UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ROBERT M. LANE, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. DR. VIKKI L. LANE; MR. BRUCE GLESBY; MS. MARISA BEUOY; GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP, Defendants - Appellees. No. 15-8092 (D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00061-ABJ) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , MATHESON , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Proceeding pro se, Robert Lane appeals the district court’ s dismissal of his claims for lack of standi ng. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 10, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I After Vikki and Robert Lane re ached a divorce settlement, Robert 1 filed for bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy trustee (the “Trustee”) initiated three adve rsary proceedings to recover assets that Robert had conveyed to affiliated trusts , shell companies, and family members. Eventually, Robert and the Trustee reached a global se ttlement resulting in the dismissal of the three adversary proceedings. The settlement provided that Robert and his affiliates would turn over all estate property, with certain exceptions, for disposition by the Trustee. Robert also ag reed that following execution of the agreement, he shall not have any standing to object , join, or otherwise be heard on any matter or proceeding in any pending or future matter in connection with administering [his] Bankruptcy Case ; this shall include, but not be limited to, approval of sett lements, sale of assets , allowance or payment of administrative expe nses, and allowance or payment of claims. He also agreed that he “shall not have standing or any right to pursue pre-petition claims or causes of action against any th ird-party or against any creditor in [his] bankruptcy case.” However, Robert later interfered with the Tr ustee’s ability to administer the estate by filing various documents in the bankruptcy court and otherwise failed to satisfy his ow n obligations under the agreement. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court sanctioned him twice for in terfering with the Tr ustee’s ability to administer the estate and for fai ling to satisfy his own obligations.

1 Because Vikki and Robert Lane share th e same last name, we refer to them by their first names in this order.3 In 2012, Vikki filed a proof of cl aim in the bankruptcy proceeding for $1,163,894, and, in April 2015, the Trust ee filed a settlement agreement in the bankruptcy court to resolve he r claim. In response, Robe rt filed this action in the District of Wyoming against Vikki and her attorneys. Although his complaint seeks damages for false statemen ts and fraud, each claim he advances constitutes a challenge to the resolution of Vikki’s proof of claim. Specificall y, he alleges fraud because the defendants: (1) filed a “false claim”; (2) as serted that their proof of claim is for child support when in actua lity it includes legal fe es and other items; (3) claimed a 10% interest rate, ra ther than the 7% rate he ar gues is permitted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court; (4) asked for penalties for past due child support even though California waives penalties for unempl oyed individuals; (5) claimed a spousal support buyout “when there was none”; (6 ) failed to properly account for certain payments; (7) requested lega l fees that the court had not awarded and that were contrary to a prenuptial agreement; and (8) c onspired to make fals e statements in an attempt to obtain bankruptcy assets. He also alleges th at attorney-defendants’ law firm failed to properly supervise them by a llowing them to partic ipate in the alleged fraud. In his complaint, Robert acknowledges that he only pursued this action in the district court because “[a] lthough this matter would norm ally be a bankruptcy court proceeding, Robert’s lack of standing in the bankruptcy c ourt requires this matter to be brought in U.S. District Court.” The defendants moved to dismiss Robert ’s complaint. Wh ile the motion was pending, the bankruptcy court approved the proposed settlement between Vikki and4 the Trustee allowing her to claim $895,01 5. The defendants filed a supplemental memorandum, asserting that th e settlement rendered the district court proceeding moot, and advancing a res judi cata defense. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Robe rt did not have standing becau se he waived standing in the global settlement agreement, and even if he had not waiv ed the issue, the claims he asserted rightfully belong to the Trustee. The district court order did not discuss mootness or res judicata. This appeal followed.
II The district court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Robert lacked standing. 2 We review the distri ct court’s determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Niemi v. Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1344 (10th Cir. 2014). As th e party invoking federal jurisd iction, Robert bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To meet his burden, he must show an “injury in fact.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). And “each elem ent must be supported in

2 The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing. In the bankruptcy context, we often apply a prude ntial standing requireme nt that “is more stringent . . . than the case or controversy standing requirem ent of Article III.” In re C.W. Mining Co., 636 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.5 ( 10th Cir. 2011) (quot ation omitted). Under Article III, a cognizable injury “need not be financ ial and need only be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action.” In re Alpex Comput. Corp., 71 F.3d 353, 357 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) ( quotation omitted). In contrast , in the bankruptcy context an appellant must be a “person aggrieved” to have pruden tial standing, as discussed infra. Id. However, the dis tinction is immaterial in the matter before us: the only injury Robert advances is a financial injury that would a llegedly result from payment of Vikki’s claim. Thus, if Robert’s alle ged injury is insufficient to show standing under the prudential “person aggrieved” sta ndard, see infra, he al so fails to show standing under the jurisdictiona l Article III standard.5 the same way as any other matter on whic h the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degr ee of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. At th e pleading stage, “[t]hr eadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, suppor ted by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). We agree with the district c ourt that Robert lacks standing. 3 Each of his claims alleges that Vikki’s claim on the bankruptcy estate was fraudulent in some way. Claims of fraud against a bankruptc y estate “are statut ory causes of action belonging to the trustee, not to the bankr upt, and the trustee as serts them for the benefit of the bankrupt’s cred itors, whose rights the trust ee enforces.” Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 43 6 (2d Cir. 1977). The debtor is not injured by such alleged fraud because, “[u]nless the estate is solv ent and excess will eventually go to the debtor, or unless the matter involves rights unique to the debtor, the debtor is not a party aggrieved by orders affecting the admini stration of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Weston, 18 F.3d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir. 1994). Robert’s argument to the contrary

3 Even if Robert demonstrated standi ng, his complaint am ounts to an attempt to circumvent the bankruptcy court proceedings . “It is for the c ourt of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected.” Celo tex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (quotation omitted). T hus, if Robert believes the decisions of the bankruptcy court are improper, the proper venues to ch allenge those decisions are the bankruptcy court and a federal district court or a ba nkruptcy appellate pane l through a direct appeal. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158. Robert instead agreed not to object in the bankruptcy proceedings. His attempt to coll aterally attack thos e proceedings “cannot be permitted . . . without se riously undercutting the orderly process of law.” Celotex, 514 U.S. at 313.6 rests on his bare conclusory assertions that if Vikki’s claim wa s not paid, the money would “otherwise be his.” 4 These conclusory statem ents are not sufficient to demonstrate an injury to support standing to challenge the administration of the bankruptcy estate. 5
III The district court’s dismissa l for lack of standing is AFFIRMED . Robert’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

4 In contrast to these bare assertions is Robert’s own concession that he lacks standing in the bankruptcy proceedings. In particular, he agreed that he “shall not have any standing to object, join, or otherwise be hear d on any matter or proceeding in any pending or future matter in conn ection with administering [his] Bankruptcy Case; this shall include . . . approval of settlements . . . and allowance or payment of claims.” We reject Robe rt’s contention that his co mplaint does not concern the bankruptcy court’s approval of settlements a nd allowance or paymen t of claims. To the contrary, the claims broug ht in this action fall square ly within the scope of his concession in the settlement agreement. Our holding finds support in—but does not depend on—this concession.

5 Robert also argues that the district c ourt abused its discre tion by entertaining the defendant’s supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss without allowing Robert to file a reply. Robert does not convincingly argue that accepting a supplemental memorandum, without more, amounts to an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Nichols on, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1993) (“District courts generally are afforded great discretion regarding trial procedure applications (including control of the docket and partie s), and their decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)).