alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| **CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS    ROBERT PITOFSKY, SHEILA F. ANTHONY AND MOZELLE W. THOMPSON**

*IN THE MATTER OF*

STONE CONTAINER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. C-3806

The Commission recognizes that in invitation to collude cases, a fundamental question    is whether the alleged "invitation" was merely legitimate business conduct. Our    colleague, Commissioner Orson Swindle, dissents in this matter on grounds that Stone    Container Corporation’s behavior in curtailing its own production, and simultaneously    purchasing excess inventory from its competitors, was conduct that did not clearly lack an    "independent legitimate business reason." As the Analysis To Aid Public Comment    emphasized, however, it would have been more economical for Stone Container to keep its    plants open than to purchase inventory from competitors, and competitors would have    recognized that fact. This conduct and other statements by Stone Container made clear that    its goal was to manipulate industry supply conditions to invite a coordinated price    increase. It is for these reasons that we now have accorded final approval to the    complaint and consent order. 

While there may be some difference of view on the facts in this matter, we agree with    Commissioner Swindle that there can be no implied invitation to collude when the actions    that amount to the invitation are justified by business considerations. |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### In the Interest of A. J.

No. 70-290.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 1, 1970.

*440Bruce S. Rogow, Miami, and Rene V. Murai, Perrine, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Melvin Grossman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ-

PER CURIAM.

This appeal on behalf of a juvenile is from an order of the juvenile and domestic relations court of Dade County adjudicating her to be a delinquent and committing her to the Dade County detention home for a period not to exceed six months. The juvenile was identified by a police officer as the one who stabbed him in the back while he and other officers were attempting to quell a spectator brawl at a public school football game. The contentions presented on behalf of the appellant have been considered in the light of the record and briefs and are found to be without merit. Although in the proceeding held under § 39.02 Fla.Stat, F.S.A., proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not required, the record discloses there was competent substantial evidence which in our view was sufficient to support the decision even if that higher quantum of proof had been requisite. The case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, cited by the appellant, which dealt with questions as to the right of a juvenile to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt vis-a-vis the New York juvenile court statute is not applicable here. Contrary to the situation in New York, under Florida law the way was open to the juvenile to have a jury trial, with the higher quantum of proof, at her election, since § 39.02(6) (b) provides that a juvenile of the age of the one involved here, joined by parent or counsel, could have demanded to be tried before a jury in the criminal court in which the (felony) offense would be triable if committed by an adult.

Affirmed.
***Exhibit 31.2******CERTIFICATIONS***I, Mark A. Zorko, certify that:1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Del Global Technologies Corp.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: December 8, 2006           /s/ Mark A. Zorko       Mark A. ZorkoChief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32   Certifications   In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011 of Springleaf Finance Corporation (the Company) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of Frederick W. Geissinger, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Donald R. Breivogel, Jr., Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


|      |                                                   |                          |  |  | 
|----- | ------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------ |  |  | 
|      | /s/                                               | Frederick W. Geissinger  | 
|      |                                                   | Frederick W. Geissinger  | 
|      | President and Chief Executive Officer             |                         
|      | /s/                                               | Donald R. Breivogel, Jr. | 
|      |                                                   | Donald R. Breivogel, Jr. | 
|      | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |                         
|Date: | May 16, 2011                                      |                          |  | 

77
#### Simon J. WIKLER, Appellant, v. Leonard HABER et al., Appellees.

No. 72-1053.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 1, 1973.

George J. Bolton and Harvey I. Silver-man, North Miami Beach, for appellant.

Joseph A. Wanick, City Atty., Cypen & Nevins, Miami Beach, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant Simon J. Wikler and the appellee Leonard Haber were candidates *52for the office of councilmen of the City of Miami Beach in a runoff election held on November 16, 1971, wherein said Leonard Haber prevailed.

On the day following that of the election the unsuccessful candidate Wilder filed a petition in the circuit court entitled “Petition for Recanvass of Return and for Examination of Voting Machines and Prohibitive Injunction to Stay Installation of Leonard Haber in the Office of Councilman for the City of Miami Beach.”

This appeal is by the petitioner from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, the successful candidate Haber, the City of Miami Beach and the city councilmen who also comprise the canvassing board.

Incident to the granting of the summary judgment the court made certain findings and holdings as follows:

> “The Court has considered the pleadings, and the matters and things set forth in the filed Petition, including the Affidavits of Hoke Welch, the Acting Supervisor of Voter Registration for Dade County, Florida, and Joseph A. Wanick, the Attorney for' the City of Miami Beach, and all the defendants except Leonard Haber. No affidavits have been filed on behalf of the Petitioner.

> ‡ # sfc ‡ ‡ ‡

> “The Court further finds that on March 3, 1972, this Court had entered its Order releasing the said voting machines to Dade County and its Supervisor of Voting and Registration for such lawful or valid use thereof as he deemed proper, and without any order or restraint placed thereon. This Order was entered pursuant to Notice, and no Petition for rehearing to this Court or any interlocutory appeal or otherwise was taken therefrom.

> jjc He * * * *

> “It further appeals from the file in this cause, that in compliance with the Order of this Court, the Petitioner, his attorney and his representatives examined all the voting machines used in voting precincts 108 and 114, which Petitioner contends were the precincts primarily involved herein. It appears, completely without contradiction that upon the check, recheck and tabulation of those machines they showed the identical number of votes reported to the City Council and tabulated by its canvassing Board on November 17, 1971, without any change in any particular whatsoever as shown.by the return sheet canvassed by the said canvassing Board at said Council meeting on November 17, 1971. The Court finds that there is nothing in this file to indicate that the like result would not have followed as to all the remaining machines in all the other precincts.”

The record supports the summary judgment, and the appellant has failed to demonstrate reversible error.

Affirmed.
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL CONSTRUCTION PERMIT REVISION 

EI FACILITY NO: 111003090 

TYPE: 

CONSTRUCTIONPERMITNO.: 14-POY-174-R1 

ConstructionPermitforProcesses: B21, B22, P25, P26, P31, F99 

In compliance with the provisions of Chapter 285, Wis. Stats., and Chapters NR 400 to NR 499, Wis. Adm. Code, 

Name of Source: WPL- Columbia Energy Center 

Street Address: W8375 Murray Road, 

Pardeeville, Columbia County, Wisconsin 

Responsible Official, & Title: Jerald Lokenvitz, Plant Manager 

is authorized to modifY and initially operate two coal-fired utility boilers described in the plans and specifications 

dated September 23, 2014 through November 25, 2014, and May 26, 2015 through July 30, 2015 in conformity 

with the conditions herein. The authority to construct, modifY, replace and/or reconstruct any process covered in 

this Construction Permit expires thirty six (36) months from the date of issuance. This approved period to 

construct, modifY, replace and/or reconstruct may be extended for up to 18 months upon request for cause, prior 

to expiration, unless otherwise specified by this construction permit. The conditions of this construction permit 

are permanent and may only be revised through a revision of the construction permit or through the issuance of a 

new construction permit. [s. 285.60(1), Wis. Stats.] 

Conditions of the construction permit marked with an asterisk (*) have been created outside of the Wisconsin's 

federally approved State Implementation Plan (SIP) and are not federally enforceable. 

This authorization requires compliance by the permit holder with the emission limitations, monitoring 

requirements and other terms and conditions set forth in Parts I and II hereof. 

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin j , IL ;(l~u, & . /0 . Za I s- " I , 

STATE OF WISCONSIN 

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 

Co~ ~' ~ By ~ Hart,Chief f~;c/;= Permits and Stationary Source Modeling Section
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No. 10493.

#### Burris *v.*Thorpe.

Decided April 14, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Clinton county.

*Messrs. Smith & Clevenger*and *Messrs. Thorpe & Miller,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. James M. Morton,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed on authority of *Courson’s Executors*v. *Courson,*19 Ohio St., 454.

Shauck, C. J., Crew and Spear, JJ., concur.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JU LY 23, 2019

NO. 03

- 17

- 00764

- CR

Chauncy Jarrell Williams, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 427TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE , JUSTICES BAKER, AN D SMITH AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having review ed

t he record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the

trial court’s judgment of conviction

. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of

conviction

. Because appellant is indigent and u nable to pay costs, no adjudica t i on of costs is

made.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

CAVARUS D. LEWIS, DOC #C00268, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-3115

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

_________________________________)

Opinion filed February 16, 2018.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Pinellas County; Frank Quesada, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

VILLANTI, SLEET, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
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THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
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STOCKHOLDERS'  EQUITY AND  STATEMENT  OF CASH FLOWS FROM FORM 10Q FOR THE PERIOD
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FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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</TABLE>
#### Marguarite MARSHALL, Appellant, v. Daniel MARSHALL, Appellee.

No. 72-228.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 17, 1973.

Bernard B. Weksler, Miami, for appellant.

Marvin M. Green, and Gary D. Katz, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ-

HENDRY, Judge.

The original opinion in this cause filed by this Court on December 19, 1972, is hereby withdrawn prior to issuance of the mandate and this opinion is substituted therefor.

Appellant wife seeks review of a final judgment in an action for dissolution of marriage brought by the appellee-husband and attacks the denial of permanent alimo*108ny, denial of her motion for continuance of the final hearing- and the failure of the trial judge to retain jurisdiction over the. parties as to alimony in the event the needs of the wife or ability of the husband changes in the future.

Upon consideration of the record on appeal, the briefs and the argument of counsel, we are of the opinion that the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance requested by the appellant. In addition, we cannot say that the Chancellor erred in denying the appellant alimony in light of the relative needs and abilities of the parties. Accordingly, we will not disturb so much of the final judgment which denies a present award of alimony.

However, we are of the opinion that the Chancellor, based on the record, did abuse his discretion in failing to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future if such be applied for and properly allowable under § 61.14, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Poe v. Poe, Fla.App.1972, 263 So.2d 644; Melton v. Melton, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 705; Reed v. Reed, Fla.App.1971, 244 So.2d 449; Arthur v. Arthur, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 8; Gordon v. Gordon, Fla.App.1967, 204 So.2d 734. We also note that this error was noted by the Chancellor at the hearing on appellant’s motion for a new trial. However, the late Judge John J. Kehoe was prevented from modifying his final order, as he had intended, by his untimely death. We, therefore, order such a modification at this time.

In addition, we note that the appellant prayed that title to the marital household and furnishings be given to her and that the appellee was agreeable to allowing the wife to keep the house. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Chancellor should have ordered the appellee to transfer title to the house and its furnishings to the appellant wife and retained jurisdiction over the parties in order to enforce such order.

Therefore, we affirm that part of the final judgment that grants the dissolution of marriage and denies the appellant permanent alimony but reverse and remand with directions for the trial court to amend the final judgment so as to retain jurisdiction over the parties as to future alimony and to enter and enforce an order directing the appellee to transfer title of the marital home and furnishings to the appellant wife.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.