alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2507 

To amend the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 with respect to pre-agreement 

costs of emergency watershed protection measures, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 14, 2021 

Mr. CURTIS (for himself and Mr. GARAMENDI) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To amend the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 with respect 

to pre-agreement costs of emergency watershed protection measures, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Making Access To 

5 Cleanup Happen Act of 2021’’ or the ‘‘MATCH Act of 

6 2021’’. 

7 SEC. 2. EMERGENCY WATERSHED PROGRAM. 

8 Section 403 of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 

9 (16 U.S.C. 2203) is amended by adding at the end the 

10 following: 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2507 IH

1 ‘‘(c) PRE-AGREEMENT COSTS.— 

2 ‘‘(1) SPONSOR.—For purposes of this sub3 section, the term ‘sponsor’ means a State or local 

4 government, or an Indian tribe (as defined in section 

5 4 of the Indian Self-Determination and Education 

6 Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b)). 

7 ‘‘(2) PRE-AGREEMENT PROJECT COSTS.—Not 

8 later than 180 days after the date of enactment of 

9 this subsection, the Secretary shall— 

10 ‘‘(A) identify a list of emergency watershed 

11 protection measures the cost of which may be 

12 incurred by a sponsor prior to entering into an 

13 agreement with the Secretary pursuant to this 

14 section; and 

15 ‘‘(B) develop a procedure, including appro16 priate deadlines, to be implemented at the State 

17 level, through which a sponsor may request, for 

18 a specified natural disaster, additional emer19 gency watershed protection measures the cost of 

20 which may be incurred by a sponsor prior to en21 tering into an agreement with the Secretary 

22 pursuant to this section. 

23 ‘‘(3) AGREEMENT CONTRIBUTION.—If the Sec24 retary and the sponsor enter into an agreement pur25 suant to this section, the Secretary shall consider 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 2507 IH

1 any applicable pre-agreement costs incurred by a 

2 sponsor for undertaking emergency watershed pro3 tection measures identified pursuant to paragraph 

4 (2) as meeting part of the sponsor’s contribution to5 wards the project costs. 

6 ‘‘(4) ASSUMPTION OF RISK.—Nothing in this 

7 subsection requires the Secretary to enter into an 

8 agreement with a sponsor, and a sponsor under9 taking emergency watershed protection measures 

10 prior to entering into an agreement with the Sec11 retary pursuant to this section shall assume the risk 

12 of incurring any costs of undertaking such meas13 ures.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7328
WILBERT MAYLE, Petitioner - Appellant, versus STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert Earl Maxwell, Senior District Judge. (CA-94-146-2) Submitted: January 13, 1998 Decided: January 30, 1998 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Wilbert Mayle, Appellant Pro Se. Carol A. Egnatoff, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate j udge and find no reversibleerror. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Mayle v. West Virginia , No. CA-94-146-2 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 2, 1996). See Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. ___, 1997 WL 338568 (U.S. June 23, 1997) (No. 96-6298). We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Thomas R. FASENMYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-405.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 3, 1970.

*643Robert W. Rawlins, Public Defender, John M. Gilbert, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., John A. Zebedee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

LILES, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellant appeals from the denial by the trial judge of appellant’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis and petition for motion to vacate judgment and/or other appropriate relief. Appellant was informed against in 19S6 on a two-count information, charging him with breaking and entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony and grand larceny and accessory before the fact. He was brought before the court for arraignment and plea and changed his plea from not guilty to one of guilty as charged. He was not represented by an attorney at the arraignment and sentencing. However, the state maintains that he knowingly, willfully and intelligently waived counsel.

The following constitutes the entire record of what took place on February 6, 1956, when appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered his plea of guilty:

> “MR. JOHNSON: Mr. Fasenmyer, I have read this information to you, charging you with the offense of Breaking and Entering with Intent to Commit a Felony in the first count and Grand Larceny in the second count. How do you plead?

> THE DEFENDANT: Guilty in both counts.

> THE CLERK: How about the attorney? Does the attorney still represent you ?

> THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes. However, I don’t need any counsel, now. But he is—

> MR. *JOHNSON:*Have you discussed with him the fact that you were going to enter a plea of guilty to these charges?

> THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

> MR. JOHNSON: Now, has any promises been made to you or threats been made to you to induce you to plead guilty?

> THE DEFENDANT: None whatsoever.

> MR. JOHNSON: You are pleading because you are guilty ?

> THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

> MR. JOHNSON: Do you have anything you would like to say to the Court at this time, Mr. Fasenmyer ?

> THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I don’t think anything further need be said.”

It is not argued by either side that the arraignment does not constitute a critical point in the proceedings and that there must be an intelligent waiver for the arraignment proceedings to be constitutional. This conversation, in our opinion, does not constitute an intelligent waiver. See Mason v. State, Fla.1965, 176 So.2d 76, 80; McKenzie v. State, Fla.App.1966, 187 So.2d 69; King v. State, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 440, 443-44.

The second point raised by appellant concerns lack of counsel or waiver of counsel at the sentencing. This question has been answered adversely to the state’s position previously by this court in Machwart v. State, Fla.App.1969, 222 So.2d 38, and needs no further elaboration here.

For these reasons the order denying appellant’s motion to vacate and set aside judgment is hereby reversed with directions that the defendant be granted a new trial at which counsel may represent him.

Reversed and remanded.

PIERCE and MANN, JJ., concur.
#### WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, etc., Petitioner, v. DIPLOMAT ELECTRIC, INC., etc., and National Union Fire Insurance Company, etc., Respondents.

No. 43586.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 30, 1973.

Certiorari denied. 273 So.2d 139.

CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Thomas D. O’MALLEY, Jr., Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer, as substituted Ancillary Receiver of North American Guaranty Insurance Company, Appellant, v. Stanley ROSENBLATT et al., Appellees.

No. 72-626.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 21, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Mind &amp; Body Acupuncture, P.C., as Assignee of Ocello Josephine, Appellant,<br><br>against<br><br>Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant.Peter C. Merani, P.C. (Eric. M. Wahrburg of counsel), for respondent. </p><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Terrence C. O'Connor, J.), entered December 16, 2015. The order denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs. </p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the amounts plaintiff sought to recover, for services rendered prior to April 1, 2013, were in excess of the workers' compensation fee schedule. </p><p>Plaintiff correctly argues that the affidavits submitted by defendant did not sufficiently set forth a standard office practice or procedure that would ensure that the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed (<i>see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co.</i>, 50 <font color="FF0000">[*2]</font>AD3d 1123 [2008]). As defendant did not demonstrate that it is not precluded from asserting its proffered defense (<i>cf.</i> 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [g] [1] [ii]), defendant is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>However, contrary to plaintiff's contention, the affidavit plaintiff submitted in support of its motion failed to establish that the claims at issue had not been timely denied (<a href="../2015/2015_04787.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.</i>, 25 NY3d 498</a> [2015]), or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (<a href="../2010/2010_08933.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.</i>, 78 AD3d 1168</a> [2010]; <a href="../2011/2011_51292.htm" target="_blank"><i>Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co.</i>, 32 Misc 3d 128</a>[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th &amp; 13th Jud Dists 2011]). As a result, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was properly denied.</p><p>Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.</p><p>PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.</p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: May 25, 2018<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
(b) (6)
SHAWN BOYD

,
Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Respondent. ___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 4717

Opinion filed January 7, 2015.

Petition for B elated A ppeal

-- Original Jurisdiction

. Nancy A. D aniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee ; Samantha Porche, Assistant Public Defender, Quincy, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General ; Trisha Meggs Pate and Kristen Lynn Bonjour

, Assistant Attorney s General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the August 15, 2014, judgment and

sentence in Gadsden County Circuit Court case number 14

- 60

- CF. Upon issuance

of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the

circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)( 6 )(D). Ifpetitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to

represent petitioner on appeal.

BENTON, CL ARK, and SWANSON, JJ.

, CONCUR.

2
<PAGE>


                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                          Independent Auditors' Consent

The Board of Directors
Swift Transportation Co., Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements No.
333-20651 and 033-66034 on Form S-3 and in the Registration Statements No.
333-98581, 33-85940, 333-53566, 333-31067, 333-64910, 333-66770 and 333-81403 on
Form S-8 of Swift Transportation Co., Inc. of our report dated January 27, 2004,
relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Swift Transportation Co., Inc.
and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated
statements of earnings, comprehensive income, stockholders' equity and cash
flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2003,
which report appears in the December 31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K of
Swift Transportation Co., Inc.


/s/ KPMG LLP

Phoenix, Arizona
March 11, 2004
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Daxor Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date thereof (the "Report"), I, Joseph
Feldschuh,M.D., President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


/s/ Joseph Feldschuh, M.D.
Joseph Feldschuh, M.D.
President and Chief Executive Officer
April 15, 2005


                                       8
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report of Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the
period ended April 24, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Annual Report"), I, Virginia M. McDowell, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that:



Date: June 16, 2011

/s/ VIRGINIA M. MCDOWELL Virginia M. McDowell Chief Executive Officer


1

---



QuickLinks
#### The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF FORT MYERS, Appellant, v. HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 73-1050.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 22, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-40842 Summary Calendar

HORTENCIA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Defendants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;

UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. B-94-CV-316

- - - - - - - - - - September 16, 1998 Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: 1 Hortencia Rodriguez has appealed the dismissal of her action
to recover property which was ordered forfeited pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 8 81. A panel of this court previously has dismissed Rodriguez’s appeal from the judgment in favor of appellee San Benito Bank & Trust Co., for lack of a timely notice of appeal. At the time Rodriguez filed her notice of appeal, the district courthad not dismissed her claims agai nst the bank. Accordingly,

Rodriguez’s a ppeal of the judgment in favor of the remaining defendant-appe llees must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Witherspoon v. White , 111 F.3d 399, 401-03 (5th Cir. 1997).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rodr iguez’s application for the appointment of appellate counsel to represent her is DENIED.
MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
<PAGE>
                                POWER OF ATTORNEY


         The undersigned who is a director or officer of NetMed, Inc., an Ohio
corporation (the "Company") does hereby constitute and appoint S. Trevor Ferger
and Kenneth B. Leachman to be his agents and attorneys-in-fact, each with the
power to act fully hereunder without the other and with full power of
substitution to act in the name and on behalf of the undersigned:

     -   To sign and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Annual
         Report of the Company on Form 10-KSB, and any amendments or supplements
         to such Annual Report; and

     -   To execute and deliver any instruments, certificates or other documents
         which they shall deem necessary or proper in connection with the filing
         of such Annual Report, and generally to act for and in the name of the
         undersigned with respect to such filings as fully as could the
         undersigned if then personally present and acting.

         Each agent named above is hereby empowered to determine in his
discretion the times when, the purposes for, and the names in which, any power
conferred upon him herein shall be exercised and the terms and conditions of any
instrument, certificate or document which may be executed by him pursuant to
this instrument.

         This Power of Attorney shall not be affected by the disability of the
undersigned or the lapse of time.

         The validity, terms and enforcement of this Power of Attorney shall be
governed by those laws of the State of Ohio that apply to instruments
negotiated, executed, delivered and performed solely within the State of Ohio.

         This Power of Attorney may be executed in any number of counterparts,
each of which shall have the same effect as if it were the original instrument
and all of which shall constitute one and the same instrument.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Power of Attorney this 27th day of
March, 2002.


       Signature                                  Title


   /s/ Kenneth B. Leachman                        Vice President - Finance
-----------------------------------------
       Kenneth B. Leachman                        Treasurer


       /s/ Cecil J. Petitti                       Director
-----------------------------------------
       Cecil J. Petitti


       /s/ Michael S. Blue, M. D.                 Director
-----------------------------------------
       Michael S. Blue, M. D.


       /s/ Robert J. Massey                       Director
-----------------------------------------
       Robert J. Massey
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Certification


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Amcast Industrial Corporation (the
"Issuer") on Form 10-Q for the period ending November 30, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Francis J. Drew, Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the
Issuer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer.



By /s/ Francis J. Drew
   -----------------------------------------------------
     Francis J. Drew
     Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer
     January 9, 2004
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANTTO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

The undersigned officer of CourierCorporation (the “Company”) hereby certifies that the Company’s quarterlyreport on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 25, 2006 to which thiscertification is attached (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,as amended, and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

 

 
| *April 27, 2006* | * * | By:                      | *s/James F. Conway III* | * * |
|------------------|----------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------|
| Date             |     | James F. Conway III      |
|             |     | Chairman, President and  |
|             |     | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

This certification shall not be deemed “filed”for any purpose, nor shall it be deemed to be incorporated by reference intoany filing, under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of1934.

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                    5
<MULTIPLIER>              1000
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>  DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>        SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>             9-MOS

       
<CAPTION>

  Crown Central Petroleum Corporation and Subsidiaries
  Dollars in thousands, except per share data


           Crown Central Petroleum Corporation and Subsidiaries
                          Financial Data Schedule
                 (In thousands, except per share amounts)

                                       Nine Months Ended
                                       September 30, 1997

<S>                               <C>
<CASH>                              $          (525        )
<SECURITIES>                                 43,387
<RECEIVABLES>                               100,535
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (656        )
<INVENTORY>                                 110,544
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     261,017
<PP&E>                                      628,042
<DEPRECIATION>                              335,301
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              599,966
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       183,472
<BONDS>                                     126,483
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0
<PREFERRED>                                       0
<COMMON>                                     50,182
<OTHER-SE>                                  157,666
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                599,966
<SALES>                                   1,198,761
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   1,198,761
<CGS>                                     1,067,053
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             1,067,053
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      91,499
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        (377            )
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           10,652
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              31,854
<INCOME-TAX>                                 11,958
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          19,896
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   0
<CHANGES>                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                                 19,896
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  2.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  2.04

        

</TABLE>