# Επίσημη Εφημερίδα C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0901
  doi:10.3000/19770901.C_2013.237.ell |
| --- | --- |
| Επίσημη Εφημερίδα
  της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237 |
| | |
| Έκδοση στην ελληνική γλώσσα | Ανακοινώσεις και Πληροφορίες | 56ό έτος15 Αυγούστου 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0901

doi:10.3000/19770901.C_2013.237.ell

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα

της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237

Έκδοση στην ελληνική γλώσσα

Ανακοινώσεις και Πληροφορίες

56ό έτος15 Αυγούστου 2013

---

| Ανακοίνωση αριθ | Περιεχόμενα | Σελίδα |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Ανακοινώσεις |
| | ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 237/01 | Μη διατύπωση αντιρρήσεων σχετικά με κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση (Υπόθεση COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Ανακοίνωση αριθ

Περιεχόμενα

Σελίδα

II   Ανακοινώσεις

ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 237/01

Μη διατύπωση αντιρρήσεων σχετικά με κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση (Υπόθεση COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Πληροφορίες |
| --- | --- |
| | ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΑ ΟΡΓΑΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Ισοτιμίες του ευρώ | 2 |
| | ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ ΧΩΡΟ |
| | Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για την περάτωση υφιστάμενης υπόθεσης χορήγησης ενίσχυσης, συνεπεία της αποδοχής εκ μέρους κράτους ΕΖΕΣ των προταθέντων κατάλληλων μέτρων | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Πρόσκληση για υποβολή παρατηρήσεων σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου σχετικά με θέματα κρατικών ενισχύσεων που αφορούν περιφερειακή ενίσχυση για το καθεστώς επενδυτικών κινήτρων στην Ισλανδία και έξι επενδυτικές συμφωνίες | 4 |

IV   Πληροφορίες

ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΑ ΟΡΓΑΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 237/02

Ισοτιμίες του ευρώ

2

ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ ΧΩΡΟ

Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ

2013/C 237/03

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για την περάτωση υφιστάμενης υπόθεσης χορήγησης ενίσχυσης, συνεπεία της αποδοχής εκ μέρους κράτους ΕΖΕΣ των προταθέντων κατάλληλων μέτρων

3

2013/C 237/04

Πρόσκληση για υποβολή παρατηρήσεων σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου σχετικά με θέματα κρατικών ενισχύσεων που αφορούν περιφερειακή ενίσχυση για το καθεστώς επενδυτικών κινήτρων στην Ισλανδία και έξι επενδυτικές συμφωνίες

4

| | V   Γνωστοποιήσεις |
| --- | --- |
| | ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΦΟΡΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΦΑΡΜΟΓΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής που δημοσιεύθηκε σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 27 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003 του Συμβουλίου στις υποθέσεις AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II και AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | ΛΟΙΠΕΣ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ |
| | Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Δημοσίευση αίτησης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο α) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Δημοσίευση αίτησης τροποποίησης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο α) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Δημοσίευση αίτησης καταχώρισης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο β) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων | 40 |

V   Γνωστοποιήσεις

ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΦΟΡΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΦΑΡΜΟΓΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 237/05

Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής που δημοσιεύθηκε σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 27 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003 του Συμβουλίου στις υποθέσεις AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II και AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

28

ΛΟΙΠΕΣ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

2013/C 237/06

Δημοσίευση αίτησης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο α) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων

31

2013/C 237/07

Δημοσίευση αίτησης τροποποίησης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο α) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων

36

2013/C 237/08

Δημοσίευση αίτησης καταχώρισης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο β) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων

40

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ |

---

(1)   Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ

1

| EL | |
| --- | --- |

EL

---

II Ανακοινώσεις

ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 15.8.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/1

---

Μη διατύπωση αντιρρήσεων σχετικά με κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση

(Υπόθεση COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ)

2013/C 237/01

Στις 18 Απριλίου 2013, η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε να μη διατυπώσει αντιρρήσεις σχετικά με την ανωτέρω κοινοποιηθείσα συγκέντρωση και να την χαρακτηρίσει συμβιβάσιμη με την κοινή αγορά. Η απόφαση αυτή βασίζεται στο άρθρο 6 παράγραφος 1 στοιχείο β) του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 139/2004 του Συμβουλίου. Το πλήρες κείμενο της απόφασης διατίθεται μόνον στα αγγλική και θα δημοσιοποιηθεί χωρίς τα επιχειρηματικά απόρρητα στοιχεία τα οποία ενδέχεται να περιέχει. Θα διατίθεται:

| — | από τη σχετική με τις συγκεντρώσεις ενότητα του δικτυακού τόπου για τον ανταγωνισμό της Επιτροπής (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ο δικτυακός αυτός τόπος παρέχει διάφορα μέσα που βοηθούν στον εντοπισμό μεμονωμένων αποφάσεων για συγκεντρώσεις όπως ευρετήρια επιχειρήσεων, αριθμών υποθέσεων, και ημερομηνιών και τομεακά ευρετήρια· |
| --- | --- |

—

από τη σχετική με τις συγκεντρώσεις ενότητα του δικτυακού τόπου για τον ανταγωνισμό της Επιτροπής (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ο δικτυακός αυτός τόπος παρέχει διάφορα μέσα που βοηθούν στον εντοπισμό μεμονωμένων αποφάσεων για συγκεντρώσεις όπως ευρετήρια επιχειρήσεων, αριθμών υποθέσεων, και ημερομηνιών και τομεακά ευρετήρια·

| — | σε ηλεκτρονική μορφή στον δικτυακό τόπο EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) με αριθμό εγγράφου 32013M6843. Ο δικτυακός τόπος EUR-Lex αποτελεί την επιγραμμική πρόσβαση στην ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία. |
| --- | --- |

—

σε ηλεκτρονική μορφή στον δικτυακό τόπο EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) με αριθμό εγγράφου 32013M6843. Ο δικτυακός τόπος EUR-Lex αποτελεί την επιγραμμική πρόσβαση στην ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία.

---

IV Πληροφορίες

ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΕΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΘΕΣΜΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΟΙΠΑ ΟΡΓΑΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 15.8.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/2

---

Ισοτιμίες του ευρώ (1)

14 Αυγούστου 2013

2013/C 237/02

1 ευρώ =

| | Νομισματική μονάδα | Ισοτιμία |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | δολάριο ΗΠΑ | 1,3243 |
| JPY | ιαπωνικό γιεν | 130,17 |
| DKK | δανική κορόνα | 7,4583 |
| GBP | λίρα στερλίνα | 0,85440 |
| SEK | σουηδική κορόνα | 8,6393 |
| CHF | ελβετικό φράγκο | 1,2415 |
| ISK | ισλανδική κορόνα | |
| NOK | νορβηγική κορόνα | 7,8130 |
| BGN | βουλγαρικό λεβ | 1,9558 |
| CZK | τσεχική κορόνα | 25,822 |
| HUF | ουγγρικό φιορίνι | 298,62 |
| LTL | λιθουανικό λίτας | 3,4528 |
| LVL | λετονικό λατς | 0,7025 |
| PLN | πολωνικό ζλότι | 4,2037 |
| RON | ρουμανικό λέου | 4,4315 |
| TRY | τουρκική λίρα | 2,5664 |
| AUD | δολάριο Αυστραλίας | 1,4524 |
| CAD | δολάριο Καναδά | 1,3689 |
| HKD | δολάριο Χονγκ Κονγκ | 10,2705 |
| NZD | δολάριο Νέας Ζηλανδίας | 1,6501 |
| SGD | δολάριο Σιγκαπούρης | 1,6835 |
| KRW | ουόν Νότιας Κορέας | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | νοτιοαφρικανικό ραντ | 13,2129 |
| CNY | κινεζικό ρενμινπί γιουάν | 8,1041 |
| HRK | κροατική κούνα | 7,5415 |
| IDR | ρουπία Ινδονησίας | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | μαλαισιανό ρινγκίτ | 4,3351 |
| PHP | πέσο Φιλιππινών | 57,975 |
| RUB | ρωσικό ρούβλι | 43,8995 |
| THB | ταϊλανδικό μπατ | 41,504 |
| BRL | ρεάλ Βραζιλίας | 3,0586 |
| MXN | πέσο Μεξικού | 16,8756 |
| INR | ινδική ρουπία | 81,3700 |

Νομισματική μονάδα

Ισοτιμία

USD

δολάριο ΗΠΑ

1,3243

JPY

ιαπωνικό γιεν

130,17

DKK

δανική κορόνα

7,4583

GBP

λίρα στερλίνα

0,85440

SEK

σουηδική κορόνα

8,6393

CHF

ελβετικό φράγκο

1,2415

ISK

ισλανδική κορόνα

NOK

νορβηγική κορόνα

7,8130

BGN

βουλγαρικό λεβ

1,9558

CZK

τσεχική κορόνα

25,822

HUF

ουγγρικό φιορίνι

298,62

LTL

λιθουανικό λίτας

3,4528

LVL

λετονικό λατς

0,7025

PLN

πολωνικό ζλότι

4,2037

RON

ρουμανικό λέου

4,4315

TRY

τουρκική λίρα

2,5664

AUD

δολάριο Αυστραλίας

1,4524

CAD

δολάριο Καναδά

1,3689

HKD

δολάριο Χονγκ Κονγκ

10,2705

NZD

δολάριο Νέας Ζηλανδίας

1,6501

SGD

δολάριο Σιγκαπούρης

1,6835

KRW

ουόν Νότιας Κορέας

1 482,39

ZAR

νοτιοαφρικανικό ραντ

13,2129

CNY

κινεζικό ρενμινπί γιουάν

8,1041

HRK

κροατική κούνα

7,5415

IDR

ρουπία Ινδονησίας

13 667,59

MYR

μαλαισιανό ρινγκίτ

4,3351

PHP

πέσο Φιλιππινών

57,975

RUB

ρωσικό ρούβλι

43,8995

THB

ταϊλανδικό μπατ

41,504

BRL

ρεάλ Βραζιλίας

3,0586

MXN

πέσο Μεξικού

16,8756

INR

ινδική ρουπία

81,3700

---

(1)  Πηγή: Ισοτιμίες αναφοράς που δημοσιεύονται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα.

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ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ ΧΩΡΟ

Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ

| 15.8.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/3

---

Κρατική ενίσχυση — Απόφαση για την περάτωση υφιστάμενης υπόθεσης χορήγησης ενίσχυσης, συνεπεία της αποδοχής εκ μέρους κράτους ΕΖΕΣ των προταθέντων κατάλληλων μέτρων

2013/C 237/03

Η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ έχει προτείνει κατάλληλα μέτρα, που έγιναν δεκτά από την Ισλανδία, για το ακόλουθο μέτρο ενίσχυσης:

| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης | : | 24 Απριλίου 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Αριθμός της υπόθεσης | : | 70958 |
| Αριθμός απόφασης | : | 159/13/COL |
| Κράτος της ΕΖΕΣ | : | Ισλανδία |
| Τίτλος | : | Κρατική ενίσχυση που χορηγήθηκε στις εταιρείες Landsvirkjun και Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Νομική βάση | : | Νόμος 42/1983 σχετικά με την Landsvirkjun, νόμος σχετικά με την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση 45/1998, νόμος 139/2001 σχετικά με την ίδρυση της Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ως επιχείρησης κοινής ιδιοκτησίας και νόμος 121/1997 σχετικά με τις κρατικές εγγυήσεις. |
| Στόχος | : | α.α. |
| Μορφή της ενίσχυσης | : | Απεριόριστες εγγυήσεις από το κράτος και τους δημοτικούς ιδιοκτήτες, χωρίς την καταβολή επαρκών αγοραίων ασφαλίστρων, για την Landsvirkjun και την Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Οικονομικοί τομείς | : | Τομέας της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας |
| Άλλες πληροφορίες | : | Με βάση τα ληφθέντα μέτρα και τις περαιτέρω δεσμεύσεις που ανέλαβαν οι ισλανδικές αρχές να καταργήσουν την απεριόριστη κρατική εγγύηση υπέρ της Landsvirkjun και της Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, η Αρχή δεν αμφιβάλλει πλέον όσον αφορά το συμβατό του καθεστώτος και περάτωσε τη σχετική έρευνα. |

Ημερομηνία έκδοσης της απόφασης

:

24 Απριλίου 2013

Αριθμός της υπόθεσης

:

70958

Αριθμός απόφασης

:

159/13/COL

Κράτος της ΕΖΕΣ

:

Ισλανδία

Τίτλος

:

Κρατική ενίσχυση που χορηγήθηκε στις εταιρείες Landsvirkjun και Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Νομική βάση

:

Νόμος 42/1983 σχετικά με την Landsvirkjun, νόμος σχετικά με την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση 45/1998, νόμος 139/2001 σχετικά με την ίδρυση της Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ως επιχείρησης κοινής ιδιοκτησίας και νόμος 121/1997 σχετικά με τις κρατικές εγγυήσεις.

Στόχος

:

α.α.

Μορφή της ενίσχυσης

:

Απεριόριστες εγγυήσεις από το κράτος και τους δημοτικούς ιδιοκτήτες, χωρίς την καταβολή επαρκών αγοραίων ασφαλίστρων, για την Landsvirkjun και την Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Οικονομικοί τομείς

:

Τομέας της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας

Άλλες πληροφορίες

:

Με βάση τα ληφθέντα μέτρα και τις περαιτέρω δεσμεύσεις που ανέλαβαν οι ισλανδικές αρχές να καταργήσουν την απεριόριστη κρατική εγγύηση υπέρ της Landsvirkjun και της Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, η Αρχή δεν αμφιβάλλει πλέον όσον αφορά το συμβατό του καθεστώτος και περάτωσε τη σχετική έρευνα.

Το αυθεντικό κείμενο της απόφασης, από το οποίο έχουν αφαιρεθεί όλα τα εμπιστευτικά στοιχεία, δημοσιεύεται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής της ΕΖΕΣ:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 15.8.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/4

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Πρόσκληση για υποβολή παρατηρήσεων σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου σχετικά με θέματα κρατικών ενισχύσεων που αφορούν περιφερειακή ενίσχυση για το καθεστώς επενδυτικών κινήτρων στην Ισλανδία και έξι επενδυτικές συμφωνίες

2013/C 237/04

Με την απόφαση αριθ. 177/13/COL, της 30ης Απριλίου 2013, που αναδημοσιεύεται στη γλώσσα του πρωτοτύπου στις σελίδες που ακολουθούν την παρούσα περίληψη, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ κίνησε τη διαδικασία που προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου. Οι ισλανδικές αρχές ενημερώθηκαν με την αποστολή αντιγράφου της απόφασης.

Με την παρούσα ανακοίνωση, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή της ΕΖΕΣ καλεί τα κράτη της ΕΖΕΣ, τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ και τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους σχετικά με το εν λόγω μέτρο, εντός ενός μηνός από τη δημοσίευση της παρούσας ανακοίνωσης, στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Οι παρατηρήσεις θα κοινοποιηθούν στις ισλανδικές αρχές. Το απόρρητο της ταυτότητας του ενδιαφερόμενου μέρους που υποβάλλει τις παρατηρήσεις μπορεί να ζητηθεί γραπτώς, με μνεία των σχετικών λόγων.

ΣΥΝΟΠΤΙΚΗ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑΣΗ

Διαδικασία

Στις 13 Οκτωβρίου 2010, η Αρχή ενέκρινε καθεστώς σχετικά με επενδυτικά κίνητρα (εφεξής «το καθεστώς») που οι ισλανδικές αρχές κοινοποίησαν με την απόφαση αριθ. 390/10/COL, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 3 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3.

Το καθεστώς προβλέπει τη δυνατότητα χορήγησης ενισχύσεων με τη μορφή άμεσων επιχορηγήσεων, αφενός μέσω διαφόρων φορολογικών απαλλαγών για διάστημα μέχρι 10 ετών και, αφετέρου μέσω της πώλησης και μίσθωσης γης κάτω από την τιμή της αγοράς για εταιρείες σε όλους τους τομείς εκτός του χρηματοπιστωτικού, σε σχέση με αρχική επένδυση σε περιοχές που είναι επιλέξιμες για περιφερειακές ενισχύσεις (γνωστές ως «c-regions») στην Ισλανδία. Το καθεστώς λήγει στις 31 Δεκεμβρίου 2013.

Η νομική βάση για το καθεστώς όπως εγκρίθηκε από την Αρχή είναι:

| — | Ο νόμος αριθ. 99/2010 περί κινήτρων για αρχικές επενδύσεις στην Ισλανδία (εφεξής «ο νόμος»), ο οποίος ψηφίστηκε από το ισλανδικό κοινοβούλιο στις 29 Ιουνίου 2010· και |
| --- | --- |

—

Ο νόμος αριθ. 99/2010 περί κινήτρων για αρχικές επενδύσεις στην Ισλανδία (εφεξής «ο νόμος»), ο οποίος ψηφίστηκε από το ισλανδικό κοινοβούλιο στις 29 Ιουνίου 2010· και

| — | Ο κανονισμός (EE) αριθ. 985/2010 περί κινήτρων για αρχικές επενδύσεις στην Ισλανδία, ο οποίος εκδόθηκε από το Υπουργείο Βιομηχανίας στις 25 Νοεμβρίου 2010 (εφεξής «ο κανονισμός»), και αντιστοιχεί σε σχέδιο κανονισμού που υποβλήθηκε στην Αρχή στις 27 Σεπτεμβρίου 2010. Ο κανονισμός αποτελεί πράξη παράγωγου δικαίου που βασίζεται στον νόμο. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ο κανονισμός (EE) αριθ. 985/2010 περί κινήτρων για αρχικές επενδύσεις στην Ισλανδία, ο οποίος εκδόθηκε από το Υπουργείο Βιομηχανίας στις 25 Νοεμβρίου 2010 (εφεξής «ο κανονισμός»), και αντιστοιχεί σε σχέδιο κανονισμού που υποβλήθηκε στην Αρχή στις 27 Σεπτεμβρίου 2010. Ο κανονισμός αποτελεί πράξη παράγωγου δικαίου που βασίζεται στον νόμο.

Στις 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2010, το Υπουργείο Βιομηχανίας εξέδωσε νέο κανονισμό, τον κανονισμό (EE) αριθ. 1150/2010 (εφεξής «ο συμπληρωματικός κανονισμός») για την τροποποίηση του κανονισμού, ιδίως για να διασφαλιστεί ο χαρακτήρας κινήτρου των επενδυτικών ενισχύσεων. Ο συμπληρωματικός κανονισμός δεν κοινοποιήθηκε στην Αρχή.

Κατά την περίοδο από το 2010 έως το 2013, το ισλανδικό κράτος συνήψε διάφορες συμφωνίες που θεώρησε ότι υπάγονταν στο καθεστώς (εφεξής «οι έξι επενδυτικές συμφωνίες»):

| 1) | Στις 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2010 με την Becromal Iceland ehf |
| --- | --- |

1)

Στις 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2010 με την Becromal Iceland ehf

| 2) | Στις 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2010 με την Thorsil ehf. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Στις 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2010 με την Thorsil ehf.

| 3) | Στις 17 Φεβρουαρίου 2011 με την Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Στις 17 Φεβρουαρίου 2011 με την Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf.

| 4) | Στις 22 Σεπτεμβρίου 2011 με την Verne Real Estate II ehf. |
| --- | --- |

4)

Στις 22 Σεπτεμβρίου 2011 με την Verne Real Estate II ehf.

| 5) | Στις 7 Μαΐου 2012 με την GMR Εndurvinnslan ehf. |
| --- | --- |

5)

Στις 7 Μαΐου 2012 με την GMR Εndurvinnslan ehf.

| 6) | Στις 28 Ιανουαρίου 2013 με την Μarmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6)

Στις 28 Ιανουαρίου 2013 με την Μarmeti ehf.

Μετά από συζητήσεις που προηγήθηκαν της κοινοποίησης, οι ισλανδικές αρχές κοινοποίησαν στην Αρχή, στις 13 Δεκεμβρίου 2012 και σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 3 του μέρους I του πρωτοκόλλου 3, σειρά από προτεινόμενες τροποποιήσεις (εφεξής «οι κοινοποιηθείσες τροποποιήσεις») στον νόμο.

Αξιολόγηση του μέτρου

Οι κοινοποιηθείσες τροποποιήσεις συνίστανται σε κατάργηση των άμεσων επιχορηγήσεων, μια νέα μέθοδο για την επιβολή του μέγιστου φόρου εταιρειών σε όλα τα νέα έργα στο πλαίσιο του καθεστώτος, απαλλαγή από τα τέλη χαρτοσήμου και αύξηση του επιπέδου των απαλλαγών από τον δημοτικό φόρο περιουσίας και τις εισφορές κοινωνικής ασφάλισης. Η Αρχή κατέληξε στο προκαταρκτικό συμπέρασμα ότι οι κοινοποιηθείσες τροποποιήσεις του καθεστώτος δεν μπορούν να διαχωριστούν από το ίδιο το καθεστώς. Ως εκ τούτου, η Επιτροπή αξιολόγησε το πλήρες καθεστώς όπως τροποποιήθηκε. Επιπλέον, αξιολόγησε την εφαρμογή του καθεστώτος και διαπίστωσε ότι ορισμένα στοιχεία των έξι επενδυτικών συμφωνιών που η Ισλανδία είχε συνάψει με βάση το καθεστώς, όπως αυτό τροποποιήθηκε, προκαλούν αμφιβολίες ως προς το συμβιβάσιμο με τη συμφωνία ΕΟΧ.

Συγκεκριμένα, η Αρχή είχε αμφιβολίες για το αν η ενίσχυση που χορηγείται στο πλαίσιο των επενδυτικών συμφωνιών Becromal, Kísilfélagið και Verne, χορηγείται στο πεδίο εφαρμογής του καθεστώτος, όπως αυτό εγκρίθηκε από την Αρχή, και έχει τον χαρακτήρα κινήτρου που οφείλουν να έχουν οι επενδυτικές ενισχύσεις.

Επιπλέον, η Αρχή είχε αμφιβολίες για το αν η επενδυτική συμφωνία Μarmeti συνάπτεται στο πεδίο εφαρμογής του καθεστώτος όσον αφορά την απαίτηση για τον χαρακτήρα κινήτρου.

Επιπλέον, η Αρχή είχε αμφιβολίες για το αν στοιχεία των επενδυτικών συμφωνιών GMR και Τhorsil προβλέπουν τη χορήγηση ενισχύσεων που δεν εντάσσονται στο εγκεκριμένο καθεστώς.

Ως εκ τούτου, η Εποπτεύουσα Αρχή είχε αμφιβολίες για το αν το καθεστώς ενισχύσεων, όπως τροποποιήθηκε, και οι ενισχύσεις που χορηγούνται στο πλαίσιο των έξι επενδυτικών συμφωνιών μπορούν να θεωρηθούν συμβιβάσιμες με τη συμφωνία ΕΟΧ.

Συμπέρασμα

Υπό το πρίσμα των ανωτέρω, η Αρχή διατηρεί αμφιβολίες για το αν το καθεστώς, όπως τροποποιήθηκε, και οι έξι επενδυτικές συμφωνίες που αναφέρονται παραπάνω, συμφωνούν με το άρθρο 61 παράγραφος 3 της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ σε συνδυασμό με τις απαιτήσεις που ορίζονται στις κατευθυντήριες γραμμές της Αρχής για τις περιφερειακές ενισχύσεις.

Με βάση τις ανωτέρω εκτιμήσεις, η Αρχή αποφάσισε να κινήσει την επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του μέρους Ι του πρωτοκόλλου 3 της συμφωνίας μεταξύ των κρατών της ΕΖΕΣ για τη σύσταση Εποπτεύουσας Αρχής και Δικαστηρίου, όσον αφορά, αφενός το καθεστώς επενδυτικών κινήτρων που εφαρμόστηκε από τις ισλανδικές αρχές με τις τροποποιήσεις που κοινοποίησαν οι ισλανδικές αρχές και όπως τροποποιήθηκε από τον κανονισμό (EE) αριθ. 1150/2010, και, αφετέρου τις έξι επενδυτικές συμφωνίες.

Τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη καλούνται να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους εντός προθεσμίας ενός μηνός από τη δημοσίευση της παρούσας ανακοίνωσης στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
| --- | --- |

(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
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(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
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(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
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(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
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(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
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(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
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(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
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(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
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(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
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(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
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(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
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(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Γνωστοποιήσεις

ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΑΦΟΡΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΦΑΡΜΟΓΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 15.8.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237/28 |
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15.8.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/28

---

Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής που δημοσιεύθηκε σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 27 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003 του Συμβουλίου στις υποθέσεις AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II και AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ

| 1. | Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 9 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003 του Συμβουλίου, της 16ης Δεκεμβρίου 2002, για την εφαρμογή των κανόνων του ανταγωνισμού που προβλέπονται στα άρθρα 101 και 102 της Συνθήκης (1), η Επιτροπή δύναται — στις περιπτώσεις που σκοπεύει να εκδώσει απόφαση με την οποία να απαιτεί την παύση μιας παράβασης και οι εμπλεκόμενες επιχειρήσεις προσφέρονται να αναλάβουν ορισμένες δεσμεύσεις για να ανταποκριθούν στις αντιρρήσεις της Επιτροπής κατά την προκαταρκτική της εκτίμηση — να καταστήσει αυτές τις δεσμεύσεις υποχρεωτικές για τις επιχειρήσεις. Η απόφαση αυτή δύναται να εκδοθεί για συγκεκριμένο χρονικό διάστημα και ενδέχεται να καταλήγει στο συμπέρασμα ότι δεν συντρέχουν πλέον λόγοι να αναλάβει δράση η Επιτροπή. Πριν από την έκδοση μιας απόφασης κατ' εφαρμογή του άρθρου 9 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 27 παράγραφος 4 του ίδιου κανονισμού, η Επιτροπή δημοσιεύει περίληψη της υπόθεσης και το βασικό περιεχόμενο των δεσμεύσεων. Τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη μπορούν να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους εντός προθεσμίας την οποία ορίζει η Επιτροπή. |
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1.

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 9 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003 του Συμβουλίου, της 16ης Δεκεμβρίου 2002, για την εφαρμογή των κανόνων του ανταγωνισμού που προβλέπονται στα άρθρα 101 και 102 της Συνθήκης (1), η Επιτροπή δύναται — στις περιπτώσεις που σκοπεύει να εκδώσει απόφαση με την οποία να απαιτεί την παύση μιας παράβασης και οι εμπλεκόμενες επιχειρήσεις προσφέρονται να αναλάβουν ορισμένες δεσμεύσεις για να ανταποκριθούν στις αντιρρήσεις της Επιτροπής κατά την προκαταρκτική της εκτίμηση — να καταστήσει αυτές τις δεσμεύσεις υποχρεωτικές για τις επιχειρήσεις. Η απόφαση αυτή δύναται να εκδοθεί για συγκεκριμένο χρονικό διάστημα και ενδέχεται να καταλήγει στο συμπέρασμα ότι δεν συντρέχουν πλέον λόγοι να αναλάβει δράση η Επιτροπή. Πριν από την έκδοση μιας απόφασης κατ' εφαρμογή του άρθρου 9 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 27 παράγραφος 4 του ίδιου κανονισμού, η Επιτροπή δημοσιεύει περίληψη της υπόθεσης και το βασικό περιεχόμενο των δεσμεύσεων. Τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη μπορούν να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους εντός προθεσμίας την οποία ορίζει η Επιτροπή.

2.   ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ ΤΗΣ ΥΠΟΘΕΣΗΣ

| 2. | Στις 6 Ιουνίου 2013, η Επιτροπή εξέδωσε προκαταρκτική εκτίμηση κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 9 παράγραφος 1 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003 που απευθύνεται στην Deutsche Bahn AG και στις θυγατρικές της DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG και DB SchenkerRail Deutschland AG (2). |
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2.

Στις 6 Ιουνίου 2013, η Επιτροπή εξέδωσε προκαταρκτική εκτίμηση κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 9 παράγραφος 1 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003 που απευθύνεται στην Deutsche Bahn AG και στις θυγατρικές της DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG και DB SchenkerRail Deutschland AG (2).

| 3. | Στην προκαταρκτική της εκτίμηση, η Επιτροπή εξέφρασε επιφυλάξεις ως προς το ενδεχόμενο κατάχρησης εκ μέρους του ομίλου DB της δεσπόζουσας θέσης του στην αγορά για την προμήθεια ρεύματος έλξης στη Γερμανία, χρεώνοντας τιμές του ρεύματος έλξης στους ανταγωνιστές οι οποίες δημιούργησαν συμπίεση των περιθωρίων κέρδους στις αγορές σιδηροδρομικών επιβατικών μεταφορών μεγάλων αποστάσεων και σιδηροδρομικών εμπορευματικών μεταφορών, κατά παράβαση του άρθρου 102 της ΣΛΕΕ. |
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3.

Στην προκαταρκτική της εκτίμηση, η Επιτροπή εξέφρασε επιφυλάξεις ως προς το ενδεχόμενο κατάχρησης εκ μέρους του ομίλου DB της δεσπόζουσας θέσης του στην αγορά για την προμήθεια ρεύματος έλξης στη Γερμανία, χρεώνοντας τιμές του ρεύματος έλξης στους ανταγωνιστές οι οποίες δημιούργησαν συμπίεση των περιθωρίων κέρδους στις αγορές σιδηροδρομικών επιβατικών μεταφορών μεγάλων αποστάσεων και σιδηροδρομικών εμπορευματικών μεταφορών, κατά παράβαση του άρθρου 102 της ΣΛΕΕ.

| 4. | Η Επιτροπή θεωρεί σε προκαταρκτικό στάδιο ότι η DB Energie κατέχει δεσπόζουσα θέση στην αγορά προμήθειας ρεύματος έλξης στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις που δραστηριοποιούνται στη Γερμανία. Το ρεύμα έλξης αποτελεί απαραίτητο ενδιάμεσο προϊόν για τις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις ώστε να είναι ανταγωνιστικές στις γερμανικές αγορές σιδηροδρομικών μεταφορών. Από το 2003, η DB Energie πωλεί ρεύμα έλξης σε σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις στο πλαίσιο συνολικής προσφοράς που περιλαμβάνει την τιμή της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας που καταναλώνεται (τιμή ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας) και την τιμή για τη χρήση του δικτύου ρεύματος έλξης (τέλος πρόσβασης στο δίκτυο). |
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4.

Η Επιτροπή θεωρεί σε προκαταρκτικό στάδιο ότι η DB Energie κατέχει δεσπόζουσα θέση στην αγορά προμήθειας ρεύματος έλξης στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις που δραστηριοποιούνται στη Γερμανία. Το ρεύμα έλξης αποτελεί απαραίτητο ενδιάμεσο προϊόν για τις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις ώστε να είναι ανταγωνιστικές στις γερμανικές αγορές σιδηροδρομικών μεταφορών. Από το 2003, η DB Energie πωλεί ρεύμα έλξης σε σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις στο πλαίσιο συνολικής προσφοράς που περιλαμβάνει την τιμή της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας που καταναλώνεται (τιμή ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας) και την τιμή για τη χρήση του δικτύου ρεύματος έλξης (τέλος πρόσβασης στο δίκτυο).

| 5. | Στην προκαταρκτική της εκτίμηση, η Επιτροπή εκτίμησε ότι αυτό το σύστημα τιμολόγησης και, ιδίως, οι εκπτώσεις του που παρέχονται στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις του ομίλου DB περισσότερο απ’ ότι στους ανταγωνιστές τους, ενδέχεται να παρεμπόδισε την ανάπτυξη του ανταγωνισμού στις αγορές εμπορευματικών σιδηροδρομικών μεταφορών και επιβατικών μεταφορών μεγάλων αποστάσεων. Η Επιτροπή ανησυχεί ότι, στις αγορές αυτές, το σύστημα τιμολόγησης του ρεύματος έλξης που χρησιμοποιείται από την DB Energie μπορεί να συνεπάγεται απόκλιση μεταξύ της τιμής του ρεύματος έλξης που χρεώνεται στους ανταγωνιστές και της τιμής των υπηρεσιών σιδηροδρομικών μεταφορών που χρεώνεται στους καταναλωτές από τις εταιρίες μεταφορών DB, η οποία εμποδίζει τους εξίσου αποτελεσματικούς ανταγωνιστές τους να ασκούν τις δραστηριότητές τους με αποδοτικό τρόπο ή περιορίζει τεχνητά το περιθώριο κέρδους τους. Η έρευνα της Επιτροπής κατέληξε στο συμπέρασμα, σε προκαταρκτική βάση, ότι η κατάσταση αυτή δημιουργεί προβλήματα ανταγωνισμού στις αγορές σιδηροδρομικών επιβατικών μεταφορών μεγάλων αποστάσεων και σιδηροδρομικών εμπορευματικών μεταφορών. |
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5.

Στην προκαταρκτική της εκτίμηση, η Επιτροπή εκτίμησε ότι αυτό το σύστημα τιμολόγησης και, ιδίως, οι εκπτώσεις του που παρέχονται στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις του ομίλου DB περισσότερο απ’ ότι στους ανταγωνιστές τους, ενδέχεται να παρεμπόδισε την ανάπτυξη του ανταγωνισμού στις αγορές εμπορευματικών σιδηροδρομικών μεταφορών και επιβατικών μεταφορών μεγάλων αποστάσεων. Η Επιτροπή ανησυχεί ότι, στις αγορές αυτές, το σύστημα τιμολόγησης του ρεύματος έλξης που χρησιμοποιείται από την DB Energie μπορεί να συνεπάγεται απόκλιση μεταξύ της τιμής του ρεύματος έλξης που χρεώνεται στους ανταγωνιστές και της τιμής των υπηρεσιών σιδηροδρομικών μεταφορών που χρεώνεται στους καταναλωτές από τις εταιρίες μεταφορών DB, η οποία εμποδίζει τους εξίσου αποτελεσματικούς ανταγωνιστές τους να ασκούν τις δραστηριότητές τους με αποδοτικό τρόπο ή περιορίζει τεχνητά το περιθώριο κέρδους τους. Η έρευνα της Επιτροπής κατέληξε στο συμπέρασμα, σε προκαταρκτική βάση, ότι η κατάσταση αυτή δημιουργεί προβλήματα ανταγωνισμού στις αγορές σιδηροδρομικών επιβατικών μεταφορών μεγάλων αποστάσεων και σιδηροδρομικών εμπορευματικών μεταφορών.

| 6. | Τον Νοέμβριο του 2010, το Γερμανικό Ομοσπονδιακό Δικαστήριο αποφάσισε ότι το δίκτυο ρεύματος έλξης θεωρείται ενεργειακό δίκτυο και ότι οι όροι και τα τέλη πρόσβασης σε αυτό ρυθμίζονται σύμφωνα με τον γερμανικό νόμο για τον ενεργειακό τομέα (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Κατά συνέπεια, η DB Energie πρέπει να χρεώνει χωριστά τα τέλη πρόσβασης στο δίκτυο, ούτως ώστε οι τρίτοι προμηθευτές ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας (δηλ. αυτοί που δεν ανήκουν στον όμιλο DB) να μπορούν να ανταγωνίζονται με την DB Energie στην αγορά προμήθειας ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις (4). |
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6.

Τον Νοέμβριο του 2010, το Γερμανικό Ομοσπονδιακό Δικαστήριο αποφάσισε ότι το δίκτυο ρεύματος έλξης θεωρείται ενεργειακό δίκτυο και ότι οι όροι και τα τέλη πρόσβασης σε αυτό ρυθμίζονται σύμφωνα με τον γερμανικό νόμο για τον ενεργειακό τομέα (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Κατά συνέπεια, η DB Energie πρέπει να χρεώνει χωριστά τα τέλη πρόσβασης στο δίκτυο, ούτως ώστε οι τρίτοι προμηθευτές ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας (δηλ. αυτοί που δεν ανήκουν στον όμιλο DB) να μπορούν να ανταγωνίζονται με την DB Energie στην αγορά προμήθειας ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις (4).

3.   ΒΑΣΙΚΟ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΤΕΙΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΔΕΣΜΕΥΣΕΩΝ

| 7. | Ο όμιλος DB δεν συμφωνεί με την προκαταρκτική εκτίμηση της Επιτροπής όσον αφορά το ενδεχόμενο κατάχρησης της δεσπόζουσας θέσης του στην αγορά προμήθειας ρεύματος έλξης στις γερμανικές σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις. Ωστόσο, προσφέρθηκε να αναλάβει δεσμεύσεις σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 9 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, προκειμένου να ανταποκριθεί στις επιφυλάξεις της Επιτροπής όσον αφορά τον ανταγωνισμό. Τα βασικά σημεία των εν λόγω δεσμεύσεων είναι τα ακόλουθα: |
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7.

Ο όμιλος DB δεν συμφωνεί με την προκαταρκτική εκτίμηση της Επιτροπής όσον αφορά το ενδεχόμενο κατάχρησης της δεσπόζουσας θέσης του στην αγορά προμήθειας ρεύματος έλξης στις γερμανικές σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις. Ωστόσο, προσφέρθηκε να αναλάβει δεσμεύσεις σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 9 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, προκειμένου να ανταποκριθεί στις επιφυλάξεις της Επιτροπής όσον αφορά τον ανταγωνισμό. Τα βασικά σημεία των εν λόγω δεσμεύσεων είναι τα ακόλουθα:

| 8. | Το αργότερο 3 μήνες μετά την κοινοποίηση της απόφασης της Επιτροπής με την οποία καθίστανται υποχρεωτικές αυτές οι δεσμεύσεις για τον όμιλο DB και το νωρίτερο την 1η Ιανουαρίου 2014, η DB Energie θα εισαγάγει ένα νέο σύστημα τιμολόγησης του ρεύματος έλξης, το οποίο προβλέπει χωριστές τιμές για την προμήθεια της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας και χωριστά τέλη πρόσβασης στο δίκτυο, όπως εγκρίθηκε από τη σχετική γερμανική ρυθμιστική αρχή (Bundesnetzagentur). Αυτό το νέο σύστημα τιμολόγησης θα επιτρέψει σε τρίτους προμηθευτές ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας να εισέλθουν στην αγορά της προμήθειας ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις (5). |
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8.

Το αργότερο 3 μήνες μετά την κοινοποίηση της απόφασης της Επιτροπής με την οποία καθίστανται υποχρεωτικές αυτές οι δεσμεύσεις για τον όμιλο DB και το νωρίτερο την 1η Ιανουαρίου 2014, η DB Energie θα εισαγάγει ένα νέο σύστημα τιμολόγησης του ρεύματος έλξης, το οποίο προβλέπει χωριστές τιμές για την προμήθεια της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας και χωριστά τέλη πρόσβασης στο δίκτυο, όπως εγκρίθηκε από τη σχετική γερμανική ρυθμιστική αρχή (Bundesnetzagentur). Αυτό το νέο σύστημα τιμολόγησης θα επιτρέψει σε τρίτους προμηθευτές ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας να εισέλθουν στην αγορά της προμήθειας ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις (5).

| 9. | Σε αυτό το νέο σύστημα, η DB Energie θα χρεώνει την ίδια τιμή για ηλεκτρική ενέργεια σε όλες τις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις χωρίς εκπτώσεις που να βασίζονται στον όγκο ή στη διάρκεια. |
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9.

Σε αυτό το νέο σύστημα, η DB Energie θα χρεώνει την ίδια τιμή για ηλεκτρική ενέργεια σε όλες τις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις χωρίς εκπτώσεις που να βασίζονται στον όγκο ή στη διάρκεια.

| 10. | Η DB Energie θα καταβάλει στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις που βρίσκονται στη Γερμανία και δεν ανήκουν στον όμιλο DB εφάπαξ αναδρομική επιστροφή σε ποσοστό 4 % του τιμολογίου ρεύματος έλξης για την περίοδο ενός έτους πριν από τη θέση σε ισχύ του νέου συστήματος τιμολόγησης. |
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10.

Η DB Energie θα καταβάλει στις σιδηροδρομικές επιχειρήσεις που βρίσκονται στη Γερμανία και δεν ανήκουν στον όμιλο DB εφάπαξ αναδρομική επιστροφή σε ποσοστό 4 % του τιμολογίου ρεύματος έλξης για την περίοδο ενός έτους πριν από τη θέση σε ισχύ του νέου συστήματος τιμολόγησης.

| 11. | Η DB Energie και η DB Mobility and Logistics AG θα διαβιβάζουν κάθε χρόνο τα αναγκαία στοιχεία στην Επιτροπή για να αξιολογεί κατά πόσον τα επίπεδα τιμών του ρεύματος έλξης και των υπηρεσιών μεταφορών που επιβάλλονται από τον όμιλο DB θα μπορούσαν να οδηγήσουν σε συμπίεση των περιθωρίων κέρδους. Η DB Energie θα κοινοποιεί επίσης εκ των προτέρων στην Επιτροπή κάθε αλλαγή της τιμής της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας. |
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11.

Η DB Energie και η DB Mobility and Logistics AG θα διαβιβάζουν κάθε χρόνο τα αναγκαία στοιχεία στην Επιτροπή για να αξιολογεί κατά πόσον τα επίπεδα τιμών του ρεύματος έλξης και των υπηρεσιών μεταφορών που επιβάλλονται από τον όμιλο DB θα μπορούσαν να οδηγήσουν σε συμπίεση των περιθωρίων κέρδους. Η DB Energie θα κοινοποιεί επίσης εκ των προτέρων στην Επιτροπή κάθε αλλαγή της τιμής της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας.

| 12. | Η ανάληψη των δεσμεύσεων θα τεθεί σε ισχύ το αργότερο τρεις μήνες μετά την κοινοποίηση της απόφασης της Επιτροπής. Οι δεσμεύσεις θα ισχύσουν επί πέντε έτη (6) μετά την κοινοποίηση της απόφασης της Επιτροπής ή μέχρις ότου το 20 % του όγκου του ρεύματος έλξης που αγοράζεται από τους ανταγωνιστές του ομίλου DB θα προέρχεται από τρίτους προμηθευτές ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας. Ο όμιλος DB θα διορίσει επίσης επιβλέποντα εντολοδόχο για να εποπτεύει την τήρηση των δεσμεύσεών του. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Η ανάληψη των δεσμεύσεων θα τεθεί σε ισχύ το αργότερο τρεις μήνες μετά την κοινοποίηση της απόφασης της Επιτροπής. Οι δεσμεύσεις θα ισχύσουν επί πέντε έτη (6) μετά την κοινοποίηση της απόφασης της Επιτροπής ή μέχρις ότου το 20 % του όγκου του ρεύματος έλξης που αγοράζεται από τους ανταγωνιστές του ομίλου DB θα προέρχεται από τρίτους προμηθευτές ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας. Ο όμιλος DB θα διορίσει επίσης επιβλέποντα εντολοδόχο για να εποπτεύει την τήρηση των δεσμεύσεών του.

| 13. | Οι δεσμεύσεις δημοσιεύονται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Ανταγωνισμού: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

Οι δεσμεύσεις δημοσιεύονται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Ανταγωνισμού: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   ΠΡΟΣΚΛΗΣΗ ΓΙΑ ΥΠΟΒΟΛΗ ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΗΣΕΩΝ

| 14. | Η Επιτροπή σκοπεύει, με την επιφύλαξη των πορισμάτων της παρούσας έρευνας αγοράς, να εκδώσει απόφαση δυνάμει του άρθρου 9 παράγραφος 1 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, στην οποία θα κηρύσσονται υποχρεωτικές οι δεσμεύσεις που συνοψίζονται παραπάνω και δημοσιεύονται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Ανταγωνισμού. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Η Επιτροπή σκοπεύει, με την επιφύλαξη των πορισμάτων της παρούσας έρευνας αγοράς, να εκδώσει απόφαση δυνάμει του άρθρου 9 παράγραφος 1 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, στην οποία θα κηρύσσονται υποχρεωτικές οι δεσμεύσεις που συνοψίζονται παραπάνω και δημοσιεύονται στον δικτυακό τόπο της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Ανταγωνισμού.

| 15. | Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 27 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, η Επιτροπή καλεί τα ενδιαφερόμενα τρίτα μέρη να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους επί των προτεινόμενων δεσμεύσεων. Η Επιτροπή πρέπει να λάβει τις εν λόγω παρατηρήσεις το αργότερο ένα μήνα μετά την ημερομηνία της παρούσας δημοσίευσης. Τα ενδιαφερόμενα τρίτα μέρη καλούνται επίσης να υποβάλουν μη εμπιστευτική εκδοχή των παρατηρήσεών τους, στην οποία οι πληροφορίες, που ισχυρίζονται ότι συνιστούν εμπορικά απόρρητα και άλλες εμπιστευτικές πληροφορίες έχουν διαγραφεί και αντικατασταθεί όπως απαιτείται από μη εμπιστευτική περίληψη ή από τη μνεία «εμπορικό απόρρητο» ή «εμπιστευτικό». Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 16 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 773/2004, κάθε απαίτηση για τήρηση του απορρήτου θα πρέπει να τεκμηριώνεται δεόντως, ιδίως με τον προσδιορισμό των λόγων για τους οποίους η κοινολόγηση των σχετικών πληροφοριών θα μπορούσε να προκαλέσει σοβαρή βλάβη. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 27 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1/2003, η Επιτροπή καλεί τα ενδιαφερόμενα τρίτα μέρη να υποβάλουν τις παρατηρήσεις τους επί των προτεινόμενων δεσμεύσεων. Η Επιτροπή πρέπει να λάβει τις εν λόγω παρατηρήσεις το αργότερο ένα μήνα μετά την ημερομηνία της παρούσας δημοσίευσης. Τα ενδιαφερόμενα τρίτα μέρη καλούνται επίσης να υποβάλουν μη εμπιστευτική εκδοχή των παρατηρήσεών τους, στην οποία οι πληροφορίες, που ισχυρίζονται ότι συνιστούν εμπορικά απόρρητα και άλλες εμπιστευτικές πληροφορίες έχουν διαγραφεί και αντικατασταθεί όπως απαιτείται από μη εμπιστευτική περίληψη ή από τη μνεία «εμπορικό απόρρητο» ή «εμπιστευτικό». Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 16 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 773/2004, κάθε απαίτηση για τήρηση του απορρήτου θα πρέπει να τεκμηριώνεται δεόντως, ιδίως με τον προσδιορισμό των λόγων για τους οποίους η κοινολόγηση των σχετικών πληροφοριών θα μπορούσε να προκαλέσει σοβαρή βλάβη.

| 16. | Οι απαντήσεις και οι παρατηρήσεις πρέπει, κατά προτίμηση, να είναι αιτιολογημένες και να αναφέρουν τα πραγματικά περιστατικά. Εάν εντοπίσετε κάποιο πρόβλημα όσον αφορά οποιοδήποτε σημείο των προτεινόμενων δεσμεύσεων, η Επιτροπή σας καλεί να προτείνετε πιθανή λύση. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Οι απαντήσεις και οι παρατηρήσεις πρέπει, κατά προτίμηση, να είναι αιτιολογημένες και να αναφέρουν τα πραγματικά περιστατικά. Εάν εντοπίσετε κάποιο πρόβλημα όσον αφορά οποιοδήποτε σημείο των προτεινόμενων δεσμεύσεων, η Επιτροπή σας καλεί να προτείνετε πιθανή λύση.

| 17. | Οι παρατηρήσεις αυτές μπορούν να αποσταλούν στην Επιτροπή με τον αριθμό αναφοράς AT.39398 II III, είτε με ηλεκτρονικό ταχυδρομείο (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), με τηλεομοιοτυπία (+32 22950128) ή ταχυδρομικώς στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Antitrust Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

17.

