### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JUL Y 28, 2003 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 01- 1360 6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 9 9- 00 04 2- CV-WLS W ILLIE SANTONIO MANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us T H U RM A

N L E E , ind ivi dua lly

a nd a s e m

plo y ee of the Ci ty of H om er vil le , A L A

N BR O W N , ind ivi dua lly

a nd as em ploy ee of the C ity

of H om erville, BAR T C RE W S, indiv iduallyand as em

ploy ee of the C ity

of Hom erv il le , CITY OF HOMERVILLE, CLINCH COUNTY, GEORGIA, D ef en dants , W IN ST O N P E T E RS O N , ind ivi dua lly a nd a s e m

plo y ee of Cl in ch Co un ty, Geo rg ia , D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 28 , 200 3) Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HUL L, MARCUS an d WILSON, Ci rc uit Jud ge s.W e r e c o un tth e e v i d e n c e i nth e l i g h tm o s tf av o r a b l e t o M an d e r s , th e n o n m o v i n gp arty, 1 on a summary

judgme nt motion. Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998). 2 HU LL , C ircuit Judg e: In this § 19 83 excessive force ca se, W illie Santonio Mand ers sued Sherif f W ins tonP et er son in h is o ff ic ia l c ap ac ity

f or inj ur ie s a lle ge dly

c au se d by

the Sh er if f’ s us e- of -f or ce pol ic y

a t the j ai l and f

ai lur e to tra in and d isc ipl ine his de put ie s inthat r eg ar d. W e co nc lud e that S he ri ff P et er son func tio ns a s an “ ar m of the S ta te ” in e sta

bli shi ng u se -o f- fo rc e pol ic y a t the j ai l and i n tr ai nin g and dis ci pli nin g hi s de put ie s inthat r eg ar d, a nd i s e nti tle d to E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m u n i t y fo r t h es e p ar t i cu l arfu n ct i o n s . Th u s , we re v er s e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s de nia l of sum m ar y j udgm en t f

or S he ri ff P et er son. I. BACKG ROUND A. Fact s A s th e el ec te d sh er if

f, de fe ndant S he ri ff

P et er son is r es pons ibl e fo r the operation of the ja il in Clinch Coun ty , G eorgia, for establishing use-of-f orce policy at the j ail, and for hiring, training, and disciplin ing hi s deputies who work in the j ai l. S he ri ff

P et er son’ s de puty

a nd c hie f j ai le r is A lan B ro w n. I n M ay 199 7, pol ic e of fi ce rs f ro m the Ci ty of H om er vil le a rr es te d pl ai nti ff

Mande rs a nd tr an spor te d hi m to the j ai l. B ec au se Mande rs ha d punc he d apol ic e of fi ce r, the 13

ar re sti ng o ff

ic er s c harg ed

him w ithf el ony obs tr uc tio n of a n of fi ce r, in vio la tio n of Geo rg ia law, O.C.G.A. § 1 6- 10 -2 4( b)
. As Manders was e scorted into th e j ail’ s hold ing cell, a City police officer state d th at

Mande rs “ hit

him ” earl ie r. A cc or din g to Mande rs , D ep uty Br ow n and a Ci ty pol ic e of fi ce r the n r ep eate dly

str uc k hi m a cr oss the he ad , ne ck , a nd f ac e an d bange d hi s he ad

a ga ins t a w al l. Mande rs suf

fe re d abr uis ed , sw oll enf

ac e. T he b e a t i n g a f

f e c t e dh i m emo t i o n a l l y, r e s u l t i n g i n amen t a l h o s p i t a l s t a y. T he m or nin g a ft er the be at ing , Mande rs w ro te astate m en t f or j ai l of fi ci al s, wher ein he stated: “ They had to be rough with m e to let m e know that they m ean busi ne ss. ” T ha t sam e day , Mande rs w as r el ea se d f ro m j ai l. A ft er

w ar ds, Mande rs ’ s m oth er

m et w ithS he ri ff

P et er son to d isc uss the be at ing
. A cc or din g to Manders’ s m other, S heriff Peter son respon ded to her concerns this way : “ [T ] hat ha ppe ns s om et im es w he n th ey bit e an d sc ratc h. ” S he ri ff P et er son did

not investig ate the beating incident. In his deposit ion, Manders later testified that Sh eri ff Pet ers on an d a no th er o ffi cer f or cedhi m

to writ e h is st at em en t. Mande rs ’ s e vid en ce a lso inc lud ed the P oli cy

a nd P ro ce dur e Manua l ( the

“ Man ua l” ) of

th e Sh eri ff’s Offi ce co nt ai ni ng th e Sh eri ff’s u se -o f-fo rce p ol ic y . Sheriff Peter son pu blish ed the Manual in 198 9 or 1990 , dra fting som e policiesDeputy Br own neve r submitted a written re port indicatinghe used f orce with Manders. 2 Sheriff Pete rson neve r re quired B rown to do so eve n afte r havingmet with Manders’ s mother. 4 him se lf a nd a dopt ing som e St at e pol ic ie s. T he Manua l r equir es that “ [e ] ac h c as e inv olv ing phy sic al or

de fe nsi ve f

or ce be r ep orte d inw ri tin g to the S he ri ff :” 2 (A ) N oti fi catio n of

S upe rv iso r 1. T he S he ri ff

sha ll be im

m ed iate ly inf orm ed of e ac h in ci de nt invo lving the use of force by officer s of this Departm ent. S uch not if ic at ionsha ll be on the sam e da te of the inc ide nt. 2. E ac h c as e inv olv ing phy sic al or de fe nsi ve f

or ce sha ll be reported in wr iting to the Sheriff
. 3. E ac h of

fi ce r pr es en t or

a ssi sti ng i n an arr es t or

inc ide nt re qui ri ng f

or ce sha ll be pr ep ar ed

to subm it a re port su

ppl em en t de sc ri bin g th e inc ide nt i f re que ste d. Ina ddi tio n to the r ep ort r equir em en t, the Manua l di sc uss es both no n- de ad ly a nd deadly force by an office r in the perform ance of his duties. T he Manual provides that no n- de ad ly

f or ce m ay be use d by

a n of fi ce r in the se sit

ua tio ns: 1. Whe n ne ce ssary

to pr es er ve the pe ac e, pr ev en t c om m iss ionof o f f e n s e s , o r p r e v e n ts u i c i d e o r

s e l f
- i n f l i c t e di n ju ry. 2
. Wh e n p r e v e n t i n g o r i n t e rr up t i n g ac r i me o r

a t t e mp t e dc r i me a g a i n s tp r o p e rt y. 3. Whe n m ak ing law fu l arr es ts and s earc he s, ove rc om ing resistance to such arre st and searches, and preventing escapes f r o m cu s t o d y. 4. Whe n inse lf

de fe nse , or

de fe nse of

a nothe r ag ai nst

unl aw fu l vio le nc e to h is p er son. T he Manua l a lso de ta ils w he n de ad ly f or ce is j ust if

ie d. S he ri ff

P et er son ha s no oth er w ri tte n or

standard ope ratin g pr oc ed

ur es f or the use of

f or ce a t the j ai l. B. Am ende d Com plaintThe pa rties and the district c ourt litigate d this lawsuit aga inst S heriff Peterson as if a ll of 3 Mand e rs ’s § 1 98 3 c la ims a g a ins t Cli nc h Co unty a lso we re ma de a g a ins t Sh e ri ff Pe te rs on in h is of fi c ia l c a pa c ity . T hu s, we de c ide the c a se a s o ne in whic h th e ame nd e d c omp la int purp or ts t o sue Sheriff

Peterson in his officia l capa city for use -of- forc e policy

and for failingto train and discipline Deputy

Br own in that reg ard. See Marsh v. B utler County , 268 F.3d 1014, 1023- 24 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) (e n banc)
. At no time has Mander s made a claim ag ainst Sheriff Peter son’s offic ial bond, which 4 Ge or g ia la w r e qu ir e s sh e ri ff

s to po st, O. C.G .A . § 15 -1 6- 5, and we do no t a dd

re ss s uc h a

c la im. 5 Inthi s § 1 983 ca se , Mande rs ’ s am en de d c om pla int c la im s th at

de fe ndants Cl inc h C ounty

a nd S he ri ff

P et er son, in his of

fi ci al c ap ac ity , a re r es pons ibl e fo r use-of-forc e policy

at the j ail, f

or training and dis ciplinin g deputi es who w ork at the j ai l, a nd f

or e nsur ing that the pol ic y

is fo llo w ed
. A cc or din g to Mande rs ,

3 De putyBrow n beat him , and Clinch Cou nty and Sheriff

Peter son perm itted Brow n’ s use of excessive force at the j ail. Manders also asserts that Clinch Co unty a nd S he ri ff

P et er son fa ile d to pr ovi de de put ie s pr ope r tr ai nin g and supe rv isi on r eg ar din g us e of f or ce a t the j ai l and f

ai le d to pr om

ulg at e ad equa te rules to regulate deputies’ conduct at the jail. Manders asserts that these failures caused his beating. Manders sough t dam ages against Clinch Coun ty and Sheriff P e t e r s o n i n h i s o f

f i c i a l c ap a c i t y. 4 T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d de fe ndants ’ m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t on Mande rs ’ s § 1 983 da m ag e cl ai m s a ga ins t C lin chCo unty a nd S he ri ff

P et er son in his of fi ci al c ap ac ity

f or the use -o f- fo rc e pol ic y

a t the j ai l and the tr ai nin g andTh e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt ( 1) to S he ri ff

Pe te rs on ind ivi du a lly

on a ll 5 claims, (2) to Clinch County and Sheriff

Peterson in his officia l capa city on Mander s’s § 1983 claim for the neg lige nt hiring of Deputy Br own, and ( 3) to Clinch County and Sheriff

Peterson on Mand e rs ’s inj un c tiv e re lie f c la ims . M and e rs did no t a pp e a l or c ro ss- a pp e a l th e se ru lin g s. Al tho ugh Cl inc h Co unty

a lso a sse rt s th at Sh e ri ff

Pe te rs on a c ts f or the State and

is n ot a 6 county policy maker , Clinch County

did not appeal be cause it could not at this t ime. When a c ounty a pp e a ls a sse rt ingthat a

sh e ri ff is n ot a c ounty po lic y make r u nd e r § 19 83 , th at pr e se nts a defe nse to liability

issue for the c ounty

over which we do not have interloc utory jurisdiction. Swi nt v . Ch ambe rs County Comm’ n, 51 4 U .S. 35 , 4 3 ( 19 95 ). In c ontr a st, wh e n a sh e ri ff in h is of fi c ia l c a pa c ity a pp e a ls i nte rl oc uto ri ly

a sse rt ingEl e ve nth

Am e ndme nt i mmunit

y , th is p re se nts a thr e sh old immun ity -f

ro m- su it i ssu e ov e r whic h w e have jur isd ic tio n. Se e P.R. Aq ue du c t & Sewer Auth. v. Metca lf & Eddy , Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993); Swint , 514 U.S. at 42-43; Gre ch v. Clay

ton County , __ F.3d __ ( 11th Cir. 2003) (en ba nc). I t is argued that the major ity opinion “badly

subverts the law ,” make s sheriff s “immune 7 fr om s uit ,” and

re nd e rs a “ su bs tanti a l bl ow ” to c iti zen s b e inga ble to h old

of fi c ia ls a c c ounta

ble fo r c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns . ( Di sse nt, B ark e tt, J., p p. 56 , 8 8) . A s n ote d a bo ve , th is c a se inv olv e s o nly

the sh e ri ff

“ in h is o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity” and

do e s n ot a ff

e c t in a ny wa y c la ims a g a ins t sheriff s or their de puties in their individual capac ities. See Haf er v. Me lo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) ( “[T] he Eleve nth Amendment does not er ect a barr ier a g ainst suits t o impose ‘individual and per sonal liability ’ on state of ficials under

§ 1983.”); Hobbs v. Rober ts, 999 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1993) (notingthat Eleventh Ame ndment immunit y does not extend to “‘individual’ or ‘per sonal’ ca

pacity suits in federa l court”) ; Gamble v. F la. Dep’ t of Hea lth & Reha bilitative Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1512- 13 (11th Cir. 1986) (“ [T] he Eleve nth Amendment provides no ba r to fede ral c ourt adjudication of suits aga inst state office rs individually .”). 6 dis ci pli nin g of

de put ie s inthat r eg ar d. S he ri ff P et er son al one f

ile d th is 5 interlocutory

appeal, claim ing th at he is a state a ctor and that the district court
er re d inde ny ing him

E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty . T his appe al doe s no t

6 ad dr es s th e ind ivi dua l l ia bil ity of S he ri ff P et er son or

his de put ie s f

or usi ng excessive force
. Instead, this appeal inv olves on ly the im m unityof Sher iff 7 P e t e r s o n i n h i s o f

f i c i a l c ap a c i t y. II . THE EL EVENTH AMENDMENT“ Al tho ugh th e e xpre ss l angua g e of the [Ele ve nth ] [A]me ndme nt d oe s n ot b ar s uit s 8 a g a ins t a state by its own c iti zen s, the Sup re me Court ha s h e ld t

hat an unc on se nti ngstate is immune from lawsuits broug ht in feder al cour t by the state’s own citizens.” Carr v. City of Flore nce, 916 F .2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (c iting Ha ns v. L ouisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890))
. “ [I ]n th e a

bs e nc e of c on se nt[, ] a s uit

in whic h th e State or

on e of its a g e nc ie s o r d e pa

rtme nts is named a s the defe ndant is proscribe d by the Eleve nth Amendment.” Pennhur st St ate Sch. & Hosp. v. Halde rman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)
. 7 A. Im m unity f

rom Suitin F eder al Court T he E le ve nthA m en dm en t pr ovi de s im m uni ty by r es tr ic tin g f

ed er al c ourts’ j udicial power: T he Jud ic ia l po w er

of the U nit ed

S ta te s sh al l no t be c onstru ed to ex te nd t o any

sui t i n lawor

e qui ty , c om

m en ce d or

pr ose cu te d a ga ins t one of the U nit ed

S ta te s by Ci tiz en s of

a nothe r St at e, or

by Ci tiz en s or Subje cts of any

Foreign State. U . S. Co nst . a m en d. X I. T he E le ve nthA m en dm en t pr ote ct s aS ta te f ro m be ing
s u e di n f e d e r a l c o u rtw i t h o u tth e S t a t e ’s c o n s e n t . A s ar e s u l t , p a rt i e s w i t h c l a i ms 8 ag ai nst anon -c onse nti ng S ta te m ust r es ort t o th e St at e’ s own c ourts. T he E le ve nth Am endm ent is “ a re cogniti on that states, thoug h part of a union, re tain attributes of sov er ei gnty , inc lud ing im m uni ty f ro m be ing c om

pe lle d to appe ar

in the c ourts o f a n o t h e r s o v e r e i g n a g a i n s tth e i r

wi l l
. ” M c C l e n d o n v . Ge o r g i aDe p ’to f C mty. Heal th , 26 1 F .3d12 52 , 12 56 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). It is al so w el l- se ttl ed

that E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty bars sui ts b ro ught in f ed er al c ourt w he n th e St at e its el f is s ue d and whe n an “ ar m of the S ta te ” is
sue d. S ee Mt . H ea lth y

Ci ty S ch
. D ist
. Bd
. of

E duc
. v. D oy le , 429 U . S. 274 , 280 (1977). T o rece ive Eleventh A m endm ent im m unity , a defendant need not beSe e Tuve so n v . F la . G ov e rn or ’s Counc il o f I nd ian A ff a ir s, Inc ., 73 4 F .2 d 7 30 ,7 34 (1 1th 9 Cir. 1984) (noting“the f

unctions of the Council” a re sig nificant to Eleve nth Amendment analy sis); cf. McMillian v. Monroe County , 520 U.S. 781, 785-86 (1997) ( instructing that the question is not whether the she riff a cts for the county or state “ in some cate g orica l, ‘all or nothing’ manner [; ]” rather the question of whe ther the she riff a cts for the county or state r equire s attention to the sheriff

’s role “ in a par

ticular a rea , or on a pa

rticular issue” ); Hess v. Port Auth. Tr ans -H ud so n Co rp ., 51 3 U .S. 30 , 4 5 ( 19 94 ) ( no tin g“ Por t Auth or ity

fu nc tio ns are no t r e a dil y classified a s ty

pically state or unque stionably

local”)
. Although the majority

opinion focuses only

on the par

ticular func tion of Sheriff Peter son in establishing f

orce policy

at the jail and tra ining a

nd disciplining his deputies, the dissent criticizes this functional approa ch and de fines the Sher iff’s c onduct at a higher le vel of a b s tr a c ti o nw it

h“ ja il o p e r ati o na s th e p e rti n e n t f un c ti o n . ” ( D is s e n t, B ar

k e tt , J. , p . 6 5 )
. We disag ree beca

use the dissent’s c hara cter ization of the function at issue is too broad; the re levant question is not whether Sherif f Peterson a cts for the State or Clinch County in some cate g orica l all or nothingmanner

in connec tion with the county jail. Instead, the pr oper inquiry is whether S h e r i f f P e t e r s o na c t s f

o r th e S t at e o r

C l i n c hC o un ty i nth e p art i c u l ar f un c t i o n s ati s s u e t o d ay. 8 labeled a “ state office r” or “ state official, ” but instead need on ly be acting as an

“ arm of the State, ” w hich includ es agents and inst rum entalities of the State. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. D oe, 519 U. S. 425, 429-30 (19 97). W hether a defendant is an “ arm

of the State” m

ust be assessed in light o f the particular function in which the defe ndant was engaged when taking the actions ou t of which lia bil ity is as se rt ed

to ar ise
. S ee S hands T ea ch ing H osp. & Cl ini cs v. Be ec h S t. Co rp . , 208 F . 3d 1 308, 131 1 ( 11th C ir
. 200 0) ( “ T he pe rt ine nt i nqui ry is not int o th e nature of [an entity ’ s] status in th e abstract, but its fun ction or role in a particular context.”). T he particular f unction s at issue are S heriff Peter son’s f orce policy

at the j ai l and the tr ai nin g and d isc ipl ini ng o f his de put ie s inthat r eg ar d. 9 B. Elevent h A m endm ent Fact ors InE le ve nthA m en dm en t c as es , thi s C ourt us es f our f ac tor s to de te rm ineWe focus on Ge org ia law, a s opposed to how other c ircuits treat sheriffs unde r other 10 states’ law s, beca

use states have extremely wide latitude in deter

mining their f

orms of g overnme nt and how state f unctions are perf

ormed, a nd beca use sig nificant for

our ca se is how the Geor g ia Supreme Court ha s treate d sheriff s in Georg ia and inter

prete d the provisions of Geor g ia law in issue. See Re g ents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997) (notingthat the Eleve nth Amendment question “c an be a nswere d only

afte r consider ing the provisions of state law that define the ag ency ’s cha rac ter” ); Mt. Healthy

City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed uc . v . D oyle , 4 29 U. S. 2 74 , 2 80 (1 97 7) (s tatin gthat w he the r a n e nti ty is e nti tle d to El e ve nth Am e ndme nt i mmunit

y “ de pe nd s, at le a st i n p art , u po n th e natur e of

the e nti ty c re ate d b y

state law”)
. 9 w he the r ane nti ty

is an“ ar m of the S ta te ” in c ar

ry ing out apart ic ular func tio n: ( 1) howstate lawde fi ne s th e en tity ; ( 2) w ha t de gr ee of c ontro l the S ta te m ai nta ins
ove r the e nti ty ; ( 3) w he re the e nti ty de ri ve s it s f

unds ; and ( 4) w ho i s r es pons ibl e fo r j udgm en ts a ga ins t the e nti ty . Mi cc osuk ee T ri be of I ndi an s of

F la
. v. F la
. S ta te Athletic Com

m ., 226 F.3d 1226 , 1231-34 (11th Cir. 2000 ); Shands, 208 F. 3d at 1311 ; T uve son v. F la
. G ove rn or ’ s C ounc il of I ndi anA ff

ai rs , I nc . , 734 F . 2d 7 30, 732 (11t h Cir. 1984 ). G ive n th es e fa ct or s, the r es olu tio n of the E le ve nthA m en dm en t i ssu e in this
ca se de pe nds, in part , on s ta te law . T he re fo re , be fo re appl y ing the f our -f ac tor te st,
w e m ust e xa m ine G eo rg ialawa nd the r el at ion shi p be tw ee n S he ri ff P et er son, the State, and Clinch Count y . The issue of whether an entity is an “ arm

of the State” fo r E le ve nthA m en dm en t purp ose s is ult im at el y aque sti on o f fe de ra l l aw . B ut the fed eral qu es ti on can be an swe redon ly after c on si de rin g p ro vi si on s o f st at e la w. T hus, w e nowj our

ne y thr oughG eo rg ia ’ s le ga l t er ra in at so m e le ngth. 10 II I. GE ORGI A LAWGeor g ia’s Constituti on provides that sher iffs “sha ll be elec ted by the qualified vote rs of 11 their re spective c ounties for ter ms of four year s and shall have such qualifications, powers, and duties as provided by

g ener al law.” Ga. Const. art. IX, § 1, ¶ 3(a ). That pa ragraph a lso provides that the “[c]ounty

office rs . . . may

be on a f ee ba sis, salary

basis, or fe e basis supplemente d by salary ,” but that “[m] inimum compensation for said county office rs may

be esta blished by

the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

by g e ne ra l la

w” and su pp le me nte d b y

loc a l la w o r “ if su c h a uth or ity is deleg ated by

local law, by

action of the county

g overningauthority .” Ga . Const. art. IX, § 1, ¶ 3(b); see infra note 12. The State leg islature thus also controls sher iffs’ qua lifications and m i n i mums a l ar

y. 10 W e first e xam ine the governm ental structure of Sher iff P eterson’ s office vis -à -v is the S ta te a nd C lin chCo unty und er G eo rg ialaw . N ex t, w e out lin e the fu nc ti on s Sh eri ff Pet ers on pe rfo rm s as th ey refl ectth e ch arac te r of

hi s o ffi ce. Then w e apply

the Ele venth Am endm ent factors to the sheriff ’ s functions in issu e: pr om ulg at ing f or ce pol ic y

a nd tra ini ng and d isc ipl ini ng d ep uti es in that r eg ar d. A. Georgia’s Governm ental St ruct ure Ge orgia’ s Constit ution has created the sheriff’ s office a s an elected
co nst itu tio na l of

fi ce in G eo rg ia ’ s go ve rn m en ta l hi er ar ch y . G a. Co nst . a rt . I X , § 1, ¶ 1. T he she ri ff

’ s of fi ce is not adiv isi on o r subunit

of Cl inc h C ounty

or it s c ounty go ve rn in g b od y , and , th us , itis no t a s tru ctur al pa rt o f Cl in ch Co un ty gov ern m en t. Se e id. ; G a. Co nst . a rt . I X , § 2, ¶ 1( c) (1 ). R athe r, the she ri ff ’ s of fi ce is a se parate constitu tional office independent from Clinch Countyand its gov erning bod y . S ee Ga. Co ns t. ar t. IX, § 2, ¶ 1 (c)( 1)
. Furthe r, G eo rg ia ’ s C onst itu tio n gr an ts the S ta te le gis la tur e the e xc lus ive
au tho ri ty to es ta bli sh and t o c ontro l a

she ri ff ’ s po w er s and d

uti es . G a. Co nst . a rt . IX , § 1, ¶ 3( a) -( b)
. I nte rp re tin g th is c onst itu tio na l pr ovi sio n, the G eo rg ia

11Ge or g ia ’s Con sti tut ion pr ov ide s th at th e le g isl ativ e “ po we r gra nte d to c ounti e s . . . sh a ll 12 not be construe d to ext end to . . . [a]ction affec ting a ny elec tive county

office , the salar ies the re of , o r t he pe rs onne l th e re of

, e xce pt t he pe rs onne l su

bje c t to the jur isd ic tio n o f t he c ounty g overningauthority .” Ga . Const. art. IX, § 2, ¶ 1(c )(1) . The Ge org ia Attorney Gene ral ha s stated that, u nd e r G e or g ia ’s Con sti tut ion , c ounty g ov e rn inga

uth or iti e s la c k e ve n th e a

uth or ity to su pp le me nt t

he sh e ri ff ’s sa lary “ un le ss a uth or ize d b y

loc a l la w e na c te d b y

the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y to supplement the salar

y .” Ga . Op. Atty . Gen. No. U 97-19 (1997) ; see infr a note 36. Al tho ugh Warr e n invo lve d a pr ior ve rs ion of the Ge or g ia

Con sti tut ion , th e same 13 rele vant languag e is in the curr ent ver sion of the Geor g ia Constitut ion. See Warre n, 231 Ga. at 499. The plain languag e of G eorg ia’s Constituti on makes the pow ers a nd duties of the constitutional sheriff’s of fice altera ble by the Geor g ia leg islature and una lterable by the county

or i t s g o v e r n i n gb o dy. 11 Su pr em e Co urt ha s e xpl ai ne d th at she ri ff s are sub j ec t t o th e co ntr ol o f the G eo rg ia le gis la tur e an d are not

c ounty e m plo y ee s. B d. of

Co m m ’ rs of Randol ph C ounty

v. W ilson , 260 Ga . 482, 482 (1990) (“ The sher iff .
. . is an e lected, constitu tional officer ; he is subject to the char ge of the G eneral A ssem bly and is not an em

ploy ee of the county

com m issio n.”) ; see Chaf

fin v. Ca lhou n, 262 Ga. 202, 203 (199 2); W arre n v . W al to n, 2 31 Ga. 49 5, 4 99 -5 00 (19 73 ). In co n t ra s tt o th e S t at e’s au t h o ri ty an dco n t ro l o v ers h er i ff s , Ge o rg i a’s Co nst itu tio n gr an ts c ount ie s no le gis la tiv e pow er or auth or ity ove r she ri ff

s and
ex pr es sly pr ev en ts c ount ie s f

ro m c ontro lli ng o r af

fe ct ing the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce or the pe rs onne l the re of

. G a. Co nst . a rt . I X , § 2, ¶ 1( c) (1 ). I n th is r eg ar d, the G eo rg ia 12 Su pr em e Co urt ha s c onc lud ed that this c onst itu tio na l r es tr ic tio n onthe le gis la tiv e pow er gr an te d to c ount ie s–ho m e ru le –pr ev en ts c ount ie s f ro m takin g a ct ion af fe ct ing the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce . W ar re n, 231 G a. at 49 9; se e St ep he nsonv. Bd
. of 13 Com m ’ rs of Cobb County , 261 Ga . 399, 401-02 (1991). A s a result, counties12

ex er ci se no a

uth or ity or c ontro l ov er

the she ri ff

’ s f or ce pol ic y , w he the r in m ak ing
arre st s o n t he st reet s o r in qu el li ng di srup ti ve in m at es at t he jail
. Further, in Georgia, counties also d o not d elegate any of their governm ental or police powers to sheriff s. I nstead, the sheriff

s’ authority

and duties are derived directly from the State. T hat counties d elegate no power or authority to sheriffs furthe r ex pla ins w hy

c ount ie s have no a

uth or ity or c ontro l ov er

the m a nd why the sh eri ff i s n ot a su bu ni t o r di vi si on of c ou nt y go ve rn m en t. Geo rg ia law l ik ewis e m ak es th e co un ty ent it y it se lf, h ere C li nc h C ou nt y , a separate e ntityindependent of the sheriff ’ s office. U nder Ge orgia law, Clinch Co unty is a “ body

c or por at e” c ap ab le of

sui ng and b ei ng s ue d and i s he ad ed by the countygoverning authority
. Ga . C onst. art. 9, § 1, ¶ 1 (“ Ea ch county shall be a body c or por at e an d po lit ic w ithsuc h go ve rn ing auth or ity
. . . a s pr ovi de d by law . ”) ; O
. C. G
. A
. §§ 3 6- 1- 3 ( “ E ve ry c ounty is a body c or por at e, w ithpow er

to sue or be sue d ina ny

c ourt. ”) ; 1- 3- 3( 7) ( de fi nin g “ Co unty gov er nin g auth or ity ” as “ the board of c ounty c om m iss ion er s, the sol e co unty c om m iss ion er , or

the gov er

nin g au tho ri ty of ac onso lid at ed

gov er nm en t” ). A s ase parate e nti ty , Cl inc h C ounty is headed by

its Board of Com

m issio ners, which is given “ exclusive jurisdiction ov er and control of count y

aff airs. ” G a. Laws 1933, p. 467, § 29. In contrast, under G eo rg ia ’ s C onst itu tio n, the S ta te ha s e xc lus ive auth or ity a nd c ontro l ov er

the dut ie s and a ff

ai rs of the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce . A lth oughthe S ta te r equir es the c ounty toThis case involves the ac ts of Deputy Sheriff B rown, who se rved a s Sheriff Peter son’s 14 chief jailer. Sherif

fs may assig n their deputy

sheriff s to work at the jail. See O .C.G.A. § 15-16- 23; Way ne County

v. Her rin, 210 Ga. A

pp. 747, 751 (1993); Ke ndrick v. Ada mson, 51 Ga. App. 40 2 ( 19 35 ). In Way

ne County , th e Ge or g ia

c ou rt re a d th e sh e ri ff

’s po we r t o h ir e and

fi re de puty 13 fund the she ri ff

’ s bu dge t, G eo rg ia ’ s C onst itu tio n pr ec lud es the c ounty f ro m exercising any

authority over the sheriff, includin g how the sheriff spends that budg et . G a. Co nst . a rt . I X , § 2, ¶ 1( c) (1 ); Ch af

fi n v. Ca lho un, 262 G a. 202 , 203
- 04 (1992 ); see B oswell v. B ram lett, 274 Ga . 50, 52 (2001 ). The separ ate and distinct natu re of S heriff Peter son’s off ice and Clinch Co unty , a nd the ir

ind ep en de nc e fr om

e ac h othe r, a re f

urthe r de m onstrate d by

how Geo rg ia law t reat s s he rif

fs ’ em pl oyees. Sh eri ffs alo ne hi re an d fi re t he ir d ep ut ie s. See O. C.G .A . § 15-16-23. D eputies, including those serving as j ailers, are em plo y ee s of

the she ri ff

a nd n ot the c ounty . W ar re n, 231 G a. a t 49 9 ( re co gni zi ng that “ [d ] ep uty

she ri ff s and d ep uty

j ai lor s are e m

plo y ee s of

the she ri ff

, w hom the she ri ff s a lon e ar e en tit le d to appoi nt o r dis ch ar ge ”) ( quot at ionm ar ks o m itt ed ); D ro st v . Ro bin son, 194 G a. 703 , 710 ( 1942 ); B ro w n v. Ja ck son, 221 G a. App. 200, 201 ( 1996 ) (n oti ng d ep uty she ri ff s “ w er e em

plo y ee s of

the she ri ff

a nd n ot Pe ac h C ounty ”) ; W ay

ne Co unty

v. H er ri n, 210 G a. App. 747 , 751 ( 1993 ); P ettus v. Sm ith, 174 Ga. App. 587, 588 (198 5); see Bosw ell, 274 Ga . at 51 (“ [E ] m ploy ees of c onst itu tio na lly

e le ct ed of fi ce rs of ac ounty a re c onsi de re d e m

plo y ee s of

the elected off

icer and no t em

ploy ees of the county , a s represented by the local governin g authority .” ); Mobley v. P olk Coun ty , 242 Ga . 798, 801-02 (1979). 14sheriff

s under O.C.G.A . § 15-16-23, tog ether with O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21, to mea n that the sherif

f may a pp oint hi s d e putie s “ at w ill ,” but a lso may e le c t in wr iti ngto m ake the ir

a pp ointme nts subject to the county

civil service sy stem as pre scribed by law in O.C.G.A. § 36-1- 21. Way ne County , 210 Ga. App. at 752-53; see B rett v. Jeffer son County , 123 F.3d 1429, 1434 ( 11th Cir. 1997) (statingdeputy

sheriff s in Georg ia ar e at- will employ ees of the sherif

f and c oncluding sheriff had fa iled to satisfy

the statutory

require ments in O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 ne cessa ry for the sheriff to place his e mploy ees unde r the c ounty civil service sy stem). Sheriffs a lso may

appoint persons to ser

ve as ja ilers who ar e not deputy sheriff s. See Tate v. N at’l Sur. Corp., 58 Ga. A pp. 874, 876 (1938) ( noting “ [t ]here wa s no evidenc e that the jailer wa s also a deputy”). O .C.G.A. § 42-4-1 pr ovides: “B y virtue of their

office s, sheriff

s are jailers of the counties and ha ve the a uthority to appoint other jailers, subjec t to the supervision of the county

g overningauthority , as pre scribed by law.” We likewise rea d O.C.G.A. §§ 42-4- 1 and 36-1-21 tog ether

to mean that the she riff ma y appoint his non-deputy

jailers “at will” under O. C.G .A . § 42 -4 -1 , b ut a lso may e le c t in wr iti ngto m ake the ir

a pp ointme nt s ub

je c t to the c ounty civil service sy stem and there by subject to county

supervision as pre scribed by law in O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21. In any

event, this ca se does not involve a ja iler who is not a deputy sheriff
. 14 Beca use sheriffs ar e elec ted by county voters, it is not surprisin g that G eo rg ia ’ s C onst itu tio n la be ls s he ri ff

s a s “ co unty

of fi ce rs . ” G a. Co nst . a rt . I X , § 1, ¶ 3(a)
. But, given how G eorgia’ s Constit ution also m akes the sheriff’ s office a
co nst itu tio na l of

fi ce ind ep en de nt f

ro m the c ounty

e nti ty it se lf , pr ec lud es a ll co unty control, and grants onlythe State c ontrol ov er sherif fs, this “ countyofficer ”
nom enclature nece ssarily ref lects a geographic label defining the territory in which
a she ri ff is el ec te d and m ai nly

ope rate s. I t i s e nti re ly

c onsi ste nt f

or she ri ff s to be i n d e p e n d e n to f

th e c o u n t y g o v e rn men ta n dt o b e s ub je c tt o S t a t e , n o tc o u n t y, co ntr ol b ut t o be c al le d “ co unty of fi ce rs ” to r ef

le ct the ir ge ogr ap hic j ur isd ic tio n in the State. Having established th at Sherif f Pe terson’ s office is independent from Clinch Co unty a nd i ts g ove rn ing auth or ity a nd tha t on ly

the S ta te c ontro ls and g rants powers and duties to sheriffs, w e next exam ine the functions of the sheriff ’ s officeThe Ge org ia Attorney Gene ral a lso has explained that under Ge org ia law, she riffs have 15 statutory duties and also all of the ir common law duties and pow ers unless modified by statute, 15 unde r G eo rg ialaw . T he spe ci fi c ta sks that sh er if fs pe rf orm a lso she d c onsi de ra

ble li gh t o n t he ch arac te r of

th e sh eri ff’s o ffi ce u nd er Geo rg ia law. B. She riff’ s Fu nctions A s no te d a

bove , c ount ie s c an not , a nd d o no t, gr an t any lawe nf or ce m en t pow er to she ri ff s and d o no t a ssi gn o r co ntr ol any of the she ri ff

s’ dut ie s. I nst ea d, the State a lone has delegated to sh eriff s specific duties in three m ain area s: (a) law en fo rc em en t; (b ) state c ourts; a nd ( c) c or re ct ion s. Whil e w e ult im at el y de ci de today only whether Ge orgia sheriffs w ear a “ state hat” in prescribing use-of-forc e pol ic y , w e out lin e the dut ie s th e St at e ha s a ssi gne d to she ri ff s a s th ey r ef le ct the ch ar ac te r of

the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce und er

G eo rg ialaw . Wha t du tie s th e St at e as sig ns s h e r i f f s i s i n d i c i ao f

h o wth e S t a t e d e f

i n e s th a te n t i t y. 1. Law Enforcem ent InG eo rg ia , the of

fi ce of she ri ff is as old a s th e St at e of

G eo rg iait se lf

a nd
carr ie s w ithit

the c om m on l awdut ie s of

she ri ff s to e nf or ce the law s and p re se rv e the peace on behalf of the sovere ign State, a s well a s other specific statutory duties im posed bythe State le gislature. O .C. G. A. § 15-16-10 (a)( 1)-(8); H annah v. State, 212 Ga. 313 (195 6) (“ The off ice of sherif

f carries w ith it . .
. all of its com m on-law dut ie s and p ow er s, e xc ep t a s m odi fi ed by statut e. ”) ( ci ta tio n and quot at ionm ar ks
om itted). G iven the sheriff’ s continu ing comm on law duties, the State legislature

15an d

th atth e s e d

u t i e s i n c l u d e e n f

o r c i n gth e l aw s an d

c o n s e r v i n gth e p e a c e . S e e G a . O p . A t ty. Ge n. No . 7 7- 83 (1 97 7) ; G a . O p. Atty Ge n. No . U 69 -3 85 (1 96 9) (b oth c on str uin gfo rm e r G e or g ia Code § 24-2813 (1933) , now O.C.G.A. § 15-16- 10). In addition, sheriffs must be state -ce rtified p ea ce o ff i ce rs , wh o ar e “ v es t ed
. . . wi thau th o ri ty t o en fo rc e t h e c ri m i n al o r t ra ff i c l aw s th ro u gh the power of ar rest and [are char g ed with the] preser vation of public orde r, the prote ction of life and prope rty , and the pr evention, dete ction, or investig ation of cr ime.” O.C.G.A. § 35- 8-2(8) (A). Other state actor s available for law enfor ceme nt activity

include the Ge org ia B urea u of 16 Investig ation and the Ge org ia State Patrol. See O.C.G.A. §§ 35- 3-3 et seq.; § 35- 2-30 et seq. 16 m an da te s t ha t i t i s t he ex pr es s d ut y of t he sh eri ff t o p erfo rm

no t o nl y “ su ch
. . . dut ie s a s are or

m ay be im pose d by law , ” but a lso tho se dut ie s “ w hic h ne ce ssari ly ap pe rta in to hi s o r he r of

fic e.” O.C.G.A. § 1 5- 16 -1 0( a)(8 ). Ge orgia’ s Constit ution also provid es that “ [t] he Governor shall take care that the laws ar e fa ithfullyexecuted and shall be the conservator of the peace thr ough out

the state . ” G a. Co nst . a rt . V , § 2, ¶ 2. I n e nf or ci ng the law s and
co nse rv ing the pe ac e, the G eo rg iaG ove rn or doe s no t a ct

a lon e, but

ne ce ssari ly
ac ts thr oughstate a ge nts , w hic h in cl ude she ri ff s f or c er ta in s ta te f

unc tio ns. T he

16 United States S uprem e Court re cently acknowledged that sheriffs historically had ge ogr ap hic r es tr ic tio ns b ut i n r ea lity “ re pr es en te d th e St at e in f ulf ill ing [ the ir ] duty to k ee p th e pe ac e. ” Mc Mi lli anv. Mo nr oe Co unty , 520 U . S. 781 , 793 ( 1997 ) (c onc lud ing that A la

ba m a she ri ff

s a ct f or the state a s to the lawe nf or ce m en t function in issue). T he Suprem e Court re flected on the longst anding historical
ro le of she ri ff s, a s f oll ow s: As the basic f

or m s of English gov ernm ent wer e tr an spl an te d in[ the U nit ed S ta te s] , it

a lso be cam e the com m o n u n d er s t an d i n g h er e t h at th e s h er i ff , t houg h lim itedWhil e the State f ulfills part of its policing func tions through the she riff’ s office , the 17 Geor g ia leg islature author izes the county to fulfill policing func tions through a county police forc e. County

g overningbodies may

cre ate “ a county

police for ce” throug h a re solution or or din anc e of

the pa rt ic ula r c ounty g ov e rn ingbo dy

fo llo we d b y

the a pp ro va l of

qu a lif ie d c ounty e le c tor s. O. C.G .A . § 36 -8 -1 (b ). Thus , a c ounty-w ide re fe re nd

um i s r e qu ir e d b e fo re a

c ounty may cre ate a county police for ce. I d. I f the re fer endum passes, the county g overningbody controls the hiringand re moval of its county police, includingthe county police chie f, and ma

y “abolish a c ounty

police for ce at any

time.” O.C.G.A. § 36-8- 2. County police off

icer s are subject to the “dire ction and contr ol of the county g overningbody .” O.C.G.A. § 36- 8-5. 17 in j ur isd ic tio n to hi s coun ty a nd g en er al ly

e le ct ed by co unty vot er s, w as in re al ity

a n of fi ce r of the S ta te , a nd ult im at el y

r ep re se nte d th e St at e in f ul fill ing his duty

to keep the peace. Id
. a t 79 4 ( int er

na l f ootnot e om itt ed ). I nde ed , “ in c onse rv ing the pub lic pe ac e, in vind icating the law, and in preserving the rights of the governm ent, [ the sheriff]
re p re s en t s th e s o v er ei g n t y o f t h e S t at e a n dh e h as n o s up er i o r i n h i s co u n t y.” 1 W. Anderson, ATr eatise on the Law of Sheriff s, Coroner s and Constabl es 5 (1941), ci te d wi th ap pr ov al in McM il li an , 52 0 U.S. at 79 4. As w e alre ady

have noted, sheriff

s in Georgia der ive their power and duti es fr om the S ta te , a re c ontro lle d by the S ta te , a nd c ount ie s c an not , a nd d o no t, de le ga te a ny

lawe nf or ce m en t po w er

or dut ie s to she ri ff

s. I n G eo rg ia , thi s 17 his tor ic al r ole of

the she ri ff

thu s c ont inu es to thi s day a s th e she ri ff

dir ec tly
r e p r e s e n t s th e s o v e r e i g n t y o f th e S t a t e , h a s n o s up e r i o r i nh i s c o u n t y, a n dp e r f

o rms st at e fu nc ti on s fo r th e so ve rei gn in en fo rci ng th e la ws an d k eep in g t he pe ace. It is al so e nti re ly

c onsi ste nt f

or G eo rg iashe ri ff

s to be e le ct ed

by c ounty vot er s and b e ca lle d “ co unty of fi ce rs ” to r ef

le ct the ir ge ogr ap hic j ur isd ic tio n, butFor example, the State has assig ned sher iffs the task of maintaining a

nd enter ing 18 war rant infor mation into the statewide cr iminal information database . O.C.G.A. § 35-3- 36; see Gre ch v. Clay

ton County , __ F.3d __ ( 11th Cir. 2003) (en ba nc) ( concluding“as to the pa rticular fu nc tio n at is su e [entr

y and ma int e na nc e of wa rr ant i nf or matio n], t he sh e ri ff is a c tin gon

be ha lf of the State a

nd thus . . . Clay

ton County

is not li able [for the she riff’ s conduct at issue] ”). Throug hout this opi nion, the term “state courts” r efe rs only to Georg ia’s super ior 19 courts, which ha

ve exclusive jurisdiction over state f elony case s, divorce c ases, c ases r espec ting tit le to l and , a

nd c a se s ari sin gin e qu ity . G a . Co ns t. a rt . V I , § 4, ¶ 1 . G e or g ia ’s su pe ri or c ourt s also have concur

rent jurisdiction over misdeme anors a nd other c ivil cases. Ga . Const. art. VI , § 4, ¶ 1; O.C.G.A. §§ 15-6- 8(1); 15-7- 4. Just a s c ounty

ja ils ho us e state c ri min a l of fe nd e rs , c ounty

c ourt ho us e s, fu

nd e d a nd bu ilt 20 b y th e c o un ty , h o u s e s t at e s u p er i o r c o urt s an d

th ei r j u d ges . O. C
. G. A. § 1 5 -6 -2 4
. Al th o u gh pr e sid ingin c ounty

c ourt ho us e s, su

pe ri or c ourt jud g e s p e rf

or m st ate jud ic ia l f

un c tio ns . 18 fo r the m sti ll to a ct

on b eh al f of

the S ta te in en fo rc ing the law s and k ee pin g th e peace in that j urisdictio n. S ee R. Cooley , H andboo k on th e L awof Municipal Corporations 51 2 (1914) (“ Sheriff s . . . clerks and other so-called county officer s ar e pr ope rl y

state of fi ce rs f or the c ounty . T he ir

f unc tio ns and d

uti es pe rt ai n chiefly to the affa irs of state in the county .” ). 18 2. S tate C ourts In addition to im

posin g certain lawenforce m ent duties, the State has
as sig ne d sh er if

fs spe ci fi c dut ie s inthe S ta te ’ s su pe ri or c ourts. S upe ri or

c ourts 19
ar e the S ta te ’ s tr ia l c ourts o f ge ne ra l j ur isd ic tio n. S ee G a. Co nst . a rt . 6, § 4, ¶ 1; O. C.G .A . § 15-6-8. T hat sheriffs perf orm an integral role in the state j udicial 20 syste m is fur th er i nd ic ia of h ow s he rif fs actforth e St at e. T he S ta te m an da te s th at

she ri ff s m ust a tte nd “ al l se ssi ons” of

sup er ior
co urts i n th ei r re spe ct ive c ount ie s and “ ne ve r . . . le av e [c ourt] w ith out theS u p e r i o r c o urtj u d g e s “ ar e a

u th o r i z e d an d e mp o w e r e d

t o tr an s f e r th e i n v e s t i g at i o nb y a 21 g ra nd jur y fr om t he c ounty wh e re the c ri me wa s c omm itt e d to the g ra nd jur y in a ny oth e r c ounty in the State” in ce rtain circ umstances. O.C.G.A . § 15-12-82( a). When this transfe r occ urs, “[t] he sh e ri ff and the c le rk of the su pe ri or c ourt of the c ounty

in whic h th e c ri me wa s c omm itt e d s ha ll be qualifie d and author ized to perform the duties of such off icer s in the same manne r as if the re had bee n no chang e of ve nue.” O .C.G.A. § 15-12-82( d). 19 pr es en ce of

him se lf or his de puty . ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 10( a) (2 ). T he S ta te a lso
m an da te s th at

she ri ff s m ust e xe cu te a nd r et

ur n th e pr oc es se s and o rd er s of the state c ourts. O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 10( a) (1 ). S he ri ff s a lso m ust pub lis h sa le s, ci ta tio ns, a nd o the r pr oc ee din gs a s r equir ed by law , ke ep a n e xe cu tio n do ck et , keep a book of all sales m ade by process of state courts, and keep m any other specified rec ords. O .C. G. A. § 15-16-10 (a)( 4)-(6). T his sam e statute provides th at

“ [i ] f an y she ri ff or de puty f ai ls t o c om

ply w itha ny pr ovi sio n of

[ O
. C. G
. A
. § 15
- 16- 10( a) ] , he sha ll be f

ine d f or ac ont em pt. ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 10( b)
. T hus, the St at e d ire ct s s he rif

fs to en fo rce s ta te co ur t o rd ers an d p un is he s t he m if t he y do no t. T he sup er ior

c ourt c le rk

a lso de liv er s to the she ri ff or his de puty

a“pr ec ep t co nta ini ng the nam es of

the pe rs ons dr awn a s gr an d j ur or s, ” an d th e she ri ff or his deputyserves the sum

m ons on each grand juror in person or by m ailing, as de te rm ine d by

the she ri ff

. O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 2- 65. 21 The S tate also has assigned sh eriff s the function o f determ ining which
co m panie s m ay

m ak e bond s inthe ir

j ur isd ic tio ns. O
. C. G
. A
. § 17 -6 -1 5. Whil e state j udges decide whether a countyj ail inm ate, charged w ith a felony , is entitled t o b o n d , s h er i ff

s ap p ro v e b o n d i n g co m

p an i es i n th ei r c o u n t i es fo r t h e S t at e’sIn c ri min a l c a se s, state c ourt s ma y re qu ir e wi tne sse s to po st b on ds to e ns ur e the ir 22 appea ranc e, O.C.G.A. § 17- 7-26, and the sheriff is responsible for a cce pting bonds a nd ensuring that they come f rom a bondingcompany

approve d by

the sherif

f. O.C.G.A. § 17- 7-27. On May 22, 2003, the Gover

nor sig ned the Ge org ia Indige nt Defe nse Ac t of 2003 (“the 23 Act”) , which ame nds O.C.G.A. Chapter 17- 12 and O.C.G.A. § 15- 16-27. H.B . 770, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg . Sess. (Ga. 2003) . The Ac t does not chang e the r equire ment in O.C.G.A. § 15-16- 27 (a ) t hat sh e ri ff

s “ de po sit c a shbo nd s h e ld b y

the sh e ri ff

in o ne or mor e int e re st- be ari ngtr

us t acc ounts.” Howe ver, pur suant to the amende d § 15-16-27( b), ef fec tive Dec ember

31, 2003, s h e r i f f s mu s tr e m i t

th e i n t e r e s tt o th e G e o r g i a P u b l i c D e f e n d e r S t an d ar d s C o un c i l , a

s t at e a g e n c y, fo r d istri butio n to the c ir c uit pu bli c de fe nd e r o ff

ic e s in ste a d o f t o th e Ge or g ia Ind ig e nt D e fe ns e Counc il. 20 cr im ina l c as es . S he ri ff

s m ust “publ isha nd m ak e av ai la ble w ri tte n r

ule s and
re gul at ion s de fi nin g a cc ep ta ble sur et ie s and p re sc ri bin g un de r w ha t c ondi tio ns sureties m ay

be acc epted.” O. C.G .A . § 17-6-15(b)(1). T he State a lso prescribes the qua lif ic at ion s of

“pr of es sio na l bo ndsp er sons . ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 17 -6 -5 0. T he S ta te in e ff ec t “pla ce s th e au tho ri ty

to ac ce pt s ur et ie s in

f el ony c as es in the of

fi ce of the she ri ff a nd n ot i n th e supe ri or

c ourt. ” Jarv is v
. J& J B ondi ng C o. , 239 G a. 213 ,

22 215 (1 977) ( co nstru ing G eo rg iaCo de § 27 -4 18 ( 1933 ), w hic h is the pr ec ur sor to O.C.G.A. § 17 -6 -1 5)
. T he S ta te a lso r equir es she ri ff s to “ de posi t c as h bo nds he ld b y the she ri ff

in
one or m or e int er es t- be ar ing tr

ust a cc ount s, ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 27( a) , a nd t o rem it th atin te res t t o a st at e ag en cy , th e Geo rg ia Ind ig en t Def en se Co un ci l. O. C.G .A . §§ 15-16-27(b); 17-12 -32. T hat Council then redistrib utes the m oney to l oc al ind ige nt d ef

en se pr ogr am s. O
. C. G
. A
. §§ 1 5- 16- 27( b) ; 17 -1 2- 30 e t se q. 23 These state court and bond -related duties do not stem from law s of general application, but from

statutes where by

the State r equires sheriffs to perf orm21

spe ci fi c ta sks that are state f unc tio ns i n th e St at e’ s c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m . T he se statut es a re not

m er e ge ne ra l r eg ulator

y c ontro l. I nst ea d, the y

r ep re se nt the S ta te delegating di screte state functions in the State’ s crim inal justice sy stem spe ci fi ca lly

to she ri ff s. 3. C orrect ions T he S ta te a lso a ssi gns she ri ff s sp ec if ic c or re ct ion s du tie s r eg ar din g st at e of fe nde rs . T he S ta te r equir es that the she ri ff take c ust ody

of a ll inm at es in the j ai l i n h i s co u n t y. O.C .G. A. § 4 2 -4 -4 . Th e G eo rg i a l eg i s l at u re m an d at es th at “ [i ]t sha ll be the duty

of the she ri ff

. . . [ t] o take f

ro m the out goi ng s he ri ff

c ust ody of the j ai l and the bod ie s of

suc h pe rs ons as a re c onf ine d th er ei n” a nd t o f

ur nis h inm at es “ m ed ic al a id, he at , a nd b lanke ts, to be r ei m bur se d if ne ce ssary

f ro m the
co unty tr ea sur y . ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 42 -4 -4 (a )( 1) -( 2)
. S he ri ff P et er son’ s auth or ity

a nd dutyto adm inister the ja il in his j urisdictio n flows fr om the State, not Clinch County
. See In re I rvin, 254 Ga. 251, 253 (198 5) (“ It is clear that the legislature ha s v es te d b ro adau th or it y in th e o ffi ce o f sh eri ff t o a dm in is te r th e jail s.”)
. Sh er if fs w ho r ef

use to take c ust ody

of a n in m at e m ay

be c harg ed

w itha m is de m ean or . O.C.G.A. § 4 2- 4- 12
. It is im portant t o ou tli ne howthe S ta te use s c ounty j ai ls t o in carc er at e its state of fe nde rs a nd, in tur

n, r equir es she ri ff

s to a dm ini ste r the m . T o be ginw ith , she ri ff s m ust take c ust ody

of inm at es a rr es te d and aw ai tin g tr ia l i n st at e supe ri orSee Howing ton v. Wi lson, 213 Ga. 664, 665 (1957) (“It is appare nt from [Georg ia] 24 statutes that the custody

of a de fenda

nt, pendinghis trial under a n indictment for a c riminal offe nse, is in the sheriff

of the c ounty

wher ein the off

ense w as committed . . . .”); State v. Mid dle br oo ks , 2 36 Ga . 5 2, 52 -5 3 ( 19 76 ) ( de fe nd a nt o ri g ina lly

de ta ine d in

City of At lanta ja il transfe rre d to custody

of the F ulton Count y

Sheriff upon indictment). 22 co urts o n st at e fe lon y

a nd m isd em eanor

c harg es . N o sh er if

f’ s a ppr ova l i s 24 required. For exam

ple, a City of H om erville police officer arr ested plaintiff Man de rs forfel on y

ob st ru ct io n o f an off

ic er– in vi ol at io n o f st at e la w, O.C.G.A. § 16 -1 0- 24 (b )– an d t oo k M an de rs to th e Cl in ch Co un ty j ai l. As custodians of pre-trial detainees c harged with state f elonies, sheriff

s transfer inm ates to and from the State’ s superior courts for pre-tr ial and trial pr oc ee din gs, a s w el l a s a tte nd a ll se ssi ons of tho se c ourts. I f a ch an ge of ve nue f or the tr ia l i s gr an te d by

the state tr ia l j udge , the she ri ff m ust tr an spor t the pe rs on t o the c ounty

to w hic h th e ch an ge of

ve nue is dir ec te d and d el ive r that pe rs on t o th e sh eri ff o f th atco un ty. O.C.G.A. § 42 -4 -1 1. Another class of inm ates in the countyj ails are those serving state sentences fo r fe lon ie s. Whe n c onvi ct ed of af el ony of fe nse , the f

el on b y ope ratio n of G eo rg ialawis co m

m itt ed to the c ust ody

of the G eo rg iaD ep ar

tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns (“ DO C”), which deter

m ines the place of confinem ent. O .C. G. A. §§ 42-5-50 (b);The state supe rior cour t has no authority

to sentence a per son convicted of a fe lony 25 other than to the c ustody

of the c ommissi oner of

the Geor g ia Depa

rtment of Corre ctions, and the State has authority

over the inmate on the plac e of c onfinement a nd on the computation of sentenc e. See E ubanks v. State, 229 Ga . App. 667, 667-68 (1997) . The State may allow fe lons to remain in the c ounty

jail and re imburse the county . O.C.G.A. § 42-5- 51(b)- (c)
. See He lmeci v. State, 230 Ga. A pp. 866, 871 (1998) ( stating that O.C.G.A. § 42-5-50( c) 26
“ is c le arl y

c ou c he d in

mand ator

y langua g e , in dic atin gthat a tr ia l c ourt

ha s n o d isc re tio n in denying a reque st to remain in the county pendingappea l”); O.C.G.A. § 42- 5-50(b) (stating except as otherw ise provided in O.C.G.A. § 42- 5-50(c ), the DO C shall assign the pla ce of confine ment for c onvicted fe lons). “The Depa

rtment of Corre ctions will provide reimburse ment to counties for c ost of 27 maintaining f

elony prisoners in the c ounty

jails after conviction and se ntencingand bef ore suc h prisoners a

re tra nsfer red to a place of conf

inement as dire cted by

the Commiss ioner, De partment of Corre ctions.” Ga . Comp. R. & Reg s. § 125-2-4-.02( d) (de scribingreimburse ment proce dure and includingfelons re maining in c ounty jail duringappea l as inmates for which re imbursement may be obtained)
. See Clay ton County

v. Evans, 258 Ga . 146, 147 (1988) ( noting “ the Gene ral 28 As se mbl y –a wa re of the pr ob le m of

the e xiste nc e of

ov e rc ro wd e d s tate pr iso ns –ma de pr ov isi on in 23 42-5-51(b). In at lea st five situation s, convicted felons serve their state sentence s

