In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-3128

Vervia D. Logan,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Kautex Textron North America,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:99 CV 269--William C. Lee, Chief Judge. 

Argued February 23, 2001--Decided July 30, 2001

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Ripple and

Williams, Circuit Judges.

 Williams, Circuit Judge. Vervia Logan

filed this suit against Kautex Textron

North America claiming that she was

discharged because of her race and in

retaliation for complaining of co-worker

harassment, and subject to a racially

hostile work environment in violation of

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e et seq.

and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981./1 The district

court granted summary judgment in favor

of Kautex on all three claims, and Logan

appeals. Because Logan has failed to

create a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether she was discharged because

of her race or in retaliation for

complaining of statements made by a coworker, we affirm.

 

I. FACTS

 Drawing all inferences in the light most

favorable to Logan, which is our standard

of review on a grant of summary judgment,

see Essex v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

111 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1997), the

facts are as follows. Logan, an African

American female, was employed by Kautex

for a little over one month. During this

probationary period, a Caucasian male coworker made two racial comments and one

that threatened Logan’s job security.
Once, while on the production line at

work, Jeff Finley stated that interracial

relationships were disgusting. Ellie

Justice, the Team Leader, told him to

shut up and he did so. On another

occasion, while driving through a rural

area with Logan, Finley stated that

blacks did not want to be caught in that

area of town because they could get

lynched. The next morning, Finley told

Logan that if she wanted to keep her job,

she better get along with him. The

parties dispute whether Logan complained

to management about Finley’s statements.

 Pursuant to company policy, Logan’s six

co-workers, including Finley, completed

evaluations to help Kautex determine if

Logan should be hired as a "permanent"

employee. Four of the six recommended

that the company not hire Logan on the

grounds that Logan either had a bad

attitude or was not a team player. Of the

two co-workers who recommended that

Kautex hire Logan, one stated that she

did not work with Logan regularly and the

other recommended hiring Logan if Logan

could control her attitude. Based on

these evaluations, Kautex decided not to

extend Logan an offer for full-time

employment and discharged her. Logan’s

criminal probation officer asserts that

she called Kautex after Logan was

discharged and was told by the Human

Resources Manager that Logan was

terminated for absenteeism.

II. ANALYSIS

 Logan, conceding that she agreed below

that she did not have direct evidence of

discriminatory animus, argues on appeal

that the district court erred in

requiring her to proceed under the

indirect method of proof set forth in Mc

Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973)./2 We will analyze her

claims under both the direct and indirect

methods because the pertinent question is

not whether a plaintiff has direct

(including circumstantial) or indirect

proof of discrimination, but whether

Logan has presented sufficient evidence

that Kautex’s decision to discharge her

was motivated by an impermissible

purpose. See Sattar v. Motorola, Inc.,

138 F.3d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1998).

 A. Discharge-Direct Method
 Under the direct method, because Logan

has conceded that she does not have

direct evidence of discrimination (an

acknowledgment of discriminatory intent

by Kautex), Logan must offer

circumstantial evidence sufficient to

provide a basis for drawing an inference

of intentional discrimination. See Troupe

v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736

(7th Cir. 1994). That is, we must be able

to infer from the evidence that Logan was

discharged because of her race or in

retaliation for complaining of racial

harassment.

 The three incidents that Logan points to

are not enough to satisfy her burden. The

first comment by Finley demeaning

interracial dating was not even directed

at Logan, but was made during a

conversation among all the individuals on

the assembly line. In fact, when Finley

was told to shut up, he did so.

Statements "made in the context of random

office banter . . . do not constitute

evidence of intent to fire for an

impermissible reason." Robin v. Espo

Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1089 (7th

Cir. 2000). The second comment by Finley,

that blacks could get lynched in a

particular part of town, although we have

no doubt it made Logan uncomfortable, was

in no way causally related to the

decisionmaking process, and therefore,

does not support a finding that she was

discharged because of her race. Id. The

third comment that, Logan better get

along with him if she wanted to keep her

job, has no racial overtones but is

pertinent because Finley actually

participated in the vote as to whether to

retain Logan. If Finley was the sole

decisionmaker, Kautex would have a

problem. However, five other people voted

and all of them either mentioned Logan’s

attitude or problem with being a team

player, and three of those five

specifically recommended that Kautex not

hire her. Logan has failed to present any

evidence that Finley’s vote counted more

than the others, that he controlled the

actions of the other co-workers, or that

the other co-workers even knew that Logan

had complained to management about

Finley’s comments. Logan argues that

Justice’s vote (another co-worker) is

also suspect because Logan complained to

Justice. But, again, there is no proof

that Justice infected the process, and
most importantly, Justice actually

recommended that Kautex hire Logan.

Because Logan has failed to create an

inference that she was discharged because

of her race or in retaliation for

complaining, Logan has not satisfied her

burden under the direct method of proof.

 B. Discharge-Indirect Method

 1. Race discrimination

 In order to establish a prima facie case

of intentional discrimination under the

indirect method, Logan must demonstrate

that: 1) she was within a protected

class; 2) she was performing to the

employer’s legitimate expectations; 3)

she suffered an adverse employment action

(discharge); and 4) Kautex treated

similarly situated employees of a

different race more favorably. See Oates

v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1171

(7th Cir. 1997). We agree with the

district court that Logan failed to

establish a triable issue as to the

fourth element--whether Kautex treated

similarly situated persons not in the

protected class more favorably. (Without

deciding, we also cast doubt on whether

Logan could satisfy the second element--

that she was meeting her employer’s

legitimate expectations--because being a

team player was one of Kautex’s

expectations).

 The undisputed evidence shows that

during the relevant time period Kautex

discharged eight white probationary

employees who were "voted out" by their

co-workers. Three of the eight were hired

immediately prior to or after Logan’s

termination, and were voted out within a

month of their hire dates, just like

Logan. Because we have found that Logan

cannot make out a prima facie case, we

need not proceed further under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method.

See Hoffmann v. Primedia Special Interest

Publ’ns, 217 F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir.

2000).

 2. Retaliation

 To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, Logan must prove that: 1)

she engaged in statutorily protected

expression, 2) she suffered an adverse

employment decision, and 3) there is a
causal link between the two. See Oates,

116 F.3d at 1172. In some instances, the

fact that a plaintiff was fired two

weeks after her complaints to management

can be a short enough time to establish

the necessary causal link. See McClendon

v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789,

796-97 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting

cases). However, Logan’s counsel conceded

at oral argument that we cannot make much

of the timing because there was no

evidence that Kautex ever ordered a vote

at any time other than within 30 days of

an employee’s start date. If that is so,

the fact that the vote was taken shortly

after Logan’s complaints does not raise a

presumption that it was in response to

her complaints. Nevertheless, because the

summary judgment standard requires us to

draw all inferences in favor of Logan,

and there was such a short time, we will

assume without finding that Logan has

established a prima facie case. However,

Logan’s claim ultimately fails because we

also find that Logan has failed to

establish that Kautex’s proffered

nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

 Pretext under the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting method of proof does not

mean a mistake, but "a phony reason for

some action." Russell v. Acme-Evans Co.,

51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995). Logan

must show that Kautex’s reason for

discharging her was unworthy of credence.

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). That is,

Logan must provide "’evidence tending to

prove that the employer’s proffered

reasons are factually baseless, were not

the actual motivation for the discharge

in question, or were insufficient to

motivate the discharge.’" Gordon v.

United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 888-

89 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Adreani v.

First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d

389, 395 (7th Cir. 1998)). To satisfy

this burden, Logan asserts that Kautex

gave multiple reasons for her discharge

(bad attitude, sabotaging tanks,

performance, and absenteeism), and this

inconsistency is enough for a jury to

infer that the proffered reason was not

the actual reason for her discharge.

 Our review of the record convinces us

that the reasons asserted by Kautex

(other than absenteeism) were not as

different as Logan claims. For example,

Justice’s statement that, in her opinion,
Logan was voted out because she sabotaged

tanks was an example of Justice’s belief

that Logan had a bad attitude. (See

Justice Deposition, pp. 6-7.)

Additionally, the "performance" box

checked on the discharge form was one of

a few generic boxes Kautex used when it

discharged an employee. Reading further

down the form in the space where a

specific description for the reason

behind the discharge is provided, Kautex

wrote that Logan was voted out by her

team. Attached to the separation form

were the evaluations of the employees

identifying each of their reasons why

Logan should not be retained. As for

absenteeism, Kautex disputes that it told

Logan’s criminal probation officer that

Logan was fired for that reason, but we

must accept this assertion as true.

Nevertheless, we conclude that no

reasonable jury could find that Logan was

terminated for any reason other than that

she was voted out by her team.

 We recognize that labeling an employee

as having an "attitude" can be a

camouflage for race discrimination in

certain cases, see Perfetti v. First

Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 457

(7th Cir. 1991), but Logan has failed to

point to any objective evidence that this

subjective evaluation was a mask for

discrimination. See Sattar, 138 F.3d at

1170-71. For example, there is nothing to

show that similarly situated employees

were treated better, that the other coworkers harbored animus toward Logan, or

that Finley somehow controlled the

actions of the other co-workers who voted

Logan out. See id. Accordingly, the

district court properly found that Logan

failed, under the indirect method of

proof, to demonstrate a triable issue of

fact on her retaliation claim.

 C. Hostile Work Environment

 In order to be actionable under Title

VII, a plaintiff’s work environment must

be both objectively and subjectively

offensive. Whether a work environment is

hostile depends on "the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity;

whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work

performance." Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). "The

workplace that is actionable is the one
that is ’hellish.’" Perry v. Harris

Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th

Cir. 1997) (citing Baskerville v.

Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th

Cir. 1995)). Furthermore, in co-worker

harassment cases, the plaintiff must show

that the employer was negligent in

failing to correct the harassment. Id.

 Even if we were to accept that Logan

subjectively believed the workplace was

offensive and that Kautex had knowledge

of the conduct, we agree with the

district court that Finley’s three verbal

utterances (one made in the context of

random office banter and two not causally

related to the decisionmaking process) do

not rise to the level of an objectively

hostile work environment. Accordingly,

summary judgment in favor of Kautex was

proper on Logan’s hostile work

environment claim.

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment

of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

/1 Both Title VII and sec. 1981 discrimination

claims are analyzed in the same manner. Eiland v.

Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998).

/2 Logan also argues that the framework set forth in

McDonnell Douglas should not be rigidly applied

to her case because her claim is one of "sex plus

race." See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County

Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-33 (5th

Cir. 1980) (recognizing that African American

women may be able to state a claim even in the

absence of discrimination against African American men or white women). Without deciding whether

we recognize a "sex-plus" theory, we refuse to

analyze Logan’s claim under such a theory because

in her complaint she pleaded only discrimination

on account of her race. Therefore, we consider

only the racial comments made by Jeff Finley.