[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 32 (Tuesday, February 18, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7281-7284]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-3888]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245]


Northeast Utilities; Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
Issuance of Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition dated 
January 5, 1995, by Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petition for action under 10 
CFR 2.206). The Petition pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station, 
Unit 1.
    In the Petition, the Petitioner described several examples of what 
he alleged were violations of Procedure WC-8, which required that 
maintenance and test equipment be signed out from and returned to a 
custodian. The Petitioner requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission institute sanctions against his department manager, his 
first-line supervisor, and two co-workers for engaging in deliberate 
misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5. The Petitioner also asserted 
that the NRC ``desperately needs to conduct an investigation'' into the 
procedure violations and to audit the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance 
department measuring and test equipment folders to reveal widespread 
problems regarding noncompliance with this procedure.
    The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined to grant the Petition in part, and deny the Petition in 
part. The reasons for this decision are explained in the ``Director's 
Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-97-04), the complete text of which 
follows this notice and is available for public inspection at the 
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at 
the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical 
College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and at the 
temporary local public document room located at the Waterford Library, 
ATTN: Vince

[[Page 7282]]

Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.
    A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this 
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on 
its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    On January 5, 1995, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a 
Petition with the Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). In the Petition, the 
Petitioner raised concerns regarding noncompliance with Procedure WC-8, 
``Control and Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment,'' at 
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, and requested that escalated 
enforcement action be taken. Specifically, the Petitioner provided 
several examples of what he alleged were violations of Procedure WC-8, 
which he stated required that measuring and test equipment (M&TE) be 
signed out from, and returned to, a custodian upon completion of work. 
The Petitioner requested that the NRC institute sanctions against his 
department manager, his first-line supervisor, and ``two coworkers'' 
<SUP>1 for engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 
50.5 in failing to comply with Procedure WC-8. The Petitioner also 
asserted that the NRC should conduct an investigation into violations 
of this procedure and audit the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance department 
M&TE folders for widespread problems regarding noncompliance with this 
procedure.
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    \1\ The ``two coworkers'' are understood to be an individual the 
Petitioner alleges willfully falsified (back-dated) an entry on the 
form to indicate that the meter was returned on October 13, 1994, 
and an individual the Petitioner alleges willfully violated 
Procedure WC-8 on November 17, 1994, by signing out his own M&TE.
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    On February 23, 1995, the NRC informed the Petitioner that the 
Petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. The NRC also 
informed the Petitioner that the staff would take appropriate action 
within a reasonable time regarding the specific concerns raised in the 
Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues raised by the 
Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded, for the reasons 
explained below, that the Petition is denied with regard to the request 
for escalated enforcement action and instituting sanctions against the 
department manager, first-line supervisor, and two co-workers, but 
granted with regard to the requests for an ``investigation into the 
above mentioned procedure violations'' and for the NRC to ``audit the 
Unit 1 maintenance department M&TE folders.''

