Opinion issued June 18, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-00611-CR

———————————

CLIFFORD LEVIENE POWELL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 371st District Court

Tarrant County, Texas1

Trial Court Case No. 1495685D

 

1 Pursuant to its docket equalization authority, the Supreme Court of Texas 

transferred this appeal to this Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001 (authorizing 

transfer of cases).
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Clifford Leviene Powell, pleaded guilty, with an agreed 

recommendation from the State as to punishment, to the third-degree-felony offense 

of using a vehicle to evade arrest or detention.2 The trial court deferred adjudication 

of appellant’s guilt, placed him on community supervision for four years, and 

assessed a fine of $400. Subsequently, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s 

guilt, alleging that he had violated the conditions of his community supervision. 

After a hearing, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at 

confinement for four years and a fine of $380. In two issues, appellant contends that 

(1) the trial court violated his due process rights by revoking his community 

supervision and adjudicating his guilt and (2) the judgment should be reformed to 

reflect that he pleaded “not true” to the allegations in the State’s motion to 

adjudicate. 

We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified.

Background

Appellant was indicted for the offense of using a vehicle to intentionally evade 

a peace officer who was attempting to arrest or detain him. On November 2, 2017,

in accordance with appellant’s plea agreement with the State, the trial court deferred 

adjudication of appellant’s guilt and placed him on community supervision, subject 

 

2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(b)(2)(A).
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to certain conditions, including that he “successfully complete” the Tarrant County 

Community Supervision and Corrections Department “Intensive Day Treatment

(Jail), Aftercare, and IDT Re-Entry Court” (“IDT program”).

On April 16, 2018, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt on the 

ground that he had violated the terms of his community supervision by being 

“unsuccessfully discharged” from the IDT program on February 5, 2018 and April 

6, 2018. At a hearing on the State’s motion, appellant pleaded “not true” to the 

allegations.

Duane Coffee, an IDT program supervisor, testified that program counselors 

are not authorized to make discharge decisions. Rather, he handled all discharges 

from the program. He explained that the first phase of the IDT program is 90 days 

in length and that, to complete the program successfully, all participants are required 

to progress to “level 3.” The program is designed to prevent participants from “just 

doing their time in the program” and not learning anything. Thus, one ground for 

discharge from the program is failing to make progress. He testified that appellant 

began the IDT program twice and was twice “unsuccessfully discharged.” The first 

time, on February 5, 2018, appellant was discharged because he “was not making 

the appropriate amount of progress,” and the trial court amended the conditions of 

appellant’s community supervision and ordered him to serve 60 days’ confinement. 

Afterwards, on April 4, 2018, the trial court ordered appellant to re-start the IDT 
4

program. On April 6, 2018, however, appellant refused to sign intake documents, 

which included the required consent for treatment, and he was discharged.

Rodney Sikes, an IDT counselor, testified that appellant initially began the 

program on January 5, 2018, attended orientation, and completed the required 

documents. Thereafter, appellant progressed “somewhat,” but was resentful and 

fixated on challenging the reasons that he had been assigned to the program. 

Appellant insisted that he did not have a substance abuse problem and that he had 

been “wronged by having to be in the program.” On February 5, 2018, appellant 

was discharged from the program. After the trial court gave appellant 60 days’ 

confinement to “re-evaluate the situation,” appellant returned to IDT and sat through 

orientation. However, he refused to sign any of the required documents. Sikes 

explained that IDT is a “HIPAA-protected program, so what one person talks about 

in substance abuse can’t be shared with other people unless they sign that

documentation, which is federal law.” Although Sikes explained to appellant that 

he would be discharged, appellant refused to sign the required documents.

Ann Henderson, a lead counselor for the IDT program, testified that appellant 

did not participate in the program as required because he refused to perform the tasks 

that he was assigned. Rather, appellant voiced that he was not supposed to be in the 

program, resisted the instructions that he was given, and did not “do the requirements 

to progress to level 1.” 
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Douglas Jones, appellant’s community supervision officer, testified that 

appellant was ordered to attend and successfully complete IDT. He explained that 

IDT counselors “don’t usually just terminate someone from IDT.” Rather, on 

February 5, 2018, appellant was brought to the trial court to address his behavioral

issues. The IDT counselors discussed with the trial court the reasons that a discharge 

was recommended, and the trial court made the decision to discharge him. The trial 

court then amended the terms and conditions of appellant’s community supervision 

by ordering him to serve 60 days of conditional jail time and ordering him to restart 

the program upon the completion of those days. And, once the trial court ordered 

appellant back into the program, he was admitted. His subsequent refusal to 

participate by signing the required documentation constituted grounds for discharge.

Appellant testified that he understood that his failure to comply with the trial 

court’s order that he successfully complete the IDT program could result in his being 

sentenced to confinement. 

The trial court found “true” that appellant had violated the conditions of his 

community supervision, found him guilty of the underlying offense, and assessed 

his punishment at confinement for four years.

Revocation and Adjudication

In his first issue, appellant asserts: “The trial court abused its discretion and 

violated due process in adjudicating guilt and revoking community supervision by 
6

sustaining the allegation that [he] was unsuccessfully discharged from a courtordered treatment program.”

Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision and 

adjudicating guilt is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see 

also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.108(b). A trial court has the discretion to 

revoke community supervision if a preponderance of the evidence supports one of 

the State’s allegations that the defendant violated a condition of his community 

supervision. Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see 

also Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that proof 

of single violation of terms of community supervision is sufficient to support trial 

court’s decision to revoke). The evidence meets the preponderance standard if the 

greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that a defendant 

has violated a condition of his community supervision. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764; 

Bell v. State, 554 S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). 

We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order. Bell, 

554 S.W.3d at 746. As the sole trier of fact, the trial court determines the credibility 

of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Id.

Revocation involves a loss of liberty and implicates due process. Leonard, 

385 S.W.3d at 577. Thus, the “central issue to be determined in reviewing a trial 
7

court’s exercise of discretion in a [community supervision] revocation case is 

whether the [defendant] was afforded due process of law.” Id. The Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals has explained:

It would surely offend due process if a defendant were discharged from 

his therapy program for a wholly inappropriate reason—such as illegal 

discrimination or mere caprice—and the bare fact of that discharge 

were used as a basis to revoke the defendant’s community supervision. 

Yet, by an ordinary abuse-of-discretion review, such a revocation 

would be sustained.

Id. Accordingly, when a trial court, through a condition of a defendant’s community 

supervision, makes his compliance with the terms of his community supervision 

subject to the discretion of a third party, we must also, in determining whether the 

trial court abused its discretion, “examine the third party’s use of discretion to ensure 

that it was used on a basis that was rational and connected to the purposes of 

community supervision.” Id.

Here, the record shows that the trial court ordered appellant to “successfully 

complete” the IDT program. The State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt on the 

ground that he had been “unsuccessfully discharged” from the IDT program on 

February 5, 2018 and April 6, 2018. At the hearing on the State’s motion to 

adjudicate, appellant testified that he understood that his failure to comply with the 

trial court’s order that he successfully complete the IDT program could result in his 

being sentenced to confinement. 
8

Coffee testified that, on February 5, 2018, appellant was discharged from the 

IDT program because he “was not making the appropriate amount of progress.” He 

explained that the first phase of the IDT program is 90 days in length and that, to 

complete the program successfully, all participants are required to progress to “level 

3.” Henderson testified that appellant did not participate in the program as required 

because he refused to perform his assigned tasks. Rather, appellant voiced that he 

was not supposed to be in the program and resisted the instructions that he was given. 

Henderson explained that, after one month in the program, appellant had not 

performed the tasks that most participants normally accomplished in the first two 

weeks. And, he did not “do the requirements to progress to level 1.” 

Sikes testified that the first time that appellant was admitted into the IDT 

program, he progressed “somewhat,” but was resentful and fixated on challenging 

the reasons that he had been assigned to the program. Appellant insisted that he did 

not have a substance abuse problem and that he had been “wronged by having to be 

in the program.” And, on February 5, 2018, appellant was discharged from the 

program. 

Jones testified that, on February 5, 2018, appellant was brought to the trial 

court to address his behavioral issues. The IDT counselors discussed with the trial 

court the reasons that a discharge was recommended, and the trial court made the 

decision to discharge appellant from the IDT program. Again, proof of a single 
9

violation of the terms and conditions of community supervision is sufficient to 

support a trial court’s decision to revoke. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. Although 

the record shows that the trial court later gave appellant a second chance to complete 

the IDT program, the evidence shows, and it is undisputed, that he did not do so. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, the greater weight 

of the evidence supports a reasonable belief that appellant violated a condition of his 

community supervision by not “successfully complet[ing]” the IDT program and 

being “unsuccessfully discharged.” See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764; Bell, 554 

S.W.3d at 746; see also Stento v. State, No. 01-17-00164-CR, 2018 WL 6377973, at 

*3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (holding that program-staff testimony about defendant’s 

behavior and violations of rules was sufficient to support trial court’s revocation of 

community supervision and adjudication of guilt); Bradford v. State, No. 02-16-

00421-CR, 2017 WL 6759030, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 28, 2017, no 

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 

Further, there is no evidence that appellant was discharged from the IDT 

program “for a wholly inappropriate reason . . . or mere caprice.” Leonard, 385 

S.W.3d at 577; Stento, 2018 WL 6377973, at *3. The purposes of community 

supervision are “to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, 

or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 
10

42A.301(a); see also Stento, 2018 WL 6377973, at *3. Coffee testified that the IDT 

program is designed to prevent participants from “just doing their time in the 

program” and not learning anything. Thus, one ground for discharge from the 

program is a failure to progress. He explained that to complete the program 

successfully, all participants are required to progress to “level 3.” IDT staff testified 

that appellant refused to perform his assigned tasks and did not “do the requirements 

to progress to level 1.” IDT staff discussed with the trial court the reasons that a 

discharge was recommended, and the trial court made the decision to discharge 

appellant from the IDT program.

Once ordered into the program, appellant’s level of participation was within 

his control. See, e.g., Donovan v. State, No. PD-0474-14, 2015 WL 4040599, at *5 

(Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2015). Discharging appellant from the program for refusing 

to progress is rationally connected to the purposes of rehabilitating and reforming 

him. See Leonard, 385 S.W.3d at 577; see, e.g., Stento, 2018 WL 6377973, at *3–

4 (holding that discharging defendant from program for “disrespecting staff, not 

following directives, [and] refusing to sign the in-house behavioral 

contract . . . rationally relate[d] to the objective of rehabilitating and reforming 

appellant through community supervision”); Riddle v. State, No. 02-14-00180-CR, 

2014 WL 5409550, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (holding that whether defendant successfully 
11

completed program was left to discretion of treatment specialists, and evidence did

not show that they abused their discretion in discharging defendant from program); 

Goodwin v. State, No. 14-12-00512-CR, 2013 WL 5346429, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (“[Defendant’s] making progress in treatment would be rationally 

connected to the purposes of rehabilitating and reforming [defendant].”).

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding “true” that 

appellant violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision and 

adjudicating his guilt. See Leonard, 385 S.W.3d at 577; Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764.

We overrule appellant’s first issue.

Modification of Judgment

In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court’s judgment should be 

modified to comport with the record, which reflects that he entered a plea of “not 

true” to the State’s allegations in its motion to adjudicate. The State agrees that the 

judgment should be so modified.

The record reflects that, at the adjudication hearing, appellant entered a plea 

of “not true” to the State’s allegations. However, the trial court’s judgment states 

that appellant entered a plea of “true.” An appellate court has the power to correct 

and reform a trial court judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has the 

necessary data and information to do so. Nolan v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex.
12

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 

529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s 

judgment to reflect that appellant entered a plea of “not true” to the allegations in 

the State’s motion to adjudicate his guilt. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) (“Court of 

Appeals may . . . modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified.”); 

Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Torres v. State, 391 

S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (modifying 

judgment to state that defendant pleaded “true” to allegations in enhancement 

paragraphs).

We sustain appellant’s second issue.

Conclusion

We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect appellant’s plea of “not true” 

to the State’s allegation in its motion to adjudicate. As modified, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Goodman and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).