# Diario Oficial C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0928
  doi:10.3000/19770928.C_2013.237.spa |
| --- | --- |
| Diario Oficial
  de la Unión Europea | C 237 |
| | |
| Edición en lengua española | Comunicaciones e informaciones | 56o año15 de agosto de 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0928

doi:10.3000/19770928.C_2013.237.spa

Diario Oficial

de la Unión Europea

C 237

Edición en lengua española

Comunicaciones e informaciones

56o año15 de agosto de 2013

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| Número de información | Sumario | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicaciones |
| | COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2013/C 237/01 | No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Número de información

Sumario

Página

II   Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2013/C 237/01

No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Información |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Tipo de cambio del euro | 2 |
| | INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO |
| | Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Ayuda estatal — Decisión de cerrar un caso de ayuda existente a consecuencia de la aceptación de medidas apropiadas por un Estado de la AELC | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia sobre ayudas estatales en relación con la ayuda regional para el Régimen de incentivos a la inversión de Islandia y seis acuerdos de inversión | 4 |

IV   Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2013/C 237/02

Tipo de cambio del euro

2

INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

2013/C 237/03

Ayuda estatal — Decisión de cerrar un caso de ayuda existente a consecuencia de la aceptación de medidas apropiadas por un Estado de la AELC

3

2013/C 237/04

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia sobre ayudas estatales en relación con la ayuda regional para el Régimen de incentivos a la inversión de Islandia y seis acuerdos de inversión

4

| | V   Anuncios |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Comunicación de la Comisión publicada de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo en los asuntos AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II y AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | OTROS ACTOS |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Publicación de una solicitud con arreglo al artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Publicación de una solicitud de modificación de conformidad con el artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Publicación de una solicitud con arreglo al artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios | 40 |

V   Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

2013/C 237/05

Comunicación de la Comisión publicada de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo en los asuntos AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II y AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

o

28

OTROS ACTOS

Comisión Europea

2013/C 237/06

Publicación de una solicitud con arreglo al artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

o

31

2013/C 237/07

Publicación de una solicitud de modificación de conformidad con el artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

o

36

2013/C 237/08

Publicación de una solicitud con arreglo al artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

o

40

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE |

---

(1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE

1

| ES | |
| --- | --- |

ES

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II Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/1

---

No oposición a una concentración notificada

(Asunto COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2013/C 237/01

El 18 de abril de 2013, la Comisión decidió no oponerse a la concentración notificada que se cita en el encabezamiento y declararla compatible con el mercado común. Esta decisión se basa en el artículo 6, apartado 1, letra b) del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo. El texto íntegro de la decisión solo está disponible en inglés y se hará público una vez que se elimine cualquier secreto comercial que pueda contener. Estará disponible:

| — | en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad, |
| --- | --- |

—

en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad,

| — | en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) con el número de documento 32013M6843. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho comunitario en línea. |
| --- | --- |

—

en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) con el número de documento 32013M6843. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho comunitario en línea.

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IV Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/2

---

Tipo de cambio del euro (1)

14 de agosto de 2013

2013/C 237/02

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Tipo de cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar estadounidense | 1,3243 |
| JPY | yen japonés | 130,17 |
| DKK | corona danesa | 7,4583 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,85440 |
| SEK | corona sueca | 8,6393 |
| CHF | franco suizo | 1,2415 |
| ISK | corona islandesa | |
| NOK | corona noruega | 7,8130 |
| BGN | lev búlgaro | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corona checa | 25,822 |
| HUF | forint húngaro | 298,62 |
| LTL | litas lituana | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats letón | 0,7025 |
| PLN | zloty polaco | 4,2037 |
| RON | leu rumano | 4,4315 |
| TRY | lira turca | 2,5664 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,4524 |
| CAD | dólar canadiense | 1,3689 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 10,2705 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandés | 1,6501 |
| SGD | dólar de Singapur | 1,6835 |
| KRW | won de Corea del Sur | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricano | 13,2129 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi | 8,1041 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,5415 |
| IDR | rupia indonesia | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | ringgit malayo | 4,3351 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 57,975 |
| RUB | rublo ruso | 43,8995 |
| THB | baht tailandés | 41,504 |
| BRL | real brasileño | 3,0586 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 16,8756 |
| INR | rupia india | 81,3700 |

Moneda

Tipo de cambio

USD

dólar estadounidense

1,3243

JPY

yen japonés

130,17

DKK

corona danesa

7,4583

GBP

libra esterlina

0,85440

SEK

corona sueca

8,6393

CHF

franco suizo

1,2415

ISK

corona islandesa

NOK

corona noruega

7,8130

BGN

lev búlgaro

1,9558

CZK

corona checa

25,822

HUF

forint húngaro

298,62

LTL

litas lituana

3,4528

LVL

lats letón

0,7025

PLN

zloty polaco

4,2037

RON

leu rumano

4,4315

TRY

lira turca

2,5664

AUD

dólar australiano

1,4524

CAD

dólar canadiense

1,3689

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

10,2705

NZD

dólar neozelandés

1,6501

SGD

dólar de Singapur

1,6835

KRW

won de Corea del Sur

1 482,39

ZAR

rand sudafricano

13,2129

CNY

yuan renminbi

8,1041

HRK

kuna croata

7,5415

IDR

rupia indonesia

13 667,59

MYR

ringgit malayo

4,3351

PHP

peso filipino

57,975

RUB

rublo ruso

43,8995

THB

baht tailandés

41,504

BRL

real brasileño

3,0586

MXN

peso mexicano

16,8756

INR

rupia india

81,3700

---

(1)  Fuente: tipo de cambio de referencia publicado por el Banco Central Europeo.

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INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/3

---

Ayuda estatal — Decisión de cerrar un caso de ayuda existente a consecuencia de la aceptación de medidas apropiadas por un Estado de la AELC

2013/C 237/03

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC ha propuesto las medidas correspondientes, que han sido aceptadas por Islandia, sobre la ayuda siguiente:

| Fecha de adopción de la Decisión | : | 24 de abril de 2013. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Asunto no | : | 70958 |
| Número de Decisión | : | 159/13/COL |
| Estado de la AELC | : | Islandia |
| Título | : | Ayuda estatal concedida a Landsvirkjun y Orkuveita Reykjavíkur. |
| Base jurídica | : | Ley 42/1983 sobre el Landsvirkjun, Ley 45/1998 sobre las administraciones locales, Ley 139/2001 sobre la creación de Orkuveita Reykjavíkur como empresa de propiedad conjunta y Ley 121/1997 sobre las garantías del Estado. |
| Objetivo | : | n.d. |
| Forma de la ayuda | : | Garantías estatales y municipales ilimitadas, sin el pago de primas de mercado adecuadas, para Landsvirkjun y Orkuveita Reykjavíkur. |
| Sectores económicos | : | Sector eléctrico. |
| Otros datos | : | Sobre la base de las medidas adoptadas y de los compromisos asumidos por las autoridades islandesas de suprimir la garantía ilimitada del Estado en favor de Landsvirkjun y Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, se han despejado las preocupaciones del Órgano en relación con la incompatibilidad del régimen y se ha archivado la investigación. |

Fecha de adopción de la Decisión

:

24 de abril de 2013.

Asunto no

:

70958

Número de Decisión

:

159/13/COL

Estado de la AELC

:

Islandia

Título

:

Ayuda estatal concedida a Landsvirkjun y Orkuveita Reykjavíkur.

Base jurídica

:

Ley 42/1983 sobre el Landsvirkjun, Ley 45/1998 sobre las administraciones locales, Ley 139/2001 sobre la creación de Orkuveita Reykjavíkur como empresa de propiedad conjunta y Ley 121/1997 sobre las garantías del Estado.

Objetivo

:

n.d.

Forma de la ayuda

:

Garantías estatales y municipales ilimitadas, sin el pago de primas de mercado adecuadas, para Landsvirkjun y Orkuveita Reykjavíkur.

Sectores económicos

:

Sector eléctrico.

Otros datos

:

Sobre la base de las medidas adoptadas y de los compromisos asumidos por las autoridades islandesas de suprimir la garantía ilimitada del Estado en favor de Landsvirkjun y Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, se han despejado las preocupaciones del Órgano en relación con la incompatibilidad del régimen y se ha archivado la investigación.

El texto de la decisión en las lenguas auténticas, suprimidos los datos confidenciales, se encuentra en la página web del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

---

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/4

---

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia sobre ayudas estatales en relación con la ayuda regional para el Régimen de incentivos a la inversión de Islandia y seis acuerdos de inversión

2013/C 237/04

Mediante Decisión no 177/13/COL, de 30 de abril de 2013, reproducida en la versión lingüística auténtica en las páginas siguientes al presente resumen, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC incoó el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia. El Gobierno islandés fue informado mediante una copia de la Decisión.

Mediante el presente anuncio, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC invita a los Estados de la AELC, a los Estados miembros de la UE y a las terceras partes interesadas a que presenten sus observaciones sobre dicha medida en el plazo de un mes, a partir de la fecha de publicación de la presente comunicación, enviándolas a:

| Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

Registro

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Las observaciones se comunicarán al Gobierno islandés. La identidad de las partes interesadas que presentan observaciones podrá preservarse, siempre y cuando exista previa solicitud por escrito aduciendo las razones para ello.

RESUMEN

Procedimiento

El 13 de octubre de 2010, el Órgano de Vigilancia aprobó un régimen de incentivos a la inversión («el Régimen») notificado por las autoridades islandesas con arreglo al artículo 1, apartado 3, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3, mediante la Decisión no 390/10/COL.

El Régimen contempla la posibilidad de conceder ayuda en forma de subvenciones directas, a través de diversas exenciones fiscales de hasta 10 años y mediante la venta y el arrendamiento financiero de terrenos por debajo del valor de mercado a empresas de todos los sectores excepto el financiero, en relación con una inversión inicial en áreas en Islandia que pueden optar a ayudas regionales (denominadas «regiones c»). El régimen expira el 31 de diciembre de 2013.

La base jurídica del Régimen según ha sido aprobado por la Comisión es:

| — | Ley no 99/2010 sobre incentivos para inversiones iniciales en Islandia («la Ley»), adoptada por el Parlamento islandés el 29 de junio de 2010; y |
| --- | --- |

—

Ley no 99/2010 sobre incentivos para inversiones iniciales en Islandia («la Ley»), adoptada por el Parlamento islandés el 29 de junio de 2010; y

| — | Reglamento (UE) no 985/2010 sobre incentivos para inversiones iniciales en Islandia, publicado por el Ministerio de Industria el 25 de noviembre de 2010 («el Reglamento»), correspondiente a un proyecto de reglamento presentado al Órgano de Vigilancia el 27 de septiembre de 2010. El Reglamento es un acto de Derecho derivado basado en la Ley. |
| --- | --- |

—

Reglamento (UE) no 985/2010 sobre incentivos para inversiones iniciales en Islandia, publicado por el Ministerio de Industria el 25 de noviembre de 2010 («el Reglamento»), correspondiente a un proyecto de reglamento presentado al Órgano de Vigilancia el 27 de septiembre de 2010. El Reglamento es un acto de Derecho derivado basado en la Ley.

El 30 de diciembre de 2010 el Ministerio de Industria publicó un nuevo Reglamento, el Reglamento (UE) no 1150/2010 («el Reglamento suplementario»), por el que se modificaba el Reglamento, en particular para garantizar el efecto incentivador de la ayuda a la inversión. El Reglamento suplementario no se notificó al Órgano de Vigilancia.

En el periodo de 2010 a 2013, el Estado islandés suscribió una serie de acuerdos que consideró podían acogerse al Régimen («los seis acuerdos de inversión»):

| 1) | El 30 de diciembre de 2010 con Becromal Iceland ehf. |
| --- | --- |

1)

El 30 de diciembre de 2010 con Becromal Iceland ehf.

| 2) | El 30 de diciembre de 2010 con Thorsil ehf. |
| --- | --- |

2)

El 30 de diciembre de 2010 con Thorsil ehf.

| 3) | El 17 de febrero de 2011 con Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf. |
| --- | --- |

3)

El 17 de febrero de 2011 con Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf.

| 4) | El 22 de septiembre de 2011 con Verne Real Estate II ehf. |
| --- | --- |

4)

El 22 de septiembre de 2011 con Verne Real Estate II ehf.

| 5) | El 7 de mayo de 2012 con GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. |
| --- | --- |

5)

El 7 de mayo de 2012 con GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

| 6) | El 28 de enero de 2013 con Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6)

El 28 de enero de 2013 con Marmeti ehf.

Tras las conversaciones previas a la notificación, las autoridades islandesas notificaron al Órgano de Vigilancia, de conformidad con el artículo 1, apartado 3, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3, una serie de propuestas de modificación («las modificaciones notificadas») a la Ley de 13 de diciembre de 2012.

Evaluación de la medida

Las modificaciones notificadas consisten en la supresión de las subvenciones directas, un nuevo método para aplicar un impuesto de sociedades máximo a todos los proyectos nuevos en el marco del Régimen, exención del impuesto de timbre e incremento del nivel de exenciones del impuesto municipal sobre los bienes inmuebles y de las cotizaciones a la seguridad social. El Órgano de Vigilancia llegó a la conclusión preliminar de que las modificaciones del Régimen notificadas no eran disociables del Régimen como tal. En consecuencia, evaluó el Régimen en su totalidad, tal como se había modificado. Evaluó, además, la aplicación del Régimen y consideró que determinados elementos de los seis acuerdos de inversión que Islandia había suscrito sobre la base del Régimen modificado, planteaban dudas sobre su compatibilidad con el Acuerdo EEE.

En particular, el Órgano de Vigilancia duda de si la ayuda concedida en virtud de los acuerdos de inversión Becromal, Kísilfélagið y Verne se concede en el ámbito del Régimen según ha sido aprobado por el Órgano de Vigilancia y respeta los requisitos del efecto incentivador de la ayuda a la inversión.

Además, el Órgano de Vigilancia duda de si el acuerdo de inversión Marmeti se ha suscrito dentro del ámbito del Régimen, en lo que se refiere al requisito del efecto incentivador.

Además, el Órgano de Vigilancia tiene dudas de si algunos elementos del acuerdo de inversión Thorsil y del GMR conceden ayuda fuera del Régimen aprobado.

En consecuencia, el Órgano de Vigilancia tiene dudas de si el Régimen de ayuda modificado y la ayuda concedida en el marco de los seis acuerdos de inversión puede considerarse compatible con el Acuerdo EEE.

Conclusión

A la vista de las consideraciones anteriores, el Órgano de Vigilancia duda de que el Régimen modificado y los seis acuerdos de inversión antes mencionados cumplan lo establecido en el artículo 61, apartado 3, del Acuerdo EEE así como los requisitos establecidos en las Directrices sobre ayudas regionales y las Directrices sobre fiscalidad de las empresas.

Habida cuenta de lo anteriormente expuesto, el Órgano de Vigilancia ha decidido incoar el procedimiento formal de investigación previsto en el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia con respecto al Régimen de incentivos a la inversión, con las modificaciones notificadas por las autoridades islandesas, modificado por el Reglamento (UE) no 1150/2010, aplicado por las autoridades islandesas y respecto a los seis acuerdos de inversión.

Se invita a las partes interesadas a que presenten sus observaciones en el plazo de un mes a partir de la publicación de la presente Decisión en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
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(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
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(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
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(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
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(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
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(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
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(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
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(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
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(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
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(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
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(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
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(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
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(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
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(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
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(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
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(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
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(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
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(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
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(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
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(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
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(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
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(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
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(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
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(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
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(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
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(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/28

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Comunicación de la Comisión publicada de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo en los asuntos AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II y AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   INTRODUCCIÓN

| 1. | Con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2002, relativo a la aplicación de las normas sobre competencia previstas en los artículos 101 y 102 del Tratado (1), cuando la Comisión se disponga a adoptar una decisión que ordene la cesación de la infracción y las empresas interesadas propongan compromisos que respondan a las inquietudes que les haya manifestado la Comisión en su evaluación preliminar, esta podrá, mediante decisión, convertir dichos compromisos en obligatorios para las empresas. La decisión podrá ser adoptada por un período de tiempo determinado y en ella constará que ya no hay motivos para la intervención de la Comisión. Antes de adoptar una decisión con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003, de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del mismo Reglamento, la Comisión publicará un breve resumen del asunto y el contenido fundamental de los compromisos. Los terceros interesados podrán presentar observaciones en un plazo que fijará la Comisión. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2002, relativo a la aplicación de las normas sobre competencia previstas en los artículos 101 y 102 del Tratado (1), cuando la Comisión se disponga a adoptar una decisión que ordene la cesación de la infracción y las empresas interesadas propongan compromisos que respondan a las inquietudes que les haya manifestado la Comisión en su evaluación preliminar, esta podrá, mediante decisión, convertir dichos compromisos en obligatorios para las empresas. La decisión podrá ser adoptada por un período de tiempo determinado y en ella constará que ya no hay motivos para la intervención de la Comisión. Antes de adoptar una decisión con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003, de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del mismo Reglamento, la Comisión publicará un breve resumen del asunto y el contenido fundamental de los compromisos. Los terceros interesados podrán presentar observaciones en un plazo que fijará la Comisión.

2.   RESUMEN DEL ASUNTO

| 2. | El 6 de junio de 2013, la Comisión aprobó un análisis preliminar a efectos del artículo 9, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 dirigido a Deutsche Bahn AG y sus filiales DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG y DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

El 6 de junio de 2013, la Comisión aprobó un análisis preliminar a efectos del artículo 9, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 dirigido a Deutsche Bahn AG y sus filiales DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG y DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2).

| 3. | En su análisis preliminar, la Comisión expresó su preocupación ante la posibilidad de que el Grupo DB pudiera haber abusado de su posición dominante en el mercado del suministro de corriente de tracción en Alemania cobrando precios para este tipo de corriente a los competidores, creando un estrechamiento de márgenes en los mercados de transporte ferroviario de viajeros de largo recorrido y de transporte de mercancías por ferrocarril, en violación del artículo 102 del TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

3.

En su análisis preliminar, la Comisión expresó su preocupación ante la posibilidad de que el Grupo DB pudiera haber abusado de su posición dominante en el mercado del suministro de corriente de tracción en Alemania cobrando precios para este tipo de corriente a los competidores, creando un estrechamiento de márgenes en los mercados de transporte ferroviario de viajeros de largo recorrido y de transporte de mercancías por ferrocarril, en violación del artículo 102 del TFUE.

| 4. | La Comisión considera preliminarmente que DB Energie tiene una posición dominante en el mercado del suministro de corriente de tracción a empresas ferroviarias que operan en Alemania. La corriente de tracción es un insumo indispensable para las empresas ferroviarias para competir en los mercados alemanes de transporte ferroviario. Desde 2003, DB Energie comercializa corriente de tracción a las empresas ferroviarias en virtud de una oferta global que agrupa el precio de la electricidad consumida (precio de la electricidad) y el precio por utilizar la red de corriente de tracción (tasa de acceso a la red). |
| --- | --- |

4.

La Comisión considera preliminarmente que DB Energie tiene una posición dominante en el mercado del suministro de corriente de tracción a empresas ferroviarias que operan en Alemania. La corriente de tracción es un insumo indispensable para las empresas ferroviarias para competir en los mercados alemanes de transporte ferroviario. Desde 2003, DB Energie comercializa corriente de tracción a las empresas ferroviarias en virtud de una oferta global que agrupa el precio de la electricidad consumida (precio de la electricidad) y el precio por utilizar la red de corriente de tracción (tasa de acceso a la red).

| 5. | En su análisis preliminar, la Comisión consideró que este sistema de tarificación, y, en particular, los descuentos que han beneficiado a los operadores ferroviarios del Grupo DB más que a sus competidores, puede haber obstaculizado el desarrollo de la competencia en los mercados de transporte de mercancías por ferrocarril y de transporte de viajeros de largo recorrido. En estos mercados, a la Comisión le preocupa que el sistema de precios de corriente de tracción utilizado por DB Energie pueda implicar un diferencial entre el precio de la corriente de tracción aplicado a los competidores y el precio de los servicios de transporte por ferrocarril cargado a los consumidores por las empresas de transporte de DB, impidiendo a competidores igualmente eficientes obtener beneficios o reduciendo artificialmente su margen de beneficio. La investigación de la Comisión concluyó con carácter preliminar que esta situación plantea problemas de competencia en los mercados de transporte ferroviario de viajeros de largo recorrido y de transporte ferroviario de mercancías. |
| --- | --- |

5.

En su análisis preliminar, la Comisión consideró que este sistema de tarificación, y, en particular, los descuentos que han beneficiado a los operadores ferroviarios del Grupo DB más que a sus competidores, puede haber obstaculizado el desarrollo de la competencia en los mercados de transporte de mercancías por ferrocarril y de transporte de viajeros de largo recorrido. En estos mercados, a la Comisión le preocupa que el sistema de precios de corriente de tracción utilizado por DB Energie pueda implicar un diferencial entre el precio de la corriente de tracción aplicado a los competidores y el precio de los servicios de transporte por ferrocarril cargado a los consumidores por las empresas de transporte de DB, impidiendo a competidores igualmente eficientes obtener beneficios o reduciendo artificialmente su margen de beneficio. La investigación de la Comisión concluyó con carácter preliminar que esta situación plantea problemas de competencia en los mercados de transporte ferroviario de viajeros de largo recorrido y de transporte ferroviario de mercancías.

| 6. | En noviembre de 2010, el Tribunal Federal de Justicia alemán consideró que la red de corriente de tracción se considerará una red energética y que sus condiciones de acceso y tasas se regularán con arreglo a la legislación del sector energético de Alemania (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Como consecuencia, DB Energie debe facturar por separado la tarifa de acceso a la red, de manera que los proveedores de electricidad terceros (es decir, no pertenecientes al Grupo DB) también puedan competir con DB Energie en el suministro de electricidad a las empresas ferroviarias (4). |
| --- | --- |

6.

En noviembre de 2010, el Tribunal Federal de Justicia alemán consideró que la red de corriente de tracción se considerará una red energética y que sus condiciones de acceso y tasas se regularán con arreglo a la legislación del sector energético de Alemania (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Como consecuencia, DB Energie debe facturar por separado la tarifa de acceso a la red, de manera que los proveedores de electricidad terceros (es decir, no pertenecientes al Grupo DB) también puedan competir con DB Energie en el suministro de electricidad a las empresas ferroviarias (4).

3.   CONTENIDO FUNDAMENTAL DE LOS COMPROMISOS OFRECIDOS

| 7. | El grupo DB no está de acuerdo con la evaluación preliminar de la Comisión de que puede haber abusado de su posición dominante en el mercado del suministro de corriente de tracción a las empresas ferroviarias alemanas. No obstante, ha ofrecido una serie de compromisos con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 con objeto de despejar las objeciones de la Comisión desde la óptica de la competencia. Los elementos clave de los compromisos se describen a continuación. |
| --- | --- |

7.

El grupo DB no está de acuerdo con la evaluación preliminar de la Comisión de que puede haber abusado de su posición dominante en el mercado del suministro de corriente de tracción a las empresas ferroviarias alemanas. No obstante, ha ofrecido una serie de compromisos con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 con objeto de despejar las objeciones de la Comisión desde la óptica de la competencia. Los elementos clave de los compromisos se describen a continuación.

| 8. | A más tardar 3 meses después de la notificación de la decisión de la Comisión por la que tales compromisos se convierten en vinculantes para el Grupo DB y, como muy pronto, el 1 de enero de 2014, DB Energie introducirá un nuevo régimen de tarificación para la corriente de tracción con precios separados para el suministro de electricidad y tasas separadas de acceso a la red según lo autorizado por la autoridad reguladora alemana correspondiente (Bundesnetzagentur). Este nuevo sistema de precios está diseñado para garantizar la entrada de proveedores de electricidad terceros al mercado de suministro de electricidad para las empresas ferroviarias (5). |
| --- | --- |

8.

A más tardar 3 meses después de la notificación de la decisión de la Comisión por la que tales compromisos se convierten en vinculantes para el Grupo DB y, como muy pronto, el 1 de enero de 2014, DB Energie introducirá un nuevo régimen de tarificación para la corriente de tracción con precios separados para el suministro de electricidad y tasas separadas de acceso a la red según lo autorizado por la autoridad reguladora alemana correspondiente (Bundesnetzagentur). Este nuevo sistema de precios está diseñado para garantizar la entrada de proveedores de electricidad terceros al mercado de suministro de electricidad para las empresas ferroviarias (5).

| 9. | Con este nuevo sistema, DB Energie cobrará el mismo precio por la electricidad a todas las empresas ferroviarias, sin descuentos por volumen o duración. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Con este nuevo sistema, DB Energie cobrará el mismo precio por la electricidad a todas las empresas ferroviarias, sin descuentos por volumen o duración.

| 10. | DB Energie devolverá a las empresas ferroviarias de Alemania no pertenecientes al Grupo DB un pago único retroactivo del 4 % de su factura de corriente de tracción por el período de un año antes de la entrada en vigor del nuevo sistema de precios. |
| --- | --- |

10.

DB Energie devolverá a las empresas ferroviarias de Alemania no pertenecientes al Grupo DB un pago único retroactivo del 4 % de su factura de corriente de tracción por el período de un año antes de la entrada en vigor del nuevo sistema de precios.

| 11. | DB Energie y DB Mobility and Logistics AG aportarán anualmente datos para que la Comisión pueda evaluar si los niveles de precios para la corriente de tracción y los servicios de transporte aplicados por el Grupo DB podrían dar lugar a un estrechamiento de los márgenes. DB Energie también notificará previamente a la Comisión cualquier cambio en el precio de la electricidad. |
| --- | --- |

11.

DB Energie y DB Mobility and Logistics AG aportarán anualmente datos para que la Comisión pueda evaluar si los niveles de precios para la corriente de tracción y los servicios de transporte aplicados por el Grupo DB podrían dar lugar a un estrechamiento de los márgenes. DB Energie también notificará previamente a la Comisión cualquier cambio en el precio de la electricidad.

| 12. | Los compromisos entrarán en vigor a más tardar tres meses después de la notificación de la decisión de la Comisión. Tendrán una duración de 5 años (6) tras la notificación de la decisión de la Comisión o hasta que el 20 % del volumen de la corriente de tracción adquirida por competidores del Grupo DB proceda de proveedores de electricidad terceros. El Grupo DB designará un administrador que supervisará el cumplimiento de los compromisos. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Los compromisos entrarán en vigor a más tardar tres meses después de la notificación de la decisión de la Comisión. Tendrán una duración de 5 años (6) tras la notificación de la decisión de la Comisión o hasta que el 20 % del volumen de la corriente de tracción adquirida por competidores del Grupo DB proceda de proveedores de electricidad terceros. El Grupo DB designará un administrador que supervisará el cumplimiento de los compromisos.

| 13. | Los compromisos se publicarán en el sitio web de la Dirección General de Competencia: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

Los compromisos se publicarán en el sitio web de la Dirección General de Competencia: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   INVITACIÓN A FORMULAR OBSERVACIONES

| 14. | A reserva de los resultados de la prueba de mercado, la Comisión se propone adoptar una Decisión con arreglo al artículo 9, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 en virtud de la cual se declaren vinculantes los compromisos citados anteriormente y publicados en la página internet de la Dirección General de Competencia. |
| --- | --- |

14.

A reserva de los resultados de la prueba de mercado, la Comisión se propone adoptar una Decisión con arreglo al artículo 9, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 en virtud de la cual se declaren vinculantes los compromisos citados anteriormente y publicados en la página internet de la Dirección General de Competencia.

| 15. | De conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003, la Comisión invita a los terceros interesados a presentar sus observaciones sobre los compromisos propuestos. La Comisión deberá recibir dichas observaciones a más tardar en el plazo de un mes a partir de la fecha de su publicación. Asimismo, se ruega a los terceros interesados que faciliten una versión no confidencial de sus observaciones en la cual se haya suprimido y sustituido la información que consideren secreto comercial y otros pasajes de contenido confidencial por un resumen no confidencial o por la indicación «secreto comercial» o «confidencial». De conformidad con el artículo 16 del Reglamento (CE) no 773/2004, cualquier solicitud de confidencialidad deberá estar debidamente motivada, facilitando, en particular, los motivos por los que la divulgación de la información de que se trate podría causar un perjuicio grave. |
| --- | --- |

15.

De conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003, la Comisión invita a los terceros interesados a presentar sus observaciones sobre los compromisos propuestos. La Comisión deberá recibir dichas observaciones a más tardar en el plazo de un mes a partir de la fecha de su publicación. Asimismo, se ruega a los terceros interesados que faciliten una versión no confidencial de sus observaciones en la cual se haya suprimido y sustituido la información que consideren secreto comercial y otros pasajes de contenido confidencial por un resumen no confidencial o por la indicación «secreto comercial» o «confidencial». De conformidad con el artículo 16 del Reglamento (CE) no 773/2004, cualquier solicitud de confidencialidad deberá estar debidamente motivada, facilitando, en particular, los motivos por los que la divulgación de la información de que se trate podría causar un perjuicio grave.

| 16. | Es preferible motivar las respuestas y los comentarios, que deberán exponer los hechos relevantes. En el caso de que identifique algún problema en cualquier parte de los compromisos propuestos, la Comisión le invitará a sugerir posibles soluciones. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Es preferible motivar las respuestas y los comentarios, que deberán exponer los hechos relevantes. En el caso de que identifique algún problema en cualquier parte de los compromisos propuestos, la Comisión le invitará a sugerir posibles soluciones.

| 17. | Estas observaciones pueden dirigirse a la Comisión con el número de referencia AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, por correo electrónico (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), por fax (+32 22950128) o por correo a la siguiente dirección:





  Comisión Europea |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección General de Competencia |
| Antitrust Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

17.

Estas observaciones pueden dirigirse a la Comisión con el número de referencia AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, por correo electrónico (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), por fax (+32 22950128) o por correo a la siguiente dirección:

Comisión Europea

Dirección General de Competencia

Antitrust Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  DO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1. Con efecto a partir del 1 de diciembre de 2009, los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE han pasado a ser los artículos 101 y 102, respectivamente, del TFUE. Los dos grupos de disposiciones son, en esencia, idénticos. A efectos de la presente Comunicación, las referencias a los artículos 101 y 102 del TFUE se entenderán hechas a los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE cuando proceda.

(2)  Deutsche Bahn AG y todas sus filiales en su conjunto serán denominadas en adelante «el Grupo DB».

(3)  Bundesgerichtshof, sentencia de 9 de noviembre de 2010, asunto EnVR 1/10.

(4)  En la página web de DB Energie figura más información sobre este cambio de sistema de tarificación y las condiciones del nuevo sistema (únicamente en alemán): http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  Además, la introducción del nuevo sistema se completará con la obligación de separar la contabilidad y la información entre las actividades de DB Energie como gestor de la red de corriente de tracción y como proveedor de electricidad.

(6)  El compromiso por DB Energie de no conceder descuentos basados en la duración para su suministro de electricidad solo durará tres años.

---

OTROS ACTOS

Comisión Europea

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/31

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Publicación de una solicitud con arreglo al artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

2013/C 237/06

La presente publicación otorga el derecho a oponerse a la solicitud, de conformidad con el artículo 51 del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo (1).

DOCUMENTO ÚNICO

REGLAMENTO (CE) No 510/2006 DEL CONSEJO

sobre la protección de las indicaciones geográficas y de las denominaciones de origen de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios
   (2)

«SZENTESI PAPRIKA»

No CE: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

IGP ( X ) DOP ( )

1.   Denominación

«Szentesi paprika»

2.   Estado miembro o tercer país

Hungría

3.   Descripción del producto agrícola o alimenticio

3.1.   Tipo de producto

| Categoría 1.6: | Frutas, hortalizas y cereales frescos o transformados |
| --- | --- |

Categoría 1.6:

Frutas, hortalizas y cereales frescos o transformados

3.2.   Descripción del producto que se designa con la denominación indicada en el punto 1

La indicación geográfica protegida «Szentesi paprika» designa los frutos obtenidos mediante cultivo forzado de tipos varietales y variedades selectas de Capsicum annuum.

En el momento de su comercialización, los productos amparados por la IGP «Szentesi paprika» deben estar en conjunto intactos y sanos y los diferentes tipos varietales deben presentar las características siguientes.

| a) | Pimiento blanco para rellenar (TV) (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Cuando está maduro, el «Szentesi paprika» blanco tiene un tacto suave, su piel es lisa y brillante, acaba en un extremo apuntado y curvo y su carne es crujiente y gruesa. Su superficie es lisa y de color crema brillante (marfil). Es de forma cónica, tiene una longitud entre 60 y 120 mm y un diámetro entre 40 y 70 mm; se compone generalmente de tres o cuatro lóbulos; el grosor de su carne varía entre 4 y 7 mm, su textura es firme y su piel es fina; su perfume a pimiento es intenso, aromático y dulce.
  Variedades cultivadas: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod,Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Pimiento blanco para rellenar (TV) (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Cuando está maduro, el «Szentesi paprika» blanco tiene un tacto suave, su piel es lisa y brillante, acaba en un extremo apuntado y curvo y su carne es crujiente y gruesa. Su superficie es lisa y de color crema brillante (marfil). Es de forma cónica, tiene una longitud entre 60 y 120 mm y un diámetro entre 40 y 70 mm; se compone generalmente de tres o cuatro lóbulos; el grosor de su carne varía entre 4 y 7 mm, su textura es firme y su piel es fina; su perfume a pimiento es intenso, aromático y dulce.

Variedades cultivadas: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod,Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia.

| b) | Pimiento apuntado (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  La superficie del «Szentesi paprika» apuntado es brillante, lisa o levemente ondulada; es largo y apuntado. Presenta un color verde claro, medio u oscuro y tiene una longitud entre 150 y 250 mm y un diámetro entre 20 y 50 mm; se compone generalmente de dos o tres lóbulos, el grosor de su carne varía entre 3 y 4 mm, su textura es firme y su piel, fina. El producto desprende un perfume a pimiento intenso, es picante y presenta un aroma y un sabor agradables.
  Variedades cultivadas: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.
  Las variedades cultivadas presentan un valor de picante comprendido entre 2 500 y 5 000 en la escala de Scoville. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Pimiento apuntado (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

La superficie del «Szentesi paprika» apuntado es brillante, lisa o levemente ondulada; es largo y apuntado. Presenta un color verde claro, medio u oscuro y tiene una longitud entre 150 y 250 mm y un diámetro entre 20 y 50 mm; se compone generalmente de dos o tres lóbulos, el grosor de su carne varía entre 3 y 4 mm, su textura es firme y su piel, fina. El producto desprende un perfume a pimiento intenso, es picante y presenta un aroma y un sabor agradables.

Variedades cultivadas: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.

Las variedades cultivadas presentan un valor de picante comprendido entre 2 500 y 5 000 en la escala de Scoville.

| c) | Pimiento de Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  El «Szentesi paprika» del grupo Kápia presenta una forma cónica ligeramente aplanada; su superficie es lisa, brillante, de color rojo oscuro aterciopelado en la madurez. Tiene entre 60 y 120 mm de longitud y entre 40 y 70 mm de anchura; se compone habitualmente de dos o tres lóbulos. El grosor de su carne varía entre 4 y 7 mm, su textura es firme y su piel es de grosor medio. El fruto tiene un sabor azucarado intenso, un perfume a pimentón molido y es dulce.
  Variedades cultivadas: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Pimiento de Kápia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

El «Szentesi paprika» del grupo Kápia presenta una forma cónica ligeramente aplanada; su superficie es lisa, brillante, de color rojo oscuro aterciopelado en la madurez. Tiene entre 60 y 120 mm de longitud y entre 40 y 70 mm de anchura; se compone habitualmente de dos o tres lóbulos. El grosor de su carne varía entre 4 y 7 mm, su textura es firme y su piel es de grosor medio. El fruto tiene un sabor azucarado intenso, un perfume a pimentón molido y es dulce.

Variedades cultivadas: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus.

| d) | Pimiento-tomate (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  El pimiento-tomate «Szentesi paprika» tiene una forma muy característica: se trata de una esfera aplanada de superficie lisa y brillante y color rojo oscuro en la madurez. Tiene un diámetro entre 60 y 120 mm y una longitud entre 40 y 60 mm; se compone generalmente de tres o cuatro lóbulos; el grosor de su carne varía entre 5 y 7 mm, su textura es firme y su piel es fina; desprende un aroma a pimiento intenso y es dulce.
  Variedades cultivadas: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.
  Dentro de los diferentes tipos varietales, la gama de las variedades indicadas que se cultiva puede variar cada año. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Pimiento-tomate (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

El pimiento-tomate «Szentesi paprika» tiene una forma muy característica: se trata de una esfera aplanada de superficie lisa y brillante y color rojo oscuro en la madurez. Tiene un diámetro entre 60 y 120 mm y una longitud entre 40 y 60 mm; se compone generalmente de tres o cuatro lóbulos; el grosor de su carne varía entre 5 y 7 mm, su textura es firme y su piel es fina; desprende un aroma a pimiento intenso y es dulce.

Variedades cultivadas: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.

Dentro de los diferentes tipos varietales, la gama de las variedades indicadas que se cultiva puede variar cada año.

3.3.   Materias primas (únicamente en el caso de los productos transformados)

—

3.4.   Piensos (únicamente en el caso de los productos de origen animal)

—

3.5.   Fases específicas de la producción que deben llevarse a cabo en la zona geográfica definida

Deben llevarse a cabo dentro de la zona geográfica delimitada en el punto 4 todas las etapas del proceso de producción del «Szentesi paprika»:

| — | la producción y el cultivo de las plantas de pimiento, |
| --- | --- |

—

la producción y el cultivo de las plantas de pimiento,

| — | en particular, el cultivo integrado y ecológico de determinados tipos varietales y de determinadas variedades, |
| --- | --- |

—

en particular, el cultivo integrado y ecológico de determinados tipos varietales y de determinadas variedades,

| — | la elección del período de producción, |
| --- | --- |

—

la elección del período de producción,

| — | el establecimiento de una zona de cultivo, |
| --- | --- |

—

el establecimiento de una zona de cultivo,

| — | la preparación y la fertilización del suelo, |
| --- | --- |

—

la preparación y la fertilización del suelo,

| — | la plantación, |
| --- | --- |

—

la plantación,

| — | la preparación de las estructuras de soporte, |
| --- | --- |

—

la preparación de las estructuras de soporte,

| — | los trabajos de cuidado de las plantas (fitotecnia), |
| --- | --- |

—

los trabajos de cuidado de las plantas (fitotecnia),

| — | el riego y el aporte de sustancias nutrientes, |
| --- | --- |

—

el riego y el aporte de sustancias nutrientes,

| — | la regulación de las condiciones climáticas, |
| --- | --- |

—

la regulación de las condiciones climáticas,

| — | la aplicación de métodos de tratamiento antiparasitario integrados y ecológicos, |
| --- | --- |

—

la aplicación de métodos de tratamiento antiparasitario integrados y ecológicos,

| — | la recolección, la preparación del producto, el almacenamiento previo/almacenamiento, |
| --- | --- |

—

la recolección, la preparación del producto, el almacenamiento previo/almacenamiento,

| — | la eliminación de los restos de cultivo, la limpieza y la desinfección de las instalaciones de producción. |
| --- | --- |

—

la eliminación de los restos de cultivo, la limpieza y la desinfección de las instalaciones de producción.

3.6.   Normas especiales sobre el corte en lonchas, el rallado, el envasado, etc.

El calibrado, el envasado y el etiquetado del «Szentesi paprika» se llevan a cabo en las instalaciones del productor o en otra instalación adecuada dentro de la zona geográfica delimitada.

Envasado por lotes: bandejas, cestas, bolsas de polietileno (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 pimientos/unidad); envasado al peso: cestas, mallas raschel (0,35, 0,5, 0,7, 1, 2 kg de pimientos/unidad) o cartones: en envases M10, M20, M30 (2,5, 10, 12, 14 kg de pimientos/unidad). El tipo de envase de determinados tipos varietales puede cambiar en cualquier momento en función de las necesidades comerciales.

Con el fin de preservar la calidad y la homogeneidad características de cada tipo varietal y, más concretamente, de cada variedad, así como el sabor, el perfume, los aromas, la textura y la integridad que conforman la especificidad de la IGP «Szentesi paprika», aunque también para garantizar la trazabilidad de los productos, el envasado debe llevarse a cabo en la zona geográfica delimitada.

3.7.   Normas especiales sobre el etiquetado

| — | Debe figurar en los envases la combinación de palabras «Szentesi paprika». |
| --- | --- |

—

Debe figurar en los envases la combinación de palabras «Szentesi paprika».

| — | Debe fijarse una etiqueta con un código de barras que permita la trazabilidad del «Szentesi paprika». |
| --- | --- |

—

Debe fijarse una etiqueta con un código de barras que permita la trazabilidad del «Szentesi paprika».

4.   Descripción sucinta de la zona geográfica

La zona de producción del «Szentesi paprika» amparada por la indicación geográfica protegida (IGP) se encuentra en el condado de Csongrád y constituye una zona homogénea.

El cultivo del «Szentesi paprika» se desarrolla dentro de los términos municipales siguientes del condado de Csongrád: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár y Szentes.

5.   Vínculo con la zona geográfica

5.1.   Carácter específico de la zona geográfica

Los factores que determinan la calidad del cultivo del pimiento, particularmente las condiciones de temperatura y luminosidad, así como las condiciones edáficas e hidrográficas, han creado un entorno especialmente favorable para el desarrollo del cultivo de regadío del pimiento propio de la región de Szentes, a partir de la labor pionera de los «horticultores búlgaros» (horticultores que recurrían a métodos especiales a pequeña escala, al cultivo forzado en invernadero y al regadío) que se establecieron en ella durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.

La zona de cultivo tradicional de la región de Szentes se halla al sureste de Hungría, en una de las cuencas más profundas de la Gran Llanura. Desde el punto de vista topográfico, la zona ocupa un lugar muy especial, pues en ella se sitúan las tierras más bajas del país; el relieve presenta tres laderas que descienden desde los condados vecinos hasta el valle del Tisza. Este río constituye el curso de agua más importante del sistema hidrográfico de la región y delimita asimismo toda su fisonomía geográfica. Debido a la multitud de aguas superficiales típicas de la región, los tipos de suelos predominante son los calizos y los Solonetz de las llanuras de Chernozem. Los suelos de la zona de producción presentan buenas características físicas, una textura granulosa, un calentamiento rápido, una ligera alcalinidad, una gran riqueza en agua y nutrientes, un contenido elevado de humus y una gruesa capa fértil.

En la producción del «Szentesi paprika», desempeñan una función determinante, entre los factores climáticos que confieren a los frutos sus cualidades intrínsecas, la luz y el número de horas de sol, por una parte, y las temperaturas y la cantidad de calor irradiado, por otra. La zona de cultivo tradicional de la región de Szentes presenta sustancialmente características climáticas continentales. La duración de la insolación se reparte en la región de manera uniforme. La insolación anual media es de 2 050 horas. La temperatura media anual en la zona de producción es de las más altas del país. Alcanza 10-11 °C y el calor total del período de crecimiento es de 3 200-3 300 °C, cifras muy favorables para el cultivo del pimiento, que necesita calor.

En cuanto a las precipitaciones, son las más bajas del país, entre 500 y 550 mm anuales. El reparto preciso a lo largo del año es el siguiente: el 40 % de las precipitaciones tiene lugar en invierno y el 60 % en verano. Es, pues, el cultivo de regadío basado en unas condiciones hidrográficas favorables (y puesto en marcha por los horticultores búlgaros) lo que permite la producción de pimiento.

5.2.   Carácter específico del producto

Los principales valores y características organolépticas del «Szentesi paprika» originario de la zona geográfica son los siguientes: posee un sabor intenso, especiado, dulce o picante; está dotado de un perfume a pimiento intenso o que recuerda al pimentón molido; su piel es fina. La carne del fruto tiene un grosor que varía entre 3 y 7 mm, lo que permite aprovechar plenamente los sabores y aromas del producto incluso cuando se consume fresco, que es lo habitual.

El «Szentesi paprika» blanco, cuando está maduro, tiene un tacto suave; su piel es lisa y brillante, su extremo apuntado y curvo y su carne crujiente y densa. Los perfumes y aromas del pimiento fresco son muy característicos, como suelen expresar popularmente los consumidores: «El pimiento de Szentes tiene sabor».

El «Szentesi paprika» apuntado tiene la superficie brillante, lisa o levemente ondulada; el fruto es largo y apuntado y la textura de su carne es firme. El producto desprende un perfume a pimiento intenso, es picante y presenta un aroma y un sabor agradables.El «Szentesi paprika» del grupo Kápia tiene forma cónica, levemente aplanada; la textura de su carne es firme y su piel tiene un grosor mediano. Su superficie es lisa, brillante y desarrolla, debido a la influencia del entorno geográfico (luz y calor), un color rojo oscuro aterciopelado especialmente atractivo.

El pimiento-tomate «Szentesi paprika» tiene una forma muy característica, de esfera aplanada; a pesar del grosor de su carne, su piel es muy fina y la superficie, lisa; adquiere un color rojo oscuro en la madurez.

5.3.   Relación causal entre la zona geográfica y la calidad o las características del producto (en el caso de las DOP) o una cualidad específica, la reputación u otras características del producto (en el caso de las IGP)

La relación con la zona geográfica se basa en la buena reputación del producto desde hace largo tiempo y en los conocimientos especializados de los agricultores que lo cultivan, transmitidos de padres a hijos.

Reputación del «Szentesi paprika»

El cultivo de regadío del pimiento propio de la región de Szentes se desarrolló gracias a la labor pionera de los «horticultores búlgaros» establecidos en ella en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX. Desde entonces no se ha interrumpido la producción del célebre «Szentesi paprika». La reputación del producto sigue siendo importante, como atestigua el primer premio obtenido en 2006 en Debrecen, en el Salón de la horticultura organizado paralelamente a la feria agrícola Farmer Expo, en la que estuvieron representadas 300 empresas nacionales y extranjeras. En 2007, el pimiento destinado al consumo en fresco obtuvo el Magyar Termék Nagydíj (gran premio de los productos húngaros).

La relación secular entre la reputación del «Szentesi paprika» y la zona geográfica está acreditada por abundantes datos históricos. La aparición en Hungría del pimiento dulce puede remontarse al establecimiento de horticultores búlgaros cerca de Úsztató, en la región de Szegvár, durante el invierno de 1875-1876. Según el gran censo agrícola de 1895, el 92,74 % de la producción total de pimientos húngaros se concentraba en la parte sureste del país, en la región de Szentes. Los horticultores tomaban en arrendamiento los terrenos llanos de Chernozem y los terrenos aluviales de la región del actual condado de Csongrád, ricas en humus y de calentamiento rápido, y elegían, si era posible, un terreno en ligera pendiente. Empleaban semillas germinadas previamente y usaban invernaderos para el cultivo precoz. También practicaban el cultivo intercalado en viveros, plantando entre los pimientos, por ejemplo, pepino que luego dejaban crecer. En cambio, los pimientos los trasplantaban a un pequeño montículo, que regaban abundante y regularmente: para ello utilizaban agua estancada caliente o agua procedente de cursos de agua poco profundos y de escaso caudal. Seguían un método singular de recogida del agua y de drenaje. Por entonces, en la región de Szentes se utilizaba la rueda de cangilones, que se adaptaba al nivel del agua fluctuante.

Conocimientos especializados locales

En la zona de cultivo tradicional de la región de Szentes, el suelo conserva muy bien el calor. Al absorber este más calor del que irradia, durante las primeras horas de la mañana se difunde el calor almacenado en el suelo y en el aire superficial, con la consiguiente subida de la temperatura. El microclima equilibrado obtenido con este aporte armonioso de calor, asociado al cultivo de regadío practicado por los horticultores búlgaros, dota al «Szentesi paprika», que es un producto que precisa de gran cantidad de calor y agua, de un gran sabor.

A los factores naturales se unen la aportación humana de los operadores regionales y la experiencia práctica adquirida en el cultivo forzado (control de la temperatura, ventilación, protección contra el sol, cuidado de las plantas) y transmitida dentro de las familias. Los conocimientos especializados así acumulados pueden compensar los efectos nefastos de las extremas condiciones meteorológicas registradas en los últimos decenios, garantizando y, si es posible, preservando el sabor, el color y el aroma del «Szentesi paprika», así como la atractiva y particular forma de determinados tipos varietales.

De hecho, la tecnología introducida por los horticultores búlgaros hace casi 150 años ha evolucionado para adaptarse a las exigencias de la época. Los factores esenciales para el cultivo del pimiento se han ido reevaluando durante el proceso de producción y han aparecido nuevos método de producción. Desde el comienzo hasta el decenio de 1960, los factores más importantes para la producción fueron las buenas condiciones del suelo, el potencial de regadío (Tisza, Körös y los sistemas de canales de riego), el número de horas de sol (posibilidad de cultivo precoz) y el calentamiento del comienzo de la primavera. El período siguiente fue el comprendido entre finales del decenio de 1960 y finales del de 1980. Los productores comenzaron a aprovechar el calentamiento precoz para cultivar en invernadero, sacando así partido de manera óptima de la elevada insolación durante los meses de invierno y primavera. En los decenios de 1960 a 1980, tras el descubrimiento de la energía geotérmica en la región, el «Szentesi paprika» pasó a cultivarse en invernadero, abandonándose el cultivo al aire libre, y se propagó asimismo el cultivo sin suelo.

Referencia a la publicación del pliego de condiciones

[Artículo 5, apartado 7, del Reglamento (CE) no 510/2006 (3)]

Boletín de desarrollo rural (Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő), 16 de noviembre de 2011, año LXI, número 6, página 317.

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

---

(1)  DO L 343 de 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Sustituido por el Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012.

(3)  Véase la nota a pie de página 2.

---

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/36

---

Publicación de una solicitud de modificación de conformidad con el artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

2013/C 237/07

La presente publicación otorga el derecho a oponerse a la solicitud de modificación, de conformidad con el artículo 51 del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo (1).

SOLICITUD DE MODIFICACIÓN

REGLAMENTO (CE) No 510/2006 DEL CONSEJO

sobre la protección de las indicaciones geográficas y de las denominaciones de origen de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios
   (2)

SOLICITUD DE MODIFICACIÓN DE CONFORMIDAD CON EL ARTÍCULO 9

«TERRA D’OTRANTO»

No CE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IGP ( ) DOP ( X )

1.   Apartado del pliego de condiciones afectado por la modificación

| — |  | Denominación del producto |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Descripción |
| — |  | Zona geográfica |
| — | ☒ | Prueba del origen |
| — |  | Método de obtención |
| — |  | Vínculo |
| — |  | Etiquetado |
| — | ☒ | Requisitos nacionales |
| — | ☒ | Otros (especifíquense) |

—



Denominación del producto

—

☒

Descripción

—



Zona geográfica

—

☒

Prueba del origen

—



Método de obtención

—



Vínculo

—



Etiquetado

—

☒

Requisitos nacionales

—

☒

Otros (especifíquense)

2.   Tipo de modificación

| — |  | Modificación del documento único o de la ficha resumen |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Modificación del pliego de condiciones de una DOP o IGP registrada de la que no se haya publicado ni el documento único ni la ficha resumen |
| — |  | Modificación del pliego de condiciones que no requiere la modificación del documento único publicado (artículo 9, apartado 3, del Reglamento (CE) no 510/2006) |
| — |  | Modificación temporal del pliego de condiciones que obedezca a medidas sanitarias o fitosanitarias obligatorias impuestas por las autoridades públicas (artículo 9, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 510/2006). |

—



Modificación del documento único o de la ficha resumen

—

☒

Modificación del pliego de condiciones de una DOP o IGP registrada de la que no se haya publicado ni el documento único ni la ficha resumen

—



Modificación del pliego de condiciones que no requiere la modificación del documento único publicado (artículo 9, apartado 3, del Reglamento (CE) no 510/2006)

—



Modificación temporal del pliego de condiciones que obedezca a medidas sanitarias o fitosanitarias obligatorias impuestas por las autoridades públicas (artículo 9, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 510/2006).

3.   Modificaciones

3.1.   Descripción del producto

El pliego de condiciones de producción se ha modificado mediante la inserción de las medianas de los descriptores típicos, la supresión de la nota de 6,5 (que carece ya de razón de ser) y la adopción del método COI/T20 Doc. no 22. Además, se han insertado en el análisis organoléptico algunas especificaciones derivadas de la prevalencia de uno de los dos cultivares autóctonos.

Aplicando el nuevo método se obtiene la siguiente parte descriptiva:

| — | color: verde o amarillo con ligeros reflejos verdes; |
| --- | --- |

—

color: verde o amarillo con ligeros reflejos verdes;

| — | aroma: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6) de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado, con ligera nota de hoja; |
| --- | --- |

—

aroma: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6) de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado, con ligera nota de hoja;

| — | sabor: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6), con nota de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado; moderado o ligero toque picante y amargo, según la época de recolección (mediana de los atributos con valores comprendidos entre 0 y 6). Además, dependiendo de la época de recolección y de la prevalencia de las variedades, el sabor afrutado se enriquece con notas de hoja de olivo, de hierba recién cortada, de cardo/alcachofa/endivia en el caso del cultivar Ogliarola, o de fruta/tomate/frutas del bosque en el del cultivar Cellina. |
| --- | --- |

—

sabor: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6), con nota de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado; moderado o ligero toque picante y amargo, según la época de recolección (mediana de los atributos con valores comprendidos entre 0 y 6). Además, dependiendo de la época de recolección y de la prevalencia de las variedades, el sabor afrutado se enriquece con notas de hoja de olivo, de hierba recién cortada, de cardo/alcachofa/endivia en el caso del cultivar Ogliarola, o de fruta/tomate/frutas del bosque en el del cultivar Cellina.

Se han introducido algunas modificaciones en los parámetros químicos, reduciendo la acidez máxima total expresada en ácido oleico (de < 0,8 a la actual < 0,65) y aumentado ligeramente el contenido de ácido linoleico (de <= 0,7 a <= 0,8) y del valor de K232 (de <= 2,1 a <= 2,2). Estas modificaciones son el resultado de la tendencia a incrementar la representatividad de los dos cultivares más extendidos en el zona geográfica, el Cellina di Nardò y el Ogliarola Salentina, que determinan, en los aceites monovarietales, anteriormente poco representativos, unos valores de ácido linoleico y de K232 ligeramente diferentes.

3.2.   Prueba del origen

Se ha modificado el pliego de condiciones con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el Reglamento (CE) no 1898/2006, insertándose en él los procedimientos que los operadores deben aplicar para establecer la(s) prueba(s) de origen.

3.3.   Requisitos nacionales

Se han suprimido los requisitos previstos en la Ley no 169 de 15 de febrero de 1992, «Disciplina per il riconoscimento della denominazione di origine controllata degli oli di oliva vergini ed extravergini», y en el Decreto Ministerial no 573/93.

3.4.   Varios

La asociación que solicita las modificaciones es el Consorzio di tutela dell’olio extra vergine di oliva «Terra d’Otranto», organismo habilitado para presentar la solicitud de modificación. El Consorzio di tutela se creó después de la fecha de la solicitud de registro de DOP «Terre d’Otranto» inicial, que entonces había presentado la asociación APROL, en calidad de líder de siete organismos asociativos de productores oleícolas.

DOCUMENTO ÚNICO

REGLAMENTO (CE) No 510/2006 DEL CONSEJO

sobre la protección de las indicaciones geográficas y de las denominaciones de origen de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios
   (3)

«TERRA D’OTRANTO»

No CE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IGP ( ) DOP ( X )

1.   Denominación

«Terra d'Otranto»

2.   Estado Miembro o Tercer País

Italia

3.   Descripción del producto agrícola o alimenticio

3.1.   Tipo de producto

| Clase 1.5. | Aceites y grasas (mantequilla, margarina, aceite, etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Clase 1.5.

Aceites y grasas (mantequilla, margarina, aceite, etc.)

3.2.   Descripción del producto que se designa con la denominación indicada en el punto 1

«Terra d’Otranto» es un aceite de oliva virgen extra que tiene las siguientes características químicas y organolépticas:

| — | acidez máxima 0,65 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

acidez máxima 0,65 %,

| — | peróxidos <= 14 MeqO2/kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

peróxidos <= 14 MeqO2/kg,

| — | K232 <= 2,2, |
| --- | --- |

—

K232 <= 2,2,

| — | K270 <= 0,17, |
| --- | --- |

—

K270 <= 0,17,

| — | ácido linoleico <= 0,8, |
| --- | --- |

—

ácido linoleico <= 0,8,

| — | color: verde o amarillo, con reflejos verdes, |
| --- | --- |

—

color: verde o amarillo, con reflejos verdes,

| — | aroma: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6) de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado, con ligera nota de hoja, |
| --- | --- |

—

aroma: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6) de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado, con ligera nota de hoja,

| — | sabor: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6), con nota de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado; |
| --- | --- |

—

sabor: moderadamente afrutado (mediana del atributo comprendida entre 3 y 6), con nota de aceituna al grado de madurez apropiado;

Moderado o ligero toque picante y amargo, dependiendo de la época de recolección; además, dependiendo de la época de recolección y de la variedades, el sabor afrutado se enriquece con notas de hoja de olivo, de hierba recién cortada, de cardo/alcachofa/endivia en el caso del cultivar Ogliarola, o de fruta/tomate/frutas del bosque, en el caso del cultivar Cellina.

3.3.   Materias primas (únicamente en el caso de los productos transformados)

—

3.4.   Piensos (únicamente en el caso de los productos de origen animal)

—

3.5.   Fases específicas de la producción que deben llevarse a cabo en la zona geográfica definida

Las operaciones de cultivo, producción y trituración del aceite de oliva virgen extra «Terra d’Otranto» deben llevarse a cabo exclusivamente en el territorio de la zona geográfica de producción contemplada en el punto 4.

3.6.   Normas especiales sobre el corte en lonchas, el rallado, el envasado, etc.

El aceite de oliva virgen extra «Terra d’Otranto» debe comercializarse en recipientes de vidrio o de hojalata de capacidad no superior a 5 litros. El envasado del aceite de oliva virgen extra «Terra d’Otranto» debe efectuarse dentro de la zona geográfica de producción, a fin de garantizar mejor el control del origen del producto, así como para impedir que su transporte a granel fuera de dicha zona geográfica pueda provocar el deterioro y la pérdida de sus características específicas definidas en el punto 3.2, en particular las típicas notas de cardo/alcachofa/endivia de dicho aceite «Terra d’Otranto». La composición del aceite, que se caracteriza por un nivel significativo de ácido grasos poliinsaturados, predispone al aceite a perder su calidad organoléptica y sus características específicas por la acción del oxígeno del aire durante la fase de trasvase, bombeado, transporte y descarga, operaciones que se repiten con mayor frecuencia en caso de embotellado fuera de la zona.

3.7.   Normas específicas sobre el etiquetado

La denominación «Terra d’Otranto» debe figurar en la etiqueta con caracteres claros e indelebles, que se distingan claramente de cualquier otra mención que aparezca en la etiqueta, y deberá ir inmediatamente seguida de la mención «Denominazione di origine protetta» o bien de sus siglas correspondientes DOP, además del correspondiente símbolo de la UE.

Cada envase puesto a la venta debe llevar una numeración consecutiva adjudicada por el envasador con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el plan de control correspondiente.

Está prohibido añadir cualquier calificación no prevista expresamente, incluidos los siguientes términos: fino, escogido, seleccionado o superior.

Se autoriza, sin embargo, la utilización de indicaciones que hagan referencia a nombres, razones sociales o marcas privadas, siempre y cuando no tengan un carácter elogioso ni induzcan a error al consumidor.

Es obligatorio indicar en la etiqueta el año de producción de las aceitunas de las que se ha obtenido el aceite.

4.   Descripción sucinta de la zona geográfica

La zona de producción de la DOP «Terra d’Otranto» comprende toda la provincia de Lecce, parte de la provincia de Tarento y parte de la provincia de Brindisi. Esa zona se extiende en forma de arco entre el Mar Jónico y el Mar Adriático, desde las colinas Murge Taratine y desde el extremo de las laderas brindisinas de las Murge del sudeste, pasando por la llanura de Lecce, para acabar en las colinas de las Serre, en la confluencia de ambos mares.

5.   Vínculo con la zona geográfica

5.1.   Carácter específico de la zona geográfica

El producto debe sus características a las especiales condiciones edafológicas y climáticas de la zona. Los factores ambientales y los cultivares específicos de este territorio confieren al aceite «Terra d’Otranto» su carácter distintivo. Los suelos presentan, a gran escala, una notable uniformidad derivada de calizas del Cretácico, sobre las que se han depositado capas de caliza del terciario, con sedimentación de arenas, arcillas y calizas del Pioceno y del Pleistoceno; se componen de tierras pardas o rojas, que con frecuencia se hallan en capas alternas, que reposan sobre rocas calizas. En el plano orográfico, la zona se caracteriza por extensas llanuras delimitadas e interrumpidas por colinas bajas y suaves. La zona carece de cursos de agua superficiales, pero posee una rica red hídrica subterránea, que confiere a toda la región un carácter cárstico. Dado que se halla en el litoral y a una baja latitud, la zona tiene un clima suave, con tendencia a cálido.

5.2.   Carácter específico del producto

El patrimonio olivícola de la zona geográfica se caracteriza por la presencia preponderante de las variedades Cellina di Nardò y Ogliarola leccese, que otorgan al aceite producido sus características cualitativas. La indicación del porcentaje mínimo del 60 % de estos dos cultivares contribuye a determinar las características organolépticas de los aceites que, dependiendo de la prevalencia de una variedad con respecto a la otra, pasan de una nota cardo/alcachofa/endivia a una de tomate/frutas del bosque.

5.3.   Relación causal entre la zona geográfica y la calidad o las características del producto (en el caso de las DOP) o una cualidad específica, la reputación u otras características del producto (en el caso de las IGP)

La oleicultura representa el principal sector productivo de la zona. Tiene un papel decisivo en la economía local. En el siglo XIX, la indicación geográfica «Terra d’Otranto» aún comprendía las actuales provincias de Lecce, Brindisi y Tarento. Esta región siempre se ha caracterizado por una fuerte presencia del olivo, del cual se extraía un «precioso elixir». Los orígenes del nombre «Terra d’Otranto» se confunden con la historia misma de la oleicultura de esa región, que introdujeron en tiempos antiquísimos los colonos fenicios y griegos, y que dio lugar, gracias al trabajo de los monjes basilianos que se instalaron allí en el siglo X, al primer mercado floreciente de valiosos aceites procedentes de la «Terra d’Otranto». La «Terra d’Otranto» es el nombre medieval de Salento, debido a que en la Edad Media Otranto fue la principal ciudad de toda la región.

Referencia a la publicación del pliego de condiciones

[Artículo 5, apartado 7, del Reglamento (CE) no 510/2006 (4)]

Esta administración ha puesto en marcha el procedimiento nacional de oposición publicando la propuesta de reconocimiento de la Denominación de Origen Protegida «Terra d’Otranto» en la Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana no 297 de 21 de diciembre de 2010. El texto consolidado del pliego de condiciones de producción puede consultarse en el siguiente sitio internet:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

o bien accediendo directamente a la página de inicio del sitio web del Ministerio de Política Agrícola, Alimentaria y Forestal (http://www.politicheagricole.it) pulsando en «Qualità e sicurezza» (calidad y seguridad) (arriba a la derecha de la pantalla) y en «Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE» (pliegos de condiciones de producción sometidos al examen de la UE).

---

(1)  DO L 343 de 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Sustituido por el Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012.

(3)  Véase la nota a pie de página 2.

(4)  Véase la nota a pie de página 2.

---

| 15.8.2013 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 237/40

---

Publicación de una solicitud con arreglo al artículo 50, apartado 2, letra a), del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

2013/C 237/08

La presente publicación otorga el derecho a oponerse a la solicitud, de conformidad con el artículo 51 del Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo (1).

SOLICITUD DE REGISTRO DE UNA ETG

REGLAMENTO (CE) No 509/2006 DEL CONSEJO

sobre las especialidades tradicionales garantizadas de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios
   (2)

«ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS»

No CE: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Nombre y dirección de la agrupación solicitante

| Nombre de la agrupación u organización (si procede): | «Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai» |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Nombre de la agrupación u organización (si procede):

«Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai»

Dirección:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 44422201

Fax

+370 44474897

E-mail:

info@zpienas.lt

2.   Estado Miembro o Tercer País

Lituania

3.   Pliego de condiciones del producto

3.1.   Nombre(s) que debe(n) registrarse [artículo 2 del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]

«Žemaitiškas kastinys»

3.2.   Indíquese si el nombre

| ☒ | es específico por sí mismo |
| --- | --- |
|  | expresa la característica específica del producto agrícola o alimenticio |

☒

es específico por sí mismo



expresa la característica específica del producto agrícola o alimenticio

El nombre «Žemaitiškas kastinys» no remite a las características específicas del producto pero está muy asentado y es muy conocido tanto en Samogicia (región occidental de Lituania) como en el resto de Lituania como designación de este producto, según puede verse en las diferentes fuentes mencionadas en el punto 3.8.

El nombre «Žemaitiškas kastinys» (kastinys de Samogicia) figura en los libros de recetas de cocina del siglo XX siguientes: Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai (Tilžė, 1927), Ką valgome del Dr Tumėnienė et al. (Kaunas, 1935), y Lietuvių valgiai, de J. Pauliukonienė, Vilnius, 1983).

3.3.   Indíquese si se solicita la reserva del nombre de acuerdo con el artículo 13, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 509/2006

| ☒ | Registro con reserva de nombre |
| --- | --- |
|  | Registro sin reserva de nombre |

☒

Registro con reserva de nombre



Registro sin reserva de nombre

3.4.   Tipo de producto (véase el anexo II)

| Clase 1.4. | Otros productos de origen animal (huevos, miel, productos lácteos, salvo la mantequilla, etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Clase 1.4.

Otros productos de origen animal (huevos, miel, productos lácteos, salvo la mantequilla, etc.)

3.5.   Descripción del producto agrícola o alimenticio que lleva el nombre indicado en el punto 3.1 [artículo 3, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]

El «Žemaitiškas kastinys» es un producto tradicional a base de nata ácida que se calienta, se remueve y, después, se enfría.

Se caracteriza por una textura consistente y homogénea; a una temperatura de + 6 °C, puede desmenuzarse, tiene una textura densa de nata sólida con gotitas dispersas y se deshace en la boca. Es de un color amarillento uniforme. Puede presentar matices de color en función de las especias utilizadas y contener pequeñas briznas o trocitos de estas. Tiene el sabor del ácido láctico, ligeramente ácido, es ligeramente salado y se notan las especias.

Propiedades fisicoquímicas del «Žemaitiškas kastinys»:

| — | grasa, en función de la receta: entre 25 y 30 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

grasa, en función de la receta: entre 25 y 30 %;

| — | contenido de sal alimentaria: entre 1 y 1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido de sal alimentaria: entre 1 y 1,5 %.

3.6.   Descripción del método de producción del producto agrícola o alimenticio que lleva el nombre indicado en el punto 3.1 [artículo 3, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]

Materias primas:

| — | Nata ácida con un contenido de grasa comprendido entre el 25 y el 30 %: de 80 kg a 83 kg/100 kg de producto. |
| --- | --- |

—

Nata ácida con un contenido de grasa comprendido entre el 25 y el 30 %: de 80 kg a 83 kg/100 kg de producto.

| — | Mantequilla con un contenido mínimo de grasa del 82 %: entre 6 y 7 kg/100 kg de producto. |
| --- | --- |

—

Mantequilla con un contenido mínimo de grasa del 82 %: entre 6 y 7 kg/100 kg de producto.

| — | Leche cuajada con un contenido de grasa comprendido entre el 2,5 y el 4 %: entre 5 y 5,5 kg/100 kg de producto. |
| --- | --- |

—

Leche cuajada con un contenido de grasa comprendido entre el 2,5 y el 4 %: entre 5 y 5,5 kg/100 kg de producto.

| — | Sal alimentaria: entre 1 y 1,5 kg/100 kg de producto. |
| --- | --- |

—

Sal alimentaria: entre 1 y 1,5 kg/100 kg de producto.

Pueden emplearse especias (pimienta negra, pimienta de Jamaica, comino, eneldo, menta o una mezcla de esas especias: entre 0,1 y 0,15 kg/100 kg de producto) y vegetales aromáticos (ajo o cebolla: entre 1 y 2 kg/100 kg de producto).

Método de producción:

El «Žemaitiškas kastinys» se produce con métodos tradicionales.

Los ingredientes se pesan respetando la receta. La nata ácida se mezcla con la leche cuajada en un recipiente separado y se calienta hasta llegar a una temperatura comprendida entre 25 °C y 30 °C. Se ablanda la mantequilla fría calentándola hasta que alcance entre 25 y 30 °C. Se lavan y pican muy fino los vegetales aromáticos.

Según la receta, se vierte la mantequilla caliente ablandada en la fuente destinada a la elaboración del producto. La mezcla de nata ácida y leche cuajada se vierte lentamente, empezando por una octava parte de la cantidad prevista por la receta y se remueve a mano o mediante un mecanismo equivalente, siempre en el mismo sentido. Una vez conseguida la consistencia adecuada de la nata ácida (sin producción de suero de leche), se añade otra octava parte de la mezcla de nata ácida y leche cuajada sin dejar de remover. Este proceso se repite hasta que se haya vertido toda la mezcla de nata ácida y leche cuajada (en función de la receta). Cuando el producto comienza a solidificarse, se sala, se añaden las especies y los vegetales aromáticos picados sin dejar de remover. El «Žemaitiškas kastinys» debe envasarse inmediatamente, antes de que se solidifique.

El «Žemaitiškas kastinys» se envase en pequeños tarros de barro o en recipientes individuales de 250 g, 200 g o 100 g a los que se coloca una tapa, también de barro, una contratapa y un cordón que se anuda alrededor de esta. Los recipientes individuales se cierran mediante una tapa de papel aluminio. Una vez envasado, el «Žemaitiškas kastinys» se enfría hasta que alcanza 6 °C, tras lo cual el producto adquiere una consistencia homogénea y rígida.

3.7.   Carácter específico del producto agrícola o alimenticio [artículo 3, apartado 3, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]

El «Žemaitiškas kastinys» se diferencia de los demás productos de la misma categoría en lo siguiente:

| — | Componentes tradicionales y método de producción: contrariamente a los demás tipos de kastinys, la receta del «Žemaitiškas kastinys» prácticamente no ha variado desde las primeras referencias escritas mencionadas en el punto 3.8 y siguen utilizando los mismos ingrediente en proporciones casi idénticas. Dese entonces, han aparecido otros tipos de kastinys en los que, para obtener una mayor variedad de sabores, la nata ácida se sustituye en su totalidad por leche cuajada o se mezcla con kéfir; también pueden añadirse remolacha roja, zumo de zanahoria o yema de huevo para darle un color rojo o amarillo. La producción de «Žemaitiškas kastinys» se caracteriza por el movimiento circular lento y constante de la mezcla de mantequilla y nata ácida durante el cual se vierte la mezcla de nata ácida y leche cuajada en ocho veces, vigilando la temperatura (que debe mantenerse a 25-30 °C) para que no se produzca suero alguno. La producción de los otros tipos de kastinys se ha modernizado, en lugar de remover se bate el producto; además, todos los ingredientes de echan en 3-4 veces o, incluso, de una sola vez, con lo que la mezcla puede sufrir mayores variaciones de temperatura. |
| --- | --- |

—

Componentes tradicionales y método de producción: contrariamente a los demás tipos de kastinys, la receta del «Žemaitiškas kastinys» prácticamente no ha variado desde las primeras referencias escritas mencionadas en el punto 3.8 y siguen utilizando los mismos ingrediente en proporciones casi idénticas. Dese entonces, han aparecido otros tipos de kastinys en los que, para obtener una mayor variedad de sabores, la nata ácida se sustituye en su totalidad por leche cuajada o se mezcla con kéfir; también pueden añadirse remolacha roja, zumo de zanahoria o yema de huevo para darle un color rojo o amarillo. La producción de «Žemaitiškas kastinys» se caracteriza por el movimiento circular lento y constante de la mezcla de mantequilla y nata ácida durante el cual se vierte la mezcla de nata ácida y leche cuajada en ocho veces, vigilando la temperatura (que debe mantenerse a 25-30 °C) para que no se produzca suero alguno. La producción de los otros tipos de kastinys se ha modernizado, en lugar de remover se bate el producto; además, todos los ingredientes de echan en 3-4 veces o, incluso, de una sola vez, con lo que la mezcla puede sufrir mayores variaciones de temperatura.

| — | Sabor: el «Žemaitiškas kastinys» tiene el sabor ligeramente ácido del ácido láctico, y es ligeramente salado; se nota el sabor de las especias o de las plantas aromáticas. Los demás tipos de kastinys se caracterizan por un sabor de ácido láctico más áspero (si la nata ácida se sustituye por leche cuajada) o tienen un regusto a levadura (si se sustituye la nata ácida por kéfir); también tienen el gusto característico de zumo (de remolacha roja o de zanahoria) o de yema de huevo. |
| --- | --- |

—

Sabor: el «Žemaitiškas kastinys» tiene el sabor ligeramente ácido del ácido láctico, y es ligeramente salado; se nota el sabor de las especias o de las plantas aromáticas. Los demás tipos de kastinys se caracterizan por un sabor de ácido láctico más áspero (si la nata ácida se sustituye por leche cuajada) o tienen un regusto a levadura (si se sustituye la nata ácida por kéfir); también tienen el gusto característico de zumo (de remolacha roja o de zanahoria) o de yema de huevo.

| — | Textura: una de las características del «Žemaitiškas kastinys» es su textura consistente y homogénea; a una temperatura de + 6 °C, puede desmenuzarse, tiene una textura densa de nata sólida con gotitas dispersas y se deshace en la boca. Los demás tipos de kastinys se caracterizan por un textura blanda que hace que se puedan untar. |
| --- | --- |

—

Textura: una de las características del «Žemaitiškas kastinys» es su textura consistente y homogénea; a una temperatura de + 6 °C, puede desmenuzarse, tiene una textura densa de nata sólida con gotitas dispersas y se deshace en la boca. Los demás tipos de kastinys se caracterizan por un textura blanda que hace que se puedan untar.

3.8.   Carácter tradicional del producto agrícola o alimenticio [artículo 3, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]

Además del método primitivo de fabricación de mantequilla muy común en toda Lituania, consistente en batir la nata ácida en un recipiente con una cuchara, una región, Samogicia, desarrolló su propia técnica de preparación de la nata ácida que, después, se exportó a toda Lituania, consistente en remover y calentar la nata ácida al mismo tiempo, asegurándose de que no se produzca suero de leche. Se obtiene así el «Žemaitiškas kastinys» (Lietuvių kalbos atlasas, vol. 1. Leksika, Vilnius, 1977), un producto con un sabor y una consistencia específicas descrito ya en obras científicas del siglo XIX [Litwa pod wzgledem starozytnych zabytkow, obyczajow i zwyczajow skreslona, Liudwik Adam Jucewicz (Liudwik z Pokiewia), Vilnius, 1846; y Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona, Leon Potocki, Poznan, 1869], en las que se destacaba el método de fabricación (producto a base de nata ácida calentada) y su sabor muy agradable.

El Museo Nacional de Lituania conserva transcripciones de personas nacidas a finales del siglo XIX y comienzos del siglo XX (fondo de la sección etnográfica del Museo Nacional de Lituania F 15-4; F 15-13; F 32-7 y F 32-48) en las que se describen el método de fabricación y la receta: se empieza echando tres cucharadas de nata ácida y media cucharada de mantequilla en una fuente de barro cocida que se ha calentado previamente; se mezcla bien todo y, con una cuchara de madera, se remueve siempre en el mismo sentido. Cuando la masa comienza a enfriarse, sin que llegue a parecerse a suero de leche, se calienta la fuente al baño maría y se vierte la masa líquida en una fuente que contiene agua fría. Sin parar de mezclar, se añade la nata ácida a la masa en pequeñas cantidades. A veces, se sustituye una parte de la nata ácida por leche cuajada, con lo que se consigue un kastinys más ligero. Al final, se añaden sal y otras especias (comino, pimienta molida, ajo y cebolla picados, tallo verde de cebolla en temporada, brotes de hinojo o de menta).

En un libro escrito por científicos en 1983 (Lietuvių valgiai, recopilación de J. Pauliukonienė, Mokslas, Vilnius, 1983), en que se describen las técnicas tradicionales antiguas de preparación de la materia prima, en las que la nata ácida se separaba de la leche manualmente (con un cuchara), dejando la leche cuajada natural, figura la siguiente receta del «Žemaitiškas kastinys» y su método de producción: 1⁄2 litro de nata ácida, 1 cucharada sopera de mantequilla, 1⁄2 cucharada sopera de comino u otras especias, y sal. Se echan la mantequilla y una cucharada de nata ácida en una fuente de barro, se pone a calentar al baño maría la fuente y se comienza a remover la mezcla con una cuchara de madera. Al poco (antes de que se forme el suero de leche), se añade una cucharada de nata ácida y se sigue dando vueltas hasta que se haya añadido toda la nata ácida. Cuando la masa comienza a espesar, se añaden sal y comino lavado y secado y se mezclan bien todos los ingredientes. El «Žemaitiškas kastinys» tiene un sabor ligeramente salado y un poco ácido.

El método de preparación y la receta del «Žemaitiškas kastinys» no han variado, como prueba el certificado atribuido en Lituania a este producto en 2010 por «VŠĮ „Kulinarinio paveldo fondas“» (Fondo del patrimonio culinario), que confirma que el «Žemaitiškas kastinys» se elabora con técnicas tradicionales y con materias primas, ingredientes y utensilios tradicionales.

3.9.   Requisitos mínimos y procedimientos aplicables al control del carácter específico [artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]

Habida cuenta de las características específicas del «Žemaitiškas kastinys», se controlan los siguiente aspectos:

| 1) | Calidad de la materia prima de cada lote:






  — | el contenido de materia grasa de la nata ácida y de la leche cuajada debe ajustar al indicado en el punto 3.6; se comprueba mediante pruebas de laboratorio, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1)

Calidad de la materia prima de cada lote:

—

el contenido de materia grasa de la nata ácida y de la leche cuajada debe ajustar al indicado en el punto 3.6; se comprueba mediante pruebas de laboratorio,

| — | el contenido de materia grasa de la mantequilla debe ajustarse al indicado en el punto 3.6; se comprueba mediante pruebas de laboratorio, |
| --- | --- |

—

el contenido de materia grasa de la mantequilla debe ajustarse al indicado en el punto 3.6; se comprueba mediante pruebas de laboratorio,

| — | las características organolépticas de las especias y de los vegetales aromáticos (sabor, aroma, color) se comprueban documentalmente y mediante evaluación sensorial; |
| --- | --- |

—

las características organolépticas de las especias y de los vegetales aromáticos (sabor, aroma, color) se comprueban documentalmente y mediante evaluación sensorial;

| 2) | observancia del método de producción indicado en el punto 3.6: la sucesión de etapas del proceso productivo y el cumplimiento de los parámetros fijados (temperatura de los ingredientes y proporciones) se comprueban visualmente y mediante mediciones durante el proceso de elaboración de cada lote; |
| --- | --- |

2)

observancia del método de producción indicado en el punto 3.6: la sucesión de etapas del proceso productivo y el cumplimiento de los parámetros fijados (temperatura de los ingredientes y proporciones) se comprueban visualmente y mediante mediciones durante el proceso de elaboración de cada lote;

| 3) | calidad del producto final de cada lote:






  — | las características organolépticas (textura, color, sabor) deben ajustarse a lo indicado en el punto 3.5; se comprueban mediante análisis sensorial, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3)

calidad del producto final de cada lote:

—

las características organolépticas (textura, color, sabor) deben ajustarse a lo indicado en el punto 3.5; se comprueban mediante análisis sensorial,

| — | el contenido de grasa debe ajustar al indicado en el punto 3.5; se comprueba mediante pruebas de laboratorio, |
| --- | --- |

—

el contenido de grasa debe ajustar al indicado en el punto 3.5; se comprueba mediante pruebas de laboratorio,

| — | el contenido de sal alimentaria debe ajustarse al indicado en el punto 3.5; se comprueba con la receta y, en caso de duda, mediante pruebas de laboratorio. |
| --- | --- |

—

el contenido de sal alimentaria debe ajustarse al indicado en el punto 3.5; se comprueba con la receta y, en caso de duda, mediante pruebas de laboratorio.

Al menos una vez al año, la autoridad indicada en el punto 4.1 comprueba que el producto y el proceso de producción se atienen a lo estipulado en el pliego de condiciones.

4.   Autoridades u organismos encargados de verificar el cumplimiento del pliego de condiciones

4.1.   Nombre y dirección

| Nombre: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Nombre:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Dirección:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 52404361

E-mail:

vvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Público |  Privado |
| --- | --- |

☒ Público

 Privado

4.2.   Tareas específicas de la autoridad u organismo

La estructura de control indicada en el punto 4.1 supervisa la observancia del pliego de condiciones.

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(1)  DO L 343 de 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Sustituido or el Reglamento (UE) no 1151/2012.

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