II. Discussion

    In the Petition, the Petitioner raises concerns regarding numerous 
noncompliances with Procedure WC-8, Revision 0, at Millstone Unit 1. 
Specifically, the Petitioner states that (1) quality assurance (QA) 
<SUP>2 test meter 1587 was signed out on October 13, 1994, for weekly 
battery readings, and as of October 19, 1994, the user had not returned 
the meter or signed it in. The Petitioner states that this practice was 
in violation of Procedure WC-8, which stated ``return M&TE to custodian 
upon completion of work,'' <SUP>3 (2) although he identified a problem 
with Procedure WC-8 (specifically, who was responsible for the actual 
signing in and out of M&TE) to his first-line supervisor on November 7, 
1994, as of December 1994, the procedure still had not been changed (in 
accordance with Procedure DC-4, ``Procedural Compliance,'' which 
requires that if a procedure conflict or interpretation problem exists, 
a change or revision should be made); (3) on November 10, 1994, he 
noticed on a station form that someone signed in the QA meter with the 
return date of October 13, 1994, and that this was a willful 
falsification (back-dating) of a nuclear record; (4) on November 17, 
1994, an electrician co-worker was directed by their first-line 
supervisor to willfully violate Procedure WC-8 by signing out his own 
M&TE, and signed out his own M&TE although both the supervisor and co-
worker knew they were to have the custodian sign out the equipment; (5) 
on November 21, 1994, his department manager instructed the custodian 
to give a spare key for the QA locker to the Millstone Unit 1 control 
room so the control room could sign out equipment at night; and (6) on 
November 25, 1994, a mechanic signed out M&TE without a custodian.
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    \2\ Quality Assurance comprises those quality assurance actions 
related to the physical characteristics of a material, structure, 
component, or system which provide a means to control the quality of 
the material, structure, component, or system to predetermined 
requirements.
    \3\ This procedure had become effective on June 20, 1994. It 
required that a ``designated custodian'' enter the date of issue and 
date of return on the custody and usage record, and that the user of 
the equipment return it to the custodian upon completion of work. In 
Attachment 1 to the procedure, ``custodian'' was defined as the 
individual designated by the department head to store, track, and 
issue the department's M&TE.
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    In addition, the Petitioner states that he believes that his 
department manager was directly responsible for sharing the effects of 
a new, revised, or rewritten procedure with the employees of his 
department if the procedure directly affected day-to-day operations. 
The Petitioner asserts that this individual's ``lack of 
communications'' regarding the procedure has caused a ``widespread 
problem of procedure noncompliance.'' <SUP>4
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    \4\ NNECO Procedure DC-1 requires that the licensee select the 
training requirements to be used in training employees whenever 
procedures are revised, and indicate the type of training that would 
be performed on Attachment 5 to Procedure DC-1. For Procedure WC-8, 
Revision 0, the training required was marked as ``training to be 
done by Department or Nuclear Training Department within 60 days of 
the effective date and prior to performance of procedure.''
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    In letters to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), licensee 
for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, dated December 5 and 28, 1994, and 
February 14, 1995, the NRC staff raised a number of maintenance-related 
issues. In those letters, the NRC staff requested NNECO to review these 
issues and submit a written response. Among these issues, the NRC 
requested NNECO to review two issues associated with Procedure WC-8 
that are now presently being raised by the Petitioner. These were that: 
(1) the Millstone Unit 1 QA test meter 1587 was signed out on October 
13, 1994, to perform weekly battery readings, but as of October 19, 
1994, the user had not returned the meter or signed in the meter; and 
(2) many members of the Millstone Unit 1 Maintenance Department never 
received training on Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, within 60 days of the 
effective date of June 20, 1994, as required by the documentation of 
training requirements form of NNECO Procedure DC-1.
    In a letter dated March 6, 1995, NNECO responded to the issue 
regarding failure to return the QA meter signed out on October 13, 
1994. In its letter, NNECO stated that on October 13, 1994, a 
maintenance electrician signed out QA test meter 1587 to perform weekly 
battery surveillances and signed it back in on the M&TE log on the same 
day. On October 19, 1994, a different

[[Page 7283]]

maintenance electrician signed out and returned QA test meter 1587. 
Sometime later that day, QA test meter 1587 was signed out again and 
subsequently returned the same day. NNECO stated that it was unable to 
determine, based on interviews with the parties involved and a review 
of the custody and usage record, the exact circumstances surrounding QA 
test meter 1587. However, what was known was that QA test meter 1587 
had been signed out once on October 13 and twice on October 19, 1994. 
NNECO's review further concluded that strict compliance with Procedure 
WC-8 was not being observed at all three Millstone units in that a 
custodian was not being used to ensure that certain actions (i.e., 
signing in and out M&TE on the M&TE log) were being accomplished. 
However, NNECO stated that it believed it met the ``intent of the 
procedure'' in that the user of the M&TE stored, tracked, and issued 
the equipment as required by the procedure, except that the custodian 
was not involved. As a result of its review, NNECO undertook certain 
corrective actions. Specifically, NNECO held a site-wide meeting for 
all departments responsible for use or issuance of QA M&TE on February 
21, 1995, to determine corrective actions necessary to ensure 
procedural compliance. Subsequently, NNECO revised Procedure WC-8 on 
April 27, 1995, to specifically allow the user of M&TE to sign QA test 
equipment in and out. The custodian is still responsible for storing 
and tracking M&TE. In addition, Millstone Unit 1 control room personnel 
responsible for accessing QA M&TE were made aware of the logging 
requirements.
    The NRC conducted a special safety inspection from May 15 through 
June 23, 1995, at the Millstone station. During this inspection, the 
staff reviewed a number of the concerns, including the concerns about 
QA test meter 1587 and the other examples of noncompliance with 
Procedure WC-8 alleged by the Petitioner, and issued its findings in 
Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-22, 50-423/95-22 (95-
22), dated July 21, 1995.
    During the inspection, the NRC staff reviewed the custody and usage 
record sheets for QA test meter 1587 from September 27 to November 11, 
1994. Based on this review, the staff was unable to determine whether 
QA test meter 1587 was properly logged in and out in October 1994 or if 
the custody and usage record sheet was back-dated. The NRC staff 
discussed this issue with the workers involved who indicated that they 
had no recollection of the exact circumstances surrounding QA test 
meter 1587 and that, to the best of their knowledge, QA test meter 1587 
was logged in and out properly. Therefore, the staff was unable to 
determine whether QA test meter 1587 was controlled improperly and 
whether the Petitioner's co-worker willfully falsified (by back-dating) 
a nuclear record (M&TE log).
    The staff also reviewed the original procedure and determined that 
although Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, was not clear in specifying who was 
responsible for the actual signing in and out of equipment, NNECO was 
meeting the intent of the procedure in that M&TE was stored, tracked, 
and issued in a controlled manner. The NRC staff further concluded that 
NNECO's additional corrective actions (i.e., modifying the procedure) 
were adequate in clarifying the procedure and should prevent 
interpretation problems in the future.
    Notwithstanding the findings of the inspection report, however, the 
NRC has reconsidered this matter and determined that NNECO was not in 
compliance with Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0. This determination is supported 
by the fact that NNECO admitted in its March 6, 1995, letter that it 
was not in compliance with Procedure WC-8. In addition, the NRC has 
reviewed the custody and usage records for signing in and out M&TE on 
November 17 and 25, 1994, and determined that an electrician and 
mechanic had signed out their own M&TE, respectively, on those dates. 
Accordingly, the Petitioner's assertions that the procedure was 
violated when a co-worker electrician signed out his own M&TE on 
November 17, 1994, and a mechanic signed out M&TE on November 25, 1994, 
is substantiated. However, the NRC has been unable to confirm that 
either of these individuals had been ``directed'' by supervision to 
sign out the equipment.
    In addition, NNECO's review, as described in its letter dated March 
6, 1995, and verified by the staff in IR 95-22, determined that keys 
had been available during this timeframe in all Millstone control rooms 
and were in the possession of security personnel to allow access to QA 
M&TE storage locations. These groups required access to these areas in 
order to properly execute their duties. Therefore, since the custodian 
did not sign in and out the equipment, the Petitioner's additional 
assertion that the procedure was violated because security personnel 
and personnel in the Millstone Unit 1 control room could sign out M&TE 
at night is substantiated. However, the NRC has been unable to confirm 
that the department manager had instructed the custodian to give a 
spare key to the control room so the control room could sign out M&TE 
at night.
    Furthermore, the staff has determined that, since there were no 
safety consequences as a result of these events, the noncompliances 
with Procedure WC-8 did not constitute a violation that could 
reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's 
corrective action for a previous violation or a previous licensee 
finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the inspection at 
issue, adequate corrective actions were implemented regarding Procedure 
WC-8, and the violation was not willful, the violation would have been 
categorized in accordance with the enforcement policy in effect at the 
time of the inspection as a non-cited Severity Level V violation and 
would not have been the subject of formal enforcement action.<SUP>5
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    \5\ The staff has reconsidered this violation in accordance with 
the current enforcement policy (NUREG-1600, ``General Statement of 
Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Action'') and has 
concluded that the violation is below the level of significance of 
Severity Level IV violations. This determination is based on the 
fact that NNECO was meeting intent of the procedure; there was 
negligible impact on safety; NNECO's interpretation of the M&TE 
custodian's responsibilities does not indicate a programmatic 
problem that could have safety or regulatory impact; if the 
violation recurred, it would not be considered a significant 
concern; and the violation was not willful. Therefore, if considered 
under the new enforcement policy, this violation would be classified 
as a minor violation. Minor violations, as described in the current 
enforcement policy, are not the subject of formal enforcement action 
and are usually not cited in inspection reports. To the extent that 
such violations are described, they are now noted as non-cited 
violations.
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    In addition, since the procedure was not clear in describing 
specific responsibilities and NNECO believed it was meeting the intent 
of the procedure, the NRC has concluded that the Petitioner's 
department manager, his first-line supervisor, and two co-workers did 
not deliberately violate NRC regulations or the Millstone Unit 1 
operating license and, therefore, did not violate the provisions of 10 
CFR 50.5. Moreover, NNECO revised Procedure WC-8 on April 27, 1995, and 
the procedure now more clearly allows the user of the M&TE to sign in 
and out QA test equipment. The custodian still is responsible for 
storing and tracking M&TE. Therefore, the staff has determined that, 
although the Petitioner is correct in that the procedure was not 
revised as of December 1994, the procedure was subsequently revised, so 
that Procedure DC-4 was not violated.
    By letter dated April 26, 1995, NNECO provided its review of 
whether members of the Maintenance Department received training within 
60

[[Page 7284]]

days of Revision 0 of Procedure WC-8 (June 20, 1994). In its letter, 
NNECO stated that no documentation indicating that training was 
conducted for Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, had been found. While no training 
records were located, NNECO stated that the Millstone Unit 1 
Maintenance Manager recalled that the procedure was discussed at a 
Maintenance Department meeting within 60 days of its effective date.
    The NRC staff reviewed Procedure DC-1 and determined that since 
NNECO could not locate the training records for Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, 
and that training by the Maintenance Department or the Nuclear Training 
Department was not conducted within 60 days of the effective date for 
Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, NNECO was in violation of Procedure DC-1.
    The staff's review of NNECO's April 26, 1995, response to the NRC 
letter dated February 14, 1995, was documented in IR 95-22. The staff 
has reviewed NNECO's corrective actions that included NNECO management 
reemphasizing the importance of training on new or revised procedures 
and following procedures, the revising of Procedure WC-8, and training 
on the revised procedure. Based on that review, the staff has 
determined that the corrective actions the licensee has taken are 
acceptable. The staff has further determined that since there were no 
safety consequences as a result of this event, it was not a violation 
that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the 
licensee's corrective action for a previous violation or a previous 
licensee finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the 
inspection at issue, adequate corrective actions were implemented, and 
the violation was not willful, the violation would have been 
categorized in accordance with the enforcement policy in effect at the 
time of the inspection as a non-cited Severity Level V violation and 
would not have been the subject of formal enforcement action.<SUP>6
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    \6\ The staff has reconsidered this violation in accordance with 
the guidance in the current enforcement policy and has concluded 
that the violation is below the level of significance of Severity 
Level IV violations. This determination is based on the fact that 
there was negligible impact on safety; the violation does not 
indicate a programmatic problem that could have safety or regulatory 
impact; if the violation recurred, it would not be considered a 
significant concern; and the violation was not willful. Therefore 
this violation is classified as a minor violation and, as previously 
discussed, minor violations are not normally the subject of formal 
enforcement action and are usually not cited in inspection reports. 
To the extent that such violations are described, they are 
characterized as non-cited violations.
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III. Conclusion

    The institution of a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is 
appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been 
raised. See Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Units 
1, 2, and 3) CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975) and Washington Public 
Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7 19 NRC 899, 
924 (1984). This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns 
raised by the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by 
the Petitioner, or other enforcement action, is warranted.
    On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that, 
although certain minor procedural violations occurred, no substantial 
health and safety issues have been raised by the Petition regarding 
Millstone Unit 1 that would require initiation of enforcement action. 
Therefore, to the extent that the Petitioner requests that escalated 
enforcement action be taken against individuals and NU for violations 
of Procedure WC-8 or failure to train employees on the procedure, the 
Petition has been denied. However, as described above, the NRC 
conducted an inspection into the alleged violations of Procedure WC-8 
from May 15 through June 23, 1995, and conducted an audit of the 
custody and usage record sheets. Therefore, to the extent that the 
Petitioner has requested an NRC ``investigation into the above 
mentioned procedure violations'' and for the NRC to ``audit the Unit 1 
maintenance department, M&TE folders,'' the Petition has been granted.
    As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be 
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review. 
This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 
days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes a review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-3888 Filed 2-14-97; 8:45 am]
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