1

 This so-called “Motion for Directed Verdict” makes little sense considering that this is not a jury

case, where such motions may be filed in some courts. See Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (“Motion

for Directed Verdict” means “A party’s request that the court enter judgment in its favor before submitting

the case to the jury”). We could find only one reported instance in which a party tried such a motion here

at the FTC, and in that case, Judge Teetor treated it as a Motion To Dismiss under Rule 3.22, and ruled that

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

__________________________________________

)

In the Matter of )

)

CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V. )

)

a foreign corporation, )

)

CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY )

) Public Record Version

a corporation, )

 ) Docket No. 9300

and )

)

PITT-DES MOINES, INC. )

)

a corporation. )

__________________________________________)

To: The Honorable D. Michael Chappell

Administrative Law Judge

COMPLAINT COUNSEL’S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS’

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF REMEDY

During the Hearing, Complaint Counselpresented substantial evidence that the merger of PDM’s

Water and EC Divisions with Chicago Bridge & Ironmaylessencompetitioninthe relevant markets:e.g.,

evidence of high concentration, attempted and actual collusion, higher post-merger prices and margins –

any of which evidence independently warrants a liability finding against Respondents. Respondents,

however, assert intheir Motion for Directed Verdict1 that Complaint Counsel has to somehowprove that
the motion was moot in light of the judgment against the Respondent. In the Matter of Capax, Inc., et al.,

91 F.T.C. 1048 (1978).

-2-

divestiture isthe only available remedy, and that if it does not do so, this Tribunal should either dismissthe

case or order some kind of “mentoring” program for the beleaguered thermal vacuum chamber industry.

These assertions have no basis in law and ignore the evidentiary record in this case.

Respondents’ motion forces this Tribunal to answer a simple question: In over five decades since

the amended Clayton Act, did both the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Supreme Court simply get

the law wrong when they assumed that the Clayton Act means what it says? Section 11(b) states: 

“If upon such hearing the Commission...shall be of the opinion that any of the provisions

of [Section 7] have been or are being violated, it shall . . . issue and cause to be served

on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such violations,

and divest itself of the . . . assets, held . . . in the manner and within the time fixed by said

order.” 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (Emphasis added). 

 

Surely Administrative Law Judge Hyun did not miss the boat in the Olin case when he stated

without equivocation: “It is axiomatic that the normal remedy in Section 7 cases is the divestiture of what

was acquired unlawfully. Indeed, divestiture is the remedy specified in Section 11(b) of the amended

Clayton Act.” In re Olin Corp., 113 FTC 400, 584 (1990). What about the dozens of other reported

cases on this very topic – Were they all wrong?

Respondents’ motionnever mentions any ofthe five decades of precedent under the ClaytonAct,

however. Indeed, they never even mention the governing provision of the Clayton Act, § 11(b) at all!

Instead, theyexplain that the lawis nowdifferent because ofthe Microsoft case, withwhich Respondents’

counsel claim intimate knowledge. U. S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Respondents’

counsel specifically told this Tribunal that the Microsoft case governed this merger case and held that
-3-

divestiture wassome kind ofextreme, “draconian” remedy. Counsel made it clear to this Tribunal that “the

divestiture cases, authority relied on in the Microsoft case are [Clayton Act] Section 7 cases. It’s the

same.” (Leon, Tr. 8314) This is not true.

Microsoft was not a merger case, and the D.C. Circuit expressly held that it was not applying

merger case law, which is different. Ironically, it was the government attorneys inMicrosoft who tried to

equate that monopolization case to a merger case (asRespondents’Counselhas alreadydone here). The

D.C. Circuit rejected this analogy and chastised the plaintiffs:

“By and large, cases upon which plaintiffs rely in arguing for the split of Microsoft have

involved the dissolution of entities formed by mergers and acquisitions. On the contrary,

the Supreme Court has clarified that divestiture ‘has traditionally been the remedy for

Sherman Act violations whose heart is intercorporate combination and control,’ and that

‘complete divestiture is particularly appropriatewhere asset orstock acquisitions

violate the antitrust laws.’” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 105 (Emphasis added) (Citations

omitted). 

As the Microsoft Court recognized, merger cases are different. Under both the Clayton Act and

Supreme Court law, divestiture is the proper remedyforillegalmergers. 15 U.S.C. § 21; U.S. v. E.I. Du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-27 (1960); U.S. v. Greater Buffalo PressInc., 402 U.S.

549, 556 (1971); Ford Motor Co. v. U. S., 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972). The Supreme Court has noted

that “[c]omplete divestiture is particularly appropriate where asset orstock acquisitions violate the antitrust

laws.” Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 573. Moreover, as explained above, Section 11(b) of the Clayton

Act grants the Commission a specific mandate to order divestiture of assets when a violation of Section 7

is found. In addition, Section 5(b) of the FTC Act expressly authorizes the Commission to award any

furtherreliefthat would restore competition. And the Commission has determined that this authority allows

ittoorder “broaddivestiture”including divestiture of assets outside ofthe relevant product market “inorder
2 See, e.g, Olin, 113 F.T.C. at 619 (Order to divest relevant product as well as a corollary one as

well); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769, 808 (1957) (Order to restore whatever assets “as may be

necessary to restore St. Helens Pulp & Paper Co. as a competitive entity in the paper trade, as organized and

in substantially the basic operating form it existed at or around the time of the acquisition”); Fruehauf Trailer

Co., 67 F.T.C. 878, 939 (1965) (Order to divest “all assets of its Strick Trailers Division and such other assets

as may be necessary to restore The Strick Company and Strick Plastics Corporation as a going concern and

effective competitor in all the lines of commerce in which it was engaged immediately prior to its acquisition

by respondent”); Ekco Products Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1228-29 (1964), aff'd 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965)

(Order to divest “all other assets as may be necessary to reconstitute McClintock Manufacturing Company

as a going concern and effective competitor”).

-4-

to increase the likelihood of a restoration of competition.” Olin, 113 F.T.C. 400, 619, aff’d 986 F.2d

1295 (9th Cir. 1993). 

There is nothing novelinthe remedysought byComplaint Counsel. The Commission has ordered,

and the Commission’sCompliance Divisionhasimplemented and enforced, divestiture ofintegrated assets

inconsummatedmerger cases many, many times over the last five decades of the amended Clayton Act.2

Contrary to Respondents’ assertions, testifying customers, competitors and company documents

demonstrate that divestiture is the only relief that has any chance of restoring competition to premerger

levels. In short, the appropriate remedy is quite simple: what was bought from PDM, including the EC and

Water Divisions, their engineers, intellectual property, fabrication plants and ongoing business must be

restored and divested. The resulting company can then be sold to another company that has the capital

and wherewithal to make the restored PDM the competitor it was before the merger.

Respondents propose, in their motion, to prevent this Tribunal from undoing the acquisition and

restoring competition through divestiture. For the reasons stated herein, Respondents’ motion should be

denied.

I. Under Controlling Law, Divestiture Is Required If a Section 7 Violation Is Found
-5-

A. The Clayton Act and the Supreme Court Have Established Divestiture as the

Standard Relief for Consummated Acquisitions Under § 7

Section 11(a) ofthe ClaytonAct confers on the Commission the authority to enforce compliance

withSection7 ofthe Act. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a). Section 5 ofthe FTC Act givesthe Commissionadditional

injunctive authority and responsibility. The Commission issued its Complaint in this matterin accordance

with Section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) and Section 5(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 45(b), based on the Commission’s reason to believe that Respondents are violating and have violated

Section7 of the Clayton Act and Section5 ofthe FTC Act. Complaint at 1. Section 11(b) of the Clayton

Act expressly provides: 

“If upon such hearing the Commission...shall be of the opinion that any of the provisions

of[Section7] have beenor are being violated, it shall . . . issue and cause to be served on

such person an order requiring such personto cease and desist from such violations, and

divest itself of the . . . assets, . . . in the manner and within the time fixed by said order.”

15 U.S.C. § 21(b). 

Section 5(b) of the FTC Act similarly provides:

“[i]f upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method of

competition . . . is prohibited by [Section 5], it shall . . . issue and cause to be served on

such person, partnership or corporation an order requiring such person, partnership, or

corporation to cease and desist from using such method of competition.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 45(b).

If this Tribunal finds that Respondents have violated Clayton Act § 7, this Tribunal must issue an

order to undo the anticompetitive acquisition and require Respondents to divest the fruits oftheir unlawful

acquisition. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that divestiture is “authorized, indeed required” upon

showing that a consummated acquisitionviolates Section7, to ensure that “those who violate the Act may

not reap the benefits of their violations and avoid an undoing of their unlawful project on the plea of
-6-

hardship and inconvenience.” E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 326-27; Greater Buffalo

Press, Inc., 402 U.S. at 556 (“Divestiture performs several functions, the foremost being the liquidation

of the illegally acquired market power.”); Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 573 (“Complete divestiture is

particularly appropriate where asset orstock acquisitions violate the antitrust laws.”). “Divestiture is a start

towards restoring the pre-acquisition situation,” Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 573, and is the only relief

in Section 7 cases that can “eliminate the anticompetitive consequences” of the acquisition. Id. at 574.

Following the Supreme Court, lower courts have similarly held that divestiture isthe standard relief

in consummated mergers under Section 7. “The very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the

acquisition is a natural remedy . . . . It should always be in the forefront of a court’s mind when a

violation of § 7 has been found.” Ash Grove Cement Co., 577 F.2d 1368, 1380 (9th Cir. 1978)

(emphasis added) (court ordered divestiture although the acquisitionhad occurred overtenyears ago);see

also Olin, 113 F.T.C. at 584 (“It is axiomatic that the normal remedy in Section 7 cases is the divestiture

of what was acquired unlawfully. Indeed, divestiture is the remedy specified in Section 11(b) of the

amendedClaytonAct.”);Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. at 807 (ordering divestiture, to ensure “the

substantialrestorationofthe competitive entitydestroyed. A remedy of this nature is necessary since one

of the adverse effects of the acquisition was to remove St. Helens as a competitor”); United States v.

United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1086 (D. Del. 1991) (ordering divestiture of assets after finding

a § 7 violation); see also Seeburg Corp. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 124, 129 (6th Cir. 1970); RSR Corp., 88

F.T.C. 800 (1976); American MedicalInt’l,104F.T.C.1, 222-23 (1984); Hospital Corp. of America,

106 F.T.C. 361, 513 (1985).

Absent divestiture, any lesser relief would be a slap on the wrist and is simply not countenanced
3

 See Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories, 12 J. Law & Econ. 43, 55 (1969) (“In

practice, the results of partial divestitures have often been so defective as to indicate that this sort of relief

order should be avoided whenever possible.”); Robert Rogowsky, The Economic Effectiveness of Section

7 Relief, 31 Antitrust Bull. 187, 195 (1986) (Same). 

-7-

bySection11(b). By moving for lesser relief, Respondents are asking this Tribunal to disregard established

precedent onbothliabilityand relief, to limit itself in the relief that it may order, and to allow Respondents

to continue to enjoythe benefits of an unlawful acquisition. Should this Tribunal find a § 7 violation, the law

is clearthat divestiture is warranted to undo itseffects. Accordingly, Respondents’ motion must be denied.

B. In Order to Restore Competition, Divestiture Must Be Complete

Once this Tribunal finds that Respondents’ unlawful acquisition warrants divestiture, this Tribunal

must order a divestiture that is both complete and broad enough “to restore the competition that existed

before the unlawful acquisition.” Olin, 113 F.T.C. at 619. See In reB.F.GoodrichCo., 110 F.T.C. 207,

345 (1988) (“In 7 cases, the principal purpose of relief is to restore competition to the state in

which it existed prior to, and would have continued to exist but for, the illegalmerger”) (citations omitted).

Inorder to restore competition, aneffective divestituremust be complete, that is,sufficient to create

a viable entity that operates independent of Respondents. Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 573. Anything

less is a waste of time.3 “[R]emedies short of divestiture have been uniformly unsuccessful in meeting the

goals of the Act.” Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 582 (Stewart, J., concurring). 

Inorder for divestiture to be successful, a complete divestiture thatreestablishesthe acquired firm

as a viable competitor is necessary. The Commission “will require a divestiture that will likely create a

viable business entity (rather than the creation of lawyers) to resolve the competitive problems posed by
4

 Timothy Muris, “Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word – Continuity,”

Remarks at the American Bar Association, Antitrust Section Annual Meeting, at 7 (Aug. 7, 2001) (available

at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.htm).

5

 In 1999, the Commission released a Divestiture Study, which analyzed all Commission-ordered

divestitures over a ten-year period. Based upon its study, the Commission concluded that the preferred relief

is “the divestiture of an on-going business with a customer base [rather than] the divestiture of assets that

facilitate entry.” A Study of the Commission's Divestiture Process, prepared by the staff of the Bureau of

Competition, at 42, (1999) (public version available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9908/divestiture.pdf).

-8-

the merger,”4 where a Section7 violationhas beenfound. In fact, the Commission has extensively studied

divestitures5and has determined that the most successful divestitures are those that create an ongoing,

viable entity:

“[T]he divestiture of an entire business (that is, an on-going, stand-alone, autonomous

business, and whichmayinclude assetsrelating to operations in other markets) . . . is most

likely to maintain or restore competitionin the relevant market . . . . The divestiture of an

intact, on-going business generally assures that the buyer of such a package will be able

to operate and compete in the relevant market immediately, thereby remedying the likely

anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition and minimizing the Commission’s risk

that it will be unable to obtain effective relief.”

Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions, at 5, March 15, 2002 (available

at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerfaq.htm). See Rogowskyat 194 (“[W]hen firms already have combined,

the highest probability of restoring competition comes from full divestiture of the acquired entity.”)

(emphasis added); Elzinga at 45-47 (“Whenever an anticompetitive increment in market power is attained

by merger, structural relief requires the restoration of the acquired firm through a divestiture order” that

requires “the acquired firm [to be] reestablished as an independent entity.”).

In Ford, the district court found that a divestiture of assets would be insufficient to restore

competition. In order to reestablish Autolite, the acquired company, as a viable, independent competitor,

the district court determined that a complete divestiture, consisting ofthe divestiture of a spark plug plant,
6

 Respondents’ proposed relief does not even address all the relevant products. Even within the one

market it does address – thermal vacuum chambers – the record shows that it requires more than technical

assistance to restore competition in this market. As Mr. Gill of Howard Fabrication testified, he has received

technical assistance from experienced people in the TVC industry and it has not helped him overcome the

“hurdle” of being able to compete in the field-erected TVC market. (Gill, Tr. 202)(“It would take more than

mentoring”). 

-9-

as well as ancillary injunctive relief, was warranted. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld divestiture as

necessary to give the new company “at least a foothold in the lucrative aftermarket and [to provide the

new company] anincentive to compete aggressively forthat market.” Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 574.

Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the ancillaryinjunctive reliefwas necessary and appropriate to the

effectiveness of the remedy. “They are designed to give the divested plant an opportunity to establish its

competitive position,” Id. at 575, and “to restore the pre-acquisition competitive structure of the market.”

Id. at 576.

The only relief that Respondents have proposed to this court as an alternative to divestiture is a

technical assistance agreement that falls woefully short of the Supreme Court’s standard in Ford.

Respondents’ proposed relief allows Respondents to retain the assets and benefits of an anticompetitive

acquisition.6 See Diamond Alkali Co., 72 F.T.C. 700, 744-45 (1967) (Rejecting Respondents' offer to

mentor another potential competitor); United Tote, 768 F. Supp. at 1086 (Finding that divestiture is

proper and that respondents presented “no reasonable alternatives to the Court” other than retaining the

assets from the proscribed acquisition). 

Moreover, an effective divestiture must be sufficiently broad to ensure that an acquirer can be a

viable competitor. “The relief which can be afforded under these statutes cannot be limited to the

restoration of the status quo ante.” Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 573 n.8; accord, Hospital Corp. of
-10-

America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1393 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Commission has a broad discretion, akin

to that of a court of equity, indeciding what relief is necessary to cure a violation oflawand ensure against

its repetition.”). In prior cases, the Commission “has ordered broad divestiture in order to increase the

likelihood of a restoration of competition.” Olin, 113 F.T.C. at 619. 

“[In order to] ensure that the package of assets divested is sufficient to give its acquirer a real

chance at competitive success,” divestiture must be broad. Id. In Olin, the Commission ordered

respondentsto divest a facilitythat manufactured the relevant product, isocyanurate (ISOS) and a product

outside the relevant market, cyanuric acid (CA). As is the case with PDM’s EC and Water Divisions, the

two operations in Olin were intertwined; thus, the Commission concluded that “the CA facility must be

divested together with a related ISOS facility in order to ensure the viability of the divested entity as

an ISOS producer.” Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993)(emphasis added).

“Anything less[would] be a divestiture in name only and would”notrestore competition. Olin, 113 F.T.C.

at 585. Similarly, the Commission in Ekco Productsfound that the elimination of an important competitor

would not be cured bythe divestiture ofthe acquired assets, and that a broader divestiture was warranted:

“The Commission might order such divestiture of other assets as is required to recreate a

viable concern having approximately the competitive strength of the acquired firm at the

time ofthe acquisition; inaddition, . . . the Commissioncould require that the acquired firm

be recreated in such form as would reflect the firm’s probable growth.” In re Ekco

Products Co., 65 F.T.C. at 1217. 

Inshort, a completeand broaddivestitureisthe appropriate remedyto successfully restore a viable

competitor to the marketplace. Anything less will be ineffective, and should not be considered by this

Tribunal.

II. Respondents’ Cited Case Law Demonstrates Divestiture Is the Singularly Appropriate
7

 In two separate offers of proof before the district court, Microsoft had offered to produce 23

witnesses to testify regarding relief. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 101. The district court denied defendant the

opportunity to present this evidence. In vacating the district court’s decree, the appellate court observed that

“a trial on liability–does not substitute for a relief-specific evidentiary hearing unless the matter of relief was

part of the trial on liability.” Id. at 101. The appellate court pointed to “the company’s basic procedural right

-11-

Relief for a Violation of Section 7

As explained above, the Respondents’reliance onMicrosoft is without basis. Under Microsoft,

the direction this Tribunal should take is clear: divestiture is required. 

 To provide guidance to the district court on remand, the Microsoft appellate court distinguished

divestiture as a well-established and appropriate remedy to an unlawful acquisition from divestiture to

address unlawful conduct by a firm that has grown by internal expansion. Indeed, it explained that in

contrast to the Microsoft case – a non-merger case, “complete divestiture is particularly appropriate

where asset orstock acquisitions violate the antitrust laws.”Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 105 (emphasis

added; citations omitted). The D.C.Circuit also explained that it was much easier to order divestiture in

a merger case, where “at least the identifiable entities preexisted to create a template for such division as

the court might later decree.” Id. at 106. 

Under the circumstances of this case, the law mandates divestiture, and the extensive evidence in

the record regarding the organization, personnel and tangible and intangible assets possessed by PDM’s

EC and Water Divisions prior to their acquisition by CB&I provides a template for reestablishing the

competitive entity that was eliminated by the acquisition. 

Respondentsalsofailtopoint out other differences betweenthis case and Microsoft. For example,

in Microsoft, the appellate court vacated the district court’s remedies decree, because it had refused to

allowMicrosoft to present evidence on anappropriate remedyand for a lack offindingsinthe record.7Id.
to have disputed facts resolved through an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 103.

8

 Respondents note that in Ford Motor Co. v. U. S., relief was ordered after nine days of hearing

on remedy. Motion for Directed Verdict at 8. They fail to note that this case was not brought by the FTC

and was not governed by Section 11(b) of Clayton Act. Rather, the action was brought under Section 4 of

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, and Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25. In the instant

proceeding, the Tribunal has held 33 days of hearings and oral argument on all issues including remedy. The

benefit of the Commission’s consolidated approach, of combining the hearing on the merits with remedy, in

assuring an expeditious resolution is demonstrated by looking at the protracted history of the Ford case in the

district court. On June 7, 1968, the district court ruled that Ford’s 1961 acquisition of certain Autolite assets

constituted a violation of Section 7. U. S. v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 445 (E.D. Mich. 1968).

After attempting unsuccessfully for a year to negotiate appropriate relief, the parties returned to the district

court and, for the first time, briefed, presented testimony, and held oral argument on the issue of relief. On

June 7, 1970, the district court ordered divestiture and instructed the parties to submit an appropriate form of

judgment. U. S. v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1970). The district court issued its

final judgment on December 18, 1970. U. S. v. Ford Motor Co., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,445 (E.D.

Mich. 1970).

-12-

at 103-105. Unlike in Microsoft, Respondents have had a full opportunity to present evidence on relief.8

As acknowledged by Respondents in their motion, “[i]n this proceeding, the matter of remedy was an

important part ofthe trialonliability. Respondents elicited testimony touching on the issue of remedy from

a dozen witnesses.” Motion for Directed Verdict at 9. As discussed below, evidence elicited by

Respondentsshowsthat inorder to restore the competitioneliminatedbythe acquisition, reliefmustinclude

a complete divestiture of the acquired assets and businesses and including restoration by Respondents of

sufficient personnel and resources to assure the viability and competitiveness of the divested business. 

In its ruling, the appellate court in Microsoft also recognized that divestiture is warranted if there

is a causalconnectionbetweenthe anticompetitive acts and Respondents’ market dominance. Addressing

the district court’s failure to provide an adequate explanation of relief, the appellate court in Microsoft

observed:

“The Supreme Court has explained that a remedies decree in an antitrust case must seek

to ‘unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct,’to “terminate the illegal monopoly,
-13-

deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remains no

practices likely to result in monopolization in the future.”

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 103 (citations omitted). The appellate court in Microsoft instructed that “[i]n

devising anappropriate remedy, the DistrictCourt also should consider whether plaintiffs have established

a sufficient causalconnectionbetweenMicrosoft’s anticompetitive conduct and its dominant positioninthe

. . . market.” Id. at 106.

Here, the causal connection is clear: The anticompetitive activityisCBI’s acquisitionofthe assets

and personnel of PDM’s EC and Water Divisions. See, e.g., Newmeister Tr. 2165-67 (LNG and LPG

tank customers will pay higher prices as a result of that acquisition); OuttrimTr. 726-27 (foreign entrants

won’t constrain CBI; after PDM acquisition, CBI willhave the potentialto increase price while they catch

up); [ (In Camera)] (after acquisition, CBI dominates the US LNG market)]; CX

629 at CBI-PL03084 (PDM acquisition “[c]ould create competition void for 1-3 years”). In short,

Microsoft does notsupport Respondents’ positionbut rather explains why divestiture is appropriate inthe

merger case before this Tribunal.

Respondents also erroneously cite BlueCross & BlueShieldUnited of Wisconsin v. Marshfield

Clinic,883 F. Supp. 1247, 1263 (W.D. Wis. 1995), aff’d in part,rev’d in part andremanded,65F.3d

1406 (7th Cir. 1995), as “findingina section 7 case that‘it isthe plaintiff’s burdento prove theyare entitled

to injunctive relief.’” Motion for Directed Verdict at 2. It would have been difficult for Respondents to

have chosena case that more strongly contradicts the verypoint for whichRespondents cite the case. See

Motionfor Directed Verdict at 2, 4. Blue Cross v. Marshfield is not a Section7 case, but a private action

for damages, under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and for injunctive reliefunder Section
-14-

16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, for an alleged violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1, 2. Blue Cross v. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1408. The district court in Blue Cross v.

Marshfield questioned “whether divestiture of a long completed transaction is an appropriate remedy in

a private action under the Sherman Act.” Blue Cross v. Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. at 1264. The court

noted that the plaintiffs “did not cite to a single case in which retroactive divestiture was awarded in a

private section 1 or 2 case,” and distinguished the case before it from actions brought by the government

under Section7: “Divestiture has been awarded in Section 7 cases in the context of proposed mergers and

in cases brought by the government.” Id. 

Finally, Respondents cite Ocean State v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., also a case brought

by a private plaintiff alleging a violationofSections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act -- not under Sections 7 or

11(b)ofthe ClaytonAct. Ocean StatePhysician HealthPlan, Inc. v. BlueCross & Blue Shield of R.I.,

692 F. Supp. 52, 74 (D. R.I. 1988). In short, these cases have no bearing on this proceeding, and do

nothing to limit the aforementioned authority of the Commission under Clayton Act Section 11 and FTC

Act Section 5.

IV. There Is Substantial Evidence in the Record to Guide the Tribunal in Ordering

Divestiture to Remedy the Effects of the Acquisition if a Violation Is Found

Respondentserroneouslyassertthat “Complaint Counselhas not presented any evidence fromany

witness whichshowsthat its proposed remedyofsplitting up the combinedCB&I and PDM Industrialand

Water Divisions into two separate companies would be feasible, desirable or effective in restoring the

alleged lack of competition, nor has Complaint Counsel presented any evidence whichwould suggest that

the alternate remedies proposed by CB&I would be undesirable or ineffective.” Motion for Directed
-15-

Verdict at 1-2. As explained above, and as expressed by Section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, Complaint

Counsel has no such burden. Nevertheless, Respondents are wrong onthe factualrecord as well. There

is ample evidence in the record establishing the need for complete divestiture to remedy the effects ofthe

acquisition and how that divestiture must be implemented in order to reestablish two independent, viable

and competitive entities and to assure that relief is effective in restoring competition.

A. Complete Divestiture Is Necessary and Appropriate

Several witnesses testified as to the desirability of Complaint Counsel’s proposed remedy. For

example,PatrickNearyofTRW, a thermalvacuumchamber customer, gave the followingtestimonyduring

his court appearance relating to the issue of remedy:

 Q. . . . If we went back to day one before the 

 transaction occurred here in February of 2001 and we 

 have a separate PDM and a separate Chicago Bridge, 

 would that be give you the competition you're looking 

 for?

 A. Yes. 

(Neary, Tr. 1489, 1502). Likewise, Mr. Britton of Fairbanks Natural Gas testified, when asked whether

he had an opinion as to the effects of the acquisition, “[m]y only opinion is that it’s always nice when you

have more than one company to get quotes from.” CX 370 at 89 (Britton Dep.).

Witnesses also testified as to the inadequacy of Respondents’ proposed remedy:

Q. Do you think that if Chicago Bridge gave them a little mentoring, taught them some

classes and stuff like that, do you think that would make Mr. Gill's company a real viable

competitorinthe thermalvacuumchamber-- large field-erected thermal vacuumchamber

business?

A. No, I would say not.

(Neary, Tr. 1458). Mr. Gill of Howard Fabrication also testified as to the inadequacy of Respondents’
-16-

proposed remedy in the thermal vacuum chamber market:

Q. Mr. Leon mentioned at the end of his opening about remedies, a proposal that they

have made, and do you think that a little mentoring by Chicago Bridge would give youthe

ability to go out and compete in the large thermal vacuum chamber business?

A. It would take more than mentoring.

(Gill, Tr. 202).

Dr. Simpson testified that complete divestiture is necessary and appropriate relief:

Q. . . . [D]o you know what the complaint in this proceeding proposes as relief in the

notice of contemplated relief?

A. To reconstitute the assets that had been . . . acquired.

Q. Do you think that this is required in order to restore the competition lost through

CB&I's acquisition of PDM EC?

A. Yes, I do. PDM EC was as strong a competitor as it was because it possessed certain

tangible and intangible assets. For a reconstituted firm to be as strong a competitor, it, too,

would have to possess these tangible and intangible assets.

Q. Why?

A. Things such as the fabrication plants that PDM EC had, its work force, its engineering

staff and its intangible assets, suchasitslearning bydoing, enabled it to compete as a very

strong competitor in this marketplace.

Simpson, Tr. 3606-07.

Respondents’ Motion overstates alleged concerns of some witnesses relating to a breakup of

CB&I. Motion for Directed Verdict at 10-11. John C. Kelly of CMS Energy testified only that he would

be concerned ifpersonnelwere pulled off his current project. Kelly, Tr. 4170. Mr. Bryngelson of El Paso,

which is currently sole sourcing with CB&I the Elba Island LNG project in Georgia, an LNG project in

the Bahamas and an LNG project at Altamira, Mexico, testified that if CB&I were split into two smaller

companies, he would be less inclined to do more thanone or two jobs with them at a time. (Bryngelson,
9

 For witness testimony, see for example [ ] (In Camera) (describing how [ 

 ] saved [ ] million on the anticipated cost of its thermal vacuum chamber by playing CB&I off against

PDM in a competitive bidding process); (Blaumueller, Tr. 289-90) (describing how PDM approached Peoples

Gas without being solicited to bid on the company’s LNG project). For documentary evidence, see for

example CX 259 at 3002 (“Additionally, if we do not convince the customer to go union [on a project for an

LNG facility in Joliet, Illinois, which was later cancelled], then we will proceed into a classic head-to-head

price war with PDM and CBI NaCon [National Constructors, CB&I’s non-union division]”); CX 863 at 8410

(“We [PDM] will be asked in the near future to re-bid the Cove Point LNG tank to Williams Gas Company

. . . . We are in a very competitive situation and need to save every dollar we can”); CX 293 at 8141 (“PDM

is bidding against CBI . . .” on the Cove Point LNG tank and “. . . will need a very competitive price to be

successful.”); CX 191 at 8948 (Air Products had awarded a LOX tank to PDM, which “was the very low

bidder and met all of the technical requirements.”

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Tr. 6123, 6214, 6155-56;see Glenn, Tr. 4234). Therefore, following divestiture, El Paso would be less

likely to rely solely on CB&I for such a large portion of its LNG tank needs. El Paso’s willingness to

consider alternativesto CB&I following divestiture is a procompetitive result ofthe divestiture and provides

an opportunity for the divested entity to gain sales. 

When asked what impact a divestiture would have on his company, Mr. Glenn, the CB&I CEO

said very little: He stated only that he would like the Court to take into consideration the fact that many

ofthe company’s contracts have non-assignabilityclauses and keyemployee provisions, that CB&I is too

small today to qualify for some unspecified projects, and that CB&I employees work on a number of

projects simultaneously. (Glenn, Tr. 4168-69). None of the items noted by Mr. Glenn is an obstacle to

restoring competition through a complete divestiture.

Complaint Counselhasintroduced substantialevidence, bothinthe formofdocumentsandwitness

testimony, asto the intense competitionthat existed in the relevant markets whenthere was anindependent

PDM.9 Many witnesses testified that the elimination of PDM as an independent competitor raises concerns

about competition. (NearyTr., 1444, 1451; Hall, Tr. 1830-31; Kistenmacher, Tr. 878; [ (In
10 (Fan, Tr. 1003-05)(describing his belief that CB&I’s pricing on a recent LIN/LOX project for

Linde was 8% higher than it should have been); [( )] (In Camera)(describing how

a budgetary estimate on a thermal vacuum chamber submitted in 2001 was 30% higher than the pricing

submitted in 1999 for the same project); (Scorsone, Tr. 5048, 5119-20)(describing how he increased the price

for Spectrum Astro’s thermal vacuum chamber after CB&I’s acquisition of PDM); (CX 370 at 42-45, 70-71

(Britton, Dep.))(describing how CB&I submitted an $18 million bid for a turnkey LNG peak shaving plant that

Fairbanks Natural Gas estimated would cost $5 million).

-18-

Camera)]). Several customers have already suffered anticompetitive price increases as a result of the

acquisition, or have received pricing for prospective projects suggestive offuture anticompetitive pricing.10

The evidence clearly supportsthe need forComplaint Counsel’s proposed remedy to restore competition

in the relevant markets.

B. Complete Divestiture Will Restore Competition

Dr. Simpsontestifiedthat divestiture to anappropriate acquirer ofthe reconstituted assets ofPDM

EC and PDM Water would be effective in restoring competition:

“I believe that if Chicago Bridge & Iron is required to reconstitute the assets of PDM EC

and PDM Water and thensellthisto another buyerthat that would restore the competition

that existed prior to the acquisition.” (Simpson, Tr. 3608-09) 

The record in this proceeding gives substantial support for an effective divestiture remedy in this

matter. There is substantial evidence in the record as to the structure, composition, and competitive viability

of PDM and CB&I premerger, the precise PDM assets and personnel acquired by CB&I, and the

disposition of those assets and personnel. See CX 385 at 25 (listing PDM EC’s salaried and hourly

employeeheadcount);CX385at21-23 (listingPDMEC’sfacilities and equipment);CX 134 (organization

chart for PDM EC); CX 133 (organization chart for PDM Water); and CX 328-339 (Asset purchase

agreement, listingall assets of the PDM EC and Water Divisions purchased byCB&I, including allowned

realproperty, tangible personalproperty, inventories, contract rights, accountsreceivables, and intellectual
11 Moreover, Mr. Glenn testified that his company is gaining over $ 1.5 billion per year in new

business, CX 1731 at 16, and it appears that CB&I has cornered six new LNG projects. (Glenn, Tr. 4148,

4234, 4396-99). Considering that there were only nine projects during the past decade, there appears to be

enough to help PDM become competitive again.

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property). This Tribunal, the Commission, and ultimately the Compliance Division can use this evidence

as a guide for recreating by divestiture as closely as possible the pre-merger competitive environment.

In Order for Divestiture to Be Effective, CB&I Must Assign Contracts to the Divested

Entity. 

The record is clear that CB&I must be ordered to secure customer consent to assign customer

contracts to the divested entity. As Respondents’ counsel told the court during the closing, “the evidence

is, there’s nonassignment clauses in these contracts.” (Leon, Tr. 8317). Likewise, Mr. Izzo testified that:

“Other factors that could be considered with a potential split in the company from a customer

perspective would be many of our contracts, we have, you know, assignment clause, which

requires the agreement of the owner before a contractor would assign the work to another

contractor.” (Izzo, Tr. 6508)

However, Mr. Byers conceded that PDM was fully prepared to go out and gain consentsfromits

customers to allow the sale of its contract backlog to third parties for completion, should PDM have

decided to liquidate the EC division. (Byers, Tr. 6804-05). CB&I was obviously successful in convincing

customers to assign PDM contracts to itself, as Respondents placed no evidence in the record of any

customers going elsewhere to have their contracts completed by third parties. Consequently, nonassignability of contracts can not be the barrier to divestiture that Respondents allege.11

In Order toBe Successful, a Divestiture Must Provide the New Company with Sufficient

Personnel.

Respondents cite to Mr. Sawchuck’sconcernthatifCB&I’s “engineering design department were

instantly cut in half” it might cause a problem. Motion for Directed Verdict at 10 n.6. Of course,
12 Respondents noted that AT&V’s experience reveals that a lack of sufficient field personnel

constrains a company’s capacity. “[T]he reason [AT&V] said they were capacity-constrained was because

they didn’t have enough experienced field people, and that’s a remedy, for CBI to give up a few field people.”

(Leon, Tr. 8328). Mr. Cutts of AT&V testified that he would need additional personnel in order to effectively

replace the competition lost by CB&I’s acquisition of PDM. He testified that he would need a “[k]ey

marketing person in cryogenics and a key technical person in cryogenics. And then I’d probably also want

the foremen and pushers and all the gear for about four more crews.” (Cutts, Tr. 2372-73).

13 Respondents have repeatedly argued that personnel with experience in the relevant markets are

readily available. Mr. Stetzler of Chattanooga Boiler & Tank testified that approximately 30-40% of his

personnel formerly worked with CB&I (Stetzler, Tr. 6322).

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Complaint Counsel has not even suggested cutting anything in half, as the former PDM is about 10-20%

ofCB&I’s entire business. Nevertheless, prior to divestiture CB&I must restore sufficient personnel levels

to staff two viable and competing businesses. In order to have the capacity to handle several projects at

once, like CB&I and PDM prior to the acquisition, the divested entity must have sufficient personnel.12

Obviously, all the management, engineers and other employeesthat were originallywithPDM mustreturn.

Since Respondents have reduced the number of personnel in the combined company following the

acquisition, CB&I must be ordered to hire sufficient personnel, including management, sales personnel,

engineers, draftsmen, estimators, and field personnel to assure that both the retained business and the

divested entity are viable and competitive.13

Divestiture Must Assure that Both CB&I and the Acquirer of the Divested Entity 

Have a Sufficient Revenue Base and Scale to Compete for Large Projects.

The Commissionmust approve boththe manner of the divestiture and the acquirer ofthe divested

entity to assure that it will have a sufficient revenue base and scale of operations to compete for large

projects. The record shows that an adequate revenue base is a critical component to competing,
14 Having sufficient size to provide bonding is also a factor affecting viability in the thermal vacuum

chamber market. Mr. Gill testified that his company, Howard Fabrication, could not effectively compete in

the thermal vacuum chamber market because it was not large enough to purchase bonds for thermal vacuum

chamber projects. (Gill, Tr. 200-01, 234).

15 CB&I did win a contract over PDM in Dabhol, India because CB&I was willing to provide

greater financial guarantees than PDM. However, this likely had nothing to do with CB&I’s size relative to

PDM’s size. (Carling, Tr. 4529).

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particularly in the LNG tank and LNG terminal markets.14 (Izzo Tr., 6511-12). LNG facility contracts

oftenimpose large liquidated damage provisions onthe constructorifthe projectis completed late, because

LNG facility owners may be liable to LNG exporters if the terminal is not ready to receive LNG when it

had been projected to be completed. (CX 891 at 46-47 (Glenn, Dep.); Izzo, Tr. 6485-86; Bryngelson,

Tr. 6154-55). A large revenue base enhances an LNG facility constructor’s ability to offer the financial

guarantees necessaryto winLNGcontracts. (CX 891 at 43, 47 (Glenn, Dep.); Izzo Tr., 6511-12). LNG

customers prefer to contract with a company that has a large asset base because there is a largertarget to

go after if the contractor is late in completing the project and the customer sues for liquidated damages.

(Bryngelson, Tr. 6154-55).

There is substantial evidence in the record as to the size an entity must have to be an effective

competitorin the LNG market. Prior to the acquisition by CB&I, PDM EC and Water were part of the

larger PDM organization, which contained five divisions in total. (Byers, Tr. 6731). PDM’s revenues

increased from $474 million to $629 million from 1997 to 1999. (CX 520 at TAN 1003317). Prior to

the acquisition, PDM’s size was not an impediment to providing sufficient financial guarantees for LNG

projects, and infactPDMprovided sufficient financialguaranteesto Enronto be employed forthe Penuelas

LNG import terminal.15 (Carling, Tr. 4529). Prior to the PDM acquisition, CB&I had annual revenue of
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between $600 to $800 million in the years between 1997 and 2000. (CX 891 at 41 (Glenn, Dep.);CX

892). CB&I was large enough to win large LNG projects between the time it was spun off from Praxair

and the time it acquired the two PDM divisions. (CX 891 at 47-48 (Glenn, Dep.).

A Successful Divestiture Must Include the Assets of both the PDM EC and PDM Water

Divisions. 

The divestiture order mustinclude allofthe former PDM EC and Water assets and personnel. The

same personnel, equipment, and fabrication facilities are used in the construction of the products of both

groups. (Rano, Tr. 5894, 5898). Respondents concede that an effective divestiture would need to include

assets necessary to other types of industrial storage tanks outside of the relevant market:

“[I]f you were only to spin off some personnel and assets to make products in these

markets, that company would wilt like a rose left out too long. There is not enough

business. So, you would have to give it all this other stuff to make flat bottom tanks, to

make gravel tanks, to make all kinds of other stuff. You would have to give it enough

personnel so that everybody would have the expertise to do every kind of tank.” (Leon,

Tr. 8311-12)

There is substantial evidence inthe record asto the close interrelationship between PDM EC and

PDM Water, and the necessity of divesting enough assets to re-create the combined divisions for the

resulting entity to be competitively viable. PDM EC and PDM Water routinely shared field erection

personnel, fabrication facilities, and field erectionequipment. (Scorsone, Tr. 4779-80; CX 552 at 45-48

(Braden Dep.)). The sharing of resources between PDM EC and PDM Water was beneficial to the

company because, among other things, it allowed for a more consistent flow of work through the

company’s fabrication facilities. (CX 552 at 52-53 (Braden Dep.)). Mr. Byers, PDM’s vice president

offinance and administration, testified that because the two divisionssharedhumanresources,services, and
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physical plant, he believed that “[i]t was not practical to split them and sell them separately.” (Byers, Tr.

6780). A Tanner & Company analysis, based on conversations with PDM executives, concluded that “due

to the historical connection between the Divisions and their sharing of facilities, the cost of separating the

two businesses may be as high as $5 to $10 million.” (Scheman, Tr. 6922-23; CX 525 at 1000406).

Dr. Simpsontestified that inorder to replace the competitionthat was eliminated bythe acquisition,

the divested entity would need the economies of scope that PDM obtained fromthe shared operations of

its EC and Water divisions:

Q. And what would the divested entity need to provide to buyersinorder to replace the

competition that was eliminated?

A. PDM EC and PDM Water shared fabrication plants and shared construction crews,

so an entity that would be divested would have to include assets that would enable the

divested firmto compete not just inthe marketsin this case but also inmarketssuchasflat

bottom tanks, egg-shaped digesters and water tanks.

(Simpson, Tr. 3607).

In Order to Be Successful, a Divestiture Must Include PDM’s Fabrication Facilities. 

The divested entitymust include PDM’sfabricationfacilities. In his expert testimony, Dr. Simpson

testified that a divested entity would need a fabrication facility in order to replace PDM:

Q. What tangible assets would an entrant need to acquire that allowed CB&I and PDM EC to

compete so effectively?

A. Both CBI and PDM EC had fabrication facilities in the U. S . . . .

(Simpson, Tr. 3155-56). Mr. Fahel, of Zachry Construction and a company repeatedly cited by

Respondents as a potential entrant into the U.S. LNG market, testified that Zachry’s lack of a U.S.

fabrication facility was a cost disadvantage versus CB&I. (Fahel, Tr. 1635-37). The former PDM EC

andWaterDivisions possessedthree fabricationfacilitieslocated inProvo, Utah; Clive,Iowa; and Warren,
-24-

Pennsylvania. Possessing multiple fabrication facilities is advantageous because it allows a competitor to

rationalize itsfreight costs. (Vetal, Tr. 428, 432-33). All three of PDM’s former fabrication facilities must

be divested.

An Effective Divestiture Must Include the Merged Company’s Intangible Assets

Including Technology and Know-How.

In order for a divestiture order to be effective, Respondents must divest all of the intellectual

property, technology and know-howand otherintangible assetsrelated to the relevant products, including

the PDM name,rightsto whichare under the collective controlofRespondents. Dr. Simpson testified that

restoration of competition requires divestiture of intangible as well as tangible assets:

“The two companies possessed various tangible and intangible assets that enabled them

tooffercustomersthe best dealrelating to dimensions of competitionsuchas price, quality,

timeliness of completion, reputation and safety.” (Simpson, Tr. 3608) Mr. Cutts, a vice

president of ATV, a company repeatedly referenced by Respondents as a potential

replacement for PDM inthe markets at issue, testified that ATV would need the following

assets to effectively compete in the relevant markets:

Q. And can you tell me what those things would be that youwould want to procure from

CB&I?

A. First, their customer base, a list of all their customers, all their bids, everyone they’ve

bid to inthe last tenyears. Second, their technical specifications associated with cryogenic

LNG applications. Their welding systems associated withcertain cryogenic applications.

Their name, so I don’t have to spend ten years building our name and fighting everybody

in the industry who says things that aren’t true about us . . . .

Q. . . . When you refer to technical specifications associated with cryogenic LNG

applications, would AT&V be interested in the technology and know-how of CB&I for

those types of tanks; is that what you’re referring to?

A. Yes. Yeah. That’s purchasing standards, design standards, calculations, drafting

standards, vendor list, those – and there’s other incidentals. They all fit under that
-25-

category.

(Cutts, Tr. 2372-73). Mr. Cutts also testified as to the advantage that CB&I possesses in established

goodwill and reputation competing in the relevant markets:

A. . . . We don’t have the marketing. We looked recently at CB&I’s marketing as far

as advertising and just manpower. And we would have to spend, in a three-year time

frame, we would have to spend almost one and a half million dollars just to equal what

they’re doing. More than what we do now. And we can’t –

Q. And that’s just for advertising and marketing?

A. Right. And we can’t do it. We know we can’t do it.

(Cutts, Tr. 2382). The PDM name will allow the new competitor created by the divestiture order to more

effectively compete in the relevant markets.

Following complete divestiture, CB&I will nevertheless continue to benefit from the trade secrets

and other intellectual property it has absorbed from PDM. Dr. Simpson testified that in order to assure

that the acquirer willbe able to compete onanequalfootingwithCB&I, the combined intellectualproperty

of CB&I and PDM must be shared with the divested entity:

Q. Prior to Chicago Bridge & Iron's acquisition of PDM EC and PDM Water, both

CB&I and PDM possessed proprietary information about bidding strategies and

construction techniques. . . . How should that proprietary information be treated in

formulating relief in this proceeding?

A. In order to have two firms that would -- that could compete onan equal footing, both

firms should have access to that proprietary information.

(Simpson, Tr. 3609).

The Divested Entity Will Need a Track Record in Order to Be Successful. 

The divested entity will require a backlog of work, both in the relevant markets and in general

industrial and water tanks, to sustain it while it regains customer recognition. Respondents conceded this
-26-

point during their closing argument: “In order for this company, new company, to work, is has to have

work inthe system. You can’t just create it and then say, go out and find work, because it takes sometimes

sixmonths to a yearfor a job once you find an opportunity for it to come in.” (Leon, Tr. 8316-17). For

this reason, it is also imperative that the experienced management, engineers and field workers return to

the new PDM. Mr. Scully of XL Systems testified that a track record is vital to a company’s success.

According to Mr. Scully, a divested entity would benefit from the wisdom of experienced people from

CB&I and PDM by obtaining:

“the history, the successful history, knowing the technology and all of the issuesthat have

caused problems inthe past that people knowand won’t make mistakes – make the same

mistakes again. Conversely, ifpeople were starting fromscratch, theywould have to make

the mistakes that we’ve experienced over the years and correct them and thus know not

to make them again.” (Scully, Tr. 1240). 

Further, competitors have testified that they would need experienced people with a track record

to replace PDM. (Cutts, Tr. 2385) (Track record and reputation are important); (Blaumueller, Tr. 301-

02)(experience is important). For example, Mr. Vetal of Matrix gave the following testimony as to the

reasons for his interest in acquiring PDM EC:

Q. Why would acquiring PDM have helped you to enter the cryogenic storage market?

A. Because they had a lot of experienced personnel and fabrication capability in that area,

both on the engineering design and shop side as well as the field side.

Q. Why is having experience in engineering design onthe field side important for entering

the cryogenic storage market?

A. You have to convince the customers that you're qualified, and you need to have the

resumes and the experienced people to do so.

Q. It was your understanding that PDM had the experience -- the expertise within their

employees to convince customers that they were qualified?

A. Yes. 
16 Reestablishing two viable and competitive entities cannot be left to Respondents to accomplish as

they see fit. It requires the skill and expertise of the Commission’s Compliance Division aided by a monitor

trustee. Jeffrey Sawchuck (BP), cited in the Motion for Directed Verdict, testified that any concerns

regarding implementation of relief depends on how the two restored competitors are set up:

Q. Would you have any concerns as a customer if the FTC tried to split up CBI's Engineered

Construction Division, their Tank Building Division, into two separate companies, one continued to

be owned and operated by CBI and another that is owned and operated on its own?

A. I think we would have to see the final outcome and how it was -- how it finally was set up.

Sawchuck, Tr. 6066. Mr. Sawchuck’s concern can be dealt with by proper monitoring of the divestiture.

-27-

(Vetal, Tr. 427-28). Thus, to make sure that the new entity has the reputation, experience and sufficient

business base to be a viable competitor,CB&I’s existing backlogofwork at the timeofthe divestituremust

be apportioned between CB&I and the divested entity.

In Order to Be Effective, the Divestiture Will Need a Trustee and the Enforcement

Efforts of the Compliance Division. 

The divestiture will require the appointment of a monitor trustee to oversee its effective

implementation, as recognized by Respondents. (Simpson, Tr. 5715). The appointment ofa trustee is a

normalpart ofthe divestiture process. See Casey Triggs, FTC Divestiture Policy, 17 Antitrust 75, 76 (Fall

2002).

There are additionalinstitutionalsafeguardsthat willinsure aneffective remedy.16 The Commission

maintains a specialized Compliance Division, whose purpose is to oversee and implement Commission

divestiture orders. The Compliance Division will work with the trustee in implementing an effective order.

TheComplianceDivisionhassubstantialexperience instructuring and implementingCommissiondivestiture

ordersto insure that the goalofrestoringcompetitionisachieved. The Commission ultimately must approve

any purchaser of the divested entity, insuring that the parent will have sufficient financing to operate the
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divested assets and maintain their competitive viability in the markets at issue. 

Finally, divesting assetsina consummated transactionis notanovelexercise. The Commission has

ordered, and the Compliance Division has successfully implemented and enforced, several divestitures of

integrated assets in consummated merger cases. See In re B.F. Goodrich Co., 110 F.T.C. 207 (1988);

In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., 115 F.T.C. 1010 (1992). Dr. Simpson testified that customers would

benefit from reconstituting and divesting the acquired businesses:

Q. Do you believe that customers would benefit by reconstituting a competitive company?

A. Yes, I do. 

Simpson, Tr. 3611.

V. Conclusion

The Clayton Act and established Supreme Court precedent unequivocally state that divestiture is

warranted and appropriate upon showing that Respondents have violated Section 7.

Respondents’ motion fails to cite any of this authority, and indeed fails to even mention the governing

provision of the Clayton Act in this case. Each one of the dozens of pieces of evidence presented by

Complaint Counsel independently mandate that CB&I return what it has wrongfully acquired. There is

substantial evidence in the record showing that a complete divestiture would be beneficial and necessary

to restore the competition that was eliminated by the acquisition. Accordingly, Respondents’ Motion for

Directed Verdict on the Issue of Remedy should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________

J. Robert Robertson
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Rhett R. Krulla

Steven Wilensky

April Tabor

Michael Franchak

Counsel Supporting the Complaint

Yasmine Carson

Honors Paralegal

Federal Trade Commission

601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.

Washington D.C. 20580

(202) 326-2650

Dated: January 23, 2003
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

__________________________________________

)

In the Matter of )

)

CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V. )

)

a foreign corporation, )

)

CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY )

)

a corporation, )

 ) Docket No. 9300

and )

)

PITT-DES MOINES, INC. )

)

a corporation. )

__________________________________________)

ORDER

On January 14, 2003, Respondents filed a Motion for Directed Verdict on the Issue ofRemedy.

On January 23, 2003 Complaint Counsel filed an Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for Directed

Verdict. Having fully considered Respondents’ Motion and Complaint Counsel’s Opposition thereto, the

Court finds that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting granting of appropriate relief in this

matter if a violation is found following post-trial briefing and submission of proposed findings and

conclusions of law. The Court furtherfindsthatRespondents are not entitled to a directed verdict on this

issue. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondents’ motion is denied in its entirety. 

ORDERED 

_____________________

D. Michael Chappell

Administrative Law Judge
-2-

Date: January , 2003
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I herebycertify thatI caused a copy of Complaint Counsel’s Oppositionto Respondents’ Motion

for Directed Verdict on the Issue of Remedy to be delivered by hand to

The Honorable D. Michael Chappell

Federal Trade Commission

H-104

6

th and Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.

Washington D.C. 20580

Administrative Law Judge

and by facsimile and by first-class mail to:

Jeffrey A. Leon

Duane M. Kelley

Winston & Strawn

35 W. Wacker Drive

Chicago, IL 60601-9703

(312) 558-5600

CounselforRespondentsChicago Bridge & IronCompany N.V.

and Pitt-Des Moines, Inc.

Dated: January 23, 2003

___________________________

Steven Wilensky