SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1511-15T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMAR B. COCKREN,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted January 16, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Ostrer and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 

15-01-0049.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Molly O'Donnell Meng, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Evgeniya Sitnikova, Deputy 

Attorney General, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

June 12, 2018
2 A-1511-15T2

Defendant Jamar Cockren appeals from his September 11, 2015 

judgment of conviction for second-degree eluding, fourth-degree 

resisting arrest, and numerous motor vehicle violations. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I.

On the evening of July 30, 2014, defendant and his friend, 

Raul Colon, were drinking alcohol at another friend's house in 

Carteret. More than once that night, Colon gave defendant the 

keys to his vehicle, a Honda CRV, so defendant could "go get 

something." While returning to the vehicle for a third time, 

defendant told Colon "he was going to be right back." Defendant 

drove to a friend's house, and after she got in the passenger 

seat, they drove around aimlessly while talking. 

At approximately four a.m. on July 31, 2014, a Woodbridge 

Township Police Sergeant was on patrol in his marked police SUV. 

He came to a stop at a red light and noticed defendant's vehicle 

across the intersection, straddling the solid white line that 

separates the straight lane from the left hand turn lane. After 

the light turned green, the officer drove through the intersection 

and observed that defendant remained stopped and was using his 

cell phone. The officer then ran the vehicle's license plate, 

which the computer flagged because the vehicle's owner had a 
3 A-1511-15T2

suspended driver's license. The officer turned around to follow 

defendant but lost sight of him. 

Soon thereafter, the officer located defendant and observed 

him make an improper turn onto Route 35. The officer activated 

his overhead lights, and defendant eventually pulled over. 

However, as the officer approached the driver side of the vehicle, 

defendant sped away. The officer broadcasted the pursuit over the 

police radio and followed. He trailed defendant as defendant sped 

through a residential area, proceeded through two stop signs, 

generally drove recklessly, and suddenly slowed his vehicle to a 

roll next to a church. Defendant then, while the car was still 

in motion, exited the driver door and fled. Around this time, 

other officers arrived and began to establish a perimeter. 

Two Woodbridge officers heard the broadcast and joined the 

pursuit. They watched as defendant's vehicle slowed down next to 

the church, and defendant exited the still moving vehicle.

Noticing the passenger screaming hysterically in the passenger 

seat of the vehicle, the officer jumped in the driver's seat and 

put the vehicle in park. 

While this was happening, another officer chased defendant 

on foot. Throughout the pursuit, the officer ordered defendant 

to stop, but defendant ignored the commands. Eventually, defendant 
4 A-1511-15T2

approached a high fence, abandoned his attempt to flee, and laid 

on the ground, placing his hands behind his back. 

In November 2014, a Middlesex County Grand Jury indicted 

defendant on the following charges: second-degree eluding an 

officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); third-degree unlawful taking of 

means of conveyance, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10; and fourth-degree 

resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2).

On July 9, 2015, the trial judge heard oral argument on the 

defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of his suspended 

driving license at the time of the incident. After conducting a 

State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992), analysis, the judge allowed

evidence of defendant's suspended license and gave a limiting 

instruction to the jury. At trial, defendant argued that the 

conditions present during the early hour chase did not create a 

risk of injury or death – an element necessary for a second-degree 

eluding conviction. Instead, defendant sought a conviction for a 

lesser charge of third-degree eluding.

Ultimately, a jury found defendant guilty of second-degree 

eluding an officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), and fourth-degree 

resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2), but acquitted him of

third-degree unlawful taking of means of conveyance, N.J.S.A. 

2C:20-10.
5 A-1511-15T2

On September 11, 2015, defendant was sentenced to nine years 

imprisonment with a four year period of parole ineligibility for 

the second-degree eluding an officer charge and concurrently to 

eighteen months for the fourth-degree resisting arrest charge. 

After a subsequent bench trial, defendant was found guilty of nine

motor vehicle violations, including reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 

39:4-96; two counts for disregarding a traffic control device, 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-81; and two counts for improper turns, N.J.S.A. 

39:4-123. The judge imposed monetary fines and jail time to run 

consecutive to his other sentences for these motor vehicle 

violations. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues:

POINT I: 

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE STATE 

TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF COCKREN'S LICENSE 

SUSPENSION FOR NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE. 

POINT II:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MERGE FIVE 

OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE CONVICTIONS INTO THE 

ELUDING CONVICTION.

POINT III:

THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY CONVICTED COCKREN 

OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT.1

 

1 Defendant withdrew this argument on appeal, and therefore, it 

does not warrant discussion. 
6 A-1511-15T2

POINT IV:

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING A NEARMAXIMUM BASE TERM WITH A NEAR-MAXIMUM PAROLE 

DISQUALIFIER.

II.

Defendant argues the trial judge improperly allowed evidence 

of his suspended driver's license because it had no legitimate 

purpose and constituted impermissible other bad acts evidence. He

contends motive was not in dispute because he essentially conceded 

he eluded the police, and the only issue left for the jury was the 

degree of the eluding conviction. 

"[T]he decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly 

entrusted to the trial court's discretion." State v. Scott, 229 

N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (quoting Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & 

Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)). A trial court's 

evidentiary ruling will be upheld "absent a showing of an abuse 

of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment." 

State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) (quoting State v. Marrero, 

148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)). "The trial court, because of its 

intimate knowledge of the case, is in the best position to engage 

in this balancing process." Marrero, 148 N.J. at 483 (quoting 

State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 266 (1987)) (discussing the 

admissibility of other-crime evidence). An appellate court 

"should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial 
7 A-1511-15T2

court, unless 'the trial court's ruling was so wide of the mark 

that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" State v. Perry, 225 

N.J. 222, 233 (2016) (quoting Marrero, 148 N.J. at 484). 

Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b):

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

not admissible to prove the disposition of a 

person in order to show that such person acted 

in conformity therewith. Such evidence may 

be admitted for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity or absence of 

mistake or accident when such matters are 

relevant to a material issue in dispute.

"One of the well-recognized dangers inherent in the admission of 

so-called 'other-crimes evidence' is that a jury may convict a 

defendant not for the offense charged, but for the extrinsic 

offense." State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182, 193-94 (2017) (citing 

State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 514 (2014)). Accordingly, such 

evidence must be "examined cautiously because it 'has a unique 

tendency' to prejudice a jury." Skinner, 218 N.J. at 514 (quoting 

State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 608 (2004)). 

In State v. Cofield, our Supreme Court established a fourpart test "to avoid the over-use of extrinsic evidence of other

crimes or wrongs" pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b). 127 N.J. at 338. 

This framework requires:

1. The evidence of the other crime must be 

admissible as relevant to a material issue;
8 A-1511-15T2

2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably 

close in time to the offense charged;

3. The evidence of the other crime must be 

clear and convincing; and

4. The probative value of the evidence must 

not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.

[Ibid. (citation omitted).]

2

The trial judge made the following findings, pursuant to 

Cofield, in determining that evidence of defendant's suspended 

driver's license was admissible. As to factor one, he found a 

lack of a driver's license was relevant to defendant's motive and 

intent because it explained his actions that night. As to factor 

two, he found while not having a license is not necessarily similar 

to eluding, it was temporally related and if anything, reduces the 

prejudicial effect of introducing such evidence. As to factor

three, at trial, the State presented and had authenticated 

defendant's driver's abstract, showing his driver's license was 

suspended at the time of the incident. As to factor four, he

found the probative value outweighed its prejudice, noting "there 

is no similarity in the types of crimes that are being charged 

here and license suspension is not really a crime." In addition, 

 

2 We should note that "[t]he second prong of the Cofield test, 

addressing the similarity and temporality of the evidence, is not 

found in Rule 404(b), and is not universally required." State v. 

Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 163 (2011) (citations omitted); see also State 

v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131 (2007).
9 A-1511-15T2

the jury was given a limiting instruction that the evidence could 

only be used to establish motive, not guilt on the underlying 

offenses. 

Even assuming for the sake of argument that defendant conceded 

he eluded the police, he continued to challenge this conviction, 

albeit in a lesser eluding charge. Therefore, motive was a 

critical issue for the jury. Accordingly, for the same cogent

reasons set forth detailed above, we affirm the trial judge's 

decision to allow the jury to consider evidence of defendant's 

suspended driving license.

III.

Defendant next asserts the trial court erred when it failed 

to merge five of the motor vehicle violations into the eluding 

conviction. Defendant argues the following motor vehicle 

violations should have been merged: reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 

39:4-96; two violations for disregarding a traffic control device, 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-81; and two violations for improper turns, N.J.S.A. 

39:4-123. We agree.

"Merger is based on the principle that an accused who has 

committed only one offense cannot be punished as if for two." 

State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 116 (1987) (citation omitted). 

Essentially, merger seeks to avoid multiple punishments for the 

same conduct. Ibid. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a)(1) provides, in pertinent 
10 A-1511-15T2

part, that "[w]hen the same conduct of a defendant may establish 

the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be 

prosecuted for each such offense" but not "convicted of more than 

one offense" unless "[o]ne offense is included in the other."

However, Title 39 "[m]otor vehicle offenses . . . fall within 

the generic category of petty offenses that do not fit within the 

Code's definition of a lesser-included criminal offense." State 

v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 98 (2003) (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, "N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8 does not apply to motor vehicle 

violations, only criminal offenses." State v. Frank, 445 N.J. 

