alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32(c)**

 

**The Dayton Powerand Light Company**

** **

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Theundersigned officers of The Dayton Power and Light Company (the “Issuer”)hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Issuer’sQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008,which this certificate accompanies, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the informationcontained therein fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Issuers as of the dates and for theperiods expressed therein.

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, orotherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within theelectronic version of this statement required by Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, has been provided to the Issuer and will beretained by the Issuers and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commissionor its staff upon request.

 

Signed:

 

 
| /s/ Paul M. Barbas                     |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Paul M. Barbas                         |   |
| President  and Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

Date:July 23, 2008

 

Theforegoing certificate is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350and is not being filed as part of the Issuer’s Annual Report or as a separatedisclosure document.

 

----
#### R. E. CORBIN, Appellant, v. RIDGE MANOR PROPERTIES, INC., Appellee.

No. 70-658.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 10, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

A.V. A Child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-708

[February 20, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Luis Delgado, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502018CJ001856A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lindsay A. Warner, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MAY, CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Judith Fannin BATAILLE, Appellant, v. Barbara Jean JOLLY, Appellee.

No. 43762.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 27, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.
**Exhibit 31.2**
CERTIFICATION
I, Amy Vidrine Samson, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 26, 2004 ofCrown Crafts, Inc.;
2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;
3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;
4.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
 (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  (c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):
 (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
Date: February 9, 2005    /s/ Amy Vidrine Samson
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                             124
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   124
<PP&E>                                           8,520
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (8,288)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  81,202
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          802,021
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     1,465,116
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,442,584)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    81,202
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   85,929
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                58,298
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              58,300
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (144,227)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (144,327)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Laura Ann SCHAEFFER, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 01-50319.

D.C. No. CR-00-3651-EJG.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 6, 2002.

Decided Aug. 14, 2002.

Before T.G. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge and PAEZ and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Laura Schaeffer appeals her eighteen-month sentence following her guilty plea to one count of bringing in aliens without presentation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1999).

*1. Minor or Minimal Role*

At sentencing, Schaeffer argued for a downward adjustment for her minor or minimal role under United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3B1.2. The district court denied Schaeffer’s request for a downward adjustment, finding “[t]hat some other person hired her to do the crime, or even as she said in one place, that she did it as a favor for a friend, actually is irrelevant.” In addition to making this factual determination, it also considered the undisputed factual representations contained in the Pre-Sentence Report — that Schaeffer knew that there was an alien concealed in the rear tire compartment of the Honda CRX she was driving; that she was paid $400 to smuggle the illegal alien across the border; and that she was to leave the car at a fast food restaurant without releasing the passenger. Based upon these facts, the district court concluded that Schaeffer “was the *787main player in the crime of conviction

Pursuant to our holding in *United States v. Rojas-Millan,*234 F.3d 464, 473-74 (9th Cir.2000), the district court is required to consider the relevant conduct of other participants in the crime scheme by looking at conduct beyond the defendant’s charged offense. The district court’s statement viewed on this record indicates to us that after considering the conduct of the other participants, it still found Schaeffer to be the “main player.” This factual finding was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Schaef-fer’s request for a downward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

*2. Reckless Endangerment*

Schaeffer asserts that due process demands that the government prove by clear and convincing evidence the applicability of a six-level upward adjustment for reckless endangerment under U.S.S.G. § 2Ll.l(b)(5). We need not decide whether the clear and convincing evidence standard was applicable in this case as the district court considered the enhancement under this heightened evidentiary standard. Thus, no due process violation occurred.

In applying the six-level upward adjustment for reckless endangerment, Schaeffer also contends that the district court erred when it found that Schaeffer’s conduct created a substantial risk of harm, that she acted recklessly, and that she knew of the risk of harm involved. There is ample evidence in the record from which the district court could so conclude. Accordingly, there was no error.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### John Richard GRAY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellees.

No. 3467.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Aug. 20, 1971.

Henry W. Bethard, III, Coushatta, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Jack O. Brittain, Natchitoches, for defendants-appellees.

Before SAVOY, CULPEPPER and MILLER, JJ.

CULPEPPER, Judge.

This is a companion case to Homer Bailes et al. v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company et al., 252 So.2d 123, in which a separate decision is being rendered by us this date. The plaintiff, John Richard Gray, seeks damages for personal injuries which he sustained, and W. Rufus Gray seeks property damages to the automobile which he owned. Made defendants are Roscoe Methvin, father of the minor, James Donald Methvin, and his insurer, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and also Richard R. Hinds, Sr., father of the minor, Richard R. Hinds, Jr. Judgment was rendered in favor of John Richard Gray for the sum of $7,500 and in favor of W. Rufus Gray for the sum of $1,000 against Richard R. Hinds, Sr. only. Plaintiffs have appealed seeking judgment against Methvin and his liability insurer. Also, the plaintiff, John Richard Gray, seeks an increase in his award of $7,500 to at least the sum of $15,000.

For the reasons stated in the companion case, the request for judgment against Methvin and his liability insurer is rejected.

John Richard Gray suffered head injuries consisting of a concussion, fracture of a facial bone and lacerations and contusions ; also a dislocated right knee cap and *129general bruises and contusions of his body which caused temporary kidney and renal problems. He was in a coma following the accident on December 22, 1968 but finally responded to treatment and was released from the hospital on December 28, 1968. Later he returned to the hospital from June 16, 1969, through June 18, 1969, for surgery of the knee. At the time of the accident he was employed at the Town and Country Super Market in Coushatta, earning $89 per week, and he lost a total of 12 weeks’ wages or $1,068.

Apparently the trial judge considered the inability of Richard R. Hinds, Sr. to pay the judgments awarded in these cases as a factor in making a rather low award to John Richard Gray for his injuries. Under all of the circumstances, the award is not an abuse of the great discretion of the trial judge.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs appellants.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2531 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2531

To amend title 38, United States Code, to make permanent the authority 
 of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide transportation to and 
   from Department of Veterans Affairs facilities in connection with 
                vocational rehabilitation or counseling.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 14, 2021

 Mr. Panetta (for himself, Mr. Lieu, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and Mr. Taylor) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                           Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, to make permanent the authority 
 of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide transportation to and 
   from Department of Veterans Affairs facilities in connection with 
                vocational rehabilitation or counseling.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Veterans Earned Transportation Act'' 
or the ``Vets ETA''.

SEC. 2. PERMANENT AUTHORITY FOR SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS TO 
              PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
              AFFAIRS FACILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH VOCATIONAL 
              REHABILITATION OR COUNSELING.

    Section 111A(a) of title 38, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(1) The Secretary'' and inserting ``The 
        Secretary''; and
            (2) by striking paragraph (2).
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENTREGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the RegistrationStatements on Form S-8 (No. 333-113848, No. 333-07785, No. 333-65452,and No. 333-92403) and Form S-3 (No. 333-45294 and No. 333-88540)of A.D.A.M., Inc. (the “Company”) of our report dated March 10, 2006relating to the financial statements of the Company as of and for the yearsended December 31, 2005 and 2004, which appears in this Form 10-KSB.

 

 
| /s/ Tauber & Balser P.C. |   |
|-----------------------------------|--------|
| Atlanta, Georgia                  |
| March 30, 2006               |

 

----
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 21

- 11019 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,**
Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus **Roy Mata,**
Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 6:05

- CR

- 40

- 1

Before **King, Costa,** and **Ho,** Circuit Judges.
**Per Curiam :**  * Roy Mata, federal prisoner # 17159

- 077 , appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release . We review for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Chambliss , 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). We need not consider whether the district court erred by

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 10, 2022 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 21-11019 Document: 00516313815 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/10/2022No. 21

- 11019

2 determining that Mata failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting relief; the district court’s alternative consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors provides a sufficient ba sis for affirmance. See Ward v. United States , 11 F.4th 354, 360

- 62 (5th Cir. 2021) ; Chambliss , 948 F.3d at 693

- 94.
Mata contends that , when the § 3553(a) factors are considered properly, intervening changes in sentencing laws and his record of rehabili tation warrant the reduction of his sentence from life to 30 years of imprisonment. Mata’s mere disagreement with the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors does not warrant reversal. See Chambliss , 948 F.3d at 694

. The motion for appointment of counsel is **DENIED** , and the order of the district court is **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 21-11019 Document: 00516313815 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/10/2022
#### Dave L. PEARCE, Commissioner of Agriculture, ex rel. LIVESTOCK SANITARY BOARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jessie JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3613.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

July 13, 1971.

*568Joel B.- Dickinson, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant.

Preston N. Aucoin, Ville Platte, for defendant-appellee.

Before FRUGÉ, SAVOY, and CUL-PEPPER, JJ.

ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

FRUGÉ, Judge.

This is a suit instituted by the Louisiana Department of Agriculture seeking a mandatory injunction to enjoin the defendant from selling cattle which have not been tested for Brucellosis. After hearing the merits of the case, the trial judge dismissed plaintiff’s suit. Plaintiff has appealed.

The defendant has now filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no judgment has been signed and placed in the record.

A careful search of the record has revealed that, in fact, no formal judgment, separate and apart from the written reasons of the district judge was ever signed or read and rendered in open court in this matter.

A trial judge’s written reasons for judgment do not constitute a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. C.C.P. Article 1918. Fisher v. Rollins, 231 La. 252, 91 So.2d 28 (1956); Anderson v. Nugent, 16 So.2d 282 (La.App. 2nd Cir., 1944); Deason v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 204 So.2d 428 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1967); Abramson v. Piazza, 198 So.2d 565 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1967).

This appeal is premature and must, therefore, be dismissed without prejudice so as to allow a proper judgment to be signed by the district judge.

For the reasons assigned, this appeal is dismissed without prejudice.

Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit 32

 

Certification

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of A.T. Cross Company, a Rhode Island corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:

The Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 4, 2003 (the "Form 10-Q") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
- Correspondence_Rpt_Correspondence_Coversheet[2]
- 2012-12-161 Intitial REQUEST
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000025757
<NAME> CROMPTON & KNOWLES CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-26-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-26-1998
<CASH>                                           8,803
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  288,311
<ALLOWANCES>                                    12,750
<INVENTORY>                                    357,921
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               726,878
<PP&E>                                         476,292
<DEPRECIATION>                                 456,882
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,544,883
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          382,803
<BONDS>                                        811,769
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,733
<OTHER-SE>                                      50,038
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,544,883
<SALES>                                      1,394,324
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,394,324
<CGS>                                          874,156
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,171,816
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (2,602)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 3,533
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              62,034
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                163,076
<INCOME-TAX>                                    60,746
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            102,330
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               (21,468)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    80,862
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.09<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.06
<FN>
<F1>Reflects Basic earnings per share.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### The CITY OF CLEARWATER, Florida, a Municipal Corporation, Picot B. Floyd, City Manager, Joseph Carwise, Karleen DeBlaker, John Rankin and Karen Martin, Commissioners, Gabriel Cazares, Mayor-Commissioner, and Edwin Blanton, Building Official, Appellants, v. FIELD CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.

No. 77-197.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 21, 1977.

Frank X. Kowalski and Marybeth Laval-lee, Asst. City Attys., Clearwater, for appellants.

Michael L. Hastings, of Battaglia, Ross, Stolba & Forlizzo, St. Petersburg, for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

In this action for declaratory judgment and other relief, the lower court entered a final judgment granting plaintiff/appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied. According to the court the defendant/appellant City of Clearwater was es-topped to deny a building permit to appel-lee (a developer) in that appellee had relied to its detriment upon a zoning ordinance which was later changed. We reverse. It cannot be said that appellee met its “ . . . burden of showing conclusively that genuine issues of material fact do not exist.” *Holl v. Talcott,*191 So.2d 40, 47 (Fla.1966); *Tamiami Builders, Inc. v. Smith,*305 So.2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). On the contrary, the record reveals sufficient conflict on material facts as to preclude the entry of summary judgment for the appel-lee.

The order granting summary judgment is therefore reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

McNULTY, A. C. J, and OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.
#### CITY OF MIAMI, Petitioner, v. Alexander R. SAMPSON and the Florida Department of Commerce, Respondents.

No. 42414.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 20, 1972.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.