[Cite as Fry v. FCA US L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-7005.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

Jason Fry Court of Appeals No. L-16-1230 

 

 Appellant Trial Court No. CI0201504812 

v. 

FCA US LLC, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellees Decided: July 28, 2017 

* * * * * 

 Sean H. Sobel, for appellant. 

 Heidi N. Hartman, for appellees. 

* * * * * 

 JENSEN, P.J. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common 

Pleas, granting appellees’, FCA US LLC (“Chrysler”) and Sarah Bento, motion for 

summary judgment based upon its determination that appellant’s, Jason Fry, claims were 

untimely filed. Finding no error, we affirm. 
2.

A. Facts and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} Appellant commenced this action upon the filing of a “Complaint for 

Injunctive Relief and Damages” with the trial court on November 17, 2015. In his 

complaint, appellant alleged that he is legally blind. Appellant applied to work at 

Chrysler at its Toledo Assembly Complex in the spring of 2014. According to the 

complaint, appellant was given an initial phone screening on April 29, 2014. On May 23, 

2014, appellant traveled to Chrysler’s premises for an onsite assessment, where he 

completed various tests over the course of several hours. Ultimately, appellant was 

offered a position with Chrysler on May 27, 2014. 

{¶ 3} On May 28, 2014, appellant underwent a physical examination at the Toledo 

Assembly Complex. Due to his vision impairment, Chrysler’s physician concluded that 

appellant could not operate forklifts or company vehicles. No other limitations were 

indicated. 

{¶ 4} Approximately nine months later, Chrysler contacted appellant to inform 

him that his employment would commence on February 18, 2015. According to his 

complaint, appellant worked without incident for two days. However, on February 20, 

2015, appellant was “removed from safety training due to what Bento, Chrysler’s 

[Human Resources] Representative, called a ‘question about [his] physical.’” Bento 

terminated appellant’s employment one hour later, informing appellant that Chrysler was 

unable to accommodate his vision impairment. 
3.

{¶ 5} Asserting that Chrysler’s stated reason for termination was merely 

pretextual, appellant filed the aforementioned complaint, asserting claims for disability 

discrimination, wrongful termination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

{¶ 6} Appellees responded to appellant’s complaint on January 15, 2016, by filing 

a motion to dismiss the action. In their motion, appellees argued that the action was 

untimely filed based upon a provision within appellant’s application for employment, 

which states: 

In consideration of the review of my application: 

* * * 

7. I agree that any lawsuit arising out of my employment with, or 

my application for employment with, Chrysler Group LLC1 or any of its 

subsidiaries and affiliates must be filed no more than 180 days after the 

date of the employment action that is the subject of the lawsuit. While I 

understand that the statute of limitations for claims arising out of an 

employment action may be longer than 180 days, I agree to be bound by the 

180 day period of limitations and I WAIVE ANY STATUTE OF 

LIMITATIONS TO THE CONTRARY. 

 

1

 FCA US LLC was formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC. 
4.

According to appellees’ answer, appellant typed his first and last name and authorized the 

use of his electronic signature to execute the application for employment. 

{¶ 7} Because appellant’s employment was terminated on February 20, 2015, and 

appellant did not file his complaint until almost nine months later on November 17, 2015, 

appellees contended that appellant’s claims were untimely under the 180-day limitations 

period to which appellant agreed. 

{¶ 8} On February 3, 2016, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to 

appellees’ motion to dismiss. In his memorandum, appellant argued that he was not 

contractually bound to the limitations period set forth in his application for employment, 

because appellees’ promise to review his application did not constitute sufficient 

consideration to form a contract. Appellant also argued that there was no meeting of the 

minds with Chrysler because he had no reasonable opportunity to consider or negotiate 

the terms of the contract, which was allegedly “thrust upon” him. Further, appellant 

contended that he did not fully understand the terms of the limitations provision prior to 

agreeing to be bound by it. 

{¶ 9} On April 12, 2016, the trial court issued an order converting appellees’ 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the trial court 

granted appellant additional time to offer evidence and arguments in response to 

appellees’ motion. 

{¶ 10} Appellant filed his subsequent memorandum in opposition to appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2016, in which appellant essentially advanced 
5.

the same arguments as he had previously raised prior to the trial court’s conversion of the 

motion to dismiss. Along with his memorandum in opposition to appellees’ motion for 

summary judgment, appellant attached a “Declaration of Jason Fry Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746.” In his declaration, appellant asserted that he is legally blind. Appellant also 

asserted that he was not given an opportunity to speak with Chrysler officials about the 

terms of the application for employment or to alter its terms. Further, appellant 

contended that he was not allowed to print a copy of the application with larger print so 

that he could read the fine print. At the end of the declaration, appellant stated: “I 

DECLARE, CERTIFY, VERIFY pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing is true 

and correct.” 

{¶ 11} Appellees responded to appellant’s memorandum by the filing of a reply on 

May 26, 2016. In their reply, appellees argued that unsworn written statements such as 

appellant’s declaration could not be substituted for sworn affidavits under Ohio law. As 

such, appellees insisted that the trial court could not consider appellant’s declaration as 

evidence to support his arguments in opposition to summary judgment. Further, 

appellees argued that the limitations provision was supported by adequate consideration 

in the form of Chrysler’s promise to review appellant’s application. Moreover, appellees 

contended that the limitations period provision was not unconscionable merely because 

appellant failed to ascertain the terms of the contract before he signed it. In support of 

their argument, appellees cited the following language from the acknowledgement page 
6.

of the application for employment: “I have read and understand the statements contained 

in this application and certify that they are true.” 

{¶ 12} Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the trial court issued its 

decision on the motion for summary judgment on September 14, 2016. In its decision, 

the trial court found that appellant’s unsworn declaration could not serve as an affidavit 

under Ohio law, and therefore did not constitute Civ.R. 56(C) evidence that could be used 

to meet appellant’s reciprocal evidentiary burden. As to the enforceability of the 

limitations provision, the trial court determined that the limitations period was supported 

by consideration. The court also found that appellant failed to introduce any evidence 

that would raise a question of fact regarding his meeting of the minds argument. 

Consequently, the court found that the limitations provision was enforceable, thereby 

rendering appellant’s claims untimely and entitling appellees to summary judgment. 

B. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 13} Appellant has timely appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment 

to appellees, asserting the following assignments of error: 

Assignment of Error I: The trial court committed reversible error by 

creating a contract out of the application. 

Assignment of Error II: The trial court committed reversible error 

by finding the contract between Fry and FCA US LLC was not 

procedurally unconscionable. 
7.

II. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review 

{¶ 14} A motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo by an appellate court. 

Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). “‘When 

reviewing a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment the court of appeals conducts an 

independent review of the record and stands in the shoes of the trial court.’” Gunsorek v. 

Pingue, 135 Ohio App.3d 695, 700, 735 N.E.2d 487 (10th Dist.1999), quoting Baker v. 

Buschman Co., 127 Ohio App.3d 561, 566, 713 N.E.2d 487 (12th Dist.1998). 

{¶ 15} In order to obtain summary judgment at the trial level, 

[I]t must be determined that (1) there is no genuine issue of material 

fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 

(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one 

conclusion when viewing the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, 

and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Cassels 

v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 631 

N.E.2d 150 (1994), citing Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 

64, 65-66, 609 N.E.2d 144 (1993); see also Civ.R. 56(C). 

B. Existence of a Contract 

{¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

concluding that he entered into a contract with Chrysler upon his execution of the 

application for employment. 
8.

{¶ 17} A contract is a promise or a set of promises that can be enforced when one 

person fails to fulfill the promise. Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 

770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 16, citing Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 83 Ohio App.3d 794, 798-799, 615 

N.E.2d 1071 (10th Dist.1992). A contract consists of an offer, acceptance, and 

consideration. Id., citing Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 409, 411 

(N.D.Ohio 1976). An offer is defined as “‘the manifestation of willingness to enter into a 

bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that 

bargain is invited and will conclude it.’” Garrison v. Daytonian Hotel, 105 Ohio App.3d 

322, 325, 663 N.E.2d 1316 (2d Dist.1995), quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d 71, 

Contracts, Section 24. Consideration is the bargained for legal benefit or detriment. Id. 

The presence or absence of consideration is a proper question for the court. Irving 

Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co., 16 Ohio App.3d 191, 192, 475 N.E.2d 127 (2d 

Dist.1984). However, once consideration is found to exist, the court may not inquire into 

the adequacy of that consideration. Williams v. Ormsby, 131 Ohio St.3d 427, 2012-Ohio690, 966 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17. 

{¶ 18} Here, the express terms of the application for employment demonstrate 

Chrysler’s willingness to enter into a bargain. Specifically, Chrysler offered to review 

appellant’s application in exchange for his agreement to be bound by a shorter period of 

limitations than would otherwise be available to him under the Ohio Revised Code. 

Appellant’s assent to those terms was all that was required in order to conclude the 

bargain. Therefore, we find that the application for employment constituted an offer 
9.

upon its presentation to appellant. When appellant executed the application, his 

acceptance of the offer was complete, and the agreement was formed. This agreement 

was supported by consideration in that Chrysler was obligating itself to review 

appellant’s application, which it would not otherwise be obligated to do, and appellant 

was waiving certain legal rights that he otherwise would possess under Ohio law. 

Because the parties’ agreement was supported by consideration, we find that the trial 

court properly found that a contract was formed in this case. 

{¶ 19} Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, appellant argues that the 

application for employment does not constitute an offer because it does not represent a 

manifestation of Chrysler’s intent to enter into a bargain such that appellant would 

understand that his assent to the terms contained therein was all that was needed to 

conclude the bargain. We find no merit to appellant’s argument in light of the clear 

language contained in the application. The authority appellant cites in support of his 

argument is unavailing. Indeed, the cases appellant relies upon are factually 

distinguishable insofar as they relate to instances in which the parties are in the process of 

negotiations and the terms of the acceptance are different from the terms of the offer, 

thereby creating a counteroffer rather than an acceptance. See Foster v. Ohio State Univ., 

41 Ohio App.3d 86, 88, 534 N.E.2d 1220 (10th Dist.1987) (finding that plaintiff’s 

purported acceptance of defendant’s offer to begin employment on July 1, 1983, was 

actually a counteroffer because plaintiff indicated that he desired to commence 

employment on July 15, 1983, thereby altering the terms of defendant’s offer). Such is 
10. 

not the case here. In this case, appellant executed the application for employment 

without modification of its terms. 

{¶ 20} Next, appellant argues that a contract could not exist in this case because 

there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. A “meeting of the minds” 

between parties is an essential element of a valid contract. Noroski v. Fallet, 2 Ohio 

St.3d 77, 79, 442 N.E.2d 1302 (1982). “The ‘meeting of the minds’ is normally 

manifested by an offer and acceptance.” Dalicandro v. Morrison Rd. Dev. Co., 10th Dist. 

Franklin Nos. 00AP-619 and 656, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1765, * 30 (Apr. 17, 2001), 

citing Nilavar v. Osborn, 137 Ohio App.3d 469, 484, 738 N.E.2d 1271 (2d Dist.2000). 

“Thus, the signing of an agreement and acquiescence in its effect generally demonstrates 

the existence of a ‘meeting of the minds.’” Id., citing Cuyahoga Cty. Hospitals v. Price, 

64 Ohio App.3d 410, 416, 581 N.E.2d 1125 (8th Dist.1989). 

{¶ 21} As indicated above, Chrysler’s offer to review appellant’s application in 

exchange for certain concessions from appellant, and appellant’s execution of the 

application for employment indicating his acceptance of Chrysler’s offer, is clear from 

the undisputed facts. Appellant insists that, because he is legally blind and only 

possesses a high school education, he did not hold the requisite level of knowledge, 

experience, or sophistication to understand the language in the application. Notably, 

appellant does not allege that he is illiterate. Moreover, appellant made no attempt to 

modify the terms of the application for employment, nor did he question Chrysler 

regarding the meaning of its terms. “[P]arties to contracts are presumed to have read and 
11. 

understood them and * * * a signatory is bound by a contract that he or she willingly 

signed.” Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Power Engineering Group, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 429, 

2007-Ohio-257, 860 N.E.2d 741, ¶ 10. Similarly, the Eighth District has previously 

stated: 

A party entering a contract has a responsibility to learn the terms of 

the contract prior to agreeing to its terms. The law does not require that 

each aspect of a contract be explained orally to a party prior to signing. 

[ABM Farms, Inc. v. Woods, 81 Ohio St.3d 498, 503, 692 N.E.2d 574 

(1997).] “It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called 

upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he 

signed it, or did not know what it contained. If this were permitted, 

contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written.” [Id.] 

citing Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50, 23 L.Ed. 203 (1875). Estate of 

Brewer v. Dowell & Jones, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80563, 2002-

Ohio-3440, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 22} In light of the foregoing, we find that the evidence contained in the record 

establishes that a meeting of the minds occurred in this case. Therefore, appellant’s 

argument concerning a lack of a meeting of the minds is without merit. 

{¶ 23} Appellant further argues that the application for employment could not 

constitute a contract because it was not supported by consideration. First, appellant 

contends that there was no express consideration given by Chrysler in the application. 
12. 

We reject this argument outright, as the terms of the application for employment are 

preceded by the phrase “In consideration of the review of my application.” 

{¶ 24} Next, appellant argues that Chrysler’s promise to review his application 

was illusory because “any implied promise to consider [appellant] for employment was 

on [Chrysler’s] own schedule and could be abandoned at their discretion once they find 

the right candidate to hire before considering the rest of the applicants.” In support, 

appellant cites several federal arbitration cases that stand for the proposition that an 

employer’s promise to consider an applicant for hire is insufficient to form a contract and 

render an arbitration provision enforceable. 

{¶ 25} At the outset, we note that the authority appellant relies upon in support of 

his argument is either factually distinguishable insofar as this case does not involve the 

enforceability of an arbitration provision, or otherwise not binding on this court due to 

the fact that the cases are not Ohio cases. Under well-established Ohio law, courts 

generally do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration once consideration is found to 

exist. Butcher v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81593, 2003-Ohio1734, ¶ 31. In this case, consideration is evident from the four corners of the application 

for employment. Moreover, appellant’s assertion that Chrysler’s promise to review his 

application was illusory is belied by the fact that Chrysler hired appellant upon its review 

of his application. Thus, we find no merit to appellant’s assertion that his assent to the 

limitations provision in the application for employment rested upon an illusory promise. 
13. 

{¶ 26} Additionally, we find no merit to appellant’s argument that mutuality of 

obligation was lacking in this case simply because the application for employment does 

not expressly limit Chrysler’s ability to sue appellant beyond the 180-day period. 

Consideration requires mutuality of obligation. However, “the obligations of each are not 

required to be identical.” Robbins v. Country Club Ret. Ctr. IV, Inc., 7th Dist. Belmont 

No. 04 BE 43, 2005-Ohio-1338, ¶ 26. In this case, Chrysler is obligated to review 

appellant’s application, which it did prior to selecting him for employment. Thus, 

mutuality of obligation is present here. 

{¶ 27} Having found no merit to appellant’s arguments concerning the trial court’s 

finding that the application for employment constituted an enforceable contract, we find 

that appellant’s first assignment is not well-taken. 

C. Conscionability of the Contract 

{¶ 28} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred 

in finding that the application for employment was not procedurally unconscionable. 

{¶ 29} A determination of whether a written contract is unconscionable is an issue 

of law that we review de novo. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 

352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12, ¶ 34. The defense that a contract or contract 

provision is unenforceable on the ground that it is unconscionable is premised on a 

finding that a party did not have any meaningful choice when entering into the contract or 

the contract terms are unreasonably favorable to one party. Lake Ridge Academy v. 

Carney, 66 Ohio St.3d 376, 382, 613 N.E.2d 183 (1993). “The party asserting 
14. 

unconscionability of a contract bears the burden of proving that the agreement is both 

procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” Taylor at ¶ 33. 

{¶ 30} “‘Procedural unconscionability concerns the formation of the agreement 

and occurs when no voluntary meeting of the minds is possible.’” Brunke v. Ohio State 

Home Servs., Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009320, 2008-Ohio-5394, ¶ 10, quoting 

Porpora v. Gatliff Bldg. Co., 160 Ohio App.3d 843, 2005-Ohio-2410, 828 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 

7 (9th Dist.). To evaluate procedural unconscionability, courts consider factors relating 

to the relative bargaining position of the parties, including “age, education, intelligence, 

business acumen, experience in similar transactions, whether the terms were explained to 

the weaker party, and who drafted the contract.” Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 157 

Ohio App.3d 150, 2004-Ohio-829, 809 N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 31 (9th Dist.). No one factor 

alone determines whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable. Hayes v. Oakridge 

Home, 122 Ohio St.3d 63, 2009-Ohio-2054, 908 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 29. Rather, procedural 

unconscionability is determined after consideration of the totality of the circumstances. 

Id. at ¶ 30. 

{¶ 31} In this case, our ability to consider the totality of the circumstances is 

frustrated by the fact that appellant submitted no evidence apart from his declaration in 

which he asserted that he is legally blind, that he was not given an opportunity to speak 

with Chrysler officials about the terms of the application for employment or to alter its 

terms, and that he was not allowed to print a copy of the application with larger print so 

that he could read the fine print. Even assuming, arguendo, that this evidence was 
15. 

admissible under Civ.R. 56, we find that appellant has failed to meet his burden of 

establishing unconscionability. As noted above, appellant makes no argument that he is 

illiterate or was unable to read the application for employment despite his alleged legal 

blindness. While he states that he was unable to understand the meaning of some of the 

terms contained in the application for employment, there is no record of appellant asking 

Chrysler officials for an explanation of such terms. 

{¶ 32} Moreover, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the terms of the 

application for employment are unreasonably favorable to Chrysler or that he had no 

meaningful choice when entering into the contract. Indeed, appellant was free to find 

another employer if he was unsatisfied with Chrysler’s terms of employment, which we 

find were reasonable in light of Chrysler’s offer to review appellant’s application and its 

subsequent decision to hire appellant. 

{¶ 33} In sum, we conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 

application for employment was procedurally or substantively unconscionable. 

Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not well-taken. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant 

to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 
16. 

 Fry v. FCA US LLC 

 C.A. No. L-16-1230 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

James D. Jensen, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE