IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–0417

Filed January 9, 2015

MAXINE GAIL VEATCH,

Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF WAVERLY and JASON LEONARD, individually and in his 

official capacity,

Appellees.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, DeDra 

Schroeder, Judge.

The City of Waverly seeks further review of a court of appeals 

decision reinstating a plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against the 

City and one of its police detectives. DECISION OF COURT OF 

APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

John J. Hines and Laura L. Folkerts of Dutton, Braun, Staack & 

Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.

Beth E. Hansen of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellees.
2

HECHT, Justice.

Staff members at a nursing home became concerned that a visiting 

family member had mistreated an elderly resident of the home and 

contacted the police. The visitor was arrested and charged with simple 

misdemeanor assault, but a jury acquitted her. After she was acquitted 

of the criminal charge, the visitor brought this civil action asserting 

negligence, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution theories 

against the arresting officer and the city that employed him. The district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. After the 

Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the plaintiff’s 

false imprisonment claim, the defendants sought, and we granted, 

further review. Because we conclude summary judgment was properly 

granted, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the 

district court’s ruling.

I. Factual Background.

A reasonable fact finder viewing the summary judgment record in 

the light most favorable to Veatch could find the following facts. On 

September 27, 2006, Maxine Veatch and her sister visited their mother, 

Agnes Bell, at Woodland Terrace, a skilled-care residential nursing home 

facility in Waverly, Iowa.1 Later that day, Janet Whiteside, a nurse

employed by the nursing home, reported to her supervisor that she had 

observed Veatch shoving Bell into her wheelchair, wheeling her out of the 

staff’s view, and screaming at her. Whiteside’s supervisor directed 

Whiteside to write a report describing her observations and submit it to 

the nursing home director, Brianna Brunner. 

1Veatch was designated by a durable power of attorney for health care as Bell’s 

agent to make health care decisions.

 
3

Brunner took action after reading Whiteside’s report. She 

forwarded the report to Debra Schroeder, the President and CEO of the 

nursing home’s corporate owner. Brunner also directed two nurses to 

examine Bell for physical evidence of an injury. The nurses performed 

the examination and noted fresh bruising on Bell’s knee and forearms.

Brunner relayed the substance of Whiteside’s report to officer 

Thomas Luebbers of the Waverly Police Department. Officer Luebbers 

prepared a report based on his conversation with Brunner. Luebbers’s

report included allegations reported by Whiteside: that Veatch had 

shoved Bell into a wheelchair, wheeled Bell into her room, shut the door, 

and screamed at Bell—along with other observations giving rise to 

concerns that elder abuse was occurring.2 The report also noted that, 

according to Brunner, Veatch and her sister held power of attorney for 

Bell. Officer Luebbers communicated his understanding of the incident 

to detective Sergeant Jason Leonard, who took over the investigation. 

Sergeant Leonard’s investigation took him to Woodland Terrace, 

where he discussed the incident with Brunner, Schroeder, and Jenny 

Kane, a nurse who supervised Whiteside and had observed Bell’s bruises. 

The meeting between Sergeant Leonard and the staff lasted one to two 

hours. Sergeant Leonard asked to speak with Bell about the incident, 

but the three nursing home employees dissuaded him from doing so, 

suggesting Bell was reluctant to speak with people she did not know and 

would fear retaliation from Veatch for any cooperation with law 

enforcement. However, Sergeant Leonard learned the nursing home’s 

2Officer Luebbers’s report documents Brunner’s observation that Woodland 

Terrace staff members had heard Veatch and her sister screaming at Bell behind closed 

doors on several other occasions, and on one occasion had seen Veatch slap Bell’s hand 

away as Bell was reaching out to use a hand rail.

 
4

employees had asked Dr. Lee Fagre, a physician, to conduct a physical 

examination of Bell and determine whether Bell’s bruises corroborated 

Whiteside’s account of the incident. Sergeant Leonard decided he would 

continue his investigation without interviewing Bell if he could obtain a 

written report documenting Dr. Fagre’s examination and a copy of 

Whiteside’s original incident report.

During the meeting at Woodland Terrace, Sergeant Leonard and 

the nursing home staff also reviewed documentation of previous alleged 

incidents involving Veatch and Bell and considered whether a temporary 

protective order protecting Bell from Veatch should be sought. Lastly, 

the meeting attendees, including Sergeant Leonard, requested assistance 

from an Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) caseworker in

investigating whether dependent adult abuse was occurring.

As Sergeant Leonard’s investigation of Veatch’s conduct continued, 

he received a telephone call from Kane relaying the results of Dr. Fagre’s 

examination. Kane told Sergeant Leonard that Dr. Fagre had noted

“thumbprint” bruises on Bell’s forearms that appeared consistent with 

someone having forcibly held Bell’s forearms to the wheelchair arms. 

Kane further reported Dr. Fagre had discovered a bruise on Bell’s left 

buttock consistent with Whiteside’s description of the incident and 

corroborating the allegation that Veatch had shoved Bell into her 

wheelchair.3

Sergeant Leonard asked Veatch to come to the police station for an 

interview. She complied. After briefly exchanging polite pleasantries, 

Sergeant Leonard explained he wanted to ask Veatch some questions 

3This summary was consistent with Dr. Fagre’s written report and his testimony 

at Veatch’s subsequent criminal trial. 

 
5

about a report that she had assaulted Bell at the nursing home. Veatch 

responded that she would not continue the interview without legal 

counsel. Veatch also told Sergeant Leonard she believed the allegations 

against her by the nursing home’s staff were retaliatory in nature and 

were a response to Veatch’s complaints about the quality of care 

provided to her mother by the staff. Sergeant Leonard acknowledged the 

request for counsel, left the interview room, and returned a few minutes 

later with a complaint charging Veatch with simple misdemeanor assault

in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 708.2(6) (2005). He arrested 

Veatch and placed a phone call to DHS reporting he had done so. Veatch 

entered a plea of not guilty, and the case went to trial. A jury acquitted 

Veatch.4 

II. Procedural Background.

A. Federal Court Proceedings. Veatch filed a civil action in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa against five 

defendants: the nursing home, two nursing home employees, the City of 

Waverly (the City), and Sergeant Leonard. See Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran 

Home, No. 08–CV–2044–LRR, 2009 WL 3270823, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 9, 

2009). In her complaint consisting of twelve counts, Veatch asserted a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sergeant Leonard and the City, as 

well as a panoply of state law tort claims against each of the defendants. 

See id. 

Sergeant Leonard and the City moved for summary judgment on 

the § 1983 claim. In its ruling on the motion, the federal district court 

focused on the question whether the arrest violated Veatch’s rights under 

4DHS conducted an administrative investigation of the incident as well. 

Although the agency initially determined the incident of dependent adult abuse was 

founded, the finding was later reversed by an administrative law judge.

 
6

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court 

noted “[f]or § 1983 purposes, an arrest for a misdemeanor does not 

require a warrant provided the arresting officer has probable cause,” and 

therefore “the issue of probable cause is the ‘determinative factor’ to 

resolve the § 1983 claim.” Id. at *7. Viewing the evidence in the 

summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Veatch, the 

court concluded the information Sergeant Leonard possessed “was 

sufficient to establish probable cause for Veatch’s arrest because ‘the 

facts and circumstances [were] sufficient to lead a reasonable person to 

believe that [Veatch] ha[d] committed’ the assault.” Id. (alterations in 

original) (quoting United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 755 (8th 

Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

After disposing of the § 1983 claim on the ground Sergeant

Leonard had probable cause to arrest Veatch, the federal district court 

declined to rule on the remaining state law claims:

“The Supreme Court has noted that, ‘in the usual case in 

which all federal[ ] law claims are eliminated before trial, the 

balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 

jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state[ ] law claims.’ ” 

Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 

350 n.7 (1988)). Accordingly, the court declines to exercise 

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the City 

and Leonard. 

Id. at *8 (alterations in original). The court dismissed the § 1983 claim 

with prejudice, and dismissed the remaining state law tort claims 

without prejudice. 

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 

Circuit reached the same conclusion as the district court: “[T]he 

information that Leonard received during the course of his investigation 
7

established probable cause” because it “was sufficiently reliable to 

establish a reasonable ground for belief that Veatch had committed a 

misdemeanor assault.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home (Veatch II), 627 

F.3d 1254, 1257–58 (8th Cir. 2010). The summary judgment was 

therefore affirmed. Id. at 1259.

B. State Court Proceedings. Veatch refiled her state law tort 

claims in the Iowa District Court for Bremer County. After the Eighth 

Circuit issued its ruling, Sergeant Leonard and the City moved for 

summary judgment on Veatch’s claims for false imprisonment, 

negligence, and malicious prosecution. Sergeant Leonard and the City

contended the federal court’s ruling that Sergeant Leonard had probable 

cause to arrest Veatch—now decided with finality in the federal court—

had preclusive effect and foreclosed each of Veatch’s remaining tort

claims. The district court agreed, concluding issue preclusion prevented 

the parties from relitigating whether Sergeant Leonard had probable 

cause to arrest Veatch. Having determined Veatch could not show 

Sergeant Leonard lacked probable cause to make the arrest, the district 

court concluded Veatch could not prevail on any of the tort theories she 

asserted. 

Veatch appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of 

appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment ruling on the negligence and malicious prosecution theories. 

The negligence claim must fail, the court of appeals explained, because 

Iowa does not recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation of 

crime. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa 1989); Smith 

v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Iowa 1982). The malicious prosecution 

claim must fail, the court further concluded, because the federal 

litigation had established as a matter of law that Sergeant Leonard had 
8

probable cause to arrest Veatch for assault. See Veatch II, 627 F.3d at 

1257–58; see also Whalen v. Connelly, 621 N.W.2d 681, 687–88 (Iowa 

2000) (including “want of probable cause” among the elements of a 

malicious prosecution claim) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, the court of appeals distinguished the federal court’s 

probable cause determination from a determination that Sergeant 

Leonard lawfully arrested Veatch without a warrant under Iowa law. In 

particular, the court concluded the federal court’s determination that 

Sergeant Leonard had probable cause to arrest Veatch under the Fourth 

Amendment standard is not preclusive of the question whether the arrest 

was valid under Iowa’s warrantless arrest statute. See Iowa Code 

§ 804.7(2) (authorizing a peace officer to make an arrest without a 

warrant “[w]here a public offense has in fact been committed, and the 

peace officer has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be 

arrested has committed it”); id. § 804.7(3) (authorizing a warrantless 

arrest when a peace officer has reasonable ground to believe an 

indictable offense has occurred and reasonable ground to believe the 

suspect committed it). The court of appeals concluded a genuine issue of 

material fact existed as to whether a public offense had in fact been 

committed within the meaning of section 804.7(2). Accordingly, the 

court held summary judgment should not have been granted on Veatch’s 

false imprisonment claim.

The court of appeals also addressed an additional argument raised 

by Sergeant Leonard and the City as an alternative ground supporting

summary judgment. This argument posited that section 804.7(3)

provided independent authorization for the warrantless arrest because 

Sergeant Leonard had “reasonable ground for believing that an indictable 

public offense ha[d] been committed and ha[d] reasonable ground for 
9

believing that [Veatch] ha[d] committed it.” Iowa Code § 804.7(3). 

Conceding Veatch was arrested for simple misdemeanor assault—which 

is not an indictable offense5—the defendants contended Sergeant 

Leonard nonetheless had reasonable ground to believe Veatch had 

committed dependent adult abuse resulting in physical injury, an 

aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa Code section 235B.20(6). However, 

the court of appeals rejected this alternative contention, concluding

Sergeant Leonard subjectively believed at the time of the arrest that 

Veatch had committed simple assault, not the indictable offense of 

dependent adult abuse. 

Finally, the court of appeals addressed and rejected the assertion 

of Sergeant Leonard and the City that they are immune from tort liability 

under Iowa Code section 670.4. Citing our decision in Thomas v. Gavin,

the court concluded section 670.4 does not bar claims for false arrest. 

See Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Iowa 2013).

Having determined a fact question exists whether the warrantless 

arrest of Veatch was lawful under section 804.7(2) and that section 

804.7(3) did not authorize a warrantless arrest in this case, the court of 

appeals reversed the summary judgment on the false imprisonment 

claim. Sergeant Leonard and the City requested, and we granted, further 

review.

III. Scope of Review.

“We review a district court’s ruling on summary judgment for 

correction of errors of law.” Thomas, 838 N.W.2d at 521. A grant of 

summary judgment will be affirmed when the record shows “there is no 

5See Iowa Code § 801.4(8) (“ ‘Indictable offense’ means an offense other than a 

simple misdemeanor.”).

 
10

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 

1.981(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In assessing whether 

summary judgment is warranted, we view the entire record in a light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party”—in this case, Veatch. Crippen v. 

City of Cedar Rapids, 618 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000). The nonmoving 

party is entitled to “every legitimate inference that the evidence will bear 

in an effort to ascertain the existence of a fact question.” Id.

Insofar as our adjudication “involves the interpretation of a 

statutory provision . . ., our review is for correction of errors at law.” 

Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 760 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 2008) 

(quoting Mortensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 590 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa 

1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. The Parties’ Positions.

Sergeant Leonard and the City contend Veatch’s arrest was 

justified under either section 804.7(2) or (3). They also assert the 

decision of the court of appeals should be vacated and the district court 

ruling should be affirmed on immunity grounds under section 670.4.6 

Sergeant Leonard and the City further contend the district court’s 

summary judgment ruling should be affirmed because we apply a less 

demanding probable cause standard in false arrest or false 

imprisonment7 cases than is applied in criminal cases. See Children v. 

6As we have noted, the district court relied on issue preclusion as the rationale 

for granting summary judgment, and did not reach the defendants’ immunity defense. 

The court of appeals considered, but rejected, the immunity defense as a ground for 

summary judgment. Because we resolve this case on other grounds, we do not reach 

the immunity question.

7The torts of false imprisonment and false arrest have both elements in common. 

See Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Iowa 2002); Kraft v. City of 

Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984). Accordingly, we consider the terms 

 
11

Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa 1983). Under this less demanding

standard, the defendants contend, “[i]f the officer acts in good faith and 

with reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the person 

arrested committed it, his actions are justified and liability does not 

attach.” Id. Citing Children, Sergeant Leonard and the City posit that 

summary judgment was properly granted because the summary 

judgment record establishes—as a matter of law—that Sergeant Leonard 

acted in good faith and with reasonable belief that an indictable crime 

had been committed.8

In contrast, Veatch urges us to affirm the court of appeals

decision. She contends the summary judgment ruling was flawed 

because a fact question exists as to whether her arrest was justified 

under section 804.7(2). Veatch further contends her arrest cannot be

justified under section 804.7(3) because the reasonable ground standard 

under that section is a subjective one assessing only the arresting 

officer’s state of mind at the time of the arrest. Noting that Sergeant

Leonard arrested her for simple assault, Veatch emphasizes that 

Sergeant Leonard and the City did not claim any potential indictable 

offense as a ground for the arrest until the summary judgment 

proceedings in the district court. 

interchangeable. See Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 678 (Iowa 1983) (“A false 

arrest is one way of committing the tort of false imprisonment . . . .”).

8The availability of the good-faith defense in the context of this civil case must be 

distinguished from the concept of good faith as an exception to the exclusionary rule in 

the context of criminal cases. See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 292–93 & n.3 (Iowa 

2000) (rejecting the good-faith defense as an exception to the exclusionary rule), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

_____________________
12

V. Discussion.

We conclude section 804.7(3) is dispositive. Although Sergeant 

Leonard and the City contended in the district court they are entitled to 

summary judgment because reasonable ground existed for the arrest 

under Iowa Code section 804.7(3), the court did not decide the summary 

judgment motion on that ground. Nonetheless, we can affirm the 

summary judgment on a ground not relied upon by the district court 

provided the ground was urged in that court and is also urged on appeal. 

See In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 879 n.1 (Iowa 1996); Johnston 

Equip. Corp. of Iowa v. Indus. Indem., 489 N.W.2d 13, 16–17 (Iowa 1992).

A. Applicable Legal Principles. A peace officer may make a 

warrantless arrest under Iowa law when the officer has “reasonable 

ground for believing that an indictable public offense has been 

committed and . . . reasonable ground for believing that the person to be 

arrested has committed it.” Iowa Code § 804.7(3). An indictable public 

offense is “an offense other than a simple misdemeanor.” Id. § 801.4(8). 

We have previously stated the term “reasonable ground” in both prongs 

of section 804.7(3) is equivalent to probable cause. Kraft v. City of 

Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984). 

The statutory standard for warrantless arrests under Iowa law is 

not identical to the federal constitutional standard. Compare Iowa Code 

§ 804.7(3) (requiring that an officer have reasonable ground to believe an 

indictable offense has been committed), with Veatch II, 627 F.3d at 1257 

(noting the Fourth Amendment standard allows warrantless arrests if the 

officer has probable cause to believe any offense has been committed). 

Therefore, an arrest consistent with the probable cause standard under 

the Fourth Amendment will not automatically satisfy the statutory 

requirements for warrantless arrests under section 804.7.
13

We have held in a false arrest action that the standard for 

evaluating probable cause under section 804.7(3) is an objective one. 

Children, 331 N.W.2d at 679. In Children, we explained “[a] false arrest 

case involving the issue of probable cause turns on what the officer knew 

at the time of the arrest.” Id. at 678. The relevant question is not what

offenses Sergeant Leonard subjectively considered at the time he arrested

Veatch, but rather what offenses a reasonable person armed with the 

same knowledge could have considered. See id. The focus of our 

reasonable ground inquiry must therefore be on the facts known to 

Sergeant Leonard, not merely the potential offenses he announced or 

subjectively considered at the time he made the arrest. See id. at 680 

(“The significant point is that courts look to the facts within the officers’ 

knowledge . . . .”). Accordingly, we reject Veatch’s contention that 

because she was not arrested for an indictable offense or because 

Sergeant Leonard did not announce that an indictable offense was within 

the universe of potential offenses he considered at the time of the arrest, 

a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether her arrest was 

justified under Iowa Code section 804.7(3).

Many other courts evaluating probable cause issues have 

concluded that, because probable cause is evaluated objectively, an 

arrest can be sustained by probable cause for a more serious offense 

than the crime the officer announced at the time of the arrest. See, e.g., 

United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding an 

arrest when “officers possessed sufficient information to make an arrest 

for assault but stated the ground for the arrest as detoxification”); 

Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304–05 (8th Cir. 1969) 

(determining a vagrancy arrest was also justified by probable cause to 

believe the defendant committed armed robbery); Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 
14

F.2d 128, 133–34 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding probable cause to arrest the 

suspect for burglary and rape, and refusing to hold the arrest was illegal 

simply because officers identified the reason for the arrest as something 

less); Ricehill v. Brewer, 338 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (S.D. Iowa 1971) 

(looking to the substance of events, not their form, and finding it “quite 

clear” that although police only arrested Ricehill for vagrancy—which is 

not an indictable offense—the available facts also provided the officer 

with probable cause to arrest for murder), aff’d, 459 F.2d 537, 540 (8th 

Cir. 1972); Callahan v. State, 557 So. 2d 1292, 1302 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1989) (“Despite the fact that Callahan was initially arrested for a traffic 

offense, the fact remains that at that time there existed probable cause 

for his arrest for . . . murder . . . .”); Reese v. State, 243 S.E.2d 650, 652 

(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that although the officer arrested the 

suspect for “prowling” near the scene of a reported sexual assault, the 

arrest could also have been made for rape); State v. Julian, 922 P.2d 

1059, 1063 (Idaho 1996) (reviewing the record and determining officers 

had probable cause to make an arrest for aggravated battery, even 

though they in fact made the arrest for misdemeanor domestic battery). 

Today we do the same and hold that under Iowa Code section 804.7(3), 

an arrest is lawful if the facts available to the officer at the time of arrest 

provide reasonable ground for believing an indictable offense has 

occurred and the arrestee committed it—even if the officer announces a 

lesser offense as the reason for the arrest.

Having established that an indictable offense can support an arrest 

retrospectively, we now turn our attention to the indictable offense of 

dependent adult abuse. Iowa Code section 235B.20(6) provides: “A 

caretaker who recklessly commits dependent adult abuse on a person in 

violation of this chapter is guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor if the 
15

reckless dependent adult abuse results in physical injury.” Iowa Code 

§ 235B.20(6). A “caretaker” under chapter 235B is “a related or 

nonrelated person who has the responsibility for the protection, care, or 

custody of a dependent adult as a result of assuming the responsibility 

voluntarily, by contract, through employment, or by order of the court.” 

Id. § 235B.2(1). The term “dependent adult abuse” includes “[p]hysical 

injury to, or . . . assault of a dependent adult.” Id. § 235B.2(5)(a)(1)(a). A 

“dependent adult” is “a person . . . who is unable to protect the person’s 

own interests or unable to adequately perform or obtain services 

necessary to meet essential human needs, as a result of a physical or 

mental condition which requires assistance from another.” Id.

§ 235B.2(4). 

B. Application of the Legal Principles. With these principles in 

mind, we now turn to the defendants’ contention that Sergeant Leonard 

had reasonable ground as a matter of law to believe Veatch had 

committed dependent adult abuse. 

We first note it is unclear from the summary judgment record 

whether Veatch told Sergeant Leonard before she was arrested that she 

believed Woodland Terrace’s allegations against her were retaliatory in 

nature. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Veatch, we 

assume in our analysis that she told Sergeant Leonard of her retaliation 

theory before he made the arrest. We also give Veatch the benefit of an 

inference that Sergeant Leonard learned before the arrest that Veatch 

believed the accusations made by the Woodland Terrace staff were biased

or otherwise unreliable because they were motivated by animus. 

Notwithstanding the inferences we make in Veatch’s favor, we 

conclude Sergeant Leonard had reasonable ground as a matter of law to 

arrest Veatch for dependent adult abuse. Assault of a dependent adult 
16

by a caretaker qualifies as dependent adult abuse. Iowa Code 

§§ 235B.2(5)(a)(1)(a), .20(6). The federal court adjudication preclusively 

established that probable cause existed to arrest Veatch for assault.

Veatch II, 627 F.3d at 1257–58; see Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 654 

N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2002) (stating elements of issue preclusion). 

Thus, for the arrest to be justified under section 804.7(3), Sergeant 

Leonard must have had reasonable ground to believe (1) Veatch was a 

caretaker, and (2) Bell was a dependent adult. The summary judgment 

record leaves no disputed issues of material fact on those elements. 

Veatch was designated by a durable power of attorney for health 

care as Bell’s agent to make health care decisions. See Iowa Code 

§ 144B.1(1) (defining “attorney in fact” as “an individual who is 

designated by a durable power of attorney for health care as an agent to 

make health care decisions on behalf of a principal and has consented to 

act in that capacity”). Further, it is undisputed on this record that Bell 

was, at all material times, a dependent adult as defined under Iowa Code 

section 235B.2(4). Additionally, as we have already noted, Sergeant 

Leonard’s prearrest meeting with the Woodland Terrace staff lasted 

between one and two hours, allowing time to gather information about 

the alleged incident involving Veatch.

Sergeant Leonard did not rely solely on information from Woodland 

Terrace staff to arrest Veatch. Instead, he waited to make the decision to 

arrest until after he received word that Dr. Fagre’s examination of Bell 

indicated bruising ostensibly consistent with the allegations against 

Veatch. In false arrest cases decided by several other courts, an 

investigation of the nature and extent conducted by Sergeant Leonard 

has been viewed as supportive of a finding of probable cause. See, e.g., 

Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 391–93, 397–99 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding 
17

probable cause as a matter of law when an officer personally observed an 

allegedly mistreated horse rather than relying solely on the walk-in 

complaint he received); Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 422–23 (7th Cir. 

1994) (affirming summary judgment on the probable cause issue when 

officers responding to a landlord–tenant dispute recognized the likelihood 

the tenant bore a grudge and investigated further before making an 

arrest); Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128, 133–35 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) 

(finding probable cause for arrest as a matter of law when an officer did 

not simply take at face value statements provided by either spouse in the 

midst of an acrimonious divorce).

We acknowledge that a contentious history between a complainant 

and the arrestee can sometimes engender a fact question as to whether 

probable cause supported an arrest. See Kraft, 359 N.W.2d at 470; see 

also Sankar v. City of New York, 867 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306–07 (E.D.N.Y. 

2012) (holding when an officer “was aware of the contentious relationship 

that existed between [the witness] and [the arrestee],” a reasonable juror 

could conclude the police lacked probable cause to arrest); Roach v. 

Marrow, No. 3:08–CV–1136, 2012 WL 1059741, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 

2012) (“[B]ecause the record is unclear as to what [the officer] knew 

about . . . Plaintiff[’]s contentious relationship with [the complainant], 

and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court 

concludes that there is a dispute as to whether there was probable cause 

because [the officer] interviewed only those witnesses who may have had 

ulterior motives for giving their statements.”). In Kraft, for example, we 

concluded a fact question existed on the probable cause question when 

arresting officers knew about preexisting animosity between a 

complainant and the person arrested for assault following a barroom 

fight. Kraft, 359 N.W.2d at 470. Despite the officers’ knowledge of the 
18

complainant’s animus, they nonetheless relied solely on his biased 

account of the fight in making an arrest without additional investigation. 

Id. at 468.

But this case is clearly distinguishable from Kraft. There, the 

arresting Bettendorf police officers arrived just after a fight had ended in 

a bar between the plaintiff and an off-duty, obviously intoxicated 

Bettendorf police officer. Id. at 468. The officers knew their colleague 

bore a longstanding animosity toward the plaintiff. Id. at 470. Yet, they 

arrested the plaintiff after speaking for less than a minute to this 

intoxicated, off-duty officer alone, without getting the account of any 

other witness in the bar. Id. at 468. In sharp contrast, Sergeant 

Leonard met with representatives of Woodland Terrace for more than an 

hour, and did not arrest Veatch until after he had received confirmation 

that Dr. Fagre had found bruises on Bell’s body consistent with the 

complainants’ version of the events. Upon our review of the summary 

judgment record in this case, we conclude a reasonable person could not 

find the relationship between Veatch and the Woodland Terrace staff was 

so contentious or affected by animus as to create a genuine issue of fact 

on the question of whether Sergeant Leonard had reasonable ground to 

believe the offense of dependent adult abuse had been committed, and 

that Veatch had committed it.

VI. Conclusion.

We conclude as a matter of law that reasonable ground existed to 

arrest Veatch for the indictable offense of dependent adult abuse. 

Therefore, Veatch’s false imprisonment claim must fail as a matter of 

law. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether the arrest was 

valid under section 804.7(2), or whether the defendants’ claims of 

statutory immunity are meritorious. We vacate the decision of the court 
19

of appeals and affirm the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.