[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14571

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cr-80007-KAM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

OSCAR IVAN PARDO-GERENA, 

a.k.a. Gilborto Alverez,

a.k.a. Gilbert Albert Garcia,

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(August 28, 2015)

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 1 of 17 
2

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Oscar Pardo-Gerena appeals his 54-month sentence, imposed after he pled 

guilty to conspiring to knowingly transport stolen goods and merchandise in 

interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314. Mr. Pardo-Gerena

argues the district court erred in calculating the loss amount under U.S.S.G. § 

2B1.1, applying a two-level reckless endangerment enhancement during flight 

under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, and applying a two-level sophisticated means 

enhancement under U.S.S.G § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). In addition, Mr. Pardo-Genera 

contends that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After 

review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm. 

I

On December 9, 2013, Mr. Pardo-Gerena entered the United States from 

Colombia via Miami, Florida, with a ticket providing for a return flight to 

Colombia on December 22, 2013. The FBI, as part of an ongoing investigation, 

conducted physical and GPS surveillance on Mr. Pardo-Gerena and five other coconspirators from December 14 through 17, 2013, as the six men traveled from 

Florida to Illinois. To make the trip, Mr. Pardo-Gerena rented a Chrysler minivan 

and an Infiniti G37 in Miami using a false identification. 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 2 of 17 
3

Mr. Pardo-Gerena and his co-conspirators made numerous trips from Illinois 

to Missouri to conduct nighttime surveillance of the Diamond Family Jewelry 

Store. They also obtained advanced tools in preparation for burglarizing the store. 

Mr. Pardo-Gerena and his co-conspirators went to the store the evening of

December 21. FBI agents witnessed three individuals walk behind the jewelry 

store and heard footsteps and drilling sounds coming from the store’s roof. The

agents spotted three of Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s co-conspirators in the store and 

arrested them. A fourth co-conspirator fled, and agents later found him hiding 

under a nearby bridge. At this point, only Mr. Pardo-Gerena and one other coconspirator had not been apprehended. 

During the arrests, the Infiniti—which had been parked near the store—

pulled out of a parking lot. FBI Special Agent Shelton Hammonds drove up and 

tried to cut off the Infiniti, which was traveling at a high speed. Agent Hammonds 

then swerved out of the Infiniti’s way to avoid an accident, and the Infiniti 

continued down the road. Agent Hammonds tried to follow the Infiniti, but was 

unsuccessful. He later found the Infiniti abandoned in a neighborhood near the 

store. The FBI arrested Mr. Pardo-Gerena a few days later at the Ft. LauderdaleHollywood International Airport as he was attempting to leave the United States.1

 1 Law enforcement never apprehended or identified the sixth suspect.

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 3 of 17 
4

On January 14, 2014, a federal grand jury charged Mr. Pardo-Gerena and the 

four apprehended co-conspirators with conspiring to transport stolen goods in 

interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314. Mr. Pardo-Gerena, 

pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty in April of 2014.

In September of 2014, the district court held Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s sentencing 

hearing. The presentence investigation report determined that Mr. Pardo-Gerena 

had a base offense level of 6 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2 B1.1(a)(2), because the 

offense involved fraud or deceit. The report included a 16-level enhancement for 

loss amount under § 2B1.1 because the intended loss amount exceeded $1,000,000 

but was not more than $2,500,000. Additionally, the report included a two-level 

reckless endangerment enhancement during flight under § 3C1.2; a two-level 

sophisticated means enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C); a three-level 

aggravating role adjustment under § 3B1.1(b); and a three-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a) and (b). Mr. Pardo-Gerena objected 

to the enhancements for loss amount, sophisticated means, reckless endangerment, 

and his role in the offense.2

Regarding the calculation for loss, the jewelry store owner testified that the 

store contained approximately $1.2 million worth of goods on the night of the 

attempted burglary. This approximation was based on the value of inventoried 

 2 The district court sustained Mr. Pardo-Genera’s objection as to the aggravating role adjustment.

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 4 of 17 
5

items, consignment items, items left at the store for repair, and other store items.

Mr. Pardo-Gerena argued that the owner speculated concerning the value of the 

consignment items and the items left at the store for repair. The district court 

overruled Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s objection and applied the 16-level enhancement,

finding that the intended loss exceeded $1 million given the owner’s testimony.

Concerning the sophisticated means enhancement, Mr. Pardo-Gerena argued 

that although the attempted burglary might have appeared sophisticated, the 

government had not shown that the conspiracy to transport stolen goods in 

interstate commerce itself was sophisticated. The district court overruled Mr. 

