alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                              18 USC, SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the annual report of the Genesis  Companies Group,  Inc.
(the  "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended  December 31, 2005, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on date hereof (the "Report"),
I, the undersigned,  in the capacity and on the date indicated  below,  certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C./  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Rule 13(a) or 15(d)
          of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



Dated: April 11, 2005                        s/Wm. Ernest Simmons
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Wm. Ernest Simmons, Chief Executive
                                             Officer/Chief Financial Officer
#### Ruth HARRIS, Appellant, v. Raymond William FILMON, Appellee.

No. 77-1947.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 19, 1978.

Charles S. Carrere of Harrison, Greene, Mann, Rowe, Stanton & Mastry, St. Peters-burg, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

RYDER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute. Appellant contends the dismissal was improper because she was not afforded prior notice or hearing. We agree and reverse.

On January 10, 1973 appellant and her husband filed a complaint against appellee for damages arising out of an automobile accident. The case eventually went to trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant on May 3, 1976. The appellant, on May 7,1976, filed a motion for new trial alleging the damages awarded were grossly inadequate. This motion was denied on June 30, 1976. Months later, on November 2, 1977, without prior notice or hearing thereon, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice.

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(e) requires notice and a hearing before a case can be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Since the trial court afforded appellant neither notice nor hearing, its order dismissing the case was improper and must be reversed. *See Franklin Acceptance Corp. v. Superior Electrical Industries, Inc.,*167 So.2d 116 (Fla.3d DCA 1964).

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

BOARDMAN, C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

    We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration
statements on Forms S-8 (No. 33-99764, 33-41474, 333-50298 and 333-111513) of
Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. of our report dated February 11, 2004 relating to
the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of
Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. and Subsidiaries, which appears in this Form 10-K.

                                            /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

                                                PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP

New York, New York
March 12, 2004
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7556

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARTIN LOCKLEAR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District

Judge. (CR-95-16, CA-98-344-5-BR)

Submitted: April 20, 1999 Decided: May 3, 1999

Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Martin Locklear, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Edward Skiver, Assistant

United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

September 29, 1998, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on September 30, 1998. Pursuant to

Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is

the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we

take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See

Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

Martin Locklear seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning

of the district court. See United States v. Locklear, Nos. CR-95-

16; CA-98-344-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 1998).* We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7056 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7056

     To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award 
   additional funding through the Indian Health Services Sanitation 
        Facilities Construction Program, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 28, 2020

  Mr. O'Halleran (for himself and Mr. Young) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources, and in 
 addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award 
   additional funding through the Indian Health Services Sanitation 
        Facilities Construction Program, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDING.

    The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the lack of infrastructure and 
sanitation available in native communities. Addressing the Indian 
Health Service's Sanitation Facilities Deficiency List, which as 
included in the 2018 report titled ``Annual Report to the Congress of 
the United States on Sanitation Deficiency Levels for Indian Homes and 
Communities'', will make investments in the necessary water 
infrastructure and, in turn, improve health outcomes.

SEC. 2. INDIAN HEALTH SERVICES SANITATION FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 
              PROGRAM FUNDING.

    (a) Additional Funding.--For the purpose described in subsection 
(b), in addition to any other funds available for such purpose, there 
is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services a total of $2,670,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 
through 2024.
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose described in this subsection is the 
planning, design, construction, modernization, improvement, and 
renovation of water, sewer, and solid waste sanitation facilities that 
are funded, in whole or part, by the Indian Health Service through, or 
provided for in, a contract or compact with the Service under the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 5301 
et seq.).
    (c) Priority for Funding.--When awarding funding under this 
section, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting through the 
Director of the Indian Health Service, shall address the highest needs 
first as established in the 2018 report titled ``Annual Report to the 
Congress of the United States on Sanitation Deficiency Levels for 
Indian Homes and Communities''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Kenneth HARMON v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 50673.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 6, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1978.

Laurel G. Weir, Thomas L. Booker, Philadelphia, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Robert D. Findley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and WALKER and BOWLING, JJ.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Neshoba County; Marcus D. Gordon, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM, LEE and COFER, JJ., concur.
#### Tarlok SINGH, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 01-71710.

INS No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 12, 2002.*

Decided Aug. 15, 2002.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Tarlok Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of depor*809tation and denial of asylum and -withholding of deportation. Singh’s sole contention is that the Board abused its discretion and denied him due process by refusing to accept a one-day late brief in support of his appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), as amended by IIRIRA § 309(c).1*Avetova-Elisseva v. INS,*213 F.3d 1192, 1195 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2000).

Singh does not dispute that his brief was filed late. It is within the Board’s discretion whether to accept a late brief. 8 C.F.R. § 3.3(c)(1) (2002). The Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept the brief when Singh never sought an extension of the filing deadline and offered a curt, one-sentence explanation for his dilatoriness: “The petitioner was sick and could not file the brief in time.”

We review de novo whether the Board’s refusal to accept the brief violated Singh’s due process rights. *Castillo-Perez v. INS,*212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir.2000). To prevail on his due process claim, Singh must demonstrate “error and substantial prejudice.” *Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000).

The Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision rested on an adverse credibility determination supported by several specific findings of discrepancies in Singh’s testimony. The Board similarly found that Singh was not credible, relying on discrepancies it observed as well as those the IJ discovered. Singh does not argue, much less demonstrate, that his brief would have cured the discrepancies relied upon by the Board. He fails to demonstrate prejudice and thereby fails to prove a due process violation. *Id.*(“A showing of prejudice is essentially a demonstration that the alleged violation affected the outcome of the proceedings ----”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. We apply the IIRIRA transitional rules because Singh’s deportation was commenced prior to April I, 1997 and the BIA’s final order of deportation issued on or after October 31, 1996. *Avetova-Elisseva,*213 F.3d at 1195 n. 4.
EXHIBIT 99.1 - CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
               1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
               OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of CPI Corp. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q/A for the period ending July 20, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, J. David Pierson,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Subsection 1350, as adopted pursuant to Subsection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly present, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and the results of
            operations of the Company.


By:  /s/ J. David Pierson
     --------------------------
         J. David Pierson
         Chief Executive Officer
         May 12, 2003
#### Norma A. ROMAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 68-508.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 5, 1971.

J. Carrington Gramling and Thomas B. Duff, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen. and Harold Mendelow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., HENDRY, J., and LOPEZ, AQUILINO, Jr., Associate Judge.

ORDER ON MANDATE

PER CURIAM.

Whereas, the judgment of this court was entered on June 24, 1969 (226 So.2d 19) reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, in the above styled cause; and

Whereas, on review of this court’s judgment by certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida, by its opinion and judgment filed October 21, 1970 (240 So.2d 633) and mandate dated November 30, 1970, now lodged in this court, quashed this court’s judgment of reversal with directions to reinstate the judgment and sentence;

Now, therefore, It is Ordered that the mandate of this court heretofore issued in this cause on September 9, 1969 is withdrawn, the opinion and judgment of this court filed June 24, 1969 is vacated, the said opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is herewith made the opinion and judgment of this court and the judgment and sentence of the circuit court appealed from herein is reinstated and affirmed. Costs allowed shall be taxed in the circuit court (Rule 3.16(b) F.A.R.), 32 F.S.A.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT

TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

In connection with this annual report on Form 10-K/A of The Wet Seal, Inc. for the year ended January 28, 2006, I,
John J. Luttrell, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of The Wet Seal, Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. This Form 10-K/A for the year ended January 28, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and

2. The information contained in this Form 10-K/A for the period ended January 28, 2006 fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of The Wet Seal, Inc.

