In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-3989

TAMIKIA TAYLOR-HOLMES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF THE COOK COUNTY PUBLIC GUARDIAN,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 06 C 2668—Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

____________

SUBMITTED APRIL 4, 2007—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 2007

____________

Before POSNER, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, who does not have

a lawyer, filed four closely related suits in the federal

district court in Chicago, all complaining that her children

had been removed from her custody in violation of law.

The cases were randomly assigned to separate judges.

The first suit was assigned to Judge Nordberg and then

Judge Gottschall. It charged that Lifelink Corporation, a

provider of social services, had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the plaintiff’s family, unreasonably

denied visitation rights to her, subjected her children to
2 No. 06-3989

cruel and unusual punishments, falsified records, and

discriminated against her on the basis of her race and her

religion. Judge Gottschall dismissed the complaint for

failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff did not appeal.

Another suit was assigned to Judge Darrah. In it the

plaintiff alleged that the office of the state’s attorney had

tampered with her records, fraudulently represented her

children at hearings, and discriminated against her on the

basis, again, of her race and her religion. Judge Darrah

dismissed the suit for want of prosecution, and again she

did not appeal. Another suit, assigned to Judge Zagel,

alleged that the Illinois Department of Children and Family

Services had fraudulently induced the plaintiff to release

her children to its custody and had not acted in the best

interests of her children, in violation of Illinois law. Judge

Zagel dismissed the suit in part for want of jurisdiction

and otherwise for failure to state a claim; and again the

plaintiff did not appeal.

In the present suit, the plaintiff charges that the Cook

County Public Guardian did not act in the best interests

of her children, failed to disclose relevant records at

custody hearings, falsified or otherwise tampered with

records, participated in secret hearings, delayed proceedings, and discriminated against her on the basis of her race

and religion. Judge Pallmeyer dismissed the complaint

without prejudice, before the plaintiff’s other three cases

had been decided, on the ground that it duplicated the

other lawsuits. This time the plaintiff has appealed.

Although no Rule 58 final judgment order was entered,

ten days after the dismissal the plaintiff filed a notice of

appeal and also moved the district judge to consolidate

the plaintiff’s four cases. The judge told the plaintiff to

refile the motion with Judge Gottschall, which the plaintiff
No. 06-3989 3

did—though she had previously filed a similar motion

with that judge. Having already dismissed the plaintiff’s

suit that was pending before her, Judge Gottschall dismissed both motions as moot.

The district court’s rules provide for the filing of a

“motion for reassignment” in order to place related cases

before one judge. N.D. Ill. R. 40.4. The motion is to be filed

in the case with the lowest docket number, and that was

the case before Judge Nordberg (later Judge Gottschall).

Why none of the judges asked the Executive Committee of

the Northern District to reassign the cases to a single

judge, an alternative route to consolidation, authorized by

Rule 40.1(d), is a mystery.

Two days after dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint,

Judge Pallmeyer wrote the following letter to the plaintiff:

You filed two documents in this case yesterday. In

the first filing, you asked that the court consolidate all

pending cases. You observed, correctly, that you do not

require “multiple judges or multiple schedules, since

these cases are all similar in nature.” I believe my

deputy explained that you should file your motion

to consolidate before the judge who has the lowestnumbered case. Judge Nordberg had the lowestnumbered case, but I understand his case was reassigned to Judge Gottschall. If I am correct about these

things, you should file your motion for consolidation before Judge Gottschall.

In your second filing, a Notice of Appeal, you state

that the case filed before me “is not a duplicate case.”

I understood that you were in fact presenting the same

claims in each of the four lawsuits you have on file

here. [The defendants were different, but the claims
4 No. 06-3989

similar and the plaintiff accused them of conspiring

against her.] If that is not correct, please let me know.

Finally, I want to assure you that there have been no

“secret meetings” between Attorney Jacobs and me. My

only contacts with this case have been scheduled

matters in the courtroom and written rulings. I have

had no private conversations with Attorney Jacobs

about this case or any other.

Jacobs was the defendant’s lawyer, and the judge sent a

copy of her letter to him. The plaintiff did not reply to the

letter.

We can understand the judge’s desire to straighten out

a confused pro se litigant, but writing her a letter, especially one subject to misinterpretation, was not the right

way to go about it. Correspondence with a litigant can

result in communications that are outside the record

maintained by the court clerk and can confuse the litigant

(and by the same token the other party or parties to the

case), who would not know in what form to reply and

what the deadline for the reply would be. It was particularly confusing in this case because the litigant had already

filed a notice of appeal and so found herself proceeding

in two courts at once by virtue of the judge’s letter. She

might even have thought that the district judge had lost

jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the filing of the

notice of appeal. Because, as we’re about to see, the appeal

was taken from an unappealable order, the district court

in fact retained jurisdiction, United States v. Bastanipour,

697 F.2d 170, 173 (7th Cir. 1982); 20 James Wm. Moore

et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 303.32(2)(b)(iv)(B) (3d ed.

2007), but the plaintiff evidently believed that the order

was appealable, because she filed a notice of appeal.

A decision is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a final

decision (and the dismissal of this case could not have
No. 06-3989 5

been appealed otherwise than under that section) only

if the district court is “finished with the case.” Chase

Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Moore, 446 F.3d 725, 726 (7th

Cir. 2006); Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 2003);

see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); In re

Brown, 484 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2007). A dismissal

without prejudice is an appealable final order if it ends

the suit so far as the district court is concerned, United

States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n. 1 (1949),

or if “there is no amendment a plaintiff could reasonably

be expected to offer to save the complaint, or if a new

suit would be barred by the statute of limitations.” Glaus

v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Kaba

v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2006); Moya v.

Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir. 2006). But

a dismissal without prejudice is not appealable if it

amounts to merely telling the plaintiff “to patch up the

complaint, or take some other easily accomplished step”;

in that event it “is no more reviewable than the resolution of a discovery dispute or equivalent interlocutory

ruling.” Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2002);

see also Moya v. Schollenbarger, supra, 465 F.3d at 451;

Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 666 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004);

Brennan v. Kulick, 407 F.3d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 2005).

The appeal must therefore be dismissed for want of

appellate jurisdiction. Judge Pallmeyer indicated in her

letter that she would rescind the dismissal if the plaintiff

explained why her suit wasn’t a duplicate of the other

suits. That was an awkward mode of proceeding. The

judge could and should have asked for this clarification

before dismissing the suit. Still, it is clear that the judge

doesn’t think she’s through with the case, and therefore

the order of dismissal is nonfinal and unappealable. For
6 No. 06-3989

guidance on remand, we point out that the fact that the

plaintiff has filed similar suits against other defendants

is not a compelling reason for dismissing the plaintiff’s

only suit against the defendant in this case. Similarity of

cases is a reason for consolidation, not dismissal. This

appeal, however, must be

DISMISSED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—9-24-07