# Jurnalul Oficial C 237/2013

| | ISSN 1977-1029
  doi:10.3000/19771029.C_2013.237.ron |
| --- | --- |
| Jurnalul Oficial
  al Uniunii Europene | C 237 |
| | |
| Ediţia în limba română | Comunicări şi informări | Anul 5615 august 2013 |

ISSN 1977-1029

doi:10.3000/19771029.C_2013.237.ron

Jurnalul Oficial

al Uniunii Europene

C 237

Ediţia în limba română

Comunicări şi informări

Anul 5615 august 2013

---

| Informarea nr. | Cuprins | Pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicări |
| | COMUNICĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2013/C 237/01 | Non-opoziție la o concentrare notificată (Cazul COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Informarea nr.

Cuprins

Pagina

II   Comunicări

COMUNICĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

2013/C 237/01

Non-opoziție la o concentrare notificată (Cazul COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informări |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2013/C 237/02 | Rata de schimb a monedei euro | 2 |
| | INFORMĂRI REFERITOARE LA SPAȚIUL ECONOMIC EUROPEAN |
| | Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere |
| 2013/C 237/03 | Ajutor de stat – Decizie de închidere a unui caz de ajutor de stat ca urmare a acceptării măsurilor corespunzătoare de către un stat AELS | 3 |
| 2013/C 237/04 | Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul între statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție cu privire la aspecte legate de ajutoarele de stat în legătură cu ajutorul regional destinat schemei de stimulente pentru investiții din Islanda și unui număr de șase acorduri de investiții | 4 |

IV   Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

2013/C 237/02

Rata de schimb a monedei euro

2

INFORMĂRI REFERITOARE LA SPAȚIUL ECONOMIC EUROPEAN

Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere

2013/C 237/03

Ajutor de stat – Decizie de închidere a unui caz de ajutor de stat ca urmare a acceptării măsurilor corespunzătoare de către un stat AELS

3

2013/C 237/04

Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul între statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție cu privire la aspecte legate de ajutoarele de stat în legătură cu ajutorul regional destinat schemei de stimulente pentru investiții din Islanda și unui număr de șase acorduri de investiții

4

| | V   Anunțuri |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2013/C 237/05 | Comunicarea Comisiei publicată în temeiul articolului 27 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003 în cazurile AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II și AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III | 28 |
| | ALTE ACTE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2013/C 237/06 | Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare | 31 |
| 2013/C 237/07 | Publicarea unei cereri de modificare în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare | 36 |
| 2013/C 237/08 | Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare | 40 |

V   Anunțuri

PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI

Comisia Europeană

2013/C 237/05

Comunicarea Comisiei publicată în temeiul articolului 27 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003 în cazurile AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II și AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

28

ALTE ACTE

Comisia Europeană

2013/C 237/06

Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare

31

2013/C 237/07

Publicarea unei cereri de modificare în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare

36

2013/C 237/08

Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare

40

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE |

---

(1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE

1

| RO | |
| --- | --- |

RO

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II Comunicări

COMUNICĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/1

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Non-opoziție la o concentrare notificată

(Cazul COMP/M.6843 – Siemens/Invensys Rail)

(Text cu relevanță pentru SEE)

2013/C 237/01

La data de 18 aprilie 2013, Comisia a decis să nu se opună concentrării notificate menționate mai sus și să o declare compatibilă cu piața comună. Prezenta decizie se bazează pe articolul 6 alineatul (1) litera (b) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 139/2004 al Consiliului. Textul integral al deciziei este disponibil doar în limba engleză și va fi făcut public după ce vor fi eliminate orice secrete de afaceri pe care le-ar putea conține. Va fi disponibil:

| — | pe site-ul internet al Direcției Generale Concurență din cadrul Comisiei, la secțiunea consacrată concentrărilor (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Acest site internet oferă diverse facilități care permit identificarea deciziilor de concentrare individuale, inclusiv întreprinderea, numărul cazului, data și indexurile sectoriale; |
| --- | --- |

—

pe site-ul internet al Direcției Generale Concurență din cadrul Comisiei, la secțiunea consacrată concentrărilor (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Acest site internet oferă diverse facilități care permit identificarea deciziilor de concentrare individuale, inclusiv întreprinderea, numărul cazului, data și indexurile sectoriale;

| — | în format electronic, pe site-ul internet EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) cu numărul de document 32013M6843. EUR-Lex permite accesul on-line la legislația europeană. |
| --- | --- |

—

în format electronic, pe site-ul internet EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) cu numărul de document 32013M6843. EUR-Lex permite accesul on-line la legislația europeană.

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IV Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/2

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Rata de schimb a monedei euro (1)

14 august 2013

2013/C 237/02

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Rata de schimb |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dolar american | 1,3243 |
| JPY | yen japonez | 130,17 |
| DKK | coroana daneză | 7,4583 |
| GBP | lira sterlină | 0,85440 |
| SEK | coroana suedeză | 8,6393 |
| CHF | franc elvețian | 1,2415 |
| ISK | coroana islandeză | |
| NOK | coroana norvegiană | 7,8130 |
| BGN | leva bulgărească | 1,9558 |
| CZK | coroana cehă | 25,822 |
| HUF | forint maghiar | 298,62 |
| LTL | litas lituanian | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats leton | 0,7025 |
| PLN | zlot polonez | 4,2037 |
| RON | leu românesc nou | 4,4315 |
| TRY | lira turcească | 2,5664 |
| AUD | dolar australian | 1,4524 |
| CAD | dolar canadian | 1,3689 |
| HKD | dolar Hong Kong | 10,2705 |
| NZD | dolar neozeelandez | 1,6501 |
| SGD | dolar Singapore | 1,6835 |
| KRW | won sud-coreean | 1 482,39 |
| ZAR | rand sud-african | 13,2129 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi chinezesc | 8,1041 |
| HRK | kuna croată | 7,5415 |
| IDR | rupia indoneziană | 13 667,59 |
| MYR | ringgit Malaiezia | 4,3351 |
| PHP | peso Filipine | 57,975 |
| RUB | rubla rusească | 43,8995 |
| THB | baht thailandez | 41,504 |
| BRL | real brazilian | 3,0586 |
| MXN | peso mexican | 16,8756 |
| INR | rupie indiană | 81,3700 |

Moneda

Rata de schimb

USD

dolar american

1,3243

JPY

yen japonez

130,17

DKK

coroana daneză

7,4583

GBP

lira sterlină

0,85440

SEK

coroana suedeză

8,6393

CHF

franc elvețian

1,2415

ISK

coroana islandeză

NOK

coroana norvegiană

7,8130

BGN

leva bulgărească

1,9558

CZK

coroana cehă

25,822

HUF

forint maghiar

298,62

LTL

litas lituanian

3,4528

LVL

lats leton

0,7025

PLN

zlot polonez

4,2037

RON

leu românesc nou

4,4315

TRY

lira turcească

2,5664

AUD

dolar australian

1,4524

CAD

dolar canadian

1,3689

HKD

dolar Hong Kong

10,2705

NZD

dolar neozeelandez

1,6501

SGD

dolar Singapore

1,6835

KRW

won sud-coreean

1 482,39

ZAR

rand sud-african

13,2129

CNY

yuan renminbi chinezesc

8,1041

HRK

kuna croată

7,5415

IDR

rupia indoneziană

13 667,59

MYR

ringgit Malaiezia

4,3351

PHP

peso Filipine

57,975

RUB

rubla rusească

43,8995

THB

baht thailandez

41,504

BRL

real brazilian

3,0586

MXN

peso mexican

16,8756

INR

rupie indiană

81,3700

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(1)  Sursă: rata de schimb de referință publicată de către Banca Centrală Europeană.

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INFORMĂRI REFERITOARE LA SPAȚIUL ECONOMIC EUROPEAN

Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere

| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/3

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Ajutor de stat – Decizie de închidere a unui caz de ajutor de stat ca urmare a acceptării măsurilor corespunzătoare de către un stat AELS

2013/C 237/03

Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere a propus măsuri corespunzătoare, care au fost acceptate de Islanda, cu privire la următoarea măsură de ajutor:

| Data adoptării deciziei | : | 24 aprilie 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numărul cazului | : | 70958 |
| Numărul deciziei | : | 159/13/COL |
| Statul AELS | : | Islanda |
| Titlu | : | Ajutor de stat acordat întreprinderilor Landsvirkjun și Orkuveita Reykjavíkur |
| Temeiul juridic | : | Legea nr. 42/1983 privind Landsvirkjun, Legea nr. 45/1998 privind administrațiile publice locale, Legea nr. 139/2001 privind înființarea Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ca întreprindere deținută în comun și Legea nr. 121/1997 privind garanțiile de stat |
| Obiectiv | : | Nu se aplică |
| Forma ajutorului | : | Garanții nelimitate din partea statului și a municipalităților care vizează entitățile private, fără plata unor prime de piață corespunzătoare, acordate întreprinderilor Landsvirkjun și Orkuveita Reykjavíkur. |
| Sectoare economice | : | Sectorul energiei electrice |
| Alte informații | : | Ca urmare a măsurilor adoptate și a angajamentelor suplimentare luate de autoritățile islandeze privind suprimarea garanțiilor de stat nelimitate în favoarea întreprinderilor Landsvirkjun și Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, preocupările Autorității cu privire la incompatibilitatea schemei de ajutor cu Acordul privind SEE au fost înlăturate, iar procedura de investigare a fost închisă. |

Data adoptării deciziei

:

24 aprilie 2013

Numărul cazului

:

70958

Numărul deciziei

:

159/13/COL

Statul AELS

:

Islanda

Titlu

:

Ajutor de stat acordat întreprinderilor Landsvirkjun și Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

Temeiul juridic

:

Legea nr. 42/1983 privind Landsvirkjun, Legea nr. 45/1998 privind administrațiile publice locale, Legea nr. 139/2001 privind înființarea Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ca întreprindere deținută în comun și Legea nr. 121/1997 privind garanțiile de stat

Obiectiv

:

Nu se aplică

Forma ajutorului

:

Garanții nelimitate din partea statului și a municipalităților care vizează entitățile private, fără plata unor prime de piață corespunzătoare, acordate întreprinderilor Landsvirkjun și Orkuveita Reykjavíkur.

Sectoare economice

:

Sectorul energiei electrice

Alte informații

:

Ca urmare a măsurilor adoptate și a angajamentelor suplimentare luate de autoritățile islandeze privind suprimarea garanțiilor de stat nelimitate în favoarea întreprinderilor Landsvirkjun și Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, preocupările Autorității cu privire la incompatibilitatea schemei de ajutor cu Acordul privind SEE au fost înlăturate, iar procedura de investigare a fost închisă.

Textul deciziei, în versiunea lingvistică autentică, din care au fost eliminate toate informațiile confidențiale, este disponibil pe site-ul Autorității AELS de Supraveghere:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/4

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Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul între statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție cu privire la aspecte legate de ajutoarele de stat în legătură cu ajutorul regional destinat schemei de stimulente pentru investiții din Islanda și unui număr de șase acorduri de investiții

2013/C 237/04

Prin Decizia nr. 177/13/COL din 30 aprilie 2013, reprodusă în versiunea lingvistică autentică în paginile care urmează acestui rezumat, Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere a inițiat procedura prevăzută la articolul 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul între statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție. Autoritățile islandeze au primit, spre informare, o copie a deciziei respective.

Prin prezenta, Autoritatea AELS de Supraveghere trimite statelor AELS, statelor membre ale UE și părților interesate o notificare prin care le invită să își transmită observațiile cu privire la măsura în cauză în termen de o lună de la publicarea prezentei notificări, la următoarea adresă:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Observațiile vor fi comunicate autorităților islandeze. Există posibilitatea nedivulgării identității părții interesate care prezintă observațiile, în urma unei solicitări formulate în scris, în care se prezintă motivele acestei cereri.

REZUMAT

Procedură

La 13 octombrie 2010, Autoritatea a aprobat o schemă privind stimulentele pentru investiții (denumită în continuare „schema”) notificată de autoritățile islandeze în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (3) din partea I a Protocolului 3, prin Decizia nr. 390/10/COL.

Schema prevede posibilitatea de a acorda ajutoare sub formă de granturi directe, prin diverse scutiri de taxe, pentru o perioadă de până la 10 ani, prin vânzarea și închirierea terenurilor sub valoarea de piață în favoarea societăților din toate sectoarele, cu excepția sectorului financiar, în legătură cu o investiție inițială în regiunile care pot beneficia de ajutoare regionale (cunoscute ca „C-regiuni”) în Islanda. Schema expiră la 31 decembrie 2013.

Temeiul juridic al schemei, astfel cum a fost aprobat de Autoritate, este:

| — | Legea nr. 99/2010 privind stimulentele pentru investiții inițiale în Islanda (denumită în continuare „legea”), adoptată de parlamentul islandez la 29 iunie 2010; și |
| --- | --- |

—

Legea nr. 99/2010 privind stimulentele pentru investiții inițiale în Islanda (denumită în continuare „legea”), adoptată de parlamentul islandez la 29 iunie 2010; și

| — | Ordinul (UE) nr. 985/2010 privind stimulentele pentru investiții inițiale în Islanda, adoptat de Ministerul Industriei la 25 noiembrie 2010 (denumit în continuare „ordinul”), care corespunde unui proiect de ordin care a fost prezentat Autorității la data de 27 septembrie 2010. Ordinul reprezintă legislație secundară, adoptat pe baza legii. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ordinul (UE) nr. 985/2010 privind stimulentele pentru investiții inițiale în Islanda, adoptat de Ministerul Industriei la 25 noiembrie 2010 (denumit în continuare „ordinul”), care corespunde unui proiect de ordin care a fost prezentat Autorității la data de 27 septembrie 2010. Ordinul reprezintă legislație secundară, adoptat pe baza legii.

La 30 decembrie 2010, Ministerul Industriei a adoptat un nou ordin – (UE) nr. 1150/2010 – (denumit în continuare „cel de al doilea ordin”), de modificare a ordinului adoptat anterior, în special în ceea ce privește asigurarea efectului stimulativ al ajutorului pentru investiții. Cel de al doilea ordin nu a fost notificat Autorității.

În perioada 2010-2013, statul islandez a încheiat un număr de acorduri considerate a se încadra în schemă (denumite în continuare „cele șase acorduri de investiții”):

| 1. | la 30 decembrie 2010 – cu Becromal Icland ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

1.

la 30 decembrie 2010 – cu Becromal Icland ehf.;

| 2. | la 30 decembrie 2010 – cu Thorsil ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

2.

la 30 decembrie 2010 – cu Thorsil ehf.;

| 3. | la 17 februarie 2011 – cu Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

3.

la 17 februarie 2011 – cu Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf.;

| 4. | la 22 septembrie 2011 – cu Verne Real Estate II ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

4.

la 22 septembrie 2011 – cu Verne Real Estate II ehf.;

| 5. | la 7 mai 2012 – cu GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

5.

la 7 mai 2012 – cu GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| 6. | la 28 ianuarie 2013 – cu Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

la 28 ianuarie 2013 – cu Marmeti ehf.

După discuțiile care s-au derulat în faza de prenotificare, autoritățile islandeze au notificat Autorității, în temeiul articolului 1 alineatul (3) din partea I a Protocolului 3, o serie de modificări propuse (denumite în continuare „modificările notificate”) la Legea din 13 decembrie 2012.

Evaluarea măsurii

Modificările notificate constau în eliminarea unor granturi directe, adoptarea unei noi metode de impunere a impozitului maxim pe profit tuturor noilor proiecte din cadrul schemei, scutirea de taxa de timbru și creșterea nivelului de scutiri de la plata impozitului municipal pe proprietate și a asigurărilor sociale. Autoritatea a ajuns la concluzia preliminară că modificările notificate ale schemei nu sunt disociabile de schema în sine. În consecință, întreaga schemă, astfel cum a fost modificată, a făcut obiectul evaluării. De asemenea, Autoritatea a evaluat aplicarea schemei și a constatat că anumite elemente ale celor șase acorduri de investiții pe care Islanda le-a încheiat pe baza schemei, astfel cum a fost modificată, ridicau îndoieli cu privire la compatibilitatea cu Acordul privind SEE.

În special, Autoritatea avea îndoieli cu privire la posibilitatea ca ajutorul acordat în cadrul acordurilor de investiții încheiate cu Becromal, Kísilfélagið și Verne să se încadreze în schema aprobată de Autoritate și ca acestea să respecte cerința privind efectul stimulativ al ajutoarelor pentru investiții.

În plus, Autoritatea avea îndoieli în sensul că încheierea acordului de investiții cu Marmeti s-a făcut cu respectarea domeniului de aplicare al schemei, în ceea ce privește cerința privind efectul stimulativ.

Mai mult, Autoritatea avea îndoieli în ceea ce privește faptul că anumite elemente ale acordurilor de investiții încheiate cu Thorsil și cu GMR prevedeau ajutor acordat în afara schemei aprobate.

Prin urmare, Autoritatea avea îndoieli privind compatibilitatea cu Acordul privind SEE a schemei de ajutor, astfel cum a fost modificată și a ajutoarelor acordate în temeiul celor șase acorduri de investiții.

Concluzie

În lumina considerațiilor de mai sus, Autoritatea se îndoiește că schema, astfel cum a fost modificată, și cele șase acorduri de investiții menționate mai sus respectă articolul 61 alineatul (3) din Acordul privind SEE coroborat cu cerințele prevăzute în Orientările Autorității privind ajutoarele regionale.

Având în vedere considerațiile de mai sus, Autoritatea a decis să inițieze procedura oficială de investigare, în conformitate cu articolul 1 alineatul (2) din partea I a Protocolului 3 la Acordul între statele AELS privind instituirea unei Autorități de Supraveghere și a unei Curți de Justiție în ceea ce privește schema de stimulente pentru investiții, cu modificările notificate de autoritățile islandeze și astfel cum a fost modificată prin Ordinul (UE) nr. 1150/2010 pus în aplicare de autoritățile islandeze și în ceea ce privește cele șase acorduri de investiții.

Părțile interesate sunt invitate să își prezinte observațiile în termen de o lună de la publicarea prezentei notificări în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 177/13/COL

of 30 April 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to the investment incentives scheme and certain investment agreements

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 in Part I and Article 4(3) in Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Chronology of events

| (1) | On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 October 2010, the Authority approved a scheme on investment incentives (‘the scheme’) (1) notified by the Icelandic authorities pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, by Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (2) | The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The scheme provides for the possibility of granting aid in the form of direct grants, through various tax exemptions for up to 10 years and through the sale and lease of land below market value to companies in all sectors except the financial sector, in connection with an initial investment in areas eligible for regional aid (known as ‘c-regions’) in Iceland.

| (3) | The scheme expires on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The scheme expires on 31 December 2013.

| (4) | The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:






  (a) | Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

The legal basis for the scheme as approved by the Authority is:

(a)

Act No 99/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (‘the Act’) (2), adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 29 June 2010; and

| (b) | Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 on incentives for initial investments in Iceland (3), issued by the Ministry of Industry on 25 November 2010 (‘the Regulation’), corresponding to a draft regulation which was submitted to the Authority on 27 September 2010. The Regulation is a piece of secondary legislation, based on the Act.

| (5) | On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Industry issued a new regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 (‘the Supplementary Regulation’), amending the Regulation. The Supplementary Regulation was not notified to the Authority.

| (6) | During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:






  (a) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(6)

During the period 2010 to 2013, the Icelandic State entered into a number of agreements which it considered to fall under the scheme. The agreements are collectively referred to herein as ‘the six investment agreements’. They are as follows:

(a)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA, with a projected investment cost of EUR 117,25 million;

| (b) | on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

on 30 December 2010, the Minister for Industry on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Thorsil ehf., Timminco Ltd. and Stokkur Energy ehf.;

| (c) | on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

on 17 February 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister for Finance on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| (d) | on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

on 22 September 2011, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ldt., on a project with the total envisaged investment cost of USD 675 million;

| (e) | on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

on 7 May 2012, the Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.;

| (f) | on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

on 28 January 2013, the Minister for Industries on behalf of the Icelandic Government entered into an investment agreement with Marmeti ehf.

2.   Procedure

| (7) | Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following pre-notification discussions, the Icelandic authorities notified, pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, a series of proposed amendments (‘the notified amendments’) to Act No 99/2010 by way of a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578).

| (8) | By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By letter submitted on 22 January 2013 (Event No 660120), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. By letter received on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request.

| (9) | The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Authority submitted a second request for information on 11 February 2013 (Event No 662250) to which it received a reply on 5 March 2013 (Event Nos 664789-92). The Authority responded to this letter on 20 March 2013. The Icelandic authorities submitted further information by way of a letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635) and a meeting was held between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority on 23 April 2013.

3.   Description of the measures under preliminary examination

3.1.   
  Background

| (10) | As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As described above, the investment incentives scheme is established by Act No 99/2010, and Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, on incentives for initial investments in Iceland. The Act and the Regulation set out a mechanism for the support of initial investment in regions which, under Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland, are eligible for regional aid.

| (11) | The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The scheme was approved by the Authority by Decision No 390/10/COL on 13 October 2010, following a notification from the Icelandic authorities dated 28 June 2010. The Authority assessed the scheme under the Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (‘the Regional aid guidelines’) (4).

| (12) | The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The aim of the scheme is to promote initial investment thereby creating jobs in the disadvantaged regions in Iceland. Projects with projected minimum annual turnover of ISK 300 million or which create at least 20 new direct jobs within the first two years of operation are eligible. The project shall operate in the region for at least 10 years. Projects must be approved by the Minister for Industry, who signs an investment agreement with each successful applicant. Approval of applications is subject to an ex ante cost benefit calculation by the Invest in Iceland Agency. For a detailed description of the scheme, reference is made to Section I.2 of Decision No 390/10/COL of 13 October 2010.

| (13) | The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The present decision of the Authority concerns three sets of measures taken in Iceland with regard to the scheme: (i) the notified amendments (Section 3.2 below); (ii) the non-notified amendments (Section 3.3); and (iii) the six investment agreements (Section 3.4).

3.2.   
  The notified amendments to the scheme

| (14) | On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:






  1. | Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

On 30 November 2012, the Icelandic Government submitted to the Parliament a bill which proposed a series of amendments to the existing scheme. On 13 December 2012, the Icelandic authorities submitted a notification to the Authority of the proposed amendments. The Icelandic Parliament adopted the bill, as Act No 25/2013, on 13 March 2013. Act No 25/2013 will only come into force once the Authority has given a decision approving the amendments. The notified amendments are as follows:

1.

Direct grants under Article 8 of Act No 99/2010 will be abolished.

| 2. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable rate at the time at which an agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary. The statutory income tax rate was raised from 18 % to 20 % on 1 January 2011. This means that the maximum 18 % tax rate will apply, instead of the tax rate (currently 20 %) in force at the time at which a new agreement is signed between the Icelandic authorities and a beneficiary for new investment projects under the scheme. The new maximum rate will apply as of the entry into force of the notified amendment until the expiry of the scheme on 31 December 2013.

| 3. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to new investment projects which will be granted aid under the scheme will be zero (instead of 0,15 %, as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 4. | The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

4.

The municipal property tax rate for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995 (instead of the 30 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| 5. | The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The general social security charge for new investment projects will be 50 % less than the charge stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge (instead of the 20 % reduction as provided in the scheme as approved).

| (15) | The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Icelandic authorities have asserted (5) that the proposed amendments will not apply to projects subject to investment agreements which had already been entered into between the beneficiary and the Icelandic authorities at the time at which the notified amendments enter into effect. The Icelandic authorities have explained that the proposed amendments will expire on 31 December 2013, as will the scheme itself.

3.3.   
  The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (16) | During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

During its preliminary examination, the Authority became aware that the Supplementary Regulation, issued by the Ministry of Industry shortly after the Authority’s approval of the scheme (6), had made a number of changes to the scheme.

| (17) | The amendments concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The amendments concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme (Article 3(c) of the Regulation);

| (ii) | the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1) of the Regulation); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation).

| (18) | The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:
  Article 3
  Conditions for granting aid
  When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:
  [...]






  (c) | the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.
  [...] |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The amended provisions (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation underlined) read as follows:

Article 3

Conditions for granting aid

When assessing whether to grant aid to new investment projects, according to Act No 99/2010, the following cumulative criteria shall be fulfilled:

[...]

(c)

the prospective investment project has not been started before the signing of an agreement according to Article 20, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act, and it is demonstrated that the granting of the aid is a prerequisite for the project to materialise in Iceland.

[...]

Article 8

Aid relating to taxes and other public fees

Regional aid under Act No 99/2010 may be granted through the reduction of taxes or other public fees relating to the investment project in question.

A company, established for initial investment purposes, which fulfils the cumulative criteria set out in Act No 99/2010, and in this Regulation, shall enjoy the following tax derogations:

| 1. | The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act
  [...] |
| --- | --- |

1.

The income tax rate of the company shall, for the period stipulated in Article 3, not exceed the income tax rate in effect when the investment agreement according to Article 20 is concluded, or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act

[...]

Article 20

Agreement on the granting of aid

If an applicant accepts the Minister’s offer to enter into an agreement on aid, such an agreement shall be signed between the applicant and the Minister on behalf of the national authorities, and where applicable the local authorities, on the granting of aid for an investment project.

The duration of an agreement granting aid according to paragraph 1 shall not exceed 13 years from the date of signature, taking into account a special investment agreement, should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. Aid granted on the basis of Article 9 of Act No 99/2010 shall apply for 10 years calculated from the date when the relevant tax liability occurs or the obligation to pay the relevant charges under Article 9(2) of Act No 99/2010 is triggered, however not exceeding 13 years from the signing of an agreement granting aid, taking into account a special investment agreement should such an agreement previously have been concluded concerning the project. The net present value of the estimated total State aid to be granted over the duration of an investment agreement shall be stipulated in the agreement. An investment agreement entered into on the basis of Act No 99/2010 shall be published in the B-Section of the Official Gazette (7).

| (19) | During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:
  ‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

During the Authority’s preliminary examination, the Icelandic authorities provided the following explanation regarding the non-notified amendments to the scheme:

‘The reference “or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act” was added to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 985/2010 with Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010 from 30 December 2010. This means that the prospective investment project must not have been initiated before the signing of an investment agreement referred to in the Regulation or a special investment agreement, specifically related to the project in question. The reference to a special investment agreement relates to preparation of the investment project. Nevertheless, the project as such shall not be undertaken before the activation of the incentives referred to in Regulation (EU) No 985/2010, as amended.’ (8).

3.4.   
  The six investment agreements

| (20) | The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The Icelandic authorities have provided the Authority with copies of six investment agreements, which were entered into during the period December 2010 to January 2013.

| (21) | The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

  Table 1 | Date | Companies | Project |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 December 2010 | Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA | Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri |
| 2 | 30 December 2010 | Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited | Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus |
| 3 | 17 February 2011 | Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC | Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 4 | 27 September 2011 | Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. | Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær |
| 5 | 7 May 2012 | GMR Endurvinnslan ehf. | Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit |
| 6 | 28 January 2013 | Marmeti ehf. | Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði |

(21)

The six investment agreements are listed below (9):

Table 1

Date

Companies

Project

1

30 December 2010

Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Becromal SpA

Aluminium foil anodising plant in the town of Akureyri

2

30 December 2010

Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited

Silicon metal production in Þorlákshöfn in the municipality of Ölfus

3

17 February 2011

Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC

Silicon metal production in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

4

27 September 2011

Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd.

Data centre in the municipality of Reykjanesbær

5

7 May 2012

GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.

Steel recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit

6

28 January 2013

Marmeti ehf.

Fish factory in the town of Sandgerði

| (22) | The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Authority has not been provided with copies of any agreements which are expressly labelled as ‘special investment agreements’, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation or as described in the reply from the Icelandic authorities quoted in paragraph 19 above.

| (23) | However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

However, two of the investment agreements listed in the table above refer to previous agreements which were entered into by the Icelandic authorities with the same beneficiaries. These agreements concerned the same projects. The Authority is therefore making the initial assumption that these earlier investment agreements fall into the category of ‘special investment agreements’ and that the references to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation in fact relates to these earlier investment agreements. The investment agreements which make reference to earlier agreements are to be found at No 1 and No 3 in the table above.

| (24) | The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The first of these was concluded between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA (‘the Becromal Investment Agreement’). This agreement refers to an investment agreement on the same project between the same parties which was entered into on 7 July 2009 (10). The project referred to is an investment in an aluminium foil anodising plant to be constructed in the town of Akureyri in two steps; the first phase, EUR 66 million, by end of March 2011 and second phase by the end of year 2014, total investment cost approximately EUR 117,25 million. The Icelandic authorities have provided some further information about the background of the Becromal Investment Agreement, including information on the earlier agreement referred to, dated on 7 July 2009 (11).

| (25) | The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The third investment agreement set out in the table above, which was concluded between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC (‘the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement’) likewise refers to a previous agreement, which was entered into between the same parties, and on the same project, on 29 May 2009 (12). The project referred to is the construction, in two or more steps, of a silicon production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær with the production capacity of up to 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon or equivalent (> 98 %), up to 20 000 metric tonnes of silica dust (SiO2) per year.

| (26) | Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Lastly, although the fourth investment agreement set out in the table above, which was entered into between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. (‘the Verne Investment Agreement’) (13), does not refer to a previous agreement, it nonetheless appears to concern the same or a similar investment project (14) as one that was subject to a previous decision of the Authority. By Decision No 418/10/COL of 3 November 2010 (15), the Authority opened a formal investigation procedure on an investment agreement which was entered into on 23 October 2009 between the State and Verne Real Estate ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. on a data centre project in Reykjanesbær. According to the Icelandic authorities, this agreement was later cancelled and the notification was withdrawn. The matter was not pursued further by the Authority at that point (16).

| (27) | The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The preliminary view of the Authority is that the reference to ‘special investment agreements’ in the Supplementary Regulation may encompass these three earlier investment agreements, which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (28) | For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

For the sake of completeness, the Authority notes that the investment agreements set out at points 2, 5 and 6 in the table above do not relate to any earlier investment agreements, according to information available to the Authority at this point in time.

| (29) | The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Authority has not been provided with further details of any ‘special investment agreements’ referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, apart from some information on the one referred to in the Becromal Investment Agreement. The Authority has not received copies of these earlier investment agreements. Furthermore, the Authority has not been provided with information on or copies of any separate agreements entered into between municipalities and the beneficiaries (17), pursuant to the provisions of the scheme allowing for exemptions from municipal property tax and sale or lease of land below market price as provided for under the scheme (18).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
  In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

In the following, the Authority will assess whether the criteria for the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are fulfilled.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (31) | To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To be qualified as State aid, an advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources. For the purposes of the State aid rules, the term ‘State’ covers also regional and local bodies (19). A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure and State support may be provided equally by tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities (20). A reduction in the tax base or a total or partial reduction on the amount of tax, fees or charges involves a loss of revenue and is therefore equivalent to the consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

| (32) | The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The scheme, its amendments and the six investment agreements all contain tax concessions, and thus State resources are involved (21).

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (33) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified amendments is selective as only undertakings investing in certain regions in Iceland eligible for assistance under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement can receive aid under the scheme. As regards the six investment agreements, the beneficiaries are individual companies and therefore the measures are selective.

| (34) | The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (22). According to settled case law, a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a transfer of State resources, places those to whom the tax exemption applies in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes aid granted by the State or through State resources (23).

| (35) | The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority notes that the scheme and the six investment agreements contain a clause protecting against future increase of the statutory rate of income tax. This guarantee against future legislative changes in itself constitutes State aid in the Authority’s view.

| (36) | The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The scheme as amended by the notified and non-notified measures, and the six investment agreements, allow or will allow beneficiaries to be relieved of part of the costs which they would normally have to bear themselves in their course of business.

| (37) | Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Thus, the scheme as amended and the six investment agreements favour certain undertakings and the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (38) | The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The notified and non-notified measures and the six investment agreements will strengthen the competitive situation of the supported undertakings in the eligible regions compared to their actual or potential competitors in the EEA. The scheme applies to all sectors, with the exemption of the financial sector, and therefore has a potential to distort trade within the EEA since it cannot be excluded that in some of these sectors there is competition between the aid beneficiaries and undertakings in the EEA.

1.5.   
  Conclusion

| (39) | The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority notes that in its Decision No 390/10/COL it found the measures under the scheme to fall within the definition of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has not been presented with new elements calling for a different assessment with respect to the scheme at this point.

| (40) | Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Based on the above findings, the Authority comes to the conclusion that the scheme, as amended by the non-notified measures set out in the Supplementary Regulation and by the notified amendments, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The same conclusion applies to the six investment agreements.

2.   New aid procedure

| (41) | All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All plans to amend the scheme are subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 and the Authority’s Decision No 390/10/COL approving the scheme.

| (42) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the approved scheme consist of the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved (the statutory stamp duty is 1,5 %).

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (43) | Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Under Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3, ‘alterations to existing aid’ are to be regarded as new aid. An increase in the original budget of an existing aid scheme by up to 20 %, without amending the provisions of an aid scheme, is not considered an alteration to existing aid, according to the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL on the implementing provisions under Article 27 in Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Decision’). The notified amendments do not merely increase the budget of the scheme. Rather, the Icelandic authorities propose amending certain provisions for granting aid in the form of tax exemptions while abolishing direct grants from the scheme. The Icelandic authorities have not considered the notified alterations to fall within the criteria for the simplified notification procedure set out in Article 4(2) of the Implementing Decision. Moreover, it is the Authority’s view that the notified amendments cannot be classified as ‘of purely formal or administrative nature’, as referred to in Article 4 of the Implementing Decision. Accordingly, the notified amendments must be regarded as alterations to existing aid. Hence, the notified amendments are classified as new aid as defined in Article 1(c) in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (44) | The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The question then arises whether the entire scheme, or only the amendments, are to be classified as new aid. According to established case-law, when alterations are made which are severable from the existing aid only the alterations need to be notified, and only when the alteration affects the actual substance of the original scheme is the latter transformed into new aid scheme (24). In the Authority’s preliminary view, the proposals to: (i) introduce a new method for granting maximum corporate tax, which would, in the current situation reduce the tax rate for all new projects instead of guaranteeing a current maximum tax rate; (ii) eliminate stamp duties for all new projects instead of only reducing them; (iii) increase the level of municipal tax discount from 30 % to 50 %; and (iv) increase the level of general social security charge from 20 % to 50 % are alterations that change basic features of the scheme and they are not severable from the scheme itself. They will apply to all aid granted to new projects under the scheme. Moreover, these are not merely additions to the scheme, which add (e.g.) categories of companies or operations, but rather, alterations that affect the whole scheme.

| (45) | The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The amendment under point (i) in itself changes the nature and the intrinsic functioning of the provision on corporate tax rate from being a pure guarantee against future increases in corporate tax rate into fixing a maximum rate below the rate at any given point, when a beneficiary enters into an agreement. This new arrangement would apply to all new projects which would be granted aid under the scheme in the future.

| (46) | Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the elimination of stamp duties in their entirety under point (ii) and the increase in discounts under points (iii) and (iv) are large in volume and they increase the discounts considerably. Under these circumstances, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the alterations to the scheme cannot be classified as being severable from the initial scheme. In other words, the alterations affect the entire scheme, such that the whole scheme must be regarded as new aid, which may not be implemented prior to a new approval. According to established case-law, the entire scheme thus becomes new aid (25).

| (47) | The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover recalls that the non-notified amendments set out in the Supplementary Regulation concern: (i) the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme; (ii) the maximum corporate tax rate applicable; and (iii) the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme.

| (48) | These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

These amendments to the scheme are in the Authority's preliminary view subject to a notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

| (49) | In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:
  ‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’ |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In its ruling in the Heineken Brouwerijen Case (26), the Court stated:

‘Where a plan has been notified and the Commission has not raised any objections to it, but the Member State concerned has made alterations of which the Commission has not been informed, the provision precludes the putting into effect of the aid programme in its entirety. The position may be different only where the alteration in question is in actual fact a separate aid measure which should be assessed separately and which is therefore not such as to influence the assessment which the Commission has already made of the initial plan.’

| (50) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the non-notified amendments to the scheme, made only shortly after its approval, influence the assessment which the Authority has already made of the scheme, in particular as regards the application of the incentive effect test, which is a central element in assessing the compatibility of national regional aid with Article 61(1) EEA. Therefore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the whole scheme, as amended, constitutes new aid according to Article 1 in Part II of Protocol 3.

| (51) | Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Insofar as one or more of the six investment agreements are concluded outside the scope of the initial scheme as approved by the Authority, they likewise constitute new aid, according to established case-law (27).

3.   Procedural requirements

| (52) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (...). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (53) | The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Icelandic authorities submitted a notification of the amendments to the scheme contained in the bill of law amending the Act with a letter dated and received on 13 December 2012 (Event No 656578). The bill was put forward to the Parliament prior to the notification. According to the information currently available to the Authority, the bill was adopted by the Parliament on 13 March 2013 as Act No 25/2013. However, the under Article 3 therein, the Act will only become effective once the Authority has approved the amendments. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have respected their obligations under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the notified amendments proposed.

| (54) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the Supplementary Regulation to the Authority. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 as regards the amendments put into effect by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010.

| (55) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the six investment agreements entered into after the approval of the scheme. Insofar as the investment agreements, or elements thereof, entail State aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme and/or were subject to individual notification requirements under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines, the Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1.   
  Introduction

| (56) | Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 61(3)(c) EEA concerns, inter alia, aid to facilitate the development of certain disadvantaged areas, known as national regional aid.

| (57) | National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

National regional aid is designed to assist the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation. The Authority has issued guidelines on the application of the derogation (the Regional aid guidelines), which are in force for the period 2007 to 2013. For Iceland, the Authority has approved a map for regions eligible for such aid, in Decision No 378/06/COL of 6 December 2006 on the map of assisted areas and levels of aid in Iceland.

| (58) | The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Authority notes that the areas which are eligible for aid under the scheme and the individual projects which were subject to the six Investment Agreements are in areas that are eligible for regional investment aid based on the Authority’s Decision No 378/06/COL.

4.2.   
  The scheme as amended

| (59) | The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:






  1. | The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority recalls that the notified amendments to the scheme as approved by the Authority in its Decision No 390/10/COL are contained in the following four proposals for increasing the level of exemptions from statutory taxes for new investment projects which will be granted under the scheme following the entry into effect of the proposed amendments:

1.

The maximum payable corporate income tax rate will be fixed to 18 %, instead of the applicable tax rate (currently 20 %) at the time at which an agreement is signed between the State and a beneficiary, as is the case under the scheme as approved.

| 2. | Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stamp duties under Act No 36/1978 on documents relating to the new investment project will be zero, instead of 0,15 % as provided in the scheme as approved.

| 3. | The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The municipal property tax rate for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 30 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than the maximum rate stipulated in Chapter II of Act No 4/1995.

| 4. | The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The general social security charge for such projects will be 50 % less (instead of 20 % less, as set out in the scheme as approved) than is stipulated in Article 2(3) of Act No 113/1990 on social security charge.

| (60) | During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

During the preliminary examination, the Authority became aware of further amendments and of the application of the scheme, which give rise to doubts as to whether the scheme has sufficiently clear criteria, inter alia, for the incentive effect to be verified, as applied by the Icelandic authorities. In order to review this, the Authority has examined the application of the scheme during the period from when it came into force in 2010 to date. In this respect the Authority has been provided with the six investment agreements entered into — in the Icelandic authorities’ view — on the basis of the scheme (28).

4.2.1.   The application of the scheme

| (61) | First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

First, the Authority notes that the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement both contain a reference to previous agreements on the same projects, referred to as ‘a preliminary step’. The Becromal Investment Agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement are considered by their parties to be ‘a follow up and completion of previous investment agreement’. This appears to be facilitated by the amendments to the scheme made by the Supplementary Agreement.

| (62) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this application of the amended scheme indicates that the conditions under the scheme as regards the application of the incentive effect test are not sufficiently limited or strict, as regards the condition that the prospective investment project is not to have started prior to the signing of an agreement under the scheme. The Authority recalls that the Icelandic authorities are under the obligation to ensure that construction work had not started prior to entering into agreements under the scheme and this obligation was a clear precondition for the its approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. The Authority recalls its reference to the significance of the incentive effect requirements under paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines, set out at Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (63) | Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Second, the scheme contains an obligation to include in the Investment Agreements an estimate of the net present value of the total State aid to be granted to a project over the duration of the scheme, and to establish the eligible costs and the overall ceiling of the aid.

| (64) | The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The obligation to make a reference to the net present value of the aid granted in the agreements entered into on the basis of the scheme is codified in Article 20(4) of the Regulation. However, the estimated net present value of the aid is not referred to in any of the six Investment Agreements. In this respect, the application of the scheme appears not to be entirely consistent with the scheme as set out in the Regulation and approved by the Authority.

| (65) | Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Further, only two of the six investment agreements refer to the total investment costs of the respective projects (the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement). The Authority recalls that the scheme provides for aid in the form of tax concessions, which only qualifies as investment aid on the basis set out in detail in Decision No 390/10/COL at Section II.3.3. An essential element for aid in the form of tax concessions to be regarded as investment aid is an overall ceiling expressed as a percentage of the eligible investment costs in a specific project.

| (66) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the lack of a clear statement of the eligible investment costs, the lack of a reference to the estimate of the discounted value of the aid, and the lack of a statement as to the overall ceiling in the investment agreements, indicate that the scheme being applied in a way that is insufficiently transparent. The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the scheme contains sufficiently clear provisions to ensure the necessary transparency and documentation with regard to the maximum aid amounts.

| (67) | Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Third, the examples mentioned above give rise to doubt as to whether the cost-benefit analysis calculation which forms part of the scheme — a mechanism designed to ensuring the necessity and proportionality of the aid to be established ex ante — is sufficiently described, regulated and applied under the scheme. The cost-benefit analysis was a precondition for the approval of the scheme, see Section II.3.6 of Decision No 390/10/COL.

| (68) | Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Fourth, in their submission to the Authority during the preliminary examination of the notified amendments to the scheme, the Icelandic authorities asserted that the amendments will not have any retroactive effects on investment agreements already concluded before the entering into force of the amendments. They have asserted that all the proposed amendments will apply only to new agreements entered into after the proposed amendments enter into force. Moreover, they have stated that beneficiaries under existing agreements under the scheme will not benefit from the amended scheme. Further, the Icelandic authorities have stated that investment projects that have already been approved under the scheme will not be eligible under the amended scheme.

| (69) | In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In the Authority’s preliminary view, the assertions above appear to be in contradiction with the explicit provisions of some of the investment agreements set out above. It is expressly stated in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, the Verne Investment Agreement, the GMR Investment Agreement and the Marmeti Investment Agreement that the beneficiaries have an unconditional right to claim that they will benefit from any amendments to the scheme which would be more favourable for them than the current arrangements. The scheme, as approved, classifies the aid granted as investment aid, on the basis set out above in paragraph 65. An unconditional contractual obligation to grant further aid in the future, in case of an amended scheme, appears not to be compatible with these conditions. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that this application of the scheme is not consistent with the scheme as approved. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is sufficiently limited and proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives, and is not instead pure operating aid.

| (70) | Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Fifth, the Becromal Investment Agreement and the Thorsil Investment Agreement contain a clause on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. The duration of the aid measures is fixed in the scheme. Grants of aid in the form of tax measures qualify as investment aid on the condition that these measures are limited in time. The Authority’s preliminary view is that the application of the scheme appears to be contrary to the nature of the investment aid which was approved by the Authority. The Authority has doubts as to whether the provisions and mechanisms under the scheme are sufficiently clear to ensure that the aid is necessary and sufficiently proportionate to ensure the regional aid objectives and is not pure operating aid.

4.2.2.   The non-notified amendments to the scheme

| (71) | As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:






  (i) | the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c)); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(71)

As described in Section I.3.3 above, the Supplementary Regulation, issued on 30 December 2010, alters Article 3(c), Article 8(2)(1) and Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2) of the Regulation. These provisions concern:

(i)

the application of the incentive effect test under the scheme as approved by the Authority (Article 3(c));

| (ii) | the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the rules on maximum corporate tax applicable (Article 8(2)(1)); and

| (iii) | the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)). |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the date for calculating the maximum duration of the tax exemptions allowed under the scheme (Article 20(3)(1) and (3)(2)).

| (72) | The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Supplementary Agreement was not notified to the Authority. In light of the conclusions above as regards the notified amendments and the six investment agreements, the Authority takes the view that the alterations of the scheme made under the Supplementary Agreement shortly after the approval of the scheme in 2010 must be examined by the Authority.

| (73) | The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:
  ‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Authority recalls that it stated in Decision No 390/10/COL that:

‘The scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before an agreement with the Icelandic authorities is entered into, according to Article 21 of the Incentives Act.’ (29).

| (74) | Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:
  ‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Furthermore, the Authority referred in that Decision to the assertions made by the Icelandic authorities regarding the incentive effect of the scheme, as follows:

‘Moreover, no aid will be granted under the scheme to projects on which work has started before the signing of an agreement on the granting of aid between the State and the beneficiary. The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that the scheme excludes the award of aid to projects which have started before publication of the final text of the scheme in line with paragraph 93 in fine of the Regional aid guidelines’ (30).

| (75) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the Supplementary Regulation has adversely affected the incentive effect requirement set out in the original scheme. The amended wording of Article 3(c) of the Regulation states that aid may be granted also to a project which has started after a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Regulation. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this amendment considerably widens the scope of the scheme beyond that which was approved by the Authority’s decision.

| (76) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’ |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the amendment to Article 3(c) of the Regulation means that the conditions under which aid is to be granted may in this respect no longer be consistent with the Regional aid guidelines. Indeed, paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines states:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces a real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore aid may only be granted under aid schemes if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project.’

| (77) | The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The requirements and method for verifying the existence of an incentive effect of aid, as prescribed by the Regional aid guidelines, were a precondition for the Authority’s approval of the scheme by Decision No 390/10/COL. Contrary to the assertion made by the Icelandic authorities, referred to in Decision No 390/10/COL, the scheme as subsequently amended by the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for aid to be granted to projects which were started before the scheme entered into force. Consequently, the Authority has doubts as to whether the requirement of an incentive effect of aid granted under the scheme as amended by the Supplementary Regulation is fulfilled.

| (78) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that, under the Regulation as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, aid might have been granted not only to projects upon which work had started prior to the conclusion of an agreement under the scheme, but indeed also prior to the entry into force of the scheme as such. The Authority’s preliminary view is reinforced by the fact that two of the six investment agreements (the Becromal investment agreement and the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement) indeed have an explicit reference to earlier individual agreements signed in 2009 on what appear to be the same projects. These projects appear to have been started prior to the starting of the scheme in 2010. In addition, the Verne Investment Agreement likewise appears to be related to a prior agreement, entered into in 2009, on the same or a similar project to one which that had already been started in 2008.

| (79) | The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority cannot exclude that the conditions for granting aid, as specified in the scheme following the insertion of new text (‘or according to a special investment agreement prior to entry into force of the Act’) into Article 3 of the Regulation, allow for a grant of aid which would be considered incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as aid may be granted for a project upon which work has started prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

| (80) | The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The alteration which the Supplementary Regulation made to Article 8 of the Regulation alters the reference rate for corporate income tax which can be guaranteed to a beneficiary as a maximum tax rate. Under the amended version of the article, the reference rate in case of a ‘special investment agreement’ is (alternatively) the corporate tax rate in effect at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme. Under the original version of the article, the reference rate would exclusively have been the tax rate at the time at which an investment agreement was signed under the scheme.

| (81) | The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority considers that the Supplementary Regulation appears to allow for a retroactive application of the scheme, insofar as the amended provisions of Article 8 allow for an application of the corporate tax rate applicable before the start of the scheme. In view of the amendments to Article 3 of the Regulation, which allow for a grant of aid to be made on the basis of agreements which were entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the Authority has doubts as to whether the amended version of Article 8, in conjunction with the amended version of Article 3, can properly be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (82) | The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The amendments made to Article 20 of the Regulation appear to provide for a maximum duration of the tax exemptions which dates from the signature of an agreement prior to the entry into force of the scheme in 2010.

| (83) | The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Authority has not yet been provided with sufficient information to allow it to verify whether the alterations, seen in relation to the alterations to Articles 3 and 8 of the Regulation discussed above, could be considered to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (84) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the scheme, as amended by the Supplementary Regulation, can be regarded compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (85) | The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority likewise has doubts as to whether the scheme as amended by Act No 25/2013 will be capable of being found to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (86) | The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority is under a duty to carry out all requisite consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, if its initial investigation does not enable the Authority to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (87) | In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the light of this duty, and the doubts expressed above as regards the necessary clarity and limitation provided for under the scheme and its application to date, the Authority cannot approve the notified amendments without further investigation.

4.3.   
  The six investment agreements

| (88) | As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As a preliminary point the Authority observes that aid granted under an approved scheme would in principle constitute existing aid. However, as set out above, any aid granted outside the scope of the approved scheme would be new aid. The Authority takes the preliminary view that aid granted on the basis of the non-notified amendments to the scheme is granted outside the scope of the approved scheme. Such aid could have been granted on the basis of investment agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme, with such earlier investment agreements later being brought within the scheme on the basis of the provisions of the Supplementary Regulation.

| (89) | The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority accordingly sets out below a preliminary examination of the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements, which appear to be related to earlier investment agreements, entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme.

| (90) | Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Moreover, the Authority cannot at this point exclude the possibility that aid granted under the Thorsil, GMR and Marmeti investment agreements, which are not related to any earlier investment agreements, went beyond the limitations set out in the scheme as approved.

| (91) | Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Therefore, the Authority will examine all six investment agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made available under the preliminary examination in the present case. They all refer to the scheme as the basis for the tax exemptions they contain.

| (92) | The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Authority will first address the three investment agreements, discussed in Section I.3.4 above, which appear to be related to a previous investment agreement: the Becromal, the Kísilfélagið and the Verne investment agreements.

4.3.1.   The Becromal Investment Agreement

4.3.1.1.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (93) | The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:
  ‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).
  On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”
  This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’ |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Becromal Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. Sections D, H and I of the preamble to the Becromal Investment Agreement read as follows:

‘The Investors have, from the year 2007, been taking the necessary preliminary and preparatory steps towards the establishment of the Plant in the township of Akureyri, which production will be marketed towards non-Icelandic international clients using electric power for its operations, supplied in first instance by Landsvirkjun on a long-term basis, propelling, by the end of March 2011, 60 specially designed machines with the estimated investment in the 1st phase being EUR 66 million, and with the expected expansion of the Plant’s capacity (the 2nd phase), by the year end 2014, with the total investment expected to be approximately EUR 117,25 million (hereinafter referred to as the “Project”).

On 7 July 2009, the Parties signed and Investment relating to the Project, covering an exemption of Becromal and the Investors from restrictions set forth in Rules No 1130/2008 on Foreign Exchange. The Investment Agreement, dated 7 July 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 7 July 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”

This Investment Agreement is therefore a follow up and completion of the previous Investment Agreement dated 7 July 2009. This Investment Agreement has legal validity on the basis of Act No 99/2010, on incentives for initial incentive on Iceland, which came into force in 2010, and subsequent secondary legislation.’

| (94) | The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31). |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The text cited appears to be linked to the alterations of the scheme by the Supplementary Regulation, which was issued on the same day as the signing of the Becromal Investment Agreement (on 30 December 2010). The Authority takes the preliminary view that Supplementary Regulation may have enabled a retroactive application of the scheme. From the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities the Authority understands that the Supplementary Regulation was designed so as to enable the previous investment agreement, entered into with Becromal on 7 July 2009, to be covered by the scheme (31).

| (95) | The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The scheme, as approved, allows for no granting of aid to projects under agreements entered into prior to the entry into force of the scheme. On the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement is entered into on the basis of the approved scheme.

| (96) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the link drawn in the Becromal Investment Agreement to a previous (special) investment agreement on the same project is compatible with the conditions set out in the Regional aid guidelines on the so-called incentive effect of investment aid.

| (97) | The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The facts of the present case appear to indicate that at the date on which the Becromal Investment Agreement was signed, work on the project to which aid was granted may have been already started. Indeed, it appears that this work started even before the signing of the earlier agreement on 7 July 2009 (32).

| (98) | The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:
  ‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The rules on incentive effect are stated in paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines:

‘It is important to ensure that regional aid produces real incentive effect to undertake investments which would not otherwise be made in the assisted areas. Therefore, aid may only be granted under aid scheme if the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for has submitted an application for aid and the authority responsible for administering the scheme has subsequently confirmed in writing that, subject to detailed verification, the project in principle meets the conditions of eligibility laid down by the scheme before the start of work on the project. An express reference to both conditions must also be included in all aid schemes. In the case of ad hoc aid, the competent authority must have issued a letter of intent, conditional on the Authority’s approval of the measure, to award aid before work starts on the project. If work begins before the conditions laid down in this paragraph are fulfilled, the whole project will not be eligible for aid.’

| (99) | The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Regional aid guidelines defines the term ‘start of work’ as ‘start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies’ (33).

| (100) | In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34). |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In line with the decision-making practices of the European Commission and the Authority, a letter of intent within the meaning of the Regional aid guidelines can be described as a ‘document that may be considered as explicitly granting aid to [the company] for the investment’ (34).

| (101) | The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36). |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The aim of paragraph 30 of the Regional aid guidelines is to make it possible for the Authority to ascertain the existence of incentive effect of investment aid without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision (35). Thus, as confirmed by the General Court in the Kronoply judgement, the Authority may base its assessment of the incentive effect by reference to a circumstance of a chronological nature (36).

| (102) | As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

As referred to above, work appears to have started on the Becromal project already in 2008. The Authority has not been provided with information which enables it to verify whether the Icelandic authorities had committed to grant aid to the project before start of work.

| (103) | The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority accordingly has doubts as to whether the incentive effect condition is satisfied as regards the Becromal Investment Agreement.

4.3.1.2.   Retroactive effect of maximum income tax

| (104) | Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’ |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 15.1 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘This Agreement shall become effective on the date of signature by the Parties. However, Article 7.1 of the Agreement shall become effective as of 7 July 2009.’

| (105) | Further, Article 7.1 reads:
  ‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’ |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Further, Article 7.1 reads:

‘Notwithstanding eventual changes in Act No 90/2003 on income tax, as amended, the Companies shall pay an income tax rate of 15 % with the following special provisions [...].’

| (106) | At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

At the time of signature of the Becromal Investment Agreement the general corporate tax rate in Iceland was 18 % (37). According to the scheme as approved by the Authority, the applicable tax rate at the time of signing an investment agreement was the tax rate that could be guaranteed to the beneficiary. By fixing the maximum tax rate (15 %) as that which was applicable at a point in time prior to the entry into force of the scheme, the aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement was granted on terms which were more favourable than those set out in the approved scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the Becromal Investment Agreement fell in this respect outside the scope of the approved scheme.

4.3.1.3.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (107) | The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

The Authority has consistently considered that fiscal aid granted to provide an incentive for firms to embark on certain specific projects (investment in particular) and which is limited in its intensity with respect to the costs of carrying out the project is no different from a subsidy and may be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, such aid schemes must lay down rules which are sufficiently transparent to enable the benefit conferred to be quantified (38).

| (108) | The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39). |
| --- | --- |

(108)

The Authority consequently considers that for aid such as the tax measures granted under the scheme and in the Becromal Investment Agreement to be characterised as investment aid: (i) it must be linked to the carrying-out of specific project(s); (ii) it must be based on an amount invested in the region; (iii) it must be possible to quantify the aid (assess the precise volume); and (iv) there must be a ceiling expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the region (39).

| (109) | The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The Becromal Investment Agreement refers to EUR 117,25 million as the total investment cost. However, it is not clear whether this is regarded as the eligible investment costs under the scheme. Moreover, the agreement does not refer to aid intensities or a fixed aid ceiling. Neither does the agreement appear to provide for a mechanism for quantifying the aid.

| (110) | Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Furthermore, the Authority observes that the Becromal Investment Agreement’s preamble refers to the investment project as to be constructed in two phases, where the second phase would expand the production capacity of the plant. The first phase, approximately EUR 66 million in investment, appears to have been expected to be operational by the end of March 2011 while the total investment costs are envisaged at EUR 117,25 million by end of year 2014. Thus, it appears that the second phase (the expansion) would almost double the initial investment by end of 2014. However, the agreement does not contain any explicit commitment on behalf of the company to complete the construction of the second phase (or the whole project). Moreover, the agreement does not contain any explicit obligation as to the time limits for the construction. Since the first phase, according to information presently available to the Authority, appears to (have) become operational irrespective of whether the subsequent phase (the expansion) is eventually constructed, the Authority’s understanding is that the situation could arise in which Becromal could decide not to carry out the construction work required under the second phase of the envisaged project. This would entail considerably lower investment costs (EUR 66 million instead of EUR 117,5 million). The Authority accordingly takes the preliminary view that a question mark remains over whether the agreement ensures that a mechanism will be put in place to guarantee whether and how the applicable aid intensities under the Regional aid guidelines would be ensured in this case.

| (111) | In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

In the light of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Becromal Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are ensured when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement.

4.3.1.4.   The possibility for an extended period of tax exemptions — Operating aid

| (112) | Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:
  ‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’ |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Article 15.3 of the Becromal Investment Agreement reads:

‘During the 13 years following the date of this Agreement, the Parties shall have concluded discussions regarding a possible extension of this Agreement for a period of a further 13 years following the date of expiration set forth in Article 15.2, on mutually agreeable terms.’

| (113) | This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

This provision opens up the possibility of negotiations regarding an extension of the tax derogations which are provided for in the agreement beyond the time limit set out in the scheme — that is, 13 years as of the signature of the agreements and 10 years from the date at which the obligation to pay tax is triggered. Such a provision is outside the scope of the scheme as approved. Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that such a provision would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, as it is not linked to an initial investment, but instead reduces the costs which Becromal would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing its day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid.

| (114) | The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

The Authority notes that the tax derogations do not appear to comply with the conditions for granting operating aid set out in Chapter 5 of the Regional aid guidelines. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority’s preliminary view is that operating aid to Becromal would not be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement and the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.1.5.   Credit balance against future tax

| (115) | The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:
  ‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’ |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Becromal Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 7.6:

‘The aggregate amount of income tax levied on and paid by the Companies from 7 July 2009 to the date of signature of this Agreement shall constitute a credit balance which shall be set off against income tax which the Companies become liable to pay from the date of signature of this Agreement and during the remainder of the Contract Period.’

| (116) | In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

In the Authority's preliminary view, the clause provides for a retroactive grant of aid. Such a grant would fall outside the scope of the scheme, and would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons set out above in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.6.   Large investment project and individual notification obligation

| (117) | In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In instances where the level of aid from all sources is above certain thresholds provided for under paragraph 53 of the Regional aid guidelines, an individual notification obligation applies. The total investment costs of the Becromal project appear to equate to EUR 117,25 million. The project therefore appears to qualify as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines (40). The Authority has not been provided with information with regard to the aid intensities, and therefore is not in a position to exclude the possibility that an individual notification obligation should apply to the Becromal Investment Agreement under paragraph 53 of those Guidelines. As regards the conditions for the detailed verification obligation set out in the Authority’s Guidelines on criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects (41) (‘the LIP Guidelines’), the Authority notes that the Icelandic authorities bear the burden of proof on the point that the market situations to which paragraph 57(a) and (b) of the Regional aid guidelines refer do not apply.

4.3.2.   The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement

4.3.2.1.   The project

| (118) | On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

On 17 February 2011, the State signed an investment agreement with Íslenska Kísilfélagið on tax concessions for the construction of a silicon metal production plant in Helguvík in the municipality of Reykjanesbær. The plant’s production capacity is 50 000 metric tonnes of metallurgical grade silicon, and up to 20 000 metric tonnes of Silica dust per year.

4.3.2.2.   Contract between Íslenska Kísilfélagið and the municipality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund

| (119) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:
  ‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement makes the following reference to a contract which was signed between Íslenska Kísilfélagið on the one hand and the municpality of Reykjanesbær and the Harbour Fund on the other hand in:

‘The Municipality of Reyjanesbær and the Harbour Fund have executed an Agreement with the Company on Licensing and Charges relating to the Project, including principles on property tax and land lease.’ (42).

| (120) | It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

It is not clear whether this contract is — as a whole or in part — regarded by the Icelandic authorities as having been entered into on the basis of the scheme. The Authority has not been provided with a copy or any further details of the contract to which the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers. Therefore, the Authority is not in a position to assess whether the contract referred to was entered into within the scope of the scheme.

4.3.2.3.   Link to an earlier investment agreement and the incentive effect

| (121) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:
  ‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’ |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement refers to a previous agreement between the State and the company. This agreement concerns the same project, and was entered into on 29 May 2009, before the entry into force of the scheme. Section N of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following:

‘The Investment Agreement, dated 29 May 2009, also contains a commitment to enter into a complete Investment Agreement, “similar to the Investment agreements the Government has previously concluded in relation to other large-scale power intensive investment projects in Iceland”. In this respect the Investment Agreement signed on 29 May 2009 was regarded as “a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a more comprehensive investment agreement between the Parties.”’

| (122) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the agreement entered into on 29 May 2009 constitutes a special investment agreement, as referred to in the Supplementary Regulation, as described above in Section I.3.3 of this Decision.

| (123) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.1 above regarding an identical provision in the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the necessary incentive effect criteria have been fulfilled in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement. The Authority, however, notes that it does not at present have information about the status of this project.

4.3.2.4.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (124) | Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Under the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, construction of the silicon metal production plant is envisaged to take place in two or more steps during a three-year period. The agreement does not provide for any start or end dates for the construction of this plant, nor for any of the steps required for such a construction to take place. Moreover, the agreement neither refers to eligible or total investment costs, nor does it stipulate the aid intensities or fix an aid ceiling.

| (125) | Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Based on the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to Íslenska Kísilfélagið would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.2.5.   Addtional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (126) | The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:
  ‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(126)

The Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement contains the following clause at Article 22.8:

‘In the event amendments are made to Act No 99/2010 which are regarded by the Company, as providing further incentives than already stipulated in the Act, the Government shall upon request by the Company amend this Agreement and provide the Company with the new incentives, which shall enter into force from date of signature of the amended Agreement.’

| (127) | This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

This provision sets out an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid to the beneficiary for a project which has already been granted aid under the scheme, should future amendments to the scheme prove more beneficial for Íslenska Kísilfélagið. This obligation is not linked to new investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that this provision guarantees the beneficiary a right to a grant of aid going beyond the initial grant of aid made under the scheme, and therefore entails an element of aid which falls outside the scope of the scheme.

| (128) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view any aid granted under the clause would be properly classified as operating aid since it is not linked to an initial investment. The Authority takes the preliminary view that such a clause is incompatible with the EEA Agreement. In particular, the measures are not granted in respect of a predefined set of eligible expenditures or costs, as is stipulated in paragraph 66 of the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.2.6.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (129) | Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:
  ‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43). |
| --- | --- |

(129)

Article 7 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement is entitled ‘Government Taxes’. It contains the following clause at Article 7.9:

‘The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.1 to 7.6 shall remain in full force and effect for 10 years from the day the relevant taxable obligation or charge obligation is activated by the Company, however never more than 13 years from date of signature of this Agreement, notwithstanding eventual changes of Act No 90/2003, on Income Tax, Act No 4/1995 on Revenues of Municipalities and Act No 38/2010, on Íslandsstofa or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.1 to 7.6. The concessions, exemptions, derogations and other stipulations of Article 7.7 to 7.8 shall remain in full force and effect for the Contract Period stipulated in Article 16 of this Agreement or any other law or secondary legislation which might otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended by the provisions of Article 7.7 to 7.8.’ (43).

| (130) | It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

It is the Authority's preliminary view that this clause has a broader application than the scope of the scheme as approved by Decision No 390/10/COL. As set out above in paragraph 35, guarantee against future legislation in itself constitutes State aid. While the tax exemptions set out in the approved scheme are limited to certain, predefined allowable derogations from statutory legislation, the text cited above appears to refer to a broader application insofar as amendments of provisions of the legislation referred to, other than those explicitly covered by the scheme, would have the effect as to ‘otherwise limit or reduce the effect intended’. As set out above, one of the conditions for tax measures to be classified as investment aid is that it must be possible to quantify the aid (by assessing the precise volume of the aid granted). Under Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Agreement, it would, in the Authority's preliminary view, be impossible to quantify the aid. The clause refers to possible alteration of not only the Act on income tax and of the Act on municipal revenues, but also ‘any other law or secondary legislation’. This wording appears to give the clause a very broad potential scope. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such an open guarantee clause would not give sufficient transparency to enable the benefit to be quantified. In that case it would entail operating aid, which in the Authority’s preliminary view would be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, for the same reasons as set out above in paragraphs 114 and 128 above.

4.3.3.   The Verne Investment Agreement

4.3.3.1.   The project and the incentive effect of the aid

| (131) | The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

The Verne Investment Agreement was signed on 27 September 2011. The project concerns a data centre complex in the municipality of Reykjanesbær (44) comprising four individual buildings housing electrical, mechanical, and IT equipment and additional administrative and electrical support buildings, serving mostly non-Icelandic international clients with the aim to commence operations in 2011.

| (132) | It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45). |
| --- | --- |

(132)

It appears that this agreement relates to the same, or a similar, investment project to a project which was the subject of the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL on 3 November 2010 to open a formal investigation procedure into an investment agreement between the Icelandic State and Verne (see Section I.2.3 of that Decision). Following the Authority's Decision, the Icelandic authorities withdrew their notification and the Authority did not further pursue the matter as regards the previous investment agreement as such further (45).

| (133) | The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The Authority observes that no explicit reference is made to any previous investment agreement in the Verne Investment Agreement. Indeed, in the preamble to the Verne Investment Agreement it is stated that: ‘In line with Act No 99/2010 the Investment Agreement only relates to new buildout of data centre space and infrastructure, which has not yet been undertaken.’ Nonetheless, the Authority also notes that the estimated potential level of investment is USD 675 million ‘over and above prior preparatory investment’, whereas the estimated investment was USD 726 million in the project under assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. The Authority accordingly has doubts over whether these are in fact two different projects. The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Holdings Ltd. together with its subsidiaries and its investors, amongst other the Wellcome Trust, Novator, and General Catalyst partners, having been taking the necessary preliminary steps towards the establishment of the project described above in paragraph 131. The beneficiary in both cases is the parent company in the Verne Group (46). Both agreements refer to power consumption that ‘could exceed 140 MW’ (47). The investors are at least partially the same in both cases, the location of the data centre appears to be the same in both cases (Reykjanesbær) and from the limited information provided on the project itself in the Verne Investment Agreement it appears to be the same or at least a similar project as the one that was subject to the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL. Reference is made to the description of that project under Section I.2.3 of that Decision. If the project is the same, the construction of the project, according to the facts as established in Decision No 418/10/COL, started in early 2008. In light of this information the Authority’s preliminary view is that it appears that the Verne Investment Agreement concerns a project on which work had already started at the time of the signature.

| (134) | On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

On this basis, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Verne Investment Agreement can be considered to have been entered into within the scope of the scheme. Furthermore, the Authority refers to the reasoning for its Decision No 418/10/COL on opening the formal investigation procedure into the previous investment agreement with Verne, see that Decision at Section II.3.1. Moreover, on the same reasoning set out above in paragraphs 98 to 102 (regarding the Becromal Investment Agreement), the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.2.   The investment costs and aid ceiling

| (135) | Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of Verne Investment Agreement, the total investment costs, which appear to be regarded as eligible under the Regional aid guidelines, are fixed to USD 675 million. However, there is no clear link between the investment and the envisaged aid. Moreover, the envisaged aid has not been quantified in the Verne Investment Agreement, and no ceiling has been expressed therein either. These elements run counter to the provisions of the scheme as approved.

| (136) | Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Accordingly, applying the reasoning set out in Section 4.3.1.3 above with regard to the Becromal Investment Agreement, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the Verne Investment Agreement does not comply with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, since the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines are met when fixing the eligible investment costs. In this respect, there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and there is no aid ceiling expressed in the agreement (which means that the Direct business taxation guidelines have not been complied with). Similarly, the Authority cannot at this point conclude that operating aid can be found compatible under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.3.3.   Additional aid in case of amendments of the scheme

| (137) | Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

Article 23.7 of the Verne Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded, as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, referred to at paragraphs 126 to 128 above. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.3.4.   Effectiveness guarantee

| (138) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.3.5.   Large investment project

| (139) | In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

In the light of the total investment costs referred to in the Verne Investment Agreement, it cannot be excluded that the project qualifies as a large investment project under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines. The Authority has not been provided with information which would exclude the possibility that the individual notification procedure provided for under that section should apply to the project.

4.3.4.   Conclusion regarding aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne

| (140) | On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

On the basis of the above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne has been granted within the scope of the scheme. The Authority takes the preliminary view that the agreements were concluded outside the scope of the approved scheme, and should therefore be classified as individual aid that should have been notified to the Authority.

| (141) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid to Becromal, Kísilfélagið and Verne was granted before the work started on the projects, and as to whether that aid was limited to a defined investment project.

| (142) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether a provision entailing an unconditional obligation for the State to grant additional aid in the case of amendments made to the scheme can be classified as investment aid, and the Authority has not been provided with reasoning as to the compatibility of such operating aid. Finally, the Authority has doubts as to the compatibility of the effectiveness guarantee.

| (143) | Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Lastly, it is the preliminary view of the Authority that it cannot be excluded that the aid granted may be properly subject to the procedure provided for under Section 4.3 of the Regional aid guidelines for large investment projects, in particular as regards the Becromal and Verne investment agreements.

4.3.5.   The Thorsil Investment Agreement

| (144) | The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme: |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Thorsil Investment Agreement was signed on 30 December 2010. It concerns a silicon metal production plant to be built in the municipality of Ölfus, with an annual production capacity of approximately 50 000 metric tonnes. The plant’s start-up is scheduled to take place in October 2014. The Authority has the following doubts as to whether certain elements of the agreement fulfil the criteria set out in the scheme:

| (145) | First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

First, the Thorsil Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to the one set out in the Becromal Investment Agreement (see Section 4.3.1.4 above), on the possibility of an extension of the aid period beyond the maximum duration provided for in the scheme. Following the same reasoning as set out at paragraphs 113 to 114 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the agreement falls within the scope of the scheme and whether such a clause is compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would be operational aid.

| (146) | Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

Second, reference is made to the discussion under paragraph 107 above, as regards the Direct business taxation guidelines. In the case of the Thorsil Investment Agreement, the total investment costs are not presented and there is no link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which has not been quantified in the agreement, as stipulated in the scheme as approved. Moreover, no aid ceiling has been expressed.

| (147) | Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Accordingly, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Thorsil Investment Agreement complies with the conditions set out in Decision No 390/10/COL, insofar as the agreement does not demonstrate that the rules on eligible expenses under the Regional aid guidelines have been met when fixing the eligible investment costs; there is no explicit obligation to carry out the second phase of the project, the aid appears not to have been quantified and no aid ceiling has been expressed in the agreement and thus the requirements of the Direct business taxation guidelines have also not been met. Similarly, the Authority cannot conclude that any operating aid that might be involved can be found compatible with EEA law under the Regional aid guidelines.

4.3.6.   The GMR Investment Agreement

| (148) | On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

On 7 May 2012, the State entered into an agreement with GMR Endurvinnslan on the granting of tax exemptions for the construction of a recycling plant at Grundartangi in the municipality of Hvalfjarðarsveit. The agreement states that GMR intends to commence production at the end of 2012 and to have the plant fully operational in 2014. The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment and the Authority is not in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement was entered into within the scope of the scheme in this respect.

| (149) | The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

The Authority notes that the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that found in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the establishment of an unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts regarding the inclusion of this clause in the GMR Investment Agreement as those which it has expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (150) | Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

Furthermore, the total investment costs are not presented in the GMR Investment Agreement. Nor is there a link between the investment and the envisaged aid, which was not quantified in the agreement, as is stipulated in the scheme as approved. Nor has an aid ceiling been expressed in the agreement.

| (151) | Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Article 7.9 contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness clause can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (152) | Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Based on its reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3 above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can properly be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether operating aid to GMR would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (153) | Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

Article 22.7 of the GMR Investment Agreement contains an identical clause to that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (see paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

4.3.7.   The Marmeti Investment Agreement

| (154) | The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The last agreement entered into on the basis of the scheme is an agreement signed after the initiation of the present case, dated on 28 January 2013. This agreement was concluded between the State and Marmeti, a company established in 2012 for the construction and operation of a fish processing factory in Sandgerði.

| (155) | The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The envisaged start-up of the factory is at the beginning of 2013. Since the Investment Agreement was only signed in late January 2013, this raises questions as to whether work may in fact have already started on the project before the signing of the agreement, contrary to the requirements of the scheme as approved (48). The Authority therefore has doubts as to whether the agreement was concluded within the scope of the scheme.

| (156) | The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The agreement does not contain any further description of the project, its scale or the volume of the investment, quantification of the aid, aid ceiling or aid intensities and the Authority is not at this point in possession of any further details to verify whether the agreement is in compliance with these conditions of the scheme.

| (157) | The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

The Authority notes that the agreement contains, at Article 20.7, an identical clause as that which is set out in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement (paragraphs 126 to 128 above) as regards the unconditional right to request increased aid, should the scheme be expanded. The Authority has the same doubts as expressed in the cited paragraphs.

| (158) | Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

Based on its line of reasoning regarding the Becromal Investment Agreements, discussed in Section 4.3.1.3. above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the aid can be characterised as investment aid. Similarily, the Authority has not been provided with any arguments as to whether possible operating aid to Marmeti would be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (159) | Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Article 7.9 of the Marmeti Investment Agreement contains an identical clause as the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement, cited above at paragraph 129. Based on the reasoning set out in paragraph 130, the Authority has doubts as to whether the effectiveness guarantee can be regarded as compatible with the EEA Agreement.

4.3.8.   Conclusion

| (160) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted under the Becromal Investment Agreement, the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement and the Verne Investment Agreement is granted within the scope of the scheme.

| (161) | Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, the Authority has doubts as to whether the Marmeti Investment Agreement is concluded within the scope of the scheme, as regards the incentive effect requirement. Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether certain clauses of the Marmeti Investment Agreement grant aid outside the approved scheme.

| (162) | Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Further, the Authority has doubts as to whether elements of the Thorsil Investment Agreement and the GMR Investment Agreement provide for aid granted outside the approved scheme.

| (163) | The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

The Authority thus has doubts as to whether aid granted under all six Investment Agreements can be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (164) | Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

Based on the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the aid measures described above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority also has doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Regional aid guidelines. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (166) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (167) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the scheme, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, the notified proposed amendments and the six investment agreements referred to in this Decision.

| (168) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (169) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(169)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 in Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the investment incentives scheme, with amendments notified by the Icelandic authorities, and as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1150/2010, implemented by the Icelandic authorities.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the following investment agreements entered into by the Icelandic authorities:

| 1. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA; |
| --- | --- |

1.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Becromal Iceland ehf., Becromal Properties ehf., Stokkur Energy efh. and Becromal SpA;

| 2. | agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited; |
| --- | --- |

2.

agreement entered into on 30 December 2010 between the State and Thorsil ehf., Stokkur Energy ehf. and Timminco Limited;

| 3. | agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC; |
| --- | --- |

3.

agreement entered into on 17 February 2011 between the State and Íslenska Kísilfélagið ehf., Tomahawk Development á Íslandi ehf. and GSM Enterprises LLC;

| 4. | agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd; |
| --- | --- |

4.

agreement entered into on 27 September 2011 between the State and Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd;

| 5. | agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and |
| --- | --- |

5.

agreement entered into on 7 May 2012 between the State and GMR Endurvinnslan ehf.; and

| 6. | agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf. |
| --- | --- |

6.

agreement entered into on 28 January 2013 between the State and Marmeti ehf.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) in Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 30 April 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/390-10-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Act, adopted by the Parliament on 29 June 2010.

2

Lög um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(3)  Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi, referred to in this Decision as the Regulation, issued by the Minister for Industry on 25 November 2010.

3

Reglugerð um um ívilnanir vegna nýfjárfestinga á Íslandi

(4)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15125&1=1

4

(5)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

5

(6)  As stated above, the Authority approved the scheme on 13 October 2010 and the Supplementary Regulation was issued on 30 December 2010.

6

(7)  In the Authority’s translation. The text in Icelandic (with the text added by the Supplementary Regulation also underlined) is as follows: 3.gr. Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana. Við mat á því hvort veita eigi ívilnun vegna nýfjárfestingar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 skal eftirfarandi skilyrðum vera fullnægt: [...] c. að fyrirhugað fjárfestingarverkefni sé ekki hafið áður en undirritaður er samningur um ívilnun skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, og að sýnt sé fram á að veiting ívilnunar sé forsenda þess að fjárfestingarverkefnið verði að veruleika hér á landi [...] 8. gr. Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum. Byggðaaðstoð getur samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010 verið í formi frávika frá sköttum eða opinberum gjöldum vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis. Félag sem stofnað er um nýfjárfestingu og uppfyllir öll skilyrði laga nr. 99/2010, og reglugerðar þessarar, fyrir veitingu ívilnunar skal njóta eftirfarandi skattalegra ívilnana: 1. Tekjuskattshlutfall viðkomandi félags skal, í þann tíma sem kveðið er á um í 3. mgr., aldrei vera hærra en það tekjuskattshlutfall sem í gildi er þegar samningur skv. 20. gr. eða samkvæmt sérstökum fjárfestingarsamningi fyrir gildistöku laganna, er gerður við félagið. [...] 20. gr. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar. Fallist umsækjandi á boð iðnaðarráðherra um ívilnun skal gerður samningur milli umsækjanda og iðnaðarráðherra, fyrir hönd stjórnvalda og, eftir atvikum, sveitarfélaga um veitingu ívilnunar vegna viðkomandi fjárfestingarverkefnis Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar skv. 1. mgr. skal að hámarki gilda í 13 ár frá undirritun hans, að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Ívilnun sem veitt er á grundvelli 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 skal gilda í 10 ár frá því að viðkomandi skattskylda eða gjaldskylda sem kveðið er á um í 2. mgr. 9. gr. laga nr. 99/2010 myndast, þó aldrei lengur en í 13 ár frá undirritun samnings um veitingu ívilnunar að teknu tilliti til sérstaks fjárfestingarsamnings ef slíkur samningur hefur áður verið gerður um verkefnið. Í samningi samkvæmt þessari grein skal koma fram áætlun um samtals fjárhæð ívilnunar, núvirt, á gildistíma samningsins. Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar, sem iðnaðarráðherra undirritar samkvæmt lögum nr. 99/2010, skal birtur í B-deild Stjórnartíðinda.

7

Skilyrði fyrir veitingu ívilnana.

Ívilnanir tengdar sköttum og opinberum gjöldum.

Samningur um veitingu ívilnunar.

(8)  Letter submitted to the Authority on 30 January 2013 (Event No 661235).

8

(9)  The investment agreements are available in the public domain, according to Article 21(4) of Act No 99/2010, and they are as of 4 March 2013 available here, in English and in Icelandic: http://stjornartidindi.is/AdvertList.aspx?ID=7F3926F3-992D-4211-903D-D4F28F1DC87A&view=2&value=ddc9274e-1111-44ac-9d52-5ffa832684fc

9

(10)  See the Becromal Investment Agreement at sections H and I of the preamble.

10

(11)  Letter received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

11

(12)  See the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement at sections N and O of the preamble.

12

(13)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to Verne Real Estate II ehf. as the ‘Company’ and Verne Holdings Ltd. as the ‘Investor’ and to both companies as the ‘Parties’. For the purposes of this Decision, the companies will both be referred to as ‘Verne’. According to the Annual Report 2011 for Verne Holdings Ltd., Verne Holdings ehf. put in place a new parent company for the Verne Group on 24 June 2011: Verne Holdings Ltd., being a company incorporated in England and Wales that is tax resident in the United Kingdom. The prior parent company was Verne Holdings ehf., domiciled in Iceland. Verne Holdings ehf. was the beneficiary according to the agreement subject to assessment in Decision No 418/10/COL. Verne Real Estate II ehf., established in September 2011, is a subsidiary of Verne Holdings Ltd., which also owns the following subsidiaries: Verne Real Estate ehf., Verne Global Inc and Verne Global Ltd., according to the Verne Group’s consolidated financial statements for the period ended on 31 December 2011. The Authority regards both Verne Real Estate II ehf. and Verne Holdings Ltd. as beneficiaries under the Verne Investment Agreement.

13

(14)  The project will be further described in Section II.4.3.3 below.

14

(15)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/418-10-COL.pdf

15

(16)  See reference to the Icelandic authorities’ letter on 28 September 2011 in the Authority’s Decision No 261/12/COL at paragraph 8; http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/261-12-COL.pdf

16

(17)  Such an agreement is referred to in the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

17

(18)  Reference is made to Decision No 390/10/COL, description of the State aid granted by municipalities, see Section I.2.5.2.6 and Section I.2.5.3.

18

(19)  Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013, paragraph 17.

19

Germany

Commission

(20)  See paragraph 3 of the Authority’s Business Taxation Guidelines.

20

(21)  As regards the notified amendments to the scheme described in Section I.3.2 above, the proposed modifications include an abolition of direct grants under Article 8 of the Act. The removal of a provision to directly grant aid manifestly does not amount to a State aid measure in and of itself. This part of the notified measures clearly does not need to be assessed within the present Decision.

21

(22)  See, in particular, Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38; Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-6717, paragraph 90; and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, paragraph 77.

22

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

Spain

Commission

Italy

Commission

(23)  See to that effect Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; and Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 132.

23

Banco Exterior de España

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others

(24)  See joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111.

24

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(25)  Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraphs 109 and 111. See also Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

25

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

Heineken Brouwerijen

(26)  Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paragraph 21.

26

Heineken Brouwerijen

(27)  See Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, paragraph 87, Report of the EFTA Court [2011], p. 268.

27

Konkurrenten.no

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(28)  The six investment agreements will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3 below.

28

(29)  Decision No 390/10/COL, p. 6.

29

(30)  Idem, p. 16.

30

Idem

(31)  Letter from the Iceland authorities, received on 10 April 2013 (Event No 668635).

31

(32)  According to information on the company's website, production started in the Becromal plant in Iceland in 2009, see: http://www.becromal.eu/history.php and http://www.becromal-.eu/iceland_projects.php

32

According to a news article in Morgunblaðið on 24 July 2008, the construction works had already started on the plant in 2008, see: http://www.mbl.is/-greinasafn/grein/1231137/

Morgunblaðið

(33)  See the Regional aid guidelines, footnote 32.

33

(34)  Case N 357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy), paragraph 40. See also Commission Decision of 15 September 2010, C 8/2009 Fri-El Acerra, and the Authority’s Decision No 418/10/COL at Section II.3.1.

34

Fri-El Acerra S.r.l

Fri-El Acerra

(35)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 81: ‘As stated in recital 30 of the Decision, the aim of applying the criterion set out in point 4.2 of the Guidelines is to ascertain the existence of incentive effect without unduly delaying the investment by carrying out a full analysis of the economic circumstances of the recipient’s investment decision, which might prove very difficult or time-consuming. The latter concern explains why the finding that the aid application was made before the start of the investment project is enough in itself, according to the Commission, to raise the presumption that an incentive effect exists.’

35

Kronoply

Commission

(36)  See Case T-162/06 Kronoply v. Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paragraph 80: ‘It should be observed that that provision refers to a circumstance of a chronological nature and therefore points to an examination ratione temporis, which is perfectly suitable for determining whether an incentive effect exists. That examination must be made by reference to the decision to invest taken by the undertaking concerned, which marks the beginning of the dynamic process that an operating investment such as that undertaken by Kronoply necessarily constitutes.’

36

Kronoply

Commission

ratione temporis

(37)  The Authority notes that the rate of corporate income tax have been increasing in Iceland from 2008 and 2009, when it was 15 %, while it had been 18 % in 2002-2007. The tax rate was raised again to 18 % on 1 January 2010 and to 20 % on 1 January 2011.

37

(38)  See the Authority's Direct business taxation guidelines at 4(3), also referred to in the Authority's Decision No 390/10/COL.

38

(39)  See Decision No 390/10/COL, Section II.3.3.

39

(40)  Large investment project is an initial investment as defined by the Guidelines with an eligible expenditure above EUR 50 million, see paragraph 49 of those Guidelines.

40

(41)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-III—-Criteria-for-an-In-depth-Assessment-of-Regional-Aid-to-Large-Investment-Projects.pdf

41

(42)  Referred to in Section G of the preamble to the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

42

(43)  Article 7.9 of the Kísilfélagið Investment Agreement.

43

(44)  The Verne Investment Agreement refers to the date centre complex as ‘initially’ in Reykjanesbær.

44

(45)  See the Authority's Decision No 261/12/COL at Section I.1.

45

(46)  See footnote 16 in this Decision.

46

(47)  See footnote 8 in Decision No 418/10/COL and paragraph 5 in the Verne Investment Agreement’s preamble.

47

(48)  Article 21 of the Act, see Decision No 390/10/COL at Section I.2.13.

48

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V Anunțuri

PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI

Comisia Europeană

| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/28 |
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15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/28

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Comunicarea Comisiei publicată în temeiul articolului 27 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003 în cazurile AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I, AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II și AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III

2013/C 237/05

1.   INTRODUCERE

| 1. | În conformitate cu articolul 9 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003 al Consiliului din 16 decembrie 2002 privind punerea în aplicare a normelor de concurență prevăzute la articolele 101 și 102 din tratat (1), în cazurile pentru care Comisia intenționează să adopte o decizie care impune încetarea încălcării, iar părțile în cauză propun angajamente pentru a răspunde preocupărilor exprimate de Comisie în evaluarea sa preliminară, Comisia poate decide ca respectivele angajamente să devină obligatorii pentru întreprinderi. O astfel de decizie poate fi adoptată pentru o perioadă determinată și conchide că nu se mai justifică o acțiune a Comisiei în acest sens. Înainte de adoptarea unei decizii în temeiul articolului 9 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, în conformitate cu articolul 27 alineatul (4) din același regulament, Comisia publică un rezumat succint al cazului și conținutul elementelor principale ale angajamentelor. Părțile interesate își pot prezenta observațiile în termenul stabilit de Comisie. |
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1.

În conformitate cu articolul 9 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003 al Consiliului din 16 decembrie 2002 privind punerea în aplicare a normelor de concurență prevăzute la articolele 101 și 102 din tratat (1), în cazurile pentru care Comisia intenționează să adopte o decizie care impune încetarea încălcării, iar părțile în cauză propun angajamente pentru a răspunde preocupărilor exprimate de Comisie în evaluarea sa preliminară, Comisia poate decide ca respectivele angajamente să devină obligatorii pentru întreprinderi. O astfel de decizie poate fi adoptată pentru o perioadă determinată și conchide că nu se mai justifică o acțiune a Comisiei în acest sens. Înainte de adoptarea unei decizii în temeiul articolului 9 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, în conformitate cu articolul 27 alineatul (4) din același regulament, Comisia publică un rezumat succint al cazului și conținutul elementelor principale ale angajamentelor. Părțile interesate își pot prezenta observațiile în termenul stabilit de Comisie.

2.   REZUMATUL CAZULUI

| 2. | La 6 iunie 2013, Comisia a adoptat o evaluare preliminară în sensul articolului 9 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, care se adresa întreprinderii Deutsche Bahn AG și filialelor acesteia, întreprinderile DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG și DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2). |
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2.

La 6 iunie 2013, Comisia a adoptat o evaluare preliminară în sensul articolului 9 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, care se adresa întreprinderii Deutsche Bahn AG și filialelor acesteia, întreprinderile DB Energie GmbH (DB Energie), DB Mobility Logistics AG, DB Fernverkehr AG și DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG (2).

| 3. | În evaluarea sa preliminară, Comisia s-a arătat preocupată de faptul că grupul DB ar fi abuzat de poziția sa dominantă pe piața de furnizare a curentului de tracțiune din Germania, prețurile curentului de tracțiune practicate de acesta în cazul concurenților conducând la o comprimare a marjelor pe piața transportului feroviar de persoane pe distanțe lungi și pe cea a transportului feroviar de mărfuri și, astfel, la o încălcare a articolului 102 din TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

3.

În evaluarea sa preliminară, Comisia s-a arătat preocupată de faptul că grupul DB ar fi abuzat de poziția sa dominantă pe piața de furnizare a curentului de tracțiune din Germania, prețurile curentului de tracțiune practicate de acesta în cazul concurenților conducând la o comprimare a marjelor pe piața transportului feroviar de persoane pe distanțe lungi și pe cea a transportului feroviar de mărfuri și, astfel, la o încălcare a articolului 102 din TFUE.

| 4. | În opinia preliminară a Comisiei, DB Energie ocupă o poziție dominantă pe piața de furnizare a curentului de tracțiune către întreprinderile feroviare care își desfășoară activitatea în Germania. Curentul de tracțiune este un factor de producție indispensabil pentru întreprinderile feroviare care doresc să concureze pe piețele de transport feroviar din Germania. Începând din 2003, DB Energie vinde curent de tracțiune întreprinderilor feroviare în cadrul unei oferte globale care cuprinde prețul energiei electrice consumate (prețul energiei electrice) și prețul pentru utilizarea rețelei de curent de tracțiune (taxă de acces la rețea). |
| --- | --- |

4.

În opinia preliminară a Comisiei, DB Energie ocupă o poziție dominantă pe piața de furnizare a curentului de tracțiune către întreprinderile feroviare care își desfășoară activitatea în Germania. Curentul de tracțiune este un factor de producție indispensabil pentru întreprinderile feroviare care doresc să concureze pe piețele de transport feroviar din Germania. Începând din 2003, DB Energie vinde curent de tracțiune întreprinderilor feroviare în cadrul unei oferte globale care cuprinde prețul energiei electrice consumate (prețul energiei electrice) și prețul pentru utilizarea rețelei de curent de tracțiune (taxă de acces la rețea).

| 5. | În evaluarea sa preliminară, Comisia a considerat că este posibil ca acest sistem de stabilire a prețurilor și, în special, reducerile de care operatorii feroviari din cadrul grupului DB au beneficiat mai mult decât întreprinderile concurente să fi împiedicat dezvoltarea concurenței pe piața transportului feroviar de persoane pe distanțe lungi și pe cea a transportului feroviar de mărfuri. Comisia este preocupată de faptul că sistemul de prețuri aplicat de DB Energie pentru curentul de tracțiune pe aceste piețe ar putea genera o diferență între prețul curentului de tracțiune practicat în cazul întreprinderilor concurente și prețul serviciilor de transport feroviar facturat consumatorilor de către întreprinderile de transport din cadrului grupului DB, diferență prin care întreprinderile concurente la fel de eficiente sunt împiedicate să își desfășoare activitățile comerciale în mod profitabil sau prin care se reduce în mod artificial marja de profit a acestora. În cadrul investigației sale, Comisia a ajuns la concluzia preliminară că această situație ridică probleme de concurență pe piața transportului feroviar de persoane pe distanțe lungi și pe cea a transportului feroviar de mărfuri. |
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5.

În evaluarea sa preliminară, Comisia a considerat că este posibil ca acest sistem de stabilire a prețurilor și, în special, reducerile de care operatorii feroviari din cadrul grupului DB au beneficiat mai mult decât întreprinderile concurente să fi împiedicat dezvoltarea concurenței pe piața transportului feroviar de persoane pe distanțe lungi și pe cea a transportului feroviar de mărfuri. Comisia este preocupată de faptul că sistemul de prețuri aplicat de DB Energie pentru curentul de tracțiune pe aceste piețe ar putea genera o diferență între prețul curentului de tracțiune practicat în cazul întreprinderilor concurente și prețul serviciilor de transport feroviar facturat consumatorilor de către întreprinderile de transport din cadrului grupului DB, diferență prin care întreprinderile concurente la fel de eficiente sunt împiedicate să își desfășoare activitățile comerciale în mod profitabil sau prin care se reduce în mod artificial marja de profit a acestora. În cadrul investigației sale, Comisia a ajuns la concluzia preliminară că această situație ridică probleme de concurență pe piața transportului feroviar de persoane pe distanțe lungi și pe cea a transportului feroviar de mărfuri.

| 6. | În noiembrie 2010, Curtea Federală de Justiție din Germania a hotărât că rețeaua de curent de tracțiune trebuie considerată o rețea de energie, condițiile și taxele de acces la aceasta fiind reglementate în conformitate cu legea germană privind sectorul energetic (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). În consecință, DB Energie ar trebui să factureze separat taxa de acces la rețea, pentru ca și furnizorii terți de energie electrică (întreprinderi care nu fac parte din grupul DB) să poată concura cu DB Energie pentru furnizarea de energie electrică întreprinderilor feroviare (4). |
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6.

În noiembrie 2010, Curtea Federală de Justiție din Germania a hotărât că rețeaua de curent de tracțiune trebuie considerată o rețea de energie, condițiile și taxele de acces la aceasta fiind reglementate în conformitate cu legea germană privind sectorul energetic (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz — EnWG) (3). În consecință, DB Energie ar trebui să factureze separat taxa de acces la rețea, pentru ca și furnizorii terți de energie electrică (întreprinderi care nu fac parte din grupul DB) să poată concura cu DB Energie pentru furnizarea de energie electrică întreprinderilor feroviare (4).

3.   CONȚINUTUL ELEMENTELOR PRINCIPALE ALE ANGAJAMENTELOR PROPUSE

| 7. | Grupul DB nu este de acord cu evaluarea preliminară a Comisiei, potrivit căreia grupul ar fi abuzat de poziția sa dominantă pe piața de furnizare a curentului de tracțiune către întreprinderi feroviare germane. Cu toate acestea, grupul a propus angajamente, în temeiul articolului 9 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, pentru a răspunde preocupărilor Comisiei în ceea ce privește concurența. Principalele elemente ale acestor angajamente sunt descrise mai jos. |
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7.

Grupul DB nu este de acord cu evaluarea preliminară a Comisiei, potrivit căreia grupul ar fi abuzat de poziția sa dominantă pe piața de furnizare a curentului de tracțiune către întreprinderi feroviare germane. Cu toate acestea, grupul a propus angajamente, în temeiul articolului 9 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, pentru a răspunde preocupărilor Comisiei în ceea ce privește concurența. Principalele elemente ale acestor angajamente sunt descrise mai jos.

| 8. | Cel mai târziu la trei luni de la notificarea deciziei Comisiei prin care angajamentele devin obligatorii pentru grupul DB și cel mai devreme la 1 ianuarie 2014, DB Energie va introduce un nou sistem de prețuri pentru curentul de tracțiune, care va cuprinde prețuri separate pentru furnizarea energiei electrice și taxe separate de acces la rețea, astfel cum au fost aprobate de autoritatea germană de reglementare în domeniu (Bundesnetzagentur). Acest nou sistem de prețuri este menit să asigure intrarea furnizorilor terți de energie electrică pe piața de furnizare a energiei electrice către întreprinderile feroviare (5). |
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8.

Cel mai târziu la trei luni de la notificarea deciziei Comisiei prin care angajamentele devin obligatorii pentru grupul DB și cel mai devreme la 1 ianuarie 2014, DB Energie va introduce un nou sistem de prețuri pentru curentul de tracțiune, care va cuprinde prețuri separate pentru furnizarea energiei electrice și taxe separate de acces la rețea, astfel cum au fost aprobate de autoritatea germană de reglementare în domeniu (Bundesnetzagentur). Acest nou sistem de prețuri este menit să asigure intrarea furnizorilor terți de energie electrică pe piața de furnizare a energiei electrice către întreprinderile feroviare (5).

| 9. | În acest nou sistem, DB Energie va practica, în cazul tuturor întreprinderilor feroviare, același preț al energiei electrice, fără a oferi reduceri pe bază de volum sau de durată. |
| --- | --- |

9.

În acest nou sistem, DB Energie va practica, în cazul tuturor întreprinderilor feroviare, același preț al energiei electrice, fără a oferi reduceri pe bază de volum sau de durată.

| 10. | DB Energie va restitui întreprinderilor feroviare din Germania care nu fac parte din grupul DB o sumă retroactivă unică în valoare de 4 % din factura de curent de tracțiune pentru perioada de un an care precede intrarea în vigoare a noului sistem de prețuri. |
| --- | --- |

10.

DB Energie va restitui întreprinderilor feroviare din Germania care nu fac parte din grupul DB o sumă retroactivă unică în valoare de 4 % din factura de curent de tracțiune pentru perioada de un an care precede intrarea în vigoare a noului sistem de prețuri.

| 11. | DB Energie și DB Mobility Logistics AG vor transmite în fiecare an date Comisiei, pentru ca aceasta să evalueze dacă nivelurile prețurilor pentru curentul de tracțiune și pentru serviciile de transport practicate de grupul DB ar putea genera o comprimare a marjelor. De asemenea, DB Energie va notifica în prealabil Comisiei orice modificare a prețului energiei electrice pe care îl aplică. |
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11.

DB Energie și DB Mobility Logistics AG vor transmite în fiecare an date Comisiei, pentru ca aceasta să evalueze dacă nivelurile prețurilor pentru curentul de tracțiune și pentru serviciile de transport practicate de grupul DB ar putea genera o comprimare a marjelor. De asemenea, DB Energie va notifica în prealabil Comisiei orice modificare a prețului energiei electrice pe care îl aplică.

| 12. | Angajamentele vor intra în vigoare cel mai târziu la trei luni de la notificarea deciziei Comisiei. Acestea rămân valabile timp de 5 ani (6) de la notificarea deciziei Comisiei sau până în momentul în care 20 % din volumul de curent de tracțiune achiziționat de concurenții grupului DB va proveni de la furnizori terți de energie electrică. De asemenea, grupul DB va numi un administrator care va monitoriza respectarea angajamentelor. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Angajamentele vor intra în vigoare cel mai târziu la trei luni de la notificarea deciziei Comisiei. Acestea rămân valabile timp de 5 ani (6) de la notificarea deciziei Comisiei sau până în momentul în care 20 % din volumul de curent de tracțiune achiziționat de concurenții grupului DB va proveni de la furnizori terți de energie electrică. De asemenea, grupul DB va numi un administrator care va monitoriza respectarea angajamentelor.

| 13. | Angajamentele sunt publicate pe site-ul internet al Direcției Generale Concurență la adresa: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

13.

Angajamentele sunt publicate pe site-ul internet al Direcției Generale Concurență la adresa: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

4.   INVITAȚIA DE A PREZENTA OBSERVAȚII

| 14. | Sub rezerva rezultatelor testului de piață, Comisia intenționează să adopte o decizie în temeiul articolului 9 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, prin care să declare obligatorii angajamentele prezentate succint mai sus și publicate pe site-ul internet al Direcției Generale Concurență. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Sub rezerva rezultatelor testului de piață, Comisia intenționează să adopte o decizie în temeiul articolului 9 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, prin care să declare obligatorii angajamentele prezentate succint mai sus și publicate pe site-ul internet al Direcției Generale Concurență.

| 15. | În conformitate cu articolul 27 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, Comisia invită părțile terțe interesate să îi prezinte observații cu privire la angajamentele propuse. Aceste observații trebuie să fie primite de Comisie în termen de cel mult o lună de la data publicării prezentei comunicări. De asemenea, părțile terțe interesate sunt invitate să prezinte o versiune neconfidențială a observațiilor lor, din care informațiile considerate a fi secrete de afaceri sau în alt mod confidențiale să fie eliminate și înlocuite, conform cerințelor, cu un rezumat neconfidențial sau cu mențiunea „secrete de afaceri” sau „confidențial”. În temeiul articolului 16 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 773/2004, cererile de confidențialitate ar trebui să fie justificate în mod corespunzător, cuprinzând, în special, motivele pentru care divulgarea informațiilor respective ar putea aduce un prejudiciu grav. |
| --- | --- |

15.

În conformitate cu articolul 27 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1/2003, Comisia invită părțile terțe interesate să îi prezinte observații cu privire la angajamentele propuse. Aceste observații trebuie să fie primite de Comisie în termen de cel mult o lună de la data publicării prezentei comunicări. De asemenea, părțile terțe interesate sunt invitate să prezinte o versiune neconfidențială a observațiilor lor, din care informațiile considerate a fi secrete de afaceri sau în alt mod confidențiale să fie eliminate și înlocuite, conform cerințelor, cu un rezumat neconfidențial sau cu mențiunea „secrete de afaceri” sau „confidențial”. În temeiul articolului 16 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 773/2004, cererile de confidențialitate ar trebui să fie justificate în mod corespunzător, cuprinzând, în special, motivele pentru care divulgarea informațiilor respective ar putea aduce un prejudiciu grav.

| 16. | Răspunsurile și observațiile ar trebui să fie motivate, de preferință, și să prezinte faptele relevante. În cazul în care constatați vreo problemă în legătură cu oricare dintre părțile angajamentelor propuse, Comisia vă invită să propuneți și o posibilă soluție. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Răspunsurile și observațiile ar trebui să fie motivate, de preferință, și să prezinte faptele relevante. În cazul în care constatați vreo problemă în legătură cu oricare dintre părțile angajamentelor propuse, Comisia vă invită să propuneți și o posibilă soluție.

| 17. | Observațiile pot fi trimise Comisiei, cu numărul de referință AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, prin e-mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), prin fax (+32 22950128) sau prin poștă, la următoarea adresă:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Antitrust Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

17.

Observațiile pot fi trimise Comisiei, cu numărul de referință AT.39678/AT.39731/AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn I/II/III, prin e-mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), prin fax (+32 22950128) sau prin poștă, la următoarea adresă:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Antitrust Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  JO L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1. De la 1 decembrie 2009, articolele 81 și 82 din Tratatul CE au devenit articolele 101 și, respectiv, 102 din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene (TFUE). Cele două serii de dispoziții sunt în esență identice. În sensul prezentei comunicări, trimiterile la articolele 101 și 102 din TFUE ar trebui înțelese ca trimiteri la articolele 81 și 82 din Tratatul CE, atunci când este cazul.

(2)  Deutsche Bahn AG și toate filialele sale sunt denumite în continuare, în ansamblu, „grupul DB”.

(3)  Bundesgerichtshof, Hotărârea din 9 noiembrie 2010 în cauza EnVR 1/10.

(4)  Mai multe informații cu privire la această schimbare a sistemului de prețuri și la condițiile noului sistem sunt disponibile pe site-ul internet al întreprinderii DB Energie (numai în germană): http://www.dbenergie.de/dbenergie-de/netzbetreiber/netzbetreiber_bahnstromnetz/2500898/bahnstromnetz_konsultation.html

(5)  În plus, introducerea noului sistem va fi însoțită de obligația unei contabilități separate și a unor informații separate cu privire la activitățile întreprinderii DB Energie în calitate de administrator al rețelei de curent de tracțiune și de furnizor de energie electrică.

(6)  Angajamentul asumat de DB Energie de a nu acorda reduceri de preț pe bază de durată în oferta sa de furnizare a energiei electrice este valabil numai pentru o perioadă de 3 ani.

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ALTE ACTE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/31

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Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare

2013/C 237/06

Prezenta publicare conferă dreptul de opoziție la cererea de înregistrare în temeiul articolului 51 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului (1).

DOCUMENT UNIC

REGULAMENTUL (CE) NR. 510/2006 AL CONSILIULUI

privind protecția indicațiilor geografice și a denumirilor de origine ale produselor agricole și alimentare
   (2)

„SZENTESI PAPRIKA”

NR. CE: HU-PGI-0005-0912-30.11.2011

IGP ( X ) DOP ( )

1.   Denumire

„Szentesi paprika”

2.   Statul membru sau țara terță

Ungaria

3.   Descrierea produsului agricol sau alimentar

3.1.   Tip de produs

| Clasa 1.6. | Fructe, legume și cereale în stare proaspătă sau prelucrate |
| --- | --- |

Clasa 1.6.

Fructe, legume și cereale în stare proaspătă sau prelucrate

3.2.   Descrierea produsului căruia i se aplică denumirea de la punctul 1

Indicația geografică protejată „Szentesi paprika” desemnează fructele, cultivate în seră, produse de tipurile de soiuri și de soiurile de Capsicum annuum enumerate.

În momentul comercializării, toate produsele cu IGP „Szentesi paprika” trebuie să fie intacte și sănătoase, iar tipurile de soiuri respective trebuie să prezinte următoarele caracteristici:

| (a) | Ardei de umplut alb (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  La maturitate, ardeiul „Szentesi paprika” alb este lucios, are coaja netedă, alunecoasă; la rupere pocnește, are vârful teșit și pulpa groasă. Are o suprafață netedă, de culoare alb-gălbui (ivoriu). Are o formă conică, o lungime de 60-120 mm și o lățime de 40-70 mm; de obicei are trei-patru lobi; pulpa are o grosime de 4-7 mm, o consistență solidă și o coajă subțire; are un miros intens de ardei, aromat și neiute.
  Soiuri cultivate: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Ardei de umplut alb (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

La maturitate, ardeiul „Szentesi paprika” alb este lucios, are coaja netedă, alunecoasă; la rupere pocnește, are vârful teșit și pulpa groasă. Are o suprafață netedă, de culoare alb-gălbui (ivoriu). Are o formă conică, o lungime de 60-120 mm și o lățime de 40-70 mm; de obicei are trei-patru lobi; pulpa are o grosime de 4-7 mm, o consistență solidă și o coajă subțire; are un miros intens de ardei, aromat și neiute.

Soiuri cultivate: Hó, Cibere, Century, Hurricane, Bronson, Emese, Kurca, Creta, Joker, Karma, Bravia (RZ35862), Kalota, Brendon, Antal, Zalkod, Censor, Celtic, Cinema, Glorietta, Dimentio, E-49.39615, Galga, Claudius, Skytia

| (b) | Ardei iute ascuțit (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)
  Ardeiul iute ascuțit „Szentesi paprika” are o suprafață lucioasă, netedă sau ușor ondulată și o formă alungită și ascuțită. Are o culoare verde-deschis, mediu sau închis, o lungime de 150-250 mm și o lățime de 20-50 mm; de obicei are doi-trei lobi, pulpa are o grosime 3-4 mm, o consistență solidă și o coajă subțire. Fructul are un miros intens de ardei și un gust picant, aromat și plăcut.
  Soiuri cultivate: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais
  Soiurile cultivate au o iuțeală între 2 500 și 5 000 pe scara Scoville. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Ardei iute ascuțit (Capsicum annuum L. var. longum)

Ardeiul iute ascuțit „Szentesi paprika” are o suprafață lucioasă, netedă sau ușor ondulată și o formă alungită și ascuțită. Are o culoare verde-deschis, mediu sau închis, o lungime de 150-250 mm și o lățime de 20-50 mm; de obicei are doi-trei lobi, pulpa are o grosime 3-4 mm, o consistență solidă și o coajă subțire. Fructul are un miros intens de ardei și un gust picant, aromat și plăcut.

Soiuri cultivate: Daras, Rush, Sarah, Fighter, Kard, Thunder, Kais

Soiurile cultivate au o iuțeală între 2 500 și 5 000 pe scara Scoville.

| (c) | Ardei capia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  Ardeiul „Szentesi paprika” din categoria capia are o formă conică, ușor turtită, o suprafață netedă și lucioasă, iar la maturitate prezintă o culoare catifelată roșu-închis. Are o lungime de 60-120 mm și o lățime de 40-70 mm; de obicei are doi sau trei lobi. Pulpa are o grosime de 4-7 mm, o consistență solidă și o coajă de grosime medie. Fructul are un puternic gust dulce, un miros de boia de ardei și nu este iute.
  Soiuri cultivate: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Ardei capia (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

Ardeiul „Szentesi paprika” din categoria capia are o formă conică, ușor turtită, o suprafață netedă și lucioasă, iar la maturitate prezintă o culoare catifelată roșu-închis. Are o lungime de 60-120 mm și o lățime de 40-70 mm; de obicei are doi sau trei lobi. Pulpa are o grosime de 4-7 mm, o consistență solidă și o coajă de grosime medie. Fructul are un puternic gust dulce, un miros de boia de ardei și nu este iute.

Soiuri cultivate: Kárpia (T 112), Kapirex, Karpex, Mágus

| (d) | Gogoșari (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)
  „Szentesi paprika” în varietatea gogoșar are o formă caracteristică de sferă turtită, cu o suprafață netedă, lucioasă, de culoare roșu-închis la maturitate. Are un diametru de 60-120 mm și o lungime de 40-60 mm, se împarte în trei sau patru lobi, iar pulpa are o grosime de 5-7 mm, o consistență solidă, o coajă subțire și un miros intens de ardei, neiute.
  Soiuri cultivate: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar
  Soiurile cultivate, care fac parte dintre tipurile enumerate mai sus, pot varia de la an la an. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Gogoșari (Capsicum annuum L. var. grossum)

„Szentesi paprika” în varietatea gogoșar are o formă caracteristică de sferă turtită, cu o suprafață netedă, lucioasă, de culoare roșu-închis la maturitate. Are un diametru de 60-120 mm și o lungime de 40-60 mm, se împarte în trei sau patru lobi, iar pulpa are o grosime de 5-7 mm, o consistență solidă, o coajă subțire și un miros intens de ardei, neiute.

Soiuri cultivate: Pritavit, Kabala, Bihar

Soiurile cultivate, care fac parte dintre tipurile enumerate mai sus, pot varia de la an la an.

3.3.   Materii prime (numai pentru produsele prelucrate)

—

3.4.   Hrană pentru animale (numai pentru produsele de origine animală)

—

3.5.   Etape specifice ale producției care trebuie să se desfășoare în aria geografică delimitată

Toate etapele procesului de cultivare a ardeilor „Szentesi paprika” trebuie să se desfășoare în aria delimitată la punctul 4, și anume:

| — | producerea și creșterea răsadurilor de ardei; |
| --- | --- |

—

producerea și creșterea răsadurilor de ardei;

| — | cultivarea biologică integrată a diferitelor tipuri de soiuri, respectiv soiuri, inclusiv: |
| --- | --- |

—

cultivarea biologică integrată a diferitelor tipuri de soiuri, respectiv soiuri, inclusiv:

| — | alegerea perioadei de cultivare; |
| --- | --- |

—

alegerea perioadei de cultivare;

| — | amenajarea suprafeței de plantare; |
| --- | --- |

—

amenajarea suprafeței de plantare;

| — | pregătirea solului, fertilizarea de bază; |
| --- | --- |

—

pregătirea solului, fertilizarea de bază;

| — | plantarea; |
| --- | --- |

—

plantarea;

| — | confecționarea dispozitivelor de susținere; |
| --- | --- |

—

confecționarea dispozitivelor de susținere;

| — | lucrările de îngrijire a plantelor (fitotehnice); |
| --- | --- |

—

lucrările de îngrijire a plantelor (fitotehnice);

| — | irigarea și completarea substanțelor nutritive; |
| --- | --- |

—

irigarea și completarea substanțelor nutritive;

| — | climatizarea; |
| --- | --- |

—

climatizarea;

| — | aplicarea unor procedee fitosanitare integrate și nepoluante; |
| --- | --- |

—

aplicarea unor procedee fitosanitare integrate și nepoluante;

| — | culesul, pregătirea pentru comercializare, predepozitarea și depozitarea; |
| --- | --- |

—

culesul, pregătirea pentru comercializare, predepozitarea și depozitarea;

| — | lichidarea culturilor de ardei, amenajarea și dezinfectarea dispozitivelor de cultivare. |
| --- | --- |

—

lichidarea culturilor de ardei, amenajarea și dezinfectarea dispozitivelor de cultivare.

3.6.   Norme specifice privind felierea, răzuirea, ambalarea etc.

Clasificarea, ambalarea și etichetarea ardeilor „Szentesi paprika” se va efectua la producător sau în cadrul oricărei unități adecvate, în interiorul ariei geografice delimitate.

Ambalarea la bucată: în caserole, coșuri sau pungi din polietilenă (3, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 buc. de ardei/unitate); ambalarea în vrac: în coșuri, plase raschel (0,35, 0,5, 0,7, 1, 2 kg de ardei/unitate) sau în cartoane: în ambalaje M10, M20, M30 (2,5, 10, 12, 14 kg de ardei/unitate). În cazul diferitelor tipuri de soiuri, tipul unității de ambalaj poate varia oricând, în funcție de cerințele comerciale.

Ambalarea trebuie efectuată în interiorul ariei geografice delimitate pentru a menține calitatea și omogenitatea caracteristicilor diferitelor tipuri de soiuri și, în cadrul acestora, a soiurilor respective, precum și a gustului, a mirosului și a aromei, a consistenței și a integrității specifice IGP „Szentesi paprika”, precum și pentru a asigura trasabilitatea produselor.

3.7.   Norme specifice privind etichetarea

| — | Pe ambalaj trebuie să figureze sintagma „Szentesi paprika”. |
| --- | --- |

—

Pe ambalaj trebuie să figureze sintagma „Szentesi paprika”.

| — | De asemenea, trebuie să apară eticheta cu codul de bare care asigură trasabilitatea produsului „Szentesi paprika”. |
| --- | --- |

—

De asemenea, trebuie să apară eticheta cu codul de bare care asigură trasabilitatea produsului „Szentesi paprika”.

4.   Delimitarea concisă a ariei geografice

Aria de producție a indicației geografice protejate (IGP) „Szentesi paprika” este situată în județul Csongrád și constituie un teritoriu compact.

Cultivarea „Szentesi paprika” se desfășoară în interiorul limitei administrative a următoarelor localități din județul Csongrád: Derekegyháza, Fábiánsebestyén, Felgyő, Mindszent, Nagymágocs, Nagytőke, Szegvár și Szentes.

5.   Legătura cu aria geografică

5.1.   Specificitatea ariei geografice

Factorii care influențează cultivarea unor ardei de calitate, în special condițiile de temperatură și de lumină, precum și cele pedologice și hidrologice au creat circumstanțe foarte favorabile dezvoltării culturii irigate a ardeiului în regiunea de producție Szentes începând din a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, în urma activității inițiatoare a așa-numiților grădinari bulgari stabiliți în această zonă (cultivatori de legume cu metode speciale pe scară redusă, prin cultura forțată în răsadnițe și irigare).

Regiunea de producție Szentes se găsește în partea de sud-est a Ungariei, în una dintre depresiunile cele mai adânci ale Câmpiei Ungare. Din punctul de vedere al reliefului, această regiune se află într-un loc cu totul special, deoarece aici se găsește zona cu altitudinea cea mai joasă a țării, în care suprafața terenului coboară din trei direcții, dinspre județele învecinate spre valea Tisei. Cea mai importantă apă curgătoare a sistemului hidrologic din zonă este Tisa, care este totodată elementul determinant al întregii fizionomii geografice. Din cauza multitudinii apelor de suprafață, caracteristică zonei, tipul de sol dominant este solul cernoziom de câmp cu carbonați și soloneț. Solul din zona de producție prezintă caracteristici fizice bune, are o structură granuloasă, se încălzește ușor, este ușor alcalin, are o bună economie a apei și a substanțelor nutritive, este bogat în humus și prezintă un strat arabil profund.

La cultivarea plantelor „Szentesi paprika”, factorii climatici cu rol determinant pentru formarea conținutului nutrițional al fructului sunt, pe de o parte, lumina și numărul de ore cu soare, pe de altă parte temperatura și căldura iradiată. În regiunea de producție Szentes predomină caracteristicile climei continentale. Orele cu soare sunt distribuite uniform pe teritoriul regiunii. Valoarea medie a orelor cu soare este 2 050 de ore pe an. În ceea ce privește evoluția temperaturii medii anuale, zona de producție se numără printre regiunile cele mai calde ale țării. Temperatura medie anuală este + 10-11 °C, iar suma temperaturilor în perioada de vegetație este de 3 200-3 300 °C, deosebit de favorabilă cultivării ardeiului, care are nevoie de căldură.

În schimb, în privința cantității de precipitații anuale, această zonă este cea mai săracă din toată țara, cu o cantitate medie de precipitații de 500-550 mm pe an. Distribuția precipitațiilor pe durata unui an este de 40 % în semestrul hibernal și de 60 % în semestrul estival. Prin urmare, cultivarea ardeilor, care necesită multă apă, este posibilă doar datorită culturii irigate, dezvoltată în urma condițiilor hidrologice prielnice și introdusă de grădinarii bulgari.

5.2.   Specificitatea produsului

Principalele valori și caracteristici organoleptice ale ardeilor „Szentesi paprika” proveniți din aria geografică delimitată sunt următoarele: gustul extrem de aromat, condimentat, dulce sau picant; mirosul intens de ardei, respectiv de boia de ardei; coaja subțire. Grosimea pulpei fructelor este de 3-7 mm, ceea ce permite, chiar și în cazul consumului predominant în stare proaspătă, să se aprecieze gustul și aroma ardeilor.

„Szentesi paprika” alb: la maturitate, este lucios, are coaja netedă, alunecoasă, pocnește la rupere, are vârful teșit și pulpa groasă. Mirosul și aroma de ardei foarte caracteristice, care își fac efectul în stare proaspătă, sunt formulate în limbajul popular al consumatorilor astfel: „«Szentesi paprika» are gust.”

Ardeiul iute ascuțit „Szentesi paprika” are o suprafață lucioasă, netedă sau ușor ondulată și o formă alungită și ascuțită, iar pulpa are o consistență solidă. Fructul are un miros intens de ardei și un gust picant, aromat și plăcut. Ardeiul „Szentesi paprika” din categoria capia are o formă conică, ușor turtită, pulpa are o consistență solidă, iar coaja are o grosime medie. Suprafața sa este netedă și lucioasă, prezentând o culoare catifelată roșu-închis, foarte atrăgătoare, care se datorează influenței mediului geografic (luminii, căldurii).

„Szentesi paprika” în varietatea gogoșar are o formă caracteristică de sferă turtită; coaja este foarte subțire în ciuda grosimii pulpei, iar suprafața fructului este netedă; la maturitate are o culoare roșu-închis.

5.3.   Legătura cauzală dintre aria geografică și calitatea sau caracteristicile produsului (pentru DOP) sau o calitate anume, reputația sau alte caracteristici ale produsului (pentru IGP)

Legătura cu aria geografică este întemeiată pe reputația bună și de lungă durată a produsului, precum și pe experiența locală a producătorilor agricoli care cultivă „Szentesi paprika”, o experiență moștenită de la o generație la alta.

Reputația ardeilor „Szentesi paprika”

Cultura irigată a ardeiului în regiunea de producție Szentes a început în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, în urma activității inițiatoare a așa-numiților grădinari bulgari stabiliți în această zonă. „Szentesi paprika”, ardeiul care și-a câștigat renumele datorită acestei culturi, se cultivă de atunci fără întrerupere. Produsul are în continuare o reputație semnificativă, fapt demonstrat și prin marele premiu obținut în 2006, la Debrecen, cu ocazia Farmer Expo (eveniment care a inclus și o expoziție specializată pe horticultură) la care au participat 300 de firme din Ungaria și din străinătate. Ardeiul gras destinat consumului proaspăt a câștigat la rândul său, în 2007, Magyar Termék Nagydíj (marele premiu decernat produselor maghiare).

Legătura multiseculară existentă între reputația ardeilor „Szentesi paprika” și zona de producție este atestată de numeroase date istorice. Apariția ardeilor grași în Ungaria poate fi datată de la stabilirea grădinarilor bulgari în iarna 1875-1876 la ferma Úsztató de lângă Szegvár. Potrivit marelui recensământ agrar din 1895, 92,74 % din producția de ardei a țării era concentrată în zona din sud-est, în jurul orașului Szentes. Grădinarii au arendat terenuri de pe teritoriul actual al județului Csongrád, cu soluri cernoziom de câmp și soluri aluvionare, care sunt bogate în humus și se încălzesc ușor, alegând, pe cât posibil, terenuri cu o ușoară declivitate. Pentru cultura precoce se foloseau semințe preîncolțite și răsadnițe. În straturile de cultivare a răsadurilor se folosea, de asemenea, cultura intercalată, de exemplu pe lângă ardei se cultivau răsaduri de castraveți care, după transplantarea ardeilor, rămâneau pe loc. Răsadurile erau transplantate împreună cu puțin pământ. Se folosea irigarea pe scară largă și regulată, cu apă stătătoare încălzită sau cu apă curgătoare de adâncime mică, cu curgere lentă. Grădinarii dispuneau de o metodă unică de extragere și de drenare a apei. În zona orașului Szentes se foloseau, în acea perioadă, așa-numitele roți cu găleți pe lanț, care se adaptau la cota variabilă a apei.

Experiența locală

În regiunea de producție Szentes, suprafața solului conservă foarte bine căldura. Deoarece solul pe care se cultivă „Szentesi paprika” absoarbe mai multă căldură decât cantitatea emanată prin iradiația de dimineață, rezerva de căldură a solului și a stratului de aer de deasupra solului crește, ceea ce atrage după sine creșterea temperaturii. Microclimatul echilibrat, realizat prin distribuția armonioasă a căldurii, precum și cultura irigată introdusă de grădinarii bulgari contribuie împreună la caracterul deosebit de aromat al ardeilor „Szentesi paprika”, care necesită multă căldură și apă.

Factorilor naturali li se adaugă munca gospodarilor locali și transmiterea în familie a experienței practice privind aplicarea culturii forțate (reglarea temperaturii, aerisirea, umbrirea, îngrijirea plantelor). Competența astfel acumulată poate contracara efectele nefavorabile create de intemperiile extreme apărute în ultimele decenii, asigurând și menținând, pe cât posibil, gustul, culoarea, aroma, precum și forma agreabilă caracteristică tipurilor de soiuri ale ardeiului „Szentesi paprika”.

Într-adevăr, tehnologia introdusă de grădinarii bulgari s-a modificat în decursul celor aproape 150 de ani de cultivare, conform cerințelor vremii. Factorii indispensabili pentru cultura ardeiului au fost reevaluați în această perioadă și au apărut noi metode de producție. De la începuturi până în anii 1960, factorii de primă importanță pentru cultură erau considerați a fi condițiile pedologice favorabile, posibilitatea irigării (Tisa, Crișul și sistemele canalelor de irigații), numărul orelor cu soare (posibilitatea culturii precoce), precum și încălzirea timpurie de la începutul primăverii. Următoarea perioadă a durat de la sfârșitul anilor 1960 până la sfârșitul anilor 1980. Cultivatorii de ardei au început să exploateze în mod optim încălzirea timpurie și numărul ridicat al orelor cu soare din lunile de iarnă și de primăvară, utilizând cultura în sere. În urma descoperirii în anii 1960-1980 a energiei geotermice în această zonă, cultura „Szentesi paprika” s-a mutat de pe câmp în sere și în solarii, unde cultura în afara solului devine din ce în ce mai răspândită.

Trimitere la publicarea caietului de sarcini

[Articolul 5 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006 (3)]

Vidékfejlesztési Értesítő, 16 noiembrie 2011, volumul LXI, numărul 6, pagina 317

http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/minosegpolitika

---

(1)  JO L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Înlocuit de Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012.

(3)  A se vedea nota de subsol nr. 2.

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| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/36

---

Publicarea unei cereri de modificare în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare

2013/C 237/07

Prezenta publicare conferă dreptul de opoziție la cererea de modificare în temeiul articolului 51 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului (1).

CERERE DE MODIFICARE

REGULAMENTUL (CE) NR. 510/2006 AL CONSILIULUI

privind protecția indicațiilor geografice și a denumirilor de origine ale produselor agricole și alimentare
   (2)

CERERE DE MODIFICARE ÎN CONFORMITATE CU ARTICOLUL 9

„TERRA D’OTRANTO”

NR. CE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IGP ( ) DOP ( X )

1.   Rubrica din caietul de sarcini care face obiectul modificării

| — |  | Denumirea produsului |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Descrierea produsului |
| — |  | Aria geografică |
| — | ☒ | Dovada originii |
| — |  | Metoda de obținere |
| — |  | Legătura |
| — |  | Etichetarea |
| — | ☒ | Cerințele naționale |
| — | ☒ | Altele (de precizat) |

—



Denumirea produsului

—

☒

Descrierea produsului

—



Aria geografică

—

☒

Dovada originii

—



Metoda de obținere

—



Legătura

—



Etichetarea

—

☒

Cerințele naționale

—

☒

Altele (de precizat)

2.   Tipul modificării (modificărilor)

| — |  | Modificare a documentului unic sau a fișei-rezumat |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | ☒ | Modificare a caietului de sarcini al DOP sau al IGP înregistrate pentru care nu s-a publicat niciun document unic și nicio fișă-rezumat |
| — |  | Modificare a caietului de sarcini care nu generează nicio modificare a documentului unic publicat [articolul 9 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006] |
| — |  | Modificare temporară a caietului de sarcini ca urmare a adoptării unor măsuri sanitare sau fitosanitare obligatorii de către autoritățile publice [articolul 9 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006] |

—



Modificare a documentului unic sau a fișei-rezumat

—

☒

Modificare a caietului de sarcini al DOP sau al IGP înregistrate pentru care nu s-a publicat niciun document unic și nicio fișă-rezumat

—



Modificare a caietului de sarcini care nu generează nicio modificare a documentului unic publicat [articolul 9 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006]

—



Modificare temporară a caietului de sarcini ca urmare a adoptării unor măsuri sanitare sau fitosanitare obligatorii de către autoritățile publice [articolul 9 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006]

3.   Modificare (modificări)

3.1.   Descrierea produsului

Caietul de sarcini al produsului a fost modificat prin introducerea unor valori medii pentru descriptorii tipici, eliminarea punctajului de 6,5 (care nu mai este relevant) și adoptarea prevederilor metodei COI/T20 Doc. nr. 22. Au fost, de asemenea, adăugate la analiza organoleptică unele specificații care decurg din prezența cu preponderență a unuia dintre cele două soiuri locale.

Aplicarea noii metode are ca rezultat următoarea descriere:

| — | culoare: verde sau galbenă cu ușoare reflexe verzi; |
| --- | --- |

—

culoare: verde sau galbenă cu ușoare reflexe verzi;

| — | aromă: destul de fructată (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), aromă de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit, cu o notă de frunze; |
| --- | --- |

—

aromă: destul de fructată (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), aromă de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit, cu o notă de frunze;

| — | gust: destul de fructat (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), cu note de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit. Note de picant și amărui moderate sau ușoare, în funcție de momentul recoltării (niveluri medii de picant și amar peste 0 și până la 6). În plus, în funcție de perioada de recoltare și de predominanța soiului, notele fructate sunt completate de note de frunze de măslin, iarbă proaspăt tăiată și cardon/anghinare/cicoare, pentru Ogliarola, sau fructe/tomate/fructe de pădure, pentru Cellina. |
| --- | --- |

—

gust: destul de fructat (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), cu note de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit. Note de picant și amărui moderate sau ușoare, în funcție de momentul recoltării (niveluri medii de picant și amar peste 0 și până la 6). În plus, în funcție de perioada de recoltare și de predominanța soiului, notele fructate sunt completate de note de frunze de măslin, iarbă proaspăt tăiată și cardon/anghinare/cicoare, pentru Ogliarola, sau fructe/tomate/fructe de pădure, pentru Cellina.

Au fost aduse unele modificări criteriilor chimice, cu reducerea acidității maxime totale exprimate în acid oleic (de la < 0,8 la nivelul actual de < 0,65) și o ușoară creștere a conținutului de acid linolenic (de la ≤ 0,7 la ≤ 0,8) și a valorii K232 (de la ≤ 2,1 la ≤ 2,2). Aceste modificări au fost făcute pentru a crește reprezentativitatea a două dintre cele mai răspândite soiuri în regiune, Cellina di Nardò și Ogliarola Salentina, ceea ce a dus la stabilirea unor valori ușor diferite ale acidului linolenic și ale K232 pentru uleiurile monovarietale; înainte, acestea nu erau deloc reprezentative.

3.2.   Dovada originii

Caietul de sarcini al produsului a fost adaptat pentru a îndeplini cerințele Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1898/2006, prin includerea procedurilor pe care trebuie să le pună în aplicare operatorii pentru a stabili dovada originii.

3.3.   Cerințele naționale

Au fost eliminate cerințele prevăzute de Legea nr. 169 din 15 februarie 1992 privind recunoașterea denumirii de origine controlată a uleiurilor de măsline virgine și extravirgine și de Decretul ministerial nr. 573/1993.

3.4.   Altele

Modificările au fost solicitate, pentru uleiul de măsline extravirgin „Terra d’Otranto”, de Consorzio di tutela (organismul de protecție), care este autorizat să depună cererile de modificare. Consorzio di tutela fost instituit după depunerea cererii inițiale de înregistrare pentru DOP „Terra d’Otranto”; la momentul respectiv, cererea a fost depusă de către APROL (Asociația producătorilor de măsline), în calitate de lider a șapte asociații diferite de producători de măsline.

DOCUMENT UNIC

REGULAMENTUL (CE) NR. 510/2006 AL CONSILIULUI

privind protecția indicațiilor geografice și a denumirilor de origine ale produselor agricole și alimentare
   (3)

„TERRA D’OTRANTO”

NR. CE: IT-PDO-0117-1519-01.03.2011

IGP ( ) DOP ( X )

1.   Denumire

„Terra d’Otranto”

2.   Statul membru sau țara terță

Italia

3.   Descrierea produsului agricol sau alimentar

3.1.   Tip de produs

| Clasa 1.5. | Uleiuri și grăsimi (unt, margarină, uleiuri etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Clasa 1.5.

Uleiuri și grăsimi (unt, margarină, uleiuri etc.)

3.2.   Descrierea produsului căruia i se aplică denumirea de la punctul 1

„Terra d’Otranto” este un ulei de măsline extravirgin cu următoarele caracteristici chimice și organoleptice:

| — | aciditate maximă: 0,65 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

aciditate maximă: 0,65 %;

| — | peroxizi: ≤ 14 mEq O2/kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

peroxizi: ≤ 14 mEq O2/kg;

| — | K232 ≤ 2,2; |
| --- | --- |

—

K232 ≤ 2,2;

| — | K270 ≤ 0,17; |
| --- | --- |

—

K270 ≤ 0,17;

| — | acid linolenic ≤ 0,8; |
| --- | --- |

—

acid linolenic ≤ 0,8;

| — | culoare: verde sau galbenă cu reflexe verzi; |
| --- | --- |

—

culoare: verde sau galbenă cu reflexe verzi;

| — | aromă: destul de fructată (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), aromă de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit, cu o notă de frunze; |
| --- | --- |

—

aromă: destul de fructată (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), aromă de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit, cu o notă de frunze;

| — | gust: destul de fructat (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), cu note de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit. |
| --- | --- |

—

gust: destul de fructat (nivelul mediu al notei fructate între 3 și 6), cu note de măsline la gradul de maturare potrivit.

Note de picant și amărui moderate sau ușoare, în funcție de momentul recoltării; tot în funcție de perioada de recoltare și de predominanța soiului, notele fructate sunt completate de note de frunze de măslin, iarbă proaspăt tăiată și cardon/anghinare/cicoare, pentru Ogliarola, sau fructe/tomate/fructe de pădure, pentru Cellina.

3.3.   Materii prime (numai pentru produsele prelucrate)

Nu se aplică.

3.4.   Hrană pentru animale (numai pentru produsele de origine animală)

Nu se aplică.

3.5.   Etape specifice ale producției care trebuie să se desfășoare în aria geografică delimitată

Cultivarea, producerea și presarea uleiului de măsline extravirgin „Terra d’Otranto” trebuie să se desfășoare în aria de producție menționată la punctul 4.

3.6.   Norme specifice privind felierea, răzuirea, ambalarea etc.

Uleiul de măsline extravirgin „Terra d’Otranto” trebuie comercializat în recipiente din sticlă sau din tablă cu o capacitate maximă de cinci litri. Uleiul de măsline extravirgin „Terra d’Otranto” trebuie ambalat în interiorul ariei geografice de producție, pentru a asigura controlul originii produsului și pentru a evita ca produsul să fie transportat în vrac în afara acestei arii, ceea ce ar putea duce la deteriorarea sa și la pierderea caracteristicilor specifice descrise la punctul 3.2, în special a gustului specific de cardon/anghinare/cicoare al uleiului. Compoziția uleiului, caracterizată printr-un nivel semnificativ de acizi grași polinesaturați, predispune uleiul la pierderea calității organoleptice și a specificității sale atunci când este expus oxigenului din aer în cursul transferului, pompării, transportului și descărcării, operațiuni mai frecvente în cazul în care îmbutelierea are loc în afara ariei de producție.

3.7.   Norme specifice privind etichetarea

Denumirea „Terra d’Otranto” trebuie să apară pe etichetă cu caractere clare și indelebile, care să poată fi distinse cu claritate de restul informațiilor care apar pe etichetă, și trebuie să fie urmată imediat de mențiunea „Denominazione di origine protetta” sau de acronimul „DOP” (denumire de origine protejată) și de simbolul comunitar relevant.

Toate ambalajele utilizate pe piață trebuie să fie marcate cu un număr de serie de către societatea de ambalare, în conformitate cu planul de control relevant.

Este interzisă adăugarea oricăror alte calificative care nu sunt prevăzute în mod expres, inclusiv a următoarelor mențiuni: fine (fin), scelto (ales), selezionato (selectat), superiore (superior).

Se permite, totuși, utilizarea unor referiri la nume, denumiri comerciale sau mărci private, cu condiția ca acestea să nu aibă un sens laudativ sau să nu inducă în eroare consumatorul.

Este obligatorie indicarea pe etichetă a anului de producție a măslinelor din care este obținut uleiul.

4.   Delimitarea concisă a ariei geografice

Aria de producție a DOP „Terra d’Otranto” cuprinde întregul teritoriu al provinciei Lecce și părți ale provinciilor Taranto și Brindisi. Aria acoperă un arc între Marea Adriatică și Marea Ionică, din Taranto Murge (șir de dealuri) și cele mai îndepărtate pante din sud-estul colinelor Brindisi Murge, trecând prin platoul Lecce, până la confluența celor două mări, în peninsula Serre Salentine.

5.   Legătura cu aria geografică

5.1.   Specificitatea ariei geografice

Produsul își datorează caracteristicile condițiilor pedo-climatice speciale: factori de mediu din zonă și soiurile specifice îi conferă uleiului „Terra d’Otranto” un caracter distinctiv. Solul este remarcabil pentru marea sa uniformitate, care se datorează calcarului din perioada cretacică, peste care s-au așternut straturi de calcar din terțiar și depozite calcaroase, nisipoase și argiloase din pliocen și pleistocen, cu soluri roșii sau maronii, adesea în straturi alternative, depuse pe baza calcaroasă. În termeni orografici, zona este caracterizată de câmpii largi, mărginite și întrerupte de dealuri joase și cu pante blânde. Zona nu dispune de râuri și izvoare de suprafață, dar beneficiază de o puternică rețea de cursuri de apă subterane, care conferă întregii regiuni caracteristici marcat carstice. Datorită apropierii de litoral și latitudinilor joase, zona are o climă blândă, care tinde să fie caldă.

5.2.   Specificitatea produsului

Patrimoniul regional legat de cultivarea măslinilor se caracterizează prin prezența cu preponderență a varietăților autohtone Cellina di Nardò și Ogliarola Leccese, care conferă uleiului produs calitatea sa distinctivă. Procentajul minim de 60 % prevăzut pentru aceste două soiuri ajută la determinarea caracteristicilor organoleptice ale uleiului, care variază de la note de cardon/anghinare/cicoare până la note de tomate/fructe de pădure, în funcție de prevalența fiecărui soi.

5.3.   Legătura cauzală dintre aria geografică și calitatea sau caracteristicile produsului (pentru DOP) sau o calitate anume, reputația sau alte caracteristici ale produsului (pentru IGP)

Cultivarea măslinilor este principalul sector de producție din zonă și joacă un rol fundamental în economia locală. Încă din secolul al XIX-lea, indicația geografică „Terra d’Otranto” includea actualele provincii Lecce, Brindisi și Taranto. Această regiune a fost întotdeauna caracterizată de importanța măslinilor, din care se putea extrage un „prețios lichid”. Originile denumirii „Terra d’Otranto” sunt strâns legate de istoria cultivării măslinilor în regiune. Agricultorii fenicieni și greci au introdus în zonă cultivarea măslinilor încă din antichitate, iar activitatea călugărilor basilieni care s-au stabilit aici în secolul al X-lea a dat naștere la prima piață prosperă pentru uleiurile prețioase din Terra d’Otranto. „Terra d’Otranto” se referă la denumirea medievală a regiunii Salento, Otranto fiind cel mai important oraș din întreaga regiune în Evul Mediu.

Trimitere la publicarea caietului de sarcini

[Articolul 5 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006 (4)]

Ministerul a deschis procedura națională de opoziție, prin publicarea propunerii de modificare a caietului de sarcini pentru denumirea de origine protejată „Terra d’Otranto” în Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana (Gazeta Oficială a Republicii Italiene) nr. 297 din 21 decembrie 2010. Textul complet al caietului de sarcini este disponibil la adresa:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

sau accesând direct pagina de internet a Ministerului Politicilor Agricole, Alimentare și Forestiere (http://www.politicheagricole.it), făcând clic pe „Qualità e sicurezza” (în partea superioară dreaptă a ecranului) și apoi pe „Disciplinari di produzione all’esame dell’UE”.

---

(1)  JO L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Înlocuit de Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012.

(3)  A se vedea nota de subsol nr. 2.

(4)  A se vedea nota de subsol nr. 2.

---

| 15.8.2013 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 237/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2013

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 237/40

---

Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare

2013/C 237/08

Prezenta publicare conferă dreptul de opoziție la cererea de înregistrare în temeiul articolului 51 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului (1).

CERERE DE ÎNREGISTRARE A UNEI STG

REGULAMENTUL (CE) NR. 509/2006 AL CONSILIULUI

privind specialitățile tradiționale garantate din produse agricole și alimentare
   (2)

„ŽEMAITIŠKAS KASTINYS”

NR. CE: LT-TSG-0007-0910-11.11.2011

1.   Denumirea și adresa grupului solicitant

| Denumirea grupului sau a organizației (dacă este cazul): | „Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai” |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Sedos g. 35 |
| LT-87101 Telšiai |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Denumirea grupului sau a organizației (dacă este cazul):

„Žemaitiško kastinio gamintojai”

Adresă:

Sedos g. 35

LT-87101 Telšiai

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 44422201

Fax

+370 44474897

E-mail:

info@zpienas.lt

2.   Statul membru sau țara terță

Lituania

3.   Caietul de sarcini al produsului

3.1.   Denumirea (denumirile) propusă (propuse) pentru înregistrare [articolul 2 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1216/2007]

„Žemaitiškas kastinys”

3.2.   Denumire

| ☒ | Este specifică în sine |
| --- | --- |
|  | Exprimă caracterul specific al produsului agricol sau alimentar |

☒

Este specifică în sine



Exprimă caracterul specific al produsului agricol sau alimentar

Denumirea „Žemaitiškas kastinys” nu exprimă caracterul specific al produsului, dar aceasta este consacrată și bine cunoscută atât în Žemaitija (o regiune din vestul Lituaniei), cât și în restul Lituaniei ca desemnând în mod tradițional acest produs, după cum reiese din diversele surse menționate la punctul 3.8.

Denumirea „Žemaitiškas kastinys” este menționată în următoarele cărți de bucate din secolul al XX-lea: Gaspadinystės knyga arba Pamokinimai kaip prigulinčiai yra sutaisomi valgiai [Tilžė (Tilsit), 1927], Ką valgome (Dr Tumėnienė et al., Kaunas, 1935) și Lietuvių valgiai (compilată de J. Pauliukonienė, Vilnius, 1983).

3.3.   A se indica dacă s-a solicitat rezervarea denumirii în temeiul articolului 13 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 509/2006

| ☒ | Înregistrare cu rezervarea denumirii |
| --- | --- |
|  | Înregistrare fără rezervarea denumirii |

☒

Înregistrare cu rezervarea denumirii



Înregistrare fără rezervarea denumirii

3.4.   Tip de produs (în conformitate cu anexa II)

| Clasa 1.4. | Alte produse de origine animală (ouă, miere, produse lactate cu excepția untului etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Clasa 1.4.

Alte produse de origine animală (ouă, miere, produse lactate cu excepția untului etc.)

3.5.   Descrierea produsului agricol sau alimentar căruia i se aplică denumirea de la punctul 3.1 [articolul 3 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1216/2007]

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” este un produs tradițional făcut din smântână încălzită, amestecată și apoi răcită.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” se caracterizează printr-o textură omogenă, densă și consistentă, rigidă, cu picături izolate de lichid; poate fi sfărâmicioasă la o temperatură de + 6 °C și se topește rapid în gură. Are o culoare gălbuie uniformă. În funcție de plantele aromatice și de condimentele utilizate în rețetă, „Žemaitiškas kastinys” poate dobândi nuanțe specifice ingredientelor adăugate și poate conține bucățele de ierburi aromatice și de condimente. Are un gust slab de acid lactic, ușor acidulat, puțin sărat, cu aromă de ierburi aromatice și de condimente.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” prezintă următoarele caracteristici fizico-chimice:

| — | conținut de grăsime, în funcție de rețetă: 25-30 %; |
| --- | --- |

—

conținut de grăsime, în funcție de rețetă: 25-30 %;

| — | conținut de sare alimentară: 1-1,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

conținut de sare alimentară: 1-1,5 %.

3.6.   Descrierea metodei de producție a produsului agricol sau alimentar căruia i se aplică denumirea de la punctul 3.1 [articolul 3 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1216/2007]

Materii prime:

| — | smântână cu un conținut de grăsime de 25-30 %: 80-83 kg/100 kg de produs; |
| --- | --- |

—

smântână cu un conținut de grăsime de 25-30 %: 80-83 kg/100 kg de produs;

| — | unt cu un conținut de grăsime de cel puțin 82 %: 6-7 kg/100 kg de produs; |
| --- | --- |

—

unt cu un conținut de grăsime de cel puțin 82 %: 6-7 kg/100 kg de produs;

| — | lapte acru cu un conținut de grăsime de 2,5-4 %: 5-5,5 kg/100 kg de produs; |
| --- | --- |

—

lapte acru cu un conținut de grăsime de 2,5-4 %: 5-5,5 kg/100 kg de produs;

| — | sare alimentară: 1-1,5 kg/100 kg de produs. |
| --- | --- |

—

sare alimentară: 1-1,5 kg/100 kg de produs.

Pot fi utilizate ierburi aromatice și condimente (piper negru, piper de Jamaica, chimen, mărar, mentă sau un amestec al acestora: 0,1-0,15 kg/100 kg de produs) și legume aromate (usturoi sau ceapă: 1-2 kg/100 kg de produs).

Metoda de producție:

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” este produs printr-o metodă tradițională.

Ingredientele necesare se cântăresc în conformitate cu rețeta. Într-un recipient separat, se amestecă smântâna și laptele acru, care se încălzesc apoi la o temperatură între 25 °C și 30 °C. Untul rece se înmoaie prin încălzire la o temperatură între 25 °C și 30 °C. Legumele aromate se curăță și se taie în bucăți.

În conformitate cu rețeta, untul încălzit și înmuiat se pune în vasul destinat preparării produsului; se adaugă treptat amestecul de smântână și lapte acru, turnând de fiecare dată câte o optime din cantitatea totală prevăzută în rețetă, și se amestecă manual sau prin mijloace mecanice echivalente. „Žemaitiškas kastinys” trebuie amestecat întotdeauna în aceeași direcție. Când amestecul dobândește consistența smântânii (fără separarea laptelui bătut), se adaugă o altă optime din amestecul de smântână și lapte acru și se amestecă în continuare. Această operațiune se repetă până la încorporarea întregului amestec de smântână și lapte acru (în conformitate cu rețeta). Atunci când „Žemaitiškas kastinys” începe să se întărească, se sărează, se adaugă ierburile aromatice și condimentele tocate și legumele aromate tăiate în bucăți și se amestecă pentru a le distribui în mod uniform. „Žemaitiškas kastinys” trebuie ambalat imediat, înainte de solidificare.

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” se ambalează în terine de lut sau în recipiente de unică folosință de 250 g, 200 g și 100 g. Terinele se acoperă cu un capac de lut, peste care se pune o învelitoare care se leagă cu un șnur. Recipientele de unică folosință se acoperă cu folie de aluminiu. După ambalare, „Žemaitiškas kastinys” se răcește la o temperatură de 6 °C. Odată răcit, produsul dobândește o structură rigidă, omogenă.

3.7.   Caracterul specific al produsului agricol sau alimentar [articolul 3 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1216/2007]

„Žemaitiškas kastinys” se distinge de alte produse din aceeași categorie prin următoarele caracteristici specifice:

| — | ingredientele și metoda de producție tradiționale: spre deosebire de alte tipuri de kastinys, rețeta pentru „Žemaitiškas kastinys” nu s-a modificat aproape deloc de când a fost menționată pentru prima dată în sursele scrise la care se face referire la punctul 3.8, și anume, se folosesc aceleași ingrediente, în proporții similare. Între timp, pentru a se obține o varietate mai mare de gusturi, în cazul altor tipuri de kastinys care au început să fie produse mai târziu, smântâna a fost complet înlocuită cu lapte acru sau a fost amestecată cu kefir, adăugându-se eventual suc de sfeclă roșie sau de morcovi sau albuș de ou, ceea ce conferă produselor o culoare roșie sau galbenă. Producția de „Žemaitiškas kastinys” se caracterizează prin amestecarea lentă, constantă, a untului și a amestecului de smântână, pe durata căreia se adaugă periodic câte o optime din amestecul de smântână și lapte acru, în timp ce temperatura este reglată cu foarte mare atenție (25-30 °C) pentru ca să nu se separe laptele bătut. Producția altor tipuri de kastinys a fost modernizată. Acestea nu se mai amestecă, ci se bat, ingredientele fiind adăugate în trei sau patru etape, sau chiar toate deodată și pot fi supuse unor fluctuații mai mari de temperatură; |
| --- | --- |

—

ingredientele și metoda de producție tradiționale: spre deosebire de alte tipuri de kastinys, rețeta pentru „Žemaitiškas kastinys” nu s-a modificat aproape deloc de când a fost menționată pentru prima dată în sursele scrise la care se face referire la punctul 3.8, și anume, se folosesc aceleași ingrediente, în proporții similare. Între timp, pentru a se obține o varietate mai mare de gusturi, în cazul altor tipuri de kastinys care au început să fie produse mai târziu, smântâna a fost complet înlocuită cu lapte acru sau a fost amestecată cu kefir, adăugându-se eventual suc de sfeclă roșie sau de morcovi sau albuș de ou, ceea ce conferă produselor o culoare roșie sau galbenă. Producția de „Žemaitiškas kastinys” se caracterizează prin amestecarea lentă, constantă, a untului și a amestecului de smântână, pe durata căreia se adaugă periodic câte o optime din amestecul de smântână și lapte acru, în timp ce temperatura este reglată cu foarte mare atenție (25-30 °C) pentru ca să nu se separe laptele bătut. Producția altor tipuri de kastinys a fost modernizată. Acestea nu se mai amestecă, ci se bat, ingredientele fiind adăugate în trei sau patru etape, sau chiar toate deodată și pot fi supuse unor fluctuații mai mari de temperatură;

| — | gustul: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” are un gust slab de acid lactic, ușor acidulat, puțin sărat, în care se simte aroma ierburilor aromatice și a condimentelor adăugate. Alte tipuri de kastinys se caracterizează printr-un gust foarte pronunțat de acid lactic (în cazul în care smântâna este înlocuită cu lapte acru) sau un gust de acid lactic cu aromă de drojdie (în cazul în care smântâna este înlocuită cu kefir), în care se simte aroma caracteristică a sucului (sfeclă roșie sau morcovi) sau a albușului de ou adăugat; |
| --- | --- |

—

gustul: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” are un gust slab de acid lactic, ușor acidulat, puțin sărat, în care se simte aroma ierburilor aromatice și a condimentelor adăugate. Alte tipuri de kastinys se caracterizează printr-un gust foarte pronunțat de acid lactic (în cazul în care smântâna este înlocuită cu lapte acru) sau un gust de acid lactic cu aromă de drojdie (în cazul în care smântâna este înlocuită cu kefir), în care se simte aroma caracteristică a sucului (sfeclă roșie sau morcovi) sau a albușului de ou adăugat;

| — | textura: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” se caracterizează printr-o textură omogenă, densă și consistentă, rigidă, cu picături izolate de lichid; poate fi sfărâmicioasă la o temperatură de + 6 °C și se topește rapid în gură. Alte tipuri de kastinys se caracterizează printr-o textură moale, tartinabilă. |
| --- | --- |

—

textura: „Žemaitiškas kastinys” se caracterizează printr-o textură omogenă, densă și consistentă, rigidă, cu picături izolate de lichid; poate fi sfărâmicioasă la o temperatură de + 6 °C și se topește rapid în gură. Alte tipuri de kastinys se caracterizează printr-o textură moale, tartinabilă.

3.8.   Caracterul tradițional al produsului agricol sau alimentar [articolul 3 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1216/2007]

Pe lângă metoda primitivă de producere a untului prin utilizarea unei linguri pentru a bate smântâna într-un vas, metodă larg răspândită în întreaga Lituanie, una dintre regiunile acestei țări, Žemaitija, și-a elaborat propria tehnică specifică de procesare a smântânii prin amestecarea smântânii încălzite și având grijă ca laptele bătut să nu se separe. Această tehnică s-a răspândit în toată Lituania. Produsul obținut, „Žemaitiškas kastinys” are un gust și o consistență specifice (Lietuvių kalbos atlasas, vol. 1, Leksika, Vilnius, 1977). Produsul a fost descris în publicații academice de la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea [Litwa pod wzgledem starozytnych zabytkow, obyczajow i zwyczajow skreslona (Ludwik Adam Jucewicz (Ludwik z Pokiewia), Vilnius, 1846) și Pamiętniki Pana Kamertona (Leon Potocki, Poznań, 1869)] care pun accentul pe metoda de producție (produs din smântână încălzită) și pe gustul său foarte plăcut.

La Muzeul Național al Lituaniei există transcrieri ale relatărilor unor persoane născute la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea și la începutul secolului al XX-lea (colecțiile etnografice ale Muzeului Național al Lituaniei, fondurile F 15-4, F 15-13, F 32-7 și F 32-48), în care tehnica de producție și rețeta sunt descrise astfel: Mai întâi, se pun într-un vas de lut încălzit trei linguri de smântână și o jumătate de lingură de unt. Acestea se amestecă bine cu o lingură de lemn, învârtind întotdeauna în aceeași direcție. Când amestecul începe să se răcească și să se separe în lapte bătut, vasul se încălzește în apă caldă, iar amestecul lichefiat se răcește într-un vas cu apă rece. În timpul amestecării, se adaugă smântâna, în cantități mici. O parte din smântână este înlocuită adesea cu lapte acru, ceea ce face kastinys mai ușor. După ce se termină de amestecat, se adaugă sare, ierburi aromatice și condimente (chimen, piper măcinat, usturoi și ceapă tăiate, frunze de ceapă verde în sezon și fire de mărar sau de mentă).

În lucrarea Lietuvių valgiai (compilată de J. Pauliukonienė, Mokslas, Vilnius, 1983), produsă de academicieni în 1983, care descrie vechile tehnici tradiționale de preparare a materiilor prime prin care smântâna este separată manual de lapte cu ajutorul unei linguri), lăsând în mod normal niște lapte acru în smântână, rețeta și metoda de producție a „Žemaitiškas kastinys” sunt descrise astfel: „Žemaitiškas kastinys”: 1⁄2 l de smântână, 1 lingură de unt, 1⁄2 linguriță de chimen sau alte ierburi aromatice ori condimente, sare. Untul se așează într-un vas de lut și se adaugă o lingură de smântână; vasul se așează în apă fierbinte; se amestecă cu o lingură de lemn. După ce se amestecă puțin (înainte de separarea laptelui bătut) se adaugă încă o lingură de smântână și se amestecă în continuare până la încorporarea întregii cantități de smântână. Când amestecul începe să se îngroașe, se adaugă sare, împreună cu chimenul spălat și uscat, amestecând bine. Kastinys are un gust puțin sărat, atenuat, ușor acidulat.

Rețeta și metoda de producție a „Žemaitiškas kastinys” au rămas aceleași până în prezent, după cum atestă certificatul acordat produsului în 2010 de Fondul Lituanian al Patrimoniului Culinar, care confirmă că „Žemaitiškas kastinys” este produs în conformitate cu tehnicile tradiționale, folosind materii prime, ingrediente și echipamente tradiționale.

3.9.   Cerințe minime și proceduri pentru verificarea caracterului specific [articolul 4 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1216/2007]

Ținând seama de caracteristicile specifice ale „Žemaitiškas kastinys”, se efectuează următoarele verificări:

| 1. | calitatea fiecărui lot de materii prime primit:






  — | conținutul de grăsime al smântânii și al laptelui acru trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.6; se testează în laborator; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

calitatea fiecărui lot de materii prime primit:

—

conținutul de grăsime al smântânii și al laptelui acru trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.6; se testează în laborator;

| — | conținutul de grăsime al untului trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.6; se testează în laborator; |
| --- | --- |

—

conținutul de grăsime al untului trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.6; se testează în laborator;

| — | indicatorii organoleptici ai ierburilor aromatice, ai condimentelor și ai legumelor aromate (aromă, gust, culoare) se verifică pe baza documentelor și prin evaluare senzorială; |
| --- | --- |

—

indicatorii organoleptici ai ierburilor aromatice, ai condimentelor și ai legumelor aromate (aromă, gust, culoare) se verifică pe baza documentelor și prin evaluare senzorială;

| 2. | conformitatea cu tehnica de producție specificată la punctul 3.6: respectarea succesiunii de procese și a parametrilor stipulați (temperatura și proporțiile ingredientelor) se verifică vizual și prin efectuarea de măsurători în timpul producerii fiecărui lot; |
| --- | --- |

2.

conformitatea cu tehnica de producție specificată la punctul 3.6: respectarea succesiunii de procese și a parametrilor stipulați (temperatura și proporțiile ingredientelor) se verifică vizual și prin efectuarea de măsurători în timpul producerii fiecărui lot;

| 3. | calitatea fiecărui lot de produse finale:






  — | caracteristicile organoleptice (textură, culoare, gust) trebuie să corespundă celor stabilite la punctul 3.5; se verifică prin analiză senzorială; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

calitatea fiecărui lot de produse finale:

—

caracteristicile organoleptice (textură, culoare, gust) trebuie să corespundă celor stabilite la punctul 3.5; se verifică prin analiză senzorială;

| — | conținutul de grăsime trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.5; se testează în laborator; |
| --- | --- |

—

conținutul de grăsime trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.5; se testează în laborator;

| — | conținutul de sare trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.5; se verifică pe baza rețetei și, dacă apar îndoieli, în laborator. |
| --- | --- |

—

conținutul de sare trebuie să fie în conformitate cu punctul 3.5; se verifică pe baza rețetei și, dacă apar îndoieli, în laborator.

Cel puțin o dată pe an, autoritatea menționată la punctul 4.1 verifică dacă produsul și procesul de producție respectă caietul de sarcini al produsului.

4.   Autoritățile sau organismele care verifică respectarea caietului de sarcini

4.1.   Denumirea și adresa

| Denumire: | Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Siesikų g. 19 |
| LT-07170 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Denumire:

Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba

Adresă:

Siesikų g. 19

LT-07170 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Tel.

+370 52404361

E-mail:

vvt@vet.lt

| ☒ Public |  Privat |
| --- | --- |

☒ Public

 Privat

4.2.   Sarcini specifice ale autorității sau organismului respectiv

Autoritatea de inspecție menționată la punctul 4.1 este responsabilă cu monitorizarea tuturor criteriilor stabilite în caietul de sarcini.

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(1)  JO L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Înlocuit de Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012.

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