Reimbursement for Detail of Judge Advocate General

Corps Personnel to a United States Attorney’s Office

The Economy Act requires the Department of Defense to be reimbursed for the detail of 

Judge Advocate General Corps attorneys to a United States Attorney’s Office.

The authonty of the Director of National Drug Control Policy temporarily to reassign federal personnel under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 does not displace the requirements 

of the Economy Act.

June 27, 1989

M e m o r a n d u m O p i n io n fo r t h e A c t in g A s s o c ia t e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l

You have asked for our opinion whether the United States Attorney’s 

Office for the District of Columbia (“DCUSA”) must reimburse the 

Department of Defense (“DOD”) for costs associated with the detail of 

ten lawyers from the Judge Advocate General Corps (“JAGC”) to the 

DCUSA for one year pursuant to an official request by the Director of 

National Drug Control Policy William Bennett (“Director”), under sections 1003(d)(2) or 1005(c)(1)(A) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 

(“the 1988 Act”), Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 1502(d)(2), 1504(c)(1)(A).1 DOD contends that DCUSA must reimburse the various departments from which JAGC personnel would be 

detailed for salaries and expenses, at an estimated cost of $300,000.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the Economy Act, 31 

U.S.C. § 1301,* requires reimbursement for the detailed JAGC personnel, 

and that the Director’s authority temporarily to reassign federal personnel under the 1988 Act does not displace the requirements of the 

Economy Act. However, the 1988 Act provides for the Director to report 

to the Congress regarding the need for any transfer of appropriated funds 

for National Drug Control Program activities. 21 U.S.C. § 1502(c)(6). To 

the extent this situation may be deemed to present a need for such a

1 Memorandum for William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office o f Legal Counsel, from Joe D. 

Whitley, Acting Associate Attorney General (May 12, 1989) See Letter for Joe D Whitley, Acting 

Associate Attorney General, from Jay B Stephens, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia

(May 9, 1989).

* Editor’s Note: This opinion incorrectly refers to 31 U S.C § 1301 as the Economy Act, when that Act 

is actually codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1535. This mistake in terminology does not affect the conclusions or 

essential analysis o f the opinion

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transfer, the Director’s report is the appropriate vehicle for seeking such 

a transfer of funds.

Analysis

1. The Economy Act

Under the Economy Act, a federal agency must spend its funds on the 

objects for which they were appropriated. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a). A corollary 

to this statutory rule is that an agency may not augment its appropriations from outside sources without specific statutory authority. See generally United States General Accounting Office, Office of General 

Counsel, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 5-62 to 5-63 (1st ed. 

1982) (explaining the non-augmentation theory). In combination, these 

rules require an agency to spend its appropriated funds — and only its 

appropriated funds — as directed by its relevant appropriation legislation. These dual requirements consistently have been interpreted as generally prohibiting the detail of employees from one federal agency to 

another on a nonreimbursable basis. As the Comptroller General has 

held, “[t]o the extent that agencies detail employees on a nonreimbursable basis ... they may be avoiding congressional limitations on the 

amount of moneys appropriated to the receiving agency for particular 

programs.” 64 Comp. Gen. 370, 380 (1985).2

Three exceptions to the general rule against nonreimbursable details 

have been recognized. First, Congress may, of course, specifically authorize nonreimbursable details by statute. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3343 (authorizing nonreimbursable details to international organizations). Second, a 

loaning agency may authorize nonreimbursable details involving “a matter [that is] similar or related to matters ordinarily handled by the loaning 

agency and will aid the loaning agency in accomplishing a purpose for 

which its appropriations are provided.” 64 Comp. Gen. 370, 380 (1985) 

(concluding that nonreimbursable detail of employees to other agencies 

or to different programs within the same agency is unlawful; opinion 

given prospective application only); see also 65 Comp. Gen. 635, 637

2 The Comptroller General is an officer of the legislative branch, see Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714, 

727-32 (1986), and historically, the executive branch has not considered itself bound by the Comptroller 

General’s legal opinions if they conflict with the legal opinions o f the Attorney Genera] and the Office of 

Legal Counsel. Under some circumstances the opjruons supply vaJuable guidance, however, and this 

Office generally has found these opinions persuasive on the application o f the Economy Act to the question of nonreimbursable details See Memorandum for Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the 

President, from Douglas W Kmiec, Assistant Attorney General, Office o f Legal Counsel, Re Executive

Agency Assistance to the Presidential Transition at 3 (Jan 3, 1989) ( “Kmiec Memo”); Reimbursement

o f the Internal Revenue Seivicc fo r Investigative Sei'viccs Provided to the Independent Counsel, 12 Op 

O.LC 233 (1988); Assignment of Army lawyers to the Department of Justice, 10 Op. O L.C 115, 118 

(1986) With one exception desenbed in footnote 3 below, the Comptroller General’s construction o f 

appropriations law is consistent with our interpretation here

189
(1986) (detail of administrative law judges from National Labor Relations 

Board to Department of Labor to hear black lung cases is not directly 

related to the objects of NLRB’s appropriations and therefore must be 

reimbursed). Third, the Comptroller General would recognize a de minimis exception for details that have a negligible effect on the loaning 

agency’s appropriations. Cf. 65 Comp. Gen. 635, 637 (1985) ($674,250 for 

costs of detail of 15-20 NLRB employees to Department of Labor not de 

minimis).3

Neither of the latter two exceptions applies here. Even assuming that 

the de minimis exception is lawful, we would not regard this detail, which 

would cost DOD approximately $300,000, as having a negligible effect on 

DOD’s appropriations. The exception for details involving matters related to the loaning agency’s appropriations also does not appear applicable 

here. JAGC lawyers ordinarily do not engage in civilian litigation.4 A case 

can be made that nonreimbursable details should be allowed when the 

loaning agency is the “client” on whose behalf litigation is undertaken, 

such as if the JAGC attorneys were to be used for military matters or military prosecutions. In such cases, the detailed personnel would provide 

specialized knowledge or assistance related to the objects of their 

agency’s appropriations. The reassignment of JAGC attorneys to DCUSA 

pursuant to the 1988 Act does not meet these criteria, however. Rather, 

the apparent purpose of the reassignment is to provide additional personnel for prosecution of civilians for narcotics and narcotics-related 

offenses committed in the District of Columbia.

In U.S. Attorney Jay B. Stephens’ letter of May 9, 1989, to Acting 

Associate Attorney General Joe D. Whitley, reference is made to the 

DCUSA’s “long history of maintaining a nonreimbursable Specials 

Program which involves the assignment of attorney personnel from various federal agencies to this Office for a period of four to six months.” 

However, we understand those short-term details to have had a different 

purpose — the training of inexperienced trial attorneys. Details for such 

purposes might well fall within the exception for details involving matters related to the loaning agency’s appropriation, in that intensive training in litigation skills may assist the loaning agency by improving the abilities and performance of its attorney personnel.5 While the DCUSA 

doubtless also receives a benefit from the detail of attorneys under the 

Specials Program, the primary purpose of the program appears to be for 

the training of the detailed attorneys.

3 Pnor opinions o f this Office have regarded the “de mjrumis exception” with some caution. See Kmiec 

Memo at 7 n 8 The Comptroller General’s opinions acknowledge that the de minimis exception actually 

violates 31 U S C § 1301(a). See 65 Comp Gen. at 638; 64 Comp. Gen at 381.

4 We have reached this conclusion in a pnor memorandum. See 10 Op O L.C. at 118 & n.4 (discussing 

circumstances under which JAGC attorneys may be detailed to Department o f Justice to assist in litigation).

5 We do not here address the validity o f the Specials Program at the DCUSA

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In contrast, the reassignment of JAGC attorneys pursuant to the 1988 

Act does not appear to be for the purpose of training. Rather, we understand the proposed detail to involve the reassignment of relatively experienced attorneys to supplement the DCUSA’s resources for combatting 

narcotics offenses. Moreover, the training of JAGC attorneys for specialized civilian narcotics prosecutions in civilian courts would not appear to 

be directly related to more than a small fraction of the work customarily 

done by JAGC attorneys for their military departments.6

In sum, we conclude that the Economy Act does not permit the proposed detail on a nonreimbursable basis, unless the 1988 Act specifically 

authorizes nonreimbursable details.

2. The 1988 Act

The 1988 Act gives the Director of National Drug Control Policy broad 

powers to reassign federal personnel to further the National Drug Control 

Program. Section 1502(d)(2) empowers the Director to

direct, with the concurrence of the Secretary of a department or head of an agency, the temporary reassignment 

within the Federal Government of personnel employed by 

such department or agency, in order to implement United 

States drug control policy.

21 U.S.C. § 1502(d)(2). In addition, section 1504(c)(1) permits the temporary assignment of personnel to provide assistance where the Director has 

designated a specific locale as a “high intensity drug trafficking area.”7

Neither of these provisions addresses directly whether the temporary 

reassignment of personnel should be on a reimbursable basis. In addition, nothing in the legislative history of the 1988 Act suggests that 

Congress intended for details made pursuant to the Director’s reassignment authority to be on a nonreimbursable basis. There are no committee reports on the 1988 Act, and statements of individual legislators 

speak only in general terms of the need for a “drug czar” who would have

°In addition, a substantial question would be presented concerning the Director’s authonty to order 

reassignment for "training" purposes The 1988 Act authorizes the Director to direct, with agency concurrence, temporary reassignment of personnel “in order to implement United States drug control polic y ” 21 U.SC § 1502(d)(3). See also id. § 1504(c)(1)(A). It is unclear whether the ordering of training 

details falls within the Director’s powers to reassign personnel in order to implement drug control policy It could be argued that details specifically for training in narcotics prosecutions would be within the 

Director’s statutory authority; however, the more narrow the focus of the training, the weaker the argument that the detail would further the objects o f the loaning agency’s appropnations, so as to be permitted on a nonreimbursable basis.

7 We are informed by Chuck WexJer, Special Assistant to the Director, that as of this date the Director 

has not designated the Distnct of Columbia as a “high intensity drug trafficking area,” though he may do 

so in the future

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broad powers to coordinate action within the federal government related to the drug problem.8

The only reference to the issue of reimbursement occurs in section 

1502(d)(3), which authorizes the Director to use services, equipment, or 

personnel of other agencies for administrative purposes on a reimbursable basis. It could be argued by negative inference from this provision that Congress intended the Director’s reassignment authority under 

section 1502(d)(2) to be exercised on a nonreimbursable basis because 

Congress failed to provide specifically for reimbursement, as in section 

1502(d)(3). This construction fails, however, for two reasons.

First, the structure of the 1988 Act cuts against the negative inference 

of nonreimbursable details. To read the 1988 Act as authorizing nonreimbursable details would create a tension between section 1502(d)(2) 

and section 1502(c)(6), which requires the Director “to report to the 

Congress on a quarterly basis regarding the need for any reprogramming 

or transfer of appropriated funds for National Drug Control Program 

activities.” Section 1502(c)(6) suggests that Congress intended to 

reserve for itself the decision whether National Drug Control Program 

policies require changes in appropriations, including any transfer of 

appropriated funds necessary to accomplish temporary personnel reassignments.9 Reserving this power would be consistent with the Economy 

Act and Congressional retention of control over its constitutional power 

of the purse.

y A recent Comptroller General decision held that the Economy Act prohibits nonreimbursable details 

under circumstances in which there were far stronger indications of legislative intent to permit such 

details. 65 Comp. Gen 635 (1986) There, the National Labor Relations Board planned to detail 15-20 

administrative law judges to the Department of Labor to handle a backlog o f 20,000 black lung cases. The 

legislative history o f both a 1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act and the fiscal year 1986 Department 

o f Labor Appropriations Act reflected

congressional concern about the backlog and provide[dJ suggestions about how to resolve it 

The Senate report accompanying the 1985 Supplemental directed the Department (o f Labor], 

to the extent practical, to increase its efforts to temporarily borrow ALJs from other agencies with less pressing workloads For fiscal year 1986, aside from recommending an additional $4 4 million for 15 new AUs, and a substantial number o f attorneys and support positions, the Senate again directed the Department to actively pursue borrowing ALJs from 

other agencies Both congressional debate and hearings accompanying the 1986 appropriations act contain similar comments 

65 Comp. Gen. at 636 (citations and footnote omitted) Despite this legislative history, the Comptroller 

General concluded that, because the statute itself did not specifically authorize nonreimbursable details, 

the concerns expressed m the legislative history remained merely generalized concerns that were left 

unaddressed in the actual legislation. Id. at 639 ( “[I]t is well settled that suggestions or expressions of 

congressional intent in committee reports, floor debates and hearings are not legally binding unless they 

are incorporated either expressly or by reference in an appropriations act itself or in some other 

statute.”). Accord Train v City of New York, 420 U.S 35, 45 (1975) (involving issue of Executive compliance with appropriations laws and noting that “legislative intention, without more, is not legislation”)

9 This inference is also supported by changes made from earlier versions o f the legislation S 2852, 

100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (the “Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act o f 1988”) at one point provided m 

sections 1006(d)(2) and (3).

(2) The Director may reprogram funds within National Drug Control Programs

Continued

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Moreover, title X, chapter I of the 1988 Act provides specific supplemental appropriations for United States Attorney’s Offices for salaries 

and expenses for increased narcotics prosecution efforts. It reasonably 

can be inferred that further enhancements of funding, such as by detailing additional personnel pursuant to the Director’s temporary reassignment authority, were not intended. See 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (rule of construction against implied appropriations) (discussed below). Cf. United 

States General Accounting Office, Office of General Counsel, Principles

of Federal Appropriations Law, supra, at 5-62 to 5-63 (non-augmentation 

theory);

Second, reading the 1988 Act as authorizing nonreimbursable details 

requires the conclusion that Congress made an “implied appropriation” 

through the Director’s reassignment authority. The Economy Act provides, however, that “[a] law may be construed to make an appropriation 

out of the Treasury or to authorize making a contract for the payment of 

money in excess of an appropriation only if the law specifically states 

that an appropriation is made or that such a contract may be made.” 31 

U.S.C. § 1301(d). Thus, reading the 1988 Act to require nonreimbursable 

details would be inconsistent with the Economy Act. Statutes ordinarily 

are to be read as consistent with one another, where possible. See

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1017, 1018 (1984) (repeals by 

implication are disfavored).

Under these circumstances, the 1988 Act should not be read to authorize nonreimbursable details. If nonreimbursable details are necessary to 

accomplish the Director’s goals of implementing national drug control 

policy, he can report to Congress under section 1502(c)(6) on the need 

for a transfer of appropriated funds to accomplish the detail of the JAGC 

attorneys.

9 ( continued)

(3) The Director may transfer, after providing notification to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, an amount not to exceed 5 per centum of the funds appropriated fo r one such program to another such program within the 

same National Drug Control Program agency.

134 Cong Rec 27,467 (1988) (emphasis added). This provision was deleted In its place, the 1988 Act, as 

enacted into law, provides

The Director shall report to the Congress on a quarterly basis regarding the need fo r any

reprogramming or tmnsfer of appropriated funds for National Drug Control Program activities.

21 U.S C. § 1502(c)(6) (emphasis added).

The same, early version of S 2852 provided in section 1010(a), with respect to the Director’s powers 

to designate “High Intensity Drug Areas,” that:

Upon making such a designation and in order to provide Federal assistance to such area, the 

Director may —

(2) transfer, after providing notification to the Committees on Appropriations o f the Senate 

and the House o f Representatives, an amount not to exceed 5 per centum of the funds appropriated for one such program to another such program, ..

134 Cong Rec. 27,468 (1988). See also id. at 27,414, 27,416 (statement of Sen Nunn, including sectionby-section analysis of bill) As passed, the 1988 Act contains no such provision

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Conclusion

We believe that the Economy Act prevents the detail of JAGC attorneys 

to the DCUSA on a nonreimbursable basis, absent clear language in the 

1988 Act that provides for such details. We conclude that no such clear 

intent is expressed in sections 1502(d)(2) and 1504(c)(1)(A) of the 1988 

Act. If the Director determines that the inability to direct the detail of 

JAGC attorneys to the DCUSA on a nonreimbursable basis impedes his 

ability to further national drug control policy, section 1502(d)(6) of the 

1988 Act provides an appropriate mechanism for seeking a remedy from 

Congress.

WILLIAM P. BARR

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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