Pardo-Gerena’s objection, finding that the attempted burglary was relevant conduct 

under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, and it was sufficient that the attempted burglary involved 

sophisticated means.

Next, Mr. Pardo-Gerena objected to the reckless endangerment enhancement 

and argued that the evidence was insufficient to find that he had been driving the 

Infiniti and that the Infiniti was driven in a manner that created a substantial risk of 

death. Agent Hammonds testified that Mr. Pardo-Gerena drove the fleeing Infiniti, 

based upon video from that night. The district court found that, because four of the 

six suspects were arrested that night, the fleeing Infiniti could have only been 

driven by either Mr. Pardo-Gerena or the sixth suspect. Agent Hammonds testified 

concerning the location of Mr. Pardo-Gerena and the unidentified sixth suspect 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 5 of 17 
6

relative to the location of the Infiniti during the attempted burglary. The district 

court overruled the objection, finding that Mr. Pardo-Gerena was driving the 

Infiniti at the time of its flight, and the Infiniti created a serious risk of bodily 

injury or death to another person during the course of flight.

Mr. Pardo-Gerena now appeals.

II

Mr. Pardo-Gerena first argues that the district court erred because it 

calculated the $1.2 million intended loss amount based in part on the owner’s 

speculation. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See

United States v. Delgado, 56 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir.1995). We review the 

district court's application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. Id. 

“A district court’s determination regarding the amount of loss for sentencing 

purposes is reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Nosrati-Shamloo, 255 F.3d 

1290, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001). “The sentencing judge is in a unique position to 

assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence” and so “the 

court’s loss determination is entitled to appropriate deference.” § 2B1.1 cmt. 

n.3(C). 

In calculating the loss amount, “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended 

loss.” Id. cmt. n.3(A). “Intended loss” is “pecuniary harm that was intended to 

result from the offense.” Id. cmt. n.3(A)(ii). Where the loss amount is greater than 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 6 of 17 
7

$1,000,000 but not more than $2,500,000, a defendant receives a 16-level 

enhancement. See § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). Where the loss amount is greater than 

$400,000, but not more than $1,000,000, a defendant receives a 14-level 

enhancement. See § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). 

The district court “need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss 

amount.” § 2B1.1 cmt n.3(C). The court does not need to value the loss with 

precision. United States v. Dominguez, 109 F.3d 675, 676 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Although “estimates are permissible, courts must not speculate concerning the 

existence of a fact which would permit a more severe sentence under the 

guidelines.” United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 890 (11th Cir. 1997)

(emphasis added). The amount of loss must be proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence, and the burden must be satisfied with “reliable and specific evidence.”

Id. (emphasis added).

The evidence supported the district court’s finding that Mr. Pardo-Gerena

and his codefendants intended to “take out every piece of jewelry that they could 

carry.” The district court found the intended loss was approximately $1.2 million. 

This sum was based on the owner’s testimony that the store contained $860,338 of 

inventoried items, $210,000 of consignment items, $115,000 of items left at the 

store for repair, $30,000 of diamond melle, and $10,000 of scrap gold. 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 7 of 17 
8

Mr. Pardo-Gerena argues that the owner’s testimony regarding the value of 

the consignment items and the items left at the store for repair amounted to 

speculation and that the district court clearly erred by including these values in its 

loss calculation. To review this argument, we need only look to evidence of how 

the owner distinguished inventoried items and consignment items.

Inventoried items were owned by the store, kept on-site, and sold to 

prospective customers. The store kept track of each inventoried item by using a 

stock keeping unit (SKU) number. The owner, using this tracking system, testified 

that his store possessed $860,338 worth of inventoried items on the night of the 

attempted burglary. Consignment items included merchandise not owned by the 

store but kept in the store for vendors. The store would keep temporary custody, 

but not ownership, over these items. If a customer was interested in buying a 

consigned item, the store would assign an SKU number to the item, thus making it 

part of the store’s inventoried items. Then, the store would sell this newly 

inventoried item to the customer. The owner testified that the store possessed 

$210,000 in consignment items on the night of the attempted burglary. Though the 

store did not keep its own financial records for these consigned items, the owner 

substantiated this $210,000 valuation using the financial records of one of its 

vendors. Because this testimony amounts to specific and reliable evidence, the 

district court did not clearly err by relying on such testimony in its loss calculation. 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 8 of 17 
9

Given that the government sufficiently showed that the store possessed more 

than $1 million in inventoried and consignment items on the night in question, the 

district court properly included those items in the loss calculation. We thus need 

not evaluate Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s arguments regarding the value of the other items 

in the store. 

