J-S40006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER ROBERSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 677 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0007126-2021

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2024

Appellant Christopher Roberson appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his convictions for persons not to possess firearms, firearms 

not to be carried without a license, and carrying a firearm in public in 

Philadelphia.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress evidence and raises a challenge to evidentiary rulings 

made by the trial court during the suppression hearing. We affirm.

The underlying factual history of this matter are well known to the 

parties. In the instant case, Appellant was charged with multiple violations of 

the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) after police recovered a firearm from his 

waistband during an investigative detention. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively. 
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motion to suppress the firearm in which he claimed that police had neither 

reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to seize the firearm.

Following a suppression hearing on September 29, 2022, the trial court 

set forth the following findings of fact:

[Philadelphia Police Officer Zachary Zgleszewski] testified that on 

June 25, 2021 at approximately 1:15 p.m. he was on duty in an 

unmarked patrol vehicle in the area of 4400 North Gratz Street. 

The officer testified that it was his understanding that Police 

Officer [] Levitt relayed information to him from a Police Officer 

Ajerio, and it was Police Officer Ajerio who told Police Officer Levitt 

that [Appellant] was in the area of 4400 North Gratz Street in a 

Chicago Bulls shirt.[2] At that time this officer, as well as [] 

Officers Levitt, Baker, and Stout began looking and surveilling the 

area for an individual matching that description. In the area of 

4400 North Gratz, the officer testified that he saw a large crowd 

of approximately 50 people, as well as [Appellant] in a Bulls jersey 

on the sidewalk holding a child.

* * *

[T]he crowd is made primarily at that time of women that are 

around [Appellant], and [Appellant] is towards to back of that 

crowd holding a child who looks approximately around the age of 

two.

The officer starts to ask the individuals, the females there to move 

to the side. As he’s doing that, [Appellant] begins handing off the 

child and begins moving his body away. As the officer says, don’t 

do that, [Appellant] then takes off running, passing the child, 

frankly, nearly dropping the child, towards someone else and 

begins to flee. At that point there is a brief foot pursuit.

[Officer Zgleszewski] indicated that he got hold of [Appellant], [] 

Officer Baker then tackled [Appellant], and [] Officer Baker is the 

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2 During the suppression hearing, Officer Zgleszewski testified as follows: 

“Officer Levitt [] relayed information to me that he spoke with Officer Ajerio . 

. . . Officer Ajerio told him that [Appellant] was on 4400 North Gratz wearing 

a Chicago Bulls jersey and was armed with a firearm and was prohibited from 

carrying a firearm.” N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/29/22, at 7.
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individual who made the recovery in [Officer Zgleszewski’s] 

presence of the silver and black Smith & Wesson [.]40 caliber 

[firearm] with 14 live rounds in the front waistband area of 

[Appellant’s] pants. . . .

[Officer Zgleszewski] also testified that the areas of 4400 North 

Gratz, 4500 North Gratz, as well as 19th Street to 17th Street at 

Wingohocking [Street] is a high crime area with a permanent car 

assigned to it due to numerous shootings, homicides, and drug 

sales.

N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/29/22, at 20-22 (some formatting altered).

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Ultimately, following a stipulated 

bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the above-referenced 

offenses. On March 1, 2023, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence 

of eleven months and fifteen days to twenty-three months’ incarceration, to 

be followed by three years’ probation. Appellant filed timely post-sentence 

motions, which the trial court subsequently denied.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal3 and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court wrote a 

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3 The record reflects that the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence 

motions on March 10, 2023. On March 7, 2023, Appellant filed a premature 

notice of appeal, purporting to appeal from the trial court’s September 29, 

2022 order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. It is well settled 

that “a direct appeal by a defendant in a criminal proceeding lies from the 

judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 562 n.1 

(Pa. Super. 2007). Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5), we shall treat Appellant’s 

notice of appeal as filed after the entry of the March 10, 2023 order denying 

Appellant’s post-sentence motions. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 

999, 1008 (Pa. 2011).
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letter to this Court addressing Appellant’s suppression claim.

4

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress physical evidence in 

finding there was reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause 

to stop, detain, arrest, and subsequently search Appellant’s 

person[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth’s 

objections to defense counsel’s inquiry into the constitutional 

classification of the encounter with Appellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (some formatting altered). 

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress. Id. at 10. Specifically, Appellant claims that Officer 

Zgleszewski “was unable to offer any testimony that presented articulable 

facts which supported the reasonable suspicion to stop and seize Appellant.” 

Id. at 12. In support, Appellant argues that Officer Zgleszewski relied solely 

on a tip from other police officers and “did not conduct any form of an 

independent investigation.” Id. at 13 (citing Commonwealth v. Queen, 639 

A.2d 443 (Pa. 1994) (holding that a police officer failed to articulate

reasonable suspicion because he relied solely on a tip from another officer

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4 We note that Hon. Mia Roberts Perez presided over Appellant’s suppression 

hearing and imposed the instant judgment of sentence. Judge Perez was 

nominated for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania by President Joseph R. Biden on July 12, 2022, and was 

confirmed by the United States Senate on December 7, 2022. See 168 Cong. 

Rec. S3244 (daily ed. July 12, 2022); 168 Cong. Rec. S7017 (daily ed. Dec. 

7, 2022). Prior to her resignation from the Philadelphia County Court of 

Common Pleas, Judge Perez sent a letter to this Court addressing the claims 

raised in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement. 
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identifying the defendant as a suspect without any articulable facts justifying 

the identification). Appellant also asserts that neither Officer Zgleszewski’s 

testimony nor the body cam footage support the trial court’s finding that 

Appellant attempted to flee when officers arrived. Appellant’s Brief at 18. In 

any event, Appellant argues that even if his actions could be considered 

“flight,” there was insufficient evidence establishing that police had reasonable 

suspicion. Id. at 19.

The Commonwealth responds that Queen is distinguishable from the 

instant case, as Officer Zgleszewski and his colleagues “did not rely exclusively 

on the unverified hunch of another officer.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 13.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our standard of review:

is limited to determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression 

court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the 

record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. 

Where, . . . the defendant is appealing the ruling of the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression 

rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes 

evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 715 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations

omitted), appeal granted on other grounds, 305 A.3d 541 (Pa. 2023).

It is well settled that “Article I, [Section] 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution both 

protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence 
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arising under both charters has led to the development of three categories of 

interactions between citizens and police.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 

298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. 

The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a 

reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period 

of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest 

or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (Pa. 2006) (citations 

omitted).

[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him 

reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal 

activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in 

that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion 

existed at the time the officer conducted the stop must be 

answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual 

stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court 

must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to 

the officer at the moment of the stop warrant a man of reasonable 

caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citations omitted and some formatting altered).

It is well settled that when determining whether a seizure has taken 

place, a court must apply an objective test:
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[T]o guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has 

been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an 

objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all 

surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have 

believed that he was free to leave. In evaluating the totality of 

the circumstances, our focus is whether, by means of physical 

force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in 

some way been restrained. In making this determination, no 

single factor dictates the ultimate conclusion as to whether a 

seizure has occurred.

Commonwealth v. Green, 298 A.3d 1158, 1163 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations 

omitted and some formatting altered).

Our Supreme Court has held that mere possession of a firearm is 

insufficient to support reasonable suspicion “[u]nless a police officer has prior 

knowledge that a specific individual is not permitted to carry a concealed 

firearm, and absent articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a 

firearm is being used or intended to be used in a criminal manner[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 937 (Pa. 2019).

However, the Hicks Court explained:

A police officer is trained to assess people and situations for 

danger. An officer responding to a dispatch . . . is capable of 

responding in a manner not amounting to a seizure by observing 

the suspect and the circumstances, by determining whether 

anyone appears to be in danger or whether a crime appears to be 

occurring, and by interviewing witnesses about any crimes that 

may have occurred before the officer’s arrival. See

[Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. 1997)]

(reasoning that, where the available information does not give rise 

to reasonable suspicion, “the police must investigate further by 

means not constituting a search and seizure.”). Such activities 

preserve peace, law, and order, and do so without depriving 

anyone of his freedom unless there is cause to do so.

Id. at 946. 
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Our Supreme Court has held that unprovoked flight in a high crime area 

is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. In 

re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001) (applying Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 

U.S. 119 (2000)); see also Commonwealth v. Barnes, 296 A.3d 52, 58 

(Pa. Super. 2023) (reiterating that “unprovoked flight in a high crime area is 

sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion” and that “[w]hile additional facts 

may negate reasonable suspicion, Wardlow requires no additional facts to 

establish reasonable suspicion” (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. 

Dunham, 203 A.3d 272, 278 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that although “flight 

alone is insufficient” to establish reasonable suspicion and that “unprovoked 

flight from police in a high-crime area is sufficient to create reasonable 

suspicion for police pursuit and will not warrant suppression” (citation omitted 

and emphasis added)).

As noted previously, Appellant relies on Queen in support of his 

assertion that Officer Zgleszewski did not have probable cause to effectuate a 

seizure. 

In Queen, a police officer conducted a stop and frisk of the defendant 

solely based on a detective’s comment that the defendant resembled a male 

wanted for robbery. Queen, 639 A.2d at 444. After recovering a firearm 

from the defendant’s waistband, the officer placed him under arrest. Id. The 

defendant subsequently filed a suppression motion and the trial court 

conducted a hearing. Id. After hearing testimony from the police officer, the 

trial court denied the motion to suppress. Id. On appeal, the Pennsylvania 
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Supreme Court concluded that the suppression court erred in denying the 

defendant’s motion because it was the detective, rather than the arresting 

officer, who possessed the information which formed the basis for the seizure. 

Id. at 445-46.

In reaching that conclusion, the Queen Court explained that

[t]o hold otherwise would permit the government to bypass the 

protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution by always having a second police 

officer summoned for assistance for the purpose of making the 

inquiry of a suspect on the basis of an initial police officer’s 

suspicion. At no time would the government have to establish any 

articulable facts, thus completely emasculating the protections 

against illegal searches and seizures.

Id. at 445.

In the instant case, Officer Zgleszewski testified that he initially began 

patrolling the area with two other officers after receiving information from 

Officer Levitt, who indicated that Appellant was reportedly “on 4400 North 

Gratz wearing a Chicago Bulls jersey and was armed with a firearm and was 

prohibited from carrying a firearm.” N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 7. Officer 

Zgleszewski described 4400 North Gratz Street as a high crime area, with 

“numerous shootings, homicides, [and] drug sales.” Id. at 10. Officer 

Zgleszewski testified that after he arrived at the scene, Appellant saw the 

police officers, then immediately attempted to flee. Id. at 8.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court explained:

While I understand the basis of [Appellant’s] argument that this 

is analogous to Queen, I think there are several circumstances 

happening here. There are elements of this that absolutely mimic 
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that of Queen; however, in this particular case we have the added 

interactions between the officers and [Appellant], in particular 

that before the officers even fully approach or address [Appellant, 

Appellant] begins making movements away from the officer. 

Again, as [the trial court] will emphasize, holding a child and 

almost dropping the child as he’s passing, tossing the child to 

another person, and he begins his flight.

Based on all of that, I do believe that [Appellant’s] flight was 

irrespective of just the information that was provided to these 

officers regarding the individual in the Bulls shirt. There [are]

additional elements here. The officers could not even get to 

the next layer before [Appellant] started attempting to flee 

in a high crime area.

Additionally, I think there is some argument to be made that this 

would be almost similar to that of an anonymous radio call 

followed by the extra layer of flight in a high crime area.

Because of that, I am going to deny [Appellant’s] motion to 

suppress.

N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 22-23.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, and we discern no error in the 

trial court’s legal conclusions. See Lear, 290 A.3d at 715. As noted 

previously, the trial court credited Officer Zgleszewski’s testimony that 

Appellant attempted to flee when the officers began to approach the scene,

which was located in a high crime area. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 22. 

Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Officer Zgleszewski 

had reasonable suspicion to seize Appellant. See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 937; 

Queen, 639 A.2d at 445-46.

Further, unlike in Queen and Hicks, Officer Zgleszewski relied on a 

combination of factors in developing reasonable suspicion, which included 
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Appellant’s unprovoked flight in a high crime area and the report from other 

officers which indicated that Appellant was in the area of 4400 North Gratz 

Street wearing a Chicago Bulls jersey and was armed with a firearm that he 

was prohibited from carrying. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 7. Cf. Hicks, 

208 A.3d at 937; Queen, 639 A.2d at 445-46. Under the totality of these 

circumstances, the trial court properly concluded that Officer Zgleszewski had 

reasonable suspicion. See Dunham, 203 A.3d at 278. Accordingly, Appellant 

is not entitled to relief. 

Scope of Cross-Examination

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when 

it sustained the Commonwealth’s objections during Appellant’s crossexamination of Officer Zgleszewski. Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. Specifically, 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by precluding Appellant from 

eliciting testimony from Officer Zgleszewski regarding his subjective view of 

the type of interaction he had with Appellant. Id. at 22-23. Appellant further

argues that, had he been permitted to pursue that line of questioning, Officer 

Zgleszewski would have confirmed that Appellant “was not free to leave 

and/or was to be detained pending an investigation[.]” Id. at 23. 

The Commonwealth responds that the testimony at issue was not 

relevant and therefore, the trial court did not err when it sustained the 

Commonwealth’s objections. Commonwealth’s Brief at 16.

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Luster, 234 A.3d 836, 838 (Pa. Super. 2020). It is well 
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settled that “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but 

is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of 

judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, illwill or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. 

Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state that “[a]ll relevant evidence 

is admissible,” while “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” 

Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact 

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact 

is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401.

As noted above, this Court employs an objective test to determine 

whether a seizure has taken place. See Green, 298 A.3d at 1163. This Court 

has further held:

[T]he officer’s subjective views are as immaterial to the objective 

standard as are [the defendant’s]. See Commonwealth v. 

Lagana, 537 A.2d 1351, 1355 n.4 (Pa. 1988) (citation omitted) 

(“The test of when a person is arrested is an objective one and 

depends upon the reasonable impression conveyed to the person 

seized and not the subjective view of the officers or the person 

being seized.”).

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1201-02 (Pa. Super. 2022), 

(quoting Lyles, 97 A.3d at 307 n.6) (some formatting altered), appeal denied

283 A.3d 793 (Pa. 2022). The Lyles Court further held that whether a seizure 

occurs is a question of law. Lyles, 97 A.3d at 302.
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Here, at the suppression hearing, the following exchange occurred 

during Appellant’s cross-examination of Officer Zgleszewski:

Q: All right. Now, when you approach [Appellant], as you saw 

in the video, you would agree with me that Officer Baker, upon I 

guess getting through the young ladies in the crowd, says, don’t 

move, correct?

A: Yeah, as he’s beginning to shuffle.

[The Commonwealth]: I’m going to object, it goes to the 

ultimate question here, it’s a finding of law.

The Court: Sustained.

Q: Is [Appellant] at that point, is he being detained?

[The Commonwealth]: Objection; same grounds.

The Court: Sustained.

Q: Are you attempting or your brother officers attempting to 

seize him to perform a frisk?

[The Commonwealth]: Objection.

The Court: Sustained. Rephrase, Counsel.

Q: What is your intention in this video? We saw the video, 

you’re on scene, what is you[sic] and your brother officers’ 

intention at the point that you encounter [Appellant]?

A: To talk to him and ask him if he had a firearm, if he does, 

do you have a permit to carry.

Q: Sure. And that’s what you classify as a mere encounter; 

correct, sir?

A: Correct.

Q: And you would agree with me that if it’s a mere encounter, 

he certainly would be free to leave; right?

[The Commonwealth]: Objection.

The Court: Sustained.
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N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 14-15 (some formatting altered and emphasis 

added).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to Appellant’s line 

of questioning. See Luster, 234 A.3d at 838. As noted above, we apply an 

objective standard when determining whether a seizure has occurred. See 

Green, 298 A.3d at 1163. Therefore, Officer Zgleszewski’s subjective views 

on his interaction with Appellant were “immaterial to the objective standard.” 

See Thomas, 273 A.3d at 1201 (quoting Lyles, 97 A.3d at 307 n.6). 

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. For these reasons, 

we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 2/21/2024