# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 16, 2021

Decided July 16, 2021

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER , Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II , Circuit Judge

No. 20-3306

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff -Appell ee ,

v

.
QUINCE D. WRIGHT , Defendant -Appell ant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

.

No. 05- cr -121- bbc -1

Barbara B. Crabb , Judge

.

O R D E R
Quince Wright , a federal prisoner, appeals the re vocation of his supervised release , but h is appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We agree with counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues on appeal, so we grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss the appea l.

Wright served 188 months’ confinement for conspiracy to distribut e methamphetamine , 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), after which he beg an a three

- year term of supervision. In the first year of his supervision , however, he failed several drug tests and plead ed guilty to third

- degree sexual assault in violation of Wisconsin Statute NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 20-3306 Page 2

§ 940.225(3)(a). S ee Wisconsin v. Wright , No . 19CF1000 ( Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2020) . The government sought to revoke his supervised release . A fter a hearing , the district court found revocation warranted because of his guilty plea and sentenced him to the statutory maximum term of 24 months in prison

. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

. Wright does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel when appealing a revocation order, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 789–91 (1973), so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review. N evertheless , our practice is to follow them. United States v. Brown , 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). C ounsel ’ s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve . Because her analysis appears adequate, and Wright has

no t responded, se e C IR

. R. 51 (b), we focus our review on the issues she discusses in her brief

. See United States v. Bey , 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

C ounsel does not tell us, as she should have , whether Wright wishes to challenge the revocation order or to withdraw any of the admissions upon which that order was based. See United States v. Wheeler , 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Knox , 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). The omission is harml ess, however, because Wright admitted his violations at the hearing . These includ e the Grade A violation of committing a new felony crime of violence , see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.2(a)(2), and several Grade C violations

— i.e., possessing and using illegal drugs. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5D1.3(a) (1), (4) , (d)(4). Because t he district court properly found that Wright violated at least one condition of his release by a preponderance of the evidence
, s ee 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)– (2) , any argument that the court wrongly revoked his release would be pointless

. See United States v. Flagg , 481 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2007).

Counsel does consider whether Wright could challenge the length of his
sentence , and rightly concludes he could not. The court correctly calculated a range of 24– 30 months ’ imprisonment under the Guidelines Chapter Seven policy statements , based on Wright’s criminal history (Category IV), und erlying offense (a class C felony), and most serious violation (Grade A). See 18 U.S.C . § 3559(1)(3); U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1 (b) ; 7B1.4(a). Although the court initially imposed a 27- month sentence that was consistent with the policy statement s but exceede d the 24- month statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), it promptly corrected its error and imposed the statutory maximum
sentenc e. T he record reflects no “misunderstanding about the statutory maximum .” Wheeler , 814 F.3d at 857

.No. 20-3306 Page 3

Finally, counsel right ly rejects any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of Wright’s 24- month prison term. Th at sentence falls within policy

- statement range , so
we may presume it to be reasonable. S ee Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Nothing in the record rebuts th at presumption . T he court acknowledged Wright’s positive post

- sentencing conduct (obtaining housing and employment and enrolling in college classes) but found these outweighed by the applicable factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) , including t he seriousness of his crimes (“I can’t just overlook them”) and the need to promote respect for the law and deter him and others from similar conduct (“[t]he purpose of this sentence is to hold you accountable for your repeated violations”). The court ’s ex planation reflects that it sufficiently considered the relevant factors and that any challenge on this basis would be frivolous

. S ee United States v. Raney , 842 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016).

We therefore GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.