UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JORGE LOYA-RAMIREZ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 23-1144 (D.C. Nos. 1:20 -CV-00485-REB & 1:15-CR-00272-REB-13) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , PHILLIPS , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Jorge Loya-Ramirez, proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We deny a COA and dismiss this appeal. I. Background Mr. Loya-Ramirez was indicted for drug conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and use of commun ication facilities in furtherance of his

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Loya-Ramirez appears pro se , we liberally construe his filings. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 8 40 (10th Cir. 2005). But we do not make arguments for pro se litigants or otherwise advocate on their behalf. Id. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 19, 2023 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-1144 Document: 010110971099 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 12 drug trafficking. A jury acquitted him of the use-of-communication counts but convicted him on all other counts. He was sentenced to life in prison. On direct appeal, he contended he was entitled to a new trial based on allege dly improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. See United States v. Loya-Ramirez , 766 F. App’x 681, 682 (10th Cir. 2019). We rejected his argument and affirmed. The charges against Mr. Loya-Ramirez st emmed from a traffic stop that revealed cocaine and methamphetamine in a hidden comp artment behind the glove box. As we noted on direct appeal, th e evidence against Mr. Loya-Ramirez was “compelling” and “overwhelming.” Id. at 682, 685. “[I]n addition to the fact that law enforcement discovered illegal drugs in a vehicle he was driving, the government also presented evidence of his guilt in the fo rm of surveillance videos, p hone calls, text messages, and the testimony of four of his coconspirators.” Id. at 685. Mr. Loya-Ramirez then filed a § 2255 motion, in which he asserted several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion in a written order. Mr. Loya-Ramirez now seeks a COA.
II. Discussion A. Standard for Obtaining COA To receive a COA, Mr. Loya-Ramirez must make “a substan tial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been reso lved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ad equate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Appellate Case: 23-1144 Document: 010110971099 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 23 Because the district court denied Mr. Loya-Ramirez’s claims on the merits, he “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would fi nd the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id.
B. Ineffective Assistance Claims A claim of ineffective assistance of co unsel requires that co unsel’s performance “fell below an objective sta ndard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). If the defendant clears this hurdle, he next must show that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Prejudice in this context means “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counse l’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Mr. Loya-Ramirez requests a COA on four ineffective assistance claims. 2 First, he claims his trial attorneys were ineffectiv e because they failed to object or move for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments during closing argument. We addressed those comments on di rect appeal and held that given the strength of the evidence Mr. Loya-Ramirez could not show that but for the improper comments the result of the trial would have been different. Loya-Ramirez , 766 F. App’x at 684, 685-86.

2 As an initial matter, Mr. Loya-Ramirez argues he need not show prejudice because the constitutional violations in th is case were so egregious. Under United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648 (1984), prejudice can be presumed where (1) the defendant is completely denied counsel at a critical stage of trial, (2 ) counsel fails completely to subject the government’s case to meaningful a dversarial testing, or (3) the circumstances were such that it is unlikely any attorney could have provided effective assistance. Id. at 659-60. We agree with the district court that none of these cat egories is applicable, and no reasonable jurist wo uld conclude otherwise. Appellate Case: 23-1144 Document: 010110971099 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 34 He correspondingly cannot satis fy the prejudice prong of a Strickland claim premised on his counsel’s failure to object to the improper comments. Second, Mr. Loya-Ramirez claims his co unsel was ineffective because they failed to file a timely motion to suppress the drugs found during the traffic stop. But he does not identify any argument his la wyers should have made that would have changed the outcome. He argues the traffic stop was illegal, but th e evidence showed the police stopped the car because its license plate was registered to a white car and Mr. Loya-Ramirez’s car was orange. He conten ds the subsequent se arch was illegal, but a police officer testified that Mr. Loya-Ramir ez consented to the search. He argues his counsel should have challenged the legality of a GPS tracker the police installed on his car before the traffic stop. The installati on, however, had been approved by a judge and Mr. Loya-Ramirez does not suggest any argume nt his counsel should have pursued. Third, Mr. Loya-Ramirez claims his counse l’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to Luis Granados-Ordonez, a coconspirator who testified for the government. Mr. Loya-Ramirez generally observes that Mr. Granados-Ordonez seemed we ll prepared and testified effectively, but he does not specify what an objectively reas onable attorney shou ld have done in the face of such testimony. On the other hand, as the distri ct court pointed out, his counsel impeached Mr. Granados-Ordonez by highlighting the bene fits he received from the government in return for his testimony. Mr. Loya-R amirez has not shown that his counsel’s cross-examination of Mr. Granados-O rdonez was objectively unreasonable. Appellate Case: 23-1144 Document: 010110971099 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 45 Finally, Mr. Loya-Ramirez claims his a ppellate counsel shoul d have argued the district court erred in declining to postpone th e trial to allow his co unsel adequate time to prepare. He argues the district court’s rejection of that claim is based on a misrepresentation of fact. Th e district court noted that on e of his attorneys, Courtland Williams, had been on the case for six mo nths. But Mr. Williams had moved to withdraw based on his lack of experience an d resources (a motion he later withdrew), and Mr. Loya-Ramirez therefore speculates he had not been preparing for trial and only began preparing in the last few days before trial. This argument, however, is inconsistent with the trial record, which reflects that his counsel put on a vi gorous defense and presented a viable defense theory. Ind eed, despite the strength of th e evidence, the jury acquitted Mr. Loya-Ramirez on several counts. M r. Loya-Ramirez simp ly cannot show the outcome of his appeal would have changed if his appellate counsel had made this argument. In short, no reasonable jurist would fi nd the district court’s assessment of Mr. Loya-Ramirez’s ineffective assist ance claims debatable or wrong.
III. Conclusion We deny the request for a COA and dismi ss this appeal. We grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 23-1144 Document: 010110971099 Date Filed: 12/19/2023 Page: 5