alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.5

Promissory Note

On this date of October 7, 2009, in return for valuable consideration received, the
undersigned borrower promises to pay to Seatac Digital Resources, Inc., the Lender, the sum of One-Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), together with interest thereon at the rate of five percent (5%) percent per annum.

Payable On Demand: The entire unpaid principal and accrued interest thereon, if any, shall become immediately due and payable on demand by the
holder of this Note.

Default - In the event of default, the borrower agrees to pay all costs and expenses incurred by the Lender, including all
reasonable attorney fees (including both hourly and contingent attorney fees as permitted by law) for the collection of this Note upon default, and including reasonable collection charges (including, where consistent with industry practices, a
collection charge set as a percentage of the outstanding balance of this Note) should collection be referred to a collection agency.

Acceleration of
Debt - In the event that the borrower fails to make any payment due under the terms of this Note, or breach any condition relating to any security, security agreement, note, mortgage or lien granted as collateral security for this Note, seeks
relief under the Bankruptcy Code, or suffers an involuntary petition in bankruptcy or receivership not vacated within thirty (30) days, the entire balance of this Note and any interest accrued thereon shall be immediately due and payable to the
holder of this Note.

Modification - No modification or waiver of any of the terms of this Agreement shall be allowed unless by written agreement
signed by both parties. No waiver of any breach or default hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or default of the same or similar nature.

Transfer of the Note - The borrowers hereby waive any notice of the transfer of this Note by the Lender or by any subsequent holder of this Note, agree to remain bound by the terms of this Note subsequent to any transfer, and agree
that the terms of this Note may be fully enforced by any subsequent holder of this Note.

Severability of Provisions - In the event that any
portion of this Note is deemed unenforceable, all other provisions of this Note shall remain in full force and effect.

Choice of Law - All terms
and conditions of this Note shall be interpreted under the laws of The State of California.

Dated: October 7, 2009



|                                                
|------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert Cambridge                            
|Americas Minority Health Network, Inc. Borrower
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-10307

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DERRICK TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:97-CR-200-2-X

- - - - - - - - - -

December 10, 1998

Before DAVIS, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Derrick Taylor appeals his guilty-plea conviction for

trafficking in counterfeit access devices affecting interstate

commerce and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1029(a)(1) and 2. He argues that his guilty plea was rendered

involuntary by the district court’s failure to inform him that

his federal sentence would run consecutively to a state sentence. 

The district court was not obligated to advise Taylor that

his federal sentence would run consecutively to a state sentence. 
No. 98-10307

-2-

United States v. Saldana, 505 F.2d 628, 628 (5th Cir. 1974). The

transcript from the guilty-plea hearing shows that the district

court fully complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11

in accepting Taylor’s guilty plea and that Taylor’s plea was

knowingly and voluntarily made. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,

242 (1969).

AFFIRMED.
#### “C” JIM ALLEN MOBILE HOMES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HERNANDO STATE BANK, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 72-278.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 31, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 1 (Friday, January 2, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 106]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-33730]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

[Docket No. FR-4235-N-36]


Federal Property Suitable as Facilities to Assist the Homeless

AGENCY: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and 
Development, HUD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This Notice identifies unutilized, underutilized, excess, and 
surplus Federal property reviewed by HUD for suitability for possible 
use to assist the homeless.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 2, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mark Johnston, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Room 7256, 
451 Seventh Street SW, Washington, DC 20410; telephone (202) 708-1226; 
TDD number for the hearing- and speech-impaired (202) 708-2565 (these 
telephone numbers are not toll-free), or call the toll-free Title V 
information line at 1-800-927-7588.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with the December 12, 1988 
court order in National Coalition for the Homeless v. Veterans 
Administration, No. 88-2503-OG (D.D.C.), HUD publishes a Notice, on a 
weekly basis, identifying unutilized, underutilized, excess and surplus 
Federal buildings and real property that HUD has reviewed for 
suitability for use to assist the homeless. Today's Notice is for the 
purpose of announcing that no additional properties have been 
determined suitable or unsuitable this week.

    Dated: December 22, 1997.
Fred Karnas, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Development.
[FR Doc. 97-33730 Filed 12-31-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4210-29-M
#### Wilber Lawrence HARPER v. Helen Lacey HARPER.

