Reversed and Remanded and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed 

December 10, 2019.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-18-00683-CR

VICTORIA RANAE BLUE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 21st District Court

Lee County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 8733

DISSENTING OPINION 

Based on the undisputed facts and testimony in the record, I disagree with 

the majority. The State failed to show with clear and convincing evidence that 

Appellant’s consent was given voluntarily. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Meeks v. 

State, 692 S.W. 2d 504, 508–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 

The reasonableness of the search is based on the totality of the 

circumstances. State v. Villareal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In 
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examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding any alleged consent, the 

trial court should consider the circumstances before the search or seizure, the 

reaction of the accused to pressure, and any other factor deemed relevant. See

Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

“The trial judge must conduct a careful sifting and balancing of the unique 

facts and circumstances of each case in deciding whether a particular consent to 

search was voluntary. . . .” Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). The ultimate question “is whether the person’s ‘will ha[s] been 

overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,’” such that 

the consent to search must have been involuntary. Id. (quoting United States v. 

Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (quoting

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 

(1973))). 

On the night of August 2, 2017, Appellant’s husband was brutally murdered 

during an attempted robbery. Appellant witnessed the murder, and the couples’

three young children were in the home at the time of the murder. 

A written consent to search was requested by officers after Appellant’s 

husband was murdered. The officer told Appellant the search was for the purpose 

of collecting evidence of her husband’s homicide. Appellant testified during the 

suppression hearing that she did not remember signing the consent form.

It is undisputed, and supported by the record, that Appellant was distraught 

and upset after seeing her husband killed. Captain Jack Allen of the Lee County 

Sheriff’s Office testified that Appellant’s mental state was “distraught,” she had

“just witnessed a violent crime” and “learned the news that her husband was 

deceased,” and further testified that she was upset and crying “like a woman who 

just saw her husband killed.” His testimony clearly defines the mental and 
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emotional state of Appellant after the attempted robbery and subsequent death of 

her husband.

The undisputed facts before us are:

• Appellant’s husband was killed in front of Appellant and their children at night 

during a robbery. 

• There were five men who participated in the robbery. 

• After the robbery, Appellant was visibly upset, crying, and grieving over the loss 

of her husband. 

• Appellant was separated from her children. 

• Appellant’s movements were restricted; she was told to remain at the scene of the 

crime for questioning. 

• Appellant testified that she did not remember signing the consent form and was in 

a state of shock. 

• Although family members arrived at the scene of the homicide, Appellant was not 

allowed to approach or speak with them, and officers told Appellant’s relatives to 

remain at the gate. 

• Captain Allen testified Appellant was barefoot and was not allowed to go get 

shoes from her house. 

• Although Captain Allen stated, “she would have been allowed to leave,” Appellant 

was told to remain on the premises, was there for 12 hours during the 

investigation, was barefoot, and was told not to talk to any family members. 

• Appellant was not allowed to use the bathroom at her house; officers took her 

away from the house to use a restroom but returned her to the scene of the 

homicide. 

• The officers conducted an investigation from approximately 5 PM until 5AM, 

during which time Appellant laid on the ground for a period of time. 

• The investigating officers stated they were only searching for evidence related to 

the homicide but had heard the deceased was a drug dealer. 

• Captain Allen testified that the house was “secured” before consent was obtained; 

• The vehicles were not used in any way during the homicide, and there was no 

evidence collected from the vehicles. However, the officers “secured” the 

vehicles before requesting consent to search from Appellant. 

• Appellant was told not to approach the vehicles. 

• The property, containers and all vehicle were “secured”; Appellant was not 

allowed near the vehicles or near her home. 
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• Captain Allen testified that the experience was traumatic for Appellant and her 

children, and her children were removed from the scene for that reason. 

• Appellant testified she attempted to leave with her children but was told to remain 

at the crime scene for questioning. 

• The investigating officers requested that Appellant sign a consent to search a mere 

five hours after the death of her husband. 

Appellant’s property, including the vehicles, were “secured”; therefore, 

Appellant did not have access to transportation to leave the property. The officers 

told Appellant to remain on the premises for questioning during this twelve-hour 

investigation. Appellant was unable to leave the premises or speak with anyone 

other than the police for at least five hours before signing the consent. The police 

physically took Appellant to use the restroom and returned her to the premises.

They did not allow Appellant to speak with or even approach anyone other than the 

police for twelve hours. Appellant had no option but to remain on the premises 

where her husband was killed. 

Although the trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of the 

witnesses’ testimony during the suppression hearings, including Appellant’s 

testimony that she did not remember consenting to the search, based on these facts, 

the State failed to meet its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the consent was voluntary. State v. Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997). Given these uncontroverted facts and circumstances, it was an abuse of 

discretion for the trial court to deny Appellant’s motions to suppress. Because the 

majority reaches the opposite conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
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 /s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant

 Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Spain, and Poissant. (Christopher, J., 

majority). 

Publish – Tex. R. App. P.47.2(b).