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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

October 14, 2014 

v No. 316176 

Oakland Circuit Court 

DAVID ANDREW MATHER, LC No. 2012-242743-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated stalking, MCL 

750.411i, and his sentence of 43 months to 10 years in prison. We affirm, but remand for the 

ministerial task of correcting defendant’s current presentence investigation report (PSIR). 

 Defendant and JE1

 began a dating relationship in July 2011, but that changed in 

September 2011 when the relationship became violent. Defendant was incarcerated twice, 

resulting in a no-contact order between defendant and JE. Defendant was released from jail on 

June 25, 2012. On June 29, 2012, he began text messaging JE. He sent numerous text messages, 

some threatening and some that included pictures of him naked. Defendant was arrested on July 

25, 2012, and subsequently found guilty of aggravated stalking. 

 On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction 

of aggravated stalking. We disagree. 

 This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v 

Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). The evidence is reviewed in a light 

most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a trier of fact could find that the essential 

elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 

139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012). 

 

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 To protect the victim’s privacy, we refer to her as “JE.” 
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 To prove aggravated stalking, the prosecution must establish that stalking occurred under 

an aggravating circumstance. MCL 750.411i(2). Defendant does not contest that he contacted 

JE in violation of a no-contact order, which was an aggravating circumstance. MCL 

750.411i(2)(a). Instead, he denies that stalking was established. Stalking is defined as “a willful 

course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would 

cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or 

molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, 

threatened, harassed, or molested.” MCL 750.411i(1)(e). “Harassment” includes “continuing 

unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress and 

that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” MCL 750.411i(1)(d). Defendant 

argues that the prosecution failed to establish unconsented contact or that JE actually felt 

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. 

 “‘Unconsented contact’ means any contact with another individual that is initiated or 

continued without that individual’s consent or in disregard of that individual’s expressed desire 

that the contact be avoided or discontinued.” MCL 750.411i(1)(f). Defendant presented 

evidence that he had consensual contact with JE, in violation of the no-contact order, until 

around May 1, 2012. However, defendant was charged with unconsented contact between June 

29, 2012, and July 25, 2012. JE testified that at a May 2012 hearing to rescind the no-contact 

order, at which defendant was present, the prosecutor read her statement aloud in court that she 

did not want contact with defendant. There was no evidence that she consented to contact after 

that. Defendant was incarcerated until June 25, 2012, and he began texting JE on June 29, 2012. 

JE testified that she did not respond to these texts and did not wish to receive them. Viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a trier of fact could find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the text messages constituted unconsented contact. 

 The prosecution also established that JE actually felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, 

threatened, harassed, or molested by the text messages. JE testified that the naked photographs 

defendant sent made her feel very uncomfortable. She did not want defendant to know where 

she was living, and receiving text messages from him made her feel scared that defendant was 

going to find her. She testified that the messages were overwhelming and made her 

uncomfortable, and that she sought counseling. Viewing that testimony in a light most favorable 

to the prosecution, a trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that JE felt terrorized, 

frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. 

 Defendant also argues that JE’s testimony was not credible because of discrepancies in 

her testimony and because her testimony was impeached. However, a witness’s credibility is a 

matter of weight and not sufficiency; credibility determinations are a matter for the jury and not 

for this Court. People v Scotts, 80 Mich App 1, 9; 263 NW2d 272 (1977). We will not disturb 

the jury’s determination that JE’s testimony was credible. 

 Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because evidence was admitted in 

violation of MRE 404(b), and his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that evidence; 

thus, his motion for a new trial should have been granted. We disagree. 

 A trial court’s decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). Our review of unpreserved claims 
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of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Davis, 

250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). “In order to obtain a new trial, a defendant must 

show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) 

but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would 

have been different.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). 

 Defendant argues that JE impermissibly testified that her relationship with defendant 

eventually changed when they “had some problems that kind of escalated and got violent.” And 

Deputy Freiberg impermissibly testified that defendant had a prior “domestic case” involving JE. 

Defendant argues that such testimony was inadmissible under MRE 404(b)(1), which provides: 

 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, 

or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the 

conduct at issue in the case. 

 The prosecution argues that the statements were admissible as res gestae evidence to 

show JE’s fear of defendant and that her fear was reasonable in light of their violent history. We 

agree. Res gestae evidence is properly admitted to provide background to jurors and allow them 

to examine the full transaction; evidence of other crimes is admissible when it explains the 

circumstances of the charged offense. People v Malone, 287 Mich App 648, 662; 792 NW2d 7 

(2010). Here, as discussed above, to prove the crime of aggravated stalking the prosecutor had 

to show that a reasonable person would feel frightened, threatened, harassed or molested by 

defendant’s behavior. The evidence was admitted to show that JE’s fear of defendant was 

reasonable and that his threats against her were credible. And the testimony was not so extensive 

or detailed as to be overly prejudicial. Therefore, the evidence was properly admitted. 

Accordingly, defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to JE’s and 

Deputy Freiberg’s testimony is without merit. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39-40; 755 

NW2d 212 (2008). 

 Further, we reject defendant’s argument that the picture of his penis should have been 

excluded under MRE 404(b). The photograph was not “other acts evidence.” The texting of the 

photograph was part of the charged crime. The evidence was also not impermissible under MRE 

403, which provides that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” The photograph was probative of whether 

JE reasonably felt threatened or intimidated by the communication. All probative evidence is 

prejudicial and defendant has failed to establish that its probative value was substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 

 Next, defendant argues that he should be resentenced. Defendant did not object at 

sentencing to the assessment of 10 points for OV 10, but raised the issue in a motion for 

resentencing. A defendant does not waive his right to appellate review of scoring errors where 

he challenged the errors in a motion for resentencing. MCL 769.34(10); People v Hershey, 303 

Mich App 330, 354; 844 NW2d 127 (2013). “Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit 
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court’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). 

“Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, 

i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an 

appellate court reviews de novo.” Id. 

 OV 10 concerns the “exploitation of a vulnerable victim.” MCL 777.40(1). Defendant 

was assessed 10 points for OV 10, which is appropriate where “[t]he offender exploited a 

victim’s physical disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or 

the offender abused his or her authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b). Because there was no 

evidence of physical or mental disability, youth or agedness, or authority status, the assessment 

of 10 points must have been based upon a domestic relationship. “Domestic relationship” is not 

defined by MCL 777.40. However, this Court has found that, under OV 10, there must be a 

“familial” or “cohabiting” relationship to “qualify as a domestic relationship.” People v 

Jamison, 292 Mich App 440, 446-447; 807 NW2d 427 (2011). MCL 777.40(3)(b) provides that 

the word “exploit” as used in OV10 “means to manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical 

purposes.” 

 There was testimony that defendant and JE lived together for two weeks in the summer of 

2011, but defendant maintained his own apartment. There was no evidence that defendant was 

able to manipulate JE because of their former brief cohabitation. Defendant did not manipulate 

JE; he sent text messages and made telephone calls to which she did not respond. Because 

defendant and JE lived together for such a brief time period and there was no evidence of 

manipulation, the trial court clearly erred in finding that OV 10 was established by a 

preponderance of the evidence. However, the error was harmless where the scoring of OV 10 at 

zero points would not have changed the guidelines range, as defense counsel acknowledged at 

the hearing on defendant’s motion for resentencing. See People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50, 52; 

658 NW2d 154 (2003) (holding that even if error occurred in assessing offense variable points, 

the Court need not address the issue on appeal where correcting the error would not change the 

defendant’s sentence). 

 Defendant also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court considered 

the PSIR from his prior domestic violence conviction, which was the basis of the no-contact 

order between defendant and JE. The prior PSIR was attached to the PSIR in this matter. 

Defendant argued in his motion for resentencing, and argues on appeal, that the information in 

the prior PSIR was inaccurate. Defendant pleaded no contest to the earlier charges. 

 A trial court’s ruling on claimed inaccuracies in a PSIR is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 648; 658 NW2d 504 (2003). Factual findings 

are reviewed for clear error. Hardy, 494 Mich at 438. The Spanke Court described the 

procedure for dealing with challenges to the accuracy of a PSIR: 

 The sentencing court must respond to challenges to the accuracy of 

information in a presentence report; however, the court has wide latitude in 

responding to these challenges. The court may determine the accuracy of the 

information, accept the defendant’s version, or simply disregard the challenged 

information. Should the court choose the last option, it must clearly indicate that 
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it did not consider the alleged inaccuracy in determining the sentence. If the court 

finds the challenged information inaccurate or irrelevant, it must strike that 

information from the PSIR before sending the report to the Department of 

Corrections. [Spanke, 254 Mich App at 648-649 (citations omitted).] 

 In ruling on defendant’s motion for resentencing, the trial court stated that, although it 

reviewed the information in the earlier PSIR, the court vividly recalled the trial in this matter and 

was not persuaded by that information in sentencing defendant. Instead, the trial court stated that 

it considered defendant’s prior record and the victim’s impact statement in which JE indicated 

that she was terrified of defendant and believed he would kill her if he was released. 

 It appears that the allegedly inaccurate information contained in the prior PSIR, and 

attached to the current PSIR, was not considered in sentencing defendant in this matter. 

Therefore, resentencing is not required. However, the trial court was required by MCR 

6.425(E)(2)(a) to strike the prior PSIR from the current PSIR, which did not happen. See Spanke,

254 Mich App at 648-649. Accordingly, we remand this matter for the trial court to complete 

the ministerial task of correcting the current PSIR and sending an amended copy to the 

Department of Corrections. 

 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing to inquire if he and his attorney 

had the opportunity to review the PSIR. MCR 6.425(E)(1)(a) requires the trial court at 

sentencing to determine, on the record, that the defendant, the defendant’s counsel, and the 

prosecutor have had an opportunity to read and review the presentence report. However, “an 

error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court” is not a ground for disturbing an order 

or judgment “unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 

justice.” MCR 2.613(A). 

 It appears here that defense counsel had the opportunity to review the PSIR based on the 

prosecutor’s statement at sentencing that the attorneys had discussed the matter. It is not clear 

that defendant had the opportunity to review the PSIR before sentencing. However, even if 

defendant did not have the opportunity to review the PSIR before sentencing, he had that 

opportunity before filing a motion for resentencing. The only challenges defendant raised to the 

current PSIR were the scoring of OV 10 and the alleged inaccuracy of the prior PSIR. As 

previously discussed, the trial court did not consider the prior PSIR in sentencing defendant, 

therefore, denying defendant’s request for resentencing premised on the trial court’s failure to 

make the requisite inquiry is not inconsistent with substantial justice. Further, affirming 

defendant’s sentence is not inconsistent with substantial justice because the scoring of OV10 did 

not change the sentencing guidelines. 

 Affirmed, but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting defendant’s current PSIR. 

We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause