2014 UT App 297

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF D.L., J.L., AND L.L.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

_______________

M.L.

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH, 

Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20140864-CA

Filed December 26, 2014

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Julie V. Lund

No. 1024039

Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, JAMES Z. DAVIS,

 and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 M.L. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights.

We affirm.

¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the

result must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the

appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
In re D.L.

has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). We “review the juvenile

court’s factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous

standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding

of fact is clearly erroneous when, in light of the evidence

supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of the

evidence. Id. Therefore, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s

decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage

in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.

¶3 Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-6-507, the finding of a

single enumerated ground will support the termination of parental

rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012).

Therefore, it is sufficient if the evidence supports any of the

grounds for termination found by the juvenile court. The court

found that Father was an unfit or incompetent parent. See id.

§ 78A-6-507(1)(c). The court further found that Father had

substantially neglected, had willfully refused, or had been unable

to remedy the circumstances that caused his children to be placed

in an out-of-home placement and that there is a substantial

likelihood that he will not be capable of exercising proper and

effective parental care in the near future. See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d).

The juvenile court also found that it was strictly necessary to

terminate Father’s parental rights. See id. § 78A-6-507(1). Finally,

the court found that it was in the children’s best interest that

parental rights be terminated. See id. § 78A-6-506(3). 

¶4 The evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that

Father was unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the

children to be in an out-of-home placement and that there was a

substantial likelihood Father would not be capable of exercising

proper and effective parental care in the near future. The State

stipulated that Father completed the requirements of the service

plan. Father argues that because the service plan was designed to

accomplish reunification, his completion of the plan should result

in reunification with his children. However, although Father made

progress in improving his parenting skills during the twelve

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In re D.L.

sessions of Parent Child Intensive Therapy (PCIT), the therapist

testified that Father would require ten to twelve months of PCIT

twice a week to make significant changes in his parenting ability.

The therapist testified that the additional PCIT would increase the

probability of success but would not guarantee that at the

conclusion of that therapy, it would be safe to return the children

to Father’s full-time care. Although Father could continue to make

improvement, the therapist was not confident that he could make

improvements that would be sufficient to meet the children’s

needs. D.L. has an autism spectrum disorder, and all three children

have special needs that require high structure, predictable

schedules, highly nurturing care, and aggressive and assertive

parenting. In sum, the therapist opined that it would be in the

children’s best interest to remain with the foster family “in a

permanent arrangement and . . . also maintain a relationship with

their birth parents.” Similarly, the caseworker testified that

although Father had been in compliance with services, the

caseworker did not believe that Father could sustain an

appropriate living environment given the children’s special needs

and the birth parents’ deficits. The caseworker agreed that an ideal

situation would be for the children to be adopted by the foster

family but have contact with their birth parents.

¶5 Father characterizes the juvenile court’s findings as based

solely upon speculation about the future. However, the evidence

sufficiently supports the juvenile court’s finding that although

Father made improvements, he was not yet in a position to regain

custody of the children at the time of the termination trial and

would not be in a position to do so in the near future. At best,

Father would require an additional ten months of PCIT. The

juvenile court found that the parents received nineteen months of

services in 2009 to 2011 for the same concerns that led to the 2012

removal. Despite those services and another nineteen months of

services in 2012 to 2014, Father was not in a position to safely take

custody of the children. The court found,

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In re D.L.

While the court recognizes that there is a possibility

that with another 10 [to] 12 months of services

[Father] might improve [his] parenting skills, the

court finds it is unlikely that [he] would be in a

position at that time to meet the special needs of [his]

children. [The two younger children] have been

under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for over

half of their short lives and the services provided to

their parents over those 36 plus months have not

resulted in permanent change in their parenting

abilities which would ensure their home

environment to be safe and appropriate.

The evidence was sufficient to support the ground for termination

of parental rights under section 78A-6-507(1)(d). 

¶6 The best interest finding is also supported by the evidence.

The foster family provided the structure, care, and nurturing

necessary to address the children’s special needs. Although the

caseworker stated at trial that the determination to pursue

termination and adoption rather than permanent custody and

guardianship in the foster parents took into account the differing

financial considerations, Fatherincorrectly asserts that this was the

sole basis for the determination. The evidence as a whole

demonstrated that the foster family provided the parenting that

would be required to address the special needs of these children,

who had resided in the foster home for over a year-and-a-half.

Similarly, the juvenile court’s conclusion that it was strictly

necessary to terminate parental rights is adequately supported

because it is in the children’s best interests to be adopted by the

foster family.

¶7 Father claims for the first time on appeal that the Division of

Child and Family Services failed to make reasonable efforts toward

reunificationby not offering PCIT earlier in the case. This claim was

not preserved for appeal. Furthermore, as the juvenile court found,

the parents received in excess of thirty-six months of services in

20140864-CA 4 2014 UT App 297
In re D.L.

multiple cases. The claim that the Division failed to make

reasonable efforts clearly lacks merit. 

¶8 Because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the

evidence,” we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s

parental rights. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435.

20140864-CA 5 2014 UT App 297