7922 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 35 / Friday, February 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

provide borrowers with a degree of

financial certainty.

The rule will allow RUS to process

applications for loans with a loan period

of more than 2 years in two parts during

a fiscal year when applications

substantially exceed available funds.

RUS will notify all electric borrowers in

writing before invoking these

procedures.

RUS recognizes that the success of the

electric program in maintaining high

quality electric service at reasonable

rates in rural areas depends on the

ability of electric borrowers to maintain

and improve their electric systems. The

temporary procedures in this rule will

assist borrowers in the essential task of

planning and managing their cash flows.

Concurrent with the publication of

this rule, RUS is issuing Bulletin

1710C–1, Temporary Processing

Procedures for Insured Electric Loans, a

compliance guide to assist borrowers,

supplemental lenders, and other

interested parties. RUS is mailing the

rule and the bulletin to all electric

borrowers and to supplemental lenders.

RUS believes that the procedures in the

bulletin will allow all borrowers to

share the limited loan appropriations on

a fair and equitable basis.

Because of: (1) The exceptionally

large backlog of applications for

municipal rate and hardship rate loans,

and (2) The urgent need for processing

procedures that will allow RUS to

advance loan funds during the spring

construction season, RUS is putting

these procedures into effect

immediately for FY 1997. RUS requests

comments and suggestions, especially

on alternate methods of allocating the

limited amount of loan funds.

List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 1710

Electric power, Electric utilities, Loan

programs—energy, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Rural

areas.

For the reasons set out in the

preamble, and under the authority of 7

U.S.C. 901 et seq., RUS amends 7 CFR

Part 1710 as follows:

PART 1710—GENERAL AND PRELOAN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

COMMON TO INSURED AND

GUARANTEED ELECTRIC LOANS

1. The authority citation for part 1710

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 901–950(b); Pub. L. 99–

591, 100 Stat. 3341; Pub. L. 103–354, 108

Stat. 3178 (7 U.S.C. 6941 et seq.).

2. Section 1710.106 is amended by

revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:

§ 1710.106 Uses of loan funds.

* * * * *

(e)(1) If, in the sole discretion of the

Administrator, the amount authorized

for lending for municipal rate loans,

hardship rate loans, and loan guarantees

in a fiscal year is substantially less than

the total amount eligible for RUS

financing, RUS may limit the size of all

loans of that type approved during the

fiscal year. Depending on the amount of

the shortfall between the amount

authorized for lending and the loan

application inventory on hand for each

type of loan, RUS may either reduce the

amount on an equal proportion basis for

all applicants for that type of loan based

on the amount of funds for which the

applicant is eligible, or may shorten the

loan period for which funding will be

approved to less than the maximum of

4 years. All applications for the same

type of loan approved during a fiscal

year will be treated in the same manner,

except that RUS will not limit funding

to any borrower requesting an RUS loan

or loan guarantee of $1 million or less.

(2) If RUS limits the amount of loan

funds approved for borrowers, the

Administrator shall notify all electric

borrowers early in the fiscal year of the

manner in which funding will be

limited. The portion of the loan

application that is not funded during

that fiscal year may, at the borrower’s

option, be treated as a second loan

application received by RUS at a later

date. This date will be determined by

RUS in the same manner for all affected

loans and will be based on the

availability of loan funds. The second

loan application shall be considered

complete except that the borrower must

submit a certification from a duly

authorized corporate official stating that

funds are still needed for loan purposes

specified in the original application and

must notify RUS of any changes in its

circumstances that materially affects the

information contained in the original

loan application or the primary support

documents. See 7 CFR 1710.401(f).

* * * * *

Dated: February 13, 1997.

Jill Long Thompson,

Under Secretary, Rural Development.

[FR Doc. 97–4334 Filed 2–20–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–15–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 23

[Docket No. 139CE, Special Condition 23–

ACE–90]

Special Conditions; Beechcraft Model

E90 Airplane

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request

for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are

issued to East Coast Aerospace

Engineering, 2601 N. Flagler Dr., W.

Palm Beach, FL 33407 for a

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) on

Beechcraft Model E90 airplane. This

airplane will have novel and unusual

design features when compared to the

state of technology envisaged in the

applicable airworthiness standards.

These novel and unusual design

features include the installation of

electronic displays for which the

applicable regulations do not contain

adequate or appropriate airworthiness

standards for the protection of these

systems from the effects of high

intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These

special conditions contain the

additional safety standards that the

Administrator considers necessary to

establish a level of safety equivalent to

the airworthiness standards applicable

to these airplanes.

DATES: The effective date of these

special conditions is on publication in

the Federal Register. Comments must be

received on or before March 24, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed

in duplicate to: Federal Aviation

Administration, Office of the Assistant

Chief Counsel, ACE–7, Attention: Rules

Docket Clerk, Docket No. 139CE, Room

1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City,

Missouri 64106. All comments must be

marked: Docket No. 139CE. Comments

may be inspected in the Rules Docket

weekdays, except Federal holidays,

between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ervin Dvorak, Aerospace Engineer,

Standards Office (ACE–110), Small

Airplane Directorate, Aircraft

Certification Service, Federal Aviation

Administration, 601 East 12th Street,

Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone

(816) 426–6941.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of

a final rule that involves requirements
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 35 / Friday, February 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 7923

affecting flight safety, and, thus, was not

preceded by notice and an opportunity

for public comment, comments are

invited on these special conditions.

Interested persons are invited to

submit such written data, views, or

arguments as they may desire.

Communications should identify the

regulatory docket and special conditions

number and be submitted in duplicate

to the address specified above. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments will be

considered by the Administrator. These

special conditions may be changed in

light of the comments received. All

comments submitted will be available in

the rules docket for examination by

interested parties, both before and after

the closing date for comments. A report

summarizing each substantive public

contact with FAA personnel concerning

this rulemaking will be filed in the

docket. Persons wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments,

submitted in response to this request,

must include a self-addressed and

stamped postcard on which the

following statement is made:

‘‘Comments to Docket No. 139CE.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Background

On January 2, 1997, East Coast

Aerospace Engineering, 2601 N. Flagler

Dr., W. Palm Beach, FL 33407 made an

application to the FAA for a

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for

the Beechcraft Model E90 airplane. The

proposed modification incorporates a

novel or unusual design feature, such as

digital avionics consisting of an

electronic flight instrument system

(EFIS), that is vulnerable to HIRF

external to the airplane.

Type Certification Basis

The type certification basis for the

Beechcraft Model E90 Airplane is given

in Type Certification Data Sheet No.

3A20 plus the following: § 23.954 and

§ 23.959 of Amendment 23–7 to FAR 23

dated February 1, 1965; § 23.1111 of

Amendment 23–7 to FAR 23;

§ 23.1385(c), § 23.1387(a), § 23.1387(e)

of Amendment 23–12 to FAR 23 and

§ 23.1301 of Amendment 23–20;

§§ 23.1309, and 23.1321 of Amendment

23–41; § 23.1311 of Amendment 23–49,

and § 23.1322 of Amendment 23–43; to

FAR 23 and Special Conditions outlined

by FAA letters to Beech dated January

21, February 15, and February 27, 1963,

and May 5, 1965, and November 8,

1961, and FAA Exemption No. 1554

issued March 31, 1972, from CAR

3.115(a) for Model E90; exemptions, if

any; and the special conditions adopted

by this rulemaking action.

Discussion

The FAA may issue and amend

special conditions, as necessary, as part

of the type certification basis if the

Administrator finds that the

airworthiness standards, designated

according to § 21.101(b), do not contain

adequate or appropriate safety standards

because of novel or unusual design

features of an airplane. Special

conditions are prescribed under the

provisions of § 21.16 to establish a level

of safety equivalent to that established

in the regulations. Special conditions

are normally issued according to

§ 11.49, after public notice, as required

by §§ 11.28 and 11.29(b), effective

October 14, 1980, and become a part of

the type certification basis in

accordance with § 21.101(b)(2)

East Coast Aerospace Engineering

plans to incorporate certain novel and

unusual design features into an airplane

for which the airworthiness standards

do not contain adequate or appropriate

safety standards for protection from the

effects of HIRF. These features include

electronic systems, which are

susceptible to the HIRF environment,

that were not envisaged by the existing

regulations for this type of airplane.

Protection of Systems from High

Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF): Recent

advances in technology have given rise

to the application in aircraft designs of

advanced electrical and electronic

systems that perform functions required

for continued safe flight and landing.

Due to the use of sensitive solid state

advanced components in analog and

digital electronics circuits, these

advanced systems are readily responsive

to the transient effects of induced

electrical current and voltage caused by

the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade

electronic systems performance by

damaging components or upsetting

system functions.

Furthermore, the HIRF environment

has undergone a transformation that was

not foreseen when the current

requirements were developed. Higher

energy levels are radiated from

transmitters that are used for radar,

radio, and television. Also, the number

of transmitters has increased

significantly. There is also uncertainty

concerning the effectiveness of airframe

shielding for HIRF. Furthermore,

coupling to cockpit-installed equipment

through the cockpit window apertures is

undefined.

The combined effect of the

technological advances in airplane

design and the changing environment

has resulted in an increased level of

vulnerability of electrical and electronic

systems required for the continued safe

flight and landing of the airplane.

Effective measures against the effects of

exposure to HIRF must be provided by

the design and installation of these

systems. The accepted maximum energy

levels in which civilian airplane system

installations must be capable of

operating safely are based on surveys

and analysis of existing radio frequency

emitters. These special conditions

require that the airplane be evaluated

under these energy levels for the

protection of the electronic system and

its associated wiring harness. These

external threat levels, which are lower

than previous required values, are

believed to represent the worst case to

which an airplane would be exposed in

the operating environment.

These special conditions require

qualification of systems that perform

critical functions, as installed in aircraft,

to the defined HIRF environment in

paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed

value using laboratory tests, in

paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate

that the operation and operational

capability of the installed electrical and

electronic systems that perform critical

functions are not adversely affected

when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF

environment defined below:

FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/METER

Frequency Peak Average

10–100 KHz .............. 50 50

100–500 .................... 60 60

500–2000 .................. 70 70

2–30 MHz .................. 200 200

30–70 ........................ 30 30

70–100 ...................... 30 30

100–200 .................... 150 33

200–400 .................... 70 70

400–700 .................... 4020 935

700–1000 .................. 1700 170

1–2 GHz .................... 5000 990

2–4 ............................ 6680 840

4–6 ............................ 6850 310

6–8 ............................ 3600 670

8–12 .......................... 3500 1270

12–18 ........................ 3500 360

18–40 ........................ 2100 750

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by

a system test and analysis that the

electrical and electronic systems that

perform critical functions can withstand

a minimum threat of 100 volts per

meter, peak electrical field strength,

from 10 KHz to 18 GHz. When using

this test to show compliance with the

HIRF requirements, no credit is given

for signal attenuation due to

installation.
7924 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 35 / Friday, February 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

A preliminary hazard analysis must

be performed by the applicant, for

approval by the FAA, to identify

electrical and/or electronic systems that

perform critical functions. The term

‘‘critical’’ means those functions whose

failure would contribute to, or cause, a

failure condition that would prevent the

continued safe flight and landing of the

airplane. The systems identified by the

hazard analysis that perform critical

functions are candidates for the

application of HIRF requirements. A

system may perform both critical and

non-critical functions. Primary

electronic flight display systems, and

their associated components, perform

critical functions such as attitude,

altitude, and airspeed indication. The

HIRF requirements apply only to critical

functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements

may be demonstrated by tests, analysis,

models, similarity with existing

systems, or any combination of these.

Service experience alone is not

acceptable since normal flight

operations may not include an exposure

to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a

system with similar design features for

redundancy as a means of protection

against the effects of external HIRF is

generally insufficient since all elements

of a redundant system are likely to be

exposed to the fields concurrently.

Conclusion

In view of the design features

discussed for the Beechcraft Model E90

Airplane, the following special

conditions are issued. This action is not

a rule of general applicability and

affects only those applicants who apply

to the FAA for approval of these features

on these airplanes.

The substance of these special

conditions has been subject to the notice

and public comment procedure in

several prior rulemaking actions. For

example, the Dornier 228–200 (53 FR

14782, April 26, 1988), the Cessna

Model 525 (56 FR 49396, September 30,

1991), and the Beech Model 200, A200,

and B200 airplanes (57 FR 1220, January

13, 1992). It is unlikely that additional

public comment would result in any

significant change from those special

conditions already issued and

commented on. For these reasons, and

because a delay would significantly

affect the applicant’s installation of the

system and certification of the airplane,

which is imminent, the FAA has

determined that prior public notice and

comment are unnecessary and

impracticable, and good cause exists for

adopting these special conditions

without notice. Therefore, these special

conditions are being made effective

upon publication in the Federal

Register. However, as previously

indicated, interested persons are invited

to comment on these special conditions

if they so desire.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and

symbols.

Citation

The authority citation for these

special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g); 40113, 44701,

44702, and 44704; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101;

and 14 CFR 11.28 and 11.49

Adoption of Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the following special

conditions are issued as part of the type

certification basis for the modified

Beechcraft Model E90 airplane:

1. Protection of Electrical and

Electronic Systems from High Intensity

Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system

that performs critical functions must be

designed and installed to ensure that the

operations, and operational capabilities

of these systems to perform critical

functions, are not adversely affected

when the airplane is exposed to high

intensity radiated electromagnetic fields

external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special

conditions, the following definition

applies: Critical Functions: Functions

whose failure would contribute to, or

cause, a failure condition that would

prevent the continued safe flight and

landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on

February 7, 1997.

Michael Gallagher,

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft

Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 97–4354 Filed 2–20–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96–NM–32–AD; Amendment

39–9932; AD 97–04–08]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker

Model F27 Mark 050, 100, 200, 300, 400,

600, and 700 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain Fokker Model F27

Mark 050, 100, 200, 300, 400, 600, and

700 series airplanes, that requires an

ultrasonic inspection to determine if

certain tubes are installed in the drag

stay units of the main landing gear

(MLG), and various follow-on actions.

This amendment is prompted by a

report that, due to fatigue cracking from

an improperly machined radius of the

inner tube, a drag stay broke, and,

consequently, lead to the collapse of the

MLG during landing. The actions

specified by this AD are intended to

prevent such fatigue cracking, which

could result in reduced structural

integrity or collapse of the MLG.

DATES: Effective March 28, 1997.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of March 28,

1997.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Fokker Services B.V., Technical

Support Department, P.O. Box 75047,

1117 ZN Schiphol Airport, The

Netherlands. This information may be

examined at the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket,

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington; or at the Office of the

Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ruth Harder, Aerospace

Engineer,Standardization Branch,

ANM–113, FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056;

telephone (206) 227–1721; fax (206)

227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to

include an airworthiness directive (AD)

that is applicable to certain Fokker

Model F27 Mark 050, 100, 200, 300,

400, 600, and 700 series airplanes was

published in the Federal Register on

October 31, 1996 (61 FR 56170). That

action proposed to require an ultrasonic

inspection to determine if certain tubes

are installed on the DSUs of the MLG,

and various follow-on actions.

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. No

comments were submitted in response

to the proposal or the FAA’s

determination of the cost to the public.

Conclusion

The FAA has determined that air

safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule as proposed.