No. 89-398 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

BHC HOLDING CO., A Montana Corporation, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsROBERT HURLY, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial ~~ilic& 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, cz 

The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Peter 0. Maltese, Sidney, Montana 

Robert Hurly, Glasgow, Montana 

For Respondent: 

David A. Veeder and Joseph V. Womack; Veeder & 

Broeder, Billings, Montana 

Submitted: Nov. 2, 1989 

Filed: 

Clerk 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Defendant, Robert Hurly, appeals from an order of the District 

Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, 

denying his motion for change of venue. We affirm. 

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in denying Hurlyls motion for change of venue. 

Robert Hurly is an attorney in private practice in Glasgow, 

Valley County, Montana. Plaintiff, BHC ~olding Company, is a 

Montana corporation with its principal place of business in 

Billings, Yellowstone County, Montana. The complaint alleges that 

BHC is the successor in interest to the rights and claims of Suburb 

Partnership, a Montana general partnership, which owned the 

Briarwood project, a housing and country club development located 

in Yellowstone County. 

BHC1s complaint stated a claim for legal malpractice, alleging 

that Suburb had employed Hurly to represent it in working out its 

financial difficulties with the United States Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) , which held a mortgage on the Briarwood 

subdivision, and First Bank of Billings, which held a mortgage on 

the Briarwood country club. BHC claimed, among other things, that 

Hurly negligently performed these services and that Hurly breached 

his duty by failing to work out suitable agreements with the Bank 

and HUD. BHC sought compensatory damages as well as cancellation 

of any sums due for legal services and return of all sums 

previously paid for such services. 

The present case is a companion to an appeal we dealt with in 

Hurly v. Studer (Mont. 1988), 761 P.2d 821, 45 St.Rep. 1761 

(Studer). In that case, Hurly brought a breach of contract suit 

in Valley County against Dean and Ralph Studer and Larry Chouinard 

individually, alleging that these defendants were the parties with 

whom he had contracted to renegotiate the Briarwood Project loans. 

Hurly sought payment for services allegedly due and owing. Like 
the present case, Studer concerned a denial of a motion for change 

of venue. We remanded the case to the District Court because the 

court had not made the initial determination as to the location of 

the performance of the contract. 

In response to the complaint filed by BHC, Hurly filed various 

motions with the Yellowstone County District Court, including a 

motion for change of venue to Valley County. The District Court 

reserved ruling on the motions pending the outcome of the Studer 

appeal and the Valley County District Court's resolution of the 

issue on remand. After several months elapsed and the Valley 

County Court had not rendered a decision on the matter, the 

Yellowstone County Court issued a ruling on the venue question, 

holding that venue was proper in Yellowstone County. Hurly 

appealed to this Court. 

The complaint in the present case states a claim of legal 

malpractice, which is a tort. The statute governing venue for 

actions based upon tort provides as follows: 

The proper place of trial for a tort action is: 

(1) the county in which the defendants, or any of them, 

reside at the commencement of the action; or 

(2) the county where the tort was committed. If the 

tort is interrelated with and dependent upon a claim for 

breach of contract, the tort was committed, for the 

purpose of determining the proper place of trial, in the 

county where the contract was to be performed. (Emphasis 

added. ) 

Section 25-2-122, MCA. 

!'For the purposes of venue, a tort is committed where there 

is a concurrence of breach of obligation and the occasion of 

damages." Whalen v. Snell (1983), 205 Mont. 299, 302, 667 P.2d 

436, 437. Hurly's obligation in this case was to negotiate a 

settlement with the Bank and HUD on behalf of BHC1s predecessor in 
interest. The breach, if any, occurred in the county in which 

Hurly performed these negotiations. 

The District Court found that, even though Hurlyls law office 

was located in Valley County, the services he performed for BHC1s 

predecessor in interest were not legal services conducted from his 

office but negotiation services conducted in Yellowstone County. 

Therefore, any negligence that Hurly may have committed occurred 

in Yellowstone County. Furthermore, any damages that may have 

resulted from Hurlyls alleged breach accrued in Yellowstone County, 

the county where the property that was the subject of the 

negotiations was located. 

The place where the alleged tort was committed was in 

Yellowstone County. Therefore, Yellowstone County was the proper 

place for trial. The District Court did not err in denying Hurly's 

motion for change of venue to Valley County. 

Affirmed . 

Justice