* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-41548 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. RUBEN SALINAS, JR Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:06-CR-11-2
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ruben Salinas, Jr., appeals his sentence following his guilty plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than 1000 kilograms of marijuana. Salinas argues that the district court erred by denying him the benefit of the “safety valve” provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 based on a finding that he possessed a firearm in connection with the offense. The firearm in question was found in a bedroom ofa house that Salinaswas using tostore more than 2,500 kilograms ofmarijuana. Salinas argues that he did not “possess” the United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D May 12, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 06-41548

2 firearm because it belonged to his father and it was found i n his father’s bedroom in his father’s house. The defendant has the burden of showing that he is entitled to a safety-valve adjustment. U nited States v. McCrimmon, 443 F.3d 454, 457 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1120 (2006). The district court’s application of the
safety valve is reviewed for clear error. I d. Possession of a fi rearm may be “actual” or “constructive” and may be proven by circumstantial evidence. U nited States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1 999). This court applies “a
common sense, fact-specificapproach” to a determination whether constructive possession exists. U nited States v. Wright, 24 F.3d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 1994). Although Salinas asserts that the firearm belonged to hisfather, whether the firearm was accessible is relevant to possession inquiry, not its ownership. See United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 271, 278 (5th Cir. 1994). The fact that Salinas knew where the firearm could be found also suggests he had access to it. See United States v. Hinojosa, 349 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2003). We also note that Sali nas’s ability to store such a large quantity of marijuana at the house, allegedly without his father’s knowledge, suggests he had some degree of “dominion or control over the premises.” U nited Statesv. Matias, 465 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2006). Salinas also argues that the firearm was not connected to his offense because it was not stored near the marijuana and it was unloaded. This court has held that, “despite any differenc e in semantics between U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and § 5C1.2(2), thetwoprovisions should be analyzed analogously.” Uni ted States v. Vasquez, 161 F.3d 909, 913 (5th Cir. 1998). The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the weapons enhancement “should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with theoffense.” § 2D1.1(b)(1) comment (n.3). A connection with the offense may be shown with “evidence that the weapon was found in the same location where drugs or drug paraphernal ia are stored or where part of theNo. 06-41548

3 transaction occurred.” U nited States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Sal inas asserts that the firearm was not sufficiently connected to his offense because it was owned by his father to protect his home; however, even ifa weapon may have some other legitimate intended use, the relevant inquiry iswhether theweapon could have been used in connection with thedrug offense. See United States v. Menesses, 962 F.2d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 1992). Salinas’s argument that the firearm was stored too far away from the marijuana is unpersuasive. See United States v. Juluke, 426 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1999). Salinas’s argument that the firearm was unloaded also is unpersuasive. SeeJacquinot, 258 F.3d at 431; United States v. Caicedo, 103 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1997). Salinas also argues that the district court erred by finding that a coconspirator could have used the firearm and that a co-conspirator’s possession of a firearm may be imputed to a defendant to deny relief under § 5C1.2. It is unclear whether a finding of co-conspirator possession was the basis for the district court’s ruling. This court has held that it is error to deny § 5C1.2 relief based on a finding that a co-conspirator possessed a firearm. See United States
v. Wilson, 105 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 1997). However, even if the district court
so erred, we affirm Salinas’s sentence because the record shows that he had constructive possession ofthefirearm. SeeUnited Statesv. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318, 1324 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1996); Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992).AFFIRMED.