25 in co un ty j ai ls
. Fi rs t, ac onvi ct ed

f el on, a lth oughin D O C c ust ody , se rv es his state f el ony se nte nc e in the c ounty

j ai l pe ndi ng a

ppe al if his a tto rn ey

c er tif ie s hi s pr es en ce is
ne ce ssary f or the appe al
. O
. C. G
. A
. § 42 -5 -5 0( c)
. N o sh er if f or D O C a ppr ova l i s re qui re d. T he D O C’ s r eg ulatio ns e ve n pr ovi de that the S ta te w ill pay f or the c ost 26 of m ai nta ini ng f

el ony pr iso ne rs in co unty

j ai ls a ft er

c onvi ct iona nd s en te nc ing until their appeals are concluded. G a. Com p. R. & Regs. § 125-2-4-.02(d). 27 Se co nd, due to pr iso n ov er cr ow din g, the D O C h as br oa d di sc re tio n to a ssi gn co nvi ct ed f el ons to s er

ve the ir state se nte nc es in co unty j ai ls and t o r ei m

bur se counties for their incarce ration at a daily rate. T he state trial court m ust no tify 28O. C.G .A . § 42 -5 -5 1( c ) f or the re imb ur se me nt t o th e c ounty . . . f or the c os t of

inc arc e ratin gstate prisoners” ). 24 the D O C tha t a

pe rs on i s c onvi ct ed

of af el ony w ith in thirty

day s. O
. C. G
. A
. § 42
- 5-50(a). T he DO C then has fifteen day s to elect to transfer the inm ate or to start pay ing f or his inc ar ce ratio n. O
. C. G
. A
. § 42 -5 -5 1( c)
. N o sh er if f’ s a ppr ova l i s re qui re d. Third, if a c onvi cted felon’ s state probation is revoked, a state j udge has dis cr et ionto se nte nc e the f el on t o se rv e his state se nte nc e in the c ounty j ai l i n ce rt ai n c ir cu m stanc es . O
. C. G
. A
. § 17 -1 0- 1( a) (3 )( A ). N o sh er if f’ s a ppr ova l i s req ui red
. Fo u rt h , c o n v i ct ed fe l o n s s er v i n g a p ar o l ed s t at e s en t en ce , u n d erth e D OC ’s
au tho ri ty , w ho v iol at e paro le m ay be he ld i n c ounty

j ai ls unti l a

state j udge fo rm al ly revo ke s t he ir s ta te pa ro le . Ga. Op. Att y . Gen. No . 82 -3 3 (1 98 2) . No sh eri ff’s ap pr ov al is requi red
. Fi fth, c onvi ct ed

f el ons in D O C c ust ody

m ay se rv e the ir

state se nte nc es in countyj ails if they

are participating in a state-spons ored proje ct and the sheriff ap pr ov es . O.C.G.A. § 4 2- 5- 51 (d ). Y et a nothe r cl as s of

inm at es in co unty

j ai ls are tho se se rv ing state
m isd em eanor

se nte nc es . I f a de fe ndant i s c onvi ct ed of astate m isd em eanorThe other locations include a

“county corr ectional institution; ” a “ state probation 29 detention ce nter or dive rsion cente r;” or a “state c orre ctional institut ion” if the “ crime w as committed . . . within the confines of a state cor rec tional insti tution.” O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3( a)( 1)- (3). Unde r Ge org ia law, c ounty jails are se parate fa cilities from “c ounty corr ectional institutions.” See O.C.G.A. § 42- 5-53. In operating the ja il, Sheriff Peterson a lso must carry out many state policies on how 30 inmates are treated and jails ar e oper ated. The State regulates the pre paration, service, a nd number of me als and inspec ts the jail periodically “to ensure ag ainst the prese nce of unsanitary conditions.” O.C.G.A. § 42-4- 32(a) -(c ). The State pr escr ibes that a jailer shall not be “guilty

of willful inhumanity

or oppre ssion to any

inmate under

his care and custody .” O.C.G.A. § 42- 4-5. The State sets the minimum safety and sec urity

require ments for jails. O.C.G.A. § 42-4- 31(a)
. We d o n ot c onte nd

that th e se statut or

y ja il d uti e s, by the mse lve s, tr ans fo rm

sh e ri ff s into state off icials. Instead, we mention these statutes as f urther e vidence of how the duties of sh e ri ff s in Ge or g ia are g ov e rn e d b y

the State and

no t by c ounty g ov e rn ingbo die s. Th is background is rele vant to our consider ation of whe ther the she riff is an a rm of the state or the c ounty in e sta bli sh ingfo rc e po lic y

a s to Ma nd e rs . Wit h respe ct to § 42-4-4( a)( 3) transf ers, the G eorg ia Supreme Court instructs that “[t]he 31 leg islature has ve sted the sher iff alone with the . . . administrative authority to order suc h transfe rs” a

nd that a state supe rior cour t may not order suc h a tra

nsfer sua sponte, althoug h the sheriff would be re quired to ca

rry out an orde r of the c ourt if the issue of the unsafe conditions of the jail wer e prope rly

befor e the c ourt. In re I

rvin, 254 Ga. 251, 253- 54 (1985). 25 offense, the state j udge has di scretion to sentence the defendant to, am ong o ther lo cat io ns , th e “ co un ty j ai l.” O.C.G.A. § 1 7- 10 -3 (a)( 1) -(3 ). 29 Be ca use the S ta te use s th e state w ide ne tw ork of c ounty j ai ls t o in carc er at e its f el ony a nd m isd em eanor

of fe nde rs , it is not sur pr isi ng tha t the S ta te e xpr es sly authorizes sheriffs to act bey ond th eir re spective counti es and to transfer prisoners to the c ounty

j ai ls o f oth er

she ri ff s. I n a ddi tio n to ve nue c hange s, the S ta te 30
re qu i re s s h er i ff

s t o t ak e p er s o n s arre s t ed t o a ja i l o f a n o t h erco u n t y i f t h e s h er i ff ’s countyj ail is in an “ unsafe conditio n.” O. C.G .A . § 42-4-4(a) (3). 31 Th e S t at e a l s o p er m i t s s h er i ff s t o ex er ci s e t h ei r d i s cr et i o n t o “ t ra n s fe r[ ] a prisoner to anoth er j ail in another countyif the sheriff concludes that su ch transferAlthough a state fe lony

inmate has a

rig ht to remain in the county jail duringappea l 32 under O .C.G.A. § 42-5-50( c), the sheriff may transfe r that inmate to anothe r jail if the sher iff’s jail is unsafe. See Helmec i, 230 Ga. App. at 871 (conc luding the “ conditions authorizing transf er [under O.C.G.A. § 42-4- 4(a) (3) we re] not present” and “the trial court e rre d in denying Helmec i’s motion to remain in the county jail pendingthe disposition of his appeals”). 26 is i n th e be st i nte re st o f the pr iso ne r or that su chtr an sf

er is ne ce ssary

f or the
or de rl y a dm ini str at ionof

the j ai l. ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 42 -4 -4 (b ). I n asim ilar ve in,

“ [w ] he n th er e is n o se cure j ai l i n ac ounty or w he n it is de em ed

ne ce ssary

by the she ri ff , a ny pe rs on c om

m itt ing a n of

fe nse in the c ounty

m ay be se nt t o aj ai l i n an oth er c ounty de te rm ine d to be sui ta

ble by the she ri ff

. ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 17 -7 -1
. 32 G ive n sh er if

fs ’ sig nif ic an t c or re ct ion s r ole f

or state of fe nde rs , the S ta te furthe r re qui re s sh er if

fs to ke ep de ta ile d r ec or ds o f pe rs ons co m m itt ed to co unty j ails. O .C. G. A. § 42-4-7. T hese rec ords includ e the “ age, sex, r ace, under what pr oc es s su chpe rs on w as c om m itt ed a nd f ro m w ha t c ourt the pr oc es s is sue d, the
cr im e w ithw hic h th e pe rs on w as c harg ed , the da te of suc h pe rs on’ s c om

m itm en t to ja il, the day

of such person’ s discharge, under w hat order such person was di sc ha rg ed , and th e co ur t fr om whi ch th e o rd er i ss ue d.” O.C.G.A. § 42 -4 -7 (a ). T he S ta te m an da te s th at ashe ri ff or ade puty w ho f ai ls t o c om

ply with these state re quirem ents shall be fined for contem pt and sub

j ect to rem oval from office. O .C. G. A. § 42-4-4(c). Insum , the se r equir em en ts are not state law s of

ge ne ra l a ppl ic at ionbut represe nt the State’ s m anaging and con trolling wher e state off enders areSheriffs’ incar cer ation of off ender s in the county

jail, such as Mande rs, who ar e cha rg ed 33 wi th s tate fe lon ie s and

be ing pr os e c ute d b y

the State of

Ge or g ia in s tate su

pe ri or c ourt s is a

state fu nc tio n. Th e State re qu ir e s th at sh e ri ff s n ot o nly tr ans po rt state of fe nd e rs to a

nd fr om s tate su pe ri or c ourt s and

atte nd a ll s e ssi on s o f t

ho se state c ourt s, but a lso take c us tod y of state of fe nd e rs in c ounty

ja ils be tw e e n th os e state su pe ri or c ourt se ssi on s. Th e State of

Ge or g ia ha s a Depa rtment of Corre ctions, a state a g ency , that operates state prisons and inc arc erates felony offe nders a fter c onviction. But the e x istence of the Depa rtment of Corre ctions does not prec lude the State from utilizi ngother lawenfor ceme nt ag encie s, such as sher iffs, to perf orm part of

the State ’s inc arc e ratio n f

un c tio n f or state of fe nd e rs . A s d e ta ile d a

bo ve , th e State re qu ir e s sh e ri ff s to take c ustody

of state of

fende rs, both pre- and post-convic tion, in county jails, and counties have no law e nf

or c e me nt o r o the r c or

re c tio ns a uth or ity ov e r s tate of

fe nd e rs in c ounty

ja ils
. In f a c t, i t make s se ns e fo r t

he State to util ize the ne tw or k o f c ounty

ja ils to i nc arc e ra

te state off ender s in the location of the state superior c ourts not only duringpre- trial and trial, but also while the inmates se rve state sentenc es duringtheir appe als. Indeed, a s expl ained a bove, the Depa rtment of Corre ctions can e lect to have state off ender s serve the entire state sentenc e in the county jail. That the State also oper ates state pr isons and require s Clinch Count y to build and fund a c ounty

jail and to provide food, c lothing, and me dical nec essities to inmates does not dim ini shthe imp or

tant s tate fu

nc tio ns that Sh e ri ff

Pe te rs on pe rf or ms r e lativ e to s tate of

fe nd e rs , su c h a s Ma

nd e rs , in the c ounty

ja il. Griff in v. Chatham County , 244 Ga. 628 ( 1979), under score s how counties lac k 34 authority over she riffs’ operation of county jails. I n Griff

in, the Geor g ia Supreme Court c on c lud e d th at th e sh e ri ff mus t a c c e pt c ity

pr iso ne rs on ly

be c a us e a loc a l a c t of

the State leg islature g rante d Chatham County power over the county

jail and that County ’s commission had contr acte d with the City of Savanna

h to maintain city

prisoners in the c ounty

jail. I d. at 629- 30. Griff in involved a local a ct by the State leg islature that wa s applicable only to Chatham County . That loca l act g rante d the Chatham County commissioners considera ble power over the county jail as follows: “Said Commis sioners [of Chatham County ] shall have power to make proper rules and r egulations for the g overnme nt and control of sa id jail of Chatham County , and the pr iso ne rs and

inm ate s th e re in, and , e xce pt a s h e re inb e fo re pr ov ide d, are he re by inv e ste d w ith the manag ement and c are of said jail.” Griffin, 244 Ga. a t 630 n.8 (quotation marks omitted) (alter ation in orig inal). In the pre sent ca se, there is no simi lar loca l act by the State leg islature reg ardingthe Clinch County jail. Absent such a loc al ac t, counties are prec luded from powe r or a uth or ity ov e r s he ri ff

s. 27 inc ar ce rate d, de sig na tin g th at c er ta in s ta te of

fe nde rs se rv e state ti m e in c ounty j ai ls, a nd the n a ssi gni ng s he ri ff s sp ec if ic c or re ct ion s du tie s r eg ar din g th ose state offenders. In contrast, counties have no authority over w hat correc tions duties 33 she ri ff s pe rf orm , or w hic h st at e of

fe nde rs se rv e tim e in c ounty j ai ls, or w ho i s in ch ar ge of the inm at es in the c ounty j ai ls. 3428

IV. APPLYING E LEVENT H AMENDMENT FACTO RS H av ing e xam ine d G eo rg ia ’ s lawgov er nin g sh er if

fs , w e nowspe ci fi ca lly ap ply the E le ve nthA m en dm en t f ac tor s to S he ri ff

P et er son’ s part ic ular func tio ns i n issue. W e need not, and do not, decide today whether Ge orgia sheriffs w ear a

“ state hat” for Eleventh A m endm ent purpos es for a ll of the m any specific duties
as sig ne d di re ct ly

by the S ta te . W e ha ve r ec ount ed the se dut ie s a s r el ev an t G eo rg ia law that reflec ts on th e nature and character of the sheriff

’ s office. W e, however,
m ust de ci de he re onl y

w he the r Sh er if

f Pe te rs on i s an “ ar

m of the S ta te ” in
es ta bli shi ng f or ce pol ic y

a t the j ai l and i n tr ai nin g and d isc ipl ini ng h is d ep uti es in that r eg ar d. A. How State Law De fines t he En tity The f irst factor in the E leventh Am endm ent analy sis is ho w G eorgia law defines the sheriff’ s office. In G eorgia, the office of sheriff is an elected
co nst itu tio na l of

fi ce . A lth oughashe ri ff

pe rf orm s hi s du tie s m ai nly , a lth oughnot alway s, w ithin the geographical confines of a county , the e ssential go vernm ental nature of his office is ( a) to continue to perform his his torical com

m on law duties to e nf or ce the lawa nd p re se rv e the pe ac e on b eh al f of the sov er ei gn S ta te a nd ( b) to perform

specific statutory

duties, directly

assigned bythe State, in law enforcem ent, in state courts, and in corrections. Most of those duties are an int eg ra l part

of the S ta te ’ s c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m a nd are state f

unc tio ns.29

Mor eo ve r, the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce is a se parate a nd i nde pe nde nt o ff ic e fr om both Cl inc h C ounty

a nd i ts g ove rn ing body . C ount ie s de le ga te no p ow er s or dut ie s to sheriffs. Sherif

f Pe terson and his deputies at the ja il are not em ploy ees of Clinch Co unty . I nde ed , G eo rg ia ’ s C onst itu tio n pr ec lud es Cl inc h C ounty f ro m havin g any co nt ro l o ve r th e sh eri ff’s o ffi ce. A lth oughthe spe ci fi c dut ie s th e St at e as sig ns t o sh er if fs she d c onsi de ra

ble lig ht o n th e ch ar ac te r of

the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce , w e m

ust f oc us o n th e na tur e of

the particular f

unction at issue here: for ce policy
. The sher iff’ s authorityto use force
o r t h e t o o l s o f v i o l en ce , wh et h erd ea d l y o r n o n -d ea d l y fo rc e, an dth e s h er i ff ’s obl igatio n to a dm ini ste r the j ai l are dir ec tly de ri ve d f ro m the S ta te a nd n ot delegated through the county entity
. In addition , use of force and creating force pol ic y a re qui nte sse nti al pol ic ing f unc tio ns, e xe rc ise d by

she ri ff s inini tia l arr es ts, in s ubdu ing inm at es in se ssi ons of state sup er ior

c ourts, or

in que lli ng d isr

upt ive in m at es in co un ty j ai ls
. Whil e w e m

ust c onsi de r co nte xt, the loc at ionw he re the she ri ff ’ s po lic ing func tio n is pe rf

orm ed doe s no t auto m at ic al ly

tr an sm ute the f unc tio n in to a

state function or a countyfunction. In adm inistering the j ail, the sherif f does not check his a rr es t po w er s or

f or ce auth or ity

a t the doo r. I nst ea d, he a nd h is d ep uti es br ing the m int o th e j ai l and e xe rc ise the m in the j ai l se tti ng. T his c as e is n ot a c as e of fe ed ing , c lothin g, or

pr ovi din g m ed ic al c ar e to i nm at es , w hic h ne ce ssari ly oc curTh e dis se nt r a ise s a pa ra de of hy po the tic a l sc e na

ri os fr om t

he Chi e f o f t

he At lanta 35 Police Depa

rtment to a sec urity

guard w atchingthe cosmetics c ounter at a depa rtment store. (D iss e nt, B ark e tt, J., p . 5 9) . N owhe re do e s th is o pin ion in a ny wa y su g g e st o r i mpl y

that a private se curity

guard’ s or a c ity

or county

police off

icer ’s power

to arre st or use for ce e ntitles that office r to Eleventh Ame ndment immunit y . All cer tified pea ce of

fice rs in Geor g ia have cer tain arr est and for ce pow ers grante d by the State. The ke y

question is not what arre st and forc e powe rs sherif

fs have , but for whom sher iffs exercise that power . A city deleg ates a

nd exercises its policing f

unction throug h its city

police off

icer s and a c ounty

throug h county

police o f f i c e r s , an d thu s c i ty an d

c o un ty p o l i c e o f

f i c e r s a c tf o r an d r e p r e s e n tth e c i ty an d

c o un ty, respe ctively . In contra st, the State deleg ates a nd perf orms cer tain state policingand cor rec tions functions throug h sever al law e nforc ement ag encie s, including she riffs, a nd sheriff s act for and repr esent the State in those a ssigne d tasks. As explained previously , under G eorg ia law c ounties lack powe r in the ar ea of

law enf orce ment except to operate a c ounty police for ce. See supra note 17. What additionally

makes sher iffs distinct from city and county

police off

icer s is that the State e xpre ssl y

ha s v e ste d in

sh e ri ff s sp e c if ic state fu nc tio ns a nd that sh e ri ff

s util ize the ir

arr e st and for ce pow ers in executingstate func tions. As detailed above , sheriff s perf orm a va riety of specific state func tions in t he State’s c riminal justice sy stem, from attendingever y session of state su pe ri or c ourt , to takin gc us tod

y of state of fe nd e rs , b oth

pr e - a nd po st- c onvic tio n, in c ounty jails. Sheriff Peter son’s authority over inmate s and the duty to administer the jail flow fr om the State , n ot C lin c h Co unty , th os e fu nc tio ns and

dutie s p e rt a in c hie fl y

to a ff a ir s o f t he State in Clinch County , and Clinch County plainly has no control or

authority over Sher iff Peter son’s fo rc e po lic y

at th e ja il o r h is d e putie s at th e ja il. 30 w ith in the j ai l. I nst ea d, it inv olv es S he ri ff

P et er son’ s f

or ce pol ic y , w hic h ha

ppe ns to b e at iss ue in the j ai l c ont ex t i n th is p ar tic ular ca se . Whil e the j ai l c ont ex t i s im portant, it li ke w ise is sig nif

ic an t tha t the she ri ff

’ s f or ce pol ic y

is at iss ue in
m an y se tti ngs an d th at

loc at iona lon e doe s no t c ontro l. I t i s a lso m at er ia l tha t the St at e use s th e co unty

j ai l t o in carc er at e not

onl y pr etri al de ta ine es c harg ed w ith state offenses, such as Manders, but also s tate offe nders serving state sentences aft er co nv ic ti on . Ba se d onour

r ev ie wof

G eo rg ialaw , w e co nc lud e that the she ri ff w ears a

“ state ha t” w he n he c re at es a nd i m ple m en ts f

or ce pol ic y

in the j ai l. T hus, thi s

35 f i r s tf a c t o r we i g h s h e a v i l y i n f

a v o r o f i mm u n i t y.The State pre scribes the qualifications for sheriff s. The Ge org ia leg islature has de clar ed 36 that “prope r qualifica

tions and standards be require d of the . . . sher iff so as to incr ease the eff ectivene ss . . . of the seve ral sher iffs of this state as la w enf orce ment office rs to combat crime.” O.C.G.A. § 15-16- 1(a) . The State mandates a de tailed set of qua lifications that a per son must satisfy

to be a c andidate f

or the sher iff’s of

fice in any

county . See O.C.G.A. § 15- 16-1(a )- (c)
. 31 B. Wh er e St at e La w V es ts C on tr ol The sec ond factor of the E leventh Am endm ent analy sis exam ines where G eo rg ialawve sts c ontro l. I n a ddi tio n to m an da tin g and c ontro lli ng s he ri ff s’ spe ci fi c dut ie s a s ou tli ne d a bove , onl y

the S ta te pos se sse s c ontro l ov er she ri ff s’ fo rc e pol ic y

a nd tha t c ontro l i s di re ct a nd s ign if

ic an t i n m an y

a re as , inc lud ing training and d isciplin e. 1. S tate R equir es An nual Training of Sher iffs T he S ta te r equir es a nnua l sp ec ia liz ed tr ai nin g of

she ri ff s ina ll co unt ie s by the G eo rg iaS he ri ff

s’ A sso ci at ionw iththe a ssi stanc e of the G eo rg iaP ubl ic S af

ety T ra ini ng C en te r. O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 3. T he a nnua l tra ini ng o f she ri ff s “ sha ll be 36 generally devoted to con tem

porary lawenforce m ent, investigation , j udicial pr oc es s, an d c orrect io ns pra ct ic es an d s pe ci fic al ly sha ll be ge rm an e to th e . . . of fi ce of she ri ff in the se ve ra l c ount ie s of thi s st at e. ” O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 3( a)
. T he

“ pur pose of thi s C ode se ct ion[ O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 3] is to p ro m ote pr of es sio na lis m within the office of sheriff by ensuring th e highest po ssibl e quality of law
en fo rcem en t t rai ni ng is off ered to each sh eri ff o n a n a nn ua l b as is .” O.C.G.A. § 15- 16- 13( a)
. I t i s r ea sona ble to as sum e that su chtr ai nin g in cl ude s in str uc tio n onTh e Go ve rn or may de te rm ine that an inve sti g atio n o f a sh e ri ff “ sh ou ld b e ma de a s a 37 re su lt o f c ri min a l c ha

rg e s, a lle g e d mi sc on du c t in of fi c e , o r a lle g e d in c a

pa c ity of the sh e ri ff

to perf orm the func tions of his office.” O.C.G.A. § 15-16- 26(a)
. 32 fo rc e pol ic y

a nd h ir ing a nd tra ini ng d ep uti es . S he ri ff P et er son te sti fi ed

that i n pr ep ari ng th e fo rce p ol ic y in hi s M an ua l h e ad op te d s om e st at e p ol ic ie s. Furthe rm or e, the G eo rg iaS he ri ff s’ A sso ci at ionuse s st at e funds (o r fe de ra l f unds di st rib ut edto th e St at e) t o c ov er al l t rai ni ng co st s. See O.C.G.A. § 15 -1 6- 3( d)
. N ota bly , if ashe ri ff f ai ls t o c om

ply w iththe a nnua l tra ini ng r equir em en ts, the G ove rn or

–th e St at e’ s c hie f–

m ay sus pe nd the she ri ff

w ith out pay f or nin ety day s. O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 3( e) (4 ). T he S ta te a lso m an da te s th at ashe ri ff ’ s f ai lur e to co m pl et e an nu al tra in in g re qu ire m en ts wil l re su lt in th e lo ss of a rres t p owe rs . O. C.G .A . § 15-16-3(e)( 1),( 4). Again, these rules are not laws of genera l application, but are specific statutes w hereby the State dire ctly

requires annual tr ai nin g of

a ll she ri ff

s, c ontro ls the tr ai nin g su bj ec t m atte r, pay s f

or the tr ai nin g, an d sanc tio ns s he ri ff

s f or non -c om pli an ce . I n c ontra st, c ount ie s have no c ontro l
ove r she ri ff

s or the ir tr ai nin g. 2. Govern or Disciplin es She riffs In addition , the G overnor has broad inv estigation and susp ension p ower s reg ard in g a ny m is co nd uc t b y a sh eri ff i n t he pe rfo rm an ce o f an y of h is du ti es . O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 26. I f a she ri ff ’ s po lic y pe rm its e xc es siv e fo rc e in the c ounty 37 j ai l, pla inl y

the G ove rn or

m ay dis ci pli ne the she ri ff

. I f a she ri ff

f ai ls t o takeA who lly se pa rate statut e , O .C. G. A. , § 45 -5 -6 , p ro vid e s f or re mov a l of

any pu bli c 38 officia l upon a fe lony

indictment. See Gipson v. Bow ers, 263 Ga . 379 (1993) ( stating that the Gover nor “c an take no officia l action ag ainst a sher iff unless ther e has be en a c riminal indictment” first). The above G eorg ia statute, O.C.G.A. § 15- 16-26, howe ver, is not a law of g ener al application to all publi c off icials but independe ntly

addre sses only

sheriff s and the Gover nor’s investig ation and suspension of she riffs f or any misconduct in office , which do not require a cr iminal indictment or even a ny suspected c riminal activity . Compare O.C.G.A . § 15- 16-26, with § 45-5-6. 33 cu sto dy of state of fe nde rs in the c ounty

j ai l, pla inl y

the G ove rn or

m ay dis ci pli ne the she ri ff

. T he S ta te le gis la tur e ex pr es sly ha s m ad e Sh er if

f Pe te rs on answ er ab le to th e Gov ern orforhi s co nd uc t an d p ol ic ie s. Specifica lly , the G overnor m ay initiate an investig ation of any suspected
m iscondu ct by

any sheriff and m ay

suspend the sheriff. O .C. G. A. § 15-16-26 (a), (c). T he Governor selec ts two sheriffs, who along with the State A ttorney Gen eral , con du ctth e in ve st ig at io n fo r th e Gov ern or . O.C.G.A. § 1 5- 16 -2 6( a). The Sta te fun ds th e in ve st ig at io n. Id
. If the G ove rn or ’ s c om

m itt ee r ec om

m en ds s uspe nsi on t o th e G ove rn or , the G ove rn or m ay sus pe nd the she ri ff

f or six ty day s and e xte nd tha t su spe nsi on f or thi rty a ddi tio na l day s. O
. C. G
. A
. § 15 -1 6- 26( c)
. T his dis ci pli nary pr oc ed ur e is direct, subst antial, and imm ediate state control over the sheriff ’ s acts. If Sheriff Peter son perm its excessive force, all the G overnor m ust do is have a com

m ittee i mme d i a t e l y i n v e s t i g a t e a n dr e p o rt , a n dth e G o v e rn o r c a n s u s p e n dh i m. 38 Mor eo ve r, if

the G ove rn or

be lie ve s th e she ri ff

sho uld be r em ove d f

ro m of fi ce , the G ove rn or

is “ au tho ri ze d to r eque st the dis tr ic t a tto rn ey of the c ounty

ofThe Gove rnor ne cessa rily acts through others in filingremova l petitions, and the district 39 at t o r n e y a c t s f o r th e S t at e i nf

i l i n ga p e t i t i o nt o r e m o v e a

s h e r i f f
. S e e O w e n s v . F u l t o nC o un ty, 87 7 F .2 d 9 47 , 9 51 -5 2 ( 11 th C ir .1 98 9) (c on c lud ingdis tr ic t atto rn e y a c te d f or the State of

