### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON January 22, 2002 Session
STATE OF TENN ESSEE EX REL. R HONDA ANDE RSON v. LESTER JARRETT

and
STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. MELINDA BE NSON v. HERMAN HARRI S

Direct Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Haywood County No. 6406 & 6638 J. Roland Reid, Judge

No. W2001-00484-COA-R3-JV - Filed March 13, 2002

This is a child support case concerning jurisdiction to review certai n administrative decisions rendered by the Depa

rtment of Human Services. In its order, the juvenile court tra nsferred the case, concluding th at sectio n 4-5-322 of the Te

nnessee Code plac ed jurisd

iction with

the “app ropriate chancery court.”Despite

its order transferringthe case, the juvenile court also decided the ca se on the merits and ruled that the State acted in contravention to section 36-5-905 of the Tennessee Code regarding the seizure of anobligor’s assets. The court further concluded that section 36-5-905 was unconstit utional. We reverse the trial court rega rding its jurisdictional determination and hold that the trial court erred by

reaching the constitutional issue.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Reversed in part; Affirmed in part; and Remanded

D AVID R. F ARMER , J., delive red the o pinion of t

he court , in which W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S., and A LAN E. H IGHERS , J., joined.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gen eral an d Reporter, and Stuart Wilson-Patton, Assistant Attorney General, for the Appellants, State of Tennessee , ex rel. Rhonda Anderson and Melinda Benson.1 The facts , procedural posture, rulings, and ord ers in e ach case a re ne arly id entica l. Acc ord ingly , we w ill only

discuss Stat

e of Tenne ssee ex re l And erson v. Ja rrett . A dis cussi on of State of Tennessee ex rel Be nson v. H arris
wo uld se rve n o pu rpo se in th is opin ion.

2 Sec tion 3 6-5 -90 5(a) of the Ten nesse e Co de state s as follo ws:

The department may enforc e the lien pr ovid ed b y this p art by issuan ce of an ad min istrative o rder to any pers on or ent it y dire cti ng the s eizur e or s ale of any asset s of an obli gor. The order shal l dir ect the person or entity to ho ld, subject to an y du e proc ess pro ced ures p rov ided the o bligo r, all ass ets of any kind of the oblig or w ho is su bject to th e order pending the out come of the adminis tra ti ve due proce ss procedur es. The order shal l be ba sed upon and i ssued pursuant to an e xist

ing j udici al or adminis tra ti ve order which has previ ously est abli shed s uppor t und er w hich an ar reara ge, d ue to overdue s upport, as def ined i n § 36-5-901, has occ urred.

-2- OPINION

This consolidated appeal arises from two decisions render ed by the Ha

ywood C ount y Juvenile Court. 1 In Anderson v. Jarret t , the State of Tennessee, on behalf of Ms. Rhonda Anderson, filed a Petition to Establish Parentage against Mr. L ester Jarrett. The Juvenile Court of Haywood County entered an Order of Parentage declaring Mr. Jarrett to be the father of the two c hildren born to Ms . A nd er so n. Su bs eq ue nt ly, the cour t held separate hearings to determine Mr . Jarrett’s current and retroactive child support obligations.

On February

23, 2000, the court set Mr. Jarrett’s retroactive child support obligation. Pursuant to the court’s order, Mr. Jarrett was to begin pay ment on the retroac tive oblig ati on on Marc h 1, 2000. T he State, however, sought to collect the retroa ctive obligation on February 23, 2000, when it issued Mr . Jarrett’ s employ er an ad ministrati ve order

for the s eizure of

assets pursuant to section 36-5-905 of

the Tennessee Code. 2 On February 25, 2000, the State notified Mr. Jarrett that his pension was to be seized to satisfy the “de linquent child support.”

Mr. Jarrett filed an objection to the seizure of his pension with the court on March 13, 2000. Mr. Jarrett also requested an administrative review by the Tennessee D epartment of Human S ervice s. The appeals referee for the Department

heard Mr. Jarrett’s case and ultimately , upheld the State’s decision to seize

Mr. Jarrett’s pension. Thereafter, Mr. Jarrett petitioned the Juvenile Court of Haywood County

to review the administrative ruling of the Department.

After reviewing the facts and procedural history of the c ase, the court determined that it was withoutjurisdiction t o review the Depa rtment’sadministr

ative ruling. Th

e court s tated tha

t a conflict existed between section 4-5-322 and section 36-5-1003 of the Te nnessee Code. The court noted that section 36-5-1003 “appe ar[ed] to give jurisdiction to the court that issued the support order,” while section 4 -5-322 “place[ d] jurisdiction with the appropriate chancery court.” Reasoning that “every word of a statute mu st be giv en effect if possible,” the court

determined that section 4-5- 322 controlled the issue

because section 3 6-5-1003 states, a ccording to the court, that “jurisdiction3 Pursuant to this Court’ s orde r fi led November 27, 2001, this matter was submit

ted f or deci sion based on t

he
reco rd, the State’s b rief, an d the State’s o ral arg um ent. -3- shallbe as ‘otherwise provided by 4-5-322.’” Theref

ore, the court or dered th at the ca se would be transferred to the chancery court at Brownsville.

After determinin g that it was without jurisdiction, the court, “in the interest of judicial efficiency ,” went on to

render a decisi on on the me

rits. The court ruled that theState impe rmissibly sei zed Mr. Jarrett’s pension. The court determined that the State issued the seizure order without statutory authority. Pursuant to section 36-5-905 of the Tenness ee Code, the cour t held tha t the State could only seize assets if the arr earage pay

ment was overdue. Because no payment was yet due when the State

issued the

seizure o rder, the court r

easoned that the Sta

te acte d in contrav ention to its statuto ry authority when it se

ized Mr. Jar

rett’s a ssets.

In addition to its ruling regarding the proprie ty of the State’s action under the seizur e statute s, the court pr

oclaimed that it was troubled by the a

bility of the State to issue or

ders on th ese matte rs. The court sta

ted that “the mixing”

of court and adminis trative procedures for the enforc ement of child support “is in this court’s opinion an unconstitutional violation of the separa tion of powers clause of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.”

On appe al, we must first note that the State concedes that it failed to comply wi th th e statutory guidelines wh en it se ized the assets belonging to Mr. Jarrett and Mr. Harris bef ore any payment was due o n th e retroactive support. Therefore, the State a grees with the trial court’s ultimate decision on the merits and in i ts brief states, “[b]ecause no pay ments were due on either retrospective obligation at the time of the administrative actions, there was no overdue support; and the seizure o f assets in both cases was, therefore, inappropr iate.” Nevertheless, the State appeals the decision of the tri al court , 3 raising the following issues for our review :
I. Whether

the lower court er red in finding tha

t it lacked j urisdicti on to review
a decision by the administrative re view unit of the Tennessee Department of Human Ser

vices.

II. Whether

the lower court

erred in finding that the Administrative procedures of the Tennessee Department of Hum an Services violate the constitutional require ment of se

paratio n of powe

rs.
In its first issue, the State contends that the trial cour t had j urisdiction to review the administrative decision rendered by the Department of Human Services. This is a question of law involving statutory interpreta tion. We review such questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded the

lower court’s judgment. Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tenn. 1999).-4-

When const

ruing st atutes, our primar

y g oal is “to ascertain and give eff ect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.” Lipscomb v. D oe , 3 2 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp. , 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000)). Whenever possible, the intentof the legislature should be determined by the natural and ordinary

meaning of the words used in the statut

e, not by a constr uction tha t is forced or which limits or extends the meaning. Id. (citing Hawks v. City of

Westmoreland

, 960 S.W.2d 10 , 16 (Tenn. 1997). In cases whe re the statutory langua ge is clear

and unamb iguous, courts wi ll ordinar ily apply the plain langua ge of the sta tute to resolve the issue. Id. (citi ng State v. Nelson , 23 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tenn. 2000). Finally , we will not construe a statute in a way that leads to an absurd result. In re Adoption of Hatcher , 16 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Pursuant to Tennessee’s Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, “pr oceedings for

review
are instituted by filing a petition for review in the cha

ncery court of Davidson County , unless another court is specified by statute.”Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 -5-322(b)(1) (1998). This same statutory pr ovi sion affords review for persons cha llenging a final decision of the Depa rtment of Human Services. Id. Those

persons “may f

ile a petition for review in the chancery court located either

in the county of the off

icial residence of the commissioner or in the county in w hich any one

(1) or more of the petitioners reside.” Id.

Section 3 6-5-1001 of the Tennessee Code gover ns the appeal of certain administrative action s by the

Department. This section provides for appeals relative to c hild support services invo lvin g, among other

items, “[t]he enforcement by administrative or ders of liens for child support pursuant to title 36, chapter 5, part 9.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-1001(a)(1)(E) (2001). Further , this section requires these appeals to be processed a s provided by section 36 -5-1003 o f the Tennessee Code. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-1001(a)(1) (2001).

Section 36-5-100 3 provide s f or the judicial review of the Department’s administrative decisions listed in section 36-5-1001 of the Tennessee Code. This section states that “[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary , the judicial review of the administrative hearing decisions of the department of human services pursuant to this part shall be conducted by the court having jurisdiction of

the support order as otherwise provided by § 4-5-322.” Tenn. CodeAnn. § 36-5-1003(a) (2001).

In the present case, the trial court focused on the language

in section 36-5-1003(a) that dire cts the reader to section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code. As section 4-5-322 provides for the jurisdiction and venue of conte sted Dep artment o f Human Se rvices c ases, the

court de termined that it mus t control the issue, not section 36-5-1003. Therefore, the court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction
over this matte

r, beca use section 4 -5-322 ve sted juris diction with the “appropriate chancery court.”

The trial court

erred in making this determination. While section 4-5-322 provides a general statement regar ding the proper c ourt for

judicial r eview of administr ative de cisions, th at same st atute also permits the legislature to specify other courts for the review of these decisions. I n enacting section 36-5- 1003 , the legislature specified another cour t for the review of certain administrative-5-

decisions made by the De partment regar ding ch ild support. T

he mentio n of sect

ion 4-5-3 22 within section 36-5-1003 served to illustrate the source of the legislature’s authority to specify other co urts to review certain administrative decisions of the Department. Any other interpretation would lead to illogical results. The language employed by

the legislature in these statutes is clear: the review of Department of

Human Services decisions made pursuant to 36-5-1001 is gover ned by 36-5-1003, while the review of other administrative decisions made by the Department is governed by section 4-5-322.

Pursuant to section 36-5

- 1003, the se case s were p roperly before the Hay wood Count

y Juvenile Court. The administrative orders issued by the Department regarded c

hild support services involving an action listed und er se ction 36-5-1001 of the Tennessee Code. The trial court ha d jurisdiction over the original support order s. Accord ingly , we hold t

hat the tr ial cour t erred in transfe rring t hese ca ses to cha

ncery court.

In its second issue, the State contends that the trial court erred in finding the administrative procedures utilized by the Department unconstitutional. We hold that the trial court should not have considered

the const itutional l egitima

cy of the sta

tute at iss ue in thes e cases . It iswell -settled in Tennessee that courts will only decide a constitutional question when it is absolute

ly necessa

ry in order to properly re solve the case. DeLaney v. Thompson , 98 2 S .W .2d 857 , 85 8 (T enn . 19 98) . In determining that the State acted bey ond its statutory authority in seizing the assets at issue, the court was readily able

to resolve the cases on nonconstitutional grounds. This determination provided the
reso lution sought by both Mr. Jarrett and Mr . Benson, foreclosing any need for thecourt’ s constitutional deci sion. Therefore, any consideration of the constitutional validity of the statutes in issue by the trial court wa s improper.

Ac co rd in gl y, we reverse the decision of the trial court r eg a rding it s lack of

jurisdict ion to review the Department’s administrative rul ing, as well as itsdecision to transf er the ma tter to chancery court. Further, we reverse the trial court’ s ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. The judgment of the trial court is otherwise affirmed. Costs of this appeal a re taxed to the State of Tennessee.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE