# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0987
  doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2013.237.mlt |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5615 ta' Awwissu 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0987

doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2013.237.mlt

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 237

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5615 ta' Awwissu 2013

---

| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 237/01 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 237/01

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 2 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA |
| | Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Għajnuna mill-Istat – Deċiżjoni biex jingħalaq każ ta' għajnuna eżistenti wara li ġew aċċettati miżuri xierqa minn Stat tal-EFTA | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna reġjonali għall-Iskema ta' Inċentivi għall-Investment fl-Islanda u sitt ftehimiet ta' investiment | 4 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 237/02

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

2

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

2013/C 237/03

Għajnuna mill-Istat – Deċiżjoni biex jingħalaq każ ta' għajnuna eżistenti wara li ġew aċċettati miżuri xierqa minn Stat tal-EFTA

3

2013/C 237/04

Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna reġjonali għall-Iskema ta' Inċentivi għall-Investment fl-Islanda u sitt ftehimiet ta' investiment

4

| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Komunikazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni ppubblikata skont l-Artikolu 27(4) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1/2003 fil-Każijiet AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II u AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | ATTI OĦRAJN |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Pubblikazzjoni ta' applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni għal emenda skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(b) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi ta’ kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u l-oġġetti tal-ikel | 40 |

V   Avviżi

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 237/05

Komunikazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni ppubblikata skont l-Artikolu 27(4) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1/2003 fil-Każijiet AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II u AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

28

ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 237/06

Pubblikazzjoni ta' applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel

31

2013/C 237/07

Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni għal emenda skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel

36

2013/C 237/08

Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(b) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi ta’ kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u l-oġġetti tal-ikel

40

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE |

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(1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

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II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 237/1

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Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2013/C 237/01

Fit-18 ta’ April 2013, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6843. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6843. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

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IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 237/2

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

L-14 ta’ Awwissu 2013

2013/C 237/02

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,3243 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 130,17 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4583 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,85440 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 8,6393 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,2415 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 7,8130 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 25,822 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 298,62 |
| LTL | Litas Litwan | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lats Latvjan | 0,7025 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,2037 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,4315 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 2,5664 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,4524 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,3689 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 10,2705 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,6501 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,6835 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 13,2129 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 8,1041 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,5415 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,3351 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 57,975 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 43,8995 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 41,504 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 3,0586 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 16,8756 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 81,3700 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,3243

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

130,17

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4583

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,85440

SEK

Krona Żvediża

8,6393

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,2415

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

7,8130

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

25,822

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

298,62

LTL

Litas Litwan

3,4528

LVL

Lats Latvjan

0,7025

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

4,2037

RON

Leu Rumen

4,4315

TRY

Lira Turka

2,5664

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,4524

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,3689

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

10,2705

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

1,6501

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

1,6835

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 482,39

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

13,2129

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

8,1041

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,5415

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

13 667,59

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

4,3351

PHP

Peso Filippin

57,975

RUB

Rouble Russu

43,8995

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

41,504

BRL

Real Brażiljan

3,0586

MXN

Peso Messikan

16,8756

INR

Rupi Indjan

81,3700

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(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

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INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/3 |
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15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

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Għajnuna mill-Istat – Deċiżjoni biex jingħalaq każ ta' għajnuna eżistenti wara li ġew aċċettati miżuri xierqa minn Stat tal-EFTA

2013/C 237/03

L-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA pproponiet miżuri xierqa, li ġew aċċettati mill-Islanda, dwar il-miżura ta' għajnuna li ġejja:

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni | : | L-24 ta' April 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numru tal-każ | : | 70958 |
| Numru tad-Deċiżjoni | : | 159/13/COL |
| Stat tal-EFTA | : | L-Islanda |
| Titlu | : | Għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija lil Landsvirkjun u Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Bażi legali | : | L-Att 42/1983 dwar Landsvirkjun, l-Att tal-Gvern Lokali 45/1998, l-Att 139/2001 dwar it-twaqqif ta' Orkuveita Reykjavíkur bħala impriża ta' sjieda konġunta u l-Att 121/1997 dwar il-garanziji tal-Istat |
| Objettiv | : | m.a. |
| Forma ta' għajnuna | : | Garanziji tas-sjieda llimitati mill-istat u muniċipali, mingħajr primjums tas-suq xierqa mħallsa, għal Landsvirkjun u Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Setturi ekonomiċi | : | Is-settur tal-elettriku |
| Tagħrif ieħor | : | Fuq il-bażi tal-miżuri meħuda u impenji oħra mogħtija mill-awtoritajiet tal-Islanda biex jiġu eliminati l-garanziji llimitati mill-istat favur Landsvirkjun u Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, it-tħassib tal-Awtorità fir-rigward tan-nuqqas ta' kompatibbiltà tal-iskema tneħħa u l-investigazzjoni ngħalqet. |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni

:

L-24 ta' April 2013

Numru tal-każ

:

70958

Numru tad-Deċiżjoni

:

159/13/COL

Stat tal-EFTA

:

L-Islanda

Titlu

:

Għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija lil Landsvirkjun u Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Bażi legali

:

L-Att 42/1983 dwar Landsvirkjun, l-Att tal-Gvern Lokali 45/1998, l-Att 139/2001 dwar it-twaqqif ta' Orkuveita Reykjavíkur bħala impriża ta' sjieda konġunta u l-Att 121/1997 dwar il-garanziji tal-Istat

Objettiv

:

m.a.

Forma ta' għajnuna

:

Garanziji tas-sjieda llimitati mill-istat u muniċipali, mingħajr primjums tas-suq xierqa mħallsa, għal Landsvirkjun u Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Setturi ekonomiċi

:

Is-settur tal-elettriku

Tagħrif ieħor

:

Fuq il-bażi tal-miżuri meħuda u impenji oħra mogħtija mill-awtoritajiet tal-Islanda biex jiġu eliminati l-garanziji llimitati mill-istat favur Landsvirkjun u Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, it-tħassib tal-Awtorità fir-rigward tan-nuqqas ta' kompatibbiltà tal-iskema tneħħa u l-investigazzjoni ngħalqet.

It-test awtentiku tad-deċiżjoni, li minnu tneħħiet l-informazzjoni kunfidenzjali kollha, qiegħed fuq il-websajt tal-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/4 |
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15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

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Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna reġjonali għall-Iskema ta' Inċentivi għall-Investment fl-Islanda u sitt ftehimiet ta' investiment

2013/C 237/04

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 177/13/COL tat-30 ta’ April 2013, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta' Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Islandiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta’ kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ din in-notifika l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex iressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jiġu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Islandiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti tista’ tinżamm mistura wara talba bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

Proċedura

Fit-13 ta’ Ottubru 2010, l-Awtorità approvat skema ta’ inċentivi għall-investiment (“l-Iskema”) nnotifikata mill-awtoritajiet Islandiżi skont l-Artikolu 1(3) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3, bid-Deċiżjoni Nru 390/10/COL.

L-Iskema tipprevedi l-possibbiltà li tingħata għajnuna fil-forma ta’ għotjiet diretti, permezz ta’ diversi eżenzjonijiet mit-taxxa sa 10 snin u permezz tal-bejgħ u l-kiri ta’ art taħt il-valur tas-suq lil kumpaniji fis-setturi kollha ħlief fis-settur finanzjarju, b’konnessjoni ma’ investiment inizjali f’żoni eliġibbli għall-għajnuna reġjonali (magħrufa bħala “c-regions”) fl-Islanda. L-Iskema tiskadi fil-31 ta’ Diċembru 2013.

Il-bażi legali għall-Iskema kif approvata mill-Awtorità hija:

| — | L-Att Nru 99/2010 dwar l-Inċentivi għall-Investimenti Inizjali fl-Islanda (“l-Att”), adottat mill-Parlament Islandiż fid-29 ta' Ġunju 2010; u |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Att Nru 99/2010 dwar l-Inċentivi għall-Investimenti Inizjali fl-Islanda (“l-Att”), adottat mill-Parlament Islandiż fid-29 ta' Ġunju 2010; u

| — | Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 985/2010 dwar l-Inċentivi għall-Investimenti Inizjali fl-Islanda, maħruġ mill-Ministeru tal-Industrija fil-25 ta' Novembru 2010 (“ir-Regolament”), li jikkorrispondi għal abbozz ta’ Regolament li tressaq lill-Awtorità fis-27 ta' Settembru 2010. Ir-Regolament huwa biċċa leġiżlazzjoni sekondarja, ibbażat fuq l-Att. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 985/2010 dwar l-Inċentivi għall-Investimenti Inizjali fl-Islanda, maħruġ mill-Ministeru tal-Industrija fil-25 ta' Novembru 2010 (“ir-Regolament”), li jikkorrispondi għal abbozz ta’ Regolament li tressaq lill-Awtorità fis-27 ta' Settembru 2010. Ir-Regolament huwa biċċa leġiżlazzjoni sekondarja, ibbażat fuq l-Att.

Fit-30 ta' Diċembru 2010 il-Ministeru tal-Industrija ħareġ Regolament ġdid, ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1150/2010 (“ir-Regolament Supplimentari”), li jemenda r-Regolament, b’mod partikolari fir-rigward tal-iżgurar tal-effett ta’ inċentiv tal-għajnuna għall-investiment. Ir-Regolament Supplimentari ma ġiex innotifikat lill-Awtorità.

Matul il-perjodu mill-2010 sal-2013, l-Istat Islandiż daħal f’għadd ta’ ftehimiet li huwa qies li jaqgħu taħt l-Iskema (“is-sitt Ftehimiet ta’ Investiment”):

| (1) | Fit-30 ta' Diċembru 2010 ma’ Becromal Iceland ehf |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Fit-30 ta' Diċembru 2010 ma’ Becromal Iceland ehf

| (2) | Fit-30 ta' Diċembru 2010 ma’ Thorsil ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Fit-30 ta' Diċembru 2010 ma’ Thorsil ehf.

| (3) | Fis-17 ta' Frar 2011 ma' Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Fis-17 ta' Frar 2011 ma' Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf.

| (4) | Fit-22 ta' Settembru 2011 ma' Verne Real Estate II ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Fit-22 ta' Settembru 2011 ma' Verne Real Estate II ehf.

| (5) | Fis-7 ta' Mejju 2012 ma' GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Fis-7 ta' Mejju 2012 ma' GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

| (6) | Fit-28 ta' Jannar 2013 ma' Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Fit-28 ta' Jannar 2013 ma' Marmeti ehf.

Wara diskussjonijiet qabel in-notifika, l-awtoritajiet tal-Islanda nnotifikaw lill-Awtorità skont l-Artikolu 1(3) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3, serje ta' emendi proposti (“l-emendi nnotifikati”) għall-Att fit-13 ta' Diċembru 2012.

Valutazzjoni tal-miżura

L-emendi notifikati jikkonsistu fl-abolizzjoni ta’ għotjiet diretti, metodu ġdid għall-impożizzjoni tat-taxxa korporattiva massima lill-proġetti ġodda kollha taħt l-Iskema, l-eżenzjoni mit-taxxa tal-bolla u żieda fil-livell ta’ eżenzjonijiet mit-taxxa muniċipali fuq il-propjetà u t-taxxa tas-sigurtà soċjali. L-Awtorità waslet għall-konklużjoni preliminari li l-emendi notifikati għall-Iskema fil-fatt mhumiex legalment separati mill-Iskema. Għaldaqstant, hija vvalutat l-Iskema sħiħa, kif emendata. Barra minn hekk, hija vvalutat l-applikazzjoni tal-Iskema u sabet li ċerti elementi tas-sitt ftehimiet ta’ investiment li l-Islanda kienet daħlet għalihom fuq il-bażi tal-Iskema kif emendata, qajmu dubji dwar il-kompatibiltà mal-Ftehim ŻEE.

B’mod partikolari, l-Awtorità kellha dubji dwar jekk l-għajnuna mogħtija skont il-Ftehimiet ta' Investiment Becromal, Kísilfélagið u Verne hijiex mogħtija fil-kamp ta' applikazzjoni tal-Iskema kif approvat mill-Awtorità u tirrispettax ir-rekwiżit tal-effett ta’ inċentiv tal-għajnuna għall-investiment.

Barra minn hekk, l-Awtorità kellha dubji dwar jekk il-Ftehim ta' Investiment Marmeti huwiex konkluż fil-kamp ta' applikazzjoni tal-Iskema, fir-rigward ir-rekwiżit tal-effett ta’ inċentiv.

Ukoll, l-Awtorità kellha dubji dwar jekk l-elementi tal-Ftehim ta' Investiment Thorsil u l-Ftehim ta' Investiment GMR jipprevedux għal għajnuna mogħtija barra mill-Iskema approvata.

L-Awtorità għalhekk kellha dubji dwar jekk l-Iskema ta’ għajnuna kif emendat u l-għajnuna mogħtija skont is-sitt Ftehimiet ta’ Investiment jistgħux jitqiesu kompatibbli mal-Ftehim ŻEE.

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-konsiderazzjonijiet ta’ hawn fuq, l-Awtorità għandha dubji dwar jekk l-Iskema kif emendata u s-sitt Ftehimiet ta' Investiment imsemmijin hawn fuq jikkonformawx mal-Artikolu 61(3) tal-Ftehim ŻEE f’konessjoni mar-rekwiżiti stipulati fil-Linji Gwida dwar l-Għajnuna Reġjonali tal-Awtorità.

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta’ hawn fuq, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ il-proċedura ta’ investigazzjoni formali skont l-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta' Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fl-Iskema ta' Inċentivi għall-Investiment, bl-emendi nnotifikati mill-awtoritajiet Islandiżi, u kif emendata mir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1150/2010, implimentata mill-awtoritajiet Islandiżi u fis-sitt Ftehimiet ta’ Investiment.

Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
| --- | --- |

(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
| --- | --- |

(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
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(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
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(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
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(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
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(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
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(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
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(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
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(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
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(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
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(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
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(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
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(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
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(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
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(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
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(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
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(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
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(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
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(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
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(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
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(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
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(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
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(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
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(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
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(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
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(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
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(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
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(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
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(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Avviżi

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 237/28

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Komunikazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni ppubblikata skont l-Artikolu 27(4) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1/2003 fil-Każijiet AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II u AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   INTRODUZZJONI

| 1. | Skont l-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1/2003 tas-16 ta' Diċembru 2002 fuq l-implimentazzjoni tar-regoli tal-kompetizzjoni stabbiliti fl-Artikoli 101 u 102 tat-Trattat (1), il-Kummissjoni tista' tiddeċiedi – f'każijiet fejn tkun biħsiebha tadotta deċiżjoni li tirrikjedi li jintemm il-ksur u li l-partijiet ikkonċernati joffru li jimpenjaw ruħhom biex jindirizzaw it-tħassib espress lilhom mill-Kummissjoni fil-valutazzjoni preliminari tagħha – li tagħmel dawk l-impenji fuq l-impriżi vinkolanti. Deċiżjoni bħal din tista' tiġi adottata għal perjodu speċifiku u għandha twassal għall-konklużjoni li m'hemmx iżjed raġunijiet għal azzjoni mill-Kummissjoni. Qabel l-adozzjoni ta' deċiżjoni skont l-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, l-Artikolu 27(4) tal-istess Regolament jgħid li l-Kummissjoni għandha tippubblika sommarju konċiż tal-każ u l-kontenut ewlieni tal-impenji. Il-partijiet interessati jistgħu jippreżentaw l-osservazzjonijiet tagħhom fil-limitu ta' żmien stabbilit mill-Kummissjoni. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Skont l-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1/2003 tas-16 ta' Diċembru 2002 fuq l-implimentazzjoni tar-regoli tal-kompetizzjoni stabbiliti fl-Artikoli 101 u 102 tat-Trattat (1), il-Kummissjoni tista' tiddeċiedi – f'każijiet fejn tkun biħsiebha tadotta deċiżjoni li tirrikjedi li jintemm il-ksur u li l-partijiet ikkonċernati joffru li jimpenjaw ruħhom biex jindirizzaw it-tħassib espress lilhom mill-Kummissjoni fil-valutazzjoni preliminari tagħha – li tagħmel dawk l-impenji fuq l-impriżi vinkolanti. Deċiżjoni bħal din tista' tiġi adottata għal perjodu speċifiku u għandha twassal għall-konklużjoni li m'hemmx iżjed raġunijiet għal azzjoni mill-Kummissjoni. Qabel l-adozzjoni ta' deċiżjoni skont l-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, l-Artikolu 27(4) tal-istess Regolament jgħid li l-Kummissjoni għandha tippubblika sommarju konċiż tal-każ u l-kontenut ewlieni tal-impenji. Il-partijiet interessati jistgħu jippreżentaw l-osservazzjonijiet tagħhom fil-limitu ta' żmien stabbilit mill-Kummissjoni.

2.   SOMMARJU TAL-KAŻ

| 2. | Fis-6 ta' Ġunju 2013, il-Kummissjoni adottat valutazzjoni preliminari skont l-Artikolu 9(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003 indirizzat lil Deutsche Bahn AG u s-sussidjarji tagħha DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG u DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fis-6 ta' Ġunju 2013, il-Kummissjoni adottat valutazzjoni preliminari skont l-Artikolu 9(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003 indirizzat lil Deutsche Bahn AG u s-sussidjarji tagħha DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG u DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2).

| 3. | Fil-valutazzjoni preliminari tagħha, il-Kummissjoni esprimiet tħassib li l-Grupp DB jista' jkun li abbuża mill-pożizzjoni dominanti tiegħu fis-suq għall-forniment ta' kurrent tat-trazzjoni fil-Ġermanja billi talab prezzijiet għall-kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-kompetituri li ħolqu pressjoni fuq il-marġni fis-suq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-passiġġieri fit-tul u fis-suq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-merkanzija, bi ksur tal-Artikolu 102 tat-TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Fil-valutazzjoni preliminari tagħha, il-Kummissjoni esprimiet tħassib li l-Grupp DB jista' jkun li abbuża mill-pożizzjoni dominanti tiegħu fis-suq għall-forniment ta' kurrent tat-trazzjoni fil-Ġermanja billi talab prezzijiet għall-kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-kompetituri li ħolqu pressjoni fuq il-marġni fis-suq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-passiġġieri fit-tul u fis-suq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-merkanzija, bi ksur tal-Artikolu 102 tat-TFUE.

| 4. | Il-Kummissjoni preliminarjament tqis li d-DB Energie hija dominanti fis-suq għall-provvista ta' kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-impriżi ferrovjarji attivi fil-Ġermanja. Il-kurrent tat-trazzjoni huwa input indispensabbli għall-impriżi ferrovjarji biex jikkompetu fis-swieq tat-trasport ferrovjarju Ġermaniżi. Id-DB Energie ilha tikkummerċjalizza l-kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-impriżi ferrovjarji mill-2003 taħt offerta li tinkludi kollox, li tgħaqqad il-prezz għall-elettriku kkunsmat (il-prezz tal-elettriku) mal-prezz għall-użu tan-netwerk ta' kurrent tat-trazzjoni (il-prezz tal-aċċess għall-grilja). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Il-Kummissjoni preliminarjament tqis li d-DB Energie hija dominanti fis-suq għall-provvista ta' kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-impriżi ferrovjarji attivi fil-Ġermanja. Il-kurrent tat-trazzjoni huwa input indispensabbli għall-impriżi ferrovjarji biex jikkompetu fis-swieq tat-trasport ferrovjarju Ġermaniżi. Id-DB Energie ilha tikkummerċjalizza l-kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-impriżi ferrovjarji mill-2003 taħt offerta li tinkludi kollox, li tgħaqqad il-prezz għall-elettriku kkunsmat (il-prezz tal-elettriku) mal-prezz għall-użu tan-netwerk ta' kurrent tat-trazzjoni (il-prezz tal-aċċess għall-grilja).

| 5. | Fil-valutazzjoni preliminari tagħha, il-Kummissjoni qieset li din is-sistema ta' prezzijiet, u b'mod partikolari l-iskontijiet tagħha li bbenefikaw minnhom l-operaturi ferrovjarji tal-Grupp DB iżjed milli l-kompetituri tagħhom, setgħet fixklet l-iżvilupp tal-kompetizzjoni fis-swieq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-merkanzija u tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-passiġġieri fit-tul. F'dawn is-swieq, il-Kummissjoni tinsab imħassba dwar il-fatt li s-sistema preżenti tal-ipprezzar tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni li tuża d-DB Energie tista' tinvolvi firxa bejn il-prezz tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni mitlub lill-kompetituri u l-prezz tas-servizzi tat-trasport ferrovjarju mitlub lill-konsumaturi mill-kumpaniji tat-trasport DB li jipprevjeni lil kompetituri tagħhom li huma effiċjenti daqshom milli jagħmlu kummerċ bi profitt jew inaqqas artifiċjalment il-marġni ta' profitt tagħhom. L-investigazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni kkonkludiet preliminarjament li din is-sitwazzjoni tqajjem tħassib dwar il-kompetizzjoni fis-swieq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-passiġġieri fit-tul u tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-merkanzija. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fil-valutazzjoni preliminari tagħha, il-Kummissjoni qieset li din is-sistema ta' prezzijiet, u b'mod partikolari l-iskontijiet tagħha li bbenefikaw minnhom l-operaturi ferrovjarji tal-Grupp DB iżjed milli l-kompetituri tagħhom, setgħet fixklet l-iżvilupp tal-kompetizzjoni fis-swieq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-merkanzija u tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-passiġġieri fit-tul. F'dawn is-swieq, il-Kummissjoni tinsab imħassba dwar il-fatt li s-sistema preżenti tal-ipprezzar tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni li tuża d-DB Energie tista' tinvolvi firxa bejn il-prezz tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni mitlub lill-kompetituri u l-prezz tas-servizzi tat-trasport ferrovjarju mitlub lill-konsumaturi mill-kumpaniji tat-trasport DB li jipprevjeni lil kompetituri tagħhom li huma effiċjenti daqshom milli jagħmlu kummerċ bi profitt jew inaqqas artifiċjalment il-marġni ta' profitt tagħhom. L-investigazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni kkonkludiet preliminarjament li din is-sitwazzjoni tqajjem tħassib dwar il-kompetizzjoni fis-swieq tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-passiġġieri fit-tul u tat-trasport ferrovjarju tal-merkanzija.

| 6. | F'Novembru 2010, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja Federali Ġermaniża ddeċidiet li n-netwerk tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni għandu jitqies bħala netwerk tal-enerġija u li l-kundizzjonijiet u l-miżati għall-aċċess għalih huma rregolati skont il-liġi Ġermaniża dwar is-settur tal-enerġija (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Bħala konsegwenza, id-DB Energie għandha titlob prezz separat għall-aċċess għall-grilja, sabiex il-fornituri terzi tal-elettriku (jiġifieri dawk li mhumiex fil-Grupp DB) ikunu jistgħu wkoll jikkompetu mad-DB Energie biex ifornu l-elettriku lill-impriżi ferrovjarji (4). |
| --- | --- |

6.

F'Novembru 2010, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja Federali Ġermaniża ddeċidiet li n-netwerk tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni għandu jitqies bħala netwerk tal-enerġija u li l-kundizzjonijiet u l-miżati għall-aċċess għalih huma rregolati skont il-liġi Ġermaniża dwar is-settur tal-enerġija (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Bħala konsegwenza, id-DB Energie għandha titlob prezz separat għall-aċċess għall-grilja, sabiex il-fornituri terzi tal-elettriku (jiġifieri dawk li mhumiex fil-Grupp DB) ikunu jistgħu wkoll jikkompetu mad-DB Energie biex ifornu l-elettriku lill-impriżi ferrovjarji (4).

3.   IL-KONTENUT PRINĊIPALI TAL-IMPENJI OFFRUTI

| 7. | Il-Grupp DB ma jaqbilx mal-valutazzjoni preliminari tal-Kummissjoni li seta' abbuża mill-pożizzjoni dominanti tiegħu fis-suq għall-provvista tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-impriżi ferrovjarji Ġermaniżi. Madankollu, offra li jieħu impenji skont l-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, biex jindirizza t-tħassib tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-kompetizzjoni. L-elementi ewlenin tal-impenji huma deskritti hawn taħt. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Il-Grupp DB ma jaqbilx mal-valutazzjoni preliminari tal-Kummissjoni li seta' abbuża mill-pożizzjoni dominanti tiegħu fis-suq għall-provvista tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni lill-impriżi ferrovjarji Ġermaniżi. Madankollu, offra li jieħu impenji skont l-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, biex jindirizza t-tħassib tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-kompetizzjoni. L-elementi ewlenin tal-impenji huma deskritti hawn taħt.

| 8. | Sa mhux aktar tard minn 3 xhur wara n-notifika dwar id-deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni li tagħmel dawn l-impenji vinkolanti għall-Grupp DB u mhux qabel l-1 ta' Jannar 2014, id-DB Energie se tintroduċi sistema ġdida tal-ipprezzar għall-kurrent tat-trazzjoni bi prezzijiet separati għall-provvista tal-elettriku u tariffi separati għall-aċċess għall-grilja kif approvati mill-Awtorità Regolatorja Ġermaniża rilevanti (Bundesnetzagentur). Is-sistema l-ġdida tal-ipprezzar hija intiża biex tiżgura d-dħul tal-fornituri terzi tal-elettriku fis-suq tal-provvista tal-elettriku lill-impriżi ferrovjarji (5). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Sa mhux aktar tard minn 3 xhur wara n-notifika dwar id-deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni li tagħmel dawn l-impenji vinkolanti għall-Grupp DB u mhux qabel l-1 ta' Jannar 2014, id-DB Energie se tintroduċi sistema ġdida tal-ipprezzar għall-kurrent tat-trazzjoni bi prezzijiet separati għall-provvista tal-elettriku u tariffi separati għall-aċċess għall-grilja kif approvati mill-Awtorità Regolatorja Ġermaniża rilevanti (Bundesnetzagentur). Is-sistema l-ġdida tal-ipprezzar hija intiża biex tiżgura d-dħul tal-fornituri terzi tal-elettriku fis-suq tal-provvista tal-elettriku lill-impriżi ferrovjarji (5).

| 9. | F'din is-sistema l-ġdida, id-DB Energie se titlob l-istess prezz tal-elettriku lil impriżi ferrovjarji kollha mingħajr skontijiet ibbażati fuq il-volum jew fuq it-tul ta' żmien. |
| --- | --- |

9.

F'din is-sistema l-ġdida, id-DB Energie se titlob l-istess prezz tal-elettriku lil impriżi ferrovjarji kollha mingħajr skontijiet ibbażati fuq il-volum jew fuq it-tul ta' żmien.

| 10. | Id-DB Energie se tħallas lura lill-impriżi ferrovjarji fil-Ġermanja li mhumiex fil-grupp DB rimbors retroattiv ta' 4 % tal-fattura fuq il-kurrent tat-trazzjoni għall-perjodu ta' sena qabel id-dħul fis-seħħ tas-sistema ġdida tal-ipprezzar. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Id-DB Energie se tħallas lura lill-impriżi ferrovjarji fil-Ġermanja li mhumiex fil-grupp DB rimbors retroattiv ta' 4 % tal-fattura fuq il-kurrent tat-trazzjoni għall-perjodu ta' sena qabel id-dħul fis-seħħ tas-sistema ġdida tal-ipprezzar.

| 11. | Id-DB Energie u d-DB Mobility and Logistics AG se jipprovdu kull sena dejta lill-Kummissjoni biex hi tkun tista' tevalwa jekk il-prezzijiet tas-servizzi tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni u tat-trasport li jitlob il-Grupp DB jistgħux iwasslu għal pressjoni fuq il-marġni. Id-DB Energie se tinnotifika wkoll lill-Kummissjoni minn qabel dwar kwalunkwe bidla fil-prezz tal-elettriku tagħha. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Id-DB Energie u d-DB Mobility and Logistics AG se jipprovdu kull sena dejta lill-Kummissjoni biex hi tkun tista' tevalwa jekk il-prezzijiet tas-servizzi tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni u tat-trasport li jitlob il-Grupp DB jistgħux iwasslu għal pressjoni fuq il-marġni. Id-DB Energie se tinnotifika wkoll lill-Kummissjoni minn qabel dwar kwalunkwe bidla fil-prezz tal-elettriku tagħha.

| 12. | L-impenji se jidħlu fis-seħħ mhux aktar tard minn tliet xhur wara n-notifika tad-deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni. Dawn se jdumu jgħoddu għal 5 snin (6) wara n-notifika tad-deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni jew sakemm 20 % tal-volumi tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni mixtrija mill-kompetituri tal-Grupp DB ikunu qed jinxtraw mill-fornituri terzi tal-elettriku. Il-Grupp DB se jaħtar ukoll trustee li se jissorvelja l-konformità tiegħu mal-impenji. |
| --- | --- |

12.

L-impenji se jidħlu fis-seħħ mhux aktar tard minn tliet xhur wara n-notifika tad-deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni. Dawn se jdumu jgħoddu għal 5 snin (6) wara n-notifika tad-deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni jew sakemm 20 % tal-volumi tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni mixtrija mill-kompetituri tal-Grupp DB ikunu qed jinxtraw mill-fornituri terzi tal-elettriku. Il-Grupp DB se jaħtar ukoll trustee li se jissorvelja l-konformità tiegħu mal-impenji.

| 13. | L-impenji huma ppubblikati fuq il-websajt tad-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni, fuq: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

L-impenji huma ppubblikati fuq il-websajt tad-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni, fuq: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   STEDINA GĦALL-KUMMENTI

| 14. | Skont ir-riżultati tat-test tas-suq, il-Kummissjoni biħsiebha tadotta deċiżjoni, skont l-Artikolu 9(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, li tiddikjara vinkolanti l-impenji li jinsabu fi-qosor hawn fuq u li huma ppubblikati fuq il-websajt tad-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Skont ir-riżultati tat-test tas-suq, il-Kummissjoni biħsiebha tadotta deċiżjoni, skont l-Artikolu 9(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, li tiddikjara vinkolanti l-impenji li jinsabu fi-qosor hawn fuq u li huma ppubblikati fuq il-websajt tad-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni.

| 15. | Skont l-Artikolu 27(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex jissottomettu l-osservazzjonijiet tagħhom dwar l-impenji proposti. Dawn l-osservazzjonijiet għandhom jaslu l-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn xahar wara d-data ta' din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-partijiet terzi interessati jintalbu wkoll jissottomettu verżjoni mhux kunfidenzjali tal-kummenti tagħhom, fejn kull informazzjoni li huma jqisu bħala sigrieti tan-negozju u informazzjoni kunfidenzjali oħra għandha titħassar u tinbidel kif meħtieġ b'sommarju mhux kunfidenzjali jew bil-kliem “sigrieti tan-negozju” jew “kunfidenzjali”. Skont l-Artikolu 16 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 773/2004 kull talba simili għall-kunfidenzjalità għandha tiġi sostanzjata kif xieraq, b'mod partikolari billi jingħataw ir-raġunijiet għaliex l-iżvelar tat-tagħrif inkwistjoni jista' jikkawża ħsara serja. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Skont l-Artikolu 27(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003, il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex jissottomettu l-osservazzjonijiet tagħhom dwar l-impenji proposti. Dawn l-osservazzjonijiet għandhom jaslu l-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn xahar wara d-data ta' din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-partijiet terzi interessati jintalbu wkoll jissottomettu verżjoni mhux kunfidenzjali tal-kummenti tagħhom, fejn kull informazzjoni li huma jqisu bħala sigrieti tan-negozju u informazzjoni kunfidenzjali oħra għandha titħassar u tinbidel kif meħtieġ b'sommarju mhux kunfidenzjali jew bil-kliem “sigrieti tan-negozju” jew “kunfidenzjali”. Skont l-Artikolu 16 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 773/2004 kull talba simili għall-kunfidenzjalità għandha tiġi sostanzjata kif xieraq, b'mod partikolari billi jingħataw ir-raġunijiet għaliex l-iżvelar tat-tagħrif inkwistjoni jista' jikkawża ħsara serja.

| 16. | It-tweġibiet u l-kummenti għandhom preferibbilment ikunu raġunati u għandhom jinkludu l-fatti rilevanti. Jekk tidentifika problema fi kwalunkwe parti mill-impenji proposti, il-Kummissjoni tistiednek biex tissuġġerixxi s-soluzzjoni possibbli. |
| --- | --- |

16.

It-tweġibiet u l-kummenti għandhom preferibbilment ikunu raġunati u għandhom jinkludu l-fatti rilevanti. Jekk tidentifika problema fi kwalunkwe parti mill-impenji proposti, il-Kummissjoni tistiednek biex tissuġġerixxi s-soluzzjoni possibbli.

| 17. | L-osservazzjonijiet jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni bin-numru ta' referenza AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, bl-e-mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), bil-faks (+32 22950128) jew bil-posta, fuq dan l-indirizz:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Antitrust Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

17.

L-osservazzjonijiet jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni bin-numru ta' referenza AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, bl-e-mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), bil-faks (+32 22950128) jew bil-posta, fuq dan l-indirizz:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Antitrust Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  ĠU L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1. B'effett mill-1 ta' Diċembru 2009, l-Artikoli 81 u 82 tat-Trattat tal-KE saru l-Artikoli 101 u, rispettivament, 102 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropa (TFUE). Iż-żewġ settijiet ta' dispożizzjonijiet huma identiċi fil-kontenut. Għall-finijiet ta' dan l-avviż, ir-referenzi għall-Artikoli 101 u 102 tat-TFUE għandhom jinftehmu bħala referenzi għall-Artikoli 81 u 82 tat-Trattat tal-KE meta jkun applikabbli.

(2)  Deutsche Bahn AG u s-sussidjarji kollha tagħha inġenerali se jissejjħu f'dan li ġej “il-Grupp DB”.

(3)  Bundesgerichtshof, sentenza tad-9 ta' Novembru 2010, każ EnVR 1/10.

(4)  Aktar informazzjoni dwar din il-bidla fis-sistema tal-ipprezzar u l-kundizzjonijiet tas-sistema l-ġdida tista' tinstab fuq il-websajt tad-DB Energie (bil-Ġermaniż biss): http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  Barra minn hekk, l-introduzzjoni tas-sistema l-ġdida se tkun ikkomplimentata minn obbligu ta' separazzjoni ta' kontabbiltà u informazzjoni bejn l-attivitajiet ta' DB Energie bħala l-maniġer tan-netwerk tal-kurrent tat-trazzjoni u bħala fornitur tal-elettriku.

(6)  L-impenn mid-DB Energie biex ma tagħtix skont ibbażat fuq it-tul għall-offerta tagħha tal-provvista tal-elettriku se jdum jgħodd biss għal 3 snin.

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ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 237/31

---

Pubblikazzjoni ta' applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel

2013/C 237/06

Din il-pubblikazzjoni tagħti d-dritt għal oġġezzjoni għall-applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 51 tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (1).

DOKUMENT UNIKU

IR-REGOLAMENT TAL-KUNSILL (KE) Nru 510/2006

dwar il-protezzjoni tal-indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi u d-denominazzjonijiet tal-oriġini għall-prodotti agrikoli u l-oġġetti tal-ikel
   (2)

“SZENTESI PAPRIKA”

Nru tal-KE: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

IĠP ( X ) DPO ( )

1.   Isem

“Szentesi paprika”

2.   Stat Membru jew Pajjiż Terz

L-Ungerija

3.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel

3.1.   Tip ta' prodott

| Klassi 1.6 – | Frott, ħaxix u ċereali, friski jew ipproċessati |
| --- | --- |

Klassi 1.6 –

Frott, ħaxix u ċereali, friski jew ipproċessati

3.2.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott li għalih japplika l-isem f'(1)

L-indikazzjoni ġeografika protetta “Szentesi paprika” tindika l-frott ikkultivat bl-infurzar tad-diversi tipi ta' varjetajiet u tal-varjetajiet tagħhom elenkati ta' Capsicum annuum.

Meta jitqiegħdu fis-suq, il-prodotti tas-“Szentesi paprika” jridu jkunu b'saħħithom u mhux mimsusa, u d-diversi tipi ta' varjetajiet irid ikollhom il-karatteristiċi li ġejjin:

| (a) | Bżar abjad għall-mili (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Meta timmatura, is-“Szentesi paprika” l-bajda tinħass żejtnija, bil-qoxra lixxa u tiżloq; titfarrak malajr, bil-forma tagħha ġejja għall-ponta u mkemmxa fit-tarf, filwaqt li laħamha huwa oħxon. Il-wiċċ huwa lixx u jleqq, ta' kulur bajdani fl-isfar (avorju). Il-forma tagħha ġejja għall-ponta, bħal kon, u hija twila bejn 60 u 120 mm u wiesgħa bejn 40 u 70 mm. Din ta' spiss tkun magħmula minn tlieta jew erba' lobi. Laħamha huwa oħxon madwar 4 u 7 mm, b'konsistenza solida u l-qoxra rqiqa; għandha riħa qawwija ta' paprika, b'togħma tajba u moderata.
  Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia. |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Bżar abjad għall-mili (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Meta timmatura, is-“Szentesi paprika” l-bajda tinħass żejtnija, bil-qoxra lixxa u tiżloq; titfarrak malajr, bil-forma tagħha ġejja għall-ponta u mkemmxa fit-tarf, filwaqt li laħamha huwa oħxon. Il-wiċċ huwa lixx u jleqq, ta' kulur bajdani fl-isfar (avorju). Il-forma tagħha ġejja għall-ponta, bħal kon, u hija twila bejn 60 u 120 mm u wiesgħa bejn 40 u 70 mm. Din ta' spiss tkun magħmula minn tlieta jew erba' lobi. Laħamha huwa oħxon madwar 4 u 7 mm, b'konsistenza solida u l-qoxra rqiqa; għandha riħa qawwija ta' paprika, b'togħma tajba u moderata.

Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia.

| (b) | Bżar jaħraq ġej għall-ponta (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  Is-“Szentesi paprika” taħraq u ġejja għall-ponta għandha l-wiċċ ileqq, lixx jew kemxejn immewweġ; għandha forma twila u għall-ponta. Għandha kulur aħdar ċar, medju jew skur, u hija twila bejn 150 u 250 mm u wiesgħa bejn 20 u 50 mm. Fil-biċċa l-kbira tkun magħmula minn żewġ jew tliet lobi, b'laħamha oħxon bejn 3 u 4 mm u b'konsistenza solida u l-qoxra rqiqa. Għandha riħa qawwija ta' paprika u togħma taħraq u pjaċevoli.
  Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.
  Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati għandhom livell pikkanti ta' madwar 2 500 u 5 000 fuq l-iskala ta' Scoville. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Bżar jaħraq ġej għall-ponta (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

Is-“Szentesi paprika” taħraq u ġejja għall-ponta għandha l-wiċċ ileqq, lixx jew kemxejn immewweġ; għandha forma twila u għall-ponta. Għandha kulur aħdar ċar, medju jew skur, u hija twila bejn 150 u 250 mm u wiesgħa bejn 20 u 50 mm. Fil-biċċa l-kbira tkun magħmula minn żewġ jew tliet lobi, b'laħamha oħxon bejn 3 u 4 mm u b'konsistenza solida u l-qoxra rqiqa. Għandha riħa qawwija ta' paprika u togħma taħraq u pjaċevoli.

Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.

Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati għandhom livell pikkanti ta' madwar 2 500 u 5 000 fuq l-iskala ta' Scoville.

| (c) | Bżar ta' Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Is-“Szentesi paprika” tal-grupp Kápia għandha forma ta' kon kemxejn ċatt; wiċċ lixx u jleqq, b'kulur aħmar skur u bellusi meta tkun lesta għall-ħsad. Hija twila bejn 60 u 120 mm u wiesgħa bejn 40 u 70 mm; u hija tipikament magħmula minn żewġ jew tliet lobi. Laħamha huwa oħxon madwar 4 u 7 mm, b'konsistenza solida u b'qoxra ta' ħxuna medja. Għandha togħma ħelwa u qawwija, b'riħa ta' paprika mitħuna.
  Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Bżar ta' Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Is-“Szentesi paprika” tal-grupp Kápia għandha forma ta' kon kemxejn ċatt; wiċċ lixx u jleqq, b'kulur aħmar skur u bellusi meta tkun lesta għall-ħsad. Hija twila bejn 60 u 120 mm u wiesgħa bejn 40 u 70 mm; u hija tipikament magħmula minn żewġ jew tliet lobi. Laħamha huwa oħxon madwar 4 u 7 mm, b'konsistenza solida u b'qoxra ta' ħxuna medja. Għandha togħma ħelwa u qawwija, b'riħa ta' paprika mitħuna.

Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus.

| (d) | Bżar b'forma ta' tadama (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Is-“Szentesi paprika” b'forma ta' tadama għandha forma partikolari ħafna: dik ta' globu ċatt, b'wiċċ lixx li jleqq u b'kulur aħmar skur meta tkun lesta għall-ħsad. Għandha dijametru ta' bejn 60 u 120 mm, twila bejn 40 u 60 mm, bi tlieta jew erba' lobi u l-laħma għandha ħxuna ta' 57 mm. Il-konsistenza hija solida, b'qoxra rqiqa, riħa qawwija ta' paprika ħelwa.
  Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.
  It-tipi ta' varjetajiet imsemmija hawn fuq li jistgħu jiġu kkultivati, ivarjaw minn sena għal oħra. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Bżar b'forma ta' tadama (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Is-“Szentesi paprika” b'forma ta' tadama għandha forma partikolari ħafna: dik ta' globu ċatt, b'wiċċ lixx li jleqq u b'kulur aħmar skur meta tkun lesta għall-ħsad. Għandha dijametru ta' bejn 60 u 120 mm, twila bejn 40 u 60 mm, bi tlieta jew erba' lobi u l-laħma għandha ħxuna ta' 57 mm. Il-konsistenza hija solida, b'qoxra rqiqa, riħa qawwija ta' paprika ħelwa.

Il-varjetajiet ikkultivati huma: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.

It-tipi ta' varjetajiet imsemmija hawn fuq li jistgħu jiġu kkultivati, ivarjaw minn sena għal oħra.

3.3.   Materja prima (għall-prodotti pproċessati biss)

—

3.4.   Għalf (għall-prodotti li ġejjin mill-annimali biss)

—

3.5.   Passi speċifiċi tal-produzzjoni li jridu jsiru fiż-żona ġeografika identifikata

Il-proċessi kollha li ġejjin fil-proċess ta' produzzjoni tas-“Szentesi paprika” jridu jsiru fiż-żona ġeografika identifikata fil-punt 4:

| — | il-produzzjoni u l-kultivazzjoni tan-nebbieta tal-bżar, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-produzzjoni u l-kultivazzjoni tan-nebbieta tal-bżar,

| — | il-produzzjoni organika integrata tad-diversi tipi ta' varjetajiet u tal-varjetajiet tagħhom, li jinkludu: |
| --- | --- |

—

il-produzzjoni organika integrata tad-diversi tipi ta' varjetajiet u tal-varjetajiet tagħhom, li jinkludu:

| — | l-għażla tal-perjodu ta' produzzjoni, |
| --- | --- |

—

l-għażla tal-perjodu ta' produzzjoni,

| — | l-iżvilupp ta' żona ta' kultivazzjoni, |
| --- | --- |

—

l-iżvilupp ta' żona ta' kultivazzjoni,

| — | it-tħejjija u l-kultivazzjoni tal-ħamrija, |
| --- | --- |

—

it-tħejjija u l-kultivazzjoni tal-ħamrija,

| — | it-tħawwil, |
| --- | --- |

—

it-tħawwil,

| — | it-tħejjija ta' struttura ta' appoġġ, |
| --- | --- |

—

it-tħejjija ta' struttura ta' appoġġ,

| — | l-attivitajiet ta' kura tal-pjanti (fitoteknoloġija), |
| --- | --- |

—

l-attivitajiet ta' kura tal-pjanti (fitoteknoloġija),

| — | it-tisqija u l-forniment ta' nutrijenti, |
| --- | --- |

—

it-tisqija u l-forniment ta' nutrijenti,

| — | ir-regolamentazzjoni klimatika, |
| --- | --- |

—

ir-regolamentazzjoni klimatika,

| — | l-użu ta' proċeduri ta' trattament kontra l-parassiti integrati u li jirrispettaw l-ambjent, |
| --- | --- |

—

l-użu ta' proċeduri ta' trattament kontra l-parassiti integrati u li jirrispettaw l-ambjent,

| — | il-ħsad, it-tħejjija tal-prodott, il-fażi ta' qabel il-ħżin u l-ħżin, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-ħsad, it-tħejjija tal-prodott, il-fażi ta' qabel il-ħżin u l-ħżin,

| — | l-eliminazzjoni ta' stokkijiet ta' bżar, l-iżvilupp u d-diżinfettar tat-tagħmir ta' produzzjoni. |
| --- | --- |

—

l-eliminazzjoni ta' stokkijiet ta' bżar, l-iżvilupp u d-diżinfettar tat-tagħmir ta' produzzjoni.

3.6.   Regoli speċifiċi dwar it-tqattigħ, it-tħakkik, l-ippakkjar, eċċ.

Il-klassifikazzjoni, l-ippakkjar u t-tikkettar tas-“Szentesi paprika” jsiru fl-istabbiliment tal-produttur jew fi kwalunkwe stabbiliment ieħor adattat fiż-żona ġeografika identifikata.

Ippakkjati f'lottijiet: trejs, qfief, boroż tal-polietilen (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 bżaru għal kull unità); skont il-piż: qfief, basket tax-xibka tat-tip Raschel (0.35, 0.5, 0.7, 1, 2 kg ta' bżar għal kull unità) jew kaxxa: f'pakketti ta' M10, M20 jew M30 (2.5, 10, 12, 14 kg ta' bżar għal kull unità). It-tip ta' ppakkjar tad-diversi tipi ta' varjetajiet jista' jvarja fi kwalunkwe ħin skont ir-rekwiżiti kummerċjali.

L-ippakkjar irid isir fiż-żona ġeografika identifikata sabiex iżomm il-kwalità u l-omoġeneità karatteristiċi tad-diversi tipi ta' varjetajiet u tal-varjetajiet tagħhom, kif ukoll it-togħma, ir-riħa, il-konsistenza u l-integrità tas-“Szentesi paprika” IĠP, u biex jiżgura t-traċċabbiltà tal-prodotti.

3.7.   Regoli speċifiċi dwar it-tikkettar

| — | Il-kliem “Szentesi paprika” irid jidher fuq il-pakkett. |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-kliem “Szentesi paprika” irid jidher fuq il-pakkett.

| — | Irid ikun hemm ukoll tabella bil-bar code li tiżgura t-traċċabbiltà tas-“Szentesi paprika”. |
| --- | --- |

—

Irid ikun hemm ukoll tabella bil-bar code li tiżgura t-traċċabbiltà tas-“Szentesi paprika”.

4.   Definizzjoni fil-qosor taż-żona ġeografika

Il-produzzjoni tal-indikazzjoni ġeografika protetta (IĠP) “Szentesi paprika” hija bbażata fuq żona kontigwa fil-kontea ta' Csongrád.

Il-produzzjoni tas-“Szentesi paprika” issir fil-limiti amministrattivi tal-lokalitajiet li ġejjin tal-kontea ta' Csongrád: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár u Szentes.

5.   Rabta maż-żona ġeografika

5.1.   Speċifiċità taż-żona ġeografika

Il-fatturi li jinfluwenzaw il-produzzjoni ta' bżar ta' kwalità, b'mod partikolari t-temperatura u d-dawl, kif ukoll il-proprjetajiet tal-ħamrija u dawk idrografiċi, ħolqu kundizzjonijiet favorevoli għall-iżvilupp ta' produzzjoni saqwija tal-bżar fir-reġjun ta' Szentes, li ġiet introdotta mill-hekk imsejħa “ġardinara Bulgari” (produtturi ta' ħaxix li jużaw metodi speċjalizzati fuq skala żgħira, il-produzzjoni infurzata f'serer sħan u tisqija) li kienu jgħixu fir-reġjun matul it-tieni nofs tas-seklu dsatax.

Ir-reġjun ta' produzzjoni ta' Szentes jinsab fix-Xlokk tal-Ungerija, f'wieħed mill-iktar baċiri fondi tal-Pjanura l-Kbira. Ir-reġjun għandu post speċjali f'termini topografiċi, peress li jinkludi l-aktar art baxxa tal-pajjiż, li tibqa' nieżla minn tliet naħat, mill-pajjiżi ġirien sal-wied Tisza. L-aktar kanal tal-ilma importanti tas-sistema idrografika tar-reġjun huwa x-xmara Tisza, li tiddefinixxi wkoll il-fiżjonomija ġeografika sħiħa tar-reġjun. Minħabba l-abbundanza tal-ilma tal-wiċċ fir-reġjun, il-ħamrija predominanti hija dik kalkarja u solonezika tal-imraġ ċernożem (ħamrija sewda). Il-ħamrija taż-żona ta' produzzjoni tinsab f'kundizzjoni fiżika tajba. Għandha konsistenza ratba li titfarrak malajr, tisħon mal-ewwel, livell ta' pH subalkalina, ġestjoni tajba tal-ilma u tan-nutrijenti, kontenut għoli ta' ħumus u b'ħamrija ħoxna tal-wiċċ.

Matul il-produzzjoni tas-“Szentesi paprika”, il-fatturi klimatiċi prinċipali li jagħtu lill-bżar il-valur ta' kontenut tiegħu huma d-dawl, l-għadd ta' sigħat ta' xemx, it-temperatura u l-ammont ta' sħana rradjata. Il-karatteristiċi klimatiċi kontinentali huma predominanti fir-reġjun ta' produzzjoni ta' Szentes. L-għadd ta' sigħat ta' xemx huma mifruxa b'mod uniformi fir-reġjun kollu, li għandu medja ta' 2 050 siegħa ta' xemx fis-sena. Jekk jitqiesu t-tendenzi tat-temperaturi medji fis-sena, ir-reġjun ta' produzzjoni jagħmel parti miż-żoni l-aktar sħan tal-pajjiż. It-temperatura medja annwali hija bejn + 10 u 11 °C, filwaqt li l-ammont totali ta' sħana matul l-istaġun ta' tkabbir huwa bejn 3 200 u 3 300 °C. Dan huwa l-ambjent ideali għall-produzzjoni tal-bżar peress li jeħtieġ ammont konsiderevoli ta' sħana.

Għall-kuntrarju ta' dan, ir-reġjun għandu l-inqas rata ta' preċipitazzjoni tax-xita tal-pajjiż, bi preċipitazzjoni medja annwali li tvarja bejn 500 u 550 mm. Ġeneralment, 40 % tal-preċipitazzjoni ssir fix-xitwa u 60 % issir fis-sajf. Il-produzzjoni ta' bżar b'ammont sostanzjali ta' ilma kienet possibbli biss permezz tal-irrigazzjoni, żviluppata bħala riżultat tal-kundizzjonijiet idrografiċi favorevoli tar-reġjun u introdotta mill-“ġardinara Bulgari”.

