RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1104-MR

RACHEL ANNE WILSON APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JUDY VANCE-MURPHY, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CR-00233

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, Rachel Wilson, appeals the Adair Circuit Court’s 

September 6, 2022 order revoking her probation. She argues the circuit court made 

insufficient findings pursuant to Kentucky’s supervised release revocation statute, 

KRS1 439.3106. We detect no error and, therefore, affirm.

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2022, Appellant pleaded guilty to several criminal 

offenses: first-degree possession of a controlled substance, first offense; tampering 

with physical evidence; possession of drug paraphernalia; operating a motor 

vehicle under the influence, first offense; failure to wear a seatbelt; and possession 

of an open container in a motor vehicle. On May 24, 2022, Appellant received a

sentence of incarceration for three years. 

Her entire sentence was probated. During her probation, Appellant

was required to report to her probation officer, commit no further violations of the 

law, and submit to drug tests. She attended her first appointment with Officer 

McFarland, her probation officer, on May 31, 2022. On June 15, Appellant was 

charged with failure to maintain insurance, no or expired registration, and, for the 

second time, possession of an open container in a motor vehicle.

Appellant appeared at her second appointment with Officer 

McFarland on June 23, 2022. Appellant signed in but left shortly thereafter. She 

stated she did so because she was confused that the interior door at the probation 

office was locked and that nobody responded when she knocked on the door. She 

also avers she decided to return home after her daughter, who drove Appellant to 

the appointment, repeatedly came to the door of the probation office. However, 

the Commonwealth notes Appellant did not call Officer McFarland while at the 
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probation office, despite a sign in the office lobby instructing her to do so. Indeed, 

Officer McFarland was at the office at that time. Appellant unsuccessfully 

attempted to contact Officer McFarland when she got home. 

Officer McFarland had no success in her attempt to contact Appellant 

on July 1. Officer McFarland visited Appellant’s home on July 13, but she was not 

home. Appellant states she was away from home because of difficulties related to 

her divorce from her abusive husband which required her to stay with a family 

friend rather than at home. She asserts she informed Probation and Parole about 

her moving out of her house. Officer McFarland left a note instructing Appellant 

to report the next day, July 14.

On July 15, Officer McFarland filed a violation-of-supervision report, 

recommending revocation of Appellant’s probation. On July 24, Appellant, while 

driving, collided with a stop sign and was found by a police officer in a nearby 

yard. Field sobriety tests revealed Appellant was drunk. Appellant was arrested 

and charged with the following: careless driving; operating a motor vehicle under 

the influence, second offense; leaving the scene of an accident; driving on a DUIsuspended license; failure to surrender a revoked driver’s license; and, for the third 

time, possession of an open container in a motor vehicle. Officer McFarland filed 

a second violation-of-supervision report following this arrest.
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The Commonwealth moved to revoke Appellant’s probation on July 

28, 2022. The circuit court held a revocation hearing on August 23, 2022 and

entered its Order Revoking Probation on September 6, 2022. Appellant now 

appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s decision to revoke probation for abuse of 

discretion. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 292 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky. 2009) (citation 

omitted). A trial court abused its discretion if its “decision was arbitrary, 

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. 

English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that trial courts must consider the criteria KRS 

439.3106 provides in determining whether to revoke probation, and that the circuit 

court failed to do so in the instant case. She also argues the circuit court did not 

enter findings of sufficient specificity as to which conditions of her probation 

Appellant violated. Neither argument has merit. KRS 439.3106 is Kentucky’s 

supervised release revocation statute, and provides as relevant:

(1) Supervised individuals shall be subject to:

(a) Violation revocation proceedings and possible 

incarceration for failure to comply with the conditions 

of supervision when such failure constitutes a 

significant risk to prior victims of the supervised 
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individual or the community at large, and cannot be 

appropriately managed in the community; or

(b) Sanctions other than revocation and incarceration 

as appropriate to the severity of the violation behavior, 

the risk of future criminal behavior by the offender, and 

the need for, and availability of, interventions which 

may assist the offender to remain compliant and crimefree in the community.

KRS 439.3106(1).

In Commonwealth v. Andrews, Andrews violated the condition of his 

probation requiring that he abstain from using any drugs not prescribed to him. 

448 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Ky. 2014). At the revocation hearing in Andrews, while the 

circuit court expressed doubt as to whether KRS 439.3106 applied to its decision 

regarding probation revocation, it made oral findings that Andrews was a 

significant risk to the community and could not be managed properly in the 

community. Id. The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[w]ithout question, the 

power to revoke probation is vested in the trial courts and in the trial courts alone.” 

Id. at 777 (citing KRS 533.010 et seq.). Despite this, a unanimous Supreme Court 

concluded that KRS 439.3106 “requires trial courts to consider whether a 

probationer’s failure to abide by a condition of supervision constitutes a significant 

risk to prior victims or the community at large, and whether the probationer cannot 

be managed in the community before probation may be revoked.” Id. at 780.
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In this case, the circuit court’s Order Revoking Probation listed the 

seven conditions of probation it determined Appellant had violated, including 

failing to report to her probation officer, failure to abstain from alcohol, and 

commission of additional criminal acts. (Record (R.) at 81-82.) The circuit court

also “further f[ound] that the Defendant’s failure to abide by the conditions of her 

probation constitutes a significant risk to the prior victim(s) and/or the community, 

and the Defendant cannot be appropriately managed in the community.” Id. at 82. 

The court’s ruling therefore contains the findings KRS 439.3106(1) requires.

Appellant argues the circuit court’s findings are simply a recitation of 

the statutory language; as she describes them, the circuit court’s findings were 

“merely boilerplate.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8.) She argues this is insufficient. 

Our jurisprudence does not support Appellant’s argument. As 

Appellant points out, “perfunctorily reciting the statutory language in KRS 

439.3106 is not enough.” Helms v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Ky. 

App. 2015). However, Helms does not stand for the proposition that, should a trial 

court’s findings simply state that each of the KRS 439.3106(1)(a) criteria are met, 

that remand is required in every case. Instead, as this Court further explains in 

Helms, “[t]here must be proof in the record established by a preponderance of the 

evidence that a defendant violated the terms of his release and the statutory criteria 

for revocation has been met.” Id. We ultimately determined in Helms that the 
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evidence of record did not meet this evidentiary burden upon an examination of the 

facts in the record. Id.

In the instant case, a preponderance of the evidence of record supports 

the circuit court’s decision to revoke Appellant’s probation. While on probation, 

Appellant was charged for several relatively minor offenses, including failure to 

maintain insurance and expired registration. Additionally, her failure to show up 

for her June 23 appointment with her probation officer, in isolation, likely would 

be insufficient to find Appellant posed a risk to the community and that she could 

not be managed in the community. However, Appellant received more serious 

criminal charges while on probation. She was arrested for careless driving, a 

second DUI, and leaving the scene of an accident after colliding with a stop sign 

and being found in a nearby yard by a police officer. Accordingly, our 

examination of the record reveals the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining the KRS 439.3106(1) criteria had been satisfied.

Appellant also argues the circuit court should have made more 

specific findings as to which of her conditions of probation she violated. In 

McClure v. Commonwealth, McClure argued, as relevant to the present appeal, the 

trial court’s finding that he was a significant risk to the public was insufficient to 

revoke his probation because “it did not include an explanation of how attempting 

to alter a drug screen posed a danger to society.” 457 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Ky. App. 
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2015) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court disagreed, 

concluding “[n]either KRS 439.3106 nor Andrews require anything more than a 

finding to this effect supported by the evidence of record.” Id. We determined, 

therefore, the trial court “owed McClure no further explanation.” Id. However, 

because the trial court made no finding as to whether McClure could be 

appropriately managed within the community as KRS 439.3106 requires, we 

remanded to the trial court to enter further findings. Id. at 733-34.

This case is distinguishable from McClure because the circuit court 

made both requisite findings. As KRS 439.3106(1) requires, the court considered 

each of Appellant’s probation violations and concluded these violations constituted 

a significant risk to either prior victims or the community and that Appellant could 

not be appropriately managed in the community. Because evidence of record 

supports the court’s findings as discussed above, the findings are sufficient. 

At the end of her brief, Appellant argues KRS 439.3106 required the 

circuit court to consider alternative sanctions. However, KRS 439.3106 requires 

trial courts to find that a person poses a risk and cannot be managed in the 

community before the court may revoke probation. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780. 

Consideration of these criteria “allows the trial court to conclude with some 

certainty that the imposition of some other accountability measure would be 

fruitless[.]” Id. at 779. In deciding that both statutory criteria applied to 
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Appellant, the circuit court in the instant case simultaneously determined 

alternative sanctions were not appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Adair Circuit Court’s 

September 6, 2022 Order Revoking Probation.

ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Julia K. Pearson

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Melissa A. Pile

Assistant Attorney General 

Frankfort, Kentucky