UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4762

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMES EDWARD ROSE, a/k/a Kwali Smith, a/k/a Buck, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:07-cr-00503-LO-1) 

Submitted: March 16, 2009 Decided: March 31, 2009 

Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Gregory B. English, ENGLISH & SMITH, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, 

Stephanie Bibighaus Hammerstrom, Michael E. Rich, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 James Edward Rose (“Rose”) appeals convictions 

resulting from the armed robberies or attempted robberies of 

several convenience stores in Northern Virginia. He challenges 

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence 

seized in two searches of residences with which Rose was 

associated: his uncle’s apartment (“Residence 1”), and his 

girlfriend’s apartment (“Residence 2”). Rose had moved to 

suppress shoes and clothes, a backpack with ammunition and 

learner’s permit bearing his name, a cap, and a CD from which a 

latent finger print was taken seized from Residence 1, and 

clothes as well as certificates and documents bearing Rose’s 

nickname seized from Residence 2. Finding that probable cause 

supported issuance of each warrant, and the incriminating nature 

of the seized items was readily apparent to detectives 

performing the search, the district court denied Rose’s motion 

to suppress. 

 Rose was convicted by a jury of three counts of 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006); attempted 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; four counts of use of 

a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A), (B) (2006); possession of a firearm by a felon, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006); attempted witness 

tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(b)(1) (West 2000 & 

2 
Supp. 2008); and attempting to impede an official proceeding, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2006). He was sentenced to 

a total term of 1,120 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Rose 

reasserts two of the arguments he made in his original pretrial 

motion to suppress: (1) the state magistrate did not have 

probable cause to issue search warrants for Residences 1 and 2; 

and (2) officers did not have authority to seize the robberyrelated items not specifically delineated in the search warrants 

for Residences 1 and 2. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion 

to suppress, this court reviews the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. 

United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008). The 

facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party below. United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th 

Cir. 2007). 

 The relevant inquiry when reviewing the propriety of 

the issuance of a search warrant is whether, under the totality 

of the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis 

for concluding that there was probable cause to issue the 

warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). The 

facts presented to the issuing judge need only convince a person 

of reasonable caution that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found at the place to be searched. Texas v. Brown, 460 

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U.S. 730, 742 (1983). We afford great deference to the district 

court’s findings of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. 

 Rose contends that the affidavit submitted in support 

of the search warrant for Residence 1 “was almost completely 

based on information provided by one informant,” with no 

independent corroboration by detectives. Therefore, according 

to Rose, the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue the 

warrant. However, a review of the record reveals that Rose 

misstates the case. 

 Detectives surveilling Residence 1 noticed significant 

“short term traffic” at the residence, of the kind typically 

associated with the purchase and distribution of drugs. They 

arrested an individual (“Informant”) seen exiting Residence 1 

soon after his arrival there. Informant told detectives he had 

purchased crack cocaine from within the residence, and that 

others in the house were using crack cocaine there. Informant 

identified David Rose from a photograph, and stated he was at 

the residence. A check of the Fairfax County Police Department 

records revealed that David Rose, Rose’s uncle, had provided 

Residence 1 as his current address; a criminal record check 

confirmed David Rose had several prior convictions for drug 

distribution. 

 These facts corroborated Informant’s information. 

Further, that the Informant’s face-to-face statements to police 

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were against his penal interest lends support to their veracity. 

See United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 523 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(noting that “an informant who meets face-to-face with an 

officer provides the officer with an opportunity to assess his 

credibility and demeanor and also exposes himself to 

accountability for making a false statement”); United States v. 

Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding an informant’s 

statement reliable as it was made against penal interest). As 

the sum of this evidence was more than sufficient to “convince a 

person of reasonable caution that contraband,” namely controlled 

substances, would be found at Residence 1, we find probable 

cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant for the 

residence. 

 Rose next argues that because the scope of the search 

warrant was limited to “cocaine, paraphernalia, and . . . 

documents related to the distribution of cocaine,” detectives 

lacked authority to seize any of the robbery-related items. 

However, this argument must fail under the plain-view doctrine. 

“[T]he plain-view doctrine authorizes warrantless seizures of 

incriminating evidence when (1) the officer is lawfully in a 

place from which the object may be plainly viewed; (2) the 

officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself; and 

(3) the object’s incriminating character is immediately 

apparent.” United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th 

5 
Cir. 1997). Here, there is no question that the officers were 

lawfully present in David Rose’s apartment and could lawfully 

open any bags, closets, drawers, or containers found in the 

apartment in which drugs might be found. See United States v. 

Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982). 

 However, Rose argues that because the authority to 

search Residence 1 was “purportedly based on information 

relating to drug trafficking[,] . . . there is no way any 

incriminating character of the [robbery-related] items could 

have been observed.” However, this contention is belied by our 

precedent. The incriminating nature of a seized object is based 

not on the information provided in the warrant, but on whether 

“the agents collectively ha[ve] probable cause to believe the 

[object] was evidence of a crime at the time of the seizure.” 

United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810 (4th Cir. 1996). As 

several of the detectives performing the search immediately 

identified the articles of clothing found at the scene as those 

depicted in the videos and still photographs of several of the 

robberies, it is clear that the incriminating nature of the 

robbery-related items was immediately apparent. As for the 

learner’s permit and the CD bearing a latent finger print, we 

have specifically upheld the seizure of items “linking [a 

suspect] to the premises where [evidence was] found.” United 

States v. Wardrick, 350 F.3d 446, 453 (4th Cir. 2003). 

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Accordingly, we find the district court did not err in denying 

Rose’s motion to suppress the items seized from Residence 1. 

 It is similarly clear from the record that the 

district court did not err in finding that probable cause 

supported issuance of the search warrant for Residence 2. A 

criminal informant (“CI”) told detectives Rose had been staying 

with his girlfriend the day before execution of the search 

warrants. Fairfax County Police records corroborated this 

information, revealing that a woman living at Residence 2 had 

once filed an assault warrant against Rose, and that Rose had 

previously provided Residence 2 as his address. 

 The CI further provided detectives with Rose’s cell 

phone number; this number was registered to “Kwili K. Smith,” 

which the CI stated was an alias Rose acquired in prison. 

Detectives independently traced the phone number and determined 

that it had received and originated calls on February 24, 2007, 

from a tower located approximately 400 yards from Residence 2, 

and the phone’s actual position was traced to that same tower. 

In addition, the CI had personally observed Rose within the last 

two weeks in possession of a handgun similar to that used in 

several of the robberies. We find that the CI’s information, 

corroborated by the detectives’ independent investigations and 

the evidence seized during the search of Residence 1, is more 

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than sufficient to support the district court’s finding that the 

issuance of the warrant was supported by probable cause. 

 Turning to the items recovered from Residence 2, we 

again find that the plain-view doctrine authorized their 

seizure. As in the first search, several of the detectives 

performing the search immediately identified the articles of 

clothing found at Residence 2 as depicted in videos and still 

photographs of some of the robberies. Thus, the incriminating 

nature of the clothing was immediately apparent. Further, the 

detectives had the authority to seize documents bearing Rose’s 

nickname as evidence linking Rose to the premises. See

Wardrick, 350 F.3d at 453. 

 Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s 

ruling denying the motion to suppress, and we affirm the 

judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED