Filed 7/2/14 Castellon v. Balbigy CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT

JUDITH CASTELLON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
NADER BALBIGY;
Defendant and Appellant. B245122
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LD062461)

APPEAL from an order of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. Steff Padilla, Christine Ewell and Vi rginia Keeny, Judges. Affirmed.

Nader Balbigy, in pro per, Appellant.

No appearance by Respondent.

_____________ _____________2 Nader Balbigy appeals from the family la w court’s domestic violence restraining order that prohibited him from having contact with his wife and children. We affirm that
order.

FACTS AND PROCED URAL HISTORY
On August 10, 2012 , the trial court issued a domes tic violence restraining order against Nader Balbigy in conn ection with the marital dissol ution proceeding brought by his wife, Judith Castellon. Distilled, th at order commanded Balb igy to refrain from contacting, stalking, or harassing Ca stellon and their three children. At the hearing on Castellon’s applicati on for that order, Balb igy admitted that he was already subject to a restraining order that resulted from his earlier no contest plea to a criminal domestic violence charge. The tr ial court reviewed the criminal court’s restraining order and pointed out that the crim inal court had not checked off the box that would have allowed Balbigy to ha ve contact with his children.
Castellon claimed that Balb igy had, in violation of th e criminal court restraining order, contacted the children to say negative things about her and pressure them into living with him, stalked her on Facebook through a fictiona l identity, check ed up on her eBay activities, and had threatened to harm th ree of her relatives. Balbigy admitted that he had contacted his children by phone and in person, had been following Castellon on Facebook, obtained records of her cell phone activity because his name was on the account, examined her eBay ac tivities, and secretly recorded a conversation he had with
her.
Castellon said she wanted an order that would allow Balbigy to see the children during monitored visits with a therapist in order to address the emotional abuse they suffered from his conduct. The trial court gr anted the restraining order and was in the process of awarding visitation on that basis wh en Balbigy interrupted and said he did not
want visitation. The trial court said it was “sorry for your children because they love you.” The trial court then issued a five-y ear restraining order against Balbigy that applied to his wife and children.3 DISCUSSION

Under the Domestic Violence Protecti on Act (Fam. Code, § 6200, et seq.), the family law court can issue restraining orders either ex parte or after notice and a hearing to enjoin a party from, among other things , stalking, threatening, harassing, making annoying phone calls, contacting, or disturbi ng the peace of the other party and, if applicable, their family or household members. (Fam. Code, §§ 6320, 6340.) We review
the trial court’s order under the abuse of di scretion standard and examine the record to determine whether the order is supp orted by substantial evidence. ( Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.Ap p.4th 1140, 1143.) We recognize that Balbigy has represen ted himself throughout these proceedings,
but he is still bound to follow the rules and prin ciples that govern the presentation of facts and arguments in appellate briefs. ( Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246- 1247.) These include: presenting the facts fu lly and completely, and not in a one-sided manner; providing an adequate record that permits meaningful appellate review; and making cogent and intelligible arguments that cite both the record and applicable legal authority. ( Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.Ap p.4th 1365, 1374.) 1 Balbigy has, for the most part, failed to meet these obligations. His opening appellate brief consists primarily of a one-sided attempt to reargue the facts that led to his
domestic violence conviction and to discredit Castellon’s fitness as a mother through charges of infidelity and other misconduct. He does not offer by way of citation to authority or otherwise any meaningful legal ar gument why the trial court erred. The most
we can discern from his brief is the contentio n that the family law restraining order was
based on the fact that the criminal court’s restraining order mistak enly excluded him from seeing his children, an error that he contends was corrected eight months after the family law restraining order was issued.

1 Castellon’s failure to file a respondent ’s brief does not relieve Balbigy of these obligations. ( Burquet v. Brumbaugh, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141, fn. 1.)4 This contention suffers from several defects. First, neither the original criminal law restraining order nor the supposed modi fied order is in the appellate record, precluding meaningful appellate review. Second, it does not acknowledge that the trial court had an independent evidentiary basis for its order based on Castellon’s evidence and Balbigy’s admissions concerning the nature and extent of his conduct in regard to both Castellon and his children. Finally, the pur ported modification or clarification of the criminal law restraining order occurred long after the family law restraining order issued,
and we review the trial court’s ruling based on matters before it at the time of the hearing. ( Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2.) 2

DISPOSITION
The family law court’s restraining order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J. WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

FLIER, J.

2 To the extent the trial court might ha ve relied on the criminal law restraining order, Balbigy is free to seek modification of that order based on changed circumstances. (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) We also not e that during oral argument Balbigy referred to other family law proceedings in this case. Those matters were not before us and we express no opinion concerning their effect or ultimate disposition should they be appealed.