In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 19, 2021

S21A0162. TRUETT v. THE STATE.

 BOGGS, Justice.

Christopher Everett Truett was convicted of malice murder

and related crimes arising out of the beating death of his girlfriend’s 

two-year-old son, Wyatt Pruitt. He appeals, asserting as his sole 

enumeration of error the trial court’s exclusion of certain character 

evidence. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.1

 1 The murder occurred on February 25, 2014. On September 15, 2014, a 

Forsyth County grand jury indicted Truett for malice murder, felony murder, 

aggravated battery, and child cruelty in the first degree. Truett was tried 

before a jury from August 20 to 28, 2015 and found guilty of all charges. On 

August 28, 2015, Truett was sentenced to serve life in prison without the 

possibility of parole for malice murder, and 20 years to serve concurrently on 

the child cruelty charge. The trial court merged the aggravated battery count 

into the malice murder conviction, and the felony murder conviction was 

vacated by operation of law. On August 31, 2015, Truett’s trial counsel filed a 

timely motion for new trial, which was amended by appellate counsel on 

December 2 and December 13, 2019. After a hearing, the motion for new trial 

was denied on March 6, 2020. Truett’s notice of appeal was filed on March 30, 

2020, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in 
2

1. The evidence at trial2 showed that on February 23, 2014, 

Truett and the victim’s mother, Dawn Shutts, had been in a 

romantic relationship for several weeks, and he had moved in with 

her and her two children. Wyatt, the younger child, was feeling ill 

and was “up and down all night.” On February 24, Truett told Shutts 

that one of the family dogs had pushed Wyatt down the stairs. He 

had a bruise over his eye but otherwise appeared fine, and Shutts 

did not think much of it. As she left for work on February 25, she 

noticed scratches on Wyatt’s eyes and made a doctor’s appointment 

for him. Wyatt was crying and screaming and did not want Shutts 

to leave. Truett was the only person with Wyatt that day.

During the morning, Shutts received several text messages 

from Truett: that his feelings were hurt because Wyatt didn’t like 

him, that Wyatt was “tripping hard,” having temper tantrums, 

harming himself, and that he had wet and soiled himself. Shutts 

 

December 2020 and submitted for decision on the briefs.

2 This Court no longer routinely considers sua sponte the sufficiency of 

the evidence in non-death penalty cases. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 

392 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). But a review of the evidence here is relevant to 

Truett’s enumeration of error.
3

responded to the messages and told Truett to give Wyatt a bath. 

Later, Truett sent still more messages: that Wyatt had fallen in the 

tub and hurt himself and that a dog had pushed him down again. 

Truett added, “Get home. Something’s wrong.” A few minutes later 

Truett sent another message, “Get home now, baby.” Shutts 

returned home to find Wyatt lying on the sofa, unresponsive. He was 

“cold and stiff,” blood was coming out of his mouth, and he had 

bruises all over his face and body that were not there earlier that

morning. Shutts exclaimed to Truett, “What did you do to my kid?”

Truett responded that Wyatt was still breathing, but Shutts saw

that Wyatt was not breathing and told Truett to call 911. Truett

“hesitated,” but then called and handed the phone to Shutts. The 

911 dispatcher instructed her on how to perform CPR, and she 

continued until the police arrived. When she looked up, Truett had 

disappeared.

A sheriff’s deputy took over CPR until paramedics arrived. He 

observed that Wyatt’s face appeared “battered.” A paramedic who 

arrived a few minutes later testified that Wyatt appeared to be dead, 
4

but he and other paramedics still attempted to revive him. They 

transported Wyatt to the hospital, where an ER physician continued 

attempts to revive him, although he testified that Wyatt was in 

“complete cardiac standstill” and rigor mortis had already set in. 

The physician testified that, based on the state of the rigor mortis 

and lividity in the child’s body, he had been dead for over an hour 

when he arrived at the hospital, approximately one-half hour after 

the 911 call was placed. He also testified that Wyatt had numerous 

bruises, scratches, and ruptured blood vessels in his face, as well as 

bruises on his ears, extremities, and abdomen. He testified that the 

abdominal injuries indicated bleeding from the liver, which required 

a “high-energy force.” He concluded that Wyatt’s injuries were 

“completely inconsistent” with a fall down the stairs and that the 

injuries were not caused by CPR. 

A medical examiner and Director of Pediatric Forensic 

Medicine for the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, who was qualified 

without objection at trial as an expert in the field of pediatric and 

forensic pathology, performed an autopsy on Wyatt’s body. She 
5

testified that Wyatt had suffered severe, multiple, wide-ranging 

injuries due to beating, squeezing, twisting, and strangulation. She 

observed extensive bleeding in the tissues of the head and bruises 

and abrasions on his head, face, lips, and ears. She also observed 

ruptured blood vessels in his face and marks on his mouth, jaw, and 

neck that in her opinion were due to compression of the neck, 

indicating an asphyxiation or strangulation event. Bilateral bruises 

on the side of his head indicated that his head had been squeezed, 

and his brain was markedly swollen. She also observed internal 

bleeding in his genitalia, indicative of a twisting or squeezing injury. 

In his abdomen, consistent with significant external bruising, she 

observed extensive bleeding, primarily due to an 8-centimeter

laceration to his liver that she described as “huge” and “severe”; this 

was the immediate cause of Wyatt’s death through loss of blood. 

About 20 percent of Wyatt’s blood supply was pooled in the abdomen. 

She also observed injuries to his diaphragm, right lung, pancreas, 

and soft tissues of the abdomen. She concluded that the cause of 

death was multiple blunt force injuries to the abdomen, such as 
6

punching or kicking, with blunt impact injuries to the head as a 

contributing factor. In the medical examiner’s opinion, the injuries 

were inflicted deliberately and were not due to falling down stairs, 

CPR efforts, or medical intervention.3

In light of the severity of Wyatt’s injuries and Truett’s sudden 

disappearance, the police immediately “pinged” Truett’s cell phone 

number; the last location of the phone was in an overgrown, swampy 

area behind the subdivision where Shutts lived. Officers set up a 

perimeter around the area and began searching; Truett was spotted 

“low crawling” in a creek bed, headed away from the subdivision. 

Officers shouted for him to come out, but he continued to elude them 

in the heavy underbrush and swamp until a K-9 officer brought in 

an apprehension dog and announced that he was about to release 

 3 Former medical examiner Dr. Joseph Burton testified for the defense 

that in his opinion Wyatt’s injuries could have been caused by a fall down the 

stairs or by efforts at CPR, and that the liver laceration “could. I’m not saying 

it would” have occurred up to 24 hours earlier and been exacerbated, but not 

caused, by CPR, although he acknowledged that CPR could not have 

contributed to Wyatt’s death if he was already in rigor mortis when the first 

deputy arrived. Dr. Burton acknowledged, moreover, that he could not explain 

all of Wyatt’s injuries and stated, “I’m not telling the jury or the Court that [his 

injuries] were caused by that fall. I’m just saying that the fall could cause the 

injuries that I saw.”
7

the dog and “that she will bite.” Truett then stood up and 

surrendered. After he was arrested, the police discovered that at 

some point he had removed the battery from his cell phone, 

rendering the phone untraceable. During Truett’s police interview,

he gave inconsistent accounts of how the injuries to Wyatt occurred. 

When a police sergeant remarked that Truett appeared to have skin 

under his fingernails, Truett immediately began “picking” at his 

hands and then attempted to urinate on his hands when he was 

escorted to the restroom. Wyatt’s DNA was recovered from under

one of Truett’s fingernails.

At trial, Truett testified and denied having harmed Wyatt. He 

testified that he was a “great father” to his own four-year-old 

daughter and that she stayed with him frequently. He presented 

seven character witnesses who testified to Truett’s reputation for 

positive conduct with children and for peacefulness. Truett further 

testified that he ran away from Shutts’ home because he was 

frightened when Shutts asked him, “What did you do to my kid?” He 

acknowledged smoking marijuana on the day of Wyatt’s death and 
8

the day before, and that he was “aggravated” with Shutts and 

wanted to go home “the whole time.”

2. In his sole enumeration of error, Truett contends that a new 

trial is required because the court erroneously prevented him from 

asking his character witnesses “if they would be comfortable with 

him around their children” or about specific instances of good 

character. 4

The relevant section of the Evidence Code is OCGA § 24-4-405, 

which provides in its entirety:

(a) In all proceedings in which evidence of character 

or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof shall 

be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in 

the form of an opinion.

(b) In proceedings in which character or a trait of 

character of a person is an essential element of a charge, 

claim, or defense or when an accused testifies to his or her 

own character, proof may also be made of specific 

instances of that person’s conduct. The character of the 

accused, including specific instances of the accused’s 

conduct, shall also be admissible in a presentencing 

 4 In his brief here, Truett repeatedly asserts that the trial court 

erroneously applied Georgia’s former Evidence Code in ruling on this matter. 

It is clear from the transcripts of the hearing and the trial, however, that the 

parties and the trial court relied upon the current Evidence Code, as well as 

commentary and treatises discussing it.
9

hearing subject to the provisions of Code Section 17-10-2.

(c) On cross-examination, inquiry shall be allowable 

into relevant specific instances of conduct.

(Emphasis supplied.)5 See generally Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 

313-314 (3) (845 SE2d 653) (2020) (discussing application of OCGA 

§§ 24-4-404 (a) and 24-4-405 (b)).

The trial court held a pretrial hearing on August 17, 2015. The 

same day, the State and Truett filed numerous motions addressing 

evidentiary issues. Among Truett’s motions was a “Motion for PreTrial Ruling” in which he asked the trial court to allow character 

witnesses for the defense to testify under OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) to 

“the defendant’s reputation, demeanor and attitude toward and 

around children” and to their “opinion as to defendant’s character 

including specific, pertinent character traits exhibited by defendant 

within the context of the charges against him.” During the argument

on this motion, the court and the parties discussed OCGA § 24-4-405

 5 The italicized portion of the Georgia rule, among other provisions, does 

not appear in the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence 405.

.
10

(a) at some length, but subsection (b) and the exception regarding a 

testifying defendant were never mentioned; Truett did not raise that 

provision of the Evidence Code, nor was there any indication from 

Truett at that time that he planned to testify.6

The court ruled that Truett could ask the character witnesses

if Truett was “a good father. He’s good around children. That would 

be basically the extent. You just can’t get into specific acts of good 

character. You can’t let the witness go on and on about, well, I’ve 

observed him, you know, the kids.” At the hearing, Truett also 

sought leave to ask the character witnesses whether they “would 

trust him with their child.” The trial court ruled out that testimony 

as going beyond a pertinent character trait, although it observed 

that it was implied in the permissible testimony. 

At trial, after Truett had testified and his first character 

witness had taken the stand, the permissible scope of the character

witnesses’ testimony was discussed again, and defense counsel 

 6 While the provisions of OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) were discussed at other 

points in the hearing, those discussions concerned other pretrial motions by 

either the State or Truett.
11

asked for “clarification” of the original ruling. Truett asked to

question the witnesses regarding Truett’s “reputation for 

peacefulness,” and the trial court stated it would allow that line of 

questioning. Once more, however, Truett did not raise the specific 

provisions of OCGA § 24-4-405 (b), and there was no discussion of 

that subsection with respect to his character witnesses’ testimony.

In Truett’s motion for new trial, he argued that the trial court 

erred in refusing to permit him to ask if the witnesses “would be 

comfortable with him around their children” or about specific 

instances of good character. He attached affidavits from four of his 

trial witnesses providing specific examples of his behavior around 

their children and of his peaceful character. The trial court denied 

Truett’s motion for new trial on this ground, finding that any error 

in excluding the disputed evidence was harmless. We agree, both 

because the proffered testimony would have been cumulative and 

because the evidence of Truett’s guilt was very strong.

In determining whether the error was harmless, we 

review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we 

would expect reasonable jurors to have done so. The test 
12

for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is 

whether it is highly probable that the error did not 

contribute to the verdict.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 

153-154 (3) (805 SE2d 873) (2017); see also OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) 

(“Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 

excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. . 

. .”).

Here, the jury heard testimony from seven character

witnesses, and, despite the trial court’s earlier ruling, most of them 

testified to numerous specific examples of Truett’s conduct with 

children, including Wyatt and his brother as well as the witnesses’

own children or grandchildren. Tonya Watkins testified that she had 

left Truett with her own children and had “never seen any kind of 

issue as far as that’s concerned.” Patti Seiber testified that Truett 

had interacted with her granddaughter. Jessica Rainwater testified 

that she witnessed Truett being “attentive” to the children at a 

family gathering, in particular to Wyatt after Shutts put him into a 

car and then ignored the child while walking around talking on her 
13

phone. Rainwater also testified that Truett had watched her 

daughter. Paul Walls testified that he observed Truett playing, 

laughing, and joking with Shutts’ children “about the same as with 

my own kids,” and keeping them from getting into trouble in a 

neighbor’s yard when Shutts did not intervene. Walls further 

testified that Truett had watched his children as well. Susan Truett, 

Truett’s mother, testified that Truett’s interactions with Wyatt were 

“normal” and that he had taken the initiative to get both Wyatt and 

his older brother away from some “aggressive” dogs when their 

mother did not do so. She also testified that she received a text 

message from Shutts with two photos of Truett and Wyatt “asleep 

on the couch, like a father and son.” The evidence presented by the 

witnesses on Truett’s motion for new trial therefore was largely 

cumulative of their trial testimony, merely elaborating on their 

earlier accounts of Truett’s positive conduct with children and

peacefulness and giving additional specific instances of his conduct.

Moreover, the evidence of Truett’s guilt was very strong. As 

noted above, Wyatt suffered multiple severe injuries to many parts 
14

of his body, including internal organs, inflicted by a variety of 

methods including multiple blunt force trauma. Truett’s expert 

witness conceded that he could not explain all of Wyatt’s injuries as 

possibly due to a fall or medical intervention. Truett was the only 

adult present in the home when Wyatt died, he did not seek medical 

aid for Wyatt despite his obvious severe injuries, and he was 

reluctant to call 911 even after Shutts arrived. He then fled the 

scene, disabled his cell phone, and attempted to elude the police. He 

also gave conflicting accounts of how Wyatt’s injuries occurred and 

made repeated attempts to remove potential evidence from his 

hands.

Any error by the trial court in limiting the witnesses’ testimony 

therefore was harmless, as it is highly probable that any such error 

did not contribute to the verdicts. See Henderson v. State, __ Ga. __ 

(3), 2021 Ga. LEXIS 7 (Case No. S20A1571, decided Feb. 1, 2021)

(exclusion of victim’s statement that he had been to prison, to the 

extent it constituted a threat, was harmless both because 

cumulative of other testimony that victim explicitly threatened 
15

appellant and because evidence of appellant’s guilt was “very 

strong”); Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 503 (5) (842 SE2d 22) (2020) 

(“[I]n light of the strong evidence of [appellant’s] guilt,” refusal to 

allow appellant’s witness to testify was “harmless error, if error at 

all,” because it was highly probable that exclusion of evidence did 

not contribute to verdict); Mitchell v. State, 293 Ga. 1, 3 (2) (742 

SE2d 454) (2013) (exclusion of portions of appellant’s recorded 

statement harmless when similar evidence admitted through 

another witness).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.