CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
 

WORLDWIDE PLAZA 

ROBE'" D. .JOP'P'E 

ALLEH P'INKELSON 

.JAMES C. V"'''DELL•• 

ROBE"" H. IlARON 825 EIGHTH AVENUE WILU..... .J. WHELAN•• SCOTT A. ....RSHAY 

DAVID S. P'INKELSTEIN 

DAVID GREENWALD 

RONALD 5. PlOL'1: 

PAUl. C. SAUNDERS 

KEVIN.J. GREHAN 

STEPHEN 5. MADSEN NEW YORK, NY 10019-7475 PHILlP.J. BOECKMAN ROGER G. aROOKS 

RACHEL G. SK,A18TI. 

PAUL H. ZUMBRO 

DOUGLAe D••"O...DW...Tr:,. C. ALLEN PARKE" WILLIAM V. P'OOG ,JOEL r. HEROLD 

ALAN C. STEPHENSON MARC a. ROSEN.IERG TELEPHONE: (212) 474- '000 ,.AI%A.J. SAEED ERIC W. HILP'ERS 

MAX N. SHULMAN 

STUAIIfT W. GOLD 

SUSAN WEBSTER 

TIMOTHY G. MASSAD F'ACSI MILE: (212) 474-3700 RICHAfIID.J. STARK THOM.... E. DUNN 

GEORGIE P'. SCHOEN 

ERIK IIf. TAVZEL 

.JOHN E••EERBOWE,. DAVID MERCADO .JULIE SPELLMAN SWEET CAAIO P'. ARCELLA 

EVAN R. CHESLER 

MICHAEL L. SCHLE" 

R'CHARD LEVIN KA'. P'. HEINZELMAN 

e. RO ••'NS KIESSLING 

ROGIE.. D. TUNNEll 

ROWAN D. WILSON 

PETE" T. IIARBUR 

SAND..... C. GOLDSTEIN 

PAUL MICHALSKI 

THO"'.... G. RAFP'£RTY 

MICHAEL S. GOLDMAN 

CITYPOINT 

ONE ROpENAKER STREET 

LONDON EeZyeH" 

TELEPHONE: 4~·ZO·1~5J·IOOO

,."CSIMILIE: 4~·ZO..1a.O·1150 

RONALD CAM) 

MA"KI.G"EENE 

SARKIS .JEeE.JIAN 

JAM IES C. WOOLER"( 

DAVID pt. MAR.UOTT 

MICHAEL A. PASKIN 

TEENA·ANN V. SANKOOftlKAL 

ANCNEW ft. THOMPSON 

DAMIIEN R. ZOU8EK 

LAUREN ANGIELILU 

TATlANA LAPU5HCHIK 

ERIC L. SCHIELE 

PHIUP A. OI£L.STON RICH.ARD HALL ANDREW oJ. PITTS 

ROlin' O. MILLSON 

P"RANCla P'. BARRON 

ELIZABETH L. GRAYER 

.JUU£A. NORTH WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER MICHAEL T. REYNOLDS ANTONY L. RYAN SPECIAL COUNSEL 

RICHARD W. CLAM 

W'LUAM P. IIOGE..... .J". 

.JAMES D. COOPE" 

STEPHEN L. GORDON 

ANDIIEW W. NEEDHAM 

STEPHEN L. BURNS 

KATHERINE B. FO""UT 

KEITH R. HUMMEL (212) 474-1714 

GEORGE IE. weiTZ 

GEORGE A. STEPHANAKIS 

DARIN P. McATEE 

GARY A. BORNSTEIN 

SAMUEL C. 8UTLE" 

GEORGE oJ. GILLESPI£•• 

DANIEL L. MoaLa DANIEL SUP"KlN TIMOTHY G. CAMERON 

GREGO..... M. SHAW ,J E'''''EY A. SM ITH KAIit. N A. DIt.......1 OJrCOUN8EL 

PETER S. WIUION ROBE"" I. TOWNSEND•• LlZABETHANH lit. EISEN CHRISTINE BUHA" 

February 29, 2008 

In the Matter ofNine West Group Inc.
 

Docket No. C-3937
 

Petition to Reopen and Modify Order
 

Dear Eric: 

You have asked us to respond to the following inquiries: 

At. Define the market and provide the source for the market share figures 

provided. Ifthe market is defined as "all women's shoes" (as opposed to "women's 

fashion shoes") explain why that isn't inconsistent with the position that the market 

is highly differentiated. 

The market referenced in Andrew Cohen's Supplemental Declaration in Support of 

Petition to Reopen and Modify Order ("Suppl. Cohen Decl.") 12 does not include "all 

women's shoes". For purposes of this Petition, the market has been defined as all 

women's fashion footwear brands that compete with Nine West brands. Exclusions from 

this list are based on factors that determine the relevance of each brand as a competitor to 

Nine West brands. The primary factors are functional categories in which Nine West 

does not have products (e.g., pure athletic footwear brands, functional styles used for 

work/labor such as construction boots, functional outdoor styles such as hiking boots, 

etc.) and price points - high or low - that are not a reasonable substitute for Nine West 

brands (e.g., Manolo Blahnik, Jimmy Choo, etc.). Even within that narrowly defined 

market, however, products are highly differentiated. Bases of differentiation include 

styles, prices, sizes, colors, materials, durability, and so forth, but such differences are 

PUBLIC
 
2 

consistent with all shoes in women's fashion footwear being reasonably interchangeable 

(on the demand or supply side or both) and competing with Nine West brands. 

The data used in calculating market shares were provided by a market research firm 

whose data are purchased by Nine West and other industry participants. 

A2. Describe in much more detail the lack of entry barriers. 

Nine West is in the business ofdesigning, contracting out manufacturing, and reselling 

women's fashion footwear. It does not itself manufacture footwear but uses third-party 

manufacturers. There are therefore essentially no barriers to entry, as there are numerous 

shoe designers and footwear manufacturers willing to provide their services. Textbook 

examples of barriers to entry, such as difficulty achieving economies ofscale, high initial 

investment, risk, scarce inputs or customers, obstacles to developing favorable product 

reputation, and government restrictions, do not exist in Nine West's business. See 2B 

Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp and John L. Solow, Antitrust Law 421, at 79-91 

(3d ed. 2007) for examples ofbarriers to entry. Indeed, all that is required for a firm to 

enter into women's fashion footwear is a shoe design and a modest amount of start-up 

capital to buy the footwear from a contract manufacturer and to pay for brand 

development. Ease of entry is confirmed by the growing number and variety ofsmall 

footwear sellers that compete with Nine West, listed in the table enclosed with our letter 

ofDecember 5,2007. 

AJ. Provide support for the claim that the practice is not ubiquitous. 

We have provided all information known to Nine West regarding competitors' minimum 

resale price maintenance practices. (See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 

Petition to Reopen and Modify Order ("Suppl. Mem.") at 9 n.8.) It is against Nine 

West's company policies to discuss pricing directly with competitors. The information 

previously provided to the Commission was publicly available or based on company 

executives' own experiences in previous positions prior to joining Nine West. 

A4. Provide evidence of the procompetitive efficiencies that occurred when Nine 

West engaged in RPM before it was under order by the Commission. 

At the time it was issued, the Commission's Decision and Order ofApril 11,2000 (the 

"Order") codified federal antitrust law regarding minimum resale price maintenance 

under Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) and 

United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Thus, Nine West was under the same 

antitrust minimum resale price maintenance prohibitions both before and after the Order 

was issued. Had the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. 

v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) not changed the law regarding minimum resale 

PUBLIC 
3 

price maintenance, Nine West would not now be petitioning the Commission to reopen 

and modify the Order. I 

Nine West has consistently attempted to abide by Dr. Miles, and consequently cannot 

provide evidence ofprocompetitive effects of prohibited resale price maintenance 

activities. As described further in Suppl, Cohen Decl. W8-10, Nine West has only rarely 

engaged in the sole form ofminimum resale price maintenance permissible under Dr. 

Miles and the Order - unilateral retailer termination as protected under Colgate ­

because ofthe high costs ofthat draconian measure. (See Suppl, Mem. at 7 (explaining 

that unilateral terminations make a manufacture's goods less accessible to consumers and 

compromises retailer good will).) 

AS. Explain how the practice is initiated, and by who - Nine West, or by retailers. 

Please see our response to A4. It is Nine West that wishes to engage lawfully in 

minimum resale price maintenance because it believes the practice will benefit both Nine 

West and consumers for all the reasons set forth in the Petition and Supplemental 

Memorandum. 

A6. Re: the savings and other benefits Nine West claims will inure when the order 

is lifted (from reduced employee training efforts, ability to work with retailers 

rather than outright terminate them), provide projections and the basis for the 

projections. Also, how will the fact that many states still have laws that prohibit 

RPM impact these savings? 

Nine West has hired outside counsel to advise it on compliance with the Order, and Nine 

West executives have between five and ten conversations per year with outside counsel 

regarding the Order. New Nine West employees holding management or sales positions 

in the wholesale divisions receive antitrust compliance training, and additional training 

I In addition, as described in greater detail in the Supplemental Memorandum, 

requiring Nine West now to make a showing of procompetitive effects of any minimum 

resale price maintenance program in place at the time the Order was issued is inconsistent 

with In the Matter a/Sharp Electronics Corp., 112 F.T.C. 303 (1989). In Sharp, where 

because of an intervening Supreme Court decision the Commission set aside a consent 

order prohibiting Sharp from imposing territorial restrictions on its dealers or defining the 

class of customers to whom dealers were permitted to sell Sharp calculators, the 

Commission analyzed the potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of such 

prohibitions in the present - not at the time ofthe consent order. (See also Suppl, Mem. 

at 8-10.) 

PUBLIC 
4 

sessions are scheduled approximately once per year to keep wholesale sales employees 

apprised ofNine West's pricing policies. 

Further, two company executives charged with addressing pricing questions from Nine 

West employees and retailers must dedicate significant time to assuring the Order is 

being satisfied. (Suppl. Cohen Decl. , 11.) We have not attempted to break out the exact 

monetary costs ofthese compliance efforts, but they are substantial. 

As a result ofthe uncertainty in state antitrust enforcement and the existence ofthe "rule 

ofreason" test ofLeegin, Nine West will still be required to provide some resale price 

maintenance guidance to its employees, but at a lesser expense. 

A7. Nine West cites Elzinga as authority for the proposition that women's shoes are 

differentiated and vulnerable to free riding (p. 3). But Elzinga may not be 

disinterested because he is the expert in the Leegin case, which is now being tried on 

a rule of reason basis before the district court. Does Nine West have any other 

authority for this argument? 

Professor Kenneth G. Elzinga, a professor at the University ofVirginia, is a renowned 

economist. Courts and federal government agencies have relied upon his impartial 

expertise for more than thirty years. For example, Professor Elzinga has served as a 

consultant to the Commission on numerous occasions, and was economic adviser to the 

Assistant Attorney General for the Department ofJustice, Antitrust Division, from 1970 

to 1971. He acted as special consultant to Judge Lewis A. Kaplan in the 

Christie's/Sotheby's antitrust litigation. He also served as an expert witness on behalfof 

the Department ofJustice, Antitrust Division, and several states in United States v. 

Oracle Corporation. Enclosed as Addendum A is Professor Elzinga's curriculum vitae, 

printed from the University ofVirginia website. 

It may well be that Professor Elzinga, like many other industrial organization economists, 

believes that resale price maintenance ought not to be illegal per se. That belief could not 

reasonably be expected to lead him (and his co-author) in a professional paper to state, 

without a basis for the statement, that shoes are vulnerable to free riding. 

In addition, we believe it is self-evident that consumers differentiate women's footwear 

brands on non-price bases. Women's fashion footwear is not a commodity businessconsumers choose women's fashion footwear based on aesthetic and desi a eal as 

well as brand ima e. 

PUBLIC
 
5 

•

c:a 

a •

11 • 

A8. Provide more detail and examples on how free-riding takes place in this 

market, and how Nine West is disadvantaged. 

We have no further information regarding the effects offree riding on Nine West and its 

retailers beyond that provided in Andrew Cohen's Declaration in Support ofPetition to 

Reopen and Modify Order ("Cohen Decl.") ft 12-14 and Suppl. Cohen Decl. ft 8-10. 

A9. Provide documentary support for as much of the above as Nine West cancontemporaneous business documents. 

Please see our response to A8. Since Nine West company policies prohibit executives 

from discussing one retailer's pricing or marketing with another, we have no such 

documentation. 

Bl. On page 3 & in .. S ofCohen Supp. Decl., no factual basis is given for the 

declaration that consumers differentiate women's footwear brands on non-price 

bases. On what non-price bases are women's shoes differentiated? What facts 

demonstrate the extent and significance of such differentiation? 

As explained also in our response to A7, consumers differentiate women's footwear 

brands on non-price bases. Women's fashion footwear is not a commodity businessconsumers choose women's fashion footwear based on aesthetic and design appeal, as 

well as brand image. 

B2. Footnote 2 relies on Elzinga for the proposition that shoe retailing is vulnerable 

to free riding. Elzinga was the economic expert for Leegin at trial and on appeal 

and remains so on remand. Is there any disinterested authority for this proposition. 

Further, most of the "services" posited by Elzinga in footnote 2 do not appear to be 

either brand specific or particularly important to consumers as opposed to either 

manufacturers or retailers. In a market where no significant information 

asymmetries exist between manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, does product 

PUBLIC 
6 

differentiation achieved by diminution of intrabrand price competition (as distinct 

from non-price intrabrand competition, and especially where intrabrand non-price 

competition exists) tend to be a greater net benefit/detriment to manufacturers, 

retailers, or consumers? Please provide detailed support for the answer. Do 

significant information asymmetries effect the distribution and sales of women's 

shoes? Ifso, identify and provide factual support for them. 

Please see our response to A7 regarding Professor Elzinga's credentials and his 

"disinterestedness". 

With respect to the services described by Professor Elzinga as set forth in footnote 2 of 

the Supplemental Memorandum, more attractive store furnishings certainly can be 

provided on a brand-specific basis. In addition, even if a service such as longer store 

hours is not necessarily brand-specific, it still has value to consumers. Further, quality 

certification by high-quality retailers provides much the same value to consumers as a 

trademark - it reduces the customer's costs ofshopping and making purchasing 

decisions because it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item is high 

quality. 

We have difficulty responding to the final part ofthis question. To begin, the assumption 

of "no significant information asymmetries" implies that there is no reason for retailers to 

provide any information (whether through in-store services, advertising or sales person 

assistance) to customers about the products, because, by assumption, customers know as 

much about the products and the stores as the retailers do, thereby assuming away many 

ofthe reasons for minimum resale price maintenance. Such assumption is flawed. Nine 

West relies on retailers to provide important, brand-specific information to consumers. 

For example, Easy Spirit shoes incorporate advanced comfort features such as "spring 

lining", "flex grooves", "heel stabilizers" and "elon midsoles". Trained salespeople at 

the retailer level are necessary to inform consumers about these features. 

Further, this part ofthe question is so general that it is hard to provide a "one size fits all" 

response. However, at a general level, we can say the following: Where a manufacturer 

believes that instituting minimum resale price maintenance will increase its profits, it will 

be justified in that belief (and will maintain the policy) only if the services provided by 

the retailers in fact cause consumers to buy more products. In that case, both the 

manufacturer and consumers benefit from the policy. Competition among retailers will 

force them to provide services up to the point where the additional sales revenues equal 

the additional costs, so that the benefit to retailers is likely to be minimal. 

PUBLIC
 
7 

B3. On page 4 & in , 8 of Cohen Supp. Decl., it is claimed that free riding by 

discounters "deterred other retailers from providing additional services that would 

enhance Nine West's ability to compete with other manufacturers." What are those 

services and what value would they be to consumers? 

Nine West's ability to compete would be enhanced ifthrough minimum resale price
 

maintenance it could provide incentives for retailers to offer more attractive and
 

extensive sales displays, better-trained salespeople, longer store hours and advertising.
 

We have no further information regarding the effects offree riding on Nine West and its
 

retailers beyond that provided in Cohen Decl. 12-14 and Suppl. Cohen Decl. 8-10.
 

B4. The next sentence on page 4 & in , 9 of Cohen Supp. Decl, claim that a 

discounter took "advantage of a nearby retailer's superior customer service, 

displays and advertising." It is not clear how one can free ride on quality-ofshopping-experience features that appear to be unique to the provider, nor does this 

claim assert that the non-terminated retailer was deterred from providing superior 

services, displays and advertising because of the discounters actions. All Nine West 

retailers free ride to a significant extent on Nine West's brand-promotional 

advertising, and on the brand advertising of each other, independent of whether 

there is discounting. 

The example offree riding on a quality-of-shopping experience described in Suppl, 

Cohen Decl. , 9 is nearly identical to the free riding described in Leegin: 

"Consumers might learn, for example, about the benefits of a 

manufacturer's product from a retailer that invests in fine showrooms, 

offers product demonstrations, or hires and trains knowledgeable 

employees. Or consumers might decide to buy the product because they 

see it in a retail establishment that has a reputation for seIling high-quality 

merchandise. Ifthe consumer can then buy the product from a retailer that 

discounts because it has not spent capital providing services or developing 

a quality reputation, the high-service retailer will lose sales to the 

discounter, forcing it to cut back its services to a level lower than 

consumers would otherwise prefer." 

127 S. Ct. at 2715-16. The deep-discounting retailer described in Suppl, Cohen Decl. 9 

was terminated to prevent that retailer from deterring other retailers in the area from 

providing desirable customer services. 

In addition, while in some cases Nine West retailers in the same geographic market 

benefit from Nine West's brand promotional advertising irrespective of discounting, in 

many instances retailers share these costs with Nine West through cooperative 

advertising arrangements. 

PUBLIC 
8 

B5. On page 7, it is claimed that "there are no significant impediments to entry." 

Nine West provides no factual basis for this assertion. 

Please see our response to A2. 

B6. The market share discussion on page 8 & in , 12 of Cohen Supp. Decl. takes
 

positions which are not bounded by a product market defmition. For example, the
 

10.4 % market share figure at the top of the page appears to assert a product 

market including all women's footwear; whereas, the 12.5% figure in footnote 6 

appears to relate to a market composed of all women's footwear sold in department 

stores. The moving papers do not advise the Commission on how it should reconcile 

an all women's footwear market with the claim of substantial product 

differentiation. Further, a comparison of shoes offered by Nike or Wolverine to 

those offered by Nine West (as shown by the respective websites for those 

manufacturers) does not intuitively suggest they operate in the same market, 

especially if the products are differentiated by use or type of sales outlet. Further, 

without a market definition, it is difficult to predict entry conditions. Finally, on 

what measure were these market share figures based? 

Please see our response to Al regarding the market definition. The 10.4% market share 

was calculated using available 2007 data for sales by department stores and national 

chain stores, while the 12.5% market share was calculated using available data for sales 

by only department stores year-to-date July 2007. 

Also, various styles by Nike, as well Hush Puppies and Merrell (by Wolverine World 

Wide, Inc.), are similar to Easy Spirit, as shown by their respective websites. 

B7. On pages 10-11, Nine West claims it cannot estimate RPM efficiencies or 

consumer benefits that would accrue from conduct forbidden to it - a fair point. 

However, can it detail any efficiencies or consumer benefits lost since, or by reason 

of, the decree? Did its contemporaneous business documents at the time it did 

engage in the conduct document any such efficiencies or benefits? 

Please see our response to A4. 

B8. Footnote 8 indicates that Nine West believes "numerous" (how many?) 

competitors use "some form or' RPM. Ifthose manufacturers are using a Colgatebased form of RPM, then it is not entirely clear what the extent and nature of Nine 

West's competitive disadvantage might be. This is especially so in light of the fact 

that Nine West indicates that some states will still claim that RPM is illegal as a 

matter of state law even after Leegin, The footnote also claims that RPM is "far 

from ubiquitous" without providing either a factual basis for the assertion or any 

PUBLIC 
9 

indication if that would still be true if the product market was reasonably narrow, 

e.g., women's fashion shoes sold in department stores (or even super-premium 

women's fashion shoes sold in up-scale department stores). 

As explained also in our response to A3, we have provided all known information 

regarding competitors' use ofminimum resale price maintenance. (See Suppl, Mem. at 9 

n.8.) 

ARonald S. Rolfe 

Eric D. Rohlek 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20580 

Ene!. 

BYFEDEX 

PUBLIC
 
PUBLIC
 

Addendum A
 
PUBLIC 

Name: KENNETH G. ELZINGA 

Placeof Birth Michigan 

HomeAddress: 

IVA 

HomePhone: 

OfficePhone: 

OfficeAddress: 

E-Mail: 

Web Site: 

Education: 

PresentPosition: 

Previous Positions: 

I<summer months) 

(434) 924-6752 (w/voicemail),
 

(434)982-2317 (fax)
 

PO Box 400182(for U.S. Maif)
 

2015 Ivy Road,Suite312 (for Overnight)
 

Dept.of Economics, University of Virginia
 

Charlottesville, VA22904-4182
 

http://www.people.virginia.edul-kge8z 

B.A., Kalamazoo College. 1963
 

M.A., Michigan StateUniversity, 1966
 

Ph.D., Michigan StateUniversity, 1967
 

L.H.D., Kalamazoo College, 2000
 

RobertC. TaylorProfessor of Economics, 2002­

Vernon F. TaylorVisiting Professor of Economics 

TrinityUniversity, Spring2006 

Distinguished Visiting Professor 

Pepperdine University, Spring2004 

Cavaliers' Distinguished Teaching Professorship, 1992-1997 

Thomas Jefferson Fellow 

Cambridge University, January-June, 1990 

Visiting Professor of Economics 

TrinityUniversity, 1984 

Fellow in Law& Economics 

University of Chicago, 1974 

Professor of Economics 

University of Virginia, 1974­

Associate Professor of Economics, 1971-1974 

Assistant Professor of Economics, 1967-1971 
PUBLIC
 

Administrative Positions: 

Academic Awards: 

Special Economic Advisorto the Assistant
 

Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
 

Department of Justice, 1970-1971
 

Assistant Instructor of Economics
 

Michigan State University, 1965-1966
 

Research Economist
 

SenateAntitrust & Monopoly Subcommittee
 

Summer, 1964
 

Coordinate and teachintroductory economics coursewith 1000
 

students and 20 graduatestudentteachingassistants, 1967­

Executive Committee, Southern Economic Association, 1985-87; 1991­


93
 

Assistant Dean,CollegeofArts & Sciences, 1971-1973
 

Distinguished Alumni Award. Michigan State University, 1999
 

Templeton HonorRoll Award forEducation in a Free Society, John
 

Templeton Foundation, 1997
 

KenanEnterprise Awardfor Teaching Economics,
 

William R. Kenan, Jr. Charitable Trust, 1996
 

ThomasJefferson Award, University of Virginia, 1992
 

Phi Eta Sigma TeacherOf TheYear, 1992
 

Commonwealth of Virginia Outstanding FacultyAward, 1992
 

President, Southern Economic Association, 1991
 

Raven SocietyFaculty HonorAward, 1983
 

Distinguished Alumni Award, Kalamazoo College, 1983
 

Distinguished Professor Award, University of Virginia, 1979
 

President, Industrial Organization Society, 1979
 

Phi Beta KappaPrizeforThe Antitrust
 

Penalties (sharedwithWilliam Breit), 1977
 

Inducted to Raven Society, 1977
 

Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar, 1973-1974
 

Z SocietyOutstanding Teaching Award,
 

University of Virginia, 1973
 

Woodrow Wi1son Fellow, 1964
 

2
 
PUBLIC
 

Member: 

Editorial Board: 

Advisory Editorin Economics: 

Baccalaureate Address: 

Membership: 

W.G. Howard Prize in Economics, 1963
 

R. S. LightScholar, University of Bonn. 1965
 

Boardof Trustees, HopeCollege.1983-1990. 2007­

Faculty. Advanced Coursefor FederalJudgeson Antitrust Economics.
 

Lawand Economics Center. 1982, 1983.1984.1986. 1992,2001.2002
 

American BarAssociation Special Committee to Studythe Federal
 

TradeCommission, 1988-89
 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensing and SafetyBoardPanel.
 

1971-1979
 

TrialJudge(withM. L.Glaser& M. E. Miller). In the Matterof
 

Alabama PowerCompany, 5 NUclear Regulatory Commission 804-962
 

(1977)
 

The Journal of Markets and Morality, 1998­

TheAntitrust Bulletin, 1977­

Industrial Organization Review. 1972-79
 

The SocialScience Quarterly, 1969-1977
 

University of Virginia, Spring, 1971
 

American Economic Association 

Southem Economic Association 

Mystery Writers of America 

International J. A. Schumpeter Society 

Industrial Organization Society 

European Association for Industrial Economics 

American Bar Association, Associate 

American Law& Economics Association 

International Association of CrimeWriters 

3
 
PUBLIC
 

Publication. (not Ineludlnc bookreview.): 

"Oligopoly,the Shennan Act,and The New Industrial State." 49 Social ScienceQuarterly49 (June, \968). 

"Mergers: Their Causesand Cures,"2 AntitrustLaw & Economics Reyiew53 (Fall, \968). 

"The AntimergerLaw:PyrrhicVictories?," 12Journal ofLaw & Economics 43 (April, 1969). Cited by 

Justice Stewartin Ford MotorCo. v, U.S., 405 U.S. 562, 582 (\972). 

"Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust." \3 Journalof Lawand Economics 23 (April, 1970). 

"The Beer Industry," in Walter Adams(ed.), The Structureof AmericanIndustty4th ed. (New York: 

Macmillan, 197\). Cited by Justice Marshall in!l.S. v. Falstaff.410 U.S. 526, 551 (1973). 

Economics: A Reader(edited) (New York: Harper& Row, 1972). 

"The Demandfor Beer," (withThomasF. Hogarty), 54 Reviewof Economics & Statistics195 (May, 1972). 

"AttitudesTowardRiskand AntitrustPenalties,"(with William Breit) 85 HarvardLaw Review693 

(February, 1973). 

"The Problemof GeographicMarketDelineation in Antimerger Suits,"(with ThomasF. Hogarty) \8 Antitrust 

Bulletin45 (Spring, 1973). 

"The Restructuring ofthe U.S. BrewingIndustry," I Industrial Organization Review 10\ (1973). 

"The Instruments ofAntitrustEnforcement," (with William Breit)in 1. Daltonand S. Levin(eds.)1JHl 

AntitrustDilemma(London& Toronto: Lexington-Heath, 1974). 

"PrivateActions:The PurposesSoughtand the ResultsAchieved: The Economist's View,"(with William 

Breit)43 AntitrustLawJournal 9 (1974). 

"Product Differentiation and Institutionalism: NewShadows on AnOld Terrain,"(with William Breit) 8 

JournalofEconomic Issues8\3 (December, 1974). 

Economics: A Reader(edited) 2nd ed. (New York: Harper& Row, \975). 

"AntitrustEnforcement, PrivateActionsand EconomicEfficiency: The UneasyCase for Treble Damages," 

(with WilliamBreit) 17 JournalofLawand Economics 329 (October, 1974). 

"The Beer Industry," in Walter Adams(ed.) TheStructureof American Industry 5th ed. (New York: 

Macmillan, \977). 

"The Economicsof Dissolution, Divorcement and Divestiture," in CharlesF. Phillips,Jr. (ed.) Competition and 

Regulation - Some Economic AspectS (Lexington: Washington & Lee University, 1976). 

The AntitrustPenalties: A Studyin Lawand Economics co-authorwith William Breit(New Haven: Yale 

UniversityPress, \976). Citedby Justice Burger in TexasIndustries v.RadcliffMaterials, 45\ U.S. 630,636 

(\98\). 

"The Goals of Antitrust- OtherThanCompetition and Efficiency, WbatElse Counts?," 125Universityof 

Pennsylvania Law Review 1191 (June, 1977). 

Economics: A Reader(edited) 3rd. ed, (New York: Harper& Row, 1978). 

"CartelProblemsand Their Persistence," (with DavidE. Mills)68 American Economic Review938 

(December, 1978). 

4 
PUBLIC
 

MurderAt The Marginby Marshall Jevons(pseudonym). co-author with William Breit(Glen Ridge:
 

ThomasHortonand Daughters) 1978. A mystery novel in whichthe protagonist useseconomic analysis to
 

solve thecrime.
 

"The ProblemofGeographic MarketDelineation Revisited: The Caseof Coal."(withThomas F. Hogarty) 23.
 

Antitrust BulletinI (Spring. 1978).
 

"TheTravel Agent, the lATACartel. and Consumer Welfare." 44 Journal of Air LawandCommerce 47
 

(1978).
 

"UtahPie and theConsequences ofRobinson-Paanan," (withThomasF. Hogarty) 21 Journal of Lawand
 

Economics 427 (October. 1978).
 

"RonaldH.Cease,"biographical entry in 18 International Encyclopedia of the SocialSciences(New York:
 

The FreePress. 1979).
 

"The Robinson-Patman Act:A New Dealfor SmallBusiness." in GaryM. Walton(ed.) Regulatory change 

in an Atmosphere of Crisis:TheCurrent-day Implications of theRoosevelt Years(New York: Academic Press. 

1979). 

"TheCompass ofCornpetitionfor Professional Services." in Roger D. Blairand StevenRubin(eds.)
 

Regulating the Professions (London& Toronto: Lexington-Heath, 1979).
 

"EzraPoundandthe GNP."(with William Breit)46 Southern Economic Journal904 (January. 1980). 

"Information ForAntitrustand BusinessActivity: Line-Of-Business Reporting," (withWilliam Breit)in 

Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy1. Muris(eds.) The Federal TradeCommission Since 1970(Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press. 198I). 

"Mr.Friedman's Strictures on Murderat the Margin." (withWilliam Breitunderthe nameof Marshall 

Jevons) 36 PublicChoice 195(1981). 

"TheBeer Industry." in WalterAdams(ed.) The Structure of America Industry 6th ed. (NewYork: 

Macmillan. 1982). 

"Defining Geographic MarketBoundaries." 26 Antitrust Bulletin 739 (Winter. 1981). 

TheAntitrust Casebook: Milestones in Economic Regulation co-edited with William Breit(Hinsdale. 

IL: Dryden Press. 1982). 

"Elzinga On Coase," in HenryW. Spiegeland Warren J. Samuels (eds.) Contemporary Economists in 

Perspective (Greenwich: JAI Press. 1984). 

Relevant Markets InAntitrust co-editedwithRobertW. Rogowsky. 14Journal of Reprints for Antitrust 

Lawand Economics (1984). 

"NewDevelopments on the Cartel Front," 29 Antitrust Bulletin 3 (Spring. 1984). Alsoappeared in slightly 

revisedformas "A ShortStoryon Cartels." Department ofJustice. Antitrust Division. Economic Policy 

Office. Discussion PaperEPO83-13,October. 1983. 

"Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning," (withWilliam Breit)28 Journal of Lawand 

Economics 405 (May. 1985). 

5 
PUBLIC
 

"PublicChoiceand Antitrust: A Comment," 4 Caw Journal 917 (Winter, 1985). 

The Fatal Equilibrium by MarshallJevons(pseudonym), co-authorwith WilliamBreit(Cambridge: MIT Press, 

1985). Paperbackversionpublishedby Ballantine, 1986. Japaneseversionpublishedby Nihon-KeizaiShinbun,1986. Frenchedition, Equilibrefatal(Paris: Economica, 2002); Koreanedition,(Seoul: Book and 

World,2001). 

The Moralityof the Market: Religious and EconomicImplications coeditedwithWalterBlock and 

H. GeoffreyBrennan(Vancouver: The Fraser Institute1985). 

"Comment" on Ezra J. Mishan's,"Religion,Cultureand Technology," in W. Block, H. GeoffreyBrennan, 

and Kenneth G. Elzinga(eds.) The Moralityof the Market; Religious and Economic Implications (Vancouver: 

The Fraser Institute, 1985). 

"Money-Wise, Pound Was Foolish,"The Wall Street Journal,December 31,1985, p, 8. Publishedin 

slightlyrevised formas "Ezra Pound:The Poet As An Economist," FallThoughtlines 17(1985), both Pound 

centennial pieces drawn from "Ezra Pound and the GNP,"mm. 

"The Beer Industry," in WalterAdams(ed.) The Structureof American Industry7th ed. (New York:
 

Macmillan, 1986).
 

AntitrustPenaltyReform; An EconomicSurveyco-authorwithWilliam Breit (Washingtonand London:
 

American EnterpriseInstitute, 1986).
 

"Technologyand Energy Use Before, Duringand AfterOPEC:The U.S. PortlandCementIndustry," (with
 

CharlesA. Capone) 8 The EnergyJournal 93 (1987).
 

"AntitrustPolicyand Trade Policy,"56 AntitrustLawJournal439 (1987). 

"TheCosts of the LegalSystemin PrivateAntitrustEnforcement," (with WilliamC. Wood)in Lawrence J.
 

White(ed.) PrivateAntitrustLitigation: NewEvidence. NewLearning(Cambridge: MIT Press, (988).
 

"PricingAchievements In LargeCompanies," in ArnoldA. Heggestad (ed.) Management and Public Policy
 

ofCorporations(Gainesville: Universityof Florida Press, 1988).
 

"Introduction" to Ronald H. Cease in Ideas.Their Origins.and TheirConsequences (Washington, D.C.: 

AmericanEnterprise Institute, 1988). 

"CollusivePredation:TheCase of Matsushitav, Zenith" in John E. Kwoka,Jr. and Lawrence 1. White 

(eds.) The Antitrust Revolution (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1989),(2nd ed. New York: Harper Collins, 

1994),(3rd. ed. [revised]Oxford UniversityPress, 1999). 

"Unmasking Monopoly: FourTypes OfEconomicEvidence," in RobertJ. Lamer and James W. Meehan,Jr. (eds.) 

Economics And AntitrustPolicy(Westport,CT: Greenwood Press,1989). 

The AntitrustCasebook: Milestones in EconomicRegulation (2nd ed.) co-editedwith William Breit 

(Hinsdale,IL: Dryden Press, 1989). 

"The NewInternational Economics Applied: JapaneseTelevisions and U.S.Consumers," in "AntitrustLaw 

and the Internationalization of Markets," symposium issue, David1. Gerber (ed.) 64 Chicago-Kent Law 

Review941 (1988). 

"Testingfor Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?"(with DavidE. Mills)34 AntitrustBulletin869 (Winter 1989). 

Cited by Justice Kennedyin Brooke Group v, Brown& Williamson, 509 U.S.209 (1993). 

"The Beer Industry," in WalterAdams(ed.) The Structureof American Industry8th ed. (NewYork: 

Macmillan, 1990). 

6 
PUBLIC
 

"Coinmentary: Remarksof ProfessorScherer,"29 WashbumLawJoumal264 (1990). 

"Walter Adamsand Chicago,"6 Reviewoflndustrial Organization 117(1991). 

Antitrust the Marketand the State: The Contributions of WalterAdamsco-edited withJames W. Brock(Armonk. 

N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,I99l). 

"The Eleven Principles of Economics," 58 Southern Economic Journal861 (1992). 

"Jeffersonand Schumpeter: Contrastsand Compatibilities," in Mark Perlmanand F.M. Scherer(eds.)
 

Entrepreneurship. Technological Innovation. and Economic Growth:Papers in the Schumpeterian Tradition
 

(Ann Arbor: Universityof MichiganPress, 1992).
 

Murder At The Marginby MarshallJevons(pseudonym), revisedand reissuedwitha Forewordby HerbertStein and 

an Afterwordby the authors(eo-authorwith William Breit). (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993). 

Spanishedition,Asesinatoen al Margen(Madrid:El Librode Bolsillo,1996); Koreanedition(Seoul:Book 

and World, 2001); French edition, MeurtreALa Marge(Paris: Economica, 2002). 

"Trumpingthe Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment StandardIn BrookeGroup."(with DavidE. Mills)62
 

AntitrustLawJournal 559 (1994).
 

"The Beer Industry," in Walter Adamsand James Brock(eds.) The Structureof American Industry9th ed. (New
 

York: Prentice-Hall, (994).
 

"The RelevantMarketfor Less-Than-TruckloadFreight: Deregulation's Consequences," 34 Transportation Journal
 

29 (1994).
 

"Monopolies" and "Profit" Entriesin D. 1. Atkinsonand D. H. Field(eds.) New Dictionaryof ChristianEthics and 

Pastoral Theology(Leicester:InterYarsity Press, 1995). 

A Deadly Indifference by MarshallJevons(pseudonym), co-authorwith WilliamBreit(New York: Carroll & Graf 

1995). 

"The SupremeCourt'sPredation Odyssey: From Fruit Piesto Cigarettes" (withDonaldJ. Boudreaux and David E. 

Mills)4 SupremeCourt Economic Review57 (1995). 

"An Assessment of Jacob Neusner'sThe Economics of the Mishnah," 7 CulturalDynamics 281 (1995) and "Jacob 

Neusnerand Post-Mishnah Economics" (a responseto Neusner's "DefiningScarceResources: Real Estateor 

Intellect"),7 CulturalDvnamics327 (1995) in "Religious andCulturalPerspectives on Economic Freedom: 

Christiansand the Jewish Tradition,"(Walter Blocked.) 7 CulturalDvnamics (Nov. 1995). 

The AntitrustCasebook: Milestonesin Economic Regulation (3rd 00.)co-editedwith WilliamBreit(Fort Worth: 

DrydenPress, 1996). 

"The Yeager Mystique: The Polymathas Teacher,ScholarandColleague," (with William Breit and ThomasD. 

Willett)22 EasternEconomicJoumal215 (1996). Slightlyrevisedas "The YeagerMystique: a profile of the 

scholar as teacherand colleague," in RogerKoppl (ed.) Monevand Markets: Essavsin Honorof LelandB. 

Yeager.(New York: Routledge,2006). 

"Innovation and Entryin the U.S. DisposableDiaperIndustry," (withDavid E. Mills)5 Industrial and Corporate 

Change 791 (1996). 

7 
PUBLIC
 

"Is Predation Rational? Is it Profitable? Comment to Adams, BrockandObst," (with DavidE. Mills) II Reviewof 

Industrial Organization 759(1996). 

"Speculation" Entryin R. E. Freeman and P. H. Werhane (eds.) Dictionary of BusinessEthics(Oxford: Blackwell 

Publishers) 1997. 

"Teaching Economics: Inspiration & Perspiration," in PhillipSaunders & William G. Waisted(eds.) Teaching 

Undergraduate Economics: A Handbook forInstructors (NewYork: McGraw Hill, 1997). 

"TheDistribution and PricingofPrescription Drugs," (withDavidE. Mills)4 International Journalof the 

Economics of Business 287 (1997). 

A DeadlyIndifference by Marshall Jevons(pseudonym, co-author with William Breit)(Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1998)Paperback version of 1995 bookby sametitle. 

"Morality and Antitrust Laws: A Replyto JeffreyTucker,"I TheJoumal of Marketsand Morality 83 (1998). 

"Switching Costsin the Wholesale Distribution of Cigarettes," (withDavidE. Mills)65 Southern EconomicJournal 

282 (1998). 

"Economics and Religion: An Essay,"in JamesM. Dean and A.M.C. Waterman (eds.) Religion and 

Economics:Normative SocialTheory, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999). 

"PriceWarsTriggered by Entry," (withDavidE. Mills)17 International Journalof Industrial Organization 179 

(1999). 

"WalterAdams: In Memoriam," 3 Southern Economic Journal 65 (1999). 

"HenryC. Simons," biographical entryin JohnA. Garraty andMarkC. Carnes(Eds.) American National Biography 

Vol. 20, NewYork;OxfordUniversity Press, 1999. 

"PCSoftware," (withDavidE. Mills)44 TheAntitrust Bulletin 739(1999). 

Personal statement ofteaehing philosophy in J. Jenry Morsman IV,William B. McAllister, MarvaA. Barnett(Eds.) 

Reflections on Teaching. Personal EssaYS on the Scholarship ofTeaching. (Charlottesville: TeachingResource 

Centerof the University of Virginia, 1999). 

"Industrial Organization and Human Action," 19 CatoJoumal233 (1999). 

"TheBeer Industry," in WalterAdams andJamesBrock(eds.) TheStructure of American Indushy 101ll ed. (Upper 

SaddleRiver, NewJersey: Prentice Hall,2000). 

"Independent ServiceOrganizations and Economic Efficiency," (withDavid. E. Mills)39 Economic Inquiry287 

( 2001). 

"U.S. v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady?" (withDavid. S. Evans andAlbertL. Nichols) 9 GeorgeMasonLaw 

Review 633 (2oot). 

"Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory," (withDavidE. Mills) 89 Georgetown LawJournal2475(2001). 

"Fifteen ThesesonClassroom Teaching," 68 Southern Economic Journal 249(2001). 

"TheEconomist as Detective," (withWilliam Breit)33 Journal of Economic Education 367 (2002). 

"Uniform Gasoline Price Regulation: Consequences forConsumer Welfare," (withMichael C. Keeley) 10 

International Journal of the Economics of Business (No.2), 157(July2003). 

8 
PUBLIC
 

"The BrandNamePrescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation (1999),'" (withDavidE. Mills)in JohnE. Kwoka, Jr. and
 

Lawrence J. White(eds.), The Antitrust Revolution (4th ed.),Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press(2004).
 

"Injunctive Reliefin Sherman Act Monopolization Cases,"(withRobertW.Crandall) 21 Journalof Research in Law 

andEconomics, (SpecialIssuein Antitrust Lawand Economics, John B. Kirkwood, ed.) 277 (2004). 

"TheBeer Industry," in WalterAdamsand JamesBrock(eds.)The Structure ofAmerican Industry II Ib ed. (Upper 

SaddleRiver, NewJersey:PrenticeHan, 2005). 

"The Supreme Courtand Beer Mergers: FromPabst/Blatz to the DOJ-FTC MergerGuidelines," (wI Anthony W.
 

Swisher) 26 Review ofIndustrial Organization 245 (2005).
 

"PriceCompetition and SlottingAllowances," (wI PeterBronsteen and DavidE. Mills)in 50 Antitrust Bulletin267 

(Summer, 2005). 

"WalterAdams," The Biographical Dictionary ofAmerican Economists, RossB. Emmett (GeneralEditor)London: 

Thoennes Continuum. 2006. 

"TheEconomics of ResalePriceMaintenance," (wI DavidE. Mills)in Wayne D. Collins(ed.), Issuesin
 

Competition Lawand Policy(American Bar Association, Antitrust Section), forthcoming.
 

"TheBeer Industry," in WalterAdamsand JamesBrock(eds.), The Structure of American Industry (l21bed.), 

forthcoming. 

"PredatoryPricingin the AirlineIndustry: SpiritAirlines v. Northwest Airlines,"(2005)(wI DavidE. Mills)in John 

E.Kwoka and Lawrence J. White(eds.), The Antitrust Revolution (Sib ed.), forthcoming. 

"The Belatedbut Welcome DemiseofDr. Miles: Whythe Court's Decision on Vertical 'Price-Fixing' is Good Law, 

Good Economics, and Good for Consumers," (wI TylerBaker)in The International Bar Association Journal 

forthcoming. 

Comment on Lawrence J. White,"The Roleof Economics in Antitrust Analysis," in John Siegfried (ed.), Better 

Livingthrough Economics. HarvardUniversity Press,forthcoming. 

References: William Breit 

E. M. Stevens Distinguished Professorof Economics 

TrinityUniversity 

715 Stadium Drive 

SanAntonio, Texas78212 

RonaldH. Coase 

CliftonR. MusserProfessor of Lawand Economics, Emeritus 

University of Chicago LawSchool 

III I E. 60th Street 

Chicago,lllinois60637 

John D. Mason 

Professorof Economics 

GordonCollege 

Wenham, Massachusetts 01984 

9 
PUBLIC
 

DavidE. MiI1s 

Professorof Economics 

University of Virginia 

Charlottesville. VA 22903 

lohn 1.Siegfried 

Professor of Economics 

Vanderbilt University 

Nashville, Tennessee 37235 

LelandB. Yeager 

Ludwig von MisesProfessor of Economics, Emeritus 

Auburn University 

Auburn, Alabama 36849 

10