# Amtsblatt C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-088X
  doi:10.3000/1977088X.C_2013.237.deu |
| --- | --- |
| Amtsblatt
  der Europäischen Union | C 237 |
| | |
| Ausgabe in deutscher Sprache | Mitteilungen und Bekanntmachungen | 56. Jahrgang15. August 2013 |

ISSN 1977-088X

doi:10.3000/1977088X.C_2013.237.deu

Amtsblatt

der Europäischen Union

C 237

Ausgabe in deutscher Sprache

Mitteilungen und Bekanntmachungen

56. Jahrgang15. August 2013

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| Informationsnummer | Inhalt | Seite |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Mitteilungen |
| | MITTEILUNGEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2013/C 237/01 | Keine Einwände gegen einen angemeldeten Zusammenschluss (Sache COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Informationsnummer

Inhalt

Seite

II   Mitteilungen

MITTEILUNGEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Europäische Kommission

2013/C 237/01

Keine Einwände gegen einen angemeldeten Zusammenschluss (Sache COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informationen |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIONEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Euro-Wechselkurs | 2 |
| | DEN EUROPÄISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSRAUM BETREFFENDE INFORMATIONEN |
| | EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Staatliche Beihilfen — Entscheidung, ein Beihilfeverfahren wegen der Annahme zweckdienlicher Maßnahmen durch einen EFTA-Staat einzustellen | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Aufforderung zur Abgabe von Stellungnahmen nach Teil I Artikel 1 Absatz 2 des Protokolls 3 zum Abkommen zwischen den EFTA-Staaten über die Errichtung einer Überwachungsbehörde und eines Gerichtshofs zu beihilferechtlichen Fragen im Zusammenhang mit Regionalbeihilfen im Rahmen einer Regelung zur Schaffung von Investitionsanreizen in Island sowie sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen | 4 |

IV   Informationen

INFORMATIONEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Europäische Kommission

2013/C 237/02

Euro-Wechselkurs

2

DEN EUROPÄISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSRAUM BETREFFENDE INFORMATIONEN

EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde

2013/C 237/03

Staatliche Beihilfen — Entscheidung, ein Beihilfeverfahren wegen der Annahme zweckdienlicher Maßnahmen durch einen EFTA-Staat einzustellen

3

2013/C 237/04

Aufforderung zur Abgabe von Stellungnahmen nach Teil I Artikel 1 Absatz 2 des Protokolls 3 zum Abkommen zwischen den EFTA-Staaten über die Errichtung einer Überwachungsbehörde und eines Gerichtshofs zu beihilferechtlichen Fragen im Zusammenhang mit Regionalbeihilfen im Rahmen einer Regelung zur Schaffung von Investitionsanreizen in Island sowie sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen

4

| | V   Bekanntmachungen |
| --- | --- |
| | VERFAHREN BEZÜGLICH DER DURCHFÜHRUNG DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Mitteilung der Kommission nach Artikel 27 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 in den Sachen AT.39678 — Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 — Deutsche Bahn II und AT.39915 — Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | SONSTIGE RECHTSHANDLUNGEN |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Veröffentlichung eines Antrags nach Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a) der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Veröffentlichung eines Änderungsantrags gemäß Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Veröffentlichung eines Antrags gemäß Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel | 40 |

V   Bekanntmachungen

VERFAHREN BEZÜGLICH DER DURCHFÜHRUNG DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK

Europäische Kommission

2013/C 237/05

Mitteilung der Kommission nach Artikel 27 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 in den Sachen AT.39678 — Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 — Deutsche Bahn II und AT.39915 — Deutsche Bahn III

28

SONSTIGE RECHTSHANDLUNGEN

Europäische Kommission

2013/C 237/06

Veröffentlichung eines Antrags nach Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a) der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel

31

2013/C 237/07

Veröffentlichung eines Änderungsantrags gemäß Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel

36

2013/C 237/08

Veröffentlichung eines Antrags gemäß Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel

40

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| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text von Bedeutung für den EWR |

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(1)   Text von Bedeutung für den EWR

1

| DE | |
| --- | --- |

DE

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II Mitteilungen

MITTEILUNGEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Europäische Kommission

| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/1

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Keine Einwände gegen einen angemeldeten Zusammenschluss

(Sache COMP/M.6843 — Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

2013/C 237/01

Am 18. April 2013 hat die Kommission nach Artikel 6 Absatz 1 Buchstabe b der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates entschieden, keine Einwände gegen den obengenannten angemeldeten Zusammenschluss zu erheben und ihn für mit dem Gemeinsamen Markt vereinbar zu erklären. Der vollständige Wortlaut der Entscheidung ist nur auf Englisch verfügbar und wird in einer um etwaige Geschäftsgeheimnisse bereinigten Fassung auf den folgenden beiden EU-Websites veröffentlicht:

| — | der Website der GD Wettbewerb zur Fusionskontrolle (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Auf dieser Website können Fusionsentscheidungen anhand verschiedener Angaben wie Unternehmensname, Nummer der Sache, Datum der Entscheidung oder Wirtschaftszweig abgerufen werden, |
| --- | --- |

—

der Website der GD Wettbewerb zur Fusionskontrolle (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Auf dieser Website können Fusionsentscheidungen anhand verschiedener Angaben wie Unternehmensname, Nummer der Sache, Datum der Entscheidung oder Wirtschaftszweig abgerufen werden,

| — | der Website EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). Hier kann diese Entscheidung anhand der Celex-Nummer 32013M6843 abgerufen werden. EUR-Lex ist das Internetportal zum Gemeinschaftsrecht. |
| --- | --- |

—

der Website EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). Hier kann diese Entscheidung anhand der Celex-Nummer 32013M6843 abgerufen werden. EUR-Lex ist das Internetportal zum Gemeinschaftsrecht.

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IV Informationen

INFORMATIONEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Europäische Kommission

| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/2

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Euro-Wechselkurs (1)

14. August 2013

2013/C 237/02

1 Euro =

| | Währung | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-Dollar | 1,3243 |
| JPY | Japanischer Yen | 130,17 |
| DKK | Dänische Krone | 7,4583 |
| GBP | Pfund Sterling | 0,85440 |
| SEK | Schwedische Krone | 8,6393 |
| CHF | Schweizer Franken | 1,2415 |
| ISK | Isländische Krone | |
| NOK | Norwegische Krone | 7,8130 |
| BGN | Bulgarischer Lew | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tschechische Krone | 25,822 |
| HUF | Ungarischer Forint | 298,62 |
| LTL | Litauischer Litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lettischer Lat | 0,7025 |
| PLN | Polnischer Zloty | 4,2037 |
| RON | Rumänischer Leu | 4,4315 |
| TRY | Türkische Lira | 2,5664 |
| AUD | Australischer Dollar | 1,4524 |
| CAD | Kanadischer Dollar | 1,3689 |
| HKD | Hongkong-Dollar | 10,2705 |
| NZD | Neuseeländischer Dollar | 1,6501 |
| SGD | Singapur-Dollar | 1,6835 |
| KRW | Südkoreanischer Won | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | Südafrikanischer Rand | 13,2129 |
| CNY | Chinesischer Renminbi Yuan | 8,1041 |
| HRK | Kroatische Kuna | 7,5415 |
| IDR | Indonesische Rupiah | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | Malaysischer Ringgit | 4,3351 |
| PHP | Philippinischer Peso | 57,975 |
| RUB | Russischer Rubel | 43,8995 |
| THB | Thailändischer Baht | 41,504 |
| BRL | Brasilianischer Real | 3,0586 |
| MXN | Mexikanischer Peso | 16,8756 |
| INR | Indische Rupie | 81,3700 |

Währung

Kurs

USD

US-Dollar

1,3243

JPY

Japanischer Yen

130,17

DKK

Dänische Krone

7,4583

GBP

Pfund Sterling

0,85440

SEK

Schwedische Krone

8,6393

CHF

Schweizer Franken

1,2415

ISK

Isländische Krone

NOK

Norwegische Krone

7,8130

BGN

Bulgarischer Lew

1,9558

CZK

Tschechische Krone

25,822

HUF

Ungarischer Forint

298,62

LTL

Litauischer Litas

3,4528

LVL

Lettischer Lat

0,7025

PLN

Polnischer Zloty

4,2037

RON

Rumänischer Leu

4,4315

TRY

Türkische Lira

2,5664

AUD

Australischer Dollar

1,4524

CAD

Kanadischer Dollar

1,3689

HKD

Hongkong-Dollar

10,2705

NZD

Neuseeländischer Dollar

1,6501

SGD

Singapur-Dollar

1,6835

KRW

Südkoreanischer Won

1 482,39

ZAR

Südafrikanischer Rand

13,2129

CNY

Chinesischer Renminbi Yuan

8,1041

HRK

Kroatische Kuna

7,5415

IDR

Indonesische Rupiah

13 667,59

MYR

Malaysischer Ringgit

4,3351

PHP

Philippinischer Peso

57,975

RUB

Russischer Rubel

43,8995

THB

Thailändischer Baht

41,504

BRL

Brasilianischer Real

3,0586

MXN

Mexikanischer Peso

16,8756

INR

Indische Rupie

81,3700

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(1)  Quelle: Von der Europäischen Zentralbank veröffentlichter Referenz-Wechselkurs.

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DEN EUROPÄISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSRAUM BETREFFENDE INFORMATIONEN

EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde

| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/3

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Staatliche Beihilfen — Entscheidung, ein Beihilfeverfahren wegen der Annahme zweckdienlicher Maßnahmen durch einen EFTA-Staat einzustellen

2013/C 237/03

Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde hat zu folgender Beihilfe zweckdienliche Maßnahmen vorgeschlagen, die von Island angenommen wurden:

| Datum der Annahme der Entscheidung | : | 24. April 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Beihilfe Nr. | : | 70958 |
| Entscheidung Nr. | : | 159/13/COL |
| EFTA-Staat | : | Island |
| Titel | : | Staatliche Beihilfe an Landsvirkjun und Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Rechtsgrundlage | : | Landsvirkjun-Gesetz Nr. 42/1983, Kommunalgesetz Nr. 45/1998, Gesetz Nr. 139/2001 über die Gründung des Unternehmens Orkuveita Reykjavíkur als Gemeinschaftsunternehmen und Gesetz Nr. 121/1997 zu staatlichen Garantien |
| Zielsetzung | : | k. A. |
| Form der Beihilfe | : | Unbegrenzte staatliche und kommunale Garantien zugunsten der Unternehmen Landsvirkjun und Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ohne Zahlung marktüblicher Prämien |
| Wirtschaftssektoren | : | Stromsektor |
| Sonstige Angaben | : | Angesichts der Maßnahmen und weiteren Zusagen Islands zur Abschaffung der unbegrenzten staatlichen Garantien zugunsten der Unternehmen Landsvirkjun und Orkuveita Reykjavíkur wurden die Bedenken der Überwachungsbehörde bezüglich der Unvereinbarkeit mit dem EWR-Abkommen ausgeräumt und das Verfahren eingestellt. |

Datum der Annahme der Entscheidung

:

24. April 2013

Beihilfe Nr.

:

70958

Entscheidung Nr.

:

159/13/COL

EFTA-Staat

:

Island

Titel

:

Staatliche Beihilfe an Landsvirkjun und Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Rechtsgrundlage

:

Landsvirkjun-Gesetz Nr. 42/1983, Kommunalgesetz Nr. 45/1998, Gesetz Nr. 139/2001 über die Gründung des Unternehmens Orkuveita Reykjavíkur als Gemeinschaftsunternehmen und Gesetz Nr. 121/1997 zu staatlichen Garantien

Zielsetzung

:

k. A.

Form der Beihilfe

:

Unbegrenzte staatliche und kommunale Garantien zugunsten der Unternehmen Landsvirkjun und Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ohne Zahlung marktüblicher Prämien

Wirtschaftssektoren

:

Stromsektor

Sonstige Angaben

:

Angesichts der Maßnahmen und weiteren Zusagen Islands zur Abschaffung der unbegrenzten staatlichen Garantien zugunsten der Unternehmen Landsvirkjun und Orkuveita Reykjavíkur wurden die Bedenken der Überwachungsbehörde bezüglich der Unvereinbarkeit mit dem EWR-Abkommen ausgeräumt und das Verfahren eingestellt.

Die um vertrauliche Passagen bereinigte rechtsverbindliche Sprachfassung der Entscheidung ist auf der Internetseite der EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde abrufbar:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/4

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Aufforderung zur Abgabe von Stellungnahmen nach Teil I Artikel 1 Absatz 2 des Protokolls 3 zum Abkommen zwischen den EFTA-Staaten über die Errichtung einer Überwachungsbehörde und eines Gerichtshofs zu beihilferechtlichen Fragen im Zusammenhang mit Regionalbeihilfen im Rahmen einer Regelung zur Schaffung von Investitionsanreizen in Island sowie sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen

2013/C 237/04

Mit Entscheidung Nr. 177/13/KOL vom 30. April 2013, die nachstehend in der verbindlichen Sprachfassung wiedergegeben wird, hat die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde ein Verfahren nach Teil I Artikel 1 Absatz 2 des Protokolls 3 zum Abkommen zwischen den EFTA-Staaten zur Errichtung einer Überwachungsbehörde und eines Gerichtshofs eingeleitet. Die isländischen Behörden wurden durch Übersendung einer Kopie von der Entscheidung unterrichtet.

Die EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde fordert hiermit die EFTA-Staaten, die EU-Mitgliedstaaten und alle Beteiligten auf, ihre Stellungnahmen zu den betreffenden Maßnahmen innerhalb eines Monats nach Veröffentlichung dieser Bekanntmachung an folgende Anschrift zu richten:

| EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde |
| --- |
| Registratur |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA-Überwachungsbehörde

Registratur

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Die Stellungnahmen werden den isländischen Behörden übermittelt. Beteiligte, die eine Stellungnahme abgeben, können unter Angabe von Gründen schriftlich beantragen, dass ihre Identität nicht bekanntgegeben wird.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Verfahren

Am 13. Oktober 2010 genehmigte die Überwachungsbehörde durch die Entscheidung Nr. 390/10/KOL eine Beihilferegelung für Investitionsanreize („die Regelung“), die die isländischen Behörden nach Teil I Artikel 1 Absatz 3 des Protokolls 3 angemeldet hatten.

Im Rahmen der Regelung sollen im Zusammenhang mit Erstinvestitionen in Gebieten, die für Regionalbeihilfen in Island in Betracht kommen (sogenannte „C-Fördergebiete“), Beihilfen in Form von direkten Zuschüssen, verschiedenen Steuerbefreiungen für bis zu zehn Jahren und des Verkaufs und der Verpachtung von Liegenschaften unter Marktwert an Unternehmen aller Wirtschaftszweige mit Ausnahme des Finanzsektors gewährt werden. Die Regelung läuft am 31. Dezember 2013 aus.

Rechtsgrundlage der von der Überwachungsbehörde genehmigten Regelung ist:

| — | Gesetz Nr. 99/2010 über Anreize für Erstinvestitionen in Island („Act No 99/2010 on Incentives for Initial Investments in Iceland“ — „das Gesetz“), angenommen vom isländischen Parlament am 29. Juni 2010; und |
| --- | --- |

—

Gesetz Nr. 99/2010 über Anreize für Erstinvestitionen in Island („Act No 99/2010 on Incentives for Initial Investments in Iceland“ — „das Gesetz“), angenommen vom isländischen Parlament am 29. Juni 2010; und

| — | Verordnung (EU) Nr. 985/2010 über Anreize für Erstinvestitionen in Island, erlassen vom isländischen Industrieministerium am 25. November 2010 („Regulation No 985/2010 on Incentives for Initial Investments in Iceland“ — „die Verordnung“), entsprechend einem Verordnungsentwurf, der der Überwachungsbehörde am 27. September 2010 übermittelt wurde. Die Verordnung ist Teil der Durchführungsvorschriften zu dem Gesetz. |
| --- | --- |

—

Verordnung (EU) Nr. 985/2010 über Anreize für Erstinvestitionen in Island, erlassen vom isländischen Industrieministerium am 25. November 2010 („Regulation No 985/2010 on Incentives for Initial Investments in Iceland“ — „die Verordnung“), entsprechend einem Verordnungsentwurf, der der Überwachungsbehörde am 27. September 2010 übermittelt wurde. Die Verordnung ist Teil der Durchführungsvorschriften zu dem Gesetz.

Am 30. Dezember 2010 erließ das Industrieministerium eine neue Verordnung (die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1150/2010 — „die ergänzende Verordnung“), mit der die ursprüngliche Verordnung insbesondere mit Blick auf die Gewährleistung des Anreizeffekts der Investitionsbeihilfen geändert wurde. Die ergänzende Verordnung wurde nicht bei der Überwachungsbehörde angemeldet.

Im Zeitraum 2010 bis 2013 schloss die isländische Regierung eine Reihe von Vereinbarungen, die ihrer Auffassung nach unter die Regelung fallen („die sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen“):

| 1. | am 30. Dezember 2010 mit Becromal Iceland ehf; |
| --- | --- |

1.

am 30. Dezember 2010 mit Becromal Iceland ehf;

| 2. | am 30. Dezember 2010 mit Thorsil ehf; |
| --- | --- |

2.

am 30. Dezember 2010 mit Thorsil ehf;

| 3. | am 17. Februar 2011 mit Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf; |
| --- | --- |

3.

am 17. Februar 2011 mit Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf;

| 4. | am 22. September 2011 mit Verne Real Estate II ehf; |
| --- | --- |

4.

am 22. September 2011 mit Verne Real Estate II ehf;

| 5. | am 7. Mai 2012 mit GMR Endurvinnslan ehf; |
| --- | --- |

5.

am 7. Mai 2012 mit GMR Endurvinnslan ehf;

| 6. | am 28. Januar 2013 mit Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

am 28. Januar 2013 mit Marmeti ehf.

Nach Vorabkontakten meldeten die isländischen Behörden am 13. Dezember 2012 nach Teil I Artikel 1 Absatz 3 des Protokolls 3 einige Änderungen des Gesetzes bei der Überwachungsbehörde an („die angemeldeten Änderungen“).

Würdigung der Maßnahmen

Die angemeldeten Änderungen betreffen die Abschaffung der direkten Zuschüsse, eine neue Methode für die Anwendung eines ermäßigten Körperschaftsteuersatzes für alle neuen Projekte im Rahmen der Regelung, die Befreiung von der Stempelabgabe und die Erhöhung der Zahl der Ausnahmen von der kommunalen Grundsteuer und den Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen. Die Überwachungsbehörde kam zu dem vorläufigen Ergebnis, dass die angemeldeten Änderungen der Regelung nicht von der Regelung trennbar sind. Daher prüfte sie die gesamte Regelung in der geänderten Fassung. Ferner bewertete sie die Anwendung der Regelung und stellte fest, dass bestimmte Bestandteile der sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen, die Island auf der Grundlage der geänderten Regelung geschlossen hatte, Anlass zu Bedenken hinsichtlich der Vereinbarkeit mit dem EWR-Abkommen gaben.

Insbesondere hatte die Überwachungsbehörde Zweifel, ob die im Rahmen der mit Becromal, Kísilfélagið und Verne geschlossenen Investitionsvereinbarungen gewährte Unterstützung unter die von der Überwachungsbehörde genehmigte Regelung fällt und das Erfordernis des Anreizeffekts einer Investitionsbeihilfe erfüllt.

Außerdem hatte die Überwachungsbehörde Zweifel, ob die mit Marmeti im Rahmen der Regelung geschlossene Investitionsvereinbarung deren Anforderungen in Bezug auf den Anreizeffekt erfüllt.

Und bei den Investitionsvereinbarungen, die mit Thorsil und GMR geschlossen wurden, hegte die Überwachungsbehörde den Verdacht, dass diese die Gewährung von Beihilfen außerhalb der genehmigten Regelung vorsehen.

Somit hatte die Behörde Zweifel, ob die Beihilferegelung in ihrer geänderten Fassung und die im Rahmen der sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen gewährten Beihilfen als mit dem EWR-Abkommen vereinbar angesehen werden können.

Schlussfolgerung

Angesichts der vorstehenden Erwägungen hat die Überwachungsbehörde Zweifel daran, dass die Regelung in ihrer geänderten Fassung sowie die genannten sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen mit den Bestimmungen des Artikels 61 Absatz 3 des EWR-Abkommens in Verbindung mit den Vorschriften der Regionalhilfeleitlinien der Überwachungsbehörde in Einklang stehen.

Daher hat die Überwachungsbehörde beschlossen, das förmliche Prüfverfahren nach Teil I Artikel 1 Absatz 2 des Protokolls 3 zum Abkommen zwischen den EFTA-Staaten über die Errichtung einer Überwachungsbehörde und eines Gerichtshofs zur Beihilferegelung für Investitionsanreize, die von den isländischen Behörden unter anderem durch die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1150/2010 geändert und von den isländischen Behörden umgesetzt wurde, sowie zu den sechs Investitionsvereinbarungen einzuleiten.

Beteiligte werden aufgefordert, ihre Stellungnahmen zu den Maßnahmen binnen eines Monats nach Veröffentlichung dieser Bekanntmachung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union zu übermitteln.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
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(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
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(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
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(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
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(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
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(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
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(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
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(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
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(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
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(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
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(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
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(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
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(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
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(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
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2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
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3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
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4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
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(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
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(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
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(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
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(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
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(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
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(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
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(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
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(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
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(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
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(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
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(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
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(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
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(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
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(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
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(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
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(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
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(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
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2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
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3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
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4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
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(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
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(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
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(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
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(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
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(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
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(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
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(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
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(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
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(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
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(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
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(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
| --- | --- |

(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Bekanntmachungen

VERFAHREN BEZÜGLICH DER DURCHFÜHRUNG DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK

Europäische Kommission

| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/28 |
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15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/28

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Mitteilung der Kommission nach Artikel 27 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 in den Sachen AT.39678 — Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 — Deutsche Bahn II und AT.39915 — Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   EINLEITUNG

| 1. | Beabsichtigt die Kommission, einen Beschluss zur Abstellung einer Zuwiderhandlung zu erlassen, und bieten die beteiligten Unternehmen an, Verpflichtungen einzugehen, die geeignet sind, die ihnen von der Kommission in ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung mitgeteilten Bedenken auszuräumen, so kann die Kommission nach Artikel 9 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 des Rates vom 16. Dezember 2002 zur Durchführung der in den Artikeln 101 und 102 des Vertrags niedergelegten Wettbewerbsregeln (1) diese Verpflichtungszusagen im Wege eines Beschlusses für bindend für die jeweiligen Unternehmen erklären. Der Beschluss kann befristet sein und muss besagen, dass für ein Tätigwerden der Kommission kein Anlass mehr besteht. Vor Erlass eines Beschlusses nach Artikel 9 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 veröffentlicht die Kommission nach Artikel 27 Absatz 4 der genannten Verordnung eine kurze Zusammenfassung des Falls und den wesentlichen Inhalt der betreffenden Verpflichtungszusagen. Dritte können hierzu binnen einer von der Kommission festgesetzten Frist Stellung nehmen. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Beabsichtigt die Kommission, einen Beschluss zur Abstellung einer Zuwiderhandlung zu erlassen, und bieten die beteiligten Unternehmen an, Verpflichtungen einzugehen, die geeignet sind, die ihnen von der Kommission in ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung mitgeteilten Bedenken auszuräumen, so kann die Kommission nach Artikel 9 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 des Rates vom 16. Dezember 2002 zur Durchführung der in den Artikeln 101 und 102 des Vertrags niedergelegten Wettbewerbsregeln (1) diese Verpflichtungszusagen im Wege eines Beschlusses für bindend für die jeweiligen Unternehmen erklären. Der Beschluss kann befristet sein und muss besagen, dass für ein Tätigwerden der Kommission kein Anlass mehr besteht. Vor Erlass eines Beschlusses nach Artikel 9 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 veröffentlicht die Kommission nach Artikel 27 Absatz 4 der genannten Verordnung eine kurze Zusammenfassung des Falls und den wesentlichen Inhalt der betreffenden Verpflichtungszusagen. Dritte können hierzu binnen einer von der Kommission festgesetzten Frist Stellung nehmen.

2.   ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

| 2. | Am 6. Juni 2013 gab die Kommission eine vorläufige Beurteilung nach Artikel 9 Absatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 ab, die an die Deutsche Bahn AG und ihre Tochtergesellschaften DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG und DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG gerichtet war (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Am 6. Juni 2013 gab die Kommission eine vorläufige Beurteilung nach Artikel 9 Absatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 ab, die an die Deutsche Bahn AG und ihre Tochtergesellschaften DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG und DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG gerichtet war (2).

| 3. | In ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung äußerte die Kommission Bedenken, dass der DB-Konzern seine beherrschende Stellung auf dem Markt für die Bereitstellung von Bahnstrom in Deutschland missbraucht haben könnte, indem er Wettbewerbern Bahnstrompreise berechnete, die zu einer Preis-Kosten-Schere auf den Märkten für Schienenpersonenfernverkehr und Schienengüterverkehr führten und somit gegen Artikel 102 AEUV verstoßen. |
| --- | --- |

3.

In ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung äußerte die Kommission Bedenken, dass der DB-Konzern seine beherrschende Stellung auf dem Markt für die Bereitstellung von Bahnstrom in Deutschland missbraucht haben könnte, indem er Wettbewerbern Bahnstrompreise berechnete, die zu einer Preis-Kosten-Schere auf den Märkten für Schienenpersonenfernverkehr und Schienengüterverkehr führten und somit gegen Artikel 102 AEUV verstoßen.

| 4. | Die Kommission vertritt vorläufig die Auffassung, dass DB Energie eine beherrschende Stellung auf dem Markt für die Bahnstromversorgung von in Deutschland tätigen Eisenbahnunternehmen innehat. Bahnstrom ist eine unverzichtbare Vorleistung für die Tätigkeit von Eisenbahnunternehmen auf den deutschen Schienenverkehrsmärkten. Seit 2003 bietet DB Energie Eisenbahnunternehmen Bahnstrom im Rahmen eines Gesamtpakets an, in dem der Preis für den Stromverbrauch (Strompreis) und der Preis für die Nutzung des Bahnstromnetzes (Netzentgelt) zusammengefasst sind. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Die Kommission vertritt vorläufig die Auffassung, dass DB Energie eine beherrschende Stellung auf dem Markt für die Bahnstromversorgung von in Deutschland tätigen Eisenbahnunternehmen innehat. Bahnstrom ist eine unverzichtbare Vorleistung für die Tätigkeit von Eisenbahnunternehmen auf den deutschen Schienenverkehrsmärkten. Seit 2003 bietet DB Energie Eisenbahnunternehmen Bahnstrom im Rahmen eines Gesamtpakets an, in dem der Preis für den Stromverbrauch (Strompreis) und der Preis für die Nutzung des Bahnstromnetzes (Netzentgelt) zusammengefasst sind.

| 5. | In ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung vertrat die Kommission die Auffassung, dass dieses Preissystem und insbesondere die Rabatte, von denen Eisenbahnunternehmen des DB-Konzerns stärker als ihre Wettbewerber profitierten, möglicherweise die Entwicklung des Wettbewerbs auf den Märkten für den Schienengüterverkehr und den Schienenpersonenfernverkehr behindert haben könnten. Die Kommission hat bezüglich dieser Märkte Bedenken, dass das Bahnstrompreissystem der DB Energie zu einer solchen Differenz zwischen dem Preis für Bahnstrom, der den Wettbewerbern in Rechnung gestellt wird, und dem Preis für Schienenverkehrsleistungen, der den Verbrauchern von den DB-Eisenbahnunternehmen in Rechnung gestellt wird, führt, dass ebenso effiziente Wettbewerber an der Erzielung von Gewinnen gehindert werden oder ihre Gewinnspanne künstlich geschmälert wird. Die Kommission kam bei ihrer Untersuchung zu dem vorläufigen Schluss, dass diese Situation wettbewerbsrechtliche Bedenken hinsichtlich der Märkte für Schienenpersonenfernverkehr und Schienengüterverkehr aufwirft. |
| --- | --- |

5.

In ihrer vorläufigen Beurteilung vertrat die Kommission die Auffassung, dass dieses Preissystem und insbesondere die Rabatte, von denen Eisenbahnunternehmen des DB-Konzerns stärker als ihre Wettbewerber profitierten, möglicherweise die Entwicklung des Wettbewerbs auf den Märkten für den Schienengüterverkehr und den Schienenpersonenfernverkehr behindert haben könnten. Die Kommission hat bezüglich dieser Märkte Bedenken, dass das Bahnstrompreissystem der DB Energie zu einer solchen Differenz zwischen dem Preis für Bahnstrom, der den Wettbewerbern in Rechnung gestellt wird, und dem Preis für Schienenverkehrsleistungen, der den Verbrauchern von den DB-Eisenbahnunternehmen in Rechnung gestellt wird, führt, dass ebenso effiziente Wettbewerber an der Erzielung von Gewinnen gehindert werden oder ihre Gewinnspanne künstlich geschmälert wird. Die Kommission kam bei ihrer Untersuchung zu dem vorläufigen Schluss, dass diese Situation wettbewerbsrechtliche Bedenken hinsichtlich der Märkte für Schienenpersonenfernverkehr und Schienengüterverkehr aufwirft.

| 6. | Im November 2010 hat der Bundesgerichtshof entschieden, dass das Bahnstromnetz als Energieversorgungsnetz anzusehen ist und dass die Zugangsbedingungen und Netzentgelte der Regulierung nach dem Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (3) (EnWG) unterliegen. Folglich sollte DB Energie die Netzentgelte getrennt in Rechnung stellen, so dass auch Stromanbieter, die nicht zum DB-Konzern gehören, mit der DB Energie bei der Stromversorgung von Eisenbahnunternehmen in Wettbewerb treten können (4). |
| --- | --- |

6.

Im November 2010 hat der Bundesgerichtshof entschieden, dass das Bahnstromnetz als Energieversorgungsnetz anzusehen ist und dass die Zugangsbedingungen und Netzentgelte der Regulierung nach dem Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (3) (EnWG) unterliegen. Folglich sollte DB Energie die Netzentgelte getrennt in Rechnung stellen, so dass auch Stromanbieter, die nicht zum DB-Konzern gehören, mit der DB Energie bei der Stromversorgung von Eisenbahnunternehmen in Wettbewerb treten können (4).

3.   WESENTLICHER INHALT DER ANGEBOTENEN VERPFLICHTUNGEN

| 7. | Der DB-Konzern stimmt der vorläufigen Beurteilung der Kommission nicht zu, dass er seine beherrschende Stellung auf dem Markt für die Bereitstellung von Bahnstrom für deutsche Eisenbahnunternehmen missbraucht haben könnte. Dennoch hat das Unternehmen nach Artikel 9 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 Verpflichtungen angeboten, um die wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken der Kommission auszuräumen. Die Verpflichtungen sehen im Wesentlichen Folgendes vor: |
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7.

Der DB-Konzern stimmt der vorläufigen Beurteilung der Kommission nicht zu, dass er seine beherrschende Stellung auf dem Markt für die Bereitstellung von Bahnstrom für deutsche Eisenbahnunternehmen missbraucht haben könnte. Dennoch hat das Unternehmen nach Artikel 9 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 Verpflichtungen angeboten, um die wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bedenken der Kommission auszuräumen. Die Verpflichtungen sehen im Wesentlichen Folgendes vor:

| 8. | Spätestens drei Monate nach der Bekanntgabe des Kommissionsbeschlusses, mit dem die Verpflichtungen als für den DB-Konzern verbindlich erklärt werden, und frühestens ab dem 1. Januar 2014 führt DB Energie ein neues Preissystem für Bahnstrom ein, bei dem die Strompreise und die von der Bundesnetzagentur genehmigten Netzentgelte getrennt berechnet werden. Dieses neue Preissystem ist so ausgestaltet, dass der Eintritt von Drittanbietern in den Markt für die Stromversorgung von Eisenbahnunternehmen gewährleistet ist (5). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Spätestens drei Monate nach der Bekanntgabe des Kommissionsbeschlusses, mit dem die Verpflichtungen als für den DB-Konzern verbindlich erklärt werden, und frühestens ab dem 1. Januar 2014 führt DB Energie ein neues Preissystem für Bahnstrom ein, bei dem die Strompreise und die von der Bundesnetzagentur genehmigten Netzentgelte getrennt berechnet werden. Dieses neue Preissystem ist so ausgestaltet, dass der Eintritt von Drittanbietern in den Markt für die Stromversorgung von Eisenbahnunternehmen gewährleistet ist (5).

| 9. | In diesem neuen System wendet DB Energie keine Mengen- oder Laufzeitrabatte mehr an und berechnet allen Eisenbahnunternehmen dieselben Preise. |
| --- | --- |

9.

In diesem neuen System wendet DB Energie keine Mengen- oder Laufzeitrabatte mehr an und berechnet allen Eisenbahnunternehmen dieselben Preise.

| 10. | DB Energie erstattet in Deutschland tätigen Eisenbahnunternehmen, die nicht zum DB-Konzern gehören, rückwirkend durch eine Einmalzahlung 4 % des Betrags, der ihnen für das Jahr vor dem Inkrafttreten des neuen Bahnstrompreissystems in Rechnung gestellt wurde. |
| --- | --- |

10.

DB Energie erstattet in Deutschland tätigen Eisenbahnunternehmen, die nicht zum DB-Konzern gehören, rückwirkend durch eine Einmalzahlung 4 % des Betrags, der ihnen für das Jahr vor dem Inkrafttreten des neuen Bahnstrompreissystems in Rechnung gestellt wurde.

| 11. | DB Energie und DB Mobility Logistics AG legen der Kommission jedes Jahr Daten vor, anhand derer sie beurteilen kann, ob die Preise des DB-Konzerns für Bahnstrom und Verkehrsdienstleistungen zu einer Preis-Kosten-Schere führen könnten. Ferner wird DB Energie der Kommission etwaige Strompreisänderungen im Voraus mitteilen. |
| --- | --- |

11.

DB Energie und DB Mobility Logistics AG legen der Kommission jedes Jahr Daten vor, anhand derer sie beurteilen kann, ob die Preise des DB-Konzerns für Bahnstrom und Verkehrsdienstleistungen zu einer Preis-Kosten-Schere führen könnten. Ferner wird DB Energie der Kommission etwaige Strompreisänderungen im Voraus mitteilen.

| 12. | Die Zusagen treten spätestens drei Monate nach der Bekanntgabe des Kommissionsbeschlusses in Kraft. Sie gelten für einen Zeitraum von 5 Jahren (6) nach Bekanntgabe des Kommissionsbeschlusses oder bis zu dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem 20 % der von Wettbewerbern des DB-Konzerns erworbenen Bahnstrommengen von nicht zum DB-Konzern gehörenden Stromanbietern bezogen werden. Der DB-Konzern ernennt einen Treuhänder, der die Erfüllung der Verpflichtungen überwacht. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Die Zusagen treten spätestens drei Monate nach der Bekanntgabe des Kommissionsbeschlusses in Kraft. Sie gelten für einen Zeitraum von 5 Jahren (6) nach Bekanntgabe des Kommissionsbeschlusses oder bis zu dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem 20 % der von Wettbewerbern des DB-Konzerns erworbenen Bahnstrommengen von nicht zum DB-Konzern gehörenden Stromanbietern bezogen werden. Der DB-Konzern ernennt einen Treuhänder, der die Erfüllung der Verpflichtungen überwacht.

| 13. | Der vollständige Wortlaut der Verpflichtungen ist auf der Website der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb veröffentlicht: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

Der vollständige Wortlaut der Verpflichtungen ist auf der Website der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb veröffentlicht: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   AUFFORDERUNG ZUR STELLUNGNAHME

| 14. | Vorbehaltlich der Ergebnisse dieses Markttests beabsichtigt die Kommission, einen Beschluss nach Artikel 9 Absatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 zu erlassen, mit dem die oben zusammengefassten und auf der Website der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb veröffentlichten Verpflichtungszusagen für bindend erklärt werden. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Vorbehaltlich der Ergebnisse dieses Markttests beabsichtigt die Kommission, einen Beschluss nach Artikel 9 Absatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 zu erlassen, mit dem die oben zusammengefassten und auf der Website der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb veröffentlichten Verpflichtungszusagen für bindend erklärt werden.

| 15. | Nach Artikel 27 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 fordert die Kommission Dritte auf, zu den angebotenen Verpflichtungen Stellung zu nehmen. Die Stellungnahmen müssen bei der Kommission spätestens einen Monat nach Veröffentlichung dieser Mitteilung eingehen. Dritte werden ferner aufgefordert, eine nichtvertrauliche Fassung ihrer Stellungnahme vorzulegen, aus der etwaige Geschäftsgeheimnisse und andere vertrauliche Informationen gestrichen und durch eine nichtvertrauliche Zusammenfassung bzw. durch den Hinweis „(Geschäftsgeheimnis)“ oder „(vertraulich)“ ersetzt sind. Nach Artikel 16 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 773/2004 sind Anträge auf vertrauliche Behandlung hinreichend zu begründen; insbesondere ist auszuführen, warum die Offenlegung der betreffenden Informationen einen beträchtlichen Schaden verursachen könnte. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Nach Artikel 27 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 fordert die Kommission Dritte auf, zu den angebotenen Verpflichtungen Stellung zu nehmen. Die Stellungnahmen müssen bei der Kommission spätestens einen Monat nach Veröffentlichung dieser Mitteilung eingehen. Dritte werden ferner aufgefordert, eine nichtvertrauliche Fassung ihrer Stellungnahme vorzulegen, aus der etwaige Geschäftsgeheimnisse und andere vertrauliche Informationen gestrichen und durch eine nichtvertrauliche Zusammenfassung bzw. durch den Hinweis „(Geschäftsgeheimnis)“ oder „(vertraulich)“ ersetzt sind. Nach Artikel 16 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 773/2004 sind Anträge auf vertrauliche Behandlung hinreichend zu begründen; insbesondere ist auszuführen, warum die Offenlegung der betreffenden Informationen einen beträchtlichen Schaden verursachen könnte.

| 16. | Die Antworten und Anmerkungen sollten nach Möglichkeit begründet werden und alle relevanten Sachverhalte enthalten. Wenn Sie Bedenken hinsichtlich eines Teils der angebotenen Verpflichtungen haben, bittet die Kommission Sie, eine mögliche andere Lösung vorzuschlagen. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Die Antworten und Anmerkungen sollten nach Möglichkeit begründet werden und alle relevanten Sachverhalte enthalten. Wenn Sie Bedenken hinsichtlich eines Teils der angebotenen Verpflichtungen haben, bittet die Kommission Sie, eine mögliche andere Lösung vorzuschlagen.

| 17. | Die Stellungnahmen können der Kommission unter Angabe des Aktenzeichens AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 — Deutsche Bahn I/II/III per E-Mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), per Fax (+32 22950128) oder per Post an folgende Anschrift übermittelt werden:





  Europäische Kommission |
| --- | --- |
| Generaldirektion Wettbewerb |
| Registratur Antitrust |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIЁ |

17.

Die Stellungnahmen können der Kommission unter Angabe des Aktenzeichens AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 — Deutsche Bahn I/II/III per E-Mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), per Fax (+32 22950128) oder per Post an folgende Anschrift übermittelt werden:

Europäische Kommission

Generaldirektion Wettbewerb

Registratur Antitrust

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIЁ

---

(1)  ABl. L 1 vom 4.1.2003, S. 1. Mit Wirkung vom 1. Dezember 2009 sind an die Stelle der Artikel 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag die Artikel 101 und 102 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (AEUV) getreten. Die Artikel 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag und die Artikel 101 und 102 AEUV sind im Wesentlichen identisch. Im Rahmen dieser Mitteilung sind Bezugnahmen auf die Artikel 101 und 102 AEUV als Bezugnahmen auf die Artikel 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag zu verstehen, wo dies angebracht ist.

(2)  Die Deutsche Bahn AG und alle ihre Tochtergesellschaften werden im Folgenden zusammen als „DB-Konzern“ bezeichnet.

(3)  Bundesgerichtshof, Beschluss vom 9. November 2010, Az. EnVR 1/10.

(4)  Weitere Informationen über diese Änderung des Preissystems und die Bedingungen des neuen Systems finden Sie auf der Website der DB Energie: http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  Darüber hinaus geht die Einführung des neuen Systems mit der Verpflichtung zur getrennten Rechnungslegung und Information bezüglich der Tätigkeiten der DB Energie als Bahnstromnetzmanager und Stromanbieter einher.

(6)  Die Zusage der DB Energie, keine Laufzeitrabatte für Stromlieferungen zu gewähren, gilt nur für einen Zeitraum von 3 Jahren.

---

SONSTIGE RECHTSHANDLUNGEN

Europäische Kommission

| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/31

---

Veröffentlichung eines Antrags nach Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a) der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel

2013/C 237/06

Diese Veröffentlichung eröffnet die Möglichkeit, gemäß Artikel 51 der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates (1) Einspruch gegen den Antrag zu erheben.

EINZIGES DOKUMENT

VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 510/2006 DES RATES

zum Schutz von geografischen Angaben und Ursprungsbezeichnungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel
   (2)

„SZENTESI PAPRIKA“

EG Nr.: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

g.g.A ( X ) g.U. ( )

1.   Name

„Szentesi paprika“

2.   Mitgliedstaat oder Drittland

Ungarn

3.   Beschreibung des Agrarerzeugnisses oder des Lebensmittels

3.1   Erzeugnisart

| Klasse 1.6. | Obst, Gemüse und Getreide, unverarbeitet und verarbeitet |
| --- | --- |

Klasse 1.6.

Obst, Gemüse und Getreide, unverarbeitet und verarbeitet

3.2   Beschreibung des Erzeugnisses, für das der unter Punkt 1 aufgeführte Name gilt

Die geschützte geografische Angabe „Szentesi paprika“ bezeichnet die Früchte der Sorten und Sortentypen der Pflanzenart Capsicum annuum, die in Treibhäusern gezogen wurden.

Die Erzeugnisse von „Szentesi paprika“ müssen beim Inverkehrbringen insgesamt unversehrt und gesund sein, und bei den einzelnen Sortentypen müssen sie die folgenden Merkmale aufweisen.

| a) | Weiße Gemüsepaprika zum Füllen (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Die weiße „Szentesi paprika“ ist im reifen Zustand schlüpfrig, ihre Haut ist glatt, glitschig, mit einem Knack bricht sie, ihr Ende ist eingedrückt, ihr Fruchtfleisch ist dick. Ihre Oberfläche ist glatt, ihre strahlende Farbe ist gelblich weiß (knochenweiß). Sie ist kegelförmig, die Länge beträgt etwa 60-120 mm, die Breite 40-70 mm; meistens ist sie drei- bis viergliedrig; die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 4-7 mm; ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut dünn; sie riecht intensiv nach Paprika, ist schmackhaft, süß und nicht scharf.
  Angebaute Sorten: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Weiße Gemüsepaprika zum Füllen (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Die weiße „Szentesi paprika“ ist im reifen Zustand schlüpfrig, ihre Haut ist glatt, glitschig, mit einem Knack bricht sie, ihr Ende ist eingedrückt, ihr Fruchtfleisch ist dick. Ihre Oberfläche ist glatt, ihre strahlende Farbe ist gelblich weiß (knochenweiß). Sie ist kegelförmig, die Länge beträgt etwa 60-120 mm, die Breite 40-70 mm; meistens ist sie drei- bis viergliedrig; die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 4-7 mm; ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut dünn; sie riecht intensiv nach Paprika, ist schmackhaft, süß und nicht scharf.

Angebaute Sorten: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia.

| b) | Spitze scharfe Paprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  Die Oberfläche der spitzen scharfen „Szentesi paprika“ ist glänzend, glatt oder schwach wellig; ihre Form ist lang und spitzig. Ihre Farbe ist hell-, mittel- oder dunkelgrün, ihre Länge beträgt 150-250 mm, die Breite 20-50 mm; sie ist meistens zwei- bis dreigliedrig, die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 3-4 mm; ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut dünn. Die Frucht riecht intensiv nach Paprika, ist schmackhaft, scharf, Aroma und Geschmack sind angenehm.
  Angebaute Sorten: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.
  Die Schärfewerte der angebauten liegen nach der Scoville-Skala zwischen 2 500 und 5 000. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Spitze scharfe Paprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

Die Oberfläche der spitzen scharfen „Szentesi paprika“ ist glänzend, glatt oder schwach wellig; ihre Form ist lang und spitzig. Ihre Farbe ist hell-, mittel- oder dunkelgrün, ihre Länge beträgt 150-250 mm, die Breite 20-50 mm; sie ist meistens zwei- bis dreigliedrig, die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 3-4 mm; ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut dünn. Die Frucht riecht intensiv nach Paprika, ist schmackhaft, scharf, Aroma und Geschmack sind angenehm.

Angebaute Sorten: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais.

Die Schärfewerte der angebauten liegen nach der Scoville-Skala zwischen 2 500 und 5 000.

| c) | Kápia Paprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Die „Szentesi paprika“ der Kápia-Gruppe ist kegelförmig, etwas abgeflacht; die Oberfläche ist glatt, glänzend, ihre Farbe ist im pflückreifen Zustand samtfarbig, dunkelrot. Die Länge beträgt 60-120 mm, die Breite ist 40-70 mm; in der Regel ist sie zwei- bis dreigliedrig. Die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 4-7 mm, ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut mittelstark. Die Schoten haben einen intensiven süßen Geschmack, riechen nach gemahlener Paprika und sind nicht scharf.
  Angebaute Sorten: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Kápia Paprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Die „Szentesi paprika“ der Kápia-Gruppe ist kegelförmig, etwas abgeflacht; die Oberfläche ist glatt, glänzend, ihre Farbe ist im pflückreifen Zustand samtfarbig, dunkelrot. Die Länge beträgt 60-120 mm, die Breite ist 40-70 mm; in der Regel ist sie zwei- bis dreigliedrig. Die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 4-7 mm, ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut mittelstark. Die Schoten haben einen intensiven süßen Geschmack, riechen nach gemahlener Paprika und sind nicht scharf.

Angebaute Sorten: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus.

| d) | Tomatenpaprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Die Form der tomatenförmigen „Szentesi paprika“ ist sehr charakteristisch: abgeflachte Kugelform, die Oberfläche ist glatt, die Farbe ist im pflückreifen Zustand tiefrot. Ihr Durchmesser beträgt 60-120 mm, die Länge 40-60 mm, sie ist drei- oder viergliederig, die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 5-7 mm, ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut dünn; sie riecht intensiv nach Paprika und ist nicht scharf.
  Angebaute Sorten: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.
  Der Kreis der pflanzbaren Sorten der einzelnen oben angeführten Sortentypen kann jährlich unterschiedlich sein. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Tomatenpaprika (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Die Form der tomatenförmigen „Szentesi paprika“ ist sehr charakteristisch: abgeflachte Kugelform, die Oberfläche ist glatt, die Farbe ist im pflückreifen Zustand tiefrot. Ihr Durchmesser beträgt 60-120 mm, die Länge 40-60 mm, sie ist drei- oder viergliederig, die Stärke des Fruchtfleisches beträgt 5-7 mm, ihre Konsistenz ist massiv, ihre Haut dünn; sie riecht intensiv nach Paprika und ist nicht scharf.

Angebaute Sorten: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar.

Der Kreis der pflanzbaren Sorten der einzelnen oben angeführten Sortentypen kann jährlich unterschiedlich sein.

3.3   Rohstoffe (nur für Verarbeitungserzeugnisse)

—

3.4   Futter (nur für Erzeugnisse tierischen Ursprungs)

—

3.5   Besondere Erzeugungsschritte, die in dem abgegrenzten geografischen Gebiet erfolgen müssen

Sämtliche Schritte des Anbauverfahrens der „Szentesi paprika“ müssen auf dem im Punkt 4. bestimmten Gebiet vorgenommen werden, so wie:

| — | Heranziehen und Pflege der Paprikasetzlinge; |
| --- | --- |

—

Heranziehen und Pflege der Paprikasetzlinge;

| — | Insbesondere der integrierte biologische Anbau der einzelnen Sortentypen bzw. Sorten; |
| --- | --- |

—

Insbesondere der integrierte biologische Anbau der einzelnen Sortentypen bzw. Sorten;

| — | die Wahl der Vegetationsperiode; |
| --- | --- |

—

die Wahl der Vegetationsperiode;

| — | die Gestaltung der Pflanzfläche; |
| --- | --- |

—

die Gestaltung der Pflanzfläche;

| — | die Bodenbearbeitung, die Grunddüngung; |
| --- | --- |

—

die Bodenbearbeitung, die Grunddüngung;

| — | das Auspflanzen; |
| --- | --- |

—

das Auspflanzen;

| — | die Fertigstellung des Stützsystems; |
| --- | --- |

—

die Fertigstellung des Stützsystems;

| — | die Pflanzenpflege (Phytotechnik); |
| --- | --- |

—

die Pflanzenpflege (Phytotechnik);

| — | die Bewässerung und Düngung; |
| --- | --- |

—

die Bewässerung und Düngung;

| — | die Klimaregelung; |
| --- | --- |

—

die Klimaregelung;

| — | die Anwendung von umweltschonenden integrierten Pflanzenschutzmaßnahmen; |
| --- | --- |

—

die Anwendung von umweltschonenden integrierten Pflanzenschutzmaßnahmen;

| — | das Pflücken, die Vorbereitung der Ware, die Vorlagerung und Lagerung; |
| --- | --- |

—

das Pflücken, die Vorbereitung der Ware, die Vorlagerung und Lagerung;

| — | Abbau der Paprikabestände, Gestaltung und Desinfizierung der Produktionsanlagen. |
| --- | --- |

—

Abbau der Paprikabestände, Gestaltung und Desinfizierung der Produktionsanlagen.

3.6   Besondere Vorschriften für Vorgänge wie Schneiden, Reiben, Verpacken usw.

Die Klassifizierung, Verpackung und Etikettierung der „Szentesi paprika“ erfolgt beim landwirtschaftlichen Erzeuger oder in anderen geeigneten Einrichtungen innerhalb des abgegrenzten geographischen Gebietes.

Stückverpackung: Tablett, Korb, Polyäthylenbeutel (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 Stück Paprika/Einheit); Verpackung mittlerer Größe: Korb, Raschelnetz (0,35, 0,5, 0,7, 1, 2 kg Paprika/Einheit) oder Karton: in den Größen M10, M20, M30 (2,5, 10, 12, 14 kg Paprika/Einheit). Der Typ der Verpackungseinheiten kann sich bei den einzelnen Sortentypen nach Handelsbedürfnissen laufend ändern.

Um die für die einzelnen Sortentypen und auch für die Sorten typische Qualität und Homogenität sowie die charakteristischen Geschmacks-, Duft- und Aromastoffe und den Zustand und die Unversehrtheit der g.g.A. „Szentesi paprika“ zu bewahren, ferner um die Rückverfolgbarkeit der Erzeugnisse zu sichern, muss die Verpackung innerhalb des bestimmten geografischen Gebietes erfolgen.

3.7   Besondere Vorschriften für die Etikettierung

| — | Angabe der Wortkombination „Szentesi paprika“ auf der Verpackung. |
| --- | --- |

—

Angabe der Wortkombination „Szentesi paprika“ auf der Verpackung.

| — | Angabe des Etikettes mit Strichkode, das zur Rückverfolgung von „Szentesi paprika“ genutzt wird. |
| --- | --- |

—

Angabe des Etikettes mit Strichkode, das zur Rückverfolgung von „Szentesi paprika“ genutzt wird.

4.   Kurzbeschreibung der Abgrenzung des geografischen Gebiets

Das Anbaugebiet der „Szentesi paprika“ g.g.A. (geschützte geografische Angabe) erstreckt sich über ein zusammenhängendes Gebiet im Komitat Csongrád.

Der Anbau der „Szentesi paprika“ erfolgt innerhalb der Verwaltungsgrenzen der folgenden Ortschaften des Komitats Csongrád: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár und Szentes.

5.   Zusammenhang mit dem geografischen Gebiet

5.1   Besonderheit des geografischen Gebietes

Die den hochwertigen Anbau von Paprika bestimmenden Faktoren, in erster Linie die Temperatur- und Lichtverhältnisse, sowie die Bodenbeschaffenheit und die hydrologischen Gegebenheiten haben sehr günstige Bedingungen für die Entwicklung des Bewässerungsanbaus von Paprika in der Anbauregion Szentes geschaffen, der der Pionierarbeit der sogenannten bulgarischen Gärtner (Gärtner, die mit speziellen kleinbetrieblichen Methoden, in Gewächshäusern und mit Bewässerung Gemüse züchten), die sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts in der Region niedergelassen haben, zu verdanken ist.

Die Anbauregion Szentes liegt im südöstlichen Gebiet von Ungarn, in einem der tiefsten Becken der Tiefebene. Orografisch ist es ein besonderes Gebiet, weil sich hier die am tiefsten liegenden Gebiete des Landes erstrecken; das Gelände senkt sich von drei Seiten, aus der Richtung der benachbarten Landesbezirke in Richtung des Tals der Theiß. Der wichtigste Fluss des hydrologischen Systems der Region ist die Theiß, die gleichzeitig auch das bestimmende Element des gesamten naturgeografischen Gebildes ist. Infolge der Vielzahl der für die Region charakteristischen Naturgewässer ist der vorherrschende Bodentyp der Region die karbonatreiche Schwarzerde vom Typ Wiesensolonetz. Der Boden des Anbaugebietes ist in einem guten physikalischen Zustand, hat eine krümelige Struktur, erwärmt sich schnell, ist schwachalkalisch, hat gute hydrologische Eigenschaften und Nährstoffversorgung, der Humusgehalt ist hoch und die Ackerkrume ist dick.

Für den Anbau der „Szentesi paprika“ sind von den klimatischen Bedingungen, die zur Substanz des Erzeugnisses beitragen, einerseits das Licht und die Sonneneinstrahlung, anderseits die Temperatur und die Menge der Wärmeeinstrahlung maßgebend. In der Anbauregion Szentes herrschen überwiegend kontinentale Klimabedingungen. Die Sonneneinstrahlung verteilt sich einheitlich auf das ganze Gebiet. Der jährliche durchschnittliche Mittelwert der Sonneneinstrahlung beträgt 2 050 Stunden. Das Anbaugebiet gehört bezüglich der mittleren Jahrestemperatur zu den wärmsten Gebieten des Landes. Die mittlere Jahrestemperatur liegt bei + 10-11 °C, die Wärmemenge der Anbauperiode beträgt 3 200-3 300 °C, was in Anbetracht des Wärmebedarfs des Paprikaanbaus sehr günstig ist.

Die Region ist hingegen das niederschlagärmste Gebiet des Landes mit einer jährlichen durchschnittlichen Niederschlagsmenge von 500-550 mm. 40 % der Niederschläge fallen im Winterhalbjahr und 60 % im Sommerhalbjahr. Der wasserintensive Paprikaanbau wurde also allein durch die günstigen hydrologischen Bedingungen und den — von den bulgarischen Gärtnern eingeführten — Bewässerungsanbau ermöglicht.

5.2   Besonderheit des Erzeugnisses

Die wichtigsten Verbrauchs- und Genusswerte und Merkmale der „Szentesi paprika“ aus dem geografischen Gebiet sind die Folgenden: außerordentlich schmackhaft, würzig, süß bzw. scharf; intensiver Paprikaduft bzw. ein Duft, der an gemahlene Paprika erinnert; dünne Schale. Die Wandstärke der Früchte beträgt 3-7 mm, was auch beim frischen Verzehr die genussvolle Entfaltung der Geschmack- und Aromastoffe ermöglicht.

Die weiße „Szentesi paprika“ ist im reifen Zustand schlüpfrig, die Haut ist glatt, gleitend, sie bricht knackend, die Spitze ist eingestampft und stumpf, das Fruchtfleisch ist dick. Ihr frisch wirkender Paprikaduft und ihr Geschmack sind sehr charakteristisch, was die Verbraucher volkstümlich so bezeichnen: „die Paprika von Szentes hat Geschmack“.

Die Haut der spitzen scharfen „Szentesi paprika“ ist glatt oder mäßig wellig; die Form ist spitz, lang, die Konsistenz des Fruchtfleisches ist massiv. Die Frucht riecht intensiv nach Paprika, sie ist scharf, Aroma- und Geschmack sind angenehm. Die zur Gruppe der Kápia-Paprika zählende „Szentesi paprika” ist kegelförmig, etwas abgeflacht; die Konsistenz des Fruchtfleisches ist massiv, die Haut mittelstark. Die Oberfläche ist glatt, glänzend und ihre durch die Einwirkung der geografischen Umgebung (Licht, Wärme) entstehende samtige, dunkelrote Farbe ist sehr anziehend.

Die Form der tomatenförmigen „Szentesi paprika“ ist sehr charakteristisch: abgeflachte Kugel, ihre Haut ist trotz der Stärke des Fruchtfleischs dünn, die Oberfläche ist glatt, im pflückreifen Zustand ist ihre Farbe tiefrot.

5.3   Ursächlicher Zusammenhang zwischen dem geografischen Gebiet und der Qualität oder den Merkmalen des Erzeugnisses (im Falle einer g.U.) bzw. einer bestimmten Qualität, dem Ansehen oder sonstigen Eigenschaften des Erzeugnisses (im Falle einer g.g.A.)

Die Beziehung zu dem geografischen Gebiet beruht auf dem längst bestgehenden guten Ruf des Erzeugnisses und auf den lokalen Fachkenntnissen, die von den landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugern, die sich mit dem Anbau der „Szentesi paprika“ beschäftigen, innerhalb der Familien weitergegeben wurden.

Der Ruhm der „Szentesi paprika“

Der Bewässerungsanbau der Paprika in der Anbauregion Szentes ist der Pionierarbeit der sogenannten bulgarischen Gärtner zu verdanken, die sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts in der Region niedergelassen haben. Die dadurch bekannt gewordene „Szentesi paprika“ wird seitdem kontinuierlich angebaut. Der Ruf des Produktes ist auch in unseren Tagen bedeutend, was auch dadurch belegt wird, dass sie 2006 in Debrecen bei der Farmer Expo und Gartenbaufachausstellung — wo 300 einheimische und ausländische Firmen vertreten waren — den Hauptpreis erlangt hatte. 2007 wurde die Paprika zum frischen Verzehr mit dem Preis „Ungarisches Erzeugnis“ ausgezeichnet.

Zahlreiche historische Daten beweisen den seit Jahrhunderten bestehenden Zusammenhang zwischen dem Ruf der „Szentesi paprika“ und dem Gebiet. Die Speisepaprika wurde in Ungarn in der Zeit eingeführt, als sich die bulgarischen Gärtner im Winter 1875-76 im Meierhof in Szegvár Úsztató niederließen. Der großen landwirtschaftlichen Erhebung von 1895 zufolge wurden 92,74 % der gesamten Paprikaproduktion von Ungarn im südöstlichen Landesteil, in der Umgebung von Szentes, erzielt. Die Gärtner haben die humusreiche, sich leicht erwärmende Schwarzerde und den Auenboden auf dem heutigen Gebiet des Komitat Csongrád gepachtet, und dabei Flächen mit möglichst geringer Neigung gewählt. Für den frühen Anbau hat man vorgekeimte Samen und Treibhäuser genutzt. Auch in den Beeten für Setzlinge hat man Zwischenfrüchte gezogen, so wurden z.B. neben der Paprika auch Gurkensetzlinge gezogen, die nach dem Auspflanzen der Paprikasetzlinge dort verblieben sind. Die Setzlinge haben sie mit kleinen Erdballen ausgepflanzt. Man hat eine bedeutende und regelmäßige Bewässerung eingeführt: sich erwärmende stehende Gewässer oder das Wasser von flachen, sich langsam bewegenden Flüssen wurden zur Bewässerung eingesetzt. Für die Wasserentnahme und Entwässerung haben die Gärtner eine einzigartige Methode entwickelt. In der Umgebung von Szentes wurde damals das sogenannte Ketteneimerrad eingesetzt, das sich dem veränderlichen Wasserstand anpasste.

Örtliche Fachkenntnisse

In der Anbauregion Szentes ist der Wärmehaushalt der Bodenoberfläche sehr günstig. Da der Boden, auf dem die „Szentesi paprika“ angebaut wird, mehr Wärme absorbiert als er in den frühen Morgenstunden abstrahlt, steigt die Wärmemenge der oberen Bodenschicht und der Luft über den Boden an, was einen Temperaturanstieg zur Folge hat. Das durch die harmonische Wärmeversorgung entstehende ausgeglichene Mikroklima sowie der von den bulgarischen Gärtnern eingeführte Bewässerungsanbau haben insgesamt dazu beigetragen, dass die wärme- und wasserintensive „Szentesi paprika“ außerordentlich schmackhaft ist.

Zu den natürlichen Bedingungen kommen die Arbeit der örtlichen Landwirte und die praktischen Erfahrungen mit dem Anbau im Treibhaus (Wärmeregulierung, Belüftung, Beschattung, Pflanzenpflege), die in der Familie weitergegeben werden. Dank der dabei erworbenen Fachkenntnisse können die in den letzten Jahrzehnten infolge der extremen Wetterbedingungen auftretenden ungünstigen Auswirkungen ausgeglichen und — soweit möglich — der Geschmack, die Farbe und die für die einzelnen Sortentypen der „Szentesi paprika“ charakteristische angenehme Form bewahrt werden.

Die von den bulgarischen Gärtnern eingeführte Technologie hat sich nämlich im Laufe des etwa seit 150 Jahren laufenden Anbaus den Anforderungen der Zeit entsprechend verändert. Die unentbehrlichen Faktoren des Paprikaanbaus wurden im Laufe der Zeit neu bewertet und neue Anbaumethoden eingeführt. Von der Anfangszeit bis zu den 1960er Jahren zählten die guten Bodengegebenheiten, die Möglichkeit der Bewässerung (Theiß, Körös und die Systeme der Bewässerungskanäle), die Sonneneinstrahlung (Möglichkeit des frühen Anbaus) und die Erwärmung im zeitigen Frühjahr zu den unentbehrlichen Faktoren des Paprikaanbaus. Die nächste Etappe dauerte vom Ende der 1960er Jahre bis zum Ende der 1980er Jahre. Die Paprikaanbauer haben die frühe Erwärmung dadurch ausgenutzt, dass sie den Anbau in Folienzelte verlegt haben und dabei die hohe Sonneneinstrahlung in den Frühlings- und Wintermonaten optimal genutzt haben. In den 1960-1980er Jahren hat man als Folge der in der Region erschlossenen geothermischen Energie den Anbau der „Szentesi paprika“ vom Freiland in Gewächshäuser und in Folienzelte verlegt, wo sich zurzeit der Anbau ohne Boden durchsetzt.

Hinweis auf die Veröffentlichung der Spezifikation

(Artikel 5 Absatz 7 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/2006 (3))

Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő (Bulletin für ländliche Entwicklung), 16. November 2011, Jahrgang LXI, Nr. 6., Seite 317.

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

---

(1)  ABl. L 343 vom 14.12.2012, S. 1.

(2)  Ersetzt durch die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012.

(3)  Vgl. Fußnote 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/36

---

Veröffentlichung eines Änderungsantrags gemäß Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel

2013/C 237/07

Diese Veröffentlichung eröffnet die Möglichkeit, gemäß Artikel 51 der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates (1) Einspruch gegen den Antrag zu erheben.

ÄNDERUNGSANTRAG

VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 510/2006 DES RATES

zum Schutz von geografischen Angaben und Ursprungsbezeichnungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel
   (2)

ÄNDERUNGSANTRAG GEMÄSS ARTIKEL 9

„TERRA D’OTRANTO“

EG-Nr.: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

g.g.A. ( ) g.U. ( X )

1.   Rubrik der Produktspezifikation, auf die sich die Änderung bezieht

| — |  | Name des Erzeugnisses |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Beschreibung des Erzeugnisses |
| — |  | Geografisches Gebiet |
| — | ☒ | Ursprungsnachweis |
| — |  | Herstellungsverfahren |
| — |  | Zusammenhang mit dem geografischen Gebiet |
| — |  | Etikettierung |
| — | ☒ | Einzelstaatliche Vorschriften |
| — | ☒ | Sonstiges (zu präzisieren) |

—



Name des Erzeugnisses

—

☒

Beschreibung des Erzeugnisses

—



Geografisches Gebiet

—

☒

Ursprungsnachweis

—



Herstellungsverfahren

—



Zusammenhang mit dem geografischen Gebiet

—



Etikettierung

—

☒

Einzelstaatliche Vorschriften

—

☒

Sonstiges (zu präzisieren)

2.   Art der Änderung(en)

| — |  | Änderung des Einzigen Dokuments oder der Zusammenfassung |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Änderung der Spezifikation einer eingetragenen g.U. oder g.g.A., für die weder ein Einziges Dokument noch eine Zusammenfassung veröffentlicht wurde |
| — |  | Änderung der Spezifikation, die keine Änderung des veröffentlichten Einzigen Dokuments erfordert (Artikel 9 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/2006) |
| — |  | Vorübergehende Änderung der Spezifikation aufgrund der Einführung verbindlicher gesundheitspolizeilicher oder pflanzenschutzrechtlicher Maßnahmen durch die Behörden (Artikel 9 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/2006) |

—



Änderung des Einzigen Dokuments oder der Zusammenfassung

—

☒

Änderung der Spezifikation einer eingetragenen g.U. oder g.g.A., für die weder ein Einziges Dokument noch eine Zusammenfassung veröffentlicht wurde

—



Änderung der Spezifikation, die keine Änderung des veröffentlichten Einzigen Dokuments erfordert (Artikel 9 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/2006)

—



Vorübergehende Änderung der Spezifikation aufgrund der Einführung verbindlicher gesundheitspolizeilicher oder pflanzenschutzrechtlicher Maßnahmen durch die Behörden (Artikel 9 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/2006)

3.   Änderung(en)

3.1.   Beschreibung des Erzeugnisses

Die Produktspezifikation wurde mit Einführung der Mediane der typischen Deskriptoren, Streichung der (bedeutungslos gewordenen) Mindestpunktzahl von 6,5 beim Panel-Test und Anwendung der Bestimmungen der Methode COI/T.20/Dok. Nr. 22 des Internationalen Olivenölrats geändert. Des Weiteren wurde die organoleptische Analyse um einige Merkmale erweitert, die der jeweils dominierenden der beiden autochthonen Kultursorten zuzuordnen sind.

Die neue Methode führt zu folgender Beschreibung:

| — | Farbe: grün oder gelb mit leichten grünen Reflexen; |
| --- | --- |

—

Farbe: grün oder gelb mit leichten grünen Reflexen;

| — | Geruch: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven, mit Noten von grünem Laub; |
| --- | --- |

—

Geruch: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven, mit Noten von grünem Laub;

| — | Geschmack: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven. Je nach Erntezeit leichter bis mittlerer scharfer und bitterer Beigeschmack (Median der Attribute zwischen > 0 und 6). Je nach Erntezeit und vorherrschender Olivensorte beinhaltet der fruchtige Geschmack außerdem eine Note von grünem Olivenlaub, frisch gemähtem Gras und Artischocke/wildem Chicorée (Sorte Ogliarola) bzw. Obst/Tomaten/Waldfrüchten (Sorte Cellina). |
| --- | --- |

—

Geschmack: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven. Je nach Erntezeit leichter bis mittlerer scharfer und bitterer Beigeschmack (Median der Attribute zwischen > 0 und 6). Je nach Erntezeit und vorherrschender Olivensorte beinhaltet der fruchtige Geschmack außerdem eine Note von grünem Olivenlaub, frisch gemähtem Gras und Artischocke/wildem Chicorée (Sorte Ogliarola) bzw. Obst/Tomaten/Waldfrüchten (Sorte Cellina).

Bei einigen chemischen Parametern wurden Änderungen vorgenommen: Der maximale Gesamtsäuregehalt, ausgedrückt in Ölsäure, wurde von < 0,8 auf < 0,65 gesenkt, der Linolensäuregehalt geringfügig erhöht (von ≤ 0,70 auf ≤ 0,80), ebenso der K232-Wert (von ≤ 2,10 auf ≤ 2,20). Grund für diese Änderungen ist die Tendenz zur Verstärkung der Präsenz der beiden im geografischen Gebiet verbreitetsten Sorten „Cellina di Nardò“ und „Ogliarola Salentina“, die in den früher nur sehr wenig vertretenen sortenreinen Olivenölsorten zu einem etwas anderen Linolensäuregehalt und K232-Wert führen.

3.2.   Ursprungsnachweis

Zur Anpassung der Produktspezifikation an die Bestimmungen der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1898/2006 wurden auch die Verfahren festgelegt, nach denen die Erzeuger den Ursprungsnachweis zu erbringen haben.

3.3.   Einzelstaatliche Vorschriften

Die Anforderungen des Gesetzes Nr. 169 vom 15. Februar 1992 betreffend die Anerkennung der kontrollierten Ursprungsbezeichnungen der nativen Olivenöle extra („Disciplina per il riconoscimento della denominazione di origine controllata degli oli di oliva vergini ed extravergini“) und des Ministerialerlasses Nr. 573/93 wurden gestrichen.

3.4.   Sonstiges

Die Beantragung der Änderungen erfolgte durch den dazu befugten Schutzverband Consorzio di tutela dell’olio extra vergine di oliva„Terra d’Otranto“, der gegründet wurde, nachdem die Vereinigung APROL, ein Dachverband von sieben Erzeugerverbänden, den ursprünglichen Antrag auf Eintragung der g.U. „Terra d’Otranto“ gestellt hatte.

EINZIGES DOKUMENT

VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 510/2006 DES RATES

zum Schutz von geografischen Angaben und Ursprungsbezeichnungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel
   (3)

„TERRA D’OTRANTO“

EG-Nr.: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

g.g.A. ( ) g.U. ( X )

1.   Name

„Terra d'Otranto“

2.   Mitgliedstaat oder Drittland

Italien

3.   Beschreibung des Agrarerzeugnisses oder des Lebensmittels

3.1.   Erzeugnisart

| Klasse 1.5 | Fette (Butter, Margarine, Öle usw.) |
| --- | --- |

Klasse 1.5

Fette (Butter, Margarine, Öle usw.)

3.2.   Beschreibung des Erzeugnisses, für das der unter Punkt 1 aufgeführte Name gilt

„Terra d’Otranto“ ist ein natives Olivenöl extra mit den folgenden chemischen und organoleptischen Merkmalen:

| — | maximaler Säuregehalt: 0,65 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

maximaler Säuregehalt: 0,65 %;

| — | Peroxidzahl: ≤ 14 mEq O2/kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

Peroxidzahl: ≤ 14 mEq O2/kg;

| — | K232-Wert: ≤ 2,20 |
| --- | --- |

—

K232-Wert: ≤ 2,20

| — | K270-Wert: ≤ 0,170 |
| --- | --- |

—

K270-Wert: ≤ 0,170

| — | Linolensäuregehalt: ≤ 0,8 |
| --- | --- |

—

Linolensäuregehalt: ≤ 0,8

| — | Farbe: grün oder gelb mit grünen Reflexen; |
| --- | --- |

—

Farbe: grün oder gelb mit grünen Reflexen;

| — | Geruch: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven, mit Noten von grünem Laub; |
| --- | --- |

—

Geruch: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven, mit Noten von grünem Laub;

| — | Geschmack: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven. |
| --- | --- |

—

Geschmack: mittelfruchtig (Median des Attributs zwischen 3 und 6) nach reifen Oliven.

Je nach Erntezeit leichter bis mittlerer scharfer und bitterer Beigeschmack; außerdem beinhaltet der fruchtige Geschmack je nach Erntezeit und vorherrschender Olivensorte eine Note von grünem Olivenlaub, frisch gemähtem Gras und Artischocke/wildem Chicorée (Sorte Ogliarola) bzw. Obst/Tomaten/Waldfrüchten (Sorte Cellina).

3.3.   Rohstoffe (nur für Verarbeitungserzeugnisse)

—

3.4.   Futter (nur für Erzeugnisse tierischen Ursprungs)

—

3.5.   Besondere Erzeugungsschritte, die in dem abgegrenzten geografischen Gebiet erfolgen müssen

Anbau, Ernte und Vermahlen der Oliven zu nativem Olivenöl extra „Terra d’Otranto“ müssen in dem in Punkt 4 spezifizierten Erzeugungsgebiet erfolgen.

3.6.   Besondere Vorschriften für Vorgänge wie Schneiden, Reiben, Verpacken usw.

Natives Olivenöl „Terra d’Otranto“ muss in Behältern aus Glas oder Weißblech von höchstens 5 Litern Inhalt in Verkehr gebracht werden. Die Abfüllung des Erzeugnisses muss im abgegrenzten geografischen Gebiet erfolgen, um den Ursprung des Erzeugnisses besser kontrollieren zu können und zu verhindern, dass durch den Transport des nicht abgefüllten Öls aus dem Erzeugungsgebiet die spezifischen Eigenschaften gemäß Punkt 3.2. beeinträchtigt werden oder verlorengehen, insbesondere seine Note von Artischocke/wildem Chicorée. Aufgrund der spezifischen Zusammensetzung seiner Inhaltsstoffe, die von einem signifikanten Anteil an mehrfach ungesättigten Fettsäuren geprägt ist, verliert das Olivenöl bei Einwirkung von Luftsauerstoff, zu der es bei Arbeitsschritten wie Umfüllen, Pumpen, Transport und Entladen kommt, sehr rasch seine organoleptischen Eigenschaften und typischen Merkmale. Bei Abfüllung außerhalb des Erzeugungsgebietes würde die Frequenz dieser Arbeitsschritte noch zunehmen.

3.7.   Besondere Vorschriften für die Etikettierung

Auf dem Etikett muss in gut lesbarer, unverwischbarer und gegenüber allen anderen enthaltenen Angaben deutlich abgehobener Schrift die Bezeichnung „Terra d’Otranto“ angebracht sein, unmittelbar gefolgt vom Hinweis „Denominazione di origine protetta“ (Geschützte Ursprungsbezeichnung) oder der entsprechenden Abkürzung DOP (g.U.) sowie dem Gemeinschaftslogo.

Bei der Vermarktung des Erzeugnisses muss jedes Behältnis eine vom Abfüllbetrieb gemäß dem entsprechenden Kontrollplan vergebene fortlaufende Nummerierung aufweisen.

Die Hinzufügung weiterer, nicht ausdrücklich vorgesehener Angaben einschließlich der Attribute „fine“ (edel), „scelto“ (erlesen), „selezionato“ (ausgewählt) oder „superiore“ (hochwertig) ist nicht zulässig.

Gestattet sind hingegen Hinweise, die sich auf Namen, Firmen oder private Markenzeichen beziehen, sofern sie nicht Werbezwecken dienen oder geeignet sind, die Verbraucher zu täuschen.

Auf dem Etikett muss das Erntejahr der Oliven angegeben sein, aus denen das Öl gewonnen wurde.

4.   Kurzbeschreibung der Abgrenzung des geografischen Gebiets

Das Erzeugungsgebiet von „Terra d’Otranto“ g.U. umfasst die gesamte Provinz Lecce sowie einen Teil der Provinzen Taranto und Brindisi. Es erstreckt sich bogenförmig zwischen ionischem und adriatischem Meer von der Kalklandschaft der Murge Tarantine und den letzten Ausläufern der südöstlichen Murge bei Brindisi über die Ebene von Lecce bis zum Hügelland der Serre Salentine, wo die beiden Meere zusammentreffen.

5.   Zusammenhang mit dem geografischen Gebiet

5.1.   Besonderheit des geografischen Gebiets

„Terra d’Otranto“ g.U. verdankt seine Eigenschaften den besonderen Klima- und Bodenbedingungen im Erzeugungsgebiet. Die Umweltfaktoren und die für die Region typischen Olivensorten verleihen dem Öl seinen besonderen Charakter. Grundlage der sehr einheitlichen Böden im Erzeugungsgebiet ist Kalkgestein aus der Kreidezeit, überlagert durch Schichten von Tertiärkalk mit kalkigen und sandig-lehmigen Sedimenten aus dem Pliozän und dem Pleistozän, woraus Braunerde- und Roterde-Böden entstanden, oft abwechselnd geschichtet auf Kalkgestein. Orografisch ist das Gebiet von weiten Ebenen gekennzeichnet, die von niedrigen, sanften Hügeln unterbrochen und begrenzt werden. Oberflächengewässer sind nicht vorhanden, aber ein dichtes Netz von unterirdischen Wasseradern verleiht der ganzen Region einen karstigen Charakter. Dank ihrer Lage in gemäßigten Breiten, umrahmt von den Küsten zweier Meere, verfügt die Region über ein mildes bis warmes Klima.

5.2.   Besonderheit des Erzeugnisses

Der Olivenanbau im geografischen Gebiet ist auf die beiden autochthonen Sorten Cellina di Nardò und Ogliarola leccese konzentriert, die auch die Eigenschaften des hier erzeugten Öls bestimmen. Die Anforderung, dass es zu mindestens 60 % aus Oliven dieser beiden Sorten besteht, trägt entscheidend zu seinen organoleptischen Eigenschaften bei; je nach Anteil der beiden Sorten variiert der Geschmack zwischen Artischocke/wildem Chicorée und Obst/Tomaten/Waldfrüchte.

5.3.   Ursächlicher Zusammenhang zwischen dem geografischen Gebiet und der Qualität oder den Merkmalen des Erzeugnisses (im Falle einer g.U.) bzw. einer bestimmten Qualität, dem Ansehen oder sonstigen Eigenschaften des Erzeugnisses (im Falle einer g.g.A.)

Der Olivenanbau spielt als wichtigster Produktionszweig im örtlichen Wirtschaftsleben eine zentrale Rolle. Im 19. Jahrhundert stand die geografische Angabe „Terra d’Otranto“ noch für das gesamte Territorium der heutigen Provinzen Lecce, Brindisi und Taranto. Das Gebiet war schon immer durch den Anbau von Oliven geprägt, die zu einem allseits geschätzten Öl verarbeitet wurden. Die Ursprünge des Namens „Terra d’Otranto“ sind eng mit der Geschichte des Olivenanbaus in der Region verbunden. Er wurde in der Antike von phönizischen und griechischen Siedlern eingeführt, und die Basilianer-Mönche, die sich im zehnten Jahrhundert hier niederließen, sorgten dafür, dass erstmals ein Markt für die begehrten Öle aus dieser Region entstand. Im Mittelalter, als Otranto die Hauptstadt der Region Salento war, stand der Name „Terra d’Otranto“ für die gesamte Region.

Hinweis auf die Veröffentlichung der Spezifikation

(Artikel 5 Absatz 7 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 510/2006 (4))

Die Verwaltungsbehörde hat das nationale Einspruchsverfahren eingeleitet und den Antrag auf Änderung der geschützten Ursprungsbezeichnung „Terra d’Otranto“ im Amtsblatt der Italienischen Republik (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana) Nr. 297 vom 21.12.2010 veröffentlicht. Der konsolidierte Text der Produktspezifikation ist abrufbar unter dem Link:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

oder direkt über die Homepage des Ministeriums für Landwirtschaft, Ernährung und Forsten (http://www.politicheagricole.it), oben rechts auf dem Bildschirm auf „Qualità e sicurezza“ (Qualität und Sicherheit) klicken und dann auf „Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE“ (Spezifikationen von Produkten zur Prüfung durch die EU).

---

(1)  ABl. L 343 vom 14.12.2012, S. 1.

(2)  Ersetzt durch die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012.

(3)  Vgl. Fußnote 2.

(4)  Vgl. Fußnote 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 237/40

---

Veröffentlichung eines Antrags gemäß Artikel 50 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über Qualitätsregelungen für Agrarerzeugnisse und Lebensmittel

2013/C 237/08

Diese Veröffentlichung eröffnet die Möglichkeit, gemäß Artikel 51 der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates (1) Einspruch gegen den Antrag einzulegen.

ANTRAG AUF EINTRAGUNG EINER G.T.S.

VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 509/2006 DES RATES

über die garantiert traditionellen Spezialitäten bei Agrarerzeugnissen und Lebensmitteln
   (2)

„ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS“

EG-Nr.: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Name und Anschrift der antragstellenden Vereinigung

| Name der Gruppe oder der Organisation (falls nötig): | „Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai“ |
| --- | --- |
| Anschrift: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Name der Gruppe oder der Organisation (falls nötig):

„Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai“

Anschrift:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 44422201

Fax

+370 44474897

E-Mail:

info@zpienas.lt

2.   Mitgliedstaat oder Drittland

Litauen

3.   Produktspezifikation

3.1   Einzutragende(r) Name(n) (Artikel 2 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1216/2007)

„Žemaitiškas kastinys“

3.2   Es handelt sich um einen Namen, der

| ☒ | für sich genommen spezifisch ist |
| --- | --- |
|  | den spezifischen Charakter des Agrarerzeugnisses oder Lebensmittels wiedergibt |

☒

für sich genommen spezifisch ist



den spezifischen Charakter des Agrarerzeugnisses oder Lebensmittels wiedergibt

Der Name „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ bringt keine spezifischen Eigenschaften des Produkts zum Ausdruck, sondern wird traditionellerweise zur Beschreibung dieses Produkts verwendet und ist sowohl in Žemaitija (westliche Region Litauens) als auch in ganz Litauen bekannt, wie die unter Punkt 3.8 angeführten Quellen zeigen.

Der Name „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ ist in zahlreichen Kochbüchern des 20. Jahrhunderts zu finden: „Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai“ (Tilžė, 1927), „Ką valgome“ (Dr. Tumėnienė et al. Kaunas, 1935) und „Lietuvių valgiai“ (zusammengestellt von J. Pauliukonienė, Vilnius, 1983).

3.3   Wird gemäß Artikel 13 Absatz 2 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 509/2006 die Vorbehaltung des Namens beantragt?

| ☒ | Eintragung mit Vorbehaltung des Namens |
| --- | --- |
|  | Eintragung ohne Vorbehaltung des Namens |

☒

Eintragung mit Vorbehaltung des Namens



Eintragung ohne Vorbehaltung des Namens

3.4   Art des Erzeugnisses (gemäß Anhang II)

| Klasse 1.4: | Sonstige Erzeugnisse tierischen Ursprungs (Eier, Honig, verschiedene Milcherzeugnisse außer Butter u.Ä.) |
| --- | --- |

Klasse 1.4:

Sonstige Erzeugnisse tierischen Ursprungs (Eier, Honig, verschiedene Milcherzeugnisse außer Butter u.Ä.)

3.5   Beschreibung des Agrarerzeugnisses oder Lebensmittels, das den unter Ziffer 3.1 angegebenen Namen führt (Artikel 3 Absatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1216/2007)

„Žemaitiškas kastinys“ ist ein traditionelles Produkt aus Sauerrahm, der erwärmt, geschleudert und anschließend abgekühlt wird.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys“ hat eine gleichmäßige, dickflüssige, homogene, bei + 6 °C auch brüchige, cremige mit einzelnen Flüssigkeitstropfen, im Mund zergehende Konsistenz. Die gesamte Masse hat eine einheitliche gelbe Farbe. Abhängig von den nach der Rezeptur verwendeten Gewürzen kann „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ den Farbton der Gewürze annehmen und kleine Stückchen der Gewürze enthalten. Der Geschmack ist leicht säuerlich, milchsauer, leicht salzig, die Gewürze sind zu spüren.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys“ weist folgende charakteristische chemische und physikalische Eigenschaften auf:

| — | Fettgehalt (je nach Rezeptur): 25-30 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

Fettgehalt (je nach Rezeptur): 25-30 %;

| — | Speisesalzgehalt 1-1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

Speisesalzgehalt 1-1,5 %.

3.6   Beschreibung der Erzeugungsmethode des Agrarerzeugnisses oder Lebensmittels, das den unter Ziffer 3.1 angegebenen Namen führt (Artikel 3 Absatz 2 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1216/2007)

Rohstoffe:

| — | Sauerrahm mit 25-30 % Fettgehalt, 80-83 kg/100 kg des Produktes; |
| --- | --- |

—

Sauerrahm mit 25-30 % Fettgehalt, 80-83 kg/100 kg des Produktes;

| — | Butter mit Fettgehalt von mindestens 82 %, 6-7 kg/100 kg des Produktes; |
| --- | --- |

—

Butter mit Fettgehalt von mindestens 82 %, 6-7 kg/100 kg des Produktes;

| — | Sauermilch mit 2,5-4 % Fettgehalt, 5-5,5 kg/100 kg des Produktes; |
| --- | --- |

—

Sauermilch mit 2,5-4 % Fettgehalt, 5-5,5 kg/100 kg des Produktes;

| — | Speisesalz 1-1,5 kg/100 kg des Produktes. |
| --- | --- |

—

Speisesalz 1-1,5 kg/100 kg des Produktes.

Es können Gewürze (schwarzer Pfeffer, Nelkenpfeffer, Kümmel, Dill, Minze oder ihre Mischungen 0,1-0,15 kg/100 kg des Produktes) oder Gewürzpflanzen (Knoblauch, Zwiebel 1-2 kg/100 kg des Produktes) hinzugefügt werden.

Herstellungsverfahren:

„Žemaitiškas kastinys“ wird auf traditionelle Art hergestellt.

Die in der Rezeptur angegebenen Zutaten werden abgewogen. In einem getrennten Behälter wird der Sauerrahm mit der Sauermilch vermischt und auf eine Temperatur von 25-30 °C erwärmt. Die kalte Butter wird durch Erwärmen auf 25-30 °C weich gemacht. Die Gewürzpflanzen werden gereinigt und zerkleinert.

In den Mischbehälter wird gemäß der Rezeptur zuerst die aufgewärmte und aufgeweichte Butter gegeben und dann schrittweise die Sauerrahm-Sauermilch-Mischung in jeweils 1/8 der Gesamtmenge hinzugefügt. Danach wird mit der Hand oder durch ein gleichwertiges mechanisches Verfahren gerührt. „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ wird immer in eine Richtung gerührt. Ist die Konsistenz des Rahms erreicht, wird ein weiterer Teil der Sauerrahm-Sauermilch-Mischung hinzugefügt und es wird weiter gerührt. Das Verfahren wird wiederholt, bis die gesamte Sauerrahm-Sauermilch-Mischung hinzugegeben wurde. Fängt der „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ an zu steifen, werden Salz, gemahlene Gewürze und zerkleinerte Gewürzpflanzen hinzugefügt und gleichmäßig eingerührt. „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ muss verpackt werden bevor er steif wird.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys“ wird in Tongefäße oder Einwegdosen von 250 g, 200 g und 100 g verpackt. Die Tongefäße werden mit einem Tondeckel und einem Tuch abgedeckt und mit einer Schnur zugebunden. Die Einwegdosen werden mit Foliendeckeln abgedeckt. Nach dem Verpacken wird der „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ bis auf eine Temperatur von 6 °C abgekühlt. Das abgekühlte Produkt bekommt eine feste, gleichmäßige Struktur.

3.7   Besonderer Charakter des Agrarerzeugnisses oder Lebensmittels (Artikel 3 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1216/2007)

Die besonderen Merkmale des „Žemaitiškas kastinys“, die ihn von den Produkten gleicher Kategorie unterscheiden, sind folgende:

| — | Traditionelle Bestandteile und Herstellungsverfahren: Im Unterschied zu anderen Sorten von Kastinys ist die Rezeptur von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ seit den ersten Erwähnungen in den schriftlichen Quellen, die unter Punkt 3.8 angeführt sind, fast unverändert geblieben. Es werden die gleichen Bestandteile und Gewürze in gleichen Mengenverhältnissen verwendet. Um mehr Geschmacksrichtungen zu erhalten begann man später damit, auch andere Sorten von Kastinys aus anderen Rohstoffen herzustellen. Der Sauerrahm wurde z. B. komplett durch die Sauermilch ersetzt, oder der Sauerrahm mit Kefir vermischt, oder verschiedene Zutaten, wie z. B. Rote-Bete-Saft, Karottensaft oder Eigelb beigefügt, um dem Kastinys eine rote oder gelbe Farbe zu verleihen. Für die Herstellung von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ ist ein ständiges, langsames Rühren der Butter-Rahm-Mischung charakteristisch, wobei die Rahm-Sauermilch-Mischung in 8 Schritten beigefügt und die Temperatur (25-30 °C) ständig kontrolliert wird, damit die Buttermilch nicht austritt. Die Produktion von anderen Sorten von Kastinys ist weitgehend modernisiert, die Mischung wird geschlagen statt gerührt und die gesamten Zutaten werden in 3 oder 4 Schritten zusammengegeben, wobei die Temperaturschwankungen größer sein können. |
| --- | --- |

—

Traditionelle Bestandteile und Herstellungsverfahren: Im Unterschied zu anderen Sorten von Kastinys ist die Rezeptur von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ seit den ersten Erwähnungen in den schriftlichen Quellen, die unter Punkt 3.8 angeführt sind, fast unverändert geblieben. Es werden die gleichen Bestandteile und Gewürze in gleichen Mengenverhältnissen verwendet. Um mehr Geschmacksrichtungen zu erhalten begann man später damit, auch andere Sorten von Kastinys aus anderen Rohstoffen herzustellen. Der Sauerrahm wurde z. B. komplett durch die Sauermilch ersetzt, oder der Sauerrahm mit Kefir vermischt, oder verschiedene Zutaten, wie z. B. Rote-Bete-Saft, Karottensaft oder Eigelb beigefügt, um dem Kastinys eine rote oder gelbe Farbe zu verleihen. Für die Herstellung von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ ist ein ständiges, langsames Rühren der Butter-Rahm-Mischung charakteristisch, wobei die Rahm-Sauermilch-Mischung in 8 Schritten beigefügt und die Temperatur (25-30 °C) ständig kontrolliert wird, damit die Buttermilch nicht austritt. Die Produktion von anderen Sorten von Kastinys ist weitgehend modernisiert, die Mischung wird geschlagen statt gerührt und die gesamten Zutaten werden in 3 oder 4 Schritten zusammengegeben, wobei die Temperaturschwankungen größer sein können.

| — | Geschmack: Der Geschmack von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ ist leicht säuerlich, milchsauer, leicht salzig, die Gewürze oder Gewürzkräuter sind zu spüren. Die anderen Sorten von Kastinys haben einen schärferen milchsauren Geschmack (bei Ersatz des Sauerrahms durch Sauermilch) oder einen milchsauren Geschmack mit einem Beigeschmack von Hefe (bei Ersatz des Sauerrahms durch Kefir), man spürt den typischen Geschmack der beigefügten Säfte (Rote Bete oder Karotten) oder des Eigelbs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Geschmack: Der Geschmack von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ ist leicht säuerlich, milchsauer, leicht salzig, die Gewürze oder Gewürzkräuter sind zu spüren. Die anderen Sorten von Kastinys haben einen schärferen milchsauren Geschmack (bei Ersatz des Sauerrahms durch Sauermilch) oder einen milchsauren Geschmack mit einem Beigeschmack von Hefe (bei Ersatz des Sauerrahms durch Kefir), man spürt den typischen Geschmack der beigefügten Säfte (Rote Bete oder Karotten) oder des Eigelbs.

| — | Konsistenz: „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ hat eine gleichmäßige, dickflüssige, homogene, bei + 6 °C auch brüchige, cremige mit einzelnen Flüssigkeitstropfen, im Mund zergehende Konsistenz. Andere Sorten Kastinys haben eine weiche, streichfähige Konsistenz. |
| --- | --- |

—

Konsistenz: „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ hat eine gleichmäßige, dickflüssige, homogene, bei + 6 °C auch brüchige, cremige mit einzelnen Flüssigkeitstropfen, im Mund zergehende Konsistenz. Andere Sorten Kastinys haben eine weiche, streichfähige Konsistenz.

3.8   Traditioneller Charakter des Agrarerzeugnisses oder Lebensmittels (Artikel 3 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1216/2007)

Neben der in ganz Litauen verbreiteten Technologie der Buttergewinnung durch Schlagen des Sauerrahms mit dem Löffel in einem Gefäß entwickelte sich in einer Region Litauens — Žemaitija — eine einzigartige Technologie der Verarbeitung von Sauerrahm, die sich später in ganz Litauen verbreitete. Dabei wird der aufgewärmte Sauerrahm gerührt und dabei der Austritt von Buttermilch vermieden. Man erhält ein Produkt mit spezifischem Geschmack und besonderer Konsistenz, nämlich den „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ (Lietuvių kalbos atlasas, Bd. 1., Leksika, Vilnius 1977). In der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts wird dieses Produkt in akademischen Publikationen beschrieben (Litwa pod wzgledem starozytnych zabytkow, obyczajow i zwyczajow skreslona, Liudwik Adam Jucewicz (Liudwik z Pokiewia), Vilnius 1846 und Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona, Leon Potocki, Poznan 1869), wobei das Herstellungsverfahren (aus erwärmtem Sauerrahm hergestellt) und der einzigartige Geschmack hervorgehoben wurden.

In den im Litauischen Nationalmuseum aufbewahrten Berichten von Menschen, die Ende des 19. — Anfang des 20. Jh. geboren wurden, (Litauisches Nationalmuseum, Ethnographische Sammlung, F 15-4, F 15-13, F 32-7, F 32-48) werden die Herstellung und Rezeptur folgendermaßen beschrieben: in eine vorgewärmte Tonschüssel werden zuerst drei Esslöffel Sauerrahm und ein halber Löffel Butter gegeben. Die Masse wird gut vermischt und mit einem Holzlöffel in eine Richtung gerührt. Kühlt die Masse ab und tritt die Buttermilch aus, so wird die Schüssel in heißem Wasser aufgewärmt und die flüssige Masse in einem Gefäß mit kaltem Wasser abgekühlt. Beim Rühren wird Sauerrahm in kleinen Mengen hinzugefügt. Ein Teil des Sauerrahms wird oft durch Sauermilch ersetzt, damit der Kastinys leichter wird. Am Ende des Rührens werden Salz und andere Gewürze hinzugefügt (Kümmel, gemahlener Pfeffer, gehackter Knoblauch, Zwiebel, je nach Saison auch Frühlingszwiebel, Dill oder Minze).

In Lietuvių valgiai (zusammengestellt von J. Pauliukonienė, Mokslas, Vilnius 1983), einem von Akademikern im Jahr 1983 veröffentlichten Buch, in dem die traditionellen Techniken zur Vorbereitung von Zutaten beschrieben sind, z. B. die Abtrennung des Rahms von der Milch (Abschöpfen mit einem Löffel), wobei im Rahm die Reste der Sauermilch verbleiben, werden Rezeptur und Herstellung von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ folgendermaßen beschrieben: „Žemaitiškas kastinys: 1⁄2 L Sauerrahm, 1 Löffel Butter, 1⁄2 Teelöffel Kümmel oder andere Gewürze und Salz. Die Butter und ein Löffel Sauerrahm werden in eine Tonschüssel gegeben. Die Schüssel wird in heißes Wasser gestellt und die Masse mit einem Holzlöffel gerührt. Es wird weiter gerührt und bevor die Buttermilch austritt wird ein weiterer Löffel Sauerrahm hinzugefügt. Dies wird fortgesetzt bis der gesamte Sauerrahm hinzugefügt ist. Wenn die Masse steifer wird, werden Salz und gewaschener getrockneter Kümmel hinzugefügt und gründlich untergerührt. Kastinys hat einen salzigen, milden, leicht säuerlichen Geschmack.“

Das Herstellungsverfahren und die Rezeptur von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ sind bis heute unverändert geblieben. Der „Fonds des kulinarischen Erbes Litauens“ hat diesem Produkt im Jahr 2010 ein Zertifikat verliehen welches bezeugt, dass „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ mit alten Technologien, aus traditionellen Zutaten und Beigaben sowie mit traditionellen Geräten hergestellt wird.

3.9   Mindestanforderungen und Verfahren für die Kontrolle der besonderen Merkmale des Produkts: (Artikel 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1216/2007 der Kommission)

Unter Berücksichtigung der spezifischen Eigenschaften von „Žemaitiškas kastinys“ werden folgende Kontrollen durchgeführt:

| 1. | Qualität der Rohstoffe jeder Partie:






  — | der Fettgehalt des Sauerrahms und der Sauermilch muss den unter Punkt 3.6 angegebenen Werten entsprechen. Dies wird im Labor überprüft; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Qualität der Rohstoffe jeder Partie:

—

der Fettgehalt des Sauerrahms und der Sauermilch muss den unter Punkt 3.6 angegebenen Werten entsprechen. Dies wird im Labor überprüft;

| — | der Fettgehalt der Butter muss den unter Punkt 3.6 angegebenen Werten entsprechen. Dies wird im Labor überprüft; |
| --- | --- |

—

der Fettgehalt der Butter muss den unter Punkt 3.6 angegebenen Werten entsprechen. Dies wird im Labor überprüft;

| — | die organoleptischen Eigenschaften der Gewürze und der Gewürzpflanzen (Geruch, Geschmack, Farbe) werden anhand von Unterlagen und sensorisch überprüft; |
| --- | --- |

—

die organoleptischen Eigenschaften der Gewürze und der Gewürzpflanzen (Geruch, Geschmack, Farbe) werden anhand von Unterlagen und sensorisch überprüft;

| 2. | Übereinstimmung mit dem unter Punkt 3.6 beschriebenen Herstellungsverfahren: die Reihenfolge der Verfahrensschritte und die Einhaltung der Parameter (Temperatur und Anteil der Bestandteile) werden visuell und anhand von Messungen bei jeder Partie überprüft; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Übereinstimmung mit dem unter Punkt 3.6 beschriebenen Herstellungsverfahren: die Reihenfolge der Verfahrensschritte und die Einhaltung der Parameter (Temperatur und Anteil der Bestandteile) werden visuell und anhand von Messungen bei jeder Partie überprüft;

| 3. | Qualität der Endprodukte jeder Partie:






  — | die organoleptischen Eigenschaften (Konsistenz, Farbe, Geschmack) müssen den unter Punkt 3.5 angegebenen Eigenschaften entsprechen und werden anhand einer sensorischen Analyse überprüft; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Qualität der Endprodukte jeder Partie:

—

die organoleptischen Eigenschaften (Konsistenz, Farbe, Geschmack) müssen den unter Punkt 3.5 angegebenen Eigenschaften entsprechen und werden anhand einer sensorischen Analyse überprüft;

| — | der Fettgehalt muss dem unter Punkt 3.5 angegebenen Wert entsprechen. Dies wird im Labor überprüft; |
| --- | --- |

—

der Fettgehalt muss dem unter Punkt 3.5 angegebenen Wert entsprechen. Dies wird im Labor überprüft;

| — | der Speisesalzgehalt muss dem unter Punkt 3.5 angegebenen Wert entsprechen und wird anhand der Rezeptur und bei Bedarf im Labor überprüft. |
| --- | --- |

—

der Speisesalzgehalt muss dem unter Punkt 3.5 angegebenen Wert entsprechen und wird anhand der Rezeptur und bei Bedarf im Labor überprüft.

Die Kontrolle durch die unter Punkt 4.1 angegebene Behörde, die die Einhaltung der Produktspezifikation überwacht, erfolgt mindestens einmal jährlich.

4.   Behörden oder Stellen, die die Einhaltung der Produktspezifikation überprüfen

4.1   Name und Anschrift

| Name: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
| --- | --- |
| Anschrift: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Name:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Anschrift:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 52404361

E-Mail:

vvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Öffentlich |  Privat |
| --- | --- |

☒ Öffentlich

 Privat

4.2   Besondere Aufgaben der Behörde oder Stelle

Die unter Punkt 4.1 genannte Kontrollbehörde ist für die Überprüfung der Einhaltung der gesamten Produktspezifikation zuständig.

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(1)  ABl. L 343 vom 14.12.2012, S. 1.

(2)  Ersetzt durch die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1151/2012.

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