alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### David FENTON and David Muskat, a partnership, Appellants, v. Louis LEVY and Marlon I. Levy, Appellees.

No. 69-572.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Jan. 20, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1970.

Fuller & Feingold, Miami, for appellants.

Dean, Adams, George & Wood, and Thomas J. Schulte, Miami, for appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See: Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305, 19 So.2d 876; 5 Fla.Jur., Brokers, §46.
Exhibit 10.39

 



 











 

 



 











 



 











 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed effective as provided above.

 

	
WITNESS\ATTEST:
    	
 
    	
SINCLAIR   BROADCAST GROUP, INC.
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
/s/   Jacqueline Pletcher
    	
 
    	
By:
    	
/s/   David B. Amy
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Print   Name:
    	
Jacqueline   Pletcher
    	
 
    	
Print   Name: 
    	
David   B. Amy
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Print   Title:
    	
EVP   and CFO
    
							


 

4
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-1432

ULISSES M. BASTOS,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A28-326-230)

Submitted: October 20, 2004 Decided: November 4, 2004

Before WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Antonio M. Zaldana, LAW OFFICE OF ANTONIO M. ZALDANA, Los Angeles,

California, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney

General, James A. Hunolt, Senior Litigation Counsel, Sarah Maloney,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Ulisses M. Bastos, a native and citizen of Brazil,

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“Board”) denying his motion to reopen and dismissing his

appeal of the immigration judge’s denial of his motions to reopen

and reconsider. We have reviewed the administrative record and the

Board’s order and find that the Board did not abuse its discretion.

See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992). Additionally, we

conclude that Bastos’s due process claim is without merit. See

Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 2004);

Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1997
<CASH>                                           7,293
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  362,396
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,500
<INVENTORY>                                    575,842
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                19,151
<PP&E>                                       2,917,716
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,774,447
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,108,201
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          742,617
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                         5,346
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,315,584
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,108,201
<SALES>                                        470,177
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               483,669
<CGS>                                          355,577
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  355,577
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               214,188
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,507
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (96,603)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (96,603)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (96,603)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.18)
        

</TABLE>
#### Rigmor EILERTSEN, Appellant, v. C. W. STONE, et ux., Appellees.

No. M-171.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 17, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Interlocutory appeal dismissed.
HEBST & GREENWALD LLP
                                Attorneys at Law
                              380 LEXINGTON AVENUE
                            NEW YORK, N.Y. 10168-0002


     WHEREAS,  Odyssey Pictures  Corporation  ("OPIX") is indebted to Stephen R.
Greenwald  ("SRG") in the amount of $210,800,  under the terms of an  Employment
Agreement between OPIX and SRG, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1; and

     WHEREAS, OPIX and SRG desire to settle the indebtedness to SRG on the terms
hereafter set forth,

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

1.   On or before October 31, 1999,  OPIX shall pay to SRG, in settlement of any
     indebtedness  owed to SRG under the Employment  Agreement,  the sum of U.S.
     $75,000 and shall  transfer to SRG 100,000  shares of common stock of OPIX,
     which  shares  shall  either be  registered  or have so called  "piggyback"
     rights for  registration  with the first  registration of shares  occurring
     after delivery of the stock to SRG;

2.   If less than  $75,000  has been paid to SRG by October 31,  1999,  then the
     number of shares to be  delivered  to SRG under  paragraph 1 above shall be
     increased by 25,000  shares for each calendar  week, or part thereof,  from
     October 31, 1999 to the date of payment of $75,000 to SRG;

3.   Upon  receipt by SRG of $75,000  and  delivery of the  requisite  number of
     shares of OPIX stock,  as determined  under  paragraphs 1 and 2 above,  the
     Employment  Agreement  shall  terminate,  SRG shall resign as an officer of
     OPIX and SRG  shall  release  OPIX  from  any and all  existing  or  future
     liabilities or obligations  to SRG under the Employment  Agreement.  Unless
     and until payment to SRG of $75,000 and delivery of the requisite number of
     shares of stock,  the Employment  Agreement  shall remain in full force and
     effect;

