### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 15, 200 5
JERR Y F AU LKN ER a/k /a JOSEPH FA ULK NER v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -28323 Jam es C. Beasley, Judge

No. W2004-02354-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled Dece m ber 12, 2005

On J anuary 27, 2004, the Shelby CountyCriminal Court acce pted the g uiltypleas of Jerry Faulkner, a lso kn ow n a s Josep h F aulkne r, thepe tit ion e r, on thr e e c ou nts of a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

a nda sin g le c ou nt o f a g g ra vate d r ape . T he e ff e c tiv e 20 -y e ar se nt ence was imp os e d to ru n c on c ur re ntl y wi th another state sentenc e and “ all Fe dera l convictions.” On Ap ri l 1 3 , 2 0 0 4 , the petitioner, who w as incar cer ated in a f

eder al fa cilit y i n M em p h i s , filed a pe tition i n the conviction court for a w rit of habea s corpus. B eca

use the pe titioner was in f

eder al custody , the habea s corpus c ourt dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appea led. Following our revie w, we a ffirm the or der of the habe as cor

pus c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE a ndJ.C. M C LIN , J J ., joined.
J erry Faulkner a

/k/a J oseph F aulkner , Appellant, Pro Se

. Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L

. B le ds oe , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Willi am L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION This court’s opinion on direc t appea l of the denia l of post-conviction re lief desc ribes the history of the petitioner’s case prior to the January 27, 2004 g uiltypleas, see Joseph T . Faulkner
v . S tate , No. W1999-00223-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, O ct. 17, 2000):

OnJune 30 , 1 99 8, the ap pel lant , Jose phT. F aulkne r, a lso known a s “ Je rr y F au lkn e r , ” e n te r e d g u il ty p le a s to o n e c o u n t of ag g ravated ra

pe and thr ee c ounts of ag g ravated robbe ry in the Shelby CountyCriminal Court. The neg otiated plea a g ree ment provided that-2- the appe llant would serve an eff ective twe nty -five y ear

sentenc e to be se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y wi th his fe de ra l sen te nc e imp os e d p ur su a nt t o h is g uilty p l ea under f

eder al indictment No. CR-97-20098-G. The jud g men t f

orms r e fl e c t th a t th e app e llant’ s st a te se nte nc e s w e re“ to b e s er v ed i n fe d er al cu s t o d y
. ” T h e a p p el l an ti s cu rr en t l y s er v i n g a TD OC s e n t e nc e a t th e Ha

rd e ma n Co un ty

Cor re c tio na l F a c ili ty , a

state f a c i l i t y. H e h a s n e v e r

b e e n r e l e a s e d t o f

e d e r a l c u s t o d y. Rely ing upon the fac t that he re mains in state custody , the app e llant f

ile d a pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n rel ie f a lle g ing that hi s g uil ty ple a s w e re no t know ing ly a ndvo lun tari ly

e nte re d. He arg ue s, in effe ct, that his ba

rg ained for concur

rent state and f

eder al sentenc es ha ve be c omec on se c uti ve by thefe de ra l g ov e rn me nt’ s r e fu sa l to acc ept hi m into their custody

. The post-conviction court de nied the appellant relief

, finding that the appe llant “has pre sented no e vidence to s up po rt

[his ] al le g a tio n” that

“ theState re fu se d to re le a se him to fede ral authorities or that fede ral authorities in fact req u es t ed the State to relea se him to their custody

. ” The court further found that “the State ha s no authority under the Supremac y Clause of the F eder al Constit ution to either requir e federa l authorities to take possession of Petitioner or g uarantee Petitioner’s sentence will be served in fe dera l custody .”
Id. , slip op. at 2 (footnotes omitted). Be cause , s u b s equently to the 1998 g uiltypleas, “ action by fede ral authorities rende red the plea a g ree ment incapa ble of e nforc ement,” id. , slip op. at 4, this court in the post-conviction appea l de termined that the petitioner’s ple as we re not made knowing ly and reve rsed the c onvictions, id ., slip op. at 4-5. I n cra fting a reme dy , this court adopted lang uag e fr om De rri c k E. Me an s v . S tate , No. 02C01-9707-CR-00248 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, A ug . 13, 1998) ( per curiam ):
Fa shioning re lief for the petitioner will take the combined g oo d f a ithe ff orts o f a ll i nv olv e d. Th e pa rt ie s are fi rs t e nc ou ra g e d to mak e every

e ff ort to fu lf ill theint e nt o f the ple a

ba rg a in. Spe c if

ic pe rf orma nc e ma y , h ow e ve r, be impos sib le to e ff e c tuate . B oth defe nse counse l and the district attorney ’s offic e, while taking steps to preserve the integ rity of the state se ntence , should contact fe dera l author ities and determine whether the fe dera l authorities would be willing to ac cept the pe titioner for his fe dera l sentence

. I f sp e c if ic pe rf orma nc e is a n imp os sib ili ty , the pa rt ie s sh ou ld enter into new plea ne g otiations taking into ac count the intentions of the failed ple a ag ree ment. The a g ree ment failed throug h no fault of the pe tit ion e r. I n ou r v ie w, ple a ne g oti a tio ns a ndse nte nc ing sh ou ldT h e p e tit io n e r a lleg e s tha t h e “w a s o n p a ro le fo r so m e c a se s [h e ] c a u g h t i n 1 9 9 8 -1 9 9 [9 ] (A V o id J u d g m e n t) 1 i s o ne [s i c] faci al l y i nval i d be cause the t ri al c o urt lacked J uri sdi ct i o n . . . t o rend er t he judgm ent

. T he d efend ant i s st at i ng t hat hi s Co nv i ct i ons i s [ s i c] V oi d on t he bas i s of t he above f act [ ] s
. . . . ” -3- take int o a c c ou nt the tim e thepet it io ner ha s se rv e d inpriso n a ndin the county

jail. I f these a v en u es do not provide a satisfac tory resolution, the petitioner may be allowed to withdraw his g uiltypleas a lto g e the r andfa c e tria l. Joseph T. Faulkne r , slip op. at 5.

Ap pa re ntl y , fo llo wi ng re ma nd , the pa rt ie s e nte re d int o a se c on d plea ag re e me nt, wh ic h p rov id ed for a n e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

20 y e ars to b e se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y wi th ano the r s tate sentenc e and w ith the petitioner’s fe dera l sentence . The a g ree ment was a pprov ed o n J anuary

27, 2004. The pe tition for habea s co rp u s re l ief now unde r re view alleg es, inte r a lia , that the 2004 sentenc es are illega l be cause of the concur rent alig nment of the state sentenc es w i t h a p ri or state sentenc e. The petitioner claims that he was on parole when he committed the offe nses re sulting in the convictions now being challeng ed. On appe al, he argue s that Tennesse e Code Annotated 1 section 40-20- 111(b) r eq u i re d that the sentenc es as imposed in 1998 and a g ain in 2004 must be serve d consec utively to the sentenc e for which he was on pa role a nd that the conc urre nt alignme nt rende red the new se ntence s illega l and void. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111( b) (2003) (“In any case in w hich a defe ndant commits a felony while such defe ndant was rele ased on bail in acc ordanc e with the provisions of chapte r 11, part 1 of this tit le, an d the def endant is convic ted of both such of fe ns e s, thetria l ju dg e sh a ll n ot h a ve dis c re tio n a s to wh e the r the se nte nc e s sh a ll r un c on c ur re ntl y or cumulatively , but shall order that such sentenc es be se rved c umulatively .”). I. Principles of Habeas Corpus The leg al issues raise d in a habe as cor pus proce eding are questions of law, and our revie w of que stions of law is de novo. Ha rt v . S tate , 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) (“[W] hether to gr ant the petition [for habea s corpus re lief] is a question of law that we r eview de novo .” ); Sta te v . H ill , 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) (question of law revie wed on a ppeal de novo).
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29-21-101 provides th at “[ a]ny person imprisoned or re strained of l iberty , under any prete nse whatsoever, . . . may prosec ute a writ of habea s corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-101 (2003)

. Habe as corpus relief in Tenne ssee, however , is available only when the a g g rieve d p arty ’s conviction is void or the sente nce ha s expi red. Se e Arc he r v . S tate , 8 5 1 S. W. 2 d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)

.-4- A v oidc on vic tio n is on e wh ic h s trike s a t the jurisd ic tio na l int e g ri ty of the tria l c ou rt

. Id. ; se e Sta te ex

re l. A ng lin v . Mitc he ll , 5 75 S.W. 2d28 4, 28 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 9) ; Pa ssa re lla v . S tate , 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Be ca u s e in this case the trial court a ppare ntly had jurisdiction over the actus reus , the subject matter , and the pe rson of the pe titioner, the petitioner’s jurisd ic tio na l is su e is l imi te d to thec la im that thec ou rt wa s w ith ou t auth ority

to e nte r the jud g me nt. Se e An gli n , 575 S.W .2d at 287 (“‘ J urisdiction’ in the s ense here used, is not li mited to jurisdiction of the pe rson or of the subject matter but a lso includes lawful authority of the c ourt to rende r the particular o rder or judg ment wher eby the petitioner ha s been imprisoned.” ); see also Arche r , 851 S.W. 2da t 16 4; Pa ssa re lla , 891 S.W .2d at 627.

The invalidity

of the sente n ce itself, as well as the br oader invalidityof the conviction, re sults in a voi d judgme nt and is a suffic ient basis for ha beas c orpus re lief. See S te p h e n s o n v. Carlton , 2 8 S. W.3 d 9 10 , 9 11 (T e nn . 2 00 0) (a vo id s e nte nc e , a s w e ll a s a vo id conviction, may

result in a void judg ment and be the subject of a habea s corpus proc eeding ). F or an illeg al-sente nce c laim to support a claim for habea s corpus relief, however , the illeg ality of the sentenc e must be eg reg ious to the point of voidness. Cox v . S tate , 5 3 S. W.3 d 2 87 , 2 92 (T e nn . Crim. App. 2001). Our supreme court has stressed that a habe as corpus action is “the pr oper pr ocedur e for collater ally challeng ing an illega l sentence .” Mo od y v . S tate , 160 S.W .3d 512, 515 (Tenn. 2005)

. I n McLan ey v. B e ll , 59 S.W .3d 90 (Tenn. 2001) , the habe as cor pus petitioner complain ed t h at h i s concur rent a lignment of

a sente nce f

or a pr e-bail offense with sentence s for post-bail offe nses was void. Se e id

. at 92. Appar ently , McL aney barg ained for and obtained a g lobal plea a g ree ment that embra ced se ntence s for a g g ravated ra pe (the pre- bail offe nse) and for r ape and burg lary (t h e post-bail offe nses). See State v . Jack ie W . McLaney , No. 74 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knoxvi lle, Mar. 31, 1988) . I n McLaney , the supreme court said that “if the f acts [were ] as alleg ed, thetria l c ou rt

imp os e d a

se nte nc e in d ir e c t c on tr a ve nti on of these nte nc ing a c t, .

. . [an d] th is w ou ld cre ate an illega l sentence .” McLaney , 5 9 S

. W

. 3 d at 93. The supr eme c ourt requir ed the ha beas corpus court to dete rmine whe ther “ the re cord of the underly ing pr ocee dings c learly showed that the latter ra pe and bur g lary o ff

en s es were c ommitt ed while Mc L aney was on ba il.” Id. at 94. Furthermore , the McLaneyc ou rt dir e c te d th a t sh ou ld the ha be a s c or pu s c ou rt fi ndthat to be thec a se – with the result that the sente nces in the latter ca ses would be void – “on r emand to the orig inal convicting trial court, a

g uiltyplea may

be withdra wn.” Id

. a t 95 . T he c ou rt re a so ne d th a t be c aus e

“ M c L a n e y e n t e r e d h i s g u i l t y p l e a i n e x c h a n g e f

o r a c o n c u rr e n ts e n t e n c e w h i c h w a s , i n a c t u a l i t y, illega l, . . . [ he] is entitl ed to withdraw the plea.” Id. (citations omitted).

II. The Pe titioner’s Clai m to Habeas Corpus Relief
A. Th e B a sis fo r a

Cla im o f S e nte nc e I lle g a lit y
T h e f i rs ts t ep i n an al y z i n g McLaney ’s app licati on to the pr e se nt c a se is t o acknow ledg e that the pe titioner inapt ly r e li e s u p o nT e n n e ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-20-111(b), the Code sec tion at play

in McLaney , that mandates c onsecutive al i gn m en t of sentenc es whe n a felony offe nse is c ommitt ed while the offe nder is on ba il fo r ano the r o ff e ns e . T he pe tit ion e r’ s c la im-5-

is that he wa s on pa ro le when he committed the crimes f or which he was sente nced in 1998 and a g a in i n 2 00 4. As su c h, the ma nd a tory te rm s of Cod e se c tio n 40 -2 0- 11 1( b) ha ve no app lic a tio n to the pre sent ca se.

T h a ts a i d , t h e t e r m s o f

T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 4 0

- 2 8

- 1 2 3 ( a ) d o ap p l y: Any prisoner w ho is convicted i n t h i s state of a felony , committed while on par ole from a

state prison, jail or workhouse, shall serve the re m ai n der of

the sentenc e under

which the prisoner wa s paroled, or such part of that sentenc e, as the board may determine befor e the prisoner c ommences se rving the sentenc e re ceive d for t h e fe lony committed while on parole

. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 28 -1 23 (a ) ( 20 03 ). Ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s said that th is “ statut e is mandatory [,] and whe n the prisoner does violate his parole he is require d to serve the rema inder of this sentence.” Hende rson v . State, 220 Tenn. 520, 523, 419 S.W .2d 176, 178 (1967). This court has pre viously h eld t hat the princ iples of McLaneyapply with equal for ce to a

violation of Code section 40-28- 123(a) as they do a violation of sec tion 40-20-111(b). See R obert A. Atkins v. J ames M. Dukes , No. W2001-01311-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim

. App., J ackson, J an. 8, 2002) (“We note that even though the defe ndant in McLaney was granted concurre nt sentence s for a felony c omm itt e d w hil e on ba il f or a no the r f

e lon y c on vi cti on , th e re su lt i s th e sa me un de r the statut e providing for c onviction of a fe lony committed while o n p ar o l e for a prior fe lony

conviction, [Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-28-123( a)].”).
B. ThePetitioner’s Status As a Habe as Corpus Claimant
We now addre ss the issue of whether the petitioner i s an eligible candidate f or habe as cor

pus relief , an issue implicated by

(1) the r equire ment of Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 29-21- 101 that the petit ioner be imprisoned or ot herw ise in restraint of liberty , see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21- 10 1 ( 20 03 ), a ndby

(2 ) T e nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 2 9- 21 -1 02 , w hic h p ro vid e s th a t [p] ersons c ommitt ed or de tained by virtue of pr ocess issued by a court of the United States, or a judge t h er eo f, in case s where such judg es or courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the laws of the United States, or haveacquir ed exclusive jurisdict ion by the c omm e nc e me nt o f s uit s insu c h c ou rt s, areno t e nti tle d to thebe ne fi ts of thi s w ri t,
id . § 29-21-102.-6- 1. Re str a int

of Libe rty The fir st question that comes to mind is whether the petitioner’s concur rent service of a fede ral sentenc e with the challeng ed state se ntence s equate s to a restraint of liberty for pur poses of habe as cor

pus relief . We conclude that it does.
We are mindful that, to have standing to seek a writ of habea s corpus, the pe titioner mus t beimp ri so ne d o r r e str a ine d o f lib e rty a s a “ dir e c t c on se qu e nc e ” of

thec halle ng e d 2 00 4 s tate judgme nts. Se e Hi c k

ma n v . S tate , 153 S.W. 3d 16 , 24 (T e nn . 200 4)

. B y thete rm s o f the jud g me nts in th e p re s ent ca se, the pe titioner is serving the re sulting sentenc es while in fe dera l custody by se rv ing a fe de ra l se nte nc e
. Th us , we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r he is imp ri so ne d or re str a ine d of his l i b e rt y as a direct conse quence of the Te nnessee sentenc es.

Tenne ssee c ourts have said, “The sole r elief a vailable unde r Tenn essee ’s habe as corpus statute is discha

rg e fr om custody .” Ke nn e th Ke rse y v . S tate , No. 01C01-9604-CR-00128, sli p o p. a t 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , N a sh vil le , Jun e 6, 19 97 ); see Taylor v. M organ , 909 S.W .2d 17, 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). I n Us se ry v . A v e ry , 222 Tenn. 50, 432 S.W.2d 656 (1968), the habe as corpus pe titioner rec eived c onsecutive te n-y ear sentenc es for

two arme d robbery

convictions, and he cha lleng ed the f

irst conviction, but not the s econd. Our supre me court rejec ted the habe as cor pus claim that cha lleng ed one c onviction when the pe titioner was also subject to lawful re straint by the second c onviction. The court stated that “[n] o provision is made fo r p as s i n g o n the validity of a judgme nt other than to re lease or deta in” under the habe as corpus statute that is now Tennesse e Code An no tate d s e c tio n § 29 -2 1- 12 2. Al though th e c ou rt re c og nize d th a t it

wo uldbe un re a so na

bleto requirea prisoner to serve a void judgme nt solely beca use it was followe d by

a conse cutive sente nce, it saw no injustice in requiring a prisoner to serve t h e t i m e t h at i s conce ded to be va lid before application may

be made

. Id. at 55-56, 432 S.W.2d at 658. The implications of Us se ry a s id e , w e b e li e v e th a t th e d is c h ar g e
- f r o m- c u s tody require men t is not applicable whe n a petitioner c halleng es a se ntence that is being serve d c on c ur re ntl y wi th an u nc hal leng e d s e nte nc e . “ Whe n tw o s e nte nc e s run c on c ur re ntl y , it me re ly means that, for

eac h day in c ustody while serving both se ntence s, the inmate rec eives c redit towar d eac h sentenc e. Concurr ent sentenc es do not nec essarily beg in and end at the same time – they simply run t og ether during the time they overla p.” Br own v . Te nn . D e

pt. of Cor r. , 11 S.W .3d 911, 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Essentially , the petitioner is serving h is 2 0 0 4 T e n n e s s e e s e n te n c e s
. We conclude that the petitioner, there fore , is imprisoned as a direc t r esult of his 20 0 4 T en nessee convictions and sente nces and that beca use he is imprisoned, his liberty is obviouslyrestrained.
We acknowle dg e that Te nnessee Code Annot ated section 29-21-122(a ) states that “[i] f no suffic ient leg al cause of det en t i o n i s shown, the plaintiff shall be discha rg ed”; howe ver, su bs e c tio n ( b) state s:

T h e p art y d e t a i n e d s h a l l b e r e m a n d e d t o c u s t o d y:In H ic k m a n v . S ta te , 15 3 S.W

. 3 d 16 (T enn. 20 0 4 ), our suprem e co urt exp o und ed on t he i m p ri sonm ent

- o r2

re stra int-o f- lib e rty re q u ire m e n t. T h e c o u rt o p ine d tha t a p e tit io n e r is n o t re stra ine d o f his li b e r ty v ia a n e x p ire d sta te se n te n c e m e re ly b e c a u se th a t sta te c o n v ic tio n r e su lted in th e e n h a n c e m e n t o f a fe d e ra l se n te n c e
. Id

. a t 2 3 (“[ W ]e ho ld tha t a p e rs o n is n o t ‘re stra ine d o f lib e rty’ fo r p u rp o se s o f th e h a b e a s c o rp u s sta tute u n le ss th e c h a llen g e d ju d g m e n t i tse lf i m p o ses a res t rai nt upo n t he p et i t i o ner’ s f reed o m of act i o n or m o vem ent .” ). In d et erm i ni ng t hat H ic k m a n ’s expi r ed sta te s ent enc e po s ed no res t rai nt of lib e rty for habea s cor pus pur po s es , t he cour t av oi ded a det er mi nat i on wh et her T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 29- 21

- 10 2’ s di s qual i f i cat i on of

f eder al pet i t i oners p er se r e q u ire d d ism issa l o f H ic k m a n ’s p e tit io n
. See i d. at 2 4 n.5 (“B ec au se H i ck m an ’ s p eti t i o n d o es no t i nd i ca t e h i s p l ac e o f co nfi ne m en t an d b ec au se thi s ca se may be r es ol ved on ot her gr ounds , we nee d not cons i der whe t her

. . . s ect i on 29- 21

- 10 2 precl udes per s ons i n f eder al
c u sto d y fro m se e k ing ha b e a s c o rp u s re lief fro m T e n n e sse e ju d g m e n ts.” ).

In X a v ie r S . To d d v . S ta te , N o. W 2005- 00681- CC A- R 3

- H C (T en n
. Cr i m. App. , J ac k s on , Se pt

. 16, 20 05 ) , t hi s cour t ut i l i zed Co de s ect i on 29- 21

- 10 2 t o det er mi ne t hat T od d , a f ed era l p r i s oner , was not en t i t l ed t o s eek habea s corpus r el i ef i n s t at e cour t ; howev er , t he cour t emphas i zed t hat t he s t at e s ent enc e bei ng ch al l eng ed by t he habea s c o rp u s p e tit io n h a d e x p ire d

. Id. , s l i p op. at 3. T h e c ou r t obs er v ed, “ W h i l e t h i s Cour t i s of t h e opi n i on t h at a n i s s u e of
w h e the r a p riso n e r in fe d e ra l c u sto d y b u t w h o se s ta te s e n te n c e h a s n o t ye t e x p ire d m a y se e k sta te ha b e a s c o rp u s re lief,
s uch i s not t he ci r cums t anc e i n t he cas e s ub j ud i ce . ” Id. -7-

(1 ) If i t app e ars thepa

rty is d e tain e d b y

virtueof pr oc e ss issued by a court or judg e of the United S tates, i n a ca se whe re suc h court or judg e has e x clusive jurisdiction; (2 ) Wh e rethetim e du ri ng wh ich su ch pa rty ma y be le g a lly detained ha s not ex pired; or (3) In every case in which the dete ntion is authoriz ed by law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-122 (2000) . Thus, althoug h a discha rg e of the petit i o n er is warranted when no suff

icient leg al cause of a

detention is shown, the petitioner may nevertheless be remande d to custody

when c ontinued custody is mandated by

a differ en t b as i s for de tention. Such is the pe tit ion e r’ s c a se ; heis i mpriso ne d a s a dir e c t r e su lt o f h is 2 00 4 T e nn e sse e c on vic tio ns
. 2. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29-21-102
The other potential impediment to the petitioner’s claim to a writ of habe as cor pus is t h e l imitation s et forth in Code sec tion 29-21-102 that per sons confined via proce ss issued by fede ral judg es or c ourts when “such j udg es or courts have ex clusive j urisdiction under the laws of the United States . . . ar e not entit l ed to the benef its of this writ.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-102 (2000). In our vi ew, this limit ation upon acc ess t o a Tennessee writ of habeas corpus implicates the primary result and benef

it of t he writ – the command to bring the body of the pe titioner befor e the c ou rt

. 2
The c ommon usag e of the term “habe as corpus” implicates a writ of habe as cor pus ad subjiciendum , a “w rit directe d to the person de taining another, a nd commanding him to produce the bo dy of t

he pr iso ne r . . . to do, submit to, and rece ive whatsoever the judg e or c ourt awaiting the writ shall consider in that be half.” Bl ac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry 865 (3 d ed. 1933) ( emphasis adde d).-8-

“The desig n of the writ is t o secur e the forthc om ing of t he pla int iff

to h a ve a fair tria l of

thele g a lit y of his imp ri so nme nt. ” Sa mue l B . G ilr e a th, Ca ru the rs’ Hi sto ry of a Laws uit § 5 64 (1 93 7) (e mph a sis added)

. Thus, althoug h courts may commonly

speak of habea s corpus re lief being g rante d or denie d when r efe rring to the officiating court’s adjudication of t he lega lity of the pe titioner’s restraint, the literal purpose of the writ is t o command the de livery of the pe titioner’s person int o the phy sical prese nce of

the offic iating c ourt as a pr edicate to adjudicating the leg ality of the re straint.
I n our vie w, Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 2 9- 21 -1 02 me re ly re c og nize s th a t, as a f unction of fe dera l sovereig nty , a state c ourt may not command an officia l action by a fe dera l office r. Tar

ble ’s Cas e 13 Wal l. 3 7, 41 1- 12 , 8 0 U .S. 39 7, 41 1- 12 (1 87 1) (r e je c tin g c la im that a

state writ of habe as cor

pus could direc t the delivery or discharg e of a prisoner “held by an off icer of the United S tates” and direc ting that a st ate court should proce ed “no further when it appea rs .
. . that a prisoner is held by an office r of the United States under . . . the authority of the United States. . . .”). T hu s, in the pr e se nt c a se , th e pe tit ion e r m a y no t se e k a

writ that, t o b e satis fi e d, re qu ir e s a fede ral func tionary

to submitto the dominion of a state court.

. III . Conclusion
The re sult is t hat, eve n th o u g hth ep e ti ti o ner’ s unexpi red 2004 state sentenc es running concur rently with a fe dera l sentence may otherwise besubject to collater al attac k, the petitioner doe s not enjoy the bene fit of the writ of state ha beas c orpus bec ause a

state court cannot command c omp lianc y by the pe tit ion e r’ s fe de ra l jail e r. F or thi s re a so n, the jud g me nt of thec ri min a l c ou rt

is aff irmed.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE