7638 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs

Administration

49 CFR Part 171

[Docket No. RSPA–97–2133 (HM–225)]

RIN 2137–AC97

Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank

Motor Vehicles in Liquefied

Compressed Gas Service; Interim Final

Rule

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs

Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Emergency Interim final rule

and announcement of a public meeting.

SUMMARY: In this interim final rule,

RSPA is amending the Hazardous

Materials Regulations (HMR) to specify

the conditions under which certain

cargo tank motor vehicles may continue

to be used on an interim basis, even if

they are equipped with emergency

discharge control systems which may

not function as required by the

regulations under all operating

conditions. This rule addresses

specification MC 330, MC 331, and

certain non-specification cargo tank

motor vehicles which are used to

deliver propane and other liquefied

compressed gases. It responds to a

recently discovered safety deficiency

which may affect many of these cargo

tank motor vehicles. The intended effect

of this action is to ensure, on an interim

basis, an acceptable level of safety for

delivery of liquefied compressed gases

while a permanent solution to the

problem is developed and implemented.

During the term of this interim rule,

RSPA is seeking comments and data on

the costs and effectiveness of alternative

means of achieving a level of safety for

the long term comparable to that

provided by its long-standing

regulation. At the same time, the

Agency is also seeking comments on the

costs and benefits of the interim

measures adopted in this rule.

A public meeting is scheduled for

March 20, 1997, to receive comments

and recommendations in regard to the

measures adopted in this interim final

rule and to solicit recommendations for

a permanent solution. Additionally, two

workshops have been scheduled for

March 4–5, 1997 and April 8–9, 1997.

All interested persons, including trade

organizations, cargo tank producers,

individual wholesale and retail entities

involved in the distribution of liquefied

compressed gases and representatives of

public protection organizations, are

encouraged to participate.

DATES: Effective date: This interim final

rule is effective February 19, 1997

through August 15, 1997.

Comment date: Comments must be

received by April 21, 1997.

Public meeting: A public meeting will

be held on Wednesday, March 20, 1997,

from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in

Washington, D.C.

Workshops: Workshops will be held

on—March 4–5, 1997, and April 8–9,

1997, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in

Washington, D.C.

Oral presentations: Any person

wishing to present an oral statement at

the public meeting should notify

Jennifer Karim by telephone or in

writing, on or before March 12, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Written comments: Address

comments to the Dockets Office, U.S.

Department of Transportation, Room

PL–401, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, D.C. 20590–0001.

Comments should identify the docket

number and be submitted in two copies.

Persons wishing to receive confirmation

of receipt of their comments should

include a self-addressed, stamped

postcard. The Dockets Office is located

on the Plaza Level of the Nassif Building

at the Department of Transportation at

the above address. Public dockets may

be reviewed there between the hours of

10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Public meeting: The public meeting

will be held at the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) Auditorium, 800

Independence Avenue, SW,

Washington, D.C. 20591.

Workshops: (1) March 4–5, 1997, U.S.

Department of Transportation (Room

6244, Nassif Building), 400 Seventh

Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590; (2)

April 8–9, 1997, U.S. Department of

Transportation (Room 6200, Nassif

Building), 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, D.C. 20590.

Oral presentations: Submit written

text of oral statement to Jennifer Karim,

U.S. Department of Transportation,

Room 8100, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590. Five copies of

written text of oral statements should be

presented to RSPA staff immediately

prior to the oral presentation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ronald Kirkpatrick, Office of Hazardous

Materials Technology, Research and

Special Programs Administration,

telephone (202) 366–4545, or Stephen

Keppler, Office of Motor Carrier Safety

and Technology, Safety and Hazardous

Materials Division, Federal Highway

Administration, telephone (202) 366–

2978, U.S. Department of

Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

telephones 20590–0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

On September 8, 1996, more than

35,000 gallons of propane were released

during a delivery at a bulk storage

facility in Sanford, North Carolina.

During the unloading of a specification

MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicle into

two 30,000-gallon storage tanks, the

discharge hose from the cargo tank

separated at its hose coupling at the

storage tank inlet connection. Most of

the cargo tank’s 9,800 gallons and more

than 30,000 gallons from the storage

tanks were released during this

incident. If this large quantity of

propane had reached an ignition source,

125 people (workers, residents and

emergency responders) could have been

killed.

The hazards associated with

transportation of liquefied petroleum

gas have been demonstrated repeatedly

on U.S. highways. In fact, propane

releases are the second leading cause of

death in hazardous materials

transportation. Between 1990 and 1991,

five reported deaths and 695 injuries

resulted from propane incidents in

highway transportation. For example,

when liquid propane is released into the

atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into its

normal non-pressurized gaseous form.

This happens very rapidly, and in the

process, the propane combines readily

with air to form fuel-air mixtures which

are ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5

percent by volume. If an ignition source

is present in the vicinity of such highly

flammable mixtures, the vapor cloud

ignites and burns very rapidly

(characterized by some experts as

‘‘explosively’’). This has occurred a

number of times over the years, and

even though the incidents described

below were not caused by spills during

lading transfer, they illustrate the grave

consequences of a large propane release

when ignition occurs:

• On July 25, 1962 in Berlin, NY, an

MC 330 bulk transport ruptured

releasing about 6,900 gallons of liquid

propane. Ignition occurred. Ten persons

were killed, and 17 others were injured.

Property damage included total

destruction of 18 buildings and 11

vehicles.

• On March 9, 1972 near Lynchburg,

VA, an MC 331 bulk transport

overturned and slid into a rock

embankment. The impact ruptured the

tank’s shell releasing about 4,000

gallons of liquid propane. Ignition

occurred. Two persons were killed and

five others were injured. Property

damage included a farmhouse,

outbuildings and about 12 acres of

woodland.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations 7639

• On April 29, 1975, near Eagle Pass,

Texas, an MC–330 bulk transport struck

a concrete headwall and ruptured

releasing more than 8,000 gallons of

liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing

fire and explosion killed 16 persons,

injured 51, and destroyed 51 vehicles.

• On February 22, 1973, 23 tank cars

derailed in Waverly, Tennessee. During

wreck-clearing operations, a 30,000-

gallon tank car containing liquefied

petroleum gas ruptured. The ensuing

fire and explosion killed 16 persons,

injured 43, and caused $1.8 million in

property damage.

• On December 23, 1988, in

Memphis, Tennessee, an MC–330 bulk

transport struck a bridge abutment and

ruptured releasing 9388 gallons of

liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing

fire and explosion killed eight persons

and injured eight.

• On July 27, 1994, in White Plains,

New York, an MC–331 bulk transport

struck a column of an overpass and

ruptured, releasing 9,200 gallons of

propane. Ignition occurred. The driver

was killed, 23 people were injured, and

an area within a radius of approximately

400 feet was engulfed in fire.

In the Sanford incident, the driver

became aware of the system failure

when the hose began to violently

oscillate while releasing liquid propane.

He immediately shut down the engine,

stopping the discharge pump, but he

could not access the remote closure

control to close the internal stop valve.

The excess flow feature of the

emergency discharge control system did

not function, and propane continued to

be released from the system.

Additionally, the back flow check valve

on the storage tank system did not

function and propane was released from

the storage tanks. In light of the large

quantity of propane released, this

incident could have resulted in a

catastrophic loss of life and extensive

property damage if the gas had reached

an ignition source. Fortunately, there

was no fire.

Based on the preliminary information

from the Sanford incident, RSPA

published an advisory notice in the

Federal Register on December 13, 1996

(61 FR 65480). This notice alerted

persons involved in the design,

manufacture, assembly, maintenance or

transportation of hazardous materials in

MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank motor

vehicles of this problem with the excess

flow feature of the emergency discharge

control systems and reminded them that

these tanks and their components must

conform to the Hazardous Materials

Regulations (49 CFR Parts 171–180;

HMR). Since that time, RSPA has

received applications for emergency

exemptions from both the National

Propane Gas Association (NPGA) and

the Mississippi Tank Company that

indicate the problem is more extensive

than originally believed. Additionally,

The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) and

National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.

(NTTC) have submitted applications to

become party to these exemptions. In

support of its exemption application the

Mississippi Tank Company, a

manufacturer of specification MC 331

cargo tank motor vehicles, has provided

preliminary information that there is

reason to suspect the problem may be

common to nearly all cargo tank motor

vehicles used in liquefied compressed

gas service within the United States.

This problem may exist also in the nonspecification cargo tanks authorized in

§ 173.315(k). Both applications for

exemption are reprinted in their entirety

and discussed in detail below.

II. National Propane Gas Association

Application for Emergency Exemption

The body of NPGA’s application for

exemption is reproduced as follows

(numbers in brackets have been added

for ease of reference in the following

discussion):

[1] The National Propane Gas Association

(NPGA), acting as an agent for its members,

presents here an application for a DOT

Exemption to the Hazardous Materials

Regulations (HMR) to permit the continued

operation of certain cargo tank motor

vehicles in propane service pending

development and installation of equipment

intended to overcome an operational

difficulty identified recently. The

Association also requests that this

application be handled as an emergency

exemption under the procedures outlined in

49 CFR 107.113. Upon issuance of this

emergency exemption, NPGA will submit a

second request to convert the emergency

exemption to a conventional exemption.

[2] NPGA is the national trade association

of the LP-gas (principally propane) industry

with a membership of about 3,500

companies, including 37 affiliated state and

regional associations, representing members

in all 50 states. Although the single largest

group of NPGA members are retail marketers

of propane gas, the membership also includes

propane producers, transporters and

wholesalers, as well as manufacturers and

distributors of associated equipment,

containers and appliances. Propane gas is

used in over 18 million installations

nationwide for home and commercial heating

and cooking, in agriculture, in industrial

processing, and as a clean air alternative

engine fuel for both over-the-road vehicles

and industrial lift trucks.

[3] On September 8, 1996, a cargo tank

motor vehicle, of the type in the industry

known as a highway transport—a large cargo

tank semi-trailer pulled by a highway truck

tractor—was unloading a cargo of propane

into permanent storage tanks at a propane

marketing facility in Sanford, North Carolina.

Shortly after the transfer operation began, the

transfer hose separated from the transfer

connection at its juncture with the plant

piping and began discharging liquid propane

to the atmosphere. The vehicle driver heard

sounds unusual for a transfer operation and

shut off the vehicle engine. According to the

report of the Federal Highway

Administration inspector, the driver was not

able to get to the remote controls to close the

internal stop flow valve. The driver then ran

to an adjacent residential area to warn

residents to immediately evacuate the area.

As will be discussed later in this letter, the

excess flow protection in the cargo tank did

not activate and the entire propane cargo was

discharged to the atmosphere.

[4] Likewise, emergency flow protection in

the plant piping did not activate

automatically as designed and intended. As

a result, the entire contents of the storage

facility—something in excess of 35,000

gallons of propane—was also discharged to

the atmosphere. While the emergency flow

control system on the transport is subject to

the HMR, the storage tank system is subject

to regulations of the State of North Carolina.

Investigation of that segment of the incident

is being handled as a separate matter. The

purpose of this letter is to discuss the

transport system, applicable regulations and

what can be done to prevent such an incident

from recurring.

[5] Mr. Samuel E. McTier, NPGA President,

has appointed a special task force to work

directly under the NPGA Executive

Committee to determine the extent and

nature of the underlying causes of this

incident. The task force was directed to study

this incident and develop two plans of

action: First, how to provide for continued

safe operation of existing propane cargo tanks

while necessary changes are developed and

put into place [including those cargo tanks to

be built during this transition period], and

second, how to correct safety and operational

problems for the long term through changes

to the MC–331 specification, if necessary,

and to industry recommended safety and

operating practices to preclude such an

incident from happening again. This task

force first met December 12–13, 1996 in

Atlanta, Georgia. The enclosed

recommendations and accompanying

comments are based on their deliberations.

[6] NPGA understands that Mississippi

Tank Company has already submitted an

application for an emergency exemption and

supports the technical discussions in that

application as a succinct presentation of the

overall problem. In the time that has passed

since that application was filed with DOT,

however, additional information has become

available. As a consequence, while much of

the Mississippi Tank information has been

incorporated into this application, there are

certain significant differences between the

NPGA application and the Mississippi tank

document.

[7] It is important to recognize that the

situation described in the Mississippi Tank

application is not unique to that company.

Rather, that situation can reasonably be

expected to occur with propane transports

from other assemblers.
7640 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations

[8] In the smaller propane cargo tank motor

vehicles (typically smaller than 3,500 gallons

water capacity, called bobtails), the cargo

tank is mounted directly on the vehicle

chassis. These vehicles have a somewhat

different piping arrangement than that used

on transports. Consequently, on preliminary

review, bobtails do not appear to have the

same operating characteristics as transports.

As a result, the first priority of this NPGA

special task force has been directed at the

transports; once the situation with the

transports has been brought under control for

the short term, the task force will

immediately make similar investigations and

studies of the bobtail vehicles.

[9] NPGA is gravely concerned about the

underlying causes of the North Carolina

incident and is committed to identifying and

implementing appropriate changes to

industry recommended safety and operating

practices and to the HMR requirements to

preclude such an incident occurring again.

[10] The propane industry transports

between 7 and 10 billion gallons annually in

these highway transports; that same volume

is transported again in these local delivery

bobtail tank trucks. In the past 10 years, there

has not been a similar reported incident

during the unloading of a transport.

According to DOT’s information, some 8 or

10 events have occurred unloading bobtails.

That incident rate works out to be less than

one per year.

[11] The propane industry is committed to

prompt correction of any problems or

concerns that are identified with DOT by this

special task force as part of our continuing

desire and goal to continue that safety record.

We also believe that the current incident

experience record is testimony to the validity

and effectiveness of the safety and operating

systems presently in use for transportation of

propane, both in the Hazardous Materials

Regulations and in industry safety and

operating practices.

The Difficulty

[12] 49 CFR 178.337–11(a)(1)(i) requires

each internal self-closing stop valve and

excess flow valve to automatically close if

any of its attachments are sheared off or if

any attached hose or piping is separated. 49

CFR 178.337–11(a)(1)(v) expands on the

requirements for properly sizing excess flow

valves regarding branching or other

restrictions and the addition of additional

smaller capacity excess flow valves, where

required.

[13] Mississippi Tank Company recently

conducted tests in an effort to determine why

the excess flow feature of the internal valve

in the transport cargo tank outlet flange in

the Sanford, North Carolina incident did not

function as intended by the MC–331

specification requirements. The Mississippi

Tank tests clearly show that the internal stop

flow valves available for use with flange

mounted pumps will not always close

automatically under conditions simulating

the situation where the hoses or piping might

be sheared off or separated from the pump.

Mississippi Tank has also determined that

there are no such internal valves presently

available that will provide the protection

required by §§ 178.337–11 (a)(1)(i) and

(a)(1)(v).

[14] Principal among the conclusions

reached from the Mississippi Tank tests is

that the internal valve equipped with the 400

gpm spring (which operates the excess flow

feature to provide automatic closure) would

close dependably with tank pressures as low

as 65 psig but that the excess flow feature

would not operate at tank pressures lower

than 65 psig.

Rather than repeat the discussion of the

test results in the Mississippi Tank

application, in the interests of brevity, we

refer you to that application.

Solutions to the Situation—Long Term

[15] From the Mississippi Tank tests and

from discussions with the manufacturers of

the cargo tank pumps and the internal valves,

NPGA has concluded that the second and

third sentences of § 178.337–11(a)(1)(v) are

self-conflicting and mutually exclusive.

Based on present technology and equipment,

it simply is not possible to comply with both

provisions.

[16] When this provision was reworded in

the HM–183 amendments, industry review of

the new provisions indicated that there

would be no problem in complying with the

requirement. The revised wording was

accepted at face value merely as a rewording

of the provisions that existed at that time in

the MC–331 specification prior to the

amendments. At the time, all of the vehicle

assemblers believed that their individual

practices for compliance with the

specification requirements were appropriate

and adequate to the need. However, the

studies and discussions undertaken as a

consequence of this North Carolina incident

have demonstrated, and have been confirmed

by the Mississippi Tank tests, that there is a

basic conflict in the provisions contained in

these two sentences in § 178.337–11(a)(1)(v).

[17] It is now clear that excess flow

protection, whether when incorporated into

the discharge internal valve or as an in-line

device, will not function under all climatic

conditions nor under other low flow rate

conditions. In recognition of the preliminary

conclusion that excess flow devices will not

always operate as intended or desired, the

NPGA special task force has concluded that

new control and operating systems must be

developed to provide the desired level of

reliability and emergency flow control during

unloading operations. Devising these new

systems is the next priority for the special

task force appointed by President McTier.

[18] The task force will also review control

systems and operating procedures for loading

operations to be sure that the desired level

of emergency flow control will also be

available in that operation as well. The

loading operations aspect of this project, has

been assigned a second level of priority,

since there have not been any reported

incidents during those operations.

[19] The special task force already has

identified several possible alternatives for

emergency flow control during transport

unloading for consideration as permanent

changes to industry recommended safety and

operation practices or for adoption as

regulatory provisions. These possible

solutions include:

• A pneumatic deadman device

interlocked with the internal stop flow valve

and the tank truck brakes, possibly combined

with a lanyard for remote activation. Possibly

applicable to bobtails as well.

Note: The term ‘‘deadman’’ is used to

identify a system that must be in place and

operable in order for the unloading system to

operate. If the shut-down mechanism of the

system is activated for any reason, the

unloading operation is discontinued and the

internal stop flow valve closes.

• A mechanical deadman device, possibly

combined with a lanyard for remote

activation. Possibly applicable to bobtails as

well.

• A differential valve downstream of the

pump. If the engine is shut down, the setpressure differential is detected and stops the

flow of propane. This system would only

protect piping downstream of the differential

valve. Applicable to bobtails as well.

[20] Amendment of § 173.33 will also be

needed to apply this improved level of safety

on a permanent basis to the continued

operation of existing MC–330 and MC–331

propane tank trucks and the nonspecification cargo tanks operated under

§ 173.315(k).

[21] The special task force will also study

provisions for allowance of the physical and

chemical properties of the lading in

designing the emergency flow protection

system required by the MC–331 specification.

Such provisions are not presently a directlymentioned provision in the specification.

The preliminary analyses conducted by the

special NPGA task force indicate that such

considerations are of primary importance. As

an example, while NPGA has every

confidence in the results of the excess flow

valve capacity tests conducted by Mississippi

Tank Company, which used water under

pneumatic tank pressure as the test medium,

we also now know that those tests only

approximate the performance of the same

equipment when handling propane in a

general manner. Sufficient data and other

information is not presently available to

satisfactorily model the performance of that

equipment in water flow to satisfactorily

predict the manner in which the same

equipment would perform when handling

propane, or any other liquefied compressed

gas, for that matter.

Solutions to the Situation—Short Term

[22] Responding to the long term need for

a new control system is the ultimate goal for

the NPGA special task force. Part of that

mission includes presentation of appropriate

recommendations to DOT for further

consideration and adoption as amendments

to the MC–331 specification for new

construction and to § 173.33 to provide for

the continued operation of existing cargo

tanks.

[23] However, the immediate problem is

how to provide for the continued operation

of (1) existing MC–330 and MC–331 cargo

tank motor vehicles in propane service, (2)

the non-specification vehicles authorized

under § 173.315(k) of the HMR, and (3) any

new vehicles built in the interim period

pending formal amendment of the HMR.

Also, provisions must be made in this

continued operation aspect for the annual

leakage test and external inspection and for
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations 7641

the five-year requalification requirements of

the HMR for these vehicles.

[24] As an agent for the members of the

Association, NPGA now submits an

application for a DOT Exemption. For

reasons set forth below, NPGA also

recommends that this application be handled

under the provisions for emergency

exemptions (Ref: § 107.113). Following

DOT’s approval of such an exemption, NPGA

will promptly submit an application to

convert that emergency exemption to a

conventional exemption. Such a combination

of Exemptions would provide two things:

(1) authorization for the continued

operation of existing cargo tank motor

vehicles in propane service in the interim to

the adoption of appropriate regulatory

provisions to correct these technical and

operational difficulties and (2) for the

conditional operation (including annual tests

and inspections and the five-year

requalification) of any cargo tank motor

vehicles built under the present regulations

pending adoption of said amendments. Given

the exceptional safety record discussed

earlier for both transports and bobtails,

NPGA believes that the following provisions

for the proposed Exemption will continue

this safety record while the relevant changes

to industry safety and operating practices and

any changes to the Hazardous Materials

Regulations are developed and put into

place.

[25] NPGA is not advocating removal of

§§ 178.337–11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v) at the

present time. Rather, we believe that further

information is needed as to the nature and

extent of changes to be considered for the

MC–331 specification before any proposed

changes are considered for the Hazardous

Materials Regulations.

[26] NPGA recognizes the importance of

prompt and expedient action in developing

recommended changes to industry safety and

operating practices and provisions of the

Hazardous Materials Regulations to improve

present the respective provisions for

emergency flow control. To that end, NPGA

will present a time plan with respective

completion points for identification,

development, testing and implementation of

retrofits and the presentation of proposed

changes to the Hazardous Materials

Regulations to DOT by February 17, 1997.

Furthermore, NPGA representatives will be

in frequent contact with RSPA/Office of

Hazardous Materials Safety and FHWA/

Office of Motor Carrier Safety staff in a

liaison capacity regarding the deliberation so

this NPGA special task force and will present

formal quarterly progress reports at

appropriate liaison meetings.

[27] Provisions of the Exemption:

1. Compliance with applicable provisions

of the Hazardous Materials Regulations, with

the exception of §§ 173.315(n), 178.337–

11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v).

2. NPGA will contact all of its members

operating or assembling propane cargo tank

motor vehicles and will work with industry

trade press and other resources to reach

affected non-member companies. The

purpose of this outreach effort will be to

bring the North Carolina incident and

related, identified concerns to the attention

of companies operating or assembling

propane cargo tank motor vehicles.

3. Transfer hose used under the terms of

the exemption (1) will be inspected before

continued use, with particular attention to

the condition and suitability of the hose end

couplings for service and (2) otherwise

comply with applicable provisions of NFPA

58, 1995 edition. New transfer hose

assemblies will be tested as required by

§ 180.407(h)(1)(ii) before the hose assembly is

placed in service.

NFPA 58, 1995 edition designates NFPA 58

Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum

Gases, published by the National Fire

Protection Association, Quincy,

Massachusetts. In its capacity as an American

National Standard, NFPA 58 has been used

as the basis of regulation by virtually all of

the 50 states. A copy of the 1995 edition (the

current edition) is enclosed for your

information and consideration.

4. The vehicle driver will be continually in

attendance and control of the loading and

unloading operations.

5. Drivers will be advised of the events

leading to the December 8, 1996 incident at

Sanford, North Carolina and trained against

the potential of that incident occurring again.

Such training will include the inspection of

delivery hose and connections to be used for

the transfer operation to determine, among

other things, that the hose is suitable for

continued service and that the hose-end

fittings and related connections to plant

piping and tank truck valves are suitable for

service. Driver training as required by

§§ 172.702 and 172.704 will include

recognition of the potential severity of

equipment failure or malfunction during

product transfer and appropriate actions to

be taken should such an event occur. Records

of this training will be included in records

required by § 172.704(d). During the term of

this exemption, a statement signed by the

driver acknowledging such training and

operating instructions will be filed by the

employer in the files required by § 172.704.

6. The proposed exemption would apply to

two types of vehicles: (1) The continued

operation of those cargo tanks already in

service—MC–330 and MC–331 cargo tank

motor vehicles in propane service and nonspecification propane cargo tanks authorized

for continued operation under the provisions

of § 173.315(k) and (2) the entrance into

service of new or remounted vehicles that

will be built or assembled in the interim

period to the adoption of formal regulatory

provisions providing new approaches to

emergency flow control as an alternative to

excess flow valves.

7. The proposed Exemption will authorize

continued assembler and design certification

of new MC–331 cargo tank motor vehicles

and required annual inspection and 5-year

requalification certifications that the subject

vehicle complies with the Hazardous

Materials Regulations, with the exception of

§§ 173.315(n) and 178.337–11(a)(1)(i) and

(a)(1)(v).

Treatment as an Emergency Exemption

[28] In recognition of the provisions of

HMR/§ 107.113(a), a copy of this request for

Emergency Exemption is being filed

concurrently with the Chief, Hazardous

Materials and Safety Division, Office of

Safety and Technology, Federal Highway

Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590–

0001.

[29] The propane industry is in the midst

of the winter heating season. Over 80 percent

of the 7–9 billion gallons of propane

referenced at the beginning of this letter is

used as a residential heating fuel in rural

locations where natural gas service is not

available. Virtually all of these cargo tank

motor vehicles—highway transports and

bobtails alike—are needed to provide timely

and adequate delivery of this heating fuel. In

addition to residential heating fuel, the

industry also provides heating fuel to dairy

barns, chicken and hog brooders, peak

shaving for natural gas utilities. In addition,

propane is also widely used as an alternative

engine fuel.

[30] There is another aspect of the need for

expedient action in the approval and

implementation of this exemption—financial

impact on the propane marketers, propane

producers, common carriers, vehicle

assemblers and equipment manufacturers.

• propane marketers—Unless they are able

to deliver fuel, these companies literally will

not be able to continue in business. Of our

3,500 member companies, some 3,200 are

small, independent businesses operating

about 3,400 bulk plants (local retail

facilities). There are another 3,400 bulk

plants operated by 17 multistate marketer

companies. Our members sell over 85% of

the propane used as a residential heating

fuel. Once the propane has been delivered to

a bulk plant by a highway transport, it is

transported again by bobtail cargo tank

vehicles to the ultimate consumer.

• propane producers—Propane heating

fuel has two sources: a co-product of natural

gas production and a by-product of crude

petroleum cracking and refining operations.

• common carriers—Over 90 percent of the

propane used as a heating fuel is transported

first by pipeline and then by highway

transport to the local propane bulk plant.

While some propane marketers have their

own fleet of transport tank trucks, many of

these companies rely on motor common

carriers to deliver their propane supply.

While many of these carriers carry other

materials as well (hazardous as well as nonhazardous), for many carriers, propane

transportation is a very significant part of

their business.

• vehicle assemblers—For some of the

vehicle assemblers, propane cargo tank motor

vehicles (especially bobtails) are a very major

part of their business. The companies

building propane highway transports

typically produce semi-trailer cargo tank

motor vehicles for the transportation of other

hazardous materials as well.

• equipment manufacturers—The

manufacturers of pumps, valves, hose and

the other equipment from which a tank truck

is assembled obviously service other

industries than just propane; at the same

time, supplying the propane industry has

become a rather significant part of their

business.

[31] The ability to be able to operate

propane bobtails and highway transports has
7642 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations

so many impacts and is so pervasive as be

almost incalculable from an economic impact

viewpoint. On the one hand, we believe the

extremely large volume of propane handled

annually (9,000,000,000 gallons) by transport

and then a second time by the bobtails in

local deliveries and the demonstrated safety

record over the history of the industry is

clear testimony to the commitment of this

industry to safety and employee training. On

the other hand, we are committed to

correction of the provisions of § 178.337–11

regarding emergency flow control to address

the problems that have been identified in the

subject incident.

[32] The NPGA special task force believes

it can identify alternative emergency flow

control systems in the very near future.

While several systems are already under

study, no preferences have been established,

nor do we know currently what present or

new equipment will be necessary to

implement any changes. Also, we want to be

reasonably sure that these ‘‘new’’ systems

will indeed operate as intended to provide

the desired level of safety and operation

control under emergency conditions, thus,

actual service tests will be conducted before

widespread installation is undertaken.

[33] Consequently, there is an extreme and

vital need to keep the present cargo tank

motor vehicles in service, albeit under closer

scrutiny and control than has previously

been the case, until these retrofit devices and

systems can be developed and placed into

operation.

[34] For many years, the propane industry

has demonstrated its dedication to safety and

compliance with standards and regulations.

Issuance of this exemption will in no way

reduce the safe transportation of propane. On

the contrary, identification of the hazard

illustrated by the Sanford, North Carolina

incident will prompt utmost caution during

the period of the proposed Exemption.

Conclusion

[35] Therefore, NPGA believes that a true

emergency exists for handling this

Exemption request in an expedited manner

and thus pledges that this exemption will be

continued in use no longer than absolutely

necessary during the retrofit of any propane

cargo tanks requiring the authorization for

operation, recertification or requalification

provided by the Exemption.

III. Mississippi Tank Company

Application for Exemption

The body of the Mississippi Tank

Company application for exemption is

reproduced as follows:

The purpose of this letter is to make

application for an emergency exemption of

the Hazardous Materials Regulations stated

above. We urgently need an expedited

response to our request and offer the

information required by part 107.3 as

follows:

1. CFR 178.337–11Ali requires that each

internal self-closing stop valve and excess

flow valve must automatically close if any of

its attachments are sheared off or if any

attached hose or piping is separated.

Paragraph 178.337–11(a)(1)(v) expands on

requirements for properly sizing excess flow

valves while considering branching or other

restrictions and, the addition of additional

smaller capacity excess flow valves, where

required.

We learned during recent evaluation and

testing of internal self closing stop-valves on

cargo tank trailers that the flange mounted

internal valves available for use with pumps

will not automatically close under conditions

simulating the situation where the hoses or

piping might be sheared off or separated from

the pump. Upon further research and

consideration, it has become apparent that

there are no internal valves available that

will provide protection as required by the

above paragraphs.

Some considerations of the complex series

of problems that are facing us considering

these requirements are listed as follows:

A. The most commonly used internal selfclosing stop valve is a Fisher C404–M32–600

flanged internal valve whose 600 at the end

of the model number indicates the flow

rating of 600 GPM (propane). Testing at our

facility under simulated conditions using air

pressure and water indicates that this

internal valve with this 600 GPM spring will

not close with tank pressures up to 125 psig.

Other flow rates available (which is

determined by the type of internal spring that

is furnished in the internal valve) are 340

GPM, 400 GPM, 800 GPM and 1000 GPM.

Both the 340 GPM and 400 GPM springs were

tested to determine their behavior, with most

of the testing performed using the 400 GPM

springs.

It was determined that the internal valve

with the 400 GPM spring would close

dependably with pressures down to 65 psig

but not at all at lower pressures. This testing

was performed while allowing the pump to

‘‘free-wheel’’, which would allow the pump

to pass more product than if it were not

allowed to free-wheel. Obviously, a pump

shaft held stationary would prevent the

pump from allowing as much product to

pass, thereby preventing the sufficient flow

of product through the pump and discharge

piping to trigger the self-closing mechanism

of the internal valve.

B. Internal valves (which are excess flow

valves when open) have springs with

manufacturing tolerances of—20%/+10%,

thereby allowing a broad range of

performance in a given flow-rated internal

valve. Example: a 400 GPM spring can allow

a flow between 320 GPM to 440 GPM.

In order to insure proper operation of a

pumping system on cargo tanks, various

sources in the industry have indicated that

internal valve flow rating have been sized

with a minimum flow rating of 1.5 times the

discharge capacity of the pump. This would

indicate that under the greatest flow

conditions that the piping system and pump

can offer, the self-closing criteria for the

internal valve would have been exceeded by

a minimum of 50%.

D. Flow rates through internal valves, and

the associated piping, is mostly determined

by the internal pressure that exists in the

cargo tank. The greater the pressure, the more

flow rate you will have through a given

piping system and the lower the pressure, the

lower flow rate through that same piping

system. As an example, a cargo tank that was

in dedicated propane service might have

internal valves and excess flow valves that

work dependably at pressures of 125 psig or

higher in warm temperatures but as the

temperature gets colder, for instance 20 °F, a

tank pressure of only about 41 psig would be

present and it is predictable that the internal

valves and excess flow valves would no

longer close due to the reduced flow

associated with lower pressures in the tank.

This problem becomes worse if a tank

designed to carry products with vapor

pressures approaching 250 psig is hauling

low vapor pressure products, such as

butanes, whose vapor pressures at warm

temperatures are very low and at very cold

temperatures can be practically nothing,

insuring that the internal valves would not

function at these low pressures.

E. It appears obvious that if you size an

internal valve to be used with a pump that

has a sufficiently low rating to insure that the

internal valve would automatically close in

the event of the separation of the discharge

piping or hoses, the internal valve would

never remain open during the pumping

operation. After further study, it appears that

due to the consistent volumetric

displacement of a pump, the internal valve

would never close if it were sized to allow

the pump to dependably unload a product.

F. Consideration was given to the use of a

lesser flow rate excess flow valve at the

pump discharge connection, but it was

determined after considerable deliberation

that an excess flow valve that was sized so

as to allow the pump to discharge product

dependably might never close in the event

the piping or hoses became separated, as the

flow rating must be sufficient to allow

pumping without causing the internal valve

to close. If separation occurred, the pump

would still be turning at the same RPMs,

thereby producing roughly the same amount

of flow rate as it was while the piping was

still connected. Again it becomes apparent

that the downstream excess protection

appears not to be a viable solution either.

G. One internal valve manufacturer offers

internal valves that open and close using

pump differential pressure, but due to the

nature of the way the pump must create

differential pressure to allow the internal

valve to stay open, it has been determined

during discussions with the internal valve

manufacturer that this internal valve might

not close in all conditions as it should.

2. The problem meeting this requirement

applies to all compressed gas cargo tanks of

the MC331 classification (and possibly the

MC338 classification) that utilize internal

self-closing stop valves and excess flow

valves in conjunction with pumps and in

some cases simply in conjunction with

discharge piping. This problem is not

specific to any one class of product and

would include all products that require the

use of these type cargo tanks.

3. Using the internal valves presently

available, our company has been producing

between 40–200 cargo tanks a year for more

than 35 years. Our company has no

knowledge of any problems or safety related

issues resulting from the use of these valves.

Although all the cargo tanks in operation

today apparently do not comply with the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations 7643

above requirements, the compressed gas

industry does not appear to have a record of

major problems in this area.

If an emergency exemption were granted to

allow the continued use and certification of

these cargo tanks, a warning statement and/

or special operating instructions could be a

new requirement as part of the conditions

allowing for the exemption. This would

provide for increased safety compared to

what is presently available.

4. We feel that a special exemption is

required for duration of 18–24 months

minimum to allow all of the assemblers,

equipment manufacturers and owners to help

work out a solution to this problem.

Equipment manufacturers advise that it takes

a minimum of 12–15 months to design, test

and make available new designs of valving.

If it is determined that this will be part of the

solution, the addition of ‘‘dead-man’’ type

devices that cause the internal valves to close

when the operator is not present may be

incorporated as part of the solution as well.

We urgently request that you act upon our

application for an emergency exemption for

the reasons explained above. This exemption

is needed to allow the continued use of

existing equipment and to allow badly

needed new equipment to continue to be

made available to the industry.

Your expedited response on a priority basis

is appreciated in advance.

IV. RSPA’S and FHWA’s Review

From the four emergency exemption

applications, discussion with the

applicants, information developed from

the Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA) investigation of the Sanford

incident, the regulatory history related

to these issues and knowledge of the

liquefied compressed gas industry,

RSPA and FHWA have developed the

following information and opinions

related to the situation associated with

the failure of the excess flow feature

with the emergency discharge control

system on cargo tanks used to transport

liquefied compressed gases.

Emergency discharge control systems

on cargo tanks used to transport

liquefied gases provide two basic safety

features. First, an excess flow feature is

designed to automatically stop the flow

of gas when piping, fittings or hoses

rupture or separate. The second feature

is a remotely controlled internal selfclosing stop valve designed to stop the

flow of product from a cargo tank. Cargo

tanks having capacities over 3500

gallons must have remote means of

automatic closure, both mechanical and

thermal, of the internal self-closing stop

valve; the remote operators must be

installed at the ends of the tank in at

least two, diagonally opposite locations.

Cargo tanks of 3500 gallons capacity or

less must have at least one remote

means of closure, which may be

mechanical, installed on the end of the

cargo tank farther away from the

loading/unloading connection area. The

HMR require the excess flow feature to

function in the event of a complete

failure (separation) of any attached

hoses or piping. The HMR do not

require the excess flow feature to

function in response to leaks or partial

failure of a pipe, fitting or hose. Manual

activation of the self-closing valve is the

primary safety feature for pipe, fitting or

hose failures during product transfer.

RSPA does not agree with the NPGA

statement (paragraph 15) that the second

and third sentences of § 178.337–

11(a)(1)(v) are ‘‘self-conflicting and

mutually exclusive.’’

When the equipment and regulations

for excess flow features on cargo tanks

transporting liquefied gases were first

developed, cargo tank motor vehicles

were unloaded using internal pressure,

by pressurizing them, or by use of

pumps installed at unloading facilities.

With such unloading systems, an excess

flow feature properly designed for a

cargo tank and the products the tank is

designed to transport would reliably

function in the event of a total pipe,

fitting, or hose failure. Over time, in

response to customer demand, most

cargo tank motor vehicles delivering

liquefied gases to customer bulk storage

facilities have been equipped with

pumps to speed product transfer. The

tests performed by Mississippi Tank

Company following the Sanford

incident demonstrated that a pump in

the discharge system functions as a

product flow regulator that restricts

excess flow, thereby preventing

functioning of the excess flow feature.

Thus, excess flow valves or features will

not function when pumps are used in a

cargo tank’s discharge system. NPGA

addresses this issue in its discussion on

‘‘Solutions to the Situation-Long Term’’

(paragraphs 15 through 21).

RSPA and FHWA do not agree with

the position of the NPGA task force,

expressed in paragraph 8, that transport

vehicles should be given first priority in

addressing this situation. While the

capacity of bobtail cargo tanks is lower

than that of transports, far more bobtails

are in use and many more local

deliveries are made each day than are

deliveries to bulk storage facilities.

Thus, the risk of an accidental discharge

of product is much higher for bobtails

than for transports. Because bobtail

cargo tank motor vehicles are fitted with

pumps and discharge systems very

similar to transports, RSPA and FHWA

believe that the excess flow features of

these smaller vehicles also may not

function when a pipe, fitting or hose

ruptures or separates. This conclusion is

supported by nine instances reported to

RSPA over the last ten years of propane

releases involving the failure of the

excess flow system on bobtails.

As previously stated, RSPA and

FHWA believe that manual activation of

the internal self-closing stop valve is the

primary means of stopping the flow of

product from a cargo tank motor vehicle

in the event of pipe, fitting or hose

failure during transfer operations. The

vehicle operator is the individual

responsible for the manual activation of

the internal stop valve in the event of

pipe, fitting or hose failure. Under the

present circumstances, where the excess

flow feature of the emergency discharge

control system may not function, RSPA

and FHWA believe that special operator

attendance requirements are necessary

to ensure that a qualified person will

always be in a position to immediately

activate the internal stop valve in the

event of a release. In addition to the

requirements of § 177.834(i), RSPA and

FHWA believe that the operator must

have an unobstructed view of the cargo

delivery lines, and be within an arm’s

reach of a means for closure of the

internal self-closing stop valve or other

device that will stop the discharge of

product from the cargo tank. Until an

automatic flow control system is

developed, this may require two

operator attendants on a cargo tank

motor vehicle or the use of a lanyard,

electro-mechanical, or other device or

system to remotely stop the flow of

product. If a lanyard or other device or

system is used, it must meet the

performance standard in the regulation

(‘‘will immediately stop the discharge of

product from the cargo tank’). For

example, there must be adequate space

for use of, and appropriate tautness in,

a lanyard being used to meet this

requirement.

A number of other measures can be

taken to mitigate the problem

experienced in Sanford. Among these

are the following:

• Remove pumps and compensate for

decreased discharge flow by means of:

—enlarging piping, fittings and hose

downstream of existing internal

valves, retaining their excess flow

features.

—increase pressure in the vapor space

of the cargo tank, e.g., with a nitrogen

pad.

• Relocate pumps to the receiving

end of the unloading system.

• Transmit readout from storage tank

filling instrumentation back to the cargo

tank so that operator/attendant can

remain in close proximity to internal

valve closure devices.

• Increase frequency and

thoroughness of maintenance actions;

for example, systems for remote closure
7644 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations

of internal valves demand regular

inspection, test and adjustment.

It has been reported that the propane

release in the Sanford incident was from

the hose used for delivery and that the

hose was new and had not been

pressure tested prior to attachment.

Also, it was reported that the hose

coupling on the storage tank end had

not been firmly attached to the hose by

means of the two machine bolts

provided for this type coupling.

On large MC 330/331 transport

vehicles, hoses typically are not

attached to the cargo tank piping during

transit, while on small local delivery

cargo tanks, hoses typically remain

attached to the piping and are under

pressure during transit. Technically,

hoses attached to piping and under

pressure during transit form part of the

cargo tank wall as defined in

§ 178.320(a)(1). This means that they

should be tested in accordance with

§ 180.407(g) at the test pressure required

for MC 330/331 cargo tanks in

§ 180.407(g)(1)(iv), i.e., at 1.5 times

either the maximum allowable working

pressure (MAWP) or the re-rated

pressure, whichever is applicable.

However, because of the difficulties that

may be encountered at these high

pressures, and due to the potential for

over-stressing hose reinforcement fibers

during such a test, RSPA and FHWA

believe the test should be conducted at

no less than 80 percent of the design

pressure or maximum allowable

working pressure (MAWP) marked on

the cargo tank. This pressure test

requirement includes couplings or other

fittings which are part of the assembled

hose as used. It must be repeated after

any repair or modification of the

assembled hose before it is re-used.

Non-specification cargo tanks.

Potential difficulties with excess flow

protection are not well defined for the

group of non-specification cargo tanks

which are authorized for transportation

of liquefied petroleum gas by

§ 173.315(k). These cargo tanks were

manufactured before January 1, 1981, in

conformance with the editions of the

ASME Code and NFPA Standard 58

which were in effect at the time of

manufacture. They must conform with

applicable laws of the states in which

they operate; and they must be tested

and inspected periodically in

accordance with subpart E of part 180,

as specified for MC 331 cargo tank

motor vehicles.

RSPA and FHWA recognize that the

situation described for MC 330 and 331

cargo tanks is no less severe for these

non-specification vessels. RSPA and

FHWA encourage responsible

authorities in every jurisdiction to give

special attention to NFPA provisions for

vapor and liquid withdrawal

requirements for internal valves with

integral excess-flow valves or excessflow protection.

V. RSPA’s and FHWA’s Evaluation of

the Applications for Exemption

As a frame of reference for evaluation

of the applications for exemption, the

specification requirements for

emergency discharge control can be

achieved by means of either an internal

self-closing stop valve or an excess flow

valve. The most important performance

standard relevant to this issue is that

‘‘Each internal self-closing stop valve

and excess flow valve must

automatically close if any of its

attachments are sheared off or if any

attached hoses or piping are separated.’’

[See § 178.337–11(a)(1)(i)]. Provisions of

§ 178.337–11(a)(1)(v) come into play

only if and when excess flow valves are

used anywhere in the system.

After evaluating the situation and the

NPGA and Mississippi Tank Company

emergency exemption applications,

RSPA finds that this situation

constitutes an emergency with broad

applicability to many persons and far

reaching safety and economic impacts.

RSPA also is not aware of readily

available, off-the-shelf equipment that

can provide a functioning automatic

excess flow feature on cargo tanks

without removal of pumps and other

restrictions. The applicants propose an

outreach effort to inform tank users of

the Sanford incident and the safety

issues related to product transfer

operations and a research and

development program to design a

system which will provide greater safety

in product transfer operations.

During evaluation of the Sanford

incident, it has become evident that the

level of safety provided by the HMR is

not being achieved on equipment

currently being produced and certified

by manufacturers of these cargo tanks.

Specifically, these tanks do not meet the

requirement for automatic closure of

internal self-closing stop valves and

excess flow valves in the event of

separation of hoses or piping. The

regulatory language is intended to

ensure a certain level of safety in these

vehicles. However, the level of safety

provided by the immediate steps

proposed by NPGA is not equivalent to

the level of safety provided by

§ 178.337–11(a)(1)(i). The NPGA

proposes requirements regarding driver

training, testing and inspection of

equipment, and driver attendance

during unloading operations (see

paragraph 27 of the NPGA application).

These proposed requirements are

effectively the same as those already set

forth in 49 CFR. In the Mississippi Tank

application, it was suggested that ‘‘a

warning statement and/or special

operating instructions’’ could be

required, but no details were offered on

how that would achieve a level of safety

equivalent to that provided by the

existing regulatory requirements in

§ 178.337–11(a)(1)(i). Thus, neither

application proposes procedures that

would compensate for the absence of

excess flow features that function

reliably and in a passive manner.

Because the applications do not

provide for an equivalent level of safety,

as required by § 107.113(f)(2)(ii), of the

HMR, they have been denied by the

Associate Administrator for Hazardous

Materials Safety. Also, the issues

addressed in the applications have

significant safety and economic

implications for a broad range of

persons; consequently, RSPA believes

the issues are better addressed through

the rulemaking process. Thus, RSPA is

issuing this interim final rule.

VI. Provisions of the Interim Final Rule

RSPA is publishing this interim final

rule to enhance the safety of product

transfer operations as they are currently

conducted, in most cases, while

allowing the continued delivery of

liquefied compressed gases (principally

propane, other liquefied petroleum

gases and anhydrous ammonia). RSPA

and FHWA believe that, without the

authorization for continued operation

provided by this rule, the public,

industry, and cargo tank motor vehicle

operators and manufacturers would be

severely impacted. The liquefied

compressed gases authorized for

highway transportation under this rule

are used for home heating, support of

industrial and agricultural operations,

and as fertilizer. Because there are no

alternative means for distribution of

these materials in most areas served by

the cargo tank motor vehicles

authorized by this rule, RSPA and

FHWA believe this rule is necessary to

prevent severe shortages of liquefied

compressed gases in the areas where

they are consumed.

This emergency interim final rule

authorizes, under specific conditions,

the continued manufacture, assembly,

certification, use and recertification of

cargo tanks that may not meet the excess

flow feature requirements for cargo

tanks authorized for the transportation

of liquefied compressed gases. This rule

is effective through August 15, 1997.

This will allow time for implementation

of changes to equipment that will

automatically shut down product

transfer as required in § 178.337–11,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations 7645

when a pipe or hose ruptures or

separates.

In the next several months, RSPA and

FHWA will actively pursue technical

improvements to product delivery

systems, as well as other feasible

operational controls, that may be

applied to minimize threats to public

safety inherent in the transportation of

liquefied compressed gases. RSPA has

developed an action plan that includes

the two public workshops scheduled for

March 4–5, and April 8–9, 1997. In

addition, working through its Volpe

National Transportation System Center,

RSPA will examine the availability and

feasibility of systems that can achieve

the purpose of the regulations; identify

facilities where automatic shut-down

systems may be safely tested, and seek

out other sources of technical expertise

in government, industry and academia.

The August 15, 1997 compliance date

was chosen in part because it falls

between the end of the summer 1997

planting season and the beginning of the

winter 1997–1998 heating season. This

date gives industry approximately six

months to bring cargo tanks into

compliance with the current (i.e., preIFR) regulatory requirement.

Alternatively, industry may be able to

demonstrate that regulatory compliance

is not feasible, and recommend

timetables for achieving compliance or

implementing alternative technology to

achieve the safety objective of a passive,

automatic shut off system for emergency

discharge control.

By the expiration of the interim final

rule, RSPA and FHWA could announce

their intent to strictly enforce the

current regulatory requirement, unless

the industry convinces us that they are

making a good faith effort to develop a

properly operating system that meets

the requirements of the HMR.

Alternatively, depending on the

information developed during the

comment period, RSPA would

implement rulemaking either to modify

the current regulatory requirement,

providing a different means of passive

shut-off, or extending the provisions of

the IFR (with modification, if

warranted) based on an industrydeveloped timetable for implementing

technological change. The rule

addresses the concerns expressed in the

exemption applications of the NPGA,

Mississippi Tank Company, TFI, and

NTTC.

In order to enhance the level of safety

during transfer operations using current

equipment, the rule specifies special

conditions for continued operations.

The following provisions are adopted in

§ 171.5 to provide a set of alternative

safety controls for the carriage of

liquefied gases in cargo tanks that

cannot be demonstrated to conform with

existing excess flow feature

requirements.

Paragraph (a)(1) specifies use

provisions under which MC 330, MC

331 or non-specification cargo tank

motor vehicles authorized under

§ 173.315(k) may be operated and

unloaded.

Paragraph (a)(1)(i) prescribes that

before transfer from a cargo tank motor

vehicle the integrity of components

making up the discharge system must be

verified. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) prescribes

that prior to using a new or repaired

transfer hose or a modified hose

assembly, the hose must be pressure

tested at no less than 80 percent of the

design pressure or maximum allowable

working pressure (MAWP) marked on

the cargo tank. Paragraph (a)(1)(iii)

specifies that a qualified person in

attendance of transfer from a cargo tank

must have the capability for emergency

shut-down. Paragraph (a)(1)(iv) specifies

that when there is an unintentional

release of lading, the internal selfclosing stop valve must be activated and

all motive and auxiliary power

equipment must be shut down.

Paragraph (a)(1)(v) prescribes the

development of comprehensive

emergency operating procedures for all

transfer operations. Paragraph (a)(1)(vi)

specifies that each manufacturer,

assembler, retester, motor carrier and

other hazmat employer must provide

training to its hazmat employees so that

they can properly perform the new

function-specific requirements in this

section.

