drive three 

(3) times in 2013 to transfer files that had “Meyer-Chatfield” or

“MC” in the file name. Likewise, an analysis of Byrd’s and 

Schwartz’s computers showed that they both used flash drives.

 In sum, Cinquanto concluded in his testimony that the 

former Meyer-Chatfield employees engaged in a systematic 

pattern of concealment and destruction of data that would have 

indicated what specific Meyer-Chatfield data [Appellants] 

accessed and sent to outside persons or companies. He added

that the action of the former employees could be the “largest IP 
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theft” case that he has seen in all of his years as a computer 

forensic [analyst]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/2014, at 3-6.

 Cinquanto did not complete his testimony until the late afternoon, so 

the trial court scheduled another hearing, which occurred on February 28, 

2014. At that hearing, the trial court permitted argument with respect to 

the grant of interim relief pending the resolution of the preliminary 

injunction. Meyer-Chatfield argued that Appellants continued to “pilfer”

clients, and to date, 18 clients, representing a “very sizeable portion of 

Meyer-Chatfield’s business” had been lost. N.T., 2/28/2014, at 4. Counsel 

further argued that, if Appellants’ conduct continued, Meyer-Chatfield would 

go out of business. Appellants argued in response to Meyer-Chatfield’s 

contentions; no testimony was taken; and, the trial court took the matter 

under advisement and scheduled a two-day hearing. 

 On March 13, 2014, the trial court signed an order, which states the 

following. 

 AND NOW, this 13th day of March 2014, it is hereby 

ORDERED and DECREED as follows: 

 [Appellants] Steven Goldberg and [BFS] and any of their 

respective partners, agents, joint ventures and any persons or 

entities acting for or on their behalf including but not limited to 

BFS Northeast, Arnold Winick, David Payne, David Schwartz and 

Joseph Byrd (collectively, [Appellants]) are hereby enjoined and 

shall immediately cease and desist from: (i) diverting existing 

BOLI business away from Meyer-Chatfield (ii) soliciting or 

inducing or attempting to induce any existing bank client of 
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Meyer-Chatfield not to do business with Meyer-Chatfield or to 

cease doing business with Meyer-Chatfield and (iii) contacting, 

soliciting or communicating in any way with existing bank clients 

of Meyer-Chatfield (including those identified in Exhibit 2 of the 

Affidavit of Bennett S. Meyer in support of the Petition.) 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that [Appellants] 

are temporarily enjoined from servicing its BOLI policies in 

regard to Customers Bank other than the Northwestern Mutual 

BOLI policy sold to Customers Bank by BFS in September 2013. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that [Appellants] 

may provide monthly reports strictly necessary for the servicing 

of existing BOLI policies at the following banks ...

 This Interim Special Injunction Order shall take effect 

immediately upon the posting of a bond by Meyer-Chatfield in 

the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) and shall 

continue in force until further Order of the Court. 

Interim Order for Special Injunction, 3/17/2014. 

 On March 19, 2014, Appellants filed a motion to dissolve the injunction 

and for a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1531(f)(1).1

 The trial court entered 

 

1

 That rule provides that 

[w]hen a preliminary or special injunction involving freedom of 

expression is issued, either without notice or after notice and 

hearing, the court shall hold a final hearing within three days 

after demand by the defendant. A final order shall be filed in the 

office of the prothonotary within twenty-four hours after the 

close of the hearing. If the final hearing is not held within the 

three-day period, or if the final order is not filed within twentyfour hours after the close of the hearing, the injunction shall be 

deemed dissolved. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1531(f)(1). 
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an order denying that motion on March 26, 2014. On March 27, 2014, 

Appellants filed a notice of appeal referencing both orders.2,3

Before we reach the issues raised on appeal by Appellants, we 

consider the trial court’s suggestion that these orders are not appealable 

because it has not yet heard all of the evidence.4 The trial court observed 

the following. 

Hearings in this matter were held on October 18, 2013, January 

29, 2014 and February 28, 2014. These preliminary injunction 

hearings have not been completed. An appeal cannot be taken 

from a temporary interim injunction order entered during the 

course of multiple hearings on a petition for preliminary 

injunction. ... Accordingly, this court’s order dated March 13, 

2014 is interlocutory, and this appeal should be quashed. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/2014, at 6. 

Although neither party responds specifically to the trial court’s 

observation, the statement of jurisdiction presented by Appellants sets forth 

that this Court has jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). Appellants’ Brief 

at 1. That rule provides that a party is entitled to an interlocutory appeal as 

of right from 

 

2

 We observe that the filing of one appeal from multiple orders is 

discouraged generally. See TCPF Ltd. P'ship v. Skatell, 976 A.2d 571, 574 

(Pa. Super. 2009). 

3 The trial court did not order a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 and none was filed.

4

 Hearings on this matter have been scheduled and postponed on numerous 

occasions. A review of the trial court docket reveals that hearings are 

scheduled currently for the end of October 2014. 
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[a]n order that grants or denies, modifies or refuses to modify, 

continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves or refuses to 

dissolve an injunction unless the order was entered ... after a 

trial but before entry of the final order. Such order is 

immediately appealable, however, if the order enjoins conduct 

previously permitted or mandated or permits or mandates 

conduct not previously mandated or permitted, and is effective 

before entry of the final order. 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4)(ii). 

 This Court has also explained that 

[a]n order which grants a request to enjoin certain conduct, as 

was done by the trial court in the ... order, is an interlocutory 

matter specifically authorized for appeal as of right by Rule 

311(a)(4). Injunctive relief is considered an extraordinary 

equitable remedy and it is to be granted only where the moving 

party has established that immediate and irreparable harm, 

which cannot be compensated by damages, will result if the 

injunction is denied. Furthermore, the party seeking to enjoin 

certain conduct must demonstrate that greater injury would 

result by refusing the injunction than by granting it. 

Pennsylvania Orthopaedic Soc. v. Independence Blue Cross, 885 A.2d 

542, 547 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 Instantly, the trial court’s “Interim Order for Special Injunction” 

entered on March 13, 2014 clearly enjoined the conduct of Appellants, and is 

therefore immediately appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). 

Moreover, the order dated March 26, 2014 which denied Appellants’ request 

to dissolve the injunction is also appealable under the same rule. 

Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review these orders. 

 We set forth our well-settled standard of review. 
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A trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a 

preliminary injunction. Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 375 

Pa.Super. 238, 244, 544 A.2d 450, 453 (1988), appeal denied, 

520 Pa. 612, 554 A.2d 505 (1989). When reviewing a trial 

court's grant or refusal of a preliminary injunction, an appellate 

court does not inquire into the merits of the controversy, but 

rather examines only the record to ascertain whether any 

apparently reasonable grounds existed for the action of the court 

below. Temtex Products, Inc. v. Kramer, 330 Pa.Super. 183, 

197, 479 A.2d 500, 507 (1984) (quoting Singzon v. 

Commonwealth Dept. of Public Welfare, 496 Pa. 8, 10–11, 

436 A.2d 125, 126–27 (1981)). We may reverse if the trial 

court's ruling amounted to an abuse of discretion or a 

misapplication of law. Bell Fuel, 375 Pa.Super. at 244, 544 A.2d 

at 453. 

WPNT Inc. v. Secret Commc'n Inc., 661 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa. Super. 

1995). 

 The procedure applicable to actions for injunctive relief is governed by 

Pa.R.C.P. 1531. That rule provides, in relevant part, as follows. 

