UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OLUWAROTIMI ODUTOLA, Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:21-cv-3212-RCL ROBERT P. FLOYD, eta!., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION What duties do an opposing counsel and an opposing party owe to their opponent in a litigation? That is the question Oluwarotimi Odutola raises in his presentprose lawsuit against the opposing lawyer and party in his prior lawsuit against Branch Banking and Trust Company ("BB&T"), where Mr. Odutola used to work. He filed his first lawsuit against BB&T alleging discrimination and retaliation. Now, he argues that BB&T as well as its lawyer, Robert P. Floyd, III, committed fraud, intentional infliction ofemotional distress, and breaches ofthe D.C. Rules ofProfessional Conduct during the discovery process ofthat first lawsuit
. The defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Odutola's present lawsuit, arguing that Mr. Odutola does not state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted. 

### It has now come to this Court's attention that Mr. Odutolahas failed to adequately invoke this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. On that basis, the Court, sua sponte, will DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Mr. Odutola's present lawsuit. 

### I. BACKGROUND 

### In October 27, 2017, Mr. Odutola filed a pro se lawsuit against his former employer, BB&T. Odutolav. BranchBanking& Tr
. Co., 321 F. Supp. 3d 67, 70-71 (D.D.C. 20l8)("Odutola I"). Mr. Odutola alleged that he was a personal banker at BB&T from October 17, 2015 to 

### 1November 22, 2016. Id. at 70. He further stated that, during his time at the bank, he (1) was convinced to violate BB&T's corporate policy against leaving a branch with only one teller working, (2) faced discriminatory remarks, (3) was confronted by an irate customer which the branch manager did nothing to address, ( 4) faced retaliation for threatening to report the branch manager to the federal government and the human resources department, and (5) was ultimately placed on administrative leave andthen terminated after calling the police regarding the customer confrontation. Id. at 70-71. He alleged that his termination was unlawful and brought claims for negligence, hostile work environment, violation ofpublicpolicy, and retaliation. Id.
. at 71. Thatlawsuit was dismissedby this Court in 2018 afterBB&Tmovedto dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted. Id. at 76. Mr. Odutola then obtained counsel and filed an amended complaint after which the case proceeded to discovery. Odutola v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 1:18-cv-94 (RCL), 2021 WL 5906105, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2021) ("Odutola II"). The case was then dismissed again after Mr. Odutola and his counsel "failed to prosecute his case, 'specifically in failing to attend the September 17 status conference and generally throughout the process of litigating th[e] case' by failing to 'manifest reasonabl_e diligence in pursuing [his] case."' Id. at *2 (internal citation omitted) (second alteration in the original). Consequently, this Court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice and then subsequentJy rejected Mr. Odutola's request for reconsideration orrelieffrom thatjudgment. Id. at *2, *6. Mr. Odutola now brings the present lawsuit against BB&T and its counsel in the prior lawsuit. Compl., ECF No. 1. He brings claims for reliefunder the D.C. Rules ofProfessional Conduct as well as for fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional infliction ofemotional distress while alleging damages of$47 million. Compl. 

## ,r,r 22-50. He invokes the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction by citing to D.C. Code § 11-921 and §28-4507. Compl. 

## ,r 9. However, neither of

2those code sections support subject-matterjurisdiction in this Court and Mr. Odutola does not adequately allege a federal question or diversity ofcitizenship as a proper basis ofsubject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, after reviewing the record and relevant law, this Court mustsua sponte dismiss Mr. Odutola's lawsuit. 

### II. LEGAL STANDARDS In order for a lower federal court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a case or controversy, Congress must provide such jurisdiction by statute within the bounds of the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction inArticle III. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Generally, the parameters ofsubject-matterjurisdiction for lower federal courts are set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. The former, setting out what is known as federal question jurisdiction, provides for jurisdiction when "civil actions aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties ofthe United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The latter, setting forth what is known as diversity jurisdiction, provides for jurisdiction over civil actions where the amount in controversy is in excess of$75,000 and there is diverse State citizenship between the parties. Id § 1332. Adequate grounds for subject-matterjurisdictionmustbepiedby theplaintiff, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and "[i]fthe court determines at any time that itlacks subject-matterjurisdiction,the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In other words, even when "neither party presents the issue, a court must dismiss a case when it lacks subject matterjurisdiction." Masoud
v. Suliman, 816 F. Supp. 2d 77, 79 (D.D.C. 2011). And while the Court may look outside ofthe complaint for support, id at 80, the Court must be able to assure itselfthat it is acting within its jurisdictional authority. Id at 79. It is the "[p ]!aintiff [who] bears the burden ofproving subject matterjurisdictionby a preponderance ofthe evidence." Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp.

32d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000). Federal courts will consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true for this analysis. Khan v. Holder, 134 F. Supp. 3d 244,249 (D.D.C. 2015). A plaintiffproceedingpro se is held to a "less stringent" standard than a lawyer, and a court must construe the plaintiffs claims liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, apro se plaintiffis not exempt from therequirements ofthe federal rules. SeeAtherton
v. D.C. Office ofthe Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009). That includes rules for alleging subject-matterjurisdiction. See, e.g., Xiu Jian Sun v. Obama, No. 1:21-cv-1442 (JDB), 2021 WL 2291941, at *l (D.D.C. June 4, 2021), aff'dsub nom. Sun v. Obama, No. 21-5147, 2021 WL 4765429 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1207 (2022). III. DISCUSSION Mr. Odutola does not adequately allege any form of subject-matterjurisdiction. Even liberally construing his complaint and reviewing the record, the Court is not satisfied that it has jurisdictional authority overhis lawsuit. Therefore, the Court must dismiss this case. A. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Under the D.C. Code Provisions Mr. Odutola cites to D.C. Code § 11-921 and § 28-4507 to allege that this Court has subject-matterjurisdictionfor his claims. Starting withthose provisions ofthe D.C. Code, neither provides subject-matterjurisdiction to this Court, which is the U.S. District Court for the District ofColumbia. Instead, the first code provision explains that the Superior Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction over certain civil actions brought in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code Ann. § 11-921 (West) ("Except as provided in subsection (b), the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in the District of Columbia."). Thatprovisiondoes not serve as abasis for subject-matterjurisdictionforthe federal courts. See Simon v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 3d244,245 (D.D.C. 2016). The latter code provision governs when the Attorney General ofthe District ofColumbia may bring lawsuits. D.C. Code
4Ann. § 28-4507 (West). It similarly does not provide this Court withjurisdiction, nor is relevant to this case. B. The Court Does Not Have Federal Question Jurisdiction Mr. Odutola chose federal questionjurisdictionas the appropriate basis forjurisdiction on the civil cover sheet he filed alongside his complaint. ECF No. 1-1. at 

### I. Federal question jurisdictionis appropriatewhenthe case "arises under" federal law. "To determine whether a case arises underfederal law, courts apply the well-pleaded complaintrule, whichprovides thatfederal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented onthe face ofthe plaintiffsproperly pleaded complaint." Organic Consumers Ass'n v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 344, 355 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotationmarks omitted) (quotingBeneficialNat'!Bankv.Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12 (2003)). Thejurisdictional distinction between District ofColumbia law and federal law is functionally the same for the District ofColumbia as thejurisdictional distinction between any State court and the accompanying federal district courts ofthat State. See Shutackv. Shutack, 516 F. Supp 219, 225 (D.D.C. 1981) (describing thejurisdiction ofthe Superior Court for the District of Columbia to be "equivalent to a hypothetical state trial court withjurisdiction in the state over all court business
...."); D.C. Ass'n of CharteredPub. Sch. v. D.C., 930 F.3d 487,491 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that "laws applicable exclusively to the District ofColumbia" do not provide federal questionjurisdiction (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1366)). 1

1Ofcourse, the District ofColumbia is in a somewhatunique position comparedto a State. Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Reorganization Act of 1970 ("DCRA") explains and codifies that there is ajurisdictional distinction betweenthe SuperiorCourt for the District ofColumbiaandthis Court. The DCRA separated outthis Court as a more traditional Article III court. D.C. Code§ 11-101 (West). There are specifically enumerated exceptions, but they have limited effect. See D.C. Code§ 11-501 (West) (establishing that the exceptions are only valid for periods of 18 and 30 months from the date ofenactment ofthe DCRA); see also Thompson v. UnitedStates, 548 F.2d 1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing that Congressprovidedfor gradualtransfer of jurisdiction in theActto avoid prejudicingparties already litigating).
5None ofMr. Odutola's claimsraise therequired federal question. The claims offraudulent misrepresentation and intentional infliction ofemotional distress are State law claims and do not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties ofthe United States. Compl. 

### ,i,i 42-44 (relying on the local law ofthe District ofColumbia for fraudulent misrepresentation), 

### ,i,i 46-49 (relying on the local lawofthe District ofColumbiafor intentional inflictionofemotional distress). Similarly, the claims under the D.C. Rules ofProfessional Conduct, ifactionable, arise under State law as well since the Rules are generated by the District ofColumbia Court ofAppeals, a _local, rather than federal, institution, for local use. 

### See Ford v. Tait, 163 F. Supp. 2d 57, 59 (D.D.C. 2001). And while it is true that Mr. Odutola's claims arose out ofthe discovery process for a federal lawsuit, that does not generate a federal issue "(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress." 

### Organic Consumers Ass'n, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

### Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,258 (2013)). C. The PlaintiffHas Not Demonstrated that the Court Has DiversityJurisdiction Because the plaintiffis proceeding

### pro se, this Court will liberally construe his filing to also allegejurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1332. Nevertheless, the complaint fails to satisfy the requirements ofpleading for diversityjurisdiction. "[I]t is the invoking party's burden to showthat: (1) complete diversity exists; and (2) the claim in good faith exceeds $75,000." 

### Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55 (D.D.C. 2004)
.

. The "complete diversity" requirement is satisfied only if

### "each defendant is a citizen ofa different State from 

### epch plaintiff." 

### Owen Equip. & 

### Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (emphases in original). "[D]iversity must exist at the time that the action is commenced." 

### Meng, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 56. And "the citizenship of

### every party to [an] action [in diversity] must be distinctly alleged [in the complaint] and cannot be established presumptively or by mere 6inference." Id. at 55 (emphasis added). A corporate defendant "is a citizen ofboth (a) the state of its incorporation, and (b) the state in which it maintains its principal place ofbusiness." Odutola 

### I, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 71. Meanwhile, "[a]n individual is deemed a citizen ofthe State of his domicile." Edwards v. Freeman, 951 F. Supp. 2d 120, 124 (D.D.C. 2013). 2 In sum, Mr. Odutola neededto allege, inhis complaint, the citizenship ofbothhimselfandthe two defendants. Mr. Odutola has failed to allege the citizenship ofMr. Floyd. The complaint states that Mr. Floyd'semployer, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, is located at 12500FairLakes Circle, Suite 300. Compl. 

## ,r 11. The cover of the complaint places that location in Fairfax, Virginia. Compl. at 1. That is the extent to which Mr. Odutola indicates Mr. Floyd's State citizenship. However, Mr. Odutola sued Mr. Floyd as an individual rather than the law firm for which he practices. Compl. 

## ,r 13. Therefore, diversityjurisdiction requires allegations as to Mr. Floyd's domicile. Becausethere are no such allegations, and this Court, despite searching review, cannot otherwise assure itselfthat Mr. Floyd and Mr. Odutola have different State citizenships, the lawsuit cannot be maintained onthe grounds ofdiversityjurisdiction. See ECF No. 1 at 5, 8, 9, 28 (mentioning Mr. Floydas practicing inVirginiabutnot identifying oralleging his domicile). * * 

### * Because Mr. Odutola has not adequately pied subject-matterjurisdiction, this Court must dismiss his lawsuit. The Court will not rule on defendants' motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim because this Court does not have subject-matterjurisdiction over the case. See Dewees v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 3d 96, 102 (D.D.C. 2017), aff'd, 767 F. App'x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Indeed, because Mr. Odutola may try bringing his claims anew in D.C. Superior Court, or pursue

2 "Domicile is determinedbytwo factors: physical presence in a state, and intent to remain there for an unspecified or indefinite period oftime
." Lopes v. JetSetDC, LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d 555,559 (D.D
.C
. 2014) (quoting Prakash v.Am
. Univ. , 727F.2d1174, 1180 (D.C
. Cir
. 1984)).
7his allegations infront ofa professional licensing entity, it would be doubly inappropriate for this Court to opine onthe defendants' motion. IV. CONCLUSION Based on the reasomng above, this Court will 

### sua sponte DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE theplaintiff's lawsuit for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdiction. The Courtwill further DENYthe defendants' motionto dismiss as moot. The Court will GRANT the plaintiffsmotionfor leave to file a surreply. A separate order will issue.

Date: September 1-J 2022 

# ~ e,. ;(~ Royce C. Lamberth United States District Judge

8