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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTOINE SAUNDERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 34 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 12, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1000272-1994

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2018

Antoine Saunders appeals from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After 

our review, we affirm.

On March 13, 1996, Saunders entered a guilty plea to first-degree 

murder,1 and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On September 9, 

2016, Saunders filed his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed 

counsel for Saunders, who filed a Turner/Finley2 no-merit letter. The court 

filed a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and on October 

12, 2017, Saunders filed a response. On December 12, 2017, the PCRA court 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2505(a).

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 
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dismissed Saunders’ petition as untimely. Saunders filed a pro se appeal, and, 

on May 4, 2018, this Court remanded the case for disposition of counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. On May 16, 2018, the PCRA court granted counsel’s 

petition to withdraw. 

Saunders raises eight issues on appeal. We have adopted the trial 

court’s paraphrased recitation of the issues for the sake of clarity: 

1. [Section 9711 of the Sentencing Code] is unconstitutionally 

overbroad.

2. The trial court abused its discretion when it presumed that it 

had the authorization to find Appellant guilty of first-degree 

murder.

3. The Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct when 

they impermissibly brought bills of information against Appellant, 

charging him with first-degree murder, third-degree murder and 

voluntary manslaughter.

4. Trial counsel was ineffective for advising Appellant to enter into 

a guilty plea to an open charge of first-degree murder.

5. Whether a conviction that rests on the abuse of trial court 

discretion, judicial misconduct, deliberate prosecutorial 

misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel are time -barred 

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to 

adequately inform Appellant of his right to a jury trial.

7. Whether Appellant’s guilty plea was involuntary.

8. Whether his sentence of life imprisonment is constitutional.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/18/18, at 2. 

Before addressing the merits of Saunders’ claims, this Court must

examine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the underlying PCRA 

petition. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999). “Our 
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standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 

A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the 

judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment 

of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

Here, Saunders’ judgment of sentence became final on April 17, 1996, 

when the time allowed for direct appeal had expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Thus, Saunders had one year, until April 17, 

1997, to file any and all PCRA petitions. The instant petition, filed on 

September 9, 2016, is manifestly untimely and cannot be reviewed unless 

Saunders invokes an exception to the PCRA time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Saunders’ petition is untimely and he failed to plead or prove

any exception; therefore, his petition was properly denied. Accordingly, the 

PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition. See Fahy, 737 A.2d 

at 223. Having discerned no error of law, we affirm the order below. See 

Wilson, 824 A.2d at 333. 

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/2/18