5.2.   Speċifiċità tal-prodott

Il-valuri u l-karatteristiċi organolettiċi prinċipali tas-“Szentesi paprika” li toriġina fiż-żona ġeografika huma: togħma eċċezzjonalment tajba, li tkun taħraq, ħelwa jew pikkanti; riħa qawwija ta' paprika jew riħa li tfakkar fil-paprika mitħuna; il-qoxra rqiqa tagħha. Laħamha huwa oħxon madwar 3 u 7 mm, u b'hekk wieħed ikun jista' jduq kompletament it-togħma u l-aromi tas-“Szentesi paprika”, anke meta tiġi kkunsmata friska, kif jiġri s-soltu.

Is-“Szentesi paprika” l-bajda: meta timmatura tinħass żejtnija, bil-qoxra lixxa u tiżloq; titfarrak malajr, bil-forma tagħha ġejja għall-ponta u mkemmxa fit-tarf, filwaqt li l-laħamha huwa oħxon. Il-bżar frisk għandu riħa u sukkulenza partikolari ħafna, jew fi kliem il-konsumaturi: “Is-‘Szentesi paprika’ għandha togħma ta' vera”.

Is-“Szentesi paprika” taħraq u għall-ponta għandha l-qoxra tleqq, lixxa u kemxejn immewwġa; b'forma twila u għall-ponta; u b'laħma ta' konsistenza solida. Għandha riħa qawwija ta' paprika u togħma taħraq u pjaċevoli. Is-“Szentesi paprika” tal-grupp Kápia għandha forma ta' kon kemxejn ċatt; laħamha għandu konsistenza solida; u l-qoxra għandha ħxuna medja. Għandha l-wiċċ lixx u jleqq, b'kulur aħmar skur u bellusi riżultat tal-ambjent ġeografiku (id-dawl u s-sħana).

Is-“Szentesi paprika” b'forma ta' tadama għandha forma partikolari ħafna: dik ta' globu ċatt; minkejja laħamha oħxon għandha wkoll qoxra rqiqa ħafna, u l-wiċċ huwa lixx; meta tkun lesta għall-ħsad, din ikollha kulur aħmar skur.

5.3.   Rabta kawżali bejn iż-żona ġeografika u l-kwalità jew il-karatteristiċi tal-prodott (għad-DPO) jew il-kwalità speċifika, ir-reputazzjoni jew karatteristiċi oħra tal-prodott (għall-IĠP)

Ir-rabta maż-żona ġeografika hija bbażata fuq ir-reputazzjoni tal-prodott li ilha stabbilita għal ħafna snin u l-għarfien espert lokali fost il-produtturi tas-“Szentesi paprika” li jgħaddi minn ġenerazzjoni għall-oħra.

Ir-reputazzjoni tas-“Szentesi paprika”

L-iżvilupp ta' produzzjoni saqwija tal-bżar fir-reġjun ta' Szentes ġie introdott mill-hekk imsejħa “ġardinara Bulgari” li kienu jgħixu fir-reġjun matul it-tieni nofs tas-seklu dsatax. Minn dak iż-żmien 'hawn, il-produzzjoni tal-magħrufa “Szentesi paprika” baqgħet għaddejja b'mod kontinwu. Il-prodott għad għandu reputazzjoni għolja sal-ġuranata tal-lum, tant li fl-2006, f'Debrecen, ingħata l-premju prinċipali fil-fiera agrikola u ta' ġardinaġġ “Farmer Expo”, li fiha kienu rappreżentati 300 ditta Ungeriża u barranija. Fl-2007, il-bżaru ħelu maħsub għall-konsum frisk rebaħ il-“Magyar Termék Nagydíj” (il-Premju tal-Aħjar Prodott ta' Kwalità fl-Ungerija).

Għadd kbir ta' dokumenti storiċi jiċċertifikaw ir-rabta bejn ir-reputazzjoni tas-“Szentesi paprika” u ż-żona ġeografika li ilha għaddejja għal sekli sħaħ. L-ewwel dehra tal-bżaru ħelu fl-Ungerija tmur lura għax-xitwa tal-1875-76 meta l-“ġardinara Bulgari” marru jgħixu f'Úsztató major, fir-reġjun ta' Szegvár. Skont iċ-ċensiment agrikolu l-kbir tal-1895, 92,74 % tal-produzzjoni totali ta' bżar fl-Ungerija kienet tinsab fix-Xlokk tal-pajjiż, fiż-żona ta' Szentes. Il-ġardinara kienu jikru l-art magħmula miċ-ċernożem u mill-ħamrija alluvjali tar-reġjun mill-kontea ta' Csongrád li tkun rikka bil-ħumus u li tisħon malajr. Fejn kien ikun possibbli, kienu jagħżlu wkoll l-art li tinsab kemxejn f'niżla. Għat-tkabbir bikri kienu jużaw żerriegħa li diġà tkun nibtet u serer sħan. Kienu jużaw ukoll il-kultivazzjoni mħallta fi mxietel, eż. ikabbru l-bżar flimkien man-nebbieta tal-ħjar u dawn tal-aħħar iħalluhom hemm anke wara l-ħsad. Waqt il-ħsad, in-nebbieta li jiġu sseparati kienu jinġabru flimkien ma' ammont żgħir ta' ħamrija. Il-ġardinara introduċew ukoll l-irrigazzjoni regolari fuq skala kbira: għall-irrigazzjoni kienu jużaw ilma qiegħed imsaħħan jew ilma ġieri li gej minn flussi tal-ilma baxx u li jimxi bil-mod. Kellhom metodu uniku li bih kienu jieħdu u jiskulaw l-ilma. Matul dan il-perjodu, fiż-żona ta' Szentes, kienet tintuża l-mitħna tal-ilma li kienet adattata għal-livell varjabbli tal-ilma.

Għarfien lokali

Fir-reġjun ta' produzzjoni ta' Szentes il-wiċċ tal-ħamrija jżomm sew is-sħana. Peress li l-ħamrija li fiha titkabbar is-“Szentesi paprika” tassorbi aktar sħana milli tiġi rilaxxata permezz tar-radjazzjoni, mas-sebħ, il-provvista ta' sħana tal-ħamrija u tal-arja tal-wiċċ jitħalltu, u b'hekk tiżdied aktar it-temperatura. Il-mikroklima bbilanċjat prodott bil-provvista armonizzata ta' sħana u l-produzzjoni saqwija introdotta mill-“ġardinara Bulgari” jingħaqdu flimkien biex jipproduċu t-togħma eċċezzjonali tas-'Szentesi paprika', li għandha bżonn ta' ħafna sħana u ilma.

Flimkien mal-fatturi naturali jingħaqdu wkoll l-attivitajiet tal-bdiewa lokali u l-esperjenza prattika miksuba mill-produzzjoni infurzata (regolazzjoni tas-sħana, ventilazzjoni, dell, kura tal-pjanti) li jgħaddu minn ġenerazzjoni għall-oħra. Dan l-għarfien għen biex jikkumpensa għall-effetti negattivi tal-kundizzjonijiet meteoroloġiċi estremi tal-aħħar deċenni, biex jiggarantixxi u fejn huwa possibbli jippreżerva t-togħma u l-kulur tas-“Szentesi paprika” kif ukoll il-forma attraenti tagħha li hija karatteristika tad-diversi tipi ta' varjetajiet.

Fil-fatt, it-tekniki introdotti mill-“ġardinara Bulgari” matul madwar 150 sena ta' kultivazzjoni, ġew adattati għall-bżonnijiet tal-ġurnata. Il-fatturi essenzjali għat-tkabbir tal-bżar ġew ivvalutati mill-ġdid matul il-proċess ta' produzzjoni u ġew żviluppati metodi ġodda ta' produzzjoni. Sas-snin sittin, fost il-fatturi l-aktar importanti għall-produzzjoni tas-“Szentesi paprika” kien hemm il-kundizzjoni tajba tal-ħamrija, il-potenzjal tal-irrigazzjoni (ix-xmajjar Tisza u Körös u s-sistemi tal-kanali ta' irrigazzjoni), l-għadd ta' sigħat ta' xemx (potenzjal għat-tkabbir bikri) u t-tisħin fil-bidu tar-rebbiegħa. Il-perjodu li jmiss beda mill-aħħar tas-snin sittin sal-aħħar tas-snin tmenin. Il-produtturi tal-bżar bdew jużaw it-tisħin bikri għall-koltivazzjoni fis-serer billi jisfruttaw bl-aħjar mod l-ammont kbir ta' sigħat ta' xemx waqt ix-xhur tax-xitwa u tar-rebbiegħa. Mill-iskoperta tal-enerġija ġeotermali fir-reġjun li seħħet bejn is-snin sittin u s-snin tmenin, il-produzzjoni tas-“Szentesi paprika” ċċaqalqet mill-arja aperta għas-serer, fejn qed jiżdiedu dejjem aktar il-metodi ta' produzzjoni li mhumiex ibbażati fuq il-ħamrija.

Referenza għall-pubblikazzjoni tal-ispeċifikazzjoni

(l-Artikolu 5(7) tar-Regolament (3) (KE) Nru 510/2006)

Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő (Bullettin tal-Iżvilupp Rurali), 16 ta' Novembru 2011, Volum LXI, Nru 6, p. 317

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

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(1)  ĠU L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Mibdul permezz tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012.

(3)  Ara n-nota f’qiegħ il-paġna Nru 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/36 |
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15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 237/36

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Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni għal emenda skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel

2013/C 237/07

Din il-pubblikazzjoni tagħti d-dritt għal oġġezzjoni għall-applikazzjoni għal emenda skont l-Artikolu 51 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (1).

APPLIKAZZJONI GĦAL EMENDA

IR-REGOLAMENT TAL-KUNSILL (KE) Nru 510/2006

dwar il-protezzjoni tal-indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi u d-denominazzjonijiet tal-oriġini għall-prodotti agrikoli u l-oġġetti tal-ikel
   (2)

APPLIKAZZJONI GĦAL EMENDA SKONT L-ARTIKOLU 9

“TERRA D’OTRANTO”

Nru tal-KE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IĠP ( ) DPO ( X )

1.   Intestatura tal-ispeċifikazzjoni affettwata mill-emenda

| — |  | Isem il-prodott |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott |
| — |  | Żona ġeografika |
| — | ☒ | Prova tal-oriġini |
| — |  | Metodu ta' produzzjoni |
| — |  | Rabta |
| — |  | Tikkettar |
| — | ☒ | Rekwiżiti nazzjonali |
| — | ☒ | Oħrajn (li għandhom jiġu speċifikati) |

—



Isem il-prodott

—

☒

Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott

—



Żona ġeografika

—

☒

Prova tal-oriġini

—



Metodu ta' produzzjoni

—



Rabta

—



Tikkettar

—

☒

Rekwiżiti nazzjonali

—

☒

Oħrajn (li għandhom jiġu speċifikati)

2.   Tip ta' emenda

| — |  | Emenda tad-dokument uniku jew tas-sinteżi |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Emenda tal-ispeċifikazzjoni tad-DPO jew l-IĠP rreġistrata, li għaliha ma ġie ppubblikat l-ebda dokument uniku jew sinteżi |
| — |  | Emenda tal-ispeċifikazzjoni li ma teħtieġ l-ebda emenda tad-dokument uniku ppubblikat (l-Artikolu 9(3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 510/2006) |
| — |  | Emenda temporanja tal-ispeċifikazzjoni li tirriżulta mill-impożizzjoni ta’ miżuri sanitarji jew fitosanitarji obbligatorji mill-awtoritajiet pubbliċi (l-Artikolu 9(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 510/2006) |

—



Emenda tad-dokument uniku jew tas-sinteżi

—

☒

Emenda tal-ispeċifikazzjoni tad-DPO jew l-IĠP rreġistrata, li għaliha ma ġie ppubblikat l-ebda dokument uniku jew sinteżi

—



Emenda tal-ispeċifikazzjoni li ma teħtieġ l-ebda emenda tad-dokument uniku ppubblikat (l-Artikolu 9(3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 510/2006)

—



Emenda temporanja tal-ispeċifikazzjoni li tirriżulta mill-impożizzjoni ta’ miżuri sanitarji jew fitosanitarji obbligatorji mill-awtoritajiet pubbliċi (l-Artikolu 9(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 510/2006)

3.   Emenda/i:

3.1.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott

L-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-prodott ġiet emendata bl-introduzzjoni ta' medjani għad-deskritturi tipiċi, bit-tneħħija tal-punteġġ ta' 6.5 (mhux relevanti aktar) u bl-adozzjoni tad-dispożizzjonijiet tal-metodu COI/T20 Doc. no 22. Xi speċifikazzjonijiet li ġejjin mill-predominanza ta' waħda miż-żewġ varjetajiet lokali ddaħħlu fil-lista tal-analiżi organolettika.

Meta jiġi applikat il-metodu l-ġdid, toħroġ din id-deskrizzjoni li ġejja:

| — | kulur: aħdar jew isfar bi ftit riflessi ħfief ħodor; |
| --- | --- |

—

kulur: aħdar jew isfar bi ftit riflessi ħfief ħodor;

| — | riħa: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott ta' bejn 3 u 6) ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità, b'togħma ħafifa tal-weraq. |
| --- | --- |

—

riħa: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott ta' bejn 3 u 6) ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità, b'togħma ħafifa tal-weraq.

| — | Togħma: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott ta' bejn 3 u 6) bis-sensazzjoni ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità. Sensazzjoni medja jew ħafifa li taħraq u qarsa skont iż-żmien tal-ġbir (livelli medjani ta' valuri ogħla minn 0 sa 6). Barra minn hekk, skont iż-żmien tal-ġbir u l-predominanza tal-varjetà, din it-togħma fruttata tingħaqad bis-sensazzjoni tal-weraq taż-żebbuġ, ħaxix appena maqtugħ, qaqoċċ salvaġġ/qaqoċċ tax-xewk/artiċoks/ċikwejra għall-Ogliarola, jew frott/tadam/frott irqiq għaċ-Ċellina. |
| --- | --- |

—

Togħma: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott ta' bejn 3 u 6) bis-sensazzjoni ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità. Sensazzjoni medja jew ħafifa li taħraq u qarsa skont iż-żmien tal-ġbir (livelli medjani ta' valuri ogħla minn 0 sa 6). Barra minn hekk, skont iż-żmien tal-ġbir u l-predominanza tal-varjetà, din it-togħma fruttata tingħaqad bis-sensazzjoni tal-weraq taż-żebbuġ, ħaxix appena maqtugħ, qaqoċċ salvaġġ/qaqoċċ tax-xewk/artiċoks/ċikwejra għall-Ogliarola, jew frott/tadam/frott irqiq għaċ-Ċellina.

Saru xi tibdiliet fil-kriterji kimiċi, bi tnaqqis fit-total massimu ta' aċidità espress f'aċtu olejku (minn < 0,8 għal-livell preżenti ta' < 0,65) u żieda żgħira fil-kontenut tal-aċtu linolenikuo (minn ≤ 0,70 għal ≤ 0,8) u l-valur tal-K232 (minn ≤ 2,10 għal ≤ 2,20). Dawn l-emendi ġejiin mix-xewqa li tiżdied ir-rappreżentattività tal-varjetajiet l-aktar imferrxin fir-reġjun, iċ-Cellina di Nardò u l-Ogliarola Salentina, li jiddeterminaw fil-monovarjetajiet, qabel ftit li xejn rappreżentati, il-valuri tal-aċtu linoleniku u l-K232, li huma kemxejn diversi.

3.2.   Prova tal-oriġini

L-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-prodott ġiet addattata biex tissodisfa r-rekwiżiti tar-Regolament 1898/2006 billi ġew inklużi l-proċeduri li l-operaturi għandhom jimplimentaw biex jistabbilixxu l-prova tal-oriġini.

3.3.   Rekwiżiti nazzjonali

L-obbligi previsti fil-Liġi Nru 169 tal-15 ta' Frar 1992, dwar l-“Ispeċifikazzjoni għar-rikonoxxenza tad-denominazzjoni tal-prodott tal-oriġini taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa verġni u extraverġni”, u fid-Digriet Ministerjali Nru 573/93, ġew eliminati.

3.4.   Oħrajn

L-emendi ntalbu mill-Consorzio di tutela (il-korp ta' protezzjoni) għaż-żejt taż-żebbuġa straverġni “Terra d’Otranto”, li hu awtorizzat li jressaq talbiet għall-emendi. Il-Consorzio di tutela ġie ffurmat wara li saret l-applikazzjoni oriġinarja għar-reġistrazzjoni tad-DPO “Terra d’Otranto”, dak iż-żmien ippreżentata mill-għaqda APROL, bħala l-għaqda ewelenija minn fost seba' għaqdiet differenti ta' produtturi taż-żebbuġ.

DOKUMENT UNIKU

IR-REGOLAMENT TAL-KUNSILL (KE) Nru 510/2006

dwar il-protezzjoni tal-indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi u tad-denominazzjonijiet tal-oriġini tal-prodotti agrikoli u tal-oġġetti tal-ikel
   (3)

“TERRA D’OTRANTO”

Nru tal-KE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IĠP ( ) DPO ( X )

1.   Isem

“Terra d'Otranto”

2.   Stat Membru jew pajjiż terz

L-Italja

3.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel

3.1.   Tip ta’ prodott

| Klassi 1.5. | Żjut u xaħmijiet (butir, marġerina, żjut, eċċ.) |
| --- | --- |

Klassi 1.5.

Żjut u xaħmijiet (butir, marġerina, żjut, eċċ.)

3.2.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott li għalih japplika l-isem fil-punt 1

It-“Terra d’Otranto” huwa żejt taż-żebbuġa straverġni bil-karatteristiċi kimiċi u organolettiċi li ġejjin:

| — | aċidità massima ta' 0,65 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

aċidità massima ta' 0,65 %;

| — | perossidi ≤ 14 Meq O2/kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

perossidi ≤ 14 Meq O2/kg;

| — | K232 ≤ 2,20 |
| --- | --- |

—

K232 ≤ 2,20

| — | K270 ≤ 0,170 |
| --- | --- |

—

K270 ≤ 0,170

| — | aċtu linoleniku ≤ 0,8 |
| --- | --- |

—

aċtu linoleniku ≤ 0,8

| — | kulur: aħdar jew isfar bi ftit riflessi ħodor; |
| --- | --- |

—

kulur: aħdar jew isfar bi ftit riflessi ħodor;

| — | riħa: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott ta' bejn 3 u 6) ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità, b'togħma ħafifa tal-weraq. |
| --- | --- |

—

riħa: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott ta' bejn 3 u 6) ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità, b'togħma ħafifa tal-weraq.

| — | togħma: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott li fih il-valuri ta' bejn 3 u 6) bis-sensazzjoni ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità. |
| --- | --- |

—

togħma: togħma kemxejn fruttata (livell medjan ta' frott li fih il-valuri ta' bejn 3 u 6) bis-sensazzjoni ta' żebbuġ fl-istadju ġust ta' maturità.

Skont iż-żmien tal-ġbir, sensazzjonijiet moderati jew ħfif ta' togħma ta' ħwawar jew ta' qrusa; anke, skont iż-żmien tal-ġbir u l-predominanza tal-varjetà, din it-togħma fruttata tingħaqad mas-sensazzjoni tal-weraq taż-żebbuġ, ħaxix appena maqtugħ, qaqoċċ salvaġġ/qaqoċċ tax-xewk/artiċoks/ċikwejra għall-Ogliarola, jew frott/tadam/frott irqiq għaċ-Ċellina.

3.3.   Materja prima (għall-prodotti pproċessati biss)

—

3.4.   Għalf (għall-prodotti li ġejjin mill-annimali biss)

—

3.5.   Passi speċifiċi tal-produzzjoni li jridu jsiru fiż-żona ġeografika identifikata

L-operazzjonijiet ta’ kultivazzjoni, ta’ produzzjoni u ta’ għasir taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa straverġni “Terra d’Otranto” għandhom iseħħu biss fit-territorju taż-żona ġeografika tal-produzzjoni msemmija fil-punt 4.

3.6.   Regoli speċifiċi dwar it-tqattigħ, it-tħakkik, l-ippakkjar, eċċ.

Biex jiddaħħal fis-suq għall-konsum, iż-żejt taż-żebbuġa straverġni “Terra d’Otranto” għandu jitqiegħed f'reċipjenti tal-ħġieġ jew tal-landa b'kapaċità massima ta' ħames litri. Iż-żejt taż-żebbuġa straverġni “Terra d’Otranto” għandu jiġi ppakkjat fiż-żona ġeografika tal-produzzjoni, biex jiġi żġurat li l-oriġini tal-prodott tkun ikkontrollata u biex ikun evitat li l-prodott jiġi trasportat fi kwantità kbira 'l barra miż-żona, xi ħaġa li tista' ġġiegħlu jiddeterjora u jitlef il-karatteristiċi speċifiċi deskritti fil-punt 3.2., speċjalment il-karatteristiċi tipiċi tal-qaqoċċ salvaġġ/qaqoċċ tax-xewk/artiċoks/ċikwejra taż-żejt “Terra d’Otranto”. Il-kompożizzjoni taż-żejt, karatterizzata minn livell sinifikattiv ta' aċidi xaħmin polinsaturi, tippermetti li ż-żejt jitlef il-kwalità organolettika u tipika tiegħu minħabba l-azzjoni tal-ossiġnu fl-arja waqt il-fażi ta' trasferiment minn kontenitur għall-ieħor, waqt l-ippumpjar, meta jinħatt u waqt it-trasport, operazzjonijiet li jirrepetu rwieħhom b'iktar frekwenza fl-eventwalità li t-tqegħid fil-fliexken isir barra ż-żona.

3.7.   Regoli speċifiċi dwar it-tikkettar

Id-denominazzjoni “Terra d’Otranto” għandha tidher fuq it-tikketta b'ittri ċari u indelibbli, distingwibbli bl-aktar mod ċar minn kwalunkwe kitba oħra li tidher fuq it-tikketta, u għandha tkun segwita immedjatament bid-“Denominazzjoni tal-oriġini” jew bl-akronimu tagħha DPO, flimkien mas-simbolu relevanti tal-Komunità.

Kwalunkwe ppakkjar użat fis-suq għandu juri n-numru tas-serje ta' dak li ppakkjah skont il-Pjan ta' Kontroll relevanti.

Kull deskrizzjoni mhux permessa espliċitament hija pprojbita, inklużi l-aġġettivi li ġejjin: “fin”, “magħżul”, “selezzjonat”, “superjuri”.

Madankollu tista' ssir kwalunkwe referenza għal ismijiet, ismijiet ta' kummerċ u ditti privati sakemm dawn ma jkollhomx għan ta’ tifħir jew ma jkunux intenzjonati li jingannaw il-konsumatur.

Is-sena ta' produzzjoni taż-żebbuġ li minnhom sar iż-żejt għandha tiġi indikata fuq it-tikketta.

4.   Definizzjoni fil-qosor taż-żona ġeografika

Iż-żona ta' produzzjoni ta' “Terra d’Otranto” DPO hi magħmula mill-pronvinċja kollha ta' Lecce u partijiet mill-provinċji ta' Taranto u Brindisi. Tali żona tkopri konnessjoni bejn l-ibħra Jonju u Adrijatiku, mill-Murge Tarantine u mill-għoljiet estremi tax-xlokk tal-Murge ta' Brinidisi, tul il-medda ta' Lecce, sat-tlaqqigħ flimkien tal-ibħra f'Serre.

5.   Rabta maż-żona ġeografika

5.1.   Speċifiċità taż-żona ġeografika

Il-karatteristiċi tal-prodott ġejjin mill-kundizzjonijiet pedoklimatiċi partikolari: il-fatturi ambjentali u t-tnissil bil-kultivazzjoni speċifiċi ta' din iż-żona jagħtu karattru distintiv liż-żejt ta' “Terra d’Otranto”. Il-ħamrija hija magħrufa għall-uniformità vasta tagħha li toriġina mill-ġir tal-era tal-Cretaceo, li fuqu saffi ta' ġir mill-perjodu Terzjarju straħu flimkien ma' fdal ta' ġir, ramel u arġilla tal-perjodi Plijoċeniku u Pleistiċenu, b'ħamrija kannella jew ħamra, ta' spiss preżenti f'saffi alternati, mistrieħa fuq blat tal-ġir. F'termini orografiċi, iż-żona hija karatterizzata minn pjanuri wesgħin li jmissu ma' xulxin jew huma interrotti b'għoljiet baxxi u ħelwin. Fil-wiċċ, iż-żona ma għandhiex xmajjar u għadajjar, imma hija għanja b'xibka qawwija ta' ilma taħt l-art li tagħti lir-reġjun karattru deċiżament karsiku. Minħabba in-natura kostali u l-ġnub baxxi tagħha, iż-żona għandha klima tajba u għandha t-tendenza li tkun sħuna.

5.2.   Speċifiċità tal-prodott

Il-patrimonju tal-produzzjoni taż-żebbuġ taż-żona ġeografika hija karatterizzata minn preżenza dominanti tal-varjetajiet lokali Cellina di Nardò u Ogliarola leccese li jikkaratterizzaw il-kwalità tal-prodott taż-żejt. L-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-persentaġġ minimu ta' 60 % ta' dawn iż-żewġ varjetajiet ta' kultivazzjonijet tgħin biex ikunu determinati l-karatteristiċi organolettiċi taż-żejt, b'medda ta' sensazzjonijiet minn qaqoċċ salvaġġ/artiċoks/ċikwejra għat-tadam/frott irqiq.

5.3.   Rabta kawżali bejn iż-żona ġeografika u l-kwalità jew il-karatteristiċi tal-prodott (għad-DPO) jew il-kwalità speċifika, ir-reputazzjoni jew karatteristiċi oħra tal-prodott (għall-IĠP)

Il-kultivazzjoni taż-żebbuġ tirrappreżenta parti produttiva ewlenija taż-żona. Din għandha sehem fundamentali fl-ekonomija lokali. Fis-seklu XIX, l-indikazzjoni ġeografika “Terra d’Otranto” kienet magħmula mill-provinċji ta' Lecce, Brindisi u Taranto. Dan ir-reġjun kien dejjem kkaratterizzat minn preżenza qawwija ta' żejt, li minnu kien jiġi estratt “likur prezzjuż”. L-oriġini tal-isem “Terra d’Otranto” jitħallat mal-istess storja tal-produzzjoni taż-żejt f'dan ir-reġjun, introdotta fiż-żmenijiet antiki minn bdiewa Feniċi u Griegi, u x-xogħol tal-ewwel monaċi Bażiljani li waslu fis-seklu X ta spinta lill-ewwel suq prosperu taż-żjut prezzjużi mit-Terra d’Otranto. It-“Terra d’Otranto” tirrappreżenta l-isem medjevali ta' Salento, minħabba l-fatt li Otranto kienet il-belt prinċipali tar-reġjun kollu fi żmien il-medjuevu.

Referenza għall-pubblikazzjoni tal-ispeċifikazzjoni

(l-Artikolu 5(7) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 510/2006 (4))

Din l-Amministrazzjoni nediet il-proċedura ta' oġġezzjoni nazzjonali bil-pubblikazzjoni tal-proposta għar-rikonoxximent tad-denominazzjoni protetta tal-oriġini tal-“Casatella Trevigiana” fil-Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 297 tal-21 ta' Diċembru 2010. It-test sħiħ tal-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-prodott jinsab fuq is-sit tal-internet li ġej:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

jew billi wieħed jikklikkja mill-ewwel fuq is-sit elettroniku tal-Ministeru tal-Politika Agrikola, Alimentari u tal-Forestrija (http://www.politicheagricole.it), u jidħol fuq “Qualità e sicurezza” (fuq in-naħa ta’ fuq tal-lemin tal-iskrin) u fl-aħħar fuq “Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE”.

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(1)  ĠU L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Sostitwit bir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012.

(3)  Ara n-nota f’qiegħ il-paġna Nru 2.

(4)  Ara n-nota f’qiegħ il-paġna Nru 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 237/40

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Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(b) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi ta’ kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u l-oġġetti tal-ikel

2013/C 237/08

Din il-pubblikazzjoni tikkonferixxi d-dritt ta' oppożizzjoni għall-applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 51 tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (1).

APPLIKAZZJONI GĦAL REĠISTRAZZJONI TA’ SPEĊJALITÀ TRADIZZJONALI GARANTITA (STG)

IR-REGOLAMENT TAL-KUNSILL (KE) Nru 509/2006

dwar prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel bħala speċjalitajiet tradizzjonali garantiti
   (2)

“ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS”

Nru tal-KE: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Isem u indirizz tal-grupp applikanti

| L-isem tal-grupp jew tal-organizzazzjoni (jekk rilevanti): | “Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai” |
| --- | --- |
| Indirizz: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

L-isem tal-grupp jew tal-organizzazzjoni (jekk rilevanti):

“Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai”

Indirizz:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 44422201

Faks

+370 44474897

Posta elettronika:

Info@zpienas.lt

2.   Stat Membru jew Pajjiż Terz

Il-Litwanja

3.   Speċifikazzjoni tal-prodott

3.1.   Isem jew ismijiet li għandhom jiġu rreġistrati (l-Artikolu 2 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007)

“Žemaitiškas kastinys”

3.2.   Indika jekk l-isem

| ☒ | huwa speċifiku fih innifsu |
| --- | --- |
|  | jesprimi n-natura speċifika tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel |

☒

huwa speċifiku fih innifsu



jesprimi n-natura speċifika tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel

L-isem “Žemaitiškas kastinys” ma jagħtix il-karattru speċifiku tal-prodott, iżda huwa stabbilit u magħruf sew kemm f’Žemaitija (reġjun fil-Punent tal-Litwanja) u fil-Litwanja kollha meta tradizzjonalment issir referenza għal dan il-prodott, kif juru s-sorsi varji msemmija fil-punt 3.8.

L-isem “Žemaitiškas kastinys” jissemma fil-kotba tar-riċetti tas-seklu 20: Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai (Tilžė (Tilsit), 1927), Ką valgome (Dr Tumėnienė et al., Kaunas, 1935) u Lietuvių valgiai (ikkompilat minn J. Pauliukonienė, Vilnius, 1983).

3.3.   Indika jekk hix mitluba r-riżerva tal-isem skont l-Artikolu 13(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 509/2006

| ☒ | reġistrazzjoni bir-riżerva tal-isem |
| --- | --- |
|  | reġistrazzjoni mingħajr ir-riżerva tal-isem |

☒

reġistrazzjoni bir-riżerva tal-isem



reġistrazzjoni mingħajr ir-riżerva tal-isem

3.4.   Tip tal-prodott (skont l-Anness II)

| Klassi 1.4. | Prodotti oħra ta’ oriġini mill-annimali (bajd, għasel, prodotti mill-ħalib għajr il-butir, eċċ.) |
| --- | --- |

Klassi 1.4.

Prodotti oħra ta’ oriġini mill-annimali (bajd, għasel, prodotti mill-ħalib għajr il-butir, eċċ.)

3.5.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-prodott tal-ikel li għalih japplika l-isem taħt il-punt 3.1. (l-Artikolu 3(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007)

Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” huwa prodott tradizzjonali magħmul minn krema qarsa li tiġi msaħħna, imħawwda u mbagħad imkessħa.

Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” għandu l-konsistenza karatteristika omoġenja, magħquda, konsistenti ta' krema xaħmija bi qtar iżolati tal-likwidu, jista’ jkun li jitfarrak f’temperatura ta’ + 6 °C u jdub malajr fil-ħalq. Għandu lewn safrani uniformi. Skont il-ħxejjex aromatiċi u l-ħwawar użati fir-riċetta, “Žemaitiškas kastinys” jista' jkun jew imżewwaq bil-kulur tal-ingredjenti miżjuda u jista’ jkun fih biċċiet ta’ ħxejjex jew ħwawar. Huwa ħafif, kemm kemm aċiduż, b'togħma tal-aċidu lattiku kemxejn mielaħ u bil-ħjiel tal-ħxejjex u tal-ħwawar.

Il-karatteristiċi fiżikokimiċi taż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” huma kif ġej:

| — | kontenut ta’ xaħam, skont ir-riċetta: 25-30 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta’ xaħam, skont ir-riċetta: 25-30 %;

| — | kontenut ta’ melħ komuni: 1-1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta’ melħ komuni: 1-1,5 %.

3.6.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-prodott tal-ikel li għalih japplika l-isem taħt il-punt 3.1. (l-Artikolu 3(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007)

Materja prima:

| — | krema qarsa b’kontenut ta’ xaħam ta’ 25-30 %: 80-83 kg/100 kg tal-prodott; |
| --- | --- |

—

krema qarsa b’kontenut ta’ xaħam ta’ 25-30 %: 80-83 kg/100 kg tal-prodott;

| — | butir b’kontenut ta’ xaħam ta' mill-inqas 82 %: 6-7 kg/100 kg tal-prodott; |
| --- | --- |

—

butir b’kontenut ta’ xaħam ta' mill-inqas 82 %: 6-7 kg/100 kg tal-prodott;

| — | krema qarsa b’kontenut ta’ xaħam ta’ 2,5-4 %: 5-5,5 kg/100 kg tal-prodott; |
| --- | --- |

—

krema qarsa b’kontenut ta’ xaħam ta’ 2,5-4 %: 5-5,5 kg/100 kg tal-prodott;

| — | kontenut ta’ melħ komuni: 1-1,5 kg/100 kg tal-prodott; |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta’ melħ komuni: 1-1,5 kg/100 kg tal-prodott;

Ħxejjex u ħwawar (bżar iswed, ħwawar imħallta, karwija, xibt, nagħniegħa jew taħlita ta' dawn kollha: 0,1-0,15 kg/100 kg tal-prodott) u ħxejjex aromatiċi (tewm jew basal: 1-2 kg/100 kg tal-prodott) jistgħu jintużaw.

Metodu ta’ produzzjoni:

Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” isir b’metodu tradizzjonali.

L-ingredjenti meħtieġa jintiżnu skont ir-riċetta. F'kontenitur separat, il-krema qarsa u l-ħalib qares jitħalltu flimkien u jiġu msaħħna sa temperatura ta' bejn 25 °C u 30 °C. Il-butir kiesaħ jirtab ftit bis-sħana sa temperatura ta' bejn 25 °C u 30 °C. Il-ħxejjex aromatiċi jiġu mnaddfa u jitqattgħu.

Skont ir-riċetta, il-butir imsaħħan, ftit imdewweb jitqiegħed fl-iskutella tat-taħlit u t-taħlita tal-krema qarsa/tal-ħalib qares tiżdied gradwalment, filwaqt li kull darba jitferra’ n-nofs ta' kwart tal-kwantità totali meħtieġa skont ir-riċetta u t-taħlita titħawwad bl-idejn jew b’mezzi mekkaniċi ekwivalenti. Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys”għandu dejjem jitħawwad fl-istess direzzjoni. Meta t-taħlita tilħaq l-konsistenza ta’ krema qarsa (mingħajr is-separazzjoni tax-xorrox tal-butir), jiżdied nofs ta' kwart ieħor tat-taħlita tal-krema qarsa/tal-ħalib qares u t-taħlita tkompli titħawwad. Din hi ripetuta sakemm it-taħlita kollha tal-krema qarsa/tal-ħalib qares tkun ġiet miżjudu (skont ir-riċetta). Meta ż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” jibda jagħqad, jinżdied il-melħ u jiżdiedu wkoll il-ħxejjex u l-ħwawar aromatiċi mitħuna u l-ħaxix aromatiku mqatta' u dawn jitħawdu b’mod uniformi. Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” għandu jiġi ppakkjat minnufih, qabel ma jissolidifika.

Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” jiġi ppakkjat f’vażetti tat-tafal jew f'kontenituri li jintremew wara l-użu ta’ 250 g, 200 g u 100 g. Il-vażetti jingħalqu b'għatu tat-tafal, li fuqu titqiegħed kopertura, li tintrabat bi spaga Il-kontenituri li jintremew wara l-użu jiġu ssiġillati b'għatu tal-fojl. Wara l-ippakkjar, iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” jiġi mkessaħ għal temperatura ta' 6 °C. Meta jkun kiesaħ, il-prodott jiżviluppa struttura iebsa u omoġenja.

3.7.   Karattru speċifiku tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-prodott tal-ikel (l-Artikolu 3(3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007

Il-karatteristiċi speċifiċi li ġejjin jiddistingwu ż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” minn prodotti oħrajn tal-istess kategorija:

| — | Ingredjenti u metodu ta' produzzjoni tradizzjonali: għall-kuntrarju ta’ tipi oħra ta’ kastinys, ir-riċetta għaż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” bilkemm inbidlet minħabba li kienet issemmiet għall-ewwel darba fis-sorsi ta' kitba msemmija fil-punt 3.8, jiġifieri l-istess ingredjenti huma użati fi proporzjonijiet simili. Fil-frattemp, sabiex tinkiseb varjetà akbar ta’ togħmiet, tipi oħra ta’ kastinys, li bdew jiġu prodotti aktar tard, bidlu kompletament il-krema qarsa mal-ħalib qares jew ħalltu l-krema qarsa mal-kefir, possibbilment b'żieda tal-meraq tal-pitravi jew taz-zunnarija jew l-isfar tal-bajd, li jagħti lil kastinys lewn aħmar jew isfar. Il-produzzjoni taż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” hija kkaratterizzat mit-taħwid kostanti u bil-mod tat-taħlita tal-butir u tal-krema qarsa, li matulu huwa miżjud kull darba nofs ta' kwart tat-taħlita tal-krema qarsa/tal-ħalib qares, filwaqt li t-temperatura tiġi rregolata b'mod preċiż ħafna (25-30 °C) li jiżgura li x-xorrox tal-butir ma jinfiridx. Il-produzzjoni ta’ tipi oħra ta’ kastinys ġiet modernizzata. Dawn ma jitħawdux iżda jiġu mħabbta, u jiżdiedu l-ingredjenti kollha fi tlieta jew erba’ darbiet jew saħansitra kollha f’daqqa, u jistgħu jkunu soġġettati għal aktar tibdil fit-temperatura. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ingredjenti u metodu ta' produzzjoni tradizzjonali: għall-kuntrarju ta’ tipi oħra ta’ kastinys, ir-riċetta għaż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” bilkemm inbidlet minħabba li kienet issemmiet għall-ewwel darba fis-sorsi ta' kitba msemmija fil-punt 3.8, jiġifieri l-istess ingredjenti huma użati fi proporzjonijiet simili. Fil-frattemp, sabiex tinkiseb varjetà akbar ta’ togħmiet, tipi oħra ta’ kastinys, li bdew jiġu prodotti aktar tard, bidlu kompletament il-krema qarsa mal-ħalib qares jew ħalltu l-krema qarsa mal-kefir, possibbilment b'żieda tal-meraq tal-pitravi jew taz-zunnarija jew l-isfar tal-bajd, li jagħti lil kastinys lewn aħmar jew isfar. Il-produzzjoni taż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” hija kkaratterizzat mit-taħwid kostanti u bil-mod tat-taħlita tal-butir u tal-krema qarsa, li matulu huwa miżjud kull darba nofs ta' kwart tat-taħlita tal-krema qarsa/tal-ħalib qares, filwaqt li t-temperatura tiġi rregolata b'mod preċiż ħafna (25-30 °C) li jiżgura li x-xorrox tal-butir ma jinfiridx. Il-produzzjoni ta’ tipi oħra ta’ kastinys ġiet modernizzata. Dawn ma jitħawdux iżda jiġu mħabbta, u jiżdiedu l-ingredjenti kollha fi tlieta jew erba’ darbiet jew saħansitra kollha f’daqqa, u jistgħu jkunu soġġettati għal aktar tibdil fit-temperatura.

