*

Honorable Levin H. Campbell, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for

the First Circuit, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 94-2766.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ronald Eugene MATHIS a.k.a. Romeo, a.k.a. Rome a.k.a. Homey,

Defendant-Appellant.

Oct. 10, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida. (No. 91-301-CR-T-17), Elizabeth A.

Kovachevich, Chief Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and RONEY and CAMPBELL*

, Senior

Circuit Judges.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge:

Defendant Ronald E. Mathis (a/k/a "Romeo") was convicted of

multiple drug counts and received a life sentence without parole.

On appeal, he alleges that the government violated his right to a

speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., that it

unconstitutionally exercised its peremptory challenges, and that

the district court erroneously admitted evidence from

unconstitutional searches.

I.

On October 23, 1991, a 47-count indictment was returned

against Mathis and eleven codefendants for their roles in a crack

cocaine distribution organization that Mathis was alleged to have

led in St. Petersburg, Florida in 1990 and 1991. Mathis was

charged with multiple offenses including racketeering (both for
 1

In a multiple defendant case, the speedy trial clock begins

to run when the last codefendant is indicted or arraigned. 

United States v. Vasser, 916 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir.1990)

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 907, 111

S.Ct. 1688, 114 L.Ed.2d 82 (1991). The record shows that the

last of Mathis's codefendants were scheduled to be arraigned on

November 22, 1991, but on that day the arraignment was continued

to November 27. Because the record does not contain an

explanation, and the difference in days is not material to our

holding, we need not decide which date triggered the speedy trial

clock. 

dealing in drugs and participating in acts of violence), engaging

in a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiring to distribute and

distributing crack cocaine, and using a telephone to commit a

crime. A superseding indictment, returned on April 15, 1992, added

a murder count. In November 1992 Mathis's trial was severed from

that of his codefendants. His trial began in February 1994.

Mathis was convicted of racketeering, engaging in a continuing

criminal enterprise, conspiracy, possession of cocaine with intent

to distribute, and distribution of cocaine. He received a life

sentence without parole. This appeal followed.

II. Speedy Trial Act

 Mathis contests the district court's rejection of his motion,

filed on March 24, 1992, to dismiss the indictment for violation of

the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. Mathis argues that

much of the period from late November 1991, when the last

codefendant was arraigned, 1

 to March 24, 1992, the date Mathis

filed his speedy trial motion, counts as nonexcludable delay. As

his motion was never renewed, there is no question of counting as

delay any subsequent periods. See United States v. Tinson, 23 F.3d

1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d

1227, 1230 (9th Cir.1989); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) ("[t]he
defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion"

for dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds).

 A defendant must be brought to trial within seventy days of

his indictment or initial appearance, whichever occurs later. 18

U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). However, certain delays resulting from

pretrial motions and other contingencies that arise in the course

of a criminal proceeding are excludable under the Act. Id. §

3161(h) & (h)(1)(F). Of importance here is the Act's

ends-of-justice exclusion for delay "resulting from a continuance

granted by a judge on his own motion or at the request of the

defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the

Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of

his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial." Id. § 3161(h)(8)(A). A district court's granting

of an ends-of-justice continuance is reviewable for an abuse of

discretion. E.g., United States v. Vasser, 916 F.2d 624, 627 (11th

Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 907, 111 S.Ct. 1688, 114 L.Ed.2d

82 (1991).

 Mathis had requested a continuance of the trial on November

25, 1991, and the trial was continued until January 29, 1992,

making that period excludable from the seventy-day limit under the

Act. See United States v. Henry, 698 F.2d 1172, 1173-1174 (11th

Cir.1983). At issue here is the district court's further

postponement of the trial on January 29, 1992. Mathis calls this

postponement "indefinite" and says it was granted at the

government's request. He denies that it amounted to an excludable
ends-of-justice continuance. Mathis accuses the government of

seeking delay in bad faith. According to him, the government's

true motive is reflected in its request for time to obtain a

superseding indictment that only differed from the original by

adding a murder count against him that had already been charged as

a predicate act under the racketeering count, and by requesting the

death penalty. These additions were eventually abandoned just

before the beginning of jury selection in February 1994. By then,

several former codefendants had agreed to testify against Mathis.

Mathis says that the district court should have inquired into or

held a hearing on why the government had not charged him earlier

with the murder count and should have made findings, instead of

simply stating, as it did, that the "interests of justice" covered

its decision to postpone trial.

 The transcript of the January 29th conference reveals that

the government was not the primary force behind the continuance.

It made no specific request for one. Rather, the court granted a

continuance sua sponte—as the Act permits, see 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(8)(A). It also seems clear that neither side was ready for

trial then, or so the court could reasonably surmise. At the

January 29th conference, the district judge asked the government

about the status of the case and what she could anticipate, to

which the government responded that it was preparing a superseding

indictment and awaiting permission from the Department of Justice

to seek the death penalty. Mathis then complained of the

government's failure to deliver promised discovery materials to the

defense. The district court told the government to provide the
discovery materials by February 18 and to report back on the status

of the superseding indictment and death penalty within a few weeks

as well, since those matters could require additional counsel and

preparation time for Mathis. With the attorneys' assistance, the

court then assessed the trial time that would be needed and tried

to establish a trial date when everyone, including the court, would

be available. The judge settled on January 1993 and advised

counsel that the date would be moved up if it became possible to do

so. The court added that another status conference would be held

in the "not-too-distant future," after the superseding indictment

was issued. In response to defendant's objection to any

continuance of trial, the court stated that "[t]he interest of

justice under 3161 certainly does protect us[.]"

The last quoted remark reflects the court's intention, on its

own motion, to continue the case under authority of section

3161(h)(8)(A). The court, it is true, did not adhere to the Act's

requirement to "set[ ] forth, in the record of the case, either

orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of

justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the

best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial."

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The reasons, however, are evident from

the record, and we have held that a district court "need not

enunciate its findings when it grants the continuance so long as

there is sufficient evidence in the record indicating that it

considered the factors identified in the statute when it granted

the continuance." Vasser, 916 F.2d at 627. The factors the

statute calls upon the court to consider include:
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the

number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the

existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is

unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial

proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits

established by this section.

(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case

which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to

fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable

time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant

or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel

for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the

reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking

into account the exercise of due diligence.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B). "[G]eneral congestion of the court's

calendar" is not a factor that operates to exclude delay resulting

from such a continuance. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(C).

The transcript of the January 29th conference indicates that

the court sufficiently took into account the relevant factors

identified in section 3161(h)(8)(B), supra. See United States v.

McKay, 30 F.3d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S.

----, 116 S.Ct. 323, 133 L.Ed.2d 224 (1995); see also United

States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.1996) ("Courts need

not necessarily expressly conduct a balancing or use particular

language" if it is " "clear from the record that the trial court

struck the proper balance when it granted the continuance.' ")

(citations omitted), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 25, 1996)

(No. 95-9420). The court expressed concern with scheduling

adequate preparation and trial time for this complex narcotics case

involving multiple defendants. It set February 18 as the date for

the handing over of discovery materials to defense counsel so that

counsel would have time to review them with his client. Cf. United

States v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574, 1578 (N.D.Ga.1986) (need for a
continuance was "patently obvious" in light of lengthy indictment

"naming 12 defendants in 36 counts alleging numerous conspiracies

to import massive quantities of narcotics, and to launder large

sums of money, of the 225 pretrial motions filed, and of the scope

of discovery required"), aff'd, 856 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.1988),

cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3222, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (1989).

The court also recognized the prosecutor's wish for reasonable time

to prepare a superseding indictment and to obtain approval to seek

the death penalty; it specifically asked how much time would be

needed, and accepted the prosecutor's response of two to three

weeks. Although the court indicated concern with its own schedule

as well, it did so in the context of inquiring about other

attorneys' upcoming commitments, including the prosecutor's

commitment to trying cases in this same court connected to this

drug conspiracy (before the cases were consolidated and Mathis's

was severed). See Henry, 698 F.2d at 1174 ("Appropriate

consideration must always be given to a multiplicity of factors,

i.e. adequate time for defense counsel to prepare, number of

defendants, pending motions, anticipated trial time, possible

severances, conflicts in schedules of judges and trial counsel,

etc.").

Hence, while the district court did not summarize its reasons,

the record indicates that the court took into account the material

statutory factors when granting the continuance. Nor is there

doubt that a continuance of limited duration rather than a mere

indefinite delay was intended. Trial dates were discussed and a

January 1993 date assigned. The court extended the discovery
deadline to a specific date and informed the parties and counsel

that another status conference would be held following the

superseding indictment. See Spring, 80 F.3d at 1457 ("The court

did not specifically state that it was granting a continuance, yet

that was indisputably the effect of its order vacating the

scheduled trial date, pending appearance of new counsel[.]"). But

cf. United States v. Crawford, 982 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir.1993).

The court sought and received the government's estimate as to when

it would know about the superseding indictment and death penalty.

The superseding indictment was handed down on April 15; the

defendants were arraigned on April 22; and the court held a

further conference on April 24. In these circumstances, we find a

valid ends-of-justice continuance, excludable under the Act,

running through the handing down of the superseding indictment,

which occurred in mid-April. See Spring, 80 F.3d at 1458

(open-ended continuance was warranted in light of complexity of the

case, need for adequate preparation time, and fact that court set

a new trial date).

Defendant's argument that, had the court made further inquiry,

it would have discovered that the government was acting in bad

faith, is speculative at best. The government freely admitted at

the January 29th conference that the original racketeering count

included, as a predicate act, the murder the government wanted now

to charge separately. Its dropping of the murder count, along with

others, two years later could be based on a host of considerations

not known on January 29, 1992.

As the court's actions on January 29 amounted to the granting
of a valid ends-of-justice continuance, there was no speedy trial

violation. Mathis concedes that if a valid continuance were

granted on January 29, there would be no violation of the Act. We

add that quite apart from the ends-of-justice continuance, a Speedy

Trial Act violation was unlikely because of the pendency during the

same period of pretrial motions and requests from Mathis and his

codefendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7); Vasser, 916 F.2d at 626

("A motion relating to one defendant tolls the speedy trial clock

for all co-defendants.") (citations omitted).

III. Peremptory Challenges

Mathis, who is African-American, argues that the prosecutor

unconstitutionally used peremptory strikes to exclude an AfricanAmerican man and a Hispanic woman from the panel of potential

jurors. We find no constitutional violation.

The prosecutor used four peremptory challenges, one to strike

one of two African-American members on the panel and one to strike

the only Hispanic member. Assuming without deciding that defendant

presented a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, see

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722-23, 90

L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1245

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 993, 112 S.Ct. 612, 613, 116

L.Ed.2d 635 (1991) and 502 U.S. 1119, 112 S.Ct. 1239, 117 L.Ed.2d

472 and 503 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1279, 117 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992), we

hold that the district court did not err in accepting the

government's race-neutral explanations and concluding that

defendant had not carried his burden of proving purposeful

discrimination. Only brief comments are necessary in light of
well-established precedent.

 The record shows that an African-American panel member, Mr.

Johnson, was challenged because he worked at a funeral home across

from Mathis's car wash (referred to in the indictment as

purportedly Mathis's legitimate place of business), had his

personal car washed there regularly and other business cars washed

there on occasion, and was familiar with people who worked there

and might be called as witnesses. Mr. Anderson did not know Mathis

personally, but knew of him as "Romeo" and also lived fairly close

to the car wash. The district judge conducted her own inquiry of

Mr. Anderson and accepted the government's concern about possible

associational links to the defendant. Under these circumstances,

there was no clear error in granting the peremptory challenge. See

Williams, 936 F.2d at 1247.

 The record shows that Ms. Perera, who is Hispanic, was

removed because a close family member of hers had had a cocaine

conviction. There was no clear error in allowing the strike in

this case. See United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1552 (11th

Cir.1991) ("familial association with someone convicted on drug

charges [is] clearly a weighty and racially neutral reason"). Even

if we were to consider defendant's new argument on appeal—that

purposeful discrimination was shown by the government's striking of

the Hispanic panel member without also striking a white panel

member whose son had had a criminal conviction—our decision would

not change. The latter's conviction did not involve controlled

substances, making his case insufficiently similar to justify an

inference of purposeful discrimination by the government. See
 2

The record indicates that court approval had been obtained

to operate pin registers. 

Williams, 936 F.2d at 1246.

Defendant further insists that purposeful discrimination was

shown by the government's unsuccessful attempt to change venue from

Tampa to Fort Myers (where apparently fewer racial minorities are

registered voters). We find no merit in this contention.

IV. Suppression of Evidence

(a) Intercepted Cordless Telephone Conversations

Mathis challenges the district court's refusal to suppress

evidence from cordless telephone interceptions he believes were

unlawful. Mathis filed a pretrial motion to suppress this and

other evidence, which the magistrate judge denied.

The government introduced at trial numerous tapes of

conversations made on cordless and cellular telephones from

Mathis's residence. St. Petersburg Police Department detectives

intercepted these communications from June through October 1991,

without Mathis's consent and without prior judicial approval. 2

Following a denial of Mathis's pretrial motion to suppress the

recordings, the district court, on the first day of trial, allowed

the government to begin admitting them over Mathis's objection.

His objections at this time were based on the attorney-client

privilege (with respect to one conversation) and Florida

constitutional law governing the nonconsensual interception of

cordless telephone communications. In rejecting the latter ground,

the court said, "[t]here's no reasonable expectation of privacy on

a cordless phone." It allowed Mathis's request for a standing
 3

The government contends that Mathis waived this issue,

having conceded at the suppression hearing the absence of a legal

basis for requiring a warrant to intercept cordless telephone

communications (and pressed only the matter of cellular phone

communications). Thereafter, he did not supplement the record

with factual support as the magistrate judge had allowed, or

object to the magistrate's report and recommendation on any

wiretap-related ground. At trial, Mathis's oral motion asserted

the protection of the attorney-client privilege (for one

communication) and also mentioned, with respect to cordless

telephones, the broad right of privacy under the Florida

Constitution recognized just a few weeks earlier by a state

appellate court.

Because the district court chose to consider and to

resolve on the merits Mathis's trial motion claiming a

reasonable expectation of privacy in cordless telephone

conversations, we review the substance of that ruling. See

United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1548 (11th Cir.)

(citing United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 440-441 (5th

Cir. Unit B 1981) and United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d

976, 978 n. 2 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849, 103

S.Ct. 109, 74 L.Ed.2d 97 (1982)), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984); see also United

States v. Vasquez, 858 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir.1988), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 847, 102 L.Ed.2d 978 and

489 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 1161, 103 L.Ed.2d 220 (1989); 3

Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: 

Criminal 2d § 673, at 769 & n. 57 (1982) (citing cases for

the proposition that "if the district court entertains the

belated motion and decides it on the merits, it cannot be

argued on appeal that it had been waived[ ]"). 

 4

See, e.g., Askin v. McNulty, 47 F.3d 100, 103 (4th Cir.),

(before Congressional amendments in 1994, cordless telephone

communications were "neither a wire nor electronic communication"

under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

of 1986, and "[v]irtually every court to have faced the question

of whether cordless phone conversations were oral communications

under [18 U.S.C.] § 2510(2) answered in the negative[ ]")

(emphasis added) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----

, 116 S.Ct. 382, 133 L.Ed.2d 305 (1995). 

objection to the admissibility of all such communications.3

We agree with the district court to the extent that, at the

time Mathis's conversations were intercepted, federal statutory law

recognized no reasonable expectation of privacy on a cordless

telephone.4 Mathis, in fact, has never argued that federal
statutory or constitutional law at the time these recordings were

made required officers to obtain prior judicial approval to

intercept cordless telephone communications. He has instead

focused on the right of privacy in the Florida Constitution, which

he says bars the interception, without consent or prior judicial

approval, of cordless telephone communications made from his

residence. See Mozo v. State, 632 So.2d 623, 632-634

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (holding that "the random interception of a

cordless phone communication, without sufficient cause or

suspicion, constitutes an unreasonable interception of a private

communication in violation of article I, section 12," and that

"under article I, section 23, a person's private conversations over

a cordless telephone are presumptively protected from government

interception" though a showing of a compelling state interest may

overcome the presumption), aff'd on state statutory grounds, State

v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Fla.1995).

 Assuming without deciding that Mathis's interpretation of

Florida law is correct, the fact remains, " "that federal law

governs the admissibility of tape recordings in federal criminal

cases,' and complaints that the evidence was obtained in violation

of state law are of no effect." United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d

1376, 1380 (11th Cir.1982) (rejecting that warrantless tape

recordings should have been suppressed under Florida constitutional

law because state and local officials were involved in the

investigation) (quoting United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251,

253 (5th Cir.1978)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 735, 74

L.Ed.2d 958 (1983); accord United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688,
695 (2d Cir.1996). Defendant's citation to United States v.

Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.

1017, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 3477, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 and 472 U.S. 1021, 105

S.Ct. 3488, 87 L.Ed.2d 622 (1985), is inapposite, as that case held

that state and federal law requirements "govern a federal district

court's determination of the validity of wiretap warrants obtained

by state law enforcement officers in state courts." Id. at 1347.

That ruling—based on a provision of the federal wiretap statute, 18

U.S.C. § 2516, which allows state courts to authorize the

interception of wire or oral communications in conformity with 18

U.S.C. § 2518 and applicable state law—is entirely consistent with

the general rule that federal law determines the admissibility in

federal criminal cases of communications intercepted by a state or

local officer. See Nelligan, 573 F.2d at 253-254.

We reject, therefore, Mathis's claim of error in the district

court's admission of the cordless telephone recordings.

(b) Searches and Seizures

In his appellate brief, Mathis asserts error in the district

court's admission of evidence alleged to be the product of searches

of his residence on March 22, 1990, and November 1, 1991. Mathis's

suppression motion raising these two matters was the subject of a

pretrial hearing before the magistrate judge, who denied the

motion. After careful consideration of the briefs and record, the

magistrate judge's memorandum, and the relevant law, we find no

merit in either claim of error, and see no need to expound further

as to them.

Mathis raises a closer claim regarding evidence uncovered by
 5

Two warrantless searches of the garage were conducted that

day, with only the second revealing information that aided the

officers' investigation and enabled them to obtain a search

warrant for the garage, where they subsequently found a safe

hidden by Mathis containing thousands of dollars. 

police on November 1, 1991, in a warrantless search of a detached

garage on the premises where Mathis's mother resided, next door to

him.5

 The magistrate judge determined that Mathis's mother had

consented to this search and that she had the authority validly to

do so. In making this determination, the magistrate judge credited

the police officers' factual version of what had occurred,

including that Mathis's mother was entirely cooperative and

consented to the officers' searching of her house and the garage,

and had told an officer whom she knew personally that the garage

was hers. These and other facts found by the magistrate judge

amply support, in our view, an objectively reasonable belief by the

searching officers that Mathis's mother had authority to consent to

a search of the garage. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,

188, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990); United States

v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993 n. 7, 39

L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); cf. United States v. Fernandez, 58 F.3d 593,

598 (11th Cir.1995) (where a defendant told police that a trailer

belonged to his codefendant, it was reasonable for officers to

believe that the codefendant had authority to consent to a search);

United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866-867 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 504 U.S. 989, 112 S.Ct. 2976, 119 L.Ed.2d 595 (1992). We

reject Mathis's contention that the district court should have

suppressed the evidence found in the garage.

Mathis's conviction is affirmed.