UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

In the Matter of Docket 

No. C-3937 

NINE WEST GROUP INC., 

a corporation. PUBLIC 

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 

PETITION TO REOPEN AND MODIFY ORDER 

Pursuant to Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 45(b), and Commission Rule 2.51, 16 C.F.R. § 2.51, Nine West Footwear Corporation, 

successor-in-interest to Nine West Group Inc. (hereinafter "Nine West") hereby submits 

this Supplemental Memorandum in support of its Petition to Reopen and Modify Order 

(hereinafter the "Petition") previously filed with the Commission on October 29,2007, 

requesting that the above-captioned proceedings be reopened and that Paragraph II of the 

Decision and Order of April 11, 2000 (hereinafter the "Order") be modified following the 

dramatic change in antitrust law brought about by the Supreme Court's decision in 

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 

Overview 

Nine West's Petition requests that Paragraph II of the Order be modified 

to allow Nine West to take actions to maintain resale prices, other than unilaterally 

terminating the retailer without prior notice. (Petition at 1.) The scope of Nine West's 

request was — and remains — extremely narrow. Nine West does not seek an 
unrestricted license to engage in all types of minimum resale price maintenance, nor is 

Nine West requesting a declaration from the Commission that minimum resale price 

maintenance is per se legal, contrary to one comment's suggestion,1

 or even that there is 

a presumption of legality. Rather, Nine West wishes only to operate under the same 

antitrust legal framework as its competitors, allowing it to employ forms of minimum 

resale price maintenance that leading economists and the Supreme Court have 

acknowledged are more effective at promoting interbrand competition than unilateral 

retailer termination. 

I. THE DESIRED MODIFICATION TO THE ORDER WILL PRODUCE 

PROCOMPETITIVE EFFECTS. 

A. Free Riding Among Retailers Selling Nine West Shoes Deters 

Retailers from Providing Desired Services, and Allowing Nine West to 

Engage in Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Will Reduce Free 

Riding and Benefit Consumers. 

In Leegin, the Supreme Court acknowledged that minimum resale price 

maintenance promotes interbrand competition by deterring free riding and thereby 

encouraging retailers to "invest in tangible or intangible services or promotion efforts that 

aid the manufacturer's position as against rival manufacturers". 127 S. Ct. at 2715-16. 

As noted by the Amid Curiae economists in Leegin, the procompetitive effects of retailer 

investment in such services are "most significant in cases for products that are 

differentiated and therefore are sold on the basis of features and quality as well as price". 

Brief of Amid Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather 

Prods, v. PSKS, Inc., at 6. For example, women's accessories "may benefit from longer 

See Amended States' Comments Urging Denial of Nine West's Petition, filed with 

the Commission on January 17,2008 (hereinafter "States' Comment"), at 5. 
store hours, more convenient or prestigious store locations, better-trained and more 

enthusiastic employees, or favoritism in shelf placement". Id. 

Consumers differentiate women's footwear brands — as they do other 

fashion accessories like those at issue in Leegin — on the basis of criteria in addition to 

price. (See Supplemental Declaration of Andrew Cohen (hereinafter "Suppl. Cohen 

Decl.") 15.) To aid in favorably distinguishing its brands from competitors' brands, 

Nine West relies on retailers to provide adequate and appropriate floor space, advertise 

and promote Nine West's branded products, actively manage product assortment flow, 

and employ highly trained sales staff. (Declaration of Andrew Cohen (hereinafter 

"10/24/07 Cohen Decl.") f 12.) Nine West similarly depends on retailers to operate in 

convenient, aesthetically pleasing locations during desirable hours.3 (Suppl. Cohen Decl. 

2

 One economic study specifically identified shoe retailers as being vulnerable to free 

riding: 

"The free rider problem is not confined to high-tech, information-intensive 

consumer durables. RPM occurs in markets where goods do not require detailed 

information, extensive product demonstration, or significant post-sale service 

commitments. Such products include women's fashion accessories, shoes, candy, and 

designer jeans. In the case of such products, retailers may use RPM-protected margins to 

invest in retail services like longer hours of operation, more attractive store furnishings, 

and other amenities that owe little to specialized information. Besides shopping 

amenities, retailers with reputations for selling high-quality merchandise provide what 

has been called a "quality certification" service to manufacturers. A manufacturer may 

use RPM to insure that reputable retailers - those who help the manufacturer build and 

maintain a good reputation for its brand - carry its brand by affording those retailers 

protection from free-riding discounters." 

Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price 

Maintenance, in Issues in Competition Law and Policy (Wavne D. Collins, ed., American 

Bar Association, forthcoming 2008) at 3 (emphasis added), available at 

http://www.virginia.edu/economics/papers/mills/RPM for ABA.pdf, cited in Brief of 

Amid Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods, v. PSKS, Inc. 

Notably, although Nine West does provide certain benefits to retailers who 

designate sales personnel to devote additional time specifically to selling Nine West 
If 6.) Nine West also cannot rely solely on retailers owned by its parent company, Jones 

Apparel Group, to provide these desired services. (Id. TJ 7.) Jones derived only about 

17% of its Q3 2007 revenues from its retail stores selling Nine West and other brands, 

reflecting the importance of non-Jones-owned retailers to Nine West.4 (Id.) 

As the Supreme Court's opinion in Leegin and economists5 would predict, 

free riding by discount retailers on the efforts of those retailers who provide these desired 

services has been a problem for Nine West. (Suppl. Cohen Decl. 1J 8.) Specifically, 

intrabrand competition from deep-discounting dealers has in some cases deterred other 

retailers from providing additional services that would enhance Nine West's ability to 

compete with other manufacturers. (Id.) For example, in one instance an independent 

retailer with minimal floor space who provided little customer service offered Nine West 

styles at rock-bottom prices, taking advantage of a nearby retailer's superior customer 

service, displays and advertising. (Id. f 9.) Nine West unilaterally terminated the 

independent retailer to prevent harm to Nine West brands and other nearby retailers, but 

products, Nine West does not automatically provide benefits for other important retailer 

services such as desirable location, hours, floor space, etc. (Suppl. Cohen Decl. J 6.) 

4

 At the end of 2000, Jones Apparel Group had 773 stores selling primarily women's 

footwear (432 specialty stores and 341 outlet stores). (Suppl. Cohen Decl. ^f 7.) At the 

end of 2006, Jones had 796 stores selling primarily women's footwear (398 specialty 

stores and 398 outlet stores). (Id.) Outlet stores provide a broad selection of Jones 

brands at value prices, offering a distribution channel for residual inventories of current 

and proven prior season's styles, with the remainder of the merchandise consisting of 

discontinued styles. (Id.) 

5

 See Brief of Amid Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioner, Leegin Creative 

Leather Prods, v. PSKS, Inc., at 5-10; see also T. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: 

Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence 122-23 (1983) (reviewing a study of a 

Commission case against Florsheim shoes that concluded that it was "analytically 

plausible, and supported by the evidence available from an industry study" that Florsheim 

used resale price maintenance to create a "strong signal of product quality" and combat 

free riding), cited in Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715, 2717, 2718. 
would have preferred to utilize a less drastic response. (Id.) Similar free riding among 

Nine West retailers has occurred in other regions. (Id.) Modifying the Order to permit 

Nine West to engage in minimum resale price maintenance other than unilateral 

termination would assist in reducing such free riding. 

B. Forcing Nine West to Continue to Operate Under Per Se Restrictions 

Is Anticompetitive and Harmful to Consumers. 

Under the terms of the Order, Nine West is prohibited from employing 

vertical minimum price restraints, but it may unilaterally refuse to deal with retailers that 

do not follow its suggested prices, under United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 

Employing this extreme tactic of retailer termination, the Leegin Court acknowledged, 

can lead, and has led, rational manufacturers to take wasteful measures. 127 S. Ct. at 

2722-23. The Court explained: 

"A manufacturer might refuse to discuss its pricing policy with its 

distributors except through counsel knowledgeable of the subtle intricacies 

of the law. Or it might terminate longstanding distributors for minor 

violations without seeking an explanation. The increased costs these 

burdensome measures generate flow to consumers in the form of higher 

prices." 

Id. (citations omitted); see also Brief of PING, Inc. asAmicus Curiae in Support of 

Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods, v. PSKS, Inc., at 9-18 (describing the costly 

and inefficient programs PING has implemented solely to preserve its ability to terminate 

excessively discounting retailers, as provided for in Colgate). 

Under the Order, which implements Colgate and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 

John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), Nine West has been burdened by just 

such inefficiencies. On numerous occasions, Nine West executives have been forced to 

decide between unilaterally terminating deep-discounting retailers that were harming 

brand integrity and other service-providing retailers, or abiding the discounters' harmful 
pricing. (Suppl. Cohen Decl. f 10.) In such instances, less extreme measures, such as 

suspension of— or at least discussion with — the deep-discounting retailer would have 

been preferable (id.), but would not have been protected under Colgate, or permitted by 

the Order. 

Moreover, to comply with the Order, Nine West must ensure that none of 

its retailers incorrectly implies or concludes that it has entered into any "agreement" with 

Nine West regarding pricing. This effort is made at great expense to Nine West, which 

must provide training and allocate resources that could otherwise be used to improve the 

quality of Nine West products, the efficiency of its production systems, the development 

of new products to increase consumer choice, or the provision of additional consumer 

services. Instead, these resources are dedicated only to helping Nine West avoid an 

antitrust lawsuit. For instance, Nine West has retained outside counsel to train its sales 

staff and executives about how to run the gauntlet between Colgate on the one hand and 

Dr. Miles and the Order on the other. (Suppl. Cohen Decl. Tf 11.) Nine West attorneys 

have drafted scripts to guide divisional management and sales employees through 

retailer-initiated conversations relating to pricing. (Id.) New Nine West employees 

holding management or sales positions in the wholesale divisions receive (and are 

required to certify receipt of) an antitrust compliance handbook and watch a videotaped 

training program on Nine West pricing policies and antitrust compliance under the Order. 

(Id.) Additional training sessions are scheduled regularly approximately once per year to 

keep wholesale sales employees apprised of Nine West's pricing policies. (Id.) Further, 

employees are instructed that they must direct questions regarding retailer pricing to one 

of two specially designated company executives. (Id.) 
In addition to the expense and inefficiency of Nine West's safeguards to 

prevent the appearance of an "agreement" regarding prices, the act of unilateral 

termination itself can be costly and produce serious anticompetitive effects. Unilateral 

termination harms consumers by reducing the number of retailers selling a given brand 

and reducing the supply of the product in question, thereby limiting consumer choice and 

preventing goods from being as readily accessible. See Brief of PING, Inc. as Amicus 

Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods, v. PSKS, Inc., at 4 

(describing how unilateral termination of more than 1,000 retailers as permitted under 

Colgate limits consumer choice and ultimately reduces output). The net result of such 

terminations is that the manufacturer's goods are less accessible to consumers, translating 

into reduced interbrand competition. Also, such terminations often come at an added cost 

of retailer good will. Retailers who might otherwise be effective dealers may choose not 

to sell a manufacturer's products because of the danger of unilateral termination without 

warning. 

Such negative effects are particularly onerous for Nine West following 

Leegin. Under the Order, Nine West must maintain its costly and inefficient antitrust 

safeguards, but its competitors now may use less extreme measures to control resale 

prices. As discussed further infra in Part II, leaving Nine West to operate at this 

competitive disadvantage is unfair and causes the market to operate less efficiently for all 

participants, translating ultimately into higher costs for consumers. 

C. The Highly Competitive Nature of the Women's Footwear Market 

Makes It Unlikely that Minimum Resale Price Restraints Would Be 

Used to Facilitate Collusion. 

The market for women's footwear is highly competitive and there are not 

significant impediments to entry. (10/24/07 Cohen Decl. f 9.) In 2007, Nine West 
brands accounted for about 10.4% of that market, based upon available total department 

store and national chain store sales in that market.6

 (Suppl. Cohen Decl. f 12.) Nine 

West's top competitors and their approximate market shares were as follows: 

Brown Shoe Co. — 6.2% 

Vince Camuto Group — 4.4%

 

Coach, Inc.— 3.7% 

Nike, Inc. —2.9% 

C&J Clarks International Ltd. — 2.7% 

Steve Madden Ltd. — 2.5%

 

Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. — 2.0%

 

Wolverine World Wide, Inc. — 1.5%

 

Marc Fisher LLC — 1.3%

 

Nina Footwear Corporation — 1.1%

 

Liz Claiborne —1.0% 

(Id.) 

Given this diverse and competitive marketplace, there is little danger that 

Nine West — or any other manufacturer — could abuse minimum resale price 

maintenance to an anticompetitive end. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720 (noting that "[i]f a 

retailer lacks market power, manufacturers likely can sell their goods through rival 

retailers" and "there is less likelihood it can use the practice to keep competitors away 

from distribution outlets"). 

II. APPLYING THE SAME ANTITRUST LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO NINE 

WEST AS TO ITS COMPETITORS PROMOTES CONSIDERATIONS OF 

FAIRNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 

Although, as described supra and in the Petition, all the procompetitive 

rationales for minimum resale price maintenance discussed in Leegin apply to Nine West 

and the women's footwear market more broadly, it is difficult for Nine West to set forth 

6

 As submitted previously, Nine West women's footwear brands accounted for 

12.5% of sales year-to-date July 2007 in department stores. (10/24/07 Cohen Decl. If 8.) 
specific, empirical examples of such procompetitive effects because Nine West at present 

is prohibited from engaging in any kind of minimum resale price maintenance besides 

unilateral termination. If, as the comments suggest,7

 a demonstration of actual 

procompetitive effects is a prerequisite to modification of the Order, then Nine West's 

Petition is hopeless and it is trapped in a state of perpetual competitive disadvantage. 

Nine West cannot demonstrate procompetitive effects of minimum resale price 

maintenance programs that it is preemptively prohibited from implementing. Likewise, 

under In the Matter of Sharp Electronics Corp., 112 F.T.C. 303 (1989), Nine West should 

not be required now to make a showing of procompetitive effects of any minimum resale 

price maintenance program in place at the time of the Order. In Sharp, where because of 

an intervening Supreme Court decision the Commission set aside a consent order 

prohibiting Sharp from imposing territorial restrictions on its dealers or defining the class 

of customers to whom dealers were permitted to sell Sharp calculators, the Commission 

analyzed the potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of such prohibitions in 

the present — not at the time of the consent order for a nuncpro tune determination. See 

Sharp, 112 F.T.C. 303 (1989) (observing "the market today appears to be competitive" 

and noting that "[tjhere also appear to be no significant impediments to entry into the 

market") (emphasis added). Meanwhile, under Leegin Nine West's competitors may 

engage in minimum resale price maintenance8 and — if those programs are challenged — 

7

 The States argue that Nine West must be required to prove: "(1) its vertical price 

fixing caused retailers to provide actual enhanced value or services; (2) the enhanced 

value or services increased demand for its shoes; and (3) the increased demand from that 

value or those services was greater than the decreased demand caused by the higher price 

that consumers paid." States' Comment at 8. 

o 

Nine West executives believe that numerous competitors currently employ some 

form of resale price maintenance, although the practice is far from ubiquitous. Nine West 
demonstrate their programs' validity with a showing of their procompetitive effects. 

Leaving Nine West at this disadvantage is anticompetitive and harmful to consumers, 

creating inefficiencies and higher costs and causing the market to operate less efficiently 

for all participants. (See also Petition at 11-12.) 

It is important to note, moreover, that Nine West seeks only to be placed 

on a level playing field with its competitors — not given a carte blanche minimum resale 

price maintenance pass. 

III. NINE WEST WILL REMAIN SUBJECT TO STATE AND FEDERAL 

ANTITRUST LAWS IF THE COMMISSION GRANTS THE PETITION. 

Even if the Commission modifies the Order as requested, Nine West will 

remain subject to state and federal antitrust laws if its use of minimum resale price 

maintenance should produce anticompetitive effects. Indeed, as the States themselves 

assert, many states "vigorously prosecute vertical price-fixing". States' Comment at 2. 

For instance, minimum resale price maintenance is unlawful under California law, and 

any contract setting forth a minimum resale price maintenance agreement is 

unenforceable under New York law. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720(d), (e)(3); N.Y. 

executives understand that Coach, Inc., Deckers Outdoor Corporation, C&J Clark 

International Limited, Born Footwear, Ecco and Brown Shoe Company all use some type 

of minimum resale price maintenance. (Suppl. Cohen Decl. ]f 13.) Also, Coach, Merrell, Born, Ecco, Sofft, Clarks, Kate Spade, UGG and BCBG/BCBG Max Azria are all 

competitor brands that have been excluded from department store point-of-sale coupons, based on a review of fine-print exclusions in Macy's, Bloomingdale's and Lord & 

Taylor's point-of-sale coupons appearing in publications such as The New York Times, 

the Stamford Advocate and direct mail promotions. (Id.) What Nine West does not know — without the types of discussions that would be problematic — is to what extent its 

competitors have embraced the Leegin world and rejected the Dr. Miles/Colgate 

straight) acket. 

10 
Gen. Bus. Law § 369-a.9

 Nine West would no doubt remain under careful scrutiny by 

both the Commission and the states if the Order is modified as requested. 

Conclusion 

For all of the reasons stated above, as well as in the original Petition, Nine 

West respectfully requests that parts (A)-(D) of Paragraph II of the April 11, 2000 

Decision and Order be deleted so as to prohibit minimum resale price maintenance no 

longer. 

February 8, 2008 

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, 

Ronald S. Rolfe ~7 

Member of the Firm 

Worldwide Plaza 

825 Eighth Avenue 

New York, NY 10019-7475 

(212)474-1000 

Attorneys for Applicant Nine West 

Footwear Corporation 

9

 In the majority of states, but certainly not all, federal antitrust precedent is used by 

courts in interpreting state antitrust statutes. (See Supplemental Exhibit 1, annexed to this 

Supplemental Memorandum, for a summary of current state law regarding resale price 

maintenance.) 

11 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petition to Reopen and Modify Order 

Supplemental Exhibit 1 

In the following states, state law regarding resale price maintenance is unsettled, but 

would likely follow federal law: Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Colorado; Connecticut; 

Delaware, Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Louisiana; 

Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; New 

Jersey; New Mexico; North Dakota; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; 

South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Virginia; Washington; West 

Virginia; Wisconsin 

In the following states, state law regarding resale price maintenance and the role of 

federal precedent in interpreting state antitrust statutes are both unclear or 

unsettled: Idaho; Kansas; Mississippi; Montana; Nevada; New Hampshire; North 

Carolina; Vermont; Wyoming 

Other: 

Arkansas: State law unclear. Statute declares it illegal "to regulate or fix, either in this 

state or elsewhere, the price of any article of manufacture", but a 1910 state supreme 

court decision says that state law does not prohibit resale price maintenance. 

California: Minimum resale price maintenance has been held to be per se illegal under 

state law, though the exception under United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919), 

applies. 

New York: State statute declares unenforceable "[a]ny contract provision" setting forth a 

minimum resale price maintenance agreement. 

Ohio: State law unsettled, but early state court decisions have held resale price 

maintenance to be per se illegal.