IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs August 3, 2010

JAMES IVY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 00-06797 James M. Lammey, Judge

No. W2010-00152-CCA-R3-CO - Filed October 5, 2010

The petitioner, James Ivy, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of error coram

nobis. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to coram nobis relief on the

basis that his 1996 guilty-pleaded conviction of burglary and his 2000 guilty-pleaded

convictions of burglary and vandalism were not voluntarily entered. Because the writ of

error coram nobis is not available to a guilty-pleading petitioner and because the petition in

this case is time-barred, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS and J.C MCLIN, JJ., joined.

James Ivy, Edgefield, South Carolina, pro se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On November 23, 2009, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram

nobis challenging his 2000 guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary and vandalism and his

1996 guilty-pleaded conviction of burglary on grounds that his counsel coerced him to enter

the guilty pleas. The petitioner, incarcerated in South Carolina under a federal conviction

of being a felon in possession of a firearm, was aggrieved that the challenged convictions had

been used to enhance his federalsentence. Finding that the statute of limitations had expired,

that the petitioner had failed to allege a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, and

that the petitioner had failed to state cognizable grounds for coram nobis relief, the coram

nobis court denied relief on December 18, 2009. The petitioner filed a timely notice of
appeal.

In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to coram nobis relief

because “he was coerced by his attorney to a guilty plea of burglary on an offense that’s

nothing more than a mis[demeanor].” The State asserts that the petitioner’s claim is barred

by the statute of limitations and that, in the alternative, he has failed to establish a cognizable

claim for coram nobis relief. We agree with the State.

Initially, this court has previously noted that “the plain language of the coram

nobis statute and its historical use belie its application to a guilty-pleaded conviction.”

Arthur Stamey, III, v. State, No. E2009-00996-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 8 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Knoxville, Feb. 11, 2010). We explained:

The statute’s repeated reference to matters litigated “at the trial”

and its reference to “evidence” appear to limit its application to

those cases that actually proceeded to trial. This conclusion is

bolstered by our supreme court’s command to test any “newly

discovered evidence” proffered by the coram nobis petitioner

“in the context of the trial, to assess its veracity and its impact

upon the testimony of the other witnesses, and to determine the

potential effect, if any, on the outcome.” When there has been

a guilty plea, there exists no evidence against which the

petitioner’s proffered evidence may be considered. The

petitioner, by virtue of his guilty plea, has admitted both his guilt

and the version of the facts as tendered by the State.

Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the writ of error coram nobis is not available to the petitioner

in this case.

Moreover, the record establishes that petitioner’s claims are barred by the

statute of limitations and that principles of due process do not require the tolling of the statute

of limitations in this case. “The writ of error coram nobis may be had within one (1) year

after the judgment becomes final by petition presented to the judge at chambers or in open

court, who may order it to operate as a supersedeas or not.” T.C.A. § 27-7-103 (2000); see

State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (1999) (holding that a petition for writ of error coram

nobis is untimely unless it is brought within one year of the entry of the trial court’s “final,”

or last, order; the time for filing is not extended by the pursuit of a timely direct appeal).

Principles of due process of law, however, may preclude the use of the statute of limitations

to bar a claim in coram nobis. Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001).

“‘[B]efore a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural requirements

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such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an

opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.’” Id. at 102 (quoting Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992)). Thus,

principles of due process may intercede when, “under the circumstances of a particular case,

application of the statute [of limitations] may not afford a reasonable opportunity to have the

claimed issue heard and decided.” Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. Here, the petitioner filed his

petition for writ of coram nobis more than ten years after his 1996 conviction of burglary and

eight years after his 2000 convictions of burglary and vandalism. Because the petitioner does

not even allege circumstances that would support a due process tolling of the statute of

limitations, the coram nobis court did not err by summarily dismissing the petition.

Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

_________________________________

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE

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