J-A14005-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TERRI L. FICK

v.

NICHOLAS E. FICK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 989 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered July 19, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2011-FC-41281

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 11, 2022

Nicholas E. Fick (“Mr. Fick”) appeals pro se from the July 19, 2021 order 

denying his exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendation regarding 

equitable distribution in this matter and directing the disbursement of marital 

funds in accordance with the Master’s Recommendation to resolve the parties’ 

economic claims after finding that Mr. Fick dissipated marital assets.1 After 

careful review, we quash this appeal. 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that the July 19, 2021 order from which Mr. Fick appeals is a final, 

appealable order, as the parties’ divorce and equitable distribution claims were 

previously bifurcated, a divorce decree was entered on December 10, 2018, 

and this order resolves the remaining economic issues in this matter. See

Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (stating a final order is any order that disposes of all 

claims and of all parties); Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1985) (indicating 

issues in divorce are reviewable after the entry of a divorce decree and 

resolution of all economic issues). 
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The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history as 

follows:

A complaint in divorce was filed by ... Terri Fick, now Terri Berto 

(“[Ms. Berto”]), on September 9, 2011, which asserted that [Ms. 

Berto] and [Mr. Fick] were married on November 4, 2005, in 

Moosic, Pennsylvania. On April 30, 2012, [Mr. Fick] filed an 

affidavit pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3301(d)[,] indicating that the 

parties separated on April 30, 2010. The parties’ divorce and 

equitable distribution claims were bifurcated by opinion and order 

dated November 13, 2018.... A divorce decree was signed on 

December 10, 2018....

On November 6, 2019, [Ms. Berto] filed a petition for an equitable 

distribution hearing..., which was denied on November 26, 2019. 

In that petition, [Ms. Berto] alleged that [Mr. Fick] purchased a 

property at 3 Spruce Lane, Lake Ariel, Pennsylvania (“Lake Ariel 

Property”)[,] in an attempt to hide marital assets. It was alleged 

that [Mr. Fick] had then listed that property for sale.... [T]he Lake 

Ariel Property was purchased by [CJL Property Holdings, LLC 

(“CJL”)], a Pennsylvania limited liability company formed by [Mr. 

Fick]. William F. Dunstone, Esq. was appointed as Master in 

Divorce on December 23, 2019. [Mr. Fick] apparently evaded 

hearing notices from the Master[,] and [Ms. Berto] filed a motion 

for alternate service on July 1, 2020 (time-stamped July 9, 2020), 

which this court granted. 

On September 18, 2020, a hearing was held before the Master. 

The Master issued his Report and Recommendation[] on February 

19, 2021....

[2] [Mr. Fick] filed exceptions to the Master’s Report 

on March 9, 2021. [Mr. Fick’s] exceptions were thoroughly briefed 

by both parties. 

Prior to the resolution of [Mr. Fick’s] exceptions, [Ms. Berto] filed 

a petition to prevent dissipation of marital assets (“First Petition 

to Prevent Dissipation”) on March 17, 2021[,] and a hearing was 

scheduled for April 21, 2021. In her First Petition to Prevent 

Dissipation, [Ms. Berto] cited the Master’s conclusion that the Lake 

Ariel Property was marital property. Further, [Ms. Berto] cited the 

____________________________________________

2 The details of the parties’ testimony before the Master and the Master’s 

specific recommendations are discussed by the trial court throughout its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 
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Master’s conclusion that the Lake Ariel Property should be sold 

and the proceeds placed in escrow to resolve the equitable 

distribution issues. [Ms. Berto] alleged that [Mr. Fick] sold the 

Lake Ariel Property on or about October 12, 2020, after the 

Master’s Hearing, and argued that the proceeds of sale of the Lake 

Ariel Property were marital property consistent with the Master’s 

conclusions. Additionally, as referenced in [Ms. Berto’s] petition, 

the Master concluded that [Mr. Fick] was the sole member of CJL 

and that the CJL entity was marital property.

Supported with records obtained by subpoena from the Dime Bank 

of Honesdale regarding CJL’s checking account, [Ms. Berto] filed 

an emergency petition to prevent dissipation of marital assets 

(“Second Petition to Prevent Dissipation”) on April 8, 2021[,] 

seeking a freeze of the account. [Ms. Berto] alleged in the Second 

Petition to Prevent Dissipation that bank records showed a deposit 

on October 30, 2021[,] in the amount of $305,964.85, which 

represented the sale proceeds of the Lake Ariel Property. [Ms. 

Berto] further alleged that the account balance was 

$112,557.86[,] as of April 4, 2021, showing a dissipation of 

$193,406.99 of marital property. This court granted [Ms. Berto’s] 

emergency relief as requested in the Second Petition to Prevent 

Dissipation by order dated April 8, 2021. The April 8, 2021 order 

directed the Dime Bank of Honesdale to freeze the account 

belonging to CJL to preserve the status quo and to avoid any 

further dissipation of potential[] marital assets pending disposition 

of [Mr. Fick’s] exceptions. 

On April 20, 2021, [Mr. Fick] filed answers to [Ms. Berto’s] First 

and Second Petitions to Prevent Dissipation and a brief in 

opposition. [Mr. Fick] also filed objections to subpoenas served 

on him and the Dime Bank of Honesdale, along with two motions 

to quash, and two separate requests for sanctions against [Ms. 

Berto] and [Ms. Berto’s] counsel. 

The following day, a hearing was held on ... [Ms. Berto’s] petitions 

... and [Mr. Fick’s] various challenges to the subpoenas. [Mr. Fick] 

attempted to represent the interests of CJL at the time of the April 

21, 2021 hearing in violations of Pennsylvania law. See Order[,] 

4/22/2021, ... at ¶ 4 (citing David R. Nicholson Builder, LLC v. 

Jablonski, 163 A.3d 1048, 1057 (Pa. Super. []2017)). By way 

of order dated April 22, 2021, this court granted the Second 

Petition to Prevent Dissipation and denied [Mr. Fick’s] requests for 

relief.4
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4 Only the Second Petition to Prevent Dissipation was 

addressed by the April 22, 2021 order. Based on the 

evidence and testimony of the April 21, 2021 hearing, [Ms. 

Berto’s] prayers for relief in the Second Petition superseded 

her prayer for relief in the First Petition.

[Mr. Fick] obtained counsel to represent CJL’s interests in this 

litigation and CJL filed a petition to intervene on May 5, 2021, 

which this court granted. CJL also filed a motion to reconsider 

[the] order of April 22, 2021 (“Motion for Reconsideration”), which 

this court granted pending a hearing. On July 7, 2021, a hearing 

was held on CJL’s Motion for Reconsideration. By way of an order 

dated July 19, 2021, this court denied CJL’s Motion for 

Reconsideration.[3] 

Oral argument on [Mr. Fick’s] exceptions to the Master’s Report 

and Recommendation was also held on July 7, 2021. After 

reviewing the record before the Master, the Master’s Report and 

Recommendation, the parties’ various filings regarding the 

exceptions, and holding two hearings regarding the freeze of CJL’s 

bank account, this court affirmed the Master and adopted his 

Report and Recommendation. 

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 9/9/21, at 3-6 (citations to record, some 

footnotes, and unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

On July 19, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying Mr. Fick’s 

exceptions to the Master’s Report, affirming and adopting the Master’s Report 

and Recommendation, and further ordering:

3. This court specifically finds that the bank account of CJL ... 

contains marital assets subject to equitable distribution and 

that [Mr. Fick] used marital funds to purchase a property in 

Lake Ariel, Pennsylvania[,] in the name of CJL Property 

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3 Mr. Fick and CJL filed separate appeals from the July 19, 2021 order denying 

CJL’s motion for reconsideration at docket nos. 1057 and 990 MDA 2021, 

respectively. Both appeals were quashed sua sponte by this Court, as an 

appeal does not lie from an order denying reconsideration. Rather, an appeal 

must be timely filed from the underlying final order. See Commonwealth v. 

Moir, 766 A.2d 1253 (Pa. Super. 2000). 
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Holdings, LLC, sold that property, and then transferred the 

proceeds of the sale to a CJL ... bank account. Subsequently, 

[Mr. Fick] dissipated the funds deposited in that account.

4. [Mr. Fick’s] actions in this matter represent a clear attempt to 

defeat equitable distribution.

5. As such, the balance of funds in the CJL ... bank account ending 

in xxx43 shall be disbursed to resolve the parties’ economic 

claims. Said funds shall be disbursed in the manner 

recommended by the Divorce Master in pages 45 to 48 in the 

Master’s Report and Recommendation....

Order, 7/19/21, at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

On July 22, 2021, Mr. Fick filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a 

timely, court-ordered “Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal” pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on 

September 9, 2021. Mr. Fick now presents the following issues for our review 

on appeal:

1. Did the lower court err as a matter of law in failing to dismiss 

the claim for a quantum meruit marital portion of a legal fee 

in the Perrini/Koziell matter, a pending contingent fee case?

2. Did the lower court err as a matter of law in failing to find that 

the Perrini/Koziell matter was nonmarital property with no 

increase in value during marriage?

3. Did the lower court err as a matter of law in failing to find that 

the Perrini/Koziell fee was future income and therefore 

nonmarital property?

4. Did the Master err as a matter of law in creating multiple 

issues on his own post[-]hearing, which were not raised in 

the hearing, in violation of statutory authority and the 

applicable rules, and in violation of due process?

5. Did the lower court err as a matter of law in failing to find a 

waiver of possible marital claims against the former law 

practice of Mr. Fick as a whole, a premarital property owned 
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by Mr. Fick on Highland Avenue, and a so-called agreement 

for the full payment of Wells Fargo debt by Mr. Fick?

6. Is the record void of necessary competent evidence to 

establish a value of the former law practice?

7. Is the record void of any competent evidence concerning the 

value of the Highland Avenue property owned by Mr. Fick 

prior to marriage and a compete [sic] record relative to the 

purchase of the same and work performed on the property 

prior to marriage?

8. Does the record lack the necessary elements of an agreement 

for Mr. Fick to assume the full Wells Fargo debt?

9. Did the lower court err in awarding attorney’s fees and costs?

10. Did the lower court err as a matter of law in failing to address 

the amount of the Master’s fee considering the actions of the 

Master in exceeding his statutory authority, failing to follow 

established case law and complicating what should have been 

a straightforward divorce action?

11. Did the lower court err as a matter of law in finding that the 

bank account of CJL ... contained marital funds and Mr. Fick 

dissipated marital funds?

12. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in analyzing equitable 

distribution factors?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-5 (suggested answers omitted). 

Before addressing the merits of the numerous claims raised by Mr. Fick, 

we must first determine whether he has properly preserved these issues for 

appellate review. This Court has long recognized that “Rule 1925 is a crucial 

component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify 

and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v. 

Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa. Super. 2004). “The Statement shall 

concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge 

with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 
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1925(b)(4)(ii). However, the filing of a timely Rule 1925(b) statement alone 

“does not automatically equate with issue preservation.” Tucker v. R.M. 

Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

In Tucker, we explained:

This Court has held that when appellants raise an outrageous 

number of issues in their [Rule] 1925(b) statement, the appellants 

have deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule 

1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review 

of the issues [they] now seek to raise. We have further noted that 

such voluminous statements do not identify the issues appellants 

actually intend to raise on appeal.... Further, this type of 

extravagant [Rule] 1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible 

for the trial court to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 

issues.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in the original).

Hence, “the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and 

‘coherent’ such that the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues to 

be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest the existence of 

bad faith.” Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

See Kanter, 866 A.2d at 401 (determining that where a total of 104 issues 

were included in their Rule 1925(b) statements, the appellants raised “an 

outrageous number of issues, ... deliberately circumvented the meaning and 

purpose of Rule 1925(b)[,] and ... thereby effectively precluded appellate 

review of the issues they now seek to raise”). “Even if the trial court correctly 

guesses the issues [an a]ppellant raises on appeal and writes an opinion 

pursuant to that supposition the issues are still waived.” Id. at 400 (internal 

brackets and citation omitted). Moreover, we cannot accord special relief to 
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an appellant merely because of his or her pro se status. See Commonwealth 

v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996) (noting that a pro se appellant 

is not entitled to any particular advantage). 

In the case sub judice, Mr. Fick filed a fourteen-page, single-spaced Rule 

1925(b) statement consisting of 115 errors complained of on appeal.4 This 

voluminous statement is anything but concise and certainly did not identify 

the issues that Mr. Fick actually intended to raise before this Court. Instead, 

Mr. Fick’s Rule 1925(b) statement identified significantly more issues than he 

could have possibly raised on appeal due to appellate briefing limitations, 

forcing the trial court to guess which issues he would actually raise on appeal. 

See TCO at 2 (“Despite an effort to be comprehensive here, this [c]ourt is 

impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis. With so many exceptions raised, 

it is difficult to determine which specific issues [Mr. Fick] intend[s] to raise on 

appeal.... This [o]pinion addresses a multitude of the issues raised and 

provides as full of an analysis as possible under the circumstances.”). 

Thus, we conclude Mr. Fick’s court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement was 

not concise and constitutes bad faith designed to undermine the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. See Jiricko, supra; Kanter, supra. Consequently, 

Mr. Fick has waived all issues on appeal due to his circumventing the meaning 

and purpose of Rule 1925(b), which hinders us from conducting meaningful 

____________________________________________

4 We observe that one of Mr. Fick’s alleged errors incorporates all 120 of his 

exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendation. See TCO at 1 (citing 

Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement at ¶ 93). 
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judicial review. We note that, in addition to Jiricko, Tucker, and Kanter, 

there is ample precedent supporting our analysis and conclusion. See Satiro 

v. Maninno, 237 A.3d 1145 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding waiver of all issues 

where the Rule 1925(b) statement identified 29 issues, declaring the issues 

on appeal were “so voluminous and vague” that the trial court was forced to 

guess at what they are and “there can be no meaningful appellate review”); 

Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86 (Pa. Super. 2005) (concluding that all of Wife’s 

issues were waived after determining Wife “attempted to overwhelm the trial 

court” by filing a seven-page Rule 1925(b) statement identifying twenty-nine 

issues and that Wife’s conduct “breache[d] her duty of good faith and fair 

dealing with the Court and constituted a course of misconduct which is 

designed to ‘undermine the Rules of Appellate Procedure’”) (quoting Kanter, 

866 A.2d at 402). 

Accordingly, we quash this appeal due to our inability to conduct 

meaningful appellate review. 

Appeal quashed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/11/2022