4.   Upon SRG's release of OPIX from  liability  under  paragraph 3 above,  OPIX
     shall release SRG from any and all  obligation to OPIX under the Employment
     Agreement  and  shall  waive  and  release  SRG from any and all  claims or
     liability  arising out of SRG's employment  relationship  with OPIX and for
     his service as a director of OPIX;

5.   If payment of $75,000 and  delivery of the  requisite  number of shares has
     not been  made by  December  31,  1999,  this  Agreement  shall  terminate,
     provided that, at his option,  SRG may extend the term of this Agreement to
     a later date.

6.   Agreement subject to the Board approval by October 20, 1999.






/s/ Stephen R. Greenwald
------------------------
    Stephen R. Greenwald                            Odyssey Pictures Corp.


                                                 By:/s/ Odyssey Pictures Corp.
                                                 ------------------------------


                                       1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                          12,701
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   33,533
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,450
<INVENTORY>                                     36,589
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                89,141
<PP&E>                                          51,575
<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,445
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 136,350
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           37,111
<BONDS>                                          3,960
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         8,785
<OTHER-SE>                                      41,187
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   136,350
<SALES>                                        129,308
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                           50,528
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  116,770
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    50
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,724
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,814
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,326
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,488
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,488
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.98
        

</TABLE>
#### Clyde W. PARROTT, Petitioner, Cross-Respondent, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Bituminous Casualty Corporation, et al., Respondents, Cross-Petitioners.

No. 39741.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 31, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 1970.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and DREW, THORNAL, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED BY THE 10-QSB FOR
THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 FOR CUTCO INDUSTRIES,  INC. AND IS QUALIFIED
BY ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                      9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                 SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                           760,856
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  1,785,571
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               2,675,877
<PP&E>                                            43,863
<DEPRECIATION>                                    23,891
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,740,307
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            171,121
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                         958,771
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,598,002
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,740,307
<SALES>                                          304,980
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 328,569
<CGS>                                            621,554
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    621,554
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (292,985)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (3,050)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                    0
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (296,035)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.34)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (.34)



</TABLE>
#### Joseph GOLDBERG, Petitioner, v. COIN METER COMPANY and the Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.

No. 42781.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 11, 1973.

Certiorari denied.

CARLTON, C. J„ and ROBERTS, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, J., dissents.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

__________________________________________

)

In the Matter of )

)

CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V., )

)

a foreign corporation, )

)

CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY, )

)

a corporation, ) Docket No. 9300

)

and )

)

PITT-DES-MOINES, INC., )

)

a corporation. )

__________________________________________)

PROPOSED ORDER

Upon consideration of Respondents’ Motion to Strike Trial Testimony Relating to 

Exhibits CX 1577 and CX 1578, the Court hereby grants Respondents’ Motion to Strike Trial 

Testimony Relating to Exhibits CX 1577 and CX 1578. The Court will disregard/strike: Trial 

Tr. 7600:19-7601:8; 7603:1-19; 7604:15-7605:8; 7616:11-13; 7618:9-20; 7619:9-10; 7619:18-

7622:5; 7624:20-7625:11; 7629:18-7630:5.

_____________________________

D. Michael Chappell

Administrative Law Judge Date: ____________, 2002
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           2,501
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,475
<ALLOWANCES>                                       372
<INVENTORY>                                         24
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                12,110
<PP&E>                                           4,108
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,674
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  13,806
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,653
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            40
<OTHER-SE>                                      10,067
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    13,806
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                11,495
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,195
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    43
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,343
<INCOME-TAX>                                       505
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                838
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       838
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.20


</TABLE>
#### John Wilson COFFMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-1025.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 30, 1973.

James A. Gardner,- Public Defender, and Elliott C. Metcalfe, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Guy E. Labalme, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Clarke, Fla.App.1971, 242 So.2d 791, cert. den. Fla., 246 So.2d 112. See, also, Commonwealth v. Hernley, 1970, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904, cert. den. 401 U.S. 914, 91 S.Ct. 886, 27 L.Ed.2d 813, and Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1178.

HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY , and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-51065

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ADON JOSHUA MUNIZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:08-CR-127-ALL

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Adon Joshua Muniz pleaded guilty to one count of possession of an

unregistered firearm. The district court sentenced him to serve 120 months’

imprisonment, which exceeds the advisory guidelines sentencing range. Muniz

contends his sentence is unreasonable. The Government maintains this

challenge is barred by Muniz’ waiver of his appellate rights. Muniz replies that

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 26, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-51065

2

the Government lost its right to invoke the waiver by standing silent at

sentencing when the district court erroneously informed him that he could

appeal his sentence.

Our court reviews de novo whether the waiver of a right to appeal in a

written plea agreement prevents an appeal from being taken. United States v.

Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002). A review of the record shows: Muniz

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence; and the claim

he now raises is barred by the language of the waiver. See United States v.

Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005). The district court’s related

misstatements at sentencing do not affect the validity of the waiver, and the

Government’s silence does not preclude it from invoking the waiver. See United

States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, consideration

of Muniz’ challenge to his sentence is precluded by the waiver. See id.; see also

United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 230-31 (5th Cir. 2006).

DISMISSED.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Office of the Secretary

March 2, 2011

Mr. Eric Silverberg

State of New York

Re: In the Matter of Twitter, Inc., File No. 092 3093, Docket No. C-4316

Dear Mr. Silverberg:

Thank you for your comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s consent agreement in

the above-entitled proceeding. The Commission has placed your comment on the public record

pursuant to Rule 4.9(b)(6)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(6)(ii),

and has given it serious consideration. 

Your comment asks that the Commission clarify the impact of the proposed settlement on

small websites. Your comment also poses a hypothetical in which the security of a small online

message board is breached and asks whether the Commission would fine the operator of the

message board.

In response, the Commission notes that its complaint against Twitter alleges that the

company engaged in deceptive acts or practices, in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, by

falsely representing that it used reasonable and appropriate measures to protect its users’

nonpublic information from unauthorized access and honor the privacy choices exercised by its

users. The Commission notes that the failure of any company to keep such promises made to

consumers concerning the privacy and security of their personal information may violate the

FTC Act’s prohibition on deceptive acts or practices, regardless of the size of the company. The

Commission has, however, adopted a flexible approach to data security, taking into account the

nature of the business and the risks involved in determining whether security measures are

reasonable or enforcement is warranted. The Commission has developed guidance for

businesses on data security measures which may be useful to you. This guidance can be found at

http://www.business.ftc.gov/.

 

 Whether a breach such as the one described in your comment gives rise to a law

violation is beyond the scope of the complaint and order in this case and cannot be determined

given the limited information provided. We note, however, that the fact of a breach does not

mean that a company has failed to honor a promise to maintain reasonable security. The

Commission recognizes that there cannot be “perfect” security, and that data breaches can occur

even when a company maintains reasonable precautions to prevent them. Finally, with respect

to whether a fine is possible, the Commission notes that it currently does not have authority to

impose civil monetary penalties for violations of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act. 
In light of these considerations, the Commission has determined that the public interest

would best be served by issuing the Decision and Order in final form without any modifications. 

The final Decision and Order and other relevant materials are available from the Commission’s

website at http://www.ftc.gov. It helps the Commission’s analysis to hear from a variety of

sources in its work, and it thanks you again for your comment.

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark

Secretary
No. 10237.

#### Szendel *v.*Thrumm.

Decided March 24, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

*Mr. Conway W. Noble,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Sanders, Cline & Sanders,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Si-iauck, C. J., Crew and Spear, JJ., concur.