## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

N O S

. P D

- 0 0 6 7

- 1 4 & P D

- 0 0 6 9

- 1 4

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

v

.

D A V I D C O L T R E D U S

, A p p e l l e e

a n d

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

v

.

J O S E G U A D A L U P E Z E R M E N O

, A p p e l l e e

O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N S F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E S I X T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

L A M A R C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e u n a n i m o u s C o u r t

.

O P I N I O N

I n t h e s e t w o c o n s o l i d a t e d c a s e s

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e g r a n t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t s ’ m o t i o n s t o

s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e

. T h e S t a t e f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l i n e a c h c a s e

, b u t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l sRedus & Z erme no Pag e 2

d i s m i s s e d t h e a p p e a l s

, c o n c l u d i n g t h a t i t d i d n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n b e c a u s e t h e e l e c t e d d i s t r i c t

a t t o r n e y f

a i l e d t o t i m e l y f

i l e t h e s t a t u t o r i l y r e q u i r e d c e r t i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e a p p e a l w a s n o t t a k e n

f o r d e l a y a n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p r e s s e d w a s o f “ s u b s t a n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e ” t o t h e c a s e

. T h e 1

S t a t e f i l e d f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w

, a s k i n g w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f

t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t w a s “ h y p e r t e c h n i c a l ” a n d c o n t r a r y t o s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n

. 2

W e c o n c l u d e t h a t i t w a s n e i t h e r

. A s w e e x p l a i n e d i n S t a t e v

. R i e w e

, t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y ’ s 3

c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y t o c o n f e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o n t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

. W e

, t h e r e f o r e

, a f f i r m

t h e j u d g m e n t s o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i n t h e s e c a s e s

.

I

.

D a v i d R e d u s w a s c h a r g e d w i t h i n t o x i c a t i o n m a n s l a u g h t e r ; J o s e Z e r m e n o w a s c h a r g e d

w i t h a t h i r d

- t i m e

, f

e l o n y D W I o f

f e n s e

. I n b o t h c a s e s

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e

p r o v i s i o n s o f C h a p t e r 7 2 4 o f t h e T e x a s T r a n s p o r t a t i o n C o d e m a n d a t i n g a n o n c o n s e n s u a l

State v. Redus

, No. 06-13-00136- CR, 2013 WL 6210977, at *4 (Tex. App.–Texarkana Nov. 1

27, 2013); State v. Zermeno

, 06- 1 3

- 0 0 1 3 5

- CR

, 2 0 1 3 WL 6210975, at *4 (Tex. App.–Texarkana Nov.

27, 2013). Be cause the two appellate opinions are virtually identical (only the names and the

wording of the indictments have be en cha ng ed), we shall ref

er to the court of appea ls’s discussion

in Redus throug hout our opinion.

The State’s sole g round for revie w re ads as f

ollows: 2

The trial court decla

red the mandato ry blood draw statute to be fac ially

unconstitutional. The State timely filed its notice of appea l with a “ce rtification” that

quoted article 44.01(a) (5) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. By dismiss ing

the appea l for want of

jurisdiction, was the appellate court’s opinion a hy perte chnica l

interpre tation of the statute, and c ontrary to statutory

construction?

13 S.W .3d 408, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (conc lu d i n g t h at (1 ) the lack of a timely 3

ce rt i fi cation in a State’s notice of appea l deprive d the court of appea ls of jurisdiction, and (2 ) an

amende d, but untimely , cer tification did not retroa ctively confe r jurisdiction).Redus & Z erme no Pag e 3

b l o o d d r a w w e r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l w h e n t h e b l o o d w a s d r a w n w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t

. T h e r e f o r e

,

h e s u p p r e s s e d t h e b l o o d

- a l c o h o l e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d w i t h o u t c o n s e n t o r w a r r a n t

. I n b o t h

c a s e s

, t h e S t a t e t i m e l y f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t h a t s t a t e d

,

P u r s u a n t t o T R A P R u l e 2 5

. 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d T e x

. C o d e C r i m

. P r o c

. A r t

. 4 4

. 0 1 ( a ) t h e

S t a t e o f T e x a s i s p e r m i t t e d t o a p p e a l a n o r d e r t h a t

. . . ( 5 ) “ g r a n t s a m o t i o n t o

s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e

, a c o n f e s s i o n o r a n a d m i s s i o n

, i f j e o p a r d y h a s n o t a t t a c h e d

i n t h i s c a s e a n d i f t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y c e r t i f i e s t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e

a p p e a l i s n o t t a k e [ n ] f

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d e l a y a n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e

, c o n f e s s i o n

,

o r a d m i s s i o n i s o f s u b s t a n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e i n t h e c a s e

.

T h e d o c u m e n t w a s s i g n e d b y t h e e l e c t e d c o u n t y a n d d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y

.

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t t h e a b o v e p a r a g r a p h w a s n o t a n “ a p p r o p r i a t e

c e r t i f i c a t i o n ” b y t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y b e c a u s e “ [ a ] r e c i t a t i o n o f t h e p e r t i n e n t C o d e p r o v i s i o n

d o e s n o t a m o u n t t o a c e r t i f i c a t i o n

, a s r e q u i r e d b y A r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 ( a ) ( 5 )

. ” 4

T h e S t a t e p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t t o r e v i e w t h e l o w e r c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n

, a r g u i n g t h a t i t

w a s “ c o n t r a r y t o s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n ” b e c a u s e “ ( 1 ) t h e o p i n i o n w a s a n a r r o w a n d

h y p e r t e c h n i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r c o n s t r u c t i o n ; ( 2 ) t h e o p i n i o n h a s l e a d t o ‘ a b s u r d

Redus , 2013 WL 6210977, at *1. The court of appe als reje cted the State’ s arg ument that 4

the cer tification was made by the prosec utor’s statemen t i n the trial court: “Judge, for future

purposes, obviously we’re g oing to appea l this–as are –I t’s g oing to be appea led acr oss the State

either from the defe ndant or from the State.

. . . Ultimately the Court of Criminal Appe als is g oing

to answe r this question[.] ” Id. n

. 1

. The court next reje cted the State’s arg ument that, even if the

notice of appea l failed to contain a certifica tion, the ruli ng had the eff ect of dismiss ing part of the

indictment be cause nothing in either indictment was aff ecte d by the trial judge ’s ruling

. Id. at *2.

The indictment did not mention a blood test or blood-alcohol level, so “the case can proce ed to trial

on the prese nt indictment.” Id. at *3. The court also reje cted the State’s arg ument that, beca use the

case involves the constitutionalit y of the mandatory blood-draw statutes, the court of appea ls should

acc ept jurisdiction as a matter of equity

. Id. at *3 & n. 2

. Finally

, the court relied on this Court’s

decision in Riewe and reje cted the State’s arg ument that its untimely amende d notice of appea l which

contained a

cer tification confe rre d jurisdiction. Id. at *4.Redus & Z erme no Pag e 4

c o n s e q u e n c e s ’ a n d ( 3 ) t h e o p i n i o n a d d e d a ‘ s t a t u t o r y b a r r i e r ’ t h a t w a s c o n t r a r y t o p r e c e d e n t

f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t

. ” 5

I I

.

I t w a s n o t u n t i l 1 9 8 7 t h a t t h e S t a t e h a d a n y r i g h t t o a p p e a l a n a d v e r s e l e g a l r u l i n g i n

a T e x a s c r i m i n a l c a s e

. B y e n a c t i n g A r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 o f t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e

, t h e 6

T e x a s L e g i s l a t u r e r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d t o b a l a n c e t h e r i g h t s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t t o a f

a i r a n d

s p e e d y t r i a l w i t h t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s o f t h e S t a t e a n d p u b l i c t o a c c u r a t e l e g a l r u l i n g s

. 7

O n e o f t h e a r g u m e n t s t h a t w a s m a d e a g a i n s t g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e a r i g h t t o a p p e a l

p r e t r i a l r u l i n g s w a s t h a t “ i t w o u l d p e r m i t a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t w h i l e

t h e d e f e n d a n t i s o n l y p e r m i t t e d t o a p p e a l f r o m a f i n a l j u d g m e n t

. ” B u t t h e s t a t u t e w a s d r a f t e d 8

s o t h a t

, a s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r

, t h e S t a t e w o u l d a p p e a l p r e t r i a l s u p p r e s s i o n i s s u e s o n l y w h e n

t h e t r i a l j u d g e ’ s r u l i n g e f f e c t i v e l y p u t a n e n d t o t h e c a s e o r “ w h e n a p o i n t o f l a w i s d e e m e d

s o c r u c i a l a n d s o l i k e l y t o r e c u r t h a t a n a d v e r s e r u l i n g

, w h i l e n o t w h o l l y d e s t r u c t i v e t o t h e

State’s B rief at 8. 5

Cathleen C. Her asimchuk, Criminal Justice and the State’s Right to Appeal

, 51 T E X

. B. J

. 6

242, 242 (1988) (noting that, for more than 100 y ear s, the Texas Constit ution stated, “The State shall

have no rig ht of appea l in criminal case s”; observing that “[e]very state in the nation, except Texas,

had cr afte d leg islation to accommodate both a state’s right to appea l errone ous leg al ruling s and a

defe ndant’s rig ht to be fre e fr om multi ple trials for the same off ense.” ).

Id. 7

Id. at 244. 8Redus & Z erme no Pag e 5

p a r t i c u l a r c a s e

, i s d e v a s t a t i n g t o t h e l e g a l s y s t e m o r t h e c o n c e p t o f f a i r p l a y

. ” B e f

o r e 9

e n a c t i n g A r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1

, t h e L e g i s l a t u r e w a s i n f o r m e d

,

W h i l e i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e S t a t e m i g h t f i l e f r i v o l o u s a p p e a l s s o l e l y f o r t h e

p u r p o s e o f h a r a s s m e n t a n d o p p r e s s i o n

, t h e r e q u i r e d c e r t i f i c a t i o n b y t h e D i s t r i c t

A t t o r n e y w o u l d m a n d a t e a c a r e f u l a p p r a i s a l o f t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f s u c c e s s a n d

n e c e s s i t y f

o r r e v i e w b e f

o r e t h e a p p e a l s a r e u n d e r t a k e n

. 1 0

T h u s

, a s e n a c t e d

, A r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 ( a ) ( 5 ) p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e S t a t e i s e n t i t l e d t o a p p e a l a n

o r d e r i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e i f t h a t o r d e r

g r a n t s a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e

, a c o n f e s s i o n

, o r a n a d m i s s i o n

, i f

j e o p a r d y h a s n o t a t t a c h e d i n t h e c a s e a n d i f t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y c e r t i f i e s

t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e a p p e a l i s n o t t a k e n f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d e l a y a n d t h a t

t h e e v i d e n c e

, c o n f

e s s i o n

, o r a d m i s s i o n i s o f s u b s t a n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e i n t h e

c a s e

. 1 1

S e v e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s m u s t b e m e t b e f o r e t h e S t a t e m a y t a k e a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l : ( 1 ) t h e

t r i a l j u d g e ’ s r u l i n g i s m a d e p r e t r i a l b e f o r e j e o p a r d y h a s a t t a c h e d ; ( 2 ) t h e e l e c t e d p r o s e c u t o r 1 2

Id. ; see State v. Medrano

, 67 S.W .3d 892, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (compa ring the 9

Texas state’s rig ht to appea l statute to compar able statutes in other states and sug g esting that the vast

majority of provisi ons focus on whether the t rial j udg e’s r uling is “outcome determinative” in the

sense that it ef

fec tively preve nts the prosec ution from prese nting its complete c ase to a jury ).

Cathleen C. Her asimchuk, Criminal Justice and the State’s Right to Appeal

, 24 H O U

. L A W

. 1 0

22, 24 (Jan.-Fe b. 1987). I n Medrano

, we ex p l ained, “This article

, published befor e the 1987

L eg islature met and enac ted article 44.01, contained the ‘propose d leg islat ion,’ along with an

ex p l an at ion of t he proposed statutory terms, an historical analy sis of t he S tate’s right to appeal i n

other jurisdictions, and arg uments both for and ag ainst enac ting a State’s rig ht to appea l in Texas.”

67 S.W .3d at 897 n.9.

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 44.01(a )(5)

. 1 1

Article 44

. 0 1 (i ) s t ates that, “I n this article

, ‘prose cuting attorney ’ means the county 1 2

attorney

, district attorney

, or criminal district attorney who has the primary responsibility of

prosec uting case s in the court hear ing the ca s e and does not include an assistant prosec uting

attorney .” T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art. 44.01(i). An assistant to the elec ted prosec utor may sign theRedus & Z erme no Pag e 6

p e r s o n a l l y c e r t i f

i e s t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t ( a ) t h e a p p e a l i s n o t t a k e n t o d e l a y t h e t r i a l

, a n d ( b )

t h e s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e i s o f “ s u b s t a n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e ” t o t h e c a s e

. T h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e

t o e n s u r e t h a t p r o s e c u t o r s d o n o t a p p e a l t r i a l j u d g e s ’ r u l i n g s i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y a n d c l o g u p t h e

a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s w h i l e l e a v i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t u n d e r t h e c o n t i n u i n g c l o u d o f c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s

. 1 3

T h e e l e c t e d p r o s e c u t o r p u t s h i s r e p u t a t i o n a n d i n t e g r i t y

, a s w e l l a s h i s s i g n a t u r e

, o n t h e l i n e

cer tification only with the persona l and express authorization of the elec ted officia l. State v. Muller

, 829 S.W .2d 805, 808-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (ar ticle 44.01(a) (5) requir es t h e elected

“prose cuti n g at t o rney ,” not his assistant, to “make ” st ate’ s notice of appea l, within the prescribed

time period, either by phy sically signing the notice or by persona lly and expressly authorizing an

assistant to file specific notice of a ppeal on his beha lf).

Her asimchuk, supra note 6, at 246 (“F rivolous [i nterlocutory ] appea ls are discourag ed by 1 3

the require ments of: immediate appea l, c osts bor ne by the State, rea sonable bail for the defe ndant,

an d the district attorney ’s cer tification of the ‘substantial importance ’ of the evidenc e in Sectio n

(a) (5) a ppeals. The pref

ere ntial docketing of state a ppeals will minimi ze delay s.”).

For a thoro u g h historical discussion of the fede ral statute permitting interlocutory appea ls

by the g overnme nt with proper cer tifi ca t i o n

, s ee United States v. Carril lo-Bernal

, 58 F.3d 1490,

1492-97 (10th Cir. 1995). Af ter e x amining the history

of such a ppeals, the c ourt conc luded that,

this somewhat extended historical excursion has illumi nated the exceptional nature

of g overnme ntal appea ls in criminal case s– proce eding s that have been curbe d by the

courts and car efully circ umscribed by Congr ess out of a desire (among other rea sons)

to safe g uard i n dividuals from the specia l hazards inhere nt in prolong ed litigation

with the sovere ign. As to suppressi o n order s, those conce rns have been translated

into the express require ment that the prosec utor contempora neously cer

t ify to the

district court that the appea l is not taken for purposes of delay and that the evidenc e

is critica l. I t require d a g rea t deal of time and effo rt by the United States Attorney

Gene ral to ex t rac t from Congr ess any rig ht to appea l such order s. Both Hanks and

this case ref

lect this court’s deter

mination that we d o not ask too much of

g overnme nt attorney s, in their exercise of that rig ht, to slow down long enoug h to

conduct their evalua tions in a manner and at a time tha t a re consistent with Section

3731’s h i story and the important interests that the cer tification require ment was

desig ned to protec t.

Id. at 1497. The court, finding that the prosec uting attorney ’s explanation f or failing to timely file

a cer tification of its appeal wa s inadequa te and sug g esting that the g overnme nt did not take the

cer tification requir ement ser iously , dismiss ed the a ppeal. Id.Redus & Z erme no Pag e 7

i n f i l i n g n o t i c e o f a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l

. 1 4

I n a n a l y z i n g A r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 ( a ) ( 5 )

, w e h a v e e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e e l e c t e d p r o s e c u t o r ’ s

p e r s o n a l c e r t i f

i c a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y t o c o n f e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o n t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t

. H o w e v e r

, 1 5

t h e d e f e n d a n t m a y n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e v e r i t y o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ’ s c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e “ s u b s t a n t i a l

i m p o r t a n c e ” o f t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p r e s s e d b e c a u s e t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e n e i t h e r

See United States v. Moskowitz

, 702 F.3d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Cer tification is not to 1 4

be trea ted as n o m ore than an ‘administrative formality .’ So, althoug h we ag ree that ‘since the

Solicitor Gene ral must in any event app ro v e fe d era l g overnme nt appea ls, there is no signific ant

dang er that the appea l will be frivol o u s,’ we never theless reiter ate our expectation that the

g overnme nt wil l ‘c are fully analy ze[ ] the case before deciding to appea l.’ Whil e we are confide nt

that the U.S. Attorney will car ry out her cer

tification responsibilities in g ood faith, we note that our

power to impose direc t sanctions is a sufficie nt g uara ntor that the g overnme nt will not overstep itself

in this reg ard.” ) (citations omitted); United States v. W .R. Grace

, 526 F.3d 499, 507 (9th Cir. 2008)

(en b a n c ) (abr og ating former rule that U.S. Attorney was require d to establish materia lity of evidenc e

when filin g a

n in terlocutory appea l beca

use “[t] he cer

tification itself is a repr esenta tion by the United

States Attorney

, as an office r of the court, that the appeal i s not for purposes of delay and that the

suppressed evidenc e is inde ed materia l .

. . . Moreove r, should we find the g overnme nt’s appea l to

be patently frivolous or have rea son to believe its cer tification is fa l s e, we could di rec tly sanction

such misconduct, surely a potent ‘che ck’ on prosec utori al abuse of the cer tification proce ss.”);

United States v. DeQuasie

, 373 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 2004) (“ The c ertification requireme nt of §

3731 opera

tes to ensure that befor e the United States interrupts a criminal proce eding (and there by

delay s a defe ndant from obtaining resolution of the char g es ag ainst him) by taking an interlocutory

appea l, it has evalua ted whether the appea l is war rante d; the cer

tificate itself opera tes as proof of the

evalua tion.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Smith

, 263 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Sec tion

3731 require s the g overnme nt to cer tify that the appea l is not taken for the purpose of delay

, and that

the evidenc e is a substantial proof of a fac t materia l in the proce eding

. The cer tification is intended

to ensure a ‘consc ientious pre- appea l analy sis by the responsible prosec uting officia l.’ The purpose

of the c ertifica

tion is clea

rly defe ated when the g overnme nt f iles its c ertification after initiating an

appea l.”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Jefferson

, 623 F.3d 227, 231-32 (5th Cir. 2010)

(collec ting case s that set out the “consc ientious revie w” purpose of the cer tification require ment for

g overnme nt interlocutory appea ls).

State v. Riewe

, 13 S.W .3d 408, 4 1 1 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“The cer tification require ment 1 5

is in Art. 44.01, and we have held that the failure to c omply with A rt. 44.01 is a substantive defe ct

which deprive s the court of appea ls of jurisdiction. There f

o r e

, w e must conclude that the cer tification

require ment is jurisdictional, and the State’s notice of appea l in this case failed to confe r jurisdiction

on the cour

t of appe als.”).Redus & Z erme no Pag e 8

r e q u i r e s n o r p e r m i t s i t

. T h e p r o s e c u t o r ’ s p r o m i s e o f i m p o r t a n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t

. 1 6

F u r t h e r

, t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s o n l y a w r i t t e n a n d s i g n e d a s s e r t i o n o f t h e t w o n e c e s s a r y

f a c t s

– t h a t t h e a p p e a l i s n o t t a k e n f o r d e l a y a n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e i s o f “ s u b s t a n t i a l

i m p o r t a n c e ” ; n o s p e c i a l f o r m i s n e c e s s a r y a n d t h e r e q u i r e d a s s e r t i o n s o f f a c t m a y b e

c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e t e x t o f t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

. U s u a l l y t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n b e g i n s w i t h t h e 1 7

p h r a s e

, “ I

, J o h n D o e

, t h e D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y o f X Y Z C o u n t y

, c e r t i f y t h a t

. . . ” b u t o t h e r f

o r m s

a r e e q u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e a s l o n g a s t h e e l e c t e d p r o s e c u t o r v o u c h e s f o r t h e s e t w o f

a c t s

. I t i s 1 8

a s i m p l e

, b u t s o l e m n

, u n d e r t a k i n g

.

W e h a v e a l s o h e l d t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e d e f e c t s i n t h e S t a t e ’ s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l c a n n o t b e

c o r r e c t e d b y a n u n t i m e l y a m e n d m e n t

. A n y a m e n d m e n t m u s t b e m a d e b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n 1 9

o f t h e o r i g i n a l t i m e t o f

i l e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

, t h a t i s

, w i t h i n t w e n t y d a y s a f t e r e n t r y o f t h e t r i a l

Johnson v. State

, 871 S.W .2d 744, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see also State v. Chupik

, 1 6

343 S.W .3d 144, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (following fede ral case s and finding that “once the

g overnme nt cer

tifies that the evidenc e is a substantial proof of a materia l fac t, a revie wing court may

not revie w ‘the substantiality or the materia lity ’ of the evidenc e” and the rec ord need not ref lect the

content of the suppressed e vidence befor e the a ppellate c ourt will review the trial court’ s ruling)

.

State v. F

u r l ey

, 8 90 S.W .2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.–Waco 1994, no pet.) (op. on reh’ g ) 1 7

(ar ticle 44.01(a) (5) “re quires a written asser tion that the appea l is not taken for delay and that the

evidenc e is of substantial importance to the case

. The statute does not dictate that a specia l form be

utiliz ed in making this asser tion, only that the elec ted attorney sign a writing which vouches that the

fac ts to be cer

tified are true. There fore

, we hold that statements in the body of the notice of appea l,

asser ting that the appea l is not taken for delay and that the evidenc e is of substantial importance

, over

the sig nature of the e lected attorney are sufficie nt to satisfy

the re quirements of the statute.”).

Id. 1 8

See State v. Muller, 829 S.W .2d 805, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that it was err or 1 9

for the court of appea ls to p er m i t t h e S tate to amend its orig inal notice of appea l to include a

cer tification made by

the elec ted District Attorney afte r the orig inal filing pe riod had e lapsed).Redus & Z erme no Pag e 9

j u d g e ’ s r u l i n g

. B e c a u s e t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y ’ s c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

, t h e S t a t e ’ s 2 0

a p p e a l m u s t b e d i s m i s s e d f o r w a n t o f j u r i s d i c t i o n i f t h e p r o p e r c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s n o t f

i l e d w i t h i n

t w e n t y d a y s a f

t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r s i t s o r d e r s u p p r e s s i n g e v i d e n c e

. 2 1

W i t h t h a t g e n e r a l b a c k g r o u n d

, w e t u r n t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e s

.

I I I

.

I n t h e s e t w o c a s e s

, t h e e l e c t e d d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y s i g n e d t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

, b u t h e d i d

n o t c e r t i f

y

, o r v o u c h f

o r

, t h e r e q u i r e d f

a c t s t h a t t h e a p p e a l w a s n o t m a d e f o r p u r p o s e s o f

d e l a y a n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p r e s s e d w a s o f s u b s t a n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e c a s e

. I n s t e a d

,

t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l s i m p l y q u o t e s t h e p e r t i n e n t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n a n d c o n t a i n s t h e d i s t r i c t

a t t o r n e y ’ s s i g n a t u r e a t t h e b o t t o m

.

B u t a c e r t i f

i c a t i o n i s d e f

i n e d a s “ t h e f

o r m a l a s s e r t i o n o f s o m e f a c t

. ” T o c e r t i f

y 2 2

s o m e t h i n g i s “ [ t ] o a u t h e n t i c a t e o r v o u c h f o r a t h i n g i n w r i t i n g

. T o a t t e s t a s b e i n g t r u e o r a s

r e p r e s e n t e d

. ” A “ c e r t i f i c a t e ” b y a p u b l i c o f

f i c e r “ i s a s t a t e m e n t w r i t t e n a n d s i g n e d

, b u t n o t 2 3

n e c e s s a r i l y s w o r n t o

, w h i c h i s b y l a w m a d e e v i d e n c e o f t h e t r u t h o f t h e f a c t s s t a t e d f

o r a l l o r

f o r c e r t a i n p u r p o s e s

. ” F o r e x a m p l e

, a n a p p e l l a t e b r i e f m u s t c o n t a i n a c e r t i f i c a t e o f s e r v i c e 2 4

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art. 44.01(d) (“The prosec uting attorney may not make an appea l 2 0

under Subsection (a) or (b) of t his article later than the 20t h day afte r the da te on which the or der,

ruling , or sentenc e to be a ppeale d is entere d by

the cour t.”).

State v. Riewe , 13 S.W .3d 408, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 2 1

B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 206 (5th ed. 1979) ( defining “ce rtification”)

. 2 2

Id. at 207 (de fining “ce rtify ”). 2 3

Id. at 205 (de fining “ce rtificate ”). 2 4Redus & Z erme no Pag e 10

t h a t s t a t e s t h e p e r s o n ’ s c o m p l i a n c e w i t h c e r t a i n f a c t s o f s e r v i c e a n d i s s i g n e d b y t h e p e r s o n

w h o m a k e s t h e s e r v i c e

. I t i s n o t g o o d e n o u g h t o s i m p l y q u o t e t h e a p p l i c a b l e a p p e l l a t e r u l e 2 5

a n d t h e n s i g n b e l o w t h a t q u o t a t i o n

. T h e s i g n e r i s

, i n e f f e c t

, p r o m i s i n g t h a t h e h a s p e r f o r m e d

c e r t a i n a c t s

– g i v i n g t h e d a t e a n d m a n n e r o f s e r v i c e

, s e t t i n g o u t t h e n a m e a n d a d d r e s s o f e a c h

p e r s o n s e r v e d

, a n d t h e n a m e s o f e a c h p e r s o n ’ s a t t o r n e y

, i f a p p l i c a b l e

. 2 6

T h e c e r t i f

i c a t i o n o f t h e S t a t e ’ s a p p e a l c a r r i e s t h e s a m e s e r i o u s p u r p o s e

. B u t h e r e

, 2 7

t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y d i d n o t v o u c h f o r a n y f a c t

. H e s i m p l y s i g n e d a d o c u m e n t t h a t q u o t e d t h e

s t a t u t e

. T h a t q u o t a t i o n w a s p r e c e d e d b y t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e i s “ p e r m i t t e d ” t o a p p e a l

a s u p p r e s s i o n o r d e r

. I n d e e d i t i s

, b u t o n l y i f i t f u l f i l l s a l l o f t h e n e c e s s a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s

,

i n c l u d i n g c e r t i f

i c a t i o n

. T h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t

, i n q u o t i n g t h e s t a t u t e

, t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y

“ i n f e r e n t i a l l y ” v o u c h e d f

o r t h e n e c e s s a r y f

a c t s

. I f c e r t i f

i c a t i o n s a r e l e g a l l y b i n d i n g w h e n

t h e y m e r e l y q u o t e a s t a t u t e a n d t h e n t h a t q u o t a t i o n i s s i g n e d

, t h e n w e c o u l d a c c e p t t h e S t a t e ’ s

a r g u m e n t

. W e c e r t a i n l y a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t “ [ a ] p e r s o n ’ s r i g h t t o a p p e a l a c i v i l o r

c r i m i n a l j u d g m e n t s h o u l d n o t d e p e n d u p o n t r a c k i n g t h r o u g h a t r a i l o f t e c h n i c a l i t i e s

, ” b u t 2 8

w e a r e u n a b l e t o f

i n d a n y c a s e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e ’ s c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f a p r e t r i a l

s u p p r e s s i o n m o t i o n i s j u s t a “ t e c h n i c a l i t y ” o r t h a t q u o t i n g t h e s t a t u t e s a t i s f i e s t h e c e r t i f

i c a t i o n

T E X

. R. A P P

. P. 9.5(e). 2 5

Id. 2 6

See supra notes 13-14. 2 7

State’s Br ief at 10-11 (quoting Gonzales v. State

, 421 S.W .3d 674, 675 (Tex. Crim App. 2 8

2014)).Redus & Z erme no Pag e 11

r e q u i r e m e n t

. A l t h o u g h t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f a p p e a l i n f

e d e r a l c o u r t s i s n o t

j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

, i t s e r v e s t h e s a m e p u r p o s e a s i t d o e s i n T e x a s c o u r t s :

T h e c e r t i f

i c a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t i m p o s e d b y S e c t i o n 3 7 3 1 s e r v e s t h e v e r y

i m p o r t a n t p u r p o s e o f

e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r c a r e f u l l y a n a l y z e s t h e c a s e

b e f o r e d e c i d i n g t o a p p e a l

. C e r t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r c e s t h e

p r o s e c u t o r t o r e p r e s e n t t h a t s h e h a s

, i n f a c t

, t h o r o u g h l y a n d c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y

c o n s i d e r e d t h e d e c i s i o n t o a p p e a l

. B y f o r c i n g t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o t a k e t h e s e p r e

a p p e a l s t e p s

, S e c t i o n 3 7 3 1 ’ s c e r t i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t f

u r t h e r s t h e v i t a l

u n d e r l y i n g g o a l o f p r e v e n t i n g n e e d l e s s d e l a y a n d p r o l o n g e d w o r r y i n c r i m i n a l

p r o c e e d i n g s

. 2 9

C o u r t s a r e n o t “ h y p e r t e c h n i c a l ” i n r e q u i r i n g t h e e l e c t e d p r o s e c u t o r t o a c t u a l l y v o u c h f o r t h e

f a c t s t h a t h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l i s n o t b e i n g t a k e n f o r p u r p o s e s o f d e l a y a n d t h a t t h e

e v i d e n c e s u p p r e s s e d i s o f “ s u b s t a n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e ” t o t h e c a s e

. C o u r t s d o n o t g o b e h i n d t h e

c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o e x a m i n e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y

r e l y u p o n t h e e l e c t e d p r o s e c u t o r ’ s c e r t i f i c a t i o n t h a t h e h a s r e v i e w e d t h e l e g a l m e r i t s o f h i s

United St ates v. Sali sbury

, 158 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). I n 2 9

Salisbury

, the g overnme nt f iled its c ertification a month afte r it filed its notice of appea l, a nd g ave

as an excuse the fac t that the assig ned prosec utor was out of town. The circ uit court, althoug h noting

that cer tification was not jurisdictional, dismiss ed the g over n ment’s appea l beca use “[s] imple

neg lige nce

. . . cannot excuse n o n co m p l i an ce with the express mandate of the statute.” Id. The

g overnme nt also arg ued that “eve n though it failed to cer tify proper ly

, the decision t o appea l was

based on a conscie ntious pre- appea l analy sis. Whil e the responsible prosec utors may have complied

with the spirit of the statute, nothing in the rec ord supports this positi on. We cannot ac cept suc h a

naked asser

tion a s sufficie nt.” Id. ; see also I n re J.W

. , 763 A.2d 1129, 1131-32 (D.C. 2000) (“We

share the conce rn that the cer tificate require ment be car efully observe d. The cer tificate, when filed,

is conclusiv e an d not subject t o substantive revie w by the appellate court. Every eff ort should be

made by the g overnme nt to car efully follow the prec ise statutory requir ements, including that the

cer tification be made by the attorney ‘conduc ting the prosec ution’ and that it be made ‘to the judge

who g rante d such motion.’”) (citation omitted); United States v. Carril lo-Bernal

, 58 F.3d 1490,

1492-93 (10th Cir. 1995) (stressing importance of the cer tification to show that g overnme nt has

car efully revie wed the merit s o f i t s leg al position befor e filing notice of appea l; excoriating

prosec utor for failing to take the cer tification seriously and instead trea ting it as a “mer e formality ”).Redus & Z erme no Pag e 12

a p p e a l

.

T h e S t a t e a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t

, a s c o n s t r u e d b y t h e c o u r t

o f a p p e a l s

, l e a d s t o “ a b s u r d c o n s e q u e n c e s ” b e c a u s e “ t h e S t a t e w a s c l e a r l y c o n t e m p l a t i n g a

s u f f i c i e n t ‘ c e r t i f

i c a t i o n ’ b y q u o t i n g o r r e c i t i n g t h e p e r t i n e n t C o d e p r o v i s i o n

. ” B u t q u o t i n g 3 0

a s t a t u t e d o e s n o t v o u c h f o r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h i t s p r o v i s i o n s

. A n d n o t i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e

“ p e r m i t s ” a n a p p e a l u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s

, i s n o t t h e s a m e a s v o u c h i n g t h a t t h e

c i r c u m s t a n c e s e x i s t

.

T h e S t a t e a s k s t h a t w e a p p l y s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i n a w a y t h a t d o e s n o t c o n f l i c t

w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 3 7 3 1

. T h e s i m p l e 3 1

a n s w e r t o t h a t s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t w e h a v e d o n e s o

. T h e n u m e r o u s f e d e r a l c a s e s c i t e d a b o v e

i n n o t e s 1 3

, 1 4

, a n d 2 9 a l l s u p p o r t o u r p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s a s o l e m n p e r s o n a l

a s s e r t i o n o f f

a c t s ; w e a r e u n a b l e t o f

i n d a n y f e d e r a l c a s e h o l d i n g t h a t m e r e l y q u o t i n g S e c t i o n

3 7 3 1 i s a s u f

f i c i e n t c e r t i f

i c a t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f a g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l

.

F i n a l l y

, t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a d d e d a “ s t a t u t o r y b a r r i e r ” t o t h e

S t a t e ’ s a p p e a l b y f

o l l o w i n g o u r p r i o r d e c i s i o n i n R i e w e

, w h i c h h e l d t h a t t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n

r e q u i r e m e n t i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

. W e d e c l i n e t o o v e r r u l e e i t h e r t h e r e a s o n i n g o r t h e r e s u l t i n 3 2

State’s B rief a

t 17. 3 0

State’s B rief a

t 18. 3 1

See Redus

, 2013 WL 6210977, at *3 (“The cer tification require d by Article 44.01(a) (5) is 3 2

nece ssary to confe r jurisdiction over the appea l in the appellate court, see State v. Riewe

, 13 S.W .3d

408, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).”).Redus & Z erme no Pag e 13

t h a t c a s e

. 3 3

W e t h e r e f

o r e a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s d i s m i s s i n g t h e s e a p p e a l s f o r

w a n t o f j u r i s d i c t i o n

.

D e l i v e r e d : O c t o b e r 8

, 2 0 1 4

P u b l i s h

See Riewe

, 13 S.W .3d at 411 (explaining that, “[i] n [ State v. Muller

, 829 S.W .2d 805 (Tex.

3 3

Crim. App. 1992)] we made clea r that ‘the State’s noncompliance with the specific provisions of Art.

44.01 [i s] a substantive failure to invoke the court of appea ls’ statutorily define d jurisdiction.’ We

conclude d that Art. 44.01 ‘d o es m o re than mere ly presc ribe a proce dural g uideline for filing the

State’s notice of

appea l. Rather it limit s the State’s substantive authority to appea l.’”).