Date: December 12, 2006



/s/ JOHN J. LUTTRELLJohn J. LuttrellExecutive Vice President andChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 2 4 - 0 292 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. CHALON MICHAEL KINHOLT,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including October 9 , 202 4 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 5 2024

09/05/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0292
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Gerald David YANKS, Relator, v. E. Wilson PURDY, as Sheriff of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, and Jack Sandstrom, Respondents.

No. 72-1335.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 13, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Habeas Corpus denied.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 249 (Tuesday, December 30, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 67849]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-33787]



[[Page 67849]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary of Defense


Meeting of the DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Advisory Group on Electron Devices.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Working Group A (Microwave Devices) of the DoD Advisory Group 
on Electron Devices (AGED) announces a closed session meeting.

DATES: The meeting will be held at 0900, Tuesday, February 17, 1998.

ADDRESSES: The meetings will be held at Palisades Institute for 
Research Services, 1745 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 500, Arlington, 
VA 22202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Eric Carr, AGED Secretariat, 1745 Jefferson Davis Highway, Crystal 
Square Four, Suite 500, Arlington, Virginia 22202.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The mission of the Advisory Group is to 
provide advice to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E), and through the DDR&E to the Director, Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and the Military Departments in 
planning and managing an effective and economical research and 
development program in the area of electron devices.
    The Working Group A meeting will be limited to review of research 
and development programs which the Military Departments propose to 
initiate with industry, universities or in their laboratories. This 
microwave device area includes programs on developments and research 
related to microwave tubes, solid state microwave devices, electronic 
warfare devices, millimeter wave devices, and passive devices. The 
review will include details of classified defense programs throughout.
    In accordance with Section 10(d) of Public Law 92-463, as amended 
(5 U.S.C. App. Section 10(d) (1994)), it has been determined that this 
Advisory Group meeting concerns matters listed in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(1) 
(1994), and that accordingly, this meeting will be closed to the 
public.

    Dated: December 22, 1997.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 97-33787 Filed 12-29-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-M
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7464

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SAVINO BRAXTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge;

Frank A. Kaufman, Senior District Judge. (CR-90-135-K, CA-97-465-K)

Submitted: February 26, 1998 Decided: March 19, 1998

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Savino Braxton, Appellant Pro Se. Lynne Ann Battaglia, United

States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying his

motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), in which he sought review

of the district court's previous decision to deny relief under 28

U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997), without an evidentiary

hearing and in which he claimed he is entitled to discovery. Because Appellant filed the motion more than ten days after entry of

judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), the motion is properly construed as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). We have reviewed

the record and the district court's order and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b)

motion. See Heyman v. M.L. Mktg. Co., 116 F.3d 91, 94 (4th Cir.

1997) (stating standard of review); CNF Constructors, Inc. v.

Donohoe Constr. Co., 57 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that

where motion seeks reconsideration of legal issues already

addressed in earlier ruling, motion is not authorized by Rule 60(b)

and rejection of motion is not an abuse of discretion) (citing

United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1982)).

Accordingly, we grant Appellant's motion to file an oversize brief,

deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-20502 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RAY LATSON, Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. CR-H-95-174-3

________________________________________

March 12, 1997 Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ray Latson appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and aiding and abetting same. He argues that he was entrapped by the Drug Enforcement Agency. Accepting every fact in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict, the evidence established that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Latson waspredisposed to engage in the criminal conduct at issue. An officer acting undercover did no more

than provide Latson with an opportunity to break the law, and Latson readily accepted the opportunity. Latson’s lack of reluctance to engage in criminal conduct was sufficient to demonstrate predisposition. See United States v. Byrd , 31 F.3d 1329, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1432 (1995). There is no plain error concerning the alleged sentencing- factor manipulation, see United States v. Vital , 68 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garcia , 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 158 (1996), or the jury’s inquiry regarding entrapment. See Byrd , 31 F.3d at 1335; United States v. Calverly , 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995). AFFIRMED.