DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JOSE PEROZO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-527

[February 22, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Scott Suskauer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2020-CF-006633-

AXXX-MB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Robert Porter, Assistant Public 

Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CONNER, J.

Jose Perozo (“Defendant”) appeals his judgment and sentences after a 

jury found him guilty of burglary of a dwelling, fleeing or attempting to 

elude, and possession of cocaine. Defendant asserts four grounds for 

reversal on appeal. We affirm without discussion as to three of the 

grounds, but reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court 

erred in denying Defendant’s motion to continue trial to hire counsel 

without making an adequate inquiry into the surrounding circumstances 

and clear findings to show that Defendant’s constitutional right to counsel 

of choice was not being arbitrarily denied.

Background

The State charged Defendant with burglary of a dwelling, fleeing or 

attempting to elude an officer, and possession of cocaine. The public 

defender was appointed to represent Defendant. The case proceeded to a 

jury trial.
2

One week before trial was set to begin, Defendant filed a stipulation of 

substitution of counsel, substituting his court-appointed assistant public 

defender with private counsel. Two days later, private counsel filed a 

notice of appearance. The next day, the trial court held a status check 

requested by Defendant’s assistant public defender regarding a 

determination of counsel. Defendant did not attend the status hearing. 

At the status hearing, private counsel requested that the trial court allow 

him to represent Defendant and indicated that he had a further request, 

of which he had previously advised the State. Before private counsel could 

make his further request, the trial court stated: “I’m not granting a 

continuance. If you want to go on board to try the case next week[,] [i]t’s 

up to you. I’m not going to have . . . defendant’s [sic] run the show around 

here, picking new lawyers . . . and getting continuances.”

Later the same day the status hearing was held, private counsel filed a 

motion to withdraw the stipulation for substitution of counsel. In the 

withdrawal motion, private counsel stated that his agreement to represent 

Defendant was dependent on the trial court granting a trial continuance, 

and because the trial court denied a continuance, he immediately notified 

Defendant that he would not be able to represent him and refunded the 

retainer which Defendant paid. Shortly after private counsel filed the 

motion, the trial court entered an order deeming the motion for 

substitution of counsel and notice of appearance withdrawn.

A little over an hour after the trial court entered the order deeming the 

motion to substitute counsel withdrawn, Defendant filed a motion for 

thirty-day continuance to hire counsel of his choice and to depose 

witnesses who had refused to honor subpoenas after being served.1 

Defendant cited case law supporting his right to counsel of his choosing 

and holding that a trial court errs in denying a continuance without an 

adequate inquiry into the surrounding circumstances and clear findings 

to demonstrate that a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of his or 

her choice is not being arbitrarily denied.

On the morning of trial, the trial court first addressed Defendant’s 

motion for continuance. The trial court stated that it had reviewed 

Defendant’s motion and was denying a continuance.

Accordingly, trial proceeded with Defendant represented by the 

assistant public defender who had been handling the case for some time. 

1 Because the State witnesses did not honor deposition subpoenas prior to trial,

the State makes no argument on appeal that court-appointed counsel was 

seeking a last-minute delay in the trial because the defense was not diligent.
3

The jury ultimately convicted Defendant as charged. After sentencing, 

Defendant gave notice of appeal.

Appellate Analysis

“A denial of a motion for continuance to obtain new counsel is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion.” McKenzie v. State, 308 So. 3d 183, 187 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2020). “A wrongful denial of the right to be represented by a 

privately retained lawyer of defendant’s choice, however, is prejudicial per 

se.” Jones v. State, 271 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).

“The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the 

right of a criminal defendant to be represented by the attorney of his or 

her own choosing.” Alvarez v. State, 75 So. 3d 420, 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2011); see also Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const. However, “the essential aim of the 

Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal 

defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be 

represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat v. United States, 486 

U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988). Thus, we have

acknowledged that a defendant’s right to be represented by an attorney of 

his or her choosing is neither unfettered nor absolute. See Jones, 271 So. 

3d at 1044. 

Consequently, “it is within a trial court’s discretion to deny a 

defendant’s request for particular counsel when there is a ‘countervailing 

public interest in the fair and orderly administration of justice.’” Foster v. 

State, 704 So. 2d 169, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting Bundy v. State, 

455 So. 2d 330, 347 (Fla. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Fenelon 

v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992)). “For example, a defendant’s 

invocation of the right to choose his own attorney may not be made in bad 

faith or ‘for the sake of arbitrary delay or to otherwise subvert judicial 

proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Holley v. State, 484 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1986)).

In the instant case, Defendant made his request for a continuance on 

the eve of trial. “Although requests for substitution of counsel on the eve 

of trial are disfavored, we have held that this fact alone” is not 

determinative. Jones, 271 So. 3d at 1044 (quoting Bentz v. State, 251 So. 

3d 201, 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). Instead, “any denial of an accused’s 

request for a continuance to retain counsel of choice must be based on an 

adequate inquiry into the surrounding circumstances and ‘proper findings 

to show that the defendant’s constitutional right is not being arbitrarily 

denied.’” Deal v. State, 145 So. 3d 212, 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting 

Alvarez, 75 So. 3d at 423). “The ‘[f]actors to be considered by the trial 
4

court include whether the motion is being made in bad faith or as a delay 

tactic; whether a continuance would prejudice the State; or whether the 

court’s schedule would not permit a continuance.’” Jones, 271 So. 3d at 

1044 (alteration in original) (quoting Valcarcel v. State, 201 So. 3d 795, 

798 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)). 

The instant case’s facts are similar to Valcarcel’s facts. There, one week 

before his scheduled sentencing hearing, the defendant’s family retained 

a private attorney, who filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing 

to prepare. 201 So. 3d at 797. Two days before the sentencing hearing, 

the defendant’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing 

problematic statements in the private attorney’s motion to continue. Id. 

At the hearing on the court-appointed attorney’s motion to withdraw, 

private counsel told the trial court he could not take the case if the trial 

court did not grant a continuance, so when the trial court denied the 

continuance, it also denied the court-appointed attorney’s motion to 

withdraw. Id. The defendant proceeded to sentencing while represented 

by the court-appointed attorney. Id. On appeal, this Court determined

“that the trial court summarily denied the motion to continue, which 

resulted in the summary denial of [the defendant’s] counsel of choice,” as 

the trial court made neither an inquiry into the surrounding 

circumstances nor clear findings that the defendant’s constitutional rights 

were not being arbitrarily denied. Id. at 797-98.

Like in Valcarcel, the trial court here erred in denying Defendant’s 

request for a continuance to retain counsel of his choice without 

conducting any inquiry into the surrounding circumstances and making

any findings to show that Defendant’s right to counsel of his choice was

not being arbitrarily denied. See also Hillsman v. State, 159 So. 3d 415, 

421 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reversing where “no inquiry of any kind was 

made” by the trial court). Further, not only did the trial court fail to 

conduct any inquiry, but it cut private counsel off when he was attempting 

to explain the motion. Moreover, not only did the trial court fail to make 

clear findings demonstrating that Defendant’s constitutional right was not 

being arbitrarily denied, its reasoning for denying Defendant’s motion 

indicates that the trial court did arbitrarily deny Defendant his 

constitutional right. In ruling, the trial court stated that it was not going 

to allow “defendant[s to] run the show around here, picking new lawyers . 

. . and getting continuances.” We agree with Defendant’s argument that 

this statement indicates that the trial court denied Defendant’s request for 

a continuance based on a general policy, rather than on the circumstances 

of the case. Cf. Brown v. State, 942 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) 

(finding that although “the trial court made reference to a policy to deny 

motions for a continuance when they were made after a late substitution 
5

of counsel,” it properly exercised its discretion in hearing argument and 

ruling on the motion). 

Further, after the trial court denied Defendant’s request at the hearing, 

Defendant filed a written motion, directing the trial court to case law and 

arguing that it was error for the trial court to have denied Defendant’s 

request for a continuance without an adequate inquiry and proper 

findings. However, when the trial court addressed Defendant’s written 

motion on the morning of trial, indicating that it had “reviewed” 

Defendant’s motion, it still made no inquiry or findings. Thus, even 

confronted with its error and the opportunity to correct it, the trial court 

still failed in performing its duty.

Finally, the State argues that any error as to the trial court’s denial of 

a continuance is harmless. However, the case on which the State relies to 

argue harmless error, Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2002), did not 

involve a request for a continuance for the defendant to retain counsel of 

choice, but instead, a motion for continuance for a witness to personally 

appear to testify. Id. at 847. To the contrary, as we have stated, “[a] 

wrongful denial of the right to be represented by a privately retained lawyer 

of defendant’s choice . . . is prejudicial per se.” Jones, 271 So. 3d at 1044. 

Thus, we reject the State’s harmless error argument.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to make any inquiry into the 

circumstances surrounding Defendant’s request for a continuance to 

retain private counsel of his choice. Additionally, the trial court failed to 

make findings to demonstrate that Defendant’s constitutional right to 

counsel of his choice was not arbitrarily denied. Therefore, we reverse 

Defendant’s judgment and sentences and remand for a new trial.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for new trial.

MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.