12-4536

Huang v. Holder

BIA

Poczter, IJ

A200 927 655

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER

MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 30th 4 day of July, two thousand fourteen.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 RALPH K. WINTER,

8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 JUN YING HUANG,

14 Petitioner, 

15

16 v. 12-4536

17 NAC 

18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Ning Ye, Flushing, New York. 

24

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney

26 General; Anthony W. Norwood, Senior

27 Litigation Counsel; Shahrzad Baghai,

28 Trial Attorney, Office of

29 Immigration Litigation, United

30 States Department of Justice,

31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Jun Ying Huang, a native and citizen of

6 China, seeks review of an October 18, 2012, decision of the

7 BIA affirming an April 15, 2011, decision of an Immigration

8 Judge (“IJ”), denying Huang’s application for asylum and

9 withholding of removal. In re Junying Huang, No. A200 927

10 655 (B.I.A. Oct. 18, 2012), aff’g No. A200 927 655 (Immig.

11 Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 15, 2011). We assume the parties’

12 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history

13 in this case.

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the

15 IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v.

16 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable

17 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.

18 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513

19 (2d Cir. 2009).

20 Because Huang did not allege past persecution, she was

21 required to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future

22 persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). To meet her

23 burden, Huang had to “make some showing that authorities in

2
1 [her] country of nationality are either aware of [her]

2 activities or likely to become aware of [her] activities.” 

3 Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 

4 The agency reasonably found that Huang did not meet this

5 standard.

6 There is no evidence that authorities in China are

7 aware of Huang’s practice of Christianity in this country,

8 and she testified that, in China, she intended to worship at

9 home, conceding that persecution was unlikely if she

10 practiced in this manner. Relying on cases from other

11 circuits, Huang contends that restricting her religious

12 practice, itself, constitutes persecution. We need not

13 address this issue because, as the agency concluded, Huang

14 has not demonstrated that her fear of attending an

15 unregistered church is objectively reasonable in her home

16 province. 

17 The agency reasonably determined that China’s treatment

18 of unregistered churches varies by region, and Huang points

19 to no evidence addressing the treatment of unregistered

20 churches in her home region of China. See Jian Xing Huang

21 v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that a

22 fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid

23 support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”). 

3
1 Huang contends that the agency should have considered

2 whether she would face persecution in China as a whole, but

3 she does not allege that, if returned to China, she will go

4 somewhere other than her home province. Moreover, in light

5 of the regional variations in the treatment of unregistered

6 churches, the agency’s requirement that she show a

7 likelihood of persecution in her home region was reasonable. 

8 See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149-50, 159-60,

9 165 (2d Cir. 2008). 

10 Insofar as Huang argues that, out of fear of

11 persecution, she will refrain from proselytizing to the

12 public in China, the agency found that she had not

13 demonstrated that she wished to proselytize in China. 

14 Although Huang contests this conclusion, she concedes that

15 her testimony on the issue was inconsistent. Accordingly,

16 the agency’s determination that she presented insufficient

17 evidence that she would be proselytize to the public is

18 supported by substantial evidence. See Siewe v. Gonzales,

19 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two

20 permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice

21 between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (citation

22 omitted)).

4
1 Because Huang failed to demonstrate that her fear of

2 future persecution was objectively reasonable, the agency

3 did not err in denying asylum and withholding of removal. 

4 See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43.

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

6 DENIED. 

7 FOR THE COURT: 

8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

9

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