RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 11a0155p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

ERIC T. ROTH, individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated; MARY BETH

ROTH, individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated; ERIN C. KENNY,

individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

HENRY GUZMAN, Director, Ohio Department

of Public Safety; MIKE RANKIN, Registrar,

Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles,

 Defendants-Appellants.

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No. 10-3542

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.

No. 09-00253—Michael R. Barrett, District Judge.

Argued: April 26, 2011

Decided and Filed: June 13, 2011 

Before: GUY, CLAY, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Elisabeth A. Long, OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, Columbus,

Ohio, for Appellants. Charles T. Lester, Jr., ERIC C. DETERS & ASSOCIATES,

Independence, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Elisabeth A. Long, Benjamin C.

Mizer, OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.

Charles T. Lester, Jr., ERIC C. DETERS & ASSOCIATES, Independence, Kentucky,

for Appellees. 

GUY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McKEAGUE, J., joined.

CLAY, J. (pp. 21–26), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

1
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 2

1

Apart from the issue of qualified immunity, the district court also found that plaintiffs had

standing; that Eleventh Amendment immunity did not bar the claims for money damages; and that statutory

rights under the DPPA are enforceable both directly and under § 1983. None of these issues are before

us.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendants Henry Guzman, Director of the

Ohio Department of Public Safety, and Mike Rankin, Registrar of the Ohio Bureau of

Motor Vehicles, appeal from the district court’s determination that they were not entitled

to qualified immunity from suit in this putative class action alleging violation of the

plaintiffs’ rights under the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Without challenging other aspects of the decision

denying their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that their alleged conduct did not

violate the plaintiffs’ clearly established federal rights as delineated by the DPPA. We

agree, and for the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I.

This court has jurisdiction over the defendants’ interlocutory appeal from the

denial of qualified immunity, but only to the extent that the appeal turns on issues of law.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408

F.3d 305, 309-10 (6th Cir. 2005). We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo,

and the same standard applies to the motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(c) as to a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Williams v.

Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689-90 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc); EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing

Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint

must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).1
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 3

2

Among several well-publicized cases was the 1989 murder of the actress Rebecca Shaeffer by

a stalker who obtained her unlisted address from information that she had provided to the California DMV.

A. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994

The federal DPPA was enacted in response to growing concerns over the ease

with which stalkers and other criminals could obtain personal information from state

departments of motor vehicles.2 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143-44 (2000).

Congress was also concerned about the practice in many states of selling personal

information from motor vehicle records to businesses, marketers, and others for, at

times, significant revenue. Id. The DPPA, held to be a proper exercise of the power to

regulate interstate commerce, established a regulatory scheme that both mandates and

restricts the disclosure of personal information from records maintained by state motor

vehicle departments. Id. at 148.

At all times relevant to this case, the DPPA, as amended, imposed the following

general prohibitions against the disclosure of personal information obtained from an

individual’s motor vehicle record:

(a) In general.–A State department of motor vehicles, and any officer,

employee, or contractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or

otherwise make available to any person or entity:

(1) personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C.

[§] 2725(3), about any individual obtained by the

department in connection with a motor vehicle record,

except as provided in subsection (b) of this section; or

(2) highly restricted personal information, as defined in

18 U.S.C. § 2725(4), about any individual obtained by the

department in connection with a motor vehicle record,

without the express consent of the person to whom such

information applies, except uses permitted in subsections

(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(6), and (b)(9); Provided, That

subsection (a)(2) shall not in any way affect the use of

organ donation information on an individual’s driver’s

license or affect the administration of organ donation

initiatives in the States.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 4

3

Disclosure under subsections (b)(11) (for any use) and (b)(12) (for bulk distributions for surveys,

marketing or solicitation) is permissible “if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to

whom such personal information pertains.” Id. at § 2721(b)(11)-(12) (as amended eff. June 1, 2000).

18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). “Personal information” is defined as

“information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social

security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip

code), telephone number, and medical or disability information.” Id. at § 2725(3).

“Highly restricted personal information” is defined as “an individual’s photograph or

image, social security number, medical or disability information.” Id. at § 2725(4).

Section 2721(b) carves out both mandatory and permissive exceptions to the

general prohibitions in subsection (a). Id. at § 2721(b). First, states must disclose

personal information for use in carrying out the purposes of several federal statutes not

relevant here. Second, states may disclose personal information (subject to

§ 2721(a)(2)), for any of the permissible uses or purposes listed in § 2721(b)(1)-(14).

Eleven of these permissible uses—including for “use in the normal course of business”

under § 2721(b)(3)—authorize nonconsensual disclosure of personal information. Id.

at § 2721(b)(1)-(10) and (14). The other three permissible uses require the express

consent of the persons to whom the information pertains. Id. at § 2721(b)(11)-(13).

The DPPA also regulates the “resale or redisclosure” of personal information in

§ 2721(c), which provides, in pertinent part, that: “An authorized recipient of personal

information (except a recipient under subsection (b)(11) or (12)) may resell or redisclose

the information only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under

subsection (b)(11) or (b)(12)).” Id. at § 2721(c) (emphasis added). Subsection (c) also

imposes a record-keeping obligation on “[a]ny authorized recipient (except a recipient

under subsection (b)(11)) that resells or rediscloses personal information covered by this

chapter” to keep for five years “records identifying each person or entity that receives

information and the permitted purpose for which the information will be used and must

make such records available to the motor vehicle department upon request.” Id.

3
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 5

4

Defendants’ Answer alleged that Guzman did not become director of the DPS until February 9,

2007, and that Rankin did not become Registrar of the BMV until April 16, 2007. Defendants argue that,

if the case were to go forward, they could not be held personally liable for disclosures that occurred before

they took office.

The DPPA makes it unlawful for “any person knowingly to obtain or disclose

personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under [§]

2721(b),” or “to make false representation to obtain any personal information from an

individual’s motor vehicle record.” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a)-(b). A person who knowingly

violates the DPPA is subject to criminal fine, id. at § 2723(a), and may be held civilly

liable for actual damages (but not less than $2,500 in liquidated damages), punitive

damages, attorney fees, and appropriate equitable relief, id. at § 2724. A “person” is

defined as an individual, organization or entity, “but does not include a State or agency

thereof,” id. at § 2725(2). Instead, the Attorney General may impose civil penalties if

a state has a policy or practice of “substantial noncompliance” with the DPPA, id. at

§ 2723(b) (civil penalty of not more than $5,000 per day).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiffs Eric Roth, Mary Beth Roth, and Erin Kenny brought this action on

behalf of themselves and other similarly situated drivers licensed in Ohio any time after

April 8, 2004, whose “personal information” as defined by the DPPA was disclosed,

sold, or otherwise disseminated by the individual defendants while acting as agents or

employees of the Ohio Department of Public Safety (DPS) and/or the Ohio Bureau of

Motor Vehicles (BMV). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Shadowsoft, Inc., a Texas

corporation specializing in “public records database distribution,” unlawfully acquired

a large database from the DPS and/or BMV that contained “personal information”

belonging to “hundreds of thousands” of drivers licensed in Ohio. Defendants admitted

in their Answer that the BMV disclosed personal information to Shadowsoft in response

to its requests for public records for a purportedly permissible purpose under the

DPPA—namely, for use in the “normal course of business” under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2721(b)(3)—and attached documents associated with Shadowsoft’s requests to their

Answer.4
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 6

5

Form 1173 references Ohio’s parallel statute governing disclosures of personal information from

motor vehicle records rather than the provisions of the DPPA. There is no dispute that the Ohio statute

mirrors the DPPA, except that defendants maintain that the Ohio law directs that disclosures must be made

whenever permissible under the DPPA.

Plaintiffs further alleged, upon information and belief, that Shadowsoft

“transferred the database in totum” to The Source for Public Data, LP, (PublicData),

which, in turn, allegedly made the personal information “available for search and sale

on its website, www.publicdata.com.” There is no claim that the defendants disclosed

information directly to PublicData, only a general allegation that plaintiffs’ personal

information was disseminated without obtaining their express consent and not for a

purpose otherwise permitted by the DPPA. Defendants, for their part, generally denied

having unlawfully disclosed, sold, or otherwise disseminated personal information to

Shadowsoft, PublicData, or any other entity.

More specifically, the documents attached to defendants’ Answer, and therefore

properly considered as part of the pleading for all purposes, shed light on the challenged

disclosures. See FED.R.CIV. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit

to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.

v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007). First, in Exhibit A, defendants

attached two Record Requests made by an individual on behalf of Shadowsoft using

Ohio’s BMV Form 1173. The first request sought driver’s license information on a

monthly basis, and the second requested vehicle registration records. On each form, the

requester indicated, by way of a check mark, that the requests were being made for a

permissible purpose corresponding to the “normal course of business” exception under

§ 2721(b)(3). Form 1173 also informed the requester of the restrictions placed on the

resale or redisclosure of the information consistent with the DPPA’s limitations found

in § 2721(c). The requester provided her name, the company name, an address, and

telephone numbers, but left blank the spaces that requested other identifying information

(e.g., social security number, driver’s license number, tax identification number, vendor

number or professional license number).5
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 7

6

At one point, plaintiffs disavowed that their claims were based on how the information was

allegedly misused by Shadowsoft. (“Plaintiffs have brought this suit because of an unlawful disclosure

made by the individual Defendants, not because of how the information was ultimately misused by

Shadowsoft. In other words, it makes no difference whether Shadowsoft sold the unlawfully disclosed

information on the internet, or whether it used the information to tabulate how many ‘Johns’ or ‘Jims’ are

driving in Ohio. The Defendants[’] liability is based on the fact that they were prohibited from disclosing

the information except to an ‘authorized recipient[.]’”)

Defendants’ Exhibit B to the Answer, titled “Agreement for the Sale of

Information (to be used with BMV Form 1173),” was executed in December 2004 by

Shadowsoft and the comptroller of the BMV. That Agreement provided, among other

things, that Shadowsoft would receive copies of public records on a monthly basis and

would pay the associated fees on a monthly basis. Also, Shadowsoft warranted that it

and all its personnel were familiar with the Ohio Driver Privacy Protection Act, and

agreed that all users would abide by both federal and state laws restricting access to

personal information from motor vehicle records and governing the resale or redisclosure

of such information. In addition, Shadowsoft agreed not to provide information obtained

under the Agreement to any other person without entering into an agreement that

included these prohibitions.

Accepting the factual allegations as true, we assume that the BMV made “bulk”

disclosures of personal information from motor vehicle records to Shadowsoft for what

was asserted to be a permissible purpose, and that Shadowsoft resold or redisclosed the

information “in bulk” to PublicData. While defendants do not deny that PublicData

resold or redisclosed the information in violation of the DPPA, there are also no facts

alleged regarding the operation of PublicData or the disclosures allegedly made by it.6

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs commenced this action in April 2009, and amended their complaint

shortly thereafter. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal

of the amended complaint on a number of grounds. That motion was fully briefed,

argued, and supplemented. In an order entered March 31, 2010, the district court

rejected each of the defendants’ contentions and concluded, in pertinent part, that the

defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit on the plaintiffs’ claims
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 8

under the DPPA or § 1983. Briefly, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had

plausibly alleged that the defendants’ conduct violated a statutory right by alleging that

defendants had disclosed personal information for a purpose not permitted by the DPPA.

Further, the district court found that this right was “clearly established” by the plain

language of the statute and that, in light of the incomplete information provided in the

Record Requests, a reasonable official would have understood that the disclosures would

violate the DPPA. Defendants appealed, and the district court entered a stay pending

appeal.

II.

Qualified immunity protects government officials and employees performing

discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). In deciding claims of qualified immunity, we must

determine: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiffs make out a violation

of federal statutory or constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was “clearly

established” at the time of the defendants’ alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan,

129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009). Although it is “often appropriate” to resolve these

questions sequentially, it is no longer mandatory that the court do so. Id. at 818; see also

Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2009). For a right to be “clearly

established,” the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Once raised as a defense, plaintiffs bear the

burden of demonstrating that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006).

A. Purportedly Permissible Use

Plaintiffs argue that, as the district court found, defendants violated the DPPA

by disclosing personal information for a use not permitted under § 2721(b). In reaching
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 9

this conclusion, the district court interpreted the DPPA’s provisions as imposing

liability, presumably criminal as well as civil, whether or not the state official knew that

the disclosure was not actually for a proper purpose. Defendants argue (1) that this is

a misreading of the DPPA that would require the state to verify a requester’s true

intentions; and (2) that, even if a correct interpretation, it was not a clearly established

right of which a reasonable person would have known.

1. Violation

The pleadings establish that the disclosures in this case were purportedly made

under § 2721(b)(3), which permits nonconsented disclosure of personal information (but

not highly restricted personal information):

(3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business or

its agents, employees, or contractors, but only—

(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information

submitted by the individual to the business or its agents,

employees, or contractors; and

(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or

is no longer correct, to obtain the correct information, but only

for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies

against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the

individual.

18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(3). As outlined above, the disclosures made by the Ohio BMV

were made based on Shadowsoft’s express written representations that the disclosures

were “for use in the normal course of business”—as permitted by § 2721(b)(3) (and

Ohio law)—although plaintiffs allege that Shadowsoft falsely represented this to be the

purpose of the disclosures.

The finding that this alleged a violation of the DPPA rested on the district court’s

interpretation of § 2724(a), which provides that: “A person who knowingly obtains,

discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not

permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information

pertains[.]” The district court relied on Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 241-42 (E.D.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 10

Pa. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008), which reasoned that the

location of the adverb “knowingly” in this provision suggested an intention to limit the

reach of the knowledge requirement. That is, the court in Pichler found that

“knowingly” modifies only the first part—the two clauses defining the act element—and

not the last part—the third clause defining the purpose element. Without agreeing or

disagreeing with Pichler, we find that it does not address the question presented in this

case.

In Pichler, the labor union defendants recorded license plate numbers from cars

in an employee parking lot and obtained the employees’ addresses from motor vehicle

records through Westlaw and a private investigator’s requests to the state motor vehicle

department. The court in Pichler rejected the defendants’ claim that they could not be

liable because they did not know that the requester’s purpose in obtaining the personal

information was not permissible, explaining:

If one could not violate the DPPA without “knowing[]” that the purpose

for which he “obtain[ed],” “disclose[d]” or “use[d]” motor vehicle

information was unlawful, then every defendant would get at least one

free bite at the violation-of-privacy apple. After all, anyone could claim

that he did not “know” his purpose to be impermissible until a court

interpreted the DPPA to proscribe that purpose. Even after such a ruling,

a defendant could manufacture a slightly different purpose for his

conduct and then claim ignorance of whether the DPPA prohibited the

new purpose. A plaintiff could recover only if the defendant repeatedly

violated her privacy and lacked sufficient creativity to conjure up some

conceivable purpose that no court had yet considered.

Id. at 242; see also Rios v. Direct Mail Express, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204-05

(S.D. Fla. 2006) (relying on Pichler to conclude that plaintiffs were not required to prove

that a direct marketer who knowingly obtained records from the Florida DMV also knew

that Florida had not obtained the express consent required under the amended DPPA to

release the records to a mass marketer under (b)(12)).

It is one thing to say that a defendant’s ignorance that his own conduct violates

the law is not a defense, but it is another, we think, to conclude that a defendant is liable

for a knowing disclosure made for a permissible purpose any time the purpose was
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 11

misrepresented or the information was later misused or improperly redisclosed by the

requester or any other entity. Here, the pleadings establish that the defendants’ act, the

knowing disclosure of personal information, was for an explicitly permissible purpose.

Moreover, the plaintiffs complain that Shadowsoft falsely represented its intended use

and redisclosed the information to PublicData, which made the information available for

search and sale to its customers for unspecified purposes.

If no distinction is made between the use for which the defendants disclosed the

information, and the undisclosed use for which it was obtained, subsequently misused

or impermissibly redisclosed by the recipient, the DPPA becomes essentially a strict

liability statute. Every subsequent misuse could be traced back to a violation by the state

official. Rather than place all of the liability with the state officials, however, the DPPA

makes it unlawful for any person (excluding the states and their agencies) to knowingly

obtain, disclose, or use the information for a purpose not permitted by the DPPA. While

it may be that this and other courts will find that one’s ignorance of the law is no defense

to a claim under the DPPA, this was not the defendants’ claim in this case. Rather,

defendants’ alleged that their disclosures were for a permitted purpose, even if

Shadowsoft’s undisclosed intention was to obtain the personal information for a purpose

not permitted by the DPPA.

That the defendants’ disclosure was expressly for a permitted purpose

distinguishes this case from Welch v. Theodorides-Bustle, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D.

Fla. 2010). Similar to this case, state officials were alleged to have violated the DPPA

by making disclosures of personal information in bulk to Shadowsoft, which, in turn,

redisclosed the information to PublicData. The defendants did not deny that from

PublicData’s website, “an internet user can access the information for any or no

reason—or on a whim.” Id. at 1286. Unlike this case, however, the court in Welch

specifically found that the contracts entered into with Shadowsoft did not specify either

a proper purpose for the disclosures, or the uses and further disclosures it would or

would not make. No claim could be made in that case that disclosures were for a

purportedly permissible purpose, and the court rejected the suggestion that the
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 12

defendants could rely on § 2721(b)(1) (for use by a government agency in carrying out

its functions). Not surprisingly, the court also found that the state officials’ disclosures

for an unspecified purpose, when the DPPA requires that personal information not be

disclosed except as provided for in § 2721(b), violated clearly established federal law of

which the defendants’ should have known. Id. (citing Collier v. Dickenson, 477 F.3d

1306 (11th Cir. 2007).

2. Clearly Established

Even if we accept that the DPPA may be read to impose liability on a state

official in his individual capacity when personal information disclosed for a purportedly

permissible purpose was actually obtained for an impermissible purpose, we cannot

agree that this right was clearly established at the time of the disclosures (putting aside

the allegation that the disclosures were only made under the defendants’ authority for

a short time).

The district court acknowledged that there was (and is) no binding precedent

from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, the district court itself, or other circuits

deciding the issues raised in this case such as would render the asserted right “clearly

established.” See Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2002). “‘This is

not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action

in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.’” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615

(1999) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). An official may be on notice that his

conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. See Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

Relying on the Eleventh Circuit decision in Collier affirming the denial of

qualified immunity to state officials for disclosures under the DPPA, the district court

concluded that the plain language of the DPPA clearly established an individual’s right

to be free from disclosures for purposes not permitted under § 2721(b). As is clear from

a closer reading of Collier, however, the district court did not engage in a sufficiently

particularized reading of the rights that are clearly established by the DPPA.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 13

7

Another Eleventh Circuit decision interpreting the DPPA also arises out of the failure of the

State of Florida to amend its statutes to comply with the amendments to the federal DPPA that changed

the manner for obtaining consent from an “opt-out” to an “opt-in” procedure. See Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank

& Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Forty-nine states immediately passed legislation to ensure

compliance with this amendment to the DPPA. Florida was the only state that did not immediately

comply. Instead, Florida waited until May 13, 2004, to amend its public records statute to comply with

the DPPA.”) (holding that no actual damages were required to recover liquidated damages), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1612 (2006). Notably, while concurring in the denial of certiorari in Kehoe, Justice Scalia,

joined by Justice Alito, noted that there were two important issues in the case: (1) whether actual damages

must be shown, and (2) whether the bank that purchased vehicle registration information for purposes of

solicitation can be held liable if it did not know that the state had failed to comply with the “express

consent” requirement. See 126 S. Ct. at 1612.

In Collier, the plaintiffs alleged that the state officials in Florida violated the

DPPA by releasing personal information from driver’s license records to a mass

marketer without first obtaining the driver’s express consent. The court in Collier found

not only that the DPPA, as amended, required express consent for bulk distribution of

surveys, marketing or solicitations in § 2721(b)(12), but also that the Supreme Court’s

decision in Condon specifically recognized (1) that following the amendments in 2000,

states could no longer infer consent from a driver’s failure to “opt-out” of disclosures,

and (2) that states were bound by the mandates of the DPPA irrespective of any

conflicting state law. Collier, 477 F.3d at 1312. The same cannot be said for the alleged

violation in this case based on the defendants’ failure to discover Shadowsoft’s true

intentions.7

 Finally, the district court rejected defendants’ contention that this interpretation

made the state BMV an insurer rather than simply a gatekeeper that may rely on the

requester’s declaration that the disclosure would be for a permitted purpose. The district

court explained as follows:

While Defendants may be properly characterized as gatekeepers, this

does not mean that they may forfeit this role entirely and adopt without

question the representations of entities such as Shadowsoft who make

requests for personal information. The Court finds the following

discussion applicable, even though it is outside the context of the DPPA:

Qualified immunity is intended to allow officials to

render intelligent decisions even though they may, upon

further reflection, be deemed to have been erroneous. It

is not intended to allow individual officers to abdicate

their decision-making obligations in blind reliance on
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 14

state statutes. This is especially true in this instance

where the officers involved, unlike police officers who

frequently have little rule-making authority, are endowed

with independent policy-making authority and have an

obligation to make reasoned decisions with respect to

programs and policies which they promulgate, regardless

of whether those programs and policies are promulgated

in accordance with State law.

F. Buddie Contracting, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 31

F. Supp. 2d 584, 589-590 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (finding that officials were

not entitled to qualified immunity where there was evidence that

affirmative action policy was unconstitutional even though the policy

was enacted in compliance with state law).

In this instance, those with policy-making authority have made

no effort [to] ensure that requests for information are legitimate. Based

on the allegations before the Court, Defendants take any request at face

value and without any regard to the accuracy of the information. The

Court notes that while the Record Request included places for

Shadowsoft to provide its tax identification number, vendor number,

professional license number, and license, Shadowsoft never completed

this part of the form. Despite this lack of information, Defendants

granted Shadowsoft’s request for information. This indicates to the

Court that Defendants proceeded with “blind reliance” on any request

made. While Defendants place value in the Agreement between ODPS

and Shadowsoft, the Court finds reliance on such an agreement at best

naive. By simply visiting the PublicData website, Defendants would

have discovered that just as Plaintiffs allege, the information Defendants

were providing was available to anyone with a credit card.

Certainly, there is no claim by defendants that they did anything to affirmatively verify

that Shadowsoft’s request was for the use it stated. At the same time, nothing about the

incomplete requester information would have told defendants that Shadowsoft was

misrepresenting the use it intended to make of the personal information it was

requesting. Nor did Shadowsoft’s Record Requests give defendants a reason to visit

PublicData’s website. Whether or not it would have been prudent for the BMV to

investigate Shadowsoft before making any disclosures, this is neither an obligation

imposed by the terms of the DPPA, nor one that has been “clearly established” under the

governing case law.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 15

8

Nor did plaintiffs contend that there were any material questions of fact in dispute concerning

Shadowsoft’s legal status at the time of the disclosure requests.

The suggestion that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because

defendants could not have reasonably believed that Shadowsoft was a “legitimate

business”—a term not defined by the DPPA—misses the mark. Plaintiffs did not allege

or argue that Shadowsoft was, in fact, anything but a “legitimate business.”8 Indeed, the

district court’s focus was on what it viewed to be defendants’ “blind reliance” on

Shadowsoft’s representations and not on a failure to verify that Shadowsoft was a

“legitimate business.” The logic of this argument seems to be that if defendants had

verified Shadowsoft’s corporate existence—as plaintiffs alleged that Shadowsoft was

a Texas corporation—the defendants might have found reason to question the veracity

of Shadowsoft’s representation that it was requesting personal information for a

permissible purpose. It is not explained, however, how a reasonable official would have

known that it would violate the DPPA to make a disclosure for an expressly permissible

purpose, to an entity plaintiffs do not claim to be illegitimate, because the defendants did

not investigate the legitimacy of that business.

B. Bulk Disclosures under § 2721(b)(3)

Defendants recognize that plaintiffs have asserted a second basis for finding that

the disclosures to Shadowsoft violated the DPPA. That is, plaintiffs contend that even

if the personal information had been requested for use in the “normal course of

business,” “bulk” disclosures are not authorized for requests made under § 2721(b)(3).

The district court did not reach this issue, however.

The parties agree that the starting point is the ordinary meaning of the statute.

Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985) (“In construing a federal statute

it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress

employed ‘accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’”) (citation omitted). If the

language of the statute is clear, the plain meaning of the text must be enforced. United

States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). “The plainness or ambiguity

of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 16

context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a

whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). When a plain reading

“leads to ambiguous or unreasonable results, a court may look to legislative history to

interpret a statute.” Limited, Inc. v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2002).

Quoted in full above, § 2721(b)(3) provides that state officials may disclose

personal information “[f]or use in the normal course of business . . . to verify the

accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business,” and to

correct inaccurate personal information for the purposes of “preventing fraud by,

pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against the

individual.” Plaintiffs interpret the references to “the individual” in § 2721(b)(3) as

unambiguously limiting disclosure to personal information pertaining to one individual

at a time. Defendants counter that “individual” in this subsection does not refer to how

many requests may be made at one time, but rather to the basis for disclosures permitted

under this subsection. The Fifth Circuit, the only circuit to decide this issue, rejected the

same arguments in Taylor v. Acxiom Corp., 612 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2010), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011).

Texas, like at least eleven other states, allows persons or entities to purchase

magnetic tapes of the database of driver’s license records upon certification of a lawful

purpose under the DPPA. Id. at 332. The defendants in Taylor were third parties who

did not use all of the records immediately, but maintained databases to either use in the

future (non-resellers) or to resell to others for lawful purposes (resellers). The plaintiffs

in Taylor argued that maintaining records not actually used was itself an impermissible

purpose; in other words, that “‘buying the records in bulk with an expectation and

purpose of valid potential use is not a permissible use under the DPPA.” Id. at 334.

Examining § 2721(b)(3) in the context of all fourteen permissible uses under § 2721(b),

the court emphasized that only one subsection limits permissible uses to individual

motor vehicle records, while only one other subsection limits permissible uses to bulk

distributions. Id. at 335; compare § 2721(b)(11) (“[f]or any other use in response to

requests for individual motor vehicle records if the State has obtained the express
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 17

9

Plaintiffs also misrepresent Locate.Plus.Com, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609,

616 (Iowa 2002), as holding that the § 2721(b)(3) exception only authorizes the disclosure of information

belonging to a specific individual and not the entire driving public. However, that case involved a request

for disclosure by a private business for the purpose of reformatting the information for resale to law

enforcement agencies, which the Court held was not among the permissible purposes of § 2721(b).

consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains”), with § 2721(b)(12)

(“[f]or bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has obtained

the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains”). For the

rest of the permissible uses, the court found there was more than one reasonable

interpretation: “individual release, bulk release, or both.” Id. at 335. The court

explained:

It does not make sense that Congress would expressly limit states

to individual distribution with one permissible use if Congress intended

to limit all of the permissible uses to individual distribution. If Congress

intended only individual distribution, one would expect either Congress

to expressly limit all uses or, at least, to remain silent on the matter.

Likewise, if Congress intended only bulk distribution, it makes no sense

to expressly limit one of the fourteen uses to bulk distribution and not the

others. The text of the statute strongly indicates that it allows both

individual and bulk distribution.

Id. at 336. We agree. Plaintiffs in this case do not offer any authority or persuasive

argument for concluding that § 2721(b)(3) clearly and unambiguously limits disclosure

of personal information to one individual at a time.9

To resolve the ambiguity, both parties point to aspects of the legislative history

to support their positions but nothing speaks directly to the issue of “bulk” disclosures

under § 2721(b)(3). More generally, Congress expressed an intention “to strike ‘a

critical balance between legitimate governmental and business needs for this

information, and the fundamental right of our people to privacy and safety.’” Russell v.

Choicepoint Servs., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 450, 456 (E.D. La. 2004) (quoting 139 Cong.

Rec. S15, 763 (1993)). Although plaintiffs rely on statements from the legislative

history reflecting an intention to give individuals control over the release of their

personal information, those statements are again directed at the bulk sale of personal

information for direct marketing purposes.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 18

A statement by the sponsor of the DPPA in the House expressed concern first

with the need to address the ease with which criminals and strangers could obtain

driver’s license information and second with the desire to curb the sale of DMV

databases to direct marketers for commercial purposes by requiring consent. Taylor, 612

F.3d at 336-37 (quoting statement of Rep. Moran Feb. 4, 1994, 1994 WL 212698

(F.D.C.H.)). In that same statement, however, the sponsor also expressed the intention

that common uses being made of the information at the time—including by businesses

verifying personal information—should continue unfettered. Id. at 336.

Notably, the amendments to the DPPA, which restricted further the bulk

distribution provision to require express as opposed to implied consent, did not adopt a

consent requirement for disclosure under § 2721(b)(3), or clarify that requests for

disclosure under § 2721(b)(3) should be for one person’s records at a time. The Fifth

Circuit was also persuaded by a Department of Justice (DOJ) advisory opinion issued

in October 1998, concluding that the DPPA allowed the State of Massachusetts to

release personal information to a commercial distributor who would disseminate the

information to any other authorized recipients or entities that use the information solely

for authorized purposes. Taylor, 612 F.3d at 339. We agree that the DOJ’s advisory

opinion is inconsistent with the notion that bulk distribution is prohibited by the DPPA.

Id.

Finally, the court in Taylor concluded that the plaintiffs’ reading of § 2721(b)(3)

would lead to “essentially absurd results,” explaining:

At a checkout line at a grocery store or similar establishment, when a

customer wishes to pay by (or cash) a check, and presents a driver’s

license as identification, it is obviously wholly impractical to require the

merchant for each such customer to submit a separate individual request

to the state motor vehicle department to verify the accuracy of the

personal information submitted by the customer, under section

2721(b)(3). Any such process would obviously take way too long to be

of any use to either the customer or the merchant, and would moreover

flood the state department with more requests than it could possibly

handle. So, the merchant buys the state department’s entire data base and

from it extracts on that occasion that particular customer’s information,

and later performs the same task as to the next such customer in the line.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 19

Plaintiffs would have us hold that the merchant violates the DPPA by

acquiring the data base even though every single actual use made of it is

an authorized use under section 2721(b), so long as there is at least one

name in the data base as to which no actual use is made.

Id. at 337. The court then analogized the situation to the purchase of a set of legal

reporters, which a lawyer purchases for the purpose of legal research even though the

attorney would never read every opinion in each volume. Id.

As interpreted by the court in Taylor, plaintiffs could not establish a violation of

the DPPA merely because the defendants sold personal information from motor vehicle

records in bulk where the disclosure was for use, or potential use, in “the normal course

of business” under § 2721(b)(3). The purchase in bulk for use as needed for a permitted

purpose under § 2721(b)(3), described by some courts as “stockpiling,” has been found

not to violate the DPPA by several district courts. See, e.g., Wiles v. ASCOM Transp.

Sys., Inc. (Wiles II), No. 3:10-cv-28-H, 2011 WL 672652 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 17, 2011)

(unpublished); Cook v. ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D.

Mo. 2010).

Although the district court did not decide this issue in the first instance, it is

apparent to us that, as a matter of law, it was not clearly established at the time of

defendants’ conduct that “stockpiling” or bulk disclosures of personal information for

a permissible purpose under § 2721(b)(3) would violate the DPPA. For this reason,

plaintiffs cannot overcome a claim of qualified immunity on this theory.

III.

To the extent that the plaintiffs could prove a violation of the DPPA based on the

allegation that Shadowsoft misrepresented itself as having a proper purpose under

§ 2721(b)(3) or that the disclosures were made in bulk under § 2721(b)(3), we find the

contours of such rights were not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have

understood at the time that the disclosures would violate such rights. Accordingly, we

REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity with respect to claims under
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 20

either the DPPA or § 1983, and REMAND for entry of judgment in favor of defendants

Guzman and Rankin.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 21

1

The district court held that “a reasonable official would have understood that a disclosure of

information for a purpose other than one permitted by the DPPA would violate the DPPA.” (Dist. Ct. Op.

at 19-20.) 

_________________

DISSENT

_________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. While I do not take issue with the majority’s

conclusion that nothing in the Drivers Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA” or the “Act”),

18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq., prohibits the bulk disclosure of personal information contained

in drivers’ records, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the

disclosure of such records to Shadowsoft by officials at the Ohio Department of Public

Safety and the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (collectively, “BMV Officials”), without

reasonably inquiring into whether Shadowsoft was a legitimate business using the

records for a permissible purpose, was not a violation of a clearly established statutory

requirement.

While, as the majority notes, we have no binding case authority to guide us in

addressing the claims raised in this case, we do have the statutory language of the DPPA.

Under the factual scenario and procedural posture of the case now before us, I agree with

the district court that the language of the DPPA is, in itself, sufficient to defeat qualified

immunity for Defendants.1

Defendants argue that the DPPA does not impose on them any obligation to

verify how the information that they disclose will be used. Instead, if they disclose

information that is used for an impermissible purpose, then “a driver may seek relief

against the entity that violated the DPPA, not the State.” (Defs.’ Br. at 15.) Plaintiffs

counter that “[t]he DPPA is clear: if the Defendants disclosed information for a purpose
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 22

2

As this appeal arises from a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants must concede

all factual allegations to Plaintiffs. Therefore, if there were a dispute regarding whether Shadowsoft

permissibly used the records it obtained from BMV Officials, Plaintiff’s factual allegations must be

conceded for the purposes of the qualified immunity inquiry. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (“For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all

well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the

motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.”) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

that did not meet an exception to the DPPA, then they are in violation of the Statute.”2

(Pls.’ Br. at 10.)

The majority opinion circumvents the legal question of what duty the DPPA

imposes on Defendants by making the finding that Defendants disclosed drivers’

information to Shadowsoft “for an explicitly permissible purpose,” though Shadowsoft

later used the information impermissibly. (Maj. Op. at p. 11 (emphasis omitted).) In

doing so, the majority reasons that as long as a requestor represents to BMV Officials

that it will use drivers’ personal information in accordance with a DPPA exception,

BMV Officials do not violate the Act if they then knowingly disclose that information.

There are two insurmountable problems with the majority’s approach. The first

is simple, but dispositive—the record, on this judgment on the pleadings, is too vastly

underdeveloped for the majority to make the factual findings necessary to logically

support its conclusion. The evidence in the record insufficiently addresses any number

of necessary questions, such as: what is Shadowsoft’s legal status? What is

Shadowsoft’s relationship to PublicData? What did Shadowsoft represent to BMV

Officials during contract negotiations? What did BMV Officials actually know about

Shadowsoft at the time of disclosure? Did Shadowsoft impermissibly use the

information that it received? With each of these material factual questions still in

dispute, a grant of qualified immunity to Defendants is inappropriate. See Harrison v.

Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]o the extent that the denial of qualified

immunity is based on a factual dispute, such a denial falls outside of the narrow

jurisdiction of this Court.”)

Secondly, the majority’s reading of the DPPA not only contradicts the

“straightforward and commonsense meaning[]” of the Act, see Henry Ford Health Sys.
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 23

v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 2000), but if accepted also renders much of the

language of the DPPA completely superfluous. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101

(2004) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that

no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”) (citing 2A N. Singer,

Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06, pp. 181-186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)).

Under the majority’s reading of the DPPA, the Act places no actual duty upon

BMV Officials, other than the ministerial task of soliciting rote representations from

prospective requesters. In the majority’s view, as long as BMV Officials receive such

rote representations, then they have complied with the DPPA.

It is difficult to reconcile this reading of the Act by the majority with the very

next conclusion reached in its opinion. Because the majority continues by holding that

even when a requestor does not provide a representation that it is acting in accordance

with the DPPA—for instance, that the requester is a “legitimate business” under

18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(3)—BMV Officials still do not violate the Act by knowingly

disclosing information to that requestor.

The majority, in determining whether BMV Officials are liable to Plaintiffs

because they disclosed information that was used for an impermissible purpose, holds

that BMV Officials are immune because they disclosed the information in reliance on

Shadowsoft’s arguably false representations. But in determining whether BMV Officials

are liable to Plaintiffs because they disclosed information to an arguably illegitimate

business, the majority holds that BMV Officials are entitled to immunity, even though

Shadowsoft made no actual representations that would invite the reliance of BMV

Officials. Under this interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(3), whether BMV Officials

relied on false representations, or none at all, is of no actual consequence. The majority

seemingly holds that the DPPA permits state officials such as those at the BMV to ask

nothing and require no salient information, but to disclose everything.

Clearly, any interpretation of the DPPA that would require a requestor to make

an affirmative statement of illegal intent or bad purpose in order for disclosure liability

to attach to BMV Officials is inconsistent with both the language and the purpose of the
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 24

Act. While the DPPA may not mandate that BMV Officials conduct an actual

investigation into an entity requesting drivers’ information, or verify that entity’s

purpose, it clearly imposes some kind of duty upon the state and state officials. If it did

not, then subjecting the state to a penalty for having a “policy or practice of substantial

noncompliance” with the DPPA would be nonsensical, because as a practical matter a

state (or its officials) could not fail to comply with an Act that imposes no actual duty

upon it. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2723(b).

Therefore, a proper reading of the DPPA compels the conclusion that the Act

imposes upon the state (and its officials) a duty of reasonable inquiry. In this case, the

permissible use that Defendants claim allows BMV Officials to knowingly disclose

drivers’ personal information to a certain type of requestor—“a legitimate

business”—for certain purposes—“to verify the accuracy of personal information” and

“to obtain . . . correct information” to prevent fraud or pursue other legal remedies. 18

U.S.C. § 2721(b)(3). Consequently, the Act sets forth a requirement that BMV Officials

reasonably inquire into the dual questions of the identity of the requestor and the purpose

for which information protected under the Act is being disclosed.

The content of the Record Request form (“Form 1173”) created by BMV

Officials to ensure compliance with the DPPA confirms that BMV Officials understood

that the DPPA imposed this duty of reasonable inquiry. This understanding is apparent

from the fact that Form 1173 requires that a requester submit both information about

itself and information about the basis for the request. (See R. 13; Ex. A, B.)

On the two Form 1173s completed by Shadowsoft, the company provided none

of the required information about itself, with the exception of an out-of-state mailing

address. As the district court highlighted, “while [Form 1173] included places for

Shadowsoft to provide its tax identification number, vendor number, professional license

number, and license, Shadowsoft never completed this part of the form.” (Dist. Ct. Op.

at 21.) Nor did Shadowsoft provide any information regarding its status as a business

in the contract that it subsequently entered into with BMV Officials, which did not

request such information. (R. 13; Ex. A, B.) 
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 25

3

Because the procedural posture of the case arises from a motion for judgment on the pleadings,

no discovery was taken into the issue of Shadowsoft’s claim that it was a “legitimate business” at the time

that it made the record requests. Again, the majority’s factual presumption that Shadowsoft was a

“legitimate business,” and that Defendants were in a position that would have allowed them to confirm as

much, is misplaced. Because material disputes exist as to both of these questions, a grant of qualified

immunity which relies upon accepting Defendants’ representations on these matters is unjustified.

Not inconsequently, it appears from the record that BMV Officials conducted this

transaction with Shadowsoft via fax. So not only did BMV Officials not require

Shadowsoft to represent that it was a licensed or incorporated business, it did not even

require any actual contact with Shadowsoft. (Id.) There is no indication that BMV

Officials even verified the identity of the individual requestor listed on the Form 1173s,

Cara Hill, nor did she provide her personal driver license or social security number, as

required by the forms. In practical terms, less verification was demanded of Shadowsoft,

in order to receive the personal information of every driver in Ohio, than would be

requested of any judge on this panel to write a personal check while shopping at any

major retailer in this country.

The majority has strongly implied that Plaintiffs have somehow conceded that

Shadowsoft operates as a “legitimate business,” and that such a concession, if existent,

should have some impact on this Court’s legal analysis. (See Maj. Op. at p. 15.) On the

contrary, Plaintiffs have alleged throughout the course of this litigation that BMV

Officials had no basis for considering Shadowsoft a legitimate business at the time of the

disclosure. (Pls.’ Br. at 12-13, 22-23.) Defendants, in their answer to the complaint,

denied any knowledge of Shadowsoft’s corporate status based on their “want of

information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matter.” (R.

11: Answer at 3.) On reply before this Court, Defendants state that Shadowsoft is a

legitimate business, but still offer no assertion or evidence that BMV Officials were

aware of or inquired into this fact, even if accurate, at the time of the disclosure. (Defs.’

Reply at 2-4.)

But whether Shadowsoft is a legitimate business is largely irrelevant.3

 What is

relevant is that Defendants in this case do not plead that they knew or had any reason to

believe that Shadowsoft was a legitimate business at the time that they made the
No. 10-3542 Roth, et al. v. Guzman, et al. Page 26

disclosure. At the time of the disclosure and alleged violation, Shadowsoft had neither

represented itself to BMV Officials as a legitimate business, nor had BMV Officials

inquired into or confirmed whether it was a legitimate business.

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); see

also Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 951 (6th Cir. 2000). Even if it were true, as the

majority contends, that BMV Officials’ obligation of reasonable inquiry into a

requester’s permissible use begins and ends with a check in a box on a standardized

form, it cannot be the case that a state official fulfills his legal obligations, under

18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(3), when he releases drivers’ personal information with absolutely

nothing to indicate that he is releasing the information to a “legitimate business.” Under

the facts as pleaded in this case, any reasonable official would have been on notice that

to disclose the information requested by Shadowsoft in response to Shadowsoft’s facially

deficient request would violate the DPPA.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the exceptions outlined in 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2721(b)(1)-(14) are permissive, not mandatary. Holding that a state official must

perform a reasonable minimal inquiry before releasing sensitive personal information

to anyone with a fax machine, a pencil and two dollars does not impose an unreasonable

burden. BMV Officials may decide that they do not want to face the threat of DPPA

liability for disclosing drivers’ information without first inquiring into whom and for

what purpose they are being asked to disclose. The solution is simple: when in doubt

as to whether the purpose of the request comports with the requirements of the Act,

BMV Officials may choose not to release drivers’ information for non-mandatory uses.

After all, the purpose of the DPPA is to encourage state officials to do what they should

strive to do anyway, which is to protect the personal information of state residents.

For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the district court, and I therefore

respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.