# Publicatieblad C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0995
  doi:10.3000/19770995.C_2013.237.nld |
| --- | --- |
| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | C 237 |
| | |
| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Mededelingen en bekendmakingen | 56e jaargang15 augustus 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0995

doi:10.3000/19770995.C_2013.237.nld

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

C 237

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Mededelingen en bekendmakingen

56e jaargang15 augustus 2013

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| Nummer | Inhoud | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Mededelingen |
| | MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2013/C 237/01 | Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Nummer

Inhoud

Bladzijde

II   Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

2013/C 237/01

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informatie |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Wisselkoersen van de euro | 2 |
| | INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE |
| | Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Staatssteun — Besluit om een bestaande steunzaak te sluiten na de aanvaarding van dienstige maatregelen door een EVA-staat | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Uitnodiging om overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie opmerkingen te maken over staatssteunvraagstukken met betrekking tot regionale steun voor de regeling inzake investeringsstimulansen in IJsland en zes investeringsovereenkomsten | 4 |

IV   Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

2013/C 237/02

Wisselkoersen van de euro

2

INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

2013/C 237/03

Staatssteun — Besluit om een bestaande steunzaak te sluiten na de aanvaarding van dienstige maatregelen door een EVA-staat

3

2013/C 237/04

Uitnodiging om overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie opmerkingen te maken over staatssteunvraagstukken met betrekking tot regionale steun voor de regeling inzake investeringsstimulansen in IJsland en zes investeringsovereenkomsten

4

| | V   Adviezen |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Bekendmaking van de Commissie overeenkomstig artikel 27, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 van de Raad in de zaken AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II en AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | ANDERE HANDELINGEN |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder a), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Bekendmaking van een wijzigingsaanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder a), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder b), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen | 40 |

V   Adviezen

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

2013/C 237/05

Bekendmaking van de Commissie overeenkomstig artikel 27, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 van de Raad in de zaken AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II en AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

28

ANDERE HANDELINGEN

Europese Commissie

2013/C 237/06

Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder a), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

31

2013/C 237/07

Bekendmaking van een wijzigingsaanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder a), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

36

2013/C 237/08

Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder b), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

40

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst |

---

(1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst

1

| NL | |
| --- | --- |

NL

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II Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/1

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Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie

(Zaak COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

2013/C 237/01

Op 18 april 2013 heeft de Commissie besloten zich niet te verzetten tegen bovenvermelde aangemelde concentratie en deze verenigbaar met de gemeenschappelijke markt te verklaren. Deze beschikking is gebaseerd op artikel 6, lid 1, onder b), van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad. De volledige tekst van de beschikking is slechts beschikbaar in het Engels en zal openbaar worden gemaakt na verwijdering van eventuele bedrijfsgeheimen. De tekst is beschikbaar:

| — | op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebeschikkingen op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector, |
| --- | --- |

—

op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebeschikkingen op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector,

| — | in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) onder documentnummer 32013M6843. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving. |
| --- | --- |

—

in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) onder documentnummer 32013M6843. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving.

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IV Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/2

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Wisselkoersen van de euro (1)

14 augustus 2013

2013/C 237/02

1 euro =

| | Munteenheid | Koers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,3243 |
| JPY | Japanse yen | 130,17 |
| DKK | Deense kroon | 7,4583 |
| GBP | Pond sterling | 0,85440 |
| SEK | Zweedse kroon | 8,6393 |
| CHF | Zwitserse frank | 1,2415 |
| ISK | IJslandse kroon | |
| NOK | Noorse kroon | 7,8130 |
| BGN | Bulgaarse lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tsjechische koruna | 25,822 |
| HUF | Hongaarse forint | 298,62 |
| LTL | Litouwse litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Letlandse lat | 0,7025 |
| PLN | Poolse zloty | 4,2037 |
| RON | Roemeense leu | 4,4315 |
| TRY | Turkse lira | 2,5664 |
| AUD | Australische dollar | 1,4524 |
| CAD | Canadese dollar | 1,3689 |
| HKD | Hongkongse dollar | 10,2705 |
| NZD | Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar | 1,6501 |
| SGD | Singaporese dollar | 1,6835 |
| KRW | Zuid-Koreaanse won | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | Zuid-Afrikaanse rand | 13,2129 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 8,1041 |
| HRK | Kroatische kuna | 7,5415 |
| IDR | Indonesische roepia | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | Maleisische ringgit | 4,3351 |
| PHP | Filipijnse peso | 57,975 |
| RUB | Russische roebel | 43,8995 |
| THB | Thaise baht | 41,504 |
| BRL | Braziliaanse real | 3,0586 |
| MXN | Mexicaanse peso | 16,8756 |
| INR | Indiase roepie | 81,3700 |

Munteenheid

Koers

USD

US-dollar

1,3243

JPY

Japanse yen

130,17

DKK

Deense kroon

7,4583

GBP

Pond sterling

0,85440

SEK

Zweedse kroon

8,6393

CHF

Zwitserse frank

1,2415

ISK

IJslandse kroon

NOK

Noorse kroon

7,8130

BGN

Bulgaarse lev

1,9558

CZK

Tsjechische koruna

25,822

HUF

Hongaarse forint

298,62

LTL

Litouwse litas

3,4528

LVL

Letlandse lat

0,7025

PLN

Poolse zloty

4,2037

RON

Roemeense leu

4,4315

TRY

Turkse lira

2,5664

AUD

Australische dollar

1,4524

CAD

Canadese dollar

1,3689

HKD

Hongkongse dollar

10,2705

NZD

Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar

1,6501

SGD

Singaporese dollar

1,6835

KRW

Zuid-Koreaanse won

1 482,39

ZAR

Zuid-Afrikaanse rand

13,2129

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

8,1041

HRK

Kroatische kuna

7,5415

IDR

Indonesische roepia

13 667,59

MYR

Maleisische ringgit

4,3351

PHP

Filipijnse peso

57,975

RUB

Russische roebel

43,8995

THB

Thaise baht

41,504

BRL

Braziliaanse real

3,0586

MXN

Mexicaanse peso

16,8756

INR

Indiase roepie

81,3700

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(1)  Bron: door de Europese Centrale Bank gepubliceerde referentiekoers.

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INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/3

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Staatssteun — Besluit om een bestaande steunzaak te sluiten na de aanvaarding van dienstige maatregelen door een EVA-staat

2013/C 237/03

De Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA heeft voor de volgende steunmaatregel passende maatregelen voorgesteld die door IJsland zijn aangenomen:

| Datum waarop het besluit is genomen | : | 24 april 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Nummer van de steunmaatregel | : | 70958 |
| Nummer van het besluit | : | 159/13/COL |
| EVA-staat | : | IJsland |
| Benaming | : | staatssteun aan Landsvirkjun en Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Rechtsgrondslag | : | wet nr. 42/1983 betreffende Landsvirkjun, wet nr. 45/1998 op het lokaal bestuur, wet nr. 139/2001 betreffende de oprichting van Orkuveita Reykjavíkur als gemeenschappelijke onderneming en wet nr. 121/1997 betreffende staatsgaranties |
| Doelstelling | : | n.v.t. |
| Vorm van de steun | : | onbeperkte staats- en gemeentegaranties zonder betaling van marktpremies voor Landsvirkjun en Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Economische sectoren | : | elektriciteitssector |
| Andere informatie | : | op basis van de door de IJslandse autoriteiten genomen maatregelen en gedane toezeggingen tot afschaffing van de onbeperkte staatsgarantie voor Landsvirkjun en Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, werden de bezwaren van de Autoriteit betreffende de onverenigbaarheid van de steunregeling weggenomen en werd het onderzoek gesloten. |

Datum waarop het besluit is genomen

:

24 april 2013

Nummer van de steunmaatregel

:

70958

Nummer van het besluit

:

159/13/COL

EVA-staat

:

IJsland

Benaming

:

staatssteun aan Landsvirkjun en Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Rechtsgrondslag

:

wet nr. 42/1983 betreffende Landsvirkjun, wet nr. 45/1998 op het lokaal bestuur, wet nr. 139/2001 betreffende de oprichting van Orkuveita Reykjavíkur als gemeenschappelijke onderneming en wet nr. 121/1997 betreffende staatsgaranties

Doelstelling

:

n.v.t.

Vorm van de steun

:

onbeperkte staats- en gemeentegaranties zonder betaling van marktpremies voor Landsvirkjun en Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Economische sectoren

:

elektriciteitssector

Andere informatie

:

op basis van de door de IJslandse autoriteiten genomen maatregelen en gedane toezeggingen tot afschaffing van de onbeperkte staatsgarantie voor Landsvirkjun en Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, werden de bezwaren van de Autoriteit betreffende de onverenigbaarheid van de steunregeling weggenomen en werd het onderzoek gesloten.

De tekst van het besluit in de authentieke ta(a)l(en), waaruit de vertrouwelijke gegevens zijn geschrapt, kan worden geraadpleegd op de website van de Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/4

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Uitnodiging om overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie opmerkingen te maken over staatssteunvraagstukken met betrekking tot regionale steun voor de regeling inzake investeringsstimulansen in IJsland en zes investeringsovereenkomsten

2013/C 237/04

De Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA heeft bij Besluit nr. 177/13/COL van 30 april 2013, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, de procedure ingeleid van artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie. De IJslandse autoriteiten zijn hiervan door middel van een afschrift van het betrokken besluit in kennis gesteld.

De Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA verzoekt hierbij de EVA-staten, de lidstaten van de EU en belanghebbenden hun opmerkingen over de betrokken maatregel binnen een maand na bekendmaking van deze mededeling in te dienen bij de:

| Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA |
| --- |
| Griffie |
| Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

Griffie

Belliardstraat 35

1040 Brussel

BELGIË

De opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van de IJslandse autoriteiten worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

SAMENVATTING

Procedure

Op 13 oktober 2010 keurde de Autoriteit bij Besluit nr. 390/10/COL een regeling inzake investeringsstimulansen („de regeling”) goed, die de IJslandse autoriteiten overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 3, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 hadden aangemeld.

De regeling voorziet in de mogelijkheid steun te verlenen in de vorm van directe subsidies, door middel van diverse belastingvrijstellingen gedurende ten hoogste tien jaar en door middel van sale-and-leaseback van grond onder de marktwaarde voor ondernemingen uit alle sectoren met uitzondering van de financiële sector, in samenhang met een initiële investering in gebieden in IJsland die voor regionale steun in aanmerking komen (bekend als „c-regio’s”). De regeling loopt af op 31 december 2013.

De door de Autoriteit goedgekeurde regeling is in de volgende besluiten opgenomen:

| — | Wet nr. 99/2010 betreffende stimulansen voor initiële investeringen in IJsland („de wet”), die op 29 juni 2010 door het IJslandse Parlement is aangenomen; en |
| --- | --- |

—

Wet nr. 99/2010 betreffende stimulansen voor initiële investeringen in IJsland („de wet”), die op 29 juni 2010 door het IJslandse Parlement is aangenomen; en

| — | Reglement (EU) nr. 985/2010 betreffende stimulansen voor initiële investeringen in IJsland („het reglement”), dat op 25 november 2010 door het ministerie van Industrie is afgekondigd en overeenstemt met het ontwerpreglement dat op 27 september 2010 bij de Autoriteit was ingediend. Het reglement is afgeleide wetgeving met de wet als rechtsgrondslag. |
| --- | --- |

—

Reglement (EU) nr. 985/2010 betreffende stimulansen voor initiële investeringen in IJsland („het reglement”), dat op 25 november 2010 door het ministerie van Industrie is afgekondigd en overeenstemt met het ontwerpreglement dat op 27 september 2010 bij de Autoriteit was ingediend. Het reglement is afgeleide wetgeving met de wet als rechtsgrondslag.

Op 30 december 2010 kondigde het ministerie van Industrie een nieuw reglement af, Reglement (EU) nr. 1150/2010 („het aanvullende reglement”), waarbij het reglement werd gewijzigd, met name om te garanderen dat de investeringssteun een stimulerend effect heeft. Het aanvullende reglement werd niet bij de Autoriteit aangemeld.

In de periode 2010-2013 sloot de IJslandse Staat een aantal overeenkomsten, die volgens hem onder de regeling vielen („de zes investeringsovereenkomsten”):

| 1. | op 30 december 2010 met Becromal Iceland ehf; |
| --- | --- |

1.

op 30 december 2010 met Becromal Iceland ehf;

| 2. | op 30 december 2010 met Thorsil ehf; |
| --- | --- |

2.

op 30 december 2010 met Thorsil ehf;

| 3. | op 17 februari 2011 met Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf; |
| --- | --- |

3.

op 17 februari 2011 met Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf;

| 4. | op 22 september 2011 met Verne Real Estate II ehf; |
| --- | --- |

4.

op 22 september 2011 met Verne Real Estate II ehf;

| 5. | op 7 mei 2012 met GMR Endurvinnslan ehf; |
| --- | --- |

5.

op 7 mei 2012 met GMR Endurvinnslan ehf;

| 6. | op 28 januari 2013 met Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

op 28 januari 2013 met Marmeti ehf.

Na voorafgaande besprekingen meldden de IJslandse autoriteiten op 13 december 2012 bij de Autoriteit overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 3, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 een reeks voorgestelde wijzigingen van de wet („de aangemelde wijzigingen”) aan.

Beoordeling van de maatregel

De aangemelde wijzigingen bestaan uit een afschaffing van de directe subsidies, een nieuwe methode voor het opleggen van een maximumvennootschapsbelasting voor alle nieuwe projecten die onder de regeling vallen, een vrijstelling van zegelrecht en een verhoging van de vrijstellingen van de gemeentelijke eigendomsbelasting en de socialezekerheidsbelasting. De Autoriteit kwam tot de voorlopige conclusie dat de aangemelde wijzigingen van de regeling niet konden worden afgescheiden van de regeling als zodanig. Bijgevolg beoordeelde zij de volledige regeling, zoals gewijzigd. Voorts beoordeelde zij de toepassing van de regeling en stelde zij vast dat er twijfel kon bestaan of bepaalde elementen van de zes investeringsovereenkomsten die IJsland op basis van de gewijzigde regeling had gesloten, wel met de EER-Overeenkomst verenigbaar zijn.

De Autoriteit betwijfelde met name of de steun die bij de investeringsovereenkomsten met Becromal, Kísilfélagið en Verne is toegekend, wel onder de regeling valt zoals die door de Autoriteit is goedgekeurd en wel het vereiste stimulerende effect heeft.

Voorts betwijfelde de Autoriteit of de investeringsovereenkomst met Marmeti onder de regeling valt, met betrekking tot het vereiste stimulerende effect.

Voorts betwijfelde de Autoriteit of elementen van de investeringsovereenkomsten met Thorsil en GMR niet voorzien in steun die buiten de goedgekeurde regeling valt.

De Autoriteit betwijfelde derhalve of de gewijzigde steunregeling en de in de zes investeringsovereenkomsten toegekende steun wel met de EER-Overeenkomst verenigbaar kunnen worden geacht.

Conclusie

Gelet op bovenstaande overwegingen betwijfelt de Autoriteit of de gewijzigde regeling en de zes bovengenoemde investeringsovereenkomsten voldoen aan artikel 61, lid 3, van de EER-Overeenkomst in samenhang met de vereisten die in de richtsnoeren regionale steun van de Autoriteit zijn vastgelegd.

Gelet op bovenstaande overwegingen heeft de Autoriteit besloten overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie de formele onderzoeksprocedure in te leiden met betrekking tot de door de IJslandse autoriteiten toegepaste regeling inzake investeringsstimulansen, met de door hen aangemelde wijzigingen en zoals gewijzigd door Reglement (EU) nr. 1150/2010, en met betrekking tot de zes investeringsovereenkomsten.

Belanghebbenden wordt verzocht hun opmerkingen binnen één maand na bekendmaking van deze mededeling in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie, kenbaar te maken.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
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(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
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(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
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(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
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(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
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(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
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(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
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(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
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(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
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(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
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(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
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(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
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(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
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(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
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(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
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(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
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(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
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(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
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(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
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(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
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(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
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(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
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(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
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(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
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(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
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(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
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(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
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(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Adviezen

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/28

---

Bekendmaking van de Commissie overeenkomstig artikel 27, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 van de Raad in de zaken AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II en AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   INLEIDING

| 1. | Overeenkomstig artikel 9 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 van de Raad van 16 december 2002 betreffende de tenuitvoerlegging van de mededingingsregels van de artikelen 101 en 102 van het Verdrag (1) kan de Commissie — in gevallen waarin zij voornemens is een besluit tot beëindiging van een inbreuk vast te stellen en de betrokken partijen toezeggingen doen om aan de bezwaren tegemoet te komen die de Commissie hun in haar voorlopige beoordeling te kennen heeft gegeven — die toezeggingen bij besluit een verbindend karakter verlenen. Het besluit kan voor een bepaalde periode worden vastgesteld en bevat de conclusie dat er niet langer gronden voor een optreden van de Commissie bestaan. Voordat de Commissie een besluit op grond van artikel 9 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 vaststelt, maakt zij overeenkomstig artikel 27, lid 4, van dezelfde verordening een beknopte samenvatting van de zaak en de hoofdlijnen van de toezeggingen bekend. Belanghebbende derden kunnen hun opmerkingen meedelen binnen de door de Commissie vastgestelde termijn. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Overeenkomstig artikel 9 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 van de Raad van 16 december 2002 betreffende de tenuitvoerlegging van de mededingingsregels van de artikelen 101 en 102 van het Verdrag (1) kan de Commissie — in gevallen waarin zij voornemens is een besluit tot beëindiging van een inbreuk vast te stellen en de betrokken partijen toezeggingen doen om aan de bezwaren tegemoet te komen die de Commissie hun in haar voorlopige beoordeling te kennen heeft gegeven — die toezeggingen bij besluit een verbindend karakter verlenen. Het besluit kan voor een bepaalde periode worden vastgesteld en bevat de conclusie dat er niet langer gronden voor een optreden van de Commissie bestaan. Voordat de Commissie een besluit op grond van artikel 9 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 vaststelt, maakt zij overeenkomstig artikel 27, lid 4, van dezelfde verordening een beknopte samenvatting van de zaak en de hoofdlijnen van de toezeggingen bekend. Belanghebbende derden kunnen hun opmerkingen meedelen binnen de door de Commissie vastgestelde termijn.

2.   SAMENVATTING VAN DE ZAAK

| 2. | Op 6 juni 2013 heeft de Commissie een voorlopige beoordeling in de zin van artikel 9, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 aangenomen die tot Deutsche Bahn AG en haar dochterondernemingen DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG en DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2) was gericht. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Op 6 juni 2013 heeft de Commissie een voorlopige beoordeling in de zin van artikel 9, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 aangenomen die tot Deutsche Bahn AG en haar dochterondernemingen DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG en DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2) was gericht.

| 3. | In haar voorlopige beoordeling heeft de Commissie haar bezorgdheid geuit over het feit dat de DB-groep mogelijk haar machtspositie op de markt voor de levering van tractiestroom in Duitsland in de zin van artikel 102 VWEU heeft misbruikt door haar concurrenten zodanig hoge prijzen voor tractiestroom aan te rekenen dat er een margin squeeze ontstond op de markten voor langeafstandsvervoer van reizigers en goederenvervoer per spoor. |
| --- | --- |

3.

In haar voorlopige beoordeling heeft de Commissie haar bezorgdheid geuit over het feit dat de DB-groep mogelijk haar machtspositie op de markt voor de levering van tractiestroom in Duitsland in de zin van artikel 102 VWEU heeft misbruikt door haar concurrenten zodanig hoge prijzen voor tractiestroom aan te rekenen dat er een margin squeeze ontstond op de markten voor langeafstandsvervoer van reizigers en goederenvervoer per spoor.

| 4. | De Commissie is voorshands van oordeel dat DB Energie een machtspositie inneemt op de markt voor de levering van tractiestroom aan spoorwegondernemingen die in Duitsland actief zijn. Tractiestroom is onontbeerlijk voor spoorwegondernemingen die op de Duitse spoorvervoersmarkt willen concurreren. Sinds 2003 verkoopt DB Energie tractiestroom aan spoorwegondernemingen in het kader van een all-inaanbod dat de prijs van de verbruikte elektriciteit (elektriciteitsprijs) en de prijs voor het gebruik van het tractiestroomnet (vergoeding voor de nettoegang) omvat. |
| --- | --- |

4.

De Commissie is voorshands van oordeel dat DB Energie een machtspositie inneemt op de markt voor de levering van tractiestroom aan spoorwegondernemingen die in Duitsland actief zijn. Tractiestroom is onontbeerlijk voor spoorwegondernemingen die op de Duitse spoorvervoersmarkt willen concurreren. Sinds 2003 verkoopt DB Energie tractiestroom aan spoorwegondernemingen in het kader van een all-inaanbod dat de prijs van de verbruikte elektriciteit (elektriciteitsprijs) en de prijs voor het gebruik van het tractiestroomnet (vergoeding voor de nettoegang) omvat.

| 5. | In haar voorlopige beoordeling was de Commissie van mening dat dit prijszettingssysteem, en met name het feit dat de spoorwegexploitanten van de DB-groep meer van de door het systeem geboden kortingen konden profiteren dan hun concurrenten, de ontwikkeling van de concurrentie op de markten voor goederenvervoer en langeafstandsvervoer van reizigers per spoor kan hebben belemmerd. De Commissie vreest dat het door DB Energie gehanteerde prijszettingssysteem voor tractiestroom op deze markten tot een zodanig groot verschil tussen de aan concurrenten in rekening gebrachte prijs van tractiestroom en de door DB-transportbedrijven aan consumenten aangerekende prijs van spoorwegvervoerdiensten kan leiden dat even efficiënte concurrenten als de DB-transportbedrijven wordt belet winst te boeken of met een kunstmatige vermindering van hun winstmarge worden geconfronteerd. De voorlopige conclusie van het onderzoek van de Commissie luidt dan ook dat deze situatie mededingingsbezwaren doet rijzen op de markten voor langeafstandsvervoer van reizigers en goederenvervoer per spoor. |
| --- | --- |

5.

In haar voorlopige beoordeling was de Commissie van mening dat dit prijszettingssysteem, en met name het feit dat de spoorwegexploitanten van de DB-groep meer van de door het systeem geboden kortingen konden profiteren dan hun concurrenten, de ontwikkeling van de concurrentie op de markten voor goederenvervoer en langeafstandsvervoer van reizigers per spoor kan hebben belemmerd. De Commissie vreest dat het door DB Energie gehanteerde prijszettingssysteem voor tractiestroom op deze markten tot een zodanig groot verschil tussen de aan concurrenten in rekening gebrachte prijs van tractiestroom en de door DB-transportbedrijven aan consumenten aangerekende prijs van spoorwegvervoerdiensten kan leiden dat even efficiënte concurrenten als de DB-transportbedrijven wordt belet winst te boeken of met een kunstmatige vermindering van hun winstmarge worden geconfronteerd. De voorlopige conclusie van het onderzoek van de Commissie luidt dan ook dat deze situatie mededingingsbezwaren doet rijzen op de markten voor langeafstandsvervoer van reizigers en goederenvervoer per spoor.

| 6. | In november 2010 heeft het Bundesgerichtshof bepaald dat het tractiestroomnet als een energienetwerk moet worden beschouwd en dat de toegangsvoorwaarden en -vergoedingen ervan gereglementeerd zijn bij de Duitse wet op de energiesector (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Bijgevolg moet DB Energie de vergoeding voor de nettoegang afzonderlijk in rekening brengen, zodat ook derde elektriciteitsleveranciers (d.w.z. leveranciers die niet tot de DB-groep behoren) in staat zijn met DB Energie te concurreren voor de levering van elektriciteit aan spoorwegondernemingen (4). |
| --- | --- |

6.

In november 2010 heeft het Bundesgerichtshof bepaald dat het tractiestroomnet als een energienetwerk moet worden beschouwd en dat de toegangsvoorwaarden en -vergoedingen ervan gereglementeerd zijn bij de Duitse wet op de energiesector (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). Bijgevolg moet DB Energie de vergoeding voor de nettoegang afzonderlijk in rekening brengen, zodat ook derde elektriciteitsleveranciers (d.w.z. leveranciers die niet tot de DB-groep behoren) in staat zijn met DB Energie te concurreren voor de levering van elektriciteit aan spoorwegondernemingen (4).

3.   HOOFDLIJNEN VAN DE GEDANE TOEZEGGINGEN

| 7. | De DB-groep is het niet eens met de voorlopige beoordeling van de Commissie dat zij misbruik kan hebben gemaakt van haar machtspositie op de markt voor de levering van tractiestroom aan Duitse spoorwegondernemingen. Niettemin heeft de onderneming toezeggingen gedaan in de zin van artikel 9 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 om aan de mededingingsbezwaren van de Commissie tegemoet te komen. De voornaamste elementen van de toezeggingen worden hierna beschreven. |
| --- | --- |

7.

De DB-groep is het niet eens met de voorlopige beoordeling van de Commissie dat zij misbruik kan hebben gemaakt van haar machtspositie op de markt voor de levering van tractiestroom aan Duitse spoorwegondernemingen. Niettemin heeft de onderneming toezeggingen gedaan in de zin van artikel 9 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 om aan de mededingingsbezwaren van de Commissie tegemoet te komen. De voornaamste elementen van de toezeggingen worden hierna beschreven.

| 8. | Uiterlijk drie maanden na de kennisgeving van het besluit van de Commissie waarbij deze toezeggingen bindend worden verklaard voor de DB-groep, en ten vroegste op 1 januari 2014, voert DG Energie een nieuw prijszettingssysteem voor transactiestroom in met afzonderlijke leveringsprijzen voor elektriciteit en afzonderlijke vergoedingen voor netwerktoegang, zoals goedgekeurd door de desbetreffende Duitse toezichthoudende instantie (Bundesnetzagentur). Dit nieuwe prijszettingssysteem is zodanig opgezet dat derde elektriciteitsleveranciers toegang hebben tot de markt voor de levering van elektriciteit aan spoorwegondernemingen (5). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Uiterlijk drie maanden na de kennisgeving van het besluit van de Commissie waarbij deze toezeggingen bindend worden verklaard voor de DB-groep, en ten vroegste op 1 januari 2014, voert DG Energie een nieuw prijszettingssysteem voor transactiestroom in met afzonderlijke leveringsprijzen voor elektriciteit en afzonderlijke vergoedingen voor netwerktoegang, zoals goedgekeurd door de desbetreffende Duitse toezichthoudende instantie (Bundesnetzagentur). Dit nieuwe prijszettingssysteem is zodanig opgezet dat derde elektriciteitsleveranciers toegang hebben tot de markt voor de levering van elektriciteit aan spoorwegondernemingen (5).

| 9. | In het kader van dit nieuwe systeem moet DB Energie aan alle spoorwegondernemingen dezelfde elektriciteitsprijs aanrekenen zonder op volume of duur gebaseerde kortingen toe te staan. |
| --- | --- |

9.

In het kader van dit nieuwe systeem moet DB Energie aan alle spoorwegondernemingen dezelfde elektriciteitsprijs aanrekenen zonder op volume of duur gebaseerde kortingen toe te staan.

| 10. | DB Energie zal overgaan tot een eenmalige retroactieve terugbetaling aan alle niet tot de DB-groep behorende spoorwegondernemingen in Duitsland van 4 % van hun tractiestroomfactuur voor de periode van een jaar vóór de inwerkingtreding van het nieuwe prijszettingssysteem. |
| --- | --- |

10.

DB Energie zal overgaan tot een eenmalige retroactieve terugbetaling aan alle niet tot de DB-groep behorende spoorwegondernemingen in Duitsland van 4 % van hun tractiestroomfactuur voor de periode van een jaar vóór de inwerkingtreding van het nieuwe prijszettingssysteem.

| 11. | DB Energie en DB Mobility Logistics AG zullen de Commissie elk jaar gegevens verstrekken opdat deze kan uitmaken of de door DB-groep aangerekende prijzen voor tractiestroom en vervoersdiensten eventueel tot een margin squeeze kunnen leiden. DB Energie zal de Commissie ook van tevoren in kennis stellen van elke wijziging in haar elektriciteitsprijs. |
| --- | --- |

11.

DB Energie en DB Mobility Logistics AG zullen de Commissie elk jaar gegevens verstrekken opdat deze kan uitmaken of de door DB-groep aangerekende prijzen voor tractiestroom en vervoersdiensten eventueel tot een margin squeeze kunnen leiden. DB Energie zal de Commissie ook van tevoren in kennis stellen van elke wijziging in haar elektriciteitsprijs.

| 12. | De toezeggingen zullen uiterlijk drie maanden na de kennisgeving van het besluit van de Commissie in werking treden. Zij zullen gedurende 5 jaar (6) na de kennisgeving van het besluit van de Commissie van kracht zijn of totdat 20 % van de door concurrenten van de DB-groep aangekochte volumes aan tractiestroom van derde elektriciteitsleveranciers afkomstig zijn. De DB-groep zal ook een trustee aanwijzen die toezicht zal houden op de naleving van de gedane toezeggingen. |
| --- | --- |

12.

De toezeggingen zullen uiterlijk drie maanden na de kennisgeving van het besluit van de Commissie in werking treden. Zij zullen gedurende 5 jaar (6) na de kennisgeving van het besluit van de Commissie van kracht zijn of totdat 20 % van de door concurrenten van de DB-groep aangekochte volumes aan tractiestroom van derde elektriciteitsleveranciers afkomstig zijn. De DB-groep zal ook een trustee aanwijzen die toezicht zal houden op de naleving van de gedane toezeggingen.

| 13. | De toezeggingen worden gepubliceerd op de website van het directoraat-generaal Concurrentie op het volgende adres: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

De toezeggingen worden gepubliceerd op de website van het directoraat-generaal Concurrentie op het volgende adres: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   UITNODIGING OM OPMERKINGEN TE MAKEN

| 14. | De Commissie is voornemens om, op basis van de resultaten van de markttoets, een besluit overeenkomstig artikel 9, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 vast te stellen, waarmee de hierboven samengevatte en op de website van het directoraat-generaal Concurrentie gepubliceerde toezeggingen verbindend worden verklaard. |
| --- | --- |

14.

De Commissie is voornemens om, op basis van de resultaten van de markttoets, een besluit overeenkomstig artikel 9, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 vast te stellen, waarmee de hierboven samengevatte en op de website van het directoraat-generaal Concurrentie gepubliceerde toezeggingen verbindend worden verklaard.

| 15. | Overeenkomstig artikel 27, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 nodigt de Commissie belanghebbende derden uit hun opmerkingen over deze toezeggingen te maken. Deze opmerkingen dienen de Commissie te bereiken binnen één maand vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking. De belanghebbende derden wordt verzocht ook een niet-vertrouwelijke versie van hun opmerkingen in te dienen waarin gegevens die zij als bedrijfsgeheimen en anderszins vertrouwelijke informatie beschouwen, dienen te zijn geschrapt en vervangen door een niet-vertrouwelijke samenvatting dan wel door de vermelding „bedrijfsgeheim” of „vertrouwelijk”. Overeenkomstig artikel 16 van Verordening (EG) nr. 773/2004 dient elk dergelijk verzoek tot vertrouwelijke behandeling naar behoren te worden gemotiveerd, met name door aan te geven waarom de openbaarmaking van de gegevens in kwestie ernstige schade zou veroorzaken. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Overeenkomstig artikel 27, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2003 nodigt de Commissie belanghebbende derden uit hun opmerkingen over deze toezeggingen te maken. Deze opmerkingen dienen de Commissie te bereiken binnen één maand vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking. De belanghebbende derden wordt verzocht ook een niet-vertrouwelijke versie van hun opmerkingen in te dienen waarin gegevens die zij als bedrijfsgeheimen en anderszins vertrouwelijke informatie beschouwen, dienen te zijn geschrapt en vervangen door een niet-vertrouwelijke samenvatting dan wel door de vermelding „bedrijfsgeheim” of „vertrouwelijk”. Overeenkomstig artikel 16 van Verordening (EG) nr. 773/2004 dient elk dergelijk verzoek tot vertrouwelijke behandeling naar behoren te worden gemotiveerd, met name door aan te geven waarom de openbaarmaking van de gegevens in kwestie ernstige schade zou veroorzaken.

| 16. | U wordt verzocht uw antwoorden en opmerkingen te onderbouwen en de relevante feiten te vermelden. Mochten bepaalde aspecten van de voorgestelde toezeggingen volgens u problemen opleveren, dan verzoekt de Commissie u een mogelijke oplossing voor te stellen. |
| --- | --- |

16.

U wordt verzocht uw antwoorden en opmerkingen te onderbouwen en de relevante feiten te vermelden. Mochten bepaalde aspecten van de voorgestelde toezeggingen volgens u problemen opleveren, dan verzoekt de Commissie u een mogelijke oplossing voor te stellen.

| 17. | Deze opmerkingen kunnen naar de Commissie worden gezonden per e-mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), per fax (+32 22950128) of per post, onder vermelding van het referentienummer AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, naar het volgende adres:





  Europese Commissie |
| --- | --- |
| Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie |
| Griffie Antitrust |
| 1049 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

17.

Deze opmerkingen kunnen naar de Commissie worden gezonden per e-mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), per fax (+32 22950128) of per post, onder vermelding van het referentienummer AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, naar het volgende adres:

Europese Commissie

Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie

Griffie Antitrust

1049 Brussel

BELGIË

---

(1)  PB L 1 van 4.1.2003, blz. 1. Vanaf 1 december 2009 zijn de artikelen 81 en 82 van het EG-Verdrag artikel 101 respectievelijk artikel 102 van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie (VWEU) geworden. De bepalingen in beide verdragen zijn inhoudelijk identiek. In het kader van dit besluit moeten verwijzingen naar de artikelen 101 en 102 VWEU waar nodig worden begrepen als verwijzingen naar, respectievelijk, de artikelen 81 en 82 van het EG-Verdrag.

(2)  Deutsche Bahn AG en al haar dochterondernemingen samen zullen in het vervolg van de tekst „de DB-groep” worden genoemd.

(3)  Arrest van het Bundesgerichtshof van 9 november 2010 in zaak EnVR 1/10.

(4)  Meer informatie over deze wijziging in het prijszettingssysteem en over de voorwaarden van het nieuwe systeem is te vinden op de website van DB Energie (enkel in het Duits): http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  Bovendien wordt de invoering van het nieuwe systeem aangevuld met een op DB Energie rustende verplichting om voor haar activiteiten als beheerder van het tractiestroomnet en als elektriciteitsleverancier een gescheiden boekhouding te voeren en gescheiden informatie te verstrekken.

(6)  De toezegging door DB Energie om geen op duur gebaseerde korting voor de levering van elektriciteit toe te staan, zal gelden voor een termijn van slechts drie jaar.

---

ANDERE HANDELINGEN

Europese Commissie

| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/31

---

Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder a), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

2013/C 237/06

Deze bekendmaking verleent het recht om op grond van artikel 51 van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad (1) bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen de aanvraag.

ENIG DOCUMENT

VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 510/2006 VAN DE RAAD

inzake de bescherming van geografische aanduidingen en oorsprongsbenamingen van landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen
   (2)

„SZENTESI PAPRIKA”

EG-nummer: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

BGA ( X ) BOB ( )

1.   Naam

„Szentesi paprika”

2.   Lidstaat of derde land

Hongarije

3.   Beschrijving van het landbouwproduct of levensmiddel

3.1.   Productcategorie

| Categorie 1.6: | Groenten, fruit en granen, in ongewijzigde staat of verwerkt |
| --- | --- |

Categorie 1.6:

Groenten, fruit en granen, in ongewijzigde staat of verwerkt

3.2.   Beschrijving van het product waarvoor de in punt 1 vermelde naam van toepassing is

De beschermde geografische aanduiding „Szentesi paprika” wordt gebruikt voor paprika’s die worden geteeld door het forceren van vastgelegde soorten en variëteiten van Capsicum annuum.

Wanneer zij in de handel worden gebracht, moeten de voor de BGA „Szentesi paprika” gebruikte paprika’s allemaal gaaf en gezond zijn, en de verschillende soorten moeten de volgende kenmerken bezitten:

| a) | Witte paprika om te vullen (TV) (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Wanneer de witte „Szentesi paprika” rijp is, voelt hij zacht aan en is de huid glad en niet stroef; hij is stomp en aan het uiteinde gebogen en het vlees is knapperig en dik. Het oppervlak is glad en hij is glanzend roomkleurig (ivoor). Hij is kegelvormig, 60-120 mm lang en 40-70 mm breed en heeft meestal drie tot vier lobben. De dikte van het vruchtvlees varieert van 4 tot 7 mm, de textuur is stevig, de huid dun. Hij heeft een intense, aromatische, zoete paprikageur.
  Geteelde rassen: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Witte paprika om te vullen (TV) (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Wanneer de witte „Szentesi paprika” rijp is, voelt hij zacht aan en is de huid glad en niet stroef; hij is stomp en aan het uiteinde gebogen en het vlees is knapperig en dik. Het oppervlak is glad en hij is glanzend roomkleurig (ivoor). Hij is kegelvormig, 60-120 mm lang en 40-70 mm breed en heeft meestal drie tot vier lobben. De dikte van het vruchtvlees varieert van 4 tot 7 mm, de textuur is stevig, de huid dun. Hij heeft een intense, aromatische, zoete paprikageur.

Geteelde rassen: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia.

| b) | Spitse peper (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  Het oppervlak van de spitse „Szentesi paprika” is glanzend, glad of licht golvend en de paprika is lang en spits. Hij is licht-, middel- of donkergroen van kleur, 150-250 mm lang en 20-50 mm breed. Hij bestaat meestal uit twee of drie lobben, het vlees is 3-4 mm dik met een stevige textuur en een dunne huid. Het product ruikt intens naar paprika, het is pikant en heeft een aangename geur en smaak.
  Geteelde rassen: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.
  De geteelde variëteiten hebben een heetheid tussen 2 500 en 5 000 op de Scovilleschaal. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Spitse peper (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

Het oppervlak van de spitse „Szentesi paprika” is glanzend, glad of licht golvend en de paprika is lang en spits. Hij is licht-, middel- of donkergroen van kleur, 150-250 mm lang en 20-50 mm breed. Hij bestaat meestal uit twee of drie lobben, het vlees is 3-4 mm dik met een stevige textuur en een dunne huid. Het product ruikt intens naar paprika, het is pikant en heeft een aangename geur en smaak.

Geteelde rassen: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.

De geteelde variëteiten hebben een heetheid tussen 2 500 en 5 000 op de Scovilleschaal.

| c) | Kapiapaprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  De „Szentesi paprika” van de kapiasoort is kegelvormig en licht afgevlakt. Het oppervlak is glad, glanzend en als hij rijp is donkerfluweelrood van kleur. Hij is 60-120 mm lang en 40-70 mm breed en bestaat meestal uit twee of drie lobben. De dikte van het vlees varieert van 4 tot 7 mm, de textuur is stevig en de huid heeft een gemiddelde dikte. De peul heeft een intens zoete smaak, een geur van gemalen paprika en hij is scherp.
  Geteelde rassen: Karpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Magus. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Kapiapaprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

De „Szentesi paprika” van de kapiasoort is kegelvormig en licht afgevlakt. Het oppervlak is glad, glanzend en als hij rijp is donkerfluweelrood van kleur. Hij is 60-120 mm lang en 40-70 mm breed en bestaat meestal uit twee of drie lobben. De dikte van het vlees varieert van 4 tot 7 mm, de textuur is stevig en de huid heeft een gemiddelde dikte. De peul heeft een intens zoete smaak, een geur van gemalen paprika en hij is scherp.

Geteelde rassen: Karpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Magus.

| d) | Tomaatpaprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  De tomaatpaprika „Szentesi paprika” heeft een zeer kenmerkende vorm: die van een afgeplatte bol met een glad, glanzend oppervlak en als hij rijp is, is hij donkerrood van kleur. De paprika heeft een doorsnee tussen 60 en 120 mm en een lengte van 40 tot 60 mm en heeft meestal drie of vier lobben. De dikte van het vlees varieert tussen 5 en 7 mm, de textuur is stevig en de huid dun, de peul ruikt intens naar paprika en is niet scherp.
  Geteelde rassen: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.
  Binnen de verschillende soorten kan het hierboven aangegeven scala van variëteiten die kunnen worden verbouwd, van jaar tot jaar variëren. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Tomaatpaprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

De tomaatpaprika „Szentesi paprika” heeft een zeer kenmerkende vorm: die van een afgeplatte bol met een glad, glanzend oppervlak en als hij rijp is, is hij donkerrood van kleur. De paprika heeft een doorsnee tussen 60 en 120 mm en een lengte van 40 tot 60 mm en heeft meestal drie of vier lobben. De dikte van het vlees varieert tussen 5 en 7 mm, de textuur is stevig en de huid dun, de peul ruikt intens naar paprika en is niet scherp.

Geteelde rassen: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.

Binnen de verschillende soorten kan het hierboven aangegeven scala van variëteiten die kunnen worden verbouwd, van jaar tot jaar variëren.

3.3.   Grondstoffen (alleen voor verwerkte producten)

—

3.4.   Diervoeders (alleen voor producten van dierlijke oorsprong)

—

3.5.   Specifieke onderdelen van het productieproces die in het afgebakende geografische gebied moeten plaatsvinden

Alle onderdelen van het productieproces van de „Szentesi paprika” moeten plaatsvinden in het in punt 4 omschreven afgebakende geografische gebied:

| — | de productie en de teelt van de paprikaplanten; |
| --- | --- |

—

de productie en de teelt van de paprikaplanten;

| — | in het bijzonder de geïntegreerde, biologische teelt van bepaalde soorten en variëteiten; |
| --- | --- |

—

in het bijzonder de geïntegreerde, biologische teelt van bepaalde soorten en variëteiten;

| — | de keuze van de productieperiode; |
| --- | --- |

—

de keuze van de productieperiode;

| — | de totstandbrenging van een teeltgebied; |
| --- | --- |

—

de totstandbrenging van een teeltgebied;

| — | de voorbereiding en de bemesting van de bodem; |
| --- | --- |

—

de voorbereiding en de bemesting van de bodem;

| — | het planten; |
| --- | --- |

—

het planten;

| — | de voorbereiding van de structuren om de planten te ondersteunen; |
| --- | --- |

—

de voorbereiding van de structuren om de planten te ondersteunen;

| — | het onderhoud van de planten (fytotechniek); |
| --- | --- |

—

het onderhoud van de planten (fytotechniek);

| — | het besproeien en toedienen van voedingsstoffen; |
| --- | --- |

—

het besproeien en toedienen van voedingsstoffen;

| — | de klimaatregeling; |
| --- | --- |

—

de klimaatregeling;

| — | de toepassing van geïntegreerde en ecologische methoden ter bestrijding van plagen; |
| --- | --- |

—

de toepassing van geïntegreerde en ecologische methoden ter bestrijding van plagen;

| — | het plukken, de voorbereiding van het product, de voorlopige opslag/de opslag; |
| --- | --- |

—

het plukken, de voorbereiding van het product, de voorlopige opslag/de opslag;

| — | het verwijderen van gewasresten, het reinigen en ontsmetten van de productie-installaties. |
| --- | --- |

—

het verwijderen van gewasresten, het reinigen en ontsmetten van de productie-installaties.

3.6.   Specifieke voorschriften betreffende het in plakken snijden, het raspen, het verpakken enz.

Het sorteren, verpakken en etiketteren van de „Szentesi paprika” vinden plaats bij de teler of in ieder ander daarvoor geschikt bedrijf in het afgebakende geografische gebied.

In partijen verpakt: schalen, manden, polyethyleen zakken (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 paprika’s per eenheid); verpakt per gewicht: manden, netzakken (raschel) (0,35, 0,5, 0,7, 1, 2 kg paprika’s per eenheid) of dozen: in M10-, M20-, M30-verpakkingen (2,5, 10, 12, 14 kg paprika’s per eenheid). Het soort verpakking van bepaalde variëteiten kan op elk moment veranderen afhankelijk van de commerciële vraag.

Om de typerende kwaliteit en homogeniteit van elke soort en meer nog van elke variëteit te behouden, evenals de smaak, de geur, de aroma’s, de textuur en de gaafheid die de specifieke kenmerken van de BGA „Szentesi paprika” vormen, maar ook om de traceerbaarheid van het product te garanderen, moet het verpakken in het afgebakende geografische gebied plaatsvinden.

3.7.   Specifieke voorschriften betreffende de etikettering

| — | De woorden „Szentesi paprika” moeten op de verpakking voorkomen; |
| --- | --- |

—

De woorden „Szentesi paprika” moeten op de verpakking voorkomen;

| — | Een streepjescode waarmee de „Szentesi paprika” kan worden getraceerd, moet worden aangebracht. |
| --- | --- |

—

Een streepjescode waarmee de „Szentesi paprika” kan worden getraceerd, moet worden aangebracht.

4.   Beknopte beschrijving van het afgebakende geografische gebied

Het productiegebied van de paprika waarvoor de beschermde geografische aanduiding „Szentesi paprika” geldt, bevindt zich in het comitaat Csongrád en vormt een homogeen gebied.

De teelt van de „Szentesi paprika” vindt plaats binnen de gemeentegrenzen van de hierna genoemde plaatsen van het comitaat Csongrád: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár en Szentes.

5.   Verband met het geografische gebied

5.1.   Specificiteit van het geografische gebied

De factoren die de kwaliteit van de paprikateelt beïnvloeden, en met name de temperatuur en de hoeveelheid licht, maar ook de bodemgesteldheid en de afwatering, maken deze omgeving bijzonder gunstig voor de ontwikkeling van de geïrrigeerde paprikateelt die specifiek is voor de regio Szentes. Deze is tot stand gekomen dankzij het pionierswerk van de „Bulgaarse tuinders” (tuinders die gebruik maakten van specifieke kleinschalige methoden, met geforceerde teelt in warme, geïrrigeerde kassen) die zich in de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw in deze regio hebben gevestigd.

In het zuidoosten van Hongarije, in een van de laagstgelegen bekkens van de Grote Vlakte, bevindt zich het traditionele teeltgebied van de regio Szentes. Uit topografisch oogpunt neemt het een zeer bijzondere plaats in, want hier bevinden zich de laagstgelegen gebieden van het land; de bergen hebben drie hellingen die vanuit de naburige comitaten aflopen tot aan de vallei van de Tisza. De belangrijkste waterloop van het hydrografische systeem van de regio is de rivier de Tisza, die tegelijk ook het hele geografische landschap bepaalt. Vanwege de veelheid aan oppervlaktewateren die typerend zijn voor de regio, zijn de dominante bodems kalkrijke gronden en Solonetzen van de Chernozemvlakten. De bodem van het productiegebied heeft goede fysische kenmerken, een korrelige structuur, hij warmt snel op en is kalkarm, rijk aan water en voedingsstoffen, hij heeft een hoog humusgehalte en een dikke laag teelaarde.

Tijdens de productie van de „Szentesi paprika” behoren enerzijds de hoeveelheid licht en het aantal uren zonneschijn en anderzijds de temperatuur en de hoeveelheid uitgestraalde zonnewarmte tot de klimatologische factoren die bepalend zijn voor de intrinsieke kwaliteiten van de vruchten. In het traditionele teeltgebied van de regio Szentes komt hoofdzakelijk een landklimaat voor. Het aantal uren zonneschijn in de regio is gelijkmatig verdeeld. Het gemiddelde aantal uren zonneschijn bedraagt 2 050 per jaar. Gelet op de gemiddelde jaarlijkse temperatuurschommelingen in het productiegebied behoort dit tot de warmste delen van het land. De gemiddelde jaarlijkse temperatuur bedraagt +10-11 °C, de totale warmte tijdens de groeiperiode is 3 200-3 300 °C, hetgeen zeer gunstig is voor de paprikateelt, want die heeft warmte nodig.

Wat de jaarlijkse hoeveelheid neerslag betreft, is deze regio echter de slechtst bedeelde van het hele land met gemiddeld 500 tot 550 mm neerslag per jaar. De precieze verdeling van de neerslag over het jaar is als volgt: 40 % valt 's winters en 60 % 's zomers. Door de irrigatieteelt, die zich heeft ontwikkeld dankzij de gunstige hydrografische omstandigheden en de toepassing ervan door Bulgaarse tuinders, werd de productie van de waterverslindende paprika mogelijk.

5.2.   Specificiteit van het product

De belangrijkste waarden en organoleptische kenmerken van de uit het geografische gebied afkomstige „Szentesi paprika” zijn de volgende: hij heeft een uitgesproken smaak, kruidig, zoet of scherp. Hij ruikt intens naar paprika of doet denken aan paprikapoeder en heeft een dunne schil. Het vruchtvlees varieert in dikte van 3 tot 7 mm, waardoor de smaak en de geur volledig tot hun recht komen, zelfs wanneer hij vers wordt gegeten, wat meestal het geval is.

De witte „Szentesi paprika”: wanneer hij rijp is, voelt hij zacht aan, de huid is glad en niet stroef; hij is stomp en aan het uiteinde gebogen en het vlees is knapperig en dik. De geur en de aroma’s van verse paprika zijn zeer karakteristiek, wat goed wordt uitgedrukt in de veelgehoorde woorden van de liefhebbers: „De paprika van Szentes heeft smaak”.

Het oppervlak van de spitse „Szentesi paprika” is glanzend, glad of licht golvend, de paprika is lang en het vruchtvlees is stevig. Het product ruikt intens naar paprika, is pikant en heeft een aangename geur en smaak.De „Szentesi paprika” behoort tot de kapiagroep en is kegelvormig en licht afgeplat; de textuur van het vruchtvlees is stevig, de huid is van gemiddelde dikte. Het oppervlak is glad en glanzend en onder invloed van de geografische omstandigheden (licht, warmte) krijgt hij een bijzonder aantrekkelijke donkerfluweelrode kleur.

De tomaatpaprika „Szentesi paprika” heeft een zeer kenmerkende vorm, namelijk die van een afgeplatte bol; ondanks de dikte van het vlees is de huid zeer dun en het oppervlak glad; als hij rijp is, wordt hij donkerrood van kleur.

5.3.   Causaal verband tussen het geografische gebied en de kwaliteit of de kenmerken van het product (voor een BOB) dan wel een bepaalde hoedanigheid, de faam of een ander kenmerk van het product (voor een BGA)

Het verband met het geografische gebied berust op de goede reputatie die het product al lange tijd heeft en op de lokale knowhow van de telers van de „Szentesi paprika”, die van vader op zoon wordt doorgegeven.

De reputatie van de „Szentesi paprika”

De irrigatieteelt van de specifieke paprika van de regio Szentes heeft zich ontwikkeld dankzij het pionierswerk van de „Bulgaarse tuinders”, die zich in de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw in de streek hebben gevestigd. Daardoor is de teelt van de vermaarde „Szentesi paprika” ononderbroken voortgezet. De reputatie van het product is vandaag de dag nog altijd zeer goed, zoals blijkt uit het feit dat het in 2006 de eerste prijs behaalde op de tuinbouwbeurs in Debrecen, die werd georganiseerd in samenwerking met de landbouwbeurs Farmer Expo en waar 300 binnen- en buitenlandse bedrijven waren vertegenwoordigd. In 2007 behaalde de paprika die bestemd is om vers te worden gegeten de Magyar Termék Nagydíj, de grote prijs voor Hongaarse producten.

Een groot aantal historische bronnen getuigt van het eeuwenoude verband tussen de faam van de „Szentesi paprika” en het geografische gebied. De verschijning van de zoete paprika in Hongarije kan worden teruggevoerd tot de winter van 1875-1876, toen Bulgaarse tuinders zich in de buurt van Úsztató major in de regio Szegvár vestigden. Volgens de algemene landbouwtelling van 1895 was 92,74 % van de totale Hongaarse paprikaproductie geconcentreerd in het zuidoostelijke deel van het land, in de regio Szentes. De tuinders pachtten de Chernozemvlakten en de alluviale gronden in de regio van het huidige comitaat Csongrád, die humusrijk zijn en snel opwarmen, en kozen waar mogelijk licht hellende terreinen. Voor de vroege teelt gebruikten zij voorgekiemd zaad en warme kassen. Ook beoefenden zij combinatieteelt in de kwekerijen, door naast paprika’s bijvoorbeeld jonge komkommerplanten te verbouwen, die na het uitplanten van de paprika’s bleven staan. De uit te planten plantjes werden opnieuw gepoot met een klein heuveltje eromheen. Er werd veel en regelmatig bevloeid. Daarvoor gebruikten de tuinders stilstaand, warm geworden water of water van ondiepe waterlopen met een laag debiet. Zij hadden een unieke methode van wateropvang en afwatering. In die tijd werd in de regio Szentes een zogenaamd schoepenrad gebruikt, dat werd aangepast aan het wisselende waterpeil.

Lokale knowhow

In het traditionele teeltgebied van de regio Szentes houdt de bovenste bodemlaag de warmte zeer goed vast. Omdat de bodem waarin de „Szentesi paprika” wordt geteeld meer warmte opneemt dan hij in de vroege ochtenduren door straling afstaat, wordt de in de bodem en in de lucht vlak daarboven opgeslagen warmte verspreid, wat resulteert in een stijging van de temperatuur. Door het evenwichtige microklimaat dat het gevolg is van deze gelijkmatige verdeling van de warmte, in combinatie met de door de Bulgaarse tuinders ingevoerde irrigatieteelt, wordt de warmte- en waterminnende „Szentesi paprika” een zeer smakelijk product.

Naast de natuurlijke factoren zijn er de menselijke bijdrage van de regionale actoren en de praktische ervaring die met de geforceerde teelt zijn opgedaan (temperatuurregeling, ventilatie, bescherming tegen de zon, verzorging van de planten) en die binnen families worden doorgegeven. Met de zo opgebouwde knowhow kunnen de negatieve gevolgen van de extreme weersomstandigheden van de afgelopen decennia worden gecompenseerd en worden de smaak, de kleur en het aroma van de „Szentesi paprika”, evenals de typische interessante vorm van bepaalde soorten, gewaarborgd en zo mogelijk behouden.

Sterker nog, de door de Bulgaarse tuinders ingevoerde technieken werden in de loop van 150 jaar teelt ontwikkeld en aangepast aan de eisen van de tijd. De voor de paprikateelt belangrijkste factoren zijn tijdens de productie opnieuw bekeken en er zijn nieuwe productiemethoden ontstaan. Sinds de aanvang van de teelt tot de jaren 60 werden de goede bodemgesteldheid, het irrigatiepotentieel (Tisza, Körös en het systeem van irrigatiekanalen), het aantal uren zonneschijn (mogelijkheid van vroege teelt) en de opwarming aan het begin van het voorjaar gerekend tot de belangrijkste productiefactoren. De daaropvolgende periode duurde van het eind van de jaren 60 tot het eind van de jaren 80. Toen begonnen de paprikatelers gebruik te maken van de vroege opwarming voor de teelt in kassen, waardoor zij maximaal konden profiteren van het grote aantal uren zonneschijn gedurende de wintermaanden en het voorjaar. In de jaren 1960-1980 is de teelt van de „Szentesi paprika”, onder invloed van de geothermische energie die in de regio werd ontdekt, overgegaan van een teelt in de openlucht naar een teelt onder glas, waarbij hydrocultuur wijdverbreid is.

Verwijzing naar de bekendmaking van het productdossier

(artikel 5, lid 7, van Verordening (EG) nr. 510/2006 (3))

Tijdschrift voor Plattelandsontwikkeling (Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő), 16 november 2011, jaargang LXI, nummer 6, blz. 317.

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

---

(1)  PB L 343 van 14.12.2012, blz. 1.

(2)  Vervangen door Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012.

(3)  Vgl. voetnoot 2.

---

| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/36

---

Bekendmaking van een wijzigingsaanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder a), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

2013/C 237/07

Deze bekendmaking verleent het recht om op grond van artikel 51 van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad (1) bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen de aanvraag.

WIJZIGINGSAANVRAAG

VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 510/2006 VAN DE RAAD

inzake de bescherming van geografische aanduidingen en oorsprongsbenamingen van landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen
   (2)

WIJZIGINGSAANVRAAG OVEREENKOMSTIG ARTIKEL 9

„TERRA D’OTRANTO”

EG-nummer: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

BGA ( ) BOB ( X )

1.   Rubriek van het productdossier waarop de wijziging betrekking heeft

| — |  | Naam van het product |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Beschrijving van het product |
| — |  | Geografisch gebied |
| — | ☒ | Bewijs van de oorsprong |
| — |  | Werkwijze voor het verkrijgen van het product |
| — |  | Verband |
| — |  | Etikettering |
| — | ☒ | Nationale eisen |
| — | ☒ | Overig (nader aan te geven) |

—



Naam van het product

—

☒

Beschrijving van het product

—



Geografisch gebied

—

☒

Bewijs van de oorsprong

—



Werkwijze voor het verkrijgen van het product

—



Verband

—



Etikettering

—

☒

Nationale eisen

—

☒

Overig (nader aan te geven)

2.   Aard van de wijziging(en)

| — |  | Wijziging van het enige document of de samenvatting |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Wijziging van het productdossier voor een geregistreerde BOB of BGA waarvoor geen enig document en evenmin een samenvatting bekend zijn gemaakt |
| — |  | Wijziging van het productdossier waarbij geen wijziging van het bekendgemaakte enige document nodig is (artikel 9, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 510/2006) |
| — |  | Tijdelijke wijziging van het productdossier als gevolg van een verplichte gezondheids- of fytosanitaire maatregel die is opgelegd door de overheid (artikel 9, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 510/2006) |

—



Wijziging van het enige document of de samenvatting

—

☒

Wijziging van het productdossier voor een geregistreerde BOB of BGA waarvoor geen enig document en evenmin een samenvatting bekend zijn gemaakt

—



Wijziging van het productdossier waarbij geen wijziging van het bekendgemaakte enige document nodig is (artikel 9, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 510/2006)

—



Tijdelijke wijziging van het productdossier als gevolg van een verplichte gezondheids- of fytosanitaire maatregel die is opgelegd door de overheid (artikel 9, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 510/2006)

3.   Wijziging(en)

3.1.   Beschrijving van het product

De wijzigingen van het productdossier betreffen de invoering van medianen voor de typische beoordelingsaspecten, het schrappen van het puntenaantal van 6,5 (dat niet langer relevant is), en de toepassing van de voorschriften van de methode COI/T20, doc nr. 22. Bovendien werden enkele specificaties die voortvloeien uit het feit dat een van de twee inheemse cultivars vaker voorkomt, in de sensorische test opgenomen.

De toepassing van de nieuwe methode leidt tot de volgende beschrijving:

| — | kleur: groen of geel met een lichte, groene schijn; |
| --- | --- |

—

kleur: groen of geel met een lichte, groene schijn;

| — | geur: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6) bij de juiste mate van rijpheid, met een lichte hint van blad; |
| --- | --- |

—

geur: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6) bij de juiste mate van rijpheid, met een lichte hint van blad;

| — | smaak: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6), met een hint van olijven bij de juiste mate van rijpheid. Licht of matig pikant en bitter naargelang van de oogstperiode (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 0 en 6). Afhankelijk van de oogstperiode en de meest voorkomende variëteit wordt de fruitige smaak verrijkt met toetsen van olijfblad, vers gemaaid gras, distel/artisjok/wilde cichorei in het geval van de cultivar Ogliarola, of van fruit/tomaat/bosvruchten in het geval van de cultivar Cellina. |
| --- | --- |

—

smaak: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6), met een hint van olijven bij de juiste mate van rijpheid. Licht of matig pikant en bitter naargelang van de oogstperiode (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 0 en 6). Afhankelijk van de oogstperiode en de meest voorkomende variëteit wordt de fruitige smaak verrijkt met toetsen van olijfblad, vers gemaaid gras, distel/artisjok/wilde cichorei in het geval van de cultivar Ogliarola, of van fruit/tomaat/bosvruchten in het geval van de cultivar Cellina.

De chemische parameters zijn enigszins gewijzigd doordat het in oliezuur uitgedrukte totale maximale zuurgehalte werd verlaagd (van < 0,8 tot < 0,65 nu) en het linolzuurgehalte licht werd verhoogd (van ≤ 0,7 tot ≤ 0,8), evenals de K232-waarde (van ≤ 2,1 tot ≤ 2,2). Deze wijzigingen vloeien voort uit de tendens naar een grotere representativiteit van de twee meest voorkomende cultivars in het geografische gebied, de Cellina di Nardò en de Ogliarola Salentina, die bepalend zijn voor licht verschillende linolzuurgehalte- en K232-waarden in de — vroeger nauwelijks representatieve — met een enkel ras geproduceerde oliën.

3.2.   Bewijs van de oorsprong

Het productdossier is gewijzigd overeenkomstig het bepaalde in Verordening (EG) nr. 1898/2006 door invoering van de procedures die de marktdeelnemers moeten toepassen om het bewijs/de bewijzen van oorsprong te leveren.

3.3.   Nationale eisen

De verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit wet nr. 169 van 15 februari 1992„Disciplina per il riconoscimento della denominazione di origine controllata degli oli di oliva vergini ed extravergini” (voorschriften inzake de goedkeuring van de gecontroleerde oorsprongsbenaming voor olijfolie van eerste persing en extra olijfolie van eerste persing) en van het ministerieel besluit nr. 573/93 zijn geschrapt.

3.4.   Overige

De instelling die om de wijzigingen verzoekt is het „Consorzio di tutela” voor de extra olijfolie van eerste persing met de BOB „Terra d’Otranto”, het orgaan dat is gerechtigd om de wijzigingsaanvraag in te dienen. Het Consorzio di tutela werd opgericht na de datum van de aanvraag tot registratie van de BOB „Terra d’Otranto”, die destijds namens zeven verenigingen van olijventelers werd ingediend door de vereniging APROL.

ENIG DOCUMENT

VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 510/2006 VAN DE RAAD

inzake de bescherming van geografische aanduidingen en oorsprongsbenamingen van landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen
   (3)

„TERRA D’OTRANTO”

EG-nummer: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

BGA ( ) BOB ( X )

1.   Naam

„Terra d’Otranto”

2.   Lidstaat of derde land

Italië

3.   Beschrijving van het landbouwproduct of levensmiddel

3.1.   Productcategorie

| Categorie 1.5. | Oliën en vetten (boter, margarine, spijsolie, enz.) |
| --- | --- |

Categorie 1.5.

Oliën en vetten (boter, margarine, spijsolie, enz.)

3.2.   Beschrijving van het product waarvoor de in punt 1 vermelde naam van toepassing is

„Terra d'Otranto” is een extra olijfolie van eerste persing met de volgende chemische en organoleptische eigenschappen:

| — | maximaal zuurgehalte 0,65 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

maximaal zuurgehalte 0,65 %;

| — | peroxiden ≤ 14 meq O2/kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

peroxiden ≤ 14 meq O2/kg;

| — | K232 ≤ 2,2; |
| --- | --- |

—

K232 ≤ 2,2;

| — | K270 ≤ 0,17; |
| --- | --- |

—

K270 ≤ 0,17;

| — | linolzuur ≤ 0,8; |
| --- | --- |

—

linolzuur ≤ 0,8;

| — | kleur: groen of geel met een groene schijn; |
| --- | --- |

—

kleur: groen of geel met een groene schijn;

| — | geur: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6) bij de juiste mate van rijpheid, met een lichte hint van blad; |
| --- | --- |

—

geur: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6) bij de juiste mate van rijpheid, met een lichte hint van blad;

| — | smaak: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6), met een hint van olijven bij de juiste mate van rijpheid. |
| --- | --- |

—

smaak: matig fruitig (de mediaan voor deze eigenschap ligt tussen 3 en 6), met een hint van olijven bij de juiste mate van rijpheid.

Licht of matig pikant en bitter naargelang van de oogstperiode. Bovendien wordt, afhankelijk van de oogstperiode en de meest voorkomende variëteit, de fruitige smaak verrijkt met toetsen van olijfblad, vers gemaaid gras, distel/artisjok/wilde cichorei in het geval van de cultivar Ogliarola, of van fruit/tomaat/bosvruchten in het geval van de cultivar Cellina.

3.3.   Grondstoffen (alleen voor verwerkte producten)

—

3.4.   Diervoeders (alleen voor producten van dierlijke oorsprong)

—

3.5.   Specifieke onderdelen van het productieproces die in het afgebakende geografische gebied moeten plaatsvinden

De teelt, de productie en het persen van de extra olijfolie van eerste persing „Terra d’Otranto” mogen slechts plaatsvinden in het onder punt 4 omschreven afgebakende geografische gebied.

3.6.   Specifieke voorschriften betreffende het in plakken snijden, het raspen, het verpakken enz.

De extra olijfolie van eerste persing „Terra d’Otranto” moet in glazen recipiënten of blikken van maximaal 5 liter in de handel worden gebracht. Voor een beter toezicht op de herkomst van het product en om te voorkomen dat bulktransport buiten dit geografische gebied leidt tot aantasting van het product en verlies van de hierboven onder punt 3.2 beschreven bijzondere kwaliteiten, vooral de typische hints van distel, artisjok/wilde cichorei van de olie „Terra d’Otranto”, moet het verpakken van de extra olijfolie van eerste persing „Terra d’Otranto” plaatsvinden in het geografische productiegebied. Door de samenstelling van de olie, die wordt gekenmerkt door een hoog gehalte aan meervoudig onverzadigde vetzuren, verliest deze zijn organoleptische kwaliteiten en zijn specifieke eigenschappen onder invloed van de zuurstof in de lucht tijdens het overhevelen, pompen, vervoeren en lossen, handelingen die vaker moeten worden uitgevoerd wanneer het bottelen buiten het productiegebied plaats vindt.

3.7.   Specifieke voorschriften betreffende de etikettering

De benaming „Terra d’Otranto” moet in duidelijke, onuitwisbare en duidelijk van elke andere vermelding te onderscheiden letters op het etiket worden aangebracht, onmiddellijk gevolgd door de woorden „Denominazione di origine protetta” of de afkorting AOP en het overeenkomstige EU-logo.

Op elke in de handel gebrachte verpakking moet een door de verpakker toegekend oplopend volgnummer worden aangebracht op grond van de bepalingen van het dienovereenkomstige plan van toezicht.

Het is niet toegestaan enige kwalificatie toe te voegen waarin niet uitdrukkelijk is voorzien, ook niet de woorden „fijn”, „uitgelezen”, „geselecteerd”, „superieur”.

Het gebruik van namen, bedrijfsnamen of particuliere merken is toegestaan op voorwaarde dat deze niet lovend van aard en niet verwarrend voor de consument zijn.

Het productiejaar van de olijven waaruit de olie is verkregen, moet op het etiket worden vermeld.

4.   Beknopte beschrijving van het afgebakende geografische gebied

Het productiegebied van de BOB „Terra d’Otranto” omvat de gehele provincie Lecce en een deel van de provincies Taranto en Brindisi. Dit gebied strekt zich in een boog uit tussen de Ionische en de Adriatische Zee, van de Murge Taratine-heuvels en de uitlopers van de flanken van de Murge tot het zuidoosten van Brindisi, via het plateau van Lecce tot in de heuvels van de Serre, waar beide zeeën samenvloeien.

5.   Verband met het geografische gebied

5.1.   Specificiteit van het geografische gebied

Het product dankt zijn eigenschappen aan de bijzondere bodemgesteldheid en klimatologische omstandigheden in het gebied: dankzij de omgevingsfactoren en de specifieke cultivars van dit gebied heeft de „Terra d’Otranto”-olie een heel eigen karakter. De bodem is in grote lijnen opmerkelijk eenvormig en bestaat uit kalksteen uit het Krijt waarop tertiaire kalksteenlagen met kalkhoudende en zandige kleisedimenten uit het Plioceen en het Pleistoceen zich hebben afgezet. De bodem bestaat uit bruine of rode aarde, vaak in afwisselende lagen, op rotsen van kalksteen. Wat het reliëf betreft, wordt het gebied gekenmerkt door uitgestrekte vlaktes die worden begrensd en onderbroken door zacht glooiende lage heuvels. Het productiegebied heeft geen waterlopen aan de oppervlakte, maar een uitgebreid ondergronds watersysteem, waardoor de gehele regio blijvend een karstgebied is. Omdat het gebied op een lage breedtegraad aan de kust ligt, heeft het een mild, tamelijk warm klimaat.

5.2.   Specificiteit van het product

De traditionele olijventeelt van het geografische gebied wordt gekenmerkt door de overheersende aanwezigheid van de inheemse rassen Cellina di Nardó en Ogliarola leccese, waardoor de kwaliteit van de geproduceerde olie wordt bepaald. Het voorschrift dat de olie voor minimaal 60 % met deze twee cultivars moet worden geproduceerd, bepaalt mede de organoleptische kenmerken ervan die, afhankelijk van de overheersende soort, variëren van toetsen van distel/artisjok/wilde cichorei naar toetsen van fruit/tomaat/bosvruchten.

5.3.   Causaal verband tussen het geografische gebied en de kwaliteit of de kenmerken van het product (voor een BOB) dan wel een bepaalde hoedanigheid, de faam of een ander kenmerk van het product (voor een BGA)

De olijventeelt is de belangrijkste productiesector in de streek en speelt een essentiële rol in de lokale economie. De geografische aanduiding „Terra d’Otranto” omvatte in de negentiende eeuw nog de huidige provincies Lecce, Brindisi en Taranto. Deze regio is altijd al gekenmerkt door de sterke aanwezigheid van olijfbomen, waarvan de vruchten worden geperst tot een „edel vocht”. De oorsprong van de naam „Terra d’Otranto” valt samen met de geschiedenis van de olijventeelt in deze regio. De teelt werd hier zeer lang geleden ingevoerd door Fenicische en Griekse kolonisten en zorgde, dankzij het werk van de Basilianen, monniken die zich hier in de tiende eeuw vestigden, voor de eerste bloeiende markt van kwaliteitsolie uit de Terra d’Otranto. „Terra d’Otranto” is de naam die in de middeleeuwen werd gebruikt voor het schiereiland Salento, omdat Otranto in die tijd de belangrijkste stad van de regio was.

Verwijzing naar de bekendmaking van het productdossier

(artikel 5, lid 7, van Verordening (EG) nr. 510/2006 (4))

De huidige regering heeft de nationale bezwaarprocedure gestart door de aanvraag tot wijziging van het productdossier van de beschermde oorsprongsbenaming „Terra d'Otranto” bekend te maken in het Staatsblad van de Italiaanse Republiek nr. 297 van 21 december 2010. De geconsolideerde tekst van het productdossier is te vinden op de website:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

of rechtstreeks via de startpagina van het ministerie van Landbouw-, levensmiddelen- en bosbouwbeleid (http://www.politicheagricole.it), door te klikken op „Qualità e sicurezza” (linksboven in het scherm) en op „Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE”.

---

(1)  PB L 343 van 14.12.2012, blz. 1.

(2)  Vervangen door Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012.

(3)  Vgl. voetnoot 2.

(4)  Vgl. voetnoot 2.

---

| 15.8.2013 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 237/40

---

Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 50, lid 2, onder b), van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake kwaliteitsregelingen voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

2013/C 237/08

Deze bekendmaking verleent het recht om op grond van artikel 51 van Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad (1) bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen de aanvraag.

AANVRAAG TOT REGISTRATIE VAN EEN GTS

VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 509/2006 VAN DE RAAD

inzake gegarandeerde traditionele specialiteiten voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen
   (2)

„ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS”

EG-nummer: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Naam en adres van de aanvragende groepering

| Naam van de groepering of organisatie (indien van toepassing): | „Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai” |
| --- | --- |
| Adres: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Naam van de groepering of organisatie (indien van toepassing):

„Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai”

Adres:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 44422201

Fax

+370 44474897

E-mail:

info@zpienas.lt

2.   Lidstaat of derde land

Litouwen

3.   Productdossier

3.1.   Benaming(en) waarvoor de registratie wordt aangevraagd (artikel 2 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007)

„Žemaitiškas kastinys”

3.2.   De benaming

| ☒ | is zelf specifiek |
| --- | --- |
|  | brengt de specificiteit van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel tot uitdrukking: |

☒

is zelf specifiek



brengt de specificiteit van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel tot uitdrukking:

De naam „Žemaitiškas kastinys” brengt de specificiteit van het product niet tot uiting, maar is een gevestigde naam en goed gekend in zowel Žemaitija (een regio in het westen van Litouwen) als in de rest van Litouwen en wordt traditioneel gebruikt om naar dit product te verwijzen. Dit blijkt uit de verschillende bronnen die in punt 3.8 worden genoemd.

De naam „Žemaitiškas kastinys” wordt genoemd in de volgende kookboeken uit de 20e eeuw: Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai (Tilžė (Tilsit), 1927), Ką valgome (Dr Tumėnienė et al., Kaunas, 1935) en Lietuvių valgiai (samengesteld door J. Pauliukonienė, Vilnius, 1983).

3.3.   Aanvraag tot registratie met of zonder reservering overeenkomstig artikel 13, lid 2, van Verordening (EG) nr. 509/2006

| ☒ | Registratie met reservering van de benaming |
| --- | --- |
|  | Registratie zonder reservering van de benaming |

☒

Registratie met reservering van de benaming



Registratie zonder reservering van de benaming

3.4.   Productcategorie (overeenkomstig bijlage II)

| Categorie 1.4. | Andere producten van dierlijke oorsprong (eieren, honing, diverse zuivelproducten met uitzondering van boter, enz.) |
| --- | --- |

Categorie 1.4.

Andere producten van dierlijke oorsprong (eieren, honing, diverse zuivelproducten met uitzondering van boter, enz.)

3.5.   Beschrijving van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel waarvoor de in punt 3.1 vermelde benaming geldt (artikel 3, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007)

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” is een traditioneel product op basis van zure room die wordt opgewarmd, doorgeroerd en afgekoeld.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” heeft een kenmerkende homogene, dikke, consistente textuur die eruitziet als opgesteven room, met hier en daar vloeistofdruppels, kan kruimelig zijn op een temperatuur van + 6 °C en smelt gemakkelijk in de mond. Het product heeft een uniforme geelachtige kleur. „Žemaitiškas kastinys” kan, afhankelijk van de kruiden en specerijen die in het recept zijn gebruikt, de kleur van de toegevoegde ingrediënten aannemen en kan kleine stukjes kruiden of specerijen bevatten. Het heeft een zachte, lichtzure en lichtzoute melkzuursmaak met een zweem van kruiden en specerijen.

De fysisch-chemische eigenschappen van „Žemaitiškas kastinys” zijn de volgende:

| — | vetgehalte, afhankelijk van het recept: 25-30 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

vetgehalte, afhankelijk van het recept: 25-30 %;

| — | gehalte gewoon zout: 1-1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

gehalte gewoon zout: 1-1,5 %.

3.6.   Beschrijving van de methode waarmee het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel met de in punt 3.1 vermelde benaming wordt geproduceerd (artikel 3, lid 2, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007)

Grondstoffen:

| — | zure room met een vetgehalte van 25-30 %: 80-83 kg/100 kg product; |
| --- | --- |

—

zure room met een vetgehalte van 25-30 %: 80-83 kg/100 kg product;

| — | boter met een vetgehalte van ten minste 82 %: 6-7 kg/100 kg product; |
| --- | --- |

—

boter met een vetgehalte van ten minste 82 %: 6-7 kg/100 kg product;

| — | zure melk met een vetgehalte van 2,5-4 %: 5-5,5 kg/100 kg product; |
| --- | --- |

—

zure melk met een vetgehalte van 2,5-4 %: 5-5,5 kg/100 kg product;

| — | gewoon zout: 1-1,5 kg/100 kg product. |
| --- | --- |

—

gewoon zout: 1-1,5 kg/100 kg product.

Kruiden en specerijen (zwarte peper, piment, karwij, dille, munt of een mengsel hiervan: 0,1-0,15 kg/100 kg product) en aromatische planten (look of ui: 1-2 kg/100 kg product) mogen worden gebruikt.

Productiemethode:

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” wordt op traditionele wijze geproduceerd.

De vereiste ingrediënten worden afgewogen volgens het recept. De zure room en de zure melk worden in een afzonderlijke recipiënt gemengd en opgewarmd tot een temperatuur van 25 °C à 30 °C. De koude boter wordt zacht gemaakt door deze op te warmen tot een temperatuur van 25 °C à 30 °C. De aromatische planten worden gewassen en fijngesneden.

Volgens het recept wordt de opgewarmde, zacht geworden boter in een mengkom gedaan en wordt het mengsel van zure room en zure melk geleidelijk toegevoegd, namelijk per achtste deel van de totale hoeveelheid die volgens het recept is vereist. Het mengsel wordt manueel of mechanisch doorgeroerd. Voor „Žemaitiškas kastinys” moet steeds in dezelfde richting worden geroerd. Wanneer het mengsel de consistentie van zure room krijgt (zonder afscheiding van de karnemelk), wordt nog een achtste deel van het mengsel van zure room en zure melk toegevoegd, waarna verder wordt geroerd. Dit wordt herhaald totdat het mengsel van zure room en zure melk volledig is toegevoegd (volgens het recept). Wanneer „Žemaitiškas kastinys” begint op te stijven, worden het zout, de gemalen kruiden en specerijen en de fijngesneden aromatische planten toegevoegd en gelijkmatig eronder geroerd. „Žemaitiškas kastinys” moet onmiddellijk worden verpakt, voordat de massa stolt.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” wordt verpakt in stenen potten of wegwerppotjes van 250 g, 200 g en 100 g. De potten worden afgedekt met een stenen deksel waarover een doekje wordt gespannen met een koord. De wegwerppotjes worden afgesloten met een folie. Na het verpakken wordt de „Žemaitiškas kastinys” afgekoeld tot 6 °C. Na afkoeling heeft het product een vaste, homogene structuur.

3.7.   Specificiteit van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel (artikel 3, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007)

De volgende specifieke kenmerken onderscheiden „Žemaitiškas kastinys” van andere producten van dezelfde categorie:

| — | Traditionele ingrediënten en productiemethode: in tegenstelling tot andere soorten kastinys is het recept van „Žemaitiškas kastinys” zo goed als ongewijzigd gebleven sinds de eerste vermelding van het product in de in punt 3.8 genoemde schriftelijke bronnen. Dezelfde ingrediënten worden dus nog steeds in gelijksoortige verhoudingen gebruikt. Intussen werd, om meer smaken te krijgen, voor andere soorten kastinys, die pas later werden geproduceerd, de zure room volledig vervangen door zure melk of vermengd met kefir, al dan niet met toevoeging van rode bieten- of wortelsap of eierdooiers, wat de kastinys een rode of gele kleur geeft. De productie van „Žemaitiškas kastinys” wordt gekenmerkt door het constant en traag doorroeren van de boter en het zure-roommengsel, waarbij telkens een achtste deel van het mengsel van zure room en zure melk wordt toegevoegd en de temperatuur (25-30 °C) nauwkeurig wordt geregeld om te vermijden dat de karnemelk wordt afgescheiden. De productie van andere soorten kastinys werd gemoderniseerd. Ze worden niet geroerd, maar geklopt en alle ingrediënten worden in drie of vier keer, of zelfs allemaal tegelijkertijd, toegevoegd. Bovendien kan bij de productie van deze soorten de temperatuur meer schommelen. |
| --- | --- |

—

Traditionele ingrediënten en productiemethode: in tegenstelling tot andere soorten kastinys is het recept van „Žemaitiškas kastinys” zo goed als ongewijzigd gebleven sinds de eerste vermelding van het product in de in punt 3.8 genoemde schriftelijke bronnen. Dezelfde ingrediënten worden dus nog steeds in gelijksoortige verhoudingen gebruikt. Intussen werd, om meer smaken te krijgen, voor andere soorten kastinys, die pas later werden geproduceerd, de zure room volledig vervangen door zure melk of vermengd met kefir, al dan niet met toevoeging van rode bieten- of wortelsap of eierdooiers, wat de kastinys een rode of gele kleur geeft. De productie van „Žemaitiškas kastinys” wordt gekenmerkt door het constant en traag doorroeren van de boter en het zure-roommengsel, waarbij telkens een achtste deel van het mengsel van zure room en zure melk wordt toegevoegd en de temperatuur (25-30 °C) nauwkeurig wordt geregeld om te vermijden dat de karnemelk wordt afgescheiden. De productie van andere soorten kastinys werd gemoderniseerd. Ze worden niet geroerd, maar geklopt en alle ingrediënten worden in drie of vier keer, of zelfs allemaal tegelijkertijd, toegevoegd. Bovendien kan bij de productie van deze soorten de temperatuur meer schommelen.

| — | Smaak: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” heeft een kenmerkende zachte, lichtzure en lichtzoute melkzuursmaak met een zweem van kruiden en specerijen. Andere soorten kastinys hebben eerder een kenmerkende scherpe melkzuursmaak (indien de zure room werd vervangen door zure melk) of een gistige melkzuursmaak (indien de zure room werd vervangen door kefir), met een zweem van de smaak die kenmerkend is voor het toegevoegde sap (rode biet of wortel) of de eierdooiers. |
| --- | --- |

—

Smaak: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” heeft een kenmerkende zachte, lichtzure en lichtzoute melkzuursmaak met een zweem van kruiden en specerijen. Andere soorten kastinys hebben eerder een kenmerkende scherpe melkzuursmaak (indien de zure room werd vervangen door zure melk) of een gistige melkzuursmaak (indien de zure room werd vervangen door kefir), met een zweem van de smaak die kenmerkend is voor het toegevoegde sap (rode biet of wortel) of de eierdooiers.

| — | Textuur: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” heeft een kenmerkende homogene, dikke, consistente textuur die eruitziet als opgesteven room, met hier en daar vloeistofdruppels, kan kruimelig zijn op een temperatuur van + 6 °C en smelt gemakkelijk in de mond. Andere soorten kastinys worden gekenmerkt door een zachte, smeerbare textuur. |
| --- | --- |

—

Textuur: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” heeft een kenmerkende homogene, dikke, consistente textuur die eruitziet als opgesteven room, met hier en daar vloeistofdruppels, kan kruimelig zijn op een temperatuur van + 6 °C en smelt gemakkelijk in de mond. Andere soorten kastinys worden gekenmerkt door een zachte, smeerbare textuur.

3.8.   Traditioneel karakter van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel (artikel 3, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007)

Naast de primitieve, in heel Litouwen toegepaste methode om boter te maken, namelijk het kloppen van zure room met een lepel in een bord, ontwikkelde een Litouwse regio, Žemaitija, een eigen techniek voor het verwerken van zure room: het doorroeren van opgewarmde zure room zonder dat de karnemelk wordt afgescheiden. Deze techniek verspreidde zich in heel Litouwen. Het product dat op die manier wordt verkregen, namelijk „Žemaitiškas kastinys”, heeft een specifieke smaak en consistentie (Lietuvių kalbos atlasas, vol. 1, Leksika, Vilnius, 1977). In het midden van de 19e eeuw werd het product beschreven in academische publicaties (Litwa pod wzgledem starozytnych zabytkow, obyczajow i zwyczajow skreslona (Ludwik Adam Jucewicz (Ludwik z Pokiewia), Vilnius, 1846) en Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona (Leon Potocki, Poznań, 1869)), waarin de productiemethode werd beschreven (gemaakt op basis van opgewarmde zure room) en de zeer aangename smaak werd benadrukt.

In het Nationaal Museum van Litouwen zijn er transcripties te vinden van verhalen van mensen uit eind 19e-begin 20e eeuw (Nationaal Museum van Litouwen, etnografische collecties, bewaarplaatsen F 15-4, F 15-13, F 32-7 en F 32-48), waarin de productietechniek en het recept als volgt worden beschreven: eerst worden drie eetlepels zure room en een halve lepel boter in een verwarmde stenen kom gedaan. Deze worden goed gemengd en doorgeroerd met een houten lepel, steeds in dezelfde richting. Wanneer de geroerde massa begint af te koelen en de karnemelk begint af te scheiden, wordt de kom in warm water opgewarmd en wordt de vloeibaar geworden massa afgekoeld in een kom koud water. Tijdens het roeren wordt zure room in kleine hoeveelheden aan de massa toegevoegd. Vaak wordt een deel van de zure room vervangen door gestremde melk, waardoor de kastinys lichter wordt. Wanneer het tijd is om te stoppen met roeren, worden zout en andere kruiden en specerijen toegevoegd (karwij, gemalen peper, fijngesneden look en ui, verse lente-uitjes en takjes dille of muntblaadjes).

In Lietuvių valgiai (samengesteld door J. Pauliukonienė, Mokslas, Vilnius, 1983), een boek uit 1983 waarin academici de oude traditionele technieken beschrijven voor de bereiding van de grondstoffen, waarbij de zure room manueel van de melk wordt gescheiden (door het afromen met een lepel) en dus op natuurlijke wijze gestremde melk in de zure room overblijft, worden het recept en de productiemethode voor „Žemaitiškas kastinys” als volgt beschreven: „Žemaitiškas kastinys”: 1⁄2 l zure room, 1 lepel boter, 1⁄2 koffielepel karwij of andere kruiden of specerijen, zout. De boter wordt in een stenen kom gedaan en een lepel zure room wordt toegevoegd. De kom wordt vervolgens in warm water geplaatst en het mengsel wordt met een houten lepel doorgeroerd. Na enige tijd roeren (maar voordat de karnemelk wordt afgescheiden) wordt nog een lepel zure room toegevoegd. Het roeren blijft doorgaan totdat alle zure room is toegevoegd. Wanneer de massa dik begint te worden, worden het zout en de gewassen en gedroogde karwij toegevoegd. Het geheel wordt goed gemengd. Kastinys heeft een enigszins zoute, zachte, lichtzure smaak.

Het recept en de productiemethode van „Žemaitiškas kastinys” zijn tot op vandaag ongewijzigd gebleven. Dit blijkt uit het getuigschrift dat aan dit product in 2010 werd toegekend door het Litouws culinair erfgoedfonds. Hierin wordt bevestigd dat „Žemaitiškas kastinys” wordt geproduceerd volgens de traditionele technieken, op basis van traditionele grondstoffen en toegevoegde ingrediënten en met traditioneel materiaal.

3.9.   Minimumeisen en procedures voor de controle van de specificiteit (artikel 4 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007)

Rekening houdend met de specifieke eigenschappen van „Žemaitiškas kastinys” worden de volgende controles uitgevoerd:

| 1. | kwaliteit van elke partij ontvangen grondstoffen:






  — | het vetgehalte van de zure room en de zure melk moet voldoen aan de waarden in punt 3.6; dit wordt in een laboratorium getest, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

kwaliteit van elke partij ontvangen grondstoffen:

—

het vetgehalte van de zure room en de zure melk moet voldoen aan de waarden in punt 3.6; dit wordt in een laboratorium getest,

| — | het vetgehalte van de boter moet voldoen aan de waarde in punt 3.6; dit wordt in een laboratorium getest, |
| --- | --- |

—

het vetgehalte van de boter moet voldoen aan de waarde in punt 3.6; dit wordt in een laboratorium getest,

| — | de organoleptische indicatoren van de kruiden, specerijen en aromatische planten (aroma, smaak en kleur) worden gecontroleerd op basis van documenten en zintuiglijke beoordeling; |
| --- | --- |

—

de organoleptische indicatoren van de kruiden, specerijen en aromatische planten (aroma, smaak en kleur) worden gecontroleerd op basis van documenten en zintuiglijke beoordeling;

| 2. | overeenstemming met de in punt 3.6 vermelde productietechniek: er wordt visueel en door middel van metingen tijdens de productie van elke partij gecontroleerd of de volgorde van de processen en de bepaalde parameters (temperatuur en verhoudingen van de ingrediënten) worden nageleefd; |
| --- | --- |

2.

overeenstemming met de in punt 3.6 vermelde productietechniek: er wordt visueel en door middel van metingen tijdens de productie van elke partij gecontroleerd of de volgorde van de processen en de bepaalde parameters (temperatuur en verhoudingen van de ingrediënten) worden nageleefd;

| 3. | kwaliteit van elke partij van het eindproduct:






  — | de organoleptische eigenschappen (textuur, kleur, smaak) moeten overeenstemmen met die in punt 3.5; dit wordt gecontroleerd aan de hand van zintuiglijke analyse, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

kwaliteit van elke partij van het eindproduct:

—

de organoleptische eigenschappen (textuur, kleur, smaak) moeten overeenstemmen met die in punt 3.5; dit wordt gecontroleerd aan de hand van zintuiglijke analyse,

| — | het vetgehalte moet voldoen aan de waarde in punt 3.5; dit wordt in een laboratorium getest, |
| --- | --- |

—

het vetgehalte moet voldoen aan de waarde in punt 3.5; dit wordt in een laboratorium getest,

| — | het gehalte aan gewoon zout moet voldoen aan de waarde in punt 3.5; dit wordt gecontroleerd op basis van het recept en, in geval van twijfel, in een laboratorium. |
| --- | --- |

—

het gehalte aan gewoon zout moet voldoen aan de waarde in punt 3.5; dit wordt gecontroleerd op basis van het recept en, in geval van twijfel, in een laboratorium.

De in punt 4.1 genoemde autoriteit controleert minstens jaarlijks of het product en het productieproces voldoen aan de criteria in het productdossier.

4.   Autoriteiten of organen die de naleving van het productdossier controleren

4.1.   Naam en adres

| Naam: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
| --- | --- |
| Adres: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Naam:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Adres:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 52404361

E-mail:

vvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Publiek |  Privaat |
| --- | --- |

☒ Publiek

 Privaat

4.2.   Specifieke taken van de autoriteit of het orgaan

De in punt 4.1 genoemde keuringsinstantie is verantwoordelijk voor het controleren van alle criteria in het productdossier.

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(1)  PB L 343 van 14.12.2012, blz. 1.

(2)  Vervangen door Verordening (EU) nr. 1151/2012.

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