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13-4430-pr 

Peeler v. McGill

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 31st day of October, two thousand fourteen. 

PRESENT: 

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

Circuit Judges. 

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RUSSELL PEELER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 -v.- No. 13-4430-pr 

JEFFREY E. MCGILL, WARDEN, ET AL., 

 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Russell Peeler, pro se, Somers, CT 

 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Ann E. Lynch and Colleen B. Valentine, 

Assistant Attorneys General, for George 

Jepsen, Attorney General, Connecticut Office 

of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 

(Robert N. Chatigny, Judge). 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED. 

Russell Peeler, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 

defendants, a group of state corrections staff. The District Court concluded that Peeler had failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We review an 

order granting summary judgment de novo, “‘resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible 

factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.’” Burg v. 

Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009)). 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and 

the issues on appeal. 

 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought with 

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined 

in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 2012). “[T]he 

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve 

general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The Supreme Court has also held that the PLRA 

exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion, “which means using all steps that the agency 

holds out . . . so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 

(2006) (internal quotation marks and parentheses omitted) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 

1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). That is, “prisoners must complete the administrative review process in 

accordance with the applicable procedural rules—rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the 

prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that the District Court did not err 

in finding that Peeler failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies properly before filing his 

federal complaint, and that this failure should not be excused. We therefore affirm for substantially 

the same reasons stated in the District Court’s thorough decision. 

We have considered all of Peeler’s arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 

FOR THE COURT, 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court