Filed 8/14/23 T.L. v. Superior Court CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

T.L.,

 Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, 

 Respondent,

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY 

CHILD WELFARE 

SERVICES,

 Real Party in Interest.

2d Juv. No. B326173

(Super. Ct. No. 22JV00363)

(Santa Barbara County)

T.L., the mother of 8-month-old Bella L., seeks

extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s order bypassing 

reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency 
2

planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 366.26.1 We deny the petition. 

Facts and Procedural Background

Mother has a long history with the child dependency 

system going back to 2011, including for neglect, chronic drug 

abuse, and criminality. She had multiple drug-related referrals, 

her parental rights to two of her children had been terminated in 

two separate cases, and she had a voluntary family maintenance 

case for a third child after testing positive for methamphetamine

during a prenatal visit in 2018.

In November 2022, Santa Barbara County Department of 

Social Services (the department) secured a protective custody 

warrant and detained newborn baby Bella and her four-year-old 

sister, S.H., after Bella tested positive for amphetamine at birth. 

The department filed a dependency petition alleging, among 

other things: (1) Bella’s positive test for amphetamine; (2)

mother’s positive test for methamphetamine during a prenatal 

visit in August 2022; (3) mother’s admission to using 

methamphetamine during her pregnancy; (4) mother’s

“substantial” child welfare history, including the removal and 

subsequent adoptions of Bella’s half siblings, J.L. and M.L. in 

2012 and 2018, respectively; and (5) mother’s criminal history. 

J.L.’s case involved mother’s failure to make substantial 

progress with her substance abuse treatment program, drug 

testing, visitation, and her failure to obtain suitable housing.

M.L.’s case involved mother’s arrest for outstanding warrants

and living in her vehicle with M.L. Mother was subsequently 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

bypassed for services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions 

(b)(10), (b)(11), and (b)(13).

In this case, the detention report indicated that during an 

in-hospital interview with mother, she told a department social 

worker that she had “slipped” and relapsed one time after she 

found out she was pregnant at about four months along. The

social worker told mother she likely used recently as she had 

tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother responded, “‘ok, 

just those two times.’” But when the social worker asked mother 

about the positive test in August 2022 during a prenatal visit, 

mother became defensive and stated, “‘ok three times!’” Mother 

stated that “she did not have any problems with substance use” 

and that “she had been clean for years.” When asked if she would 

be open to services, mother told the social worker she was not 

willing to do inpatient treatment but would do outpatient 

treatment “‘all day.’” 

The department’s amended jurisdiction and disposition 

report recommended mother be bypassed for family reunification 

services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11), 

and (b)(13). The department cited mother’s chronic, longstanding substance abuse, the prior loss of custody of J.L. and 

M.L., and mother’s failure to comply with the court-ordered 

substance abuse treatment services in J.L.’s case and mother’s

2015 criminal court case. 

As part of her formal supervision for the criminal case, 

mother was referred to services at Recovery Point. However, she

was terminated unsuccessfully in 2015 when she failed to attend 

the program. In 2016, mother was arrested and incarcerated for 

violation of probation. After her release from jail, mother

completed approximately one year of substance abuse treatment 
4

services. Mother reported that she relapsed after completing 

treatment and used methamphetamine between October 2017 

and early 2018. 

After Bella’s birth in November 2022, and following the 

children’s detention, mother completed a 60-day inpatient

treatment program through Project Premie, enrolled in a sixmonth outpatient program, attended group counseling, met with 

her sponsor weekly, and attended 12-step Narcotics Anonymous 

meetings daily. 

At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in 

January 2023, the department social worker and mother 

testified. After hearing testimony and considering the evidence, 

the juvenile court found by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the allegations in the amended petition were true, ordered 

reunification services to be bypassed for mother, and set the 

matter for a section 366.26 hearing as to Bella. 

Discussion

Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her 

reunification services because insufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s findings that she met the required statutory 

criteria pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11), 

and (b)(13). 

We review an order denying reunification services for

substantial evidence. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 

Cal.App.4th 87, 96 (Cheryl P.).) Under that standard, “we 

inquire whether the evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports the [juvenile] court’s determination. We resolve all 

conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate 

inferences to uphold the findings and may not substitute our 

deductions for those of the juvenile court.” (Georgeanne G. v. 
5

Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 864-865 (Georgeanne 

G.).) 

Generally, when a child is removed from parental custody 

under the dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to 

provide reunification services unless one of several statutory 

exceptions applies. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) For example, 

reunification services shall not be provided to a parent described 

in section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11), or (b)(13), “unless 

the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (Id., subd. 

(c)(2).) “‘[O]nce it is determined one of the situations outlined in 

subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring reunification is 

replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would 

be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]’” (Renee 

J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 744 (Renee J.).) 

Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) recognizes the problem of 

recidivism by the parent despite reunification efforts. (Renee J., 

supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 744-745; Cheryl P., supra, 139 

Cal.App.4th at p. 96.) This subdivision applies if the juvenile 

court previously ordered the termination of reunification services 

for any siblings or half siblings of the child, and the parent “has 

not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems 

that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . . ” (§ 361.5, 

subd. (b)(10)(A).) 

Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), authorizes the denial of 

reunification services if “the parental rights of a parent over any 

sibling . . . had been permanently severed” and the “parent has 

not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems 

that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . .” (Id., subd. 

(b)(11)(A).) 
6

There is no dispute the first prongs of section 361.5, 

subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) were established, i.e., the 

termination of reunification services and the permanent 

severance of mother’s parental rights over J.L. and M.L. in the 

two prior dependency actions. However, mother contends 

substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding 

that she had not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems 

that led to the removal of J.L. and M.L. We disagree. 

Here, in denying reunification services, the juvenile court 

expressly considered mother’s “chronic history of drug abuse” and 

her “fail[ure] to reunify” with two of her other children “for the 

same problem.” Although the juvenile court commended mother 

for her recent efforts, it explained that it did not believe “the 

legislation is written in a way where the parent can defeat the 

exception of reunification services by starting reunification 

services once the petition is filed.” 

Mother contends the court’s reasoning was not appropriate 

because the statute does not require the parent to have made the 

effort before the filing of the section 300 petition. According to 

mother, the juvenile court “failed to deem [her] prior and 

subsequent efforts as reasonable.” 

But not every “effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to 

address the problems leading to removal will constitute a 

reasonable effort and as such render these provisions 

inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to 

consider the duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts, 

as well as any other factors relating to the quality and quantity of 

those efforts, when evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And 

while the degree of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a 

parent’s progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long 
7

term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the 

reasonableness of the effort made.” (In re R.T. (2012) 202 

Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) 

Here, the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that mother had not made reasonable efforts to treat 

the problems that led to removal of the children’s sibling or half 

sibling. In making its ruling, the juvenile court opined that it did 

not believe there was “much evidence” that mother had done

“much” to treat the problem since the last time she was in front of 

the juvenile court. It also did not believe mother was “being 

candid about her drug use,” and there was “clear evidence” that 

mother had “an ongoing problem with drug use.” 

The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. By 

mother’s own admission, she had been “dipping and dabbing” 

with methamphetamine since 2002. Her substance abuse issues

led to the loss of her parental rights to J.L. in 2012. Despite this, 

mother continued to use methamphetamine, failed to comply 

with her probation requirements in her drug-related 2015 

criminal case, and ultimately lost custody of M.L. in 2018. 

Although mother was able to complete one year of residential 

treatment at Project Premie in 2017 and voluntarily participated 

in another drug program through Project Premie in 2018, the 

record shows mother used while pregnant with Bella on at least 

one occasion. Even when confronted with this evidence, mother

attempted to minimize her drug use, and denied that she had a 

substance abuse problem. 

The purpose of the reasonable effort prong of section 361.5, 

subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), is not to create further delay for a 

child by allowing a parent, who up to that point has not 

reasonably addressed his or her problems, another opportunity to 
8

do so. (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 843.) 

Based on this record, the juvenile court did not err in denying 

mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11). 

The juvenile court also denied mother reunification services 

pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). That section

provides in part that the juvenile court may bypass services to a 

parent where it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 

parent “has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of 

drugs or alcohol,” and “has failed or refused to comply with a 

program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan 

required by Section 358.1 on at least two prior occasions, even 

though the programs identified were available and accessible.” (§ 

361.5, subd. (b)(13).)

Here, mother concedes that she satisfies the first condition, 

i.e., that she has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic 

abuse of drugs. As to the second condition, mother acknowledges

she was ordered into drug treatment in 2011 when she was 

granted family reunification services as to J.L. and failed that. 

She also acknowledges the juvenile court was “not incorrect” in 

considering her failure to complete the criminal court-ordered 

probation program in 2015, which falls within the statutory 

criteria of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). (See D.B. v. Superior 

Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 197, 204.) 

Nevertheless, mother asks us to “deem” her “follow-up 

compliance” with the probation requirement of substance abuse 

treatment services in 2016 as “an act that supersedes her failure 

to comply in 2015.” We decline mother’s request to do so. (See 

Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 865.) 
9

Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s order bypassing services to mother on this basis, 

we need not address the statute’s alternative basis for bypassing 

services, i.e., that the parent “resisted prior court-ordered 

treatment for this problem during a three-year period 

immediately prior to the filing of the petition . . . .” (§ 361.5, 

subd. (b)(13).)

Disposition

The petition is denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.
Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Jesse Frederic Rodriguez and Giselle Marie Achecar, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Adam R. Crawford, 

Snr. Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.