United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-1615

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Andrew Scott Scanlan

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

 ____________

 Submitted: February 13, 2023

Filed: April 17, 2023

[Published]

____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, STRAS and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Andrew Scott Scanlan, age 34, was sentenced to 840 months of incarceration

following a guilty plea to two counts of producing child pornography (360 months

each) and one count of committing an offense while a registered sex offender

(mandatory minimum of 120 months). Scanlan’s pornography production offense
involved the sexual abuse of his ten-year-old nephew and four-year-old niece. In

addition to the incarceration, the district court1 also imposed ten years of supervised

release. As a special condition of the supervised release, the district court required

that Scanlan not contact the victims or the victims’ family without permission from

his probation officer. Scanlan argues that the district court made three reversible

errors during sentencing. Specifically, he asserts that (1) his lengthy sentence is

substantively unreasonable; (2) the special condition of supervised release is not

narrowly tailored and is not reasonably related to the goals of sentencing; and (3) the

district court failed to make an individualized inquiry when crafting the special

condition of supervised release. We affirm.

I. Background

The district court orally justified its sentence as follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section

3553, in determining the sentence that is appropriate, the Court needs to

consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant. I have considered all of the factors

under Section 3553(a), although it will not be necessary to address all

of them in the process of explaining the sentence here today.

Mr. Scanlan, I understand you’ve got a rough background, and I

understand you’ve been through a lot yourself, but you are a sexual

predator. You’re a dangerous guy, and you’re a dangerous guy to

vulnerable people.

The Court begins and almost ends with the seriousness of the

offense. The offense involving the children that came from online

sources is serious enough because it continues to do damage to those

children, but what you did under the circumstances of this case so

1The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

-2-
fundamentally violated the trust of these good people and this child,

these children, that the seriousness of the offense is overwhelming. 

Anything I do today is going to apply to the deterrence of criminal

conduct by others. I need to be concerned about protecting the public

from further crimes that you might commit, and it’s obvious in this

record that there is a huge danger that you will commit further crimes,

very serious crimes. 

Accordingly, based upon the Court’s review of the criteria set

forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553, and the unique

circumstances of this case, it is the judgment of the Court that the

defendant, Andrew Scott Scanlan, is hereby sentenced to the custody of

the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 840 months, consisting of 360

months on each of Counts 2 and 3 consecutive and 120 months

consecutive on Count 6.

R. Doc. 66, at 15:3–16:8. The district court also imposed a ten-year term of

supervised release, projected to begin in 2080.

II. Discussion

Because we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in either the

length of the sentence or in imposing the challenged special condition of supervised

release, we affirm.

A. Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence

Scanlan first argues his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively

unreasonable. We review a district court’s sentencing decision for substantive

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Stoner, 795

F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2015). “An abuse of discretion is (1) failing to consider a

relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) giving significant

weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considering only the appropriate

factors but in weighing them, committing a clear error of judgment.” Id. Sentences

-3-
within the applicable Guidelines range may be presumed reasonable upon appellate

review. United States v. Williams, 913 F.3d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

“It is the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within,

above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.”

United States v. Wisecarver, 911 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The district court recounted the relevant factors and explained the

weight it placed on each. Scanlan’s case indeed involves a very high sentence; but

given the offense conduct, the harm to the victims, and the need to protect the public

outlined by the district court, it is not “the unusual case” warranting reversal. See id.

The district court considered all the applicable § 3553(a) factors and committed no

clear error of judgment in weighing them. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s withinGuidelines-range sentence.

B. Special Condition of Supervised Release

Scanlan next argues that the special condition of supervised release (1) is

insufficiently narrowly tailored; (2) is unrelated to the familiar goals of sentencing;

and (3) was imposed without an individualized inquiry. We review the imposition of

special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Jennings, 930 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2019). “District courts have wide discretion

in imposing conditions of supervised release, so long as the conditions meet the

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” United States v. Wroblewski, 715 F.3d 701,

702 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

(requiring that conditions “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary”). “When crafting a special condition of supervised release, the

district court must make an individualized inquiry into the facts and circumstances

underlying a case and make sufficient findings on the record so as to ensure that the

special condition satisfies the statutory requirements.” United States v. Walters, 643

F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

-4-
The special condition Scanlan challenges reads, “You must not contact the

victim(s), nor the victim’s family without prior permission from the U.S. Probation

Officer.” R. Doc. 53, at 5. Scanlan argues that, as written, the special condition is not

narrowly tailored because it could be read to prevent him from contacting members

of his own family who are only distantly related to the victims. Because Scanlan’s

victims are his niece and nephew, there is familial overlap. Scanlan asks that the

condition be amended to say “immediate” family. The government argues that

“immediate” family is the most natural reading of the condition and concedes that,

were the condition read and applied in a manner to include distant relatives of his

victims, it would be insufficiently narrowly tailored. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

Scanlan’s proposed reading of the release condition is not reasonable. The

obvious intent of the condition is to prevent Scanlan from having unpermitted contact

with both his victims and those so intimately connected to them that Scanlan

indirectly victimized them. This includes the parents and siblings now shouldering

not only the weight of ameliorating the physical and psychological trauma inflicted

by Scanlan’s abhorrent crimes on his victims but also their own psychological trauma.

Given the facts of the case and those harmed by his conduct, the victims’ “close”

family—more than only immediate family, but less than distant shared relations—is

the only reasonable meaning. Should the probation officer’s implementation of that

reading prove problematic when Scanlan’s incarceration ends, the court supervising

the case can address it at that time. If Scanlan then faces a “greater deprivation of

liberty than is reasonably necessary,” due to restrictions on family members he wishes

to visit, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), he may renew his objection to the appropriate court at

that time.

Scanlan further argues that the condition is unrelated to the familiar goals of

sentencing. Not so. Preventing victims from experiencing repeated abuse or further

psychological harm is reasonably related to the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(1) (requiring special conditions be reasonably related to certain sentencing

-5-
factors, such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1), and “the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)); see also United States v. Forde, 664 F.3d

1219, 1223–24 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting the Supreme Court’s emphasis on a sentencing

court’s broad discretion in crafting special conditions of supervised release and the

appropriateness of using “judicial common sense” when doing so); United States v.

Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850, 853–54 (8th Cir. 2013) (upholding a special condition of

supervised release requiring probation officer’s permission before the defendant

could contact his own children following conviction for possession of child

pornography, even though the defendant had no history of sexually abusing minors).

The condition protects Scanlan’s victims and those closest to them from being

revictimized upon his eventual release—a goal reasonably related to the appropriate

sentencing factors.

C. Individualized Inquiry

Finally, Scanlan argues that the district court failed to make an individualized

inquiry into his case prior to imposing the special condition. To the contrary, as

quoted above, the district court highlighted the hideousness and destructiveness of

Scanlan’s crimes. The district court concluded that Scanlan “fundamentally violated

the trust of these good people and this child, these children.” R. Doc. 66, at 15:19–20.

The court’s statement reflects its individualized inquiry into Scanlan’s case and made

a sufficient record of the court’s thorough consideration of the circumstances.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s imposition of the

special condition of supervised release as appropriately within its discretion and its

imposition of an 840-month sentence as substantively reasonable.

______________________________

-6-