6278 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 28 / Tuesday, February 11, 1997 / Notices

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day

of February 1997.

Ronald W. Hernan,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

II–3, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–3321 Filed 2–10–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket 70–7002]

Notice of Amendment to Certificate of

Compliance GDP–2 for the U.S.

Enrichment Corporation, Portsmouth

Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Portsmouth,

OH

The Director, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, has

made a determination that the following

amendment request is not significant in

accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In

making that determination, the staff

concluded that: (1) There is no change

in the types or significant increase in

the amounts of any effluents that may be

released offsite; (2) there is no

significant increase in individual or

cumulative occupational radiation

exposure; (3) there is no significant

construction impact; (4) there is no

significant increase in the potential for,

or radiological or chemical

consequences from, previously analyzed

accidents; (5) the proposed changes do

not result in the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident; (6) there is no

significant reduction in any margin of

safety; and (7) the proposed changes

will not result in an overall decrease in

the effectiveness of the plant’s safety,

safeguards, or security programs. The

basis for this determination for the

amendment request is described below.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

certificate amendment application and

concluded that it provides reasonable

assurance of adequate safety, safeguards,

and security and compliance with NRC

requirements. Therefore, the Director,

Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards, is prepared to

issue an amendment to the Certificate of

Compliance for the Portsmouth Gaseous

Diffusion Plant (PORTS). The staff has

prepared a Compliance Evaluation

Report which provides details of the

staff’s evaluation.

The NRC staff has determined that

this amendment satisfies the criteria for

a categorical exclusion in accordance

with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental

impact statement or environmental

assessment need be prepared for this

amendment.

USEC or any person whose interest

may be affected may file a petition, not

exceeding 30 pages, requesting review

of the Director’s Decision. The petition

must be filed with the Commission not

later than 15 days after publication of

this Federal Register Notice. A petition

for review of the Director’s Decision

shall set forth with particularity the

interest of the petitioner and how that

interest may be affected by the results of

the decision. The petition should

specifically explain the reasons why

review of the Decision should be

permitted with particular reference to

the following factors: (1) The interest of

the petitioner; (2) how that interest may

be affected by the Decision, including

the reasons why the petitioner should

be permitted a review of the Decision;

and (3) the petitioner’s areas of concern

about the activity that is the subject

matter of the Decision. Any person

described in this paragraph (USEC or

any person who filed a petition) may

file a response to any petition for

review, not to exceed 30 pages, within

10 days after filing of the petition. If no

petition is received within the

designated 15-day period, the Director

will issue the final amendment to the

Certificate of Compliance without

further delay. If a petition for review is

received, the decision on the

amendment application will become

final in 60 days, unless the Commission

grants the petition for review or

otherwise acts within 60 days after

publication of this Federal Register

Notice.

A petition for review must be filed

with the Secretary of the Commission,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Docketing and Services Branch, or may

be delivered to the Commission’s Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, by

the above date.

For further details with respect to the

action see: (1) The application for

amendment and (2) the Commission’s

Compliance Evaluation Report. These

items are available for public inspection

at the Commission’s Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the

Local Public Document Room.

Date of amendment request:

November 8, 1996, as modified by USEC

responses dated December 13, 1996, and

January 16, 1997, to NRC requests for

additional information dated November

29, 1996, and December 31, 1996,

respectively.

Brief description of amendment: The

amendment changes the Technical

Safety Requirement (TSR) Standby

Operational Mode definition for the UF6

Withdrawal Stations by allowing the

compression loop vent path to the

cascade to be open. It should be noted

that venting of the Withdrawal Station

compression loop to the cascade is

routinely done at PORTS. However,

accounting for this procedure was

inadvertently left out of the Standby

Operational Mode definition by USEC

from its proposed TSRs which have

been approved by the NRC.

Basis for finding of no significance:

1. The proposed amendment will not

result in a change in the types or

significant increase in the amounts of

any effluents that may be released

offsite.

The proposed change to TSR 2.5.1

permits evacuating UF6 from the

compression loop in the UF6

withdrawal station to the cascade,

which acts as a low pressure sink, in the

Standby Operational Mode. This change

will not result in significantly

increasing the potential for

unconfinement of UF6 which could lead

to an increase in effluents that may be

released offsite since it only involves

venting of UF6 from one portion of

process piping, which confines UF6 in

the Withdrawal Station, to another

portion of process piping which

confines UF6 in the enrichment

cascade. Confinement of UF6 within the

cascade is primarily provided by

maintaining the cell high-side

(compressor discharge) gas pressure

below 25 psia (TSR 2.2.3.13) and by

applying appropriate quality assurance

requirements to process gas piping and

equipment (Safety Analysis Report

Section 3.8.2.2). Therefore, this TSR

amendment will not result in significant

amounts of effluents that may be

released offsite.

2. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant increase in

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure.

Evacuating UF6 from the compression

loop to the cascade in the Standby

Operational Mode will not significantly

impart additional occupational

radiation exposure. The cascade or the

withdrawal loops do not result in

significant occupational radiation

exposures. Some of the reasons being

that: (1) The occupancy factor is low, (2)

distance from the source is generally

high, (3) significant shielding is

provided by piping and equipment, (4)

depleted and low enriched uranium has

low specific activities and are also

comparatively low gamma radiation

emitters, (5) most of the uranium is in

gaseous form (low density), and (6) UF6

is confined within quality controlled

equipment and piping. Therefore, any

transfer of confined UF6 from the

withdrawal station to the cascade would

not measurably modify individual or
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 28 / Tuesday, February 11, 1997 / Notices 6279

cumulative occupational radiation

exposures.

3. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant construction

impact.

Since the proposed changes do not

involve any construction, therefore,

there will be no construction impacts.

4. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant increase in the

potential for, or radiological or chemical

consequences from, previously analyzed

accidents.

The proposed changes which involve

evacuating UF6 from the compression

loop to the cascade (low pressure sink)

in the Standby Operational Mode will

not result in a significant increase in the

potential for UF6 releases. In fact,

venting the compression loop to the

cascade may enhance safety by

minimizing the potential for overpressurization of the UF6 withdrawal

loop with subsequent confinement

rupture. To avoid enrichment losses,

UF6 is vented back to the A-suction of

a compressor in the cascade that has

UF6 of similar enrichment. All Asuction pressures in lines that would

receive the vented UF6 are

subatmospheric. Therefore, any

confinement failure would likely result

in inleakage as opposed to outleakage.

In addition, cascade units that would

receive vented UF6 would likely be

comprised of relatively smaller sized

equipment containing relatively smaller

quantities of UF6 since they would be

located near the top and at the bottom

of the cascade. Therefore, the proposed

change will not result in a significant

increase in the potential for UF6

releases.

Going from a closed compression loop

vent path to an open compression loop

vent path will not result in a significant

increase for, or radiological

consequences from, previously

evaluated criticality accidents. The

likelihood of an accidental criticality in

the cascade due to wet-air (moderator)

inleakage would not be increased

significantly for the following reasons:

a. This amendment involves a valve

that is internal to several valves even

when the pigtail is not attached to the

withdrawal manifold. These valves

would be in the closed position.

Therefore, several misvalving errors

would be required to permit significant

wet-air inleakage into the cascade

through the compression loop vent

valve.

b. To maintain the integrity of the

UF6 pressure boundary, USEC is

committed to applying appropriate

quality assurance requirements to

process gas piping and equipment

(including valves) with diameters of 2

inches or larger.

c. Formation of UO2F2 in the cascade

due to significant inleakage of wet-air

would result in compressor vibration

and would reduce barrier permeability

thus affecting cascade compressor

performance which would be observed

in the control rooms via motor load

indications. Changes in compressor Asuction pressures would also be

detected.

d. Introduction of wet-air into the

cascade would be detected on the line

recorders that continuously indicate

nitrogen and oxygen concentrations.

Based on the primary reasons

provided above, the proposed TSR

change will also not significantly raise

the probability or consequences of a

criticality accident.

5. The proposed amendment will not

result in the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident.

For similar reasons provided in the

assessment of criterion 4, evacuating

UF6 from the compression loop to the

cascade in the Standby Operational

Mode will not result in a new potential

accident involving UF6 releases or

criticality. In fact, venting the

compression loop to the cascade may

enhance safety by minimizing the

potential for over-pressurization of the

UF6 withdrawal loop with subsequent

confinement rupture.

6. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant reduction in any

margin of safety.

As discussed above, from a UF6

release accident standpoint, venting to

the cascade may enhance safety, and

from a criticality accident standpoint,

the safety impact is insignificant. This

procedure, which is routine operation at

PORTS, will not result in the violation

of any limiting condition of operation.

Therefore, the opening of the vent

pathway in the Standby Operational

Mode will not significantly reduce any

margin of safety.

7. The proposed amendment will not

result in an overall decrease in the

effectiveness of the plant’s safety,

safeguards, or security programs.

As discussed above, from a UF6

confinement standpoint venting to the

cascade may enhance the plant’s safety

program and from a criticality safety

program standpoint, the safety impact is

insignificant.

The staff has not identified any

safeguards or security related

implications from the proposed

amendment. Therefore, the opening of

the vent pathway in the Standby

Operational Mode will not result in an

overall decrease in the effectiveness of

the plant’s safety, safeguards, or security

programs.

Effective date: This amendment

becomes effective at 12:00 noon on the

day following the day issued.

Certificate of Compliance No. GDP–2:

Amendment will revise the Technical

Safety Requirements.

Local Public Document Room

location: Portsmouth Public Library,

1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio

45662.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day

of February 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Carl J. Paperiello,

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 97–3322 Filed 2–10–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket 70–7001]

Notice of Amendment to Certificate of

Compliance GDP–1 for the U.S.

Enrichment Corporation, Paducah

Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, KY

The Director, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, has

made a determination that the following

amendment request is not significant in

accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In

making that determination the staff

concluded that (1) there is no change in

the types or significant increase in the

amounts of any effluents that may be

released offsite; (2) there is no

significant increase in individual or

cumulative occupational radiation

exposure; (3) there is no significant

construction impact; (4) there is no

significant increase in the potential for,

or radiological or chemical

consequences from, previously analyzed

accidents; (5) the proposed changes do

not result in the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident; (6) there is no

significant reduction in any margin of

safety; and (7) the proposed changes

will not result in an overall decrease in

the effectiveness of the plant’s safety,

safeguards or security programs. The

basis for this determination for the

amendment request is shown below.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

certificate amendment application and

concluded that it provides reasonable

assurance of adequate safety, safeguards,

and security, and compliance with NRC

requirements. Therefore, the Director,

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards, is prepared to issue an

amendment to the Certificate of

Compliance for the Paducah Gaseous

Diffusion Plant. The staff has prepared

a Compliance Evaluation Report which

provides details of the staff’s evaluation.