No. 50236.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 26, 1978.

Edward L. Cates, John C. Underwood, Jr., Earl R. Cruthirds, Jackson, for appellant.

Brown & Stanfield, Percy Stanfield, Jr., Jackson, for appellee.

Before SUGG, WALKER and COFER, JJ., and LEON E. HANNAFORD, Commissioner.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                          0
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   0
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                0
<PP&E>                          0
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           0
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        3
<OTHER-SE>                      (3)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    0
<SALES>                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                0
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    0
<EPS-BASIC>                   0
<EPS-DILUTED>                   0



</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          18,774
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  481,537
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,500
<INVENTORY>                                    483,190
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,297
<PP&E>                                       2,997,805
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,803,420
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,196,903
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,090,725
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            5,346
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,100,832
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,196,903
<SALES>                                        364,750
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               367,941
<CGS>                                          330,567
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  330,567
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               229,947
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,833
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (209,406)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (209,406)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (209,406)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.39)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.39)
        

</TABLE>
#### Gerald A. VAN DEN BLIEK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-480.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 6, 1973.

*219Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Norman J. Kapner and Richard S. Power, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Frank B. Kessler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate judgments of conviction for two escapes from the Osceola County Jail. This court, in State v. Benjamin, Fla.App.1972, 267 So.2d 348, cert. dismissed Fla. 1972, 270 So.2d 20, agreed with the decision in Brochu v. State, Fla.App.1972, 258 So.2d 286, which held that in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the escape it was essential that the person so charged was a prisoner who had been “convicted and sentenced”; it was not sufficient to show that at the time of his escape defendant was merely “charged” with the crime for which he was then being held.

In the case sub judice defendant was convicted of one escape in 1970. Prior to 1969, F.S. Section 944.40, F.S.A., the escape statute, declared that the substantive offense of escape was committed without regard to whether the prisoner was confined pursuant to a “charge” or pursuant to a “conviction” of a crime. However, in 1969 the statute was amended and the word “charge” was deleted, which led to the decision in Brochu v. State, supra.

Based upon our opinion in State v. Benjamin, supra, we therefore conclude that insofar as the judgment of conviction and sentence of four years for the crime of escape in Case No. 82-67, having occurred prior to the 1969 amendment of Section 944.40, said judgment is affirmed on the authority of State ex rel. Wilson v. Culver, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 674. However, the judgment and conviction of sentence for the crime of escape in Case No. 147-70, having occurred subsequent to the amendment of Section 944.40, as heretofore noted, said judgment is vacated and set aside and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Cf. Naylor v. State, Fla.App.1971, 250 So.2d 660.

Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part.

OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

CHRISTOPHER LEE DUNCAN, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-176 

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed April 3, 2019. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco 

County; Mary M. Handsel, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public 

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Katie Salemi Ashby, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

CASANUEVA, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
STEAM ELECTRIC CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE 

EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819 

DCN: SE02958

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT 

CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION 

(CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.
<TABLE> <S> <C>
                                    
<ARTICLE>                                                 5
<CIK>                                            0000863437
<NAME>                                   HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                                              1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
                                          
<S>                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                  JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                    DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                           1
<CASH>                                           14,686,034
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     4,374,992
<ALLOWANCES>                                        234,000
<INVENTORY>                                         528,839
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 19,736,490
<PP&E>                                           76,245,233
<DEPRECIATION>                                   25,434,769
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  150,679,787
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            13,182,866
<BONDS>                                          94,232,389
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                         342,800
<COMMON>                                             26,611
<OTHER-SE>                                       22,350,910
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    150,679,787
<SALES>                                          31,838,694
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 31,838,694
<CGS>                                            21,191,807
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    21,191,807
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (7,274,734)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                7,315,153
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  10,606,468
<INCOME-TAX>                                      4,949,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               5,657,468
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                      3,910,243
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          1.63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          1.15
        

</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 25, 2017

No. 04-17-00436-CR & 04-17-00437-CR

David Stuart BISHOP,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015CR3325 & 2015CR3326

The Honorable Laura Lee Parker, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Appellant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is GRANTED.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 25th day of October, 2017.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Margaret LOCKHART and Buel Lockhart, her husband, Appellants, v. Nellie PRUDOT and James Prudot, her husband, Appellees.

No. 71-693.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. *15,*1972.

*158John R. Parkhill and Edward J. Hunter, Tampa, for appellants.

Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

A verdict of zero damages for pain and suffering is sustainable in this case, where the injury is not objectively verifiable and a jury of reasonable persons would be justified in concluding that Mrs. Lock-hart was not injured.1 The jury’s verdict in favor of Mrs. Lockhart for $402 bore a note reading:

“$235.00 auto dam.

50.00 Dr. Trupp

35.00 Dr. Keller

52.00 Dr. Aliearn

X-Rays 30.00

These items were all recoverable by Mr. Lockhart, who owned the car individually.

An obvious transposition of verdicts can be, and should be, corrected by the trial judge on motion without granting a new trial.2

However, this case presents a different problem which we think requires either a new trial or a record substantiating the claim that the jury was not improperly influenced. On the last morning of the trial one juror, in his car on his way to the court house, was struck from behind in much the same type of accident as that which gave rise to this action. He suffered no injury. He told his fellow jurors about the experience. The trial judge’s inquiry into the effect of this incident was limited to questions directed at the individual juror, who stated that the occurrence did not influence the verdict. The unanswered question is whether other jurors were influenced improperly. If the absence of influence can be shown the verdict should be allowed to stand; if not, a new trial should be awarded. This decision is predicated upon the great similarity between the accidents and the disallowance of damages to Mrs. Lockhart. This coincidence suggests the need for a more extensive inquiry than was conducted.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

LILES, Acting C. J., and HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.

1

. Boeck v. Diem, Fla.App.2d 1971, 245 So.2d 687; Tejon v. Broome, Fla.App.2d 1972, 261 So.2d 197.

2

. Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Fla.1971, 257 So.2d 36.
Exhibit 15.1

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form F-3 (No 333-217778) and in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos.  333-198655, 333-184397, 333-147914, 333-156093, 333-202546, 333-202547) of Rio Tinto Plc and Rio Tinto Ltd of our reportdated 28 February 2018 relating to the financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 20‐F.

 

 

 

 

 

| /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP |   | /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers |
|--------------------------------|--------|----------------------------|
|                           |   |                       |
| PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP     |   | PricewaterhouseCoopers     |
| London, United Kingdom         |   | Brisbane, Australia        |
|                           |   |                       |
| 1 March 2018                   |   | 1 March 2018               |
#### Amy Marilene ODOM, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Appellees.

No. 73-248.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 31, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Orange County; Parker Lee McDonald, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
No. D-2221.

#### In re Disbarment of Wallman.

Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see *ante,*p. 1034.]
Document

Exhibit 10.3


THIRD AMENDMENT TO


EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT


THIS THIRD AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT (“Amendment”) is entered into on November 3, 2021 and effective as of January 1, 2021 (the “Effective Date”) by and between Penn National Gaming, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation (the “Company”), and Jay A. Snowden, an individual (“Executive”), with respect to the following facts and circumstances:


RECITALS


The Company and Executive entered into an Executive Agreement on July 31, 2019, as amended by the First Amendment dated March 27, 2020 and effective as of April 1, 2020, and the Second Amendment dated and effective as of October 1, 2020 (as amended, the “Agreement”).


The Company and Executive desire to further amend the Agreement pursuant to the terms set forth herein.


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants and agreements set forth herein, the parties hereto agree as follows:


AMENDMENTS


1.                 As of the Effective Date, Section 1(c) of the Agreement (Employment) is hereby deleted and replaced with the following new Section 1(c) of the Agreement (Employment): “(c) personal use of Company aircraft.”


2.                 Except as modified herein, all other terms of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. In the event of a conflict between the terms of the Agreement and this Amendment, the terms of this Amendment shall apply. No modification may be made to the Agreement or this Amendment except in writing and signed by both the Company and Executive.


[SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE]
















IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly executed as of the date first written above.


												
	EXECUTIVE
		PENN NATIONAL GAMING, INC.

				
	/s/ Jay A. Snowden
		By:
	/s/ Harper Ko

	Jay A. Snowden
			Harper Ko,

				Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary