alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1... See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-07-401-CR

BENNIE LORENZO DORSEY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

Appellant Bennie Lorenzo Dorsey appeals the trial court’s order revoking

his deferred-adjudication community supervision. We affirm. 

Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on

March 19, 2007, and received ten years’ deferred-adjudication community

supervision and a $1,000 fine. On August 3, 2007, the State filed a petition
2... 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

3... See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);

Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no

2

to adjudicate, and the trial court held a hearing on October 23, 2007.

Defendant pleaded true to violating the terms of his community supervision by

committing the new offense of evading arrest and by failing to attend the

Treatment Alternatives to Incarceration program on four occasions. The trial

court adjudicated defendant guilty and assessed punishment at five years’

confinement. 

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of the motion. In the brief, counsel

avers that, in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a 2

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. In addition, this court informed appellant that he may file a

pro se brief, but he has not done so.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw

on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of

Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the

record. Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

3 4
pet.).

4... See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351

(1988).

5... See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); accord Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

3

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the record. We agree

with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find

nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Accordingly, we 5

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

PER CURIAM

PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; WALKER and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 14, 2008
#### NATIONAL SECURITY FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY v. James H. FARMER.

No. 50586.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Aug. 30, 1978.

Bryant & Stennis, Grier J. Gregory, Gulf-port, for appellant.

Hurt & Dickerson, Gerald A. Dickerson, Lucedale, for appellee.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., BROOM and LEE, JJ., and DAN M. LEE, Commissioner'.

Appeal from Circuit Court, George County; Merle F. Palmer, Judge.

AFFIRMED.
EX-10.28(g)



 Exhibit 10.28(g) 

SECOND AMENDMENT TO 
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the “Amendment”) is made by and between R. Milton Johnson (the “Executive”) and HCA Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), effective as of January 1, 2014. 

WITNESSETH: 
 WHEREAS, HCA Inc. previously entered into an Employment Agreement (the “Employment Agreement”) with the Executive dated November 16, 2006; 

WHEREAS, on November 22, 2010, the Company completed a corporate reorganization pursuant to which the Company
became the direct parent company of, and successor issuer to, HCA Inc. (the “Corporate Reorganization”); 
 WHEREAS, the Company assumed the Employment Agreement in connection with the Corporate Reorganization; 
 WHEREAS, the Employment Agreement was previously amended effective February 9, 2011; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive desire to further amend the Employment Agreement so as to reflect the Executive’s appointment, responsibilities and duties as Chief Executive Officer and
President of the Company. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, and other valid
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Company and the Executive hereby amend the Employment Agreement as follows: 
 1. Amendment. Section 2(a) of the Employment Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 

“a. During the Employment Term, Executive shall serve as the Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company.
In such position, Executive shall have such duties, authority and responsibility as shall be determined from time to time by the Board of Directors of the Company which duties, authority and responsibility are consistent with those attendant to such
position with the Company with respect to the business of the Company. For so long as Executive is an officer with the Company, Executive shall serve as a member of the Board of Directors of the Company. Executive shall, if requested, also serve as
a member of the Board of Directors of any affiliate of the Company, without additional compensation.” 
 2.
Certain Definitions. Capitalized terms used in this Amendment not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meaning as set forth in the Employment Agreement. 

  
 1 








 3. Effect of Amendment. Except as modified hereby, the Employment
Agreement shall remain unaffected and in full force and effect. 
 4. Counterparts. This Amendment may be
executed in counterparts, each of which shall be an original but all of which shall constitute but one document. 
 [Signature
page follows] 

  
 2 








 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Agreement,
intending to be legally bound, as of the date first stated above. 
  

			
	 HCA HOLDINGS, INC.

		
	By:	 	/s/ John M . Steele
	Name:	 	John M. Steele
	Title:	 	Senior Vice President – Human Resources
		 	
	 /s/ R. Milton Johnson

	  

	R. Milton Johnson



  
 3
### The HONORABLE RICHARD H. KYLE, United * 

### States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States 1 

### District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. _____________ No. 95-3234

_____________ Michael R. Williams, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Eastern District of Missouri. * John Langland; John Doe, I-III, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Defendants-Appellees. *

_____________ Submitted: April 12, 1996 Filed: July 1, 1996

_____________ Before WOLLMAN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and KYLE, Distric t * Judge.

_____________ PER CURIAM.
Mic hael R. Williams appeals from the district court's dismissa l 1 with out prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming deliberat e indifference to his alleged serious medical needs. The district cour t dismissed the action because Williams failed to timely serve the defendant s pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Williams contends that the distric t court abused its discretion in dismissing his lawsuit because he offered explanations which

### Prior to argument in this case, Williams filed a motion to 2 

### strike the response of Correctional Medical Services and to consider the response filed by the State of Missouri as the brief of the Appellees or, alternatively, to strike the State's brief as well. We ordered Williams' motion to be submitted with the case and, after a careful review, it is hereby denied. -2- constitute good cause to excuse his failure to timely effect service on th e defendants. Specific ally, Williams claims that the court articulated the proper standard for determining whether good cau se exists but subsequently applied a different and improper standard to the facts of this case.
After car efully reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Williams' lawsuit for the reasons set forth in its well-reasoned opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of th e district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 2

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
CKH-12.31.2013-Ex 10.26






Exhibit 10.26
Compensation Arrangements for the Executive Officers
Set forth below is a summary of the compensation by SEACOR Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) to its executive officers in their positions as of the date of filing of the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2013 (the “Form 10-K”). All of the Company's executive officers are at-will employees whose compensation and employment status may be changed at any time in the discretion of the Company's Board of Directors.
Base Salary.  Effective January 1, 2014, the executive officers are scheduled to receive the following annual base salaries in their current positions:
	
					
	Name and Current Position
	 
	Base Salary

	Charles Fabrikant, Executive Chairman of the Board
	 
	$
	700,000
	


	Oivind Lorentzen, President and Chief Executive Officer
	 
	$
	700,000
	


	Dick Fagerstal, Senior Vice President, Corporate Development and Finance
	 
	$
	350,000
	


	Paul Robinson, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary
	 
	$
	450,000
	


	Richard Ryan, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
	 
	$
	350,000
	


	Matthew Cenac, Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer
	 
	$
	300,000
	





Cash Bonus and Share Incentive Plan.  In their current positions, the executive officers are eligible to:
		
	•
	Receive an annual cash incentive award subject to the discretion of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors.


		
	•
	Participate in incentive programs, which currently involve awards of restricted stock and stock options pursuant to SEACOR Holdings Inc.'s 2007 Share Incentive Plan (Exhibit 10.29 to the Company's Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007).


Benefit Plans and Other Arrangements.  In their current positions, the executive officers are eligible to participate in the Company's broad‐based benefit programs generally available to its salaried employees, including health, disability and life insurance programs, a qualified 401(k) plan, and the employee stock purchase plan.
#### Clyde C. CLARK, Appellant, v. PALMER POOLS, a division of Palmer Electric, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 73-915.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 31, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orange County; Parker Lee McDonald, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Joseph Booe BATEMAN, Appellant, v. Cleo Christine BATEMAN, Appellee.

No. II-47.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 25, 1978.

Alan B. Fields, Jr. of Dowda & Fields, Palatka, for appellant.

James S. Dunning, Jr. of Hedstrom, Dunning & Smith, Palatka, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court determined the money issues in this marriage dissolution *911proceeding by considering a transcript of the parties’ testimony before a hearing examiner and the parties’ written submissions. That record does not contain substantial competent evidence supporting the judgment that appellee wife is in need of permanent periodic alimony, nor that she needs $75 per week. Without prejudice to further proceedings, that part of the judgment is REVERSED; and it is otherwise AFFIRMED. Appellee’s motion for an allowance of fee money for her attorney’s appellate services is PROVISIONALLY GRANTED. *Dresser v. Dresser,*350 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

BOYER, Acting C. J., and SMITH and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
SHW-12.31.2013-EX10b




EXHIBIT 10(b)


SUMMARY OF BASE SALARY AND ANNUAL INCENTIVE
COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
2014 Base Salary.  On February 18, 2014, the Compensation and Management Development Committee (the “Compensation Committee”) of the Board of Directors of The Sherwin-Williams Company (“Sherwin-Williams”) set the 2014 base salaries of the executive officers who are expected to be named in the Summary Compensation Table of Sherwin-Williams’ 2014 Proxy Statement (the “Named Executive Officers”).  The base salaries of the Named Executive Officers for 2014 are as follows:  Christopher M. Connor, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer ($1,221,987); John G. Morikis, President and Chief Operating Officer ($853,580); Sean P. Hennessy, Senior Vice President - Finance and Chief Financial Officer ($643,786); Robert J. Davisson, President, Paint Stores Group ($528,112); and Catherine M. Kilbane, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary ($515,008).
Annual Incentive Compensation to Be Earned in 2014.  The Compensation Committee also approved the following minimum, target and maximum cash bonus award levels, as a percent of salary, for the Named Executive Officers for 2014 under The Sherwin-Williams Company 2007 Executive Performance Bonus Plan.
    	
