alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL and Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Company, Petitioners, Cross-Respondents, v. Virginia PARTENHEIMER and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents, Cross-Petitioners.

No. 41136.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 22, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1971.

Fred C. Davant, of Wicker, Smith, Pysz-ka, Blomqvist & Davant, Miami, for petitioners, cross-respondents.

Edward Schroll, Miami, for respondent Virginia Partenheimer, respondent, cross-petitioner.

Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., and J. Franklin Garner, Tallahassee, for Industrial Relations Commission, respondent.

*2PER CURIAM.

Both the claimant and the employer/carrier seek review of an Industrial Relations Commission order directing that the Judge of Industrial Claims give further consideration to claimant’s status as being either permanently partially disabled as to her left leg, or permanently totally disabled. With the exception of one point raised by claimant, we think the arguments raised by the parties are without merit, and the petitions should be denied.

Initially, the claimant was awarded a rating of 25% permanent partial disability of the left leg. The award was made with the understanding that she should seek rehabilitative job training. In the course of subsequent training, it was discovered that her condition resulted in the effective loss of the use of her leg, and her practical ability to either train for new employment or secure a job was cast into doubt. A claim for modification resulted in an increased award of 50% permanent partial disability with loss of the use of the leg. On review, the Commission reversed and ordered that the Judge of Industrial Claims reconsider the claimant’s ability to compete for employment. Citing Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So.2d 596 (Fla.1960), the Commission noted that even though a claimant may be able to perform some work, a finding of total permanent disability might still obtain.

While agreeing with the Commission that a reconsideration is appropriate, we cannot follow the Commission’s further comment that, “[I]f she is not a permanently totally disabled, her rating would necessarily remain as originally found, i. e., 25 percent permanent partial disability of the leg.” The modification of the original award under Fla.Stat. § 440.28, F.S.A., was based upon a mistake in fact: the mistaken extent to which it was thought that claimant could be effectively rehabilitated for the job market. Claimant correctly asserts that this rating is supported by the requisite quality of competent, substantial evidence. Therefore, the Judge of Industrial Claims is free to adhere to that award if, upon reconsideration, a determination of permanent total disability is not justified.

The petition of the employer/carrier is denied. The cross-petition of the claimant is denied with the point of exception noted above, and accordingly the Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims is reinstated to the extent of the point of exception without oral argument.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, Acting C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
~ (:~ fl ~\l~ß~l. 

c;l-/p t;~ 1 

UNITED STATES OF AMRICA 5Jf'f 75/ FEDERAL TRADE COMMSSION 

OFFICE OF ADMISTRATIV LAW JUGES 

hi the Matter of 

) 

) 

POL YPORE INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

Respondent. 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 9327 

) 

ORDER REQilRING REPLY BRIEF
 

On September 25,2009, Respondent submitted a Second Motion to Reopen the 

Hearing Record ("Motion"). Complaint Counsel submitted its opposition to the Motion 

on October i, 2009 ("Opposition"). Pusuant to Rule 3.22(c) of the Commission's Rules 

of Practice, it is hereby ORDERED that Respondent shall submit a reply to the 

Opposition, as fuer described below. 

Respondent's reply shall respond to all pertinent facts and arguments asserted in 

the Opposition, and shall specifically address, without limitation, 
 the following: 

i. Whether the facts asserted in the proffer in Respondent's Motion are relevant 

and admissible under Commission Rule 3.43, including, without limitation, Respondent's 

theory of relevance, and whether such facts are cumulative to evidence in the hearing 

record; 

2. Whether Respondent possesses evidence disputing the assertions of fact in the 

Declaration of Douglas Gilespie, submitted with the Opposition as Attachment A; 

3. When and how Respond.ent first became aware of the facts asserted in the 

proffer; and 

4. How Respondent would be prejudiced if the record were not reopened to 

receive the evidence proffered by Respondent. Such assertions of prejudice shall not be 

merely conclusory, but shall be supported by specific facts. 
Respondent's reply in compliance with this Order shall be fied with the Office of 

the Secretary. A copy shall be submitted by electronic mail to the Office of the 

Administrative Law Judges no later than 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, October 7,2009. 

ORDERED: 

D. Michael CH pel 

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

Date: October 2, 2009 

2
Exhibit 10.79

 

2011 Plan — Non-employee director

 

	
Stock Option Award Certificate
    	

    
	
(NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR)
    	
ID: XXXXXXXX
    
	
 
    	
Treasury Building,
    
	
 
    	
Lower Grand Canal Street
    
	
 
    	
Dublin 2, Ireland
    


 

	
«FIRST_NAME» «MIDDLE_NAME» «LAST_NAME»
    	
 
    	
Option   Number:
    	
 
    	
«NUM»
    
	
«ADDRESS_LINE_1»
    	
 
    	
Plan:
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
«PLAN_NAME»
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«ADDRESS_LINE_2»
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«ADDRESS_LINE_3»
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«CITY», «STATE»   «ZIP_CODE»
    	
 
    	
ID:
    	
 
    	
«ID»
    


 

Effective «GRANT_DATE», you have been granted a Non-Qualified Option to buy «SHARES_GRANTED» shares of Alkermes plc (the “Company”) common stock at «OPTION_PRICE» per share.

 

The total option price of the shares granted is «TOTAL_OPTION_PRICE».

 

The right to acquire the shares subject to the Non-Qualified Stock Option will become fully vested on the date shown below. The Non-Qualified Stock Option shall expire on the 10th anniversary of the date of grant (unless otherwise provided below).

 

	
Shares
    	
 
    	
Vest Date
    	
 
    
	
«SHARES»
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    


 

In the event of the termination of your service relationship with the Company, the Non-Qualified Stock Option shall vest and be exercisable in full on such termination of service relationship and the period during which the Non-Qualified Stock Option (to the extent that it is exercisable on the date of termination of the service relationship) may be exercised shall be three (3) years following the date of termination of the service relationship, but not beyond the original term of the Non-Qualified Stock Option.

 

The foregoing Option has been granted under and is governed by the terms and conditions of this Certificate and the Alkermes plc 2011 Stock Option and Incentive Plan.

 

	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Alkermes plc
    	
 
    	
Date
#### BURLEIGH HOUSE, INC., Appellant, v. Nathaniel COLLER and Rosalind Coller, Appellees.

No. 71-53.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 23, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Bettye R. REGISTER, Appellant, v. Freeman REGISTER, Appellee.

No. P-395.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Sept. 9, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Interlocutory appeal dismissed.
#### Robert RYAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 43226.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 30, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.

CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Nelia MORENO, a widow, Appellee. DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert R. GILBERT, as Administrator of the Estate of Angel Moreno, deceased, Appellee.

Nos. 69-542, 69-541.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Oct. 28, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1969.

*549Fowler, White, Collins, Gillen, Humkey & Trenam and A. Blackwell Stieglitz, Miami, for appellant.

Weiner & Rubin, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PEARSON, Chief Judge.

These interlocutory appeals are from identical orders in two separate suits. They involve the same point of law and were consolidated for all appellate purposes. Each order denied the defendant-appellant’s motion to dismiss the cause pursuant to Rule 1.420(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A., for failure to Prosecute.

The order recited:

> “* * * that the defendant DADE COUNTY’S Motion to Dismiss be, and the same is, hereby denied upon the express finding of this Court that good cause has been shown by the plaintiffs why this cause should not be dismissed, to-wit, the Statute of Limitations on the claim has run and a dismissal under the provisions of this Rule would bar the plaintiffs’ claim.”

The ground assigned has been held insufficient as good cause for reinstatement of actions dismissed for lack of prosecution under § 45.19(1), Fla.Stat. Davant v. Coachman Properties, Inc., Fla.App. 1960, 118 So.2d 844, 846, 80 A.L.R.2d 1396. And in Laug v. Murphy, Fla.App. 1968, 205 So.2d 695, 697, the court held:

> *% * **ífí sfc

> “Neither the fact that a case is ready to be set for trial, the fact that the dismissal will cause severe hardship, nor the fact that the parties have unsuccessfully negotiated for settlement, constitutes good cause for reinstatement within the intendment of F.S.1963, Section 45.19(1), F.S.A.” (Footnotes omitted.)

Although Rule 1.420(e) has superseded § 45.19(1) and provides for a slightly different practice upon the presentation of a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, the prior opinions are persuasive as to the meaning of the terms employed. Cf. State ex rel. Avery v. Williams, Fla.App. 1969, 222 So.2d 477. We therefore hold that good cause is not shown by a sworn statement that the statute of limitations on the claim has run and that upon dismissal the statute would bar the plaintiff’s claim.

We have examined appellee’s affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss for other allegations which might con*550stitute good cause for sustaining the denial of the motion to dismiss. None of the allegations recited would constitute the requisite good cause. Cf. Moore v. Gannon, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 618.

Therefore the orders denying appellant’s motions to dismiss are reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the causes pursuant to Rule 1.420(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Jack W. OLSHEN, Appellant, v. Elsie G. ROBINSON et al., Appellees.

No. 70-700.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 18, 1971.

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1971.

*535Daniel Neal Heller, Miami, for appellant.

Feibelman, Friedman, Britton & Stettin, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL, J., and ADAMS, ALTO, Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant suffered an order in the nature of a directed verdict dismissing his complaint at the conclusion of his case as plaintiff in an action to establish a trust in property held by an estate. The single point on appeal urges that the trial judge misapplied F.S. § 90.05, F.S.A., commonly called the “Dead Man’s Statute”. It clearly appears that the transaction appellant sought to establish does not come under the holding of the case of Tharp v. Kitchell, 151 Fla. 226, 9 So.2d 457 (1942), because the transaction was with the deceased personally and not with the deceased as an officer of the corporation. No error has been shown.

Affirmed.
#### JOHNSON v. PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF THE SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC.

No. 37768.

Supremo Court of Florida.

Feb. 1969.

Appeal dismissed without opinion.
#### CITY OF BRADENTON v. PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF THE SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC.

No. 37789.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 1969.

Appeal dismissed without opinion.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ADAM SOFTWARE, INC. FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER
31, 1996, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           1,813
<SECURITIES>                                     9,996
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,319
<ALLOWANCES>                                       712
<INVENTORY>                                        448
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                12,977
<PP&E>                                           2,265
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,494
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  14,452
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,003
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            52
<OTHER-SE>                                      12,397
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    14,452
<SALES>                                          3,464
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,464
<CGS>                                              929
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,726
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   9
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (4,548)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (4,548)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (4,548)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.87)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.87)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.1

 

AMENDMENT TO THE

SPX CORPORATION SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN

 

SPX Corporation currently maintains the SPX Corporation Supplemental Retirement Savings Plan (the “Plan”).  Pursuant to the powers of amendment reserved in Section 7.1 of the Plan, effective as of March 10, 2014, SPX Corporation hereby amends the Plan in the following manner:

 

1.              Section 9.2(a) of the Plan is amended by replacing the phrase “twenty percent (20%)” with “twenty-five percent (25%)” wherever such phrase occurs therein.

 

2.              Section 9.2(a)(iii)(B)(1) of the Plan is amended by deleting the phrase “(other than rights under the Company’s Rights Agreement dated June 25, 1996 with The Bank of New York, as amended)” in its entirety.

 

3.              Section 9.2(c) of the Plan is amended by replacing the phrase “Approval by the shareholders of (or if such approval is not required, the consummation of)” with “The consummation of”.

 

4.              Section 9.2(c) of the Plan is amended by replacing the phrase “eighty percent (80%)” with “seventy-five percent (75%)”.

 

5.              Section 9.3 of the Plan is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

 

“Section 9.3                              RESERVED”
Exhibit 32(b)

                          Section 1350 Certification
                                    of
                             Mark E. Maddocks

     I certify that the Quarterly Report of Dataram Corporation with
which this Certification is furnished fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, and that the information contained in the periodic report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Dataram Corporation.



December 8, 2005                  MARK E. MADDOCKS

                                   _______________________

                                   Mark E. Maddocks
                                   Vice President, Finance and
                                   Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 249 (Tuesday, December 30, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67937-67938]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-33859]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board
[STB Finance Docket No. 33517]


North American Railnet, Inc.; Continuance in Control Exemption--
Illinois Railnet, Inc.

    North American Railnet, Inc. (Railnet) has filed a notice of 
exemption to continue in control of the Illinois Railnet, Inc. (IR), 
upon IR's becoming a Class III railroad.
    The earliest the transaction could be consummated was December 9, 
1997, the effective date of the exemption (7 days after the exemption 
was filed).
    This transaction is related to STB Finance Docket No. 33516, 
Illinois Railnet, Inc.--Acquisition and Operation Exemption--The 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway, wherein IR seeks to acquire 
and operate a rail line from The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 
Railway.
    Applicant controls one existing Class III railroad: Nebraska, 
Kansas, & Colorado Railnet, Inc., operating in the States of Kansas, 
Nebraska, and Colorado.
    Applicant states that: (i) The rail lines to be operated by IR do 
not connect with any railroad in the corporate family; (ii) the 
transaction is not part of a series of anticipated transactions that 
would connect IR's lines with any railroad in the corporate family; and 
(iii) the transaction does not involve a Class I carrier. Therefore, 
the transaction is exempt from the prior approval requirements of 49 
U.S.C. 11323. See 49 CFR 1180.2(d)(2).

[[Page 67938]]

    Under 49 U.S.C. 10502(g), the Board may not use its exemption 
authority to relieve a rail carrier of its statutory obligation to 
protect the interests of its employees. Section 11326(c), however, does 
not provide for labor protection for transactions under sections 11324 
and 11325 that involve only Class III rail carriers. Because this 
transaction involves Class III rail carriers only, the Board, under the 
statute, may not impose labor protective conditions for this 
transaction.
    If the notice contains false or misleading information, the 
exemption is void ab initio. Petitions to revoke the exemption under 49 
U.S.C. 10502(d) may be filed at any time. The filing of a petition to 
revoke will not automatically stay the transaction.
    An original and 10 copies of all pleadings, referring to STB 
Finance Docket No. 33517, must be filed with the Surface Transportation 
Board, Office of the Secretary, Case Control Unit, 1925 K Street, N.W., 
Washington, DC 20423-0001. In addition, a copy of each pleading must be 
served on John D. Heffner, Rea, Cross & Auchincloss, 1920 N Street, 
N.W., Suite 420, Washington, DC 20036.

    Decided: December 16, 1997.

    By the Board, David M. Konschnik, Director, Office of 
Proceedings.
Vernon A. Williams,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-33859 Filed 12-29-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-00-P
#### Monroe POPE, surviving natural father of Susan Pope, a Deceased minor and Monroe Pope, Administrator of the Estate of Susan Pope, a Deceased minor, Petitioner, v. Joel POLLACK and Federal Insurance Company, Respondents.

No. 72-1259.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 10, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari dismissed.
```

                                                                      EXHIBIT 11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         ARTESIAN RESOURCES CORPORATION
                   COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE

                                          2003             2002             2001
Earnings
   Income Applicable to
    Common Stock Shares,
    Class A Non-Voting
    and Class B Common Stock       $ 3,845,323      $ 4,125,431      $ 3,270,342
   Weighted average number
    of shares outstanding
      Basic                          3,880,159        3,533,460        3,039,414
      Diluted                        3,992,519        3,612,588        3,107,315
Net Income per Common Share,
   Class A Non-Voting and
   Class B Common Stock
      Basic                        $      0.99      $      1.17      $      1.07
      Diluted                      $      0.96      $      1.14      $      1.05
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6957

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LLOYD GEORGE MAXWELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (CR-93-262-A, CA-97-382-AM)

Submitted: November 6, 1997 Decided: November 25, 1997

Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lloyd George Maxwell, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas More Hollenhorst,

Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal

are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and

jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434

U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S.

220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have sixty days within

which to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions

to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time

to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its order on March 21, 1997; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on May 26, 1997, which is beyond

the sixty-day appeal period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c). Appellant's

failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves this court without jurisdiction to consider the

merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

DISMISSED