Paragraph (a)(2) prescribes conditions

for continued qualification of existing

in-service cargo tank motor vehicles.

Paragraph (a)(3) addresses new

vehicles, including a special entry on

the certification required by § 178.337–

18.

Paragraph (b) specifies the marking to

be displayed on a cargo tank motor

vehicle operating under this section.

Paragraph (c) establishes August 15,

1997, as the expiration date for this

temporary regulation.

VII. Request for Comments

To facilitate decisions on the need for

this interim final rule as a short term

response to an emergency and the

potential need for a permanent change

in the rule, RSPA requests comments

responding to the questions listed

below. RSPA also invites comments on

any aspect of this rulemaking action not

specifically addressed by the questions.

RSPA and FHWA encourage interested

persons to participate in this rulemaking

by submitting written views, data, and

information concerning this interim

final rule. Commenters are requested to

provide a reason or basis for each

comment.

Additionally, RSPA and FHWA are

seeking information pertaining to

research and development related to the

issues contained in this rule. This

information may be presented at the

public meeting.

1. NPGA has suggested the

development of a ‘‘deadman’’ or a

remote valve actuation system, possibly

using a lanyard. Automobiles are

commonly equipped with remote

transmitter devices that fit on key rings

to unlock doors or open trunk lids from

50 feet away. If such a manually

activated device were used to close

internal self-closing stop valves, would

it provide a level of safety equivalent to

the requirement for a passive automatic

shut-down system required by

§ 178.337–11(a)(1)(i)?

2. What types of devices can provide

the passive automatic shut-down

function required by § 178.337–

11(a)(1)(i)?

3. What tests are appropriate at the

time of manufacture or assembly and at

the time of requalification to ensure that

the product discharge system will close

as required by § 178.337–11(a)(1)(i)?

4. In view of the fact that specification

MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank motor

vehicles are authorized for a broad range

of hazardous materials, is it possible to

design an emergency discharge control

system that functions effectively with

all liquefied compressed gases under all

conditions normal to transportation? If

not, should the manufacturer’s

certification required under § 178.337–

18 specify the materials and conditions

that are acceptable for carriage in, or

unloading of, the cargo tank?

5. Do manufacturers and assemblers

of cargo tank motor vehicles provide

operational and maintenance

instructions to operators on the use of

the cargo tank motor vehicles they

supply? If so, provide examples of such

information to RSPA.

6. Provide any information available

on other interstate or intrastate

incidents involving the failure of

emergency control systems on cargo

tanks authorized to transport liquefied

compressed gases.

7. Are hoses used to transfer product

from large transport cargo tank motor

vehicles permanently attached or

carried on the vehicles or supplied by

the customer at the point of delivery?

8. RSPA is concerned that this

problem may highlight a deficiency in

the training programs for Design

Certifying Engineers and those persons

certifying cargo tanks as meeting the
7646 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations

requirements of the HMR. In addition,

carrier function-specific training

programs also may not be providing

sufficient training in the specification

requirements for these cargo tanks.

What training is provided to those

individuals who are responsible for

certifying, operating, testing and

repairing these cargo tank motor

vehicles?

VIII. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This final rule is considered a

significant regulatory action under

section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866

and was reviewed by the Office of

Management and Budget. The rule is

considered significant under the

Regulatory Policies and Procedures of

the Department of Transportation (44 FR

11034).

Because of the emergency nature of

this rule, RSPA is not required to

prepare a regulatory evaluation.

Nevertheless, in an effort to minimize

the burden of this rule, RSPA prepared

a preliminary regulatory evaluation

which is available in the public docket.

Because of the potential safety risk

posed by continued transportation of

liquefied compressed gases in

specification MC 330 and MC 331 cargo

tank motor vehicles that do not conform

to the performance criteria for

emergency discharge controls, RSPA has

determined that good cause exists for

making this rule effective less than 30

days from its issuance and that prior

notice and opportunity to comment is

impractical and contrary to public

interest.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (Act),

as amended, 5 U.S.C. 601–612, directs

agencies to consider the potential

impact of regulations on small business

and other small entities. The Act,

however, applies only to rules for which

an agency is required to publish a notice

of proposed rulemaking pursuant to

section 553 of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553. See

5 U.S.C. 603(a) and 604(a). Because of

the emergency nature of this rule, RSPA

is authorized under section 553(b)(B)

and section 553 (d)(3) of the APA to

forego notice and comment and to issue

this rule as an interim final rule with an

immediate effective date. Consequently,

RSPA is not required under the Act to

do a regulatory flexibility analysis in

this rulemaking.

Specifically, section 553(b)(B) and

section 553(d)(3) of the APA authorize

agencies to dispense with certain

procedures for rules, including notice

and comment, when they find ‘‘good

cause’’ to do so. ‘‘Good cause’’ includes

a finding that following notice-andcomment procedures would be

‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary

to the public interest.’’ Section 553(d)(3)

allows an agency, upon a finding of

good cause, to make a rule effective

immediately. ‘‘Good cause’’ has been

held to include situations where

immediate action is necessary to reduce

or avoid health hazards or other

imminent harm to persons or property,

or where inaction would lead to serious

dislocation in government programs or

the marketplace.

Nevertheless, RSPA is concerned with

the effect this rule may have on small

business. Consequently, in preparing a

preliminary regulatory evaluation under

Executive Order 12866, RSPA has

analyzed, based on information

currently available to the agency, the

impact of this rule on all affected

parties, including small businesses. The

preliminary regulatory evaluation is

available for review in the public

docket. In that preliminary evaluation,

RSPA estimates that where an operator

of bobtails chooses to comply with the

arms-reach attendance requirement by

use of a lanyard—as suggested by NPGA

in its application for emergency

exemption—the average annual cost per

operator will be $1,324. In addition, in

this interim final rule RSPA is asking

commenters to provide information to

the agency regarding the economic,

safety and other impacts of this rule so

that the agency can make any necessary

changes to the rule.

A small entity includes a small

business, small organization or small

governmental jurisdiction. For purposes

of this discussion, a small business is

deemed to be one which is

independently owned and operated and

which is not dominant in its field of

operation. RSPA believes that the

impacts of this rule are primarily

addressed to businesses involving the

distribution of liquefied petroleum gas

and anhydrous ammonia, and to

manufacturers and assemblers of cargo

tanks used for the distribution of these

products. Under the Small Business

Administration’s size standard

definitions (13 CFR Part 121), liquefied

petroleum gas distributors with $5

million or less in annual receipts, and

manufacturers of truck or bus bodies or

truck trailers that employ 500 or less

individuals are small businesses. Based

on available information, RSPA

estimates that at least 90% of the

businesses impacted by this rule are

small businesses. RSPA further

estimates there are at least 6,800

businesses and at least 25,000 cargo

tank motor vehicles (7,000 ‘‘transports’’

and 18,000 ‘‘bobtails’’) affected by this

rule.

In order for RSPA to determine the

potential impacts of this rule on small

entities, small businesses affected by

this final rule are requested to submit

comments addressed to the impacts of

this rule and other significant

alternatives on small entities. Some of

the considerations envisioned in

assessing these impacts include the

following:

1. Are RSPA’s estimates as to number

of businesses affected by this rule, and

the percentage of these which are small

businesses, consistent with industry

estimates? Are other estimates available

as to the numbers of businesses and

small businesses in each sector of

business addressed by this rule (i.e., gas

distributor, cargo tank manufacturer,

cargo tank assembler) and numbers of

cargo tank motor vehicles? Are there

other business sectors affected? Are

some geographic areas affected more

than others (please identify)?

2. Are there alternatives to this rule

which accomplish RSPA’s objectives,

while imposing less of an impact on

small businesses? What are those

alternatives?

3. In what manner could differing

compliance or reporting requirements

be implemented for small businesses to

take into account the resources available

to small businesses? In what manner

could compliance or reporting

requirements be clarified, consolidated

or simplified for such small businesses?

4. What are the direct and indirect

costs of compliance with the rule,

calculated both as absolute costs and as

a percentage of revenue of the regulated

small business?

5. What are the direct and indirect

costs of completing paperwork or

recordkeeping requirements, again both

as absolute costs and as a percentage of

revenue?

6. What is the effect of this rule, if

any, on the competitive position of

small entities in relation to larger

entities?

7. What is the effect of this rule on the

small entity’s cash flow and liquidity?

8. What is the effect of this rule on the

ability of a small entity to remain in the

market?

9. What is the availability and cost to

the small entity for professional

assistance to meet regulatory

requirements?

10. Are there any Federal rules that

duplicate, overlap or conflict with this

rule?
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations 7647

C. Executive Order 12612

This final rule has been analyzed in

accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order

12612 (‘‘Federalism’’). The Federal

hazardous materials transportation law,

49 U.S.C. 5101–5127, contains an

express preemption provision (49 U.S.C.

5125(b)) that preempts State, local, and

Indian tribe requirements on certain

covered subjects. Covered subjects are:

(1) The designation, description, and

classification of hazardous materials;

(2) The packing, repacking, handling,

labeling, marking, and placarding of

hazardous materials;

(3) The preparation, execution, and

use of shipping documents related to

hazardous materials and requirements

related to the number, contents, and

placement of those documents;

(4) The written notification,

recording, and reporting of the

unintentional release in transportation

of hazardous material; or

(5) The design, manufacture,

fabrication, marking, maintenance,

recondition, repair, or testing of a

packaging or container represented,

marked, certified, or sold as qualified

for use in transporting hazardous

material.

This interim final rule addresses

covered subject item (5) above and

preempts State, local, and Indian tribe

requirements not meeting the

‘‘substantively the same’’ standard.

Federal hazardous materials

transportation law provides at

§ 5125(b)(2) that, if DOT issues a

regulation concerning any of the

covered subjects, DOT must determine

and publish in the Federal Register the

effective date of Federal preemption.

The effective date may not be earlier

than the 90th day following the date of

issuance of the final rule and not later

than two years after the date of issuance.

RSPA has determined that the effective

date of Federal preemption for these

requirements will be May 20, 1997.

Thus, RSPA lacks discretion in this

area, and preparation of a federalism

assessment is not warranted.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

The information collection and

recordkeeping requirements contained

in this final rule have been submitted

for emergency approval to the Office of

Management and Budget under the

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction

Act of 1995. Section 1320.8(d), Title 5,

Code of Federal Regulations requires

that RSPA provide interested members

of the public and affected agencies an

opportunity to comment on information

collection and recordkeeping requests.

RSPA estimates that the total

information collection and

recordkeeping burden in this interim

final rule is 17,575 hours, at a cost of

$376,875, for the development and

maintenance of the comprehensive

emergency operating procedure. These

figures are based in RSPA’s belief that

standardized emergency operating

procedures can be developed for use by

a majority of industry members, thus

reducing substantially the burden hours

and cost to individual industry

members of compliance with the

emergency operating procedures

requirement. Requests for a copy of this

information collection should be

directed to Deborah Boothe, Office of

Hazardous Materials Standards (DHM–

10), Research and Special Programs

Administration, Room 8102, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590–0001. Telephone (202) 366–8553.

Written comments should be received

by the close of the comment period

identified elsewhere in this rulemaking

and should be addressed to the Dockets

Unit as identified in the Addresses

section of this rulemaking. Under the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no

person is required to respond to an

information collection unless it displays

a valid OMB control number. RSPA will

publish a notice advising interested

parties of the OMB control number for

this information collection when

assigned by OMB.

E. Regulation identifier number (RIN)

A regulation identifier number (RIN)

is assigned to each regulatory action

listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal

Regulations. The Regulatory Information

Service Center publishes the Unified

Agenda in April and October of each

year. The RIN number contained in the

heading of this document can be used

to cross-reference this action with the

Unified Agenda.

F. Executive Order 12778

Any interested person may petition

RSPA’s Administrator for

reconsideration of this final rule within

30 days of publication of this rule in the

Federal Register, in accordance with the

procedures set forth at 49 CFR 106.35.

Neither the filing of a petition for

reconsideration nor any other

administrative proceeding is required

before the filing of a suit in court for

review of this rule.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 171

Exports, Hazardous materials

transportation, Hazardous waste,

Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49

CFR part 171 is amended as follows:

PART 171—GENERAL INFORMATION,

REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

1. The authority citation for Part 171

is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5127, 44701;

Sec. 4, Pub. L. 101–410, 104 Stat. 890 (28

U.S.C. 2461 note); Sec. 31001, Pub. L. 104–

134, 110 Stat. 1321; 49 CFR 1.45 and 1.53.

2. Section 171.5 is added to read as

follows:

§ 171.5 Temporary regulation; liquefied

compressed gases in cargo tank motor

vehicles.

(a) Section 178.337–11 of this

subchapter requires an excess flow

feature as a part of the emergency

discharge control system installed in a

cargo tank motor vehicle used to

transport certain liquefied compressed

gases. Other regulations in Parts 173 and

180 of this subchapter reference this

requirement or similar requirements in

effect at the time of manufacture of a

cargo tank. Notwithstanding this

requirement, a DOT MC 330 or MC 331

specification cargo tank motor vehicle,

or a non-specification cargo tank motor

vehicle conforming to the requirements

of § 173.315(k) of this subchapter, may,

without certification and demonstrated

performance of the excess flow feature

of its emergency discharge control

system, be represented for use and used

to transport liquefied compressed gases

under the following conditions:

(1) Use. The cargo tank motor vehicle

must otherwise be operated, unloaded

and attended in full conformance with

all applicable requirements of this

subchapter and the following additional

requirements:

(i) Before initiating any transfer from

the cargo tank motor vehicle, the person

performing the function shall verify that

each component of the discharge system

is of sound quality, is free of leaks, and

that connections are secure.

(ii) Prior to commencing transfer

using a new or repaired transfer hose or

a modified hose assembly, it must be

pressure tested at no less than 80

percent of the design pressure or

maximum allowable working pressure

(MAWP) marked on the cargo tank. This

test must include all hose and hose

fittings and equipment arranged in the

configuration to be employed during

transfer operations. A hose or associated

equipment that shows signs of leakage,

significant bulging, or other defects, is

not acceptable for use.

(iii) In addition to attendance

requirements in § 177.834(i) of this

subchapter, the person who attends the
7648 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations

unloading of a cargo tank motor vehicle

must have an unobstructed view of the

discharge system and be within arm’s

reach of a means for closure (emergency

shut-down device) of the internal selfclosing stop valve or other device that

will immediately stop the discharge of

product from the cargo tank.

(iv) If there is an unintentional release

of lading to the environment during

transfer, the qualified person attending

the cargo tank shall immediately

activate the internal self-closing stop

valve and shut down all motive and

auxiliary power equipment.

(v) A comprehensive emergency

operating procedure must be developed

for all transfer operations and hazmat

employees who perform unloading

functions must be thoroughly trained in

its provisions. The emergency operating

procedure must be prominently

displayed in or on the cargo tank motor

vehicle.

(vi) As required by § 172.704 of this

subchapter, each manufacturer,

assembler, retester, motor carrier and

other hazmat employer subject to the

requirements of this section shall ensure

that its hazmat employees are trained to

properly perform these new functionspecific requirements including the

meaning of the marking specified in

paragraph (b) of this section. The

hazmat employer shall ensure that a

record of the training is created,

certified, and maintained as specified in

§ 172.704(d) of this subchapter.

(2) Continuing qualification. An

existing in-service cargo tank motor

vehicle may continue to be marked and

documented as required by Part 180 of

this subchapter if the following

statement is added to the current

inspection report required by

§ 180.417(b) of this subchapter:

‘‘Emergency excess flow control

performance not established for this

unit.’’

(3) New vehicles. A new (unused)

cargo tank motor vehicle manufactured,

marked and certified prior to August 16,

1997, may be marked and certified as

conforming to specification MC 331 if it

otherwise meets all requirements of the

specification and the following

statement is added to the certification

document required by § 178.337–18 of

this subchapter: ‘‘Emergency excess

flow control performance not

established for this unit.’’

(b) Marking. The following marking

must be displayed on a cargo tank used

in or represented for use under this

section:

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / Rules and Regulations 7649

(1) The letters must be white and the

background black.

(2) The letters must be at least 1.5cm

in height.

(3) The marking must be 6cm x 15cm.

(c) Expiration date. This section is

effective February 19, 1997 through

August 15, 1997.

Issued in Washington, DC on February 13,

1997 under authority delegated in 49 CFR

part 1.

D.K. Sharma,

Administrator, Research and Special

Programs Administration.

[FR Doc. 97–4116 Filed 2–14–97; 12:09 pm]

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P