									
	 
	 
	Incentive Award as a Percentage of Base Salary

	Named Executive Officer
	 
	Minimum
	 
	Target
	 
	Maximum

	Christopher M. Connor
	 
	0
	 
	125
	

	 
	250
	


	John G. Morikis
	 
	0
	 
	75
	

	 
	150
	


	Sean P. Hennessy
	 
	0
	 
	75
	

	 
	150
	


	Robert J. Davisson
	 
	0
	 
	60
	

	 
	120
	


	Catherine M. Kilbane
	 
	0
	 
	60
	

	 
	120
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 722 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 722

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 18, 2019

    Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate a mountain in the State of Utah as ``Miracle Mountain''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Miracle Mountain Designation Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds as follows:
            (1) On September 13, 2018, the Bald Mountain Fire burned 
        nearly 20,000 acres of land in Utah.
            (2) Elk Ridge City, located in Utah County, was nearly the 
        victim of this fire.
            (3) Suddenly, the fire halted its progression and, instead 
        of burning into Elk Ridge City, stayed behind the mountain and 
        spared the city.
            (4) Congress, in acknowledgment of this event, believes 
        this mountain holds special significance to the residents of 
        Elk Ridge City and surrounding communities.
            (5) The presently unnamed peak has been referred to as 
        ``Miracle Mountain'' by many residents since the fire that 
        nearly went into Elk Ridge City.

SEC. 3. MIRACLE MOUNTAIN.

    (a) Designation.--The mountain in the State of Utah, located at 39 
59' 02N, 111 40' 12W, shall be known and designated as ``Miracle 
Mountain''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
record, or other paper of the United States to the mountain described 
in subsection (a) shall be considered to be a reference to ``Miracle 
Mountain''.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 17, 2019.

            Attest:

                                             CHERYL L. JOHNSON,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
INDEX TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS


                                                                  Page


Bradley Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Subsidiaries

 Report of Independent Certified Public Accountants                F-2


 Consolidated Balance Sheets at December 31, 2000 and 1999         F-3


 Consolidated Statements of Operations for the
  Years Ended December 31, 2000 and 1999                           F-5


 Consolidated Statement of Shareholders' Equity for the
 Years Ended December 31, 2000 and 1999                            F-6


 Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows for the
 Years Ended December 31, 2000 and 1999                            F-7


 Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements                     F-8 - F-25




REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS



Board of Directors and Shareholders
Bradley Pharmaceuticals, Inc.


We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Bradley
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000 and 1999, and
the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders' equity and
cash flows for the years then ended.  These financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management.  Our responsibility is to express
an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards generally
accepted in the United States of America. Those standards require that we plan
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the
financial statements are free of material misstatement.  An audit includes
examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures
in the financial statements.  An audit also includes assessing the accounting
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.  We believe that our
audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly,
in all material respects, the consolidated financial position of
Bradley Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000 and 1999,
and the consolidated results of their operations, and their consolidated
shareholders' equity and their consolidated cash flows for the years then ended,
in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United
States of America.



GRANT THORNTON LLP

New York, New York
February 23, 2001
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-27-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-29-1997
<CASH>                                          15,290
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,126,703
<ALLOWANCES>                                   200,058
<INVENTORY>                                  5,274,523
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,781,568
<PP&E>                                       5,210,011
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,039,854
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,094,304
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,122,382
<BONDS>                                      1,861,743
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        13,110
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,097,069
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,094,304
<SALES>                                      6,209,156
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,209,156
<CGS>                                        3,983,547
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,983,547
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                53,093
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                32,797
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             210,144
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (675,803)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (227,246)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (448,557)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (448,557)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.34)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.34)
        

</TABLE>
#### Troy S. ODOM v. CITY OF MINDEN, Louisiana.

No. 54364.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 8, 1974.

In re: Troy S. Odom applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Webster. 287 So.2d 659.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
#### STATE ex rel. Leroy McREED, Relator, v. Robert W. TYSON, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 73-1093.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 30, 1973.

Warner S. Olds, Public Defender, and William W. Herring, Asst. Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, for relator.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Basil S. Diamond, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, and Phillip S. Shailer, State’s Atty., and Robert G. Cowen, Asst. State’s Atty., Ft. Lauderdale, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Relator filed his petition for writ of mandamus. Thereupon the court issued its rule to show cause. We have now determined, in light of the advices tendered, that the petition is without merit and that the action sought was discretionary, as opposed to ministerial and, further the issue is now moot.

The rule to show cause is hereby discharged and the petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Denied.

OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 8, 2020

a0831

Order 

Clerk

September 8, 2020

160452(61)

CYNTHIA K. NEWMEYER and 

LAWRENCE W. NEWMEYER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v SC: 160452

COA: 343206

Kalamazoo CC: 2015-000368-CH

BANK OF AMERICA, INC. and FEDERAL

HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

a/k/a FREDDIE MAC,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s May 26, 2020 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration 

of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).