alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CROW, POPE & CARTER, INC., and Housing Investment Corporation, Appellants, v. James J. JAMES, Appellee.

Nos. 77-520 and 77-521.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 13, 1977.

*828Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams and Donald W. Wallis, Jacksonville and William D. Hyatt, Brown, Malman & Salmon, Miami, for appellants.

Pallot, Stern, Proby & Adkins, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, NATHAN and HUB-BART, JJ.

HUBBART, Judge.

By this interlocutory appeal, we are called upon to review the propriety of a temporary injunction. We reverse the order granting the temporary injunction because same failed to provide for the posting of a bond. The law is clear that “[wjhen a temporary injunction is granted, the court shall require the party obtaining it to give bond conditioned for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is wrongfully enjoined unless the court, after taking evidence from all the parties of the truth of the complaint and the fact that the party seeking the temporary injunction is unable to give bond, finds such to be true, in which event a temporary injunction without bond may be granted.” Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.610(b).

In the instant case, the trial court reserved ruling on the request for the posting of a bond should a temporary injunction issue. Thereafter, the trial court issued a temporary injunction without requiring the posting of a bond. No testimony was ever taken on the granting of a bond nor was any finding made that the party seeking the temporary injunction was unable to post bond. It is, therefore, clear that the entry of the temporary injunction without requiring the posting of a bond was reversible error which the appellants in no way waived. *Hart v. Kapnias,*157 Fla. 846, 27 So.2d 145 (1946); *Ginsberg v. City of Daytona Beach,*103 Fla. 168,137 So. 253 (1931); *La Gran Familia, Inc.,*v. *Cuba Pharmacy, Inc.,*349 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); *Leopold v. Richard Bertram & Co.,*265 So.2d 710 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); *Hoffman v. White,*235 So.2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). See also *Metropolitan Dade County v. Polk Pools, Inc.,*124 So.2d 737, 740-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).

In view of our conclusion herein, it is unnecessary for us to reach any other issue raised by this appeal. The order granting the temporary injunction is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate the said order and to conduct such proceedings as may be deemed appropriate to hear and determine whether a temporary injunction should be issued with or without a bond in keeping with the views herein expressed. *Hoffman v. White,*235 So.2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).

Reversed and remanded.
<PAGE> 30

                                                                  Exhibit 12


           AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
             Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                                (Unaudited)



                                                        Nine Months Ended
                                                          September 30,
                                                        2002          2001
                                                      (dollars in thousands)

Earnings:
  Income before provision for income
    taxes                                             $374,999      $281,629
  Interest expense                                     407,580       477,834
  Implicit interest in rents                            13,212        12,583

Total earnings                                        $795,791      $772,046


Fixed charges:
  Interest expense                                    $407,580      $477,834
  Implicit interest in rents                            13,212        12,583

Total fixed charges                                   $420,792      $490,417


Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                        1.89          1.57
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                         1333000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  6698000
<ALLOWANCES>                                    146000
<INVENTORY>                                    3574000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              15428000
<PP&E>                                        21631000
<DEPRECIATION>                                15527000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                27770000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         17435000
<BONDS>                                        5777000
<COMMON>                                        230000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     4328000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  27770000
<SALES>                                        9895000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               9895000
<CGS>                                          8799000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  8799000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              258000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (725000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (725000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (725000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.03)
        


</TABLE>
255 La. 150

#### MICHIGAN WISCONSIN PIPE LINE COMPANY v. Clifford HEBERT.

No. 50228.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 9, 1970.

In re: Clifford Hebert applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Acadia. 227 So.2d 616.

Writ refused. There appears no error of law in the judgment complained of.

SANDERS, J., is of the opinion a writ should be granted.

SUMMERS, J., is of the opinion the writ should be granted.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-7906

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LEROY CURTIS RICHARDSON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Richard C. Erwin,

Senior District Judge. (CR-93-238-WS, CA-94-558-6)

Submitted: April 15, 1996 Decided: April 29, 1996

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marcia Gail Shein, LAW OFFICE OF MARCIA G. SCHEIN, P.C., Atlanta,

Georgia, for Appellant. David Bernard Smith, Assistant United

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Leroy Curtis Richardson, Jr., appeals the district court's

decision denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) motion. Richardson

claims his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the consequences of his plea agreement and

that the district court improperly computed his sentence. The ineffective assistance claims are without merit, as the record reveals

that Richardson was informed of the consequences of his plea by his

attorney, the plea agreement, and the court. See Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977). Additionally, Richardson

waived his right to appeal the sentencing claims by entering into

the plea agreement, which waived his right to direct appeal. See

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Accordingly, we affirm the

district court's decision. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
Sanitized:

All information and diagrams are Confidential Business Information
```

[Federal Register: July 15, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 135)]
[Notices]               
[Page 41274]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr15jy10-114]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 7088]

 
Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``The Art of Ancient Greek Theater''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 
236-3 of August 28, 2000, I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``The Art of Ancient Greek Theater,'' 
imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, 
are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan 
agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that 
the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at the J. Paul Getty 
Museum, Pacific Palisades, CA, from on or about August 26, 2010, until 
on or about January 3, 2011, and at possible additional exhibitions or 
venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. I have 
ordered that Public Notice of these Determinations be published in the 
Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6467). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, SA-5, L/PD, 
Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: July 9, 2010.
Ann Stock,
Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2010-17311 Filed 7-14-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
#### Shawn ROBERSON, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Susan HUBBARD, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 00-15749.

D.C. No. CV-99-00094-CW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 3, 2001.

Submission Vacated Dec. 20, 2001.

Resubmitted Aug. 7, 2002.

Decided Aug. 7, 2002.

Before HUG, D.W. NELSON, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

ORDER *

This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with *Carey v. Saffold,*— U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). Specifically, we remand for an evidentiary hearing so that the district court may determine whether Roberson filed his original habeas petition in the California Supreme Court “within a reasonable time after [he] knew, or with due diligence should have known, the facts underlying the claim as well as the legal basis of the claim.” *Saffold v. Carey,*295 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting *In re Harris,*5 Cal.4th 813, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391, 398 n. 7 (Cal.1993)). If Roberson’s petition to the California Supreme Court was timely in light of this standard, then the federal habeas petition was timely as well, as a California state habeas petition is “pending” during the interval between a lower court decision on the petition and the filing of a new petition in the California Supreme Court. *Saffold,*— U.S. at ---, 122 S.Ct. at 2140-41.

REMANDED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>



                                  EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Datascope Corp.
(the "Company") for the Quarter ended September 30, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     o    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

     o    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


November 9, 2004




                             /s/ Lawrence Saper
                             -------------------------------------
                             Lawrence Saper
                             Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer




                             /s/ Murray Pitkowsky
                             -------------------------------------
                             Murray Pitkowsky
                             Senior V.P., Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer



                                       19
#### In the Matter of AIU Insurance Company, Respondent, v Jerry Fernandez, Appellant.

[721 NYS2d 840]

—In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, Jerry Fernandez appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), dated March 3, 2000, which denied his motion to vacate a prior order of the same court, dated September 13, 1999, grant*543ing the petition and permanently staying arbitration upon his default in appearing.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

To vacate the order entered upon his default in appearing in opposition to the petition to permanently stay arbitration, the appellant was obligated to establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense *(see,*CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; *Presbyterian Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co.,*277 AD2d 299; *McGee v McAleer,*277 AD2d 207). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion, as he failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default *(see, McGee v McAleer, supra; U.S. Dental v Hart Armonk Assocs.,*277 AD2d 221; *Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v Matteo,*271 AD2d 422). In light of this conclusion, we need not consider whether the appellant established the existence of a meritorious defense *(see, Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v Matteo, supra).*Bracken, P. J., S. Miller, McGinity and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 240 (Monday, December 15, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65654-65655]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-32692]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board
[Order No. 934]


Expansion of Foreign-Trade Zone 15: Kansas City, Missouri, Area 
(Carthage, Missouri, Site)

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of June 
18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade Zones Board 
(the Board) adopts the following Order:
    Whereas, an application from the Greater Kansas City Foreign Trade 
Zone, Inc., grantee of Foreign-Trade Zone 15, Kansas City, Missouri, 
area, for authority to expand FTZ 15 to include an additional site in 
Carthage, Missouri, was filed by the Board on February 11, 1997 (FTZ 
Docket 7-97, 62 FR 8422, 2/25/97);
    Whereas, notice inviting public comment was given in Federal 
Register and the application has been processed pursuant to the FTZ Act 
and the Board's regulations; and,
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
Board's regulations are satisfied, and that the proposal is in the 
public interest;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby orders:
    The application to expand FTZ 15 is approved, subject to the Act 
and the Board's regulations, including Section 400.28, and subject to 
the standard 2,000-acre activation limit for the overall zone project.


[[Page 65655]]


    Signed at Washington, DC, this 8th day of December 1997.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, 
Alternate Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.
John J. Da Ponte, Jr.,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-32692 Filed 12-12-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
Ia. ” 3031 

H2ALTH CERTIFICAT2 OF MAN J'ROCURIXG 

YARRIAOB LICENSE 

oplnlon oonstrulng Artfcla 464oc. 8. c. s.; 

'and holdlngr 

1.. Legislature did not apacify method by 

whloh "reputable llaenaed physician* ahould 

determine findin& 

2.. Comty Clerk not authorized or required 

to look beyond oertlflbate ot physlolan as to 

freedom from~venereal disease of man seeking 

marriage llosnse. 

OFFICE OF TEE ATl!ORM2Y GEXEfAL 

January 24, 1939 

-. Hon. A. J. Bryan, Jr. 

Cricllnal Dletriot Attorney 

HQlsboro, Texas 

Deati Slrr 

- Should a doctor 

make a blood test before certlfylng a man to be tree from 

venereal disease for a marriage 

llcenae. 

This will aOknOwledgc receipt Of your letter Of 

January 4th. 1939, addressed to the Attorney Oenaral, whioh 

has been referred to the writer for consideration and reply. 

You rcqueat an opinion of this department in rcaponse to the following question: 

T?hare a party 1s seeking a~health certlficate in order to get his marriage llcenaa, la 

a doctor requlrad to make a blood test?* 

Your attention is direotad to Artlola 46490, Bevised Civil Statutes oi.Texae, whfoh provides as follows: 

Weiore the 'oocnty olerk shall issue any 

marriage lioenee, the man shell produce a certificate from a reputable licensed physlclsn to 

show that he 1s free from all venereal dlseaaes." 

There having been no court declslons construing the above article, se ara confined to the coqstruction and the meanin Of 

its nprda. 
Hon. A. Ji Bpn; Jr.; Jannery 84, 1939. Pago 2 

It..wll$ be noted the loglslature did not &eolfy 

or partloularlre any oertaln means or method by whloh the 

"reputable lloenoed phyeloian" should dotormlne his flnd- 

.lqa. There la no definite teat preacrlbed. The physlofan 

moklng the oertifloate must, under tha terms of the anaotment, be l refutable" and *lIoensedW. When the oounty olerk 

is cognizant of thsas two things, it 1s our o9fnIop.hla 

lnqulry 1s ended. Howhere doe8 the Ieggislature authorize, 

or requlra, the clerk to 30 beyond the certlfioate ftaelf. 

Aooordlngly, lf.the aertlfloate be lesoed'by a "reputable 

licensed physlclan" and if It certlflee the applicant ror 

license to be Yrekfrom all venereal diseases", If the 

other statutory requlrementa be met, it Is the duty of the 

clerk to fcrthwlth'lssuo tha lloonee. 

Letter oplnlon 30. O-35, written January 13, 1939, 

la withdrawn end thle one substituted therefor. 

,Very 'truly yours 

ATTO~GEl?&.OFTEX&, _ 

This oplnlon has been oonsldered In conference, 

approved, and ordered recorded. 

wEIG.?-- . 

ATTORNEY GL~RAL OF T2XAS
#### In the Matter of William M. BURTON Petition for Reinstatement to The Florida Bar.

No. 38725.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 2, 1970.

*390Dudley Burton, Miami, for petitioner.

Walter S. Holland, Miami, for The Florida Bar, respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on petition for review of the judgment of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar dated June 22, 1970.

Petitioner was disbarred by Order of this Court effective August 1968, in a decision reported at 218 So.2d 748. On June 12, 1969, petitioner Burton petitioned for reinstatement to membership in The Florida Bar. This petition was filed under the Integration Rule in effect prior to July 1, 1969.

The Referee recommended that petitioner be reinstated to membership in good standing and pay the costs of the proceedings. The Board of Governors dismissed the petition for reinstatement on the grounds that it was premature.

After argument and upon consideration of the record, report of the referee and judgment of the Board of Governors we find that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to membership in The Florida Bar at this time. In reaching this conclusion we have considered the fact that no evidence was offered against petitioner at the hearing ; that petitioner has repaid one client in full and is paying the other client faithfully and promptly on a weekly basis. The Referee in recommending reinstatement correctly applied the guidelines on rehabilitation set out in this Court’s opinion in Petition of Dawson, 131 So.2d 472 (Fla.1961).

Accordingly, it is ordered that petitioner, William M. Burton, Jr., be reinstated to membership in good standing in The Florida Bar and pay the costs of these proceedings.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, C. J., DREW, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., and SPECTOR, District Court Judge, concur.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of ML Life Insurance Company of New York
(the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended
December 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, Joseph E. Justice, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



| | /s/ JOSEPH E. JUSTICE
Joseph E. Justice
Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
| | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated:
March 28, 2005

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to ML Life Insurance Company of New York and will be retained by ML
Life Insurance Company of New York and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7088 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 111 James Street in Reidsville, Georgia, as 

the ‘‘Senator Jack Hill Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 7088 EH

1 SECTION 1. SENATOR JACK HILL POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 111 James Street in Reidsville, 

4 Georgia, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Senator 

5 Jack Hill Post Office Building’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Senator Jack Hill 

10 Post Office Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 10, 

2020. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7088 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostPost Office Building’’. Reidsville, Georgia, as the ‘‘Senator Jack Hill al Service located at 111 James Street in