| — | Togħma: It-togħma karatteristika taż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” hija ħafifa, kemm kemm qarsa, tal-aċidu lattiku kemxejn mielħa u bil-ħjiel tal-ħxejjex u tal-ħwawar miżjuda. Tipi oħra ta’ kastinys huma kkaratterizzati minn togħma pjuttost qawwija tal-aċidu lattiku (fejn il-krema qarsa ġiet sostitwita mill-ħalib qares) jew togħma ta' ħmira tal-aċidu lattiku (fejn il-krema qarsa ġiet sostitwita mill-kefir), bi ħjiel tat-togħma karatteristika tal-meraq miżjud (pitravi jew karroti) jew isfar tal-bajd. |
| --- | --- |

—

Togħma: It-togħma karatteristika taż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” hija ħafifa, kemm kemm qarsa, tal-aċidu lattiku kemxejn mielħa u bil-ħjiel tal-ħxejjex u tal-ħwawar miżjuda. Tipi oħra ta’ kastinys huma kkaratterizzati minn togħma pjuttost qawwija tal-aċidu lattiku (fejn il-krema qarsa ġiet sostitwita mill-ħalib qares) jew togħma ta' ħmira tal-aċidu lattiku (fejn il-krema qarsa ġiet sostitwita mill-kefir), bi ħjiel tat-togħma karatteristika tal-meraq miżjud (pitravi jew karroti) jew isfar tal-bajd.

| — | Konsistenza: Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” għandu l-konsistenza karatteristika omoġenja, magħquda, konsistenti ta' krema xaħmija bi qtar iżolati tal-likwidu, jista’ jkun li jitfarrak f’temperatura ta’ + 6 °C u jdub malajr fil-ħalq. Tipi oħra ta’ kastinys huma kkaratterizzati minn konsistenza ratba u li tista' tindilek. |
| --- | --- |

—

Konsistenza: Iż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” għandu l-konsistenza karatteristika omoġenja, magħquda, konsistenti ta' krema xaħmija bi qtar iżolati tal-likwidu, jista’ jkun li jitfarrak f’temperatura ta’ + 6 °C u jdub malajr fil-ħalq. Tipi oħra ta’ kastinys huma kkaratterizzati minn konsistenza ratba u li tista' tindilek.

3.8.   Karattru tradizzjonali tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-prodott tal-ikel (l-Artikolu 3(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007

Minbarra l-metodu primittiv tal-produzzjoni tal-butir bl-użu ta’ mgħarfa biex biha titħabbat il-krema qarsa f’dixx, metodu li kien mifrux mal-Litwanja kollha, reġjun Litwan partikolari, Žemaitija, żviluppa t-teknika distintiva tiegħu tal-ipproċessar tal-krema qarsa billi jħawwad il-krema qarsa msaħħna u billi joqgħod attent li x-xorrox tal-butir ma jinfiridx. Din it-teknika nfirxet mal-Litwanja kollha. Il-prodott miksub, “Žemaitiškas kastinys”, għandu togħma u konsistenza speċifiċi (Lietuvių kalbos atlasas, vol. 1, Leksika, Vilnius, 1977). F’nofs is-seklu 19, il-prodott ġie deskritt f’pubblikazzjonijiet akkademiċi Litwa pod wzgledem starozytnych zabytkow, obyczajow i zwyczajow skreslona (Ludwik Adam Jucewicz (Ludwik z Pokiewia), Vilnius, 1846) u Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona (Leon Potocki, Poznań, 1869)), b’enfasi fuq il-metodu ta’ produzzjoni tiegħu (magħmul minn krema qarsa msaħħna) u b'togħma pjaċevoli ħafna.

Il-mużew nazzjonali tal-Litwanja għandu traskrizzjonijiet tar-rakkonti minn persuni li twieldu fi tmiem is-seklu 19 u fil-bidu tas-seklu 20 (Il-Mużew Nazzjonali tal-Litwanja kollezzjonijiet etnografiċi, repożitorji tal-ħżin F 15-4, F 15-13, F 32-7 u F 32-48), li fihom hemm deskritti t-teknika tal-produzzjoni u r-riċetta kif ġej: L-ewwel, tliet imgħaref ta' krema qarsa u nofs mgħarfa butir huma mqiegħda fi skutella tat-tafal imsaħħna. Dan jitħallat sew u jiġi mħawwad b’mgħarfa tal-injam, dejjem fl-istess direzzjoni. Meta t-taħlita tibda tiksaħ u tissepara f’xorrox tal-butir, l-iskutella tiġi msaħħna f’ilma jaħraq u l-massa likwifikata titkessaħ fi skutella ta’ ilma kiesaħ. Waqt it-taħwid, tiżdied il-krema qarsa mal-massa fi kwantitajiet żgħar. Ftit mill-krema qarsa ta' spiss hija sostitwita mill-baqta, u b'dan il-mod il-kastinys isiru aktar ħfief. Meta jkun wasal iż-żmien li t-taħwid jintemm, jiżdiedu l-melħ u ħxejjex u ħwawar oħrajn (karwija, bżar mitħun, tewm u basal imqattgħin, basal żgħir meta jkun żmienhom u friegħi (sprigs) tax-xibt jew tan-nagħniegħa).

F’Lietuvių valgiai (ikkompilat minn J. Pauliukonienė, Mokslas, Vilnius, 1983), ktieb prodott minn akkademiċi fl-1983 li jiddeskrivi tekniki tradizzjonali antiki għat-tħejjija tal-materja prima, li fih il-krema qarsa tiġi sseparata mill-ħalib bl-idejn (bl-ixkumar b’mgħarfa), filwaqt li naturalment titħalla xi baqta fil-krema qarsa, ir-riċetta u l-metodu ta’ produzzjoni taż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” huma kif ġej: “Žemaitiškas kastinys” 1⁄2 l krema qarsa, 1 mgħarfa butir, 1⁄2 kuċċarina karwija jew ħxejjex jew ħwawar oħra jew ħwawar, melħ. Il-butir jitqiegħed fl-iskutella tat-tafal b’mgħarfa krema qarsa, l-iskutella titqiegħed fl-ilma sħun, u t-taħlita titħawwad b’mgħarfa tal-injam. Wara li jkun ġie mħallat ftit (qabel ma x-xorrox tal-butir jissepara), tiżdied mgħarfa oħra krema qarsa, u jitkompla t-taħwid sakemm il-krema qarsa kollha tkun ġiet miżjuda. Meta t-taħlita tibda tgħaqqad, jiżdied il-melħ, flimkien mal-karwija maħsula u mnixxfa, u jitħalltu sewwa. Kastinys għandha togħma kemxejn mielħa, mhux qawwija ż-żejjed u ftit qarsa.

Ir-riċetta u l-metodu ta’ produzzjoni taż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” ma nbidlux sal-lum, kif muri miċ-ċertifikat mogħti lil dan il-prodott fl-2010 mill-Fond Litwan għall-Patrimonju Kulinari, li jikkonferma li ż-“Žemaitiškas kastinys” isir skont it-tekniki tradizzjonali, bl-użu ta’ materja prima tradizzjonali, b'ingredjenti miżjuda u b'tagħmir.

3.9.   Rekwiżiti minimi u proċeduri għall-verifika tal-karattru speċifiku (l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007)

B’kunsiderazzjoni tal-karatteristiċi speċifiċi ta’ “Žemaitiškas kastinys”, għandhom jitwettqu l-verifiki li ġejjin:

| (1) | il-kwalità ta’ kull lott ta’ materja prima riċevut:






  — | il-kontenut ta’ xaħam fil-krema qarsa u fil-ħalib qares għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.6; dan jiġi ttestjat f’laboratorju; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

il-kwalità ta’ kull lott ta’ materja prima riċevut:

—

il-kontenut ta’ xaħam fil-krema qarsa u fil-ħalib qares għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.6; dan jiġi ttestjat f’laboratorju;

| — | il-kontenut ta’ xaħam fil-butir għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.6; dan jiġi ttestjat f’laboratorju; |
| --- | --- |

—

il-kontenut ta’ xaħam fil-butir għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.6; dan jiġi ttestjat f’laboratorju;

| — | l-indikaturi organolettiċi tal-ħxejjex, tal-ħwawar u tal-ħaxix aromatiku (l-aroma, it-togħma, il-kulur) jiġu kkontrollati fuq il-bażi ta’ dokumenti u b’valutazzjoni organolettika; |
| --- | --- |

—

l-indikaturi organolettiċi tal-ħxejjex, tal-ħwawar u tal-ħaxix aromatiku (l-aroma, it-togħma, il-kulur) jiġu kkontrollati fuq il-bażi ta’ dokumenti u b’valutazzjoni organolettika;

| (2) | il-konformità mat-teknika ta’ produzzjoni speċifikati fil-punt 3.6: l-aderenza mas-sekwenza ta’ proċessi u mal-parametri stipulati (it-temperatura u l-proporzjonijiet tal-ingredjenti) għandha tiġi vverifikata b’mod viżwali u billi jittieħed kejl matul il-produzzjoni ta’ kull lott; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

il-konformità mat-teknika ta’ produzzjoni speċifikati fil-punt 3.6: l-aderenza mas-sekwenza ta’ proċessi u mal-parametri stipulati (it-temperatura u l-proporzjonijiet tal-ingredjenti) għandha tiġi vverifikata b’mod viżwali u billi jittieħed kejl matul il-produzzjoni ta’ kull lott;

| (3) | il-kwalità ta’ kull lott tal-prodott finali:






  — | il-karatteristiċi organolettiċi (il-konsistenza, il-kulur u t-togħma) għandhom jikkorrispondu ma’ dawk stabbiliti fil-punt 3.5; din tiġi kkontrollata b’analiżi sensorjali; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3)

il-kwalità ta’ kull lott tal-prodott finali:

—

il-karatteristiċi organolettiċi (il-konsistenza, il-kulur u t-togħma) għandhom jikkorrispondu ma’ dawk stabbiliti fil-punt 3.5; din tiġi kkontrollata b’analiżi sensorjali;

| — | il-kontenut ta’ xaħam għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.5; dan jiġi ttestjat f’laboratorju; |
| --- | --- |

—

il-kontenut ta’ xaħam għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.5; dan jiġi ttestjat f’laboratorju;

| — | il-kontenut ta’ melħ komuni għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.5; dan jiġi ċċekkjat fuq il-bażi tar-riċetta u, meta jqumu dubji, f’laboratorju. |
| --- | --- |

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il-kontenut ta’ melħ komuni għandu jkun kif speċifikat fil-punt 3.5; dan jiġi ċċekkjat fuq il-bażi tar-riċetta u, meta jqumu dubji, f’laboratorju.

Mill-inqas darba fis-sena, l-awtorità speċifikata fil-punt 4.1 tivverifika li l-prodott u l-proċess ta’ produzzjoni jikkonformaw mal-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-prodott.

4.   Awtoritajiet jew korpi għall-verifika tal-konformità mal-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-prodott

4.1.   Isem u indirizz

| Isem: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
| --- | --- |
| Indirizz: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Isem:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Indirizz:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 52404361

Posta elettronika:

svvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Pubblika |  Privata |
| --- | --- |

☒ Pubblika

 Privata

4.2.   Kompiti speċifiċi tal-awtorità jew tal-korp

L-awtorità ta’ spezzjoni msemmija fil-punt 4.1 hija responsabbli għall-monitoraġġ tal-kriterji kollha stabbiliti fl-ispeċifikazzjoni.

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(1)  ĠU L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Sostitwit bir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012.

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