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15-P-1554 Appeals Court

THE HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP, INC. vs. RAW SEAFOODS, INC.

No. 15-P-1554.

Suffolk. September 16, 2016. - April 26, 2017.

Present: Agnes, Neyman, & Henry, JJ.

Insurance, General liability insurance, Coverage. Words, 

"Occurrence."

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

September 21, 2012.

The case was heard by Christine M. Roach, J., on motions 

for summary judgment.

Michael J. Daly (Samuel P. Blatchley also present) for the 

defendant.

Jeffrey E. Dolan (Anthony M. Campo also present) for the 

plaintiff.

NEYMAN, J. In this case we analyze whether damage to 

scallops at a seafood processing facility, where the precise 

cause of damage is unknown, constituted an "occurrence" within 

the meaning of a commercial general liability (CGL) policy. A 

Superior Court judge concluded that the defendant-insured, Raw 
2

Seafoods, Inc. (RSI), has no reasonable expectation of proving 

that its claimed loss was caused by an occurrence, and granted 

summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-insurer, Hanover

Insurance Group, Inc. RSI appeals therefrom. We reverse.

Background. 1. RSI and the damaged scallops. RSI is a 

seafood processing facility in Fall River. One of RSI's

customers, Atlantic Capes Fisheries, Inc. (Atlantic), sells 

scallops and other types of seafood around the world. Atlantic 

purchases fresh scallops from fishing vessels, then transports 

the scallops to RSI for processing, portioning, packaging, and 

freezing. RSI's staff inspects the scallops for quality upon 

arrival, reports the results to Atlantic, and receives 

processing instructions from Atlantic. After processing, the 

scallops are transported to Arctic Cold Storage (Arctic), a 

third-party cold storage facility. Atlantic then ships its 

customers' orders directly from Arctic's facility. RSI handles 

approximately 4 million to 6 million pounds of scallops for 

Atlantic per year.

In July, 2011, RSI-processed scallops were making their way 

through customs in Denmark, heading to an Atlantic customer. 

Upon inspection, the 37,102 pounds of scallops were found to be 

decomposed, exhibited a strong ammonia smell, and were deemed 

unacceptable for human consumption. By all accounts, something 
3

was rotten in the state of Denmark.1 The United States Food and 

Drug Administration tested the scallops and confirmed that they 

were spoiled. The scallops were then returned to Arctic's 

facility, where representatives from Atlantic and RSI jointly 

inspected the shipment and confirmed the damage. They also 

inspected another batch of scallops, processed by RSI for 

Atlantic around the same time as the rejected batch, and 

discovered approximately 20,000 additional pounds of damaged 

product.

2. The underlying litigation. In 2012, Atlantic brought 

an action against RSI in the United States District Court for 

the District of Massachusetts (the "underlying litigation"), 

which included a count for negligence for the damage to the 

scallops. At that time, Hanover insured RSI pursuant to a CGL

policy (policy), and agreed to defend RSI in the underlying 

litigation (with counsel selected by RSI), while reserving its 

right to deny coverage under the policy.

During discovery in the underlying litigation, RSI's 

president, Jason Hutchens, acknowledged that the scallops were 

delivered to RSI in good condition, but that "somewhere in 

[RSI's] system, the product got messed up." It is undisputed 

that the damage occurred while the scallops were in RSI's 

possession, but the precise cause of the damage at RSI's 

 

1 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act I, scene 4.
4

facility remains unknown. Hutchens stated that "we've never 

seen anything like this before . . . we beat our heads against 

the wall for, it seemed like months, trying to figure this out. 

We've never seen anything like it and haven't seen anything 

after this problem. But we can't put our hands around it, how 

it happened and why it happened -- we don't know." Nonetheless, 

he agreed that, to his understanding, "[t]he damage occurred in 

[RSI's] custody" and "was the result of some, as yet, unknown 

failure on the part of [RSI's] processing people or handling 

people within [RSI's] plant." He further agreed that the damage 

to the scallops could have occurred because someone failed to 

"maintain temperatures carefully enough." Atlantic's chief 

operating officer, Jeffrey Bolton, agreed with Hutchens's 

statements and added that his "assumption is that somewhere 

along the line during the process of the scallops that 

[Atlantic] shipped to [RSI], there was temperature abuse, and 

that's why they were deemed decomposed."

Atlantic moved for summary judgment in the underlying 

litigation under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, arguing that

it was undisputed that Atlantic had delivered the scallops to 

RSI in good condition; RSI had exclusive control over the 

scallops until they were delivered to Arctic in a frozen state; 

the scallops were not damaged after they were delivered to 

Arctic; although the precise cause of the damage was unknown, 
5

RSI accepted responsibility for damaging the scallops; and the 

damage could only have been caused by RSI's negligent handling 

of the product. Atlantic further contended that while it could 

not conclusively establish precisely where in RSI's handling the 

scallops were damaged, the most likely cause was "temperature 

abuse" caused by "RSI's personnel's failure to monitor the 

temperature in some vats of scallops." A Federal District Court 

judge granted Atlantic's motion for summary judgment "for the 

reasons stated therein," and issued a judgment against RSI and 

in favor of Atlantic in the amount of $599,790.08 with 

postjudgment interest.

3. The policy. At all relevant times Hanover insured RSI. 

RSI's policy with Hanover provides in relevant part that Hanover 

"will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 

to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property 

damage' to which this insurance applies." By its terms, the 

policy applies to "property damage" that is caused by an 

"occurrence." The policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, 

including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 

same general harmful conditions." The policy also contains 

several exclusions limiting the application of the policy, as 

well as a "special broadening endorsement."2 However, where the 

 

2 The special broadening endorsement modifies insurance 

coverage and the scope of certain exclusions in the policy.
6

judge decided the motion for summary judgment solely on her 

determination that RSI could not show that there was an

occurrence within the meaning of the policy, we need not delve 

into these additional provisions here.

4. The present action. During the pendency of the 

underlying litigation, Hanover filed the present action in the 

Superior Court. Hanover sought a declaratory judgment that

either the damage to the scallops was not caused by an 

"occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, or the damage to 

the scallops fell under one or more exclusions to the policy, 

such that Hanover had no duty to indemnify RSI for any judgment 

in the underlying litigation. RSI filed an answer and asserted 

counterclaims for breach of contract and violations of G. L. 

cc. 93A and 176D. The Superior Court allowed RSI's motion to 

stay discovery in the present action, which Hanover opposed, 

pending resolution of the underlying litigation. After judgment 

entered against RSI in the underlying litigation, a Superior 

Court judge further stayed discovery and the parties filed cross

motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of coverage. 

A different Superior Court judge held a hearing on the cross

motions and granted summary judgment in favor of Hanover. In a 

comprehensive decision, the judge concluded that "because there 

was no demonstrated accident distinct from [RSI's] performance 

of its work," RSI could not meet its burden of proving that its 
7

claimed loss was caused by an "occurrence," as a matter of law. 

The judge also dismissed RSI's counterclaims as moot. RSI

timely appealed.

Discussion. 1. Legal standards. a. Summary judgment. 

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no issues of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 

(2002). We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. 

See Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012). 

"[W]here both parties have moved for summary judgment, the 

evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

against whom judgment has entered." Ibid. (citations and 

quotations omitted). "A party seeking summary judgment may 

satisfy its burden of demonstrating the absence of triable 

issues by showing that the party opposing the motion has no 

reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of its 

case." Ibid. (citations omitted).

b. Insurance contract interpretation. Questions 

concerning the interpretation of an insurance contract are 

questions of law. Fuller v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 448 Mass. 1, 5 

(2006). Pacific Indem. Co. v. Lampro, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 60, 65 

(2014). RSI, as the insured, bears the burden of proving its 

claim falls within the scope of coverage provided by the policy. 

Boazova, supra at 351. Thus, to survive summary judgment, RSI 
8

must demonstrate that it has a reasonable expectation of proving 

that the claimed loss was caused by an "occurrence," which, as 

discussed above, is defined in the policy as an "accident."

Under Massachusetts law, an "accident" is commonly defined 

as "an unexpected happening without intention or design." 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 407 Mass. 354, 358 (1990), 

quoting from Beacon Textiles Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. 

Co., 355 Mass. 643, 646 (1969). See also Pacific Indem. Co., 

supra (accident implies fortuitous or unexpected event). 

Massachusetts courts broadly construe the term "accident" in an 

insurance policy. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 393 

Mass. 81, 83 (1984). See also Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 

Co., 348 Mass. 427, 432-433 (1965) ("The breadth of 

interpretation given to the term 'accident' by Massachusetts 

cases makes it unnecessary to deal with Federal cases and cases 

from other jurisdictions cited by [the insurer]").

2. Analysis. a. Occurrence. With these guiding 

principles in mind, we turn to the question whether the damage 

to the scallops was caused by an "occurrence" under the policy. 

The parties agree that the cause of the damage "was the result 

of some, as yet, unknown failure on the part of [RSI's] 

processing people or handling people within [RSI's] plant." The 

consensus ends there.
9

RSI contends that the record demonstrates that it has a 

reasonable expectation of proving an occurrence; i.e., that RSI

did not specifically intend to destroy the scallops and that it 

was an accident rather than an anticipated event. As noted 

above, such an event had never occurred before and has not 

occurred since. RSI grounds its argument on (1) the finding of 

negligence in the underlying litigation, and (2) the decision in 

the Beacon Textiles case, in which damage to a product caused by 

an unexplained defect was held to constitute an accident.

Hanover counters that RSI has produced no evidence as to 

precisely how the scallops were damaged, leaving the actual 

cause of the damage to speculation and conjecture. Therefore, 

RSI has no reasonable expectation of proving that the damage was 

caused by an occurrence and cannot survive a motion for summary 

judgment. See, e.g., Brooks v. Peabody & Arnold, LLP, 71 Mass. 

App. Ct. 46, 56 (2008). Hanover further argues that even 

assuming RSI could prove that the damage was caused by some 

mishandling of the scallops on RSI's part, RSI has no reasonable 

expectation of proving that the scallops were damaged by a 

fortuitous event, and not by a "normal, foreseeable, and 

expected incident of doing business." Pacific Indem. Co., 86 

Mass. App. Ct. at 65.

We conclude that Massachusetts law favors RSI's position. 

While the precise cause or mechanics of the damage to the 
10

scallops is unknown, the summary judgment record supports the 

conclusion that the damage resulted from an unanticipated mishap 

during RSI's processing operation. Atlantic is a consistent RSI

customer for whom RSI handles approximately 4 million to 6

million pounds of scallops for Atlantic per year. In the nearly 

seventeen years RSI had been in business, it has "never seen 

anything like this before . . . and [had not] seen anything 

after this problem." In other words, viewed in the light most 

favorable to RSI, the damage resulted from an accident, and not 

from a routine consequence of RSI's work.

Hanover maintains that even assuming that the damage 

resulting from RSI's mishandling of the scallops was atypical or 

even anomalous, absent evidence to the contrary RSI can only 

speculate that the damage stemmed from unintended conduct.

Therefore, Hanover posits, RSI still cannot sustain its burden 

of proving that the scallops were damaged by an accident, rather 

than by intentional conduct or a "normal, foreseeable, and 

expected incident of doing business." Pacific Indem. Co., 

supra.

3 Hanover's argument ignores that the underlying 

 

3 The summary judgment record is devoid of any evidence or 

claim that fraud, collusion, or subterfuge played any role in 

causing the damage. Hanover does not argue to the contrary. 

Compare Vappi & Co., 348 Mass. at 432 ("Unintended or unforeseen 

circumstances of reckless or negligent acts, and even of 

intentional acts, at least if not undertaken 'with malice or 

intent to injure' the person or property hurt . . . may be 

within the definition of 'accident'").
11

litigation by Atlantic against RSI went to judgment on a claim 

of negligence. Although the precise cause and mechanism of 

damage was not established, Atlantic prevailed in the underlying 

litigation on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. Cases on res ipsa 

loquitur are clear that the doctrine is simply a way of 

establishing negligence. See Edwards v. Boland, 41 Mass. App. 

Ct. 375, 377-378 (1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 328D(1)(a) (1965). We have found no Massachusetts precedent 

for the proposition that a determination of negligence through 

the application of res ipsa loquitur is treated any differently 

from any other determination of negligence.

Hanover responds that the judgment in the underlying 

litigation contains no findings delineating how the scallops 

were specifically damaged, and thus negligence and fortuity were

not demonstrated. Contrary to Hanover's claim, the court in the 

underlying litigation granted Atlantic's motion for summary 

judgment "for the reasons stated therein" and in doing so,

necessarily held, on the undisputed facts, that the only 

explanation for the damage to the scallops was RSI's negligent 

handling of the product.

4 Because the basis for RSI's liability 

 

4 Atlantic and RSI were in agreement as to the facts in the 

underlying litigation and the conclusion that the damage was 

consistent with mishandling of scallops. Although the parties

could not conclusively establish precisely where in RSI's 

handling the scallops were damaged, Atlantic's chief operating 

officer testified that the most likely cause was "temperature 
12

-- negligence under a res ipsa loquitur theory -- was 

established in an underlying case that went to judgment, the 

insurer, Hanover, is bound by that ground.5 The insurer cannot 

relitigate factual issues decided in the underlying case. This 

has long been the rule in Massachusetts.6 We further note that 

there is no indication in the record that Hanover sought to 

 

abuse caused by RSI's personnel's failure to monitor the 

temperature in some vats of scallops, resulting in spoilage that 

went undetected prior to the product being frozen. Failure to 

manually ice the vats is likely the precise cause of the 

damage."

5 Hanover's claim that all other causes of damage were not 

explicitly ruled out also misses the mark. See Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 328D (1965) comment f ("plaintiff is not 

required to exclude all other possible conclusions beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and it is enough that he makes out a case from 

which the jury may reasonably conclude that the negligence was, 

more probably than not, that of the defendant").

6 In Miller v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 291 Mass. 

445, 448-449 (1935), the Supreme Judicial Court held that 

"[w]here an action against the insured is ostensibly within the 

terms of the policy, the insurer, whether it assumes the defence 

or refuses to assume it, is bound by the result of that action 

as to all matters therein decided which are material to recovery 

by the insured in an action on the policy. . . . This case is 

but one instance under a rule of broad application that an 

indemnitor, after notice and an opportunity to defend, is bound 

by material facts established in an action against the 

indemnitee." See also Jertson v. Hartley, 342 Mass. 597, 602-

603 (1961) (following rule in Miller); Blais v. Quincy Mut. Fire 

Ins. Co., 361 Mass. 68, 70-71 (1972) ("In the absence of fraud 

or collusion the insurer would be bound by a judgment entered by 

default. A judgment by consent stands no worse"); Polaroid 

Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 414 Mass. 747, 763 n.20 (1993), 

citing Miller, supra at 448-449 ("If an underlying case went to 

judgment, the insurer would be bound by the result of the trial, 

as to all material matters decided in that action that bear on 

the coverage issue").
13

intervene in the underlying litigation. See, e.g., Newton v. 

Krasnigor, 404 Mass. 682, 683 (1989); Liquor Liability Joint 

Underwriting Assn. v. Hermitage Ins. Co., 419 Mass. 316, 323-324

(1995).

Additionally, the judgment on Atlantic's negligence claims 

in the underlying litigation precludes a subsequent 

determination of intentional conduct by RSI in the present case. 

Intentional and negligent conduct are mutually exclusive. 

Miller v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 447 

(1935) ("[N]egligence and wilful and wanton conduct are so 

different in kind that words properly descriptive of the one 

commonly exclude the other"); Sabatinelli v. Butler, 363 Mass. 

565, 567 (1973) ("Under the law of the Commonwealth, the 

difference between intentional and negligent conduct is a 

difference in kind and not in degree. If conduct is negligent 

it cannot also be intentional"); Waters v. Blackshear, 412 Mass. 

589, 590 (1992) ("intentional conduct cannot be negligent 

conduct and . . . negligent conduct cannot be intentional 

conduct"); Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 

460 Mass. 352, 361 (2011) (finding of negligence is inconsistent 

with finding of intentional and criminal act).

The Beacon Textiles decision further bolsters RSI's 

position. There, an insured sustained loss caused by yarn which 

changed color after the yarn was used in a customer's sweaters. 
14

The evidence showed that the yarn was defective in the insured's 

possession before it was delivered to the customer. Beacon 

Textiles Corp., 355 Mass. at 645. The insured had been in 

business as a seller of yarn for over thirty years and 

discoloring of its yarn had never before occurred. Ibid. The 

cause of the defect remained unknown. The Supreme Judicial 

Court concluded that "[s]ome ingredient or ingredients of the 

dyed yarn acted or failed to act at some point in time contrary 

to the intention and expectation of the person who put them 

together," and held that "a change of color in yarn due to a 

latent unexplained defect is an accident." Ibid. In making 

this determination, the court relied on the rule that "[t]he 

term 'accident' is to be broadly construed in a policy insuring 

against damage by accident." Ibid.

Hanover attempts to distinguish the Beacon Textiles

decision on several grounds. First, Hanover claims that the 

term "occurrence" does not appear in that case and the court was 

interpreting a different policy provision prior to decades of 

jurisprudence interpreting the meaning of "occurrence." We 

disagree. The court in the Beacon Textiles case interpreted the 

meaning of the term "accident" in an insurance policy which 

obligated the insurer "[t]o pay on behalf of the insured all 

sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 

damages because of injury to or destruction of property, 
15

including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident." Ibid. 

In the present case, "occurrence" is defined by Hanover as an 

"accident." The alleged distinction is unpersuasive. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court has never overruled or 

limited the application of the Beacon Textiles decision. To the 

contrary, the case has been cited approvingly by Massachusetts 

courts. See, e.g., Quincy Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 393 Mass. at 

83; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 407 Mass. at 358; Powell v. Fireman's 

Fund Ins. Cos., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 508, 515 (1988); Preferred 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gamache, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 197 (1997). 

See also Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Pajam Fishing Corp., 691 F. 

Supp. 2d 260, 265 (D. Mass. 2010).

Next, Hanover alleges that in the Beacon Textiles case, the 

defendant insurer identified an expert who was able to attribute 

damage to a defect that preexisted the transmission of the yarn 

to the end user. Thus, the damage in that case was not 

completely unexplained. Contrary to this interpretation, the 

court in the Beacon Textiles decision merely states that an 

expert concluded that the yarn was defective in the insured's 

hands before it was delivered to the customer. Beacon Textiles 

Corp., 355 Mass. at 645. There was no indication that the 

expert narrowed or defined any specific cause of the damage to 

the yarn. Likewise, in the present case, all parties agreed 

that the scallops were damaged in the insured's hands before 
16

they were delivered to the customer. The claimed distinction 

raised by Hanover is inapposite.

Hanover also argues that the Beacon Textiles case involved 

an insured that was accused only of selling defective yarn, and 

did not involve a claim where a product was allegedly damaged 

during the performance of the insured's work. The purported 

distinction misses the key point that, in both instances, the 

damage or defect stemmed from an unknown cause and occurred 

while the insured was in control of the product (i.e., the yarn 

and the scallops). In neither case could the parties determine 

with certainty the specific cause of the damage.

Finally, Hanover contends that the present case is 

controlled by Pacific Indem. Co., 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 66, and 

that a finding that the damage to the scallops was caused by an 

occurrence is foreclosed under this precedent. This argument is 

also unpersuasive. In that case, the insured was hired to cut 

down trees. Indeed, it cut down more trees than directed, 

failed to follow restrictions in cutting brush and trees, and 

"exceeded the scope of the [relevant] permits." Ibid. Cutting 

down trees was part and parcel of the insured's ordinary work 

process. Furthermore, the insured intended to engage in the 

"clear-cutting" at issue.

In the present case, by contrast, damaging scallops was not 

part of the ordinary work process, and, as evidenced by the 
17

finding of negligence in the underlying litigation, RSI did not 

intend to cause the resulting harm.

7 Moreover, the evidence in 

the summary judgment record in the underlying litigation 

supports the conclusion that the destruction of the scallops was 

the result of an accident. RSI has been processing scallops 

using the same method for the greater part of seventeen years. 

Whatever caused the harm to the scallops had never occurred 

before and has not occurred since. Furthermore, Atlantic did 

 

7 Hanover also argues that RSI's argument is contrary to 

Friel Luxury Home Constr., Inc. vs. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. 

Co. RRG, No. 09-CV-11036-DPW (D. Mass. 2009). That case, which 

is not binding on this court, is readily distinguishable. 

There, the insured-builder was sued (via counterclaim) in the 

underlying case for the cost of repairing numerous deficiencies 

in a home it had negligently constructed. The defects were 

characterized as being the result of the builder's "faulty 

workmanship." Id. at 3. The counterclaim alleged that the 

builder had "failed to perform work consistent with even minimum 

industry standards and also materially misrepresented aspects of 

the nature and the cost of the work." Id. at 1. For example, 

the plumbing was incorrectly installed, the roofing work was 

"shoddy," the ceilings were not level, certain walls were 

bulging, and the stairs were not adequately supported in 

accordance with the building code. Ibid. The builder argued 

that the defects "must" have been accidental because it did not 

specifically intend to cause the homeowner's harm, nor was it 

substantially certain that such harm would occur. Id. at 5. 

The court rejected this argument and noted that under 

Massachusetts law, faulty workmanship generally fails to 

constitute an accidental occurrence in a commercial liability 

policy because "a failure of workmanship does not involve the 

fortuity required to constitute an accident." Ibid. The court 

opined that in these circumstances, none of the numerous alleged 

defects in the builder's work were "reasonably susceptible" of 

an interpretation that they were accidental, and concluded that 

there was no "occurrence" resulting in property damage within 

the meaning of the policy. Ibid. Thus, the insurer had no duty 

to defend the builder in the underlying case.
18

not sue RSI to have the defective processing redone, but rather

for the value of the damaged property. Contrast Friel Luxury 

Home Constr., Inc. vs. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co. RRG, No. 

09-CV-11036-DPW (D. Mass. 2009) (homeowners sued builder for 

cost of hiring someone else to redo builder's defective work). 

This case is about protecting RSI from liability for the damage 

it negligently caused to the property of a third party, 

Atlantic. It is not about reimbursing RSI for the cost to 

reprocess the scallops or, in essence, redoing its own defective 

work. See Oxford Aviation, Inc. v. Global Aerospace, Inc., 680 

F.3d 85, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2012).

In short, the present case is controlled by the reasoning 

in the Beacon Textiles decision, and Hanover's efforts to 

distinguish that case are unconvincing.8 This precedent,

combined with the finding of negligence in the underlying 

litigation and the broad construction of the term "occurrence" 

in a CGL policy, compels us to conclude that RSI has a 

reasonable expectation of proving that the unexplained damage 

was caused by an occurrence. See Vappi & Co., 348 Mass. at 432 

("This court will be slow to adopt any narrow construction of 

 

8 Were we to accept Hanover's argument, an insured would 

never have a reasonable expectation of proving that damage was 

caused by an occurrence if it could not specify the precise 

cause of such damage. We think that such a blanket rule would 

undermine the broad construction of CGL policies required by our 

precedent, and unfairly limit coverage. See Quincy Mutual Fire 

Ins. Co., 393 Mass. at 83.
19

the term 'accident' which will limit or defeat any coverage 

fairly intended to be given by a policy described by the insurer 

in such broad terms . . . "). Thus, the judge erred in allowing 

Hanover's motion for summary judgment.

b. Exclusions. Because the judge concluded that RSI did 

not meet its initial burden of proving that its claimed loss was 

caused by an occurrence, she did not analyze the applicability 

of any exclusions or the special broadening endorsement. RSI 

contends that we need not remand the matter for determination as 

to the applicability of the exclusions. Although the 

determination thereof is a question of law, we conclude that a 

remand is appropriate in this case. See, e.g., Middleborough v. 

Middleborough Gas & Elec. Dept., 422 Mass. 583, 588 (1996); 

Szymanski v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 

382 (2002). Hanover did not argue the applicability of the 

exclusions in its opposition and cross motion for summary 

judgment or in its appellate brief. Nonetheless, we disagree 

with RSI's assertion that Hanover waived its arguments regarding 

the exclusions.9

c. Duty to defend and RSI's counterclaims. The judge

granted summary judgment in Hanover's favor, and further ordered 

 

9 The record reflects some confusion between the parties and 

the judge as to what specific issues were to be briefed in the 

partial motions for summary judgment. The record supports 

Hanover's position that it did not waive the right to address 

the applicability of the relevant exclusions.
20

that "the remaining claims and counterclaims of the parties are 

DISMISSED with prejudice, as moot." Where we hold that summary 

judgment should not have entered for Hanover, we vacate the 

judgment entered by the Superior Court, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion regarding (1) the 

applicability of the exclusions, (2) Hanover's duty to defend,10

and (3) RSI's counterclaims for breach of contract and 

violations of G. L. cc. 93A and 176D.

11

So ordered.

 

10 Hanover defended RSI in the underlying litigation 

pursuant to a reservation of rights with counsel selected by 

RSI. However, RSI contends that Hanover did not pay all of the 

legal bills and expenses incurred therein.

11 Hanover explicitly sought to conduct discovery in the 

Superior Court prior to the filing of the cross motions for 

summary judgment. A Superior Court judge rejected Hanover's 

request and stayed all discovery pending the motions for partial 

summary judgment on the question of coverage. Hanover continues 

to seek discovery regarding the applicability of the exclusions. 

Whether and to what extent discovery will be allowed as to all 

issues in the case going forward, including the timing and scope 

thereof, is left to the discretion of the judge of the Superior 

Court.