FILED

July 7, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

FOR PUBLICATION

WESTLAND WEST COMMUNITY ) Filed: July 7, 1997

ASSOCIATION, et al. )

)

Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) KNOX CHANCERY

)

v. ) Hon. Sharon Bell, Chancellor

)

KNOX COUNTY, et al., ) No. 03S01-9610-CH-00098

)

Defendants/Appellees. )

FOR APPELLANT: FOR APPELLEE:

George W. Morton, Jr. Courtney N. Pearre

Knoxville Knoxville

Michael W. Moyers

Knox County Law Department

Knoxville

O P I N I O N

COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED HOLDER, J.
1

 SC is limited to retail uses. SC limits building height to a maximum of

three stories and is intended for retail developments that generally attract

consumers from the surrounding residential areas.

2

OPINION

We granted this appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 13-7-105(a) mandates submission of a newly proposed zoning classification

amendment to the regional planning commission following the commission's

rejection of a similar but different proposed classification. The Court of Appeals

held that the statute does not require futile resubmissions of revised proposals. 

We, however, find that the proposal in question was not merely a revised prior

proposal but was a new and previously unsubmitted proposal. The statute

clearly mandates submission of new proposals to the regional planning

commission. We reverse the Appellate Court and hold that the new zoning

proposal should have been submitted to the regional planning commission.

BACKGROUND

The appellee, Thomas N. Schriver, filed a rezoning application with the

Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission (“MPC”). His

application sought to amend a tract of land’s zoning from Agriculture ("A") to

Shopping Center (“SC”)1

. The MPC unanimously denied Schriver’s requested

change. He then appealed the MPC’s decision to the County Commission. 

During the hearing before the County Commission, the appellee

presented a zoning proposal that differed from the proposal he originally

submitted to the MPC. He requested the commission to rezone the property to
2

 PC permits extensive commercial services and light distribution centers. 

Buildings may exceed four stories in height in land zoned as PC. PC is intended

to draw customers from both outside and inside the immediate residential area. 

This attraction of a larger market may increase consumer traffic to the area. The

presence of commercial trucking may also be more prevalent in land zoned as

PC as opposed to SC.

3

 Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-105 provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

(a) The county legislative body may from time to time amend the

number, shape, boundary, area or any other provision of any

zoning ordinance; but such amendment shall not be made or

become effective unless that same be first submitted for approval,

disapproval or suggestions to the regional planning commission of

the region in which the territory covered by the ordinance is

located, and, if such regional planning commission disapproves

within thirty (30) days after such admission, such amendment shall

require the favorable vote of a majority of the entire membership of

the county legislative body.

3

Planned Commercial ("PC")2

 as opposed to SC. The County Commission

approved the revised amendment request and rezoned the property as PC.

The appellants, Westland West Community Association, et al., appealed

the commission's zoning decision to the Knox County Chancery Court. They

alleged that the Commission’s decision was void. They argued that Tenn. Code

Ann. § 13-7-105(a)3

 mandated that the appellee submit his new proposal to the

MPC prior to seeking review before the County Commission. The chancery court

agreed and held that when the appellee changed his request from SC to PC, he

was required to by statute to resubmit the zoning request to the MPC.

The Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court's decision. They found

that resubmission of the more onerous proposed amendment to MPC would

have been futile due to the MPC's previous determination that "any commercial

zone would be contrary to the . . . Sector plan." Pursuant to Wilgus v. City of

Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. App. 1975), the court held that

resubmission is not mandated unless there is "a strong probability that the
4

[regional planning] commission's recommendation would have been affected by

the revision."

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The appellants argue that the Court of Appeals erred in focusing its

analysis solely on whether the board's decision would have been the same upon

resubmission. They maintain that the proper inquiry should focus on the gravity

of the revised proposal's changes. Provided the revisions are substantial, Tenn.

Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a) mandates resubmission. We agree in part.

A county legislative body is vested the statutory power to amend zoning

ordinances. Tenn. Code Ann § 13-7-105(a). A proposed zoning amendment,

however, shall neither be granted nor become effective unless the proposed

amendment is first submitted to the regional planning commission. Id. The

regional commission can then either approve, disapprove, or make suggestions. 

Id. If the regional commission rejects the proposed amendment, the amendment

may then be submitted to the county legislative body for approval. Id.

Our analysis is guided by the principles of statutory interpretation. 

Legislative intent shall be derived from a statute's face when a statute's language

is unambiguous. Hamblen County Educ. Ass'n v. Hamblen County Bd. of Educ.,

892 S.W.2d 428, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); see also Carson Creek Vac.

Resorts v. Dept. of Rev., 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993) (stating where language

within four corners of statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous ambiguous, intent

shall be derived from statute's face). If a statute's language is expressed in a

manner devoid of ambiguity, courts are not at liberty to depart from the statute's

words. Id. Accordingly, courts are restricted to the "natural and ordinary"
5

meaning of a statute unless an ambiguity necessitates resorting elsewhere to

ascertain legislative intent. Austin v. Memphis Publ. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 149

(Tenn. 1983).

We find the statute's language clear. A proposed amendment to a zoning

scheme must first be submitted to the regional planning commission. If a

proposed zoning amendment is not first presented to the regional planning

commission, the county commission is devoid of jurisdiction to act upon the

proposal.

Once a proposed admendment has been submitted to the regional

planning commission, the proposal may be revised. Whether the revised

proposal must then be resubmitted to the regional planning commission is

contingent upon: (1) the gravity of the revision(s), and (2) whether the board's

recommendations would have been altered by the revision(s). Wilgus v. City of

Murfeesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50, 53-54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975). If the revision is

inconsequential and would not have altered the board's recommendation,

resubmission is not mandated. If, however, the revision(s) substantially alters

the initial proposal, the proper inquiry is: (1) whether there is a detrimental

impact on those who would oppose the proposal; and (2) whether the board's

recommendations would have been altered by the revision(s). Id.; State v. Board

of Comm'rs of Knox County Tenn., 806 S.W.2d 181, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 

An affirmative answer to either question mandates resubmission.

In the present case, we are not confronted with a mere revision to a

previously proposed zoning amendment. Accordingly, we do not revert to the

test for determining whether a revision was substantial. We are confronted with

an entirely new zoning classification proposal (i.e., a new zoning admendment
6

proposal) which had never been before the regional planning commission. We

find a clear distinction between a newly proposed classification and a previously

submitted classification that has undergone mere revisions. Tennessee Code

Annotated § 13-7-105 mandates submission of the new classification without

further inquiry.

Accordingly, we hold that the proposed zoning change to planned

commercial in the present case must have been presented to the regional

planning commission before the county commission had jurisdiction to act on the

proposal. The county commission's review and approval was, therefore, both

null and void. Costs shall be taxed to the Knox County Board of Commissioners

for which execution may issue if necessary.

Janice M. Holder, Justice

Concurring:

Birch, C.J.

Reid, Drowota and Anderson, JJ.