UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ROBERT M. LANE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

DR. VIKKI L. LANE; MR. BRUCE 

GLESBY; MS. MARISA BEUOY; 

GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-8092 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00061-ABJ) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Proceeding pro se, Robert Lane appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 

claims for lack of standing. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 

affirm. 

 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

May 10, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I 

After Vikki and Robert Lane reached a divorce settlement, Robert1

 filed for 

bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy trustee (the 

“Trustee”) initiated three adversary proceedings to recover assets that Robert had 

conveyed to affiliated trusts, shell companies, and family members. Eventually, 

Robert and the Trustee reached a global settlement resulting in the dismissal of the 

three adversary proceedings. The settlement provided that Robert and his affiliates 

would turn over all estate property, with certain exceptions, for disposition by the 

Trustee. Robert also agreed that following execution of the agreement, he 

shall not have any standing to object, join, or otherwise be heard on any 

matter or proceeding in any pending or future matter in connection with 

administering [his] Bankruptcy Case; this shall include, but not be 

limited to, approval of settlements, sale of assets, allowance or payment 

of administrative expenses, and allowance or payment of claims. 

He also agreed that he “shall not have standing or any right to pursue pre-petition 

claims or causes of action against any third-party or against any creditor in [his] 

bankruptcy case.” However, Robert later interfered with the Trustee’s ability to 

administer the estate by filing various documents in the bankruptcy court and 

otherwise failed to satisfy his own obligations under the agreement. Accordingly, the 

bankruptcy court sanctioned him twice for interfering with the Trustee’s ability to 

administer the estate and for failing to satisfy his own obligations. 

 1

 Because Vikki and Robert Lane share the same last name, we refer to them 

by their first names in this order. 
3 

In 2012, Vikki filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for 

$1,163,894, and, in April 2015, the Trustee filed a settlement agreement in the 

bankruptcy court to resolve her claim. In response, Robert filed this action in the 

District of Wyoming against Vikki and her attorneys. Although his complaint seeks 

damages for false statements and fraud, each claim he advances constitutes a 

challenge to the resolution of Vikki’s proof of claim. Specifically, he alleges fraud 

because the defendants: (1) filed a “false claim”; (2) asserted that their proof of 

claim is for child support when in actuality it includes legal fees and other items; (3) 

claimed a 10% interest rate, rather than the 7% rate he argues is permitted by the U.S. 

Bankruptcy Court; (4) asked for penalties for past due child support even though 

California waives penalties for unemployed individuals; (5) claimed a spousal 

support buyout “when there was none”; (6) failed to properly account for certain 

payments; (7) requested legal fees that the court had not awarded and that were 

contrary to a prenuptial agreement; and (8) conspired to make false statements in an 

attempt to obtain bankruptcy assets. He also alleges that attorney-defendants’ law 

firm failed to properly supervise them by allowing them to participate in the alleged 

fraud. In his complaint, Robert acknowledges that he only pursued this action in the 

district court because “[a]lthough this matter would normally be a bankruptcy court 

proceeding, Robert’s lack of standing in the bankruptcy court requires this matter to 

be brought in U.S. District Court.” 

The defendants moved to dismiss Robert’s complaint. While the motion was 

pending, the bankruptcy court approved the proposed settlement between Vikki and 
4 

the Trustee allowing her to claim $895,015. The defendants filed a supplemental 

memorandum, asserting that the settlement rendered the district court proceeding 

moot, and advancing a res judicata defense. The district court granted the motion to 

dismiss, concluding that Robert did not have standing because he waived standing in 

the global settlement agreement, and even if he had not waived the issue, the claims 

he asserted rightfully belong to the Trustee. The district court order did not discuss 

mootness or res judicata. This appeal followed. 

II 

The district court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction 

because Robert lacked standing.2

 We review the district court’s determination 

regarding subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Niemi v. Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 

1344 (10th Cir. 2014). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Robert bears the 

burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 

(1992). To meet his burden, he must show an “injury in fact.” Clapper v. Amnesty 

Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). And “each element must be supported in 

 2

 The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing. In the 

bankruptcy context, we often apply a prudential standing requirement that “is more 

stringent . . . than the case or controversy standing requirement of Article III.” In re 

C.W. Mining Co., 636 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

Under Article III, a cognizable injury “need not be financial and need only be fairly 

traceable to the alleged illegal action.” In re Alpex Comput. Corp., 71 F.3d 353, 357 

n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). In contrast, in the bankruptcy context an 

appellant must be a “person aggrieved” to have prudential standing, as discussed 

infra. Id. However, the distinction is immaterial in the matter before us: the only 

injury Robert advances is a financial injury that would allegedly result from payment 

of Vikki’s claim. Thus, if Robert’s alleged injury is insufficient to show standing 

under the prudential “person aggrieved” standard, see infra, he also fails to show 

standing under the jurisdictional Article III standard. 
5 

the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 

i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the 

litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. At the pleading stage, “[t]hreadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

We agree with the district court that Robert lacks standing.3 Each of his 

claims alleges that Vikki’s claim on the bankruptcy estate was fraudulent in some 

way. Claims of fraud against a bankruptcy estate “are statutory causes of action 

belonging to the trustee, not to the bankrupt, and the trustee asserts them for the 

benefit of the bankrupt’s creditors, whose rights the trustee enforces.” Allegaert v. 

Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1977). The debtor is not injured by such alleged 

fraud because, “[u]nless the estate is solvent and excess will eventually go to the 

debtor, or unless the matter involves rights unique to the debtor, the debtor is not a 

party aggrieved by orders affecting the administration of the bankruptcy estate.” In 

re Weston, 18 F.3d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir. 1994). Robert’s argument to the contrary 

 3

 Even if Robert demonstrated standing, his complaint amounts to an attempt 

to circumvent the bankruptcy court proceedings. “It is for the court of first instance 

to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed 

for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on 

its decision are to be respected.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 

(1995) (quotation omitted). Thus, if Robert believes the decisions of the bankruptcy 

court are improper, the proper venues to challenge those decisions are the bankruptcy 

court and a federal district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel through a direct 

appeal. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158. Robert instead agreed not to object in the 

bankruptcy proceedings. His attempt to collaterally attack those proceedings “cannot 

be permitted . . . without seriously undercutting the orderly process of law.” Celotex, 

514 U.S. at 313. 
6 

rests on his bare conclusory assertions that if Vikki’s claim was not paid, the money 

would “otherwise be his.”4

 These conclusory statements are not sufficient to 

demonstrate an injury to support standing to challenge the administration of the 

bankruptcy estate.5

 

III 

The district court’s dismissal for lack of standing is AFFIRMED. Robert’s 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

 4

 In contrast to these bare assertions is Robert’s own concession that he lacks 

standing in the bankruptcy proceedings. In particular, he agreed that he “shall not 

have any standing to object, join, or otherwise be heard on any matter or proceeding 

in any pending or future matter in connection with administering [his] Bankruptcy 

Case; this shall include . . . approval of settlements . . . and allowance or payment of 

claims.” We reject Robert’s contention that his complaint does not concern the 

bankruptcy court’s approval of settlements and allowance or payment of claims. To 

the contrary, the claims brought in this action fall squarely within the scope of his 

concession in the settlement agreement. Our holding finds support in—but does not 

depend on—this concession. 

5

 Robert also argues that the district court abused its discretion by entertaining 

the defendant’s supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss 

without allowing Robert to file a reply. Robert does not convincingly argue that 

accepting a supplemental memorandum, without more, amounts to an abuse of discretion. 

See United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1993) (“District courts 

generally are afforded great discretion regarding trial procedure applications 

(including control of the docket and parties), and their decisions are reviewed only 

for abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)).