United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2183

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Lavoy Savalas Steed, by and through next friend Toya Steed

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Missouri State Highway Patrol; Brent J. Fowler, MO State Trooper #782 (in his 

individual and official capacity); J. A. Ashby, Trooper #234 (in his individual and 

official capacity)

 Defendants - Appellees

City of Pevely, Missouri; Kyle M. Weiss, Sergeant #778 (in his individual and 

official capacity); Brian Benjamin, Police Officer #780 (in his individual and 

official capacity)

 Defendants 

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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Submitted: April 15, 2021

Filed: June 25, 2021

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Before KELLY, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
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Jerome Goode led police on a twenty-five-mile car chase that ended in his 

death and the deaths of passengers Lavoy Steed and Leon Haywood. One passenger, 

Presiada Hayes, survived. Steed’s next friend filed this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Missouri State Troopers Brent Fowler and J.A. Ashby 

alleging that the traffic stop that precipitated the chase and an attempt to halt Goode’s 

vehicle with spike strips were unconstitutional seizures in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. The district court1 granted summary judgment in favor of the troopers. 

We affirm. 

I. 

Trooper Fowler was on Interstate 55 near St. Louis when he saw a blue Ford 

Explorer speeding and following other cars too closely. Jerome Goode was driving; 

Leon Haywood, Lavoy Steed, and Presiada Hayes were passengers. Trooper Fowler

clocked the Explorer at ninety-two miles per hour. After dodging through traffic to 

catch up, Trooper Fowler pulled up behind the SUV and matched its speed. Both 

cars were doing close to ninety. Trooper Fowler activated his emergency lights and 

Goode stopped the Explorer. 

As Trooper Fowler approached the Explorer, Goode started to drive off. 

Trooper Fowler told him, “You don’t want to do this,” but he took off anyway and 

merged into traffic. Trooper Fowler gave chase. The pursuit spanned twenty-five

miles and reached speeds of over 100 miles per hour. 

Trying to end the chase, Trooper Ashby placed spike strips on the left and 

center lanes of the interstate, leaving the right lane open. But Goode swerved around

the spike strips and continued to flee. At this point, other officers joined Trooper 

Fowler in the chase, but Goode did not pull over. At mile marker 186, he tried to 

1

The Honorable Henry Edward Autrey, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Missouri. 
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exit the interstate. He lost control of the Explorer and it flipped several times. 

Goode, Steed, and Haywood were all killed in the crash. 

Steed, through his next friend, Toya Steed, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against the Missouri Highway Patrol and the troopers. The complaint asserted 

various claims, but on appeal we consider only whether the initial stop of the 

Explorer and the use of spike strips were unconstitutional seizures.2

 The district 

court granted Troopers Fowler and Ashby summary judgment, finding probable 

cause for the initial traffic stop and that the spike strips were not a seizure because 

Goode drove around them. Steed appealed. 

II. 

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for summary 

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.” Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 808 

(8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “In doing so we grant the nonmoving party the 

benefit of all relevant inferences.” Id. “If there is a genuine dispute concerning 

predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, there can be no summary 

judgment.” Id. (citation omitted) (cleaned up). 

Qualified immunity shields a defendant from personal liability if his or her 

conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Quraishi v. St. Charles Cty., Mo., 

986 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). We conduct a two-step inquiry: 

“(1) whether [the plaintiff] ha[s] alleged facts to show a violation of a constitutional 

right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 

misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted).

2

In his opening brief, Steed mentions that the officers put innocent lives at risk 

by chasing the Explorer and that the supervising officer can be heard over Trooper 

Fowler’s audio calling off the car chase. But Steed does not tie these facts to any 

underlying constitutional violation. 
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A.

Steed says that the initial stop violated Lavoy’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

The Fourth Amendment secures the right of the people to be free from “unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” “The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the 

police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” United 

States v. Adler, 590 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). 

“Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” 

Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he issue for immunity purposes is not probable cause in 

fact but arguable probable cause, that is, whether the officer should have known that 

the arrest violated plaintiff’s clearly established right.” Schaffer v. Beringer, 842 

F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 

Steed argues that there was no probable cause for Trooper Fowler to stop the 

Explorer because the lone survivor of the accident says Goode was not speeding. 

The dashcam footage shows the Explorer going close to ninety miles per hour. Steed 

says this inconsistency creates a genuine issue of material fact. But “[w]hen 

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by 

the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that 

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott 

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The dashcam footage is in the record, so we 

agree with the district court that Trooper Fowler had probable cause. Even assuming 

he misinterpreted the speed reading, he would still be entitled to qualified immunity 

because he had at least arguable probable cause to believe the Explorer was 

speeding. 

B. 

Steed next argues that Lavoy’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when 

Trooper Ashby deployed the spike strips. A failed attempt to restrain a suspect is 

not a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless there is some

application of physical force. See Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2021)
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(seizure only for the moment that the officer’s bullet struck the plaintiff). Here, the 

officers tried to stop the Explorer with the spike strips—physical force—but were

unsuccessful. Steed says that a reasonable jury could find that the Explorer drove 

over the spike strips. But again, that argument is “blatantly contradicted by the 

record.” Harris, 550 U.S. at 380. The dashcam footage shows the strips on the two 

left lanes, and the Explorer drove in the far-right lane. Plus, the Explorer continued 

the chase afterwards—likely impossible to do with punctured tires. We conclude

that the record clearly establishes that the troopers did not apply physical force by 

trying to use the spike strips, so there was no seizure. 

III. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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