IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

)

STATE OF DELAWARE )

) I.D. No. 1401002421

v. )

)

THOMAS D. ALSTON, )

)

Defendant. )

Submitted: September 21, 2015

Decided: December 16, 2015

On Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief.

DENIED.

ORDER

Karin M. Volker, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 

Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Thomas D. Alston, Howard R. Young Correctional Center, Wilmington, 

Delaware, pro se.

COOCH, R.J.

This 16th day of December, 2015, upon consideration of Defendant’s

Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:

1. Thomas D. Alston (“Defendant”) pleaded guilty to Attempted 

Rape Second Degree on March 3, 2015.1

 On May 13 

Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. In

his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Defendant asserted that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, because his attorney 

 1 Plea Agreement at 1, D.I. 40. 
2

did not file a motion for speedy trial.2 A hearing was held by 

this Court on June 25 and Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw was 

denied for lack of merit. Immediately Afterwards, Defendant 

was sentenced by this Court to six years at Level V with 

decreasing levels of supervision to follow.3

2. On August 26, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion for 

Postconviction Relief (“Motion”). In his Motion, Defendant 

claimed he is entitled to relief for violations of due process, 

speedy trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant 

stated in his first ground for relief, which he titled “Motion for 

violation of due process and speedy trial,” that he has 

“documents of [his] defense which would show beyond a 

reasonable doubt the outcome of the process would have been 

different with compotent [sic] advice.”4

3. Defendant contended in his second ground that his counsel was 

ineffective because “[his] lawyer deliberately and recklessly 

with held [sic] information from the Judge and DA (such as on 

three separate times [he] asked for a lie detector test in which 

[counsel] said to [him] that it didn’t matter).”5

 

4. Next, Defendant asserted, “[his] lawyer stated that it didn’t 

matter whether [he] had a good defense or not, or telling the 

truth. The fact that [the victim] was a juvenile and [he] being a 

felon a jury would find [him] guilty at trial.”6

 

5. Finally, Defendant stated:

[he is] claiming that [his] counsel[‘]s ine[f]fectiveness

caused [him] to plead guilty despite [his] documents of 

defense which would have knowingly lead to an acquittal. 

[He] was prejudiced by counsel[‘s] deficient performance 

in advising [him] to take a plea of guilt[y] of a minimum of 

10 to 25 y[ea]rs when in[]fact the sentence carried 2 y[ea]r

 2 Def’s. Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea, D.I. 46. 

3 Sentencing Order, D.I. 49. 

4 Def’s. Mot. for Postconviction Relief, at 3. 

5 Id. 6 Id.
3

minimum with 2 to 5 y[ea]rs TIS [guideline], but sentenced 

to 6 plus 2.7

6. Defendant’s first assertion that he suffered a violation of due 

process and right to a speedy trial is without merit. Defendant’s 

statement that he is in possession of documents that “would show 

beyond a reasonable doubt the outcome of the process would 

have been different” is conclusory. Defendant does not name or 

attempt to describe these documents. Furthermore, Defendant’s 

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was based on a violation of his 

right to speedy trial. In this Motion, Defendant does not assert 

any new grounds that would justify revisiting that issue. 

Therefore, Defendant’s arguments that his rights to due process 

and a speedy trial were violated are without merit.

7. Similarly, Defendant’s assertions that his counsel performed 

ineffectively also lacks merit. To successfully bring an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a claimant must 

demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and 

(2) the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or 

her of a fair trial with reliable results.8

 To prove counsel’s 

deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.9

 Moreover, a 

defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and 

substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.10 “[A] court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”11 

8. A successful Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.”12 Furthermore, when a 

defendant voluntarily signs a plea agreement, that defendant is 

“bound by those statements in the absence of clear and 

 7 Id. 8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

9 Id. at 667-68.

10 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).

11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

12 Id. at 694. 
4

convincing proof to the contrary and he bears the burden of 

presenting such proof.”13

9. Defendant’s contentions that counsel withheld information by 

not having Defendant submit polygraph evidence; informed him 

that the jury would be likely to convict him; and his counsel’s 

ineffectiveness caused him to plead guilty are vague, conclusory, 

and do not satisfy the first prong of Strickland. In addition to the 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell into the wide 

range of acceptable assistance, Defendant voluntarily signed a 

plea agreement. Defendant has not presented any evidence that 

is clear and convincing to this Court that he should not be bound 

to those voluntarily-given statements. Defendant has failed to 

substantiate any concrete showing of actual prejudice. 

Therefore, without more, this Court can find no basis for relief 

on Defendant’s claims.

10. Finally, the Court notes that this is Defendant’s first Motion and 

was timely filed. In situations such as this, it is within the 

Court’s discretion to appoint or not appoint counsel. The Rule 

states:

First postconviction motions in guilty plea cases. The judge 

may appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely 

postconviction motion and request for appointment of 

counsel if the motion seeks to set aside a judgment of 

conviction that resulted from a plea of guilty or nolo 

contendere only if the judge determines that: (i) the 

conviction has been affirmed by final order upon direct 

appellate review or direct appellate review is unavailable; 

(ii) the motion sets forth a substantial claim that the 

movant received ineffective assistance of counsel in 

relation to the plea of guilty or nolo contendere; (iii) 

granting the motion would result in vacatur of the judgment 

of conviction for which the movant is in custody; and (iv) 

specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment 

of counsel.14

11. This Court declines to appoint counsel for Defendant’s Motion, 

because Defendant did not make any request for representation. 

 13 Smith v. State, 1990 WL 1475, at* 1 (Del. Supr. Jan. 4, 1990) (citing State v. Insley, 

141 A.2d 619, 622 (Del. 1958)). 

14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2) (second and third emphasis added). 
5

Furthermore, even if Defendant did request that this Court 

appoint counsel, that request would have been denied. 

Defendant’s Motion fails to set forth a “substantial claim”15 that 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his 

guilty plea. As discussed above, Defendant’s claims are vague 

and conclusory. Also, Defendant has not asserted the existence 

of any exceptional circumstances that warrant the appointment of 

counsel. 

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________

Richard R. Cooch, R.J.

cc: Prothonotary

Investigative Services 

 15 “Substantial” is defined as: “[r]eal and not imaginary; having actual, not fictitious, 

existence <a substantial case on the merits>. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).