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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-11-00613-CV

____________________

IN RE COMMITMENT OF CHARLES PHILIP ANDERSON

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 11-02-02043 CV

________________________________________________________ _____________

OPINION 

Charles Philip Anderson challenges his civil commitment as a sexually violent 

predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2010 & Supp. 

2012) (the SVP statute). A person is a “sexually violent predator” subject to commitment 

if the person: “(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral 

abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” 

Id. § 841.003(a) (West 2010). Anderson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict, and he challenges some of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.

He attacks some of the judge’s comments, the judge’s ruling on a demonstrative exhibit, 

and the judge’s fairness. Anderson claims that certain provisions of the SVP statute are 

unconstitutional. We hold the evidence is sufficient, sections 841.002(2) and 
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841.003(a)(2) are constitutional, the rulings and comments of the trial court do not 

support a reversal, and the record does not establish judicial bias. We affirm the judgment 

of the trial court. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Anderson challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

finding that he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior and that he is likely to 

engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. His argument is that he has not engaged in 

any sexual misconduct during the ten years of his second incarceration, and this, he 

argues, demonstrates he is not dangerous and does not suffer from a serious lack of 

control. He suggests that the experts and the jury could not “reasonably or 

constitutionally infer” that he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior “based on his 

more than ten-year old past acts of sexually offending.”

In the legal sufficiency challenge, we view all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, the elements required for commitment under the SVP statute. In re 

Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). 

The factual sufficiency challenge to the SVP commitment order requires this Court to 

weigh the evidence to determine whether a verdict supported by legally sufficient 

evidence nevertheless reflects a risk of injustice so great that we are compelled to grant a 
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new trial. In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 213 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, 

pet. denied). 

Anderson has a history of sexual offenses: indecency with a child in 1985; sexual 

assault of a child in 1989; attempted sexual assault of a female adult in 1989; and 

aggravated sexual assault in 2001. He pleaded guilty to each offense. He served 

approximately eight years in prison and was released in 1997. On the aggravated sexual 

assault offense, he was sentenced in 2002 to ten years.

The State’s experts, Dr. Price and Dr. Self, testified that Anderson suffers from a 

behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual 

violence. Dr. Quijano, the defendant’s expert, testified Anderson no longer has a 

behavioral abnormality. The experts had similar diagnoses for Anderson: paraphilias,

antisocial personality disorder, and significant psychopathic personality traits. Dr. Price 

and Dr. Self diagnosed Anderson with sexual deviancy. Dr. Quijano and Dr. Price 

indicated Anderson suffers from depression.

Dr. Quijano testified for the defense that Anderson also has bipolar disorder and 

has taken medication for the condition. The State’s testifying experts disagreed with the 

bipolar disorder diagnosis. Dr. Quijano testified medication is helping Anderson, and the 

previous condition affecting the behavioral abnormality is no longer present. Quijano 

testified that if Anderson quits taking his medication, “we have to assume that the mania 

will come back and then of course the effect of the mania on the volitional capacity will 
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come back.” Although Quijano testified that Anderson is “overall compliant” in taking 

his medications, he also explained, as did the State’s experts, that Anderson is at times 

non-compliant.

Dr. Price testified to four major reasons for his opinion that Anderson has a 

behavioral abnormality. Price explained that Anderson has chronic sexual offending in 

his history, different types of sexual offending, escalating sexual offending, and a current 

perception that he did not commit these sexually violent offenses and does not need 

treatment. Dr. Price testified that Anderson is a sexual deviant. Price explained that a 

sexual deviant is a person who becomes aroused and engages in abnormal sexual 

behavior. Sexual deviance is a paraphilia that is outside of what is normal in the context 

of sexual behavior, thinking, and feeling. Based on records reviewed by Price, 

Anderson’s own testimony, Anderson’s current perceptions about the offenses, and 

actuarial test results, Price testified Anderson is a menace to society and has a behavioral 

abnormality that makes him likely to commit a predatory act of sexual violence.

Dr. Self testified that sexual deviancy and a history of sexual offenses are “high on 

the list” of risk factors for “future acts.” Self found that Anderson’s pattern of criminality 

and his antisocial and unstable lifestyle, combined with the sexual deviancy, create a 

heightened risk of reoffending. Self also found significant Anderson’s minimizing or

denial of the offenses and the lack of empathy for his victims, a characteristic that Self 

described as a lack of “social brakes.” Dr. Self concluded that Anderson was seeking the
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excitement and sexual arousal from overpowering someone else and forcing that person 

to do Anderson’s will sexually. Dr. Self characterized the pattern as “stepping up, where 

the behavior that was exciting and gratifying to an extent loses its thrill over time and the 

individual has to step up to kick it up a notch and get more intensity.” Self did not 

diagnose Anderson with bipolar disorder. But, as Self explained, if Anderson is bipolar, 

he was not compliant with his medication while he was in prison, and there is an 

extremely high probability that he will be non-compliant over time. Moreover, Self 

testified there is no pill that can cure someone’s sexual deviancy or behavioral 

abnormality, and no pill that can obviate the risk that Anderson will commit acts of 

predatory sexual violence.

The expert witnesses offered explanations for the absence of sexual misconduct 

disciplinaries during Anderson’s second incarceration. Price testified that inmates who 

have been in prison a long time have learned the system; by the time of Anderson’s 

second incarceration, he had learned how to follow the rules. Price suggested that aging

and medications are factors contributing to the lack of sexual disciplinaries during the 

second incarceration. Dr. Quijano indicated that the lack of sexual misconduct 

disciplinaries was attributable to the positive effects of medication. 

Anderson testified that his medication has had little, if anything, to do with the 

absence of sexual reoffending for the last ten years. And on appeal, he states that the 

evidence regarding bipolar disorder, medication treatment for it, and periodic non-
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compliance with medication is not relevant. He further maintains that age has changed 

and mellowed him and lessened his sex drive, and he asserts he can control his sexual 

urges.

The record establishes that Anderson committed sexually violent offenses while he 

was on probation for a sexually violent offense, after he received sex offender treatment, 

after he received medications for the alleged bipolar disorder, and after he served time in 

prison for commission of a sexually violent offense. Anderson declined the most recent 

offer of sex offender treatment. He testified that he still has a problem controlling his 

urges, and that he is concerned about reoffending.

The evidence supports the jury’s verdict. The jury was entitled to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to determine ultimate fact issues, and to resolve conflicts and 

contradictions in the evidence by believing all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. In 

re Commitment of Barbee, 192 S.W.3d 835, 842 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.). 

Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the 

jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson has a behavioral 

abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. The 

record does not reflect a risk of injustice that compels granting a new trial. Issues one and 

two are overruled.
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EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES

Anderson challenges evidentiary rulings of the trial court. He argues the trial court 

erred in admitting details of his prior criminal offenses. He asserts that Dr. Price went 

beyond using evidence of the prior offenses for the purpose of explaining the basis for his 

opinion and used the evidence for the purpose of establishing the truth of the details. An 

expert may disclose details regarding the underlying facts or data that the expert relied on 

in arriving at his opinion, subject to the trial court’s application of the balancing test and 

providing any requested necessary limiting instructions. See In re Commitment of Ford, 

No. 09-11-00425-CV, 2012 WL 983323, at **1-2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 22, 2012, 

no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d at 199; see also Tex. R. Evid. 

703, 705. Price used Anderson’s criminal history, as appellate counsel acknowledges, for 

the “legitimate purpose of explaining the significance of the escalation of [Anderson’s] 

sexual offenses that he committed before 2002 . . . .”

Anderson argues that the evidence should have been excluded because the “sordid 

details” of the offenses had very little probative value and, under Rule 403, were unfairly

prejudicial. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has an undue 

tendency to suggest that a decision be made on an improper basis, commonly, but not 

necessarily, an emotional one. Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002) (citing Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). In applying 

Rule 403, factors that should be considered include the probative value of the evidence, 
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the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational way, the time needed 

to develop the evidence, and the proponent’s need for the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 

810 S.W.2d 372, 389-390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g). Here, each expert 

explained the facts considered and how those facts affected that expert’s evaluation. The 

evidence assisted the jury in weighing the testimony and the opinion each expert offered.

The trial judge could reasonably conclude the experts’ testimony was not unfairly 

prejudicial. See In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d at 199. We overrule issue three.

Anderson contends that the State should not have been allowed to question him

about the details of one of the sexually violent offenses to which he pleaded guilty.

Anderson denied many of the details of the offense. Anderson’s attorney voiced 

objections in the trial court: hearsay; hearsay documents; and reading from the police 

report. The trial court overruled the objections and noted that it was not apparent that the 

State’s attorney was reading from the police report. The report was not in evidence.

Moreover, the argument on appeal -- essentially that the trial court’s limiting instruction 

was insufficient -- is not the same as the the objections defense counsel made in the trial 

court. See Wohlfahrt v. Holloway, 172 S.W.3d 630, 639-40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (Because objection in trial court did not comport with complaint 

on appeal, the objection was waived.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Thomas v. State, 

723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). A reviewing court generally presumes a 
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jury followed a trial court’s limiting instruction. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. 

Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 771 (Tex. 2003). We overrule issue four.

In issue five, Anderson contends the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Quijano’s 

testimony that Anderson may have committed unknown sex offenses. Anderson argues 

the evidence was purely speculative and was not relevant to any issue in this case. The 

State asked Dr. Quijano, who testified on Anderson’s behalf, if “sex offenders often have 

committed more sex offenses than they have been arrested for[.]” He answered “yes” and 

agreed that possibly Anderson had sexually assaulted people that “we don’t even know

about[.]” Anderson testified he exposed himself approximately 3,000 times. The record, 

including Anderson’s own testimony and Dr. Quijano’s complete testimony, does not 

support the argument that Dr. Quijano’s statement caused an improper result in the trial. 

Any error in allowing the question and the admission of Dr. Quijano’s statement during 

the State’s cross-examination does not require reversal of the judgment in this case. See 

Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. Issue five is overruled.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

Anderson argues the trial court erred by “effectively instructing” the jury during 

closing jury arguments to ignore a critical portion of his defense. During closing 

argument, Anderson’s counsel stated as follows:

This is a case of a mentally ill person who has been criminalized in 

the system. It is time to tell them no. It is time to say you are going to get 

proper medical care for someone who needs it. Not throw away the key and 
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say that this is just going to be further consequences for something that 

happened[.]

The State objected that Anderson’s counsel was, in effect, testifying about the effect of 

the verdict. The trial judge responded, “I am going to tell the jurors you are to ignore the 

effect of what your verdict is going to have. Okay?” The trial court did not instruct the 

jury to ignore Anderson’s defenses. See generally Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 

851, 857 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (argument concerning 

legal effect of answers); see also Louisiana & Ark. Ry. Co. v. Capps, 766 S.W.2d 291, 

295-96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ denied). We overrule issue six.

DEMONSTRATIVE AID AND ALLEGATIONS OF BIAS

Anderson contends the trial court demonstrated bias and deprived him of a fair 

trial by continuously displaying a demonstrative visual aid during the testimony of the 

State’s expert witnesses, and by disparaging defense counsel during her crossexamination of the State’s experts. During the testimony of Dr. Price, the State’s attorney

asked, “[I]n arriving at your opinion, did you answer the question whether you thought 

Mr. Anderson had a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a 

predatory act of sexual violence?” The State’s attorney then asked whether it would aid 

the jury for the State to display the question, and Dr. Price stated that it would be of 

assistance to the jury. The question was apparently displayed for the jury’s view. Shortly 

thereafter, defendant’s attorney requested that the display be removed. The trial judge 

denied the request and stated as follows:
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This is the issue they are going to be asking about. So it is not a big deal. . . . 

This is the only thing this jury is focusing on. And I think it is good it is up 

there. So you guys should be focused and those are questions you should be 

asking about.

Later defense counsel again objected to the “continuing display [of] the words ‘suffers 

from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of 

sexual violence.’” The judge stated as follows: 

Well, the record is not really too clear what is going on here. For the record, 

it is on an Elmo which is on the screen TV which is in front of the jury.

And essentially it is the question that the jury is asked. That definition is 

given to them in the jury charge. It is not an incorrect statement of the law.

And I think that it helps, at least will encourage, the lawyers to ask 

questions about this question because sometimes it seems that they get a 

little adrift. So I am going to overrule your objection. When you present 

your case, you can take it down or we will have the State take it down.

The demonstrative aid contained statutory language. Defense counsel objected “to this as 

not being a complete quote from the statute and an incomplete part of the question.” The 

display apparently included the second part of the definition of sexually violent predator.

The applicability of the first part of the definition -- whether Anderson is a repeat 

sexually violent offender -- was not in dispute. The trial court offered to allow defense 

counsel to “[p]ut the rest of it up there.” The trial judge then stated, “It certainly doesn’t 

mislead the jury.”

Anderson does not refer us to any authority precluding the use of a demonstrative 

aid under these circumstances. The quotation from the statute was the question the jury 

was required to answer in arriving at its verdict; the quotation was not misleading. See 
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generally Henricks v. State, 293 S.W.3d 267, 276 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d) 

(Trial court allowed investigator to have PowerPoint presentation as an aid for the jury to 

understand the testimony; “[a] witness may be allowed to demonstrate before the jury so 

as to make her testimony more plain and clear.”).

Anderson argues the trial judge displayed bias against his counsel during the trial.

The trial judge questioned the relevance of some of defense counsel’s questions and 

stated that the court would display the question again until trial counsel could “keep in 

mind what the goal is here.” Anderson also directs us to defense counsel’s crossexamination of Dr. Self during which the trial judge stated as follows: 

[Defense counsel], ask your questions. If [the witness] needs to have his 

recollection refreshed, he can do that. But don’t just ask questions and try 

to put documents into evidence in front of the jury. Okay? I have already 

done that. I told you that once. Ask another question, please.

Trial judges have broad, though not unfettered, discretion in handling trials. Metzger v. 

Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 37-40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1994, writ denied); see also 

In re Commitment of Barbee, 192 S.W.3d at 847-48. A trial court has inherent power to 

control the disposition of cases with economy of time and effort, exercising that power 

without bias and with patience, and in a manner that promotes confidence in the judge’s 

impartiality. Considering the entire record and the comments in context, we cannot 

conclude the judge’s comments constitute reversible error under the circumstances. See 

Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. We overrule issue seven.
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UNIFIED ISSUE

In a supplemental brief filed after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re 

Commitment of Bohannan, Anderson argues that the Supreme Court rendered sections 

841.002(2) and 841.003(a)(2) facially unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s due process clause. See In re Commitment of Bohannan, No. 10-0605, 

2012 WL 3800317, at **4-5 (Tex. Aug. 31, 2012). He also contends that the Court 

eliminated the requirement that the person must have “serious difficulty controlling 

behavior.” But the Court did neither. 

Bohannan did not eliminate any proof required by the statute for a sexuallyviolent-predator finding, nor did the Supreme Court change the statute or render it 

unconstitutional. A requirement for finding someone a sexually violent predator is that 

the person must suffer from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to 

engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 

841.003(a). The Supreme Court stated that after “[b]oiling it down,” the definition of 

behavioral abnormality is “‘a . . . condition that . . . predisposes’ sexually violent 

conduct.” In re Commitment of Bohannan, 2012 WL 3800317, at *4. The Court 

explained that “condition and predisposition are one and the same[,]” and the question of 

“whether a person ‘suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to 

engage in a predatory act of sexual violence’ is a single, unified issue.” Id. at **4-5.
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This Court and the Third Court of Appeals have addressed arguments similar to 

those made by appellant, and noted that serious difficulty controlling behavior is 

embedded in the definition of “behavioral abnormality.” See In re Commitment of 

Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 502-07 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (holding

that no separate definition of emotional or volitional capacity as meaning serious 

difficulty controlling behavior was necessary); In re Commitment of Browning, 113 

S.W.3d 851, 862-63 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (holding that no separate jury 

question of serious difficulty controlling behavior was necessary). We said in Almaguer:

The statutory criteria submitted to the jury under the Texas statute in this

case describes the severity of the behavioral abnormality and the severity of 

the danger which must be present to subject the person to civil 

commitment. The statutory definition describes behavior caused by an 

abnormality that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of

another person. See § 841.002(2). In answering the question submitted to it, 

the jury found that Almaguer suffers from a behavioral abnormality that 

“predisposes” him, and makes him “likely,” to engage in a predatory act of 

sexual violence, to the extent that he is a menace to the health and safety of 

another. See §§ 841.002(2), 841.003.

In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d at 505. The Austin Court of Appeals 

previously explained:

A finding that a person suffers from an emotional or volitional defect so 

grave as to predispose him to threaten the health and safety of others with 

acts of sexual violence entails a determination that he has “serious 

difficulty controlling behavior.”

In re Commitment of Browning, 113 S.W.3d at 863 (citing In re Commitment of Mullens, 

92 S.W.3d at 884-87 (evidence relating to defined abnormality legally sufficient to prove 
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serious difficulty in controlling behavior)). An affirmative answer to the question of 

whether a person suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to 

engage in a predatory act of sexual violence necessarily entails a determination that he 

has serious difficulty controlling behavior. As the United States Supreme Court stated in 

Kansas v. Hendricks, “[W]e have never required State legislatures to adopt any particular 

nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes. Rather, we have traditionally left to 

legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance.”

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). 

We do not read the Bohannan opinion as eliminating a statutory requirement, or as

altering the proof required under the statute to find that a person is a sexually violent 

predator. We overrule the issue in Anderson’s supplemental brief.

Appellant’s issues are overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.

_____________________________

 DAVID GAULTNEY

 Justice

Submitted on August 1, 2012

Opinion Delivered January 24, 2013

Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.