NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11

- 2221

_____________ JOHN WILSON, JR., Appellant

v. LOCK HAVEN UNIVERSITY SHARON E. TAYLOR

__________ ___ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 4

- 09

- cv - 02566 ) District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III

_____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 19, 2012 Before: RENDELL, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges (Opinion Filed : April 5, 2012 )

_____________ OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________ RENDELL, Circuit Judge John Wilson , Jr. appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of his former employer , Lock Haven University , and dismissing Wilson ’s claims of race

- based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

- 1 to .2 2000e

- 17) and the Pennsylvania Human Rela tions Act (PHRA , 43 Pa. Cons. Stat

. §§ 951

- 963 ) . We will affirm.
I. From 1999 through 2011 , Wilson , who is African American , worked as the head coach of the men’s basketball team at Appellee Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania (“LHU”)

. Beginning in 2 002 , Wilson received several poor performance evaluations from LHU Athletic Director Sharon Taylor

. The evaluations document great concern for Wilson’s fundraising , his players’ low grades, and his team’s poor win

- loss record

. On two occasions, Wilson wa s suspended by the NCAA after it was discovered that he allowed students to play even though they were not eligible under league rules. In April 2009, Wilson was told that his employment contract would not be renewed when it expired in 2011. He filed a complaint in December 2009, alleging that LHU and Taylor discriminated against him on the basis of race and created a hostile work environment. Wilson claim ed that his race played a role in his poor performance evaluations (which made him ineligible fo r merit

- based pay increase s ) and the non

renewal of his employment contract. As evidence, he point ed to his belief that LHU athletes with white coach es were treated better than Wilson’s players with respect to rule violations

. He claim ed that, because of his race, LHU failed to adequately come to his defense when it was determined that he had violated NCAA rules , barred him from scheduling certain away games, and treated him differently with respect to financial aid

. H e allege d that his assistant coach w as offered a lower salary than another assistant coach. He also pointed to an email he sent to Taylor in which he refers to Taylor ’s3 comment that the Presidential search committee consisted of three retired white men and Taylor’s question to him as to whe ther he thought she was racist. The Di strict Court granted D efendants partial judgment on the pleadings, dismissing all claims under the PHRA against LHU and under Title VII against Taylor. Defendants then moved for summary judgment

. Magistrate Judge Wi lliam T. Pri nce filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) , which found that Taylor failed to offer evidence connecting the adverse employment actions he claims to have experienced with his race, and failed to show that D efendants ’ proffered explanation for those actions was pretextual. The District Court adopted the R&R in its entirety, and granted summary judgment to the defendants.
II. 1 Wilson submits that he was fired from his position due to racial discrimination. We analyze this claim using the burde n - shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Initially , the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation

. Establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimi nation requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2 ) the plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) the plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) the adverse

1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. W e have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over this appeal from an order granting summary judgment. Thus, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. In doing this, we must view all facts and draw all reasonable infere nces in favor of the non

- moving party

. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 25 5 (1986)

.4 employment action w as made under circumstances raising an inference of discriminatory action

. Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv. , 352 F.3d 789 , 7 9 7 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802)

. If the plaintiff succeeds in d oing so , the burden shifts to th e employer to articulate some legiti mate , non - discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Fuentes v. Perskie , 32 F.3d 759 , 763 (3d Cir. 1994). When that burden is met , the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show tha t the employer’s
state d reason is pretextual

. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 100 F.3d 1061 , 1067 (3d Cir. 1996). We agree with the District Court that Appellant failed to establish a prima facie

case because he did not offer evidence that ties any of the conduct h e complains of to his

race. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus , Inc. , 527 F.3d 358 , 366 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Iadimarco v. Runyon , 190 F.3d 151 , 162 (3d Cir. 1999)). T he comparisons Wilson makes between himself and other coaches were unsupported by any rec ord evidence and, thus, he has fail ed to demonstrate that other similarly situated individuals were treated any differently , regardless of race. Wilson’s bare allegations that his treatment was based on his race is insufficient to withstand summary judgme nt. Williams v. Borough of West Chester , 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). We also agree with the District Court that Defendants assert several non

discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions against Wilson , and Wilson failed to offer suffi cient evidence to show that the ir reasoning is actually a pretext for discrimination.5 III. For the foregoing reasons , we will affirm the order of the District Court.