Affirmed and Opinion filed January 23, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00541-CR

NO. 14-13-00542-CR

EX PARTE ALFREDO CASTILLO-LORENTE, Appellant

On Appeal from the 400th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 13-DCR-063078 & 13-DCR-063079

O P I N I O N

In this appeal of the denial of an application for writ of habeas corpus, we 

consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting appellant’s pretrial bail. 

We affirm the trial court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant is charged with engaging in organized criminal activity and money 

laundering in an amount greater than $200,000. Both charges arise out of alleged 

fraudulent use of identifying information. The trial court originally set bail at $400,000 
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for the charge of engaging in organized criminal activity and $250,000 for the money 

laundering charge. Appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus requesting 

the trial court to reduce his bail to a reasonable amount; appellant contended at the 

hearing that a reasonable amount would be $40,000 on each count. After conducting a 

hearing, the trial court reduced appellant’s bail to $225,000 on each count. Appellant 

filed this appeal.1

Appellant did not testify at the hearing. Gladys Lorente, appellant’s cousin, 

testified as follows:

Appellant’s family and friends have spoken with a bail bondsman and 

learned they can afford to post a $40,000 bond on each count.

For approximately two years, appellant was employed making deliveries 

for a company called Hoyo de Cuba.

Appellant has been married for more than fourteen years and has no 

children.

Appellant has lived in the Houston area for six years; he has maintained 

employment during those six years, primarily doing odd jobs such as 

“handyman” or landscaping work.

Appellant and his wife each own a vehicle. 

Appellant has family members still living in Cuba and recently visited 

them.

Appellant has no prior criminal history and is willing to relinquish his 

passport if he is released on bail.

Antonia Castillo, an employee of a bonding company, testified as follows:

Appellant could afford to post $30,000 bonds in each count. 

She considered two pieces of real property and a truck as collateral, but 

did not have specific evidence of the collateral to present at the hearing.

 

1 Appellant’s co-defendant, Fernando Castellanos, was charged with engaging in organized 

criminal activity, fraudulent use or possession of identifying information, and money laundering. The 

trial court also reduced the co-defendant’s bail to $225,000 in each count. The co-defendant has 

appealed that decision in cause numbers 14-13-00538-CR, 14-13-00539-CR, and 14-13-00540-CR.
3

Detective Matthew Cardenas testified as follows:

He found no work history for appellant through the Texas Work Force 

Commission.

Appellant and his co-defendant are accused of purchasing credit card 

numbers online and using software that re-encodes those card numbers on 

counterfeit credit cards, essentially creating a “clone” of the victim’s credit 

card. Video surveillance showed appellant and his co-defendant then used 

the cloned cards to purchase gift cards, clothes, food, and other items.

A search warrant of appellant’s house revealed several gift cards alleged to 

have been purchased with stolen credit card numbers.

Investigators located money order transfers from appellant from the United 

States to Cuba, the Ukraine, Russia, and other countries.

Other individuals who were involved in the alleged scheme have been 

arrested or located outside the United States.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 

unusual punishments inflicted.” U. S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Schilb v. Kuebel, 

404 U.S. 357, 365, (1971) (applying Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive bail to 

the states). Whether the bail set is excessive is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). A 

defendant carries the burden of proof to establish that bail is excessive. Id. at 849. In 

reviewing a trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not 

intercede as long as the trial court’s ruling is at least within the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. 

ref’d).

The amount of bail required in any case is within the discretion of the trial court 

subject to the following rules:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance of 

compliance with the undertaking.
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2. The power to require bail is not to be used as an instrument of 

oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it 

was committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken 

upon this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the 

community shall be considered.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (West 2014). 

In addition to considering the factors in article 17.15, the courts have added seven 

other factors to be weighed in determining the amount of bond: (1) the accused’s work 

record; (2) the accused’s family and community ties; (3) the accused’s length of 

residency; (4) the accused’s prior criminal record; (5) the accused’s conformity with 

previous bond conditions; (6) the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; and (7) 

aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense. Ex 

parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50. The trial court also may consider the fact that the 

accused is not a United States citizen. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1980).

ANALYSIS

In two issues appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

habeas relief. He contends the bail, as reduced, is unreasonable, and the trial court 

should have reduced it further because appellant has strong ties to the community, no 

criminal record, will appear for trial, and is not a danger to the community. Appellant 

emphasizes that he has no criminal record and the offenses for which he is charged are 

non-violent.

Nature of the Offenses and Circumstances Under Which They Are Alleged to 

Have Been Committed

The indicted offenses are engaging in organized criminal activity and money 
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laundering more than $200,000. The offenses are punishable by imprisonment for 

fifteen to ninety-nine years or life. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02 (money laundering), §

71.02 (engaging in organized criminal activity). The defendant’s potential sentence and 

the nature of the crimes are significant factors for us to consider. Ex parte Hunt, 138 

S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet ref’d). See also Montalvo v. State, 

315 S.W.3d 588, 593 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (noting that 

consideration of nature and circumstances of offense requires us to consider range of 

punishment in event of conviction). When the offense is serious and involves 

aggravating factors that may result in a lengthy prison sentence, bail must be set 

sufficiently high to secure the defendant’s presence at trial. See Ex parte Hulin, 31 

S.W.3d 754, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Because of the 

seriousness of the charged offenses and the lengthy potential sentences, appellant may 

have a strong incentive to flee the jurisdiction, and a high bail amount is reasonable.

Bail Sufficient to Assure Appearance but not Oppress

The record reflects that appellant and his co-defendant are accused of being the 

top two individuals in a credit-card-fraud ring that is alleged to have defrauded hundreds 

of victims. Some members of the ring have been arrested, but others have not. One 

member of the ring was arrested as he crossed the border from Mexico. Another was 

arrested in Colombia and is awaiting extradition. Appellants are Cuban nationals and

there is evidence they transferred money orders to Cuba, the Ukraine, and Russia. 

Appellant offered to relinquish his passport, but the evidence at the writ hearing 

supports a finding that appellant is a significant flight risk based upon his ties to 

individuals in other countries and access to equipment with which to make counterfeit 

credit cards. On this record, the trial court reasonably could conclude that bail of 

$225,000 for each offense is not higher than necessary to give reasonable assurance of 

compliance with the undertaking and that bail is not oppressive.
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Accused’s Ability to Make Bail

To show that he is unable to make bail, a defendant generally must establish that 

his funds and his family’s funds have been exhausted. Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 

149 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The accused’s ability to make bond 

is merely one factor to be considered in determining the appropriate amount of bond. 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(4); Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Appellant’s evidence with regard to his alleged 

inability to make bail consisted of Lorente’s testimony that appellant’s family and 

friends have spoken with a bail bondsman and learned they can afford to post a $40,000 

bond on each count and Castillo’s testimony that the bonding company would post a 

$30,000 bond on each count. Appellant presented no documentary evidence of his assets 

and financial resources. See Ex parte Ruiz, 129 S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (concluding that bail bondsman’s testimony of “largest bond” 

defendant could make did not carry burden to establish inability to make bail).

Because appellant has offered very little evidence supporting his claimed inability 

to make bail, the trial court properly could have concluded that the amount of bail was 

reasonable under the circumstances. See Scott, 122 S.W.3d at 870 (in affirming trial 

court’s refusal to lower bond, court cited as a factor absence of evidence regarding 

defendant’s ability to make bond when defendant’s evidence consisted of his testimony 

that he and his family lacked sufficient assets or financial resources to post the bond, but 

he did not detail either his or his family’s specific assets and financial resources nor his 

efforts to furnish bond). 

Future Safety of Victims and the Community

In support of his argument to lower bail, appellant points out that he is charged 

with non-violent offenses. Cardenas testified that restrictions on computer use and the 

Internet would not prevent appellant from continuing to illegally obtain credit card 
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numbers if he were released on bond. There was no evidence presented concerning any 

physical threat appellant might pose to victims of the offenses or to the community. But, 

this court has previously held that those who possess illegal drugs with the intent to 

deliver in large quantities affect the community in which they live. See Maldonado v. 

State, 999 S.W.2d 91, 96–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). In this 

case, as with possession and distribution of large quantities of illegal drugs, it is a matter 

of common sense that those who produce hundreds of counterfeit credit cards affect the 

community in which they live. The theft of credit card numbers and impact on the 

victims cannot be ignored in analyzing the safety of the community relevant to bail 

determinations.

Other Factors

The evidence is conflicting as to whether appellant maintained employment. He is 

a Cuban national and the record contains evidence indicating he was involved in money 

order transfers to Cuba and other foreign countries. The record reflects that appellant is 

a permanent resident of the United States, but not a citizen. Appellant has no prior 

criminal history and has lived in the United States for six years. He has a wife and 

cousin in the Houston area. Research has not revealed precedent from this court or other 

Texas courts addressing bail for the offenses with which appellant is charged

(racketeering and money laundering), but precedent from other jurisdictions shows that 

for racketeering charges, bail in amounts greater than set in today’s case have been 

found not to be excessive. See United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir. 

1982) (determining bail set at $2 million was not excessive in case involving charges 

under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and federal drug charges).

Indeed, at least one court denied bail in a racketeering case. See Constantino v. Warren, 

684 S.E.2d 601, 601-04 (Ga. 2009) (in prosecution for violation of the Racketeering 

Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, denial of bail did not violate the Excessive Bail 
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment).

Based on the evidence before the trial court in this case, the trial judge reasonably 

could have concluded the bail set was justified by the circumstances presented. The 

record contains evidence that appellant had engaged in extensive credit card fraud and 

theft by cloning hundreds of credit cards. Appellant is not a citizen of the United States 

and has family members in Cuba. Given the nature of the charged offenses and the

aggravating circumstances, the trial court reasonably could have concluded a bond of 

$225,000 for each count was necessary to deter appellant from fleeing the jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

Based on our consideration of the above factors and the record evidence, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting appellant’s bail at 

$225,000 on each count and in concluding that appellant did not demonstrate that bail in 

this amount is excessive. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the 

trial court’s order.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Wise.

Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).