* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 30 2002 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MARY FRANCES DURAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Defendant-Appellee. No. 01-2154 (D.C. No. CIV-97-1598-BB/RLP)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before MURPHY , McKAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 An additional claim of age discrimination was dismi ssed after the Supreme

Court decided that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act may not be maintained against a State without that State’s consent. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents , 528 U.S. 62 (2000). -2- Plaintiff Mary Frances Duran, an Hispanic woman, be gan working for defendant New Mexico Department of Labor in 1975 atthe age of 42. She voluntarily retired in 1999 at the age of 65. Duri ng her employment, plaintiff sought and was rejected for several different promo tions. She also objected to certain disciplinary actions taken against her and to several of her annual performance evaluations. She filed several charges of discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity C ommission (EEOC). She then filed this suit, alleging claims of race and sex discrimination 1 and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court granted summary judgment in favo r of defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 12 91. We affirm. Plaintiff argues on appeal that: (1) there was a c ausal connection between her EEOC complaints and defendant’s actions in refu sing to promote her; (2) there was a causal connection between her EEOC complaints and defendant’s actions in denying her privileges and in disciplini ng her; (3) there was a causal connection between her EEOC complaints and defendant’s allegedly unfair and false evaluations of her job performance; (4) defen dant’s denial of privileges to-3-

her and disciplinary actions against her constitute d adverse employment actions sufficient to give rise to Title VII claims; (5) de fendant’s allegedly unfair and false evaluations of her job performance constitute d adverse employment actions sufficient to give rise to Title VII claims; (6) de fendant’s justifications for its recurring refusals to promote her were pretexts fordiscrimination; (7) defendant’s denial of privileges to her and disciplinary action s against her constituted disparate treatment giving rise to an inference of discrimination; and (8) defendant’s allegedly unfair and false evaluati ons of her job performance constituted disparate treatment giving rise to an i nference of discrimination. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, ap plying the same standard as the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judg ment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, i f any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c). We vi ew the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler , 144 F.3d at 670. “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Id.-4-

We have carefully reviewed the district court’s dec ision in light of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. We are u npersuaded by plaintiff’s claims of error. Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons as those set forth in the district court’s thorough April 19, 2001 memorandum opinion, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge