COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphr eys, McClanahan and Petty Argued at Salem, Virginia

CLEVELAND WAYNLEE SOUTHERS, S/K/A CLEVELAND WAYNELEE SOUTHERS MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1434-05-3 J UDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS DECEMBER 28, 2006 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY Michael S. Irvine, Judge Joshua O. Elrod (Mann, Vita & Elrod, P.L.L.C., on brief), for appellant. Karen Misbach, Assistant Attorn ey General (Rober t F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Appellant Cleveland Waynlee Southers (“Southers ”) appeals four convi ctions of statutory burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-91, and three convictions of grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police. For the reasons that follow, we disagree, and affirm Southers’ convictions.
ANALYSIS Southers contends on appeal, as he did in th e trial court, that hi s confession should be suppressed because (1) it was not made freely and voluntarily, (2) he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his ri ght to counsel, and (3) he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain s ilent. We disagree with Southers ’ first contention, and decline to address the second two.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - On appeal, “[the] appellant carries the burden to show . . . that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth , 17 Va. App. 439, 440, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993) (citing Fore v. Commonwealth , 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980)). “In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress on appeal, we will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the pa rty prevailing below, together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn.” King v. Commonwealth , 39 Va. App. 306, 308, 572 S.E.2d 518, 519 (2002) (citing Dickerson v. Commonwealth , 35 Va. App. 172, 177, 543 S.E.2d 623, 626 (2001)). We review de novo , however, the trial court’s application of defined lega l standards to the particular facts of a case. See Ornelas v. United
States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). I. The Voluntary Nature of the Confession Southers claims that his c onfession was not freely and voluntarily given and should therefore be suppressed. We disagree. “The Commonwealth has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s confession was freely and voluntarily given.” Bottenfield v. Commonwealth , 25 Va. App. 316, 323, 487 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997) (emphasis added). “The test to be applied in determining voluntariness is whet her the statement is the ‘produ ct of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,’ or, on the ot her hand, whether the maker’s will ‘has been overborne and his capacity for self-determi nation critically impaired.’” Stockton v. Commonwealth , 227 Va. 124, 140, 314 S.E.2d 371, 381 (1984) (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). “In determini ng whether an accused’s will has been overborne, courts assess ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 226). This includes the de fendant’s background, experience, mental- 3 - and physical condition, and the conduct of the police. Commonwealth v. Peterson , 15 Va. App. 486, 488, 424 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1992). With regard to police conduct, “coercive . . . activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ” Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). In considering the conduct of the police, we “must consider the interrogation techni ques employed, including evidence of trickery and deceit, psychological pressure, threats or promises of leniency, and duration and circumstances of the in terrogation.” Terrell v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 285, 291, 403 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1991). Regarding juvenile c onfessions specificall y, “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also th at it was not the product of ignoran ce of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). The mere absence of a parent or counsel does not mean the confession was not made voluntarily. See Roberts v. Commonwealth , 18 Va. App. 554, 557, 445 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1994). Instea d, “[t]he absence of a parent or legal counsel is merely a factor to be cons idered, albeit a significant one.” Id. Reviewing the totality of the circumstan ces surrounding Southers’ confession, we cannot conclude that Southers’ arrest, or any of the events that follo wed, caused Southers’ will to be overborne. Prior to taking Sout hers’ statement, Deputy Conner a dvised Southers of his Miranda rights. Neither his mental nor physical c ondition was impaired at the time. Compare Peterson , 15 Va. App. at 488, 424 S.E.2d at 723-24 (defenda nt made incriminating statements while questioned by police in the back of an ambulance, while under the influence of cocaine, in pain and disoriented from injuries received, ha ving breathing problems and chest pains, and connected to a heart monitor). Although Southers was handcuffed, this alone is insufficient to amount to coercive conditions. See United States v. Cardwell , 433 F.3d 378, 390 n.4 (4th Cir.- 4 - 2005) (holding that being handcuffed for two hours in the front seat of a police car does not amount to oppressive conditions). Southers was not denied any other physical comforts, mistreated, or threatened. Compare Beecher v. Alabama , 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967) (statement obtained after police held a gun to suspect’s head). Likewise, Southers was not intimidated or deceived by Conner, or anyone else, before he made the statement. Compare Leyra v. Denno , 347 U.S. 556, 559-61 (1954) (statement obtained af ter suspect spent hours with psychiatrist trained in hypnosis, while suspect believed the doctor was a gene ral practitioner). Southers’ behavior at the sher iff’s department further shows that he made his statement both freely and voluntarily. Southers agreed to come to the sher iff’s department on the condition that Deputy Burgdorff came as well. Southers said he would only spea k to Burgdorff, and he asked to speak to his brother before he made a statement about the allege d burglaries. During his testimony, Southers even admitted how he had to ta lk his brother into admitting his involvement with the four burglaries and how they “picked” the four burglaries from the list. Moreover, Conner did not make any promises of leniency to Southers, other than telling him that his cooperation could help him in the end. 1 Although Southers asked where his mother was, there is nothing in the record that indica tes he requested her presence. Southers was very young and not well-educated at the time, but indicated he unde rstood his rights at th e suppression hearing. Initially, when the sheriff’s deputies executed th e search warrant on Southers’ home, officers in body armor surrounded Southers with their weapons drawn, but this was no longer the situation when Southers confessed at the sheriff’s department. Despite his age and the absence of his mo ther, the overall conditions Southers was subjected to when he made his confession fa il to support Southers’ claim of coercion, the

1 Southers testified that the de puties told him he would “go home that day” if he gave a confession, but Conner denies this . Viewing the evidence most favorably to the Commonwealth, we disregard Southers’ testimony on this subject.- 5 - “necessary predicate to the finding that a confessi on is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Four teenth Amendmen t.” Connelly , 479 U.S. at 167. The record supports the trial court’s decisi on that the confession was voluntary, and we therefore affirm its decision. II. The Waiver of the Right to Counsel and the Right Agains t Self-Incrimination Southers also argues that his confession is inadmissible because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Southers, however, cites no authority or principles of law in suppor t of either of these arguments. “‘Statements unsupported by argument, authorit y, or citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration.’” Budnick v. Budnick , 42 Va. App. 823, 833, 595 S.E.2d 50, 55 (2004) (quoting Roberts v. Roberts , 41 Va. App. 513, 527, 586 S.E.2d 290, 297 (2003)); see Rule 5A:20(e) (requiring appellants to brief the “p rinciples of law, the argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented”). Because Southers has presented no authority or citations in suppor t of these arguments, Southers has waived these arguments on appeal . Thus, we decline to address them. See Rule 5A:20(e).
CONCLUSION Because Southers’ encounter with the police was not coercive, we hold that his confession was given voluntaril y. Moreover, because Southers’ remaining arguments are procedurally defaulted, we do not address them. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision denying Southers’ motion to suppress. Affirmed.