156

SARI F. DEIHL, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, RESPONDENT

Docket No. 22897–08. Filed February 23, 2010. 

In 2004 P and her husband litigated three consolidated 

cases before the Court concerning their 1996, 1997, and 1998 

tax years. P’s attorney raised the issue of relief from joint and 

several liability under sec. 6015, I.R.C., in the petition for 

1996 but not 1997 or 1998. The request did not invoke any 

specific subsection of sec. 6015, I.R.C. P then withdrew her 

claim for relief from joint and several liability in the stipulation of facts for the consolidated cases. P’s husband died after 

the opinion in the consolidated cases was filed but before 

decisions were entered. After decisions were entered, P filed 

an administrative claim for relief from joint and several 

liability with R for 1996, 1997, and 1998. R determined P did 

not qualify for relief under sec. 6015(b), (c), or (f), I.R.C., and 

that P’s claim was barred by sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., regardless. Held: Sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., applies because the Court 

entered final decisions for 1996, 1997, and 1998. Held, further, 

P did not participate meaningfully in the prior proceeding. 

Held, further, relief from joint and several liability was raised 

only in the pleadings for 1996. Therefore, for 1997 and 1998 

sec. 6015, I.R.C., relief from joint and several liability was not 

an issue in the prior proceeding. Held, further, relief from 

joint and several liability under sec. 6015(b) and (f), I.R.C., for 

1996 was an issue in the prior proceeding. Held, further, for 

purposes of sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., an election under sec. 

6015(c), I.R.C., shall not be deemed to have been an issue in 

a prior proceeding where the requesting spouse’s original 

request for relief under sec. 6015, I.R.C., did not specifically 

invoke sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., and the requesting spouse was 

ineligible to make an election under sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., at the 

time because the requesting spouse’s husband was alive. 

Accordingly, an election under sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., for 1996 

was not an issue in the prior proceeding. Held, further, sec. 

6015(g)(2), I.R.C., bars P from claiming relief from joint and 

several liability for 1996 under sec. 6015(b) and (f), I.R.C. 

Held, further, the exception in sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., applies 

to, and P is not barred from electing, relief from joint and several liability under sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., for 1996 and relief 

(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 157

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as 

amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 2 Respondent in the notice of determination denied petitioner relief from joint and several liability for each of the years in issue because: (1) ‘‘The information we have available does not 

show you meet the requirements for relief ’’; (2) ‘‘The United States Tax Court or other court 

issued a final decision regarding the liabilities from which you seek relief and you meaningfully 

participated in that proceeding’’ (i.e., res judicata); (3) ‘‘You knew, or had reason to know, of 

the income or deductions that caused the additional tax’’; and (4) ‘‘You did not show it would 

be unfair to hold you responsible’’. On Mar. 27, 2009, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion 

to sever the issues. This Opinion deals only with the issue of res judicata. We do not here decide 

whether petitioner qualifies for relief from joint and several liability under sec. 6015. 3Mr. Hartmann was originally hired by Mr. Deihl over 20 years ago to serve as counsel for 

Mr. Deihl and petitioner’s businesses as well as for personal matters. He withdrew as attorney 

of record in the consolidated cases to be able to serve as a witness at trial but continued to 

Continued

from joint and several liability under sec. 6015(b), (c), and (f), 

I.R.C., for 1997 and 1998. 

Tim A. Tarter and Kirk A. McCarville, for petitioner. 

Anne W. Durning, for respondent. 

OPINION 

VASQUEZ, Judge: Petitioner seeks review of respondent’s 

determination that she is not entitled to relief from joint and 

several liability under section 6015(b), (c), and (f) 1 with 

respect to her joint Federal income tax liabilities for 1996, 

1997, and 1998. Our jurisdiction to review petitioner’s 

request for relief is conferred by section 6015(e). The only 

issue for decision is whether petitioner is precluded by the 

doctrine of res judicata as set forth in section 6015(g)(2) from 

raising the issue of relief from joint and several liability for 

the years in issue. 2

Background

Petitioner and her husband (Mr. Deihl) were the taxpayers 

in three cases previously litigated in the Tax Court in 2004: 

Docket Nos. 11136–02 (1996), 16293–02 (1998), and 1024–03 

(1997). The cases were consolidated for trial, briefing, and 

opinion (the consolidated cases). The consolidated cases concerned the substantiation of business expense deductions 

claimed by Mr. Deihl and petitioner in 1996, 1997, and 1998 

related to their S corporation. 

Mr. Deihl hired Donald MacPherson (Mr. MacPherson) to 

represent him and petitioner in the consolidated cases. 

Robert Hartmann (Mr. Hartmann) assisted Mr. MacPherson 

with the representation. 3 Petitioner was not involved in the 

158 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156) 

assist Mr. MacPherson throughout the litigation. 

4Similarly, the answers filed in 1997 and 1998 were silent as to relief from joint and several 

liability and the Commissioner, in his pretrial memorandum for the consolidated cases, referred 

only to 1996 in addressing petitioner’s claim for relief from joint and several liability. 

hiring of Mr. MacPherson and did not sign the engagement 

letter for the consolidated cases. 

Mr. MacPherson signed and filed the three petitions in the 

consolidated cases; petitioner did not sign them. The petition 

in docket No. 11136–02 (the 1996 petition) raised the issue 

of relief from joint and several liability. It states: 

Under Sec. 6013(e) and 6015, PETITIONER SARI F. DEIHL was/is an 

innocent spouse for the year at issue in the statutory NOD. Considering 

all of the facts and circumstances, it would be unfair to hold SARI responsible for the understatement of tax, if any, and related penalties and 

interest, if any. 

The petitions in docket Nos. 16293–02 (1998) and 1024–03 

(1997) did not raise the issue of relief from joint and several 

liability. 4

On October 21, 2004, the parties submitted their stipulation of facts in the consolidated cases. Paragraph 20 thereof 

(paragraph 20) states that ‘‘Petitioner Sari F. Deihl no longer 

seeks innocent spouse relief for the taxable years 1996, 1997 

or 1998’’. Relief from joint and several liability was not discussed at trial in the consolidated cases (the 2004 trial). 

The Tax Court filed its opinion in the consolidated cases on 

December 15, 2005. See Deihl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 

2005–287 (Deihl I). The Court generally sustained the 

Commissioner’s determinations of deficiencies in tax, additions to tax, and penalties against petitioner and Mr. Deihl 

for 1996, 1997, and 1998 and instructed that decisions would 

be entered under Rule 155. Mr. Deihl died on February 5, 

2006, 52 days after Deihl I was filed but before the final 

decisions in the consolidated cases were entered. 

Petitioner served as personal representative for the estate 

of Mr. Deihl from March 20, 2006, to July 30, 2007. She 

sought new counsel after receiving advice from Mr. MacPherson and Mr. Hartmann with which she disagreed. On or 

about March 16, 2006, petitioner retained Martha Patrick, 

whose representation of petitioner ended on or around April 

24, 2006. Soon thereafter, on April 27, 2006, petitioner 

retained Terence D. Woolston (Mr. Woolston) and Tim A. 

(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 159

5The Court originally entered its decisions in docket Nos. 16293–02 and 1024–03 on Sept. 12, 

2006, but vacated the original decisions after granting the Commissioner’s motion to vacate. 

6The decision in docket No. 11136–02 became final on Dec. 12, 2006. The decisions in docket 

Nos. 16293–02 and 1024–03 became final on Jan. 2, 2007. 

7 Respondent argues petitioner could have raised sec. 6015(c) by moving the Court to reopen 

the record or to vacate the decisions before they became final. Given our conclusion, discussed 

hereinafter, that petitioner did not participate meaningfully in the consolidated cases and that 

relief under sec. 6015(c) in fact was not an issue in the consolidated cases, we need not decide 

whether petitioner could have raised relief under sec. 6015(c) in the consolidated cases. 

Tarter of Woolston & Tarter P.C. to represent her and the 

estate of Mr. Diehl. 

Mr. Woolston and counsel for the Commissioner worked 

together to finalize the Rule 155 computations in the consolidated cases. 

The Court entered its decision in docket No. 11136–02 on 

September 12, 2006, and in docket Nos. 16293–02 and 1024–

03 on October 3, 2006. 5 Neither side appealed. 6

On or about March 6, 2007, petitioner filed Form 8857, 

Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, requesting relief under 

section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for 1996, 1997, and 1998. On 

August 22, 2008, respondent sent petitioner a notice of determination denying petitioner’s request for relief from joint and 

several liability for each of those years. On September 16, 

2008, petitioner timely filed a petition for review of respondent’s determination. Petitioner resided in Arizona at the time 

she filed the petition in this case. 

Discussion

Respondent argues that res judicata as delineated in section 6015(g)(2) bars petitioner from claiming relief from joint 

and several liability for 1996, 1997, and 1998 because the 

Court entered final decisions for those years. Respondent further argues that the exception to res judicata in section 

6015(g)(2) does not apply because relief from joint and several liability was an issue in the consolidated cases and petitioner participated meaningfully therein. 

Petitioner argues that the exception to res judicata in section 6015(g)(2) applies because relief from joint and several 

liability was not an issue in the consolidated cases and she 

did not participate meaningfully therein. She also argues 

that res judicata should not apply to her election under section 6015(c) because she could not have raised it in the 

consolidated cases. 7

160 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156) 

I. Section 6015(g)(2)

Section 6015(g)(2) codifies the application of res judicata 

with respect to claims for relief from joint and several 

liability under section 6015.

A. Res Judicata in General

Under the judicial doctrine of res judicata, when a court of 

competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment on the merits 

of a cause of action, the parties to the action are bound by 

every matter that was or could have been offered and 

received to sustain or defeat the claim. Commissioner v. 

Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); see also Gustafson

v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 85, 91 (1991). The doctrine of res 

judicata ‘‘serves to promote judicial economy and the repose 

of disputes’’ by precluding repetitious lawsuits. Gustafson v. 

Commissioner, supra at 91. 

Because Federal income taxes are determined on an 

annual basis, each year is a separate cause of action, and res 

judicata is applied to bar subsequent proceedings involving 

the same tax year. Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra at 597–

598; Calcutt v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 14, 21 (1988). As a 

general rule, where the Tax Court has entered a decision for 

a taxable year, both the taxpayer and the Commissioner 

(with certain exceptions) are barred from reopening that 

year. Burke v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 41, 47 (1995); 

Hemmings v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 221, 233 (1995). 

A stipulated judgment is a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. Baker v. IRS, 74 F.3d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 

1996) (and cases cited thereat). It follows that, for res judicata purposes, the decision incorporates those elements that 

the parties have settled by stipulation as well as those that 

have been redetermined by the Court. See Lincir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007–86. 

Although the general outlines of res judicata are relatively 

straightforward, the details applicable in certain cases may 

be quite intricate. See, e.g., the discussion in Hemmings v. 

Commissioner, supra at 230–235. In addition, Congress 

sometimes enacts legislation that overrides or modifies res 

judicata. See, e.g., Burke v. Commissioner, supra at 47.

(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 161

8Sec. 6015(g)(2) provides: 

RES JUDICATA.—In the case of any election under subsection (b) or (c) or of any request for equitable relief under subsection (f), if a decision of a court in any prior proceeding for the same 

taxable year has become final, such decision shall be conclusive except with respect to the qualification of the individual for relief which was not an issue in such proceeding. The exception 

contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply if the court determines that the individual 

participated meaningfully in such prior proceeding. 

B. The Exception

Under common law principles of res judicata, a taxpayer 

who was a party to a prior proceeding for the same taxable 

year is barred from seeking relief from joint and several 

liability whether or not the claim had been raised as an issue 

in the prior proceeding. Section 6015(g)(2) creates an exception to this rule where such relief was not an issue in the 

prior proceeding. However, the exception does not apply if 

the court determines that the taxpayer participated meaningfully in the prior proceeding. 8 Thus, res judicata does not bar 

a taxpayer from requesting relief from joint and several 

liability under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) if: (1) Relief from 

joint and several liability under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) was 

not an issue in the prior proceeding; and (2) the court determines that the taxpayer did not participate meaningfully in 

the prior proceeding. Said differently, if a final decision was 

entered in a prior proceeding for a tax year and relief from 

joint and several liability was an issue therein, section 

6015(g)(2) will bar the taxpayer from subsequently 

requesting the same relief for that year. Or, if a final decision was entered in a prior proceeding for a tax year and the 

taxpayer participated meaningfully therein, section 

6015(g)(2) bars the taxpayer from subsequently requesting 

relief from joint and several liability that was or could have 

been an issue in the prior proceeding. See Vetrano v. 

Commissioner, 116 T.C. 272, 278 (2001); sec. 1.6015–1(e), 

Income Tax Regs. 

II. The Consolidated Cases

This Court entered final decisions in the consolidated cases 

for the tax years at issue here. Res judicata as delineated in 

section 6015(g)(2) bars petitioner’s claims for relief from joint 

and several liability unless those claims for relief were

not an issue in and petitioner did not participate meaningVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 May 24, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00006 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\DEIHL.134 SHEILA
162 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156) 

9 Because the case involved a motion for summary judgment, the Court did not decide whether 

fully in the consolidated cases. We first address whether petitioner participated meaningfully in the consolidated cases.

A. Meaningful Participation

Under section 6015(g)(2), the requesting spouse bears the 

burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

he or she did not participate meaningfully in the prior litigation. Monsour v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004–190. 

Meaningful participation is not defined in section 

6015(g)(2) or the accompanying regulations, and the legislative history does not provide guidance as to the proper definition. Moreover, the Court, despite deciding whether 

requesting spouses have participated meaningfully in prior 

proceedings, has not clearly defined meaningful participation, 

although we have indicated that while ‘‘merely [complying]’’ 

with a spouse’s instructions to sign various pleadings and 

other documents filed in prior litigation is not conclusive of 

meaningful participation, Thurner v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 

43, 53 (2003), signing court documents and participating in 

settlement negotiations are indicators of meaningful participation, id.; Monsour v. Commissioner, supra. This case warrants a brief description of our cases discussing meaningful 

participation. 

In Thurner v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer husband 

and the taxpayer wife filed separate petitions each seeking 

relief from joint and several liability under section 6015. The 

Commissioner moved for summary judgment on the issue of 

meaningful participation. We found that the record clearly 

established that the taxpayer husband had participated 

meaningfully in a prior court proceeding. The taxpayer husband had signed court documents and been fully engaged in 

the proceeding. In addition, the taxpayer husband had maintained exclusive control over all tax matters including the 

handling of the prior proceeding. To the contrary, we found 

there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

taxpayer wife had participated meaningfully in the prior proceeding where she asserted that she had merely complied 

with her husband’s instructions to sign the pleadings and 

various other documents that were filed in the prior proceeding. 9

(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 163

the taxpayer wife had participated meaningfully in the prior proceeding. 

10 Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2001–131. 

In Monsour v. Commissioner, supra, we found the taxpayer 

had participated meaningfully in a prior Tax Court proceeding involving the taxpayer and her husband. We found 

significant the fact that the taxpayer chose not to call a particular witness to testify about her level of participation in 

the prior proceeding and inferred from her failure to call this 

witness that his testimony, if given, would have been 

unfavorable to the taxpayer. The taxpayer relied on her husband’s testimony to support her position that she had not 

participated meaningfully. However, we did not find this 

testimony to be credible and we did not rely on this testimony to support the taxpayer’s contentions. Moreover, the 

taxpayer, an attorney, agreed to a stipulated decision that 

she was jointly and severally liable for deficiencies in tax. 

In Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006–180, affd. 

276 Fed. Appx. 634 (9th Cir. 2008), the record showed that 

in a prior proceeding 10 the requesting spouse had read and 

signed two petitions filed with the Tax Court; spoken and 

participated at pretrial meetings with IRS counsel; signed 

various documents including a stipulation of settled issues, a 

power of attorney, and stipulations of facts; testified about 

her husband’s potential income sources; and signed a trial 

brief, a reply brief, and a motion for leave to file a reply 

brief. The taxpayer had also prepared her and her husband’s 

joint Federal income tax returns for the years in issue. 

Despite the requesting spouse’s arguments to the contrary 

and although she may have signed some documents under 

the direction of her husband, we held on the entire record 

that the taxpayer had nevertheless participated meaningfully 

in the prior proceeding. 

In Moore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007–156, we found 

the taxpayer’s participation in a prior proceeding to be meaningful where the taxpayer had been informed about section 

6015, had participated in meetings with IRS counsel and the 

Court, and had voluntarily entered into a settlement. 

Petitioner’s participation in the consolidated cases differs 

significantly from that of the requesting spouses in Monsour, 

Huynh, and Moore. Petitioner, who is not an attorney and 

did not complete her high school education, did not sign any 

164 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156) 

11Only 11 out of 335 pages of the transcript from the 2004 trial consisted of petitioner’s testimony. 

court documents in the consolidated cases. She did not 

review the petitions or the stipulations of facts, nor did she 

agree to any of the stipulations. Mr. MacPherson and Mr. 

Hartmann did not discuss these documents with petitioner. 

In fact, she saw them for the first time at trial in the present 

matter. Petitioner did not meet with any IRS personnel, 

participate in any settlement negotiations with the IRS, or sit 

in on any such meetings between her attorneys and the IRS

during the litigation in the consolidated cases. However, petitioner was called as a witness in the 2004 trial and testified 

briefly 11 about certain expenses for entertainment and computers deducted by her and Mr. Deihl’s S corporation. 

Respondent called Robert Cuatto (Mr. Cuatto), associate 

area counsel with the IRS, to testify about petitioner’s participation in the consolidated cases. Mr. Cuatto observed petitioner in discussions with Mr. Deihl and their counsel during 

several breaks in the 2-day trial and in the hallway in the 

morning before trial both days. In his opinion, petitioner 

seemed to be engaged and actively involved in the trial. However, Mr. Cuatto was not involved in any of the aforementioned discussions and admittedly had no knowledge of what 

was being discussed. We cannot speculate as to what petitioner, Mr. Deihl, and their counsel may have been discussing during breaks and in the hallway before trial. 

Petitioner and respondent initially expressed a desire to 

call Mr. MacPherson to testify as to petitioner’s participation 

in the consolidated cases. However, Mr. MacPherson was in 

Germany recovering from an illness at the time of trial in the 

present matter and did not testify. The parties agreed that 

the record was sufficiently complete without his testimony. 

Therefore, we shall not infer anything from the fact that Mr. 

MacPherson did not testify. 

Mr. Hartmann did not meet with petitioner immediately 

after Deihl I was filed. He was instructed by Mr. Deihl to 

keep the findings in Deihl I ‘‘under our hat for a while’’. It 

was only after Mr. Deihl’s death that Mr. Hartmann and Mr. 

MacPherson met with petitioner. At that time they gave petitioner advice with which she disagreed. Petitioner then 

informed Mr. Hartmann that she was speaking with different 

(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 165

12 An individual shall only be eligible to make an election under sec. 6015(c) if at the time 

of the election such individual is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the individual with whom such individual filed the joint return to which the election relates, or such 

individual was not a member of the same household as the individual with whom such joint 

return was filed at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date such election is 

filed. Sec. 6015(c)(3)(A)(i). For purposes of these eligibility requirements, a widow is treated as 

Continued

attorneys. Mr. Woolston handled the consolidated cases from 

that point on. 

We believe Mr. Deihl, like the husband in Thurner v. 

Commissioner, 121 T.C. 43 (2003), controlled the litigation in 

the consolidated cases until his death. Although petitioner 

testified at the 2004 trial, she was more like a third-party 

fact witness than a participating litigant. The totality of the 

evidence demonstrates that petitioner was never fully 

informed or engaged in the litigation. We find that petitioner 

has shown that she did not participate meaningfully in the 

consolidated cases. 

B. Relief at Issue in the Consolidated Cases

Mr. MacPherson raised the issue of relief from joint and 

several liability in the 1996 petition. Although paragraph 20 

seemingly withdraws the issue for all years in the consolidated cases, the petitions and corresponding answers filed for 

1997 and 1998 did not raise relief from joint and several 

liability. Further, respondent’s pretrial memorandum for the 

consolidated cases specifically addressed petitioner’s claim 

with respect to 1996 only. Because relief from joint and several liability was raised in the pleadings for 1996 only, that 

is the only year in which said relief was an issue. See Rules 

38, 324. Relief from joint and several liability was not an 

issue in 1997 or 1998. The mere reference to 1997 and 1998 

in paragraph 20 without more did not put relief from joint 

and several liability in issue for those years. Accordingly, 

petitioner is not barred from making an election under section 6015(b) and (c) and requesting equitable relief under 

section 6015(f) for 1997 and 1998. 

The 1996 petition did not specify the basis for relief 

requested under section 6015; i.e., whether petitioner was 

electing or requesting relief under section 6015(b), (c), or (f). 

However, petitioner was not eligible to make an election 

under section 6015(c) when the 1996 petition was filed 

because she was not divorced or separated from Mr. Deihl. 12

166 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156) 

no longer married. Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 123–124 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 

(10th Cir. 2003). 

13Our holding does not impair the Court’s ability to interpret an ambiguous request for relief 

under sec. 6015 as including an election under sec. 6015(c). 

14We do not attempt in this Opinion to decide how sec. 6015(g)(2) applies under a different 

set of facts where a requesting spouse does not become eligible to elect relief under sec. 6015(c) 

until after a decision in a prior proceeding has become final pursuant to sec. 7481. 

Determining what subsections of section 6015 were an issue 

in a prior proceeding under these facts is an issue of first 

impression. We hold that for purposes of section 6015(g)(2), 

an election under section 6015(c) shall not be deemed to have 

been an issue in a prior proceeding where the requesting 

spouse’s original request for relief under section 6015 did not 

specifically invoke section 6015(c) and the requesting spouse 

was ineligible to make an election under section 6015(c) at 

the time because the requesting spouse’s husband was 

alive. 13 Therefore, we conclude that petitioner’s claim for 

innocent spouse relief in the 1996 petition was an election 

under section 6015(b) and a request for equitable relief under 

section 6015(f). Relief under section 6015(c) for 1996 was not 

an issue in the consolidated cases. 14

Petitioner argues she should not be bound by the 1996 

petition or paragraph 20 because she was not adequately represented during the consolidated cases and she was not 

aware of the contents of the 1996 petition or paragraph 20 

until after Deihl I was released. However, we have held that 

‘‘the quality of advocacy and the actual knowledge of the litigants are not special circumstances in determining whether 

a prior judgment is a bar in a subsequent litigation.’’ Moore 

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007–156; see also Rule 33(b). 

Accordingly, relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b) and (f) was an issue in the consolidated cases as 

to 1996; relief under section 6015(c) was not. 

We find that section 6015(g)(2) bars petitioner from 

making an election under section 6015(b) and requesting 

equitable relief under section 6015(f) for 1996. We find further that the exception in section 6015(g)(2) applies to petitioner’s claim for relief under section 6015(c) for 1996 and 

petitioner’s claim for relief under section 6015(b), (c), and (f) 

for 1997 and 1998.

(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 167

III. Conclusion

A summary of our holdings follows. The Court entered 

final decisions for petitioner’s 1996, 1997, and 1998 tax 

years, which were litigated in 2004. Petitioner did not 

participate meaningfully in that litigation. Relief from joint 

and several liability was an issue in the consolidated cases 

as to 1996 only under section 6015(b) and (f). Therefore, petitioner is barred from making an election under section 

6015(b) and requesting equitable relief under section 6015(f) 

for 1996. Relief from joint and several liability under section 

6015(c) for 1996 and section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for 1997 and 

1998 was not an issue in the consolidated cases. Therefore, 

the exception to res judicata in section 6015(g)(2) applies to 

these claims. Accordingly, petitioner is not barred from 

making an election under section 6015(c) for 1996 or

from making an election under section 6015(b) and (c) and 

requesting equitable relief under section 6015(f) for 1997

and 1998. 

In reaching all of our holdings herein, we have considered 

all arguments made by the parties, and to the extent not 

mentioned above, we find them to be irrelevant or without 

merit. 

To reflect the foregoing, 

fAn appropriate order will be issued.