UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4476

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

VALENTINO LEON TUCKER, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III, 

District Judge. (7:06-cr-00042-D-2) 

Submitted: February 17, 2009 Decided: March 30, 2009 

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Rudolph A. Ashton, III, Charles K. McCotter, Jr., MCCOTTER, 

ASHTON & SMITH, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Banumathi 

Rangarajan, Jennifer May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Valentino Leon Tucker appeals his seventy-two month 

sentence imposed following revocation of his original sentence 

of probation. Tucker pled guilty to one count of making a 

material false statement in connection with the purchase of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2006), and was 

sentenced to three years of probation. Tucker admitted each of 

the alleged violations in the three motions for revocation filed 

by his probation officer. Following a lengthy hearing, the 

district court provided a detailed explanation for its sentence. 

Tucker timely noted his appeal and argues that, for various 

reasons, his sentence is plainly unreasonable. 

 This court reviews a sentence imposed upon revocation 

of a defendant’s probation to determine whether the sentence is 

“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 

656 (4th Cir. 2007). In determining whether a probation 

revocation sentence is “plainly unreasonable,” this court must 

first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable. Id. Although a sentencing court 

must consider the Chapter Seven policy statements and the 

applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors in fashioning its 

sentence, the sentencing court retains broad discretion to 

revoke a defendant’s probation and impose a term of imprisonment 

up to the statutory maximum. Id. Only if the defendant 

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demonstrates that the sentence is unreasonable will this court 

consider whether the sentence was “plainly unreasonable.” Id. 

 Tucker first claims that his seventy-two month 

sentence is unreasonable simply because it is higher than his 

original advisory guidelines range of eighteen to twenty-four 

months and his revocation advisory guidelines policy statement 

range of fifteen to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. Tucker’s 

sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable, 

however. The district court, in both its ruling from the bench 

and its written order, provided an exhaustive and reasoned 

explanation for Tucker’s sentence. The record shows that the 

district court considered the Chapter 7 policy statements and 

advisory guidelines range, § 3553(a)(4)(B), the relevant 

§ 3553(a) factors, Tucker’s abysmal performance on probation, 

his criminal history, his original sentence of probation after 

receiving a substantial assistance departure, and the arguments 

of counsel in sentencing Tucker. Thus, Tucker’s sentence was 

procedurally reasonable. 

 The district court’s decision to impose a sentence 

greater than both Tucker’s original guidelines range and the 

advisory policy statement range was also substantively 

reasonable. Tucker committed multiple Grade C violations 

including continued drug use, refusal of drug treatment, and 

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failure to submit to drug testing. Tucker also pled guilty to 

felony sale of marijuana, a Grade A violation. 

 Tucker’s advisory policy statement range was based 

only on the severity of the Grade A violation and did not 

reflect his numerous Grade C violations. See Moulden, 478 F.3d 

at 658. Moreover, Tucker’s original sentence was based on a 

substantial assistance departure. See U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 7B1.4 cmt. n.4 (2008). 

Additionally, the district court properly considered the 

inherent breach of trust in Tucker’s conduct while on probation. 

USSG ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b); United States v. 

Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 130 n.6 (2d Cir. 2008). Finally, 

Tucker continued his criminal behavior, virtually without 

interruption, despite lenient treatment from the district court. 

Accordingly, because Tucker’s sentence was substantively 

reasonable, his first claim is without merit. 

 Tucker next claims that “the district court failed to 

properly analyze sentences, Guidelines, policy statements and 

sentencing disparity.” This assertion is simply belied by the 

record. 

 Tucker next alleges that he should have received 

credit for the seven months he spent in state custody on his 

federal detainer. “A defendant shall be given credit toward the 

service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in 

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official detention prior to the date the sentence commences.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2006). Section 3585 does not permit a 

district court to determine credit at sentencing. United States 

v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992). Rather, only the Attorney 

General, through the Bureau of Prisons, may compute credit. Id.

at 334-35. Therefore, the district court was without authority 

to order the Bureau of Prisons to give Tucker credit for the 

time served. Additionally, Tucker admitted that he received 

some credit from North Carolina toward his North Carolina 

sentences for the seven months he spent waiting for his 

probation revocation hearing. Tucker was, therefore, not 

entitled to have credit already applied to his state sentence 

counted a second time and applied to his federal sentence. 18 

U.S.C. § 3585(b). Accordingly, the district court did not err 

in failing to direct that Tucker be given credit for the seven 

months he spent in state custody on the federal detainer. 

 Tucker’s fourth argument on appeal is that the 

district court failed to consider sentencing disparities between 

his co-defendant, Donte Nathaniel Johnson, and himself. A 

district court need not robotically tick through each subsection 

of § 3553(a). United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th 

Cir. 2006). Here, the context and record establish that the 

district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and found the 

circumstances warranted a sentence above the advisory guidelines 

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policy statement range. Moreover, § 3553(a) seeks only to avoid 

unwarranted sentencing disparities. Unlike his co-defendant, 

Tucker was initially given a sentence of probation, and as the 

district court noted, a sentence within Tucker’s original 

advisory guidelines range would not address his abysmal 

performance on probation. 

 Finally, Tucker contends that the district court 

improperly punished him for the criminal conduct underlying his 

revocation by relying heavily on his new felony conviction and 

imposing a consecutive sentence without giving him credit for 

time served. Tucker’s claim is without merit as the court was 

entitled to consider the fact that his Grade C violations were 

likely to, and did, result in new felonious conduct, and the 

guidelines instructed that his sentence should be consecutive to 

his state sentence. USSG §§ 7B1.3(f), 7B1.4 cmt. n.3. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately detailed in the materials before the 

court, and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED