FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE; WILLIAM 

ROGERS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 10-35555

v. DC No.  6:09 cv-6269 AA ED RAY; MARK MCCAMBRIDGE;

LARRY ROPER; VINCENT OPINION

MARTORELLO,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ann L. Aiken, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 2, 2011—Portland, Oregon

Filed October 23, 2012

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Carlos T. Bea, and

Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima;

Dissent by Judge Ikuta

12757
COUNSEL

Heather Gebelin Hacker, Alliance Defense Fund, Folsom,

California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Karla H. Ferrall, Assistant Attorney General, State of Oregon,

Salem, Oregon, for the defendants-appellees.

Steven W. Fitschen, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for amicus

curiae The National Legal Foundation.

James J. Manning, Jr., Reid & Hellyer, Riverside, California,

and Frank D. LoMonte, Arlington, Virginia, for amicus curiae

Student Press Law Center.

12762 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

The complaint alleges that employees in Oregon State University’s Facilities Department gathered up the outdoor newsbins belonging to the Liberty, a conservative student monthly,

and threw them in a heap by a dumpster in a storage yard. The

employees acted pursuant to an unwritten and previously

unenforced policy governing newsbins on campus. They did

not notify anyone at the Liberty before confiscating the newsbins. After the confiscation, University officials denied the

paper permission to replace the bins anywhere but in two designated campus areas — limited areas to which the University’s traditional student paper, the Daily Barometer, was not

confined. 

Plaintiffs, the Liberty’s student editors and student publishers, sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have little trouble finding constitutional violations. The real issue is whether the

complaint properly ties the violations to the four individual

defendants, who are senior University officials. Plaintiffs confront a familiar problem: they do not know the identities of

the employees who threw the newsbins into the trash heap,

and they do not know which University official devised the

unwritten policy or which official gave the order to confiscate

the bins. Plaintiffs do know, however, that three of the four

defendants participated in the decision to deny them permission to place bins outside of the designated areas after the

confiscation. We conclude that the complaint states claims

against those three defendants based on this post-confiscation

decision. We also hold that the complaint states a claim

against one defendant — the Director of Facilities Services —

based on the confiscation itself.

I

We accept as true the well-pleaded facts in the complaint.

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1220 (9th Cir. 2011). PlaintiffOSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12763
appellant OSU Students Alliance is a registered student organization at Oregon State University (“OSU” or the “University”). Its members are all OSU students. OSU Students

Alliance publishes the Liberty, an independent student newspaper distributed to students on OSU’s campus in Corvallis,

Oregon. The Liberty is a conservative student newspaper that

styles itself as an alternative to the University’s official student paper, the Daily Barometer. The Liberty is funded

through private donations and advertising revenue. OSU Students Alliance may apply for and receive student fees to fund

the Liberty, but has chosen not to apply for those funds to

maintain its independence. The Daily Barometer is funded

through student fees and advertising revenue. 

In 2002, OSU Students Alliance began distributing the Liberty on campus via newsbins. The OSU Facilities Services

gave OSU Students Alliance permission to place these bins

around campus, including in dining halls and the Memorial

Union.

In 2005, OSU Students Alliance placed eight new bins

around campus. OSU Students Alliance placed the bins in the

areas of campus with the heaviest student traffic — near the

bookstore, dorms, football stadium, and other locations. Most

of these locations already had the Barometer bins, and OSU

Students Alliance’s goal was to place bins next to the Barometer so that students would pick up a copy of both student

newspapers. After one bin was stolen, OSU Students Alliance

used wire bicycle chains to secure the remaining seven bins

to nearby light or sign poles. In total, the Liberty had seven

outdoor distribution bins.

At the time of the complaint, the Barometer had 24 distribution bins, which were located throughout campus. Offcampus newspapers, including the Corvallis Gazette-Times,

Eugene Weekly, and USA Today also had distribution bins on

campus. Each of these newspapers had bins chained to fixtures such as light posts or building columns.

12764 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
During the 2008-09 winter term, all seven of the Liberty’s

outdoor distribution bins disappeared from campus.1 The bins

of the other papers, including the other off-campus papers,

were left untouched. Because OSU had given the Liberty permission to place its bins at specific locations throughout campus, and had not revoked that permission, the Liberty’s editors

had no reason to suspect their bins had been confiscated by

the University. Thus, they called the police. Only through the

police investigation did they learn of the University’s involvement. After contacting the Facilities Department, the student

editors recovered the seven newsbins from the storage yard,

where they had been left “heaped on the ground.” One bin

was cracked and others had spilled open, resulting in the loss

of 150 copies of the Liberty to water damage. The wire bicycle locks that the editors used to secure the bins against theft

had been cut.

The Facilities Department’s customer service manager told

plaintiff William Rogers, the Liberty’s executive editor, that

the Department had removed the bins because it was “catching up” on its enforcement of a 2006 University policy that

prohibited newsbins in all but two designated campus locations, one near the bookstore and another by the student

union. The customer service manager told Rogers that, going

forward, the Liberty could not place newsbins anywhere but

in the designated areas. 

Rogers complained by email to defendant Ed Ray, President of OSU, who responded that the events surrounding the

Liberty were “news to him.” Ray copied defendant Mark

McCambridge, Vice President of Finance and Administration,

and defendant Larry Roper, Vice Provost for Student Affairs,

on the email and indicated that these individuals would contact Rogers about the incident. Several days later, defendant

Vincent Martorello, the Director of Facilities Services, called

1The Liberty also had a few indoor distribution bins, but the record does

not state whether the indoor bins were removed as well. 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12765
Rogers and explained, much like the customer service manager had, that the University’s newsbin policy prohibited the

Liberty from placing bins anywhere but in the two designated

locations. Martorello said the purpose of the 2006 policy was

to keep the campus clean by regulating newsbins belonging to

“off-campus” publications. Martorello also said that the policy did not allow bins to be chained to school property

Martorello’s explanation perplexed Rogers. He did not consider the Liberty an “off-campus” paper, because it was written and edited entirely by OSU students and published by the

OSU Student Alliance, a Registered Student Organization

(“RSO”).2 Also, OSU had not applied the policy against the

Daily Barometer, the traditional school paper, nor against the

other off-campus newspapers such as the Corvallis GazetteTimes, Eugene Weekly, and USA Today, which continued to

place their newsbins throughout the campus, not just in the

designated areas. The only apparent difference between the

two papers’ connection to the OSU community was that the

Barometer supplemented its advertising revenue by accepting

student fees from the University, whereas the Liberty received

private funding and advertising revenue but no student fees.3

Rogers challenged the application of the policy against the

Liberty. He wrote Martorello a long email explaining that the

Liberty was a student paper and requesting permission to

place newsbins outside of the designated areas, just as the

Barometer was allowed to do. Martorello initially agreed to

assess the “potential of adding additional [Liberty] bins on

campus. But two weeks later, Martorello tersely denied Rogers’ request: “The Liberty is not in the same situation as the

2The OSU Student Alliance had allowed its RSO status to lapse due to

an oversight sometime in 2007 or 2008, but it renewed its status in 2009.

Neither side argues that the temporary lapse is relevant. 

3Plaintiffs represent that the Liberty “may apply for and receive student

fees . . . but has chosen not to apply for those fees to maintain its independence.” 

12766 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
Barometer and will need to be located at the approved locations . . . .”

In an earlier email to Rogers, Vice President McCambridge

had explained the more onerous restrictions on the Liberty, as

opposed to the Barometer, as follows: “As a newspaper that

is not funded by ASOSU [the Associated Students of OSU],

we don’t have the same communications availability between

your paper and the University . . . .” McCambridge also said

that OSU would work with Rogers on finding newsbin locations for the Liberty, but that those locations would “be

agreed to within the parameters that the University determines.” McCambridge left ultimate resolution of the matter in

Martorello’s hands, writing that Martorello would keep both

him and President Ray informed about the progress of the

Liberty’s request for better campus access. 

After Martorello definitively denied the request, the Liberty’s editors asked him for a copy of the policy governing

newsbins. In response, they received an email from Charles

Fletcher, Esq., Associate General Counsel of OSU, who

explained that the 2006 policy was unwritten: 

There is no specific written policy that governs the

placement of publication bins, and none is required.

OSU’s control over its grounds, buildings, and facilities . . . is plenary under ORS Chapters 351 and 352

. . . subject only to limited exceptions that do not

apply here. I hope this helps. 

Fletcher also suggested that the policy did not apply to the

Barometer because it had been “the campus newspaper since

1896” and because it was funded by ASOSU. In another message, Fletcher explained:

The mere fact that The Liberty has students on staff

does not mean that it is entitled to the same bin locations as the Daily Barometer. The Daily Barometer

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12767
was established over 100 years ago as the OSU student newspaper. It’s published by the OSU Student

Media Committee on behalf of ASOSU. The Liberty, on the other hand, is not published by OSU and

receives almost all of its funding from outside

sources.

Arguing that the unwritten policy arbitrarily distinguished

between the Liberty and the Barometer, the Liberty’s editors

drafted a proposed alternative policy under which both publications would receive equal campus access. The administration refused to consider the proposal. In a final email

reaffirming the University’s commitment to the policy,

Fletcher wrote that he had “been in communication with President Ray and Vice President McCambridge” about plaintiffs’

objections to the policy, but asserted that the policy was constitutional.

Plaintiffs filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of their constitutional rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. Soon thereafter, OSU adopted a

written policy on newspaper bins which, in contrast to its

unwritten predecessor, does not distinguish between “oncampus” and “off-campus” publications. Rather, the written

policy allows any person to obtain permission to place a

newsbin on campus by submitting a request form and complying with certain physical requirements, such as that bins “shall

be placed on a level surface and kept in an upright position.”

In light of the new policy, the district court dismissed as

moot the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. As for

the damages claims, it held them deficient because the complaint did not allege that any of the four defendants had participated in the confiscation of the newsbins. The district court

did not consider the allegations about the aftermath of the

confiscation, when the University continued to apply the

unwritten policy against the Liberty. The court dismissed the

12768 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
damages claims for failure to state a claim, and granted judgment for defendants without leave to amend. See OSU Student

Alliance v. Ray, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Or. 2010). It also

denied plaintiffs’ post-judgment motion seeking leave to

amend. Plaintiffs appeal only the dismissal of the damages

claims and the denial of leave to amend.

II

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to

state a claim. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205. To avoid dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff

must “allege ‘sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v.

United States, 648 F.3d 708, 721 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009)); see also Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216 (“[T]he factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery

and continued litigation.”). In reviewing a dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6), we accept the well-pleaded factual allegations

of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs. Id.; Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n,

629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

III

To state a claim under § 1983 against state officials in their

individual capacities, a plaintiff must plead that the officials,

“acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a

federal right.” Suever v. Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1060 (9th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).

No one disputes that the four defendants acted under color of

state law. Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to plead the

other two elements: (1) the deprivation of a federal right; and

(2) causation. We begin our analysis with the first element.

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12769
The complaint asserts violations of three constitutional rights:

free speech, equal protection, and procedural due process.

A

[1] The circulation of newspapers is expressive conduct

protected by the First Amendment. See City of Lakewood v.

Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988); Honolulu

Weekly, Inc. v. Harris, 298 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“[I]t is beyond dispute that the right to distribute newspapers

is protected under the First Amendment . . . .”) (citation omitted). Therefore, if the government wishes to regulate the

placement of newsbins in a public forum, it must do so

according to established, content-neutral standards. See Plain

Dealer, 486 U.S. at 760. A city ordinance violates the First

Amendment if it allows the mayor to grant or deny applications for newsbin permits without creating standards to limit

the mayor’s discretion — beyond requiring that he “state the

reasons” for a denial — because the absence of established

decision-making criteria makes it “far too easy” for the mayor

to practice censorship by offering “post hoc rationalizations”

and “shifting or illegitimate” justifications. Id. at 758; see id.

at 763 (“[The] danger [of content and viewpoint censorship]

is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and

who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government official.”); see also G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake

Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (“To avoid

impermissible discretion, the challenged ordinance should

‘contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision

and render it subject to effective judicial review.’ ”) (quoting

Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002)). On the

other hand, a city ordinance that seeks to reduce sidewalk

clutter by establishing a content-neutral lottery to award a

limited number of newsbin permits does not violate the First

Amendment, because the lottery establishes a clear basis for

distinguishing between permit applicants. See Honolulu

Weekly, 298 F.3d at 1044.

12770 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
1

[2] To decide whether the complaint adequately pleads a

First Amendment violation under these principles, we must

first determine the nature of the relevant forum — namely, the

OSU campus. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956,

968 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The first step in assessing a First

Amendment claim relating to private speech on government

property is to identify the nature of the forum, because the

extent to which the Government may limit access depends on

whether the forum is public or nonpublic.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Forum analysis has traditionally divided

government property into three categories: public fora, designated public fora, and nonpublic fora.” Flint v. Dennison, 488

F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The traditional public forum is a place “which by long

tradition . . . ha[s] been devoted to assembly and debate.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The designated public

forum “exists when the government intentionally dedicates its

property to expressive conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). The non-public forum is “any public property that

is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

There is also a fourth category, the limited public forum,

which is a partially designated public forum:

The government is not left with only the two options

of maintaining a non-public forum or creating a designated public forum; if the government chooses to

open a non-public forum, the First Amendment

allows the government to open the non-public forum

for limited purposes. The limited public forum is a

sub-category of a designated public forum that refers

to a type of nonpublic forum that the government has

intentionally opened to certain groups or to certain

topics. 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12771
Id. at 830-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In traditional and designated public fora, content-based

restrictions on speech draw strict scrutiny. Id. at 830. But in

a limited public forum, speech restrictions are constitutional

so long as they: (1) comport with the definition of the forum

(for example, the government cannot exclude election speech

from a forum that it has opened specifically for election

speech); (2) are reasonable in light of the purpose of the

forum; and (3) do not discriminate by viewpoint. Id. at 831.

[3] OSU’s campus is at least a designated public forum.

Section 576-005-0015(1) of the Oregon Administrative Rules,

which governs public areas at OSU, states that “University

grounds are open to the public and the University community

for speech activities except any grounds designated for authorized access only.” Through this rule, the state has “intentionally dedicate[d] [campus] property to expressive conduct,”

thereby creating a designated public forum. Flint, 488 F.3d at

830 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hays Cnty.

Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 116-17 (5th Cir. 1992)

(holding that public university campus was a designated public forum because a university rule opened the campus to

speech activities).4

[4] Defendants argue that OSU’s adoption of the unwritten

newsbin policy converted the campus from a designated pub4Because traditional and designated public fora are subject to the same

constitutional restrictions, we need not decide whether the campus is a traditional public forum. See Flint, 488 F.3d at 830. In the past, we have suggested that college campuses may be traditional public fora for students,

id. at 831, but we have also noted that a university retains “the power to

foster an atmosphere and conditions in which its educational mission can

be carried out . . . .” Souders v. Lucero, 196 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1999); see also Desyllas v. Bernstine, 351 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a university could limit fliers to designated bulletin boards

because the bulletin boards were designated public fora while other hallway walls were nonpublic fora). 

12772 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
lic forum into a limited public forum that excluded noncompliant newsbins from the scope of permissible speech activities.

This reasoning is circular: the contention is that the policy

placed a limitation on the forum, and that the limitation on the

forum in turn justified the policy. If speech restrictions in a

designated public forum automatically constituted limitations

on the scope of the forum itself, then the concept of the “designated public forum” would merge entirely with that of the

limited public forum: in either type of forum, the government

would be able to exclude speech subject only to the limitations of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality. To destroy

the designation of a public forum, the government must do

more. It must consistently apply a policy specifically designed

to maintain a forum as non-public. See Hopper v. City of

Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] general

policy of open access does not vanish when the government

adopts a specific restriction on speech, because the government’s policy is indicated by its consistent practice, not each

exceptional regulation that departs from the consistent practice.” Hays Cnty. Guardian, 969 F.2d at 117-18. Accepting as

true the allegations in the complaint, OSU’s newsbin policy

was unwritten and, prior to its application against the Liberty,

entirely unenforced. Therefore, the policy did not establish a

consistent practice aimed at partially closing the campus to

speech activities and, accordingly, did not vitiate the codified

designation of OSU’s campus as a public forum.

2

[5] Having concluded that the OSU campus is a public

forum, we now consider whether enforcement of the unwritten policy against the Liberty violated the rule of Plain

Dealer: restrictions on newspaper circulation in public fora

are unconstitutional unless enforced according to established,

content-neutral standards. Plaintiffs expressly decline to argue

that the unwritten nature of OSU’s policy alone demonstrates

an unconstitutional lack of standards. They cite no law on this

issue, but their concession is probably correct. If OSU had

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12773
announced and consistently applied a straightforward but

unwritten rule about newsbins — for example, that newsbins

could not be chained to lampposts — the University’s failure

to codify the rule might not be fatal. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at

322-32 (approving of licensing standards that are “limited by

[their] terms, or by nondiscriminatory practice, to [contentneutral] considerations . . . .”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

[6] The policy that OSU enforced against plaintiffs, however, was not merely unwritten. It was also unannounced and

had no history of enforcement. It materialized like a bolt out

of the blue to smite the Liberty’s, but not the Daily Barometer’s, newsbins onto the trash heap. The policy created no

standards to cabin discretion through content or history of

enforcement, and it set no fixed standard for a distinction

between the Barometer and the Liberty. The policy’s enforcement against plaintiffs therefore violated the First Amendment. See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 769.

Of course, after the initial confiscation, while plaintiffs

sought permission to replace their newsbins throughout campus, defendants did try to explain the line they drew between

the two student newspapers. Fletcher, the Associate General

Counsel, emphasized the Barometer’s status as OSU’s traditional, flagship paper: “The Daily Barometer was established

over 100 years ago as the OSU student newspaper. It’s published by the OSU Student Media Committee . . . .” Martorello and McCambridge invoked the concept of “off-campus”

versus “on-campus” publications and reasoned that the Liberty was off-campus because it received outside funding,

which, in turn, somehow impeded communication with the

University. 

These explanations have clear constitutional flaws. Fletcher’s explanation raises the ominous specter of viewpoint discrimination. See Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“‘[V]iewpoint discrimination’ occurs when the

12774 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
government prohibits ‘speech by particular speakers,’ thereby

suppressing a particular view about a subject.”) (quoting

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.

37, 59 (1983)); see also Hays Cnty. Guardian, 969 F.2d at

121 (holding that a university could not favor its official student paper over competing papers). And both explanations

invoke criteria — established versus unestablished publications; on-campus versus off-campus funding — that bear no

relationship to the University’s purported interests in reducing

clutter and maintaining the aesthetic beauty of campus. See

City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,

424-25 (1993) (holding that a city ban of only commercial

newsracks was not narrowly tailored, and was therefore

unconstitutional, because “the distinction [between commercial and noncommercial racks] [bore] no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests [in aesthetics] that the city [ ]

asserted”). 

The explanations’ most obvious flaw, however, and the

flaw that guides our decision here, is their timing. Because

defendants offered the explanations only after the confiscation, in an effort to justify the University’s application of an

unannounced and unenforced policy, the explanations cannot

be distinguished from post hoc rationalizations. See Plain

Dealer, 486 U.S. at 760. Maybe the unwritten policy sought

from its inception to differentiate papers based on their

sources of funding, or maybe OSU officials seized upon this

criterion after the Liberty published something that infuriated

them. The “policy’s” lack of established standards muddles

the provenance of defendants’ explanations in a manner that

is unconstitutional under Plain Dealer. The fact that the “policy” was not written or otherwise established by practice

meant there were no standards by which the officials could be

limited. It left them with unbridled discretion.5

5By “standard” we mean a set of requirements for use as a rule or basis

of comparison established in advance to judge the acceptability of a particular object. 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12775
In recent years, courts have limited the rule against just

such unbridled discretion. In Thomas, which concerned a permitting ordinance for events in a public park, the Supreme

Court rejected the contention that the ordinance’s thirteen

enumerated grounds for denial of a permit were “insufficiently precise because they [we]re described as grounds on

which the Park District ‘may’ deny a permit, rather than

grounds on which it must do so.” 534 U.S. at 324.6 Similarly,

we have determined that a permitting scheme is not unconstitutional simply because it contains “somewhat elastic” provisions that allow “reasonable discretion to be exercised by the

permitting authority.” Desert Outdoor Adver. v. Oakland, 506

F.3d 798, 807 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). So long as the ordinance contains standards that are “significantly . . . concrete,” it does not confer unconstitutionally

broad discretion. Id.

Those holdings, however, do not aid defendants. Although

courts have qualified Plain Dealer and earlier unbridled discretion cases by finding that a certain degree of flexibility in

a permitting scheme does not make it unconstitutional, no

court has held that a standardless policy passes muster. OSU’s

unwritten policy provided that newsbins of all newspapers

were limited to two locations, except for the Barometer’s

newsbins, which could be placed anywhere on campus. But

even that policy was not enforced evenly. Only the newsbins

of the Liberty were removed, not the newsbins of other papers

the University did not control, such as the Corvallis GazetteTimes, Eugene Weekly, and USA Today. Thus, we conclude

that this “standard” that the University voiced after the Liberty filed suit was really no standard at all. Its application to

the Liberty’s newbins therefore violated the First Amendment.

6

“Granting waivers to favored speakers (or, more precisely, denying

them to disfavored speakers) would of course be unconstitutional, but we

think that this abuse must be dealt with if and when a pattern of unlawful

favoritism appears, rather than by insisting upon a degree of rigidity that

is found in few legal arrangements.” Thomas, 534 U.S. at 325. 

12776 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (“[A] time, place, and manner

regulation [must] contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial

review.”).7

[7] Defendants do not cite Plain Dealer or make any argument about the policy’s lack of standards. Instead, they

defend the policy as a valid time, place, manner restriction.

But a speech restriction cannot satisfy the time, place, manner

test if the restriction does not contain clear standards. To identify just one problem, the time, place, and manner test

requires content neutrality. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584

F.3d 1196, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kuba v. 1-A

Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2004) (time, place,

and manner restrictions “must be content-neutral, be narrowly

tailored to serve an important government interest, and leave

open ample alternative channels for the communication of the

message”)). One cannot tell if OSU’s unwritten policy was

content-neutral, because the policy did not disclose the basis

7

In Hays County Guardian, the Fifth Circuit struck down a university

regulation that prohibited the handing out of newspapers on campus unless

the papers contained no advertising or were sponsored by a student organization. 969 F.2d at 120-21. However, Hays also rejected an “unbridled

discretion” challenge to a different university regulation that limited newsbins to areas “designated in advance by the Dean of Students.” Id. at 121-

22. Although the regulation included no criteria to guide the Dean’s decisions, the court found that Plain Dealer’s holding on unbridled discretion

did not apply because the regulation gave the Dean discretion to distinguish only between locations, not between the publications that sought to

use those locations. Id. at 122. Yet, the Hays opinion makes clear that the

university allowed its official student paper to place newsbins throughout

campus, not just in the “designated areas” to which other papers were confined. Id. at 115. Perhaps the terms of the regulation contemplated distinctions only between locations, but the administrators nonetheless

distinguished between publications by determining which publications fell

under the policy and which did not. The Hays court’s attempt to distinguish Plain Dealer is thus unpersuasive. In any event, in this case, there

is no dispute that OSU applied its newsbin policy to distinguish between

publications, not merely locations. Accordingly, even under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, Plain Dealer applies. 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12777
on which it distinguished between publications. As Plain

Dealer explains:

[T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult

to distinguish, “as applied,” between a licensor’s

legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate

abuse of censorial power. Standards provide the

guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts

quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor

is discriminating against disfavored speech. 

486 U.S. at 758. OSU’s standardless policy cannot qualify as

a valid time, place, and manner restriction. Id; see also

Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323; Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d

780, 805-07 (9th Cir. 2012).

[8] Plaintiffs also correctly pleaded that the University

applied its “policy” to discriminate against the Liberty

because of its viewpoint. That the University did not apply its

“policy” as articulated by attorney Fletcher equally across all

the newspapers with bins on campus adequately alleges that

the policy was really just an ad hoc attempt to rationalize

viewpoint discrimination — and a poor one at that.8 Once one

applies reasonable construction principles to the complaint’s

allegations which incorporate Fletcher’s explanation, and

translates the Orwellian euphemism of better “communications” based on University funding, the words mean the University has control over the Barometer through its funding,

control which it doesn’t have over Liberty and that is the reason for the application of its news bin “policy” to limit Liberty’s access to the student body. The complaint alleges that

8Similarly, when a Batson challenge is brought in a criminal case and

we evaluate a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for striking a potential

juror, we analyze whether the prosecutor applied that same rationale

across the entire venire of similarly-situated potential jurors, or just as a

post hoc rationalization for striking that one juror. See Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). 

12778 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
OSU officials removed and restricted the newsbins because

the officials disliked the Liberty’s viewpoints. In other words,

leaving the policy’s defects aside, plaintiffs assert that OSU

violated the First Amendment by enforcing the policy in a

viewpoint-discriminatory fashion. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at

325 (noting that even if an ordinance is facially valid, it violates the constitution if applied in a content- or viewpointdiscriminatory fashion); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d

962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this theory, the complaint

plausibly alleges that OSU officials applied the policy to

quash the Liberty’s viewpoint, rather than on the basis of

some unarticulated, content- and viewpoint-neutral criterion.

Hence, the allegations of the complaint sufficiently state a

non-neutral viewpoint restriction to speech in a designated

public forum.

[9] Thus, the complaint adequately pleads a First Amendment violation on two grounds by applying a standardless policy to draw a distinction between the Liberty and the

Barometer and by engaging in viewpoint discrimination.

B

Plaintiffs press equal protection claims on the theory that

the University treated them differently than similarly situated

persons by restricting the Liberty’s newsbins but not the

newsbins of other publications. 

The equal protection claims rise and fall with the First

Amendment claims. Plaintiffs do not allege membership in a

protected class or contend that the University’s conduct burdened any fundamental right other than their speech rights.

Therefore, the University’s differential treatment of plaintiffs

will draw strict scrutiny (as opposed to rational basis review)

under the Equal Protection Clause only if it impinged plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. See ACLU of Nev. v. City of

Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797-98 (9th Cir. 2006); Monterey

Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12779
1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting, with regard to “equal protection claims relating to expressive conduct,” that “[o]nly

when rights of access associated with a public forum are

improperly limited may we conclude that a fundamental right

is impinged”). 

[10] As we have already explained, the complaint properly

alleges that the University infringed plaintiffs’ speech rights

by employing a standardless policy to draw a distinction

between the Liberty and the Barometer and by engaging in

viewpoint discrimination. Therefore, the complaint also states

equal protection claims for differential treatment that trenched

upon a fundamental right. See ACLU of Nev., 466 F.3d at 798.

Defendants argue that the equal protection claims’ dependence on the First Amendment claims requires dismissal of

the equal protection claims. There is no authority for this

proposition. At least twice, the Supreme Court has analyzed

speech-based equal protection claims that were coupled with

First Amendment claims without suggesting that the claims’

common analytical predicate foreclosed one claim or the

other. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 54; Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530

U.S. 703, 709 (2000). Although the Court has noted that one

analysis will often control both claims, see Perry, 460 U.S. at

54, it has never invoked the concept of duplicity or redundance to find preclusion of a speech-based equal protection

claim. Defendants rely on a footnote in a Ninth Circuit decision which, after noting that the plaintiff had “made only

passing reference to [his speech-based] Equal Protection [theory] in his Complaint and dedicated to it only one sentence in

his opening brief on appeal,” quoted a treatise for the proposition that “[i]t is generally unnecessary to analyze laws which

burden the exercise of First Amendment rights . . . under the

equal protection guarantee.” Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207,

1213 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). This footnote recognizes that the

two types of claims share a common analytical foundation,

but it stops well short of barring a plaintiff from bringing a

12780 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
§ 1983 claim for violation of a constitutional right simply

because that violation mirrors the violation of a different

right. 

[11] The complaint adequately pleads an equal protection

violation.

C

Plaintiffs contend that the University violated their due process rights by confiscating the newsbins without notice.

[12] Due process generally requires that the government

give notice before seizing property. Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he government may not take property like a thief in the night; rather, it

must announce its intentions and give the property owner a

chance to argue against the taking.”). This general rule has

exceptions. “The government need not give notice in an emergency, nor if notice would defeat the entire point of the seizure, nor when the interest at stake is small relative to the

burden that giving notice would impose.” Id. at 1093-94.

Defendants invoke the final exception. 

The Clement plaintiff had parked her car in the lot of the

hotel where she resided, in violation of the car’s “nonoperational” registration, which barred the vehicle from

accessible parking lots. Id. at 1092. Rather than issue her a

ticket or notify her of the violation, the defendant police officer had the car towed. Id. The court found a due process violation because giving notice would not have imposed a burden

on the officer. The car was parked in the lot with the hotel’s

permission, not in “the path of traffic,” and the officer easily

could have provided notice by leaving a ticket or informing

the hotel clerk that plaintiff had to move the car. Id. at 1094-

95. The court also noted that even though the vehicle was

non-operational, the plaintiff had an appreciable interest in

receiving notice before the tow. Id. at 1094 (“[T]he [typical

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12781
car] owner suffers some anxiety when he discovers that [his]

vehicle has mysteriously disappeared from its parking spot

. . . . [Also,] the owner will normally have to travel to the towing garage . . . which may involve significant cost . . . .”). 

[13] The complaint adequately pleads a due process violation under Clement. If the allegations are true, then OSU confiscated property without notice even though providing notice

would have imposed, at most, only a minimal burden on

OSU. After adopting the unwritten newsbin policy in 2006,

the University waited more than two years to enforce it

against the Liberty. Clearly there was no urgency and no reason to junk the bins instead of directing plaintiffs to remove

them. Moreover, contact information for the paper’s editorial

board appeared inside the first page of every copy of the Liberty. Providing notice would have been as simple as flipping

a page and making a phone call or sending an email. The

Facilities Department’s decision to forego this procedure in

favor of summarily confiscating the newsbins — more like a

“thief in the night” than a “conscientious public servant” —

violated due process. Id. at 1093, 1095.

Defendants seek to distinguish Clement on the ground that

plaintiffs here had only a small interest in receiving notice

before the confiscation. Whereas the car owner in Clement

was presumed to have suffered inconvenience, cost, and anxiety in locating and recovering her car after the tow, the argument goes, plaintiffs recovered their newsbins “with little

effort or cost.” Problematically, this argument ignores the

“burden” prong of the Clement analysis: even if it were true

that plaintiffs’ interest in avoiding confiscation of the newsbins was small in some absolute sense, that interest certainly

was not small “relative to the burden that giving notice would

[have] impose[d],” because giving notice would not have

imposed any burden at all. Id. at 1093-94. Moreover, the argument that plaintiffs weathered the confiscation with “little

effort or cost” contravenes the factual allegations. Like the

plaintiff in Clement, plaintiffs had no idea what had happened

12782 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
to their newsbins after the confiscation; they had to call the

police just to learn of OSU’s involvement. And once plaintiffs

located the bins in a heap by the dumpster, they had to clean

them of mud and debris and then load and transport them out

of the storage yard “over several trips.” They lost 150 copies

of the paper due to water damage. They had to arrange for the

Facilities Department to repair one damaged bin. Because the

Facilities Department took all seven of the Liberty’s outdoor

newsbins, the confiscation likely hobbled the paper’s circulation for a period. Plaintiffs had as much interest in avoiding

this ordeal as the Clement plaintiff had in avoiding the tow of

her non-operational vehicle, which she could not use for

transportation in any event. See id. at 1094.

The complaint adequately pleads a due process violation.

IV

More difficult is the question of individual causation —

whether the complaint ties the constitutional violations to the

individual defendants.

[14] Section 1983 suits, like Bivens suits, do not support

vicarious liability.9“[E]ach government official, his or her

title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The Attorney General’s

senior position does not by itself make him liable for racial

and religious discrimination perpetrated by subordinates;

rather, he must have engaged in culpable action or inaction

himself. Id. at 1948. To state a valid § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff

9

“[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to an action against state or

local officials under § 1983.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1202. It is an action

brought against federal employees for violations of a plaintiff’s federal

constitutional rights. Minneci v. Pollard, ___U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 617, 602

(2012); see generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) ( “[V]iolation of [the

Fourth Amendment] by a federal agent . . . gives rise to a cause of action

for damages” against a Federal Government employee.”). 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12783
must plead that each government-official defendant, through

the official’s own individual actions, had violated the Constitution.” Id. 

A. First Amendment and Equal Protection Claims

Against Martorello

[15] Some of plaintiffs’ claims raise thorny questions

under Iqbal, but the First Amendment and equal protection

claims against Martorello, the Director of Facilities Services,

are more straightforward. The complaint straightforwardly

ties Martorello to violations of both constitutional provisions.

After unknown Facilities Department employees threw the

newsbins into the trash heap, the Liberty’s editors pleaded

with Martorello for permission to replace the bins in locations

beyond the “designated areas.” The Liberty is an on-campus

paper just like the Barometer, they said, and should enjoy the

same access to campus. Martorello rejected these pleas

directly. He told the editors that “[t]he Liberty is not in the

same situation as the Barometer and [its bins] will need to be

located at the approved locations by the Memorial Union.” In

other words, relying on a standardless and unwritten policy,

Martorello denied plaintiffs permission to place their newsbins in locations where the Barometer was permitted to place

its bins. He did so directly, not through subordinates, and

therefore violated the First Amendment under Plain Dealer

through his “own individual actions.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1948.

For the same reasons, he violated equal protection by discriminating against the Liberty in a way that impinged plaintiffs’

speech rights. See ACLU of Nev., 466 F.3d at 797-98. 

As we shall see, Iqbal emphasizes that a constitutional tort

plaintiff must allege that every government defendant —

supervisor or subordinate — acted with the state of mind

required by the underlying constitutional provision. 129 S. Ct.

at 1948-49. Invidious discrimination claims require specific

intent; accordingly, to state invidious discrimination claims

against the Attorney General, Javaid Iqbal had to allege that

12784 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
the Attorney General acted with the purpose of discriminating

by race, religion, or national origin. Id. The First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech claims against Martorello,

however, do not implicate this requirement, because the allegations show specific intent. After deliberating over plaintiffs’

request, Martorello purposefully denied them the same campus access that the Barometer enjoyed. Even if free speech

claims require specific intent (which they do not, as we conclude below), the complaint states claims against Martorello.

[16] The district court erred by considering only Martorello’s involvement vel non in the confiscation of the bins, without considering his personal participation in continuing to

enforce the unconstitutional policy against the Liberty after

the confiscation. The court dismissed the claims against Martorello (and the other defendants) because it found that “plaintiffs do not allege that any individual defendants were

involved in the bin removal process.” This analysis is incomplete. Whether or not the complaint plausibly alleges that

Martorello had a hand in the confiscation, it states valid

§ 1983 claims for First Amendment and equal protection violations because it pleads that he personally applied the policy

against plaintiffs after the confiscation.

B. First Amendment and Equal Protection Claims

Against Ray and McCambridge

[17] The claims against President Ray and Vice President

McCambridge require closer examination. According to the

complaint, neither defendant actually made the decision to

deny plaintiffs permission to place their newsbins throughout

campus; Martorello did that. Both Ray and McCambridge,

however, oversaw Martorello’s decision-making process and

knowingly acquiesced in his ultimate decision. Multiple

emails excerpted in the complaint (one by McCambridge himself)10 state that Martorello and Fletcher kept the President

10McCambridge’s email to Rogers, the Liberty’s executive editor, indicates that McCambridge agreed with Martorello’s eventual decision to

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12785
and Vice President informed about the status of the Liberty

controversy — both before and after Martorello definitively

decided that the unwritten policy required that the Liberty

newsbins remain confined to the designated areas. According

to the complaint, then, Ray and McCambridge knew that their

subordinate, Martorello, was applying the previously unannounced and unenforced policy against the Liberty, but not

against any of the other off-campus newspaper, and they did

nothing to stop him. The question is whether allegations of

supervisory knowledge and acquiescence suffice to state

claims for speech-based First Amendment and equal protection violations.

[18] Iqbal does not answer this question. That case holds

that a plaintiff does not state invidious racial discrimination

claims against supervisory defendants by pleading that the

supervisors knowingly acquiesced in discrimination perpetrated by subordinates, but this holding was based on the elements of invidious discrimination in particular, not on some

blanket requirement that applies equally to all constitutional

tort claims. Iqbal makes crystal clear that constitutional tort

claims against supervisory defendants turn on the requiredeny plaintiffs the same campus access given the Barometer. The

McCambridge email, however, did not actually impose that decision.

Rather, the email left the ultimate decision to Martorello, whom it indicated would “follow up” on plaintiffs’ request and would “keep [Ray and

McCambridge] informed.” Unlike Martorello, then, McCambridge did not

directly deny plaintiffs’ request. The email does serve as evidence that

McCambridge harbored an intent to deny plaintiffs expanded campus

access when he ultimately acquiesced in Martorello’s unconstitutional

decision. And McCambridge’s e-mail to Fletcher can be read to express

the reason the University was intentionally limiting the Liberty’s freedom

of speech when he stated, “we don’t have the same communications availability between your paper and the University”, i.e., the University did not

have control over the content of the Liberty. However, because we conclude that knowledge and acquiescence suffices to state a First Amendment claim against a supervisor, we do not decide whether the complaint

plausibly alleges that McCambridge acted with specific intent. 

12786 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
ments of the particular claim — and, more specifically, on the

state of mind required by the particular claim — not on a generally applicable concept of supervisory liability. “The factors

necessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the

constitutional provision at issue.” 129 S. Ct. at 1948. Allegations that the Attorney General (Ashcroft) and the director of

the FBI (Mueller) knowingly acquiesced in their subordinates’ discrimination did not suffice to state invidious racial

discrimination claims against them, because such claims

require specific intent — something that knowing acquiescence does not establish. Id. at 1949; see Starr, 652 F.3d at

1207 (“Holding [ ] Ashcroft and [ ] Mueller personally liable

for unconstitutional discrimination if they did not themselves

have a discriminatory purpose would be equivalent to finding

them vicariously liable for their subordinates’ violation

. . . .”). On the other hand, because Eighth Amendment claims

for cruel and unusual punishment generally require only

deliberate indifference (not specific intent), a Sheriff is liable

for prisoner abuse perpetrated by his subordinates if he knowingly turns a blind eye to the abuse. See id. at 1205. The Sheriff need not act with the purpose that the prisoner be abused.

See id. at 1206-07 (“A showing that a supervisor acted, or

failed to act, in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to

an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights is sufficient to demonstrate the involvement — and the liability — of that supervisor.”). Put simply, constitutional tort liability after Iqbal

depends primarily on the requisite mental state for the violation alleged. 

Section 1983 “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying

constitutional right;” therefore, the requisite mental state for

individual liability will change with the constitutional provision at issue.11 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).

11Municipalities, in contrast, are subject to a generally applicable state

of mind requirement that is independent of the underlying constitutional

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12787
Here, where President Ray and Vice President McCambridge

are alleged to have knowingly acquiesced in their subordinate

Martorello’s violation of plaintiffs’ free speech rights under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we must decide

whether knowledge (as opposed to purpose) satisfies the mental state requirement for free speech violations.12

provision. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 n.8 (1989)

(“[T]he proper standard for determining when a municipality will be liable

under § 1983 for constitutional wrongs does not turn on any underlying

culpability test that determines when such wrongs have occurred.”); see

also Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-deterrence, and Supervisory Liability after Iqbal, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 279, 305-06 (2010)

(arguing that Iqbal and the Canton v. Harris doctrine of municipal liability

are inconsistent). 

12The idea that constitutional tort claims impose state of mind requirements comes from the tort concept of “duty.” See Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (“[Section 1983] should be read against the background of tort liability . . . .”). To state a § 1983 claim against a government defendant, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted with

sufficient culpability to breach a duty imposed by the relevant provision

of federal law. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. The Equal Protection Clause,

for example, imposes a duty not to purposefully discriminate on the basis

of race, religion, or national origin. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49. The

Eighth Amendment imposes a duty not to act with deliberate indifference

towards the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Starr, 652 F.3d

at 1206-07. After Iqbal, the first question in a § 1983 case, like a common

law tort case, is whether the defendant’s conduct breached a duty to the

plaintiff. 

Also like common law torts, constitutional torts require proximate

cause. Even if the defendant breached a duty to the injured party, the

defendant is only liable if his conduct foreseeably caused the injury. See

Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 926 (9th Cir. 2009). Proximate

cause is an objective requirement. It does not require a separate mental

state; the element of duty requires a mental state. See Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (noting in the municipal liability context

that “a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the

requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link

between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”)

(emphasis added). Of course, duty often eclipses proximate cause in the

arena of intentional torts. An action taken with the purpose of violating a

12788 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
If the inquiry sounds misplaced — if it strikes one as

wrongheaded to speak of free speech violations and mental

state requirements in the same breath — it is because the law

has had scant occasion to address it. With some notable

exceptions, courts before Iqbal generally did not have to

determine the required mental state for constitutional violations, particularly not free speech violations. A uniform mental state requirement applied to supervisors: so long as they

acted with deliberate indifference, they were liable, regardless

of the specific constitutional right at issue. See Preschooler II

v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs. 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.

2007) (“[A] supervisor is liable for the acts of his subordinates if the supervisor . . . knew of the violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent them.”) (internal quotations

and alterations omitted); see also Kit Kinports, Iqbal and

Supervisory Immunity, 114 Penn St. L. Rev. 1291, 1294-95

(2010) (noting that before Iqbal, the circuits had adopted

generally-applicable mental state standards for § 1983 supervisory liability).13 As for the subordinate officials who violate

constitutional rights directly — the officer who shoots the

suspect, the Facilities Department employee who junks the

newsbins — they act intentionally in most cases. Perhaps they

do not always know that their actions are unconstitutional

constitutional right, or the knowledge that such a violation will occur, will

typically be the foreseeable cause of the ensuing violation, absent perhaps

an intervening cause. See, e.g., Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862

(9th Cir. 2008). Still, confusing the two elements portends analytical mishap, particularly in the § 1983 context. Whereas proximate cause is a fixed

requirement — it imposes the same hurdle upon on all § 1983 claims for

individual liability regardless of the specific provision of federal law on

which the claims are premised, see Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (“[§ 1983]

makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions”)

(emphasis added) — the duty requirement changes with the underlying

claim. 

13Not every circuit used the deliberate indifference standard for supervisory liability — at least one circuit found that gross negligence sufficed

— but each circuit applied a uniform standard that did not depend on the

particular constitutional right at issue. Kinports, supra, at 1295. 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12789
(hence, the qualified immunity defense), but they do intend to

take the violative action. Thus, before Iqbal, fixing the mental

state requirement for a particular constitutional provision was

most often unnecessary. The line officers generally satisfied

every mental state because they acted intentionally, and

supervisors were subject to a uniform mental state requirement divorced from the underlying claim.14 By abrogating the

second half of this framework, however, Iqbal places new

weight on the state of mind requirement for constitutional

torts. Now claims against supervisors present problems that

claims against subordinates typically do not: must the supervisor have harbored the specific intent to subject the plaintiff to

the injury-causing act, or does knowledge or some lesser mental state suffice?15

14The constitutional tort claims that did require mental state analysis

pre-Iqbal concerned injuries that resulted from inaction or inadvertence,

e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (procedural due process

claim for injuries caused when deputy sheriff inadvertently left pillow on

jail stairs); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment

claim for failure to provide adequate medical care), and claims for invidious discrimination. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).

15We understand Iqbal’s language eliminating the doctrine of “supervisory liability” to overrule circuit case law that, following City of Canton

v. Harris, had applied a uniform test for supervisory liability across the

spectrum of constitutional claims. See 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[The doctrine

of] ‘supervisory liability’ is inconsistent with [the rule] the petitioners may

not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a § 1983 suit

or a Bivens action . . . the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer.”);

Kinports, supra, at 1295 (summarizing circuit case law). Iqbal means that

constitutional claims against supervisors must satisfy the elements of the

underlying claim, including the mental state element, and not merely a

threshold supervisory test that is divorced from the underlying claim.

Iqbal does not stand for the absurd proposition that government officials

are never liable under § 1983 and Bivens for actions that they take as

supervisors. Nobody would argue, for example, that a supervisor who

orders subordinates to violate constitutional rights escapes liability under

Iqbal. As we held in Starr, even a supervisor’s knowledge and acquiescence will suffice for liability in some circumstances. 652 F.3d at

1206-07; see also Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648

F.3d 1020, 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that involuntarily commit12790 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
[19] For two reasons, we conclude that knowledge suffices

for free speech violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.16 First, it is black-letter law that government need not

target speech in order to violate the Free Speech Clause.

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), sets forth a

framework for analyzing the constitutionality of laws that

inhibit expressive conduct without aiming to do so: 

[A] government regulation [of expressive conduct] is

sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional

power of the Government; if it furthers an important

or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

expression; and if the incidental restriction on

alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than

is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 

Id. at 377.17 The requirement that the governmental interest be

“unrelated to the suppression of free expression” is but one

prong in O’Brien’s four-pronged test. Even if a law has purely

speech-neutral purposes — such as, for example, preservation

of the orderly functioning of the draft system — its incidental

effects on free expression still might violate the First Amendted psychiatric patient stated due process claim against hospital administrator for failing to provide safe conditions through knowledge and

acquiescence). Iqbal holds simply that a supervisor’s liability, like any

government official’s liability, depends first on whether he or she

breached the duty imposed by the relevant constitutional provision. 

16Because the facts alleged do not require us to do so, we do not decide

whether anything less than knowledge, such as recklessness or gross negligence, suffices. 

17In O’Brien, the Supreme Court held that because of the government’s

substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of draft cards,

the statute making it a criminal offense to knowing destroy or mutilate a

draft card was an appropriately narrow means of protecting the government’s interest. The statute condemned only the independent noncommunicative impact of the conduct and was therefore not a violation of the

defendant’s right to freedom of speech. 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12791
ment if those effects are “greater than is essential” to further

the speech-neutral interest. Id.; see also Clark v. Cmty. for

Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (applying

intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment to regulation prohibiting camping on national parks in Washington,

D.C.). In other words, the government may violate the speech

clause even if it acts without the purpose of curtailing speech.

Free speech claims do not require specific intent.

Second, only in limited situations has the Supreme Court

found constitutional torts to require specific intent. We know

of three examples: (1) due process claims for injuries caused

by a high-speed chase, Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

U.S. 833, 836 (1998); (2) Eighth Amendment claims for injuries suffered during the response to a prison disturbance,

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986); and (3) invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and the

First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1948. As for the first two examples, they turn on exigent circumstances not present in the free speech context. Because

prison riots and high-speed chases do not afford officers time

for “actual deliberation” before determining how best to carry

out their official responsibilities, deliberate indifference does

not suffice for liability in those contexts — the plaintiff must

show intent. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851, 852-53 (“As the very

term ‘deliberate indifference’ implies, the standard is sensibly

employed only when actual deliberation is practical . . . .”).

The reasoning does not apply to officials who embark on a

course of conduct that curtails speech, because such officials

— like Ray and McCambridge, for example — do not face

similar exigencies. See Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police

Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he critical question in determining the appropriate standard of culpability is

whether the circumstances allowed the state actors time to

fully consider the potential consequences of their conduct.”).

As for invidious discrimination claims, the substance of the

constitutional right to which the claims correspond — the

12792 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
right not to be singled out because of some protected characteristic, like race or religion — calls for a specific intent

requirement. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (“The

central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”). But the First Amendment

Speech Clause is more absolute: a limitation on speech may

be unconstitutional even if it follows from a law that, like

many time, place, and manner restrictions, applies neutrally to

expressive and non-expressive conduct alike. See, e.g., Long

Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d

1011, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (striking down as not narrowly tailored a parks regulation that required permits for activities

“likely to require the provision of city services”). Thus, while

a specific intent requirement inheres in claims for invidious

discrimination, the same requirement does not inhere in

claims for free speech violations. 

[20] For these two reasons — because Supreme Court case

law indicates that free speech violations do not require specific intent, and because the rationales that have led the Court

to read specific intent requirements into certain other constitutional tort claims do not apply in the free speech context —

we conclude that allegations of facts that demonstrate an

immediate supervisor knew about the subordinate violating

another’s federal constitutional right to free speech, and

acquiescence in that violation, suffice to state free speech violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleges that Ray and McCambridge knowingly

acquiesced in Martorello’s decision to continue restricting the

Liberty’s circulation under the standardless, unwritten newsbin policy. They stood superior to Martorello; they knew that

Martorello denied plaintiffs’ publication the same access to

the campus that the Barometer received; and they did nothing.

The complaint therefore states First Amendment and Equal

Protection claims against Ray and McCambridge.18

18As we have already noted, see Part III.B, supra, the same analysis

controls the First Amendment and speech-based equal protection claims.

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12793
C. Process Claims

Unlike the free speech violation, the procedural due process

violation based on the University’s failure to notify the owner

of the newsbins prior to taking them did not endure beyond

the confiscation of the newsbins. The Facilities Department

threw the newsbins into the storage yard, without notice, but

then allowed plaintiffs to reclaim the bins. Plaintiffs’ task in

tying Martorello and the other defendants to the due process

violation is therefore more difficult than the free speech violation. To state a claim that defendants committed a procedural

due process violation through their “own individual actions,”

plaintiffs must tie the defendants to the confiscation itself.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

1. Martorello

The allegations portray Martorello as the University official

responsible for enforcing the unwritten newsbin policy. Thus,

the question on which plaintiffs’ due process claim against

Martorello turns is not whether knowledge and acquiescence,

deliberate indifference, or some lesser mental state meets the

state of mind requirement for the claim, but rather whether an

official’s administration and oversight of an unconstitutional

policy meets the required threshold. The Tenth Circuit confronted this question in Dodds, where the issue was whether

the complaint stated a § 1983 claim against a Sheriff for a due

process violation that occurred when jail officials denied the

plaintiff the opportunity to post bail for several days after his

arrest. 614 F.3d at 1189-90. The violation occurred pursuant

Unlike equal protection claims for racial or religious discrimination,

speech-based equal protection claims do not require a showing that the

plaintiff was singled out because of a particular characteristic. Rather,

speech-based equal protection claims require only a showing that the

plaintiff was subjected to differential treatment that trenched upon a fundamental right. See ACLU of Nev., 466 F.3d at 797-98. Therefore, plaintiffs’ equal protection claims do not require specific intent. 

12794 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
to a county policy that prevented detainees charged with felonies from posting bail before arraignment, even if bail had

been pre-set in the arrest warrant. Id. at 1190. The Sheriff was

in charge of the jail and therefore oversaw enforcement of the

policy, although there was no allegation that he was involved

in or aware of the policy’s application against the plaintiff in

particular. Id. at 1202-03. The court held that the complaint

stated a claim: 

Whatever else can be said about Iqbal, and certainly

much can be said, we conclude the following basis

of § 1983 liability survived it and ultimately resolves

this case: § 1983 allows a plaintiff to impose liability

upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses

responsibility for the continued operation of a policy

the enforcement (by the defendant-supervisor or her

subordinates) of which “subjects, or causes to be

subjected” that plaintiff “to the deprivation of any

rights . . . secured by the Constitution . . . .” 

Id. at 1199 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Because the Sheriff

maintained the policy at the jail, and because the unconstitutional denial of the opportunity for the plaintiff to post bail

followed directly from the policy, the Sheriff was held liable.

Id. at 1203-04.

[21] We agree with Dodds. When a supervisory official

advances or manages a policy that instructs its adherents to

violate constitutional rights, then the official specifically

intends for such violations to occur. Claims against such

supervisory officials, therefore, do not fail on the state of

mind requirement, be it intent, knowledge, or deliberate indifference. Iqbal itself supports this holding. There, the Court

rejected the invidious discrimination claims against Ashcroft

and Mueller because the complaint failed to show that those

defendants advanced a policy of purposeful discrimination (as

opposed to a policy geared simply toward detaining individuOSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12795
als with a “suspected link to the [terrorist] attacks”), not

because it found that the complaint had to allege that the

supervisors intended to discriminate against Iqbal in particular. 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (concluding that Javaid Iqbal failed to

allege that the supervisory defendants created a policy that

directed subordinates to discriminate by race or religion).

Advancing a policy that requires subordinates to commit constitutional violations is always enough for § 1983 liability, no

matter what the required mental state, so long as the policy

proximately causes the harm — that is, so long as the plaintiff’s constitutional injury in fact occurs pursuant to the policy.

Under these principles, the complaint states a due process

claim against Martorello if it plausibly alleges that: (1) “he

promulgate[d], implement[ed], or in some other way possesse[d] responsibility for the continued operation of” the

newsbin policy; and (2) the due process violation (i.e., the

confiscation of the newsbins without notice) occurred pursuant to that policy. 

[22] The complaint does not allege that Martorello devised

the newsbin policy; plaintiffs have no way of knowing, without discovery, who at OSU devised the unwritten policy. But

the complaint does create a plausible inference that Martorello

was “responsib[le] for the continued operation of” the newsbin policy. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199. It describes his job

responsibilities as “overseeing campus administration related

to Facilities and creating, implementing, and/or administering

university policies, including the policies and procedures

challenged herein.” Of course, the complaint also alleges that

the other three defendants were responsible for the “policies

and procedures” challenged in this action — viz., the newsbin

policy. But the allegation that Martorello bore responsibility

for the operation of the policy is plausible — not conclusory

— in light of other allegations in the complaint. Martorello

was head of the Facilities Department. The unwritten newsbin

policy governed use of OSU facilities and fell to the Facilities

12796 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
Department for enforcement. The inference that Martorello

oversaw enforcement of the policy flows naturally from these

facts. Moreover, the allegations about the aftermath of the

confiscation make plain that Martorello was the policy’s steward. When plaintiffs complained about the unequal treatment

the Liberty received vis-a-vis the Barometer, University officials tapped Martorello to handle the issue. It was Martorello

who analyzed plaintiffs’ petition for recognition as an “oncampus” publication under the policy, and it was Martorello

who ultimately denied that petition. The complaint need not

allege more plausibly to allege that Martorello bore responsibility for administration of the newsbin policy. 

[23] As for proximate causation, the complaint pleads

forthrightly that the unknown Facilities Department employees confiscated the newsbins pursuant to the policy that Martorello administered. According to the allegations, the

Department’s customer service manager told plaintiffs that

the confiscation occurred because the Department “was

finally ‘catching up’ with the policy.” Similarly, when Martorello contacted plaintiffs after the confiscation, he “related the

existence of the policy” and explained that “the University

was trying to keep the campus clean and was therefore regulating ‘off-campus’ newspaper bins.” Thus, because it alleges

that Martorello was in charge of the newsbin policy and that

the confiscation without notice was conducted pursuant to that

policy, the complaint pleads a due process claim against Martorello. 

We note two distinctions from the invidious discrimination

claims that Iqbal rejected. First, Javaid Iqbal’s complaint did

not “contain facts plausibly showing that [Ashcroft and Mueller] purposefully adopted a policy of classifying postSeptember-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their

race, religion, or national origin.” 129 S. Ct. at 1952. Simply

put, the complaint did not tie the alleged unconstitutional conduct — purposeful discrimination by race or religion — to

any policy that the supervisory defendants advanced. This

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12797
case is different. Through concrete allegations, the complaint

ties the unconstitutional confiscation of the newsbins to the

policy that Martorello administered.

Second, the small scope of Martorello’s operation matters.

It is one thing to allege that, because some low-level government officers engaged in purposeful discrimination, a cabinetlevel official must also have engaged in purposeful discrimination. But it is another thing to say that the director of a university facilities department had a hand in the unconstitutional

manner in which his employees enforced a department-wide

policy. The second claim is plausible. Like all claims at the

pleading stage, of course, it requires development. For example, the complaint does not really clarify whether the policy

(or Martorello’s administration of the policy) directed

employees to confiscate the newsbins without notice, or

whether the employees improvised the failure to notify. To

ask plaintiffs to clarify this point at the pleading stage, however, asks too much. They have not yet had discovery on what

the unwritten policy required or on how Martorello told his

employees to enforce it. 

To be sure, when a plaintiff presses an implausible claim,

lack of access to evidence does not save the complaint. See

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the

doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more

than conclusions.”). But where the claim is plausible —

meaning something more than “a sheer possibility,” but less

than a probability — the plaintiff’s failure to prove the case

on the pleadings does not warrant dismissal. Id. at 1949 (“The

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement,

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Discovery will reveal whether Martorello’s stewardship of the

policy in fact called for confiscation without notice. All that

matters at this stage is that the allegations nudge this inference

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1951

(internal quotations omitted). Martorello was responsible for

12798 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
the policy, Martorello’s subordinates confiscated the bins

without notice, and two people — including Martorello himself — said the subordinates had acted pursuant to the policy.

That is enough to get discovery. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216

(holding that allegations must be sufficiently plausible “such

that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation”);

Pinnacle Armor, 648 F.3d at 721 (“[A plaintiff] is not

required to ‘demonstrate’ anything in order to survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rather, it only needs to allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a [plausible]

claim to relief . . . .”) (some internal quotation marks omitted).

D. Due Process Claims Against Ray and 

McCambridge

[24] The complaint does not tie President Ray and Vice

President McCambridge to the confiscation, through the policy or any other means. Unlike Martorello, these officials are

not alleged to have run the department that enforced the policy or to have had any familiarity with the policy’s requirements before the confiscation. (Recall Ray’s “its news to me”

response.) The averments thus do not support an inference

that deliberate action or even recklessness by Ray or McCambridge caused the due process violation. Perhaps one could

infer that the President and Vice President acted carelessly in

presiding over subordinates who enforced an unconstitutionally standardless policy governing newspaper circulation, but

even this inference would be inadequate, because negligence

does not suffice for due process liability. See Daniels, 474

U.S. at 328 (“The Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss

of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”). Therefore, the complaint does not state due process claims against these defendants. 

E. Defendant Larry Roper

[25] The complaint names a fourth defendant, Larry

Roper, against whom it makes only two factual averments. It

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12799
says that Roper was Vice Provost for Student Affairs, and that

President Ray forwarded to Roper, along with two other persons, plaintiff Rogers’ first email message complaining about

the confiscation. That is the totality of the allegations against

Roper. These allegations do not suffice to state any claims

against Roper. One cannot infer that Roper knowingly acquiesced in the decision to continue applying the unconstitutional

newsbin policy against plaintiffs after the confiscation,

because nothing suggests that Roper knew about that decision. Rather, the complaint suggests that he was copied on

one email and then fell out of the loop. The complaint does

not even contain facts to suggest that the newsbin issue fell

within Roper’s purview or that he was derelict in not ensuring

that the University handled the matter appropriately. The First

Amendment and equal protection claims premised on the

post-confiscation application of the policy therefore fail

against Roper. As for the due process claim against him, it

fails for the same reason that it fails against Ray and McCambridge: the allegations do not suggest that he had anything to

do with the confiscation itself or the unconstitutional policy

pursuant to which the confiscation occurred.

* * *

To summarize, we hold that the complaint states free

speech claims under the First Amendment and the Fourteenth

Amendment Equal Protection Clause against Martorello, Ray,

and McCambridge; and that it states a due process claim

against Martorello. We further hold that the complaint does

not state due process claims against Ray and McCambridge,

and that it does not state any claims against Roper.

V

[26] The district court dismissed the complaint and entered

judgment without granting plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.

Plaintiffs did not request leave to amend until after the judgment issued, but the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal

12800 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
was still an abuse of discretion. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]e have repeatedly

held that ‘a district court should grant leave to amend even if

no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not be cured by the allegation

of other facts.’ ”) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494,

497 (9th Cir.1995)). Because plaintiffs might well be able to

remedy the deficiencies in the claims against Roper and in the

due process claims against Ray and McCambridge, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying

plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. See id. at 1131. On

remand, plaintiffs should be afforded that opportunity.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

Simply put, to state a claim under § 1983 against a government official, a plaintiff must allege that the official’s “own

misconduct” violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). What the plaintiff

must plead and prove “will vary with the constitutional provision at issue,” based on the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding what conduct violates that particular provision. Id. at 676.

But the Supreme Court is quite clear that “supervisory liability” is a “misnomer” in § 1983 cases, and that officials “may

not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents.” Id.

at 677. 

The majority muddles and obscures this simple principle.

Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately alleges that Vincent Martorello, OSU’s facilities services director, violated their First

Amendment rights under § 1983 by personally and arbitrarily

limiting The Liberty’s distribution on campus. But their complaint nowhere indicates how OSU’s president, Ed Ray, and

the vice president of finance and administration, Mark

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12801
McCambridge, also violated those rights through their “own

individual actions.” Id. at 676. The majority considers it sufficient that Ray and McCambridge “knowingly acquiesced” in

Martorello’s actions. Maj. op. at 12793. Under Iqbal, however, an official is not liable under § 1983 for simply knowing

about a lower ranking employee’s misconduct and failing to

act. In holding otherwise, the majority resurrects the very kind

of supervisory liability that Iqbal interred. I disagree with this

departure from Iqbal.

I

Iqbal made it clear that a supervisor, like any other official,

“is only liable for his or her own misconduct,” id. at 677.

Since the Supreme Court clarified this point, we have not held

an official liable for inaction in the face of someone else’s

wrongdoing unless the official had a legal duty to act. Such

a duty arises under only two narrow exceptions. The first

exception applies when a statute expressly imposes the duty.

See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). In

Starr, the prison sheriff was “required by statute to take

charge of and keep the county jail and prisoners in it, and

[was] answerable for the prisoner’s safekeeping,” and therefore was liable under § 1983 for supervisory omissions that

would likely enable subordinates to commit a constitutional

injury. Id. (quoting Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d

1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). The second exception applies

when the courts have recognized a legal duty arising “by virtue of a ‘special relationship’ between state officials and a

particular member of the public.” Ting v. United States, 927

F.2d 1504, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991). Ting held that law enforcement officers may be held liable under § 1983 for inaction

that breaches their “constitutional duty to protect those persons in [their] custody whom [they] know[ ] to be under a

specific risk of harm from themselves or others in the state’s

custody or subject to its effective control.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty.

Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007)

12802 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
(school officials may be held liable for breaching a legal duty

to report abuses committed by a subordinate or for failing to

take corrective action). In sum, for an official’s inaction to

deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights under color of law,

the official must fail to act when the law requires action. Cf.

King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 706 (6th Cir. 2012)

(“Liability [under § 1983] will not lie absent active unconstitutional behavior; failure to act or passive behavior is insufficient.”). 

Neither exception applies here. Plaintiffs do not allege that

Ray or McCambridge had a legal duty to stop Martorello from

continued enforcement of his newsbin policy, that they

exerted any control over the decisions of the facilities department, or that their failure to intervene in the dispute between

Plaintiffs and Martorello violated any law, statute, or even

university requirement. This is not a case like Preschooler II,

479 F.3d at 1183, where there was a legal duty to report; or

like Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208, where a statute imposed a duty

to protect and to take corrective action; or even like Bergquist

v. Cnty. of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986),

abrogated on other grounds by City of Canton v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378 (1989), where failure to train or supervise amounted

to a policy or custom of deliberate indifference. Nor do plaintiffs allege that either Ray and McCambridge personally took

an action that deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.

Rather, the complaint indicates that Ray and McCambridge

did not even know about the removal of The Liberty’s bins

until after the fact, at which point Ray stated that the removal

of the bins was “news” to him, and McCambridge told plaintiffs that Martorello would be the “point of contact” with

respect to further inquiries. Nor does the complaint allege that

either official developed or enforced the newsbin policy,

which was promulgated by the facilities department, and

enforced by Martorello. In sum, the complaint merely recites

“the organizational role of the[ ] supervisors,” and makes “no

allegation that the supervisors took any specific action resulting in” the constitutional violation. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12803
(Moss II), 675 F.3d 1213, 1231 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in

original). This is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

The majority misses this central point because it focuses

solely on one component of a § 1983 claim: the proper mental

state for First Amendment claims. The majority’s detailed and

elaborate discussion of this issue, see Maj. op. at 12785-93,

boils down to the simple, though erroneous, proposition that

a plaintiff can adequately allege a § 1983 claim for violation

of that plaintiff’s First Amendment rights merely by alleging

that the official had knowledge of such violation. The majority brushes aside § 1983’s requirement that a defendant

engage in conduct that “subjects, or causes to be subjected”

a plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional rights, and instead

holds it suffices if a supervisory official “knowingly acquiesces” in the misconduct of a lower ranking employee. Maj.

op. at 12793. But of course, “acquiescence” is merely a way

to describe knowledge and inaction. See Webster’s Third New

Int’l Dictionary 18 (3d ed. 2002) (defining “acquiescence” as

“passive assent or submission.”). The word “acquiescence”

adds nothing to the mental state of “knowledge” unless the

official has a legal duty not to acquiesce. Further, the majority

erroneously implies that an allegation of “knowledge” suffices to establish the causation element of a § 1983 claim,

namely, that the official caused the plaintiff’s injury. The

majority relies on a novel and somewhat impenetrable formulation that “duty” is generally equivalent to acting with a

specified state of mind, and this duty “eclipses” proximate

cause where the plaintiff acts with knowledge that a violation

may occur. Maj. op. at 12788-89 n.12. Because (in the majority’s view) the mental state of knowledge stands in for both

misconduct and causation, the plaintiffs can state a § 1983

claim by alleging only that a supervisor had knowledge of a

subordinate’s misconduct and took no action. 

This is not enough. While plaintiffs here must plead the

elements of a First Amendment violation, including mental

state, they must also plead that each official acted in a way

12804 OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY
that “subject[ed], or cause[d] to be subjected,” a citizen to the

deprivation of First Amendment rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiffs here did not allege that Ray or McCambridge

engaged in any misconduct or that these officials caused their

injury. Therefore, the complaint in its current form does not

meet the bare minimum for stating a First Amendment claim

under § 1983 against Ray or McCambridge, and this claim

must be dismissed.1

The majority reaches a contrary determination only because

it smuggles respondeat superior back into our § 1983 jurisprudence. In place of personal misconduct and causation, the

majority substitutes mere knowledge of a lower-ranking

employee’s misconduct. But this is the very standard Iqbal

rejected, because it makes officials responsible for lowerranking employees’ misdeeds merely by virtue of the officials’ positions in the organization. By adopting this standard,

the majority returns us to pre-Iqbal jurisprudence and revives

vicarious liability, at least for First Amendment claims.

Because this is contrary to Iqbal’s ruling that “each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for

his or her own misconduct,” 556 U.S. at 677, I dissent.

1

I would dismiss plaintiffs’ equal protection claim against Ray and

McCambridge on the same grounds. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

OSU STUDENT ALLIANCE v. RAY 12805