13-2742 (L)

13-2747 (CON) and 13-2748 (CON)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

MONIQUE SYKES, et al., individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

MEL S. HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES LLC, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

MEL HARRIS JOHN/JANE DOES 1-20, et al.,

Defendants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRIEF FOR THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN

General Counsel

JOHN F. DALY

Deputy General Counsel for Litigation

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

November 13, 2013

MEREDITH FUCHS

General Counsel

TO-QUYEN TRUONG

Deputy General Counsel

DAVID M. GOSSETT

Assistant General Counsel

SARANG VJIAY DAMLE

Senior Counsel

JESSICA RANK DIVINE

Attorney 

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

1700 G Street NW 

Washington DC 20552

(202) 435-7069

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

GLOSSARY

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 1

STATEMENT........................................................................................................................ 3

I. Statutory Background ..................................................................................... 3

II. Factual and Procedural Background ............................................................. 5

ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................... 8

There Is No Blanket Immunity From FDCPA Liability For Conduct 

Directed To Third Parties.......................................................................................... 8

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 24

CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE

STATUTORY ADDENDUM

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Allen v. LaSalle Bank, N.A.,

629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011)....................................................................................... 19, 22

Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. RJNJ Services, Inc.,

932 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011)............................................................... 14

Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, LLC,

505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) ...............................................................................19, 22, 23

Gagen v. Kipany Productions Ltd,,

735 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2001)............................................................... 14

Goldman v. Cohen,

445 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2006)............................................................................................. 11

Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC,

499 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................... 22

Heintz v. Jenkins,

514 U.S. 291 (1995) ..............................................................................................11, 15, 17

Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A.,

674 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................... 10, 18

Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC,

717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013)............................................................................................. 12

Hubbard v. United States,

514 U.S. 695 (1995) .......................................................................................................... 21

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,

559 U.S. 573 (2010) ...................................................................................................passim

Keele v. Wexler,

149 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 1998) ......................................................................................... 3, 4

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Kropelnicki v. Siegel,

290 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2002) .................................................................................... 21, 22

Lewis v. City of Chicago,

130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010)...................................................................................................... 15

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,

547 U.S. 71 (2006) ............................................................................................................ 12

Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,

508 U.S. 248 (1993) .......................................................................................................... 15

O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC,

635 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 19, 20

Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc.,

886 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989)........................................................................................passim

Romea v. Heiberger & Associates,

163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998)............................................................................................. 11

Rusello v. United States,

464 U.S. 16 (1983) ............................................................................................................ 13

Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson,

485 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................... 19, 22

See Todd v. Collecto, Inc.,,

732 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................................... 13, 21

Volden v. Innovative Fin. Sys.,

440 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................... 18

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ..................................................................................................... 1, 3

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b-1692j ...................................................................................................... 4

15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)............................................................................................................. 13

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15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)............................................................................................................... 16

15 U.S.C. § 1692e...........................................................................................................passim

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1)-(16)....................................................................................................... 4

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8)......................................................................................................... 2, 12

15 U.S.C. § 1692f...........................................................................................................passim

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1)-(8)......................................................................................................... 4

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5) ....................................................................................................... 12, 13

15 U.S.C. § 1692k ............................................................................................................. 1, 15

15 U.S.C. § 1692l .............................................................................................................. 1, 16 

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3215(f).......................................................................................................... 6

Rules

Fed. R. App. P. 23(f).............................................................................................................. 8

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (6)............................................................................................ 1

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B).................................................................................................... 1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.................................................................................................................. 17

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f)................................................................................................................ 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(a) ............................................................................................................... 1

Other Authorities

Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848 (Nov. 12, 2013)............................ 4

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Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 2010: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(2010).................................................................................................................................... 4

Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 2011: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(2011).................................................................................................................................... 4

Heintz v. Jenkins,

No. 94-367, 1994 WL 706068 (1994)............................................................................. 17

Jerman v. Carlisle,

No. 08-1200, 2009 WL 4247965 (2009)......................................................................... 17

S. Rep. No. 95–382 (1977) .................................................................................................. 14

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GLOSSARY

Bureau Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Commission Federal Trade Commission

FDCPA Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

Harris Br. Br. for Appellants Mel S. Harris and Assoc. LLC, et al., 

Dkt. 54 

Leucadia Br. Br. for Appellants Leucadia Nat’l Corp., et al., Dkt. 43 

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INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(a), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

respectfully submits this brief to address the scope of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.1 The Bureau is joined in this brief by the 

Federal Trade Commission.

The Bureau and Commission have significant regulatory authority with respect 

to the Act. Together with other federal agencies, the Bureau and Commission

enforce the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l. In addition, the Bureau has authority to issue 

advisory opinions interpreting the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e). Congress also 

granted the Bureau authority to “prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts 

by debt collectors”—a power no agency previously had. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d). The 

Bureau and Commission therefore have a substantial interest in ensuring the proper 

interpretation of the Act. 

Defendants ask this Court to adopt a sweeping exclusion from the FDCPA’s 

coverage for “communications made either to third parties not affiliated with the 

debtors that the statute seeks to protect, or in circumstances otherwise having no 

chance of debtor deception.” See Leucadia Br. at 35. But the plain text of the two 

provisions of the Act most directly at issue here, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f, 

contains no such limitation. Section 1692e states that “[a] debt collector may not use 

 1 The government expresses no view here regarding the class certification issues 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 

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any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt.” Section 1692f provides, without limitation, that “a debt 

collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect 

any debt.” Neither provision limits itself to communications to debtors. In fact, 

defendants’ reading is contradicted by, among other provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8), 

which prohibits as a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means” of 

collecting a debt, the act of “[c]ommunicating . . . to any person credit information 

which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to 

communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” This provision plainly protects 

consumers from debt collectors who provide false credit information to third parties

such as credit reporting agencies. 

Defendants’ effort to cabin the plain sweep of this language through invocation 

of the Act’s consumer-protection purposes falls wide of the mark. As this Court has 

stressed, “courts are not at liberty to excuse violations [of the FDCPA] where the 

language of the statute clearly comprehends them.” Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, 

Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1989). 

Indeed, the Act’s purposes would be disserved through a reading that bars 

injured consumers from recovering against unscrupulous debt collectors simply 

because those debt collectors directed their misconduct at someone other than the 

consumers themselves. Moreover, the case law on which plaintiffs rely has either 

been substantially limited by later cases or is incorrect.

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PERTINENT STATUTES

Pertinent statutes are reproduced in the addendum. 

STATEMENT

I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to eliminate “abusive debt collection 

practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from 

using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to 

promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 

Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 802, 91 Stat. 874, 874 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692); see 

also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 577 (2010). 

Congress found that such abuses had “contribute[d] to the number of personal 

bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual 

privacy.” Id. § 802(a). It also determined that “[e]xisting laws and procedures for 

redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.” Id. § 802(b). The 

FDCPA focuses on improper collection practices and does not distinguish between 

debts that are actually owed and those that are not. See, e.g., id. § 1692e; § 1692f; see 

also Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he FDCPA is designed to 

protect consumers from the unscrupulous antics of debt collectors, irrespective of 

whether a valid debt actually exists.”).”

Improper collection practices continue to be of significant concern today. For 

many years, the Commission has received more consumer complaints about the debt 

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collection industry than any other. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 

67848, 67851 (Nov. 12, 2013) (advanced notice of proposed rulemaking).

2

 And since 

July 1, 2013, about thirty percent of all consumer complaints the Bureau has received 

have been about the debt collection industry. Ibid. 

The FDCPA is a key federal statute protecting these consumers. To effectuate 

its purposes, the Act prohibits a broad range of practices pertaining to the collection 

of consumer debts by debt collectors. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b-1692j. Two 

such prohibitions are most relevant here. First, the Act prohibits the use of “any 

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Second, the Act prohibits the use of 

“unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Id. 

§ 1692f. Both of these provisions also set forth specific examples of conduct that 

violate the general bans. Id. § 1692e(1)-(16); § 1692f(1)-(8).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

1. This is a class-action lawsuit brought by consumers against a group of

affiliated debt-buying companies, their outside law firm and certain of its attorneys, 

 2 See also Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 2011: Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act 4 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110321fairdebt

collectreport.pdf; Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 2010: Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act 4 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/

P104802fdcpa2010annrpt.pdf. 3 The factual discussion is drawn from the district court’s class certification

opinion, SA2-SA11, and the allegations in plaintiffs’ third amended complaint, JA140. 

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and a process serving agency and its employees. SA3-SA4. Plaintiffs allege that 

defendants engaged in an unlawful scheme to obtain default judgments against the 

plaintiffs in debt-collection actions in New York City civil court. SA4-SA6. After 

obtaining these default judgments, the defendants were able to (among other things) 

freeze plaintiffs’ bank accounts and garnish their wages. JA161.

According to plaintiffs, the scheme operated in the following manner: The 

debt buyers and law firm defendants jointly purchased large portfolios of defaulted 

debts. SA4; JA161; JA165. They then filed over 124,000 debt-collection actions over 

a three-year period in New York City civil court. SA6. The company hired to serve 

process on the putative debtors, however, frequently failed to properly execute 

service, instead engaging in what is colloquially known as “sewer service.” See SA5-

SA7; JA162. When the debtors failed to appear in court, defendants moved for 

default judgment. See generally JA162-JA166. Under New York law, a court may issue 

a default judgment only if the plaintiff provides “proof of service,” generally in the 

form of an affidavit from the process server, and “proof of the facts constituting the 

claim, the default and the amount due,” which can be supplied via an “affidavit of 

merit.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3215(f); see also SA5; JA160. 

According to plaintiffs, the affidavits the defendants filed to satisfy these 

requirements were false. SA5. In the affidavits of service, the process servers

“claim[ed] to have served [debtors] with legal process when they ha[d] not, in fact, 

done so.” JA163. Plaintiffs explain that “although defendants secure default 

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judgments in tens of thousands of lawsuits every year, service of process in the 

majority of those lawsuits is allegedly done by only a handful of individual process 

servers.” Ibid. Indeed, the district court found that “[r]ecords maintained by 

defendants reveal hundreds of instances of the same process server executing service 

at two or more locations at the same time,” and “many other occasions where 

multiple services were purportedly made so close in time that it would have been 

impossible for the process server to travel from one location to the other as claimed.” 

SA6-SA7. 

Furthermore, plaintiffs allege that the other defendants should have known that 

the service affidavits provided by the process servers were false. JA163. According to 

plaintiffs, defendants were “required to review each and every affidavit of service” 

before it is filed with the court, and so defendants would have been aware that a

“small number of individual process servers” could not possibly have “serve[d] [such] 

an astoundingly large number of defendants.” Ibid. Indeed, plaintiffs allege that the 

debt buyers and law firms “knowingly promot[ed] the use of false affidavits of 

service” by paying the process server company “no more than $20 per completed 

service, of which the individual process servers received only $3 to $6,” JA163, and by 

declining to make any payment for unsuccessful service attempts. JA157; JA162-

JA163; see also JA154-JA155 (noting a 1986 New York state report had “concluded 

that low pay for process servers was the primary cause of sewer service”).

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Plaintiffs allege that the affidavits of merit were also false. SA5. Each of the 

affidavits of merit was drafted by a single affiant, and stated that the affiant 

“‘maintain[ed] the daily records and accounts in the regular course of business, 

including records maintained by and obtained [from the] assignor,’” and was “‘thereby 

fully and personally familiar with, and [had] personal knowledge of, the facts and 

proceedings relating to the within action.’” JA164-JA165; SA7-SA8. But according to 

plaintiffs, the affidavits were “purposely drafted in this manner in order to give court 

personnel the impression that [the debt collectors] have met the statutory 

requirements for obtaining a default judgment, when in fact, [they] have not and 

cannot meet these requirements.” JA165-JA166. Indeed, the district court found that 

the affiant “sign[ed] hundreds of affidavits a week, purportedly based on personal 

knowledge, purporting to certify that the action has merit, without actually having 

reviewed any credit agreements, promissory notes, or underlying documents, and, 

indeed, without even reading what he was signing.” SA11. 

2. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, 

alleging that the above scheme violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and § 1692f. 

JA207. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the federal Racketeering Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act and state law. JA208-JA218. 

The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the FDCPA (and 

other) claims, and later granted class certification. JA103; SA1. In denying the motion 

to dismiss the FDCPA claims, the district court (as relevant here) explained that the 

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alleged conduct was “false, deceptive or misleading” under § 1692e, and “unfair or 

unconscionable” under § 1692f. JA118-JA120. The district court explained that 

“[p]laintiffs do not merely allege that the . . . defendants ‘lack physical evidence of the 

debt,’ but that they knowingly authorized [the filing of] false affidavits of merit—

misleading both the Civil Court and consumer-defendants—to secure default 

judgments.” JA119-JA120. 

3. This case is now on interlocutory appeal from the district court’s classcertification decision under Fed. R. App. P. 23(f).

ARGUMENT

THERE IS NO BLANKET IMMUNITY FROM FDCPA LIABILITY FOR 

CONDUCT DIRECTED TO THIRD PARTIES.

The consumer plaintiffs here allege that the debt-collector defendants

employed unlawful means to obtain default judgments against consumers in statecourt debt-collection actions, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. According 

to plaintiffs, defendants failed to serve consumers with process, but nevertheless filed 

affidavits falsely asserting that such service was made. And the defendants also

allegedly filed affidavits of merit falsely asserting that the affiant was “fully and 

personally familiar” with the facts constituting the claim.

This matter is currently before this court on interlocutory appeal from the 

district court’s class certification decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f); JA427. Although

the bulk of the parties’ briefing is devoted to addressing whether the class-certification 

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standards of Rule 23 have been met, the government expresses no interest in those 

matters. Rather, the government’s interest in this matter relates to particular 

arguments defendants have made regarding the legal scope of the FDCPA, and our 

participation in this matter is simply to apprise the Court of the Bureau and 

Commission’s view of that specific issue. 

In particular, defendants urge that the Act does not apply at all to

“communications made either to third parties not affiliated with the debtors that the 

statute seeks to protect, or in circumstances otherwise having no chance of debtor 

deception.” See Leucadia Br. at 35; see also Harris Br. at 40 (“[C]ommunications made 

to persons other than the consumer, at least where the consumer did not ‘stand in the 

shoes’ of the recipient, are not actionable under the FDCPA.”). Applying that theory

here, defendants urge that any deception was perpetrated only on the New York City 

civil court, and not the consumer. Leucadia Br. at 15; Harris Br. at 20. 

As explained below, defendants’ reading of the Act is incorrect. But as an 

initial matter, their assertion that the alleged conduct here was not “directed at 

consumers” and that there was “no chance of debtor deception” is flawed. See Harris 

Br. at 43; Leucadia Br. at 35. In the ordinary course of civil litigation, submissions to 

a court must also be served on the opposing party. See 22 N.Y. COMPL. CODES R. &

REGS. tit. 22, § 208.4 (“every paper filed in court shall have annexed thereto 

appropriate proof of service on all parties where required”); Hemmingsen v. Messerli & 

Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]hough rarely made 

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‘directly’ to the consumer debtor,” representations by debt collector lawyers in court 

“routinely come to the consumer’s attention and may affect his or her defense of a 

collection claim”). Anticipating this point, the law firm defendants urge that the false 

affidavits were “not even seen by [the consumers] before entry of the default 

judgment.” Harris Br. at 43. But this point only underscores the implausibility of 

defendants’ claim that any misconduct was directed only to the court: to the extent 

that the falsehoods here were not seen by anyone other than the court, it is because of 

another aspect of the misconduct—one that was unquestionably “directed at” 

consumers: the failure to properly serve those consumers with legal process. Indeed, 

taken as a whole, the alleged scheme is best understood as having been directed at 

consumers rather than the court, since it is the consumers who were ultimately 

injured, albeit via fraud on the court. 

In any event, even accepting arguendo defendants’ understanding that any

misconduct here was “directed at” the state court and not at consumers, the

contention that such misconduct is immune from FDCPA liability is mistaken. 

1. As relevant here, plaintiffs raise claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. 

See JA118-JA120. Section 1692e states that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of 

any debt.” Section 1692f provides that “a debt collector may not use unfair or 

unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 

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This language is purposefully expansive. As this Court has explained, “[i]t is 

clear that Congress painted with a broad brush in the FDCPA to protect consumers 

from abusive and deceptive debt collection practices.” Pipiles, 886 F.2d at 27; see also 

Jerman, 559 U.S. at 602 (highlighting the FDCPA’s “broadly worded prohibitions on 

debt collector misconduct”). Thus, “courts are not at liberty to excuse violations 

where the language of the statute clearly comprehends them.” Pipiles, 886 F.2d at 27; 

see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1995) (declining to “read the statute as 

containing an implied exemption for those debt-collecting activities of lawyers that 

consist of litigating”); Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the 

“plain language of the FDCPA”); Romea v. Heiberger & Associates, 163 F.3d 111, 118 

(2d Cir. 1998) (declining to “disregard the plain language of the FDCPA”). 

Properly understood in accordance with their plain language, the provisions at 

issue here apply to the conduct alleged in this case even if, in some sense, that

conduct was directed at a third party. First, there is no textual basis for limiting 

Sections 1692e and 1692f, as defendants urge, to conduct “directed at” a consumer. 

Nor is there any textual basis for excluding conduct that is only meant to deceive or 

mislead a state court or other third party. On its face, Section 1692e broadly prohibits 

the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with

the collection of any debt.” Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 

U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (giving the phrase “in connection with” a “broad interpretation”). 

Similarly, Section 1692f bars, without limitation, “unfair or unconscionable means” of 

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collecting debts. Neither provision contains any requirement that the relevant 

misconduct be directed at the consumer. 

Second, defendants’ contention that the Act excludes “communications made 

. . . to third parties not affiliated with the debtors that the statute seeks to protect,” 

Leucadia Br. at 35, is contradicted by some of the specific examples of unlawful 

conduct listed in Sections 1692e and 1692f. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) 

prohibits as a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means” the act of 

“[c]ommunicating . . . to any person credit information which is known or which should 

be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is 

disputed.” This provision thus protects consumers from false communications made 

to third parties, including (for example) credit reporting agencies. See Hooks v. Forman, 

Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that under 

§ 1692e(8) “once a debt has been disputed, a debt collector cannot communicate the 

debtor consumer’s credit information to others without disclosing the dispute” 

(emphasis added)). Similarly, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5) provides that it is “unfair or 

unconscionable” for a debtor to “caus[e] charges [such as collect-call charges] to be 

made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose of the 

call.” See Todd v. Collecto, Inc., 732 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2013) (relying in part on 

§ 1692f(5) to conclude that “the reach of § 1692f is readily apparent, and we conclude 

that anyone aggrieved by a debt collector’s unfair or unconscionable collection 

practices can fall within the provision’s zone of interest”). 

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Third, other FDCPA provisions are expressly limited to communications 

received by a consumer. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a) (providing that “a debt 

collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of 

any debt” in certain circumstances (emphasis added)). “[W]here Congress includes 

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 

same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 

the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In sum, even assuming that the alleged conduct here was not directed at 

consumers, see supra pp. 9-10, it unquestionably falls within the plain language of

Sections 1692e and 1692f. As alleged, defendants perpetrated fraud on a massive 

scale to obtain tens of thousands of default judgments against consumers in debtcollection actions without having to defend or substantiate the merits of their claims 

as required by New York state law.

4

 The allegations thus unambiguously state a claim 

that defendants used “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 

connection with the collection of any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, and also used “unfair 

 4 New York courts have explained that “the granting of a default judgment 

does not become a ‘mandatory ministerial duty’ upon a defendant’s default” and that 

“the plaintiff must present some proof of liability so that the reviewing court can 

determine that the ‘prima facie validity’ of the uncontested cause of action has been 

established.” Gagen v. Kipany Productions Ltd, 735 N.Y.S.2d 225, 227-28 (App. Div. 3d 

Dep’t 2001); see Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. RJNJ Services, Inc., 932 N.Y.S.2d 109, 111 (App. 

Div. 2d Dep’t 2011) (holding that plaintiff had failed to satisfy this requirement).

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or unconscionable means to collect . . . any debt,” id. § 1692f. Cf. S. Rep. No. 95–382 

at 1, 4, 7 (describing debt collection abuse as including “simulating legal process” and

“simulating court process,” and indicating that “utilizing bogus legal documents” is 

prohibited).

2. Defendants make no effort to explain why the conduct alleged here does 

not fall within the plain text of Sections 1692e and 1692f. Indeed, defendants’ briefs 

contain no discussion of Section 1692f, which in and of itself provides an 

independent basis for FDCPA liability on the facts alleged here. Defendants

nevertheless claim that the Act contains an implied and categorical exclusion for all 

“communications made either to third parties not affiliated with the debtors that the 

statute seeks to protect, or in circumstances otherwise having no chance of debtor 

deception.” See Leucadia Br. at 35. That argument lacks merit. 

a. Defendants argue that allowing plaintiffs to obtain recovery under the Act 

for misconduct directed at third parties would not further the Act’s consumerprotection purposes. Leucadia Br. at 35; Harris Br. at 40. That claim fails to advance 

defendants’ position. 

First, where (as here) the statutory language is clear, a court may not “rewrite 

the statute so that it covers only what [it] think[s] . . . Congress really intended.” Lewis 

v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2010). “[V]ague notions of a statute’s ‘basic 

purpose’ are . . . inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific 

issue under consideration.” Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993). 

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Thus, as this Court has explained in the context of the FDCPA, “[w]e are not at 

liberty to substitute a view different from that expressed by Congress in the legislative 

enactment.” Pipiles, 886 F.2d at 27. Absent any textual basis for reading Sections 

1692e and 1692f to exclude communications to third parties, defendants’ contention 

that such an exclusion would be consonant with the Act’s purposes is simply beside 

the point. Cf. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295-96 (declining to “read the statute as containing 

an implied exemption for those debt-collecting activities of lawyers that consist of 

litigating”).

Second, contrary to defendants’ suggestion, reading Sections 1692e and 1692f 

as written to encompass communications to third parties does protect the consumer, 

and far more effectively than the reading defendants propose.5 For instance, the 

Supreme Court has made clear that conduct in debt-collection litigation is subject to 

the Act’s prohibitions. See Heintz, 514 U.S. at 299. On defendants’ view, however,

debt collectors may obtain a blanket immunity from those prohibitions simply by 

failing to serve process on the consumer and thus keeping the consumer ignorant of 

any misconduct, or by claiming that the misconduct was directed at the court rather 

than at the consumer. It is difficult to fathom how such a result serves the Act’s 

 5 Contrary to defendants’ suggestion (see, e.g., Leucadia Br. at 35), consumers are 

not the only intended beneficiaries of the Act’s protections. This is evident in 

§ 1692k(a), which provides that “any debt collector who fails to comply with any 

provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person.” 

(emphasis added). 

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purposes. Moreover, defendants’ view “would give a competitive advantage to debt 

collectors who press the boundaries of lawful conduct,” Jerman, 559 U.S. at 602, and

would thus run contrary to Congress’s goal of “insur[ing] that those debt collectors 

who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 

disadvantaged.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 

In addition, acceptance of defendants’ theory would not simply hinder 

consumers’ own efforts to obtain redress through private civil actions. The 

enforcement authority of the Bureau, the Commission, and other federal agencies 

under the FDCPA depends on the existence of a violation of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692l(a)-(c). If communications with third parties were categorically outside the 

Act’s purview, the FDCPA would not authorize governmental enforcement no matter 

how egregious the conduct.

b. Narrowing their focus to misconduct directed specifically to courts, 

defendants posit that “[s]tate courts and state bars are perfectly capable of policing the 

conduct of lawyers and the adequacy of state-court filings without the intervention of 

the FDCPA.” Harris Br. at 42; see also Leucadia Br. at 37-38. But the FDCPA 

provides an independent federal cause of action for violations of its provisions, and 

that cause of action exists even where other laws or ethical standards also bar the 

same conduct. Thus, “courts are not at liberty to excuse violations [of the FDCPA] 

where the language of the statute clearly comprehends them.” Pipiles, 886 F.2d at 27.

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Indeed, this same argument has now twice been raised and dismissed by the 

Supreme Court. In Heintz v. Jenkins, the Court held that the FDCPA “applies to 

attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that 

activity consists of litigation.” 514 U.S. at 299. The Court rejected the claim that 

“Congress intended, silently and implicitly, to create a . . . broad[] exception, for all 

litigating attorneys, from the Act itself.” 514 U.S. at 297. In reaching that conclusion, 

the Court gave no weight to the debt collector’s argument that Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 

its state-law equivalents “already regulate the type of litigation activity challenged by 

Jenkins’ complaint” and that such rules “are the appropriate method of regulating the 

type of misconduct claimed by Jenkins.” Br. for Pet’rs, Heintz v. Jenkins, No. 94-367, 

1994 WL 706068, at *20-*21 (1994). Similarly, in Jerman v. Carlisle, the Court held that 

an attorney could be held liable under the FDCPA for conduct in litigation even when 

that conduct is based on a reasonable mistake of law. 559 U.S. at 581. The Court 

again rejected an argument akin to that raised by defendants here: that reading the 

FDCPA as applying to mistakes of law would be “tantamount to congressional 

control of attorney advocacy under the FDCPA, subjecting even the most ethical 

attorneys to lawsuits by non-clients for exercising professional judgment.” Br. for 

Respondents, Jerman v. Carlisle, No. 08-1200, 2009 WL 4247965, at *45 (2009). The 

Court explained that “[t]o the extent the FDCPA imposes some constraints on a 

lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of a client, it is hardly unique in our law.” 559 U.S. at 

600. 

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c. Defendants also purport to find support for their position in case law. But, 

significantly, no court has accepted defendant’s sweeping contention that conduct 

directed at third parties is fully immune from FDCPA liability. To the contrary, a 

number of courts of appeals have concluded that such conduct is actionable under the 

Act. For example, in Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., plaintiffs claimed, as most 

relevant here, that a law firm had violated § 1692e “by making false statements and 

misrepresentations in a memorandum filed in [a] state court [debt-collection] action.” 

674 F.3d at 815. The district court, in the decision on review, had rejected those 

claims on the exact ground urged by defendants here: that the law firm “made 

allegedly false representations only to the state court judge.” Id. at 818. But on appeal 

the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court’s reasoning. Id. at 818-19 (“We are 

unwilling to adopt the district court’s broad ruling that false statements not made 

directly to a consumer debtor are never actionable under the Act.”). 6

 And in so 

ruling, the court substantially cabined an earlier Eighth Circuit decision, Volden v. 

Innovative Fin. Sys., 440 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2006), on which defendants here rely. See

674 F.3d at 818. 

Likewise, in Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2007), the 

Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff could bring a claim under § 1692e and § 1692f 

 6 The Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s judgment on other 

grounds, namely, that in the specific circumstances presented, the district court judge 

had not been misled. 674 F.3d at 819.

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based on allegations that, as part of its summary judgment motion, the defendant law 

firm had made false statements to the debtor’s attorney regarding the amount of debt 

owed and had improperly asserted a right to attorney’s fees. Id. at 233-34. In doing 

so, the court rejected the law firm’s arguments—akin to the arguments raised here—

that there is a “blanket common law litigation immunity from the requirements of the 

FDCPA” or, alternatively, that communications to a debtor’s attorney are not subject 

to the FDCPA. Id. at 230, 232-33. See also Allen v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 

368 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “§ 1692f(1) prohibits ‘unfair or unconscionable 

means,’ regardless of the person to whom the communication was directed”); Evory v. 

RJM Acquisitions Funding, LLC, 505 F.3d 769, 774-75 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.) 

(holding that misrepresentation made by debt collector to the consumer’s lawyer is

actionable under §§ 1692e and 1692f, and explaining that “[t]hese sections do not 

designate any class of persons, such as lawyers, who can be abused, misled, etc., by 

debt collectors with impunity”).

For their part, defendants chiefly rely on two cases. First, they point to the

Seventh Circuit’s divided decision in O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 

F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2011). In that case, plaintiff raised a claim under § 1692e (but not 

§ 1692f) based on allegations that, as part of a state-court debt collection action, the 

defendant debt collector submitted an exhibit that looked like, but was not, a recent 

credit card bill indicating the amount owed. Id. at 939. The debt collector did this to 

take advantage of a state law allowing debts to be established through submission of a

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recent bill or statement. Id. at 940. Despite acknowledging the fraudulent nature of 

the debt collector’s actions, the majority held that the FDCPA “does not extend to 

communications that would confuse or mislead a state court judge.” Id. at 940, 944. 

Judge Tinder rejected that conclusion, concurring only in the result. See id. at 944-49 

(Tinder, J., concurring). 

Significantly, the majority and Judge Tinder agreed that the “Act’s language is 

not specifically limited to statements directed at consumers.” Id. at 941; see also id. at 

948 (Tinder, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of the judicial process is unquestionably a 

means by which debts are collected, and I struggle to find in the language of the 

statute any reason why statements or representations made during the use of the 

judicial process should be categorically excluded from its ambit.”). Nevertheless, the 

majority narrowed the reach of the statute’s plain text based on its own assessment of 

“the Act’s purposes.” Id. at 942. In particular, the majority reasoned that “the Act 

and its protections do not extend to third parties” and that “nothing in the Act’s text 

extends its protection to anyone but consumers and those who have a special 

relationship with the consumer.” Id. at 943, 944. (The O’Rourke majority did not 

explain the relevance of such reasoning given that the injured plaintiffs in that case

were consumers.) 

This Court should decline to adopt the O’Rourke majority’s flawed reasoning. 

To begin with, in a more recent decision, the Seventh Circuit has disclaimed the core 

of the O’Rourke majority’s reasoning, and limited that decision’s scope. See Todd, 731 

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F.3d at 737-38. Specifically, the court explained that Congress clearly intended to 

“extend protection beyond consumers,” and stressed that a reading of the Act that 

limited its protections to consumers would be “in tension with the text of several 

provisions of the FDCPA, as well as the act’s legislative history and much appellate 

precedent interpreting it.” Ibid. And, as particularly relevant here, the court declined 

to extend O’Rourke’s holding to claims under Section 1692f. Id. at 738. 

In addition, adopting O’Rourke’s reasoning would require this Court to depart 

from the bedrock principle that “[i]n the ordinary case, absent any indication that 

doing so would frustrate Congress’s clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our 

obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it.” Hubbard v. United States, 514 

U.S. 695, 703 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Pipiles, 

886 F.2d at 27 (“courts are not at liberty to excuse violations where the language of 

the [FDCPA] clearly comprehends them”). Defendants cannot plausibly contend that 

their reading of the Act is compelled by “Congress’s clear intention,” or that the 

government’s would “yield patent absurdity.” 

Second, defendants rely on Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2002),

while acknowledging that the relevant portions of that decision were entirely dicta. In 

Kropelnicki, plaintiff claimed that the debt collector had violated § 1692e by filing 

papers in a state-court debt collection action after having told the plaintiff’s attorney it 

would not do so without first contacting him. Id. at 127. In dismissing those claims 

on other grounds, this Court suggested—while expressly declining to “rule” on the 

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22

issue—“that alleged misrepresentations to attorneys for putative debtors cannot 

constitute violations of the FDCPA,” because “[w]here an attorney is interposed as an 

intermediary between a debt collector and a consumer,” the attorney “will protect the 

consumer from a debt collector’s fraudulent or harassing behavior.” Id. at 127-28. 

The Ninth Circuit employed equivalent reasoning in holding that communications to 

a consumer’s attorney are not actionable under the FDCPA. Guerrero v. RJM 

Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t appears that Congress 

viewed attorneys as intermediaries able to bear the brunt of overreaching debt 

collection practices from which debtors and their loved ones should be protected.”). 

A number of appellate decisions post-dating Kropelnicki, however, have properly 

rejected this reading of the Act. See, e.g., Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 232-33; Evory, 505 F.3d at 

774-75; Allen, 629 F.3d at 368; see also Guererro, 499 F.3d at 942 (W. Fletcher, J., 

dissenting in part) (examining the statute’s language and concluding that “it is 

impossible to conclude that all otherwise prohibited conduct is permitted merely 

because it is directed at a debtor’s attorney”). And, in any event, the logic employed 

in Kropelnicki and Guerrero has no application to this case because there was no 

attorney involved. And as alleged here, the state courts were hindered from

themselves “protect[ing] the consumer,” because defendants engaged in outright 

fraud that deprived the court of the benefit of adversarial proceedings. Cf. Evory, 505 

F.3d at 775 (noting that “[a] false claim of fact in a dunning letter may be as difficult 

for a lawyer to see through as a consumer”). 

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In short, this Court must apply the text of the FDCPA as Congress has written 

it, without limiting its plain scope based on defendants’ incorrect assessment of the 

Act’s purposes. This Court should accordingly reject defendants’ attempt to read into 

the Act a blanket immunity for conduct that is “directed at” third parties. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this court should hold that the alleged conduct here 

is actionable under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN

General Counsel

JOHN F. DALY

Deputy General Counsel for Litigation

THEODORE (JACK) METZLER

Attorney

Federal Trade Commission

MEREDITH FUCHS

General Counsel

TO-QUYEN TRUONG

Deputy General Counsel

/s/ David M. Gossett

DAVID M. GOSSETT

Assistant General Counsel

SARANG VIJAY DAMLE

Senior Counsel

JESSICA RANK DIVINE

Attorney 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

1700 G Street NW 

Washington DC 20552

(202) 435-7069

NOVEMBER 2013

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(A)

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of Fed. R. App. 

P. 32(a)(5) and (6) because it has been prepared in 14-point Garamond, a 

proportionally spaced font. 

I further certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. 

R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 5,774 words, excluding the parts of the 

brief exempted under Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), according to the count of Microsoft Word

2010.

/s/ David M. Gossett

DAVID M. GOSSETT

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 13, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing 

brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. I further certify that I will 

cause 6 paper copies of this brief to be filed with the Court within three business days.

The participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and service will be 

accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. 

/s/ David M. Gossett

DAVID M. GOSSETT

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STATUTORY ADDENDUM

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A1

15 U.S.C. § 1692e. False or misleading representations.

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation 

or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general 

application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched 

for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of 

any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.

(2) The false representation of—

(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or

(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully 

received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.

(3) The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or 

that any communication is from an attorney.

(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in 

the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or 

sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt 

collector or creditor intends to take such action.

(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not 

intended to be taken.

(6) The false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer 

of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to—

(A) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt; or

(B) become subject to any practice prohibited by this subchapter.

(7) The false representation or implication that the consumer committed any 

crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.

(8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit 

information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the 

failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.

(9) The use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is 

falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, 

official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which creates a false 

impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.

(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or 

attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

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A2

(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the 

consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in 

that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt 

and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to 

disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt 

collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in 

connection with a legal action.

(12) The false representation or implication that accounts have been turned 

over to innocent purchasers for value.

(13) The false representation or implication that documents are legal process.

(14) The use of any business, company, or organization name other than the 

true name of the debt collector's business, company, or organization.

(15) The false representation or implication that documents are not legal 

process forms or do not require action by the consumer.

(16) The false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is 

employed by a consumer reporting agency as defined by section 1681a(f) of this title.

(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §807, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 877; 

amended Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2305(a), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–425.)

15 U.S.C § 1692f. Unfair practices.

A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 

attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, 

the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense 

incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by 

the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

(2) The acceptance by a debt collector from any person of a check or other 

payment instrument postdated by more than five days unless such person is notified 

in writing of the debt collector's intent to deposit such check or instrument not more 

than ten nor less than three business days prior to such deposit.

(3) The solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other 

postdated payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal 

prosecution.

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A3

(4) Depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other 

postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such check or instrument.

(5) Causing charges to be made to any person for communications by 

concealment of the true purpose of the communication. Such charges include, but are 

not limited to, collect telephone calls and telegram fees.

(6) Taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession 

or disablement of property if—

(A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as 

collateral through an enforceable security interest;

(B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or

(C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or 

disablement.

(7) Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.

(8) Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on 

any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by 

telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does 

not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.

(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §808, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 879.)

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