i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 43 3- CV Carole O. K OTZ , Appellant
v . IMP ERIAL CAP ITAL BANK , et al.,

Appellee s Fr om the 285th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CI -17426 Honora ble Andy Mireles, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: March 24, 2010 REVERSED AND REMANDED ; TEMPORARY I NJ UNCTI ON DI SSOL VED Carole Kotz bring s this interloc utory appea l f rom the trial court’s or der g ranting a tempora ry injunction enjoining her

from takingor attempti ng to take possession of c erta in commerc ial rea l
e state , c omm

un ic a tin g wi th a

ny te na nts of the pr op e rt y , or receiv ingany re nts fr om t

he te na nts
curr ently occupy ing the premises under lease s held by Patrick Man a nd Gra ce Ma

n. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 51.014(a) (4) (Vernon 2008) . Kotz contends the temporar y injunction04
- 09
- 00 43 3- CV

- 2- order is void because it doe s not de tail w hy irrepa rable injury

will occur if the temporar y injunction is not gra nted. We ag ree . I n rele vant par

t, Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil P roce dure requires that an “ order g r an ti n g an in

ju n c ti o n . . . s h a ll s e t f

o rth th e r e a s o n s f

o r it s is s u an c e [. ]” T EX . R. C IV . P. 683. The Texas Supreme C ourt “interpr et[s] the Rule t o require in this respect only that the orde r set for

th the
rea sons why

the cour t deems it proper

to issue the writ to preve nt injury to the applicant in the interim; that is, the reasons why the court believes the applicant’ s probable rig ht will be endang ere d if the writ does not issue.” Transp. Co. o f T ex . v. R o b ertson Transps., Inc ., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W. 2d 54 9, 55 3 ( Te x. 19 53 ); State v. Cook United, I nc ., 464 S.W .2d 105, 106 (Tex. 1971) (“U nder Rule 683 .
. . it is necessar y to give the re asons why

injury will be suffe red if the interlocutory relief is n ot o rd e re d. ” ). Th e tr ia l court mus t set fo rt h spe c if ic re a so ns , n ot m e re ly

c on c lus or

y state me nts , in the order g ranting temporar y injunctive relief

. T EX . R. C IV . P. 6 83 (“ be sp e c if ic in t e rm s” ); ac c or

d Ch a r te r M

e d

. Co rp. v. Miller, 547 S.W .2d 77, 78 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, no writ). The proce dural re quirements of Rule 683 a re ma ndatory , and an or der g ranting a tempora ry injunction that fails to strictly

comply with the rule is subject to beingdecla red void a

nd dissolved. Qw est Co mmunic ati on s Co rp . v . A T& T Cor p ., 24 S.W. 3d

33 4, 33 7 ( Te x. 20 00 ) ( pe r c ur iam) ; I n t e r Fi rst Bank San Fe lipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co. , 715 S.W .2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). I n this case , the onl y part of the order t hat can be construe d as setting forth the r easons f or iss uin g the inj un c tio n r e a ds a s f oll ow s: Th e Court

fi nd s th a t Int erve no rs Pa tr ic k M an a nd Gr a c e Ma

n w ill suffe r irre para

ble injury in their possession and use of the Subject Property in the event t h at the re quested injunctive re lief is not g rante d, that they

have no a dequate reme dy at law, a

nd that the04
- 09
- 00 43 3- CV

- 3- reque sted injunctive relief is nece ssary

to preser ve the status quo pending final trial. We conclude this languag e does not c omply with the require ments of Rule 683 beca use it doe s not pr ov ide sp e c if

ic re a so ns wh y

inj ur y will r e su lt i n th e a

bs e nc e of a te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n. Me re ly stating that “irre para

ble injury will r esult” if injunctive relief is not g rante d does not comply with the specific ity require ments of Rule 683. See I ndep. Capital Mgmt., L.L .C. v. Collins , 261 S.W .3d 792, 795-96 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (injunction order simply setting out e lements nec essar y for r elief, a

nd failing to identify

the i njury from denia l of the injunction, was conc lusory and void); Au toN ati on , Inc . v. Ha tfi e ld , 186 S.W .3d 576, 581 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (m e re re c ita l of

“ ir re pa ra ble ha rm ” do e s n ot m e e t Ru le 68 3’ s sp e c if ic ity re qu ir e me nts ); Univ. Interscholastic League v . Torres , 616 S.W .2d 355, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1981, no writ) (sa me). Nor c an we agr ee wi t h the Mans that the a dditional verbiag e, “[the Mans] will suffer i r r e p ar a b l e i n j u r y in t h ei r p o s s ession and use of th e Subject P ropert y in the event that the reque sted injunctive relief is n o t g rante d . . . ” is sufficie ntly detailed to mee t the require ments of Rul e 68 3. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he tr ia l c ourt fa ils to s e t f

or th a ny un de rl y ingfa c ts t o s up po rt its finding that “irre para

ble injury in [ the Mans’] posse ssion a nd use of the Subject Property ” will occur, making the court’s finding conclusory
. Arkoma Basin Ex ploration Co. v. FMF

Associates 1990-A, Ltd. , 249 S.W
. 3 d 3 8 0 , 389 n.32 (Tex. 2008) (“c onclusory ” is define d as “[e]x pressing a fa ctual inf e re nc e w i t h o u ts t a t i n g t h e u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s o nw h i c h t h e i n f

e r e n c e i s b a s e d ” )
. A tm o s t , thi s lang uag e cha

rac terizes by wh at m ea ns harm will occur unless Kotz is enjoined fr om taking po sse ssi on a nd us e of the su bje c t pr op e rt

y —b ut do e s no t state or e xpla in t he re a so ns whyir

re pa ra ble04
- 09
- 00 43 3- CV

- 4- injury will result absent an injunction. Se e Ro be rts on Tra ns ps . , 26 1 S. W.2 d at 55 3 ( mus t se t f or th why the applica

nt’s probable rig ht will be endang ere d if the writ d o es n o t i s s u e). Com pa re By rd Ranch, Inc . v. Inte rwest Sav. Ass’n , 717 S.W .2d 452, 454 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 1 98 6, no wr it) (i t is ina de qu a te un de r R

ule 68 3 to sim

ply state that “ de fe nd ants are e njo ine d f ro m do ingX b e c a

us e X wil l be done unless so enjoined;” orde r must state with particular ity why injury will result absent injunction), and Stoner v. Thompson , 553 S.W .2d 150, 151 (Tex. Ci v . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref

’d n.r.e .) (c onclusion that situation is “har mful” i s not rea son why injury will be suffe red if interlocutory relief not ordere d), with Ro be rts on Tra ns ps . , 261 S.W .2d at 553 (orde r wa s
su ff ic ie ntl y sp e c if ic un de r R

ule 68 3 w he re it s ta ted res po nd e nt “ wo uld int e rf e re wi th t he mark e ts establi s h e d b y th e p la in ti f f s an d w o u ld p r o b a

b ly d iv e rt f

r e ig h t to n n a g e an d r e v e n u e f r o m the p l ai n t i ff ” a n d “t h at s u ch i n t er fe re n ce wi t h cu s t o m er s an d m ar k et s an d d i v er s i o n o f f re i gh tt o n n age and revenue s would result i n irrepa rable and inesti mable damag e to the plaintiffs”) , and IAC, Ltd. v. Be ll Helicopter Textron, Inc

. , 160 S.W .3d 191, 200 (Tex. App
. — Fo rt W o rt h 2005, no pet.) (injunction set forth suff

icient re asons for its issuance wher e orde r explicitl y stat ed that Be ll had shown that respo n d en t s h ad possession of Be ll data entitled to trade secr et protec tion and wer e
a c tiv e ly us ingthat data

to c omp e te wi th B e ll i n th e re pla c e ment bla de mark e t, a nd re sp on de nts ’ bla de wo uld

be priced lo wer th an B e ll’ s w hic h w ou ld l e a d to “ inc a lc ula ble los s o f b us ine ss g oodwill”), and K

h a ledi v. H.K. Global Trading, L td. , 126 S.W .3d 273, 280 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (injunction orde r wa s adequate to support issuance w here court stated that former business partner ’s fa ilure to rele ase and subordinate preve nted companies a nd businessmen

“ f r o m r e a lizin g the sig nif

ic ant l oa n v a lue s in

su c h uniq ue pr op e rt ie s” and

sig nif ic antl y imp a ir e d th e ir ability to assist in pay ing a

mounts owed under pr omi s s o ry n o t e and to tender money into court’s04
- 09
- 00 43 3- CV

- 5- reg istry , and that business plan and ability to obta in f inancingon proper

ties were “adve rsely

aff ecte d in a way that cannot be eff ectively measure d in dollars”)
. The trial court’s or der statingits reasons fo r g ra nti nga te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n mu st b e sp e c if ic and le g a lly su ff ic ie nt o n it s fa c e and

no t me re ly conclusory
. T EX . R. C IV . P. 6 83 ; Cook United , 4 64 S.W. 2d a t 10 6; Torres , 616 S.W .2d at 358. Her e, the tempora

ry injunction order simply

fails to state, as re q uired by Rule 683, the rea sons why irrepa rable injury

woul d b e suffere d if injunctive relief was not g rante d. Be cause the tempora ry injunction order doe s not satisfy the require ments of Rule 683, we conclude the trial cour t abused its discr et ion in entering the orde r and the order is void. Qw est , 2 4 S. W.3 d at 33 7; Torres , 616 S.W .2d at 358. The Mans further argue that g iven t he nature of this case , the t empora ry injunction order

does comply with the require ments of Rule 683 bec ause the case involves disputed title, possession, and use of r eal e state. In support of their a rg ument, the Mans cite us to nume rous authorities for the leg al proposition that every

piece of re al es t at e i s i n n ately unique. See , e.g. , Greater Houston Bank v. Con te , 641 S.W .2d 407, 410 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1982, no writ) (“I t is well established law that e a c h a

nd e ve ry pie c e of re a l e state is uniq

ue . T he refore, if app ellan ts w e re a llo we d to fo re c los e a

pp e lle e s wou ld be ir

re pa ra bly ha rm e d, sin c e re a l e state is s o uniq ue .” ); El Paso Dev . Co. v. Be rryman , 729 S.W .2d 883, 888 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ) (“Ever y piece of re al
e state is uniq

ue , a nd if fo re c los ur e we re al low e d b e fo re a fu ll d e te rm inatio n o f t

he us ur y c la im, appellee would be irre para bly harme d.”). Thus, the Mans arg ue that whe n, as her e, the tempor ary injunction order involves disputed title to rea l e state, the cour t can pr esume irr epar able injury and la c k o f ana d e qu a te r e me dy

a t l aw b e c a

u s e o f th e u n iq u e c h ar a c te r

o f e a c h p ie c e o f

r e a l e s tate
. We
a g re e on the ba sis of th e ci te d a

uth or iti e s th a t e ve ry

pie c e of re a l e state is u

niq ue , a nd that th is04
- 09
- 00 43 3- CV

- 6- uniqueness may , in an injunction c ase, constitute some evidenc e of an irr epar able injury ; however , th a t a lo n e is n o t c o n c lusive. Se e In re Sta rk, 126 S.W .3d 635, 641 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2004,
o r ig
. p r o c e e d in g ) ( “ Re a l e s tate is u n iq u e an d s o ar e th e r e a s o n s f

o r p u r c h a s in g an d

o w n in g it
. We thi nk it i s r e a so na

ble to c on c lud e that un de r s ome c ir c ums tanc e s mone tary dama g e s a ff

or d a de qu a te relief for the loss of rea l e state and under some circ umstances it doe s not.”). The Mans cite us to no authority , and we have f ound none, stating that the trial cour t i s re l ieved of

the mandator

y require ments of Rule 683 in case s involving re al estate
. See Arreche a v. Plantowsky , 705 S.W .2d 186, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1985, no writ) (modified te mporary injunction affe cting le a se d r e a l pr op e rt

y that di d n ot c on ta in s pe c if ic fi nd ing s su

pp or tin g its iss ua

nc e c ann ot b e re a d in conjunction wit h the original order t o supply missing statutory

require ments). I f the c ourt’s orde r g ra nti nga te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n d oe s n ot c omp ly on its fa c e wi th the sp e c if

ic ity re qu ir e me nts of

Rul e 6 83, it constitut es an a

buse of discr etion and is thus void. Qw est , 2 4 S. W.3 d at 33 7; Colli ns , 261 S.W. 3d a t 79 5; Torres , 616 S.W .2d at 358. B e c a us e we c on c lud e the or de r g ra nti ng the te mpo ra

ry inj un c tio n fa ils to m e e t th e sp e c if ic ity require ments of Rule 683, and is thus void, we nee d not addre ss the other a ppellate issues ra ised by Kotz. According ly , the trial cour t’s order g ranting the tempora

ry injunction is reverse d, the inj un c tio n is dis so lve d, and the c a us e is r e mand e d to the tr ia l c ourt fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.
Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice