J-A17011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM BRUNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 541 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 6, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008747-2017, 

CP-51-CR-0008748-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM BRUNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 542 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 6, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008747-2017, 

CP-51-CR-0008748-2017

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2023

William Brunson (Brunson) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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after a jury found him guilty of various sexual offenses committed against his 

grandsons. On appeal, he challenges the weight of the evidence. We affirm.

At the end of a two-day jury trial held in July 2021, Brunson was 

convicted of two counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI)

with a child, indecent assault of a person under 13 years old, endangering the 

welfare of a child and unlawful contact with a minor.1 The two victims were 

Brunson’s grandsons: S.N. (born 2013) and S.C.W. (born 2011). The mother 

of the two boys was Brunson’s daughter, Lucretia. Brunson committed the 

offenses while living with Lucretia and her children (and several other family 

members) in the home of the children’s great-aunt, Jaleecia. Because the

offenses were committed in June 2017, S.N. and S.C.W. would have been

three and six years old at the time of the offenses, respectively.

The trial summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:

S.N. testified that on one occasion several years earlier, 

when he was three or four, he was in Pop Pop’s bedroom, in the 

city and county of Philadelphia, watching a movie with his older 

brother S.C.W. and his Pop Pop, Defendant William Brunson. N.T. 

Trial 6/9/21, at 53-56. S.N. testified that while in the room, Pop 

Pop pulled down S.N.’s pants and Pop Pop put his penis in S.N.’s 

butt. Id. at 56. S.N. further stated that Pop Pop used his hand 

to physically cover S.N.’s mouth while Pop Pop put his penis in 

S.N.’s butt and that S.N. tried to scream but could not. Id. at 

103. S.N. testified that he was touched one time and that his Pop 

Pop never put his penis in S.N.’s mouth. Id. at 65, 74. S.N. 

testified that the incident ended when his uncle, Qaudir, came into 

the room, saw what was happening, helped both children and they 

ran and told their mom, Lucretia. Id. at 95-97.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), 4304(a)(1) and 6318(a)(1).
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S.C.W. testified to an occasion four years earlier at his Aunt 

Jaleecia's house, Jaleecia Wells, where he was called into his Pop 

Pop’s bedroom along with his brother S.N. Id. at 110-12. At the 

time, S.C.W. was six years old. Id. at 125. S.C.W. testified that 

in the room Pop Pop touched S.C.W.’s butt with his “D” [penis] 

and “that was it”. Id. at 118. Upon further examination, S.C.W. 

testified that Pop Pop’s “D” went around his butt, not inside. Id. 

at 120. S.C.W. further testified that Pop Pop then put his penis 

around S.N.’s butt. Id. at 121. S.C.W. explicitly stated multiple 

times that Pop Pop never put his penis in S.C.W.’s mouth or 

anywhere other than around his butt. Id. at 121-23. S.C.W. 

likewise testified to never observing Pop Pop put his penis in S.N.’s 

mouth or anywhere other than around his butt. Id. S.N. testified 

that he tried to escape but Pop Pop grabbed his arms and dragged 

him back into the room. Id. at 159-60. The incident ended when 

S.N. ran out of the room for help and told his mother. Id. at 152.

Jeffery Daly of the Philadelphia Police, Special Victims Unit 

testified that on June 24, 2017, he was assigned to investigate the 

alleged assault of S.N. and S.C.W., by their grandfather, William 

Brunson. Id. at 167-68. In that capacity, he interviewed Lucretia, 

the mother of the children. Id. He testified that she was the only 

individual he interviewed and that he did not attempt to obtain 

any evidence because the disclosure occurred four days after the 

alleged assault. Id. at 171-72.

Baron Martin, Social Worker for Philadelphia Department of 

Human Services, testified that he was assigned to an allegation of 

child abuse at 123 West Ashmead Street in June of 2017. Id. at 

196-200. As part of his investigation, he went out to that address 

on June 25, 2017, where he met with Lucretia, the mother of the 

children. Id. at 201. Mr. Martin testified he observed Lucretia to 

be frantic. Id. Lucretia explained to Mr. Martin that William 

Brunson had sexually assaulted the children while she ran out to 

the deli. Id. at 202. Mr. Martin explained that his visit to the 

home was unannounced and that he was not able to speak with 

the children. Id. at 205. Furthermore, the children had not been 

taken to a hospital for medical examination. Id. at 207. Upon 

cross examination, Mr. Martin stated that while he attempted to 

interview Lucretia regarding the allegations, she was not able to 

specifically answer how the boys had been assaulted; rather, “she 

said, I quote ‘he did it.’” Id.
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Lucretia testified that in June of 2017 she was living with 

her aunt at 123 Ashmead with her two sons, S.C.W. and S.N. N.T. 

Trial, 6/10/21 at 3-6. Lucretia testified that around June 24th she 

was scrolling through social media when S.N. told her that Pop 

Pop, whom she identified as her father William Brunson, had 

shown him pictures with girls in ripped panties, like the pictures 

Lucretia was looking at. Id. at 16. She stated at first she was 

not concerned but later decided to follow-up on her son’s 

statement. Id. at 15. She stated that S.N. told her that Pop Pop 

was “humping on him.” Id. at 16. She stated that upon hearing 

this, she went and confronted S.C.W. who also said Pop Pop had 

been “humping on him” and stated that “it did not go in because 

it hurted.” Id. at 17-18. Lucretia further testified that she and 

her aunt then examined the children’s privates and noticed that 

S.C.W.’s rectum was red. Id. at 19-20.

Lucretia further testified that she had left her sons in the 

care of William Brunson on June 21, 2017, for a couple of hours 

while she went to the laundromat. Id. at 87. She stated when 

she left the house it was the afternoon and her sons as well as 

some of the other children in the home were running around and 

playing. Id. at 88. She stated when she returned the house 

seemed normal, just messier from the playing, and that no one 

complained about any inappropriate touching. Id. at 87-92. 

Lucretia further stated that on the morning of June 24th, the day 

her children disclosed, she had previously gotten into an argument 

with Mr. Brunson for an unrecalled reason and had kicked him out 

of the home. Id. at 48, 94.

Christian Dozier, forensic interviewer for Philadelphia 

Children’s Alliance testified to conducting a forensic interview of 

S.N. and S.C.W. on July 12, 2017. Id. at 125-126. Ms. Dozier 

testified to noting S.N.’s inability to explain what happens when 

people lie and what would happen if someone lied to his mother. 

Id. at 131. Ms. Dozier further testified that she was not concerned 

with the three-week delay between disclosure and interview, 

although she acknowledged the importance of interviewing 

children as close to disclosure as possible. Id. at 143-45. 

Additionally, S.N. testified that he spoke with his mother after Pop 

Pop was arrested and his mother told him what to say and how to 

say it. Id. at 99.

The Commonwealth presented a video-taped interview of 

S.N. conducted at Philadelphia Children’s Alliance on July 12, 
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2017. In the video, S.N. stated that Will [Defendant] pulled his 

pants down and put his dick in his and S.C.W.’s butt cheeks. He 

stated that Will put his dick on the floor and asked to be his 

boyfriend. At first, S.N. stated that nothing happened with his 

mouth but later in the interview said that Will put his dick in both 

his mouth and his brother’s. S.N. stated that his brothers, Zadeek 

and Quadir were present. S.N. further stated that he was shown 

naked pictures and that Tayone[, an older family member,] was 

in them. S.N. described Will as a bitch and as gay but was not 

able to answer what it means to be gay.

The Commonwealth presented a video interview of S.C.W.

conducted at Philadelphia Children’s Alliance on July 12, 2017. 

S.C.W. stated that Pop Pop showed him naked pictures, put his 

“D” in his mouth, and humped on him. S.C.W. stated that his dick 

went on the outside of his butthole and it felt sloppy and hairy. 

S.C.W. stated that he threw up after Will put his penis in his mouth 

and made a gagging gesture. He further stated that it happened 

on more than one day and on days when Pop Pop got smart with 

his mom.

Jaleecia Wells testified that in June of 2017 her niece, 

Lucretia, awoke her crying that William Brunson had touched her 

children, S.N. and S.C.W. Id. at 161-62. She testified that she 

asked to check the kids but S.C.W. said no. Id. at 162-63. Ms. 

Wells further stated that S.N. told her that Pop Pop “touched me 

down there”, that “he would jerk off in the middle of their butts”

and make them watch “nasty videos.” Id. at 166-67. Ms. Wells 

stated that she examined S.N.’s butt and noticed redness as well 

as something “linty, like somebody tried to wipe it off.” Id. at 

167. Ms. Wells testified that her examination of S.N. took place 

on June 24, 2017, four days after the incident. Id.

Ms. Wells further testified to being present when Lucretia 

spoke to police but to not having made a statement herself at such 

time. Id. at 165-66, 172. Ms. Wells did not recall ever speaking 

to any DHS worker but did recall a worker coming out to the 

house. Id. at 173. Medical records were presented by stipulation 

of counsel indicating that both S.C.W. and S.N. were evaluated at 

Saint Christopher’s Hospital for Children on June 25, 2017, at 9 

p.m. Both children were evaluated for alleged sexual assault to 

mouth and anus and neither child displayed any associated 

symptoms; rather both children appeared healthy, with normal 
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genitalia and anus, and had no complaints of pain, vomiting, or 

discomfort. Id. at 180-183.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/22, at 1-6 (cleaned up; footnotes omitted).

On October 6, 2021, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 6 

to 15 years’ imprisonment for both counts of IDSI and no further penalty on 

the remaining counts. After sentencing, Brunson filed a timely post-sentence 

motion for a new trial alleging that the jury’s verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence. That motion was denied by operation of law on February 15, 

2022, after which Brunson filed this appeal.2 On appeal, he challenges the

denial of his post-sentence motion to set aside the jury’s verdict as being 

against the weight of the evidence.3

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2 The order denying the post-sentence motion by operation of law listed both 

trial court dockets. When a single order resolves issues arising on more than 

one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed from that order at each 

docket. See Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021). 

Brunson filed a notice of appeal at each separate trial court docket number, 

listing both docket numbers on each notice. See Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc). We consolidated 

the appeals sua sponte.

3 Our standard of review for a challenge to the denial of a motion for a new 

trial based on the weight of the evidence is well settled.

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
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I.

On appeal, Brunson raises several arguments for why the jury’s verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence. First, he alleges that the boys’ mother

fabricated the allegations because she admitted that she disliked Brunson and 

wanted him out of the house. Second, he contends that the boys were 

coached on what to say because both contradicted their forensic interviews in 

trial in the same manner. Third, he emphasizes that there was no physical 

evidence of injuries to corroborate the boys’ allegations. Fourth and finally, 

Brunson alleges that the jury ignored character evidence that he admitted at 

trial.

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An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review 

applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a 

review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

To successfully challenge the weight of the evidence, a defendant 

must prove the evidence is so tenuous, vague and uncertain that 

the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).
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A.

Brunson first contends that the boys’ mother fabricated the allegations 

against Brunson because of her hatred for him and that she enlisted her two 

sons to lie about the abuse to get him out of house. In support, Brunson notes 

that she admitted at trial that before the boys disclosed the abuse to her, she 

was angry with Brunson.

Q. When is the last time you saw your father, prior to today?

A. The day that my son told me everything, we was arguing that 

morning.

Q. About what?

A. I did not like him for some reason. I don’t know if it was me 

pregnant, but my feelings was just not right with him.

Q. What do you mean?

A. Like I just did not like him. Just to look at him just made me 

mad.

Q. Why?

A. That’s the thing, I didn’t know. Maybe it was my pregnant 

emotions. Like, I was pregnant, I mean maybe just the pregnant 

emotion, but something did not sit right with me with him.

N.T., 6/10/21, at 48.

While the boys’ mother admitted to having a frayed, contentious 

relationship with her father, it was the jury’s prerogative to determine her 

credibility and whether she fabricated the allegations. See Commonwealth 

v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“The weight of the 

evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, which is free to believe all, part, 
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or none of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”)

(citation omitted). That the boys’ mother testified that she was upset with 

Brunson before she contacted the police does not equate to an abuse of the 

trial court’s discretion where it concluded that the verdict was not against the 

weight of the evidence. Rather, it appears that the jury credited the children’s

testimony about the abuse as truthful and rejected Brunson’s argument that 

the boys’ mother fabricated the allegations and coaxed her two sons into lying 

about the abuse. Under such circumstances, we will not intrude on the jury’s 

credibility determination and find that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 195 A.3d 594, 601 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (rejecting weight of the evidence claim that victim had motive 

to fabricate because jury viewed and credited victim’s testimony); see also 

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 528 (Pa. 2003) (“A verdict is not 

contrary to the weight of the evidence because of a conflict in testimony”);

Commonwealth v. Furness, 153 A.3d 397, 404 (Pa. Super. 2016) (rejecting 

defendant’s weight claim and explaining that credibility and conflicts in 

evidence are for the fact-finder to resolve; a reviewing Court may not disturb 

these findings).

B.

Brunson’s second argument is similarly premised on his contention that 

the boys lied about the allegations and were coached by their mother about 

what to say. Brunson bases this contention on the inconsistencies between 
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the boys’ forensic interviews and their trial testimony. On this point, Brunson 

highlights that each boy’s testimony varied in the same ways; namely, the 

frequency and the type of abuse. He points out that the boys told the forensic 

interviewer that the abuse was both anal and oral and happened several times, 

while at trial, the boys testified that the abuse was only anal and happened 

only once. Brunson also notes that the boys’ testimony about revealing the 

abuse differed from the boys’ mother’s claims about how the boys disclosed 

the abuse.

Again, however, it was for the jury to resolve the inconsistencies in the 

boys’ testimony about what kind and how often Brunson abused them.4 

Indeed, as noted above, “the jury was the ultimate fact-finder and the sole 

arbiter of the credibility of each of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v.

Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017). “Issues of witness credibility 

include questions of inconsistent testimony...” Id. at 1081 (citation omitted). 

“A jury is entitled to resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s 

evidence in the manner that it sees fit.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the jury heard both the boys’ testimony and viewed their forensic 

interviews from July 2017 about the abuse. While there were inconsistencies 

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4 Contrary to Brunson’s argument, S.N. did not testify at trial that Brunson 

only abused him anally. Instead, S.N. testified that he saw Brunson “put his 

penis in my brother’s mouth and his butt.” N.T., 6/9/21, at 63. When asked 

if he did the same thing to him, S.N. replied, “Yes.” Id.
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between the testimony and interviews, none of the inconsistencies rose to the 

level required for this Court to reverse the determination of the trial court, 

which had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence, concerning the weight 

of the evidence. See Cramer, supra at 601 (when trial court finds a verdict 

not against the weight of the evidence, appellate court must give gravest 

consideration to trial court’s conclusion because it had opportunity to hear and 

see evidence presented).

C.

Brunson next focuses on the lack of any physical evidence to corroborate 

that he abused the boys. At trial, the parties entered into a stipulation that 

the boys’ mother took them to the hospital on June 25, 2017, because of the 

allegations. Neither child had any tears or lacerations, nor any rashes or 

abrasions; both were tested for sexually transmitted diseases and found to be 

negative. Furthermore, because the alleged abuse happened four days before 

the examination, no evidence collection kit was used. See N.T., 6/10/21, at 

180-83. Brunson believes that the absence of any physical evidence 

corroborating the abuse claims supports his contention that the allegations 

were fabricated.

However, “the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim, if 

believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient” to sustain a conviction. See

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 3106 (explaining that the “testimony of a 
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complainant need not be corroborated in prosecutions” for sexual offenses). 

That the Commonwealth did not present evidence about the boys suffering 

any injuries as a result of the abuse is of little import, as the examination did 

not occur until several days after the alleged abuse. The jury was free to 

determine what weight to give to the lack of any corroborating physical 

evidence, and we will not disturb the trial court’s determination concerning 

weight on this basis. Here, the jury credited S.N. and S.C.W. about what 

happened, and their testimony was sufficient on its own to support its verdict. 

See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(holding that a victim’s testimony alone, if believed by the fact-finder, is 

sufficient to sustain a conviction).5

Brunson also contends that this case is factually analogous to

Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993). There, our 

Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction of forcibly raping his 14-

year-old stepsister, holding that the Commonwealth’s evidence, in its entirety, 

was so unreliable and contradictory that the conviction could not have been 

based upon anything other than conjecture and surmise. In so doing, the 

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5 We also reject Brunson’s argument that the jury’s verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence because the police failed to obtain Brunson’s cell phone 

records to corroborate that he showed the children pornographic materials. 

Like the lack of any physical evidence, the jury was free to determine what 

weight to give to the police decision not to obtain Brunson’s cell phone records

to check his browser history. At trial, the investigating detective testified he 

was not an expert on the matter and was not sure if he would have been able 

to obtain such records. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 187.
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Court acknowledged that questions of credibility are to be resolved by the 

finder of fact and the verdict will not be disturbed if the evidence is credible, 

but also recognized the following:

This concept, however, must be distinguished from an equally 

fundamental principle, that a verdict of guilt may not be based 

upon surmise or conjecture. Following this principle, courts of this 

jurisdiction have recognized that where evidence offered to 

support a verdict of guilt is so unreliable and/or contradictory as 

to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture, a jury may 

not be permitted to return such a finding.

Id. at 1170 (citations omitted).

With this in mind, our Supreme Court determined that the record was 

“riddled with inconsistencies” and observed that the victim’s testimony was 

“disturbingly vague,” thus casting “serious doubt upon the jury’s ability” to 

find that the crime of rape occurred during the time alleged. Id. at 1171. The 

alleged rape victim could not provide the date of any alleged assault, and in 

her initial report to police, was unable to recall the defendant ever penetrating 

her. Id. Additionally, other witnesses testified that the defendant was rarely 

in the home during the charged time. Id. As a result, our Supreme Court 

held that the evidence, “carefully reviewed in its entirety, is so unreliable and 

contradictory that it is incapable of supporting a verdict of guilty, and thus, is 

insufficient as a matter of law.” Id. at 1172.

After review, we do not agree with Brunson’s contention that this matter 

is like Karkaria where the trial court rendered a verdict based solely upon 

vague and contradictory evidence that failed to establish the elements of the 
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crimes charged. First, there is no dispute that the boys’ testimony and their 

forensic interviews contained inconsistencies about what happened; namely, 

about whether Brunson abused them both anally and orally, as well as how 

many times it happened. That said, there was no such evidence rendering 

the boys’ claims impossible. Thus, despite some mere inconsistencies in the 

evidence, the jury credited S.N.’s and S.C.W.’s testimony that Brunson 

committed the sexual offenses against them while he was living with them.

In contrast, in Karkaria, the alleged victim’s own testimony disproved 

her allegations of rape because the timeframe when she said the rapes 

occurred was contradicted by uncontested evidence about when the defendant 

and his brother would have been in the house, thus making her claims 

factually impossible when she claimed they happened. In contrast, here, while 

there were inconsistencies concerning certain aspects of the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, there was no evidence that would render the boys’ allegations 

factually impossible like that involved in Karkaria. In the absence of such 

evidence, we will not disturb the trial court’s determination that the jury’s 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. 

Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 809-10 (Pa. Super. 2017) (affirming denial of 

defendant’s weight of the evidence claim based on argument that minor victim 

was not credible and testified inconsistently because determination of victim’s 

credibility was within exclusive province of the jury).
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D.

In his fourth and final argument, Brunson argues that the jury’s verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence because he presented three witnesses 

at trial who testified about his law-abiding reputation. Again, however, it was 

within the jury’s prerogative as fact-finder to determine what weight (if any) 

to give these character witnesses and weigh it against the testimony of his 

two grandsons that he committed the sexual offenses against them in June 

2017. Even if the jury credited this character evidence, it was still free to 

credit the boys’ testimony and convict Brunson of the offenses. Accordingly, 

for all these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

denial of Brunson’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. 

See Commonwealth v. Brown, 212 A.3d 1076, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s rejection of weight claim where 

defendant presented his own testimony and several character witnesses).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/22/2023