III

Mr. Pardo-Gerena next raises a three-pronged argument that the district 

court erred in applying the reckless endangerment enhancement. Mr. Pardo-Gerena

argues that there was insufficient evidence to find that he was the driver of the 

Infiniti that fled from the law enforcement officers, that the Infiniti driver’s 

conduct constituted reckless endangerment during flight, and that the Infiniti driver 

knowingly fled from law enforcement officers.

The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts 

necessary to support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v Askew, 193 

F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir 1999). “This burden requires the trier of fact to believe 

that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v.

Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). When the defendant challenges one of the facts supporting his sentence, 

the government must prove the disputed fact with “reliable and specific evidence.” 

See United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 9 of 17 
10

First, we review Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s argument that there was insufficient 

evidence for the court to find that he was the driver of the Infiniti. As the district 

court explained, at the time the Infiniti was driving away, its driver could have

been only Mr. Pardo-Gerena or the unidentified sixth suspect, because the other 

four suspects were already in custody. After reviewing the store’s security video, 

Agent Hammonds identified Mr. Pardo-Gerena, based on his gait and clothing, as 

the person who fled in the Infiniti. Further, Agent Hammonds testified that the 

unidentified sixth suspect (the only other possible driver of the Infiniti) was not 

inside the store during the attempted burglary, and there were signs that the sixth 

individual fled the area on foot through a white picket fence. Agent Hammonds’ 

testimony thus provided reliable and specific evidence for the district court to find 

that Mr. Pardo-Gerena was more likely than not the Infiniti driver.

Next, we review Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s argument that there was insufficient 

evidence that the Infiniti driver created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily 

injury. A reckless endangerment enhancement applies “[i]f the defendant 

recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another 

person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer . . . .” U.S.S.G § 

3C1.2. “Another person” means “any person, except a participant in the offense 

who willingly participated in the flight.” Id. cmt. n.4. 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 10 of 17 
11

“Driving a car at a high speed in an area where people are likely to be found 

constitutes reckless disregard for others’ safety.” United States v. Washington, 434 

F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s application of the 

enhancement). Agent Hammonds testified that the Infiniti pulled out of the parking 

lot, forcing him to swerve to avoid a collision. Then the Infiniti turned onto a 

public street going approximately 50 or 60 miles per hour on icy roads. Thus, the 

district court had sufficient evidence to find that Mr. Pardo-Gerena recklessly 

created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. 

Finally, Mr. Pardo-Gerena argues that there was no evidence from which the 

district court could find that he knew he was fleeing law enforcement officers. 

Because he did not object on this basis in the district court, our review is only for 

plain error. See United States v. Pantle, 637 F.3d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Under plain error review, “(1) there must be error; (2) the error must be plain; (3) 

the error must affect the appellant's substantial rights; and (4) the error must 

seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

Id.

The reckless endangerment enhancement applies “only where the defendant 

knows he is fleeing from a law enforcement officer who is in pursuit of the 

defendant.” United States v. Martikainen, 640 F.3d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). In 

Martikainen—upon which Mr. Pardo-Gerena relies—the defendant had absconded 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 11 of 17 
12

with his son on a boat traveling from Florida toward the Yucatan Peninsula. Three 

days later, law enforcement agents received a tip as to his whereabouts and began 

to follow the defendant from a distance of eight miles. The next day, the law 

enforcement officers boarded the defendant’s boat, and he fully cooperated with 

the officers. The court found that the defendant did not knowingly flee a law 

enforcement officer. Id. at 1193-94. 

Here, the evidence supports the finding that Mr. Pardo-Gerena fled because 

he knew law enforcement officers were in pursuit. Mr. Pardo-Gerena, in the 

Infiniti, sped out of a parking lot just as law enforcement agents came upon the 

scene to arrest his co-conspirators. Agent Hammonds tried to use his car to block 

Mr. Pardo-Gerena to prevent him from driving away, and then pursued Mr. PardoGerena, who was fleeing. Given this evidence, the district court did not commit 

plain error in finding that Mr. Pardo-Gerena knew that law enforcement was 

pursuing him.

IV

Mr. Pardo-Gerena contends that the district court erred in applying a twolevel sophisticated means enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). He 

argues that the government presented evidence that only the attempted burglary 

was sophisticated, not that the offense of conviction (conspiracy to transport stolen 

goods in interstate commerce) was sophisticated. 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 12 of 17 
13

We review for clear error a district court’s factual finding that sophisticated 

means were used. See United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1199 (11th Cir. 

2011). Sophisticated means is defined as “especially complex or especially 

intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.”

§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B). “There is no requirement that each of a defendant’s individual 

actions be sophisticated in order to impose the enhancement. Rather, it is sufficient 

if the totality of the scheme was sophisticated.” United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 

1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming a sophisticated means enhancement where 

the defendant’s acts included conducting extensive research, using forged 

documents and unwitting couriers, and transferring funds to others who withdrew 

cash for him). 

In determining a defendant’s specific offense characteristics, the district 

court must consider all of the defendant’s “relevant conduct,” as defined in § 

1B1.3. When a defendant jointly undertakes criminal activity, “relevant conduct” 

includes all acts by the defendant, and all reasonably foreseeable acts of others in 

furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, “that occurred during the 

commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the 

course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” § 

1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 13 of 17 
14

Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s primary argument—that any sophisticated conduct 

occurred in relation to the attempted burglary, but not the conspiracy to transport 

the proceeds from the burglary in interstate commerce—is meritless. The 

attempted burglary was part of the means by which Mr. Pardo-Gerena and his coconspirators sought to obtain the items to transport in interstate commerce, and 

thus the burglary was relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) as an act done in 

preparation for the offense of conviction.

Further, there was sufficient evidence to find that the totality of Mr. PardoGerena’s scheme employed sophisticated means. First, Mr. Pardo-Gerena and his 

co-conspirators left Florida using false identities, stayed in Illinois, and planned to 

rob a jewelry store in Missouri. See § 2B1.1 cmt n.9 (“[L]ocating the main office 

of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in another 

jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.”). Second, they spent one 

week surveying the store to study its alarm, telephone, electrical systems, and 

wires. Third, they used false identifications to rent cars, storage units, and hotel 

rooms, obtained cell phone jammers to disrupt law enforcement’s ability to use 

radios, and purchased advanced tools to disable the store’s alarm, security 

cameras, and phone lines to avoid detection. The district court had sufficient 

evidence to find that Mr. Pardo-Gerena employed sophisticated means to 

perpetrate and conceal his scheme. See Ghertler, 605 F.3d at 1267.

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 14 of 17 
15

V

Mr. Pardo-Gerena asserts that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable 

because the district court inappropriately weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 

and based its sentence on speculation that he was part of an international burglary 

ring. In addition, Mr. Pardo-Gerena argues that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable because the district court had “no reason to go above the low end of

the guidelines” based on the facts of the case. We disagree.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In reviewing 

the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the sentence was procedurally 

reasonable, meaning that the district court properly calculated the Guideline range, 

treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the §3553(a) factors, did not select a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and adequately explained the chosen 

sentence. See id. at 51. Once we determine that a sentence is procedurally sound, 

we examine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the 

totality of the circumstances. See id.

The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is 

unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. 

Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). As long as the sentence imposed is a 

reasonable one, we will not set the sentence aside merely because we determine 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 15 of 17 
16

that a different sentence would have been more appropriate. See United States v. 

Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Rather, we will set aside a 

sentence only if we determine, “after giving a full measure of deference to the 

sentencing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.” Id. “The 

district court may determine on a case-by-case basis the relative weight to give the 

Guidelines range in light of the other section 3553(a) factors.” United States v. 

Lozano, 490 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007). Although we do not automatically 

presume a within-Guidelines sentence to be reasonable, we expect that such a 

sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 

2008). 

We reject Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s argument that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court found, in part, that he was part of an 

international burglary ring. Mr. Pardo-Gerena cites nothing in the record to support 

this assertion. The district court did not mention an international burglary ring in 

pronouncing Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s sentence, but rather stated that it considered the 

parties’ statements, the presentence investigation report, the Sentencing

Guidelines, and the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Mr. Pardo-Gerena has failed to 

show that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. See Tome, 611 F.3d at 

1378. 

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 16 of 17 
17

Mr. Pardo-Gerena finally argues that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable because the district court sentenced him above the low end of his 46 

to 57 month advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s 54-month 

sentence was within his advisory range and we conclude it was reasonable based 

on the facts of the case. He offers no valid argument why the district court’s 

within-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable.

VI

The district court did not err in calculating the intended loss amount or in 

applying the sophisticated means and reckless endangerment enhancements. And

Mr. Pardo-Gerena failed to show that his sentence was procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Pardo-Gerena’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-14571 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 17 of 17