(a) A court shall issue a preliminary or special injunction[5] only 

after written notice and hearing unless it appears to the 

satisfaction of the court that immediate and irreparable injury 

will be sustained before notice can be given or a hearing held, in 

which case the court may issue a preliminary or special 

injunction without a hearing or without notice. In determining 

whether a preliminary or special injunction should be granted 

and whether notice or a hearing should be required, the court 

may act on the basis of the averments of the pleadings or 

 

5

“Because of the many similarities between preliminary and special 

injunctions, the two types tend to merge into one and the words are used 

interchangeably. Although the former equity rules made minor distinctions 

between them, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure treat them exactly 

alike.” 5 Goodrich Amram 2d § 1531(a):1 (Amram Commentary). For the 

sake of consistency, we will refer to the injunction granted in this case as a 

preliminary injunction. 
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petition and may consider affidavits of parties or third persons or 

any other proof which the court may require. 

***

(c) Any party may move at any time to dissolve an injunction. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1531(a) and (c) (footnote added). 

 This rule has been interpreted as follows. 

This court has acknowledged that there is no absolute right to a 

hearing on a preliminary injunction. Bell Fuel, 375 Pa.Super. at 

248, 544 A.2d at 455; Franklin Decorators, Inc. v. Hende–

Jon Furniture Showrooms, Inc., 339 Pa.Super. 449, 489 A.2d 

246 (1985). Nevertheless, “our rules and our case law clearly 

indicate that a hearing is the preferred procedure. It is the rare 

preliminary injunction that can correctly be denied without a 

hearing and no preliminary injunction can be granted and 

continued without a hearing, whether before or after the 

initial grant.” Bell Fuel, 375 Pa.Super. at 249, 544 A.2d at 455 

(emphasis added). See also Pubusky v. D.M.F. Inc., 428 Pa. 

461, 239 A.2d 335 (1968). 

In Pubusky, supra, the trial court initiated a hearing on 

the requested preliminary injunction. Interrupting defendant's 

cross-examination of plaintiff and preventing defendant from 

presenting any evidence or testimony on his own behalf, the 

lower court discontinued the hearing and granted plaintiff a 

preliminary injunction. This state's Supreme Court vacated the 

decree and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing after 

concluding that “[i]t is ... fundamental that all of the parties are 

entitled to a hearing before [a preliminary] injunction should 

issue.” Id. at 463, 239 A.2d at 336–37. The court in Pubusky

further noted that even when circumstances support the 

issuance of an ex parte injunction, a hearing is not excused, but 

merely delayed for a limited time. Id. at 463 n. 1, 239 A.2d at 

337 n. 1. See also Ogontz Controls Co. v. Pirkle, 329 

Pa.Super. 8, 13–14, 477 A.2d 876, 879 (1984), appeal after 

remand, 346 Pa.Super. 253, 499 A.2d 593 (1985) (although the 

trial court conducted a hearing within five days of issuing an ex 

parte injunction, it erred by continuing the preliminary injunction 
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without allowing the objecting party to present evidence at the 

abbreviated hearing)[.] 

WPNT Inc., 661 A.2d at 411. 

We frequently have said that a preliminary injunction

should not issue at least until the rights of the plaintiff are 

clearly established. It also is fundamental that all of the parties 

are entitled to a hearing before such an injunction should issue. 

While the testimony at a hearing for a preliminary injunction 

which seeks only to preserve the status of the parties until the 

issue is finally determined need not always be as extensive as 

that at a final hearing, the litigants should not be deprived of 

their right to fully cross-examine all adverse witnesses, nor of 

the opportunity to present testimony which is relevant to the 

question of whether or not the injunction should issue. These 

basic rights were overlooked in this case. 

Pubusky v. D. M. F. Inc., 239 A.2d 335, 336-37 (Pa. 1968) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 As the trial court points out, the hearing in this matter has not been 

completed. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/2014, at 7 (“The hearings are not 

complete, and the court has reached no final conclusion on whether to issue 

the preliminary injunction.”). Thus, the trial court misapplied law by 

granting a preliminary injunction under these circumstances. 

Moreover, we find the trial court’s attempt to couch its order as an 

“interim special injunction” unavailing. The rules do not provide any basis 

for such relief. Accordingly, we vacate the March 17, 2014. 

Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum. 
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Judge Shogan concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/7/2014