### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A PR IL22, 200 8 S es sio n JOEY C ONN ER v. C AR MEN CO NN ER Appeal from t he Chancery Court for Haywood County No. 11718 GeorgeR. Ellis, Ch ancellor

No. W2007-01711-C OA-R3-C V - Filed May 29, 2008

This appea l arises fr om a post-divorce proce eding wher ein the minor child’s mother, contending that there had bee n a material change in circ umstances, sought a change of custody. After sever al days of hea rings, the trial cour

t transfe rre d custody from the fathe r to the mother. W e find that the tria l c ou rt app lie d a n in c or

re c t le ga l stand ard a nd a lso fi nd that the fi na l he ari ng be low wa s p re ma tur e ly terminated. W e ther efor e vac ate and rema nd for f urther pr ocee dings.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t V ac at e d and Re ma nde d.
W A LTER C. K URTZ , S R
. J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.
Jennifer Twyman King, Jac kson, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Joey Conner. Felicia Corbin Johnson, Memphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, Ca

rmen Conner

.

OP IN ION
Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s th e c us tod y o f a min or c hild. Th e pa

rt ie s w e regr a nte d a

div or c e in 1998, and custody of the child was awa rded to the f

ather . In July 2007, the mother sought to transfe r c us tod y fr om the fathe r to he rs e lf

. Th e tr ia l cou rt gr a nte d the mothe r’ s re qu e st. Th e fathe r a pp e a ls arg uin g th a t the tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d b othpr oc e du ra l a ndsu bs ta nti ve e rr or s th a t r e qu ir e re ve rs a l. More spe cifica lly, he contends that the trial court impermissibly changed c ustody without finding t h at t h ere had be en a material c hange in c ircumstance s and additionally that the trial court ruled prematurely wit hout allowing him an opportunit y to prese nt all of his proof. For the r easons state d here in, we vac ate the de cision of the trial c ourt and re mand for f urther pr ocee dings.A t t he hear i ng , t he t r i al court com m ent ed t hat t he chi l d w ou l d t urn t w el ve i n J ul y and i n T enness ee “w hen 1

a c hi l d get s t hat age, t he court s genera l l y fol l ow w hat t he chi l d desi r es
. ” -2- I. Bac kgr ound The pa rties wer e divorc ed on Sep t em b er 1 0 , 1998. They ha d one minor child, who wa s eleve n year s old at the time of the hea rings that are at i s s u e i n t h i s appea l. The final de cre e of divorce grante d primary residential custody of the child to the fathe r and allowed t h e m o t h er wee kend visitation.
The re lationship between t h e p ar t ies was not smooth following their divorce as they c on tin ue d to sp ar i n c ou rt ov e r c us tod y, vis itatio n, a nde nfo rcem ent of c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio ns
. Me a nw hil e , th e fathe r r e marrie d. Th e pr e se nt r ou ndof lit igatio n wa s ini tiate d by the fathe r i n late 2004 when he sought to incre ase the mother’s child support obli gations but decre ase he r visitation. The mother c ountere d by alleging a c hange in c ircumstance s and seeking to tr ansfe r custody. The mother ar gued, a m o n g other things, that the father a nd his new wife had used e xcessive c orpora l punishment in discipli ning the child.
Pr oo f o n th e pe tit ion s f

ile d b y th e pa

rt ie s w a s h e ardby the tria l c ou rt on fo ur se pa rate days : August 2 2 , 2006; November 27, 2006; May 8, 2007; and May 9, 2007. The court rule d orally on May 9, 2007. For rea sons not appar ent i n the re cord, the decision of the c ourt was not memoria lized in an o rd e r u nti l Ju ly 2 0, 20 07 . I n p e rt ine nt p art , th at or de r s ta te s: 1. The Court is of t h e o p i nion that Respondent/Counter-Petitioner has not demonstrated a

materia l change in circ umstances to modify [] the existing Permanent Parenting Plan dated January 8, 2002; but the Court must consider the fa ct that the min or c hil d .

. . wi ll turn tw e lve ye ars oldon Ju ly 2 , 2 00 7[, ] and th e Court mu st consider the child’s pre fer enceto live with Respondent/Count er- Petitioner. 1
2. When the Court considers that c hild’s prefer en ce to primarily reside with her mother, the Cou rt is of the opinion that custody should be modified and Respondent/Counter-Petitioner shall be the primary residential pare nt and Pe tit ion e r/ Cou nte r- Re sp on de nt sh a ll b e the a lte rn a tiv e re sid e nti a l pa re nt, a ndsh a ll ha ve thefi rs t a ndthi rd we e ke nd s of e a c h mo nth , a ndre sid e nti a l ti me wi th the c hil d during Christmas vacation, spring break, summer vacation[,] a n d h o lidays as specific ally set forth i n the Amende d Permane nt Parenting Plan Order filed simult aneously with this Order

. 3. The Ame nded Perma nent Pare nting Pl an shall begin whe n school ends for the 2006-2007 school yea

r. During the four

days of testimony hea

rd by the court be low there was c onflicting evidenc e adduce d rega

rding the allege dly exce ss i v e disciplining of the child by the fathe r. Likewise , there was c onflicting proof fr om e xpert witnesses as to the pare nting skills of the respe ctive parties a nd-3-

the ef fec t the action s o f t h e par ents wer e having on the w elfa re and well-be ing of the child. The mother testified a s to her chan g e i n circ umstances: a move to Murfre esboro, Te nnessee and an improved employment situation.
After the court change d custody of the c hild, the fathe r did not seek a stay of the tria l court’s order . The c hild now lives with her mother in Mur fr eesboro and visits with her fathe r, who continues to live in Brownsville, Tennesse e just as he ha d prior to the orde r changing custody. This is an admittedly brief ove rview of the proof presente d, but it suffices for our purpose s since, for the re asons set out below, this case must be returne d to the tri al co u rt for additional proce edings.
II. Stand ard of Re view

“ W h e n th e tria l c o u r t h a s s e t f o r th it s f a c tu a l f in d in g s in th e r e c o r d , w e w il l p r e sume the corr ectne ss of t hese findings so long as the evidenc e does not pre ponderate against them.” Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn

. 2 0 0 1 ). We, how ever , do not acc ord the trial c ourt’s lega l conclusions t hat same pr esumption. Se e , e .g ., Cur tis v . H ill , 215 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). The a

ppellate c ourt’s revie w of these legal conclusions is conducted “ under a pure de novo standard of

revie w.” Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

III . A pplic abl e St anda r d f orCha ngi ng C ust ody
Dec isions regarding c hild custody and visitation are a mong th e m o s t important matters a dd re sse d b y o ur

c ou rt s. S te e n v . Steen , 61 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). T ennesse e courts ar e s t at u t o ri ly authorize d to modify custody arrangements as ne cessitated by intervening change s in circumstanc es. Tenn

. C o d e Ann. § 36-6-101(a)( 1). In a ltering an a lrea dy existing c us tod y a rr a ng e me nt, thele gis la tur e ha s d e te rm ine d a s f oll ow s: If the issue be fo re the court is a modification of the c ourt’s prior de cre e pertaining to custody, the petitioner must prove by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e a material changein circumstanc e. A mate rial chan g e o f circumstance does not requir e a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the child. A material change of circ umstance may i nclude, but is not limi ted to, failure s to adhere to the pare nting plan or an orde r of c us tod y a ndvis itatio n o r c ir c ums ta nc e s that ma ke the pa re nti ng plan n o lo ng e r i n the best intere st of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-101(a )(2) (B).

Inor de r t o c ha ng e a n e xis tin g c us tod y arr a ng e me nt, the tr ia l c ou rt mus t make tw o s e pa rate determinations. Boye r v. He imermann , 238 S.W.3d 249, 255-60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). First, the c ou rt mus t de te rm ine that th e re ha s b e e n a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s. Se c on d, thec ou rt mus t conclude that changing the e xisting custody arrange ment is in the child’s best int ere sts. Id. at 259-60;T h e c o u rt re p o rte r w a s n o t i n v ited to a tten d th e c o n fe re n c e
. 2
-4- see Kendric k v. Shoe make , 90 S.W .3 d 566 , 5 70 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Krupp v. Cunningham-Grogan , No. M2005-01098-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 2505037, at *6 ( Tenn. Ct

. App. Aug. 29, 2006). Only if the trial court make s the threshold dete rmination that there ha s been a materia l c hange in circumstanc es does it then proce ed to consider the child’s best intere sts. Boye r , 238 S.W.3d at 259.
As ref lected in its dec ision, the trial court wa s of the opinion that the custodial pre fer ence of the eleve n year

old—who was soon to be twe lve—was suf fi ci ent to war

rant a change in custody. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6 -1 0 6 (a )( 7 )( A) (c u s t o d y d et er m i n at i o n m ay i n cl u d e r ea s o n able preferenc e of child age twelve or

older). T his Court has previously held that the stated pref ere nce of a child, standing alone, doe s not constitute a material change in circumstanc es. Mu l ke y v. Mulkey , No. E2004-005 9 0-COA-R3-CV, 2004 W L 2412610, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2004). Howe ver, the c hil d’ s p re fe re nc e , c ou ple d w ithoth e r c ir c ums ta nc e s, ma y a mou nt t o a mat eri al chang e in circ umstances.
IV. Proc edural Issu es In his appea l, the fathe r also conte nds that the trial court erre d significantly when it halted the proof at the close of the mother’s dire ct exam i n at i o n , d i d not hear from the f

ather , and then summari ly r e n d e r e d it s d e c is io n
. T h e r e c o r d s u p p o r ts th e f a th e r ’ s c o n te n ti o n a s to th e p o in ts th at the mother wa s not cross-e xamined and that the fathe r did not testify. At the close of the mother’s direc t examination, the trial c ourt stated: “Okay. Let me see the attorne ys back in the jury r oom.” Th e tr a ns c ri pt h e re re fl e c ts the fo llo wi ng :

(In c amer a mee ting with the court and attorneys for the parties.)

. 2
Th e jud ge the n r e turne d to the co urt roo m, ab orte d th e he ari ng , a ndimm e diate ly ann ou nc e d h is ruling, which wa s later r efle cted in the written order quote d above. As t h e m o t h er points out, no ob je c tio n w a s ma de by the fath er to the pr oc e du reun de rt ake n b y th e tr ia l c ou rt . W e are a t a disadvan t ag e b ec ause no r ecor d was made of the in camera meeting. The importanc e of c ounsel ensuring that a c ourt reporter is pre sent for a ll a spects of pr ocee dings, including during in camera confe renc es, has been pr eviously noted. Se e Ru the rfo rd v . R uth e rfo rd , 971 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that in chamber s interviews with children must be held in the pr esenc e of c ou rt re po rt e r) ; see also S t ate v. Sc hlegel , W2000-02597- CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1558640, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Ja n. 28, 2002) (criticizing f act that discussion betwe en trial c ourt and c ounsel was no t r e c or de d) ; cf. State v. Ham mons , 737 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (conde mning unrec orded be nch conf

ere nces)

. Th is C ou rt

simply do e s n ot kno w w hat ha pp e ne d d uri ng the t

ri a l ju dg e ’s c on fe re nc e wi th counsel. Af

ter the c on fe renc e, the judge—w ithout objection—render ed judgment. It would be appar ent to any judge that, unless the f ather and his counsel had agre ed, he could not change custody without first allowing for cross-e xamination of the mother and hearing testimony from the father

. As a prior

panel of this C o u rt has held: “[ There is nothing] more important than the custody ofI t har dl y nee ds ci t at i on t hat , i n t he a dj udi ca t i on of i m por t ant i nt er es t s , t he r i ght t o c onduct c r os s e xam i nat i on 3

a lo n g w ith th e r ig h t t o p re se n t ev id e n c e is fu n d a m e n ta l t o d u e p ro c e ss. See 3 Ronal d D

. Rot unda & J ohn E. N ow ak, Tr eat i s e on C on s t i t ut i on al Law : Sub s t an ce an d P r ocedu r e § 1 7 .8 (a ) (4 th e d . 2 0 0 8 ).

W hi l e not obj ect i ng oft en const i t ut es a w aiv er, appel l at e c ou r t s r el ax t hi s r ul e w hen fund am ent al 4

cons t i t ut i onal r i ght s a r e i nvol ved, t her e i s no oppor t uni t y t o obj ec t , or t he cour t r oom ’ s a t m os pher e m ake s obj ec t i ons d iffic u lt. See N e il P

. C o h e n , S a ra h Y

. S h e p p e a rd & D o n a ld F . P a in e , Tenn es s ee Law of E vi dence § 1. 03[ 4] [ b] ( 5t h e d. 2 0 0 5 ). -5- children a fter a

divorce . Such a determination r equire s a full, fair, and complete he aring.” Price 3 v. Price , No. E1999-00102- COA-R10-CV, 2000 WL 704596, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2000)

. Pe rh aps the tria l c ou rt

wa s so su re that th e pr e fe re nc e of thec hil d w ou ld c on tr ol the c a se that it thought no further pr oof wa s nece ssary. The trial court did not explain why it terminated the hearing. V. Discussion On appe al, the mother all but conce des that the trial c ourt’s findings do not support a change in custody, but she contends that the record supports finding a material change in circumstanc es and thus that we should nevertheless affirm. She points to evidence of disciplinary a buse by the father, evidenc e that the c hild was fea rful of he r father, e vidence of the father’s pr oblems in managing anger , and fina lly evidence of her own positive change in circumstanc es. The Court cannot affirm, however , as the he aring be low was a borted a nd the proof incomplete. The Court is cognizant that no objection was ma de to the termination of the hea ring, bu t in c on sid e ri ng su c h impo rt a nt righ ts a s th os e of c ro ss- e xa min a tio n a ndte sti fy ing fo r o ne se lf, th is Court would have to be show n some aff irmative indication in the record that those rights were waived be fore we c ould overlook their a bsence

. 4
The father, on the othe r hand, ha s reque sted that this Court reverse the trial court and reinstate the original perma nent parenting plan, which had designated him as the primary re sidential pare nt. In light of the aborte d hearing, we also de cline to re verse the trial court’s order . We be lieve that the dec ision below was pre mature in that the tria l court had not ye t hear d the father’s te stimony and the c ross-examination of t he mot her. Consequently, the t rial court’s order must be vacated and the ca se re manded f

or a further hearing wher ein t he trial c ourt will consider a ll of the evidenc e and apply the legal standard on materia l c hange of circ umstances se t forth in Boye r . In light of the fa ct that the best interests of the child should dic tate the resolution of any case , the ch i l d ’s p h y s ical custody shall rema in with the mother pe nding the rec onvening of the unc ompleted hea ring. The tria l court should conduct the a dditional procee dings prior to August 1, 2008. The trial court is directed to issue its custody decision before the beginning of school in August 2008.

VI. Conclusion-6-

The de cision below is vacated, and t h i s case is remande d for f urther pr ocee dings and dispositi on as indicated above. Costs of this a ppeal are taxed to the appellee , Ms. Carmen Conner, and her surety for

which exe cution may issue if nec essary.

_________________________________ WALTE R C. KURTZ, SENIOR JUDGE