12-4536 Huang v. Holder BIA Poczter, IJ A200 927 655 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER**  **FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER**  **IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER** **”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER**  **MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals**  1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 30 th** **day of July, two thousand fourteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **RALPH K. WINTER,** 7 **ROSEMARY S. POOLER,** 8 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,** 9 Circuit Judges**.** 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **JUN YING HUANG,** 13 Petitioner**,** 14 15 **v. 12-4536** 16 **NAC** 17 **ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent**.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER: Ning Ye, Flushing, New York.** 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney** 25 **General; Anthony W. Norwood, Senior** 26 **Litigation Counsel; Shahrzad Baghai,** 27 **Trial Attorney, Office of** 28 **Immigration Litigation, United** 29 **States Department of Justice,** 30 **Washington, D.C.** 31UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 3 is DENIED. 4 Petitioner Jun Ying Huang, a native and citizen of 5 China, seeks review of an October 18, 2012, decision of the 6 BIA affirming an April 15, 2011, decision of an Immigration 7 Judge (“IJ”), denying Huang’s application for asylum and 8 withholding of removal. In re Junying Huang, No. A200 927 9 655 (B.I.A. Oct. 18, 2012), aff’gNo. A200 927 655 (Immig. 10 Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 15, 2011). We assume the parties’ 11 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 12 in this case. 13 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the 14 IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. 15 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 16 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 18 (2d Cir. 2009). 19 Because Huang did not allege past persecution, she was 20 required to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future 21 persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). To meet her 22 burden, Huang had to “make some showing that authorities in 23 2[her] country of nationality are either aware of [her] 1 activities or likely to become aware of [her] activities.” 2 Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 3 The agency reasonably found that Huang did not meet this 4 standard. 5 There is no evidence that authorities in China are 6 aware of Huang’s practice of Christianity in this country, 7 and she testified that, in China, she intended to worship at 8 home, conceding that persecution was unlikely if she 9 practiced in this manner. Relying on cases from other 10 circuits, Huang contends that restricting her religious 11 practice, itself, constitutes persecution. We need not 12 address this issue because, as the agency concluded, Huang 13 has not demonstrated that her fear of attending an 14 unregistered church is objectively reasonable in her home 15 province. 16 The agency reasonably determined that China’s treatment 17 of unregistered churches varies by region, and Huang points 18 to no evidence addressing the treatment of unregistered 19 churches in her home region of China. See Jian Xing Huang 20
v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that a 21 fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid 22 support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”). 23
3Huang contends that the agency should have considered 1 whether she would face persecution in China as a whole, but 2 she does not allege that, if returned to China, she will go 3 somewhere other than her home province. Moreover, in light 4 of the regional variations in the treatment of unregistered 5 churches, the agency’s requirement that she show a 6 likelihood of persecution in her home region was reasonable. 7 See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149-50, 159-60, 8 165 (2d Cir. 2008). 9 Insofar as Huang argues that, out of fear of 10 persecution, she will refrain from proselytizing to the 11 public in China, the agency found that she had not 12 demonstrated that she wished to proselytize in China. 13 Although Huang contests this conclusion, she concedes that 14 her testimony on the issue was inconsistent. Accordingly, 15 the agency’s determination that she presented insufficient 16 evidence that she would be proselytize to the public is 17 supported by substantial evidence. See Siewe v. Gonzales , 18 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two 19 permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice 20 between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (citation 21 omitted)). 22

4Because Huang failed to demonstrate that her fear of 1 future persecution was objectively reasonable, the agency 2 did not err in denying asylum and withholding of removal

. 3 See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43. 4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 5
DENIED. 6
FOR THE COURT: 7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 8 9 10

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