Super. 98, 108 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Stanton, 176 N.J. at 99). 

Nevertheless, motor vehicle violations are "consolidated for 

trial with indicted offenses, not because they are lesser-included 

criminal offenses of the crimes charged in an indictment, but 

because our jurisprudence and Rule 3:15-3(a)(1) require 

consolidation of even Title 39 offenses to avoid double jeopardy 

problems." Stanton, 176 N.J. at 100-01 (citations omitted). Thus, 

"it is appropriate to merge the conviction of an offense and motor 

vehicle violation where their elements and the evidence presented 

to establish these elements correspond." Frank, 445 N.J. Super. 

at 108 (citation omitted). In examining merger, we consider the 

following factors:
11 A-1511-15T2

the time and place of each purported 

violation; whether the proof submitted as to 

one count of the indictment would be a 

necessary ingredient to a conviction under 

another count; whether one act was an integral 

part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent 

of the accused; and the consequences of the 

criminal standards transgressed.

[State v. Allison, 208 N.J. Super. 9, 23-24 

(App. Div. 1985) (quoting State v. Davis, 68 

N.J. 69, 81-82 (1975)).]

Here, because the five above-mentioned motor vehicle 

violations are part of one integral scheme, they should have been 

merged into the second-degree eluding conviction. See e.g., State 

v. Wallace, 313 N.J. Super. 435, 438-39 (App. Div. 1998), aff’d,

158 N.J. 552 (1999). The reckless driving, improper turns, and 

disregarding a traffic control device violations all arose out of 

the same facts and were presented under the same evidence of the 

second-degree eluding conviction, which requires a danger to life. 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-96 ("A person who drives a vehicle heedlessly, in 

willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, in 

a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or 

property."). Indeed, these motor vehicle violations served as a 

factual predicate for the higher degree of eluding conviction. 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to 

amend the judgment of conviction consistent with this opinion.
12 A-1511-15T2

IV.

Lastly, defendant argues the trial judge erred in imposing a 

near-maximum base term sentence with a near-maximum parole 

disqualifier. In particular, defendant avers the trial judge 

applied the wrong standard in imposing a discretionary period of 

parole ineligibility. He further argues the trial judge afforded 

undue weight to aggravating factors three, six, and nine, and 

failed to find mitigating factors one and two. 

Review of the trial court's "sentencing decisions is 

relatively narrow and is governed by an abuse of discretion 

standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010). When 

reviewing a sentence, we consider "whether the trial court has 

made findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably 

credible evidence and whether the 'factfinder [has applied] 

correct legal principles in exercising its discretion.'" Ibid.

(quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984)).

We will not set aside a trial court's sentence "unless: (1) 

the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of 

aggravating and mitigating factors were not 'based upon competent 

credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the 

guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial 

conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65).
13 A-1511-15T2

The trial judge sentenced defendant to nine years, with four 

years of parole ineligibility, for second-degree eluding, 

concurrent to eighteen months for fourth-degree resisting arrest. 

Defendant's argument that the trial judge failed to find 

mitigating factor one and two is without merit. Mitigating factor 

one requires "[t]he defendant's conduct neither caused nor 

threatened serious harm," and mitigating factor two requires 

"[t]he defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause 

or threaten serious harm[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(1) and (2). 

Defendant was convicted of second-degree eluding, which

requires the "flight or attempt to elude created a risk of death 

or injury to any person." Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Eluding 

an Officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b" (rev. Nov. 15, 2004) (emphasis 

added). Certainly risk of serious harm encompasses "risk of death 

or injury to any person." Furthermore, the record demonstrates 

defendant's flight caused potential harm to others, despite his 

contentions no one was at risk of harm. He greatly exceeded posted 

speed limits, made two improper turns, drove recklessly, and left 

the vehicle running and in motion with a passenger inside.

Lastly, defendant's contention the trial judge did not recite 

the proper standard in imposing a near-maximum parole disqualifier 

is also unavailing. While defendant contends the trial judge 

attributed undue weight to aggravating factors three, six, and 
14 A-1511-15T2

nine, he does not assert they are unsupported by the record. Thus, 

the issue is simply whether the aggravating factors substantially 

outweighed the mitigating factors. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) 

("[W]here the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating 

factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, . . . the 

court may fix a minimum term not to exceed . . . one-half of the 

term set pursuant to a maximum period of incarceration for a crime 

. . . ."). In this case, it was within the trial court's sentencing 

discretion to conclude that in this case, the three aggravating 

factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors, so as to 

warrant the imposition of four years of parole ineligibility on a 

nine year sentence.

Affirm in part, reverse and remand for resentencing.