No. 81385 

FILED 

APR 1 4 2022 

EF DEPUTY CLERK 

138 Nev., Advance Opinion 210 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

LEONIDAS P. FLANGAS, AN 

INDIVIDUAL, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

PERFEKT MARKETING, LLC, AN 

ARIZONA LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY, 

Respondent. 

Appeal from a district court order denying a motion to set aside 

a domesticated foreign judgment. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Trevor L. Atkin, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg, Reno; 

Christopherson Law Offices and Ian Christopherson, Las Vegas, 

for Appellant. 

The Law Office of Vernon Nelson and Vernon A. Nelson, Jr., Las Vegas, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.' 

'The Honorable Abbi Silver, Justice, is disqualified from participation 

in the decision of this matter. 

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OPINION 

By the Court, CADISH, J.: 

Respondent judgment creditor domesticated a foreign judgment 

in Nevada within the rendering states statute of limitations but did not 

perfect service of the domestication notice on appellant judgment debtor 

until after the rendering states limitations period for judgment 

enforcement passed. The district court denied appellant's motion to set 

aside the judgment, determining that respondent timely domesticated the 

judgment in Nevada and that respondent's accomplishment of actual 

service of the domestication notice on a later date did not affect the 

judgment's enforceability. Appellant now argues that the judgment is 

invalid and unenforceable because respondent did not renew it in the 

rendering state before it served appellant with notice of the domestication, 

thereby allowing the judgment to expire in the meantime. Appellant also 

argues that enforcement of a foreign judgment under such circumstances 

violates a judgment debtor's due-process rights. 

We conclude that under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 

Judgments Act, which Nevada has adopted, a foreign judgment is 

enforceable in Nevada if the judgment creditor domesticates that judgment 

according to the provisions of the Act within the rendering states 

limitations period, and additionally, complies with the statutory notice 

provisions of the Act, which the district court correctly determined that 

appellant did here. We further conclude that enforcement of the foreign 

judgment does not violate due process because respondent served the 

domestication notice by certified mail, as required by statute, and this type 

of service is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties in this context. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

2 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Respondent Perfekt Marketing, LLC, obtained a judgment, 

entered on May 5, 2014, against appellant Leonidas Flangas in Arizona. On 

February 5, 2019, Perfekt Marketing domesticated the judgment by filing a 

certified copy of the foreign judgment and an affidavit of the foreign 

judgment's validity and enforceability, along with the names and last 

known addresses of the judgment debtor and creditor, respectively, in a 

Nevada district court. On February 6, 2019, Perfekt Marketing sent a 

notice of the filed application and affidavit by certified mail, return receipt 

requested, to Flangas's last-known address, as well as to the address of 

Flangas's attorney in Arizona. Additionally, Perfekt Marketing filed an 

affidavit of service with the Nevada district court to verify the date of 

service of the notice of the application and affidavit. 

Perfekt Marketing never received confirmation by way of the 

return receipt that Flangas received the mailed notice. Thereafter, it 

attempted personal service of the notice on Flangas at the same, last-known 

personal address on four subsequent occasions. Perfekt Marketing 

accomplished personal service on Flangas on June 6, 2019, this time at the 

address of Flangas's law firm, approximately 120 days after the 

domestication notice was first mailed to Flangas and his Arizona attorney. 

Thereafter, Flangas sought relief from the foreign judgment 

under NRCP 60(b). He argued that the Arizona judgment had expired, and 

thus, was void, because Perfekt Marketing failed to renew the judgment 

under Arizona law before it perfected personal service of the domestication 

notice on Flangas. Flangas also contended that the judgment was not 

entitled to full faith and credit because the delay in service of the 

domestication violated statutory-notice and due-process guarantees. 

Perfekt Marketing opposed and argued that the registration of a foreign 

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judgment in Nevada domesticates the judgment in Nevada and triggers the 

