1

05-7005 -cr Un i t edSt a t es v. Dom i n gu ez

1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 3 August Term 2006 4 Docke t No. 05-7005-c r 5 Argued: J une 22, 2007 De cided: F ebrua ry 15, 2008 6 Amended: Ma rch 20, 2008 7

_____________________________________________________________________________ 8 UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, 9 Ap pe lla nt, 10 v. 11 KASHA RI CHARDSON, 12 De fe nd ant, 1 3 C AR OL DO M I

NG UE Z, 14 Def endant- Appellee

. 15

_____________________________________________________________________________ 16 B e fo re : MI

NE R, SA CK , a

nd HA L L , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. 17 Ap pe a l by the Go ve rnme nt f

ro m a jud g me nt o f c onvic tio n a nd se nte nc e fo r c on sp ir a c y

to 18 distribute coca ine and c ocaine base e ntere d in the United States District Court for the N orthern 19 District of Ne w York ( Hurd, J.) insofar as the sentenc e re flec ts a depa rture of approximately

93% 20 from the statutory minimum sentenc e, the District Court havingdeter mined that the 21 Go ve rnme nt’ s mo tio n f or a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e ba se d u

po n d e fe nd ant’ s c oo pe ratio n e na ble d it 22 to e xer c ise dis c re tio n, a pp are ntl y inf or me d b y a va ri e ty of sp e c if ie d a nd un sp e c if ie d f a c tor s, to 23 impose a sentenc e it deeme d “fa ir and re asonable under the circ umstances.” 24 25 Vac ated a nd rema nded.2 1 B R EN DA K. S ANN ES , Assistant 2 United States Attorney , for Gle nn T. 3 Suddaby , United States Attorney for 4 the Northe rn District of Ne w York 5 (John M . Katko, Assistant United 6 States Attorney , of counse l), 7 Sy ra c us e , N Y, fo r a

pp e lla nt.

8 C R AI G P. S CHL ANG ER , Sy rac use, NY, 9 for de fenda nt-appe llant Carol 1 0 D o mi n gu e z.3 1 MI NER, Circuit J udg e: 2 Appellant United States of America (the “ Gover

nment”) a ppeals fr om a judg ment of 3 conviction and se ntence for c onspiracy to distribute cocaine and coc aine ba se ente red in the 4 Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k ( Hurd , J.) a g a ins t de fe nd ant5 a pp e lle e Caro l D omi ngue z (“ Do min gue z”) ins of ar a s th e se nte nc e of

46 4 d ay s r e fl e c ts a 6 depar

ture of a pproxi mately

93% fr om the statutory

minimumsentenc e of 240 months. The 7 District Court determined that the Gover nment’s motion for a downw ard de parture based on 8 Domingue z’ assistance to the Gove rnment ena bled it to ex erc ise discre tion, appare ntly informed 9 by a var iety of spec ified and unspe cified f actor s, to impose a sentenc e it deeme d “fa ir and 10 rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s.” 11 On appe al, the Gove rnment conte nds that the startingpoint for a r educe d sentenc e is the 12 statutory

minimum sentenc e, that the only fac tors to be consider ed in this case a re those r elating 13 to Domingue z’ cooperation, that the District Court erre d in failingto put forth sufficie nt rea sons 14 to justi fy

the depa rture, a nd that the extent of the depa rture w as unre asonable in any event. 15 Domingue z responds that the District Court did use the statutory minimum as a point of 16 de pa

rt ur e , p ro pe rl y

c on sid e re d s e nte nc ingfa c tor s o the r t ha n c oo pe ra tio n, imp os e d a

re a so na ble 17 non-Guidelines se ntence , and ade quately stated its rea sons for imposing the sentenc e. F or the 18 rea sons give n below, we vacate, re mand, and a rticulate the appropr iate methodolog y to be 1 9 e mp lo y e d

in r e s e n te n c in gD o mi n gu e z. 20 BACK GR OUND 21 By

a Superse ding I

ndictment filed on September 23, 2004, the Gover

nment char g ed 22 Do min gue z, a lon gwi th f if te e n c o- de fe nd ants , w ithkn ow ing ly and int e nti on a lly

c on sp ir ingto 23 dis tr ibute mor e tha n 5 00 g ra ms o f c oc a ine and

mor e tha n 5 0 gra ms o f c oc a ine ba se , a ll i n 24 violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Accordingto the Indictment, the conspira cy beg an “in or

about 25 Janu ary

20 02 , th e e xac t date be ingunkn own, ” and c ontin ue d u p to the date of

the Ind ic tme nt, 26 September 23, 2004. The loci of the c onspiracy wer e said to be in One ida County , in the4 1 No rt

he rn Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k, and e lse wh e re . B e c a

us e Do min gue z wa s c onvic te d p re vio us ly 2 for a

felony narc otics violation, the Government invoked a g ainst her in the Indictment and in an 3 Information filed on January 7, 2005 the enha

nced pe nalty

provisions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 4 841(b)( 1)(A) and 851. Pursuant to these pr ovisions, Dominguez was subjec t to a mandatory 5 min imum se nte nc e of imp ri so nme nt o f t

we nty y e ars . 6 The c harg es ag ainst Domingue z and her c o-conspirators arose from the ope ration of a 7 larg e-sc ale c ocaine distribution ring ce ntere d in the city of Rome, New

York. Membe rs of the 8 conspirac y

obtained lar g e quantities of c ocaine and coc aine ba se (c rac k) fr om suppliers in New 9 York City

and then tra

nsported the dr

ug s in bulk quantiti es to Rome. There , the drug s were 10 broken down into smaller quantities and pre pare d for late r distribution. Members of the 11 conspirac y

then saw to the distribution of the re packa g ed nar cotics throug hout New Yor k’s 12 Mohawk Va lley , including the are as in and a round the c ities of Utica a nd Rome in Oneida 1 3 C o un ty. 14 On

Ap ri l 7, 20 05 , D omi ngue z exe c ute d a wr itt e n p le a

a g re e me nt ( the “ Agre e me nt” ) w ith 15 the United States Attorney for the N orthern D istrict of NewYork, a g ree ing to e nter a plea of 16 guilty

to the conspirac y

char g ed in the Indictment. In the Ag ree ment, Domingue z admitt ed to a 17 “per sonal relationship wit h co-[conspirator ] Kasha Richardson,” who was na med as a defe ndant 18 in t

he same Ind ic tme nt. She a lso a dmi tte d th at sh e “ c on du c te d d ru gtr a ff ic kin ga c tiv ity

wi th 19 [R ichar dson] on a regular ba sis” and re veale d that “[o] n occa sion, [ she] would hold or store 20 cra ck coc aine, c ocaine powder and drug -re lated proc eeds f or Richar dson at her r esidenc e.” T he 21 Agre e me nt i nc lud e d a c la us e pr ov idi ngthat “ [t]he qu anti ty of c ontr oll e d s ub sta

nc e s invo lve d in 22 this conspiracy

and attributable to [ Domingue z] included betwe en 50 and 150 grams of a mix ture 23 or substance containinga dete ctable a mount of coca ine base (cr ack) and an unknown quantity of 24 coca ine.” 25 In exchang e for Domingue z’ ag ree ment to enter a guilty plea, the United States Attorney 26 sti pu late d, int e r a lia , th at D omi ngue z’ c ri min a l hi sto ry c ate g or y c ou ld n ot b e “ de fi nit ive ly5 1 deter

mined prior to the completion of the prese ntence investigation”; that the quantity of 2 controlled drugsubstances attributable to Domingue z established a cr iminal offense level of 32, 3 “without considera tion of information provided by the Def endant whic h is protected by U.S.S.G. 4 § 1B1.8” ; that the United States Attorney would rec ommend a downwa rd depa rture of three 5 levels base d upon Domingue z’ continued ac cepta nce of responsibility

and the pr ompt entry

of a 6 plea of

guilty ; and that “[t] here are no fac ts and circ umstances whic h would war rant a n upwar d 7 or downwa

rd depa rture f rom the applica

ble SentencingGuidelines ra ng e in this case.” The 8 pa rt ie s to the Agre e me nt a c kn ow le dg e d th at “ [t]he se nte nc e to b e imp os e d u po n th e De fe nd ant i s 9 within the sole discretion of the se ntencingCourt, subject to the statutory maxi mum penalties set 10 forth above and the pr ovisions of the SentencingReform Ac t and the United States Sentenc ing 11 Guidelines promulg ated ther eunder .” 12 In a pre sentenc e investig ation repor t (“PSR”) prepa

red on July

27, 2005 and re vised on 13 September 29, 2005, the Norther n District Probation Offic e ca lculated Dominguez’ offe nse leve l 1 4 at2 5 a f

t e r c r e d i t i n gh e r

w i tha d j u s tm e n t s f

o r h e r m i t i g at i n gr o l e an d

a c c e p t an c e o f

r e s p o n s i b i l i ty. 15 Withre sp e c t to c ri min a l hi sto ry , th e PSR n ote d th at D omi gue z wa s se nte nc e d in On e ida County 16 Court

on No ve mbe r 1 3, 20 00 to a

te rm of pr ob atio n o f f

ive y e ars a ft e r b e ingc onvic te d f or fi ft h 17 deg ree criminal possession of a c ontrolled substance with intent to sell. As a result of 1 8 D o mi n gu e z’ p a s t c o n v ic ti o n , o n e p o int w a s a d d e d to h e r c r im in a l h is to r

y s c o r e . D o mi n gu e z’ 19 criminal history

score was fur

ther incr ease d by

two points because she wa s on probation when 20 she committed the instant offe nse. Ac cording ly , the re port established a total of three criminal 21 history

points, resulting in a c riminal history cate g ory of I I

. 22 Invoking the sentenc ing ta ble at U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Par t A, the PSRindentified a 23 Guidelines ra

ng e of 63–78 months, base d on the fore g oing c alculations. Citing U.S.S.G. § 24 5G1.1(b) ( mandatory minimum sentenc e is Guideline Sentenc e whe re greater than max imum of 25 applicable Guidelines ra ng e), the PSRobserve d that the offe nse of c onviction car ried a minimum 26 term of twe nty

y ear s and that the Guide lines sentence there fore would be 240 months. An6 1 a dd e nd

um t o th e PSR n ote d th at a se nte nc ingc on fe re nc e wa s w a ive d, that ne ith e r t he de fe ns e 2 counsel nor the Gover nment had any

objections to the Guidelines ca lculations contained in the 3 repor

t, and that seve ral minor re visions with reg ard to Dominguez’ persona l history wer e made at 4 the re quest of def

ense c ounsel. 5 A sentenc ing me morandum (the “ Memorandum” ) wa s filed on beha lf of Dominguez on 6 November

13, 2005. In the Memora ndum, counsel for

Domingue z point ed out that, as of the day 7 schedule d for se ntencing , November 16, 2005, his client would have be en conf ined for a total of 8 464 day s in feder al custody . Arguing that Domingue z had made g ood use of he r time and ha d 9 maintained a “ positive attitude” toward post-a rre st rehabilitation duringher c onfinement a t the 10 Mo ntg ome ry

County Cor re c tio na l F a c ili ty , c ouns e l no te d th at sh e ha d a pp lie d f or e nr oll me nt i n 11 aca demic programs, obtained a job in the jail laundry , and starte d a women’ s g roup foc used on 12 makin gbe tte r l if

e c ho ic e s. Attache d to the Memorandum we re f ourtee n letters of suppor

t from 13 family , members of the community , and for

mer c o-worke rs. 14 As summarized by counsel, the le tters submitted “show [Dominguez] to be a responsible, 15 ha

rd -w or kin g , c a pa ble and g e ne ro us pe rs on

wi th a n e xce lle nt e mpl oy

me nt r e c or d a

nd the be ne fi t 16 of a c lose family

and networ

k of fr iends who have stood by her, a nd will continue to stand by her 17 so as to help her

stay ‘straig ht’ when she returns home .” The Memorandum c oncluded by 18 reque sting the c ourt, inter alia, to e stablish a Guidelines sentenc e base d on an off ense le vel of 25 19 and

a c ri min a l hi sto ry

c ate g or y of I Iin a c c or da

nc e wi th t he pr e se nte nc e inv e sti g atio n r e po rt ; to 20 impose a sentenc e less than that pr ovided by the Guidelines ra

ng e in consider ation of the fa ctors 21 rec ommended in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); a nd to at least impose a se ntence of imprisonment at the 22 low end of the Guidelines ra ng e. 23 On Novembe r 14, 2005, the Gove rnment filed its sentenc ing me morandum (the 24 “ Go ve rnme nt’ s Me mor and um” ), un de r s e a l, a do pti ngthe Gu ide lin e s se nte nc ingra ng e se t f or th i n 25 the pre sentenc e investig ation repor t. The Gove rnment’s Memor andum included motions for 26 downwar d depar ture pursua

nt to § 5K1.1, United States SentencingGuidelines, and f or a7 1 s e n te n c e b e lo wth e s tatuto r y mi n im um p ur s u an t t o 1 8 U

. S. C. § 3 5 5 3 ( e ) , b a s e d o nD o mi n gu e z’ 2 cooper ation with authorities afte r her arr est. The nature, e x tent, and usef ulness of that 3 cooper ation wer e set for th at some leng th in the Governme nt’s Memorandum. The Gover nment 4 beg an its calc ulation of a re commended se ntence by noting that the indica

ted Guidelines sente nce 5 is the statutory

mandatory

minimum of twenty

y ear s (240 months) as provided in U.S.S.G. § 6 5G1.1(b). 7 Ap ply

inga c ri min a l of

fe ns e le ve l of

36 and a c ri min a l hi sto ry

c ate g or y of I Ifo r a re su lt 8 that encompa sses 240 months (210–262 months), the Governme nt subtracted thr ee le vels for 9 Domingue z’ cooperation to arrive at a level of 33, yielding a

sentenc ing r ang e of 151–188 10 months. The Gover nment contende d that a sente nce w ithin thi s rang e “w ould be re asonable and 11 appropr iate base d upon all of the re levant sente ncingfac tors.” United States Sentenc ing Me m. at 12 8. “[O]bj ect[ing] to the imposit ion of a sente nce be low this Guidelines rang e,” the Gover nment 13 argue d th at “ [a]ll of the re le va

nt f a c tor s th at mi g ht b e c on sid e re d und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ) i n 14 imposing the sente nce in this ca se have been taken into acc ount by the SentencingGuidelines.” 15 I d. 16 Domingue z filed a Supplemental Memora ndum, under sea l, on November 14, 2005, 17 respondingin the main to the Gover nment’s motions for a downw ard de parture and for a 18 sentenc e below the statutory minimum . Reviewingthe consider ations for downw ard de parture 19 se t f

or th i n U .S. S.G . § 5K 1. 1, c ouns e l f or Do min gue z ar gue d th at th e a ssi sta nc e re nd e re d b y

his 20 client fulfilled eve ry consideration enumerated, includingthe risk of injury to Domingue z or her 21 family . Def

. Supp. Mem. at 1–2. Acc ording ly , counsel a rgued that a downwar d depar ture fr om 22 the SentencingGuidelines of more than the thre e leve ls recommende d by the Gover

nment was 23 war

rante d. I d. at 2. Counsel also argued that no ter m of supervised r elea se wa s nece ssary and 24 urg ed depa

rture f rom the spec ified minimum t erm of supe rvised re lease . I d. 25 Sentencingproce eding s were conducte d in open cour t on November

16, 2005. 26 Domingue z and counsel for the Gover

nment at that time advised the c ourt that they had no8 1 “objec tions to t he fa ctual ac cura cy” of the prese ntence investigation report. The court ther eupon 2 adopted the f

actua l statements in the repor t, made the r eport pa

rt of the r ecor d, and dire cted the 3 repor

t to be place d under se al. The c ourt next ascerta ined that counse l had no objections to the 4 probation off

icer ’s application of the SentencingGuidelines and the ref ore f ound that the 5 Gu i d el i n es ra n ge w as 6 3

– 7 8 m o n th s , “b u twi thth e m an d at o ry m i n i mum , th e G u i d el i n e r an ge 6 [sic ] is tw o hun dr e d a nd fo rt y months

. 7 Continui ngwith the sentenc ing pr ocee ding, the court grante d the motions made by the 8 Gover

nment under 18 U .S.C. § 3553(e) and U .S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and stated that “[t] here fore , the 9 mandatory

minimum is no longe r applica ble.” The court then he ard f rom Doming uez’ mother 10 and a f

ormer e mploy er, both of whom spoke to her g ood qualities and re commended le niency

. 11 Domingue z’ counsel then spoke on he r beha lf, noting that a number of her f amily and fr iends 12 wer e pre sent in the courtr oom and that a number of letters spe akingto her g ood char acte r 13 previously

wer e submitted to the court. He next reviewed the g oals of sente ncingset forth in 18 14 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ) a nd a sk e d th e c ourt

to e xami ne tho se g oa ls a nd “ fi nd [that] a se nte nc e of

le ss 15 tha

n f or ty -s ix months , w ou ld b e , a s w e sa id, su ff ic ie nt, and

c e rt a inl y no t gre ate r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry to 16 acc omplish t he purpose s of sentenc ing.” In support of his sentenc ing r equest, c ounsel 17 c ha

ra c te ri zed his c lie nt a s “ we ll o n h e r w ay to r e ha bil itatio n, ” wi th m any

po sit ive inf

lue nc e s in 18 her life and “de finite and positive plans for the future .” 19 Domingue z briefly addre ssed the cour

t and said that she wa s “ver y sorry for the a ctions 20 that Ihave c hosen in my life.” She e x presse d g ratitude to her family and fr iends and a

pologized 21 for the pr oblems she had c aused the m in the past. She stated: “And I know if g iven the cha

nce 22 ag ain, I

would make the r ight de cisions. And Iwant to make the rig ht decisions.” 23 Responding to the a rguments made on be half of D omingue z, the Assist ant United States 24 Attorney

repr esentingthe Gover

nment argued that counse l for Dominguez improperly calc ulated1 Counsel for the Gove rnment appa rently misspoke at the sentenc ing he aring ; counsel for 1 2 Domingue z argued that the Guide lines rang e wa s 25 minus the three-le vel downwa rd depa rture 3 re c omm e nd e d b y

the Go ve rnme nt. 9 1 the Guidelines ra

ng e at 26 minus the three -leve l downwar d depar ture. Acc ordingto the 1 2 Gover

nment, the three -leve l depar ture should have been taken fr om the 240 months required by 3 the mandator

y minimum sentenc e. Conce ding that Domingue z was remorse ful and that she ha d 4 g reat support from her family , the Gover

nment argued that the e x tent of her participation and her 5 prior convic tion were pertinent fa ctors to be c onsidered. Counsel f or the Gove rnment “a sk[ed] 6 the [c]ourt t o resist the urg e to g o well below the a ppropriate [G] uideline ra

ng e bec ause the re a

re 7 fac tors that come into this case which indicates [sic] that she should have lear ned her lesson, and 8 she did not.” As to Dominguez’ coope ration, counse l for the Gove rnment stated to the c ourt: “I 9 absolutely

did not need her , but we did it any way , and we g ave he r a br eak in that r eg ard.” He 10 indicated that he r par ticipation in criminal activity was greater than r efle cted in the c harg e that 11 was made

. 12 Ad dr e ssi ngDo min gue z, th e Di str ic t Judg e sa id: “ Ido n’ t f ind that your i nv olv e me nt i s 13 substantial as [the attorney for the G overnme nt] indicate[d], buty ou wer e involved.” Without the 14 Go ve rnme nt’ s mo tio n f or de pa rt ur e ba se d o n c oo pe ra

tio n, the Di str ic t Judg e ind ic ate d th at a 15 twenty -y ear

sentenc e would be r equire d and he “ would have a bsolutely no discretion” in the 16 matter. The District J udg e advise d Domingue z as follows: “Now that the motion has bee n made, 17 Ihave disc retion to sentenc e you as to what I fee l would be fa ir and re asonable under the 18 circ umstances.” After war ning D omingue z of the conseque nces of further wrong doing, the court 19 stated as f

ollows: “Ihave r eviewe d and conside red a ll the pertinent information including but not 20 limit ed to the pre sentenc e investig ation repor t, submiss ions by

counsel, the f

actor s outlined in 18 21 U.S.C. S ection 3553 and the sentenc ing guidelines.” 22 The c ourt there upon sentenc ed Dominguez to a term of 464 da y s, the time alrea dy

serve d 23 in pre-tr ial confine ment. The c ourt imposed an eight-y ear term of supe rvised re lease and re quired 24 Domingue z to participate in a substanc e abuse prog ram a nd to perfor

m community

service

.10 1 Followingthe impositi on of sentenc e, counse l for the Gove rnment made the following 2 inq

uir y : “ I s th e re a

c e rt a in c a lc ulatio n th e [c]o ur t us e d to re a c h th at se nte nc e or jus t ba sic a lly 3 tim e [] se rv e d b a se d o n a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t he c a se ? ” Th e c ourt

re sp on de d: “ B a se d o n a ll 4 the circ umstances in the c ase a nd the motion by

the g overnme nt, this i s the [c] ourt’s sentenc e.” 5 Counsel for the Gove rnment there upon “ma[d]e [ his] objection for the rec ord.” 6 B y

c he c kin gthe a

pp ro pr iate bo xes o n a

sta nd ard pr e -p ri nte d f

or m, f ile d und e r s e a l, w ith 7 heading s entitled “Statement of Rea sons,” and attached to the written judg ment of convic tion and 8 sentenc e, the District Court indicate d: that it “adopt[ed] the pre sentenc e investig ation repor t 9 without chang e”; that it deter mined that the mandator

y minimum sentenc e did not apply on 10 acc ount of substantial assistance in a ccor dance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); that the cour t depar ted 11 fr om t

he a dv iso ry

Gu ide lin e s r ang e fo r r e a so ns a uth or ize d b y

the Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s Ma nu a l; 12 and that the se ntence imposed depar ts below the advisory

Guideline ra

ng e base d on the 13 Gover

nment’s § 5K1.1 motion relatingto substantial assistance. 14 AN AL YSI S 15 We are constraine d to reviewsentenc es for rea sonablene ss. See United States v. B ooker, 16 54 3 U .S. 22 0, 26 1 ( 20 05 ). Our r e vie w e nc omp a sse s b oth the pr oc e dura l and

su bs tanti ve a sp e c ts 17 of re asonable ness in the sentenc ing c ontext . See United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d 103, 114 ( 2d 18 Cir . 2 00 5) . Pr oc e dura l r e a so na ble ne ss r e qu ir e s u s to e xami ne wh e the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y 19 “(a ) identified the Guidelines rang e supported by the fa cts found by

the cour t, (b) tre ated the 20 Guidelines as a dvisory , and (c ) consider ed the Guide lines toge ther with the other fac tors outlined 21 in 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ). ” Un ite d St ate s v . Ratto ba lli , 4 52 F .3 d 1 27 , 1 31 –3 2 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 6) . A s to 22 substantive rea sonablene ss, our revie w re quires that we consider only whether the leng th of the 23 sentenc e is rea sonable in lig ht of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. Crosby , 397 F.3d at 113–15. Courts of 24 appea ls may

presume that a sentenc e that is imposed within the Guidelines rang e is rea sonable, 25 but the presumption is not bindi ng . See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462–63 (2007). 26 Our re view of a

district court’s interpr etation of the Sente ncingGuidelines is de novo, and w e11 1 apply

the clea rly err oneous standar d when e valuatinga district cour t’s finding s of fa ct. United 2 States v. Selioutsky , 409 F.3d 114, 119 ( 2d Cir. 2005). 3 The sente ncingfac tors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), with which we are conce rned in our 4 re vie w o f b oth

pr oc e dura l and

su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss, are a s f

oll ow s: 5 (1) the na

ture a nd circ umstances of

the offe nse and the history and cha rac teristics 6 of

the de fe nd ant; 7 (2) the ne ed for the sentenc e imposed — 8 (A) to r efle ct the ser iousness of the off ense, to promote r espec t for the law , 9 and to provide just punishment for the of fense ; 10 (B ) t o a ff or d a de qu ate de te rr e nc e to c ri min a l c on du c t; 11 (C) to protec t the public from fur ther c rimes of the de fenda nt; and 12 (D) to pr ovide the def endant with nee ded educ ational or voc ational 13 tr a ini ng , me dic a l c are , o r o the r c or re c tio na l tr e atme nt i n th e mos t 14 eff ective ma nner; 15 (3) the kinds of se ntence available ; 16 (4) the kinds of se ntence and the se ntencingrang e esta blished for — 17 (A ) t he a pp lic a ble c ate g or

y of of fe ns e c omm itt e d b y

the a pp lic a ble 18 cate g ory of def endant a s set forth in the guidelines — 19 (i ) i ssu e d b y the Se nte nc ingCommis sio n p ur su ant t o 20 section 994 (a )(1) of title 28, United States Code . . . ; and 21

. . . . 22 (5) a

ny pertinent policy

statement — 23 (A) issued by the SentencingCommi ssion pursuant to section 994(a) (2) of 24 title 28 . . .; 25 (6 ) t

he ne e d to avo id u

nw arr ante d s e nte nc e dis pa ri tie s amon gde fe nd ants wi th 26 simil ar r ecor ds who have been f ound guilty

of similar conduc t; and 27 (7) the ne ed to provide r estitution t o any victims of the offe nse. 28 In the ca se bef ore us, Dominguez is subject to a cong ressionally mandated minimum 29 sentenc e of twe nty y ear s, since the punitive statute to which she is subject calls for a statutory 3 0 m i n i mump er i o d o f i n ca rc er at i o no f t we n ty y ea rs t o l i fe

. S ee 2 1 U. S

. C

. § 8 4 1 (b )( 1 )( A)

. Al th o u gh 31 the Go ve rnme nt i n it s b ri e f o n a pp e a l c ha ra c te ri zes Do min gue z’ c oo pe ra tio n a s “ mod e st, ” its12 1 motions for downwar d depar ture de scribe f

airly extensive assistance to the a uthorities on her pa

rt. 2 These motions broug ht into play the provisions of both U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3 35 53 (e ). Se c tio n 3 55 3( e ) p ro vid e s: 4 Upon motion of the Gover nment, the cour

t shall have the a

uthority to impose a 5 se nte nc e be low a le ve l e sta bli sh e d b y

statut e a s a

min imum se nte nc e so a s to 6 ref

lect a de fenda

nt’s substantial assistance in the inve stigation or prosec ution of 7 ano the r p e rs on wh o h a s c omm itt e d a

n o ff e ns e . Su c h s e nte nc e sh a ll b e imp os e d in 8 acc ordanc e with the guidelines and policy statements issued by

the Sentencing 9 Commi ssion pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code. 10 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 11 In th e wa

ke of B oo ke r, the se c on d s e nte nc e of the fo re g oin gpr ov isi on

mus t be re a d to 1 2 r e qu i r e a

p p l i c at i o no f

th e S e n t e n c i n gG u i d e l i n e s i nana dv i s o r y, r ath e r th ani na m an d at o r

y, 13 c a

pa c ity . Cf

. Unit e d St ate s v . Ca sti llo , 4 60 F .3 d 3 37 , 3 53 –5 4 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 6) (h old ingthat in 14 context of “safe ty valve” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), whic h allows for downwar d depar ture fr om 15 statut or

y min imum se nte nc e wh e n c e rt a in c ri te ri a pr inc ipa lly

re latin gto t

he natur e of

the of fe ns e 16 and prior c riminal conduct a re me t, Guidelines sentenc e nee d not be imposed, and de fenda nt “may 17 instead re ceive the bene fit of the advisory Guidelines re g ime”). 18 A distinction must be made betwee n motions for depar ture unde r the provisions of 19 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and motions for a sente nce r eduction to a leve l below the mandatory minimum 20 se nte nc e purs ua

nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (e ). U. S.S. G. § 5 K1 .1 pr ov ide s: 21 Upon motion of the g overnme nt stating that the de fenda nt has provided 22 substantial assistance in the inve stigation or prosec ution of another pe rson who 23 ha s c omm itt e d a n o ff e ns e , th e c ourt

may de pa rt fr om t he guid e lin e s. 24 (a) The a ppropriate reduc tion shall be determined by the cour t for re asons 25 stated that may include, but ar e not limited to, consideration of the 2 6 fo l l o wi n g: 27 (1) the c ourt’s eva luation of the sig nificanc e and 28 us e fu lne ss o f t he de fe nd ant’ s a ssi sta

nc e , ta kin gint o 29 consideration the gove rnment’s e valuation of the 30 a ssi sta nc e re nd e re d; 31 (2) the tr uthfulness, completene ss, and re liability of 32 any information or testimony provided by

the 33 de fe nd ant;13 1 (3) the na ture a nd extent of the defe ndant’s 2 assistance ; 3 (4) a ny injury suffe red, or

any dang er or

risk of 4 injury to the defe ndant or his family resultingfrom 5 his a ssi sta nc e ; 6 (5) the timeliness of the defe ndant’s assistanc e. 7 Th e dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o p ro vis ion s r e latin gto s ub sta nti a l a ssi sta

nc e is p ro pe rl y 8 stated as f

ollows: “A motion under § 5K1.1 author izes the sentencingcourt to depa rt below the 9 applicable advisory guideline ra

ng e in deter

mining the a dvisory

guideline sentenc e, and a § 10 3553(e) motion permits the court to sentence below a statutory minimum .” United States v. 11 Wil liams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1131 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotingMelende z v. United St ates, 518 U.S. 120, 12 128–29 (1996))

. 13 In th e a

bs e nc e of any e xplanatio n b y

the Di str ic t Co ur

t r e g ard ingthe me tho d e mpl oye d in 14 applying the two pertinent provisions re lating to a ssistance, we are unable to say whether the 15 sentenc e imposed on Dominguez was proc edura lly rea sonable. Nor

are we a ble to discern, on the 16 basis of the re cord ma de on sente ncingin open cour t, whether a sente nce of

464 day s — a 17 substantial depar ture fr om the advisory

Guidelines sentenc e, and a 93% re duction from the 18 mandatory

minimum of 240 months — was substantively rea sonable. 19 The District Court mere ly stated that it was takinginto account “ all the per tinent 20 information includingbut not lim ited to the prese ntence investigation report, submissions by 21 counsel, the f

actor s outlined in 18 U.S.C . Section 3553 and the se ntencingguidelines.” When 22 counsel for

the Gover

nment inquired as to the c ourt’s method of “ calc ulation,” the cour t 23 re sp on de d: “ B a se d o n a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s in the c a se and

the mot ion

by the g ov e rnme nt, thi s is 24 the [c]ourt’s sentence.” In the context of this case, it seems to us that the District Court did not 25 satisfy

its obli g ation to “state in open c ourt the re asons for its imposition of the particular 26 sentenc e.” 18 U .S.C. § 3553(c). The PSR is no subst itute, beca use the fa ctual finding s in the 27 repor

t provided inade quate support f or the sente nce imposed. See United States v. Carter , 489 28 F.3d 528, 539–40 ( 2d Cir. 2007).The Guide lines SentencingRang e is deter mined in a serie s of steps pre scribed by 2 U. S.S. G. § 1 B 1. 1( a )– (g ), inc lud ingide nti fi c atio n o f t he c on du c t and

the c or re sp on din gof

fe ns e level, followe d by

application of a

ppropriate adjustments relate d to victim, role, obstruction of justice, and a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty ; identification of the de fenda nt’s criminal history cate g ory and any applicable adjustments to the offense level; and, f inally , ref ere nce to the Se nte nc ingTa

ble in U .S. S.G . Ch . 5 , Pt . Ato f ind the int e rs e c tio n o f t

he of fe ns e le ve l so deter mined (ver

tical axis) and the cr iminal hist ory cate g ory (horizontal axi s) so found. The intersec tion thus ascerta ined display s in the SentencingTable a SentencingRang e. Where , as here , the statutory

minimumsentenc e of imprisonment excee ds the span of months of imprisonment encompassed w ithin the rang e so identified, the minimum sentence become s the Guidelines sentenc e. 14 1 In light of the fore g oing, r emand f or re sentenc ing is indicated. The pr ocedur e to be 2 fo llo we d b y

the Di str ic t Co ur

t in re se nte nc ingDo min gue z is a s f oll ow s. Th e Di str ic t Co ur t mu st 3 first asce rtain the a ppropriate Guideline ra

ng e. B eca

use, as it appe ars ha s alrea dy been c alculate d, 4 the mandator

y minimum sentenc e, her e 240 months, exceeds the a pplicable Guide lines rang e, the 5 Court

mus t se t th e Gu ide lin e s se nte nc e at th e statut or ily re qu ir e d mi nim

um. Suc h a

pr oc e dure is 6 require d by

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), which pr ovides: “Where a statutorily

require d minimum 7 sentenc e is g reater than the maxi mum of the applica ble guideline ra

ng e, the statutorily

require d 8 minimum will be the guideline sentenc e.” 2 9 Where the statutory minimum sentenc e bec omes the Guidelines se ntence , and in the 10 absenc e of a

ny other motions for upwa

rd or downw ard de parture , a g overnme nt motion t o depar t 11 below the Guide lines pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 is, as a pra ctical matter , superf luous. W hile § 1 2 5 K1

. 1 p ro v i d es gu i d an ce t o th e s en t en ci n g co urtre gar d i n g fa ct o rs t o co n s i d er i nca l cu l at i n g a 13 be low -m and ator

y -m ini mum

de pa rt ur e , it do e s n ot, in a

nd of its e lf , a uth or ize a dis tr ic t c ourt

to 14 depar

t below a statutory

minimum — such a de parture may only occur pursuant to a g overnme nt 15 motion made under 18 U .S.C. § 3553(e). See Me lendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 124–26 16 (1996) ( holding that a motion pursuant to U.S.S .G. § 5K1.1 does not a uthorize a court to depa

rt 17 below a statutory minimum and that for

a cour t to do so requires a

motion comply ing w ith the 18 require ments set out in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(e) ). 19 When, as here , the Guidelines sente nce e nds up as the statutory minimum , both the 20 decision to depa

rt and the max imum permissibl e extent of this departure below the statutory15 1 minimum may

be base d only

on substantial assistance to the g overnme nt and on no other 2 mitigatingconsidera tions. S ee 18 U .S.C. § 3553(e) (pr oviding “ defe ndant’s substantial assistance 3 in the investigation or prosec ution of another pe rson who has c ommitt ed an of fense ” as singular 4 g round for

depar ting be low statutory

minimum ); see a lso United States v. Desselle, 450 F .3d 179, 5 182 (5th Cir. 2006), ce rt. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1148 (J an. 22, 2007) ( “We . . . join the majority of 6 circ uits in hol ding that the extent of a . . . § 3553(e) depar ture must be base d solely on assistance

7 related conc erns.” ); United States v. Will iams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1130–31 (8th Cir. 2007) ( “Where a 8 court ha s authority to sentence below a statutory minimum only

by virtue of a

g overnme nt motion 9 under § 3553( e), the reduc tion below the statutory minimum must be based e x clusively on 10 assistance -re lated conside rations.”) ; United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2003) 11 (“[I ]n fix ing a

substantial assistance de parture . . [t ]he district court may not, however , consider 12 fac tors unrelated to the def endant’ s assistance.” ). In arr iving at a final sente nce, of course , the 13 district court may consider othe r fa ctors in deter mining whe ther to g rant the f ull ex tent of the 14 depar

ture pe rmitted by

§ 3553(e)

. 15 Although by itself § 5K1.1 may

not be used to ef

fec tuate a de parture below a statutory 16 minimum sentenc e, its fac tors are instructive in deter mining the maximum permissi ble extent of a 17 depar

ture be low the statutory

minimum pursuant to § 3553(e ). See Me lendez, 518 U.S. at 129 18 (“Sec tion 5K1.1(a) ma y guide the district cour

t when it selec ts a sentenc e below the statutory 19 minimum .”); see also United States v. Pillow, 191 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 1999) (“ [T] he district 20 court should use the f actor s listed in § 5K1.1(a)( 1)–(5) as its guide when it selec ts a sentenc e 21 below the statutorily require d minimum sentenc e.”)

. 22 The c ase be fore us must be remande d for imposition of a sentenc e in ac corda nce w ith the 23 proce dure de scribed a bove. Only

then ca n we be g in to decide whe ther a below-statutory

minimum 24 sentenc e does not fa ll beneath a level “r efle ct[ing] . . . [ Domingue z’] substantial assistance in the 25 investigation or prosec ution of another pe rson who has c ommitt ed an of fense .” 18 U.S.C. § 26 35 53 (e ). Mo re ov e r, we e xpe c t th at on re mand the Di str ic t Co ur

t, i n ma kin gany a pp ro pr iate16 1 reduc tion for substantial assistance , will adequate ly articulate in open cour

t and in its written order 2 of judg ment a stateme nt of rea sons for the se ntence imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); United 3 State s v . Si nd ima , 4 88 F .3 d 8 1, 85 (2 d Ci r. 20 07 ). Th e re a so ns thu s g ive n w ill e na ble us to 4 deter

mine whether

any reduc tion for substantial assistance below the statutory minimum was 5 excessive or unre asonable . See United States v. Sae nz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (8th Cir. 2005). 6 CO NC LU SION 7 For

the fore g oing r easons, we vacate the sente nce a nd rema nd for r esente ncingconsistent 8 with this opi nion.