Ge or g ia and no t F ult on

County in p ro se c uti on

de c isi on s, e ve n th ou g h e le c te d b y on ly F ult on County vo te rs and

a lth ou g h h is o ff

ic e ’s bu dg e t w a s p ro vid e d in larg e pa rt by c ounty fu nd s) . T he state judicial proce eding s for re moval of a she riff a re ide ntical to those for the remova l of a c lerk of the superior

court unde r O.C.G.A. § 15- 6-82. O.C.G.A. §§ 15- 16-10(b) & 42- 4-4(c ). I t has bee n sug g ested that c ounties have more oversig ht than the State over the sherif

f’s 40 operation of the jail beca

use “c ounty

g overningauthorities have at their disposal the investig ative po we rs of g ra nd jur ie s, se e [O. C.G .A .] § 1 5- 12 -7 1( c ) ( 20 01 ), wh ic h mu st i ns pe c t ja ils annua lly and make appropr iate re commendations to the county commission. [ O.C.G.A.] § 15-12-78.” (D iss e nt, B ark e tt, J., p . 7 4) . T his su g g e sti on mis a pp re he nd s th e se statut e s a nd the we lle sta bli sh e d f un c tio n o f gra

nd jur ie s in the State ’s jus tic e sy ste m. Under Geor g ia law, the grand jury has two principa l duties. First, the g rand jury historically

and func tionally

is a wholly

independe nt investigating a nd acc using body

in the State’s fe lony

case s. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-61, 15- 12-71, 15-12- 74, 15-12-82, 15- 12-100. Second, the State vests in the g rand jury the civil power

and func tion of inspectingand investig atingnot jus t th e c ounty

ja il, but any

c ounty bu ild ing , th e c ounty

g ov e rn ingbo dy

its e lf , o r a ny c ounty 34 the she ri ff

’ s r es ide nc e to b ri ng a

r em ova l pe tit iona ga ins t the she ri ff ” ba se d up on the e vid en ce r ep orte d by

the G ove rn or ’ s in ve sti ga tio n c om m itt ee . I d. T he

39 G ove rn or m ay or de r ad dit ion al inv es tig at ion“ by the c om m itt ee , by the G eo rg ia Bureau of I nvestig ation, by other lawenforce m ent agencies .
. . or by any special
com m ittee appointed b y

the Governor f

or such purpo se.” O .C. G. A. § 15-16-26 (c). 3. C ou nt ie s L ac k

C on tr ol I n c ontra st, c ount ie s have no a uth or ity , c ontro l ov er , or

inv olv em en t i n Sh er if f Pe te rs on’ s f

or ce pol ic y

a t the j ai l, or

his tr ai nin g and d isc ipl ini ng o f de put ie s inthat r eg ar d. Whil e G eo rg iac ount ie s have obl igatio ns i nvol vin g th e j ai l str uc tur e an d in m at es ’ f

ood, c lothin g, a nd m ed ic al ne ce ssi tie s, suc h du tie s in vol ve w hol ly se parate a nd d ist inc t m atte rs f ro m the she ri ff

’ s f or ce pol ic y

a t the j ai l and his tr ai nin g and d isc ipl ini ng o f de put ie s inthat r eg ar d. 40c omm iss ion e r. O. C.G .A . § 15 -1 2- 71 (b )( 2) . B e c a us e the g ra

nd jur y is i nd e pe nd e nt a

nd e qu a lly overse es county

g overningauthorities, it cannot fa irly be said that grand jurie s work at the counties’ disposal or a ct for c ounties in investigatingsheriff s or county

jails. Instead, grand juror s, like sheriff s, are drawn from the c ounty , paid with county funds, but pe rf or m di sc re te fu

nc tio ns in t

he State ’s jus tic e sy ste m. T o th e e xtent su pe rv isi on e xists , superior c ourt judg es in the state judicial sy stem supervise grand jurie s. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12- 71 (a ); 15 -1 2- 80 , 1 5- 12 -1 00 (a ), 15 -1 2- 10 1. Sup e ri or c ourt jud g e s d ra w a nd imp ane l g ra

nd jur or s, c ha rg e the m, a dmi nis te r t

he ir oaths , a nd se le c t th e ir

fo re pe rs on

or dir e c t th e jur

y its e lf to s e le c t a fore person. O.C.G.A . §§ 15-12-62, 15- 12-68. Gi ve n th at ma

ny state of fe nd e rs se rv e tim e in c ounty ja ils , th e State le g isl atur e a lso require s that g rand jurie s eac h y ear “inspec t the condition and oper ations of the county jail,” O.C.G.A. § 15-12- 71(b)( 1), and “ the offic es of the district attorney at least onc e in eve ry

three c a le nd ar ye ars .” I d. Th e g ra nd jur y “ may pr e pa re re po rt s o r i ssu e pr e se ntm e nts ba se d u po n it s inspections,” then f

iled in the superior c ourt. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12- 71(b)( 3); 15-12-80. A t eac h annual § 15- 12-71(b) (1) inspec tion, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-78 re quires that the grand jury make rec ommendations reg ardingheatingand ventilation, which the c ounty “shall strictly

enfor ce,” and pre sentments as to the “tre atment of the inmate s.” We rejec t the arg

uments (a) that the State’s contr ol over sher iffs re prese nts nothing 41 mor e tha n “ its ro le a s th e se at of

le g isl ativ e po we r i n G e or g ia ” and its “ so ve re ig n p re ro g ativ e to structure local g overnme nt,” (Dissent, B arke tt, J ., pp. 66-67) a nd (b) that the State’ s control over sh e ri ff s is the “ the kin d o f i nd ir e c t and ult imate c ontr ol .
. . re se rv e d b y the state wi th r e sp e c t to e ve ry state -c re ate d e nti ty .” (D iss e nt, An de rs on , J. p . 5 2) . We fu lly re c ognize that ul tim ate control of e very

state-c reated entity

resides w ith the State and that the State may destroy or resha pe any political subdivisi on as it sees fit, includingthe sherif f’s off ice. The key

differ ence s here are that the State of Ge org ia has struc tured Sherif f Peterson’ s office as indepe ndent of Clinch County , that the State has ve sted in Sheriff Peter son specific state func tions, that mostof Sheriff Pete rson’s duties re late dire ctly to, and ar e an integral pa rt of, the State’ s criminal justice sy stem, and that the State c an discipline direc tly Sheriff Pete rson for a

ny misconduct. That sh e ri ff s a c t a s to state matte rs (a nd no t a s to loc a l g ov e rnme nt m atte rs ) i s, in p art , why c ounti e s, and c iti e s to o, have no po we r, a uth or ity , o r c ontr ol o ve r s he ri ff s. 35 Be ca u s e o f t h e S t at e’s d i re ct an ds ub s t an t i al co n t ro l o v erth e s h er i ff ’s dut ie s, tr ai nin g, a nd d isc ipl ine a nd the c ounty ’ s to ta l l ac k th er eo f, thi s c ontro l fa ct or a lso w ei ghs he av ily

in favor of S he ri ff P et er son’ s e nti tle m en t t o E le ve nth A men d men ti mm

u n i t y. 41 C. Fu ndsTh e State pa y s th e c ounty

the pe r d ie m r ate fo r c onvic te d s tate of fe nd e rs in t

he c ounty 42 jail, and the county , in turn, funds the sher iff’s budg et. O.C.G.A. § 42-5- 50(d); Ga . Comp. R. & Re g s. § 1 25 -2 -4 .0 2( d) . T he State re qu ir e s th e c ounty to p ay fo r p re -t ri a l st ate of

fe nd e rs , b ut, on c e c onvic te d, the State pa y s. We stress that this case doe s not involve medical ca re, which counties have a statutory 43 ob lig atio n to pr ov ide to i nmate s in c ounty ja ils . O .C. G. A. § 4 2- 5- 2. Se e , e .g ., Ep ps v. Gw inn e tt County , 2 31 Ga . App . 6 64 , 6 70 (1 99 8) (G wi nn e tt Co unty c ontr a c te d w ithPr iso n H e a lthSe rv ic e s, Inc.); Cher okee County

v. North Cobb Surg ical Assocs., 221 G a. App. 496, 499 ( 1996); Macon36 T he thi rd f ac tor in the E le ve nthA m en dm en t ana ly sis is w he re the e nti ty de ri ve s it s f

unds
. T he S ta te f

unds the a nnua l tra ini ng o f she ri ff s, f unds the G ove rn or ’ s di sc ipl inary

pr oc ed ur e ove r she ri ff

s f or use of e xc es siv e fo rc e, a nd p ays fo r c er t ai n s t at e o ff

en d er s as s i g n ed t o th e c o u n t y ja i l s u n d erth e s h er i ff ’s supervisio n. T hus, state funds are involved to som e extent in the particular

42 functions of Sher iff P eterson at issue. Whi l e C l i n ch Co u n t y b ea rs th e majo r b u rd en o f f u n d i n g Sh er i ff

Pe t er s o n ’s office and the jail, it is because the State so m andates. B y state statutes, Clinch Co unty m ust ( 1) m ai nta in the j ai l stru ct ur e, ( 2) appr opr ia te f

unds f or ne ce ssi tie s to inm at es ( suc h a s f

ood, be ddi ng, c lothin g, e le ctri ci ty , a nd s an itatio n) a nd the
sa lari es of

S he ri ff P et er son an d hi s de put ie s, a nd ( 3) pay the pr em ium

f or the Sh eri ff’s o ffi ci al bo nd . O.C.G.A. §§ 36 -9 -5 ; 4 2- 5- 2( a); 15 -1 6- 20 ; 4 5- 4- 7. Mande rs r el ie s onO
. C. G
. A
. § 42 -5 -2 (a ), w hic h pr ovi de s, in part , that “ it sha ll be the r es pons ibi lity of the gov er

nm en ta l un it, sub div isi on, or a ge nc y havin g the phy sic al c ust ody

of a n in m at e to m ai nta in the inm at e, f ur nis hin g hi m

f ood, cl oth ing , a nd any

ne ed ed m ed ic al a nd h ospi ta l a tte nti on. ” B ut M an de rs doe s no t 43Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Houston County , 207 Ga. App. 530, 531- 32 (1993) ( concluding Houston County

owed hospital for

medical c are provided to inmate in county jail). In Chaffin, the c ounty , over the sheriff ’s objection, shifted the r esponsibility for 44 patrollingand drugenfor ceme nt to the new county police depa

rtment and re duced the sheriff ’s bu dg e t by fo rt y -s e ve n p e rc e nt. 26 2 G a . at 20 2, 20 4. Th e tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d th e c ounty ’s re qu e st for a n injunction requiringthe sherif f to coope rate in the implementation of the plan to transf er personne l and equipment to the new ly cre ated c ounty

police depa

rtment. I d. at 202-03. The Ge or g ia Sup re me Court

a ff ir me d, ho ldi ngthat th e tr ia l c ourt ha d n ot a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in findingthat the re maining budg et was suf ficient to allow the she riff to pe rfor m his duti es. I d. at 204. In doing so, the Geor g ia Supreme Court re aff irmed that: (1) “ Sheriff Chaf fin is an elec ted, constitutional officer ,” Chaff in, 262 Ga. at 203 ( citing G a. Const. art. IX, § 1, ¶ 3(a )); (2) “[t] he sheriff is not an employ ee of

the county

commission,” Chaffin, 262 Ga . at 203 (c iting B oard of Commis sio ne rs of

Rand olp h Co unty

v. Wils on , 2 60 Ga . 4 82 (1 99 0) ); and (3 ) a lth ou g h th e c ounty commission has the power to c reate its own county police for ce, “ ‘the c ommissi oners c ould not divest the sheriff

of his power

and duty to enforc e the law s and pre serve the pea ce,’ ” either direc tly or indirec tly

by exercise of

their fisca l authority

or control of

county proper ty , Chaffin, 262 Ga. at 203 (quoting Wolfe v. Huf f, 232 Ga . 44, 45 (1974))
. In another

budg et battle betwe en the she riff a nd county commission in Board of Commi ssioners of Randolph County v. Wil son, the sheriff

reque sted $70,000 to pay deputies, but the c ounty

c omm iss ion

bu dg e te d a

lum p s um o f o nly

$6 0, 08 0. 26 0 G a . at 48 2. Th e Ge or g ia 37 allege that Sherif

f Pe terson denied him

necessities in O. C.G .A . § 42-5-2. Rather , Mande rs c ha lle nge s on ly S he ri ff P et er son’ s f

or ce pol ic y

a t the j ai l and the tr ai nin g an d d is ci pl in in g o f hi s d ep ut ie s. Furthe rm or e, Cl inc h C ounty ’ s f inanc ia l c ontro l i s a tte nua te d be ca use ( a) the St at e m an da te s S he ri ff

P et er son’ s m ini m

um sa lary a nd o ff ic ia l bo nd am ount , a nd (b ) Cl inc h C ounty

se ts the tot al bud ge t bu t c an not dic ta te howS he ri ff

P et er son spe nds it. T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt ha s he ld tha t c ount ie s “ m ust pr ovi de
re as ona bly suf fi ci en t f unds to al lowthe she ri ff

to dis ch ar ge his le ga l du tie s, ” an d that “ the c ounty

c om m iss ionm ay

not dic ta te to the she ri ff

howthat bu dge t w ill be spe nt i n th e ex er ci se of

his dut ie s. ” Ch af

fi n v. Ca lho un, 262 G a. 202 , 203 -0 4 (1 992) ; se e Bo sw el l v. Br am le tt, 274 G a. 50, 52 ( 2001 ). G eo rg ia ’ s C onst itu tio n

44Supreme Court held that the c ounty commission did notabuse its authority , viewingthe ca se as “involving the power

of the c ommissi on to approve the sherif f’s budg et rather than the power of the sherif f to hire de puties.” I d. at 484. Al a bama sh e ri ff s a re e le c te d b y

c ounty vo te rs , th e ir

bu dg e ts a

re pa id f ro m c ounty

fu nd s, 45 and their jurisdiction is limit ed to the borde rs of their r espec tive counties. The Supre me Court found these f

actor s insufficient to establish county control over

sheriff s and dec ided that Alabama sheriff s act for and re prese nt the State in their law e nforc ement duties. See Mc Milli an v. Monroe County , 520 U.S. 781, 791 (1997) (“ The c ounty ’s pay ment of the sher iff’s sa lary does n o ttra n s l at e i n t o co n tro l o v er [ th e s h er i ff

] , s i n ce th e c o un ty

n ei th er h as th e au th o ri ty

t o ch an ge his salary nor the discr etion to refuse pay ment completely .”). The Supreme Court conc luded that the ability of the c ounty

g overningbody

to reduc e the she riff’ s budg et as longas the budg et rema ins reasona

ble re sults in “attenuated a nd indirect influenc e over the sherif

f’s ope rations.” Se e id. at 79 1- 92 . A lth ou g h th e ana ly sis re qu ir e d o n th e El e ve nth Am e ndme nt q

ue sti on is dif fe re nt f ro m th at f or a § 1 98 3 p oli c y

make r c la im, the iss ue of c ontr ol u nd e r s tate law i s a re le va nt f a c tor to b oth inq uir ie s. After noting that Ala

bama law cut both way s, the Supreme Court in McMillian conclude d that Alabama

sheriff s act for the State of Ala

bama, not the c ounty , and then made this apt ob se rv atio n a

bo ut A la bama law, wh ic h a

pp lie s e qu a lly

to G e or g ia

law r e gulatin gits sh e ri ff s: “We ar e not, of c ourse, pr edictingthat state law w ill alway s speak with per fec t clarity . . . . I t may not be possible to draw a

n eleg ant line that will resolve this conundrum.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 79 3 ( qu oti ngPa

pr otn ik, 48 5 U .S. at 12 5, 12 6- 27 ). Th is c a se e xemp lif ie s th at axiom, and

it a lso explains why

we na rrowly decide only

that Geor g ia sherif

fs in their off

icial ca pacity act f or the State in establishing f

orce policy

in the county

jail and in trainingand disciplining the ir deputies in that reg ard. 38 furthe r pr ev en ts c ount ie s f ro m takin g any

a ct iona ff

ec tin g any

e le ct ive c ounty of fic e o r th e p ers on ne l t he reo f. Ga. Con st . art . IX, § 2 , ¶ 1(c )(1 ). Paym en t of

S he ri ff P et er son’ s bu dge t, w he n r equir ed by the S ta te , doe s no t es ta bli sh any c ontro l by

Cl inc h C ounty

ove r his f

or ce pol ic y

a t the j ai l or

howhe tr ai ns and d isc ipl ine s de put ie s. B y vir tue of S ta te m an da te s, both st at e an d 45
co unty f unds a re inv olv ed

in the part ic ular func tio ns i n is sue . T his state inv olv em en t i s su ff

ic ie nt t o ti lt the thi rd

f ac tor of the E le ve nthA m en dm en t
a n a l ys i s t o w a r di mm

u n i t y.39

D. Liability for and P aym ent of Ad verse Judgm ents T he f ourth f ac tor is the sourc e of

the f unds that w ill pay

a ny a dve rs e j udgm en t a ga ins t S he ri ff P et er son in h is o ff

ic ia l c ap ac ity
. B ef

or e ap ply ing thi s fa ct or , w e dis cu ss thr ee r ec en t c as es a ddr es sin g it
. In He ss v. Port Autho rity Tr ans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S . 30, 35-39 (199 4), the S upr em e Co urt de nie d E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty to anint er state railw ay -port authority , c reate d und er the U .S . C onsti tutio n’ s Interstate Com pact Cl au se and c ontro lle d by the f ed er al gov er

nm en t and tw o st at es . B ec au se the federa l governm ent was one of the “ m ultip le cre ator-controllers, ” the five-j ustice
m aj or ity in H es s c onc lud ed

that the state s ha d c ed ed aportio n of

the ir sov er ei gnty to Congress and th at having th e “ Com pact Clause” e ntityrespond in federal court did no t affr ont “ the dign ity ” of the states. Id. at 47. H ess further c onclud ed that

“ both le ga lly

a nd p ra ct ic al ly ” ne ith er

state w as obl igate d to pay a ny j udgm en t ag ai nst the e nti ty . I d. a t 51 -5 2. R athe r, the e nti ty w as f inanc ia lly ind ep en de nt,
w ithf unds f ro m pr ivate inv es tor s, tol ls, f ee s, a nd i nve stm en t i nc om e. I d. a t 36 , 49-50. Although weighing this so urce-of -paym ent factor heavily , H ess never sugg ests that for E leventh Am endm ent im m unitya state tre asury

drain is required per se and H ess notes that “ current E leventh Am endm ent j urisprudenceI t is at th e outse t of its op ini on

in H e ss t hat th e Sup re me Court

dis c us se s “ c ur

re nt” 46 El e ve nth Am e ndme nt j ur isp ru de nc e and its e mph a sis on

“ the int e g ri ty

re ta ine d b y

e a c h St ate in our f e de ra l sy ste m.” He ss, 51 3 U .S. at 39 . T he El e ve nth Am e ndme nt’ s r ole his tor ic a lly wa s to protec t the State’s trea sury from fe dera l courts forc ing the State to repa y war debts. I d. The Court in H e ss d isc us se d th e state tr e a sury fa c tor but on ly a ft e r f ir st c on c lud ingthat “ [s]uit in fe de ra l c ourt

is n ot a n a ff ro nt t o th e dignit

y of a Com pa c t Cla us e e nti ty , f

or the fe de ra l c ourt , in relation to such an enter

prise, is hardly

the instrument of a distant, disconne cted sove reign; rathe r, the fe de ra l c ourt

is o rd a ine d b y

on e of the e nti ty ’s fo un de rs .” I d. at 41 . T he Sup re me Court continued its focus on the importanc e of the sovere ign integrity of the State unde r the Eleventh Ame ndment and pointed out why the States’ integ rity

was not compromised when a C o mp ac tC l au s e e nt i ty

i s s u edi nfe d er al co urt , s t at i n g: Nor is the integ rity

of the c ompactingStates compromised whe n the Compact Clause entity

is sued in fede ral c ourt. As par t of the fe dera l plan presc ribed by the Constit ution, the States ag ree d to the power sharing , coordination, and unified action that ty

pify Compact Clause cr eations. Ag ain, the fe dera l tribunal cannot be reg arde d as alien in this cooper ative, trig overnme ntal arr ang ement. I d. at 41 -4 2. Th e Sup re me Court fu rt he r s tr e sse d th at “ fe de ra l c ourt s a re no t a lie n to a

bis tate entity Congr ess par

ticipated in cr eating .” I d. at 47. The Court in Hess foc used on the state tr easur y fac tor, but only

afte r it conclude d that the so ve re ig n inte g ri ty

of the State wa s n ot i mpl ic ate d whe n a Com pa c t Cla us e e nti ty is s ue d in fe de ra l c ourt . In s tark

c ontr a st, be c a

us e sh e ri ff

s a c t f or and re pr e se nt t

he State , n ot t

he c ounty , in promulg atingforc e policy at the jail, the State’s integrity is heavily

involved in this case. 40 em pha siz es the int eg ri ty

r et ai ne d by

e ac h S ta te in our

f ed er al sy ste m . ” H es s, 513 U . S. a t 39
. 46 T he f oc us o f the S upr em e Co urt i n R eg en ts o f the U niv er sity of Ca lif or nia
v. D oe , 519 U . S. 425 , 430 -3 1 ( 1997 ), w as on “pot en tia l l eg al li ab ili ty ” an d “ the risk of adverse j udgm ents,” a s oppo sed to requiring th at state funds actually pay t h e ju d g men t . I n R e g e n t s , th e f e d e r a l g o v e rn men ti n d e mn i f i e das t a t e u n i v e r s i t y, an d th e lit igatio n ha d “ no i m pa ct ” on the state tr ea sur

y . I d. N ev er

the le ss, the Su p re m e C o u rtd et er m i n ed th at th i s fu l l i n d emn i t y d i dn o taf fe ct th e u n i v er s i t y’ s im m uni ty . I d. T he S upr em e Co urt e m pha siz ed that “ [t ] he E le ve nthA m en dm en t pr ote ct s th e St at e fr om

the r isk of a dve rs e j udgm en ts e ve n th oughthe S ta te m ay beOther tha n Reg ents and He ss, the only other re cent Supre me Court discussion of the 47
“ arm of the State ” do c tr ine in t

he El e ve nth

Am e ndme nt c onte xt is a

fo otn ote in Aue r v . Ro bb ins , 519 U.S. 452 (1997). In Auer , the Supreme Court c oncluded that the St. L ouis Boar d of Police Commi ssioners was not a n arm of the state: althoug h the Gover nor appointed f

our of the f

ive members, “ the city

of St. L ouis is responsible for the boa rd’s fina ncial liabilities” and “ the boar d is n ot s ub je c t to the State ’s dir e c tio n o r c ontr ol i n a ny oth e r r e sp e c t.” I d. at 45 6 n .1 . In c ontr a st to Aue r, Clin c h Co unty

is n ot l ia ble fo r S he ri ff

Pe te rs on ’s a c ts, is n ot r e qu ir e d to pa y jud g me nts a g a ins t th e She ri ff

, a nd the State dir e c ts a

nd c ontr ols the She ri ff

in m any re sp e c ts. 41 indem nified by a third party ,” and “ it is the entity ’ s potenti al legal liability , r ather than it s a bil ity or ina bil ity to re qui re athi rd

party to re im bur se it , or

to dis ch ar ge the li ab ili ty

in the f ir st i nst an ce , that i s r el ev an t. ” I d. a t 43 1. 47 Ther eafte r, this Court appli ed these principles in Shands Te aching Hospital
an d C lin ic s, I nc . v. Be ec h S tr ee t C or p. , gr an tin g im

m uni ty to pr ivate c or

por at ion s that c ontra ct ed

w iththe state to adm ini ste r its he al th i nsur an ce pr ogr am a nd t o provide a network of m edical services. 208 F.3d at 1310-11, 1313
. W e stated that

“ al tho ugh the se a re pr ivate c or por at ion s th at

a re ne ith er

c ontro lle d no r funde d by the state , the y

a re pr ote ct ed

by gov er nm en ta l i m

m uni ty w he n th ey

a re c le ar ly
ac tin g a s a ge nts of

the state . ” I d. a t 13 11. N oti ng tha t othe r ci rc uit s ha d no t ad opt ed a n a ppr oa chof

tot al or no i m m uni ty , S hands loo ke d to the r el ie f soug ht
an d w he the r the j udgm en t a ga ins t the pr ivate c or por at ion“ w oul d im

pli cate the st at e tr eas ury

or i nt erfe re wi th th e ad m in is tra ti on of [ a] sta te . . . pr og ram .” Id
. G ive n th at

the S ta te c oul d be sue d f or the ne gli ge nc e of

the a ge nt c or

por at ion s in unt im el y pay ing c la im s, w e de te rm ine d th at the j udgm en t a ga ins t the pr ivateWay ne County

B d. of Comm’ rs v. War

re n, 23 6 G a . 1 50 , 1 52 (1 97 6) (c on c lud ingthat a 48 county has no liability

for the violations of the c ivil rights of a ny person by

a county sheriff ); B ro wn , 2 21 Ga . App . at 20 1 ( re ve rs ingde nia l of summa ry jud g me nt f

or Pe a c h Co unty

be c a us e the Pe a c h Co unty

sh e ri ff , n ot P e a c h Co unty , w a s th e pr op e r p art y to s ue and

no tin gthat de puty sheriff s “we re e mploy ees of

the sherif

f and not Pea ch County ”); L owe v. Jones County , 231 Ga. Ap p . 3 7 2 , 3 7 3 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ( c o n c l u d i n g“ d e p u ty s h e r i f f s ar e e mp l o ye e s o f

th e s h e r i f

f , n o tth e c o un ty, and the c ounty

cannot be held vicar iously liable as their pr incipal”) ; Pettus v. S mith, 174 Ga. App. 587, 588 (1985) ( aff irming summar

y judgme nt for county

board of commissioners and c on c lud ing , “ [a]s the c ounty c omm iss ion e rs ha d n o c ontr ol o ve r t he of fi c ia l dutie s o f t

he de puty sheriff . . . , they had no duty

to determine whether

a hig h-spee d drivingcourse rathe r than a defe nsive drivingcourse was re asonably require d to be supplied to deputy sheriff s”); Chadwic k v. Stewart, 94 Ga . App. 329, 329-30 (1956)
. 42 co rp or at ion s “ w oul d im

pli cate state f

unds ” an d th at

the pr ivate c or

por at ion s w oul d ind em nif y the state w as im

m at er ia l. I d. a t 13 13. Appl y ing the se pr inc ipl es to thi s c as e, w e fi rs t de te rm ine that un de r G eo rg ia lawCl inc h C ounty

w oul d no t pay

adam ag es aw ar d a ga ins t S he ri ff P et er son. G eo rg iac ourts s pe ak

w ithunanim ity

in co nc lud ing that a

de fe ndant c ounty

c an not be held liable for the tortious action s or m iscondu ct of the sheriff or his deputi es an d is not r equir ed to pay the r es ult ing j udgm en ts. L ike w ise , G eo rg iac ourts 48 have concluded th at counties are not liable for, and not required to giv e sheriff s m one y to pay , j udgm en ts a ga ins t sh er if fs in ci vil r igh ts a ct ion s. S ee W ay ne Co unty Bd
. of Co m m ’ rs v. W ar

re n, 236 G a. 150 , 152 ( 1976 ) (“ [A ] c ounty ha s no l i ab i l i t y i n c o n n e c t i o n wi t h th e v i o l a t i o n s o f th e c i v i l r i g h t s o f

a n y p e r s o n b y a co unty of fi ce r. ”)
. T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt i n W ar re n qu ote d aG eo rg iastatut e statin g th at

“ [a ] c ounty

is not li ab le to sui t f

or a ny c au se of a ct ionunl es s m ad e soThe statute quoted in Warr en is forme r Ge org ia Code § 23-1502 ( 1933), which is now 49 O
. C
. G
. A
. § 3 6
- 1
- 4
. In th e s u b s e qu e n td e c i s i o n

o f C h ath amC o un ty C o m m i s s i o n e r s v . R um ar y, 253 Ga. 60 ( 1984), the Ge org ia Supreme Court he ld that the Chatham County Boa rd of Commi ssioners was r equire d to pay a judg ment ag ainst a deputy sheriff for da mag es in an automobile collision because Chatham County ’s own Code provide d for the de fense of the de puty at tr ia l and

pa y me nt o f f ina l ju dg me nts awa

rd e d in c ourt s. I d. at 60 -6 1. Th e Ge or g ia Supreme Court empha siz ed that “[t]he nature of the [county ] Board’ s liabilit y here is not that of responde at superior

[for the deputy

sheriff ’s ac ts] , but exi sts solely

by virtue of its voluntary

and self-imposed oblig ation to provide indemnification for the ac ts of its employ ees c ommitt ed duringthe per formanc e of the ir duties.” I d. at 61. No evide nce in this ca se sug g ests that Clinch County voluntarily

has agree d to provide indemnification to S heriff Peterson or his deputies. Fur ther, the Supre me Court has instructed that indemnification does not re move the cloak of immunit y . Reg ents, 519 U.S. at 430-31. Hay wood v. Hug hes, 238 Ga . 668 (1977), ha s been c ited for the pr oposition t hat 50 counties, by

statute, are authorized to pay for the she riff’ s leg al costs in civil rig hts suits by third pa rt ie s a g a ins t sh e ri ff

s. Se e O. C.G .A . § 45 -9 -2 1. In H ay wo od , h ow e ve r, the Ge or g ia Sup re me Court e mph a size d th at th e statut e a uth or ize s c ounti e s to do so “ in t he ir dis c re tio n” and

“ g ive [s] the county

considera

ble latitude in deter

mining what actions will be defe nded.” I d. at 669 (c iting Ga . Co de Ann. § 8 9- 94 5, wh ic h is no w O .C. G. A. § 4 5- 9- 21 ). In H ay wo od , th e Gl a sc oc k Co unty Commi ssioners adopted a policy to pay attorney ’s fe es in two specif ic suits ag ainst the sheriff
. I d. Hay wood demonstrate s that Clinch Count y is not required to pa

y the sherif

f’s attorney ’s fe es unless it elects to do so. 43 by statut e. ” I d. a t 15 1 ( quot at ionm ar ks o m itt ed ). T hus, by

statut e, the c ounty 49
w as not li ab le
. I n a ddi tio n, the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt c onc lud ed that “ the re is no duty of the c ounty

to furn ishthe she ri ff

w ithm one y

to se ttl e a ci vil r igh ts j udgm en t e nte re d a ga ins t hi m . ” I d. a t 15 2. 50 Although Clinch Countyis not required to pay and althoug h Sheriff Pe te rs on arg ue s th at

“ the ‘ le ga l l ia

bil ity ’ f or she ri ff s inG eo rg iar es ts w iththe S ta te of G eo rg ia , not

ind ivi dua l c ount ie s, ” w e can lo cate no G eo rg ialawe xpr es sly
re qui ri ng the S ta te to pay a n a dve rs e j udgm en t a ga ins t S he ri ff P et er son in h is of fi ci al c ap ac ity
. S he ri ff

P et er son thu s a

ppare ntl y w oul d have to pay

a ny a dve rs e fe de ra l c ourt j udgm en t a ga ins t hi m in his of fi ci al c ap ac ity

out of the bud ge t of

theHess say s that the state tre asury fac tor is a “c ore c oncer

n” of Ele venth Amendment 51 jurisprudenc e. 513 U.S. at 51. It is true that the pre sence of a state trea sury drain a lone may trig g er Ele venth Amendment immunity and make consideration of the other f actor s unnece ssary . Thus , th is i s why

so me de c isi on s f

oc us on the tr e a sury

fa c tor . I f t

he State fo ote d th e e nti re bil l here , there would be no issue to dec ide. Th e El e ve nth

Am e ndme nt, ho we ve r, do e s n ot t ur n a bli nd e y e to t he state ’s so ve re ig nty sim ply be c a us e the state tr e a sury

is n ot d ir e c tly

a ff e c te d. Mo re ov e r, the Un ite d St ate s Su pr e me Court has neve r said that the a bsence of the tre asury

fac tor alone de feats imm unity and pre cludes consideration of other fa ctors, such a s how state law de fines the e ntity or what deg ree of control the State has ove r the e ntity . As mentioned ea rlier, a lthough the state trea sury was not af

fec ted, the Hess Court spent c onsiderable time pointing out how that lawsuit in fede ral c ourt did not aff ect the dignity

of the two States bec ause the y had ce ded a pa

rt of their sove reignty

to the fede ral g overnme nt as one of the cre ator-c ontrollers of the Compac t Clause entity in issue. I f the state-tre asury -dra in element we re a lway s determinative in itself, this discussion, as well as the other c ontrol discussion, would have bee n unnece ssary . See supra note 46. 44 sheriff’ s office. In turn, this paym ent would reduce his budg et, and the practical reality is that Sheriff

Peter son m

ust recoup that m oney

from som ew here. If

a signi ficant adverse j udgm ent occurs, both countyand state funds are im plicated be ca use S he ri ff

P et er son w oul d ne ed

to se ek agr eate r tot al bud ge t f

ro m the c ounty fo r his of fi ce a nd a gr eate r da ily

r at e fr om the S ta te f

or f el ony of fe nde rs se rv ing th ei r st at e se nt en ces in th e co un ty j ai l. Ne ver has the Suprem e Court re quired an actual drain on the state treasury
as ape r se c ondi tio n of

E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty . S ee Re ge nts of

the 51 Uni v. o f Cal . v. Do e, 51 9 U.S. 4 25 ; Hes s, 5 13 U.S. 30 ; Sh an ds , 20 8 F .3d13 08
. T his is be ca

use the E le ve nthA m en dm en t “ is r oot ed in a re co gni tio n th at

the St at es , a lth oughauni on, m ai nta in c er ta in attr ibu te s of

sov er ei gnty , ” an d apur

pose of the E leventh Am endm ent is to “ accord[] the States the r espect owe d them as m em be rs of the f ed er at ion ” an d no t t o a ff

ro nt the “ dig nity ” or

“ int eg ri ty ” of

astateNe ve r b e fo re ha s th is C ourt dis c us se d o r d e c ide d e n b anc the pa rt ic ula r i ssu e in t

his 52 case . We think that no panel actua lly has dec ided the question bef ore this ca se. In prior § 1983 c a se s, we me re ly

a c c e pte d o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity su its a g a ins t G e or g ia

sh e ri ff s a s su its a g a ins t th e ir respe ctive counties. See , e.g ., Alexander v. F ulton Count y , 207 F.3d 1303, 1322 n.14 ( 11th Cir. 2000); Way

ne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 1999). In these c ases, we did not decide whether , under G eorg ia law, she riffs a re a g ents for the State or the c ounties, and it does not appea r the pa rties ra ised the question. To the e x tent that our prior de cisions state or imply that Geor g ia sherif

fs ac t for counties r eg ardingthe par ticular func tions in i ssue–forc e policy and trainingand disciplining of deputies in that reg ard–w e over rule those de cisions. We a re min df ul o f t he Sup re me Court ’s ins tr uc tio n th at, b e fo re re a c hin gan E le ve nth 53 Amendment issue, a c ourt should addre ss “the question [of] whether the statute itself pe rmits the cause of ac tion it create s to be asser ted ag ainst States.” Ver

mont Age ncy

of Nat. Res. v. United State s e x re l. S te ve ns , 5 29 U. S. 7 65 , 7 79 (2 00 0) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . I f s he ri ff s in the ir officia l capa city

are arms of the state whe n exercisingcer tain functions, then an issue a rises whether Mander s’s § 1983 suit is subj ect to dismissal on the independe nt gr ound that they are not “per sons” for pur

poses of § 1983. See Wil l v. Michiga n Dep’ t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). This statutory

issue, howeve r, is not before us as it was neither briefe d nor ar gued on appea l. 45 by r equir ing astate to re spon d to law sui ts i n f ed er al c ourts. H es s, 513 U . S. a t 39
- 40 ( ci ta tio n and quot at ionm ar ks o m itt ed ). “ [C ] ur

re nt E le ve nthA m en dm en t j urisprudence em

phasizes the integrityretained by each S tate in our federa l sy ste m . ” I d. a t 39
. T he S ta te ’ s “ int eg ri ty ” is n ot l im ite d to w ho f oot s th e bil l, a nd, at a m inim

um , the liability -for- adverse-j udgm ent factor does not defeat S heriff P e t e r s o n ’s i mmu n i t y c l a i m. V. C ONC LUS ION Having applied the Eleventh Am endm ent factors, we conclude that Sheriff Pe te rs on i n hi s of

fi ci al c ap ac ity

is ana rm of the S ta te , not

Cl inc h C ounty , in
es ta bli shi ng u se -o f- fo rc e pol ic y a t the j ai l and i n tr ai nin g and d isc ipl ini ng h is de put ie s inthat r eg ar d. T he re fo re , S he ri ff P et er son is e nti tle d to E le ve nth 52 Am endm ent im

m unityin this case. W e need not answer , and do not answer, 53I t has bee n sug g ested that the she riff’ s office is an independe nt, constituti onal, elec ted 54 of fi c e that is ne ith e r t

he State no r t

he c ounty . ( Di sse nt, An de rs on , J., p. 53 ). Thro ugho ut t his litigation the par

ties have br iefe d and fr amed the le g al issue in this case solely as whe ther Sherif

f Peterson in his officia l capa city acts on be half of the State or Clinch County in the context of the E l e v e n thA m e n dm e n t . T hu s , w e d e c i d e th atc o n tr o v e r s y . N o o th e r i s s u e i s b e f

o r e u s . In addition, while we a g ree that the sherif f’s off ice is indepe ndent from a nd not controlled by

the county , we c onclude today only that the sherif

f ac ts for the State in per formingthe par ticular functions at issue in this case. 46 tod ay w he the r Sh er if

f Pe te rs on w ears a“ state ha t” f or a ny oth er f unc tio ns h e pe rf orm s. W e co nc lud e onl y that he doe s a s to the li m ite d f unc tio ns at i ssu e in this case. The f irst two fa ctors we igh heavilyin favor of im m unity , and the thi rd fa ct or ti lts that w ay

a s w el l. S he ri ff

s’ dut ie s and f

unc tio ns are de ri ve d di re ct ly fr om the S ta te , pe rf

orm ed f or the S ta te , a nd c ontro lle d by the S ta te . T he S ta te of G eo rg iaha s e xe rc ise d it s m an ag er ia l pr er oga tiv e: ( a) to inc ar ce rate state of fe nde rs , pr etri al a nd p ost -c onvi ct ion , in co unty j ai ls, am ong oth er

loc at ion s; ( b) to as sig n she ri ff s c er ta in s pe ci fi c state f

unc tio ns i n lawe nf

or ce m en t, state c ourts, a nd
co rr ec tio ns, inc lud ing m ak ing she ri ff s inc harg e of

state of fe nde rs in co unty

j ai ls; (c ) to c ontro l sh er if

fs ’ dut ie s, tr ai n sh er if

fs in tho se dut ie s, a nd d isc ipl ine she ri ff s; (d ) to p re cl ude a ny

c ounty c ontro l ov er

she ri ff s bu t no ne the le ss r equir e co unt ie s to fund the j ai l stru ct

ur e an d sh er if

fs ’ bud ge ts; a nd ( e) f

or the S ta te to pay

f or she ri ff s’ tr ai nin g and d isc ipl ine , a s w el l a s c er ta in s ta te of

fe nde rs in the c ounty j ai l. G ive n th es e pr inc ipl es of G eo rg ialaw , w e co nc lud e that sh er if fs a ct f or the State, not coun ties, as to the functions in iss ue. 5447

A s to the f

ina l f ourth f ac tor in the E le ve nthA m en dm en t ana ly sis , a lth ough the S ta te a nd the c ounty

a re not r equir ed to pay a n a dve rs e j udgm en t a ga ins t the she ri ff , both c ounty

a nd s ta te f

unds ind ir ec tly

a re im pli cate d. I n any

e ve nt, the State’ s sovereigntyand thus it s integrity rem ain directly

aff ected w hen federa l court lawsuits interfer e w ith a state program or function. A t a m inim um , this final f a c t o r d o e s n o td e f

e a ti mm u n i t y. Ac co rd i n g l y, we r ev er s e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s o rd erd en yin g Sh er i ff Pe t er s o n ’s
m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t and r em an d th is c as e to the dis tr ic t c ourt f or pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w iththi s op ini on. REVERSED AND REMANDED.48

A N D E RS O N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng, in w hic h T JO FL A T , BI RC H , a nd W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge s, j oin : I re spe ct fu lly

dis se nt. I sub m it that the opi nio n f or the c ourt m isa

ppl ie s th e ap pr opr ia te E le ve nthA m en dm en t ana ly sis
. I n m y j udgm en t, the m ost

f av or ab le fa ce that the she ri ff

m igh t pu t onthi s c as e w oul d pa int thi s c as e as sim ilar to H es s v. Port Autho rity

Tr ans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S . 30, 115 S.Ct. 394 (199 4). In H es s, the “ [i ] ind ic at or s of im m uni ty or the abse nc e the re of

do n ot . . . a ll poi nt the
sa m e w ay , ” id. a t 44 , 115 S
. Ct
. a t 40 2. I n th is c as e, the f oll ow ing im

m uni ty ind ic at or s po int

a ga ins t E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty : the she ri ff

’ s ge ogr ap hic lim itation to a single county , the sherif f’ s accountabilityto the electorate of a sin gle c ounty , the state c onst itu tio n’ s tr eatm en t of she ri ff s a s c ounty

of fi ce rs a nd not a s st at e of

fi ci al s, the state ' s de le ga tio n of br oa d po lic ym ak ing auto nom y to the she ri ff a s op pose d to r et ai nin g hands- on c ontro l, a nd the f ac t tha t the state ha s no le ga l l ia bil ity a nd n o po te nti al le ga l l ia bil ity w ithr es pe ct

to j udgm en ts a ga ins t a sheriff. As in H ess, the f unction s of the sheriff “ are not readily classified as ty pically state or unquestio nably

local.” Id. at 45, 115 S. Ct. at 403. Both states
an d m uni ci pa lit ie s e nga ge in lawe nf or ce m en t a ct ivi tie s, a nd i n part ic ular in the j ai lin g f unc tio n.Withre sp e c t to the fi rs t in dic ator – h owthe state de fi ne s th e She ri ff ’s Of fi c e wi th 1 respe ct to the jail function – I ag ree with most of what J udg e B arke tt say s in her dissent. See Ba rkett, J., di ssenting, at Part I . Wit h respe ct to the third indicator – the sour ce of defe ndant’s funding– Iag ain agree with most of what J udg e B arke tt has written. I d. at Part I I I . Wit h respe ct to the fourth indicator

– the state’s liability

for a dverse judgme nts – no one has sug g ested that the state wo uld

be lia ble , a nd thu s th is m os t im

po rt ant f a c tor , th is c or e c on c e rn

of the El e ve nth Am en dm en t , p o i n t s s tro n gl y aga i n s ti m mun i ty . Ino th er wo rd s , Iagr ee wi thm o s to f w h atJ u d ge Ba rkett has wr itten, but Ispecific ally decline to join her

implication that the county g overning body would bear

§1983 liability

for a ctions of the sher iff. All we ne ed dec ide in this case is that the sherif f is not an ar

m of the state; we need not de cide the c ounty ’s liability vel non. Ultimately , Ibelieve e ven the c ontrol fac tor fails to offe r much support for the 2 majority position. The control exercised by the state is simply

too indirect and too limited. See brief disc ussion below, and the f uller discussion in Ba

rkett, J., di ssenting, Par

t I I . 49 Inm y j udgm en t, the se co nd E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty f ac tor – c ontro l – is the onl y

one of the f our ind ic at or s that m igh t pr ovi de som e supp ort f or the 1
m aj or ity pos iti on. E ve n a ssu m ing argu en do that there ar e im m unityindicators 2 poi nti ng i n di ff

er en t di re ct ion s, the S upr em e Co ur t ha s gi ve n us c le ar

gui danc e in
suc h si tuatio ns: “ Whe n in dic at or s of im m uni ty poi nt i n di ff

er en t di re ct ion s, the E le ve nthA m en dm en t’ s tw in r ea sons f or be ing r em ai n our pr im e gui de
. ” H es s, 513 U . S. a t 47 , 115 S
. Ct
. a t 40 4. T he f ir st o f the tw in r ea sons a ske d w he the r it
w oul d be “ dis re spe ct fu l” or a“ thr eat t o th e dig nity ” of the state to re qui re the state to answer the c om

plaint in feder al court. Of course, it is well established that an identical claim

against a city

or a c ount y

– i.e. , Manders’ § 1983 excessive force cl ai m f or vio la tin g th e E igh th A m en dm en t by be at ing him

w hil e in j ai l – w oul d not be barr ed

by E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty . I se e no g re at er

thr eat t o th e di gn it y of t he st at e in th e in st an t s ui t ag ai ns t t he Sh eri ff o f Cl in ch Co un ty.FollowingHess, the c ases have uniformly continued to consider

the state tre asury 3 fac tor as dominant. See Vog t v. Boa rd of Comm' rs, 294 F.3d 684, 689 ( 5th Cir. 2002) (following He ss, “ [the ] mos t si gnif

ic ant f a c tor in a sse ssi ngan e nti ty ' s st atus is whe the r a jud g me nt a g a ins t it will be paid with state funds” ) (c itation omit ted); Streit v. County of L os Ang eles, 236 F .3d 552, 56 7 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 1) (a

pp lyingHe ss, wh e the r s tate is f ina nc ia lly lia ble fo r j ud g me nt a g a ins t sheriff ' s office for ope ration of c ounty jail is “the most important factor in identify ing a n arm of the state” ); Har

ter v. Ve rnon, 101 F .3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996) (obse rving , in holding that North Carolina she riff a

nd deputies ar e not immune, that “whe n the state tre asury will not pay

the judgme nt ... the most salient factor in Ele venth Amendment de cisions weig hs ag ainst a findingof immunit y”) ( internal quotes omitted); Sonnenfe ld v. Denver , 100 F.3d 744, 749 ( 10th Cir. 1996) (c iti ngHe ss, “ [t]he mos t im po rt ant f a c tor in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty

is entitled to Eleventh Amendme nt immuni ty is whether a

judgme nt ag ainst it would be paid from the state tre asury .”); Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 54 F .3d 1140, 1145, 1149-50 (3rd Cir. 1995) ( quoting He ss, “the most important fac tor is whether a judg ment ag ainst the entity in question ... would be paid out of the state trea sury ,” and holdingthat there was no Eleventh Ame ndment immunit y despite consider able state control) ( internal quotes omitted).

50 T he se co nd o f the tw in r ea sons w hic h th e Su pr em e Co urt i n H es s he ld shou ld g uid e us i s w ha t the S upr em e Co urt c hara ct er iz ed a s “ the im

pe tus f or the E le ve nthA m en dm en t: the pr ev en tio n of f ed er al -c ourt j udgm en ts tha t m ust be pa id out of aS ta te ’ s tr ea sur

y . ” I d. a t 48 , 115 S
. Ct
. a t 40 4 ( em pha sis a dde d)
. T he Su pr em e Co urt a lso c hara ct er iz ed thi s st at e tr ea sur

y f ac tor a s “ the E le ve nth Am endm ent’ s core concer n,” id. at 51, 115 S. Ct. at 406, and cited with approval the fact that the vast m aj ority of the circ uits have conclu ded that the state treasury fa ct or is “ the m ost

im portant f ac tor ” to b e co nsi de re d. I d. a t 49 , 115 S
. Ct
. a t 40 5. 3 Inappl y ing thi s ana ly sis , the S upr em e Co urt e xpr es sly dis co unt ed

the sig nif ic an ce of the c ontro l f

ac tor , statin g inr el ev an t part : Bu t ul tim at e co ntr ol o f ev er y state -c re at ed

e nti ty r es ide s w iththe St at e, fo r th e St at e m ay

de st ro y or r es hape an y

un it itcrea te s. “ [P ] oli tic al sub div isi ons ex ist sol el y a t the w him

a nd b eh es t of

the ir St at e, ” y et

c iti es a nd c ount ie s do not e nj oy E le ve nthA m en dm en t imm un it y .51

Id. at 47, 115 S.Ct. at 404 (citation om itted). E ven m ore significant, the Court he ld: Mor eo ve r, r en de ri ng c ontro l di spos iti ve doe s no t ho m e in o n th e im petus for the Eleventh A m endm ent: the prevention of feder al-court ju d g men t s th a tmu s tb e p a i do u to f aS t a t e ’s tr e a s u ry. Id
. a t 48 , 115 S
. Ct
. a t 40 4. T he f ac t tha t the c ontro l f

ac tor w as dis co unt ed

in H es s is particularly

significant for the instant case because the state control in Hess w as m uc h m or e dir ec t and s ign if ic an t than th e co ntr ol e xe rc isa ble by the state in the ins tant c as e. A t i ssu e in H es s w as the E le ve nthA m en dm en t st at us o f a bi- state port auth or ity
. T he gov er nin g bo dy

of the port auth or ity , tw el ve c om m iss ion er s, w er e ap poi nte d, six by

e ac h st at e. I d. a t 36 , 115 S
. Ct
. a t 39 9. A ny vot e or a ct ion by the co m

m is si on ers was s ub

ject t o a ve to by the go ve rn orth ei r res pe ct iv e st at es . Id . at 3 7, 1 15 S.Ct . at 3 99 . Oth er co nt ro l was ex erci sabl e b y th e st at e le gi sl atur es . Id . In Hes s, i n o th er wo rd s, t he re was di rect co nt ro l o ve r an y an d a ll de ci si on s. On the other hand, the state control in th e instant case is clear ly indirect. It inc lud es de le ga tio ns o f au tho ri ty ; i t pr ovi de s f or ge ne ra l st an dard s and ins pe ct ion s; i t r es er

ve s f or the G ove rn or

the pow er

to te m por ar ily sus pe nd a she ri ff f or spe ci fi ed m isc ondu ct

or inc ap ac ity , a nd p ar

tic ipatio n inthe pr oc es s of
re m ova l f ro m of fi ce , a ga in f

or spe ci fi ed m isc ondu ct

or inc ap ac ity
. Mo re ove r, the state c ontro l i n th e ins tant c as e is e ith er e qua lly appl ic ab le to ci ty

a nd c ounty

j ai ls,
or a na log ous to s ta te c ontro l ov er oth er loc al of fi ce rs . I n sh ort, the state c ontro lJ ustice O' Connor' s dissent in Hess would have pla ced greater we ight on the 4 c ontr ol f a c tor , b ut o nly

on “ re a l, i mme diate c ontr ol a nd ov e rs ig ht, rathe r t

ha n o n th e po te nti a lity of a State taking a ction to seize the reins.” See id. at 62, 115 S.Ct . at 411 (O' Connor, J ., dissenting) . I t is doubtful that the state' s control in the instant case would satisfy J ustice O' Connor' s standard.

Although the control fa ctor is re levant both in the policy maker inquiry for § 1983 5 purposes a

nd in the Eleventh Ame ndment inquiry , control is a more signific ant fa ctor in the § 1983 inquiry . Compare Tur quitt v. J eff erson County , Alabama , 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 ( 11 Cir. th 1998) (e n banc) (“L ocal g overnme nts can ne ver be liable under §1983 for the a cts of those whom the local g overnme nt has no authority to control.”) w ith Hess, 404 U.S. at 47-48, 115 S.Ct. at 404 (discountingthe control fa ctor a s above discusse d). F or this rea son, as well as the primacy for the El e ve nth

Am e ndme nt o f t

he state tr e a sury

fa c tor , th e § 1 98 3 c a se law s ho uld be us e d o nly c a uti ou sly in a n E le ve nth

Am e ndme nt a

na ly sis
. Nothing in Reg ents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 117 S.Ct. 900 6 (1997), sug g ests a contr ary result her e. In Doe, the Court f rame d the cor e Eleve nth Amendment qu e s t i o na s w h e th e r

ana dv e r s e j u d g m e n tw o u l d e x p o s e th e s t at e t o “ p o t e n t i a l ” l e g a l l i a b i l i ty, even if some cove rag e mec hanism exi sted to indemnify the state a g ainst actua l liabilit y . I d. at 43 1, 11 7 S. Ct. at 90 4. Th e re is n o s ug g e sti on he re that th e state is l ia

ble fo r j ud g me nts a g a ins t sh e ri ff s in any fa sh ion , r e a l or

po te nti a l. 52 here is prec isely

the kind o f indirect and ultim ate control which the Suprem e Court in Hess discountedas being reserved by the state w ith respect to everystatecreated entity
. Id. at 47, 115 S.Ct. at 404 (“ But ultim ate control of everystatecr eate d e nti ty

r es ide s w iththe S ta te . ”)
. T hus, if state c ontro l w as not

suf fi ci en t t o 4
w ar rant E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty in H es s, I c an not

c onc lud e that i t i s inthe instant case. I r espectfully subm it that the opi nion for the court overe m phasizes 5 the c ontro l f

ac tor a nd unde re m

pha siz es the state tr ea sur y f ac tor . W ithr es pe ct

to the la tte r, it

is cl ear that the state tr ea sur y is not obl igate d to pay

a dve rs e j udgm ents against th e sheriff
. In this respect too, the instant case is even clear er than H es s. 653

Insum , I sub m it that, a t be st, the oth er im m uni ty ind ic at or s po int

in dif fe re nt d ir ec tio ns. A s inH es s, w e shou ld the re fo re loo k to the “ tw in r ea sons ” fo r gui danc e. I sub m it that the se r ea sons poi nt a ga ins t E le ve nthA m en dm en t im m uni ty , a nd i nde ed

m or e str ongl y

so than inH es s. Ina ddi tio n to the ina

ppr opr ia te e m

pha sis dis cu sse d a

bove , I a lso
r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s a g r e e w i t h th e o p i n i o n f o r th e c o urti n a n o t h e r

r e s p e c t . I n my j udgm en t, it

a sks the w ro ng que sti on. I t a sks w ho h as the m ost c ontro l, the state or the county
. I subm it that the proper questio n is whether the sherif f has car ried his bur de n of

pr ovi ng tha t he is ana rm of the state . I n othe r w or ds, the iss ue is not the state ve rs us the c ounty ; r athe r, the iss ue is w he the r the she ri ff is ana rm of the state ve l no n . T he m er e fa ct that the she ri ff

is not the pol ic ym ak er

f or the c ounty co m m iss ion , is not

c ontro lle d by

the c ounty

c om m iss ion , a nd the f

ac t tha t the
co unty ha s no respon de at s upe rio r li ab ili ty f or j udgm en ts a ga ins t the she ri ff , do not , e ith er

sin gly or in co m bin at ion , go v er

y f ar tow ar d e sta

bli shi ng tha t a

G eo rg ia she ri ff is ana rm of the state . T he S ev en th C ir cu it re co gni ze d th is i n F rankl in v
. Zaruba, 150 F. 3d 68 2 (7 Cir. 1998 ). T here, in hold ing th at an Illinois sheriff w as th not e nti tle d to E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty , the c ourt sa id: A cc or din g to de fe ndants , if she ri ff s inI lli noi s are not

a ge nts of the countyfor purposes of holdi ng the coun ty liable under respon de at supe rio r , the n sh er if

fs m ust the re fo re be a ge nts of

the state . T his ar gum en t ov er loo ks a

c ru ci al thi rd

pos sib ili ty

. . . – nam el y , that the sheriff is an a gent of the countysheriff’ s departm ent, an54

ind ep en de ntl y -e le ct ed

of fi ce that i s no t su

bj ec t t o th e co ntr ol o f the co un ty in m os t re sp ect s. Id. at 685. The court held that the fact that “ the countyis not liabl e under
respon de at s upe rio r

for the ac tions of the sheriff does not n ecessar ily

entail that the she ri ff

m ust ne ce ssari ly

be a n a ge nt o f the state . ” I d. a t 68 6. S im ilarl y , in H es s, the re w as no atte m

pt t o a ssi gn r es pons ibi lity f or the bi- state auth or ity

to som e le ve l of

gov er nm en t othe r than th e state . I t w as suf fi ci en t the re , a s it

sho uld be he re, t o s ay

th atde fen da nt is no t an arm of t he st at e. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , I r es pe ct fu lly dis se nt.Thus we and our s ist e r c ir c uit s h ave pr e vio us ly he ld, c or re c tly in my vie w, that c la ims 1 a g a ins t sh e ri ff

s in the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c ity fo r c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns at c ounty ja ils are c la ims ag ainst the rele vant county . See, e.g ., Way ne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 1999) (s tatin gthat ja il i nmate ’s § 1 98 3 “ c la im a g a ins t Sh e ri ff Jar vis in h is o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity is a c la im ag ainst DeKa lb County ”); see also Streit v. County of L os Ang eles, 236 F .3d 552, 564 (9th Cir. 2001); DeG enova v. Sher iff of D uPag e County , 209 F.3d 973, 977 ( 7th Cir. 2000); Doe B y and Throug h Doe v. Washing ton County , 150 F.3d 920, 923- 24 (8th Cir. 1998); Dotson v. Chester, 55 BA RKE T T , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng, in w hic h T JO FL A T , BI RC H , a nd W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge s, j oin , a nd i n w hic h A N D E RS O N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , j oin s in part : W ill ie S an ton io M an de rs sue d C lin chCo unty S he ri ff W ins tonP et er son under 42 U.S .C. § 1983 for inj uries Manders sustained when officer s under Sheriff Peter son’s supervision st ruck him repeatedly

in the face and bashed his head ag ai nst aw al l i n th e Cl inc h C ounty Ja il. A cc or din g to Mande rs ’ s de posi tio n te sti m ony , the be at ing he sus ta ine d up on h is arr iva l a t the c ounty j ai l e ve ntu al ly
re sul te d inhis a dm iss ionto a m en ta l ho spi ta l. In Ge orgia, c ount y

j ails such as the one where Manders w as held are quin tessentially

local institu tions that exist separate and apart from the state's int eg rate d sy ste m

of pr iso ns. T he ir

ope ratio n is a m ong the r es pons ibi lit ie s of the
co unty a nd, spe ci fi ca lly , the c ounty she ri ff
. L ongs tandi ng a

uth or ity c le ar ly
es ta bli she s th at

loc al gov er

nm en ts s uc h a s c ount ie s m ay be he ld l ia

ble und er 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 f

or pol ic ie s th ey

a dopt or c ust om ar y pr ac tic es the y

tol er at e in ope ratin g lo ca l go ve rn m en ta l f ac ili tie s. S ee Jin ks v
. Ri ch land C ounty , 123 S
. Ct
. 1667 , 1673 (2003) (unanim ous op inion ); Monell v. N ewYork C ity De p’ t of Social Servs. , 436 U. S. 658 (197 8). In the past, therefore , plaintiffs such as Manders 1937 F.2d 920, 934 ( 4th Cir. 1991); Blac kburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 571 ( 1st Cir. 1985). 56 co uld be c onf ide nt tha t vi olatio ns o f the ir c onst itu tio na l r igh ts i n c ounty j ai ls
w oul d no t go unr em ed ie d. Today , how ever, the m aj ority badly subverts the law of local governm ental liabilityby

holdi ng that coun ty

sheriffs in G eorgia act f

or the state, and thus are im m une f ro m sui t by ope ratio n of

the E le ve nthA m en dm en t, w he n th ey e xe rc ise pol ic y -m ak ing auth or ity

ove r co unty

j ai ls. I t r ea ch es thi s c onc lus ionby de te rm ini ng tha t e ve n if

S he ri ff P et er son’ s po lic ie s w er e re spon sib le f or inm at e Mande rs ’ s be at ing , P et er son ad opt ed the se pol ic es not

in his r ole a s j ai le r, but

in
carr y ing ou t the previousl y

unkn own “ functions ” of “ establishi ng use-of-force policy at the j ail and . .
. training and d isciplin ing hi s deputies in that regard. ” Ma j or ity O pin iona t 2. Whe n co n fr o n t ed i n th e p as twi t h § 1 9 8 3 cl ai m s b as ed o n a ja i l i n m at e’s treatm ent while in custody , w e have alw ay s defined the relevant function as

“ ope ratin g ac ounty

j ai l. ” S ee T ur qui tt v. Je ff er son Co unty , 137 F . 3d 1 285, 128 8 (1 1thCi r. 199 8) ( enbanc ); se e al so M ar sh v
. Bu tle r Co unty , 268 F . 3d 1 014, 102 8 (1 1thCi r. 200 1) ( enbanc ) (quot ing T ur qui tt) ; L an ca ste r v. Mo nr oe Co unty , 116 F. 3d 1 419, 142 8 ( 1997 ). T his ha s be enour pr ac tic e fo r good

r ea son. T he poi nt o f ide nti fy ing the pe rt ine nt g ove rn m en ta l f unc tio n ine ac h c as e is t o ke ep our an al y sis f oc use d onthe dis cr et e se t of pos iti ve state lawauth or iti es that de fi ne theSince 1863, the Ge org ia Code has pr ovided that sherif fs ar e “Jailers of the c ounties.” 2 Ga. Code § 331 ( 1863). Today , it provides that “sher iffs ar e jailer s of the counties a nd have the aut ho ri ty to app oi ntot her j ail ers , s ub jec t t o t he s up ervi si onof t he co un ty govern in g auth ori ty ." Ga. Code Ann. § 42-4-1( a) ( 1997). More over, it is counties that have the “phy sical custody” of 57 part ic ular ar ea

of of fi ci al r es pons ibi lity

a t i ssu e. C f. Mc Mi lli anv. Mo nr oe County , 520 U. S. 781, 786 (199 7) (re quiring analy sis of the “ particular ar ea” at iss ue a nd c ontra sti ng i t w itha“ cate gor ic al , ‘ al l or nothin g’ ” ap pr oa ch ); Ci ty of S t. L oui s v. P ra

pr otn ik, 485 U . S. 112 , 125 ( 1988 ) (e xpr es sin g c onf ide nc e that st at e law will provide sufficient guidance when inquiry is focused on a “ given area of a loc al gov er

nm en t’ s bu sin es s” ). T his a na lytic al pur pose is ine vit ab ly

f ru str at ed if the notio n of function is con flated w ith what is m ore properly deem ed a genera l attribute of the defendant’ s office, incidental to a range of offic ial functions. Once
ou r in qu iry beco m es ti edto an att rib ut e th atis at i ss ue in a va rie ty of co nt ex ts , we face th e d an ge r of

a sp rawl in g i nq ui ry

sp an ni ng th e who le co rp us of s ta te law. Su chis the c as e he re . A t bo tto m , the m aj or ity ’ s ne w ly inv en te d “ func tio n” is n oth ing m or e than th e she ri ff ’ s law fu l auth or ity

to use f or ce . T his pow er

is i m p l i ca t ed , a ta g re at ero r l es s erd eg re e o f r emo v e, i n v i rt u al l y al l o f a s h er i ff ’s
ar ea s of of fi ci al r es pons ibi lity . I t i s no t a f unc tio n bu t r athe r a ge ne ra l a ttr ibu te of the sheriff’ s office. By defining “ function” in its unprecedented fashion, the m aj ority dispens es with the guidance to be foundin Georgia statutes clearly directing that Sheriff Pe te rs on m an ag es the Cl inc h C ounty Ja il fo r Cl inc h C ounty . I t the n f ai ls t o lo cate 2inmates in their jails and ar e ther efor e bound to “maintain” them, as by furnishing“food, clothing, a

nd any neede d medical a

nd hospital attention.” I d. § 42-5-2( a).

58 an y equa ll y cle ar au th or it y

ad dr es si ng th e que st io n we m us t d eci de to da y . No guid ance is to be found in th e statute identify ing circum stances under which
s h e r i f f s may d e p l o y f

o r c e , b e c au s e th i s e n a c t me n te s t ab l i s h e s o n l y t h a tth e s a me au tho ri ty e xte nds to s ta te a nd l oc al gov er nm en ta l a ct or s a lik e. S ee G a. Co de A nn. § 17 -4 -2 0( d) ( pr ohi bit ing e ith er a“ lawe nf

or ce m en t a ge nc y

of thi s st at e or

of a ny pol iti ca l su

bdi vis ionof

thi s st at e” f

ro m li m iti ng p ea ce of

fi ce rs ’ auth or ity

to use fo rc e) ( em

pha sis a dde d) ; P er

ry v. S ta te , 419 S
. E . 2d 9 22, 924 ( G a. Ct
. App. 199 2) (d efi ni ng sco pe of s he rif

f’s arre st po wer b y

way of Ga . Cod e Ann . § 1 7- 4- 20 ). Instead, the m aj ority

rifles through the rest of the Ge orgia Code, drawing indirect inf er en ce s f ro m statut es a ddr es sin g e ve ry thi ng f ro m r eg istratio n of

ba il- bond
sur et ie s to e xe cu tio n of

c ourt pr oc es s. I n th e co ur se of it s e ff ort t o in te gr at e the se s t a t e l a w s i n t o as o rto f

u n i f i e dth e o ry o f

Ge o r g i as h e r i f

f s , th e maj o r i t y d e p l o ys tw o arg um en ts tha t m iss ta te the lawa nd h av e im pli catio ns o f tr em en dous br ea dth
. Fi rs t, the m aj or ity

sug ge sts that sh er if

fs a re e nti tle d to E le ve nthA m en dm en t im m unitybecause their a

utho rity to use force is confer

red by the state. See Ma j or ity O pin iona t 29
. T his log ic m ar ks a blatant e nd- run aro und our f unc tio nby -f unc tio n a ppr oa ch
. A s th e m aj or ity it se lf poi nts out , she ri ff

s m ay e xe rc ise fo rc e “ in i nit ia l arr es ts, in subd uin g in m at es in se ssi ons of state sup er ior

c ourts, or in que lli ng d isr

upt ive inm at es in co unty

j ai ls. ” I d. I f she ri ff

s are state a ge nts59

sim ply be ca use the ir auth or ity to use f or ce or igi na te s instate law , the n it m ust be the y a ct a s st at e ag en ts whe ne ve r en ga ge d inac ap ac ity that r equir es the de plo ym en t of

f or ce – w hic h is to say , in virtua lly e ve ry f unc tio n sh er if

fs have tr ad iti ona lly

se rv ed
. E ve n m or e ra dic al ly , thi s arg um en t i m pli es that E le ve nthA m en dm en t im m uni ty e xte nds be y ond she ri ff

s to c ity pol ic e of fi ce rs , c ounty

pol ic e of fi ce rs , an d e ve n pr ivate se curi ty guard s. A ll of

the se ind ivi dua ls, f

ro m the Ch ie f of

the A tlanta P oli ce D ep ar

tm en t t o th e em

plo y ee ke ep ing w at chove r the c osm et ic s a isl e of ade partm en t st or e, a ct

on a uth or ity ve ste d inthe m

by state laww he n us ing force to effec tuate arr ests for violation s of state law
. See Allen v. City of A tlanta, 5 1 0 S. E.2 d6 4 , 6 6 (G a. Ct . Ap p . 1 9 9 8 ) ( s t ri k i n g d o wn ci t y p o l i ce d ep ar t m en t ’s policy governing officer s’ discharge of their fir earm s on basis of conflict w ith Ga. Co de A nn. § 17 -4 -2 0) ; G a. Co de A nn. § 36 -8 -5 ( au tho ri zi ng arr es t by c ounty pol ic e) ; i d. § 17 -4 -6 0 ( au tho ri zi ng arr es t by pr ivate part ie s) ; C as h v. S ta te , 221 S.E.2d63 , 64 (Ga. 19 75 ) (ap pr ov in g s to re s ecu rit y off ic er’s arr es t o f sh op li fte r). Y et it is se ttl ed lawthat c ity

pol ic e, c ounty

pol ic e, a nd s ec ur ity

guard s hi re d by pr ivate e nti tie s are not

e nti tle d to E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty . C ity

of Canto n v. H ar ri s, 489 U . S. 378 , 388 ( 1989 ); P em baur v. Ci ty of Ci nc inatti , 475 U . S. 469 , 47 3- 74 , 48 4- 85 (19 86 ); F arre d v . Hick s, 9 15 F.2d 15 30 , 15 32 -3 3 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 0)
.To be sure , th e ma jor ity e nd e avo rs to a

rt ic ulate su c h a

dis tin c tio n b y

statin gthat “ [a] c ity 3 d el ega t es an d

ex er ci s es i t s p o l i ci n g fu n ct i o nth ro u ghi t s ci ty p o l i ce o ff

i ce rs an d a c o un ty th ro u gh county police off

icer s,” whe rea s “the State de leg ates a nd perf orms cer tain state policingand corr ections func tions through se vera l law enf orce ment ag encie s, including she riffs. . . .” Majority Opinion at 30 n.35. This purported distinction presupposes a n answe r to the ver

y question at issue in this appeal, name ly , whether county sheriff s in Georg ia ac t for the state
. Be cause the ana ly sis by

which the major ity

rea ches its af

firmative a

nswer r ests in part on an attribute common to all pea ce of fice rs in Geor g ia – namely , the conf erme nt by state law of

a power to effe ct ar

rests by forc e – it would seem to follow that not only sheriff s but also city

and county police off

icer s could be re g arde d as state a ctors. Appa rently this is notso. Whi le the majority ’s distinction escape s me, Icer tainly ag ree that city

and county

police off

icer s do not g ener ally act a s arms of the state, and thus I am re assure d by

today ’s promise that the “ hy po the tic a l sc e na

ri os ” ra ise d b y

the ma jor ity ’s re a so nin gwi ll r e ma in, a ft e r a ll, me re ly hy pothetical. Majority

Opinion at 30 n.35. 60 T he m aj or ity

pr of fe rs no t es t t o di sti ngui sh the se of fi ce rs a nd i ndi vid

ua ls f ro m the
co unty she ri ff s w hose e xe rc ise of

f or ce it ne w ly de sig na te s astate f

unc tio n. 3 T he se co nd unte nable a rg um en t of fe re d by the m aj or ity

is that the she ri ff

is
en tit le d to E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty sim ply be ca use the G en er al A sse m

bly defines the powers and du ties of his or her office
. Ye t on thi s theory of w hat
m ak es apub lic of

fi ce a n “ ar

m of the state ” im

m une f ro m sui t, Mt . H ea lth y

Ci ty Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. D oy le, 429 U.S . 274, 280 (1977), there can be no such thing as local governm ent, beca use all local governm ent is by definition a creature of the state’ s authorityto attach power s and duti es to particular offic es. Indeed, a s I sha ll dis cu ss at gr eate r le ngth be low , the G eo rg iaCo nst itu tio n auth or iz es the state le gis la tur e to d ef

ine the pow er s and d

uti es of the ve ry of fi ci al s m ost

r ea dil y as soc ia te d inG eo rg iaw ithpol ic y -m ak ing on b eh al f of loc al gov er

nm en ts: c ounty co m m iss ion er s. T o ho ld tha t c ounty c om m iss ion er s are e nti tle d to E le ve nth61

A m en dm en t i m

m uni ty pla inl y f lou ts e sta bli she d law . N one the le ss, thi s is p r e c i s e l y wh a tth e maj o r i t y i mp l i e s t o d a y. Inthe e nd, ide nti fy ing “ fo rc e pol ic y ” as the f unc tio n a t i ssu e in this c as e so br oa de ns the inquir

y r equir ed in ap ply ing the E le ve nthA m en dm en t tha t the
m aj ority ’ s opin ion becom es a lar gely ad hoc survey

of the G eorgia Code. When
we instead recognize j ail operation as the proper focus of our inquiry , e very relevant fa ctor straightforwardly we ighs agains t the conclusio n that Sheriff Pe te rs on, in carr

y ing out thi s f unc tio n, a ct s a s an “ ar

m of the state ” suc h th at

the Elev en th Am en dm en t i m m un iz es hi m

fro m su it in fed eral co ur t. I. D EF INITION OF SHERIFF ’S OF FIC E A ND JAILS UN DER STA TE LAW T he f ir st f ac tor r el ev an t i n our ap pli catio n of the E le ve nthA m en dm en t i s howstate lawde fi ne s th e en tity or of fi ci al sue d a s ade fe ndant. W e ha ve pr ev iou sly

f ound thi s f ac tor to favor hol din g ashe ri ff

unp ro te ct ed

by the E le ve nth A m en dm en t w he n th e state c onst itu tio n, a s in te rp re te d by the state sup re m e co urt, es ta bli she d th at

the “ she ri ff

is a ‘ co unty

of fi ci al ’ a nd, a s su ch , is anint eg ra l part of the ‘ co unty . ’ ” H uf

fo rd v. Ro dge rs , 912 F . 2d 1 338, 134 1 ( 11th C ir
. 199 0) ( ci ta tio n om itted). The G eorgia Constitut ion is u nequiv ocal in its desig nation o f sheriff s as

“ co unty of fi ce rs . ” G a. Co nst . a rt . 9, § 1, ¶ 3. I have dis cu sse d th e re le vant pr ovi sio n and i ts h ist or

y a t so m e le ngth inG re chv. Cl ay tonCo unty , ___

F . 3d _

__62

(B ar ke tt, J. , c onc ur

ri ng)
. R athe r than r ev isi t tha t di sc uss ionin fu ll, I he re not e sim ply that the langua ge , str

uc tur e, a nd h ist or

y of the G eo rg iaCo nst itu tio n ove rwhe lm ing ly

de m onstrate a n in te nt o n th e fr am er s’ part to ratif y m or e than on e hundre d y ears of

G eo rg iac as e lawr ec ogni zi ng the she ri ff ’ s in de pe nde nc e fr om state law m akers. Indeed, the drafter s resoundin gly rej ected a suggestion th at would have given th e state legislature the power to decide whether the sheriff' s of fic e wou ldex is t an d b y

who m itco ul d b e fi ll ed . Id. at 10 n.8 (Bar ke tt , J., concurring). This designation of sheriff s as independent county

officer s m ilitates ag ai nst c onsi de ri ng the m

a rm s of the state in an y

of the ir of fi ci al f unc tio ns. W ithr es pe ct

to the part ic ular she ri ff

’ s f unc tio n w e m

ust c onsi de r in this
ca se , statut or

y lawde fi nin g j ai ls a s c ounty ins tit uti ons pe rf

ec tly c om ple m en ts the constitu tion’s definition of the sheriff’ s office. “ By virtue of their offic es, sher iffs
ar e j ai le rs of

the c ount ie s and h av e the auth or ity to ap poi nt o the r j ai le rs , sub j ec t t o the supervisio n of the countygoverning authority , a s prescribed by law .” G a. Code Ann. § 42-4-1(a). Acounty “ having the phy sical custodyof an inm ate” has t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y:

to m ai nta in the inm at e, f

ur nis hin g hi m

f ood, c lothin g, an d any ne ed ed m ed ic al a nd h ospi ta l a tte nti on; to de fe nd an y ha be as c or pus or oth er pr oc ee din gs i nst itu te d by or on b eh al f of

the inm at e; a nd t o be ar

a ll ex pe nse s r el at ive to any e sc ap e an d r ec ap tur e, inc lud ing the e xpe nse s of ex tr ad iti on.63

Id
. § 42 -5 -2 (a ). A s go ve rn m en ta l un its c harg ed w iththe c ust ody

of pe rs ons accu se d o f cri m es , cou nt ie s m ai nt ai n t he ir jai ls th ro ug h t he effo rts of t he ir s he rif fs
. In perform ing th is function , sher iffs cannot be decre ed the arm s of the state. In order to re ach a c ontrary conclusion , the m aj ority finds it necessary

to set as ide the G eo rg iaCo nst itu tio n’ s ge ne ra l c hara ct er iz at ionof she ri ff s a s c ounty of fic ers an d t he Geor gi a Co de ’s id en ti fic at io n o f jail s as co un ty ins ti tu ti on s. To thi s e nd, it

de plo y s it s no ve l c onc ep t of “ func tio n” to dis tin gui sh the pr es en t c as e from one invo lving the duties sp ecifica lly enum erate d in Section 42-5-2(a),
na m el y , “ fe ed ing , c lothin g, or pr ovi din g m ed ic al c ar e to i nm at es . ” Ma j or ity Opinion at 29. In the m aj ority ’ s view, these duties and th e sheriff ’ s broader responsib ility

“ to m aintain” inm ates are not im plicated in this case bec ause here
we m ust cons ider not ja il operation per se, but rather “ Sheriff Peter son’s f

orce pol ic y , w hic h ha

ppe ns t o be a t i ssu e in the j ai l c ont ex t . . . . ” I d. a t 30
. Af oc us o n

“ fo rc e pol ic y , ” how ev er , doe s no t i de nti fy a ny state lawthat i llum inate s th e state or loc al c hara ct er

of thi s “ func tio n” a s c le ar ly a s do statut es ve sti ng c ount ie s w ith
re spon sib ili ty

f or j ai ls. R athe r, a s a lr ea dy

dis cu sse d, the G eo rg iastatut e authorizing sheriffs to use forc e sheds no lig ht whatsoever on whether the sheriff
ac ts f or the state or

the c ounty

in doi ng s o. T he m aj or ity

c om pe nsa te s f

or thi s la ck of dir ec t gu idanc e by

tur nin g to “ the specific duties the State assigns to sh eriff s,” “ m ost” of which it regar ds asThe majority also points to sheriffs’ duty to detain ce rtain prisoner s in county jails for a 4 limit ed per iod after

they have be en committed to state custody . Majority Opinion at 30; id. at 23- 24 . A ssumin gfo r p ur

po se s o f a rgume nt t hat to thi s e xtent st ate law d oe s d e fi ne sh e ri ff s a s “ arm s of the state ,” the po int

ha s li ttl e fo rc e in t

his c a se . F ir st o f a ll, Ma

nd e rs wa s n ot c omm itt e d to state custody

at any point during his dete ntion at the Clinch County J ail. Second, the spe cial cate g ories of pr isoners discussed by the majority

– consisting mainly

of per sons appea ling conviction, awa iting imposition of suspended sentenc e, or se rvingpreviously probate d sentenc es r e v o k e d o nth e b a s i s o f

m i n o r o f f e n s e s – ar e c l e ar l y

m i n o r e x c e p t i o n s t o th e g e n e r a l r u l e . In operating a

jail, the sheriff

exercises c ustody

primarily over pr etrial de tainees a

nd persons convicted of

misdemeanors. With respec t to these much broa der c ateg ories of pr isoner, it is the county rathe r than the state that is responsible for the detention and we ll-beingof per sons in the sheriff ’s custody . Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-51. I discuss below the one other c ateg ory of prisoner s specia lly single d out by

the majority : persons whom the Ge org ia Depa rtment of Corre ctions temporar ily

pay s counties a pe r diem fe e to house due to overc rowdingin state prisons. See infra note 11. Remarka

bly , the majority

g oes so fa

r as to sug g est at one point that deta ining a ccuse d 5 c ri min a ls i s a lw ay s and

e ve ry wh e re a “ state fu nc tio n” wh e ne ve r o ff

e nd e rs are c ha

rg e d w ith“ state felonies.” See Majority

Opinion at 27 n.33. The re asoningappea rs to be that the e nactment of state laws de finingfelony offe nses makes a ll persons cha rg ed with the commission of a fe lony “state of fende rs,” a

nd acc ording ly

entitles their custodians to Eleve nth Amendment protec tion from at lea st some suits. Thi s infirm logic marks a va riation on the ar gument that Sheriff Peterson is entitled to Eleventh Amendme nt immuni ty whene ver he exercises his authority under 64 “ int eg ra l” to the “ St at e’ s c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m . ” I d. a t 28 -2 9. I n th is
co nne ct ion , the m aj or ity

dis cu sse s “ state c ourt and b ond- re la te d du tie s, ” id. a t 20 , as w el l a s “ the c om

m on l awdut ie s of

she ri ff s to e nf or ce the law s and p re se rv e the pe ac e on b eh al f of

the sov er ei gn S ta te . ” I d. at 15
. T he pr obl em w iththi s 4 ap pr oa chis that l awe nf

or ce m en t, c ourt, a nd b ond- re late d du tie s have nothin g to do with the function at iss ue in this case, even on the m aj ority ’ s definition of that function as “ establishi ng use-of-force policy at the j ail.” T he beating to which Manders alleges he w as subjecte d was neither c onnected with his arrest, which ha d a lr ea dy

be ene ff ec te d by the ti m e he e nte re d th e Cl inc h C ounty Ja il, nor i n c i d e n tt o h i s tr a n s p o rtt o o r f r o m ac o u rt r o o m. 5state law to use f orce in making a

rre sts. J ust as the majority ’s re liance on G eorg ia’s use- of-f orce statut e imp lie s th at e ve ry

sh e ri ff , c ity po lic e of fi c e r, and sto re se c ur ity

gua rd mus t be a

state actor , so its dis cer

nment of a “ state func tion” from the mer e existence of state pena l codes imp lie s th at e ve ry

on e of thi s c ountr

y ’s ja ils , d e te nti on

un its , a nd ho ldi ngc e lls mus t be a

state institution. That impli cation def ies the long standingamena bility of loca l gove rnments to suit for vio latin gthe c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts of pe rs on s h e ld i n lo c a l ja ils on state c ha rg e s. Se e , e .g ., Jinks , 12 3 S. Ct. at 16 73 (s tatin gthat c la im a ri sin gout of

pr iso ne r’ s d e ath i n c ounty de te nti on fa c ili ty lay ag ainst “a political subdivision” of the state , rathe r than state itself, when prisoner had bee n arr ested for

failingto pay

child support); Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F .2d 1381, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholdingawa rd of $45,000 in dama g es ag ainst city of Atlanta f

or conditions of conf inement suffe red by

plaintiff while deta ined in Atlanta City J ail on char g e of r ape)
. Plainly baff ling, then, is the ma

jority ’s cha

rg e that this dissent, in taking jail oper ation as 6 the per tinent function, “de fines the Sher iff’s c onduct at a higher le vel of a bstraction” tha

n the ma jor ity its e lf . M a jor ity Op ini on at 8 n .9 . D ivi natio n o f t

he sh e ri ff ’s “ e sse nc e ” wo uld

se e m to involve abstrac tion of a ver y high or der. B y

contra st, the concr ete f

unction of jail operation focuse s our inquiry

on positive state leg al authority direc tly rele vant to this case, namely , the Geor g ia statute that make s sheriff s “jailers of

the counties.” Ga. Code Ann. § 42-4-1( a). The majority

rec og nizes that counties may be liable f

or constitutional deprivations ar ising out of ce rtain aspe cts of jail administration. See Majority Opinion at 34, 36 & n.43 (distinguishingMander s’s suit from one involving pr ovision of “food, c lothing, and a ny neede d medical a nd hospital attention” to jail detainee s, as re quired unde r Ga . Code Ann. § 42-5- 2(a) ). Whil e I a g re e wi th t

he ma jor ity that c ounti e s a

re re sp on sib le fo r p ro vid ingpr iso ne rs wi th t he se basic ne cessities, I

believe the ir responsibility extends much more broa dly to all aspec ts of op e ratin gc ounty

ja ils
. 65 H en ce the m aj or ity ’ s r ef

usa l t o r ec ogni ze j ai l op er at iona s th e pe rt ine nt func tio n inthi s c as e ult im at el y be co m es ali ce nse to dis pe nse e nti re ly w iththe func tio n- by -f

unc tio n a ppr oa chw e ap ply

in de ci din g c la im s of

E le ve nth A m en dm en t i m

m uni ty . I nst ea d, the m aj or ity of fe rs a n a d ho c co lle ct ionof G eo rg ialaw s pe rt ai nin g no t t o j ai l op er at ion , nor e ve n to the f

unc tio n it ha s ne w ly inv en te d, but

r athe r to the she ri ff

’ s “ es se nti al gov er

nm en ta l natur e. ” Ma

j or ity 6 O pin iona t 28
. T his loo ks v er y m uc h li ke the “ al l or

nothin g” appr oa cha ga ins t
w hic h th e Su

pr em e Co urt ha s w ar

ne d. S ee Mc Mi lli an , 520 U . S. a t 78 5 (i nstru ct ing that the que sti on o f w he the r a she ri ff a ct s f or the c ounty

or stateThe majority likewise empha siz es Ge org ia ca ses statingthat the sherif f is “not an 7 employ ee of

the county

commission.” Wi lson v. Boar d of Comm’rs of Randolph County , 396 S.E.2d 903, 903 (Ga. 1990) (empha sis added); see also Bosw ell v. Br amlett, 549 S.E.2d 100, 102 (Ga . 2001) (e x plaining that employ ees of “constitutionally

elec ted offic ers of

a county ,” such a s s h e r i f f s , ar e n o te mp l o y e e s o f

th e c o un ty

“ a s r e p r e s e n t e d

b y th e l o c a l g o v e r

n i n ga u th o r i ty” )
. It then re ads this authority

for the ve ry

differ ent rule that the sheriff is not an employ ee of

the c ounty . M a

jor ity Op ini on at 29 . T hat inte rp re tiv e le a p f ind s n o s up po rt

in G e or g ia

law. As I dis c us s b e low , s e e inf

ra no te 15 , G e or g ia

law e sta bli sh e s th at sh e ri ff

s a re c on sti tut ion a l c ounty office rs independe nt of county commissions. This independe nce doe s not unfasten sher iffs fr om loc a l g ov e rnme nt, but r athe r v e sts the m w ithfi na l po lic y -m akin ga uth or ity ov e r t ho se c ounty functions entrusted to their office . That sher iffs ar e not employ ees of county commissions re fl e c ts n oth ingmor e tha

n th is s e pa

ratio n o f p ow e rs .

66 requires attention to th e sheriff 's role “ in a particular area, or on a particular issue”). T he m aj or ity

a lso se ek s to m ini m iz e the im portanc e of

statut es m ak ing she ri ff s r es pons ibl e fo r co unty

j ai ls b y e m pha siz ing that this r es pons ibi lity de vol ve s up on s he ri ff

s by w ay of state law . S ee Ma

j or ity O pin iona t 21 (d isc uss ing statut or

y a nd d oc tr ina l auth or ity

e sta bli shi ng tha t sh er if

f is r equir ed

by l aw t o ad m i n i s t erjai l s ). In th i s co n n ec t i o n , i tco n t ra s t s th e G en er al As s emb l y’ s au th or it y to en actleg is la ti on pe rta in in g t o s he rif fs , see Ga. Con st . art . 9, § 1, ¶ 3( a) , w iththe c ounty

c om m iss ion ’ s la ck

of auth or ity to en larg e or

r es tr ic t the
s h er i ff ’s ch ar g e. Se e G a. Co n s t . a rt . 9 , § 2 , ¶1 (c )( 1 ). Th e G en er al As s emb l y’ s

7 authorityto alter the powe rs and duties attaching to the sheriff’ s office, however, in di cat es no th in g m or e th an it s ro le as t he sea t o f le gi sl at iv e p owe r in Geor gi a. Pu t anothe r w ay , the A sse m bly ’ s ge ne ra l auth or ity

to de fi ne the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce is aTh e ma jor ity e xplic itl y

re c ognize s th at “ ult imate c ontr ol o f e ve ry state -c re ate d e nti ty 8 re sid e s w iththe State and that th e State may

de str oy or re sh a pe any po lit ic a l su

bd ivi sio n a s it se e s f it. ” Ma jor ity Op ini on at 35 n. 41 . It th e n ma int a ins that th is e le me nta l f or m of state so ve re ig nty

is n ot t he so le ba sis fo r i ts c on c lus ion that G e or g ia

law d e fi ne s Sh e ri ff

Pe te rs on a s a state off icer . Yet the major ity ’s discussion relies fir st, foremost, and throughout on the clause s of the Ge or g ia

Con sti tut ion

c ite d a bo ve , whic h p ro vid e sim

ply that ( 1) the state ’s Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y may le g isl ate on

matte rs pe rt a ini ngto t

he e le c tiv e c ounty

of fi c e of sh e ri ff and (2 ) c ounty commissions m ay

not so leg islate. See Major ity Opinion at 10 (citingGa. Const. art. 9, § 1, ¶ 3(a) , which provide s that sheriff s, alongwith other county office rs, “sha ll have such qualifications, powers, and duties a s provided by g ener al law” ); id. at 11, 13, 37-38 (c iting Ga
. Const. art. 9, § 2, ¶ 1(c )(1) , which provide s that county commissions’ powers “sha ll not be construed to e x tend to. . . [a] ction aff ectingany

elec tive county

office ”). Those provisions do no mor e tha n a rt ic ulate , w ithre sp e c t to e le c tiv e c ounty of fi c e s, pr e c ise ly

the e le me nta l f

or m of state so ve re ig nty

wh ic h th e ma

jor ity ins ist s is no t th e ba sis of its argume nt. 67 se parate m atte r fr om

our pr es en t c onc er

n w ithw he the r the law s it ha s e na ct ed

do in fact define the sher iff as an arm of the state. 8 The m aj ority ’ s neglect of this dis tinction is at the core of an argum ent that proves far too m

uch. N ot onl y

sheriffs but all form s of “ elective county office” are subject to the state’ s sovereign prerogative to st ructure local governm ent. G a. Const. art. 9 § 2, ¶ 1(c )(1); see also, e. g., Ga . C ode Ann. § 36-64-5 (re quiring that loc al park s bo ar ds e sta

bli she d by

“ the gov er

nin g bo dy

of a ny c ounty or m uni ci pa lity . . . sha ll co nsi st o f a m ini m um of f ive pe rs ons an d am ax im

um of nin e pe rs ons, se rv ing w ith out

pay , ” an d th at

ge ne ra lly the “ te rm s of

of fi ce of the
m em be rs of the board

sha ll be f or f ive y ears ”) ; i d. § 36 -7 4- 5 ( se tti ng f orth
re qui re m en ts f

or appoi ntm en t, m em

be rs hip , c om

pe nsa tio n, a nd o rg an iz at ionof loc al c ode e nf

or ce m en t bo ar ds)
. T his is tr ue of loc al gov er

nm en t no t on ly

in Ge orgia but across this country . He ss v. Port Auth. Tr ans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S
. 30, 47 ( statin g th at

“pol iti ca l su

bdi vis ion s e xis t so le ly

a t the w him

a nd b eh es t of68

the ir S ta te ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n and a lte ratio n m ar ks o m itt ed )) ; C ity

of T re nto n v. N ewJe rs ey , 262 U . S. 182 , 187 ( 1923 ) (“ A m uni ci pa lity

is m er el y ade partm en t of the state , a nd the state m ay w ith hol d, gr an t or

w ith dr awpow er s and p ri vil eg es a s it sees fit. ” (f

ootn ote and citation om itted)). In de ed , the G en er al A sse m bly m ay e nlarg e or

c ontra ct the pow er s and dut ie s no t on ly

of the she ri ff

, but a lso of the ve ry ins tit uti on m ost

r ea dil y co nc ei ve d a s ar ep osi tor

y of loc al pol ic y -m ak ing auth or ity in G eo rg ia : the c ounty governin g authority , which in Clinch Cou nty is its board of comm issio ners. See 1933 G a. L aw s § 2 9, p. 467
. A rt ic le N ine of the G eo rg iaCo nst itu tio n, w hic h ve sts co unty c om m iss ion er s w ithc er

ta in “ hom e ru le ” pow er s, m ak es c le ar that this delegation “ shall not restrict the a utho rity of the G eneral A ssem

bly by general law to f urthe r de fi ne thi s po w er

or to br oa de n, li m it, or

oth er w ise r eg ulate the e xe rc ise the re of
. ” S ee G a. Co nst . a rt . 9, § 2, ¶ 1( a)
. A cc or din gly , the G en er al A sse m bly has created num erous duties o n the part of com m issio ners. County

com m issio ners m ust satisfy

m inim um training requirem ents, avoid conflicts of interest when purchasing g oods and property for the county , and com

ply with ce rtain disclosu re an d r ec usa l r

ule s w he n z oni ng a ct ion s c om e be fo re the m . S ee G a. Co de A nn. §§ 36- 20- 4, 36- 1- 14, 36- 67A -2
. My ri ad oth er dut ie s stru ct

ur e the c ounty co m m iss ion ’ s c oll ec tiv e dis ch ar ge of of fi ci al f unc tio ns. S ee , e . g. , id. § 36 -1 -2 5 (r equir ing that of

fi ci al m inu te s be ke pt o f al l m ee tin gs) ; i d. § 36 -6 7- 3 ( re qui ri ng that official re view of z onin g propos als address six statut orily specified m atters);69

id. § 36 -9 -3 ( re qui ri ng tha t sa le s of r ea l pr ope rty

be m ad e to “ the hig he st responsib le bidder, e ither by sealed bids or by

auction after due notice has been giv en ”)
. F ina lly , the m atte rs ove r w hic h c ounty c om m iss ion s e xe rc ise le gis la tiv e po wers are t ho se whi ch st at e la w ent ru st s t o t he co un ti es ’ ho m e ru le au th or it y . See Stephenson v . B oard of Com m ’ rs of Cobb County , 405 S. E. 2d 48 8, 489 (Ga
. 1991 ); Mob le y

v. P olk Co unty , 251 S
. E . 2d 5 38, 541 ( G a. 197 9) ( “N ei the r the
co unt ie s of

thi s st at e nor

the ir of fi ce rs c ando any

a ct , m ak e an y

c ontra ct , nor

inc ur any liabilitynot autho rized by som e legislative act applicable thereto. ”). If the e na ctm en t of

law s m ak ing she ri ff

s r es pons ibl e fo r j ai ls e nti tle s th e sh eri ff t o El ev en th Am en dm en t p ro te ct io n, a l og ic al in fere nc e is th atst at e la ws im posin g duti es on count y

com m issio ners likewise bring these locally elected
re pr es en ta tiv es w ith in the a m en dm en t’ s am bit
. T his is a re sul t st ar

kly in oppo sition to the line of precedent holdin g that local gov ernm ents are not entitled to s ove re ignim

m uni ty und er the E le ve nthA m en dm en t. S ee Mt . H ea lth y , 429 U . S. a t 28 0; L inc olnCo unty v. L uni ng, 133 U . S. 529 , 530 ( 1890 ). I t l ike w ise unde rm ine s th e ru le that l oc al gov er nm en ts m ay

be li ab le und er

§ 19 83 f or pol ic ie s or

c ust om ar y pr ac tic es that de pr ive ind ivi dua ls o f fe de ra l r igh ts. Mo ne ll, 436 U.S . at 690-91
. The m aj ority fails to rec kon with thi s oppo sition betwee n es ta bli she d lawa nd i ts arg um en t tha t the m er e ex ist en ce of state law s ta ski ng s h e r i f f s wi t h s p e c i f

i c du t i e s f a v o r s El e v e n t h Ame n d men ti mm u n i t y.70

Insum , the m aj or ity ’ s de sig na tio n of “ fo rc e pol ic y ” as the f

unc tio n to consider in thi s case culm inates in a fatally flaw ed analy sis of how state law defines the defendant. A m ong th e casualties of the m aj ority ’ s m isgui ded dis cu ssi on are the f

unc tio n- by -f

unc tio n a ppr oa chthat our lawc om pe ls and the
w el l- es ta bli she d no tio n th at

loc al gov er

nm en ta l e nti tie s, de spi te be ing de fi ne d by state law , are independent of the state. Ne ither of the infirm ities of the m aj ority ’ s approach would arise w ere ope ratio n of

ac ounty j ai l r ec ogni ze d a s th e ap pr opr ia te f unc tio n to c onsi de r in this
ca se . R athe r, the que sti on o f howstate lawde fi ne s th e she ri ff in carr y ing out thi s func tio n r ea dil y

r es olv es it se lf

upo n c onsu ltatio n of

statut es de fi nin g G eo rg iaj ai ls
as c ounty ins tit uti ons. T he f

ir st f ac tor in our a na ly sis thu s stro ngl y

a nd
une qui voc al ly

f av or s th e co nc lus ionthat S he ri ff P et er son is n ot, in ope ratin g a co unty j ai l, a n arm

of the state e nti tle d to the pr ote ct ionof the E le ve nth A m en dm en t. II. IN DEP END ENC E F ROM STA TE C ONT ROL IN OP ERA TION OF COU NTYJAILS T he se co nd f

ac tor in our E le ve nthA m en dm en t i nqui ry is the de gr ee of control the state m aintains ov er the def endant. U nlike oth er c orrectional fac ilities in G eo rg ia , w hic h are m an ag ed by astate de partm en t and o ve rs ee n by astate board , j ai ls are the e xc lus ive dom ai n of G eo rg ia ’ s sc or es of

c ounty she ri ff s, w ho
m anage these institut ions in dependentlyof virtually all state oversight. AproperGe or g ia ’s Cod e us e s th e te rm “ c ounty c or re c tio na l in sti tut ion s” to r e fe r n ot t o 9 corr ectional f

acilities in a g ener ic sense but spe cifica lly to work ca

mps that are distinct fr om county jails and municipal detention units. See 1973 Op. Ga . Att’y Gen. 117 ( identifying “county corr ectional institutions” as county public works ca

mps). Sheriff Pete rson re cog nizes the distinction in a brief filed w ith this Court. See Reply Br ief of A

ppellant, Sept. 21, 2001, at 1- 2 (“County

corr ectional institutions are entire ly differ ent fa cilities from county jails.”). 71 ex am inatio n of

c ounty j ai ls and s he ri ff

s’ r ole in runni ng the m

giv es no i ndi catio n of state c ontro l. G eo rg ia ’ s C ode spe ci fi ca lly c harg es e ac h c ounty ’ s sh er if f w iththe duty

of takin g “ cu sto dy

of the j ai l and the bod ie s of suc h pe rs ons as a re c onf ine d th er ei n, al on g wi th th e warra nt or c au se of c omm it m en t.” Ga. Co de Ann . § 4 2- 4- 4( a)(1 ). In ci de nt t o th is f

undam en ta l r es pons ibi lity is the she ri ff

’ s ob lig at ionto “ furn ish pe rs ons co nf

ine d inthe j ai l w ithm ed ic al a id, he at , a nd b lanke ts, ” id. § 42 -4
- 4( a) (2 ), a s w el l a s to c om m it pe rs ons to the j ai ls o f ne ar by c ount ie s sh oul d th e loc al f ac ili ty pr ove uns af

e. I d. § 42 -4 -4 (a )( 3)
. T he c ount ie s th em se lve s bu ild the j ails operated by

their sheriff

s. I d. § 36-9-5(a). Inc ontra st, the state m ai nta ins ane tw ork of c or re ct ion al f

ac ili tie s th at

e xis ts separate and apart from

j ails. T his state sy stem

encom passes “ state corre ctional instit ution s” and “ countycorre ctional inst itutio ns,” both o f w hich are distinct 9 fr om j ai ls and r ec ei ve pr iso ne rs onl y a ft er the y a re c onvi ct ed
. S ee id. §§ 4 2- 5- 30; 42-5-53; 4 2-5-51; In re Pr isoners Aw aiting Transfer , 224 S. E. 2d 90 5, 906 (Ga
. 1976 ). U nli ke j ai ls, both st at e an d c ounty c or re ct ion al ins tit

uti ons m ust a nsw er to state auth or iti es : the ir

w ar de ns s er

ve a t the ple as ur e of

the G eo rg iaBo ar d ofIn th e c a se of c ounty c or re c tio na l in sti tut ion s, wa

rd e ns are a

pp ointe d b y

c ounty 10 g overningauthorities “subjec t to approval” of the boa rd of c orre ctions, and they serve “at the pleasure of the c ounty

or the boa

rd.” G a. Code Ann. § 42- 5-30.

72 Co rr ec tio ns, w hose m em

be rs a re appoi nte d by

the gov er

nor . G a. Co de A nn. §§ 42- 2- 2( a) , 42- 5- 30. Mo re ove r, suc h f ac ili tie s op er at e unde r the “ supe rv isi on and 10
co ntr ol” of

the state D ep ar

tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns, pur suant t o r ule s pr om ulg at ed by the board
. I d. §§ 4 2- 2- 5, 42- 5- 53( b) ; W ilk es Co unty v. A rr en da le , 180 S
. E . 2d 548, 549 ( G a. 197 1)
. I n e xe rc isi ng this r ule -m ak ing auth or ity , the Bo ar d of Correc tions has adopted regulation s governin g everything from inm ates’ personal hygi en e to th e si ze o f di sc ip li na ry is ol at io n c el ls to th e fre qu en cy of i ns pe ct io ns . Se e G a. Co m

p. R. & Re gs. r . 125 -2 -3 -. 04 ( hy gie ne ); id. r . 125 -3 -2 -. 09 (disciplin ary

fac ilities); id. r. 25-3-1-.04 (inspections). N one of thi s r eg ulatio n a

ppl ie s to she ri ff

s, ake y ind ic at or of the state of G eo rg ia ’ s la ck

of im m ed iate c ontro l ov er

she ri ff s’ e xe rc ise of

c ust odi al auth or ity in c ounty j ai ls. S ee G a. Co de A nn. § 42 -5 -5 1( a) ( statin g th at D ep ar tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns “ sha ll ha ve no a uth or ity , j ur isd ic tio n, or

r es pons ibi lity ” w ithr es pe ct to of fe nde rs se nte nc ed

to co nf ine m en t i n c ounty

j ai ls)
. A lth oughashe ri ff w ho f ai ls to c ar ry out c er ta in s ta tut or

y r es pons ibi lit ie s f

ac es the pos sib ili ty

of f ine s f or co nte m pt o r re m ova l f

ro m of fi ce , id. § 42 -4 -4 (c ), im

posi tio n of

the se sanc tio ns re qui re s f orm al pr oc ee din gs i n c ourts o f law . G ips on v . Bo w er s, 434 S
. E . 2d 4 90, 491 (Ga. 1993 ). A ccountabilit y to judicial enforc em ent establishes o nly thatThe majority identifies one e x ception to this categ orica l statutory command. Unde r 11 Geor g ia law a

nd in exchang e for

a per diem fee , sheriff

s maintain temporar

y custody of prisoner s wh om t he De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio ns is una

ble to t ra ns fe r t o s tate pr iso ns du e to o ve rc ro wd ingin these fa cilities. See Clay ton County

v. Evans, 366 S.E.2d 282, 282-83 (G a. 1988). Y et the Depa rtment of Corre ctions enjoy s no more author ity with respec t to these inmates’ c ustody than with respec t to the sheriff’ s custody of all other pe rsons confine d in county jails. The detailed regulations promulgated for the administration of state prisons re main wholly inoperative. Moreove r, the ve ry

fac t that the depar

tment must pay

a per diem fee in this connection, see G a. Code Ann. § 42-5- 51(c) , demonstrates that state law doe s not transform the she riff ma intaining su c h p ri so ne rs int o a

state a g e nt, but r athe r c ontin ue s to re c ognize ja ils a s lo c a l e nti tie s w ith which the state enter s into an essentially contra ctual re lationship. Accord Clay ton County , 366 S.E.2d at 283 (re

jectingproposition that prisoners housed in county jail for per

diem fee “we re ‘assig ned’ to ser

ve sente nces in the c ounty ' s jail without t he county ’s appr oval” a nd char acte rizing them instead a s “mere ly temporar ily

incar cer ated in the c ounty jail, with the reimburse ment provided by § 42-5- 51( c), until such time as spac e could be made available f or their transf

er to a state cor rec tional insti tution”). The a rra ng ement through which state a nd local a uth or iti e s in

Ge or g ia c oo pe rate fo r t

he purp os e of

re lie vin gov e rc ro wd ingin s tate pr iso ns fa ils to d e mon str ate that th e state e xer c ise s c ontr ol o ve r c ounty sh e ri ff s. 73 she ri ff s’ of fi ce s inG eo rg iapos se ss l eg al pe rs ona lity , not that the state c ontro ls the she ri ff f or pur pose s of our E le ve nthA m en dm en t ana ly sis
. Mor eo ve r, w he re as the state c anor de r co unty c or re ct ion al ins tit

uti ons to take c ust ody

of pr iso ne rs , it

ge ne ra lly la ck s auth or ity

to hous e pr iso ne rs in co unty j ai ls w ith out

the appr ova l of

the loc al she ri ff

. T he c hie f adm ini str at ive of fi ce r of the D ep ar tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns “ m ay

de sig na te a s apla ce of

c onf ine m en t any av ai la ble , sui ta ble , a nd a ppr opr ia te state or

c ounty c or re ct ion al ins tit

uti on i n th is state operated under the j urisdictio n or supervisio n of the departm ent. . . . Ne ither
m al e nor f em al e state inm at es sha ll be a ssi gne d to se rv e in any m an ne r in a

c ounty j ai l un le ss [ upon ]
. . . the appr ova l of
. . . the she ri ff

or the j ai l a dm ini str at or

of the
co unty . ” G a. Co de A nn. § 42 -5 -5 1( d)
. S ta te c ourt j udge s li ke w ise la ck auth or ity 11 to c om pe l the she ri ff

to tr an sf er apr iso ne r by

w ay of asua spo nte de te rm inatio nComplementing this authority is the obligation of sheriff s to acc ept prisoner s from other 12 counties upon re ceipt of a n advanc e pay

ment of fe es and c osts. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7- 2. The majority

char acte rizes the g rand jury ’s inspection of c ounty jails as incident to the 13 “we ll-established func tion of g rand jurie s in the State’s justice sy stem.” Majority Opinion at 34- 74 that a particular j ail is insecure. See In re Irvin, 328 S. E. 2d 21 5, 218 (Ga . 1985); How ingto n v. W ilson , 100 S. E. 2d 72 6, 727 (Ga . 1957). By contrast, sherif

fs the m se lve s have the auth or ity und er c er ta in c ondi tio ns t o c om

m it pe rs ons in the ir
cu sto dy to j ai ls i n a dj oin ing c ount ie s. S ee G a. Co de A nn. § 17 -7 -1
. 12 The m ost su bstantial ov ersight to which Georgia law subj ects sheriff s inv olv es not

state but oth er c ounty of fi ce rs . T he c ha

pte r of the G eo rg iaCo de tit le d “ Ja ils ” be gin s w iththe m an da te that “ she ri ff s are j ai le rs of

the c ount ie s and ha ve the auth or ity

to ap poi nt o the r j ai le rs , sub j ec t t o th e supe rv isi on o f the c ounty gove rn ing auth or ity
. ” I d. § 42 -4 -1 (a ); G ri ff in v
. Ch atha m

Co unty , 261 S
. E . 2d 5 70, 571- 72 ( G a. 197 9) ( ci tin g pr ed ec es sor pr ovi sio n inuph old ing c ounty com m issio n’ s authorityto com pel sheriff to ac cept prisoners whom county had ag re ed to hol d inde te nti on)
. I n a id o f thi s su pe rv iso ry f unc tio n, c ounty

gov er nin g authorities have at their dispo sal the investig ative powers of grand jurie s, see Ga
. Co de A nn. § 15 -1 2- 71( c) , w hic h m ust ins pe ct j ai ls annua lly

a nd m ak e ap pr opr ia te re co m m en da tio ns t o th e co unty c om m iss ion
. I d. § 15 -1 2- 78. N ota bly , gr an d j ur ie s r eg ularl y

a dvi se c ounty

c om m iss ion s w ithr eg ar d to “ the tr eatm en t of the inm at es , ” id. 15- 12- 78, a s w el l a s th e j ai l’ s ge ne ra l “ ope ratio ns. ” I d. § 15 -1 2- 71( b) (1 ). C ounty

ove rs igh t of

j ai ls i n G eo rg iathu s sw ee ps m or e br oa dly than in 1335 n.40. That g ener al role is simply immaterial to the pre sent ca se, which a ddresse s the particula r func tion of jail administration. As the majority acknow ledg es, g rand jurie s inform county commissions about the “treatment of inmates” g ener ally . The bre adth of this advisory fu nc tio n c oin c ide s w ithc ounti e s’ g e ne ra l r e sp on sib ili ty fo r s he ri ff

s’ mana g e me nt o f c ounty ja ils
. 75 Al ab ama. A s we ex p l ai n ed i n Tu rq u i t t , 1 3 7 F. 3 dat 1 2 8 9 , “ Al ab ama’s Co nst itu tio n se nds a cl ear m es sa ge that a she ri ff is a state of

fi ce r, w hose a ct ion s w ithr es pe ct

to the w el l- be ing of

j ai l i nm at es a re m ost

appr opr ia te ly

c ontro lle d by state of fi ci al s, ” w he re as A la

ba m a co unt ie s are pr im ar ily r es pons ibl e onl y

f or the j ai l’ s “phy sic al plant. ” I d. a t 12 90. G eo rg iac ount ie s’ br oa de r supe rv iso ry r ole
co m ple m en ts the ir

c or re spon din gly

e xpansi ve r es pons ibi lity to m ai nta in n ot o nly the j ai ls the m se lve s bu t a lso the inm at es in the ir c ust ody
. G a. Co de A nn. § 42 -5
- 2( a)
. C ount ie s are r es pons ibl e not onl y f or the he al th and hum an e tr eatm en t of j ai l inm at es but

a lso f or c er ta in c ost s be ar ing am or e atte nua te d r el at ion shi p to the
m ai nte nanc e of

c ust ody : the y

m ust de fe nd h ab ea s c or

pus ac tio ns and p ay

f or the cost of any

escape and recapture of pr isoners. Se e id. § 42-5-2(a)
. Insum , G eo rg iaha s c re at ed tw o di ff er en t so rt s of

f ac ili tie s f or the c ust ody of pe rs ons de ta ine d a s ar es ult of a lle ge d or

pr ove n c ri m es . O n th e one hand i s th e set of fac ilities m aintained directly by the state for the c ustod y

of m ost conv icted fe lon s. O n th e oth er

a re the j ai ls o f the state ’ s c ount ie s, w hic h e xis t pr im ar ily to holdpersons awaiting trial or convicted of m inor offenses. The state has int eg rate d it s own c or

re ct ion al ins tit

uti ons w ith in a

uni fi ed sy ste m sub j ec t t o th e co ntr ol o f state w ide a ge nc ie s, w hic h di re ct the appoi ntm en t and r em ova l ofThe majority seeks to minimiz e the importanc e of she riffs’ independe nce f rom 14 Geor g ia’s integ rate d corr ections sy stem by rema rkingthat the exist ence of a state wide Depa rtment of Corre ctions “does not pre clude the State f rom [also] utiliz ing othe r law e nf or c e me nt a g e nc ie s, su c h a s sh e ri ff s, to p e rf or m th e State ’s inc arc e ra

tio n f un c tio n f or state of fe nd e rs .” Ma

jor ity Op ini on at 27 n. 33 . B e thi s a s it

may , th e on ly

re a so n g ive n b y

the ma jor ity for r eg ardingSheriff Pete rson as a ctingfor the state at all, with re spect to prisoner s such as Wil lie Mander s, is its pronounce ment that sheriff s eng ag e in a state function whe never they de ta in p e rs on s c ha

rg e d w ithfe lon ie s. I d. As dis c us se d a bo ve , h ow e ve r, the op e ra tio n o f c ounty jails cannot be r eg arde d as a state function mere ly beca use the e lements of fe lony offe nses ar e found in state pena l codes. See supra note 5. E ven we re this mistaken pre mise conce ded, the rele vant point with respec t to the control fac tor would rema in that county sheriff s discharg e a “ State [] inc arc e ratio n f

un c tio n” ind e pe nd e ntl y

of the on ly state a g e nc y

wi th s up e rv iso ry

a uth or ity over state corr ectional f

acilities. Thus, the control f actor would continue to militate ag ainst the e xten sio n o f E le ve nth

Am e ndme nt i mmunit

y . T he ma

jority ’s e lis ion

of thi s p oint ul tim ate ly consists in the argument that beca use sher iffs (1) exercise indepe ndent custodial authority and (2) are state ac tors, their own indepe ndence – their self- control, if you will – should be considere d “state c ontrol.” The be labore d tautology of this rea soning is less than illuminating with re spect t o o ur p r e s e n ti n q

u i r y. 76 w ar de ns, sup er

vis e ope ratio ns, a nd d ec ide w hic h in sti tut ion s w ill take c ust ody of whi ch pri so ne rs . By

co nt ras t, Geo rg ia ’s cou nt y jail s ex is t i n re la ti ve is ol at io n. E ac h is r un b y a n in de pe nde nt s he ri ff

und er the sup er vis ionof ac ounty gov er nin g authority , w ith no institu tionalized m echanism for state oversight. T he sheriff 14
m ay generally ref use to hou se state prisoners, and inasm uch as Ge orgia law carves out c er ta in e xc ep tio ns t o th is r

ule , it ne ve r intru de s up on the she ri ff s’ ind ep en de nt custodyover all persons confined in coun ty j ails. S heriffs e xercise this undi luted
au tho ri ty to ope rate w ha t are ind

ubi ta bly c ounty ins tit uti ons. A s init s a

ppl ic at ionof

the f ir st E le ve nthA m en dm en t f ac tor , the m aj or ity sli ght s th e w ei ght

of state law s ve sti ng c ount ie s and the ir she ri ff s w ithauth or ity
ove r j ai ls b y

r el y ing on i ts unortho dox de fi nit ionof “ fo rc e pol ic y ” as the

“ func tio n” a t i ssu e in this c as e. T hus it ch ar ac te ri ze s G eo rg iac ount ie s’Apar t from its argument that trainingrequire ments and the state’ s limi ted suspension 15 power establish state control, the ma jority muddies its analy sis by

trying to e stablish the c omp le me nta

ry pr op os iti on

that G e or g ia

c ounti e s h ave no c ontr ol o ve r t he fu nc tio n at is su e in thi s c a se . M a

jor ity Op ini on at 34 . Si nc e She ri ff

Pe te rs on is h ims e lf

an in de pe nd e nt c ounty office r under

Geor g ia’s Constituti on, the only way to make sense of this assertion is to rea d it as premised on the c ounty

commission’s lack of c ontrol over the she riff. As Ihave e xpla ine d in

my c on c ur re nc e in G re c h, __

_ F .3 d _

__ , h ow e ve r, the c ounty c omm iss ion

is n ot t he on ly ins tit uti on that a c ts f

or the c ounty . G e or g ia

ha s st ru c tur e d it s c ounty g overnme nts to vest authority for diff ere nt functions in differ ent, coe qual offic es intera ctingin a manner akin to the fe dera l gove rnment' s separ ation of powe rs. Thus, the sher iff’s indepe ndence from the c ounty

commission shoul d be interpr eted not as inde pendenc e fr om the county , but rathe r a s in de pe nd e nt a

uth or ity to a c t f or the c ounty

wi th r e sp e c t to the fu

nc tio ns e ntr

us te d h is office
. 77 oblig ations with regard to “ the j ail structure and .
. . f ood, clothin g, and m edical
ne ce ssi tie s” a s in vol vin g “ w hol ly se parate a nd d ist inc t m atte rs ” fr om the f unc tio n invo lved in th is case. See Maj ority Opinion at 34. A fter e xecuting th is m aneuver, however, the m aj ority

once again fails to cite any lawby which the state does
co ntr ol s he ri ff

s w ithr es pe ct

to the “ fo rc e pol ic y ” func tio n th e m aj or ity ha s ne w ly de fi ne d. I nst ea d, the m aj or ity r es ts i ts a

ppl ic at ionof

the c ontro l f

ac tor on the obse rv at ion s th at

she ri ff s m ust und er go tra ini ng c oor din at ed by astate w ide
as soc ia tio n of

she ri ff s and the gov er

nor m ay sus pe nd s he ri ff

s f or up t o 90 day s. 15 T h e s e p o i n t s c a n n o tb e a r th e w e i g h ta s s i g n e dth e m. W ithr es pe ct

to tr ai nin g, the m aj or ity

m ust r el y on h y pothe sis to re la te it s discuss ion to “ force policy ” at all. Sherif fs are required to undergo twenty hours of tr ai nin g “ ge ne ra lly

de vot ed to co nte m

por ar y lawe nf or ce m en t, inv es tig at ion , jud ic ia l p ro ces s, an d c orrect io n p ract ic es .” Ga. Co de Ann . § 1 5- 16 -3 (a), (e )(1 ).78

T he la ck of m or e spe ci fi c au tho ri ty

notw ith standi ng, the m aj or ity de cr ee s it

“ re as ona ble to as sum e” that this tr ai nin g “ inc lud es ins tr uc tio n onf

or ce pol ic y

a nd hir ing a nd tra ini ng d ep uti es . ” Ma j or ity O pin iona t 31 -3 2. R ea sona ble or not , the
co ntr ol f ac tor m ay be appl ie d m

uc h m or e str ai ght fo rw ar dly by obs er vin g si m ply that the she ri ff

’ s c ust odi al r es pons ibi lity f or j ai ls, inc lud ing the tr eatm en t of inm at es , is not

sub j ec t t o ov er sig ht f

ro m state c or re ct ion al a ge nc ie s. T he m aj or ity ’ s di sc uss iona lso f al te rs be ca

use it c an not be sa id tha t sh er if

fs ’ tr ai nin g is in fa ct

a dm ini ste re d by

the state . R athe r, the tr ai nin g is ove rs ee n by the Ge o rg i a S h er i ff

s ’ As s o ci at i o n , ap ri v at e o rg an i za t i o n co m p ri s i n g th e s t at e’s el ec te d sh er if

fs
. S ee G a. Co de A nn. § 15 -1 6- 3( e) (1 ); se e al so G eo rg iaS he ri ff s’ A sso ci at ion , W el co m e, a t w w w . ge or gia she ri ff s. or g (la st vi si te d J un . 11 , 20 03 ). G ive n th e as soc ia tio n’ s c om posi tio n, it

be gs the que sti on p re se ntl y be fo re us t o charac terize sheriffs’ training as a state-adm inistered program : we are sitting en banc f or the ve ry pur pose of de te rm ini ng whe the r the she ri ff s w ho d es igna nd
co nduc t this tr ai nin g are the m se lve s st at e or c ounty of fi ci al s. Fi na lly , ina sm

uc h a s th e m aj or ity

m eans t o a sse rt

that the m er e ex ist en ce of
a tr ai nin g r equir em en t e sta bli she s st at e co ntr ol, it s a ppr oa cha ga in p ro ve s to o m uch. N ot onl y

the sheriff but also holders of the quin tessential local gove rn m en ta l of

fi ce , that of

c ounty c om m iss ion er , m

ust sa tis fy atr ai nin g79

re qui re m en t. S ee G a. Co de A nn. § 36 -2 0- 4 ( re qui ri ng c om m iss ion er s to c om

ple te 18 h our s of

tr ai nin g onm atte rs pe rt ai nin g to the a dm ini str at ionof c ounty gove rn m en ts)
. S o to o m

ust c ity a nd c ounty

pol ic e of fi ce rs , se e id. §§ 3 5- 8- 9, 35- 8-21, 35-8-2(8)(A ) (r equiring basi c training course prior to service and annual tr ai nin g th er ea ft er ), a nd p ri va te law y er s. S ee G a. S t. Bar R. 8- 104( A ) (s ettin g forth annual contin uing legal education requirem ent for m em bers of bar)
. Just as the Gener al A ssem

bly m ay define the power s and duti es which attac h to local of fi ce , it m ay r equir e that l oc al of

fi ce -h old er s and l ic en se d pr of es sio na ls c om

ple te courses of training. T his exercise of state sovereign authority does not m ean that the pe rs ons re gul at ed

a re sub j ec t t o st at e “ co ntr ol” suc h th at the E le ve nth A m en dm en t sh oul d im

m uni ze the m

f ro m sui t. T he m aj or ity

f ai ls t o r ec kon w ith thi s anom al ous im

pli catio n of

it s r el ianc e on s he ri ff

s’ a nnua l tra ini ng r equir em en t in apply ing ou r second Ele venth Am endm ent factor. T he oth er c om pone nt o f the m aj or ity ’ s c ontro l ana ly sis is its dis cu ssi on o f the G eo rg iagov er

nor ’ s po w er

to sus pe nd c ounty

she ri ff s. Whil e the gov er

nor indeed has the autho rity

to susp end sheriffs by

following a statutorilydefined procedure, it is not clear w hy this po we r shouldbe viewe d as m ore decisive than the lim its clearly

circum scribing it. For one thing, the governor cannot act uni la te ra lly

to re m ove ac ounty

she ri ff
. S ee G ips on, 434 S
. E . 2d at 49 1 ( statin gThe majority distinguishes Gipson as a case construingthe statute that def ines the 16 go v ern o r’ s p o we r t o re m o v e a n y an d ev ery p u b l i c o ff i ci al , ra th er

th an th e s t atu t e c o n fe rr i n g a mor e sp e c if

ic po we r t o te mpo ra

ri ly su sp e nd sh e ri ff s. Se e Ma

jor ity Op ini on at 33 n. 38 . Y e t it

is undisputed that the g overnor has no more pow er to re move sherif fs than any

other off icials. The majority chooses to ig nore this and instea d focus e x clusively on suspension. As Iexplain in t he te xt, th e signif

ic anc e wh ic h th e ma

jor ity a ssi g ns the g ov e rn or ’s su sp e ns ion po we r i nd ic ate s o nly its need to rest a

n otherwise unsuppor

ted ar gument on infere nces dr awn f rom a lawthat could as e a sil y be int e rp re te d to the op po sit e e ff e c t. Wh ile the ma

jor ity se e ms t o f

a ult the Ge or g ia Supreme Court for

speakingtoo broadly

when it explained in Gipson that the g overnor “ca n take no officia l action ag ainst a sher iff” a bsent criminal indictment, see Majority Opinion at 33 n.38, one mig ht also reg ard the high c ourt’s unanimous agree ment upon such categ orica l languag e as an indication of the conce ption of sheriff s held by jurists better traine d than we in Ge org ia law. 80 that “ the G ove rn or

a nd the A tto rn ey

G en er al c antake no o ff

ic ia l a ct iona ga ins t a she ri ff unl es s th er e ha s be enac ri m ina l i ndi ctm en t” ). N ot o nly do the r el ev an t 16 statut es ve st the gov er

nor w ithno r em ova l po w er , the y a lso f or bid him or he r fr om su sp en di ng a sh eri ff fo r lo ng er t ha n n in et y da y s. See Ga. Cod e Ann . § 15- 16- 26( c)
. E xe rc ise of e ve n th is l im ite d su spe nsi on p ow er r equir es the gov er

nor to appoi nt and receive the af firm ative rec omm endation o f an investigatory
com m ittee, see id. § 15-16-26(c), on which county sheriffs them selves constit ute a
m aj ority
. Id. § 15-16-26(a). T he governor’ s real but lim ited susp ension p ower an d hi s la ck

of r em ova l po w er

a re a s r ea dil y

vie w ed a s e vid en ce of

ala ck of
co ntr ol a s of

c ontro l. Insum , the m aj or ity ’ s f

law ed c onc ep tio n of

the f unc tio n a t i ssu e in this c as e le ad s it to ign or e a statut or

y sc he m e cl earl y

r en de ri ng S he ri ff

P et er son independ ent from

state corr ections officials in his adm inistration of the Clinch81

Co unty Ja il. A t the sam e tim e, the m aj or ity ’ s di sc uss ionof “ fo rc e pol ic y ” as the
re le vant f unc tio n le ad s it

to no c om

para bly il lum inatin g st at

uto ry gui danc e, but
rathe r inv olv es it

in fl aw ed

or te nde nti ous ar gum en ts b as ed on the tr ai nin g pr ogr am she ri ff s m ust a tte nd and the gov er

nor ’ s po w er

to or de r sus pe nsi ons of she ri ff s f or up t o 90 day s. II I. FUNDS Th e t h i rd El ev en t h Am en d m en tfa ct o r i s th e s o u rc e o f a d ef en d an t ’s funding
. Sheriff

Peter son’s operating budget is appropriated entirely by Clinch Co unty . S ee G re chv. Cl ay tonCo unty , ___

F . 3d _ __, a t 24 -2 5 ( ci tin g G a. Co de A nn. §§ 3 6- 5- 22. 1, 15- 16- 20, 45- 4- 7, 15- 16- 5; C ha ff in v
. Ca lho un, 262 G a. 202 , 203 (199 2)). T he county also appropriates other funds related to the function at iss ue in thi s c as e, nam el y , the c ost s of bui ldi ng and o pe ratin g j ai ls. G a. Co de A nn. §§ 36 -9-5, 42-5-2(a). T he m aj or ity

r ec ogni ze s th at

“ Cl inc h C ounty

be ar s th e m aj or

bur de n of fundi ng S he ri ff

P et er son’ s of

fi ce a nd the j ai l, ” Ma

j or ity O pin iona t 36 , but

it
none the le ss v en tur es a n arg um en t tha t the f undi ng f ac tor ult im at el y

“ til t[ s] ” in fa v o r o f E l ev en t h Am en d m en ti m m u n i t y. Id . a t3 8 . As i s tru e o f t h e majo ri t y’ s application o f the other re levant factors, it reac hes this con clusion via a route that be gin s w ithit s m ist ak enc onc ep tio n of the f unc tio n a t i ssu e in this c as e. T he82

m aj ority relies on its novel no tion o f a “ force policy ” function to set aside statut es requiring count ies to pay for the j ail’ s construction , upkeep, and operations. See G a Co de A nn. §§ 3 6- 9- 5, 36- 9- 8, 42- 5- 2. I t the n a ddr es se s th e m atte r of w ho funds the she ri ff

by w ay of spe cu la tio n th at

is hig hly r em ove d f

ro m a ny pos iti ve au t h o r i t y. Sp ec if ic al ly , the m aj or ity

r ep ri se s th e sa m e te nde nti ous as sum pti ons an d inf er en ce s se t f

orth i n it s a

ppl ic at ionof

the c ontro l f

ac tor . I t po int s ou t tha t the state pay s f

or tw en ty hours of tr ai nin g ( w hic h, it

a ssu m es , m

ust e nc om pa ss ins tr uc tio n inthe use of

f or ce ), a s w el l a s f

or a ny c ost s in curr ed

in the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f

s h e r i f f s . Al t h o u g h th i s f

u n d i n g p e rt a i n s n o mo r e t o “ f o r c e p o l i c y” than to a ny

oth er f unc tio n of

the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce , the m aj or ity

c hoos es to re gard

it as particularly

pertinent to this case. It does not explain h ow funds appropriated fo r a tr ai nin g c our se of

se ve ra l day s and the r ar e inv es tig at ionof pos sib le
m iscondu ct outweigh the counties’ obligation to finance j ail construction and then pay a ll co sts of

the ir da ily ope ratio n and m ai nte nanc e, y ear in and y ear out . T he m aj or ity

a lso r em ar

ks tha t c ount ie s’ f

undi ng o bli ga tio ns, inc lud ing
m ini m um sa lary a nd b ond re qui re m en ts, a re e sta bli she d un de r state law . Ma j or ity O pin iona t 36
. T he se poi nts a re im m at er ia l t o our ap pli catio n of the f undi ng factor, which addresses sim ply the origin of an entity ’ s fundin g, not the law under83

w hic h f undi ng o bli ga tio ns ari se . S ee T uve son v. F lor ida G ove rn or ’ s C ounc il on Indian Aff

airs, 734 F.2d 730, 732 (11t h Cir. 1984 ) (stating relevant question as

“ w he re f unds f or the e nti ty

a re de ri ve d” ). I n im

ply ing ac ontrary

r ule , the
m aj ority ’ s analy sis again conflates the state’ s authorityto structure local governm ental entities – as by requiring each county

to appropriate funds for a she ri ff ’ s of fi ce – w iththe sov er ei gn i m m uni ty a cc or de d by

the E le ve nth A m en dm en t. Moreover, Ge orgia courts have recognized that countycom m issio ns act au ton om ousl y

in fundi ng the she ri ff

’ s of fi ce so l ong as the ir

appr opr ia tio ns preserve the sherif

f’ s capacity

to execute the basic functions of office. See Ch af fi n v. Ca lho un, 415 S
. E . 2d 9 06, 908 ( G a. 199 2)
. R ev ie wof w he the r thi s m inim um standard has been satisfied is for abuse of discretion, Boar d of Com m ’ rs of Randolph Cou nty

v. W ilson , 396 S. E. 2d 90 3, 904 (Ga . 1990), and the cases
am ply de m onstrate c ount ie s’ auth or ity to m ak e ve ry

sub stanti al c uts in she ri ff s’ fu n d i n g . S ee Ch af

fi n , 4 1 5 S. E.2 dat 9 0 8 (u p h o l d i n g co u n t y co m m i s s i o n ’s
re duc tio n of

she ri ff ’ s bu dge t by

47 p er ce nt) ; B oard

of Co m m ’ rs of Randol ph Co unty , 396 S
. E . 2d at 90 4 ( upho ldi ng c om m iss ion ’ s de ci sio n no t t o a ppr opr ia te funds needed to p ay

deputy ’ s salary ); L ovett v. Bussell, 249 S.E .2d 86, 86 (G a.See supra note 15. 17 84 1978 ) (u phol din g c om

m iss ion ’ s de ci sio n no t t o a ppr opr ia te f

unds ne ce ssary

to supp lem ent salaries of six deputies). Fi na lly , the m aj or ity

a sse rt s th at

“ Cl inc h C ounty

se ts the tot al bud ge t bu t cannot dic ta te howS he ri ff

P et er son spe nds it. ” Ma j or ity O pin iona t 37
. T his
ar gum en t i s bo th i na

ppos ite a nd m ist ak en . F ir st o f al l, it c onf la te s th e co ntr ol and fundi ng f ac tor s. Mo re im

portantl y , it

obs cure s th e onl y

poi nt r el ev an t t o our E le ve nthA m en dm en t ana ly sis : w ha te ve r the e xte nt o f co unty c om m iss ion er s’
co ntr ol, it is undi sput ed

that the state e xe rc ise s no c ontro l w ha tso ev er ove r the she ri ff ’ s e xpe ndi tur es . F ina lly , the m aj or ity w ro ngl y e qua te s th e “ co unty , ” of which Sher iff P eterson and m em bers of the board of com

m issio ners are coequal of fi ce rs , w iththe board

of c om m iss ion er s a lon e. B ec au se S he ri ff P et er son is 17 him se lf ac ounty of fi ce r, it is inc ohe re nt t o say

the c ounty

“ cannot dic ta te ” howhis budg et is spe nt. IV. STAT E’S L IAB IL IT Y FOR ADVERSE JUDGM ENT The f inal factor r elevant in our analy sis is th e state’ s legal liabilityfor a j udgm en t a ga ins t the she ri ff
. Asho w ing that the state w oul d be li ab le f or j udgm en t m ili tate s w ithpart ic ular fo rc e in f av or of hol din g E le ve nthA m en dm en t sove re ignim

m uni ty to pr ote ct

the de fe ndant f

ro m sui t i n f ed er al c ourt; a show ing85

that the state w oul d no t be li ab le c uts str ongl y a ga ins t su chim

m uni ty . R eg en ts o f the Univ. of Cal. v. D oe, 519 U. S. 425, 430 (199 7); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 456 n .1 (1997) (declining to extendEle venth Am endm ent im m unityto poli ce co m m iss ion , 80 p er ce nt o f w hic h w as appoi nte d by state gov er

nor , be ca use “ the city of St. Louis is responsib le for the board' s financial liabilities” (internal citation om itted)). H er e, the m aj or ity

is co rr ec t i n c onc lud ing that G eo rg ialawof fe rs no in di cat io n t ha t t he st at e wou ldbe li ab le fora jud gm en t ag ai ns t Sh eri ff Pet ers on . Ma j or ity O pin iona t 43
. I t w ro ngl y c onc lud es , how ev er , that G eo rg ialawa lso
une qui voc al ly

pr ote ct s c ount ie s f

ro m li ab ili ty f or the ir she ri ff s’ a ct ion s. T he m aj or ity

c ite s anum

be r of c as es sho w ing that the state of G eo rg iaha s, as age ne ra l m atte r, gr an te d c ount ie s im m uni ty f ro m sui t onc au se s of

a ct ion arising und er state law. N otably , it has done so und er a statutory provisio n that stands apart from

the enactm ent defining th e state’ s own im m unity
. Com

pare G a. Co de A nn. § 36 -1 -4 w ithid. § 50 -2 1- 20 e t se q. C ount ie s’ im m uni ty f ro m m an y state lawc au se s of

a ct iondoe s no t r en de r the m im m une f ro m li ab ili ty und er 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 f

or vio la tio ns o f fe de ra l r igh ts. H ow le tt v. Ro se , 496 U . S. 356 , 376-77 (1990) (“ [S] ince the Court has held that m unicipal corporation s and sim ilar gove rn m en ta l e nti tie s are ‘ pe rs ons, ’ astate c ourt e nte rt ai nin g a§ 19 83 a ct ionm ust86

adhe re to that i nte rp re ta tio n. Munic ipa l de fe nse s–i nc lud ing a n a sse rt ionof
sove re ignim

m uni ty –to a f ed er al r igh t of

a ct iona re , of

c our se , c ontro lle d by fed eral law.”) (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) ; M art in ez v . Cal ifo rn ia , 44 4 U.S. 2 77 , 28 4 & n.8 (1 980) ( state lawgr an tin g im m uni ty to paro le of

fi ce rs doe s no t c ontro l qu es tio n whether such officers have im m unityunder § 198 3). G e o r g i a ’s o w n c o u rt s h a v e r e c o g n i z e da s mu c h
. I n Lo w e v . J o n e s C o u n t y, 499 S.E .2d 348, 350-51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998 ), the court rea ched the m erits of a cl ai m that a she ri ff ’ s tr ai nin g po lic ie s ha d vi olate d th e fe de ra l c onst itu tio na l r igh ts of the plaintiff’ s decedent. The plaintiff had nam ed the sheriff and the coun ty as defendants. I d. at 349. Thus, sim ply by rea ching th e m erits, the court treated a § 1983 sui t a ga ins t a

c ounty she ri ff a s no t i m pli catin g th e thr es hol d im m uni ty f ro m su it to whi ch st at e in st ru m en ta li ti es are en ti tl edun de r th e Ele ve nt h Am en dm en t. T he c ourt a lso state d e xpl ic itl y that “ loc al gov er

nm en ts m ay

be li ab le ” fo r ce rt ai n violatio ns of federa l rights, thereby convey ing th e view that a suit arising ou t of a she ri ff ’ s po lic ie s im

pli cate s th e lia

bil ity of the c ounty , not

the state . I d. a t 35 0. A lso f av or ing the c onc lus ionthat C lin chCo unty w oul d satis fy

a§ 19 83 j udgm ent against Sheriff P eterson is the authorityof county com m issio ns to pay at to rn ey fees in cu rred by she rif

fs in de fen di ng civ il rig ht s ac ti on s i n fe de ral co ur t. Se e H ay w ood v. H ughe s, 235 S
. E . 2d 2 , 3 ( G a. 197 7)
. Whil e the m aj or ity isThe majority seeks to mitigate the for ce of the state’s non- liability

by speakingin broad 18 terms of the pote ntial for judg ments ag ainst sheriff s to “interfe re w ith a state program or function.” Ma

jority Opinion at 47. This argument beg s the question. In draw ing a connec tion be tw e e n s he ri ff

s and “ a state pr ogra

m,” the ma

jor ity pr e sume s th e ve ry

po int it h a s f a ile d to establish in its application of our first thre e Eleve nth Amendment fa ctors. 87 co rr ec t i n po int ing out

that c ount ie s are not

r equir ed to take thi s st ep , no c ounty w oul d have a ny

inc en tiv e to d ef

en d a ct ion s a ga ins t sh er if fs w er e it tr

ue that a j udgm ent would be the responsib ility of the state. While a defendant m ay

be entitled to Eleventh Am endm ent im m unityeven w he n an a dve rs e j udgm en t w ill not im pli cate the state ’ s tr ea sur y , Re ge nts of

the U niv
. of Ca l. , 519 U . S. a t 43 1, li ab ili ty f or j udgm en t r em ai ns the sin gle m ost im portant f ac tor in our a na ly sis
. H es s, 513 U . S. a t 48 -4 9 ( ide nti fy ing “pr ev en tio n of f ed er al -c ourt j udgm en ts tha t m ust be pa id o ut o f a St at e’ s tr ea sur y ” as the

“ im pe tus f or the E le ve nthA m en dm en t, ” an d c iti ng w ithappr ova l se ve n c ourt of ap pe al s de ci sio ns r ec ogni zi ng “ vul ne ra bil ity of the S tate ’ s purs e as the m ost sa lie nt f ac tor in E le ve nthA m en dm en t de te rm inatio ns” ). T hus, w he n th e state bears no liabilityfor a defendant’ s actions, this fact m ilitates with particular f orce ag ai nst a llo w ing the de fe ndant t o in voke the E le ve nthA m en dm en t. F or thi s re as on, the auth or ity

ind ic at ing that G eo rg iainc ur s no li ab ili ty in co nne ct ionw ith j udgm en ts a ga ins t c ounty she ri ff s si m ply c an not be ign or ed
. A s w iththe r es t of

18 the state laww e ha ve e xa m ine d inthi s c as e, the state ’ s no n- lia bil ity f or a ny88

j udgm en t a ga ins t S he ri ff P et er son de m an ds tha t w e al lowMande rs ’ s su it to pr oc ee d. CON CLU SION In this case, each of the f actors w e norm ally

apply to determ ine whether a de fe ndant i s e nti tle d to E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty w ei ghs ag ai nst

e xte ndi ng suc h pr ote ct ionto Sh er if

f Pe te rs on. G eo rg ialawc le ar ly de fi ne s S he ri ff

P et er son as ac ounty

of fi ce r an d j ai ls a s c ounty

ins tit uti ons; the state ’ s c or

re ct ion s au tho ri tie s e xe rc ise no c ontro l ov er S he ri ff P et er son in h is o pe ratio n of the c ounty j ai l; Cl inc h C ounty

appr opr ia te s S he ri ff

P et er son’ s op er at ing bud ge t and p ay s f or the j ai l’ s c onstru ct iona nd u pke ep ; and the re is no i ndi catio n th at aj udgm en t against Sheriff P eterson would operate against the state of G eorgia. By inv en tin g apr ev iou sly

unknow n f

unc tio n a s th e pur

porte d f oc us o f its
an al y sis , the m aj or ity

tr ad es the c lari ty

to be f ound in the G eo rg ialawof

c ounty j ai ls f or ablur of inf er en ce a nd s pe cu la tio n. T he ups hot is a subs tanti al blo wto es ta bli she d lawa ssuri ng c iti ze ns’ abil ity to hol d lo ca l go ve rn m en ts a cc ount ab le fo r vio la tio ns o f the U nit ed S ta te s C onst itu tio n. S ee Jin ks, 123 S
. Ct
. a t 16 73; Mon el l, 436 U . S. a t 69 0- 91. Ac or re ct r ea din g of

G eo rg ialawsho w s th at

c ounty sh eri ffs op erat e co un ty j ai ls forth e co un ti es in whi ch th ey ser ve . In ev ery se ns e, a sui t un de r 42 U
. S. C. § 19 83 a ga ins t a c ounty she ri ff a lle gin g m istre atm en t i n a89

countyj ail is a suit against a local gov ernm ent. T he Ele venth Am endm ent, which pr ote ct s st at es , is ina

ppl ic ab le , a nd the de ci sio n of the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d the re fo re be a ff

irm ed
. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , I dis se nt.