UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Before the

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

Public Comment Forum 

In the Matter of

Tentative Agreements among ICANN, the U.S. Department

of Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc. 

Comment of the

Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the

Federal Trade Commission*

October 29, 1999 

Inquires regarding this comment may be directed to 

Bureau of Consumer Protection staff attorney 

Michael Donohue, (202) 326-3563, mdonohue@ftc.gov

I. Introduction

The staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC 

or Commission) welcomes this opportunity to comment on the recently negotiated 

agreements (Tentative Agreements) among the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 

and Numbers (ICANN), the U.S. Department of Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc. 

The focus of this comment is the need for registrars to exercise greater vigilance in 

requiring accurate contact information from domain name registrants in .com, .net., and 

.org domains.(1) We support those measures contained in the Tentative Agreements which 

are aimed at improving the accuracy of registration contact information, and offer two 

suggestions for closing possible loopholes in those measures. The first recommends 

domain name suspension in situations where a registrar is unable to obtain accurate 

contact information after a reasonable investigation. The second encourages ICANN to 

avoid delay in adopting a policy requiring registrars to implement reasonable verification 

procedures. 

The FTC is an independent agency charged with protecting consumers and promoting a 
competitive marketplace. The cornerstone of the Commission's mandate is Section 5 of 

the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition and 

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.(2) Since 1994, the FTC has 

used this authority to bring over 100 Internet-related cases, obtaining orders for over $80 

million in consumer redress and injunctions prohibiting future illegal conduct.(3) Many of 

the Commission's Internet cases have involved traditional scams which migrated online - 

e.g., pyramid schemes, miracle health cures, and credit repair scams - and an increasing 

number involve the use of new technology in devious ways to injure consumers.(4)

Whether traditional or high-tech, scams on the Internet can appear suddenly, spread 

rapidly, and disappear just as quickly. The challenge for law enforcement is to identify 

and stop the wrongdoers that harm consumers and undermine overall confidence in the 

burgeoning global online marketplace. 

Although the Internet can be used to facilitate fraudulent practices, it has also become an 

increasingly valuable tool in the effort to stop such practices.(5) For example, the 

Commission maintains a large consumer fraud database, Consumer Sentinel, which it 

makes available to law enforcement officials in the U.S. and Canada via a secure Web 

site. Similarly, e-mail and other forms of electronic communication have enhanced the 

Commission's ability to coordinate its efforts with law enforcement partners around the 

world. FTC investigators also make active use of the myriad information sources available 

on the Web. Particularly useful is the Whois database of registration information about the 

operators of Web sites.(6) When its registration data are accurate, Whois can help law 

enforcers quickly identify actors responsible for online fraud.(7) 

II. The Need for Registrars to Obtain Accurate and Reliable Contact Information 

from Domain Name Registrants

For law enforcers working to prevent Internet fraud, the problem of false domain name 

registration information has become an impediment to effectively identifying law 

violators. When accurate, the registration information publicly available on the Whois

database provides an important tool for tracking down the operators of Web sites violating 

the law. Commission investigations are increasingly being hampered, however, by 

registration information that is not only false, but sometimes clearly false on its face.(8) 

A. Noteworthy Measures in the Accreditation Agreement 

With encouragement from stakeholders in the intellectual property arena,(9) ICANN has 

attempted to improve the quality of information in the Whois database. As law enforcers, 

we support the use of the proposed Registrar Accreditation Agreement (Accreditation 

Agreement) to elicit a more active role for registrars in ensuring that the Whois database 

contains accurate contact information.(10)

Several measures contained in the Accreditation Agreement are particularly noteworthy. 

One essential provision, paragraph II(J)(7), requires a registrar to collect contact 

information in a number of categories from an applicant for a domain name, and specifies 

that the applicant's willful failure to provide accurate information may result in the 
termination of the registration. From a law enforcement perspective, the most critical 

information gathered is the name and physical address of the domain name holder, which 

is necessary to identify an alleged wrongdoer and facilitate service of process.(11) 

Another measure we support is the proposal in paragraph II(J)(4) that a registrar obtain 

payment of registration fees prior to activating the domain name registration. Despite the 

contractual obligation to submit accurate contact information, unscrupulous applicants 

may persist in providing false contact details. Indeed, certain bad actors may register with 

no intention of paying, seeking only a free, short-lived domain name to defraud 

consumers. Requiring prepayment would discourage such practices. Additionally, 

registrars can use payment information obtained during the registration process to validate 

the accuracy of the contact information if necessary. 

Commission staff also supports the requirement in paragraph II(F)(1) of the Accreditation 

Agreement that a registrar make publicly available the essential contact information in 

real-time. This measure will assist law enforcers in efficiently identifying wrongdoers. 

The critical factor here is speed. Although the Commission has a number of investigatory 

tools at its disposal, including compulsory process, the context of quick-disappearing 

Internet frauds makes it necessary to obtain rapidly the basic identifying information 

about the operator of a Web site.

We also welcome the measure in the Accreditation Agreement aimed at ensuring that a 

registrar take reasonable steps to investigate complaints that the contact information for a 

registrant is inaccurate. Paragraph II(J)(8) provides that if a registrar is notified of an 

inaccuracy in the registration information, it shall "take reasonable steps to investigate 

that claimed inaccuracy." It further provides that: "In the event Registrar learns of 

inaccurate contact information associated with [a registrant], it shall take reasonable steps 

to correct that inaccuracy." These provisions recognize the need for registrars to play a 

more active role in ensuring accurate contact information. 

B. Suggested Improvements to the Accreditation Agreement

Although the measures highlighted above will help, they may not go far enough. The 

Accreditation Agreement would be strengthened if it required that registrars, if they are 

unable to obtain accurate information after having conducted an investigation and after 

having given the registrant a reasonable opportunity to cure inaccuracies, suspend 

registration for commercial sites until accurate contact information is obtained. Paragraph 

II(J)(7)(a) already establishes that (1) the willful provision of inaccurate or unreliable 

contact information or (2) the failure of a registrant to respond within 15 days to an 

inquiry by the registrar about the accuracy of contact details constitutes a material breach 

of contract and basis for cancellation. Further, paragraph II(J)(8) already requires a 

registrar to investigate reports of false information and take reasonable steps to correct 

that information. However, the Accreditation Agreement fails to make the necessary link 

between the investigation provisions and the cancellation provisions. When, after 

reasonable investigation, the registrar is unable to correct the contact information for a 

commercial registrant - whether because the registrant has not responded to the inquiry or 
responded with more inaccurate information - the registrar should be required to suspend 

the registration until accurate information is obtained. 

As currently drafted, cancellation of the registration is left to the registrar's discretion. 

This policy is problematic for two important reasons. First, experience shows that 

registrars have little incentive to suspend a domain name once a registration fee has been 

paid. Without a suspension requirement in place, scam artists would be free to perpetrate 

fraud anonymously. Second, if this measure is discretionary, registrars that adopt relaxed 

policies on accurate contact information may attract businesses seeking anonymity, 

creating havens for bad actors to shield their true identity from law enforcement and 

others. There is no apparent justification, however, for a commercial registrant to falsify 

registration information. Requiring all registrars to suspend commercial registrations until 

accurate information is obtained would help root out fraud from the Internet and bolster 

confidence in the integrity of the DNS.(12) 

Another area in which the Accreditation Agreement could be strengthened concerns the 

requirement in paragraph II(J)(8) that a registrar abide by "any ICANN-adopted policies 

requiring reasonable and commercially practicable (a) verification, at the time of 

registration, of contact information associated with an SLD registration sponsored by 

Registrar or (b) periodic re-verification of such information." It does not appear that 

ICANN presently has such a policy in place. If not, we encourage ICANN to avoid delay 

in adopting a policy requiring registrars to implement reasonable verification measures. 

Even modest up-front verification procedures could help weed out blank or incomplete 

registration forms, as well as some of the obviously false information which undermines 

the integrity of the Whois database. In calling only for "reasonable and commercially 

practicable" efforts ICANN would infuse the flexibility needed to ensure that this 

requirement does not unreasonably constrain the high-volume operations of a registrar. 

III. Conclusion

The Accreditation Agreement, especially if modified as suggested above, should improve 

the information gathering practices of registrars and the quality of the Whois database, 

thereby aiding law enforcement in preventing Internet fraud. We appreciate the efforts 

made by ICANN to engage public debate on the issues raised in the Tentative 

Agreements. Open dialogue among all stakeholders will encourage the consensus and 

cooperation upon which the smooth operation of the DNS depends. As law enforcers 

continue their efforts to protect consumers online, new issues concerning the operations of 

the DNS will no doubt appear.(13) The Commission looks forward to a continued a 

dialogue with other stakeholders over the best means of resolving such issues. 

Endnotes

(*) This comment represents the views of the staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection 

of the Federal Trade Commission. They are not necessarily the views of the Federal Trade 
Commission or any individual Commissioner.

1. The importance of accurate contact information was noted in a comment submitted by 

Commission staff in 1998 to the National Telecommunications and Information 

Administration on its proposal to privatize the DNS. The comment is available on the 

Commission's Web site: www.ftc.gov/be/v980005.htm. 

2. 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. The Commission has responsibilities under 40 additional 

statutes, e.g., the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et 

seq., which prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection with the 

collection and use of personally identifiable information from and about children on the 

Internet. See www.ftc.gov/ogc/coppa1.pdf. The Commission also enforces over 30 rules 

governing specific industries and practices, e.g., the Mail and Telephone Order 

Merchandise Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 435, which covers purchases made over the Internet 

and spells out the ground rules for making promises about shipments, notifying consumers 

about unexpected delays, and refunding consumers' money. See

www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_99/16cfr435_99.html. 

3. A list of these cases is posted at www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9909/case92199.pdf. 

4. For example, in FTC v. Audiotex Connection, Inc., CV-97-0726 (E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 

13, 1997) the Commission alleged that consumers who visited defendants' sites were 

solicited to download a "viewer" program in order to obtain "free" online images. Once 

downloaded and executed, the program disconnected the computer from the consumer's 

own access provider, turned off the consumer's modem speakers, dialed an international 

telephone number and reconnected the computer to a remote site. The international call 

was charged to consumers at more than $2 per minute, and charges kept accruing until the 

consumer shut down his computer entirely. Pursuant to settlements entered in this case 

and a companion case, 27,000 consumers received $2.14 million in redress. See

www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9711/audiot-2.htm. 

5. The Internet also has enhanced the Commission's consumer and business education 

initiatives. For example, the Commission's Web site, www.ftc.gov, houses a large number 

of electronic brochures for both consumers and business. Through the use of "teaser" Web 

pages, the Commission warns consumers not to get duped by Web-based scams. FTC Surf 

Days result in the sending of an e-mail message containing an educational message to 

businesses. See, e.g., www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9906/coupon2.htm. 

6. The importance of accurate domain name registration information goes beyond the 

need to identify fraud operators. Because some online businesses do not provide sufficient 

identifying information on their Web sites, Whois information can provide consumers 

with a useful supplement to the Web site disclosures. 

7. Apart from its utility as a tool for information gathering and communication, the 

Internet - actually the DNS itself - offers a mechanism for bringing Web sites permeated 

by fraud to a rapid halt. Indeed, in a recent FTC enforcement action the Court ordered that 
several domain name registrations be suspended by the registrar pending trial, effectively 

stopping the injurious practices. FTC v. Pereira, CV-99-1367-A (E.D.Va. filed Sept. 14, 

1999)(Preliminary Injunction entered Sept. 21, 1999). See

www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9909/index.htm#22. 

8. For example, Whois information for "taboosisters.com," (a Web site targeted in FTC v. 

Pereira) indicated that the domain name was registered by "Kewl" Photographies at "4 

Skin" Street in Amsterdam, with "Amanda Hugandkiss" designated as the administrative 

contact. In another Commission action, FTC v. J.K. Publications, Inc.,Civ. No. 99-000-

44ABC (AJWx) (C.D. Cal.), a query of the Whois database for a Web site operated by the 

defendants provided a street address of "here there, ca 10001" for the administrative and 

technical contacts. These examples do not appear to be isolated incidents. A recent 

sampling of Whois queries turned up a number of domain names with facially false 

address information registered to "hacker," "FBI," "Bill Clinton," "Mickey Mouse," and 

"God." 

9. Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process (April 30, 1999). See 

http://wipo2.wipo.int/process/eng/final_report.html. 

10. The Commission's interest in these issues is limited to improving the quality of 

contact information for those intending commercial uses. Many individuals use the 

Internet for non-commercial purposes and some of these users may have a legitimate need 

to protect their anonymity. 

11. The additional contact details required for the administrative and technical contacts 

(telephone number, email address, and, if applicable, fax number) should also be of 

assistance in establishing contact with Web site operators.

12. The Commission recognizes that the proposed measures are not a cure-all. They 

would not, for example, limit in any way the ability of a registrant who has had a domain 

name terminated to register new domain names. 

13. One such issue might involve compliance by registrars with foreign court orders. 

Injury caused by fraudulent Web sites registered in one country may extend beyond that 

country. Registrars are uniquely poised to stop such injury by terminating registration 

when Web sites are found to be permeated by fraud. See, e.g., FTC v. Pereira, supra note 

7. Given the global nature of the Internet and the increasing geographic diversity among 

registrars, court orders requiring registration termination may be issued outside the 

registrar's country. Compliance by registrars in such situations might be one subject for 

further discussion.