[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-10765

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cv-00681-GKS-TBS

VICTORIA LANEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

THOMAS RAY SLATEN, JR.,

LARSEN AND ASSOCIATES, P.L., 

JILL JORGENSEN, 

SOUTHWEST PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 

OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC., 

ROBERT MCKEY, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees,

JIM RYGH,

 Defendant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(May 1, 2017)

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Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Victoria Laney appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims against Jill 

Rygh,1 Southwest Property Management of Central Florida, Robert McKey, and 

The Hammocks Homeowner’s Association of Orange County, Inc. (collectively, 

“the Hammocks defendants”).2

 The district court held that Laney failed to state a 

claim against the Hammocks defendants under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 

Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq.; the Florida 

Consumer Collections Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Fla. Stat. § 559.55 et seq.; the 

federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; and the Florida Fair Housing 

Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.20 et seq. Laney also appeals the court’s announcement that it 

would award sanctions against her under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 

After careful review, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Laney’s complaint 

and dismiss her appeal of the sanction issue as moot.

I.

Laney is a homeowner and resident in “The Hammocks,” a deed-restricted 

community in Ocoee, Florida. As a homeowner in the community, Laney is a 

member of The Hammocks Homeowners Association of Orange County (“the 

 1 Laney first identified Rygh’s last name as Jorgensen. This mistake has since been 

corrected, but the case caption retains the style first used in the complaint and by the district 

court.

2 Laney also brought claims against two other defendants in this case. They have settled 

separately from this appeal.

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Association”). Laney used to serve on the Board of Directors for the Association, 

but was recalled by the Association on June 2, 2008. After the recall, Laney filed a 

Petition for Arbitration with the Florida Department of Business and Professional 

Regulations, Division of Condominiums, Time Shares, and Mobile Homes to 

challenge the Association’s recall. The arbitrator found in favor of the Association

and awarded the Association attorneys’ fees. To enforce this award against Laney, 

the Association filed suit in Florida state court. The state court enforced the 

arbitration award in two orders dated February 24 and June 21, 2010.

In September 2014, Laney filed a “Petition for Writ of Certiorari” in the 

Florida state court. In the petition, Laney said she had sent the Association a check

soon after the arbitration, but that the Association never cashed it. She also alleged

the Association’s collection efforts were improper and asked the court to retract the

discovery order about her assets. The Florida state court denied Laney’s petition 

on October 15, 2014.

Laney filed this action in federal court on April 27, 2015. Although Laney

initially proceeded pro se, she hired an attorney, Scott Siverson, shortly after filing 

her federal complaint. With the assistance of her counsel, Laney filed an amended 

complaint on July 13, 2015. She alleged that Rygh, the property manager,

distributed a letter from Slaten, the Association’s lawyer, at the annual membership

meeting of the Association, which at least 68 homeowners attended. Laney also 

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said McKey, the president of the Board, read the letter aloud at the meeting. The 

letter, dated February 26, 2014, contained information about Laney’s debt and the 

Association’s efforts to collect those debts. Laney says the letter was humiliating, 

factually inaccurate, and caused her neighbors to be “exceedingly unkind” to her. 

She also claims that on April 29, 2014, Southwest Property posted on its website 

the past due amounts she owed the Association. Laney says this has never been 

done to any other homeowner in the Hammocks. Finally, she alleges that 

Southwest Property and the Association considered her “emotionally or mentally 

ill,” and claims the Association, through Slaten, caused her arrest and unlawful 

incarceration.

Based on these allegations, Laney brought four claims against the

Hammocks defendants. The district court dismissed all four with prejudice. The 

court also sanctioned Laney and her attorney, Siverson, under its Rule 11 and 

inherent powers after finding the case frivolous given the previous state court 

litigation. The district court instructed the parties to submit information about the 

amount of fees and costs due to the Hammocks defendants, as well as any 

objections. Laney appealed the district court’s order.

Since the district court issued its order, the Hammocks defendants and 

Siverson reached a settlement with regard to the sanctions award. Siverson paid 

the Hammocks defendants to settle this part of the district court’s order. Laney, 

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however, never agreed to nor signed the settlement documents. On appeal, Laney 

is proceeding pro se.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the 

factual allegations in the complaint as true and construing all inferences in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 

(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). We review for an abuse of discretion the district 

court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions as well as the decision to award costs to the 

prevailing party. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009); 

Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). This Court also 

liberally construes pro se pleadings and briefs. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 

874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th 

Cir. 2006).3

 3 The Hammocks defendants argue Laney has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal 

of her complaint with prejudice because her brief’s statement of the issues refers only to the 

sanctions award. However, Laney’s brief makes it quite clear that she is challenging the district 

court’s dismissal of her claims. And in any event, we liberally construe pro se briefs. Timson, 

518 F.3d at 874.

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A.

Laney first argues Counts II and III should not have been dismissed by the 

district court based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.4

 The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine prohibits federal district courts from reviewing state court final judgments, 

because that is the role of state appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). It is 

“confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries by 

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22 

(2005). The doctrine applies when:

(1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in 

state court; (2) the prior state court ruling was a final or 

conclusive judgment on the merits; (3) the party seeking 

relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to 

raise its federal claims in the state court proceeding; and 

(4) the issue before the federal court was either 

adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably 

intertwined with the state court’s judgment. 

Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1310 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quotation omitted). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state 

court judgment when it would “effectively nullify” the state judgment or would 

 4 This doctrine is named for the two Supreme Court cases that created it: Rooker v. 

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).

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“succeed[] only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” 

Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260 (quotation omitted).

Laney’s claims against the Hammocks defendants under the FDUTPA in 

Count II and the FCCPA in Count III are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

The state court decisions in the record are final judgments, concerning the same 

parties, and are “inextricably intertwined.” See id. The record shows Laney’s 

allegations in Counts II and III concerned the same conduct as the allegations in 

her state court proceedings—primarily, the Hammocks defendants’ attempts to 

collect attorneys’ fees from her. If Laney were to win on her FDUTPA or FCCPA 

claim in federal court, this would effectively nullify the state court’s decision that 

the Hammocks defendants’ debt collection practices were permissible under 

Florida law. And the record also shows the state court fully adjudicated Laney’s 

claims regarding these practices.5

 Because Laney’s claims in Counts II and III are 

therefore “inextricably intertwined” with her previous state court proceedings, and 

because she could have raised her FDUTPA and FCCPA claims there, the RookerFeldman doctrine applies and bars Laney’s claims from consideration in the district 

court. See Storck, 354 F.3d at 1310 n.1; Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260. We affirm the 

district court on its ruling as to these claims.

 5 To the extent Laney challenges the district court’s consideration of extraneous materials 

on a motion to dismiss, we affirm as well. The district court was free to consider any documents

attached to a motion to dismiss so long as each was “(1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) 

undisputed.” Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). The state court records in 

this case met both requirements.

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B.

Laney also argues her claims in Counts IV and V should not have been 

dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). To 

avoid dismissal, a complaint must allege enough facts to state a claim that is 

plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 

1955, 1974 (2009). Thus, a plaintiff must offer “factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). A recital of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by 

conclusory statements, is not enough to adequately plead a claim. Id. at 678–79, 

129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. Count IV of Laney’s amended complaint is based on the 

federal Fair Housing Act, while her claim in Count V is based on the Florida Fair 

Housing Act. These two statutes are substantively identical, and therefore we 

apply the same legal analysis to each. Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. 

Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Laney alleged that she was “a member of a protected group” under both 

statutes because the Hammocks defendants “collectively perceived or regarded 

[her] as being emotionally or mentally impaired or ill.” She points to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3602(h) of the Fair Housing Act to argue that mental handicaps are protected 

under the statutes. But she does not allege how the Hammocks defendants’ 

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conduct in any way impacted her accessibility to housing nor how they refused to 

permit reasonable modifications for handicapped persons. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3604(a), (f). Neither does the complaint allege any sort of injury from the 

Hammocks defendants’ alleged discrimination other than her personal interactions 

with the Association. Thus, Laney did not plead enough facts to state a plausible

claim for relief under the federal Fair Housing Act, and by extension, the Florida 

Fair Housing Act. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974; Bhogaita, 

765 F.3d at 1285. We affirm the district court’s ruling as to these claims as well.

C.

Laney finally appeals the district court’s imposition of sanctions against her. 

However, we need not decide whether the district court’s decision to award 

attorneys’ fees and costs to the Hammocks defendants was proper. Siverson, 

Laney’s attorney in the district court, paid the Hammocks defendants, so they say

the sanctions award is moot. They have confirmed to this Court that they no 

longer seek any amount of sanctions from Laney. Siverson also agreed the paid 

sum will not be returned even if the award of sanctions were to be reversed on 

appeal. Therefore, this issue “no longer presents a live controversy with respect to 

which the court can give meaningful relief.” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United 

States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). This portion of 

Laney’s appeal is dismissed as moot.

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AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. 

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