UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4454

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

VICTORIA NICOLE HOWELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Margaret B. Seymour, Chief 

District Judge. (5:08-cr-00944-MBS-23)

Submitted: October 10, 2012 Decided: December 19, 2012

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Langdon D. Long, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. John David Rowell, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Victoria Howell appeals the district court’s order 

revoking her term of supervised release and imposing a sentence 

of six months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that 

there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning 

whether the six-month sentence was plainly unreasonable. Howell 

was given the opportunity file a pro se supplemental brief, but 

has not done so. The Government declined to file a brief. We 

affirm. 

A district court has broad discretion to impose a 

sentence revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will 

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release 

if it is within the statutory maximum and is not “plainly 

unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 

(4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination, we first 

consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. A supervised release 

revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court has considered the advisory policy statement range and the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised release 

revocation. Id. at 438-40. “A court need not be as detailed or 

specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when 
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imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a 

statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 

F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper 

basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence 

imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. 

Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. 

The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines 

policy statement range as three to nine months’ imprisonment, 

and the six-month sentence is within the statutory maximum of 

thirty-six months’ imprisonment. Howell admitted each of the 

violations: failing to report for scheduled drug testing on 

three separate occasions, testing positive for illegal drugs on 

three occasions, and refusing to enter inpatient treatment. 

The district court’s revocation sentence did not, 

however, address or rely on any of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors listed in § 3583(e). Nevertheless, a defendant must 

invoke those factors and argue “for a sentence different than 

the one ultimately imposed” in order to “preserve[] its claim.” 

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010). “An 

objection to an inadequate explanation will be preserved if, 

during sentencing proceedings, the defendant properly raised a 
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meritorious factual or legal issue relating to one or more of 

the [sentencing] factors." Id. at 579 (quotation omitted).

Howell never submitted a request for a belowguidelines sentence or any sentence different than the one 

imposed, and "the rigorous plain-error standard applies to 

unpreserved claims of procedural sentencing error." Id. at 577. 

In order to prevail, therefore, Howell “must show that an error 

(1) was made, (2) is plain (i.e., clear or obvious), and (3) 

affects substantial rights.” Id. The first two conditions are 

likely satisfied, since "failing to consider the § 3553(a) 

factors" delineated in § 3583(e) constitutes a procedurally 

unreasonable sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 

(2007). 

However, we are satisfied that any error did not 

affect Howell's substantial rights. "An error that affects 

substantial rights is an error that has a prejudicial effect on 

the outcome: there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 

error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different." In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82, 

(2004)). Howell admitted to the allegations underlying the 

sentencing revocation, and the sentence was in the middle of the 

applicable guidelines. Accordingly, we find there is no 

reasonable probability that the district court would have 
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imposed a different sentence even after considering the § 

3553(a) factors.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and 

deny Howell’s motion and supplemental motion to expedite as 

moot. This court requires that counsel inform Howell, in 

writing, of her right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Howell requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Howell. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED