UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4452

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

BARRY DEAN BAIZE, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00296-TDS-1) 

Submitted: February 11, 2015 Decided: March 31, 2015

Before WYNN, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United 

States Attorney, Robert A. J. Lang, Assistant United States

Attorney, Kimberly Sokolich, Third-Year Law Student, 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2

PER CURIAM: 

Barry Dean Baize was convicted after a two-day trial

before a jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012), and was 

sentenced to 245 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Baize 

challenges his conviction, arguing that the evidence is 

insufficient to support it, that the district court abused its 

discretion in dismissing an ill juror and replacing her with an 

alternate, and that—as applied to him—the “in or affecting 

commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. 

We affirm. 

We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction de novo. United States v. McLean, 715 F.3d 129, 137 

(4th Cir. 2013). “A defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge 

must overcome a heavy burden, and reversal for insufficiency 

must be confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is 

clear.” United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir. 

2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is 

limited to determining whether, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Government and accepting the 

factfinder’s determinations of credibility, the verdict is 

supported by substantial evidence, that is, “evidence that a 

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 
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sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 700 

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To convict Baize of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),1 the Government 

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) he was 

previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) he voluntarily and 

intentionally possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in 

or affecting commerce, because the firearm had traveled in 

interstate or foreign commerce. United States v. Gallimore, 

247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Langley, 

62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The second element 

may be satisfied by proof of actual possession or constructive 

possession of the firearm. Gallimore, 247 F.3d at 136-37. 

We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to establish 

Baize’s guilt. The parties stipulated that Baize had a prior 

conviction for a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment 

 1 The indictment also charged Baize with violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e), which provides for a fifteen-year minimum prison term 

for a person who violates § 922(g)(1) and has three previous 

convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or 

both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 

Baize’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, however, 

do not pertain to § 924(e). 
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exceeding one year. Three witnesses observed Baize actually 

possess a firearm in the yard abutting an Eden, North Carolina 

residence, and Baize was observed throwing a shiny object in a 

field near the residence after walking from the yard to the 

field. An operable .22 caliber Derringer firearm that was 

manufactured in West Germany and had traveled in interstate or 

foreign commerce was recovered near the location where Baize 

threw the shiny object. Baize also admitted during a recorded 

telephone conversation after his arrest that he possessed a 

firearm. 

On appeal, Baize addresses the credibility of the 

witnesses who testified at trial, asserting that the 

eyewitnesses’ testimony should be viewed with caution and that 

his testimony denying possession of the firearm was credible. 

We reject these assertions as meritless. It is the role of the 

jury to weigh the credibility of the evidence, to resolve 

conflicts in the evidence, and—where the evidence supports 

different, reasonable interpretations—to decide which 

interpretation to believe. McLean, 715 F.3d at 137. The jury 

was entitled to credit the eyewitnesses’ testimony and discredit 

that given by Baize and, in reviewing for substantial evidence, 

this court will not weigh evidence or review witness 

credibility. Id. 
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Baize also asserts that there was no fingerprint or 

DNA evidence linking him to the recovered firearm. We reject 

this assertion as well. The testimony adduced by the Government 

at trial was sufficient to establish Baize’s guilt; no 

fingerprint or DNA evidence linking him to the firearm was 

required. See United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1190 

(4th Cir. 1997) (“Just as the uncorroborated testimony of one 

witness or of an accomplice may be sufficient to sustain a 

conviction, the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may 

also be sufficient.”). 

Baize argues next that the district court abused its 

discretion in dismissing a juror who became ill during the trial 

and replacing her with an alternate. Rule 24(c) of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly authorizes district courts 

to impanel alternate jurors and to substitute them for jurors 

who can no longer serve. We review a district court’s decision 

to replace a juror with an alternate for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 517 (4th Cir. 2013), 

cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). “A finding that a district 

court acted on an irrelevant legal basis or lacked factual 

support for the conclusion that a juror was unable or 

disqualified to perform his duty amounts to a finding that the 

court abused its discretion.” United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 

1344, 1349 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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We conclude that the district court had both factual 

support and a legally relevant basis for excusing the ill juror 

and replacing her with an alternate. Prior to the commencement 

of the second day of trial, the juror’s mother had reported to 

the district court that the juror got sick the night before. 

Although the juror traveled to the courthouse on the second day 

of trial and was able to answer the district court’s questions 

regarding her illness, she affirmed she was then dizzy and 

nauseous, had vomited the night before, did not know how long 

her illness—which had “off-and-on” symptoms—would last, and that 

she probably would not be able to concentrate if she were to sit 

as a juror that day. Given the uncertainty regarding the length 

of the illness, the juror’s confirmation that concentration on 

the evidence would likely be problematic, and the inconvenience 

that any delay might cause, the district court acted within its 

discretion in excusing the ill juror and replacing her with an 

alternate rather than postponing the trial. See Nelson, 

102 F.3d at 1349-50 (finding no abuse of discretion where 

district court replaced two jurors with alternates because 

jurors were scheduled to go on vacation); United States v. 

Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding no abuse of 

discretion where district court replaced a juror who knew one of 

the witnesses with an alternate); United States v. Colkley, 

899 F.2d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no abuse of 
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discretion where district court excused a juror who failed to 

appear for thirty minutes and replaced him with an alternate). 

Finally, Baize argues that the “in or affecting 

commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)2 as applied to him is 

unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. As Baize correctly 

acknowledges, however, relief on this claim is foreclosed by 

controlling Circuit precedent. See Gallimore, 247 F.3d at 

137-38. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

 2 Section 922(g)(1) prohibits individuals in specified 

categories from “ship[ping] or transport[ing] in interstate or 

foreign commerce, or possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any 

firearm or ammunition; or . . . receiv[ing] any firearm or 

ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate 

or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).