J-A05040-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

2016 PA Super 85

CONESTOGA BANK, S/B/M/ FIRST PENN 

BANK, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TIOGA INVESTMENTS II, LLC AND YIPYAN WONG,

Appellants No. 1271 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 17, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): March Term, 2013-No. 000381

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 12, 2016

Appellants Tioga Investments II, LLC and Yip-Yan Wong (collectively 

“the Borrowers”) appeal from the Order entered on April 17, 2015, by the 

Honorable Gary S. Glazier in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County denying their Verified Petition to Mark Judgment Satisfied, Released 

and Discharged Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103(d). Upon our review of the 

record, we affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history 

herein as follows: 

[ ] [Conestoga Bank, S/B/M/ First Penn Bank] [“the 

Bank”], loaned funds to [the Borrowers]. The loaned funds were 

secured by a mortgage against five distinct real properties 

located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The complaint-in-
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confession-of-judgment asserts that Borrower[s] defaulted by 

failing to make payments to the Bank when due.1 The Bank 

confessed judgment against Borrower[s] on March 5, 2013, in 

the amount of $739,924.81 (the “Judgment Amount”). On April 

26, 2013, a writ of execution was issued: The writ required the 

Sheriff of Philadelphia County to levy against the aforementioned five mortgaged properties. A sheriff’s auction 

occurred on November 7, 2013, and the Bank acquired the five 

properties for $300,000.00. The five properties acquired by the 

Bank appear to have a combined value inferior to the full 

Judgment Amount of $739,924.81.

***

On August 22, 2014, the Bank received delivery of the 

deed to the five properties from the Sheriff’s Office. This deed, 

however, was incomplete because it did not contain the metes 

and bounds descriptions to some of the properties therein.3

Consequently, the Sheriff of Philadelphia prepared and delivered 

to the Bank a “Corrective Deed” on September 29, 2014. 

Subsequently, the Bank filed a petition to fix the fair market 

value of the property acquired through the Sheriff’s auction.[1] 

Through this petition, the Bank seeks an Order that would fix the 

value of the five properties to an amount in satisfaction of the 

Judgment Amount of $739,932.81. The petition to fix the fair 

market value of the five properties was filed more than six 

months after delivery of the first, incomplete deed, but within six 

months after delivery of the subsequent, corrective deed.

On March 4, 2015, before the Bank filed its petition to fix 

the fair market value of the properties, Borrower[s] filed the 

instant petition to mark the judgment satisfied, released and 

discharged, notwithstanding the deficiency in the value of the 

property as acquired by the Bank. In [their] petition, 

Borrower[s] argue[] that the Bank failed to file the petition to fix 

the real estate value of the property within the statutory period 

of six months, beginning on August 22, 2014- the date of 

delivery of the first, yet incomplete deed. According to 

Borrower[s], the six-month period for filing of the petition began 

to run upon delivery of the first, incomplete deed, and not upon 

delivery of the second, corrective deed. Borrower[s] assert[] 

that the second, corrective deed “does not extend or limit 

____________________________________________

1 The Bank filed its Petition to Establish Fair Market Value of Real Estate 

Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 3281 on March 17, 2015.
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existing record legal title or interest” [;]4therefore, the Bank lost 

its opportunity to establish a judgment deficiency by failing to 

timely file its petition within six months from delivery of the first 

deed. 

____

1 Complaint, ¶ 13.

3 Metes and bounds are defined as “[t]he territorial limits of real 

property as measured by distances and angles from designated 

landmarks and in relation to the adjoining properties.” BLACKS 

LAW DICTIONARY 1005 (7TH ED. 1999). 

4 Brief in support of petition to mark judgment satisfied, released 

and discharged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103(d), p.6 (citing 

72 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103-C.3). 

Trial Court Opinion, filed April 17, 2015, at 1-3. 

On March 24, 2015, the Bank filed its Answer in opposition to the 

Borrowers’ petition to satisfy, and the Borrowers filed a response to the 

Bank’s petition to establish fair market value on April 6, 2015. 

On April 17, 2015, the trial court entered its Order denying the 

Borrowers’ petition to mark judgment satisfied. The Borrowers filed a timely 

notice of appeal on April 21, 2015. In response, the parties agreed that the 

Bank’s petition to establish fair market value would be withdrawn without 

prejudice pending the result of the appellate proceedings.2 

____________________________________________

2 Also in that Order, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the Bank’s 

petition to establish fair market value which was to be held on May 11, 

2015. An appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted 

by statute or rule. McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 788 A.2d 

345 (Pa.Super. 2002). In addition, Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) states: “A final 

order is any order that disposes of all claims and of all parties.” The 

dispositive issue in the Borrowers’ petition is whether or not the Bank timely 

filed its petition to set fair market value; if it has not done so, an order must 

be entered directing the Prothonotary to mark the judgment satisfied. Thus, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court did not direct the Borrowers to file a statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and they did not do 

so. In its Opinion filed on May 12, 2015, the trial court indicated that for the 

reasons contained in its Memorandum Opinion of April 17, 2015, its Order 

entered on that same date should be affirmed. In its April 17, 2015, 

Memorandum Opinion, the trial court noted Pennsylvania permits the 

execution and delivery of a corrective deed. Trial Court Opinion, filed April 

17, 2015, at 4 (citing Pa.R.C.P. 3135(b)).3 Reasoning that “a corrective 

deed is a deed” the trial court, without citation to authority or a detailed 

analysis, found that the Bank was entitled to file its petition for the 

establishment of a fair market value of the properties both within six months 

after delivery of the original deed and within six months after delivery of the 

corrective deed. Id. 

The Borrowers now present the following questions for our review:

1. Did the lower [c]ourt commit an error of law when it 

denied [Borrowers’] Petition to Mark Judgment Satisfied, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

because the appealed order fully resolved all issues in the Borrowers’ 

petition and the Bank withdrew the petition to establish fair market value 

without prejudice pending the resolution on appeal of the Borrower’s petition 

and the May 11, 2015, hearing was never held, the April 17, 2015, Order is 

appealable as it constitutes a final order fully disposing of the Borrowers’ 

petition to mark judgment satisfied released and discharged. 

3 This Rule provides that: “[i]f the sheriff has made a defective return of the 

execution proceeding or has executed a defective deed, including the 

erroneous description of the real estate, the court upon petition of the 

purchaser or the purchaser’s successors in title may correct the return or 

deed or order that a new return or deed be executed.” Pa.R.C.P. 3135(b). 
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Released and Discharged based upon its conclusion that the 

appropriate date from which to calculate the commencement of 

the six month statute of limitations for the filing of a Petition to 

Set Fair Market Value could be either the date of delivery of a 

corrective deed to [the Bank] or the date of delivery of the 

original deed corrected thereby?

2. Did the lower [c]ourt commit an error of law when it 

entered the [a]ppealed Order without first hearing oral 

argument?

Brief of Appellants at 2. 

At the outset, we note that when reviewing deficiency judgment 

proceedings, this Court is limited to determining whether there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the holding of the trial court or whether it committed 

reversible error of law. Bryn Mawr Trust Co. v. Healy, 667 A.2d 719, 721 

(Pa.Super. 1995). 

Herein, the Borrowers assert that the trial court’s April 17, 2015, Order 

denying its petition to mark judgment satisfied should be reversed because 

the Bank did not file its petition to establish fair market value within six 

months of the date upon which the Sheriff delivered the deed to the 

Recorder of Deeds following the real estate Sheriff’s sale. Specifically, the 

Borrowers maintain that the six-month period within which the Bank was 

required to file its petition commenced upon the delivery of the Sheriff’s 

deeds on August 22, 2014, not upon the delivery of the corrective deeds on 

September 29, 2014. In doing so, the Borrowers reason that the corrective 

sheriff’s deed conveyed nothing to the Bank, and in accordance with the 

parties’ clear intention, the August 22, 2014, deed actually and effectively 
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conveyed title to all five of the purchased properties, notwithstanding its 

omissions of certain legal descriptions. Brief for Appellant at 10-12, 13-14. 

The Borrowers’ first contention that the judgments should have been 

marked as satisfied by the trial court because the Bank did not timely file its 

petition to establish fair market value arises under the Deficiency Judgment 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103 which provides in relevant part: 

(a) General rule.—Whenever any real property is sold, directly 

or indirectly, to the judgment creditor in execution proceedings

and the price for which such property has been sold is not 

sufficient to satisfy the amount of the judgment, interest and 

costs and the judgment creditor seeks to collect the balance due 

on said judgment, interest and costs, the judgment creditor shall 

petition the court to fix the fair market value of the real property 

sold. The petition shall be filed as a supplementary proceeding in 

the matter in which the judgment was entered. If the judgment 

was transferred from the county in which it was entered to the 

county where the execution sale was held, the judgment shall be 

deemed entered in the county in which the sale took place.

* * *

(d) Action in absence of petition.—If the judgment creditor 

shall fail to present a petition to fix the fair market value of the 

real property sold within the time after the sale of such real 

property provided by section 5522 (relating to six months 

limitation), the debtor, obligor, guarantor or any other person 

liable directly or indirectly to the judgment creditor for the 

payment of the debt, or any person interested in any real estate 

which would, except for the provisions of this section, be bound 

by the judgment, may file a petition, as a supplementary 

proceeding in the matter in which the judgment was entered, in 

the court having jurisdiction, setting forth the fact of the sale, 

and that no petition has been filed within the time limited by 

section 5522 to fix the fair market value of the property sold, 

whereupon the court, after notice as prescribed by general rule, 

and being satisfied of such facts, shall direct the clerk to mark 

the judgment satisfied, released and discharged.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8103(a), (d).
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The Deficiency Judgment Act, as applicable herein, required the Bank 

to file its petition to fix the fair market value within six months of the date 

upon which the Sheriff delivered the deed, and it is presumed as a matter of 

law that a judgment is satisfied if a judgment creditor fails to proceed under 

the Act within the time mandated by statute. Bryn Mawr, supra at 722. 

The six-month deadline derives from 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5522 which states a sixmonth statute of limitations is applicable to judicial sales: 

(b) Commencement of action required.--The following 

actions and proceedings must be commenced within six months:

[...]

(2) A petition for the establishment of a deficiency judgment 

following execution and delivery of the sheriff's deed for the 

property sold in connection with the execution proceedings 

referenced in the provisions of section 8103(a) (relating to 

deficiency judgments). 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5522(b)(2). 

As indicated supra, the Bank filed its petition to establish fair market 

value on March 17, 2015, which was more than six months after the sheriff’s 

deed omitting metes and bounds descriptions for three of the mortgaged 

properties and lacking BRT4 numbers initially was delivered on August 22, 

2014, but within six months of when the corrective deed which included this 

missing information was delivered on September 29, 2014. As the Sheriff 

____________________________________________

4 BRT refers to Board of Revision of Taxes Numbers which are assigned to 

real estate located in Philadelphia County. 
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delivered a deed twice herein, this Court must determine from which date 

the six-month time period began to run. Our research has not revealed, nor 

has the trial court or the parties identified, any legal authority addressing a 

similar scenario; thus, we look to the plain language of the relevant 

statutory provisions, and the principles set forth in the Statutory 

Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501–1991, to guide our resolution of this 

issue.

The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate 

the intention of the General Assembly while also construing each statute to 

give effect to all of its provisions. Notwithstanding, when the words of the 

statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, we will not disregard the letter 

of the law under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Centolanza v. Lehigh 

Valley Dairies, Inc., 658 A.2d 336, 339 (Pa. 1995). 

It is well-established precedent that the date of sale for purposes of 

the six-month statute of limitations under the Deficiency Judgment Act is the 

date of delivery of the sheriff’s deed. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5522(b)(2); Bryn 

Mawr, supra 667 A.2d at 772. See also Marx Realty & Imp. Co. v. 

Boulevard Center, Inc., 156 A.2d 827, 830 (Pa. 1959) (stating that since 

the Deficiency Judgment Act “requires giving credit on the judgment to the 

extent of the fair value, no bidder has anything from which to give credit 

until he gets title, and hence no sale to him can be said to have taken place 

until a deed is delivered). A plain reading of Section 5522(b)(2) reveals it 
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does not specifically differentiate between dates of delivery of an incomplete 

deed and a corrective deed, but rather anticipates the delivery of a single 

one as is evident in its reference to the “execution and delivery of the

sheriff’s deed for the property sold in connection with the execution 

proceedings” (emphasis added). Borrowers assert that the date of delivery 

of the corrective deed is “entirely irrelevant” to a consideration of the six (6) 

month limitations period of Section Pa.C.S.A. 5522(b)(2), and reasons that 

the use of the article “the” rather than “a” denotes a single incident such 

that the trial court erroneously determined the six month time period began 

to run from the date of either the sheriff’s deed or the corrective deed. 

Brief of Appellants at 12, 15. 

Contrary to this rationale, the Legislature specifically contemplated a 

“deed for the property sold.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5522(b)(2). A deed is the 

principal method by which to convey real estate in Pennsylvania and the 

term “denotes an instrument in writing, signed, sealed and delivered by the 

grantor whereby an interest in realty is transferred from the grantor to the 

grantee.” Mountain Properties v. Tyler Hill Realty, 767 A.2d 1096, 1099 

(Pa.Super. 2001) (citation omitted). It is well-settled that if a legal 

description found in a deed is not completely technically accurate or by 

metes and bounds, it must, nevertheless, be clear and sufficiently precise to 

enable a surveyor to locate and identify the property referenced therein. 

Dickson v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, 423 A.2d 711, 
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712-713 (Pa.Super. 1980). In addition, pursuant to 21 Pa.C.S. § 10.1, 

entitled “Uniform parcel identifier; conveyances, mortgages, releases, and 

other instruments,” real estate may be conveyed only pursuant to a deed 

containing a uniform parcel identifier and either a metes and bounds 

description or a lot number reference to a recorded subdivision plan. 21 

Pa.C.S. § 10.1(1),(2). Moreover, it is noteworthy that our Supreme Court 

has stressed the description of a parcel of property is crucial in a conveyance 

of land through a tax sale and held that a sale is not valid unless both the 

assessment and the treasurer’s deed contain sufficient descriptions to 

identify and disclose the property taxed and sold. Bannard v. New York 

State Natural Gas Corp., 293 A.2d 41, 46 (Pa. 1972). 

While two sheriff’s deeds were delivered herein, the August 22, 2014, 

deed delineated a metes and bounds description of Parcels “A” and “B” only 

and omitted a metes and bounds description and lot number reference for 

parcels “C,” “D,” and “E.” In contrast, the sheriff’s deed delivered on 

September 29, 2014, contained a complete description of and BRT numbers 

for all five properties the Bank had acquired in connection with the execution 

proceedings to enable a surveyor to locate the property that was the subject 

of the sheriff’s sale. Moreover, the latter deed is entitled “Deed of 
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Correction” and bears a separate Instrument Number than that assigned to 

the August 22, 2014, sheriff’s deed.5

We are cognizant that the purpose of the Deficiency Judgment Act is:

to protect debtors after their property was foreclosed. The act 

was aimed at shielding the mortgagor-debtor from the 

mortgagee who would purchase the mortgaged property for less 

than fair market value, usually for cost, and then reduce the 

debt only by the purchase price. Prior to the Deficiency 

Judgment Act, the judgment creditor often recovered the 

property and the full amount of the debt. The Deficiency 

Judgment Act prevented this by requiring the judgment creditor 

to reduce the debt by the fair market value of the property. 

Fidelity Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass’n v. Capponi, 684 A.2d 580, 586 

(Pa.Super. 1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Prior to 

September 29, 2014, the Bank had not obtained clear title to “the property 

sold,” for the deeds lacked descriptions for three properties and the required 

BRT numbers, thus necessitating the delivery of the corrective deed. This 

corrective deed was not merely supplementary of the August 22, 2014, 

instrument, but was delivered “to add missing portion of legal” as the 

notation on both the Realty Transfer Tax Statement of Value and the 

Philadelphia Real Estate Transfer Tax Certification forms indicates.6 As such, 

____________________________________________

5 While the August 22, 2014, deed was filed at Instrument No. 52819798, 

the September 29, 2014, Deed of Correction was filed at Instrument No. 

52833256. 

6

It can never be supposed that it was the meaning of the parties, 

that a valuable consideration should be paid for a defective title. 

“The obvious and plain rule,” says Yeates, J., in Steinhauer v. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the August 22, 2014, sheriff’s deed was inoperative since it in no way 

complied with the aforesaid legal principles that a deed must adequately 

describe the subject property. Because the August 22, 2014, sheriff’s deed 

did not contain a sufficient description of all five properties which were to 

have been conveyed to the Bank, it was a legal nullity. 

It is also noteworthy that this Court has stated “courts faced with 

determining the precise date on which the six-month period began have 

followed the Marx rule, only carving out an exception where the executing 

creditor’s delay in obtaining delivery of the deed is inexcusable.” Fidelity 

Bank, N.A. v. Bourger, 663 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa.Super. 1995). There is no 

evidence in the record of the Bank’s dilatory conduct in procuring the 

issuance of a complete deed for the property sold. In fact, the Sheriff 

prepared both of the deeds at issue, promptly corrected the errors contained 

therein and delivered the corrective deed five weeks later. The parties may 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Witman, 1 S. & R. 446, “is, what was the true meaning of the 

contracting parties? Was it contemplated mutually, that the 

purchaser should hold the land under a good right, or that he 

should run his chance of getting a title, and be exposed to all 

hazards.” The sheriff's writ commands him to levy on the 

property of the defendant, and he has no right to put up to sale 

or dispose of a mere pretence or shadow of title. It would be a 

dangerous doctrine to say that every purchaser is bound by his 

bid, though it turns out immediately after, that nothing can be 

conveyed by the sheriff. No person would bid at sheriffs' sales on 

such terms.

Friedly v. Scheetz, 1822 WL 2005, at *3 (Pa. 1822).
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henceforth engage in proceedings to determine the fair market value of the 

real properties and thereby determine the Borrower’s remaining liability, if 

any.

In light of the foregoing, we find that under the circumstances 

presented herein, the trial court’s decision the Bank, as a creditor, was 

entitled to file a petition to establish fair market value within six months 

after the Sheriff’s delivery of the corrective deed on September 29, 2014, is 

consistent with the Act. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8103(a), (d), 5522(b)(2)7 It 

follows that the Bank’s petition filed on March 17, 2015, was timely, and, as 

a result, the trial court did not err in denying the Borrowers’ petition to mark 

judgment satisfied, released and discharged. 

The Borrowers also contend the trial court erred in deciding their 

petition to mark the judgment satisfied, released and discharged without 

first hearing oral argument. Relying upon Pa.R.C.P. 211 and local rules of 

civil procedure which they explain fail to establish a prescribed procedure for 

requesting oral argument, Borrowers contend that the default position is that 

oral argument is required on all motions. 

____________________________________________

7 This Court may affirm an order of the trial court on any basis. 

Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep’t of Wilkinsburg, 345 A.2d 641 (Pa. 

1975).
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It is well-settled in this Commonwealth that parties to a civil action 

generally have the right to orally argue motions. Pa.R.C.P. 211.8 While the 

Borrowers point out the failure of local rules to delineate clearly the 

procedure for requesting oral argument on a petition or motion, they 

nowhere specifically indicate in their appellate brief that they actually wished 

and attempted to make such a request. Also, a review of the Verified 

Petition to Mark Judgment Satisfied, Released and Discharged Pursuant to 

42 Pa.C.S.A. 8103(d) does not reveal such a request.9 Therefore, we 

conclude the Borrowers may not predicate error upon the trial court's failure 

to require oral argument prior to disposing of their petition, as the trial court 

properly may dispose of a motion without first hearing argument. See

Godlewski v. Pars Mfg. Co., 597 A.2d 106, 108 (Pa.Super. 1991)

Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________

8 Effective January 1, 2016, this rule was amended to read as follows: “Any 

interested party may request oral argument on a motion. The court may 

require oral argument, whether or not requested by a party. The court may 

dispose of any motion without oral argument.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 211. 

9

In the “WHEREFORE clause,” Borrowers respectfully requested only that 

the trial court “enter an order directing the Prothonotary to mark the 

Judgment satisfied, released and discharged.” See Verified Petition to Mark 

Judgment Satisfied, Released and Discharged Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

8103(d) at ¶ 3. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2016