NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CASEY H., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.H., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0339 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 533071

The Honorable Nicolas B. Hoskins, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Thomas Jose

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 6-2-2022
CASEY H. v. DCS, M.H.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Casey H. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his daughter, M.H., born in 2019. He 

argues the court erred in finding termination was in M.H.’s best interests. 

Because reasonable evidence supports the court’s order, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Two days after M.H. was born, DCS received a report that 

Esmeralda K. (“Mother”) had a history of daily methamphetamine use and

untreated mental illness. When DCS interviewed Father, he disclosed 

having severe mental illness and was not sure he could care for M.H. Due 

to these issues, DCS removed M.H. from the parents’ care and placed her 

in a licensed foster home. 

¶3 In January 2020, DCS filed a dependency petition as to both 

parents. DCS alleged that Father was unable to parent due to mental illness 

and neglect, and that paternity was already established because Father’s 

name was listed on M.H.’s birth certificate. Neither parent contested the 

allegations and the court adjudicated M.H. dependent, with a case plan of 

family reunification. 

¶4 At that time, Father was already receiving mental health 

treatment through Partners in Recovery (“Partners”). Father agreed to 

participate in additional reunification services, including parent aide, 

supervised visitation, and substance abuse testing. In April 2020, after 

completing a psychological evaluation, the evaluator diagnosed Father 

with “Schizoaffective Disorder” and “Bipolar type Unspecified.” The 

evaluator recommended that Father participate in individual 

psychotherapy and parenting classes. In May 2020, at the request of 

Father’s counsel, a guardian ad litem was appointed for Father. 

¶5 In November 2020, DCS stopped receiving updates on 

Father’s participation in services. Father later informed DCS that he had 

stopped receiving mental health services from Partners but had scheduled 
CASEY H. v. DCS, M.H.

Decision of the Court

3

an intake with a new provider. Father also requested that DCS “not be 

involved with his mental health services.” 

¶6 In February 2021, the juvenile court ordered DCS to provide

Father weekly supervised visitation with M.H. DCS documented some 

progress, noting in a March 2021 report that Father was prepared for visits, 

had found employment, and had made changes to his house to ensure 

M.H.’s safety. But DCS remained concerned about Father’s ability to care 

for M.H. Despite a prior domestic dispute between Father and Mother, 

Father intended for Mother to move back into the home. DCS was also 

concerned that Father’s mental illness remained unmanaged, given that he 

had not complied with treatment recommendations and discontinued his 

medication. DCS noted the same concerns in its May 2021 report. 

¶7 In June 2021, Father refused to participate in further services

or visitation until he received a paternity test. About a week later, Father 

made a series of calls to DCS reporting “all sorts of scenarios about his past 

suicidal attempt, how [Mother] wants to harm him, how he no longer can 

keep [M.H.] safe and [M.H.] is not safe with [Mother].” In August 2021, the 

juvenile court ordered DCS to provide Father a paternity test and changed 

the case plan to severance and adoption. The following month, DCS moved 

to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. As to Father, DCS 

sought severance under abandonment (A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1)), as well as nineand fifteen-months’ out-of-home placement (A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b),(c)).

¶8 Father did not appear at the initial severance hearing. After 

discovering Father had been admitted into an impatient facility the day 

before, the court continued the matter for a pretrial conference in October 

2021. Father did not appear at the pretrial conference, and no explanation 

for his absence was provided. Over his attorney’s and guardian ad litem’s 

objections, the court allowed DCS to present its case to terminate Father’s 

parental rights. The DCS case manager testified that Father could not

provide for M.H.’s needs, had no contact with M.H. since June 2021, and 

stopped participating in reunification services. She also reported that M.H. 

was adoptable and in an adoptive placement meeting all of her needs. The 

case manager then opined that termination would benefit M.H. by 

furthering the adoption plan and providing stability, and that M.H. would 

be at risk of harm if returned to Father’s care. 

¶9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that 

DCS proved each of the statutory grounds alleged in the motion for 

termination, and that terminating Father’s parental rights was in M.H.’s 

best interests. After DCS submitted proposed findings of facts and 
CASEY H. v. DCS, M.H.

Decision of the Court

4

conclusions of law, the court issued a signed order terminating Father’s 

parental rights. Meanwhile, the court continued the termination hearing 

as to Mother so she could receive an updated psychological evaluation.

1

Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶10 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find at 

least one statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence, and that 

termination is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577, ¶ 4 (App. 

2017). We will affirm the court’s order unless there is an abuse of discretion 

or the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). The juvenile court “is 

in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004).

¶11 Father’s sole argument on appeal is that the court erred in

finding that termination of his parental rights was in M.H.’s best interests. 

Termination is in a child’s best interests if “the totality of the circumstances” 

establishes that the child will either benefit from the termination or be 

harmed if it is denied. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, 150

¶¶ 1, 13 (2018). “At the best-interests stage of the analysis, ‘we can presume 

that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has 

already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination 

by clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. at 150, ¶ 12 (citation omitted). 

¶12 The juvenile court found that termination was in M.H.’s best 

interests “because it would further the plan of adoption, which would 

provide the child with permanency and stability.” The court also found 

that M.H. was adoptable, was residing in an adoptive placement meeting 

all her needs, and that “another adoptive placement could be located 

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal. As far as the record before us 

reveals, DCS’s motion for termination of her parental rights has not yet been 

resolved.
CASEY H. v. DCS, M.H.

