# Dziennik Urzędowy C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-1002
  doi:10.3000/19771002.C_2013.237.pol |
| --- | --- |
| Dziennik Urzędowy
  Unii Europejskiej | C 237 |
| | |
| Wydanie polskie | Informacje i zawiadomienia | Tom 5615 sierpnia 2013 |

ISSN 1977-1002

doi:10.3000/19771002.C_2013.237.pol

Dziennik Urzędowy

Unii Europejskiej

C 237

Wydanie polskie

Informacje i zawiadomienia

Tom 5615 sierpnia 2013

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| Powiadomienie nr | Spis treśći | Strona |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikaty |
| | KOMUNIKATY INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ |
| | Komisja Europejska |
| 2013/C 237/01 | Brak sprzeciwu wobec zgłoszonej koncentracji (Sprawa COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Powiadomienie nr

Spis treśći

Strona

II   Komunikaty

KOMUNIKATY INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Komisja Europejska

2013/C 237/01

Brak sprzeciwu wobec zgłoszonej koncentracji (Sprawa COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informacje |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACJE INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ |
| | Komisja Europejska |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Kursy walutowe euro | 2 |
| | ZAWIADOMIENIA DOTYCZĄCE EUROPEJSKIEGO OBSZARU GOSPODARCZEGO |
| | Urząd Nadzoru EFTA |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Pomoc państwa – Decyzja o zamknięciu postępowania w sprawie istniejącej pomocy w związku z przyjęciem odpowiednich środków przez państwo EFTA | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Zaproszenie do zgłaszania uwag zgodnie z art. 1 ust. 2 w części I Protokołu 3 do Porozumienia między państwami EFTA w sprawie ustanowienia Urzędu Nadzoru i Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, dotyczących kwestii pomocy państwa związanych z pomocą regionalną na rzecz programu zachęt inwestycyjnych i sześciu umów inwestycyjnych | 4 |

IV   Informacje

INFORMACJE INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Komisja Europejska

2013/C 237/02

Kursy walutowe euro

2

ZAWIADOMIENIA DOTYCZĄCE EUROPEJSKIEGO OBSZARU GOSPODARCZEGO

Urząd Nadzoru EFTA

2013/C 237/03

Pomoc państwa – Decyzja o zamknięciu postępowania w sprawie istniejącej pomocy w związku z przyjęciem odpowiednich środków przez państwo EFTA

3

2013/C 237/04

Zaproszenie do zgłaszania uwag zgodnie z art. 1 ust. 2 w części I Protokołu 3 do Porozumienia między państwami EFTA w sprawie ustanowienia Urzędu Nadzoru i Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, dotyczących kwestii pomocy państwa związanych z pomocą regionalną na rzecz programu zachęt inwestycyjnych i sześciu umów inwestycyjnych

4

| | V   Ogłoszenia |
| --- | --- |
| | POSTĘPOWANIA ZWIĄZANE Z REALIZACJĄ POLITYKI KONKURENCJI |
| | Komisja Europejska |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Komunikat Komisji opublikowany na podstawie art. 27 ust. 4 rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 w sprawach AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II and AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | INNE AKTY |
| | Komisja Europejska |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. a) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. a) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. b) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych | 40 |

V   Ogłoszenia

POSTĘPOWANIA ZWIĄZANE Z REALIZACJĄ POLITYKI KONKURENCJI

Komisja Europejska

2013/C 237/05

Komunikat Komisji opublikowany na podstawie art. 27 ust. 4 rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 w sprawach AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II and AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

28

INNE AKTY

Komisja Europejska

2013/C 237/06

Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. a) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych

31

2013/C 237/07

Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. a) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych

36

2013/C 237/08

Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. b) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych

40

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Tekst mający znaczenie dla EOG |

---

(1)   Tekst mający znaczenie dla EOG

1

| PL | |
| --- | --- |

PL

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II Komunikaty

KOMUNIKATY INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Komisja Europejska

| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/1

---

Brak sprzeciwu wobec zgłoszonej koncentracji

(Sprawa COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Tekst mający znaczenie dla EOG)

2013/C 237/01

W dniu 18 kwietnia 2013 r. Komisja podjęła decyzję o niewyrażaniu sprzeciwu wobec powyższej zgłoszonej koncentracji i uznaniu jej za zgodną ze wspólnym rynkiem. Decyzja ta została oparta na art. 6 ust. 1 lit. b) rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 139/2004. Pełny tekst decyzji dostępny jest wyłącznie w języku angielskim i zostanie podany do wiadomości publicznej po uprzednim usunięciu ewentualnych informacji stanowiących tajemnicę handlową. Tekst zostanie udostępniony:

| — | w dziale dotyczącym połączeń przedsiębiorstw na stronie internetowej Komisji poświęconej konkurencji: (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Powyższa strona została wyposażona w różne funkcje pomagające odnaleźć konkretną decyzję w sprawie połączenia, w tym indeksy wyszukiwania według nazwy przedsiębiorstwa, numeru sprawy, daty i sektora, |
| --- | --- |

—

w dziale dotyczącym połączeń przedsiębiorstw na stronie internetowej Komisji poświęconej konkurencji: (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Powyższa strona została wyposażona w różne funkcje pomagające odnaleźć konkretną decyzję w sprawie połączenia, w tym indeksy wyszukiwania według nazwy przedsiębiorstwa, numeru sprawy, daty i sektora,

| — | w formie elektronicznej na stronie internetowej EUR-Lex jako numerem dokumentu 32013M6843 Strona EUR-Lex zapewnia internetowy dostęp do europejskiego prawa. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). |
| --- | --- |

—

w formie elektronicznej na stronie internetowej EUR-Lex jako numerem dokumentu 32013M6843 Strona EUR-Lex zapewnia internetowy dostęp do europejskiego prawa. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm).

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IV Informacje

INFORMACJE INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Komisja Europejska

| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/2

---

Kursy walutowe euro (1)

14 sierpnia 2013 r.

2013/C 237/02

1 euro =

| | Waluta | Kurs wymiany |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dolar amerykański | 1,3243 |
| JPY | Jen | 130,17 |
| DKK | Korona duńska | 7,4583 |
| GBP | Funt szterling | 0,85440 |
| SEK | Korona szwedzka | 8,6393 |
| CHF | Frank szwajcarski | 1,2415 |
| ISK | Korona islandzka | |
| NOK | Korona norweska | 7,8130 |
| BGN | Lew | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Korona czeska | 25,822 |
| HUF | Forint węgierski | 298,62 |
| LTL | Lit litewski | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Łat łotewski | 0,7025 |
| PLN | Złoty polski | 4,2037 |
| RON | Lej rumuński | 4,4315 |
| TRY | Lir turecki | 2,5664 |
| AUD | Dolar australijski | 1,4524 |
| CAD | Dolar kanadyjski | 1,3689 |
| HKD | Dolar Hongkongu | 10,2705 |
| NZD | Dolar nowozelandzki | 1,6501 |
| SGD | Dolar singapurski | 1,6835 |
| KRW | Won | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | Rand | 13,2129 |
| CNY | Yuan renminbi | 8,1041 |
| HRK | Kuna chorwacka | 7,5415 |
| IDR | Rupia indonezyjska | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | Ringgit malezyjski | 4,3351 |
| PHP | Peso filipińskie | 57,975 |
| RUB | Rubel rosyjski | 43,8995 |
| THB | Bat tajlandzki | 41,504 |
| BRL | Real | 3,0586 |
| MXN | Peso meksykańskie | 16,8756 |
| INR | Rupia indyjska | 81,3700 |

Waluta

Kurs wymiany

USD

Dolar amerykański

1,3243

JPY

Jen

130,17

DKK

Korona duńska

7,4583

GBP

Funt szterling

0,85440

SEK

Korona szwedzka

8,6393

CHF

Frank szwajcarski

1,2415

ISK

Korona islandzka

NOK

Korona norweska

7,8130

BGN

Lew

1,9558

CZK

Korona czeska

25,822

HUF

Forint węgierski

298,62

LTL

Lit litewski

3,4528

LVL

Łat łotewski

0,7025

PLN

Złoty polski

4,2037

RON

Lej rumuński

4,4315

TRY

Lir turecki

2,5664

AUD

Dolar australijski

1,4524

CAD

Dolar kanadyjski

1,3689

HKD

Dolar Hongkongu

10,2705

NZD

Dolar nowozelandzki

1,6501

SGD

Dolar singapurski

1,6835

KRW

Won

1 482,39

ZAR

Rand

13,2129

CNY

Yuan renminbi

8,1041

HRK

Kuna chorwacka

7,5415

IDR

Rupia indonezyjska

13 667,59

MYR

Ringgit malezyjski

4,3351

PHP

Peso filipińskie

57,975

RUB

Rubel rosyjski

43,8995

THB

Bat tajlandzki

41,504

BRL

Real

3,0586

MXN

Peso meksykańskie

16,8756

INR

Rupia indyjska

81,3700

---

(1)  Źródło: referencyjny kurs wymiany walut opublikowany przez EBC.

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ZAWIADOMIENIA DOTYCZĄCE EUROPEJSKIEGO OBSZARU GOSPODARCZEGO

Urząd Nadzoru EFTA

| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/3

---

Pomoc państwa – Decyzja o zamknięciu postępowania w sprawie istniejącej pomocy w związku z przyjęciem odpowiednich środków przez państwo EFTA

2013/C 237/03

Urząd Nadzoru EFTA zaproponował odpowiednie środki, które zostały zaakceptowane przez Islandię, odnośnie do następującego środka pomocy:

| Data przyjęcia decyzji | : | 24 kwietnia 2013 r. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numer sprawy | : | 70958 |
| Numer decyzji | : | 159/13/COL |
| Państwo EFTA | : | Islandia |
| Nazwa środka pomocy | : | Pomoc państwa przyznana Landsvirkjun i Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Podstawa prawna | : | Ustawa nr 42/1983 o Landsvirkjun, ustawa nr 45/1998 o samorządzie terytorialnym, ustawa nr 139/2001 o ustanowieniu Orkuveita Reykjavíkur jako przedsiębiorstwa będącego wspólną własnością oraz ustawa nr 121/1997 o gwarancjach państwowych |
| Cel pomocy | : | Brak danych |
| Forma pomocy | : | Nieograniczone gwarancje właścicieli państwowych i lokalnych dla Landsvirkjun i Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, nieuwzględniające płatności odpowiednich stawek rynkowych |
| Sektory gospodarki | : | Sektor energii elektrycznej |
| Inne informacje | : | W związku ze środkami podjętymi przez władze islandzkie w celu zniesienia nieograniczonych gwarancji państwowych dla Landsvirkjun i Orkuveita Reykjavíkur oraz dalszymi zobowiązaniami, obawy Urzędu dotyczące niezgodności tego programu zostały rozwiane, zaś postępowanie zostało zamknięte |

Data przyjęcia decyzji

:

24 kwietnia 2013 r.

Numer sprawy

:

70958

Numer decyzji

:

159/13/COL

Państwo EFTA

:

Islandia

Nazwa środka pomocy

:

Pomoc państwa przyznana Landsvirkjun i Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Podstawa prawna

:

Ustawa nr 42/1983 o Landsvirkjun, ustawa nr 45/1998 o samorządzie terytorialnym, ustawa nr 139/2001 o ustanowieniu Orkuveita Reykjavíkur jako przedsiębiorstwa będącego wspólną własnością oraz ustawa nr 121/1997 o gwarancjach państwowych

Cel pomocy

:

Brak danych

Forma pomocy

:

Nieograniczone gwarancje właścicieli państwowych i lokalnych dla Landsvirkjun i Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, nieuwzględniające płatności odpowiednich stawek rynkowych

Sektory gospodarki

:

Sektor energii elektrycznej

Inne informacje

:

W związku ze środkami podjętymi przez władze islandzkie w celu zniesienia nieograniczonych gwarancji państwowych dla Landsvirkjun i Orkuveita Reykjavíkur oraz dalszymi zobowiązaniami, obawy Urzędu dotyczące niezgodności tego programu zostały rozwiane, zaś postępowanie zostało zamknięte

Tekst decyzji w autentycznej wersji językowej, z którego usunięto wszystkie informacje poufne, można znaleźć na stronie Urzędu Nadzoru EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/4

---

Zaproszenie do zgłaszania uwag zgodnie z art. 1 ust. 2 w części I Protokołu 3 do Porozumienia między państwami EFTA w sprawie ustanowienia Urzędu Nadzoru i Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, dotyczących kwestii pomocy państwa związanych z pomocą regionalną na rzecz programu zachęt inwestycyjnych i sześciu umów inwestycyjnych

2013/C 237/04

Decyzją nr 177/13/COL z dnia 30 kwietnia 2013 r., zamieszczoną w autentycznej wersji językowej na stronach następujących po niniejszym streszczeniu, Urząd Nadzoru EFTA wszczął postępowanie na mocy art. 1 ust. 2 w części I Protokołu 3 do Porozumienia między państwami EFTA w sprawie ustanowienia Urzędu Nadzoru i Trybunału Sprawiedliwości. Władze Islandii otrzymały stosowną informację wraz z kopią wyżej wymienionej decyzji.

Urząd Nadzoru EFTA wzywa niniejszym państwa EFTA, państwa członkowskie UE oraz inne zainteresowane strony do zgłaszania uwag w sprawie omawianego środka w terminie jednego miesiąca od daty publikacji niniejszego zaproszenia na poniższy adres Urzędu Nadzoru EFTA:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Uwagi zostaną przekazane władzom islandzkim. Zainteresowane strony zgłaszające uwagi mogą wystąpić z odpowiednio uzasadnionym pisemnym wnioskiem o objęcie ich tożsamości klauzulą poufności.

STRESZCZENIE

Procedura

Dnia 13 października 2010 r. decyzją nr 390/10/COL Urząd zaakceptował program zachęt inwestycyjnych (zwany dalej „programem”) zgłoszony przez władze islandzkie zgodnie z art. 1 ust. 3 w części I protokołu 3.

Program umożliwia udzielanie pomocy w formie dotacji bezpośrednich, poprzez różne zwolnienia podatkowe na okres do 10 lat oraz poprzez sprzedaż i dzierżawę terenów poniżej wartości rynkowej przedsiębiorstwom ze wszystkich sektorów rynku poza sektorem finansowym w związku z inwestycją początkową na obszarach kwalifikujących się do pomocy regionalnej (zwanych „regionami c”) w Islandii. Program kończy się dnia 31 grudnia 2013 r.

Podstawę prawną programu zaakceptowanego przez Urząd stanowią:

| — | ustawa nr 99/2010 w sprawie zachęt do prowadzenia inwestycji początkowych w Islandii (zwana dalej „ustawą”), przyjęta przez islandzki parlament dnia 29 czerwca 2010 r. oraz |
| --- | --- |

—

ustawa nr 99/2010 w sprawie zachęt do prowadzenia inwestycji początkowych w Islandii (zwana dalej „ustawą”), przyjęta przez islandzki parlament dnia 29 czerwca 2010 r. oraz

| — | rozporządzenie (UE) nr 985/2010 w sprawie zachęt do prowadzenia inwestycji początkowych w Islandii wydane przez Ministerstwo Przemysłu dnia 25 listopada 2010 r. (zwane dalej „rozporządzeniem”), odpowiadające projektowi rozporządzenia przedstawionemu Urzędowi dnia 27 września 2010 r. Rozporządzenie stanowi akt prawodawstwa wtórnego oparty na ustawie. |
| --- | --- |

—

rozporządzenie (UE) nr 985/2010 w sprawie zachęt do prowadzenia inwestycji początkowych w Islandii wydane przez Ministerstwo Przemysłu dnia 25 listopada 2010 r. (zwane dalej „rozporządzeniem”), odpowiadające projektowi rozporządzenia przedstawionemu Urzędowi dnia 27 września 2010 r. Rozporządzenie stanowi akt prawodawstwa wtórnego oparty na ustawie.

Dnia 30 grudnia 2010 r. Ministerstwo Przemysłu wydało nowe rozporządzenie – (UE) nr 1150/2010 (zwane dalej „dodatkowym rozporządzeniem”) zmieniające rozporządzenie, w szczególności w kwestii zapewniania efektu zachęty pomocy inwestycyjnej. Dodatkowe rozporządzenie nie zostało zgłoszone Urzędowi.

W okresie 2010–2013 państwo islandzkie zawarło szereg umów, które uznało za wchodzące w zakres programu (zwanych dalej „sześcioma umowami inwestycyjnymi”):

| 1) | dnia 30 grudnia 2010 r. z Becromal Iceland ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

1)

dnia 30 grudnia 2010 r. z Becromal Iceland ehf.;

| 2) | dnia 30 grudnia 2010 r. z Thorsil ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

2)

dnia 30 grudnia 2010 r. z Thorsil ehf.;

| 3) | dnia 17 lutego 2011 r. z Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

3)

dnia 17 lutego 2011 r. z Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf.;

| 4) | dnia 22 września 2011 r. z Verne Real Estate II ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

4)

dnia 22 września 2011 r. z Verne Real Estate II ehf.;

| 5) | dnia 7 maja 2012 r. z GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

5)

dnia 7 maja 2012 r. z GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| 6) | dnia 28 stycznia 2013 r. z Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6)

dnia 28 stycznia 2013 r. z Marmeti ehf.

Dnia 13 grudnia 2012 r., w następstwie rozmów poprzedzających zgłoszenie, władze islandzkie zgłosiły Urzędowi zgodnie z art. 1 ust. 3 w części I protokołu 3 szereg proponowanych zmian (zwanych dalej „zgłoszonymi zmianami”) do ustawy.

Ocena środka

Zgłoszone zmiany polegają na zniesieniu dotacji bezpośrednich, nowej metodzie wprowadzania maksymalnego podatku od przedsiębiorstw dla wszystkich nowych projektów w ramach programu, zwolnieniu z opłaty skarbowej oraz zwiększeniu zakresu zwolnienia z gminnego podatku od nieruchomości oraz składek na ubezpieczenie społeczne. Urząd doszedł do wstępnego wniosku, zgodnie z którym zgłoszonych zmian w programie nie można oddzielić od samego programu. W związku z tym Urząd dokonał oceny programu w całości, w zmienionej formie. Następnie Urząd dokonał oceny stosowania programu i stwierdził, że niektóre elementy sześciu umów inwestycyjnych, które Islandia zawarła w ramach zmienionego programu, budzą wątpliwości co do zgodności z Porozumieniem EOG.

Urząd w szczególności wyraził wątpliwości co do tego, czy pomoc udzielona w ramach umów inwestycyjnych z Becromal, Kísilfélagið oraz Verne wchodzi w zakres programu w formie, w jakiej został zaakceptowany przez Urząd, i czy spełnia wymóg efektu zachęty pomocy inwestycyjnej.

Ponadto Urząd miał wątpliwości, czy umowa inwestycyjna z Marmeti wchodzi w zakres programu, jeśli chodzi o wymóg istnienia efektu zachęty.

Następnie Urząd miał wątpliwości co do tego, czy niektóre elementy umowy inwestycyjnej z Thorsil i GMR nie zapewniają pomocy wykraczającej poza ramy zaakceptowanego programu.

W związku z powyższym Urząd miał wątpliwości, czy program pomocy w zmienionej formie oraz pomoc udzielona w ramach sześciu umów inwestycyjnych mogą być uznane jako zgodne z Porozumieniem EOG.

Podsumowanie

W świetle powyższego, Urząd wyraża wątpliwość, czy program pomocy w zmienionej formie oraz sześć umów inwestycyjnych, o których mowa powyżej, są zgodne z art. 61 ust. 3 Porozumienia EOG w związku z warunkami określonymi w wytycznych Urzędu dotyczących pomocy regionalnej.

W świetle powyższych zastrzeżeń Urząd podjął decyzję o wszczęciu formalnego postępowania wyjaśniającego zgodnie z art. 1 ust. 2 w części I Protokołu 3 do Porozumienia między państwami EFTA w sprawie ustanowienia Urzędu Nadzoru i Trybunału Sprawiedliwości odnośnie do programu zachęt inwestycyjnych wraz ze zmianami zgłoszonymi przez władze islandzkie i zmienionego rozporządzeniem (UE) nr 1150/2010 wprowadzonym w życie przez władze islandzkie oraz odnośnie do sześciu umów inwestycyjnych.

Zainteresowane strony wzywa się do nadsyłania uwag w terminie jednego miesiąca od publikacji niniejszego zawiadomienia w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
| --- | --- |

(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
| --- | --- |

(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
| --- | --- |

(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
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(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
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(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Ogłoszenia

POSTĘPOWANIA ZWIĄZANE Z REALIZACJĄ POLITYKI KONKURENCJI

Komisja Europejska

| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/28

---

Komunikat Komisji opublikowany na podstawie art. 27 ust. 4 rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 w sprawach AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II and AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   WPROWADZENIE

| 1. | Zgodnie z art. 9 rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia w życie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 101 i 102 Traktatu (1) Komisja może zdecydować – w przypadkach, w których zamierza przyjąć decyzję nakazującą zaprzestania naruszenia i gdy zainteresowane strony zaproponują zobowiązania uwzględniające zastrzeżenia wyrażone przez Komisję w ocenie wstępnej – o uczynieniu takich zobowiązań wiążącymi dla przedsiębiorstw. Decyzja taka może zostać przyjęta na czas określony i oznacza, że nie ma już dalszych podstaw do podejmowania działań przez Komisję. Przed przyjęciem decyzji na podstawie art. 9 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 Komisja, zgodnie z art. 27 ust. 4 tego samego rozporządzenia, publikuje zwięzłe streszczenie sprawy i zasadniczą treść zobowiązań. Zainteresowane strony mogą przedłożyć swoje uwagi w terminie wyznaczonym przez Komisję. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Zgodnie z art. 9 rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2003 z dnia 16 grudnia 2002 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia w życie reguł konkurencji ustanowionych w art. 101 i 102 Traktatu (1) Komisja może zdecydować – w przypadkach, w których zamierza przyjąć decyzję nakazującą zaprzestania naruszenia i gdy zainteresowane strony zaproponują zobowiązania uwzględniające zastrzeżenia wyrażone przez Komisję w ocenie wstępnej – o uczynieniu takich zobowiązań wiążącymi dla przedsiębiorstw. Decyzja taka może zostać przyjęta na czas określony i oznacza, że nie ma już dalszych podstaw do podejmowania działań przez Komisję. Przed przyjęciem decyzji na podstawie art. 9 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 Komisja, zgodnie z art. 27 ust. 4 tego samego rozporządzenia, publikuje zwięzłe streszczenie sprawy i zasadniczą treść zobowiązań. Zainteresowane strony mogą przedłożyć swoje uwagi w terminie wyznaczonym przez Komisję.

2.   STRESZCZENIE SPRAWY

| 2. | W dniu 6 czerwca 2013 r. Komisja przyjęła ocenę wstępną w rozumieniu art. 9 ust. 1 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 skierowaną do przedsiębiorstwa Deutsche Bahn AG oraz jego spółek zależnych DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG i DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

W dniu 6 czerwca 2013 r. Komisja przyjęła ocenę wstępną w rozumieniu art. 9 ust. 1 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 skierowaną do przedsiębiorstwa Deutsche Bahn AG oraz jego spółek zależnych DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG i DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2).

| 3. | W ocenie wstępnej Komisja wyraziła zaniepokojenie, że grupa DB mogła nadużyć swojej dominującej pozycji na rynku dostaw energii trakcyjnej w Niemczech poprzez stosowanie wobec konkurentów cen energii trakcyjnej, które powodowały zawężenie marży na rynku dalekobieżnego kolejowego transportu pasażerskiego i na rynku kolejowego transportu towarowego, naruszając art. 102 TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

3.

W ocenie wstępnej Komisja wyraziła zaniepokojenie, że grupa DB mogła nadużyć swojej dominującej pozycji na rynku dostaw energii trakcyjnej w Niemczech poprzez stosowanie wobec konkurentów cen energii trakcyjnej, które powodowały zawężenie marży na rynku dalekobieżnego kolejowego transportu pasażerskiego i na rynku kolejowego transportu towarowego, naruszając art. 102 TFUE.

| 4. | Komisja wstępnie uznaje, że przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie zajmuje pozycję dominującą na rynku dostaw energii trakcyjnej dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych prowadzących działalność w Niemczech. Energia trakcyjna jest dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych surowcem niezbędnym do konkurowania na niemieckich rynkach transportu kolejowego. Od 2003 r. przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie oferuje energię trakcyjną przedsiębiorstwom kolejowym w ramach całościowej oferty obejmującej cenę zużywanej energii elektrycznej (cenę energii) i cenę korzystania z sieci dystrybucyjnej energii trakcyjnej (opłatę za dostęp do sieci). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Komisja wstępnie uznaje, że przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie zajmuje pozycję dominującą na rynku dostaw energii trakcyjnej dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych prowadzących działalność w Niemczech. Energia trakcyjna jest dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych surowcem niezbędnym do konkurowania na niemieckich rynkach transportu kolejowego. Od 2003 r. przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie oferuje energię trakcyjną przedsiębiorstwom kolejowym w ramach całościowej oferty obejmującej cenę zużywanej energii elektrycznej (cenę energii) i cenę korzystania z sieci dystrybucyjnej energii trakcyjnej (opłatę za dostęp do sieci).

| 5. | W ocenie wstępnej Komisja uznała, że taki system cen, a w szczególności zniżki, z których przewoźnicy kolejowi należący do grupy DB korzystali w większym stopniu niż ich konkurenci, mógł utrudniać rozwój konkurencji na rynku kolejowego transportu towarowego i na rynku dalekobieżnego kolejowego transportu pasażerskiego. W odniesieniu do tych rynków Komisja obawia się, że system cen energii trakcyjnej stosowany przez przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie może prowadzić do różnic w cenach energii trakcyjnej stosowanych wobec konkurentów oraz do sytuacji, w której ceny usług transportu kolejowego stosowane wobec konsumentów przez przedsiębiorstwa transportowe należące do grupy DB uniemożliwiają ich równie efektywnym konkurentom osiągnięcie zysków bądź też ograniczają ich marżę zysku. W dochodzeniu Komisji wstępnie stwierdzono, że w przedmiotowej sytuacji występują problemy w zakresie konkurencji na rynku dalekobieżnego kolejowego transportu pasażerskiego i na rynku kolejowego transportu towarowego. |
| --- | --- |

5.

W ocenie wstępnej Komisja uznała, że taki system cen, a w szczególności zniżki, z których przewoźnicy kolejowi należący do grupy DB korzystali w większym stopniu niż ich konkurenci, mógł utrudniać rozwój konkurencji na rynku kolejowego transportu towarowego i na rynku dalekobieżnego kolejowego transportu pasażerskiego. W odniesieniu do tych rynków Komisja obawia się, że system cen energii trakcyjnej stosowany przez przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie może prowadzić do różnic w cenach energii trakcyjnej stosowanych wobec konkurentów oraz do sytuacji, w której ceny usług transportu kolejowego stosowane wobec konsumentów przez przedsiębiorstwa transportowe należące do grupy DB uniemożliwiają ich równie efektywnym konkurentom osiągnięcie zysków bądź też ograniczają ich marżę zysku. W dochodzeniu Komisji wstępnie stwierdzono, że w przedmiotowej sytuacji występują problemy w zakresie konkurencji na rynku dalekobieżnego kolejowego transportu pasażerskiego i na rynku kolejowego transportu towarowego.

| 6. | W listopadzie 2010 r. niemiecki Federalny Trybunał Sprawiedliwości orzekł, że sieć dystrybucji energii trakcyjnej uznaje się za sieć energetyczną, a warunki dostępu do tej sieci i związane z nim opłaty są regulowane niemiecką ustawą o sektorze energetycznym (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). W związku z tym przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie powinno pobierać opłatę za dostęp do sieci osobno, aby umożliwić dostawcom energii będącym stronami trzecimi (tj. nienależącym do grupy DB) konkurowanie z przedsiębiorstwem DB Energie na rynku dostaw energii elektrycznej dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych (4). |
| --- | --- |

6.

W listopadzie 2010 r. niemiecki Federalny Trybunał Sprawiedliwości orzekł, że sieć dystrybucji energii trakcyjnej uznaje się za sieć energetyczną, a warunki dostępu do tej sieci i związane z nim opłaty są regulowane niemiecką ustawą o sektorze energetycznym (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). W związku z tym przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie powinno pobierać opłatę za dostęp do sieci osobno, aby umożliwić dostawcom energii będącym stronami trzecimi (tj. nienależącym do grupy DB) konkurowanie z przedsiębiorstwem DB Energie na rynku dostaw energii elektrycznej dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych (4).

3.   ZASADNICZA TREŚĆ ZAPROPONOWANYCH ZOBOWIĄZAŃ

| 7. | Grupa DB nie zgadza się ze wstępną oceną Komisji, w której stwierdzono, że grupa mogła nadużyć swojej dominującej pozycji na rynku dostaw energii trakcyjnej dla niemieckich przedsiębiorstw kolejowych. Niemniej jednak zgodnie z art. 9 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 grupa zaproponowała zobowiązania, których może się podjąć, by uwzględnić zastrzeżenia Komisji w zakresie konkurencji. Główne elementy tych zobowiązań są następujące: |
| --- | --- |

7.

Grupa DB nie zgadza się ze wstępną oceną Komisji, w której stwierdzono, że grupa mogła nadużyć swojej dominującej pozycji na rynku dostaw energii trakcyjnej dla niemieckich przedsiębiorstw kolejowych. Niemniej jednak zgodnie z art. 9 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 grupa zaproponowała zobowiązania, których może się podjąć, by uwzględnić zastrzeżenia Komisji w zakresie konkurencji. Główne elementy tych zobowiązań są następujące:

| 8. | Najpóźniej w ciągu 3 miesięcy od dnia powiadomienia o decyzji Komisji uznającej zobowiązania za wiążące dla grupy DB, lecz nie wcześniej niż w dniu 1 stycznia 2014 r. przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie wprowadzi nowy system cen energii trakcyjnej, z osobnym cennikiem za energię elektryczną i osobnymi opłatami za dostęp do sieci, zatwierdzony przez właściwy niemiecki organ regulacyjny (Bundesnetzagentur). Nowy system cen opracowano, aby zapewnić wejście dostawców energii będących stronami trzecimi na rynek dostaw energii elektrycznej dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych (5). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Najpóźniej w ciągu 3 miesięcy od dnia powiadomienia o decyzji Komisji uznającej zobowiązania za wiążące dla grupy DB, lecz nie wcześniej niż w dniu 1 stycznia 2014 r. przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie wprowadzi nowy system cen energii trakcyjnej, z osobnym cennikiem za energię elektryczną i osobnymi opłatami za dostęp do sieci, zatwierdzony przez właściwy niemiecki organ regulacyjny (Bundesnetzagentur). Nowy system cen opracowano, aby zapewnić wejście dostawców energii będących stronami trzecimi na rynek dostaw energii elektrycznej dla przedsiębiorstw kolejowych (5).

| 9. | W nowym systemie przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie będzie pobierać taką samą cenę za energię elektryczną od wszystkich przedsiębiorstw kolejowych i nie będzie stosować zniżek uzależnionych od kupowanych ilości lub czasu trwania umowy. |
| --- | --- |

9.

W nowym systemie przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie będzie pobierać taką samą cenę za energię elektryczną od wszystkich przedsiębiorstw kolejowych i nie będzie stosować zniżek uzależnionych od kupowanych ilości lub czasu trwania umowy.

| 10. | Przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie wypłaci działającym w Niemczech przedsiębiorstwom kolejowym nienależącym do grupy DB jednorazowy zwrot w wysokości 4 % wartości wystawionej im faktury za energię trakcyjną w okresie jednego roku przed wejściem w życie nowego systemu cen. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie wypłaci działającym w Niemczech przedsiębiorstwom kolejowym nienależącym do grupy DB jednorazowy zwrot w wysokości 4 % wartości wystawionej im faktury za energię trakcyjną w okresie jednego roku przed wejściem w życie nowego systemu cen.

| 11. | Przedsiębiorstwa DB Energie i DB Mobility Logistics AG będą corocznie przedkładać do Komisji dane umożliwiające ocenę, czy poziom stosowanych przez grupę DB cen energii trakcyjnej i usług transportowych może doprowadzić do zawężania marży. Przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie będzie też z wyprzedzeniem powiadamiać Komisję o wszelkich zmianach stosowanych cen energii elektrycznej. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Przedsiębiorstwa DB Energie i DB Mobility Logistics AG będą corocznie przedkładać do Komisji dane umożliwiające ocenę, czy poziom stosowanych przez grupę DB cen energii trakcyjnej i usług transportowych może doprowadzić do zawężania marży. Przedsiębiorstwo DB Energie będzie też z wyprzedzeniem powiadamiać Komisję o wszelkich zmianach stosowanych cen energii elektrycznej.

| 12. | Zobowiązania wejdą w życie najpóźniej w trzy miesiące od dnia powiadomienia o decyzji Komisji. Będą obowiązywać przez 5 lat (6) od dnia powiadomienia o decyzji Komisji lub do momentu, w którym 20 % energii trakcyjnej nabywanej przez konkurentów grupy DB będzie pochodzić od dostawców energii będących stronami trzecimi. Grupa DB wyznaczy też powiernika monitorującego przestrzeganie zobowiązań. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Zobowiązania wejdą w życie najpóźniej w trzy miesiące od dnia powiadomienia o decyzji Komisji. Będą obowiązywać przez 5 lat (6) od dnia powiadomienia o decyzji Komisji lub do momentu, w którym 20 % energii trakcyjnej nabywanej przez konkurentów grupy DB będzie pochodzić od dostawców energii będących stronami trzecimi. Grupa DB wyznaczy też powiernika monitorującego przestrzeganie zobowiązań.

| 13. | Treść zobowiązań została opublikowana na stronie internetowej Dyrekcji Generalnej ds. Konkurencji pod adresem: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

Treść zobowiązań została opublikowana na stronie internetowej Dyrekcji Generalnej ds. Konkurencji pod adresem: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   ZAPROSZENIE DO ZGŁASZANIA UWAG

| 14. | W oparciu o wyniki testu rynkowego Komisja zamierza przyjąć na podstawie art. 9 ust. 1 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 decyzję uznającą za wiążące zobowiązania streszczone powyżej i opublikowane na stronie internetowej Dyrekcji Generalnej ds. Konkurencji. |
| --- | --- |

14.

W oparciu o wyniki testu rynkowego Komisja zamierza przyjąć na podstawie art. 9 ust. 1 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 decyzję uznającą za wiążące zobowiązania streszczone powyżej i opublikowane na stronie internetowej Dyrekcji Generalnej ds. Konkurencji.

| 15. | Zgodnie z art. 27 ust. 4 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 Komisja wzywa zainteresowane strony trzecie do zgłaszania uwag na temat zaproponowanych zobowiązań. Komisja musi otrzymać wspomniane uwagi nie później niż w terminie jednego miesiąca od daty niniejszej publikacji. Zainteresowane strony trzecie są również proszone o przedłożenie nieopatrzonej klauzulą poufności wersji swoich uwag, z której usunięto tajemnice handlowe oraz pozostałe informacje poufne oraz zastąpiono je nieopatrzonym klauzulą poufności streszczeniem lub słowami „tajemnica handlowa” lub „poufne”. Zgodnie z art. 16 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 773/2004 żądanie poufności należy odpowiednio uzasadnić, w szczególności wyjaśniając, dlaczego ujawnienie danych informacji mogłoby spowodować poważne szkody. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Zgodnie z art. 27 ust. 4 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2003 Komisja wzywa zainteresowane strony trzecie do zgłaszania uwag na temat zaproponowanych zobowiązań. Komisja musi otrzymać wspomniane uwagi nie później niż w terminie jednego miesiąca od daty niniejszej publikacji. Zainteresowane strony trzecie są również proszone o przedłożenie nieopatrzonej klauzulą poufności wersji swoich uwag, z której usunięto tajemnice handlowe oraz pozostałe informacje poufne oraz zastąpiono je nieopatrzonym klauzulą poufności streszczeniem lub słowami „tajemnica handlowa” lub „poufne”. Zgodnie z art. 16 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 773/2004 żądanie poufności należy odpowiednio uzasadnić, w szczególności wyjaśniając, dlaczego ujawnienie danych informacji mogłoby spowodować poważne szkody.

| 16. | Prosimy o przesyłanie uzasadnionych odpowiedzi i uwag, przedstawiających istotne fakty. Jeśli stwierdzą Państwo istnienie problemu dotyczącego dowolnej części proponowanych zobowiązań, prosimy o zasugerowanie możliwego rozwiązania. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Prosimy o przesyłanie uzasadnionych odpowiedzi i uwag, przedstawiających istotne fakty. Jeśli stwierdzą Państwo istnienie problemu dotyczącego dowolnej części proponowanych zobowiązań, prosimy o zasugerowanie możliwego rozwiązania.

| 17. | Uwagi z dopiskiem zawierającym numer referencyjny AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III można przesyłać do Komisji pocztą elektroniczną (na adres: COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), faksem (+32 22950128) lub listownie na poniższy adres:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Antitrust Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

17.

Uwagi z dopiskiem zawierającym numer referencyjny AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III można przesyłać do Komisji pocztą elektroniczną (na adres: COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), faksem (+32 22950128) lub listownie na poniższy adres:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Antitrust Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  Dz.U. L 1 z 4.1.2003, s. 1. Ze skutkiem od dnia 1 grudnia 2009 r. art. 81 i 82 Traktatu WE stały się odpowiednio art. 101 i 102 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej (TFUE). Treść tych dwóch grup postanowień jest zasadniczo identyczna. Dla celów niniejszego zawiadomienia odniesienia do art. 101 i 102 TFUE należy rozumieć, w odpowiednich przypadkach, jako odniesienia do art. 81 i 82 Traktatu WE.

(2)  Przedsiębiorstwo Deutsche Bahn AG oraz wszystkie jego spółki zależne zwane są dalej „grupą DB”.

(3)  Wyrok Bundesgerichtshof z dnia 9 listopada 2010 r. w sprawie EnVR 1/10.

(4)  Więcej informacji na temat zmiany systemu cen oraz warunków nowego systemu można znaleźć na stronie internetowej przedsiębiorstwa DB Energie (wyłącznie w języku niemieckim) pod adresem: http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  Ponadto wprowadzenie nowego systemu cen zostanie uzupełnione obowiązkiem oddzielenia rachunkowości i informowania związanych z działalnością przedsiębiorstwa DB Energie w zakresie zarządzania siecią dystrybucyjną energii trakcyjnej od rachunkowości i informowania związanych z działalnością tego przedsiębiorstwa w zakresie dostaw energii elektrycznej.

(6)  Zobowiązanie przedsiębiorstwa DB Energie do niestosowania w odniesieniu do dostaw energii elektrycznej zniżek uzależnionych od czasu trwania umowy będzie obowiązywać tylko przez 3 lata.

---

INNE AKTY

Komisja Europejska

| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/31

---

Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. a) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych

2013/C 237/06

Niniejsza publikacja uprawnia do zgłoszenia sprzeciwu wobec wniosku zgodnie z art. 51 rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 (1).

JEDNOLITY DOKUMENT

ROZPORZĄDZENIE RADY (WE) NR 510/2006

w sprawie ochrony oznaczeń geograficznych i nazw pochodzenia produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych
   (2)

„SZENTESI PAPRIKA”

NR WE: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

ChOG ( X ) ChNP ( )

1.   Nazwa

„Szentesi paprika”

2.   Państwo członkowskie lub państwo trzecie

Węgry

3.   Opis produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego

3.1.   Rodzaj produktu

| Klasa 1.6. | Owoce, warzywa lub zboża, na świeżo lub przetworzone |
| --- | --- |

Klasa 1.6.

Owoce, warzywa lub zboża, na świeżo lub przetworzone

3.2.   Opis produktu noszącego nazwę podaną w pkt 1

Chronione oznaczenie geograficzne „Szentesi paprika” oznacza uprawiane w szklarniach owoce odmian i rodzajów odmian rośliny z gatunku Capsicum annuum.

Podczas wprowadzania do obrotu produkty objęte ChOG „Szentesi paprika” powinny być całe i zdrowe, a poszczególne rodzaje odmian powinny posiadać następujące właściwości:

| a) | Papryka biała do faszerowania (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  W stanie dojrzałym biała „Szentesi paprika” jest śliska w dotyku, jej skórka jest gładka i napięta; papryka ma spłaszczony, zagięty koniec, a jej miąższ jest chrupki i mięsisty. Jej powierzchnia jest gładka, a kolor – żółtobiały (kość słoniowa). Jej kształt jest stożkowy, długość wynosi 60–120 mm, a szerokość – 40–70 mm; w większości przypadków papryka ma trzy lub cztery komory; grubość miąższu wynosi 4–7 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka cienka; zapach owocu jest intensywnie paprykowy, aromatyczny i łagodny.
  Uprawiane odmiany: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Papryka biała do faszerowania (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

W stanie dojrzałym biała „Szentesi paprika” jest śliska w dotyku, jej skórka jest gładka i napięta; papryka ma spłaszczony, zagięty koniec, a jej miąższ jest chrupki i mięsisty. Jej powierzchnia jest gładka, a kolor – żółtobiały (kość słoniowa). Jej kształt jest stożkowy, długość wynosi 60–120 mm, a szerokość – 40–70 mm; w większości przypadków papryka ma trzy lub cztery komory; grubość miąższu wynosi 4–7 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka cienka; zapach owocu jest intensywnie paprykowy, aromatyczny i łagodny.

Uprawiane odmiany: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia.

| b) | Ostra, spiczasta papryka (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  Ostra, spiczasta „Szentesi paprika” ma błyszczącą, gładką lub lekko pofalowaną powierzchnię; jej kształt jest wydłużony i spiczasty. Kolor – zielony w odcieniu jasnym, średnim lub ciemnym; długość wynosi 150–250 mm, a szerokość – 20–50 mm; w większości przypadków papryka ma trzy lub cztery komory; grubość miąższu wynosi 3–4 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka cienka. Produkt ma intensywny paprykowy zapach, jest pikantny i wykazuje przyjemny aromat i smak.
  Uprawiane odmiany: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.
  Uprawiane odmiany wykazują wskaźnik pikantności między 2 500 a 5 000 według skali Scoville. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Ostra, spiczasta papryka (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

Ostra, spiczasta „Szentesi paprika” ma błyszczącą, gładką lub lekko pofalowaną powierzchnię; jej kształt jest wydłużony i spiczasty. Kolor – zielony w odcieniu jasnym, średnim lub ciemnym; długość wynosi 150–250 mm, a szerokość – 20–50 mm; w większości przypadków papryka ma trzy lub cztery komory; grubość miąższu wynosi 3–4 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka cienka. Produkt ma intensywny paprykowy zapach, jest pikantny i wykazuje przyjemny aromat i smak.

Uprawiane odmiany: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.

Uprawiane odmiany wykazują wskaźnik pikantności między 2 500 a 5 000 według skali Scoville.

| c) | Papryka Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  „Szentesi paprika” z grupy Kápia posiada stożkowy, lekko spłaszczony kształt; jej powierzchnia jest gładka, błyszcząca, zaś jej kolor w stanie dojrzałym do zbierania jest aksamitnie ciemnoczerwony. Długość papryki wynosi 60–120 mm, a szerokość – 40–70 mm; owoc składa się z dwóch lub trzech komór; grubość miąższu wynosi 4–7 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka średniej grubości. Owoc jest łagodny, intensywnie słodki, o zapachu mielonej papryki.
  Uprawiane odmiany: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Papryka Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

„Szentesi paprika” z grupy Kápia posiada stożkowy, lekko spłaszczony kształt; jej powierzchnia jest gładka, błyszcząca, zaś jej kolor w stanie dojrzałym do zbierania jest aksamitnie ciemnoczerwony. Długość papryki wynosi 60–120 mm, a szerokość – 40–70 mm; owoc składa się z dwóch lub trzech komór; grubość miąższu wynosi 4–7 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka średniej grubości. Owoc jest łagodny, intensywnie słodki, o zapachu mielonej papryki.

Uprawiane odmiany: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus.

| d) | Papryka w kształcie pomidora (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Papryka „Szentesi paprika” w kształcie pomidora posiada charakterystyczny kształt: jest to spłaszczona kula o gładkiej, błyszczącej powierzchni; jej kolor w stanie dojrzałym do zbierania jest głęboko ciemnoczerwony. Średnica owocu wynosi 60–120 mm, a długość – 40–60 mm; papryka składa się z trzech lub czterech komór; grubość miąższu wynosi 5–7 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka cienka; owoc wydziela intensywny zapach i jest łagodny.
  Uprawiane odmiany: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.
  Odmiany wyżej wymienionych rodzajów mogą z roku na rok ulec zmianie. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Papryka w kształcie pomidora (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Papryka „Szentesi paprika” w kształcie pomidora posiada charakterystyczny kształt: jest to spłaszczona kula o gładkiej, błyszczącej powierzchni; jej kolor w stanie dojrzałym do zbierania jest głęboko ciemnoczerwony. Średnica owocu wynosi 60–120 mm, a długość – 40–60 mm; papryka składa się z trzech lub czterech komór; grubość miąższu wynosi 5–7 mm, konsystencja jest zwarta, a skórka cienka; owoc wydziela intensywny zapach i jest łagodny.

Uprawiane odmiany: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.

Odmiany wyżej wymienionych rodzajów mogą z roku na rok ulec zmianie.

3.3.   Surowce (wyłącznie w odniesieniu do produktów przetworzonych)

—

3.4.   Pasza (wyłącznie w odniesieniu do produktów pochodzenia zwierzęcego)

—

3.5.   Poszczególne etapy produkcji, które muszą odbywać się na wyznaczonym obszarze geograficznym

Wszystkie etapy procesu produkcji „Szentesi paprika” powinny odbywać się na obszarze geograficznym określonym w pkt 4:

| — | produkcja i uprawa sadzonek, |
| --- | --- |

—

produkcja i uprawa sadzonek,

| — | zintegrowana produkcja ekologiczna poszczególnych odmian i rodzajów odmian, w tym: |
| --- | --- |

—

zintegrowana produkcja ekologiczna poszczególnych odmian i rodzajów odmian, w tym:

| — | wybór okresu produkcji, |
| --- | --- |

—

wybór okresu produkcji,

| — | utworzenie obszaru uprawy, |
| --- | --- |

—

utworzenie obszaru uprawy,

| — | przygotowanie gruntu, nawożenie gleby, |
| --- | --- |

—

przygotowanie gruntu, nawożenie gleby,

| — | sadzenie, |
| --- | --- |

—

sadzenie,

| — | przygotowanie struktur wsparcia, |
| --- | --- |

—

przygotowanie struktur wsparcia,

| — | pielęgnacja roślin (fitotechnika), |
| --- | --- |

—

pielęgnacja roślin (fitotechnika),

| — | nawadnianie i uzupełnienie składników odżywczych, |
| --- | --- |

—

nawadnianie i uzupełnienie składników odżywczych,

| — | regulowanie warunków klimatycznych, |
| --- | --- |

—

regulowanie warunków klimatycznych,

| — | zastosowanie zintegrowanych, ekologicznych procedur ochrony roślin, |
| --- | --- |

—

zastosowanie zintegrowanych, ekologicznych procedur ochrony roślin,

| — | zbiór, przygotowanie produktu, przechowywanie wstępne i przechowywanie, |
| --- | --- |

—

zbiór, przygotowanie produktu, przechowywanie wstępne i przechowywanie,

| — | likwidowanie pozostałości po uprawie, czyszczenie i dezynfekcja urządzeń produkcyjnych. |
| --- | --- |

—

likwidowanie pozostałości po uprawie, czyszczenie i dezynfekcja urządzeń produkcyjnych.

3.6.   Szczegółowe zasady dotyczące krojenia, tarcia, pakowania itd.

Klasyfikacja, pakowanie i etykietowanie papryki „Szentesi paprika” odbywają się u producenta lub w innym, przystosowanym do tej funkcji pomieszczeniu, na wyznaczonym obszarze geograficznym.

W opakowaniach na sztuki: tacka, koszyk, torba polietylenowa (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 szt. papryki/jednostka); w opakowaniach na wagę: kosz, siatka raszlowa (0,35, 0,5, 0,7, 1, 2 kg papryki/jednostka) lub w kartonach: w opakowaniach M10, M20, M30 (2,5, 10, 12, 14 kg papryki/jednostka). Rodzaje opakowań odmian poszczególnych rodzajów mogą ulec zmianie w zależności od potrzeb handlowych.

W celu zachowania charakterystycznej jakości i jednorodności poszczególnych odmian i rodzajów odmian, jak również odrębnego smaku, zapachu, aromatu, konsystencji i nienaruszonego stanu produktu objętego ChOG „Szentesi paprika”, a także w celu zapewnienia jego identyfikowalności, pakowanie powinno odbywać się na wyznaczonym obszarze geograficznym.

3.7.   Szczegółowe zasady dotyczące etykietowania

| — | Zapis „Szentesi paprika” musi występować na opakowaniu. |
| --- | --- |

—

Zapis „Szentesi paprika” musi występować na opakowaniu.

| — | Konieczne jest umieszczenie na opakowaniu etykiety z kodem kreskowym, umożliwiającej identyfikowalność produktu „Szentesi paprika”. |
| --- | --- |

—

Konieczne jest umieszczenie na opakowaniu etykiety z kodem kreskowym, umożliwiającej identyfikowalność produktu „Szentesi paprika”.

4.   Zwięzłe określenie obszaru geograficznego

Obszar produkcji papryki „Szentesi paprika” objętej chronionym oznaczeniem geograficznym (ChOG) znajduje się na terenie komitatu Csongrád i tworzy zwarty obszar.

Produkcja papryki „Szentesi paprika” odbywa się w granicach administracyjnych następujących miejscowości znajdujących się w komitacie Csongrád: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár i Szentes.

5.   Związek z obszarem geograficznym

5.1.   Specyfika obszaru geograficznego

Czynniki wpływające na jakość uprawy papryki, zwłaszcza temperatura i światło, a także warunki glebowe i hydrograficzne, stworzyły bardzo sprzyjające otoczenie do rozwoju nawadnianej uprawy papryki w regionie Szentes, która rozpoczęła się dzięki pionierskiej pracy tzw. ogrodników bułgarskich (uprawiających warzywa specjalnymi metodami na niewielką skalę, w szklarniach i z wykorzystaniem nawadniania), którzy osiedlili się w tym rejonie w drugiej połowie XIX wieku.

Tradycyjny obszar produkcji w regionie Szentes znajduje się w południowo-wschodniej części Węgier, w jednej z najgłębszych części basenu Niziny Węgierskiej. Pod względem topografii obszar zajmuje szczególne miejsce, ponieważ rozciągają się tu tereny położone najniżej w kraju; rzeźba terenu wykazuje nachylenie z trzech stron, opadając od sąsiadujących komitatów w stronę doliny Cisy. Najważniejszy ciek wodny w systemie hydrograficznym regionu stanowi rzeka Cisa, która zarazem jest determinującym elementem przyrodniczo-geograficznym całego regionu. Z uwagi na obfitość wód powierzchniowych w regionie dominują czarnoziemy łąkowe. Gleby w obszarze produkcji wykazują dobre właściwości fizyczne, sypką konsystencję, łatwo się nagrzewają, ich odczyn jest lekko zasadowy, są bogate w wodę i substancje odżywcze, zawierają dużo próchnicy i posiadają grubą warstwę orną.

Przy produkcji „Szentesi paprika” decydujące znaczenie mają czynniki klimatyczne nadające owocom istotne właściwości, takie jak ilość światła, liczba godzin nasłonecznienia, temperatura i ilość napromieniowanego ciepła. Cechy klimatu kontynentalnego dominują w tradycyjnym obszarze produkcji regionu Szentes. Ilość godzin nasłonecznienia rozkłada się w regionie w sposób wyrównany. Średnie roczne nasłonecznienie wynosi ok. 2 050 godzin. Obszar produkcji – przy uwzględnieniu średniej rocznej temperatury – można zaliczyć do najcieplejszych regionów kraju. Średnia roczna temperatura waha się w granicach + 10–11 °C, całkowita ilość ciepła w okresie produkcji wynosi 3 200–3 300 °C, co sprzyja uprawie papryki wymagającej ciepła.

Pod względem rocznej sumy opadów region ten należy do terenów najuboższych w opady, ze średnią roczną sumą opadów wynoszącą 500–550 mm. Na ogół 40 % opadów przypada na półrocze zimowe, a 60 % – na półrocze letnie. Produkcja papryki wymagającej dużej ilości wody możliwa była dzięki rozwinięciu – i wprowadzeniu przez bułgarskich ogrodników – uprawy nawadnianej, możliwej dzięki sprzyjającym warunkom hydrologicznym.

5.2.   Specyfika produktu

Główne wartości i właściwości organoleptyczne papryki „Szentesi paprika” pochodzącej z tego obszaru geograficznego to: zdecydowany smak – ostry, słodki lub pikantny; intensywny zapach papryki lub zapach przypominający mieloną paprykę oraz cienka skórka. Grubość miąższu papryki wynosi 3–7 mm, co pozwala na pełne delektowanie się smakiem i aromatem papryki podczas spożycia, przeważnie na świeżo.

W stanie dojrzałym biała „Szentesi paprika” jest śliska w dotyku, jej skórka jest gładka i napięta; papryka ma spłaszczony, zagięty koniec, a jej miąższ jest chrupki i mięsisty. Jej powierzchnia jest gładka. Zapach i aromat świeżej papryki są niezwykle charakterystyczne, co znajduje odzwierciedlenie w popularnym powiedzeniu sformułowanym przez konsumentów: „»Szentesi paprika« ma smak”. Ostra, spiczasta „Szentesi paprika” ma błyszczącą, gładką lub lekko pofalowaną powierzchnię; jej kształt jest wydłużony i spiczasty. Konsystencja miąższu jest zwarta. Produkt wydziela intensywny paprykowy zapach, jest pikantny i wykazuje przyjemny aromat i smak.

„Szentesi paprika” z grupy Kápia posiada stożkowy, lekko spłaszczony kształt; konsystencja jej miąższu jest zwarta, a skórka średniej grubości. Jej powierzchnia jest gładka, błyszcząca, a pod wpływem czynników geograficznych (światło, temperatura) owoc nabiera aksamitnie ciemnoczerwonego, bardzo atrakcyjnego koloru.

Papryka „Szentesi paprika” w kształcie pomidora posiada charakterystyczny kształt: jest to spłaszczona kula o gładkiej, błyszczącej powierzchni. Mimo grubego miąższu jej skórka jest cienka, a powierzchnia gładka; kolor owocu w stanie dojrzałym do zbierania jest głęboko ciemnoczerwony.

5.3.   Związek przyczynowy zachodzący między charakterystyką obszaru geograficznego a jakością lub właściwościami produktu (w przypadku ChNP) lub szczególne cechy jakościowe, renoma lub inne właściwości produktu (w przypadku ChOG)

Związek z obszarem geograficznym opiera się na renomie, jaką od dawna cieszy się produkt, oraz na lokalnych umiejętnościach producentów rolnych „Szentesi paprika”, które są przekazywane z pokolenia na pokolenie.

Renoma „Szentesi paprika”

Nawadniana uprawa papryki w regionie Szentes została rozwinięta dzięki pionierskiej pracy „ogrodników bułgarskich”, którzy osiedlili się w tym rejonie w drugiej połowie XIX wieku. Renomowana „Szentesi paprika” jest od tamtej pory nieustannie produkowana. Renoma produktu jest nadal istotna, czego dowodem jest główna nagroda przyznana w 2006 r., w Debreczynie, podczas specjalistycznej wystawy ogrodnictwa i sadownictwa połączonej z targami „Farmer Expo”, gdzie obecnych było ponad 300 wystawców krajowych i zagranicznych. W 2007 r. papryka przeznaczona do spożycia w postaci świeżej otrzymała nagrodę „Magyar Termék Nagydíj” (główną nagrodę produktów węgierskich).

Liczne dane historyczne wskazują na wielowiekowy związek zachodzący między renomą „Szentesi paprika” a obszarem geograficznym. Pojawienie się na Węgrzech papryki spożywczej datuje się od osiedlenia się bułgarskich ogrodników w regionie „Szegvár Úsztató major” zimą 1875/1876 r. Dane z wielkiego spisu rolniczego w 1895 r. wskazują na to, że 92,74 % łącznej produkcji papryki skupione było w południowo-wschodniej części kraju, w regionie Szentes. Na terenie obecnego komitatu Csongrád ogrodnicy wynajmowali łąki z czarnoziemem i tereny aluwialne, bogate w próchnicę i łatwo ogrzewające się, wybierając w miarę możliwości tereny o lekkim nachyleniu. We wczesnej produkcji używano wykiełkowanych nasion i wykorzystywano szklarnie. Stosowano także uprawę pośrednią w szkółkach, uprawiając np. obok papryki młode sadzonki ogórka, które po wysadzeniu papryki pozostawały na miejscu. Poszczególne sadzonki były wysadzane wraz z małymi grudkami ziemi. Przeprowadzano także obfite, regularne nawadnianie: do tego celu wykorzystywano podgrzane wody stojące oraz wolne prądy płytkich rzek. Producenci mieli także wyjątkowy sposób na pozyskanie i odprowadzenie wody. W tamtych czasach w regionie Szentes stosowano tzw. koła o wiadrach łańcuchowych, które dostosowane były do zmiennego poziomu lustra wody.

Umiejętności lokalne

W tradycyjnym regionie produkcji Szentes powierzchna gruntu bardzo dobrze utrzymuje ciepło. Ze względu na to, że gleba, na której prowadzona jest uprawa papryki „Szentesi paprika”, pochłania więcej ciepła niż go wydziela poprzez promieniowanie w godzinach porannych, ilość ciepła zgromadzonego w glebie i powietrzu nad gruntem zwiększa się, co powoduje podwyższenie temperatury. Zrównoważony mikroklimat uzyskany dzięki harmonijnemu napływowi ciepła, w połączeniu z nawadnianiem wprowadzonym przez bułgarskich ogrodników, pozwala na uzyskanie wyjątkowo smacznego produktu „Szentesi paprika”, który wymaga ciepła i wody.

Do czynników naturalnych dochodzi działalność miejscowych rolników oraz doświadczenie praktyczne zdobyte w zakresie produkcji w szklarniach (regulowanie ciepła, wentylacja, zacienianie, pielęgnacja roślin) i przekazywane z pokolenia na pokolenie. Dzięki zdobytym w ten sposób umiejętnościom możliwe jest przeciwstawienie się niekorzystnym zmianom warunków klimatycznych, zachodzącym w ostatnich dziesięcioleciach, zapewniając i, w miarę możliwości, zachowując smak, kolor, aromat „Szentesi paprika”, a także ciekawy kształt charakterystyczny dla poszczególnych rodzajów odmian.

Technika wprowadzona przez ogrodników bułgarskich ulegała podczas 150 lat uprawy stosownym zmianom, aby spełniać wymogi epoki. Dokonano ponownej oceny czynników mających zasadnicze znaczenie w uprawie papryki, a także pojawiły się nowe metody produkcji. Od początków do lat 60. XX wieku do najważniejszych czynników w produkcji zaliczano: dobre warunki glebowe, możliwość nawadniania (Cisa, Körös i system kanałów irygacyjnych), liczbę godzin nasłonecznienia (możliwość wczesnej uprawy) oraz ocieplenie na początku wiosny. Następny okres trwał od lat 60. do końca lat 80. XX wieku. Producenci papryki zaczęli wykorzystywać wczesne ocieplenie do produkcji w szklarniach, korzystając w optymalny sposób z dużej liczby godzin nasłonecznienia w miesiącach zimowych i wiosennych. W latach 60. i 80. XX wieku w regionie odkryto energię geotermiczną, wskutek czego produkcja „Szentesi paprika” przeszła z uprawy na wolnym powietrzu do uprawy w szklarniach, w których rozpowszechnia się uprawa bezglebowa.

Odesłanie do publikacji specyfikacji

(Artykuł 5 ust. 7 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 510/2006 (3))

Biuletyn rozwoju obszarów wiejskich (Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő), dnia 16 listopada 2011 r., rocznik LXI, nr 6, s. 317

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

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(1)  Dz.U. L 343 z 14.12.2012, s. 1.

(2)  Zastąpione rozporządzeniem (UE) nr 1151/2012.

(3)  Porównaj: przypis 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/36

---

Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. a) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych

2013/C 237/07

Niniejsza publikacja uprawnia do zgłoszenia sprzeciwu wobec wniosku zgodnie z art. 51 rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 (1).

WNIOSEK O ZATWIERDZENIE ZMIANY

ROZPORZĄDZENIE RADY (WE) NR 510/2006

w sprawie ochrony oznaczeń geograficznych i nazw pochodzenia produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych
   (2)

WNIOSEK O ZATWIERDZENIE ZMIANY SKŁADANY NA PODSTAWIE ART. 9

„TERRA D’OTRANTO”

NR WE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

ChOG ( ) ChNP ( X )

1.   Nagłówek w specyfikacji produktu, którego dotyczy zmiana

| — |  | Nazwa produktu |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Opis produktu |
| — |  | Obszar geograficzny |
| — | ☒ | Dowód pochodzenia |
| — |  | Metoda produkcji |
| — |  | Związek z obszarem geograficznym |
| — |  | Etykietowanie |
| — | ☒ | Wymogi krajowe |
| — | ☒ | Inne (określić jakie) |

—



Nazwa produktu

—

☒

Opis produktu

—



Obszar geograficzny

—

☒

Dowód pochodzenia

—



Metoda produkcji

—



Związek z obszarem geograficznym

—



Etykietowanie

—

☒

Wymogi krajowe

—

☒

Inne (określić jakie)

2.   Rodzaj zmiany (zmian)

| — |  | Zmiana jednolitego dokumentu lub arkusza streszczenia |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Zmiana specyfikacji zarejestrowanej ChNP lub zarejestrowanego ChOG, w odniesieniu do których nie opublikowano ani jednolitego dokumentu, ani arkusza streszczenia |
| — |  | Zmiana specyfikacji niewymagająca zmian w opublikowanym jednolitym dokumencie (art. 9 ust. 3 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 510/2006) |
| — |  | Tymczasowa zmiana specyfikacji wynikająca z wprowadzenia obowiązkowych środków sanitarnych lub fitosanitarnych przez organy publiczne (art. 9 ust. 4 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 510/2006) |

—



Zmiana jednolitego dokumentu lub arkusza streszczenia

—

☒

Zmiana specyfikacji zarejestrowanej ChNP lub zarejestrowanego ChOG, w odniesieniu do których nie opublikowano ani jednolitego dokumentu, ani arkusza streszczenia

—



Zmiana specyfikacji niewymagająca zmian w opublikowanym jednolitym dokumencie (art. 9 ust. 3 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 510/2006)

—



Tymczasowa zmiana specyfikacji wynikająca z wprowadzenia obowiązkowych środków sanitarnych lub fitosanitarnych przez organy publiczne (art. 9 ust. 4 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 510/2006)

3.   Zmiana (zmiany)

3.1.   Opis produktu

Wprowadzono zmiany do specyfikacji produkcji, polegające na dodaniu median typowych deskryptorów, usunięciu wartości 6,5 (obecnie bez znaczenia) i przyjęciu wytycznych metody COI/T20 Dok. nr 22. Ponadto dodano do analizy organoleptycznej kilka charakterystyk, które wynikają z przewagi jednej z dwóch autochtonicznych odmian.

Po zastosowaniu nowej metody otrzymano następującą część opisową:

| — | barwa: zielona lub żółta z delikatnymi zielonymi refleksami, |
| --- | --- |

—

barwa: zielona lub żółta z delikatnymi zielonymi refleksami,

| — | zapach: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu z lekką nutą liści, |
| --- | --- |

—

zapach: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu z lekką nutą liści,

| — | smak: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu. Średni lub lekki posmak pikantny i gorzki uzależniony od okresu zbioru (mediana cech o wartości wyższej niż 0 i niższej niż 6). Ponadto w zależności od okresu zbioru i przeważających odmian smak owocowy łączy się z nutą liści drzewa oliwnego, świeżo skoszonej trawy, ostu/karczocha/cykorii w przypadku odmiany Ogliarola lub owoców/pomidora/owoców leśnych w przypadku odmiany Cellina. |
| --- | --- |

—

smak: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu. Średni lub lekki posmak pikantny i gorzki uzależniony od okresu zbioru (mediana cech o wartości wyższej niż 0 i niższej niż 6). Ponadto w zależności od okresu zbioru i przeważających odmian smak owocowy łączy się z nutą liści drzewa oliwnego, świeżo skoszonej trawy, ostu/karczocha/cykorii w przypadku odmiany Ogliarola lub owoców/pomidora/owoców leśnych w przypadku odmiany Cellina.

Wprowadzono kilka zmian parametrów chemicznych, tj. obniżono wartość maksymalnej łącznej kwasowości wyrażonej w zawartości kwasu oleinowego (z < 0,8 do < 0,65) i nieznacznie zwiększono poziom zawartości kwasu linolowego (z ≤ 0,70 do ≤ 0,8) i wartość K232 (z ≤ 2,1 do ≤ 2,2). Zmiany te wynikają z tendencji do upowszechniania dwóch najczęściej spotykanych na tym obszarze geograficznym odmian, tj. Cellina di Nardò i Ogliarola Salentina, w przypadku których, gdy oliwa produkowana jest tylko z jednej odmiany oliwek (wcześniej bardzo mało rozpowszechnionej), poziom zawartości kwasu linolowego i K232 nieznacznie się różni.

3.2.   Dowód pochodzenia

Dostosowano specyfikację produktu do przepisów rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1898/2006 przez dodanie opisu procedur, jakie producenci muszą stosować, aby wskazać dowód lub dowody pochodzenia.

3.3.   Wymogi krajowe

Skreślono wymogi określone w ustawie (legge) nr 169 z dnia 15 lutego 1992 r.Disciplina per il riconoscimento della denominazione di origine controllata degli oli di oliva vergini ed extravergini (Wytyczne w sprawie uznawania kontrolowanych nazw pochodzenia oliwy z oliwek z pierwszego tłoczenia i oliwy z oliwek z pierwszego tłoczenia ekstra) oraz rozporządzeniu ministra (decreto ministeriale) nr 573/93.

3.4.   Inne

Zrzeszenie wnioskujące o wprowadzenie zmian to Consorzio di tutela dell’olio extra vergine di oliva „Terra d’Otranto” (konsorcjum na rzecz ochrony oliwy z oliwek z pierwszego tłoczenia ekstra „Terra d’Otranto”), które jest podmiotem uprawnionym do złożenia wniosku o wprowadzenie zmian. Konsorcjum to powstało już po dacie pierwszego wniosku o zarejestrowanie ChNP „Terre d’Otranto”, złożonego wówczas przez zrzeszenie APROL, będące podmiotem wiodącym siedmiu zrzeszonych organizacji producentów uprawiających drzewa oliwne.

JEDNOLITY DOKUMENT

ROZPORZĄDZENIE RADY (WE) NR 510/2006

w sprawie ochrony oznaczeń geograficznych i nazw pochodzenia produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych
   (3)

„TERRA D’OTRANTO”

NR WE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

ChOG ( ) ChNP ( X )

1.   Nazwa

„Terra d'Otranto”

2.   Państwo członkowskie lub państwo trzecie

Włochy

3.   Opis produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego

3.1.   Rodzaj produktu

| Klasa 1.5. | Oleje i tłuszcze (masło, margaryna, oleje, itp.) |
| --- | --- |

Klasa 1.5.

Oleje i tłuszcze (masło, margaryna, oleje, itp.)

3.2.   Opis produktu noszącego nazwę podaną w pkt 1

Oliwa „Terra d’Otranto” to oliwa z oliwek z pierwszego tłoczenia ekstra, która charakteryzuje się następującymi właściwościami chemicznymi i organoleptycznymi:

| — | kwasowość maksymalna: 0,65 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

kwasowość maksymalna: 0,65 %;

| — | liczba nadtlenkowa: ≤ 14 mEqO2/kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

liczba nadtlenkowa: ≤ 14 mEqO2/kg,

| — | K232: ≤ 2,2, |
| --- | --- |

—

K232: ≤ 2,2,

| — | K270: ≤ 0,17, |
| --- | --- |

—

K270: ≤ 0,17,

| — | kwas linolowy: ≤ 0,8, |
| --- | --- |

—

kwas linolowy: ≤ 0,8,

| — | barwa: zielona lub żółta z zielonymi refleksami, |
| --- | --- |

—

barwa: zielona lub żółta z zielonymi refleksami,

| — | zapach: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu z lekką nutą liści, |
| --- | --- |

—

zapach: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu z lekką nutą liści,

| — | smak: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu. |
| --- | --- |

—

smak: owocowy średni (mediana cechy mieszcząca się w przedziale 3–6) oliwy dojrzałej w odpowiednim stopniu.

Średni lub lekki posmak pikantny i gorzki uzależniony od okresu zbioru. Ponadto w zależności od okresu zbioru i przeważających odmian smak owocowy łączy się z nutą liści drzewa oliwnego, świeżo skoszonej trawy, ostu/karczocha/cykorii w przypadku odmiany Ogliarola lub owoców/pomidora/owoców leśnych w przypadku odmiany Cellina.

3.3.   Surowce (wyłącznie w odniesieniu do produktów przetworzonych)

—

3.4.   Pasza (wyłącznie w odniesieniu do produktów pochodzenia zwierzęcego)

—

3.5.   Poszczególne etapy produkcji, które muszą odbywać się na wyznaczonym obszarze geograficznym

Uprawa, produkcja i tłoczenie oliwy z oliwek z pierwszego tłoczenia ekstra „Terra d’Otranto” muszą odbywać się wyłącznie na obszarze geograficznym określonym w pkt 4.

3.6.   Szczegółowe zasady dotyczące krojenia, tarcia, pakowania itd.

Oliwa z oliwek z pierwszego tłoczenia ekstra „Terra d’Otranto” musi być wprowadzana na rynek w opakowaniach szklanych lub z blachy ocynkowanej o pojemności nie więcej niż 5 l. Rozlewanie oliwy z oliwek z pierwszego tłoczenia „Terra d’Otranto” musi odbywać się na określonym obszarze geograficznym, aby zagwarantować kontrolę pochodzenia produktu, a także by zapobiec pogorszeniu jakości lub utracie specyficznych właściwości, określonych w pkt 3.2, w szczególności charakterystycznych nut ostu/karczocha/cykorii oliwy „Terra d’Otranto”, podczas transportu produktu luzem poza określony obszar geograficzny. Ze względu na swój skład, charakteryzujący się dużą zawartością kwasów tłuszczowych wielonienasyconych, oliwa jest podatna na utratę cech organoleptycznych i typowych właściwości na skutek działania tlenu, znajdującego się w powietrzu, podczas przelewania, pompowania, transportu i rozładunku, czyli podczas czynności, które częściej powtarzane są w przypadku ewentualnego butelkowania poza określonym obszarem.

3.7.   Szczegółowe zasady dotyczące etykietowania

Nazwa „Terra d’Otranto” musi być naniesiona na etykiecie czcionką wyraźną i nieusuwalną, wyraźnie odróżniającą się od wszystkich innych napisów umieszczonych na etykiecie, a bezpośrednio po niej należy umieścić wyrażenie „Denominazione di origine protetta” („chroniona nazwa pochodzenia”) lub odpowiadający jej akronim „DOP” („ChNP”) oraz odpowiedni symbol unijny.

Na każdym opakowaniu wprowadzonym do obrotu należy umieścić numer kolejny przypisany przez zakład pakujący zgodnie z odpowiednim planem kontroli.

Zabrania się dodawania jakiegokolwiek dodatkowego określenia wyraźnie nieprzewidzianego, w tym określeń: czysta (fine), wyborna (scelto), wyborowa (selezionato), najwyższej jakości (superiore).

Dozwolone jest stosowanie określeń odnoszących się do nazwisk, nazw firm lub prywatnych znaków towarowych pod warunkiem że nie mają charakteru reklamującego i nie wprowadzają konsumenta w błąd.

Obowiązkowe jest umieszczanie na etykiecie roku produkcji oliwek, z których otrzymano oliwę.

4.   Zwięzłe określenie obszaru geograficznego

Obszar produkcji ChNP „Terra d’Otranto” obejmuje całą prowincję Lecce, część prowincji Taranto i część prowincji Brindisi. Obszar ten rozciąga się łukiem między Morzem Jońskim i Adriatyckim, od wzgórz Murge Tarantine i południowo-wschodnich skrajnych stoków łańcucha Murge w rejonie Brindisi, przez rozległą nizinę Lecce, aż po wzgórza Serre Salentine, gdzie łączą się te dwa morza.

5.   Związek z obszarem geograficznym

5.1.   Specyfika obszaru geograficznego

Produkt zawdzięcza swoje cechy szczególnym warunkom glebowo-klimatycznym: czynniki środowiskowe i odmiany specyficzne dla tego obszaru powodują, że oliwa „Terre d’Otranto” odznacza się wyjątkowym charakterem. Obszary te są w dużym stopniu jednorodne, ukształtowane na skałach wapiennych z okresu kredowego, na których zalegają trzeciorzędowe złoża wapienne ze skałami osadowymi wapniowo-piaskowo-gliniastymi pochodzącymi z pliocenu i plejstocenu; pokryte są glebami brunatnymi lub czerwonymi, często występującymi w naprzemiennych warstwach ułożonych na skałach wapiennych. Pod względem orograficznym obszar charakteryzuje się rozległymi nizinami, ograniczonymi i przecinanymi niskimi i łagodnymi wzgórzami. Na obszarze tym nie występują powierzchniowe cieki wodne, ale posiada on bogatą podziemną sieć wodną, co nadaje całemu regionowi charakter zdecydowanie krasowy. Ze względu na położenie na wybrzeżu i na niewielkich wysokościach obszar odznacza się klimatem łagodnym, z tendencją do ciepłego.

5.2.   Specyfika produktu

Uprawa drzew oliwnych na określonym obszarze charakteryzuje się przewagą autochtonicznych odmian Cellina di Nardò i Ogliarola Leccese, które decydują o charakterze jakościowym wyprodukowanego oleju. Wymagana zawartość tych dwóch odmian, nie mniejsza niż 60 %, wpływa na ukształtowanie cech organoleptycznych oliwy, które – w zależności od tego, czy przeważa jedna czy druga odmiana – charakteryzują się nutą ostu/karczocha/cykorii lub pomidora/owoców leśnych.

5.3.   Związek przyczynowy zachodzący między charakterystyką obszaru geograficznego a jakością lub właściwościami produktu (w przypadku ChNP) lub szczególne cechy jakościowe, renoma lub inne właściwości produktu (w przypadku ChOG)

Uprawa drzew oliwnych stanowi główny sektor produkcji na tym obszarze. Odgrywa ona zasadniczą rolę dla lokalnej gospodarki. Nazwa geograficzna „Terra d’Otranto” obejmowała jeszcze w XIX w. obecne prowincje Lecce, Brindisi i Taranto. Region ten zawsze charakteryzował się liczną obecnością oliwek, z których pozyskiwano „drogocenny płyn”. Pochodzenie nazwy „Terra d’Otranto” łączy się z historią uprawy drzew oliwnych w tym regionie, wprowadzoną już w czasach starożytnych przez osadników fenickich i greckich, a dzięki działaniom zakonu bazylianów, którzy osiedlili się tutaj w X w., powstał pierwszy dobrze prosperujący rynek cennych oliw pochodzących z Terra d’Otranto. Terra d’Otranto to średniowieczna nazwa rejonu Salento, ponieważ w średniowieczu Otranto było głównym miastem całego regionu.

Odesłanie do publikacji specyfikacji

(Artykuł 5 ust. 7 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 510/2006 (4))

Właściwe władze administracyjne wszczęły krajową procedurę sprzeciwu, publikując propozycję uznania chronionej nazwy pochodzenia „Terra d’Otranto” w Dzienniku Urzędowym Republiki Włoskiej nr 297 z dnia 21 grudnia 2010 r. Skonsolidowany tekst specyfikacji produkcji można znaleźć na stronie internetowej:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

lub wchodząc na stronę internetową Ministerstwa polityki rolnej, żywnościowej i leśnej (http://www.politicheagricole.it), otwierając zakładkę „Qualità e sicurezza” (na górze ekranu po prawej stronie), a następnie zakładkę „Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE”.

---

(1)  Dz.U. L 343 z 14.12.2012, s. 1.

(2)  Zastąpione rozporządzeniem (UE) nr 1151/2012.

(3)  Porównaj: przypis 2.

(4)  Porównaj: przypis 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | PL | Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

PL

Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej

C 237/40

---

Publikacja wniosku zgodnie z art. 50 ust. 2 lit. b) rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 w sprawie systemów jakości produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych

2013/C 237/08

Niniejsza publikacja uprawnia do zgłoszenia sprzeciwu wobec wniosku zgodnie z art. 51 rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1151/2012 (1).

WNIOSEK O REJESTRACJĘ GTS

ROZPORZĄDZENIE RADY (WE) NR 509/2006

w sprawie produktów rolnych i środków spożywczych będących gwarantowanymi tradycyjnymi specjalnościami
   (2)

„ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS”

NR WE: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Nazwa i adres grupy składającej wniosek

| Nazwa grupy lub organizacji (jeżeli dotyczy): | „Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai” |
| --- | --- |
| Adres: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Nazwa grupy lub organizacji (jeżeli dotyczy):

„Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai”

Adres:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 44422201

Faks

+370 44474897

E-mail:

info@zpienas.lt

2.   Państwo członkowskie lub kraj trzeci

Litwa

3.   Specyfikacja produktu

3.1.   Nazwa(-y) przeznaczona(-e) do rejestracji (art. 2 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1216/2007)

„Žemaitiškas kastinys”

3.2.   Nazwa

| ☒ | jest specyficzna sama w sobie |
| --- | --- |
|  | wyraża specyficzny charakter produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego |

☒

jest specyficzna sama w sobie



wyraża specyficzny charakter produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego

Nazwa „Žemaitiškas kastinys” nie oddaje specyficznego charakteru produktu, lecz ma ugruntowaną pozycję i jest dobrze znana zarówno na Żmudzi (region w zachodniej Litwie), jak i na całej Litwie, ilekroć wspomina się o tym produkcie w kontekście tradycyjnym, o czym świadczą różne źródła, o których mowa w pkt 3.8.

Nazwa „Žemaitiškas kastinys” wspomniana jest w następujących książkach kucharskich z XX wieku: Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai (Tilžė (Tilsit), 1927), Ką valgome (Dr Tumėnienė i in., Kowno, 1935) oraz Lietuvių valgiai (opracowanie J. Pauliukonienė, Wilno, 1983).

3.3.   Czy wniosek obejmuje zastrzeżenie nazwy na mocy art. 13 ust. 2 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 509/2006

| ☒ | Rejestracja z zastrzeżeniem nazwy |
| --- | --- |
|  | Rejestracja bez zastrzegania nazwy |

☒

Rejestracja z zastrzeżeniem nazwy



Rejestracja bez zastrzegania nazwy

3.4.   Rodzaj produktu (zgodnie z załącznikiem II)

| Klasa 1.4. | Inne produkty pochodzenia zwierzęcego (jaja, miód, różne produkty mleczne z wyjątkiem masła itp.) |
| --- | --- |

Klasa 1.4.

Inne produkty pochodzenia zwierzęcego (jaja, miód, różne produkty mleczne z wyjątkiem masła itp.)

3.5.   Opis produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego, którego dotyczy nazwa w pkt 3.1 (art. 3 ust. 1 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1216/2007)

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” to tradycyjny produkt wytwarzany z kwaśnej śmietany, którą się podgrzewa, miesza i następnie chłodzi.

Produkt „Žemaitiškas kastinys” ma charakterystyczną jednorodną, gęstą, jednolitą konsystencję gęstej śmietany z pojedynczymi kroplami cieczy, może być kruchy w temperaturze + 6 °C i łatwo rozpływa się w ustach. Ma jednolity żółtawy kolor. W zależności od ziół i przypraw zastosowanych w przepisie „Žemaitiškas kastinys” może mieć zabarwienie dodanych składników i może zawierać drobinki ziół lub przypraw. Ma łagodny, lekko kwaśny smak kwasu mlekowego, jest lekko słonawy i ma wyczuwalną nutę ziół i przypraw.

Właściwości fizykochemiczne „Žemaitiškas kastinys” są następujące:

| — | zawartość tłuszczu, w zależności od przepisu: 25–30 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

zawartość tłuszczu, w zależności od przepisu: 25–30 %,

| — | zawartość soli zwyczajnej: 1–1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

zawartość soli zwyczajnej: 1–1,5 %.

3.6.   Opis metody produkcji produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego, którego dotyczy nazwa w pkt 3.1 (art. 3 ust. 2 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1216/2007)

Surowce:

| — | śmietana o zawartości tłuszczu 25–30 %: 80–83 kg/100 kg produktu, |
| --- | --- |

—

śmietana o zawartości tłuszczu 25–30 %: 80–83 kg/100 kg produktu,

| — | masło o zawartości tłuszczu co najmniej 82 %: 6–7 kg/100 kg produktu, |
| --- | --- |

—

masło o zawartości tłuszczu co najmniej 82 %: 6–7 kg/100 kg produktu,

| — | kwaśne mleko o zawartości tłuszczu 2,5–4 %: 5–5,5 kg/100 kg produktu, |
| --- | --- |

—

kwaśne mleko o zawartości tłuszczu 2,5–4 %: 5–5,5 kg/100 kg produktu,

| — | sól zwyczajna: 1–1,5 kg/100 kg produktu. |
| --- | --- |

—

sól zwyczajna: 1–1,5 kg/100 kg produktu.

Można użyć ziół i przypraw (pieprzu czarnego, ziela angielskiego, kminku, kopru, mięty lub ich mieszanki: 0,1–0,15 kg/100 kg produktu) oraz aromatycznych warzyw (czosnku lub cebuli: 1-2 kg/100 kg produktu).

Metoda produkcji:

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” jest produkowany przy użyciu metod tradycyjnych.

Potrzebne składniki odważa się według przepisu. Śmietanę i kwaśne mleko miesza się razem w osobnym pojemniku i podgrzewa do temperatury 25–30 °C. Zimne masło zmiękcza się przez ogrzanie do temperatury 25–30 °C. Aromatyczne warzywa czyści się i kroi.

Zgodnie z przepisem ogrzane, miękkie masło umieszcza się w misie i stopniowo dodaje się do niego mieszaninę śmietany i kwaśnego mleka, wlewając za każdym razem jedną ósmą całkowitej ilości wymaganej według przepisu i mieszając ręcznie lub przy użyciu równoważnych środków mechanicznych. „Žemaitiškas kastinys” trzeba zawsze mieszać w tym samym kierunku. Gdy mieszanina osiągnie konsystencję śmietany (lecz nie dojdzie do oddzielenia się maślanki), dodaje się kolejną jedną ósmą mieszaniny śmietany i kwaśnego mleka i kontynuuje mieszanie. Czynność tę powtarza się, aż do dodania całej mieszaniny śmietany i kwaśnego mleka (zgodnie z przepisem). Kiedy „Žemaitiškas kastinys” zaczyna twardnieć, soli się go, dodaje się zmielone zioła i przyprawy oraz posiekane aromatyczne warzywa i równomiernie miesza się całość. „Žemaitiškas kastinys” trzeba pakować natychmiast, zanim stwardnieje.

Produkt „Žemaitiškas kastinys” pakowany jest w gliniane lub jednorazowe pojemniki w porcjach o masie 250 g, 200 g i 100 g. Gliniane pojemniki zamykane są glinianą pokrywką, na której umieszcza się kryzę i ciasno obwiązuje sznurkiem. Pojemniki jednorazowe są szczelnie zamykane pokrywami foliowymi. Po zapakowaniu „Žemaitiškas kastinys” schładza się do temperatury 6 °C. Po schłodzeniu produkt osiąga gęstą, jednorodną konsystencję.

3.7.   Specyficzny charakter produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego (art. 3 ust. 3 rozporządzenia Komisji (WE) nr 1216/2007)

Następujące cechy charakterystyczne odróżniają „Žemaitiškas kastinys” od innych produktów należących do tej samej kategorii:

| — | tradycyjne składniki i metoda produkcji: w przeciwieństwie do innych rodzajów kastinys przepis na „Žemaitiškas kastinys” prawie nie uległ zmianie od czasu pierwszej wzmianki o nim w źródłach pisanych, o których mowa w pkt 3.8, tj. te same składniki są używane w podobnych proporcjach. Tymczasem w celu uzyskania większej różnorodności smaków w innych rodzajach kastinys, które zaczęto produkować później, całkowicie zastępuje się śmietanę kwaśnym mlekiem lub miesza się śmietanę z kefirem, ewentualnie dodaje się sok z marchwi lub buraka bądź żółtka jaj, co nadaje kastinys czerwony lub żółty kolor. Produkcja „Žemaitiškas kastinys” charakteryzuje się ciągłym, powolnym mieszaniem mieszaniny masła i śmietany, w trakcie którego dodaje się po jednej ósmej mieszaniny śmietany i kwaśnego mleka i bardzo ściśle reguluje się temperaturę (25–30 °C), aby nie oddzielała się maślanka. Produkcja innych rodzajów kastinys została zmodernizowana. Nie są one mieszane, lecz ubijane, wszystkie składniki dodaje się w trzech lub czterech partiach lub nawet wszystkie na raz, a mieszanina może być poddawana większym wahaniom temperatury, |
| --- | --- |

—

tradycyjne składniki i metoda produkcji: w przeciwieństwie do innych rodzajów kastinys przepis na „Žemaitiškas kastinys” prawie nie uległ zmianie od czasu pierwszej wzmianki o nim w źródłach pisanych, o których mowa w pkt 3.8, tj. te same składniki są używane w podobnych proporcjach. Tymczasem w celu uzyskania większej różnorodności smaków w innych rodzajach kastinys, które zaczęto produkować później, całkowicie zastępuje się śmietanę kwaśnym mlekiem lub miesza się śmietanę z kefirem, ewentualnie dodaje się sok z marchwi lub buraka bądź żółtka jaj, co nadaje kastinys czerwony lub żółty kolor. Produkcja „Žemaitiškas kastinys” charakteryzuje się ciągłym, powolnym mieszaniem mieszaniny masła i śmietany, w trakcie którego dodaje się po jednej ósmej mieszaniny śmietany i kwaśnego mleka i bardzo ściśle reguluje się temperaturę (25–30 °C), aby nie oddzielała się maślanka. Produkcja innych rodzajów kastinys została zmodernizowana. Nie są one mieszane, lecz ubijane, wszystkie składniki dodaje się w trzech lub czterech partiach lub nawet wszystkie na raz, a mieszanina może być poddawana większym wahaniom temperatury,

| — | smak: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” ma charakterystyczny łagodny, lekko kwaśny smak kwasu mlekowego, jest lekko słonawy i ma wyczuwalną nutę dodanych ziół i przypraw. Inne rodzaje kastinys cechują się dość ostrym smakiem kwasu mlekowego (w przypadku gdy śmietanę zastąpiono kwaśnym mlekiem) lub smakiem drożdży i kwasu mlekowego (jeżeli śmietanę zastąpiono kefirem), z lekkim charakterystycznym posmakiem dodanego soku (z buraka lub marchwi) lub żółtka jaj, |
| --- | --- |

—

smak: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” ma charakterystyczny łagodny, lekko kwaśny smak kwasu mlekowego, jest lekko słonawy i ma wyczuwalną nutę dodanych ziół i przypraw. Inne rodzaje kastinys cechują się dość ostrym smakiem kwasu mlekowego (w przypadku gdy śmietanę zastąpiono kwaśnym mlekiem) lub smakiem drożdży i kwasu mlekowego (jeżeli śmietanę zastąpiono kefirem), z lekkim charakterystycznym posmakiem dodanego soku (z buraka lub marchwi) lub żółtka jaj,

| — | konsystencja: produkt „Žemaitiškas kastinys” ma charakterystyczną jednorodną, gęstą konsystencję, może być kruchy w temperaturze + 6 °C i łatwo rozpływa się w ustach. Inne rodzaje kastinys są miękkie i łatwe do rozsmarowania. |
| --- | --- |

—

konsystencja: produkt „Žemaitiškas kastinys” ma charakterystyczną jednorodną, gęstą konsystencję, może być kruchy w temperaturze + 6 °C i łatwo rozpływa się w ustach. Inne rodzaje kastinys są miękkie i łatwe do rozsmarowania.

3.8.   Tradycyjny charakter produktu rolnego lub środka spożywczego (art. 3 ust. 4 rozporządzenia Komisji (WE) nr 1216/2007)

Oprócz prymitywnej metody wytwarzania masła poprzez ubijanie śmietany w naczyniu łyżką, która to metoda była powszechnie stosowana na całej Litwie, w jednym litewskim regionie, tj. na Żmudzi, rozwinęła się charakterystyczna technika przetwarzania śmietany poprzez mieszanie podgrzanej śmietany, uważając przy tym, żeby nie oddzieliła się maślanka. Technika ta rozprzestrzeniła się na całą Litwę. Otrzymywany produkt, „Žemaitiškas kastinys”, ma specyficzny smak i konsystencję (Lietuvių kalbos atlasas, t. 1, Leksika, Wilno, 1977). W połowie XIX wieku produkt ten został opisany w publikacjach naukowych (Litwa pod względem starożytnych zabytków, obyczajów i zwyczajów skreślona (Ludwik Adam Jucewicz (Ludwik z Pokiewia), Wilno, 1846) oraz Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona (Leon Potocki, Poznań, 1869), gdzie podkreślono metodę jego produkcji (fakt wytwarzania z podgrzanej śmietany) i bardzo przyjemny smak.

Litewskie Muzeum Narodowe posiada transkrypcje relacji osób urodzonych pod koniec XIX wieku i na początku XX wieku (zbiory etnograficzne Litewskiego Muzeum Narodowego, repozytoria F 15-4, F 15-13, F 32-7 i F 32-48), w których technika produkcji i przepis opisane są w następujący sposób: najpierw umieszcza się trzy łyżki śmietany i pół łyżki masła w podgrzewanej glinianej misce. Miesza się je dokładnie drewnianą łyżką, zawsze w tym samym kierunku. Gdy mieszana masa zaczyna ochładzać się i dochodzi do oddzielenia maślanki, miskę ogrzewa się w gorącej wodzie, a płynną masę chłodzi się w misce z zimną wodą. W trakcie mieszania do masy dodaje się małymi porcjami śmietanę. Część śmietany często zastępuje się zsiadłym mlekiem, dzięki czemu kastinys jest lżejszy. Kiedy pora zakończyć mieszanie, dodaje się sól oraz inne przyprawy i zioła (kminek, zmielony pieprz, posiekany czosnek i cebulę, w sezonie posiekany szczypior dymki oraz listki kopru lub mięty).

W Lietuvių valgiai (opracowanie J. Pauliukonienė, Mokslas, Wilno, 1983), książce opracowanej przez naukowców w 1983 r., w której opisano stare tradycyjne techniki przygotowywania surowców, polegające na ręcznym oddzieleniu śmietany od mleka (poprzez zebranie jej z powierzchni mleka łyżką), dzięki czemu w śmietanie naturalnie pozostaje trochę zsiadłego mleka, przepis i metodę produkcji „Žemaitiškas kastinys” przedstawiono w następujący sposób: „Žemaitiškas kastinys”: 1⁄2 l śmietany, 1 łyżka masła, 1⁄2 łyżeczki kminku lub innych ziół lub przypraw, sól. Masło umieszcza się w glinianej misce z łyżką śmietany, miskę wkłada się do gorącej wody i miesza mieszaninę drewnianą łyżką. Po mieszaniu przez pewien czas (przed oddzieleniem się maślanki) dodaje się kolejną łyżkę śmietany i dalej miesza, dopóki cała śmietana nie zostanie dodana. Kiedy mieszanina zaczyna gęstnieć, dodaje się sól wraz z umytym i wysuszonym kminkiem, po czym dokładnie miesza. Kastinys ma nieco słony, łagodny, lekko kwaśny smak.

Przepis i metoda produkcji „Žemaitiškas kastinys” nie zmieniły się do dziś, o czym świadczy certyfikat przyznany temu produktowi w 2010 r. przez Litewski Fundusz Dziedzictwa Kulinarnego, w którym potwierdza się, że „Žemaitiškas kastinys” wytwarzany jest zgodnie z tradycyjnymi technikami, przy użyciu tradycyjnych surowców, dodanych składników i sprzętu.

3.9.   Minimalne wymogi i procedury sprawdzania specyficznego charakteru (art. 4 rozporządzenia Komisji (WE) nr 1216/2007)

Biorąc pod uwagę specyficzne cechy „Žemaitiškas kastinys”, przeprowadza się następujące kontrole:

| 1) | jakości każdej partii otrzymanych surowców:






  — | zawartość tłuszczu w śmietanie i kwaśnym mleku musi być zgodna z zawartością tłuszczu w śmietanie i kwaśnym mleku określoną w pkt 3.6; jest to badane w laboratorium, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1)

jakości każdej partii otrzymanych surowców:

—

zawartość tłuszczu w śmietanie i kwaśnym mleku musi być zgodna z zawartością tłuszczu w śmietanie i kwaśnym mleku określoną w pkt 3.6; jest to badane w laboratorium,

| — | zawartość tłuszczu w maśle musi być zgodna z zawartością tłuszczu w maśle określoną w pkt 3.6; jest to badane w laboratorium, |
| --- | --- |

—

zawartość tłuszczu w maśle musi być zgodna z zawartością tłuszczu w maśle określoną w pkt 3.6; jest to badane w laboratorium,

| — | wskaźniki organoleptyczne ziół, przypraw i aromatycznych warzyw (zapach, smak, kolor) sprawdzane są na podstawie dokumentacji i oceny sensorycznej; |
| --- | --- |

—

wskaźniki organoleptyczne ziół, przypraw i aromatycznych warzyw (zapach, smak, kolor) sprawdzane są na podstawie dokumentacji i oceny sensorycznej;

| 2) | zgodności z techniką produkcji określoną w pkt 3.6: przestrzeganie kolejności procesów i określonych parametrów (temperatury i proporcji składników) jest sprawdzane wizualnie oraz poprzez dokonywanie pomiarów podczas produkcji każdej partii; |
| --- | --- |

2)

zgodności z techniką produkcji określoną w pkt 3.6: przestrzeganie kolejności procesów i określonych parametrów (temperatury i proporcji składników) jest sprawdzane wizualnie oraz poprzez dokonywanie pomiarów podczas produkcji każdej partii;

| 3) | jakości każdej partii produktu końcowego:






  — | cechy organoleptyczne (konsystencja, kolor, smak) muszą odpowiadać cechom organoleptycznym określonym w pkt 3.5; jest to sprawdzane poprzez analizę sensoryczną, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3)

jakości każdej partii produktu końcowego:

—

cechy organoleptyczne (konsystencja, kolor, smak) muszą odpowiadać cechom organoleptycznym określonym w pkt 3.5; jest to sprawdzane poprzez analizę sensoryczną,

| — | zawartość tłuszczu musi być zgodna z zawartością tłuszczu określoną w pkt 3.5; jest to badane w laboratorium, |
| --- | --- |

—

zawartość tłuszczu musi być zgodna z zawartością tłuszczu określoną w pkt 3.5; jest to badane w laboratorium,

| — | zawartość soli zwyczajnej musi być zgodna z zawartością soli zwyczajnej określoną w pkt 3.5; jest to badane na podstawie przepisu oraz – w przypadku wątpliwości – w laboratorium. |
| --- | --- |

—

zawartość soli zwyczajnej musi być zgodna z zawartością soli zwyczajnej określoną w pkt 3.5; jest to badane na podstawie przepisu oraz – w przypadku wątpliwości – w laboratorium.

Co najmniej raz w roku organ określony w pkt 4.1 kontroluje, czy produkt i proces produkcji są zgodne ze specyfikacją produktu.

4.   Organy lub jednostki kontrolujące zgodność ze specyfikacją produktu

4.1.   Nazwa i adres

| Nazwa: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
| --- | --- |
| Adres: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Nazwa:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Adres:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 52404361

E-mail:

vvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Organ publiczny/jednostka publiczna |  Organ prywatny/jednostka prywatna |
| --- | --- |

☒ Organ publiczny/jednostka publiczna

 Organ prywatny/jednostka prywatna

4.2.   Szczególne zadania organu lub jednostki

Organ kontroli, o którym mowa w pkt 4.1, jest odpowiedzialny za monitorowanie wszystkich kryteriów określonych w specyfikacji.

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(1)  Dz.U. L 343 z 14.12.2012, s. 1.

(2)  Zastąpione rozporządzeniem (UE) nr 1151/2012.

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