1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-20-00280-CR

__________________

JUSTIN ALLISON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 19-31221

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

After a jury found Justin Allison guilty of engaging in deviate 

sexual intercourse with Blaire,1 an inmate at the Jefferson County 

1To protect the privacy of the complaining witness named in the 

indictment, we refer to her by using a pseudonym. See Tex. Const. art. I, 

§ 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness 

and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the 

criminal justice process”). 
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Correctional Facility, Allison appealed. 2 Allison raises two issues in his 

brief, one complaining about a question the prosecutor asked him when 

she cross-examined him in the trial, the other complaining about an 

argument the prosecutor made in summation. Because we conclude 

Allison’s issues lack merit, we will affirm.

Background

Allison was working as a correctional officer at the Jefferson 

County Correctional Facility (the Facility) in October and November 

2018 when Blaire claimed that Allison engaged in acts of deviate sexual 

intercourse with her. In 2019, a Jefferson County grand jury indicted 

Allison, alleging that on or before November 5, 2018, and while employed 

at the Facility, Allison intentionally engaged in deviate sexual 

2The indictment alleges the offense occurred on or about November 

5, 2018. Although the improper sexual activity with an inmate statute 

has since been amended and the penalty for the offense increased, when 

Allison committed the offense, the offense in 2018 was punishable as a 

Class A misdemeanor. CompareAct of June 19, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch.

1136, § 1(b), 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 1136, with Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 

39.04(b)(West Supp. 2022) (increasing the penalty for the offenses in this 

category effective January 1, 2021).
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intercourse with Blaire while Blaire was an inmate at the Facility.

Allison pleaded not guilty.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence 

shows Blaire was arrested and then jailed in July 2018 after police 

charged her with committing aggravated assault. The testimony shows 

Allison was charged with stabbing her former boyfriend with a knife. 

Blaire was jailed at the Jefferson County Correctional Facility, where she 

remained while awaiting her trial.

The State called eight witnesses, including Blaire, to prove Allison 

committed the crime alleged in the indictment. Since Allison’s appeal is 

limited in scope,we limit our discussion of the testimony to the testimony 

needed to resolve Allison’s appeal. In the appeal, Allison’s complaints 

revolve around the testimony the jury heard from Allison and from 

Blaire. 

When Blaire testified, she said that she and Allison began having 

conversations in October 2018, either when she was in the Facility’s yard 

or inside her cell. At one point, according to Blaire, their conversations

became sexual. Blaire said Allison let her know “there was a place off 

camera to where things could happen[.]” In late October 2018, Allison 
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took Blaire to an area that could not be viewed by those who monitored 

the Facility’s cameras. Blaire testified that while she and Allison were 

alone together in an area beyond camera view, Allison unzipped his 

pants, and she performed oral sex. Blaire testified the same thing 

happened again in November 2018. 

Around a week after the second incident, Blaire met with the 

Jefferson County Sheriff. Blaire explained the sheriff asked her “about 

your relationship with Justin Allison.”Atfirst, Blaire told the sheriff she 

had no contact with Allison other than as “inmate to officer.” Blaire also 

told the sheriff she didn’t perform oral sex on Allison. But when the 

sheriff told Blaire she had a letter Blaire had written about what Blaire 

claimed occurred, Blaire agreed that she told the sheriff (and later told a 

Jefferson County investigator, Tommy Savoie, who also testified in the 

trial) “what happened[.]” 

On cross-examination, Blaire admitted the aggravated assault 

charges, which the State filed against her for stabbing her former 

boyfriend, were reduced from a felony to a Class-A misdemeanor assault

based on a plea agreement, which Blaire made with the State. Blaire 

attributed the fact she reached the plea agreement to the County’s desire 
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to avoid paying for a surgery she needed to her arm,which Blaire testified 

her former boyfriend had broken shortly before she was arrested and 

charged with aggravated assault. Blaire described the plea agreement 

she reached, reducing the aggravated assault from a felony to a 

misdemeanor and her serving a sentence of time served, as “pretty great.”

Despite Blaire’s testimony that she didn’t know why the State was 

willing to give her the deal, Blaire mentioned her former boyfriend was 

not helping the State with its efforts to prosecute her when the State 

agreed to the deal. 

Allison was the sole witness called to testify in his defense.For his 

part, Allison denied he had had an inappropriate relationship with 

Blaire. Still, Allison said he knew Blaire had written notes claiming they 

engaged in an inappropriate relationship. According to Allison, when he 

got the notes, he broughtthem “upstairs in the picket and showed those 

guys . . . to cover myself and to show, like, do you see what this is, you 

know.” Allison explained he wasn’t worried about the notes because he 

hadn’t done “anything wrong.” 

Allison testified that what Blaire had claimed about the two of them 

having a relationship was “[u]ntrue.” When Allison’s attorney asked him 
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why “she would say something like that[,]” Allison responded: “I mean, 

basically, get herself out of trouble.” Then Allison’s attorney had Allison 

provide the jury with further context for his response. In response to 

those questions, Allison told the jury that Blaire had asked him to take 

an affidavit to her former boyfriend, which she wanted to use if her 

boyfriend signed the affidavit to get the assault charges from the incident 

where Blaire stabbed her boyfriend dropped. Allison testified that when 

Blaire asked him to help her, he refused. Allison also testified that when 

he refused Blaire’s request, he wasn’t “mean” or “angry” even though 

what Blaire requested would have required him to break the law. 

In summation, Allison’s attorney argued “[Blaire] concocted this 

idea to get him in trouble at the height of the “Me Too Movement” 

[because Allison refused Blaire’s request to take the affidavit to her 

former boyfriend].”The two primary themes the defense used in Allison’s 

defense were that Blaire was not a credible witness and that she 

fabricated the story about the sexual encounters to obtain the leverage 

she needed to obtain a plea so she could avoid the risk of a conviction and 

lengthy sentence on being convicted of aggravated assault. When the jury 

returned with its verdict, it found Allison guilty. In punishment, the jury 
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found Allison should serve a 180-day sentence. However, the jury 

recommended that Allison be placed on probation.3 The trial court signed 

a judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. The trial court suspended 

Allison’s sentence, and then exercised its authority to extend the 

probation period from eighteen months to three years.4

Error in Admitting Evidence

In Allison’s first issue, he argues the trial court erred by allowing 

the prosecutor to ask him a question requiring him to speculate about 

why Blaire would have had a reason to deny having sexual contact with 

him when she initially spoke to the sheriff rather than just “spill[ing] the 

beans.” Allison contends the question was improper because it required 

Allison to speculate about Blaire’s motives. The record shows Allison’s 

attorney objected to the prosecutor’s question, but the trial court 

overruled the objection.

We review a trial court’s decision admitting evidence relevant to the 

complaining witness’s motive to testify against the accused for abuse of 

3See Act of June 19, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 1, 2015 Tex. 

Gen. Laws 1136 (amended 2021) (current version at Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 39.04(b)). 4See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.055.
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discretion.5 An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling 

falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.6 If the trial court’s 

ruling is correct under any theory of law that applies, we will not reverse 

the judgment in the appeal.7 Under the abuse of discretion standard, we 

may not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless the record shows it was

arbitrary, unreasonable, or made without reference to guiding rules and 

principles.8

Texas Rule of Evidence 602 and Rule 701 apply when a party 

objects claiming a witness’s testimony is speculative.9 Rule 602 requires

that a witness’s testimony be predicated on the witness’s personal 

knowledge.10 And Rule 701 permits opinion testimony from a lay witness 

if the opinion is “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and 

“helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or determining 

a fact issue in issue.”11 Thus, even though a witness “cannot possess 

personal knowledge of another’s mental state, he may possess personal 

5Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

6Id. 7Id. 8State v. Lerma, 639 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

9Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d 895, 897-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

10See Tex. R. Evid. 602.

11See id. 701.
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knowledge of facts from which an opinion regarding mental state may be 

drawn.”12

From the beginning in his opening statement, Allison’s attorney 

placed Blaire’s motive in issue. This is what Allison’s attorney said: 

You’re going to learn that [Blaire] wanted Mr. Allison to 

reach out to her boyfriend who was in another part of the jail

and ‘kite’ him. ‘Kite’ means get him a letter. And what she 

wanted was she wanted this letter that would get him, 

convince him, to drop the charges so she would no longer be 

facing 25 years to life. That’s what she wanted; and when Mr. 

Allison wouldn’t do it, she concocted a scheme to destroy his 

career. That’s going to be the evidence. And it also helped her 

try to get herself out of trouble, and you’re going to hear about 

that.

In the State’s case-in-chief, Allison’s attorney cross-examined 

Blaire, seeking to diminish her credibility and to establish she was a liar,

capable of fabricating charges against Allison to obtain the leverage she 

needed to obtain a reduced sentenced in return for a plea.When Allison’s

attorney cross-examined Blaire in the State’s case-in-chief, the attorney 

asked her about her prior criminal convictions, the time she faced if 

convicted of stabbing her former boyfriend, and the plea deal she reached 

with the State. Allison’s attorney got Blaire to admit that when she 

12 Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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initially spoke to the sheriff, she told the sheriff she didn’t know Allison. 

But in the next question, the attorney asked Blaire if she wanted her 

boyfriend to drop the assault charges because the charges “were scary[.]”

Blaire responded: “Heck, yea.”

As is readily seen, there’s no doubt the defense accused Blaire of 

fabricating the charges Blaire made against Allison in an effort to obtain 

leverage with the State to get a favorable plea. But the problem with 

Allison’s theory is that if Blaire set Allison up from the start, why would 

Blaire have denied knowing Allison when the sheriff asked her if she 

knew him? Isn’t it more plausible that Allison, when offered the 

opportunity, would have at least told the sheriff she knew Allison and

isn’t it likely she would also have volunteered that the two of them 

engaged in sexual acts? 

When Allison took the stand, the prosecutor gave Allison the chance 

to explain why Blaire might have had a motive to deny knowing her if by 

then she had already concocted a scheme to get herself out of trouble by 

destroying his career.After Allison testified in his defense, the prosecutor 

sought to expose the flaw the State perceived with Allison’s theory by 

asking Allison the following questions:
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[Prosecutor]: So, you are aware that - - and you heard 

[Blaire’s] testimony that when [she] first was called into the 

sheriff’s office, that when she was asked about the incident, 

that she denied everything?

[Allison]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: So, if she concocted the story against you for 

something you did, can you think of a reason why she wouldn’t 

have gone in there and just spilled the beans?

[Defense Attorney]: Objection: Calls for speculation, Judge.

[Court]: Overruled.

[Prosecutor]: Can you think of a reason? If I concoct a story 

against you, why wouldn’t I go in there and spill the beans? 

Why would I go in there and deny everything?

[Allison]: Because she knew it wasn’t true.

[Prosecutor]: But you’re saying she was out to get you, right?

[Allison]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: So, if it wasn’t true and I’m out to get you, why 

wouldn’t I go in there and spill the beans about whatever story 

it is I’m trying to make up?

[Allison]: I have no idea. 

As a correctional officer at the jail, Allison had personal knowledge 

of sufficient facts about the reasons an inmate like Blaire might lie to an 

official like the sheriff in return for a favorable sentence or other 

favorable treatment while in jail. Allison also had personal knowledge 
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about the dates and locations Blaire was claiming the sexual encounters 

between the two of them occurred, the circumstances surrounding 

Blaire’s request to “kite” the affidavit she wanted her boyfriend to sign, 

and Allison heard Blaire testify about the favorable plea bargain and 

sentence she received in exchange for her plea.The jury was free to give 

as much or as little weight to Allison’s opinion about Blaire’s motive—

that she was out to get him for refusing to help her—as the jury saw fit.13

Allison’s testimony concerning his views regarding what motives 

Blaire would have had to harm him and his career was also helpful to the 

jury since Allison’s opinion is nothing more than a shorthand rendition 

of the defense’s theme that began with opening statement—that Blaire 

“concocted a scheme” to “destroy [Allison’s] career” and “to get herself out 

of trouble.”14 We conclude the trial court had the discretion to admit the 

opinion Allison formed about why Blaire might have wanted to concoct a 

story to harm his career. Allison’s first issue is overruled. 

13See id. 14Id.
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Jury Argument

Next, Allison complains that in closing argument, the trial court 

erred by allowing the prosecutor to argue that he was fired by Jefferson 

County with no explanation when he first worked as a correctional officer 

at the Facility, which was in 2015. 

During the trial, Allison testified he worked at the Facility as a 

correctional officer between February and December 2015. Allison 

testified he left the job in December when he “was forced to resign.” In 

closing argument, Allison’s attorney objected to the prosecutor’s 

argument that Allison was fired with no explanation on the grounds that 

the argument was “well outside the record.” The trial court overruled the 

objection, and it instructed the jury “to recall the evidence and remember 

to stay within the confines of the evidence during your deliberations.” 

We review rulings on objections to improper jury arguments for 

abuse of discretion.15 Generally, proper closing arguments fit into one of 

the following four categories: (1) summation of the evidence, (2) 

15Milton v. State, 527 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
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reasonable deductions from the evidence, (3) answers to an argument of 

opposing counsel, and (4) pleas for law enforcement.16

According to the State, the argument the prosecutor made was 

permissible because it falls into the second category, a reasonable 

deduction from the evidence admitted in the trial. The State concludes 

the argument about Allison being fired without explanation was a 

reasonable deduction from Allison’s testimony stating he was forced to 

resign.

Under Texas law, prosecutors are allowed wide latitude to draw 

inferences from the evidence and their arguments based on the evidence 

offered in good faith.17 Assuming those conditions are met, juries may 

choose to accept or reject the inferences a prosecutor has drawn from the 

evidence based on the prosecutor’s closing argument.18

It’s undisputed the jury heard Allison testify that while working as 

a correctional officer at the Facility, he was forced to resign. Allison also 

testified nobody ever told him why he was being forced to resign, and 

when he asked questions, they wouldn’t answer. So given the evidence 

16Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

17See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

18Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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before the jury and considering it from the trial court’s standpoint,it was 

within the trial court’s discretion whether to allow the argument Allison 

complains about since the inference that Allison was fired with no 

explanation is arguably reasonable. 

Even though Allison doesn’t say so, his brief implies the prosecutor 

used the term “fired” as the equivalent of meaning “fired for cause.” But 

we don’t agree that’s necessarily what the term means. In the 

employment context, fired just means “discharge from employ or 

service.”19 To be sure, an employee’s formal termination with it was a 

termination for cause may have consequences that are severe in other 

contexts like whether an employee may obtain unemployment 

compensation, but the term fired does not always mean fired for cause. 

As commonlyused, there’sno practical distinction between an employee’s 

being fired and being forced to resign—in both cases, the employee is 

discharged from the employer’s employ or service. Moreover, the 

prosecutor never claimed that Allison was fired because he had any 

inappropriate sexual contacts with any inmates in 2015. 

19 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 854 (2002).
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And to prevent the jury from considering any evidence that had not 

been admitted in the trial, the trial court instructed “the jury to recall 

the evidence and remember to stay within the confines of the evidence 

during your deliberations” immediately after overruling the attorney’s 

objection. Thus, the trial court reminded the jury not to go outside the 

record when the prosecutor presented the argument that Allison 

complains about in his appeal, and there was no evidence before the jury 

that in 2015 Allison was fired for cause.

We conclude no abuse of discretion occurred since the trial court’s 

ruling falls in the zone of reasonable disagreement. Issue two is 

overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled both of Allison’s issues, the trial court’s judgment

is

AFFIRMED.

_________________________

HOLLIS HORTON

Justice

Submitted on November 21, 2022

Opinion DeliveredFebruary 22, 2023

Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.