six-year statute of limitations in Nevada for judgment enforcement. It 

contended that it properly domesticated the Arizona judgment, regardless 

of the timing of personal service, because it filed the judgment in Nevada 

before its expiration under the Arizona statute of limitations. The district 

court ultimately denied Flangas's NRCP 60(b) motion, concluding "that the 

filing date of the application of foreign judgment [was] the effective date of 

the judgment in Nevada and "that there [was] no requirement that the 

notice of foreign judgment be served upon [the] judgment debtor." Flangas 

now appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

Enforceability of a foreign judgment is not defeated if a judgment creditor 

domesticates the judgment before its expiration in the rendering state, 

notwithstanding that the judgment debtor receives notice of the filing after 

its purported expiration in the rendering state 

Flangas argues that the date on which a judgment creditor 

provides actual notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment 

debtor serves as the operative date to determine whether a foreign 

judgment is valid and enforceable in a Nevada court. He asserts that the 

Arizona judgment had expired by the time Perfekt Marketing provided 

Flangas with actual notice of the domestication because the notice was not 

accomplished until after the Arizona statute of limitations for judgment 

enforcement had expired, and Perfekt Marketing failed to renew the 

judgment in Arizona before that expiration date. Further, he contends that 

Nevada courts cannot enforce an expired judgment, as it is no longer valid. 

We disagree. 

4 
Nevada's "enforcement measures" apply to the enforcement of 

foreign judgments. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) 

("Enforcement measures . . . remain subject to the evenhanded control of 

forum law."). Nevada has adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 

Judgments Act (UEFJA) to govern the procedures to domesticate and 

enforce a foreign judgment in Nevada. See NRS 17.330-.400. A foreign 

judgment is "any judgment of a court of the United States or of any other 

court which is entitled to full faith and credit." NRS 17.340. The UEFJA 

mandates enforcement of "any foreign judgment" by providing that "[a]n 

exemplified copy of any foreign judgment may be filed with the clerk of any 

district court of this state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the 

same manner as a judgment of the district court of this state." NRS 17.350 

(emphasis added). We have explained that this language means that the 

act of domesticating a "foreign judgment in a Nevada district court" creates 

"a new action for the purposes of the statute of limitations." Trubenbach v. 

Amstadter, 109 Nev. 297, 301, 849 P.2d 288, 290 (1993). The foreign 

judgment, in effect, becomes a Nevada judgment subject to Nevada's 

enforcement rules. See id.; see also NRS 17.350 ("A judgment so filed has 

the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and 

proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of a district 

court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." 

(emphasis added)). Thus, contrary to Flangas's argument, the date a 

foreign judgment is filed in Nevada, as opposed to the date actual notice of 

the filing is accomplished, provides the relevant date to determine a foreign 

judgment's enforceability and validity. Trubenbach, 109 Nev. at 299-300, 

849 P.2d at 289. Accordingly, we focus on whether the Arizona judgment 

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was enforceable and entitled to full faith and credit at the time Perfekt 

Marketing filed a copy of the foreign judgment in Nevada district court. 

Here, the parties do not dispute that the foreign judgment 

remained enforceable under Arizona law when Perfekt Marketing 

domesticated the judgment in Nevada before its expiration under the 

Arizona statute of limitations. See generally Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-

1551(A) (2013) (providing that a judgment is enforceable "at any time 

within five years"). Because the date of filing is operative in determining 

enforceability, and because Perfekt Marketing registered the judgment in 

Nevada within Arizona's limitations period, the Arizona judgment never 

expired. Thus, the district court properly determined that renewal was not 

required to enforce the judgment. See Tandy Comput. Leasing v. Terinct's 

Pizza, Inc., 105 Nev. 841, 844, 784 P.2d 7, 8 (1989) (reviewing a decision on 

a motion to set aside a foreign judgment for an abuse of discretion); Skender 

v. Brunsonbuilt Constr. & Dev. Co., 122 Nev. 1430, 1435, 148 P.3d 710, 714 

(2006) (observing that the district court abuses its discretion when it makes 

an "arbitrary or capricious" decision or "exceeds the bounds of law or reason" 

(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 

17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001D). 

Moreover, the six-year statute of limitations that governs the 

judgment's enforcement in Nevada began to accrue on February 5, 2019, 

when Perfekt Marketing filed the application, copy, and affidavit of the 

foreign judgment. See Trubenbach, 109 Nev. at 301, 849 P.2d at 290 

(explaining that domestication of a foreign judgment according to the 

UEFJA's requirements triggers the six-year statute of limitations that 

governs judgment enforcement in Nevada); see also NRS 11.190(1)(a) 

(permitting a judgment creditor to enforce any "judgment or decree of any 

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court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United 

States" for six years). Regardless of whether actual notice was even 

required, Flangas received actual notice of the judgment before its 

expiration under the Nevada statute of limitations. Thus, we turn to the 

remaining issue of whether the Arizona judgment was entitled to full faith 

and credit when Perfekt Marketing filed the judgment in Nevada. 

The Arizona judgment was entitled to full faith and credit when Perfekt 

Marketing filed it in Nevada district court 

Flangas argues that the Arizona judgment is not entitled to full 

faith and credit because the Arizona statute of limitations expired before 

Perfekt Marketing accomplished actual notice of the domestication of the 

foreign judgment. Additionally, he argues that the Arizona judgment is 

invalid on full-faith-and-credit grounds because present enforcement of the 

judgment denies him present due process of law. We disagree. 

A foreign judgment is entitled to full faith and credit if it 

constitutes a valid and final judgment of the rendering state. Clint Hurt & 

Assocs., Inc. v. Silver State Oil & Gas Co., 111 Nev. 1086, 1088, 901 P.2d 

703, 705 (1995). A foreign judgment's validity is vulnerable to attack only 

on "a showing of fraud, lack of due process, or lack of jurisdiction in the 

rendering state." Id. Plainly, then, a rendering state's statute of limitations 

does not relate to the judgment's validity, and thus, does not provide a basis 

for a court to refuse to recognize a foreign judgment as entitled to full faith 

and credit. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235; see also, e.g. , M'Elmoyle ex rel. Bailey 

v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 328 (1839) (applying forum's statute of limitations to 

bar enforcement of a valid and enforceable foreign judgment); Boudette v. 

Boudette, 453 P.3d 893, 896-97 (Mont. 2019) (applying Montana's ten-year 

statute of limitations to enforcement of an Arizona divorce decree that was 

registered in Montana under the UEFJA and reversing the trial court's 

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order granting the husband's motion to extinguish the judgment on the 

basis that it expired under Arizona's five-year judgment-enforcement 

limitation period while recognizing that "the Full Faith and Credit Clause 

does not compel the forum state to use the period of limitation of a foreign 

state" (quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 517 (1953))), 

cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 2811 (2020); see also U.S. Const. art. 

Iv, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 

Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."). In this vein, 

we have acknowledged that the full-faith-and-credit doctrine does not 

prevent states from applying the statutes of limitations of their forums to 

the enforcement of foreign judgments, even if such application bars 

enforcement of otherwise valid and final judgments. See Trubenbach, 109 

Nev. at 300, 849 P.2d at 289-90. We also recognized that a judgment's 

validity presents a distinct question from its enforceability based on the 

statute of limitations. See id. at 298-99, 849 P.2d at 289 (noting that "[t]he 

parties agree[d] that the [foreign] judgment [wa]s valiir before discussing 

"what date triggers commencement of the [Nevada] statute of limitations" 

for the judgment's enforcement). 

Here, Flangas challenges the validity of the Arizona judgment 

by claiming that the statute of limitations in Arizona expired before he 

received notice of the filing. However, a state's statute of limitations does 

not bear on the validity of the judgment. Instead, the dispositive issue is 

whether a full-faith-and-credit ground exists to refuse to recognize the 

judgment. Flangas offers none. He does not argue that Perfekt Marketing 

procured the judgment by fraud, that the rendering court lacked subjectmatter or personal jurisdiction, or that the rendering court deprived him of 

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due-process protections.2Nor does the record support such claims. 

Accordingly, the Arizona judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. In 

these circumstances, the UEFJA mandates enforcement of the Arizona 

judgment. See NRS 17.350. Thus, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in recognizing and enforcing the Arizona judgment 

in Nevada. 

The LIEKIA's notice provisions are reasonably calculated to notify a 

judgment debtor of a judgment-enforcement proceeding, and Perfekt 

Marketing complied with its requirements 

Flangas argues that the UEFJA's notice provisions violate due 

process, as those provisions do not require judgment creditors to ensure 

judgment debtors receive actual notice, and instead, allow creditors to notify 

judgment debtors of judgment-enforcement proceedings by certified mail, 

return receipt requested. He also contends that Perfekt Marketing failed 

to promptly comply with the UEFJA's requirements because it provided 

actual notice of the domestication four months after it filed the foreign 

judgment in Nevada. We disagree. 

The UEFJA requires a judgment creditor, "fpfromptly upon 

filing the foreign judgment and affidavit," to "mail notice of the filing of the 

judgment and affidavit . . . to the judgment debtor and to the judgment 

debtor's attorney of record, if any, each at his or her last known address by 

2F1angas's contention that enforcement of the Arizona judgment in 

Nevada denies him due process of law, and thus, renders the judgment 

invalid is legally insufficient under the full-faith-and-credit doctrine. A 

foreign judgment is invalid under the full-faith-and-credit doctrine if the 

rendering court denied the judgment debtor due process at the time the 

judgment was entered. See Clint Hurt, 111 Nev. at 1088, 901 P.2d at 705. 