Οι παρατηρήσεις αυτές μπορούν να αποσταλούν στην Επιτροπή με τον αριθμό αναφοράς AT.39398 II III, είτε με ηλεκτρονικό ταχυδρομείο (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), με τηλεομοιοτυπία (+32 22950128) ή ταχυδρομικώς στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Antitrust Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  ΕΕ L 1, της 4.1.2003, σ. 1. Από την 1η Δεκεμβρίου 2009, τα άρθρα 81 και 82 της συνθήκης ΕΚ έγιναν άρθρα 101 και 102 αντίστοιχα της Συνθήκης για τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΣΛΕΕ). Οι δύο νέες σειρές διατάξεων είναι κατ' ουσίαν ταυτόσημες. Για τους σκοπούς της παρούσας ανακοίνωσης, οι παραπομπές στα άρθρα 101 και 102 της ΣΛΕΕ θα πρέπει, κατά περίπτωση, να εννοούνται ως παραπομπές στα άρθρα 81 και 82 της συνθήκης ΕΚ.

(2)  Νοείται στο εξής ως «όμιλος DB» η Deutsche Bahn AG και το σύνολο των θυγατρικών της.

(3)  Bundesgerichtshof, απόφαση της 9ης Νοεμβρίου 2010, στην υπόθεση EnVR 1/10.

(4)  Περισσότερες πληροφορίες σχετικά με αυτή την αλλαγή του συστήματος τιμολόγησης και τους όρους του νέου συστήματος διατίθενται στον δικτυακό τόπο της DB Energie (μόνο στη γερμανική γλώσσα): http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  Επιπλέον, η εισαγωγή του νέου συστήματος θα συμπληρωθεί από την υποχρέωση χωριστής υποβολής λογιστικής και πληροφοριών μεταξύ των δραστηριοτήτων της DB Energie ως διαχειριστή του δικτύου ρεύματος έλξης και ως προμηθευτή ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας.

(6)  Η δέσμευση της DB Energie να μην χορηγεί, για την προσφορά προμήθειας ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας, έκπτωση που να βασίζεται στη διάρκειαν θα διαρκέσει μόνο 3 χρόνια.

---

ΛΟΙΠΕΣ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ

Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή

| 15.8.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/31

---

Δημοσίευση αίτησης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο α) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων

2013/C 237/06

Η παρούσα δημοσίευση παρέχει το δικαίωμα ένστασης κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 51 του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου (1).

ΕΝΙΑΙΟ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟ

ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006 ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ

για την προστασία των γεωγραφικών ενδείξεων και των ονομασιών προέλευσης των γεωργικών προϊόντων και των τροφίμων
   (2)

«SZENTESI PAPRIKA»

Αριθ. ΕΚ: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

ΠΓΕ ( X ) ΠΟΠ ( )

1.   Ονομασία

«Szentesi paprika»

2.   Κράτος μέλος ή τρίτη χώρα

Ουγγαρία

3.   Περιγραφή του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή του τροφίμου

3.1.   Τύπος προϊόντος

| Κλάση 1.6 | Φρούτα, λαχανικά και δημητριακά νωπά ή μεταποιημένα |
| --- | --- |

Κλάση 1.6

Φρούτα, λαχανικά και δημητριακά νωπά ή μεταποιημένα

3.2.   Περιγραφή του προϊόντος για το οποίο ισχύει η ονομασία υπό 1

Η προστατευόμενη γεωγραφική ένδειξη «Szentesi paprika» δηλώνει τους καρπούς της εξαναγκασμένης καλλιέργειας των απαριθμούμενων ποικιλιακών τύπων και ποικιλιών πιπεριάς του είδους Capsicum annuum.

Κατά τη διάθεσή τους στην αγορά, τα προϊόντα που καλύπτονται από την ΠΓΕ «Szentesi paprika» πρέπει να είναι στο σύνολό τους ακέραια και υγιή, ενώ οι διάφοροι ποικιλιακοί τύποι πρέπει να διαθέτουν τα ακόλουθα χαρακτηριστικά:

| α) | Λευκή πιπεριά για γέμισμα (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Όταν ωριμάσει, η λευκή «Szentesi paprika» είναι μαλακή στην αφή, ο φλοιός της είναι λείος και γλιστερός, το άκρο της αμβλύ και καμπυλωτό, η σάρκα της τραγανή και χοντρή και. η επιφάνειά της λεία, με λαμπερό υπόλευκο χρώμα (ιβουάρ). Έχει σχήμα κωνικό, με μήκος 60 έως 120 mm και πλάτος 40 έως 70 mm, και αποτελείται συνήθως από τρεις έως τέσσερις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας κυμαίνεται από 4 έως 7 mm, η υφή της είναι σφιχτή, ο φλοιός λεπτός και το άρωμα πιπεριάς είναι έντονο, πλούσιο και γλυκό.
  Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod,Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia. |
| --- | --- |

α)

Λευκή πιπεριά για γέμισμα (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Όταν ωριμάσει, η λευκή «Szentesi paprika» είναι μαλακή στην αφή, ο φλοιός της είναι λείος και γλιστερός, το άκρο της αμβλύ και καμπυλωτό, η σάρκα της τραγανή και χοντρή και. η επιφάνειά της λεία, με λαμπερό υπόλευκο χρώμα (ιβουάρ). Έχει σχήμα κωνικό, με μήκος 60 έως 120 mm και πλάτος 40 έως 70 mm, και αποτελείται συνήθως από τρεις έως τέσσερις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας κυμαίνεται από 4 έως 7 mm, η υφή της είναι σφιχτή, ο φλοιός λεπτός και το άρωμα πιπεριάς είναι έντονο, πλούσιο και γλυκό.

Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod,Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia.

| β) | Καυτερή μυτερή πιπεριά (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  Η επιφάνεια της καυτερής μυτερής «Szentesi paprika» είναι στιλπνή, λεία ή ελαφρώς κυματοειδής και ο καρπός είναι επιμήκης, με οξεία απόληξη. Έχει χρώμα πράσινο ανοικτό, μεσαίο ή σκούρο, μήκος 150 έως 250 mm και πλάτος 20 έως 50 mm και αποτελείται συνήθως από δύο ή τρεις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας είναι 3 έως 4 mm, η υφή της σφιχτή και ο φλοιός λεπτός. Το προϊόν αναδίδει έντονο άρωμα πιπεριάς, είναι καυτερό και έχει πολύ ευχάριστη οσμή και γεύση.
  Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.
  Οι καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες έχουν τιμή καυστικότητας μεταξύ 2 500 και 5 000 της κλίμακας Scoville. |
| --- | --- |

β)

Καυτερή μυτερή πιπεριά (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

Η επιφάνεια της καυτερής μυτερής «Szentesi paprika» είναι στιλπνή, λεία ή ελαφρώς κυματοειδής και ο καρπός είναι επιμήκης, με οξεία απόληξη. Έχει χρώμα πράσινο ανοικτό, μεσαίο ή σκούρο, μήκος 150 έως 250 mm και πλάτος 20 έως 50 mm και αποτελείται συνήθως από δύο ή τρεις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας είναι 3 έως 4 mm, η υφή της σφιχτή και ο φλοιός λεπτός. Το προϊόν αναδίδει έντονο άρωμα πιπεριάς, είναι καυτερό και έχει πολύ ευχάριστη οσμή και γεύση.

Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.

Οι καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες έχουν τιμή καυστικότητας μεταξύ 2 500 και 5 000 της κλίμακας Scoville.

| γ) | Πιπεριά Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Η «Szentesi paprika» τύπου Kápia έχει κωνικό σχήμα, ελαφρώς πεπλατυσμένο, και επιφάνεια λεία, στιλπνή, με βελούδινο σκούρο κόκκινο χρώμα όταν ωριμάζει. Έχει μήκος 60 έως 120 mm και πλάτος 40 έως 70 mm και αποτελείται συνήθως από δύο ή τρεις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας κυμαίνεται από 4 έως 7 mm, η υφή της είναι σφιχτή, ο φλοιός έχει μέτριο πάχος. Ο καρπός έχει έντονη γλυκιά γεύση και άρωμα πάπρικας.
  Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus. |
| --- | --- |

γ)

Πιπεριά Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Η «Szentesi paprika» τύπου Kápia έχει κωνικό σχήμα, ελαφρώς πεπλατυσμένο, και επιφάνεια λεία, στιλπνή, με βελούδινο σκούρο κόκκινο χρώμα όταν ωριμάζει. Έχει μήκος 60 έως 120 mm και πλάτος 40 έως 70 mm και αποτελείται συνήθως από δύο ή τρεις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας κυμαίνεται από 4 έως 7 mm, η υφή της είναι σφιχτή, ο φλοιός έχει μέτριο πάχος. Ο καρπός έχει έντονη γλυκιά γεύση και άρωμα πάπρικας.

Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus.

| δ) | Τοματοπιπεριά (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Η τοματοπιπεριά «Szentesi paprika» έχει πολύ χαρακτηριστικό σχήμα πεπλατυσμένης σφαίρας, με λεία και στιλπνή επιφάνεια και πολύ σκούρο κόκκινο χρώμα όταν ωριμάζει. Η διάμετρός της κυμαίνεται από 60 έως 120 mm και έχει μήκος 40 έως 60 mm. Αποτελείται συνήθως από τρεις ή τέσσερις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας κυμαίνεται από 5 έως 7 mm, η υφή της είναι σφιχτή, ο φλοιός λεπτός και αναδίδει έντονο γλυκό άρωμα πιπεριάς.
  Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.
  Οι καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες των διαφόρων ποικιλιακών τύπων που αναφέρονται ανωτέρω ενδέχεται να διαφέρουν μεταξύ των ετών. |
| --- | --- |

δ)

Τοματοπιπεριά (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Η τοματοπιπεριά «Szentesi paprika» έχει πολύ χαρακτηριστικό σχήμα πεπλατυσμένης σφαίρας, με λεία και στιλπνή επιφάνεια και πολύ σκούρο κόκκινο χρώμα όταν ωριμάζει. Η διάμετρός της κυμαίνεται από 60 έως 120 mm και έχει μήκος 40 έως 60 mm. Αποτελείται συνήθως από τρεις ή τέσσερις λοβούς. Το πάχος της σάρκας κυμαίνεται από 5 έως 7 mm, η υφή της είναι σφιχτή, ο φλοιός λεπτός και αναδίδει έντονο γλυκό άρωμα πιπεριάς.

Καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.

Οι καλλιεργούμενες ποικιλίες των διαφόρων ποικιλιακών τύπων που αναφέρονται ανωτέρω ενδέχεται να διαφέρουν μεταξύ των ετών.

3.3.   Πρώτες ύλες (μόνο για μεταποιημένα προϊόντα)

—

3.4.   Ζωοτροφές (μόνο για προϊόντα ζωικής προέλευσης)

—

3.5.   Ειδικά στάδια της παραγωγής τα οποία πρέπει να εκτελούνται εντός της οριοθετημένης γεωγραφικής περιοχής

Όλα τα στάδια της διαδικασίας παραγωγής της «Szentesi paprika» πρέπει να διεξάγονται εντός της γεωγραφικής περιοχής που οριοθετείται στο σημείο 4:

| — | η παραγωγή και η καλλιέργεια των φυτών της πιπεριάς, |
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η παραγωγή και η καλλιέργεια των φυτών της πιπεριάς,

| — | ειδικότερα η ολοκληρωμένη και βιολογική καλλιέργεια ορισμένων ποικιλιακών τύπων και ορισμένων ποικιλιών, |
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ειδικότερα η ολοκληρωμένη και βιολογική καλλιέργεια ορισμένων ποικιλιακών τύπων και ορισμένων ποικιλιών,

| — | η επιλογή της περιόδου παραγωγής, |
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η επιλογή της περιόδου παραγωγής,

| — | η εγκατάσταση μιας ζώνης καλλιέργειας, |
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η εγκατάσταση μιας ζώνης καλλιέργειας,

| — | η προετοιμασία και η λίπανση του εδάφους, |
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η προετοιμασία και η λίπανση του εδάφους,

| — | η φύτευση, |
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η φύτευση,

| — | η κατασκευή των υποστυλωμάτων, |
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η κατασκευή των υποστυλωμάτων,

| — | οι εργασίες φυτοτεχνικής, |
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οι εργασίες φυτοτεχνικής,

| — | η άρδευση και η προσθήκη θρεπτικών ουσιών, |
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η άρδευση και η προσθήκη θρεπτικών ουσιών,

| — | η ρύθμιση των κλιματικών συνθηκών, |
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η ρύθμιση των κλιματικών συνθηκών,

| — | η εφαρμογή ολοκληρωμένων και οικολογικών μεθόδων αντιπαρασιτικής αγωγής, |
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η εφαρμογή ολοκληρωμένων και οικολογικών μεθόδων αντιπαρασιτικής αγωγής,

| — | η συγκομιδή, η προετοιμασία του προϊόντος, η προαποθήκευση/αποθήκευση, |
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η συγκομιδή, η προετοιμασία του προϊόντος, η προαποθήκευση/αποθήκευση,

| — | η απομάκρυνση των υπολειμμάτων καλλιέργειας, ο καθαρισμός και η απολύμανση των εγκαταστάσεων παραγωγής. |
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η απομάκρυνση των υπολειμμάτων καλλιέργειας, ο καθαρισμός και η απολύμανση των εγκαταστάσεων παραγωγής.

3.6.   Ειδικοί κανόνες για τον τεμαχισμό, το τρίψιμο, τη συσκευασία κ.λπ.

Η ταξινόμηση κατά μέγεθος, η συσκευασία και η επισήμανση του προϊόντος «Szentesi paprika» πραγματοποιούνται στις εγκαταστάσεις του παραγωγού ή σε άλλη κατάλληλη εγκατάσταση, εντός της οριοθετημένης γεωγραφικής περιοχής.

Συσκευασία σε παρτίδες: δίσκοι, καλάθια, σάκοι από πολυαιθυλένιο (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 πιπεριές/μονάδα). Συσκευασία κατά βάρος: καλάθια, δικτυωτοί σάκοι Raschel (0,35, 0,5, 0,7, 1, 2 kg πιπεριών/μονάδα) ή τελάρα: σε συσκευασίες M10, M20, M30 (2,5, 10, 12, 14 kg πιπεριών/μονάδα). Το είδος συσκευασίας για ορισμένους ποικιλιακούς τύπους μπορεί να αλλάξει ανά πάσα στιγμή ανάλογα με τις εμπορικές ανάγκες.

Προκειμένου να διατηρούνται η χαρακτηριστική ποιότητα και ομοιογένεια κάθε ποικιλιακού τύπου, και πιο συγκεκριμένα κάθε ποικιλίας, καθώς και η γεύση, το άρωμα, η υφή και η ακεραιότητα των καρπών που αποτελούν τα ιδιαίτερα χαρακτηριστικά της ΠΓΕ «Szentesi paprika», αλλά και να διασφαλίζεται η ιχνηλασιμότητα των προϊόντων, η συσκευασία πρέπει να πραγματοποιείται εντός της οριοθετημένης γεωγραφικής περιοχής.

3.7.   Ειδικοί κανόνες για την επισήμανση

| — | Στις συσκευασίες πρέπει να εμφαίνεται ο συνδυασμός λέξεων «Szentesi paprika». |
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Στις συσκευασίες πρέπει να εμφαίνεται ο συνδυασμός λέξεων «Szentesi paprika».

| — | Επιβάλλεται η τοποθέτηση ετικέτας με γραμμωτό κώδικα που επιτρέπει την ιχνηλασιμότητα του προϊόντος «Szentesi paprika». |
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Επιβάλλεται η τοποθέτηση ετικέτας με γραμμωτό κώδικα που επιτρέπει την ιχνηλασιμότητα του προϊόντος «Szentesi paprika».

4.   Συνοπτική οριοθέτηση της γεωγραφικής περιοχής

Η περιοχή παραγωγής του προϊόντος «Szentesi paprika» που καλύπτεται από την προστατευόμενη γεωγραφική ένδειξη (ΠΓΕ) βρίσκεται στο διοικητικό διαμέρισμα Csongrád και συνιστά ομοιογενή ζώνη.

Η πιπεριά «Szentesi paprika» καλλιεργείται εντός των διοικητικών ορίων των ακόλουθων κοινοτήτων του διοικητικού διαμερίσματος Csongrád: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár και Szentes.

5.   Δεσμός με τη γεωγραφική περιοχή

5.1.   Ιδιαιτερότητα της γεωγραφικής περιοχής

Οι παράγοντες που επηρεάζουν την ποιότητα της καλλιέργειας της πιπεριάς, ιδίως οι συνθήκες θερμοκρασίας και φωτός, καθώς και οι εδαφολογικές και υδρογραφικές συνθήκες έχουν δημιουργήσει ένα περιβάλλον ιδιαίτερα ευνοϊκό για την ανάπτυξη της αρδευόμενης καλλιέργειας της πιπεριάς στην περιφέρεια Szentes, η οποία ξεκίνησε χάρη στην πρωτοποριακή εργασία των «βούλγαρων καλλιεργητών κηπευτικών» (καλλιεργητές που εφάρμοζαν ιδιαίτερες, μικρής κλίμακας μεθόδους εξαναγκασμένης καλλιέργειας σε θερμοκήπια και αρδευόμενης), οι οποίοι εγκαταστάθηκαν στην περιοχή κατά το δεύτερο ήμισυ του 19ου αιώνα.

Η παραδοσιακή ζώνη καλλιέργειας της περιφέρειας Szentes βρίσκεται στο νοτιοανατολικό τμήμα της Ουγγαρίας, σε μία από τις πιο βαθιές λεκάνες της Μεγάλης Πεδιάδας. Από τοπογραφική άποψη, η ζώνη καταλαμβάνει μία πολύ ιδιαίτερη θέση, καθώς περιλαμβάνει τις πιο πεδινές εκτάσεις της χώρας. Το ανάγλυφο παρουσιάζει τρεις πλαγιές, που κατηφορίζουν από τα γειτονικά διοικητικά διαμερίσματα έως την κοιλάδα του Tisza. Το σημαντικότερο υδατόρρευμα του υδρογραφικού συστήματος της περιοχής είναι ο ποταμός Tisza, ο οποίος διαμορφώνει επίσης ολόκληρη τη γεωγραφική φυσιογνωμία της περιοχής. Λόγω της αφθονίας των επιφανειακών υδάτων που χαρακτηρίζουν την περιοχή, οι κυρίαρχοι τύποι εδάφους είναι τα ασβεστολιθικά και τα εδάφη τύπου Solonetz στις πεδιάδες μελανών εδαφών. Τα εδάφη της ζώνης παραγωγής παρουσιάζουν καλά φυσικά χαρακτηριστικά, κοκκώδη υφή, ταχεία θέρμανση του εδάφους, ελαφρά αλκαλικότητα, αφθονία νερού και θρεπτικών ουσιών, καθώς και υψηλή περιεκτικότητα σε χούμο και παχύ αρόσιμο στρώμα.

Κατά την παραγωγή του προϊόντος «Szentesi paprika», μεταξύ των κλιματικών παραγόντων που προσδίδουν στους καρπούς τις εγγενείς τους ιδιότητες, καθοριστικό ρόλο διαδραματίζουν το φως και ο αριθμός ωρών ηλιοφάνειας, αφενός, και οι θερμοκρασίες και η ποιότητα της θερμικής ακτινοβολίας, αφετέρου. Στην παραδοσιακή ζώνη καλλιέργειας της περιφέρειας Szentes κυριαρχούν τα ηπειρωτικά κλιματικά χαρακτηριστικά. Η διάρκεια της ηλιοφάνειας κατανέμεται ομοιόμορφα στην περιφέρεια. Η ετήσια ηλιοφάνεια ανέρχεται σε 2 050 ώρες κατά μέσο όρο. Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις τάσεις της μέσης ετήσιας θερμοκρασίας στη ζώνη παραγωγής, αυτή συγκαταλέγεται μεταξύ των θερμότερων της χώρας. Η μέση ετήσια θερμοκρασία είναι + 10-11 °C, ενώ η συνολική θερμοκρασία κατά την περίοδο ανάπτυξης ανέρχεται σε 3 200-3 300 °C, επίπεδο ιδιαίτερο ευνοϊκό για την καλλιέργεια της πιπεριάς, η οποία έχει ανάγκη την υψηλή θερμοκρασία.

Ωστόσο, όσον αφορά τις ετήσιες βροχοπτώσεις, η συγκεκριμένη περιφέρεια είναι η πιο φτωχή της χώρας, με ύψος βροχοπτώσεων 500 έως 550 mm κατά μέσο όρο ετησίως. Η ακριβής κατανομή των βροχοπτώσεων στη διάρκεια του έτους είναι η ακόλουθη: 40 % τον χειμώνα και 60 % το καλοκαίρι. Η αρδευόμενη καλλιέργεια που αναπτύχθηκε χάρη στις ευνοϊκές υδρογραφικές συνθήκες —και εφαρμόστηκε από τους βούλγαρους καλλιεργητές κηπευτικών— είναι αυτή που κατέστησε δυνατή την παραγωγή υδρόφιλης πιπεριάς.

5.2.   Ιδιοτυπία του προϊόντος

Τα βασικά οργανοληπτικά πλεονεκτήματα και χαρακτηριστικά της πιπεριάς «Szentesi paprika» που προέρχεται από τη συγκεκριμένη γεωγραφική περιοχή είναι τα ακόλουθα: έχει έντονη πικάντικη, γλυκιά ή καυτερή γεύση, έντονο άρωμα πιπεριάς ή πάπρικας, λεπτό φλοιό. Το πάχος της σάρκας των καρπών κυμαίνεται από 3 έως 7 mm, γεγονός που επιτρέπει την πλήρη διατήρηση των γεύσεων και των αρωμάτων ακόμη και όταν το προϊόν καταναλώνεται νωπό, που αποτελεί και τη συνηθέστερη περίπτωση.

Λευκή «Szentesi paprika»: όταν ωριμάσει, είναι μαλακή στην αφή, με λείο και γλιστερό φλοιό. Το άκρο της είναι αμβλύ και καμπυλωτό και η σάρκα της τραγανή και λεπτή. Η οσμή και τα αρώματα της νωπής πιπεριάς είναι ιδιαίτερα χαρακτηριστικά, γεγονός που αποτυπώνεται στη δημοφιλή έκφραση των καταναλωτών: «Η πιπεριά του Szentes έχει γεύση».

Η επιφάνεια της καυτερής μυτερής «Szentesi paprika» είναι στιλπνή, λεία ή ελαφρώς κυματοειδής, και ο καρπός είναι επιμήκης με οξεία απόληξη· η υφή της σάρκας είναι σφιχτή. Το προϊόν αναδίδει έντονο άρωμα πιπεριάς, είναι καυτερό και έχει πολύ ευχάριστη οσμή και γεύση. Η «Szentesi paprika» τύπου Kápia έχει κωνικό σχήμα, ελαφρώς πεπλατυσμένο, η υφή της σάρκας της είναι σφιχτή και ο φλοιός της έχει μέτριο πάχος. Η επιφάνειά της είναι λεία και στιλπνή και, χάρη στο γεωγραφικό περιβάλλον (φως, θερμοκρασία), αναπτύσσει ένα βελούδινο σκούρο κόκκινο χρώμα, ιδιαίτερα ελκυστικό.

Η τοματοπιπεριά «Szentesi paprika» έχει πολύ χαρακτηριστικό σχήμα πεπλατυσμένης σφαίρας. Παρά το πάχος της σάρκας, ο φλοιός είναι πολύ λεπτός και η επιφάνεια λεία. Όταν ο καρπός ωριμάζει, αναπτύσσει πολύ σκούρο κόκκινο χρώμα.

5.3.   Αιτιώδης σχέση που συνδέει τη γεωγραφική περιοχή με την ποιότητα ή τα χαρακτηριστικά του προϊόντος (για τις ΠΟΠ) ή με μια συγκεκριμένη ποιότητα, τη φήμη ή άλλα χαρακτηριστικά του προϊόντος (για τις ΠΓΕ)

Ο δεσμός με τη γεωγραφική περιοχή βασίζεται στη φήμη που έχει αποκτήσει από μακρού το προϊόν, καθώς και στην τοπική τεχνογνωσία των παραγωγών της «Szentesi paprika» που μεταδίδεται από γενιά σε γενιά.

Η φήμη της «Szentesi paprika»

Η αρδευόμενη καλλιέργεια της πιπεριάς στην περιφέρεια Szentes αναπτύχθηκε χάρη στην πρωτοποριακή εργασία των «βούλγαρων καλλιεργητών κηπευτικών» που εγκαταστάθηκαν στην περιοχή κατά το δεύτερο ήμισυ του 19ου αιώνα. Λόγω αυτού, η παραγωγή της περίφημης «Szentesi paprika» δεν σταμάτησε ποτέ έκτοτε. Η φήμη του προϊόντος εξακολουθεί να είναι σημαντική έως σήμερα, όπως μαρτυρά το πρώτο βραβείο που κατέκτησε το 2006 στο Debrecen, στο σαλόνι κηπευτικής που διοργανώθηκε στο πλαίσιο της γεωργικής έκθεσης Farmer Expo, όπου εκπροσωπήθηκαν 300 εγχώριες και αλλοδαπές επιχειρήσεις. Το 2007, η πιπεριά που προορίζεται για νωπή κατανάλωση έλαβε το βραβείο Magyar Termék Nagydíj (μεγάλο βραβείο ουγγρικού προϊόντος).

Μεγάλος αριθμός ιστορικών στοιχείων μαρτυρούν τον μακραίωνο δεσμό που συνδέει τη φήμη της «Szentesi paprika» με τη γεωγραφική περιοχή. Η εμφάνιση της πιπεριάς στην Ουγγαρία ανάγεται στην εποχή της εγκατάστασης των βούλγαρων καλλιεργητών κηπευτικών κοντά στο Úsztató major, στην περιοχή του Szegvár, τον χειμώνα του 1875-1876. Σύμφωνα με τη μεγάλη γεωργική απογραφή του 1895, το 92,74 % της συνολικής παραγωγής της ουγγρικής πιπεριάς ήταν συγκεντρωμένο στο νοτιοανατολικό τμήμα της χώρας, στην περιφέρεια Szentes. Οι καλλιεργητές μίσθωναν τις πεδιάδες μελανών εδαφών και τα προσχωσιγενή εδάφη της περιοχής όπου βρίσκεται σήμερα το διοικητικό διαμέρισμα του Csongrad, τα οποία ήταν πλούσια σε χούμο και χαρακτηρίζονταν από ταχεία θέρμανση και επέλεγαν, εφόσον ήταν εφικτό, εκτάσεις με ελαφρά κλίση του εδάφους. Χρησιμοποιούσαν φύτρα και θερμοκήπια για την πρώιμη καλλιέργεια. Εφάρμοζαν επίσης τη συγκαλλιέργεια σε φυτώρια, καλλιεργώντας, για παράδειγμα, δίπλα στην πιπεριά νεαρά φυτάρια αγγουριάς, τα οποία παρέμεναν στη θέση τους μετά τη μεταφύτευση της πιπεριάς. Μεταφύτευαν με ένα μικρό κομμάτι ριζοχώματος τα φυτά που είχαν εκριζώσει. Ακολουθούσε σημαντική και τακτική άρδευση: χρησιμοποιούσαν για την άρδευση λιμνάζοντα ύδατα που είχαν θερμανθεί ή νερό προερχόμενο από ρηχά και χαμηλής ροής υδατορρεύματα. Κατείχαν μια μοναδική μέθοδο συλλογής των υδάτων και αποστράγγισης. Την εποχή εκείνη, στην περιφέρεια του Szentes χρησιμοποιούνταν το λεγόμενο μαγγανοπήγαδο, που ήταν κατάλληλο λόγω της κυμαινόμενης στάθμης του νερού.

Τοπική τεχνογνωσία

Στην παραδοσιακή ζώνη καλλιέργειας της περιφέρειας Szentes, η επιφάνεια του εδάφους διατηρεί άριστα τη θερμότητα. Δεδομένου ότι το έδαφος στο οποίο καλλιεργείται η «Szentesi paprika» απορροφά περισσότερη θερμότητα από αυτή που διαφεύγει μέσω ακτινοβολίας της πρώτες πρωινές ώρες, η θερμότητα που συσσωρεύεται στο έδαφος και στον επιφανειακό αέρα διαχέεται, με αποτέλεσμα την άνοδο της θερμοκρασίας. Το ισορροπημένο μικροκλίμα που επιτυγχάνεται χάρη στην αρμονική προσφορά θερμότητας, σε συνδυασμό με την αρδευόμενη καλλιέργεια που εφάρμοσαν οι βούλγαροι καλλιεργητές κηπευτικών, καθιστά τη «Szentesi paprika», που έχει μεγάλες ανάγκες θερμότητας και νερού, προϊόν εξαιρετικής γεύσης.

Στους φυσικούς παράγοντες προστίθεται η συμβολή του ανθρώπινου παράγοντα, ήτοι των καλλιεργητών της περιφέρειας και της πρακτικής εμπειρίας που αποκτήθηκε όσον αφορά την εξαναγκασμένη καλλιέργεια (έλεγχος της θερμοκρασίας, αερισμός, προστασία από τον ήλιο, περιποίηση των φυτών) που μεταδίδεται από γενιά σε γενιά. Η τεχνογνωσία που έχει αποκτηθεί με τον τρόπο αυτό μπορεί να αντισταθμίσει τις αρνητικές επιπτώσεις των δυσμενών καιρικών συνθηκών των τελευταίων δεκαετιών, εξασφαλίζοντας και, στο μέτρο του δυνατού, διατηρώντας τη γεύση, το χρώμα και το άρωμα της «Szentesi paprika», καθώς και το ενδιαφέρον σχήμα που χαρακτηρίζει ορισμένους ποικιλιακούς τύπους.

Η τεχνολογία που εισήγαγαν οι βούλγαροι καλλιεργητές κηπευτικών εξελίχθηκε επί σχεδόν 150 έτη καλλιέργειας, προσαρμοζόμενη στις απαιτήσεις της εποχής. Οι βασικοί παράγοντες για την καλλιέργεια πιπεριάς αξιολογήθηκαν εκ νέου στο πλαίσιο της παραγωγής και εμφανίστηκαν νέες μέθοδοι παραγωγής. Μέχρι τη δεκαετία του 1960, μεταξύ των σημαντικότερων παραγόντων για την παραγωγή συγκαταλέγονταν οι καλές συνθήκες του εδάφους, το αρδευτικό δυναμικό (Tisza, Körös και τα συστήματα αρδευτικών τάφρων), ο αριθμός ωρών ηλιοφάνειας (δυνατότητα πρώιμης καλλιέργειας) και η θέρμανση του εδάφους στις αρχές της άνοιξης. Η επόμενη περίοδος διήρκεσε από τα τέλη της δεκαετίας του 1960 έως τα τέλη της δεκαετίας του 1980. Οι παραγωγοί πιπεριάς άρχισαν να εκμεταλλεύονται την πρόωρη θέρμανση του εδάφους για καλλιέργεια σε θερμοκήπια, αξιοποιώντας με τον καλύτερο τρόπο τον αυξημένο αριθμό ωρών ηλιοφάνειας κατά τους χειμερινούς και εαρινούς μήνες. Κατά τις δεκαετίες 1960-1980, ως αποτέλεσμα της γεωθερμικής ενέργειας που ανακαλύφθηκε στην περιοχή, η καλλιέργεια του προϊόντος «Szentesi paprika» μετατράπηκε από υπαίθρια σε θερμοκηπιακή, ενώ διαδόθηκε η υδροπονική καλλιέργεια.

Παραπομπή στη δημοσίευση των προδιαγραφών

[Άρθρο 5 παράγραφος 7 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006 (3)]

Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő (Δελτίο αγροτικής ανάπτυξης) της 16ης Νοεμβρίου 2011, τόμος LXI, αριθ. 6, σελίδα 317.

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

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(1)  ΕΕ L 343 της 14.12.2012, σ. 1.

(2)  Αντικαταστάθηκε από τον κανονισμό (EE) αριθ. 1151/2012.

(3)  Βλέπε υποσημείωση 2.

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15.8.2013

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Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/36

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Δημοσίευση αίτησης τροποποίησης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο α) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων

2013/C 237/07

Η παρούσα δημοσίευση παρέχει το δικαίωμα ένστασης κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 51 του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου (1).

ΑΙΤΗΣΗ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΣΗΣ

ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006 ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ

για την προστασία των γεωγραφικών ενδείξεων και των ονομασιών προέλευσης των γεωργικών προϊόντων και των τροφίμων
   (2)

ΑΙΤΗΣΗ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΣΗΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΝΝΟΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΡΘΡΟΥ 9

«TERRA D’OTRANTO»

Αριθ. ΕΚ: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

ΠΓΕ ( ) ΠΟΠ ( X )

1.   Κεφάλαιο των προδιαγραφών προϊόντος που αφορά η τροποποίηση

| — |  | Ονομασία του προϊόντος |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Περιγραφή του προϊόντος |
| — |  | Γεωγραφική περιοχή |
| — | ☒ | Απόδειξη της καταγωγής |
| — |  | Μέθοδος παραγωγής |
| — |  | Δεσμός |
| — |  | Επισήμανση |
| — | ☒ | Εθνικές απαιτήσεις |
| — | ☒ | Άλλο (να προσδιοριστεί) |

—



Ονομασία του προϊόντος

—

☒

Περιγραφή του προϊόντος

—



Γεωγραφική περιοχή

—

☒

Απόδειξη της καταγωγής

—



Μέθοδος παραγωγής

—



Δεσμός

—



Επισήμανση

—

☒

Εθνικές απαιτήσεις

—

☒

Άλλο (να προσδιοριστεί)

2.   Τύπος τροποποίησης

| — |  | Τροποποίηση του ενιαίου εγγράφου ή της σύνοψης |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Τροποποίηση των προδιαγραφών της καταχωρισμένης ΠΟΠ ή ΠΓΕ για την οποία δεν έχει δημοσιευθεί ούτε ενιαίο έγγραφο ούτε σύνοψη |
| — |  | Τροποποίηση των προδιαγραφών που δεν απαιτεί τροποποίηση του δημοσιευμένου ενιαίου εγγράφου [άρθρο 9 παράγραφος 3 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006] |
| — |  | Προσωρινή τροποποίηση των προδιαγραφών λόγω της επιβολής υποχρεωτικών υγειονομικών ή φυτοϋγειονομικών μέτρων από τις δημόσιες αρχές [άρθρο 9 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006] |

—



Τροποποίηση του ενιαίου εγγράφου ή της σύνοψης

—

☒

Τροποποίηση των προδιαγραφών της καταχωρισμένης ΠΟΠ ή ΠΓΕ για την οποία δεν έχει δημοσιευθεί ούτε ενιαίο έγγραφο ούτε σύνοψη

—



Τροποποίηση των προδιαγραφών που δεν απαιτεί τροποποίηση του δημοσιευμένου ενιαίου εγγράφου [άρθρο 9 παράγραφος 3 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006]

—



Προσωρινή τροποποίηση των προδιαγραφών λόγω της επιβολής υποχρεωτικών υγειονομικών ή φυτοϋγειονομικών μέτρων από τις δημόσιες αρχές [άρθρο 9 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006]

3.   Τροποποίηση(-εις)

3.1.   Περιγραφή του προϊόντος

Τροποποιούνται οι προδιαγραφές παραγωγής με την εισαγωγή της διαμέσου των τυπικών περιγραφέων, την απαλοιφή της βαθμολογίας 6,5 (η οποία στερείται πλέον σημασίας) και την υιοθέτηση των προβλεπομένων στη μέθοδο COI/T20, έγγραφο αριθ. 22. Επιπλέον εισάγονται στην οργανοληπτική ανάλυση ορισμένα ειδικά στοιχεία, που εξαρτώνται από το ποια από τις δύο αυτόχθονες ποικιλίες είναι η επικρατούσα.

Με την εφαρμογή της νέας μεθόδου προκύπτει το ακόλουθο περιγραφικό τμήμα:

| — | χρώμα: πράσινο ή κίτρινο με πρασινωπές ανταύγειες· |
| --- | --- |

—

χρώμα: πράσινο ή κίτρινο με πρασινωπές ανταύγειες·

| — | οσμή: μεσαίο φρουτώδες ελιάς (διάμεσος μεταξύ 3 και 6) στο σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης με ελαφριά αίσθηση φύλλων· |
| --- | --- |

—

οσμή: μεσαίο φρουτώδες ελιάς (διάμεσος μεταξύ 3 και 6) στο σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης με ελαφριά αίσθηση φύλλων·

| — | γεύση: μεσαίο φρουτώδες (διάμεσος μεταξύ 3 και 6) με αίσθηση ελιάς στο σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης. Μέτρια ή ελαφριά αίσθηση καυστικότητας και πικρότητας, αναλόγως της εποχής συγκομιδής (διάμεσος άνω του 0 έως 6).·Επιπλέον, αναλόγως της εποχής συγκομιδής και της επικρατούσας ποικιλίας, το φρουτώδες συγχωνεύεται με τις αισθήσεις φύλλων ελιάς, φρεσκοκομμένου χόρτου, αγριοαγκινάρας/αγκινάρας/κιχωρίου για την ποικιλία Ogliarola, ή φρούτων/ντομάτας/φρούτων του δάσους για την ποικιλία Cellina. |
| --- | --- |

—

γεύση: μεσαίο φρουτώδες (διάμεσος μεταξύ 3 και 6) με αίσθηση ελιάς στο σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης. Μέτρια ή ελαφριά αίσθηση καυστικότητας και πικρότητας, αναλόγως της εποχής συγκομιδής (διάμεσος άνω του 0 έως 6).·Επιπλέον, αναλόγως της εποχής συγκομιδής και της επικρατούσας ποικιλίας, το φρουτώδες συγχωνεύεται με τις αισθήσεις φύλλων ελιάς, φρεσκοκομμένου χόρτου, αγριοαγκινάρας/αγκινάρας/κιχωρίου για την ποικιλία Ogliarola, ή φρούτων/ντομάτας/φρούτων του δάσους για την ποικιλία Cellina.

Τροποποιούνται οι χημικές παράμετροι, με μείωση της μέγιστης ολικής οξύτητας εκφραζόμενης σε ελαϊκό οξύ (από < 0,8 σε < 0,65), και μικρή αύξηση της περιεκτικότητας σε λινελαϊκό οξύ (από <= 0,70 σε <= 0,8) και της τιμής K232 (από <= 2,10 σε <= 2,20). Οι τροποποιήσεις αυτές προέρχονται από την ανοδική τάση της εκπροσώπησης των δύο πιο διαδεδομένων στη γεωγραφική περιοχή ποικιλιών, της Cellina di Nardò και της Ogliarola Salentina, οι οποίες προσδίδουν στα μονοποικιλιακά έλαια, τα οποία προηγουμένως είχαν πολύ μικρή παρουσία, ελαφρώς διαφορετικές τιμές λινελαϊκού οξέος και K232.

3.2.   Απόδειξη της καταγωγής

Οι προδιαγραφές παραγωγής προσαρμόζονται στις διατάξεις του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ.1898/2006, με εισαγωγή των διαδικασιών που πρέπει να εφαρμόζουν οι επιχειρήσεις για να εδραιώσουν το ή τα αποδεικτικά στοιχεία της καταγωγής του προϊόντος τους.

3.3.   Εθνικές απαιτήσεις

Καταργούνται οι απαιτήσεις του νόμου αριθ. 169 της 15ης Φεβρουαρίου 1992 ο οποίος αφορά κανόνες για την αναγνώριση της ελεγχόμενης ονομασίας προέλευσης παρθένων και εξαιρετικά παρθένων ελαιολάδων, και του υπουργικού διατάγματος αριθ. 573/1993.

3.4.   Άλλο

Η αίτηση τροποποίησης υποβάλλεται από την ένωση Consorzio di tutela dell’olio extra vergine di oliva «Terra d’Otranto», η οποία δικαιούται να υποβάλει αίτηση τροποποίησης. Το Consorzio di tutela συστήθηκε μετά την ημερομηνία της αρχικής αίτησης καταχώρισης της ΠΟΠ «Terre d’Otranto» την οποία, την εποχή εκείνη, είχε υποβάλει η ένωση APROL, ως εκπρόσωπος επτά συνεταιριστικών οργανώσεων των παραγωγών ελαιολάδου.

ΕΝΙΑΙΟ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟ

ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006 ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ

για την προστασία των γεωγραφικών ενδείξεων και των ονομασιών προέλευσης των γεωργικών προϊόντων και των τροφίμων
   (3)

«TERRA D’OTRANTO»

Αριθ. ΕΚ: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

ΠΓΕ ( ) ΠΟΠ ( X )

1.   Ονομασία

«Terra d'Otranto»

2.   Κράτος μέλος ή τρίτη χώρα

Ιταλία

3.   Περιγραφή του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή του τροφίμου

3.1.   Τύπος προϊόντος

| Κλάση 1.5. | Έλαια και λίπη (βούτυρο, μαργαρίνη, λάδι κ.λπ.) |
| --- | --- |

Κλάση 1.5.

Έλαια και λίπη (βούτυρο, μαργαρίνη, λάδι κ.λπ.)

3.2.   Περιγραφή του προϊόντος για το οποίο ισχύει η ονομασία υπό 1

Το ελαιόλαδο «Terra d’Otranto» είναι ένα εξαιρετικό παρθένο ελαιόλαδο που παρουσιάζει τα ακόλουθα χημικά και οργανοληπτικά χαρακτηριστικά:

| — | μέγιστη οξύτητα 0,65 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

μέγιστη οξύτητα 0,65 %;

| — | αριθμός υπεροξειδίων <= 14 MeqO2/kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

αριθμός υπεροξειδίων <= 14 MeqO2/kg;

| — | K232 <= 2,20 |
| --- | --- |

—

K232 <= 2,20

| — | K270 <= 0,170 |
| --- | --- |

—

K270 <= 0,170

| — | λινελαϊκό οξύ <= 0,8 |
| --- | --- |

—

λινελαϊκό οξύ <= 0,8

| — | χρώμα: πράσινο ή κίτρινο με πρασινωπές ανταύγειες· |
| --- | --- |

—

χρώμα: πράσινο ή κίτρινο με πρασινωπές ανταύγειες·

| — | οσμή: μεσαίο φρουτώδες ελιάς (διάμεσος με τιμές μεταξύ 3 και 6) στον σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης με ελαφριά αίσθηση φύλλων· |
| --- | --- |

—

οσμή: μεσαίο φρουτώδες ελιάς (διάμεσος με τιμές μεταξύ 3 και 6) στον σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης με ελαφριά αίσθηση φύλλων·

| — | γεύση: μεσαίο φρουτώδες (διάμεσος μεταξύ 3 και 6) με αίσθηση ελιάς στον σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης. |
| --- | --- |

—

γεύση: μεσαίο φρουτώδες (διάμεσος μεταξύ 3 και 6) με αίσθηση ελιάς στον σωστό βαθμό ωρίμασης.

Μέτρια ή ελαφριά αίσθηση καυστικότητας και πικρότητας αναλόγως της εποχής συγκομιδής· επιπλέον, αναλόγως της εποχής συγκομιδής και της επικρατούσας ποικιλίας, το φρουτώδες συγχωνεύεται με τις αισθήσεις φύλλων ελιάς, φρεσκοκομμένου χόρτου, αγριοαγκινάρας/αγκινάρας/κιχωρίου για την ποικιλία Ogliarola, ή φρούτων/ντομάτας/φρούτων του δάσους για την ποικιλία Cellina.

3.3.   Πρώτες ύλες (μόνο για μεταποιημένα προϊόντα)

—

3.4.   Ζωοτροφές (μόνο για προϊόντα ζωικής προέλευσης)

—

3.5.   Ειδικά στάδια της παραγωγής τα οποία πρέπει να εκτελούνται εντός της οριοθετημένης γεωγραφικής περιοχής

Οι εργασίες καλλιέργειας, παραγωγής και έκθλιψης για το εξαιρετικό παρθένο ελαιόλαδο «Terra d’Otranto» πρέπει να εκτελούνται αποκλειστικά εντός της οριοθετούμενης στο σημείο 4 γεωγραφικής περιοχής παραγωγής.

3.6.   Ειδικοί κανόνες για τον τεμαχισμό, το τρίψιμο, τη συσκευασία κ.λπ.

Το εξαιρετικό παρθένο ελαιόλαδα «Terra d’Otranto» πρέπει να διατίθεται στην κατανάλωση σε δοχεία από γυαλί ή λευκοσίδηρο μέγιστης χωρητικότητας 5 λίτρων. Η συσκευασία του εξαιρετικού παρθένου ελαιολάδου «Terra d’Otranto» πρέπει να εκτελείται εντός της γεωγραφικής περιοχής παραγωγής ώστε να εξασφαλίζεται καλύτερα ο έλεγχος καταγωγής του προϊόντος αλλά και να αποφεύγεται ο κίνδυνος να προκαλέσει η μεταφορά ασυσκεύαστου προϊόντος υποβάθμιση και απώλεια των ιδιαίτερων χαρακτηριστικών του που ορίζονται στο προηγούμενο σημείο 3.2, όπως είναι ιδίως οι τυπικές νότες αγριοαγκινάρας/αγκινάρας/κιχωρίου του ελαιολάδου «Terra d’Otranto». Η σύνθεση του ελαιολάδου, χαρακτηριζόμενη από υψηλό επίπεδο πολυακόρεστων λιπαρών οξέων, αυξάνει την τάση απώλειας της οργανοληπτικής του ποιότητας και του τυπικού του χαρακτήρα, εάν εκτεθεί στο οξυγόνο του αέρα κατά τη μετάγγιση, την άντληση, τη μεταφορά και την εκφόρτωση — εργασίες που εκτελούνται συχνότερα όταν το προϊόν εμφιαλώνεται εκτός της περιοχής παραγωγής.

3.7.   Ειδικοί κανόνες για την επισήμανση

Η ονομασία «Terra d’Otranto» πρέπει να αναγράφεται στην ετικέτα με ευκρινείς και ανεξίτηλους χαρακτήρες, οι οποίοι να διακρίνονται σαφώς από κάθε άλλη ένδειξη της ετικέτας, και να ακολουθείται απευθείας από την ένδειξη «Denominazione di origine protetta» (Προστατευόμενη Ονομασία Προέλευσης) ή το αντίστοιχο αρκτικόλεξο «DOP» (ΠΟΠ), επιπλέον του κοινοτικού συμβόλου.

Κάθε συσκευασία που διατίθεται στο εμπόριο πρέπει να φέρει αύξοντα αριθμό χορηγούμενο από τον συσκευαστή βάσει των προβλεπόμενων στο σχετικό πρόγραμμα ελέγχων.

Απαγορεύεται η προσθήκη κάθε άλλου χαρακτηρισμού ο οποίος δεν προβλέπεται ρητά, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των επιθέτων: «fine» (φίνο), «scelto» (επιλεγμένο), «selezionato» (επιλεχθέν), «superore» (ανώτερο).

Επιτρέπεται ωστόσο η χρήση ενδείξεων που αναφέρονται σε ονόματα ή έδρες ή ιδιωτικά σήματα, εφόσον δεν έχουν εγκωμιαστικό χαρακτήρα και δεν παραπλανούν τον καταναλωτή.

Στην ετικέτα αναγράφεται υποχρεωτικά το έτος παραγωγής των ελιών που χρησιμοποιήθηκαν για την παραγωγή του ελαιολάδου.

4.   Συνοπτική οριοθέτηση της γεωγραφικής περιοχής

Η περιοχή παραγωγής της ΠΟΠ «Terra d’Otranto» περιλαμβάνει το σύνολο της επαρχίας Lecce, τμήμα της επαρχίας Taranto και τμήμα της επαρχίας Brindisi. Η περιοχή σχηματίζει τόξο μεταξύ Ιονίου Πελάγους και Αδριατικής Θάλασσας, εκτεινόμενη από τη λοφώδη περιοχή Murge Taratine και τις ακραίες κλιτύες των λόφων Murge προς την πλευρά του Brindisi στα νοτιοανατολικά, μέσω της χαμηλού υψομέτρου πεδινής περιοχής Tavoliere di Lecce έως την περιοχή Serre, στη συμβολή των δύο θαλασσών.

5.   Δεσμός με τη γεωγραφική περιοχή

5.1.   Ιδιαιτερότητα της γεωγραφικής περιοχής

Το προϊόν οφείλει τα χαρακτηριστικά του στις ιδιαίτερες εδαφοκλιματικές συνθήκες: οι περιβαλλοντικοί παράγοντες και οι ειδικές ποικιλίες της συγκεκριμένης περιοχής προσδίδουν πράγματι διακριτό χαρακτήρα στο ελαιόλαδο «Terra d’Otranto». Τα εδάφη παρουσιάζουν σε μεγάλη κλίμακα σημαντική ομοιομορφία, προερχόμενα από ασβεστολιθικά πετρώματα της Κρητιδικής περιόδου τα οποία επικαλύπτονται από ασβεστολιθικά πετρώματα του Τριτογενούς με ασβεστολιθικά-αμμώδη-αργιλώδη ιζήματα της Πλειοκαίνου και της Πλειστοκαίνου. Κατατάσσονται στα καστανοχώματα ή κοκκινοχώματα, συχνά εναλλασσόμενα, τα οποία στηρίζονται σε ασβεστολιθικά πετρώματα. Από την άποψη του ανάγλυφου, η περιοχή χαρακτηρίζεται από εκτεταμένες πεδινές εκτάσεις οι οποίες οριοθετούνται και διακόπτονται από χαμηλούς και ομαλούς λόφους. Η περιοχή δεν διαθέτει επιφανειακά υδατορεύματα αλλά ένα ισχυρό δίκτυο υπόγειων υδάτων που προσδίδει σε ολόκληρη την περιοχή σαφώς καρστικό χαρακτήρα. Λόγω του παραθαλάσσιου χαρακτήρα και των χαμηλών υψομέτρων, η περιοχή διαθέτει κλίμα ήπιο, που τείνει προς το θερμό.

5.2.   Ιδιοτυπία του προϊόντος

Η ελαιοκομική κληρονομιά της γεωγραφικής περιοχής χαρακτηρίζεται από την επικράτηση των αυτόχθονων ποικιλιών Cellina di Nardò και Ogliarola του Lecce που χαρακτηρίζουν ποιοτικά το παραγόμενο ελαιόλαδο. Η ένδειξη του ελάχιστου ποσοστού του 60 % αυτών των δύο ποικιλιών συμβάλλει στον καθορισμό των οργανοληπτικών χαρακτηριστικών των ελαιολάδων τα οποία, αναλόγως της επικρατούσας ποικιλίας περνούν από την αίσθηση αγριοαγκινάρας/αγκινάρας/κιχωρίου σε αυτή της ντομάτας/φρούτων του δάσους.

5.3.   Αιτιώδης σχέση που συνδέει τη γεωγραφική περιοχή με την ποιότητα ή τα χαρακτηριστικά του προϊόντος (για τις ΠΟΠ) ή με μια συγκεκριμένη ποιότητα, τη φήμη ή άλλα χαρακτηριστικά του προϊόντος (για τις ΠΓΕ)

Η ελαιοκαλλιέργεια αποτελεί τον σημαντικότερο παραγωγικό κλάδο στην περιοχή, με καθοριστικό ρόλο στην τοπική οικονομία. Η γεωγραφική ένδειξη «Terra d’Otranto» περιλάμβανε, ήδη από τον 19ο αιώνα, τις σημερινές επαρχίες Lecce, Brindisi και Taranto. Η περιοχή ανέκαθεν χαρακτηρίζεται από την ισχυρή παρουσία της ελιάς, από την οποία εξαγόταν ένα «εκλεκτό υγρό». Η ιστορία της ονομασίας Terra d’Otranto συνδέεται άρρηκτα με την ιστορία της ίδιας της τοπικής ελαιοκομίας, η οποία εισήχθη από τους Φοίνικες και Έλληνες εποίκους από αρχαιοτάτων χρόνων. Χάρη στη δραστηριότητα των μοναχών του Τάγματος του Αγίου Βασιλείου, που εγκαταστάθηκαν τον 10ο αιώνα, η τοπική ελαιοκομία οδήγησε στην πρώτη ανθούσα αγορά εκλεκτών ελαιολάδων, προερχόμενων από την Terra d’Otranto (Γη του Οτράντο), που ήταν το μεσαιωνικό όνομα του Salento, λόγω του γεγονότος ότι το Otranto ήταν τον Μεσαίωνα η κυριότερη πόλη όλης της περιοχής.

Παραπομπή στη δημοσίευση των προδιαγραφών

[άρθρο 5 παράγραφος 7 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 510/2006 (4)]

Η εθνική διαδικασία ένστασης ενεργοποιήθηκε με τη δημοσίευση της πρότασης τροποποίησης των προδιαγραφών παραγωγής της προστατευόμενης ονομασίας προέλευσης «Terra d’Otranto» στην Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana αριθ. 297 της 21ης Δεκεμβρίου 2010. Το κείμενο των προδιαγραφών μπορεί να αναζητηθεί στο Διαδίκτυο:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

ή απευθείας στην αρχική σελίδα του δικτυακού τόπου του Υπουργείου Γεωργίας, Τροφίμων και Δασών (http://www.politicheagricole.it), επιλογή «Qualità e sicurezza » (στο επάνω και δεξιά τμήμα της οθόνης) και κατόπιν «Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE».

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(1)  ΕΕ L 343 της 14.12.2012, σ. 1.

(2)  Αντικαταστάθηκε από τον κανονισμό (EE) αριθ. 1151/2012.

(3)  Βλέπε υποσημείωση 2.

(4)  Βλέπε υποσημείωση 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | EL | Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

EL

Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης

C 237/40

---

Δημοσίευση αίτησης καταχώρισης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 50 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο β) του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, για τα συστήματα ποιότητας των γεωργικών προϊόντων και τροφίμων

2013/C 237/08

Η παρούσα δημοσίευση επιτρέπει την υποβολή ένστασης κατά της προτεινόμενης καταχώρισης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 51 του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 1151/2012 του Συμβουλίου (1).

ΑΙΤΗΣΗ ΚΑΤΑΧΩΡΙΣΗΣ ΕΠΙΠ

ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 509/2006 ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ

για τα γεωργικά προϊόντα και τα τρόφιμα που χαρακτηρίζονται ως εγγυημένα παραδοσιακά ιδιότυπα προϊόντα
   (2)

«ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS»

Αριθ. ΕΚ: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Όνομα και διεύθυνση της αιτούσας ομάδας

| Όνομα ομάδας/οργάνωσης (κατά περίπτωση) | «Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai» |
| --- | --- |
| Διεύθυνση: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Όνομα ομάδας/οργάνωσης (κατά περίπτωση)

«Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai»

Διεύθυνση:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Τηλ.

+370 44422201

Φαξ

+370 44474897

E-mail:

info@zpienas.lt

2.   Κράτος μέλος ή τρίτη χώρα

Λιθουανία

3.   Προδιαγραφές

3.1.   Ονομασία(-ες) προς καταχώριση [άρθρο 2 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1216/2007]

«Žemaitiškas kastinys»

3.2.   Ονομασία

| ☒ | είναι ιδιότυπη καθ' εαυτή |
| --- | --- |
|  | εκφράζει την ιδιοτυπία του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή του τροφίμου. |

☒

είναι ιδιότυπη καθ' εαυτή



εκφράζει την ιδιοτυπία του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή του τροφίμου.

Η ονομασία «Žemaitiškas kastinys» δεν παραπέμπει στα ειδικά χαρακτηριστικά του προϊόντος, αλλά είναι εδραιωμένη και πολύ γνωστή, τόσο στην Σαμογετία (δυτική περιοχή της Λιθουανίας) όσο και στην υπόλοιπη Λιθουανία, καθώς αυτή παραδοσιακά δηλώνει το συγκεκριμένο προϊόν, όπως προκύπτει από τις διάφορες πηγές που αναφέρονται στο σημείο 3.8.

Η ονομασία «Žemaitiškas kastinys» (kastinys της Σαμογετίας) περιλαμβάνεται στο βιβλίο μαγειρικών συνταγών του 20ού αιώνα «Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai» (Tilžė, 1927), στο βιβλίο «Ką valgome» του δόκτορα Tumėnienė e. a. («Τι τρώμε;», Kaunas, 1935), και στο βιβλίο «Lietuvių valgiai» του J. Pauliukonienė («Η λιθουανική κουζίνα», Βίλνιους, 1983).

3.3.   Να αναφερθεί εάν ζητείται η δέσμευση της ονομασίας σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 13 παράγραφος 2 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 509/2006

| ☒ | Καταχώριση με δέσμευση της ονομασίας |
| --- | --- |
|  | Καταχώριση χωρίς δέσμευση της ονομασίας |

☒

Καταχώριση με δέσμευση της ονομασίας



Καταχώριση χωρίς δέσμευση της ονομασίας

3.4.   Τύπος προϊόντος (όπως στο παράρτημα II)

| Κλάση 1.4. | Λοιπά προϊόντα ζωικής προέλευσης (αυγά, μέλι, διάφορα γαλακτοκομικά προϊόντα πλην βουτύρου κ.λπ.) |
| --- | --- |

Κλάση 1.4.

Λοιπά προϊόντα ζωικής προέλευσης (αυγά, μέλι, διάφορα γαλακτοκομικά προϊόντα πλην βουτύρου κ.λπ.)

3.5.   Περιγραφή του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή τροφίμου που φέρει την ονομασία του σημείου 3.1 [άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 1 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1216/2007 της Επιτροπής]

Το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» είναι ένα παραδοσιακό προϊόν που αποτελείται από κρέμα η οποία έχει χτυπηθεί ζεστή και κατόπιν έχει ψυχθεί.

Το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» χαρακτηρίζεται από την ομοιογενή και πηχτή υφή του· σε θερμοκρασία + 6 °C, είναι εύθρυπτο, με υφή συμπαγούς κρέμας με διασκορπισμένα σταγονίδια και λιώνει στο στόμα. Το χρώμα είναι απολύτως ομοιόμορφο, υποκίτρινο. Αναλόγως των χρησιμοποιούμενων καρυκευμάτων, το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» μπορεί να παρουσιάζει αντίστοιχες αποχρώσεις και να περιέχει μικρά τεμάχια καρυκευμάτων. Η γεύση είναι η υπόξινη του γαλακτικού οξέος και, επίσης, ελαφρώς αλμυρή· είναι αισθητά τα καρυκεύματα.

Φυσικοχημικές ιδιότητες του «Žemaitiškas kastinys»:

| — | λιπαρές ύλες, αναλόγως της συνταγής: 25 έως 30 %· |
| --- | --- |

—

λιπαρές ύλες, αναλόγως της συνταγής: 25 έως 30 %·

| — | περιεκτικότητα σε μαγειρικό αλάτι: 1 έως 1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

περιεκτικότητα σε μαγειρικό αλάτι: 1 έως 1,5 %.

3.6.   Περιγραφή της μεθόδου παραγωγής του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή του τροφίμου που φέρει την ονομασία του σημείου 3.1 [άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 2 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1216/2007 της Επιτροπής]

Πρώτες ύλες:

| — | ξινή κρέμα, περιεκτικότητας σε λιπαρές ύλες μεταξύ 25 και 30 %: 80 kg έως 83 kg/100 kg προϊόντος· |
| --- | --- |

—

ξινή κρέμα, περιεκτικότητας σε λιπαρές ύλες μεταξύ 25 και 30 %: 80 kg έως 83 kg/100 kg προϊόντος·

| — | βούτυρο, περιεκτικότητας σε λιπαρές ύλες τουλάχιστον 82 %: 6 kg έως 7 kg/100 kg προϊόντος· |
| --- | --- |

—

βούτυρο, περιεκτικότητας σε λιπαρές ύλες τουλάχιστον 82 %: 6 kg έως 7 kg/100 kg προϊόντος·

| — | πηγμένο γάλα, περιεκτικότητας σε λιπαρές ύλες 2,5 έως 4 %: 5 kg έως 5,5 kg/100 kg προϊόντος· |
| --- | --- |

—

πηγμένο γάλα, περιεκτικότητας σε λιπαρές ύλες 2,5 έως 4 %: 5 kg έως 5,5 kg/100 kg προϊόντος·

| — | μαγειρικό αλάτι 1-1,5 kg/ 100 kg προϊόντος· |
| --- | --- |

—

μαγειρικό αλάτι 1-1,5 kg/ 100 kg προϊόντος·

Προαιρετικά χρησιμοποιούνται καρυκεύματα (μαύρο πιπέρι, πιπέρι Ιαμαϊκής, κύμινο, άνηθος, μέντα ή μείγμα αυτών: 0,1 έως 0,15 kg/100 kg προϊόντος) και αρτύματα (σκόρδο ή κρεμμύδι: 1 kg έως 2 kg/100 kg προϊόντος).

Μέθοδος παραγωγής:

Το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» παράγεται σύμφωνα με τις παραδοσιακές μεθόδους.

Τα συστατικά ζυγίζονται σύμφωνα με τις αναλογίες της συνταγής. Η ξινή κρέμα αναδεύεται μαζί με πηγμένο γάλα σε χωριστό σκεύος και φέρεται σε θερμοκρασία 25 °C έως 30 °C. Το ψυχρό βούτυρο μαλακώνει με θέρμανση σε θερμοκρασία 25 έως 30 °C. Τα αρτύματα πλένονται και λεπτοκόβονται.

Το θερμό και μαλακό βούτυρο χύνεται σύμφωνα με τη συνταγή στο σκεύος που προορίζεται για την παραγωγή του προϊόντος. Το μείγμα ξινής κρέμας- πηγμένου γάλακτος χύνεται σταδιακά, ανά 1/8 της προβλεπόμενης από τη συνταγή ποσότητας και αναδεύεται χειρωνακτικά ή με ανάλογο μηχανικό μέσο. Το προϊόν «Žemaitiškas kastinys» αναμιγνύεται πάντοτε προς την ίδια κατεύθυνση. Όταν έχει επιτευχθεί η σύσταση της ξινής κρέμας (χωρίς σχηματισμό βουτυρογάλακτος), προστίθεται πάλι το 1/8 του μίγματος ξινής κρέμας — πηγμένου γάλακτος και συνεχίζεται η ανάδευση. Αυτή η διαδικασία επαναλαμβάνεται έως ότου προστεθεί το σύνολο του μείγματος ξινής κρέμας-πηγμένου γάλακτος (αναλόγως της συνταγής). Όταν το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» αρχίσει να στερεοποιείται, αλατίζεται, προστίθενται τα καρυκεύματα και τα λεπτοκομμένα αρτύματα, ενώ η ανάδευση συνεχίζεται. Το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» πρέπει να έχει συσκευάζεται πριν στερεοποιηθεί.

Το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» συσκευάζεται σε μικρά πήλινα δοχεία ή ατομικά δοχεία των 250 g, 200 g και 100 g. Τα δοχεία αυτά κλείνονται με μικρό κάλυμμα από κεραμικό, το οποίο επικαλύπτεται με δεύτερο κάλυμμα και το σύνολο περιδένεται με σπάγκο. Τα ατομικά δοχεία κλείνονται με κάλυμμα από αλουμινόχαρτο. Μετά τη συσκευασία του, το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» ψύχεται στους 6 °C. Όταν έχει ψυχθεί, το προϊόν αποκτά την ομοιόμορφη και συμπαγή του σύσταση.

3.7.   Ιδιότυπος χαρακτήρας του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή του τροφίμου [άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 3 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1216/2007]

Το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» διακρίνεται από τα άλλα προϊόντα της ίδιας κατηγορίας χάρη στα ακόλουθα χαρακτηριστικά:

| — | τα παραδοσιακά συστατικά του και τη μέθοδο παραγωγής του: αντίθετα από τους άλλους τύπους kastinys, η συνταγή του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» έχει παραμείνει σχεδόν αμετάβλητη από την εποχή που συναντάται για πρώτη φορά στις γραπτές μαρτυρίες που αναφέρονται στο σημείο 3.8· τα ίδια συστατικά χρησιμοποιούνται σε αναλογίες σχεδόν πανομοιότυπες. Εν τω μεταξύ, εμφανίστηκαν άλλοι τύποι kastinys: για να υπάρξει ποικιλία στις γευστικές ιδιότητες, η ξινή κρέμα αντικαθίσταται πλήρως από πηγμένο γάλα ή αναμειγνύεται με κεφίρ, με παντζάρια ή με χυμό καρότου, ή προστίθεται ακόμη και κρόκος αυγού, συστατικά που προσδίδουν στο kastinys κόκκινο ή κίτρινο χρώμα. Η παραγωγή του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» χαρακτηρίζεται από τη συνεχή, βραδεία, κυκλική ανάδευση του μείγματος βουτύρου και ξινής κρέμας κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας προστίθεται το μείγμα ξινής κρέμας- πηγμένου γάλακτος, σε δόσεις το 1/8 της συνολικής του ποσότητας, με επιμελέστατη ρύθμιση της θερμοκρασίας (25-30 °C), ώστε να μην σχηματίζεται βουτυρόγαλα. Η παραγωγή των άλλων τύπων kastinys έχει εκσυγχρονιστεί: χρησιμοποιείται το χτύπημα αντί για την ανάδευση· επιπλέον, όλα τα συστατικά προστίθενται σε 3-4 δόσεις ή ακόμη και σε μία· η θερμοκρασία επίσης μπορεί να αυξομειώνεται περισσότερο· |
| --- | --- |

—

τα παραδοσιακά συστατικά του και τη μέθοδο παραγωγής του: αντίθετα από τους άλλους τύπους kastinys, η συνταγή του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» έχει παραμείνει σχεδόν αμετάβλητη από την εποχή που συναντάται για πρώτη φορά στις γραπτές μαρτυρίες που αναφέρονται στο σημείο 3.8· τα ίδια συστατικά χρησιμοποιούνται σε αναλογίες σχεδόν πανομοιότυπες. Εν τω μεταξύ, εμφανίστηκαν άλλοι τύποι kastinys: για να υπάρξει ποικιλία στις γευστικές ιδιότητες, η ξινή κρέμα αντικαθίσταται πλήρως από πηγμένο γάλα ή αναμειγνύεται με κεφίρ, με παντζάρια ή με χυμό καρότου, ή προστίθεται ακόμη και κρόκος αυγού, συστατικά που προσδίδουν στο kastinys κόκκινο ή κίτρινο χρώμα. Η παραγωγή του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» χαρακτηρίζεται από τη συνεχή, βραδεία, κυκλική ανάδευση του μείγματος βουτύρου και ξινής κρέμας κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας προστίθεται το μείγμα ξινής κρέμας- πηγμένου γάλακτος, σε δόσεις το 1/8 της συνολικής του ποσότητας, με επιμελέστατη ρύθμιση της θερμοκρασίας (25-30 °C), ώστε να μην σχηματίζεται βουτυρόγαλα. Η παραγωγή των άλλων τύπων kastinys έχει εκσυγχρονιστεί: χρησιμοποιείται το χτύπημα αντί για την ανάδευση· επιπλέον, όλα τα συστατικά προστίθενται σε 3-4 δόσεις ή ακόμη και σε μία· η θερμοκρασία επίσης μπορεί να αυξομειώνεται περισσότερο·

| — | τη γεύση του — η γεύση του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» είναι η υπόξινη του γαλακτικού οξέος και ελαφρώς αλμυρή· είναι αισθητή η οσμή των καρυκευμάτων ή αρτυμάτων. Οι άλλοι τύποι kastinys χαρακτηρίζονται από την διαπεραστική όξινη γεύση του γαλακτικού οξέος (όταν η ξινή κρέμα αντικαθίσταται από πηγμένο γάλα) ή από τη γεύση του γαλακτικού οξέος με επίγευση μαγιάς (όταν η ξινή κρέμα αντικαθίσταται από κεφίρ). Είναι επίσης αισθητή η χαρακτηριστική γεύση του χυμού (από παντζάρι ή καρότο) ή του κρόκου αυγού. |
| --- | --- |

—

τη γεύση του — η γεύση του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» είναι η υπόξινη του γαλακτικού οξέος και ελαφρώς αλμυρή· είναι αισθητή η οσμή των καρυκευμάτων ή αρτυμάτων. Οι άλλοι τύποι kastinys χαρακτηρίζονται από την διαπεραστική όξινη γεύση του γαλακτικού οξέος (όταν η ξινή κρέμα αντικαθίσταται από πηγμένο γάλα) ή από τη γεύση του γαλακτικού οξέος με επίγευση μαγιάς (όταν η ξινή κρέμα αντικαθίσταται από κεφίρ). Είναι επίσης αισθητή η χαρακτηριστική γεύση του χυμού (από παντζάρι ή καρότο) ή του κρόκου αυγού.

| — | την υφή του — το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» χαρακτηρίζεται από την πηχτή και ομοιογενή υφή του· σε θερμοκρασία + 6 °C, είναι εύθρυπτο, με υφή συμπαγούς κρέμας με διάσπαρτα σταγονίδια και λιώνει στο στόμα. Οι άλλοι τύποι kastinys χαρακτηρίζονται από την μαλακή, επαλείψιμη υφή τους. |
| --- | --- |

—

την υφή του — το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» χαρακτηρίζεται από την πηχτή και ομοιογενή υφή του· σε θερμοκρασία + 6 °C, είναι εύθρυπτο, με υφή συμπαγούς κρέμας με διάσπαρτα σταγονίδια και λιώνει στο στόμα. Οι άλλοι τύποι kastinys χαρακτηρίζονται από την μαλακή, επαλείψιμη υφή τους.

3.8.   Παραδοσιακός χαρακτήρας του γεωργικού προϊόντος ή τροφίμου [άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1216/2007]

Επιπλέον της πρωτόγονης μεθόδου παρασκευής του βουτύρου, που είναι ευρέως διαδεδομένη σε όλη τη Λιθουανία και συνίσταται στο χτύπημα της ξινής κρέμας με κουτάλι μέσα σε σκεύος, μόνο στην περιοχή της Σαμογετίας εμφανίστηκε μια πρωτότυπη τεχνική παρασκευής της ξινής κρέμας, η οποία διαδόθηκε σε όλη τη Λιθουανία και συνίσταται στην ανάδευση εν θερμώ της ξινής κρέμας, φροντίζοντας ώστε να μην μετατραπεί σε βουτυρόγαλα. Με τον τρόπο αυτό λαμβάνεται το συγκεκριμένο προϊόν με την ιδιαίτερη γεύση και σύσταση — το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» («Lietuvių kalbos atlasas»«Άτλας της λιθουανικής γλώσσας», T. 1. Leksika, Βίλνιους, 1977). Το συγκεκριμένο προϊόν περιγράφεται στα επιστημονικά συγγράμματα του 19ου αιώνα (Liudwik Adam Jucewicz (Liudwik z Pokiewia). Litwa pod wzgledem starozytnych zabytkow, obyczajow i zwyczajow skreslona, Wilno, 1846· Leon Potocki. Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona, Poznan, 1869), τα οποία επικεντρώνονται στη μέθοδο παραγωγής (παραγωγή από ξινή κρέμα που θερμαίνεται) και στην εξαιρετική γεύση του.

Οι αφηγήσεις των προσώπων που γεννήθηκαν στα τέλη του 19ου αιώνα και στις αρχές του 20ού, οι οποίες έχουν διατηρηθεί στο εθνικό μουσείο της Λιθουανίας (συλλογή του τμήματος εθνογραφίας του Εθνικού Μουσείου της Λιθουανίας F 15-4· F 15-13· F 32-7· F 32-48) περιγράφουν τη συνταγή και την εκτέλεσή της ως εξής: σε κεραμικό σκεύος που έχει θερμανθεί, χύνονται αρχικά τρεις κουταλιές ξινής κρέμας και μισή κουταλιά βουτύρου. Στη συνέχεια αναμιγνύεται καλά το σύνολο με συνεχή ανάδευση, με ξύλινο κουτάλι, προς την ίδια πάντοτε κατεύθυνση. Όταν το μείγμα αρχίσει να ψύχεται και να διαχωρίζεται το βουτυρόγαλα, το σκεύος θερμαίνεται σε υδατόλουτρο και η υγροποιημένη μάζα ψύχεται σε δοχείο με ψυχρό νερό. Ενώ συνεχίζεται η ανάδευση, προστίθεται στη μάζα ξινή κρέμα, σε μικρές ποσότητες. Συχνά, μέρος της ξινής κρέμας αντικαθίσταται από πηγμένο γάλα, με αποτέλεσμα το kastinys να είναι λιγότερο λιπαρό. Στο τέλος της ανάδευσης, προστίθεται αλάτι καθώς και άλλα καρυκεύματα (κύμινο, πιπέρι σε σκόνη, λεπτοκομμένο σκόρδο και κρεμμύδι, φρέσκο κρεμμυδάκι, όταν είναι η εποχή του, και φύτρα μάραθου ή μέντας).

Στο έργο ομάδας επιστημόνων «Lietuvių valgiai» («Η λιθουανική κουζίνα», συλλογή του J. Pauliukonienė, Mokslas, Βίλνιους, 1983) το οποίο περιγράφει τις παλιές παραδοσιακές τεχνικές προετοιμασίας των πρώτων υλών, σύμφωνα με τις οποίες η ξινή κρέμα διαχωρίζεται από το γάλα χειρωνακτικά (με κουτάλι), με αποτέλεσμα μια ποσότητα πηγμένου γάλακτος να παραμένει φυσικά παρούσα στην ξινή κρέμα, περιέχεται η συνταγή του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» και περιγράφεται η μέθοδος παρασκευής του: «Žemaitiškas kastinys» — 1⁄2 l ξινή κρέμα, 1 κουταλιά βούτυρο, 1⁄2 κουταλιά κύμινο ή άλλα καρυκεύματα, αλάτι. Το βούτυρο και μια κουταλιά ξινής κρέμας χύνονται σε κεραμικό σκεύος, το οποίο κατόπιν τοποθετείται μέσα σε θερμό νερό και το μείγμα αναδεύεται με ξύλινο κουτάλι. Αμέσως μετά (πριν σχηματιστεί βουτυρόγαλα), προστίθεται μια κουταλιά ξινή κρέμα επιπλέον και το μείγμα αναδεύεται έως την προσθήκη του συνόλου της ξινής κρέμας. Όταν η μάζα αρχίσει να στερεοποιείται, προστίθεται αλάτι και κύμινο πλυμένο και στεγνό και το σύνολο αναδεύεται. Η γεύση του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» είναι ελαφρώς αλμυρή και ελαφρώς ξινή.

Η μέθοδος παρασκευής και η συνταγή του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» παρέμειναν αμετάβλητες έως σήμερα, όπως αποδεικνύει το πιστοποιητικό που χορηγήθηκε στο συγκεκριμένο προϊόν, στη Λιθουανία, το 2010, από την «VŠĮ „Kulinarinio paveldo fondas“» (Ίδρυμα γαστρονομικής κληρονομιάς), το οποίο βεβαιώνει ότι το «Žemaitiškas kastinys» παράγεται σύμφωνα με τις παραδοσιακές τεχνικές και ότι οι πρώτες ύλες, τα πρόσθετα συστατικά και ο εξοπλισμός που χρησιμοποιούνται είναι παραδοσιακά.

3.9.   Ελάχιστες απαιτήσεις και διαδικασίες εξακρίβωσης της ιδιοτυπίας του προϊόντος [άρθρο 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1216/2007]

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τα ειδικά χαρακτηριστικά του «Žemaitiškas kastinys» ελέγχονται τα εξής:

| 1) | Ποιότητα κάθε παρτίδας πρώτων υλών:






  — | η περιεκτικότητα σε λιπαρές ύλες της ξινής κρέμας και του πηγμένου γάλακτος πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στις τιμές περιεκτικότητας που αναφέρονται στο σημείο 3.6· οι εν λόγω τιμές ελέγχονται εργαστηριακά· |
| --- | --- | --- |

1)

Ποιότητα κάθε παρτίδας πρώτων υλών:

—

η περιεκτικότητα σε λιπαρές ύλες της ξινής κρέμας και του πηγμένου γάλακτος πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στις τιμές περιεκτικότητας που αναφέρονται στο σημείο 3.6· οι εν λόγω τιμές ελέγχονται εργαστηριακά·

| — | η περιεκτικότητα του βουτύρου σε λιπαρές ύλες πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στην τιμή η οποία αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.6· η εν λόγω τιμή ελέγχεται εργαστηριακά· |
| --- | --- |

—

η περιεκτικότητα του βουτύρου σε λιπαρές ύλες πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στην τιμή η οποία αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.6· η εν λόγω τιμή ελέγχεται εργαστηριακά·

| — | τα οργανοληπτικά χαρακτηριστικά των καρυκευμάτων και αρτυμάτων (γεύση, άρωμα, χρώμα) ελέγχονται βάσει εγγράφων και με οργανοληπτική εξέταση· |
| --- | --- |

—

τα οργανοληπτικά χαρακτηριστικά των καρυκευμάτων και αρτυμάτων (γεύση, άρωμα, χρώμα) ελέγχονται βάσει εγγράφων και με οργανοληπτική εξέταση·

| 2) | Συμμόρφωση με την τεχνολογική μέθοδο παραγωγής που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.6: η διαδοχή των σταδίων της διεργασίας παραγωγής και η τήρηση των προβλεπόμενων παραμέτρων (θερμοκρασία των συστατικών και αναλογίες) ελέγχονται οπτικά και με μετρήσεις κατά τη διαδικασία παραγωγής κάθε παρτίδας· |
| --- | --- |

2)

Συμμόρφωση με την τεχνολογική μέθοδο παραγωγής που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.6: η διαδοχή των σταδίων της διεργασίας παραγωγής και η τήρηση των προβλεπόμενων παραμέτρων (θερμοκρασία των συστατικών και αναλογίες) ελέγχονται οπτικά και με μετρήσεις κατά τη διαδικασία παραγωγής κάθε παρτίδας·

| 3) | Ποιότητα κάθε παρτίδας τελικού προϊόντος:






  — | τα οργανοληπτικά χαρακτηριστικά (υφή, χρώμα, γεύση) πρέπει να αντιστοιχούν στα αναφερόμενα στο σημείο 3.5· αυτά ελέγχονται με οργανοληπτική ανάλυση· |
| --- | --- | --- |

3)

Ποιότητα κάθε παρτίδας τελικού προϊόντος:

—

τα οργανοληπτικά χαρακτηριστικά (υφή, χρώμα, γεύση) πρέπει να αντιστοιχούν στα αναφερόμενα στο σημείο 3.5· αυτά ελέγχονται με οργανοληπτική ανάλυση·

| — | η περιεκτικότητα σε λιπαρές ύλες πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στην τιμή που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.5· αυτή ελέγχεται εργαστηριακά· |
| --- | --- |

—

η περιεκτικότητα σε λιπαρές ύλες πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στην τιμή που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.5· αυτή ελέγχεται εργαστηριακά·

| — | η περιεκτικότητα σε αλάτι πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στην τιμή που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.5· αυτή ελέγχεται βάσει της συνταγής και, σε περίπτωση αμφιβολίας, εργαστηριακά. |
| --- | --- |

—

η περιεκτικότητα σε αλάτι πρέπει να αντιστοιχεί στην τιμή που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 3.5· αυτή ελέγχεται βάσει της συνταγής και, σε περίπτωση αμφιβολίας, εργαστηριακά.

Τουλάχιστον μία φορά ετησίως, η αρχή που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 4.1 ελέγχει τη συμμόρφωση του προϊόντος και της διαδικασίας παραγωγής του με τις απαιτήσεις των προδιαγραφών.

4.   Αρχή ή οργανισμός ελέγχου της τήρησης των προδιαγραφών

4.1.   Όνομα και διεύθυνση

| Όνομα: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
| --- | --- |
| Διεύθυνση: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Όνομα:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Διεύθυνση:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Τηλ.

+370 52404361

E-mail:

vvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Δημόσιος |  Ιδιωτικός |
| --- | --- |

☒ Δημόσιος

 Ιδιωτικός

4.2.   Ειδικά καθήκοντα της αρχής ή του οργανισμού

Ο οργανισμός ελέγχου που αναφέρεται στο σημείο 4.1 είναι υπεύθυνος για τον έλεγχο της τήρησης όλων των όρων των προδιαγραφών.

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(1)  ΕΕ L 343 της 14.12.2012, σ. 1.

(2)  Αντικαταστάθηκε από τον κανονισμό (EE) αριθ. 1151/2012.

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