IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 18, 2018 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMIE L. WOODS

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County

No. 2016-CR-330 Jill Bartee Ayers, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2017-01760-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

On April 28, 2017, the Defendant, Jamie L. Woods, entered a guilty plea to theft of

property valued at more than $10,000.00 and received a three-year sentence of probation

with the amount of restitution to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing,

the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $19,442.36 in restitution at $540 per month. 

In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

determining the amount of restitution and the Defendant’s ability to pay the restitution. 

Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed;

Remanded for Entry of Corrected Judgment

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Roger E. Nell (on appeal), District Public Defender and Rosemary Sprague (at trial),

Assistant Public Defender for the appellant, Jamie L. Woods.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M. Todd Ridley, Assistant

Attorney General; John W. Carney, District Attorney General; and Jason White, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The State provided the following factual basis in support of the Defendant’s guilty

plea:

08/02/2018
2

[I]n February 2015, [the] [Defendant] [was] declared the manager of Old

Hickory Tool and Die [at] their White House office and manufacturing

center. At that time, he engaged in conduct specifically in the Fall of 2015,

that allowed where he would go in and the one thing he was doing, was he

was taking what he termed ‘loans’ from the company and getting them to

write him a check, stating that it was a loan, but he did not have the owner’s

permission and basically didn’t ever repay any of this. As well, he was

using company credit cards for personal business. Also using the

company’s fuel card for personal fuel as well. [H]e had the bookkeeper

write him five vacation checks in about a three month period of time,

basically ordering, hey I need a vacation check when he did not have that

earned vacation time. In total, with all the acts . . . during this time frame

as the manager, he took over ten thousand dollars from the company. 

The sole dispute in this appeal concerns the amount of restitution owed by the

Defendant to his former employer, Old Hickory Tool and Die in White House, Tennessee

(hereinafter “the company”). The trial court ordered a total amount of $19,442.36 in

restitution, of which the Defendant concedes that he owes $8500 in unauthorized loans

and $5,608.74 in credit and debit charges.1 The Defendant and the State further agree

that he has repaid the company $4200 in restitution. The Defendant contests the

remaining amount of $9500, which he contends represents independent sub-contractor

work performed for the company. We will therefore limit our factual recitation to this

issue. 

At the August 4, 2017 restitution hearing, the office manager for the company

testified that prior to the offense the Defendant was employed as a design engineer and

tool maker and paid an hourly rate of $29. On February 23, 2015, the Defendant was

promoted to plant manager, received an annual salary of $105,000 plus health insurance,

and became her boss. The office manager explained that she paid the Defendant for subcontracting work while he was plant manager similarly to how he was paid for the

unauthorized loans and vacation checks:

He would come into my office and ask me to write a check for

contract work. He gave me the job that the work was performed on. I

don’t even have record of him remitting an invoice to me, which would

have been proper procedure, that being as though he was my boss, I did

what I was asked to do and there were three checks written.

 

1

The Defendant points out, and the State does not dispute, that there are calculation errors in

arriving at the total amount owed for the unauthorized credit/debit card charges.
3

The three checks were issued by the office manager to the Defendant for sub-contracting

work on: (1) November 3, 2015 in the amount of $2500; (2) December 3, 2015 in the

amount of $2000; and (3) December 28, 2015 in the amount of $5000. In total, the

Defendant received $9500 in payments from the company for sub-contracting work while

he was plant manager. The office manager did not verify the sub-contracting work with

the owner of the company. 

On cross-examination, the office manager confirmed that prior to the Defendant’s

promotion to plant manager, he performed “a lot” of sub-contracting work and submitted

invoices to her for payment. She agreed that the issue at the hearing was not whether the

Defendant had in fact performed the sub-contracting work while he was plant manager

but rather whether the payments were included in his annual salary. She was not present

during the negotiations of the Defendant’s “terms and salary” for his promotion to plant

manager. 

The owner of the company testified in large part consistently with the testimony of

the office manager. In February 2015, the Defendant was promoted to plant manager

following the unexpected death of the previous manager. Before he was promoted, the

Defendant worked for the company as a “designer as well as a die maker” and paid

hourly. The owner could not recall if she allowed the Defendant to perform subcontractor work before he became the plant manager, but she said it was “very possible.” 

The Defendant gave the owner the following impression during his interview for plant

manager:

My previous plant manager was at a salary of [$83,440] and when my son

and I talked to [the Defendant], he wanted a much higher salary and at the

time, I couldn’t justify it, but in speaking with him, he said look at it this

way. You have three people at this salary. You have a plant manager, you

have a designer and you also have a die maker. So, he was skilled in the

die making and the designing.

Asked if there was a discussion about the Defendant’s “contract work” or if the

Defendant would be paid for his design work while he was plant manager, the owner

replied, “No, that was part of his job description.” The owner agreed to pay the

Defendant $25,000 more than the previous plant manager with the understanding that the

Defendant’s design work would be included in his salary. The owner testified that she

did not authorize the three checks issued to the Defendant for sub-contractor work. On

cross-examination, the owner agreed that there was no written contract with the terms of

the Defendant’s employment as the plant manager. When confronted with the fact that

the Defendant made more money the year before he became plant manager, the owner

explained that the Defendant worked overtime and “was pulling in some money.”
4

The Defendant testified and disputed the company owner’s understanding of his

job description and salary as a plant manager. He stated,

[T]he previous plant manager, he only worked seven hours a day, thirtyfive hours a week, making eighty – he did make ninety something thousand

and then he cut it down to like eighty something you know, prior to him

passing away. No other plant manager currently or in the past has ever had

to do design work also or go be a tool maker or anything like that. And

also, they didn’t have the software to do the work. I owned the software

myself. They didn’t even have the ability there to do the work besides my

software....

[T]hat was not my understanding whatsoever because the whole thing – the

only thing I asked for is what I took at that I would make what I made the

previous year. That’s the only thing on the salary that I asked, and had the

same exact perks [of the prior manager].

The Defendant provided his 2014 W-2, admitted as an exhibit, showing that he made

$108,652 the year before he became plant manager. He insisted that he would not have

accepted the promotion to plant manager for less money than he made the previous year. 

He further testified that while he was plant manager, he worked 80 to 100 hours a week.

The presentence report, admitted as an exhibit, showed the Defendant with the

following debts:

Utilities (Monthly) $980

Phone/Internet (Monthly) $564

Chapter 13 Bankruptcy $32,000

Car Insurance (Monthly) $158

The Defendant elaborated on the above monthly expenses during his testimony at

the hearing, detailed in the below chart:

Electric $225-$250

Water $125-$150

Internet $128

Cell Phone $442

Dental $100

Car Insurance $614 (every 3 months)

Hospital Bills $557 (remaining balance)
5

Bankruptcy $108 (weekly)

Food $600-800

Gas $50 (weekly)

Rent $800

At the time of the hearing, the Defendant was employed, making $25.00 an hour,

and sought overtime when possible. He testified that he lived with his girlfriend with

whom he shared one child. Three teenage children also lived in the home permanently

and one smaller child lived there every other week. His girlfriend did not work or assist

him with the bills.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $19,442.36

for a three-year period in monthly payments of $540. In doing so, the trial court reasoned

as follows:

The contract pay is a disputed issue. The total amount of those was

nine thousand five hundred dollars. The Court takes into account the

testimony of [the owner] about when they were negotiating the pay. Also,

the pay as plant manager, and then the previous plant manager’s payment

was substantially less. One of the things that I heard several folks talk

about is that typically that contract work, there were invoices submitted and

they would have been paid. There were not invoices that the Court has to

consider. [The office manager] indicated that she received no invoices for

those. The Court finds that in light of the salary that . . . the defendant was

making and the fact that there are no invoices, I am going to award nine

thousand five hundred dollars in restitution. . . .

So that total is twenty-three thousand, six forty-two, thirty-six. It is

undisputed that three thousand two hundred dollars was paid by the fifty

dollar a month deduction and then another one thousand was paid by the

Defendant. And so, that should leave our total at nineteen thousand, four

forty-two, thirty-six.

I will just comment on – that is the amount that the Court is going to

award. There has been testimony about his ability to pay. He’s got good

income. I find some of those bills to be kind of excessive and over the top

in choices that he has made when he took money from this company that he

admitted to, and pled guilty on and so considering all those issues of his

ability to pay, I find that to be a reasonable number that can be paid in this

three year term. Thank you.
6

It is from this order that the Defendant now appeals.

ANALYSIS

The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the

pecuniary loss and in determining his ability to pay restitution. The State argues, and we

agree, that the evidence at the restitution hearing supports the trial court’s restitution

order. 

We review a trial court’s restitution order for an abuse of discretion, granting a

presumption of reasonableness to within range sentences reflecting a proper application

of the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273,

278-79 (Tenn. 2012); State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316 (Tenn. 2014); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-104(c)(2) (restitution is authorized by the statute governing alternative sentences). “A

trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an

illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or

applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329

S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). While there is no set formula for determining restitution,

State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), above all, the restitution

amount must be reasonable. State v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994). When ordering restitution, the trial court must base the amount on the pecuniary

loss to the victim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304(b); Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 747. 

“Pecuniary loss” is statutorily defined as “[a]ll special damages, but not general damages,

as substantiated by evidence in the record or as agreed to by the defendant.” Tenn. Code

Ann. §40-35-304(e)(1); State v. David Allan Bohanon, No. M2012-02366-CCA-R3CD,

2013 WL 5777254, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2013). Moreover, “[i]n determining

the amount and method of payment or other restitution, the court shall consider the

financial resources and future ability of the defendant to pay or perform.” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-304(d); State v. Bottoms, 87 S.W.3d 95, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). This

is because “[a]n order of restitution which obviously cannot be fulfilled serves no

purpose for the appellant or the victim.” Johnson, 968 S.W.2d at 886.

Here, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by including the subcontracting work in the pecuniary loss. He essentially argues that this work was not

contemplated as part of his plant manager job description or salary; therefore, he does not

owe the company money for the work performed. In contrast to the Defendant’s position,

the record shows that the company owner promoted the Defendant to plant manager with

the understanding that his design work would be included in his salary. The company

owner paid the Defendant $25,000 more than the prior plant manager based on her belief

that the Defendant would serve three roles: a plant manager, a designer, and a die maker. 

By its ruling, the trial court implicitly accredited the testimony of the company owner
7

over that of the Defendant. Moreover, the trial court emphasized that the Defendant’s

sub-contracting work prior to becoming plant manager was supported by invoices to the

company. Significantly, after he was promoted to plant manager, the Defendant failed to

provide the company with any invoices for his sub-contracting work. Based on this

evidence, the trial court properly determined that $9500 in sub-contracting work should

be included in the company’s pecuniary loss. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on

this issue.

The Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering

an amount of restitution that exceeded his ability to pay. Specifically, the Defendant

argues that the State failed to prove his ability to pay $540 per month and requests this

court to modify the restitution order in the amount of $200 per month, with the remaining

amount to be converted to a civil judgment. While we acknowledge, as argued by the

Defendant, that the State carries the burden of proving facts relevant to sentencing by a

preponderance of the evidence, see State v. Russell E. Mills, No. M1999-2505-CCA-R3-

CD, 2000 WL 1336685, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2000); State v. Carlton

Horton, No. E2010-02146-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2084001, at *4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App.

May 19, 2011), the burden of demonstrating the impropriety of a sentence falls on the

defendant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm‘n Cmt.; State v. Jennifer

Murray Jewell, No. M2015-02141-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 65242, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Jan. 6, 2017). An alternative sentence, as granted in this case, includes an order of

restitution.

Here, the Defendant received a three-year probationary sentence, and the trial

court ordered him to pay $540 per month to satisfy $19,442.36 in restitution owed. The

presentence report showed that the Defendant was in excellent physical and mental

health, gainfully employed, and made $25 an hour. The Defendant stated that he worked

overtime when possible, and at the hearing, the office manager and the company owner

affirmed the Defendant’s work ethic and his ability to “pull in a lot of money” based on

overtime. His ability to earn money based on overtime was buttressed by the fact that he

made $108,652 the year before he became plant manager. Although he testified that he

was not currently performing design work, he owned the software to do this work for his

former employer when necessary. In any event, assuming the Defendant works 40 hours

a week, he earns a minimum of $52,000 a year or $4333 per month. The Defendant’s

debts and assets as described in the pre-sentence report and through his testimony at the

hearing show his expenses as approximately $3320 per month. While we acknowledge

that the Defendant’s collective debts leave little room for any other family obligations he

may have, the record shows that the trial court considered his financial resources and

ability to pay as required by statute. Because the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in determining the Defendant’s ability to pay the restitution amount, he is not

entitled to relief.
8

CONCLUSION

As previously noted, there are calculation errors in the amount of restitution owed

for the undisputed credit card charges. While the proof showed an amount of $5,608.74,

the trial court’s calculation of the same reflects $5,642.36, resulting in a difference of

$33.62. As such, a remand is necessary for entry of a corrected order reflecting the

proper amount of restitution owed. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed. 

____________________________________

 CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE