Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 249 / Tuesday, December 30, 1997 / Notices 67897

Respectfully yours,

Charles ‘‘Mickey’’ Flood,

President and CEO.

U.S. Department of Justice,

Antitrust Division, 1401 H Street, City Center

Building, Washington, DC 20530,

December 8, 1997.

Mr. Charles ‘‘Mickey’’ Flood

President and CEO

Independent Environmental Services, Inc.

3330 North Beach Street

Haltom City, TX 76111

Re: United States, et al., v. Allied Waste

Industries, Inc., C.A. No. 497–CV 564 E

(N.D. TX)

Dear Mr. Flood: This letter responds to

your letter dated October 10, 1997

commenting on the proposed Final Judgment

in the above-captioned civil antitrust case

challenging the acquisition by Allied Waste

Industries, Inc. (‘‘Allied’’) of the Crow

Landfill in Tarrant County, Texas owned by

USA Waste Services, Inc. The Complaint

alleges that the acquisition violates Section 7

of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18,

because it is substantially likely to lessen

competition for the disposal of municipal

solid waste (‘‘MSW’’) generated in Tarrant

County. Under the proposed Final Judgment

Allied is required to divest 880,000 cubic

yards of disposal space at the Crow Landfill

to a purchaser(s) who would have the right

to use this airspace for five years or the life

of the Crow Landfill, whichever is longer.

Allied is also required to divest 560,000

cubic yards of disposal space at the Turkey

Creek Landfill to a purchaser(s) who would

have the right to use the airspace for a tenyear period.

In your letter you expressed concern that

since acquiring the Crow Landfill Allied has

increased disposal rates and changed the way

trucks are measured that dispose of waste.

You indicated in a telephone conversation

with the staff that when USA Waste owned

the Crow Landfill that the front-load hopper

on the truck was not measured for waste

being deposited. Your letter indicates that

your disposal rates increased by 23% and the

change in the method of measuring trucks

has resulted in a total 63.4% increase to IESI.

Additionally, your letter states that before the

acquisition, USA Waste was not a competitor

in the hauling business and therefore the

Crow Landfill was desirous of IESI’s disposal

business. As Allied is also in the hauling

business, you believe the acquisition

represents a plan to raise prices for disposal

which will place IESI at a disadvantage in

competing with Allied for hauling business

since there are few disposal alternatives to

IESI. Your letter indicates that large waste

companies seek to control markets by

charging ‘‘excessive’’ disposal rates to

independent haulers, and you believe BFI, a

large waste company, will be sold the

airspace in return for assets by Allied in

another location.

We have looked into the concerns

expressed in your letter. We can report that

Allied has increased the rates at the Crow

Landfill (now called Mill Valley) and claims

that the increase is necessary because of

capital costs for the upkeep and maintenance

of the landfill. We understand the rates at the

Crow Landfill are now $6 for compacted

MSW and $4.70 for loose MSW. Our

investigation has revealed that these prices

are set at levels which are generally

comparable to prices charged at other

landfills in the Tarrant County area. With

regard to the measuring of trucks, it is our

understanding that the other landfill

operated by Allied specified in the

Complaint, Turkey Creek, and the landfills in

the Tarrant County area not owned by Allied

all measure trucks in the same fashion as

now used by Allied at Mill Valley.

Although the price increases instituted by

Allied do not appear out of line with

prevailing prices in the Tarrant County area,

the increase reinforces the belief of the

United States that a Final Judgment requiring

Allied to sell airspace at the Crow Landfill

(now Mill Valley) and the Turkey Creek

Landfill is necessary to protect competition

both in landfills and hauling in the Tarrant

County area. Divestiture will allow one or

more purchasers to obtain airspace rights that

they can use to compete directly for local

solid waste contracts or to resell to other

local haulers. As you know, Allied has

started the process of obtaining bids for

airspace rights. As we understand the

bidding process so far, the prices being

offered for the airspace are at levels which

could allow the winning bidder(s) to resell

space at prices below those being currently

charged by Allied. Your company has an

opportunity to bid on that airspace and we

understand it has done so.

Your letter also expresses a concern that

BFI, a large national waste company, is

bidding for and may win the airspace rights.

Should BFI be a bidder in the process or

become the winning bidder, this

development would not necessarily

constitute an anticompetitive effect of the

merger. The antitrust laws are not designed

to promote the interests of any one

competitor but to protect competition as a

whole. We will, however, examine any

proposed sale to ensure that it complies with

the terms of the Final Judgment.

The Antitrust Division appreciates you

bringing your concerns to our attention and

hopes this response will alleviate them.

Pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and

Penalties Act, a copy of your letter and this

response will be published in the Federal

Register and filed with the Court. Thank you

for your interest in the enforcement of the

antitrust laws.

Sincerely yours,

J. Robert Kramer II,

Chief, Litigation II Section.

[FR Doc. 97–33810 Filed 12–29–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–11–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

United States v. Tom Paige Catering,

Inc. and Valley Foods Inc., Proposed

Final Judgment and Competitive

Impact Statement

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,

15 U.S.C. 16(b) through (h), that a

proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation,

and Competitive Impact Statement have

been filed with the United States

District Court for the Northern District

of Ohio in United States v. Tom Paige

Catering, Inc. and Valley Foods Inc.,

Civil Action No. 1:97CV3268.

The Complaint in this case alleges

that the defendants formed a joint

venture in order to lessen and eliminate

competition for food service contracts

with the Cleveland, Ohio, Head Start

program, in violation of Section 1 of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

The proposed Final Judgment orders

the defendants to dissolve their joint

venture and enjoins them from (A)

agreeing with any other food service

contractor to fix prices on food service

contracts; (B) participating in future

discussions or communications about

the prices they quote on food service

contracts; (C) agreeing with other food

service contractors on the customers or

territories they bid for or serve; (D)

entering into any agreement with any

non-defendant food service contractor

before notifying the plaintiff. Each

defendant is also required to appoint an

antitrust compliance officer and

establish an antitrust compliance

program with specified requirements.

Public comment is invited within the

statutory 60-day comment period. Such

comments, and responses thereto, will

be published in the Federal Register

and filed with the Court. Comments

should be directed to William J.

Oberdick, Acting Chief, Great Lakes

Field Office, Antitrust Division,

Department of Justice, Plaza 9 Building,

55 Erieview Plaza, Suite 700, Cleveland

OH 44114 (Telephone: 216/522–4074).

Rebecca P. Dick,

Director, Civil Non-Merger Enforcement.

Stipulation

It is stipulated by and between the

undersigned parties, by their respective

attorneys, that:

(1) The parties consent that a final

judgment in the form hereto attached

may be filed and entered by the Court

at any time after the expiration of the

sixty (60) day period for public

comment provided by the Antitrust

Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C.

16(b)–(h), without further notice to any

party or other proceedings, either upon

the motion of any party or upon the

Court’s own motion, provided that

plaintiff has not withdrawn its consent

as provided herein;

(2) The plaintiff may withdraw its

consent hereto at any time within said

period of sixty (60) days by serving

notice thereof upon the other party
67898 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 249 / Tuesday, December 30, 1997 / Notices

hereto and filing said notice with the

Court;

(3) In the event the plaintiff

withdraws its consent hereto, this

stipulation shall be of no effect

whatever in this or any other proceeding

and the making of this stipulation shall

not in any manner prejudice any

consenting party to any subsequent

proceedings.

Dated:

Respectfully submitted,

For the Plaintiff:

Joel I. Klein,

Assistant Attorney General.

A. Douglas Melamed,

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Rebecca P. Dick,

Deputy Director of Operations.

Donald M. Lyon, (19207–WA).

William J. Oberdick, (2235703–NY)

Acting Chief, Great Lakes Office.

Attorneys, Antitrust Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, Great Lakes Office,

55 Erieview Plaza, Suite 700, Cleveland, Ohio

44114, Telephone: (216) 522–4080.

For the Defendants:

Jerome Emoff, Esq.

Tom Paige Catering Co., Inc.

Dennis Haines, Esq.,

Valley Foods, Inc.

Final Judgment

Plaintiff, the United States of

America, filed its complaint on

December 16, 1997. Plaintiff and

defendants have consented to the entry

of this Final Judgment without trial or

adjudication of any issue of fact or law.

This Final Judgment shall not be

evidence against or an admission by any

party to any issue of fact or law.

Defendants have agreed to be bound by

the provisions of this Final Judgment

pending its approval by the Court.

Therefore, before the taking of any

testimony and without trial or

adjudication of any issue of fact or law

herein, and upon consent of the parties,

it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and

decreed as follows:

I. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction of the

subject matter of this action and of the

parties consenting hereto. The

complaint states a claim upon which

relief may be granted against defendants

under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15

U.S.C. § 1).

II. Definitions

As used in this Final Judgment:

A. ‘‘Bid’’ means an offer, proposal, or

quotation, formal or informal, oral or

written, to a potential buyer or its agent.

B. ‘‘Food service contract’’ means any

agreement to provide meals to a

customer for a period of time, but is not

intended to include contracts for the

routine purchase of ordinary supplies

by the defendants.

C. ‘‘Food service contractor’’ means

anyone engaged in the business of

soliciting and performing food service

contracts.

D. ‘‘Person’’ means any natural

person; public or private corporation,

whether or not organized for profit;

governmental entity; partnership;

association; cooperative; sole

proprietorship; or other business or

legal entity.

III. Applicability

A. This Final Judgment applies to

defendants and to each of their officers,

directors, agents, employees,

subsidiaries, successors, and assigns,

and to all other persons in active

concert or participation with any of

them who shall have received actual

notice of this Final Judgment by

personal service or otherwise.

B. Each defendant shall require, as a

condition of the sale or other

disposition of all or substantially all of

its assets or stock, that any acquiring

party agrees to be bound by the

provisions of this Final Judgment and

that such agreement be filed with the

Court.

IV. Dissolution of Joint Venture

The defendants are hereby ordered

and directed to dissolve the joint

venture formed by them on April 1,

1994, within seventy five (75) days of

the entry of this Final Judgment, and are

enjoined and restrained from entering

into future joint ventures together for

the purpose of bidding on food service

contracts.

V. Other Prohibited Conduct

A. Each defendant is hereby enjoined

and restrained from agreeing with any

other food service contractor to fix,

establish, raise, stabilize or maintain

prices quoted on food service contracts.

B. Each defendant is further enjoined

and restrained from participating in any

future discussion with or in the future

communicating with any other food

service contractor concerning prices

quoted on food service contracts.

C. Each defendant is further enjoined

and restrained from agreeing with any

other food service contractor on

customers or territories to be bid for or

served.

D. Each defendant is further enjoined

and restrained from entering into any

agreement with any non-defendant food

service contractor regarding food service

contracts before notifying the plaintiff.

VI. Compliance Program

Each defendant is ordered to establish

and maintain an antitrust compliance

program that shall include designating,

within thirty (30) days of entry of this

Final Judgment, an Antitrust

Compliance Officer with responsibility

for implementing the antitrust

compliance program and achieving full

compliance with this Final Judgment.

The Antitrust Compliance Officer shall,

on a continuing basis, be responsible for

the following:

A. Furnishing a copy of this Final

Judgment within thirty (30) days of

entry of the Final Judgment to each of

defendant’s officers and directors and

each of its employees, salespersons,

sales representatives, or agents whose

duties include supervisory or direct

responsibility for determining the bid

prices submitted on food service

contracts except for employees whose

functions are purely clerical;

B. Distributing in a timely manner a

copy of this Final Judgment to any

owner, officer, employee or agent who

succeeds to a position described in

Section VI(A);

C. Providing each person designated

in Sections VI(A) or (B) with a written

explanation in plain language of this

Final Judgment, with examples of

conduct prohibited by the Final

Judgment, and with instructions that

each person designated in Section VI(A)

and (B) shall report any known violation

of the Final Judgment to the Antitrust

Compliance Officer;

D. Arranging for an annual oral

briefing to each person designated in

Sections VI (A) or (B) on the meaning

and requirements of this Final Judgment

and the antitrust laws, including the

advice that such defendant will make

legal advice available to such person

regarding any compliance questions or

problems, accompanied by a written

explanation of the type described in

Section VI(C);

E. Obtaining from each person

designated in Sections VI(A) or (B)

certification that he or she:

(1) has read, understands and agrees

to abide by the terms of this Final

Judgment;

(2) has been advised of and

understands defendant’s policy with

respect to compliance with the Sherman

Act and the Final Judgment;

(3) has been advised and understands

that his or her non-compliance with the

Final Judgment may result in conviction

for criminal contempt of court and

imprisonment, a fine, or both; and

(4) is not aware of any violation of the

Final Judgment that has not been

reported to the Antitrust Compliance

Officer.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 249 / Tuesday, December 30, 1997 / Notices 67899

F. Maintaining (1) a record of all

certifications received pursuant to

Section VI(E); (2) a file of all documents

related to any alleged violation of this

Final Judgment; and (3) a record of all

communications related to any such

violation, that shall identify the date

and place of the communication, the

person involved, the subject matter of

the communication, and the results of

any related investigation.

VII. Certification

A. Within seventy five (75) days of the

entry of this Final Judgment, each

defendant shall certify to plaintiff

whether such defendant has (1)

designated an Antitrust Compliance

Officer; (2) has distributed the Final

Judgment in accordance with Section

VI(A) and (B) above; and (3) has

provided the explanation and

instructions in accordance Section VI

above.

B. For ten years after the entry of this

Final Judgment, on or before its

anniversary date, each defendant shall

file with the plaintiff an annual

statement as to the fact and manner of

its compliance with the provisions of

Section V and VI.

C. If a defendant’s Antitrust

Compliance Officer learns of any

violation of any of the terms and

conditions contained in this Final

Judgment, defendant shall immediately

notify the plaintiff and forthwith take

appropriate action to terminate or

modify the activity so as to comply with

this Final Judgment.

VIII. Inspection and Compliance

A. For the purpose of determining or

securing compliance with this Final

Judgment, and for no other purpose,

duly authorized representatives of

plaintiff, upon written request of the

Attorney General or the Assistant

Attorney General in charge of the

Antitrust Division, and on reasonable

notice to a defendant, shall be

permitted, subject to any legally

recognized privilege:

1. Access during that defendant’s

office hours to inspect and copy all

records and documents in the

possession or under the control of that

defendant, which may have counsel

present, relating to any matters

contained in this Final Judgment; and

2. To interview that defendant’s

officers, employees, and agents, who

may have counsel present, regarding

any such matters. The interviews shall

be subject to defendant’s reasonable

convenience.

B. Upon the written request of the

Attorney General or the Assistant

Attorney General in charge of the

Antitrust Division made to a defendant

at its principal office, defendant shall

submit such written reports, under other

if requested, with respect to any of the

matters contained in this Final

Judgment as may be requested, subject

to any legally recognized privilege.

C. No information or documents

obtained by the means provided in this

Section VIII shall be divulged by any

representative of the Department of

Justice to any person other than a duly

authorized representative of the

Executive Branch of the United States,

except in the course of legal proceedings

to which the United States is a party, or

for the purpose of securing compliance

with this Final Judgment, or as

otherwise required by law.

D. If at the time information or

documents are furnished by a defendant

to plaintiff, defendant represents and

identifies in writing the material in any

such information or documents to

which a claim of protection may be

asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

defendant marks each pertinent page of

such material, ‘‘Subject to claim of

protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,’’ then

ten (10) days’ notice shall be given by

plaintiff to defendant prior to divulging

such material in any legal proceeding

(other than a grand jury proceeding), so

that defendant shall have an

opportunity to apply to this Court for

protection pursuant to Rule 26(c)(7) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

E. Nothing set forth in this Final

Judgment shall prevent the Antitrust

Division from utilizing other

investigative alternatives, such as Civil

Investigative Demand process provided

by 15 U.S.C. 1311–1314 or a federal

grand jury, to determine if a defendant

has complied with this Final Judgment.

IX. Ten-Year Expiration

This Final Judgment will expire on

the tenth anniversary of its date of entry.

X. Construction, Enforcement,

Modification and Compliance

Jurisdiction is retained by the Court

for the purpose of enabling any of the

parties to this Final Judgment to apply

to this Court at any time for such further

orders or directions as may be necessary

or appropriate for the construction or

carrying out of this Final Judgment, for

the modification of any of its provisions,

for its enforcement or compliance, and

for the punishment of any violation of

its provisions.

XI. Public Interest

Entry of this Final Judgment is in the

public interest.

Dated: lll.

United States District Judge.

Competitive Impact Statement

Pursuant to Section 2 of the Antitrust

Procedures and Penalties Act (‘‘APPA’’),

15 U.S.C. 16(b), the United States files

this Competitive Impact Statement

relating to the proposed final judgment

in United States v. Tom Paige Catering

Co. and Valley Foods, Inc., submitted

for entry in this civil antitrust

proceeding.

I. Nature and Purpose of the

Proceedings

On December 16, 1997 the United

States filed a civil antitrust complaint

under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, as

amended, 15 U.S.C. 4, alleging that the

above-named defendants combined and

conspired to lessen and eliminate

competition on food service contracts

with the Cleveland, Ohio, Head Start

program, in violation of Section 1 of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

The complaint seeks a judgment by

the Court declaring that the defendants

engaged in an unlawful combination in

restraint of trade in violation of the

Sherman Act. It also seeks an order by

the Court to enjoin the defendants from

any such activities or other activities

having a similar purpose or effect in the

future.

The United States and defendants

have stipulated that the proposed final

judgment may be entered after

compliance with the APPA, unless the

United States withdraws its consent.

The Court’s entry of the proposed

final judgment will terminate this civil

action against these defendants, except

that the Court will retain jurisdiction

over the matter for possible further

proceedings to construe, modify or

enforce the judgment, or to punish

violations of any of its provisions.

II. Description of the Practices Giving

Rise to the Alleged Violations of the

Antitrust Laws

Tom Paige Catering (‘‘Paige’’) is an

Ohio corporation doing business in

greater Cleveland, Ohio. Valley Foods,

Inc. (‘‘Valley’’) is a Ohio corporation

with its principal place of business in

Youngstown, Ohio. Both Paige and

Valley have been engaged in the

business of preparing and serving meals

on a contract basis.

Since at least 1991, Paige and Valley

have bid on contracts for meals to

children enrolled in the Cleveland Head

Start program. Head Start is a program

which provides comprehensive

developmental services for low-income,

pre-school children, ages three to five,

and social services for their families.
67900 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 249 / Tuesday, December 30, 1997 / Notices

The meals for the children enrolled in

the program are funded entirely by the

federal government through the United

States Department of Agriculture. The

funds are administered by the State of

Ohio’s Department of Education and

managed, locally, by sponsoring

organizations. The Cleveland Head Start

program is sponsored by the Council for

Economic Opportunity in Greater

Cleveland (‘‘CEOGC’’), a not for profit

organization. The GEOGC solicits bids

on contracts for breakfasts, lunches, and

snacks for the Head Start program in

accordance with regulations

promulgated by the United States

Department of Agriculture and the State

of Ohio. The annual value of these

contracts has ranged in recent years

from around $300,000 to over $500,000.

Since at least September 1992, Paige

and Valley have been the only bidders

on the meal contracts with Head Start.

Beginning in September of 1994, Paige

and Valley bid as a joint venture. The

purpose of their joint venture was to

illegally end competition between them.

This joint venture suppressed and

eliminated competition among the

defendants in the provision of food

service contracts to Head Start and

deprived tax payers of free and open

competition in the sale of food

contracting services to Head Start. After

the joint venture began, the cost of

meals to Head Start did in fact increase.

By way of example, Valley’s winning

bid in September 1993 included a bid of

$1.01 per meal for cold lunches. In

1994, the joint venture obtained $1.70

per meal for cold lunches. It is likely

that at least part of the increase in prices

was due to lack of competition between

Paige and Valley. Paige and Valley’s

joint venture is a contract, combination,

or conspiracy in restraint of trade in

violation of 15 U.S.C. 1.

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final

Judgment

The United States and the defendants

have stipulated that a final judgment, in

the form filed with the Court, may be

entered by the Court at any time after

compliance with the APPA, 15 U.S.C.

16(b)–(h). The proposed final judgment

provides that the entry of the final

judgment does not constitute any

evidence against or an admission by any

party with respect to any issue of fact

or law. Under the provisions of Section

2(e) of the APPA, entry of the proposed

final judgment is conditioned upon the

Court finding that its entry will be in the

public interest.

The proposed final judgment contains

three principal forms of relief. First, the

defendants are ordered to dissolve the

joint venture formed by them on April

1, 1994. Second, the defendants are

enjoined from engaging in conduct,

either among themselves or with other

competitors, that could have similar

anticompetitive effects. Third, the

proposed final judgment places

affirmative obligations on the

defendants to pursue a compliance

program directed toward avoiding a

repetition of their anticompetitive

behavior.

A. Prohibited Conduct

Section IV of the proposed final

judgment orders the dissolution of the

defendants’ joint venture. Section V

broadly enjoins each defendant from

agreeing with other food service

contractors to fix prices on food service

contracts (V(A)); from participating in

any future discussions or

communications with other food service

contractors regarding the prices quoted

on food service contracts (V(B); from

entering into territorial or customer

allocation agreements with other food

service contractors (V(C)); and from

entering into any agreements regarding

food service contracts with any nondefendant without notifying the United

States (V(D)).

B. Defendants’ Affirmative Obligations

Section VI requires that within thirty

(30) days of entry of the final judgment,

each defendant adopt an affirmative

compliance program directed toward

ensuring that its employees comply

with the antitrust laws. More

specifically, the program must include

the designation of an Antitrust

Compliance Officer responsible for

compliance with the final judgment,

and reporting any violations of its terms.

It further requires that each defendant

furnish a copy of the final judgment,

within sixty (60) days of the date of its

entry, to each of its officers and

directors and each of its employees who

is engaged in or has responsibility for or

authority over pricing of food service

contracts and to certify within seventyfive (75) days that it has distributed

those copies and designated an

Antitrust Compliance Officer. Copies of

the final judgment also must be

distributed to anyone who becomes

such an officer, director or employee

within thirty (30) days of holding that

position and to all such individuals

annually.

Furthermore, Section IV requires each

defendant to brief each officer, director

and employee engaged in or having

responsibility over pricing of food

service contracts as to the defendant’s

policy regarding compliance with the

Sherman Act and with the final

judgment, including the advice that his

or her violation of the final judgment

could result in a conviction for

contempt of court and imprisonment or

fine and that the defendant will make

legal advice available to such persons

regarding compliance questions or

problems.

Section VII requires each defendant

provide annual certification to the

plaintiff of the fact and manner of its

compliance. Each defendant annually

must obtain (and maintain)

certifications from the persons

designated in Section VI. Each such

person must certify that the

aforementioned briefing, advice and

copy of the final judgment were

received and understood and that he or

she is not aware of any violation of the

final judgment that has not been

reported to the Antitrust Compliance

officer.

Under Section VIII of the final

judgment, the Justice Department will

have access, upon reasonable notice, to

each defendant’s records and personnel

in order to determine compliance with

the judgment.

D. Scope of the Proposed Judgment

(1) Persons Bound by the Judgment

The proposed judgment expressly

provides in Section III that its

provisions apply to each of the

defendants, to each of its officers,

directors, agents and employees, to each

of its subsidiaries, successors and

assigns, and to all other persons who

receive actual notice of the terms of

judgment.

In addition, section III of the

judgment prohibits each of the

defendants from selling or transferring

all or substantially all of its stock or

assets unless the acquiring party files

with the Court its consent to be bound

by the provisions of the judgment.

(2) Duration of the Judgment

Section IX provides that the judgment

will expire on the tenth anniversary of

its entry.

E. Effect of the Proposed Judgment on

Competition

The prohibition terms of Section IV

and Section V of the judgment are

designed to ensure that each defendant

will act independently in determining

the prices, and terms and conditions at

which it will enter into food service

contracts, and that there will be no

conspiratorial restraints on the

competition for food service contracts.

The affirmative obligations of Sections

VI and VII are designed to insure that

each corporate defendant’s employees

are aware of their obligations under the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 249 / Tuesday, December 30, 1997 / Notices 67901

decree in order to avoid a repetition of

behavior that occurred limiting

competition for food service contracts.

Compliance with the proposed

judgment will prevent joint ventures

that illegally restrict competition or

foster price collusion and allocation of

sales, markets, and customers by the

defendants with each other or between

them and other food service contractors.

IV. Remedies Available to Potential

Private Plaintiffs

After entry of the proposed final

judgment, any potential plaintiff who

might have been damaged by the alleged

violation will retain the same right to

sue for monetary damages and any other

legal and equitable remedies which that

person may have had if the proposed

judgment had not been entered. The

proposed judgment may not be used,

however, as prima facie evidence in

litigation, pursuant to Section 5(a) of the

Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.

16(a).

V. Procedures Available for

Modification of the Proposed Final

Judgment

The proposed final judgment is

subject to a stipulation between the

government and the defendants which

provides that the government may

withdraw its consent to the proposed

judgment any time before the Court has

found that entry of the proposed

judgment is in the public interest. By its

terms, the proposed judgment provides

for the Court’s retention of jurisdiction

of this action in order to permit any of

the parties to apply to the Court for such

orders as may be necessary or

appropriate for the modification of the

final judgment.

As provided by the APPA (15 U.S.C.

16), any person wishing to comment

upon the proposed judgment may, for a

sixty-day (60) period subsequent to the

publishing of this document in the

Federal Register, submit written

comments to the United States

Department of Justice, Antitrust

Division, Attention: William J.

Oberdick, Acting Chief, Great Lakes

Office, Plaza 9 Building; 55 Erieview

Plaza, Suite 700; Cleveland, Ohio

44114–1816. Such comments and the

government’s response to them will be

filed with the Court and published in

the Federal Register. The government

will evaluate all such comments to

determine whether there is any reason

for withdrawal of its consent to the

proposed judgment.

VI. Alternative to the Proposed Final

Judgment

The alternative to the proposed final

judgment considered by the Antitrust

Division will a full trial of the issues on

the merits and on relief. The Division

considers the substantive language of

the proposed judgment to be of

sufficient scope and effectiveness to

make litigation on the issues

unnecessary, as the judgment provides

appropriate relief against the violations

alleged in the complaint.

VII. Determinative Materials and

Documents

No materials or documents were

considered determinative by the United

States in formulating the proposed Final

Judgment. Therefore, none are being

filed pursuant to the APPA, 15 U.S.C.

16(b).

Respectfully submitted,

Donald M. Lyon (19207–WA)

William J. Oberdick (2235703–NY)

Acting Chief, Great Lakes Office.

Attorneys, Antitrust Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, Great Lakes Office,

55 Erieview Plaza, Suite 700, Cleveland, Ohio

44114, Telephone: (216) 552–4080.

[FR Doc. 97–33820 Filed 12–29–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–11–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

Agency Information Collection

Activities Extension of a Currently

Approved Collection; Comment

Request

ACTION: Application for Procurement

Quota for Controlled Substances.

The information collection is

published to obtain comments from the

public and affected agencies. Comments

are encouraged and will be accepted

until March 2, 1998.

We are requesting written comments

and suggestions from the public and

affected agencies concerning the

collection of information. Your

comments should address one or more

of the following four points:

1. Evaluate whether the collection of

information is necessary for the proper

performance of the functions of the

agency, including whether the

information will have practical utility;

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the

agencies estimate of the burden of the

collection of information, including the

validity of the methodology and

assumptions used;

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and

clarity of the information to be

collected; and

4. Minimize the burden of the

collection of information on those who

are to respond, including through the

use of appropriate automated,

electronic, mechanical, or other

technological collection techniques or

other forms of information technology,

e.g., permitting electronic submission of

responses.

Comments and/or suggestions

regarding the item(s) contained in this

notice, especially regarding the

estimated public burden and associated

response time should be directed to Mr.

Frank Sapienza, 202–307–7183, Chief,

Drug and Chemical Evaluation Section,

Office of Diversion Control, Drug

Enforcement Administration,

Washington, DC 20537. If you have

additional comments, suggestions, or

need a copy of the information

collection instrument with instructions,

or additional information, please

contact Mr. Frank Sapienza.

Additionally, comments may also be

submitted to the Department of Justice

(DOJ), Justice Management Division,

Information Management and Security

Staff, Attention: Department Clearance

Officer, Suite 850, Washington Center,

1001 G Street, NW., Washington, DC

20530. Additional comments may be

submitted to DOJ via facsimile at 202–

514–1590.

Overview of this information

collection:

1. Type of Information Collection:

Extension of a currently approved

collection.

2. Title of the Form/Collection:

Application for Procurement Quota for

Controlled Substances. Agency form

number: DEA Form 250; Applicable

component of the Department of Justice

sponsoring the collection: Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration, Department of Justice.

3. Affected public who will be asked

or required to respond, as well as a brief

abstract: Primary: Business or other forprofit. Other: None.

Title 21, CFR, 1303.12 requires

registered dosage form manufacturers

who wish to purchase controlled

substances in Schedule II to apply on

DEA Form 250 for procurement quotas

which limit purchase quantities. The

information collected is used for

establishing quotas and controlling

procurement thereof.

4. An estimate of the total estimated

number of respondents and the amount

of time estimated for an average

respondent to respond: 531 respondents

at 1 response per year at 1 hour per

response.