If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ROBERT BRIGGS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

January 19, 2023

v No. 357863

Houghton Circuit Court

VANESSA MASON and RICHARD SALMI, LC No. 21-017597-AV

Defendants-Appellants.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Vanessa Mason and Richard Salmi, appeal by leave granted the circuit court’s 

opinion and order affirming a judgment of possession entered by the district court under the 

summary proceedings act (SPA), MCL 600.5701 et seq., in favor of Robert Briggs, who had 

purchased the real property at issue, a house, from Daniel Small by land contract. As part of the 

SPA litigation, the district court denied motions for summary disposition, for relief from judgment, 

and for determination of an interest in land that were all filed by defendants, who started renting 

the property under a lease with Small, now deceased, a few years after the land contract was 

executed. Facing eviction, defendants filed this appeal. We reverse and remand for a trial in the 

district court to determine whether Briggs abandoned the land contract.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 1, 2011, Small and Briggs entered into a land contract. Small agreed to sell 

his house to Briggs for $28,000 plus interest. Under the land contract, Briggs was required to 

make monthly payments of $200 for 72 months, culminating in a balloon payment for the 

remaining balance. Briggs also agreed to maintain insurance on the property and to pay the real 

estate taxes. Upon full payment of the land contract, Small was required to convey legal title to 

the house to Briggs pursuant to a general warranty deed. The land contract was recorded with the 

Houghton County Register of Deeds (register of deeds).

On September 29, 2014, Small entered into a rental agreement with defendants. Under the 

contract, Small rented the house—previously sold to Briggs by land contract—to defendants. The 

rental agreement contained the following provisions:
-2-

After one year, assuming all things are in accordance, the landlord [Small] 

agrees to sell said property to either or both tenants for the price of $28,000.00 less 

all monies accumulated from rent and deposit for one year ($3,900.00) for a sum 

total price of $24,100.00 at same percent (%) landlord is being charged on his 

current mortgage (currently 4.9%).

* * *

Landlord will pay all taxes and insurance on property.

On September 21, 2020, Briggs served defendants with a demand for possession of the

property for nonpayment of rent. The demand indicated that defendants owed $2,206.99 in rent. 

On November 10, 2020, Briggs filed his SPA complaint in the district court against defendants 

seeking possession of the house. The complaint alleged that defendants owed $2,206.99 for back 

taxes. A copy of the Small-to-Briggs land contract was attached to the complaint.

Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), claiming that Small 

had died intestate in February 20181and that Briggs did not own the property. Defendants noted 

that on September 21, 2020, they had filed with the register of deeds an affidavit of interest in land 

relative to the property. Defendants maintained that there was no evidence that Briggs had paid 

the 72 monthly installments required by his land contract or that Briggs had a deed for the house 

titled in his name. Briggs filed a response to the motion and claimed ownership and a right to 

possession under the land contract. 

On December 9, 2020, the district court held a hearing on Briggs’s complaint for 

possession and defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The district court asked Briggs to 

tell the court about the case. Briggs informed the district court that he, as vendee, had a land 

contract with Small covering the property. Briggs indicated that the land contract was executed in 

2011 and was recorded with the register of deeds that same year. Documentary evidence supports 

these claims. In 2012, after his wife became terminally ill, Briggs spoke with Small about Briggs’s

renting out the house. They reached an agreement that Small’s son would live at the property, that 

in exchange, the land contract payments, the taxes, and the insurance “would be [considered] paid,”

and that Briggs could not charge Small’s son “any more than that.” Briggs was unsure whether

Small or Small’s son would pay the taxes and insurance. Briggs claimed that he and Small reduced 

this agreement to writing. According to Briggs, the written agreement was in storage, and he had 

been going through boxes trying to locate it. Briggs stated that the agreement had not been filed 

with the register of deeds. 

Further, in 2018, Briggs received a delinquent tax bill for the property. He called the 

Houghton County Treasurer (county treasurer), who purportedly informed him that there was a 

payment arrangement for the delinquent taxes which would take the property out of foreclosure. 

But Briggs then received another delinquency notice from the county treasurer. When he called 

the county treasurer, he was told that the delinquent taxes had to be paid by August 31, 2020, to 

prevent the property’s foreclosure. Briggs asserted that he paid the delinquent taxes. He learned 

 

1 The record contains a death certificate showing that Small died on February 22, 2018.
-3-

from Calumet Township that defendants were living in the house. Briggs claimed that he tried 

numerous times to contact defendants because he had no knowledge that they had been living in 

the house. He indicated that he had never been informed that Small’s son no longer lived at the 

house. Briggs stated that at one point defendant Mason told Briggs that she owned the house. 

When defendants did not contact Briggs after he demanded possession of the property for 

nonpayment, Briggs sued for possession in the district court.

Briggs informed the district court that he did not have any contact with Small after 2013

and that he had no knowledge that Small had died in 2018 or that Small had entered into a rental 

agreement with defendants. According to Briggs, he never forfeited his land contract, and Small 

had never instituted any land contract forfeiture proceedings against him. 

Defendant Mason testified that she had lived in the house since 2014 when she and 

defendant Salmi entered into the rental agreement with Small. Mason stated that defendants had 

to clean the house when they moved in because it was in “total disarray.” She opined that the 

home appeared abandoned. Mason was told that the house had been vacant for two years. She 

was also informed that Briggs had a land contract for the property but that he had “just up and 

disappeared.” Mason asserted that she had heard that Briggs’s son could not locate Briggs and 

that the police were looking for him. According to Mason, she had no reason to believe in 2014 

that Small did not own the house. Mason claimed that Small told her that he owned it. She had 

not gone to the register of deeds to do a title search. Mason testified that about a month after she 

and Salmi moved into the house, Small gave her a copy of his warranty deed for the property, 

which revealed his purchase and ownership of the house. 

Mason testified that she had never been late in making a monthly rental payment.2 Since 

2014, she had paid approximately $20,000. She had also spent approximately $21,000 in repairing 

the property. Mason posited that she had regular contact with Small and learned about his death 

from Small’s girlfriend. But Mason has not been in contact with Small’s heirs.

Mason testified that the accumulation of unpaid taxes in 2018 was the result of Small’s 

death. When Mason learned of the delinquent taxes, she made arrangements to pay them, but 

defendants were unable to pay them as arranged. Mason asserted that she currently had the 

financial resources to maintain the property going forward. Mason admitted that “up until 

recently” the rental agreement had not been recorded with the register of deeds. The rental 

agreement was attached to an affidavit of interest in land that defendants had filed with the register 

of deeds. 

Defendants asked the district court to summarily dismiss Briggs’s complaint. Defendants 

argued that because Briggs did not have a warranty deed giving him title to the property, he was 

not the owner of the house. Rather, the owner of the property was Small’s estate. Defendants 

contended that the matter had to be “sort[ed] out” in probate court with respect to which individual 

 

2 We note that although Briggs served a notice of nonpayment of rent on defendants and filed a 

complaint against them for nonpayment of property taxes, the case shifted away from a 

“nonpayment” dispute to one that focused solely on who had the right to possess the property. 
-4-

or individuals now owned the property before there could be a determination of who had the right 

to possess the property. Briggs responded that he, and not defendants, had a land contract 

demonstrating a right of possession.

The district court found that although the case was “a God awful mess,” it was not legally 

complicated. According to the district court, Briggs was within his rights to demand possession 

of the property. The district court explained that Briggs had a land contract for the property that 

was recorded with the register of deeds and that remained valid. The district court observed that 

Small had never instituted legal proceedings to have the land contract forfeited. And Briggs, as 

the land contract vendee, had equitable title to the property and all the rights associated with that 

title. The district court stated that Briggs could pursue obtaining legal title and a warranty deed 

from Small’s estate. The district court opined that defendants’ rental agreement, because it was 

not notarized, could not technically be recorded with the register of deeds. The district court also 

took the position that Small had no authority to enter into the rental agreement with defendants in 

2014 because he did not have the right to occupy the home at the time; he only held legal title to 

the property. Ruling from the bench, the district court denied defendants’ motion for summary 

disposition and gave them 60 days to vacate the property. 

On December 9, 2020, the district court entered a possession judgment in favor of Briggs, 

recognizing his right to recover possession of the property.3 The judgment authorized Briggs to 

apply for an order of eviction or writ of restitution if defendants did not vacate the house by 

February 15, 2021. On December 11, 2020, the district court entered an order formally denying 

defendants’ motion for summary disposition. In the order, after summarizing the facts, the district 

court ruled:

[Briggs], as land contract vendee on a valid contract, properly has standing 

to engage summary proceedings to evict persons from the premises. When Mr. 

Small entered into the rental agreement with the Defendants, he does not appear to 

have had the authority to enter into such an agreement without the assent of the 

[Briggs]. The term of that agreement has now expired. Defendants admitted that 

they did not take any efforts to determine the identity of the actual owner of the 

premises. At best, Defendants have a tenancy-at-will agreement with a nowdeceased landlord who had no authority to enter such an agreement. [Briggs’s]

Complaint for Possession is properly filed against Defendants, and accordingly 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary disposition is denied.

Defendants filed a claim of appeal in the circuit court but then voluntarily dismissed the 

appeal. On February 10 or 11, 2021, in the district court, defendants moved for relief from 

judgment, arguing that they were entitled to relief because of Briggs’s fraud and misrepresentation. 

In support, defendants contended that the land contract that Briggs filed in the district court with 

his complaint for possession was not the same land contract that had been recorded with the register 

of deeds. Defendants also argued that relief from judgment was warranted because of mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a). They asserted that the district 

 

3 The judgment expressly indicated that no money judgment was being entered. 
-5-

court had failed to swear-in Briggs as a witness at the earlier hearing; therefore, his statements and 

claims had not been made under oath. Defendants also maintained that the district court mistakenly 

believed that defendants’ rental agreement was not recorded with the register of deeds, leading the 

court to erroneously conclude that defendants did not have an interest in the property. Defendants 

emphasized that they had recorded the rental agreement with their affidavit of an interest in land 

on September 21, 2020. Briggs filed an answer opposing the motion and challenging defendants’

claims.

The record contains a brief in support of defendants’ motion for relief from judgment

which was signed by defense counsel on February 24, 2021. The brief added an argument that 

was not contained in the motion for relief from judgment. Defendants contended that an action 

for possession of property constitutes an action at law, that Briggs did not have legal title to the 

property, and that consequently he did “not have standing to seek a legal remedy for possession of 

the property.” The district court register of actions does not show that the brief in support of the 

motion for relief from judgment was filed, but the brief itself was stamped by the district court 

with a filing date of March 9, 2021. 

Defendants also filed a motion to determine an interest in land, along with a supporting 

brief. The motion and brief were signed by defense counsel on February 24, 2021. The district 

court register of actions does not show that the motion and brief were ever filed, but the documents 

themselves were stamped by the district court with a filing date of March 9, 2021. In the motion 

and brief to determine an interest in land, defendants argued that they had an interest in the property 

that was superior to any interest held by Briggs. Defendants repeated some of their arguments 

made in the motion for relief from judgment. Relevant for our purposes, defendants also 

maintained that Briggs had “abandoned the property in 2012 and by his actions abandoned the land

contract.” They attached a copy of this Court’s opinion in Day v Lacchia, 175 Mich App 363; 437 

NW2d 400 (1989), to support their position. 

A hearing was held on defendants’ motion for relief from judgment on March 8, 2021. 

Defense counsel argued the issues contained in defendants’ motion for relief from judgment. The 

district court acknowledged that it had failed to swear-in Briggs as a witness at the previous

hearing. It then placed Briggs under oath and asked him if the testimony that he gave at the last

hearing was true to the best of his information, knowledge, and belief. Briggs answered in the 

affirmative. The district court next observed that there was no difference in “the substantive 

language” of the land contract that Briggs filed with his complaint for possession as compared to 

the land contract that Briggs recorded with the register of deeds. According to the district court, 

the only so-called difference between the two land contracts was that the contract filed with the 

possession complaint did not include the amortization schedule that had been attached to the land 

contract recorded with the register of deeds. Defendants acknowledged that the district court’s 

assessment on that matter was accurate. 

At the hearing, defense counsel also presented arguments that had been in the brief in 

support of the motion for relief from judgment and in the motion to determine an interest in land, 

along with the supporting brief, which documents were signed by counsel on February 24, 2021, 

but had not yet been filed with the district court. Defense counsel was under the belief that those 

documents had already been filed. Counsel proceeded to assert that Briggs’s complaint for 

possession of the property was premature. Defendants maintained that our Supreme Court had 
-6-

held that a land contract vendee’s title is equitable and that courts will not recognize equitable title 

in an action at law, such as an action for possession. According to defendants, until Briggs 

obtained “perfected legal title” to the property, he could not bring an action for ejectment. 

Defendants also argued that under Day, 175 Mich App 363, a land contract vendor may retake 

possession of real property if the vendee is not in possession and has effectively abandoned the 

property. Defendants claimed that Small had the right to retake possession of the property in 2014

when the rental agreement was executed, where Briggs had not possessed the house since 2012 

and had abandoned it. In support of their stance, defendants pointed out that Briggs had allowed 

the house to deteriorate such that it was “in terrible shape,” that he had not paid taxes or maintained 

insurance on the home, and that Briggs had not made payments required by the land contract.

The district court expressed that it had reviewed defendants’ motion for relief from 

judgment before the hearing and that some of defendants’ oral arguments at the hearing, including 

abandonment under Day, were not contained in that motion. Briggs, who did not have counsel, 

offered his agreement with the court’s observation. At this juncture in the hearing, there was a 

discussion between the district court and defense counsel, with the court indicating that it only had 

in its possession the motion for relief from judgment, and counsel voicing her belief that the 

supporting brief, the motion to determine an interest in land, and the brief associated with that 

particular motion had all been filed. The district court denied defendants’ motion for relief from 

judgment with respect to the arguments contained in the motion, including the arguments 

concerning the purported different land contracts and the failure to swear-in Briggs as a witness. 

The district court, however, informed the parties that, subsequent to the hearing, it would review 

Day and consider the arguments regarding the alleged abandonment of the land contract and the

purported necessity of legal title to have standing to pursue a possession judgment. The day after 

the hearing, on March 9, 2021, defendants filed the brief in support of the motion for relief from 

judgment, filed the motion to determine an interest in land, and filed the brief supporting the 

motion to determine an interest in land.

On March 15, 2021, the district court entered an order denying defendants’ motion for 

relief from judgment. Consistent with its ruling from the bench, the district court rejected 

defendants’ claim that Briggs had engaged in a misrepresentation by not attaching the amortization 

schedule to the land contract filed with his complaint for possession. The court explained that the 

absence of the amortization schedule was not material to the district court’s determination that 

Briggs had a valid land contract that had not been forfeited. The district court also found that its 

failure to place Briggs under oath at the earlier hearing did not warrant relief. The court noted that 

no objection had been made by defendants at that previous hearing and that, regardless, Briggs 

subsequently affirmed under oath that his earlier “testimony” was truthful. Finally, the district 

court ruled that defendants’ affidavit of interest in land did not persuade it that defendants had a 

superior claim to the property. The court observed that the affidavit of interest in land did not cure 

the deficiencies in the rental agreement, which were the lack of a notarized signature and the 

absence of a specified term for repayment. The district court did not address Day, the issue of land 

contract abandonment, or the argument that legal title was necessary to have standing to commence 

a complaint for possession. 

In a March 22, 2021 order, the district court denied defendants’ motion to determine an 

interest in land. The court denied the motion because defendants, in the motion, had essentially 

asserted a counterclaim of equitable title to the property but no counterclaim had ever been pleaded 
-7-

by defendants. There was no express discussion or analysis of Day, the issue of land contract 

abandonment, or the argument that legal title was necessary to have standing to seek a possession 

judgment.

Defendants appealed to the circuit court, challenging the district court’s various orders and 

reiterating, for the most part, their arguments that had been made in the district court. Oral 

argument was held on June 22, 2021. On June 29, 2021, the circuit court issued its written opinion 

and order affirming the district court’s rulings. The circuit court first addressed defendants’

argument that Briggs had abandoned the land contract and his equitable interest in the property. 

The court noted that although the extinguishment of a land contract vendee’s equitable title is 

generally accomplished through formal court proceedings, Michigan courts have recognized that 

a vendee may lose his or her equitable title through abandonment. But, according to the circuit 

court, the record before the district court did not support the claim of abandonment. The circuit 

court explained:

The record does establish that upon Defendants gaining access to the . . . 

residence, they found it to be in dire condition, however, the record also contains 

the testimony of Mr. Briggs, which was referenced by the District Court in its Order 

in response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Disposition. Mr. Briggs testified 

that he and Mr. Small entered into an understanding which permitted Mr. Small’s 

son to reside at the . . . premises. Mr. Briggs went on to say that such arrangement 

caused him to opine that his obligations under the land contract were being satisfied 

and that he never heard anything to the contrary. The testimony of Mr. Briggs in 

that regard was not disputed.

The District Court, obviously, did not find on the basis of the record before 

it that Mr. Briggs had abandoned his interest in the subject property. For that reason, 

the District Court in its Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Relief from 

Judgment found [Briggs] to have a valid land contract which “had not been forfeited

. . .”. Findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous 

and the failure of the District Court to find abandonment is supported by the record. 

The circuit court then addressed defendants’ argument that because Briggs only had 

equitable title to the property, he could not avail himself of relief under the SPA. The circuit court

indicated that defendants were essentially arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction 

to hear and decide the complaint for possession filed by Briggs. The circuit court disagreed, stating 

that when the jurisdiction of the district courts was broadened in 1980, district courts received 

authority to hear and determine equitable claims involving rights and interests in land. Finally, 

the circuit court rejected defendants’ argument that the district court had erred in finding that the 

affidavit of interest in land that they had executed was not a recordable document. The circuit 

court agreed with the district court that the issue was of no consequence. 

Defendants appeal by leave granted. Briggs v Mason, unpublished order of the Court of 

Appeals, entered January 18, 2022 (Docket No. 357863).
-8-

II. ANALYSIS

A. APPELLATE ARGUMENTS

On appeal, defendants effectively argue that the lower courts erred (1) by not recognizing 

under Day that Briggs had abandoned the land contract and his equitable title, (2) by concluding 

that Briggs had standing to commence the action for possession despite the uncontroverted fact 

that he did not have legal title to the property, and (3) by failing to find that defendants held an 

equitable interest in the property and a right of possession in light of the rental agreement and the 

recorded affidavit of an interest in land.

B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” ElKhalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “De novo review 

means that we review the legal issue independently, without required deference to the courts 

below.” Wright v Genesee Co, 504 Mich 410, 417; 934 NW2d 805 (2019). This Court reviews 

for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment. Yee v 

Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 404; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). A trial court 

abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled 

outcomes. Macomb Co Dep’t of Human Servs v Anderson, 304 Mich App 750, 754; 849 NW2d 

408 (2014). “Findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In 

the application of this principle, regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court 

to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” MCR 2.613(C). “The clear-error 

standard requires us to give deference to the lower court and find clear error only if we are 

nevertheless left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Arbor 

Farms, LLC v Geostar Corp, 305 Mich App 374, 386-387; 853 NW2d 421 (2014) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

C. DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION

Our Supreme Court “has consistently held that under a land contract, although the vendor 

retains legal title until the contractual obligations have been fulfilled, the vendee is given equitable

title, and that equitable title is a present interest in realty that may be sold, devised, or encumbered.” 

Graves v American Acceptance Mtg Corp (On Rehearing), 469 Mich 608, 614; 677 NW2d 829 

(2004). “That the vendee may ultimately default on the [land] contract does not negate the fact 

that the vendee has, in a real sense, purchased the relevant property.” Id. at 616. This is true even 

though legal title remains in the vendor until the vendee fully performs all of his or her contractual 

obligations. Id. Assuming authorization under the land contract, the vendee obtains a right to 

possess the real property. Jones v Bowling, 117 Mich 288, 292; 75 NW 611 (1898). 

A landlord-tenant “lease is a conveyance by the owner of an estate to another of a portion 

of his interest therein for a term less than his own for a valuable consideration, granting thereby to 

the lessee the possession, use and enjoyment of the portion conveyed during the period stipulated.” 

Minnis v Newbro-Gallogly Co, 174 Mich 635, 639; 140 NW 980 (1913) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted); see also Royal Oak Wholesale Co v Ford, 1 Mich App 463, 466; 136 NW2d 765 
-9-

(1965); 2 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (3d ed), § 20.2, p 1096. “A lease . . . is ordinarily 

considered to create an estate in lands.” Cameron, § 20.1, p 1093. 

To be clear, this case has no bearing on who holds legal title to the property, which at this 

stage appears to be Small’s estate, an heir or heirs of the estate, or possibly a grantee under a 

conveyance by the estate or an heir or heirs. On remand, it may be wise for the parties or the 

district court to contemplate joinder of the current legal titleholder. See MCR 2.205 and MCR 

2.206.4 

We initially conclude that defendants, having resided in the house as tenants for several 

years, plainly have some type of leasehold or possessory interest in the property regardless of any 

recordation issues. See Cameron, §§ 20.2 to 20.7, pp 1096-1098 (discussing the different types of 

tenancies recognized in Michigan, including, for example, a tenancy at will, which “may be created 

when a person takes possession of land under an invalid contract or lease”).5 But if Briggs’s 

recorded land contract and equitable title were not abandoned or otherwise forfeited, Briggs’s 

interest as a land contract vendee would constitute a superior interest in the property. We reach 

this conclusion, assuming no abandonment, because Briggs’s vendee interest in the land contract 

was created three years before the rental agreement was executed, and Small did not have the legal 

right or authority to unilaterally lease the property in conflict with Briggs’s equitable title and 

possessory right. In that circumstance, defendants’ leasehold or possessory interest would have to 

yield or succumb to Briggs’s equitable title, leaving defendants to seek recourse, if any, against 

Small or his estate.6 Defendants do not argue to the contrary.

With respect to whether Briggs had standing or authority to commence the action for 

possession under the SPA even though he only had equitable title and not legal title to the property, 

we hold that Briggs was a proper plaintiff in the SPA action, assuming that he did not abandon the 

land contract. Defendants rely on outdated legal principles that recognized distinctions between 

actions at law and in equity that for the most part have now been abolished. See Const 1963, art 

6, § 5 (“The distinctions between law and equity proceedings shall, as far as practicable, be 

abolished.”). This Court has stated that “[w]ith the adoption of the General Court Rules of 1963, 

our Supreme Court eliminated the separate character of actions at law and actions in equity and 

established one form of action, which practice continues to this day.” New Prod Corp v Harbor 

Shores BHBT Land Dev, LLC, 308 Mich App 638, 644-645; 866 NW2d 850 (2014).

Moreover, the SPA makes clear that a land contract vendee may institute an action for the 

possession of premises. “The district court . . . ha[s] jurisdiction over summary proceedings to 

recover possession of premises under this chapter.” MCL 600.5704. And MCL 600.5714(1) 

 

4 We have not been informed of any litigation filed by the legal titleholder concerning the property. 

5 See Cameron, § 20.3, p 1096.

6 We recognize that the rental agreement between Small and defendants also contained an 

agreement to sell the property to defendants, which was not exercised. But this additional 

component of the rental agreement did not give defendants an interest that was superior to the land 

contract vendee interest. 
-10-

provides that “[a] person entitled to possession of premises may recover possession by summary 

proceedings . . . .” As indicated earlier, a land contract vendee is entitled to possession of the 

premises unless the pertinent land contract, for whatever unusual reason, does not allow for 

possession, which was not the case in this instance. Indeed, even a leaseholder or tenant who has 

a legal right to possession under a rental agreement can bring a suit under the SPA to, for example, 

eject a landlord who holds legal title and who has unlawfully locked out the tenant. Additionally, 

MCL 600.8302(3) provides that in an action under the SPA, “the district court may hear and 

determine an equitable claim . . . involving a right, interest, obligation, or title in land.” (Emphasis 

added.) Accordingly, we reject defendants’ contention that Briggs could not pursue a possession 

judgment because he was not the legal titleholder.

This leave us with the issue of abandonment of the land contract and Briggs’s equitable 

title. MCL 600.5726 provides:

A person entitled to any premises may recover possession thereof by a 

proceeding under this chapter after forfeiture of an executory contract for the 

purchase of the premises but only if the terms of the contract expressly provide for 

termination or forfeiture, or give the vendor the right to declare a forfeiture, in 

consequence of the nonpayment of any moneys required to be paid under the 

contract or any other material breach of the contract. . . . .

MCR 4.202 provides the procedural rules governing a land contract forfeiture action under the 

SPA. In this case, there is no dispute that Briggs was never the subject of an action to forfeit the 

land contract.7

MCL 600.5750 provides that “[t]he remedy provided by summary proceedings is in 

addition to, and not exclusive of, other remedies, either legal, equitable or statutory.” Land 

contract vendors need not necessarily resort to the SPA in all circumstances, and self-help remains 

available in certain circumstances, including when the retaking of vacant property can be 

accomplished peaceably. Day, 175 Mich App at 374. In Dundas v Foster, 281 Mich 117, 120; 

274 NW 731 (1937), our Supreme Court addressed the issue of abandonment of a land contract:

Abandonment by the purchaser is shown where he positively and absolutely 

refuses to perform the conditions of the contract, such as a failure to make payments 

due, accompanied by other circumstances, or where by his conduct he clearly shows 

an intention to abandon the contract. As a general rule whether or not the 

purchaser’s acts and conduct amount to an abandonment of the contract is a 

question for the jury; but such acts and conduct may be so decisive and 

unambiguous as to justify the court in deciding the question as a matter of law. 

[Quotation marks, citation, and ellipses omitted; see also Houghton v Collins, 344 

Mich 175, 180; 73 NW2d 208 (1955).]

 

7 Vendee defaults on land contracts can also be entertained by the circuit court in an action for 

foreclosure. MCL 600.3101. No foreclosure suit was filed in this case.
-11-

Conduct of the vendor and vendee that is inconsistent with the continuance of a land contract 

demonstrates rescission of the contract by abandonment, and it is unnecessary to present evidence 

of a writing showing relinquishment of the land contract because abandonment may be deduced

solely from the surrounding circumstances or a course of conduct. Annett v Stout, 322 Mich 457, 

462; 34 NW2d 42 (1948). Accordingly, even when there has been no land contract forfeiture 

action, a land contract can be abandoned. But if a land contract is abandoned, the vendee would 

lose the interest necessary to commence a suit for possession under the SPA.

In this case, defendants did not specifically argue “abandonment” of the land contract at 

the time of the hearing on Briggs’s complaint for possession and defendants’ motion for summary 

disposition. But Mason’s testimony squarely gave rise to that issue where she indicated that the 

house was in “total disarray,” that it appeared abandoned, that she was told that the house had been 

vacant for two years, that she was informed that Briggs had “just up and disappeared,” and that 

she heard that Briggs’s son could not locate his father. Briggs’s own testimony established that he 

essentially had nothing to do with the house from 2012 to 2018. And even though he had an 

agreement with Small to permit Small’s son to reside in the house, which effectively allowed 

Briggs to forgo the payment of land contract installments, taxes, and insurance, the balloon 

payment was due in 2017, and apparently Briggs did nothing at that time.

8

 In closing arguments 

at the possession and summary disposition hearing, defense counsel did argue that the 

circumstances indicated that Small had intended to lease and then sell the house to defendants and 

“that [Small] believed that the land contract had been defaulted . . . .” 

Moreover, at the hearing on defendants’ motion for relief from judgment, the district court 

informed defendants that it would take into consideration Day and the issue of abandonment, but 

the rulings by the district court on the motions for relief from judgment and to determine an interest 

in land do not reveal any examination of the issue of abandonment outside of an actual forfeiture 

action. The district court’s ruling that defendants needed to file a counterclaim did not pertain to 

abandonment, and the abandonment argument could certainly serve as a defense with no need to 

file a counterclaim to raise the issue. As the circuit court noted, the district court observed that 

Small had never instituted legal proceedings to have the land contract forfeited. That observation 

does not appear to be a ruling on abandonment, and if it were so intended, it would be in error 

because a land contract can be deemed abandoned regardless of whether a land contract forfeiture 

action was instituted. 

Although there was the semblance of an evidentiary hearing in the district court, we believe 

that a trial is appropriate to fully develop and squarely address the issue of abandonment that does 

not appear to have actually been decided by the district court. For purposes of remand and to avoid 

any confusion, the issue of abandonment of the land contract need not be judged solely at the time 

defendants entered into the rental agreement in 2014; rather, if Briggs abandoned the land contract 

 

8 The circuit court did not contemplate this aspect of the case when determining that the district 

court did not err in finding that there was no abandonment, thereby undermining the circuit court’s 

ruling that we cannot affirm. Additionally, the district court did not even expressly address the 

issue of abandonment.
-12-

and thus his equitable title at any point before commencing the action for possession under the 

SPA, he would lack standing to obtain a possession judgment. 

We reverse and remand for further proceedings in the district court consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. We decline to tax costs under MCR 7.219.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ James Robert Redford