Decision of the Court

5

should the current placement be unable to adopt.”2 Father contends the 

court erred in finding M.H.’s potential adoptability supported termination 

because Mother’s rights were not terminated. 

¶13 “When a current placement meets the child’s needs and the 

child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a 

juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit 

adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 

Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016); see also Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 

370, ¶ 22 (App. 2018) (“Thus, while courts have often referred to a child’s 

‘adoptability’ or her ‘adoptive placement’ in determining best interests, we 

conclude those findings, to be meaningful, must reflect a finding that 

adoption is not only possible, but likely.”). 

¶14 As Father notes, so long as Mother continues to have parental 

rights to M.H., adoption cannot occur until Mother either consents to the 

adoption or her parental rights are terminated. See A.R.S. § 8-106(A), (B)(2). 

And because Mother is contesting the ongoing termination proceedings, 

M.H. would not become immediately eligible for adoption by the 

termination of Father’s parental rights. According to Father, given that 

M.H.’s potential adoption is contingent upon uncertain future events, the 

court could not find M.H.’s adoption to be likely, and any potential benefit 

based on adoptability is mere speculation. See Titus S., 244 Ariz. at 373–74, 

¶ 34 (explaining that the court’s speculative hope that termination would 

benefit the child sometime in the future is insufficient to support a bestinterests finding). Thus, Father argues the court erred in finding that the 

termination of his parental rights would lead to permanency and stability

for M.H. 

¶15 Father, however, has waived his argument concerning best 

interests because he failed to raise any challenge to the juvenile court’s 

findings before that court in the first instance, and more specifically, he did 

not assert that adoptability was merely speculative given that Mother’s 

parental rights have not been terminated. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 177, 178–79, ¶¶ 10, 16 (App. 2014) (arguments not 

raised in the juvenile court are generally waived on appeal); In re Kyle M., 

200 Ariz. 447, 448, ¶ 2 (App. 2001) (even constitutional arguments can be 

2 Given Father’s failure to appear at the pretrial conference, he “is 

deemed to have admitted the allegations” in the motion for termination. 

See Ariz. R. Juv. Ct. 64(C). Those allegations track the juvenile court’s 

findings. 
CASEY H. v. DCS, M.H.

Decision of the Court

6

waived if not presented to the juvenile court). Waiver aside, we are not 

persuaded by Father’s broad assertions. This is not a situation where DCS 

has alleged that termination is justified against one parent only. Instead, 

the court had already adjudicated M.H. dependent as to Mother and set the 

case plan for severance and adoption. And the record shows Mother has

untreated mental illness, persistent substance abuse issues, and inconsistent 

compliance with reunification services. On the other hand, the DCS case 

manager gave uncontroverted testimony that M.H. was adoptable and

currently in an adoptive placement meeting all of her needs. Although 

M.H.’s adoption would not be immediate, on this record the court did not 

err by implicitly concluding that M.H.’s adoption was both legally possible 

and likely. 

¶16 Moreover, Father’s reliance on Titus S. is misplaced. In that 

case, we held that the juvenile court erred in finding the children’s adoption 

was likely, given that they were old enough where their consent was 

required, and the children had adamantly refused to provide their consent. 

Titus S., 244 Ariz. at 371, ¶ 24. We explained that the court’s best interests’

findings could not rest on the speculative hope that the children would one 

day change their minds and consent to adoption. See id. at 370–71, ¶ 22. 

Here, the record reflects more than mere speculation that M.H. would be 

adopted, given Mother’s continued struggles with reunification and M.H.’s 

success at her adoptive placement. DCS is not required to present evidence 

guaranteeing that termination will lead to the child’s adoption. See id. at 

¶ 23 (“[T]he benefit of a prospective adoption, for purposes of a bestinterests inquiry, cannot depend on a ‘guarantee’ that the adoption will 

occur, as prospective parents, as well as children, might have a change of 

heart.”).

¶17 Father also asserts the juvenile court failed to properly 

consider the totality of the circumstances. In particular, he references his 

participation in services between January 2020 and June 2021, and that he 

attended six of seven court hearings during the same time frame. Father 

also points out that he was prepared for his supervised visits, had found 

employment, made his home safe, wanted his daughter back, and had 

asked for more visitation with M.H. in March 2021. 

¶18 However, Father is essentially asking this court to reweigh the 

evidence, which we will not do. See Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 334, ¶ 4. And 

even taking Father’s points into consideration, reasonable evidence 

supports the termination order. See id. Although Father initially attended 

the majority of the report and review hearings, he was absent from the 

pretrial severance conference without cause. Also, Father’s participation in 
CASEY H. v. DCS, M.H.

Decision of the Court

7

reunification services was inconsistent, and he was unable to demonstrate 

that he could manage his mental health or keep M.H. safe from Mother. 

Then in June 2021, Father discontinued all services, including visitation. 

And as already explained, the juvenile court reasonably found termination 

would provide M.H. with permanency and stability. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 

150, ¶ 12 (“The ‘child’s interest in stability and security’ must be the court’s 

primary concern.” (citation omitted)). Thus, we affirm the court’s 

determination that termination of Father’s parental rights was in M.H.’s 

best interests. 

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s 

parental rights.