In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-1211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ADAM MEECE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:08-cr-00095-bbc-1—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.

ARGUED MAY 28, 2009—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

Before BAUER, FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. After police arrested Adam

Meece, they obtained consent from his girlfriend, Jami

Lee, to search the home the couple shared. The search

revealed two handguns and Meece was charged and

convicted of illegally possessing a firearm as a felon.

Meece claims that his arrest was unlawful and that news

of the arrest startled Lee into consenting to the search,

so that the district court should have granted his motion
2 No. 09-1211

Wisconsin Statute § 302.113(8m)(a) states: “Every person 1

released to extended supervision under this section remains in

the legal custody of the department. If the department alleges

that any condition or rule of extended supervision has been

violated by the person, the department may take physical

custody of the person for the investigation of the alleged

violation.”

to suppress the handguns as fruits of a tainted search.

He also claims that the district court erred by applying

a sentence enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony, and that his sentence is

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 17, 2008, Meece was serving a state term of

extended supervision following his release from prison

on a felony conviction. Officer Denise Markham, of the

Madison, Wisconsin Police Department, received a phone

call that day from an anonymous informant accusing

Meece of possessing two or three handguns and cocaine

at a residence he shared with his girlfriend. Markham

asked the informant several questions in an attempt

to learn about the caller’s relationship to Meece and the

basis of the caller’s knowledge. Confident of the informant’s credibility, Markham reported the information to

Meece’s probation officer, who then asked Markham to

take Meece into custody pursuant to the terms of

Meece’s extended release.1
No. 09-1211 3

Meece was arrested that same afternoon on his way

home from work. Markham and other officers then went

to the house that Meece and Lee shared. The officers

told Lee that Meece had been arrested and that they

believed there were guns in the home. Lee consented to

a search of the house, which revealed two handguns

under the mattress of Meece’s bed. In the kitchen, the

officers found a scale, several plastic baggies, and a

Tupperware bowl, all containing cocaine residue.

Finally, a police dog alerted the officers to $3,400 in

cash hidden in the basement rafters.

Meece was charged in a single-count indictment with

unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress

the evidence of the weapons found in his home on the

theory that the officers lacked authority to take him

into custody and that his illegal arrest tainted the discovery of the weapons by influencing Lee’s consent to

search the house. The district court denied the motion

and Meece pleaded guilty while reserving his right to

appeal the court’s ruling on the motion.

At sentencing, the district court applied an offense

level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)

for possessing the handguns in connection with a felony

drug crime. With this enhancement, Meece’s Guidelines

sentencing range was from 63 to 78 months. The district

court sentenced Meece to 78 months’ imprisonment.
4 No. 09-1211

II. DISCUSSION

Meece makes four arguments on appeal: (1) that his

arrest was unlawful; (2) that this unlawful arrest tainted

Lee’s consent to search the house, so that the guns should

have been suppressed; (3) that the district court erroneously applied the sentence enhancement; and (4) that

his sentence is unreasonable.

A. Arrest

Meece’s first argument, and the predicate for his

second, is that his arrest was illegal. Because Meece

was serving a term of supervised release, he could be

detained upon a reasonable suspicion that he had committed, or was about to commit, a crime or violation of

the terms of his supervised release. Knox v. Smith, 342

F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003). Meece claims that the

district court erred in finding that there was reasonable

suspicion for the arrest because, although Markham

testified that she asked the anonymous informant several

questions and received satisfying answers to those questions, Markham never stated what those answers were.

Without knowing the answers, Meece claims, there is

no way to determine whether the informant was

credible and, therefore, no way to know if Markham

had a reasonable suspicion that Meece had committed a

crime. The district court found that Markham’s testimony was sufficient to show that she had a reasonable

suspicion, even though it would have been better if

Markham had revealed the informant’s answers so

that they could be evaluated.
No. 09-1211 5

It certainly would be better to know the answers given

by the informant, but we do not need to decide whether

the evidence in this case was sufficient to support a

finding of reasonable suspicion. The heart of Meece’s

appeal is that the handguns found in his home should

have been suppressed. The potential illegality of his

arrest is useful to Meece only if he can use it to prove

that the evidence of the handguns was tainted. As explained below, he cannot.

B. Taint

Meece’s second argument is that the news of his

illegal arrest tainted Lee’s consent to the officers’ search,

so that the evidence found during the search should

have been suppressed. “We review a district court’s

findings of fact in a suppression hearing for clear error

and its conclusions of law de novo.” United States v.

Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2002).

Evidence is not automatically tainted “simply because

it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions

of the police.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-

88 (1963). Neither is all evidence inadmissable that “somehow came to light through a chain of causation that

began with [illegal police activity].” United States v.

Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978). But establishing that

Meece’s arrest influenced Lee’s consent is a necessary

start. There must be some causal nexus between the

illegal police activity and the disputed evidence. As

Meece properly states in his brief, “[e]vidence which

is obtained as a result of an illegal arrest is fruit of the
6 No. 09-1211

poisonous tree . . . .” United States v. Swift, 220 F.3d 502, 507

(7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). If the news of the

arrest did not influence Lee’s consent, we do not even

need to consider whether obtaining Lee’s consent (and,

ultimately, the guns) was independent of the arrest,

inevitable, or in some other way sufficiently distanced

from the presumptively illegal arrest. See id. (“The

evidence may be purged of the taint by a finding that

it was discovered by an independent source, that it

would inevitably have been discovered without the

unlawful [activity], or that its discovery is sufficiently

distant in causal connection from the illegal [activity] so

as to attenuate the connection between the two.”).

Whether Lee’s consent was influenced by the news of

Meece’s arrest is a factual determination that we review

for clear error. “Clear error review means that the

district court’s decision will not be reversed unless

after reviewing the entire record we are left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” United States v. Carmack, 100 F.3d 1271, 1276

(7th Cir. 1996).

The record in this case supports two theories as to

why Lee consented to the search, neither of which helps

Meece. Markham testified that when Lee consented to

the search, she said that she had children in the house

and that she was worried about the guns. Lee’s affidavit

and testimony claimed that she consented to the search

because she needed to pick up her child from daycare

and Markham threatened that if Lee did not consent

to the search, the officers would get a warrant, which
No. 09-1211 7

The magistrate judge and district court credited the offi- 2

cers’ version of events and Meece does not claim that Lee’s

consent was coerced by this reported threat of not being

allowed to leave the house until a search warrant was obtained and executed.

could take hours, and that, during that time, Lee would not

be allowed to leave the house. Lee never even hinted 2

that the news of Meece’s arrest prompted her consent;

whether she consented to the search out of a concern

for her children’s safety or because she needed to pick up

her child from daycare is irrelevant.

Meece does make a good point that the magistrate

judge and, to a lesser extent, the district court took one

of Lee’s statements out of context. During cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing, Lee stated about

Meece: “Quite honestly, he has been in trouble before

and I pretty much have taken care of my three children

by myself for a very long time . . . .” The magistrate

judge used this statement to conclude that “Meece’s

arrest had zero impact on Lee’s consent to search:

she testified that Meece’s arrest was absolutely inconsequential to her thought process.” The district court stated

that “Lee testified that the defendant’s arrest was

hardly surprising or even consequential.”

Meece is correct that Lee’s statement was in response

to the government’s persistent accusation that she was

lying during the evidentiary hearing to protect the

father of her children. It was not related to her thought

process on the day she gave consent. But the fact
8 No. 09-1211

remains that Lee had two opportunities to claim that her

consent was influenced by the news of Meece’s arrest and

never made that claim. The district court was correct in

observing that “Lee testified at the hearing and said

nothing to suggest that defendant’s arrest was a factor

in her decision to let the officers into her house.”

Meece simply fails to point us to any convincing evidence that Lee was influenced by Meece’s arrest. Meece’s

claim that the news of his arrest must have influenced

Lee’s consent falls short. The fact that Lee consented to

the search after learning of Meece’s arrest is not

sufficient; chronology does not prove causation. The

district court did not err in denying Meece’s motion to

suppress.

C. Sentence Enhancement

Meece next argues that, even if his conviction was

proper, the district court erroneously applied a sentence

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). That section

increases a defendant’s offense level by four levels “[i]f

the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with

knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be

used or possessed in connection with another felony

offense.” “We review the district court’s application of

sentencing guidelines de novo, but where the district

court bases the application of a sentencing guideline

on factual findings, we review for clear error.” United

States v. Wagner, 467 F.3d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir. 2006).
No. 09-1211 9

“[R]eview of a district court’s sentencing enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)([6]) is a mixed question of fact

and law that we review for clear error.” United States v.

Markovitch, 442 F.3d 1029, 1031 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing

United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 1996)).

We have stated before that “[t]he seizure of a firearm

in close proximity to illegal drugs is considered powerful support for the inference that the firearm was used

in connection with the drug trafficking operation.”

Markovitch, 442 F.3d at 1032 (quoting United States v.

Ewing, 979 F.2d 1234, 1238 (7th Cir. 1992)); see U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1 Application Note 14(B) (firearm found in close

proximity to drug paraphernalia triggers the enhancement). In this case, the search of Meece’s house

revealed two handguns and $3,400 in cash, as well as a

scale, several baggies, and a Tupperware bowl all containing cocaine residue. The district court concluded

that Meece was trafficking drugs and that the guns were

in the house to protect against the increased risk of a

home invasion associated with drug trafficking. See

United States v. LePage, 477 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2007)

(When “guns are possessed along with the materials of

a drug trafficker, it is a reasonable inference that the

guns protect or embolden the criminal enterprise.”).

Meece argues that the guns were not in close proximity

to the drug paraphernalia because the guns were found

upstairs while the scale and baggies were found on the

main floor and the cash was recovered from the basement. We are unpersuaded by this argument. If, as the

district court found, the guns were present to protect

against the increased risk of a home invasion, then the
10 No. 09-1211

bedroom was a logical place to store them. It would do

no good, for example, to keep the guns in the basement

rafters with the cash.

While various inferences might be drawn from the

facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the district court’s interpretation of the facts and use of the enhancement was in error. See Markovitch, 442 F.3d at 1031

(“Where there are two permissible views of the

evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be

clearly erroneous.” (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer,

470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985))).

D. Reasonableness of Sentence

Meece’s final argument challenges the length of his

sentence. A district court must impose a reasonable

sentence and we review sentences for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007). When

a sentence is within a properly calculated Guidelines

range it “is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness” on appeal. United States v. Nitch, 477 F.3d

933, 937 (7th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 347 (2007).

Meece argues that his sentence was imposed in a procedurally unreasonable manner because the district court

improperly calculated his Guidelines range by

applying the sentence enhancement. We have already

found that the enhancement was appropriate, so this

argument fails.

Meece also argues that, even if his Guidelines range

was properly calculated, his sentence is substantively
No. 09-1211 11

Failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors is actually procedural 3

error. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Meece addresses it under substantive reasonableness, but it makes no difference in this case.

unreasonable and that the district court did not

adequately explain how “a 78 month stay in prison

would be the least means necessary to meet any of the

goals set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.” Meece does not 3

explain why his sentence is unreasonable other than

stating that “[p]ossession of a firearm, alone, does not

provide much guidance to a court when determining a

proper sentence” and pointing out that Meece’s only

other felony conviction was for failing to return to a

work release program. As discussed below, the district

court considered more than Meece’s bare possession of

two handguns; Meece cannot rebut the presumption of

reasonableness.

Meece’s argument that the district court failed to

explain how the sentence was appropriate in light of the

goals set out in § 3553(a) also falls short. “The district

court need not address each § 3553(a) factor in checklist

fashion, explicitly articulating its conclusion for each

factor; rather, the court must simply give an adequate

statement of reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for believing the sentence it selects is appropriate.” United States

v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2008). In

this case, the district court adequately explained the

necessity of the sentence imposed at the sentencing

hearing. She explained to Meece: “Your willingness to

ignore the consequences of your actions is chilling. You

are very dangerous to the community. At this point, the
12 No. 09-1211

damage has been relatively contained, but I see you as a

potential threat for a long time to come.” A little later,

the court summarized the need for the 78-month sentence:

Your criminal history reflects your lengthy involvement in criminal activity. You have alcohol and drug

addictions, violent tendencies, and psychological

problems. You’ve been afforded a number of opportunities for correctional treatment over the years, but

they have not proved helpful. You committed this

offense while you were on supervision, demonstrating

a serious disregard for the law. When the seriousness

of the offense is coupled with your prior criminal

history, it warrants a sentence within the advisory

guideline range, and I believe it warrants a sentence

at the high end of the range. Such a sentence is reasonable and no greater than necessary to hold you

accountable, protect the community, provide you the

opportunity to participate in correctional treatment,

and achieve parity with the sentences of similarlysituated offenders.

The district court thoroughly and thoughtfully considered the § 3553(a) factors in light of Meece’s

individual circumstances.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM Meece’s

conviction and sentence.

9-2-09