Flangas neither alleged facts to support that he was denied due process by 

the Arizona court nor presented any evidence thereof. 

9 
certified mail, return receipt requested." NRS 17.360(2). The judgment 

creditor must also "file with the clerk of the court an affidavit setting forth 

the date upon which the notice was mailed." Id. However, the judgment 

creditor does not need to verify with the court that the certified-mailing 

receipt was returned, i.e., received, by the judgment debtor. See id. NRS 

17.360(3) also delays "execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign 

judgment . . . until 30 days after the date of mailing the notice of filing" 

without reference to when the judgment debtor receives actual notice, if at 

all. 

The issue of whether the absence of an actual-notice 

requirement under the UEFJA violates due process is one of first 

impression, which we review de novo. Douglas Disposal, Inc. v. Wee Haul, 

LLC, 123 Nev. 552, 557, 170 P.3d 508, 512 (2007) (applying de novo review 

in considering the constitutionality of a statute). Actual notice means that 

an interested party in fact receives notice of any action against them. See 

Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 169 (2002). The U.S. Supreme 

Court has declined to adopt bright-line rules or methods for constitutionally 

sufficient notice, and instead, has distinguished between "actual notice and 

notice sufficient to satisfy due process. E.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 

226 (2006); Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170. In so doing, the Supreme Court, 

and this court, have required "notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 

and afford them an opportunity to present their objections" before a party 

is deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. Grupo Famsa, S.A. 

de C.V. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 132 Nev. 334, 337, 371 P.3d 1048, 

1050 (2016) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. 

Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Thus, due process does 

10 
not require, as a matter of right, receipt of actual notice in every context. 

See, e.g. , Jones, 547 U.S. at 226. Instead, the focus is on whether the method 

chosen is "reasonably calculate& to provide actual notice. Tulsa Profl 

Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988). That determination 

considers "the reasonableness of . . . a particular metho& in light of "the 

particular circumstances" in which the need for the method arises. Id.; see 

also Grupo Famsa, 132 Nev. at 337, 371 P.3d at 1050. 

Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has expressly approved of 

the use of mail to accomplish the notice element of due process. Tulsa Profl, 

485 U.S. at 489-90 (concluding that service by mail constituted "an 

inexpensive and efficient mechanism . . . reasonably calculated to provide 

actual notice). It has also determined that the government may use 

certified mail to provide notice to those affected by an action. See Jones, 

547 U.S. at 226-27. In Jones, the Supreme Court considered whether a 

states method to provide notice to debtors by certified mail of tax 

delinquencies that entitled the state to sell their properties satisfied the 

reasonably calculated standard. Id. at 223, 226. It cautioned that 

notification by certified mail "make[sl actual notice less likely in some 

cases," and therefore, the method potentially necessitates "reasonable 

followup measures by government officials, such as a "notice [posted] on 

the front dooe of a debtor's property, once those officials realize that the 

chosen method failed to accomplish notice. Id. at 234-35 (emphasis added). 

Because state officials there became aware that the debtor never retrieved 

the certified mailing, it became necessary for the officials to "take( ] 

additional reasonable steps to notify" the debtor. Id. at 234. 

11 
The circumstances in Jones, where the government sought to 

deprive debtors of property ex ante to a judicial proceeding, are not 

analogous to the circumstances here, where a judgment creditor seeks to 

enforce a valid and final judgment. A post-judgment proceeding to enforce 

a judgment between private parties presents a meaningfully distinct 

situation from the underlying action that gave rise to the judgment. By the 

time the judgment creditor seeks to enforce the judgment, the judgment 

debtor has received notice of and the opportunity to participate in the 

underlying action. Cf. NRCP 4.2(a)(2) (providing methods by which to serve 

a summons and copy of a complaint, such as "by leaving a copy of 

[both] . . . at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with a person 

of suitable age and discretion who currently resides therein"). Further, the 

judgment debtor has either appealed or forgone the right to appeal the 

underlying action to the full extent permitted by the rendering states law. 

Therefore, unless obtained by default, a judgment debtor knows of the 

existence of the judgment against them and should expect future 

enforcement of the judgment. Additionally, the lack of a return receipt 

alerts the judgment creditor that additional steps may be needed to 

accomplish actual notice. Indeed, Perfekt Marketing took those steps to 

provide Flangas with notice after it became aware that Flangas did not 

receive the mailed notice, as it eventually served him with notice at 

alternate addresses. 

Due-process jurisprudence recognizes a sliding scale that 

demands more protections the more substantial the intrusion or deprivation 

of a constitutionally protected right. Cf. Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Judicial 

Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 155, 165, 460 P.3d 976, 987 (2020) (concluding that 

"additional procedural safeguards are necessary before bail may be set in 

12 
an amount that results in continued detention"). Not only does mail notice 

qualify as reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of a 

proceeding, but also certified-mail notice here follows underlying completed 

litigation and concerns post-judgment enforcement.3We thus agree with 

those jurisdictions that have addressed notice provisions similar to the one 

at issue here and have concluded that post-judgment enforcement tolerates 

less robust notice provisions, as the judgment debtor has already litigated 

his rights and obligations. See, e.g., Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 582-

83 (Colo. 1981) (concluding that a notice-by-mail requirement under 

Colorado's version of the UEFJA satisfied due process because "the debtor's 

interest in . . . his property. . . ha[d] already been protected by prior notice 

and hearing"); Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Retterath, 928 N.W.2d 1, 10 

(Iowa 2019) (same). Accordingly, we conclude the UEFJNs requirement 

that a judgment creditor send notice of the filing by certified mail with 

return receipt requested to the judgment debtor and his attorney at each's 

last-known address provides a method reasonably calculated to inform the 

judgment debtor of a post-judgment enforcement proceeding and to protect 

the judgment debtor's due-process rights and property interests. 

Flangas does not dispute that Perfekt Marketing complied with 

the statutory requirements to send the notice of the filing and the affidavit 

by certified mail, return receipt requested, to him and his attorney and to 

file an affidavit that verified the date of the certified mailing. Instead, he 

contends that the four months Perfekt Marketing took to accomplish actual 

3Additionally, post-judgment enforcement in Nevada provides 

protections to judgment debtors against wrongful deprivation of property. 

See, e.g., NRS 21.075 (providing requirements for the content of a writ of 

execution). 

13 
notice through personal service was not prompt. We disagree, however, 

because the date when Flangas received the notice of the domestication is 

irrelevant to the issue of promptness in light of our conclusion that the 

certified-mail provision in NRS 17.360(2) satisfies due process. The record 

supports that Perfekt Marketing mailed the notice one day after it filed the 

foreign judgment. Thus, we conclude that Perfekt Marketing exercised due 

diligence.4Accordingly, enforcement of the Arizona judgment in Nevada 

does not violate Flangas's procedural due-process rights.5 

Enforcement of the Arizona judgment in Nevada does not deprive Flangas of 

the opportunity to be heard 

Flangas argues that enforcement of the Arizona judgment 

deprives him of due process because actual notice after the purported 

expiration of the Arizona judgment deprived him of defenses under Arizona 

law, which he does not identify, to attack the Arizona judgment. He says, 

without citation to authority, that the expiration of the Arizona judgment 

precludes him from raising a collateral attack on the judgment in an 

Arizona forum. Along the same lines, he also contends that he lost the 

ability to raise defenses under the UEFJA, which, again, he fails to identify. 

While Flangas bears "responsibility to present relevant authority and 

41n any event, Perfekt Marketing accounted for the fact that Flangas 

did not receive the certified-mail notice by attempting on several occasions, 

and eventually accomplishing, personal service. Cf. Jones, 547 U.S. at 230. 

5F1angas also disputes that Perfekt Marketing mailed the notice to a 

viable, last-known address. He points to no evidence in the record to 

support his claim, and instead, relies on arguments made by his attorney, 

one of which occurred after the district court issued its appealed order. 

Attorney statements are not evidence. See, e.g., Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 

Nev. 556, 580, 138 P.3d 433, 450 (2006). Because Flangas fails to offer 

support in the record for his assertion, and because he did receive actual 

notice of the filing, we decline to consider this argument. 

14 
cogent argument," and "issues not so presented need not be addressed by 

this court," Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987), we 

nevertheless review de novo the district court's decision to enforce the 

judgment based on Flangas's claim that it implicates constitutional issues, 

Awada v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 123 Nev. 613, 618, 173 P.3d 707, 711 (2007). 

However, we conclude that Flangas is not entitled to reversal because he 

has not established that any delay in serving notice of the judgment's 

domestication in Nevada deprived him of otherwise available Arizona and 

UEFJA defenses, and thus, due process. 

Procedural due process guarantees the opportunity to present 

every available defense. Nicoladze v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 94 Nev. 377, 

378, 580 P.2d 1391, 1391 (1978). "[T]he defenses preserved by Nevada's 

[BEM] and available under NRCP 60(b) are limited to those defenses that 

a judgment debtor may constitutionally raise under the" Full Faith and 

Credit Clause and that concern "the validity of the foreign judgment." 

Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 573, 747 P.2d 230, 232 (1987); see also 

NRS 17.350 (providing that a filed foreign judgment "is subject to the 

same . . . defenses . . . as a judgment of a district court of this state"). The 

Full Faith and Credit Clause limits attacks on a foreign judgment to those 

that concern fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of due process at the time 

the rendering state entered the judgment. Rosenstein, 103 Nev. at 573, 747 

P.2d at 231-32. Similarly, the rule against collateral attacks on a final 

judgment applies to the enforcement of domesticated judgments and limits 

challenges to the grounds that "the issuing court lacked personal 

jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction." State v. Sustacha, 108 Nev, 223, 

226 n.3, 826 P.2d 959, 961 n.3 (1992). 

15 
Flangas does not point to any defenses under Arizona law that 

he lost because of the alleged delay in receiving actual notice. Indeed, he 

cannot identify those defenses because Arizona law, like Nevada law, allows 

a collateral attack on a judgment only on the grounds that the issuing court 

lacked personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. See Walker v. Davies, 550 

P.2d 230, 232 (Ariz. 1976). Even if Flangas had actual notice of the filing 

before May 5, 2019, he still would lack any ability to attack the judgment 

on its substantive merits. More importantly, full faith and credit, not the 

date of actual notice of the domestication, limits Flangas's ability to attack 

the validity of the Arizona judgment. Those defenses under the Nevada 

UEFJA are virtually the same, or even more robust, than Arizona's rule 

against collateral attacks: fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of due 

process. Thus, enforcement of the foreign judgment in these circumstances 

does not deprive Flangas of the opportunity to present defenses to attack 

the Arizona judgment because he never possessed, either under full faith 

and credit or under Arizona law, additional grounds beyond fraud, lack of 

jurisdiction, and lack of due process.6 

6F1angas also argues that enforcement of the Arizona judgment 

deprives him of defenses under a settlement agreement. However, he did 

not offer a copy of the agreement in district court and thus the record 

contains no such agreement, and his alleged "numerous factual references" 

to the agreement below and on appeal do not prove the agreement's 

existence and content. We decline to address this claim of error, as "We 

cannot consider matters not properly appearing in the record on appeal." 

Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 

P.2d 276, 277 (1981) (refiising to consider a claim of error based on a 

document that does not appear in the record). 

16 
CONCLUSION 

Under the UEFJA, Nevada courts must enforce any foreign 

judgment entitled to full faith and credit as if that judgment was rendered 

in this state. The district court properly concluded that a foreign judgment's 

enforceability is determined on the date the foreign judgment is 

domesticated in Nevada district court pursuant to NRS 17.360(2), and that 

a domesticated foreign judgment is enforceable in Nevada for six years from 

the date of registration according to NRS 11.190(1)(a). Perfekt Marketing 

filed the copy of the foreign judgment and affidavit, as required by NRS 

17.360(2), within the Arizona statute of limitations, and no full-faith-andcredit grounds exist to attack the Arizona judgment. Therefore, the foreign 

judgment is enforceable in Nevada as if it was rendered by a Nevada court. 

We also conclude that the certified-mail method under NRS 

17.360(2) is reasonably calculated to apprise a judgment debtor of a postjudgment enforcement proceeding, as it follows underlying litigation in 

which the judgment debtor's rights and liabilities were adjudicated. 

Flangas was not deprived of due process here because Perfekt Marketing 

sent, one day after it filed the judgment, the notice of the filing and the 

affidavit by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Flangas and his 

attorney at their last-known addresses. And although not required as a 

matter of course, Perfekt Marketing personally served the notice after it 

became aware that Flangas had not received the certified mailing. Finally, 

we conclude that enforcement of the Arizona judgment, which was 

registered in Nevada before it expired in Arizona, does not deprive Flangas 

of any defenses, as his defenses are inherently limited by the Full Faith and 

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Credit Clause, regardless of the date he received actual notice of the 

domestication. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying 

Flangas relief from the foreign judgment. 

• 

Cadish 

We oncur: 

Parraguirre 

J. 

A'kfbaug J. 

Stiglich 

Herndon 

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