# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 20

- 20438

**Mari Leigh Oliver,**

Plaintiff

— Appellant **,**

versus
**Bret Champion; Brian Greeney; Thomas Hensley; Kimberley Walters; Lance**  **Alexander; Stephen Naetzker; Jennifer Walton; Klein Independent School**  **District; Angie Richard ,**  Defendants

— Appellees

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:17

- CV

- 3234

Before **Smith, Stewart,** and **Willett,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *

The Texas Education Code mandates that school districts “require students, once during each school day,” to recite the “pledge of allegiance to the United States.” **Tex. Educ. Code** § 25.082(b)(1). The Code contains

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 26, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 20-20438 Document: 00516069346 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/26/2021No. 20

- 20438

2 a parental opt

- out provision whereby p arents or guardians , upon “written

re quest,” may excuse their children from reciting the pledge

. Id. § 25.082(c). The Klein Independent School District has adopted a district

- wide policy that tracks the state’s pledge mandate.

Mari Oliver attended a high school within Klein ISD. She has sued teachers, administrators, and Klein ISD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , claiming they all violated her First Amendment right against compelled speech by requiring her to recite the pledge. 1 Importantly, Oliver admits that her claim is not predicated on a contention that the pledge mandate , itself, is unconstitutional. 2 Rather, Oliver’s claim is predicated on her contention that her mother complied with the parental o pt

- o ut p rovision

— somethi ng the parties vigorously dispute. We express no opinion on th at dispute

. Nonetheless, we **AFFIRM** summary judgment for D efendants.

W e review summary judgment de novo

. S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza , 912 F.3d 778, 783 (5th Cir. 2019). W e will reverse only if a genuine dispute of material fact exists or if the nonmovant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A material

- fact dispute is “genuine” only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving part y .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

1 On appeal, Oliver adequately briefs only her compelled

- speech claim

— that the D efend ants violated her right “to not participate in the pledge.” Though her complaint alleged other claims as well, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 requires appellants to provide “reasons , ” with “citations to the authorities and parts of the record” supp orting them, that warrant reversal. **Fed. R. App. P.** 28(a)(8) (A)

. Only Oliver’s compelled

speech claim meets Rule 28’s standard . Therefore, Oliver has waived appellate review of any other claims against the D efendants. Trevino v. Johnson , 168 F.3d 173, 181 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding “undeveloped,” “inadequately argued” issues waived on appeal).

2 Because Oliver does not challenge the pledge mandate’s constitutionality, we must presume its constitutionality. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Com m ’rs , 3 9 4 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (“Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally

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3 Despite Oliver’s belief otherwise, a reasonable jury could not return a verdict in her favor. Even if her mother complied with the parental opt

- out provision, t he record demonstrates that none of the D efendants ever compelled Oliver to recite the pledge

. Cf. **Tex. Educ. Code** § 25.082(b)

– (c) (excusing a student from reciting the pledge upon written request of a parent). Since Oliver “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,”
D efendants were entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

**A FFIRMED** 

. Case: 20-20438 Document: 00516069346 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/26/2021