alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF MARCH 31, 1999 AND THE RELATED
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE SIX MONTHS THEN ENDED AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          17,154
<SECURITIES>                                     1,743
<RECEIVABLES>                                  158,772
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     57,259
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               247,336
<PP&E>                                          41,083
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 329,494
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           93,118
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           234
<OTHER-SE>                                     175,003
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   329,494
<SALES>                                        238,402
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               240,008
<CGS>                                          189,319
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  189,319
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                39,699
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,945
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  9,045
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,150
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,895
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,895
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .66
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.27 - Fourth Amendment to the The Standard Register Company Employee Savings Plan - 12/29/2013






Exhibit 10.27


The Standard Register Employee Savings Plan
Fourth Amendment


Pursuant to Article XI of The Standard Register Employee Savings Plan (the “Plan”), the Plan is hereby amended effective January 1, 2010, unless an alternative effective date is specified in the manner set forth below. 


1.    The Amendment to the Plan executed on December 8, 2011 is deleted in its entirety. 


2.    Section 6.05 relating to “Termination” is amended by adding the following new last paragraph as follows:


Notwithstanding the foregoing, the accounts of Participants listed in Appendix G shall be fully vested in Matching Contributions. 
Whereupon, to record the foregoing, The Standard Register Company, has caused this Amendment to be executed by its duly authorized officer on this 23rd day of October, 2013.








                        	
	
	The Standard Register Company

	 

	By:  /S/  Gerard D. Sowar

	Gerard D. Sowar

	VP, General Counsel & Secretary
**EXHIBIT 23**

 

**Consent of Independent RegisteredPublic Accounting Firm**

 

The Board of Directors

Benchmark Electronics, Inc.:

 

We consent to the incorporationby reference in the registration statements (No. 33-61660, No. 333-26805,No. 333-28997, No. 333-54186, No. 333-66889, No. 333-76207,No. 333-103183, No. 333-101744 and No. 333-136798) on Form S-8  and (No. 333-84488) on Form S-3  of Benchmark Electronics, Inc. of ourreports dated February 27, 2008, with respect to the consolidated balancesheets of Benchmark Electronics, Inc. as of December 31, 2007 and2006, and the related consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income,shareholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-yearperiod ended December 31, 2007, and the related financial statementschedule, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting asof December 31, 2007, which reports appear in the December 31, 2007 annualreport on Form 10-K of Benchmark Electronics, Inc. Our reports refersto a change in the method of accounting for uncertain tax positions in 2007 anda change in the method of accounting for share based payments in 2006.

 
| (signed) KPMG  LLP      |
|-------------------------|
| Houston, Texas          |
| February 27,  2008 |

 

----
Burner, Gary —

From: ROBERT PEDERSEN [RPEDERSE@email.usps.gov]
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2002 3:23 PM

To: Gary.Burner

Subject: Re[2]: NYTimes.com Article: O'Neill's List

I think it went well. Fisher wants to meet with Potter in another
four weeks or so. Roger Kodat seemed particularly pleased that we
value the services of the Federal Financing Bank. I told him there
was a lot of heavy lifting on both sides, but we managed to find the
common ground and establish a sound working relationship. Hopefully,
he'll give Pete credit where credit is due!

We did not discuss anything even mildly controversial, with the
exception of Enron, which Fisher initiated.

Reply Separator

Subject: RE: NYTimes.com Article: O'Neill's List
Author: Gary.Burner@do.treas.gov at INTERNET
Date: 1/14/02 3:07 PM

How did it go today?

Siete Original Message-----

Prom: ROBERT PEDERSEN [(mailto:RPEDERSE@email.usps.gov]
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2002 2:55 PM

To: gary.burner

Subject: NYTimes.com Article: O'Neill's List

Forwarded

From: siteadm@ms1.lga2.nytimes.com at INTERNET
Date: 1/14/02 10:45AM -0500

To: ROBERT J PEDERSEN at WADCO53L

*To: rpederse@usps.com at INTERNET

Subject: NYTimes.com Article: O'Neill's List

2 01009

01200000001681
#### Elijah Mackey FERGUSON et al., Appellants, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 70-1116, 70-1117 and 70-1118.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 1, 1971.

*518Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Arnold R. Ginsberg, Legal Intern, for appel-lee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants were charged in an information with breaking and entering a building with intent to commit grand larceny, and with grand larceny. They pleaded not guilty, waived a jury, were tried before the court, and were found and adjudged guilty. Each was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of one year. On their appeals, which were consolidated here, appellants argue insufficiency of the evidence. We find that contention to be without merit. On consideration of the record and briefs we conclude the judgments were supported by competent substantial evidence, which was partly direct and partly circumstantial. Police observed the defendants exiting through a window of the building from which there had been removed merchandise that was found nearby. They fled. Pursuit and search by the police resulted in their apprehension in the vicinity. See Daniels v. State, Fla.1959, 108 So.2d 755; State v. Young, Fla.1968, 217 So.2d 567.

Affirmed.
#### Bennie L. WALTERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, Spainhour’s, Inc., and William “Red” Moore, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13440.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Jan. 16, 1978.

*1088Weiner, Weiss, Madison & Howell by James R. Madison, Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellant.

Bodenheimer, Jones, Klotz & Simmons by Harry D. Simmons, Shreveport, for defendants-appellees.

Before BOLIN, PRICE and MARVIN, JJ.

BOLIN, Judge.

The issue is whether nor not plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to show defendant employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment as a store clerk when he struck plaintiff customer with an ax handle in the store. The trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action filed by the employer and its insurer and dismissed plaintiff’s suit against these parties. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff alleged that he, his wife, and his minor child entered defendant’s hardware store to shop for a particular tool. Plaintiff’s wife found the tool, asked defendant employee its price, and informed him she considered the quoted price too high. While plaintiff’s wife was returning the-merchandise to the display rack, the employee began verbally abusing *plaintiff*and came from behind the store counter and struck plaintiff on the head with an ax handle.

The particular circumstances of each case will determine whether the employee’s conduct is within or without the course and scope of his employment. *Miller v. Keating,*349 So.2d 265 (La.1977). The dispute which erupts into violence must be either employment rooted or reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee’s duties. *LeBrane v. Lewis,*292 So.2d 216 (La.1974); *Jefferson v. Rose Oil Company of Dixie,*232 So.2d 895 (La.App. 2d Cir., 1970).

In *Jefferson*a service station employee shot a customer in the leg during an altercation over the payment of 82 cents worth of gasoline which the customer had pumped into his vehicle’s fuel tank. We found the transaction between the employee and the customer was incidental to the business which the employee was authorized to perform and held the employer vicariously liable.

Plaintiff’s allegations here show the battery may have been incidental to a business contact between customer and employee; the store clerk was required to answer a customer’s questions about the price of merchandise. If the *evidence*shows the battery arose out of a purely personal matter between plaintiff and the employee, the employer would not be vicariously liable. See *LeBrane, supra.*However, the question of the employer’s ultimate liability is not now before us. In maintaining plaintiff’s petition when we can reasonably do so, we afford the plaintiff an opportunity to present evidence to prove the employer’s liability. See *Haskins v. Clary,*346 So.2d 193 (La.1977).

The judgment is reversed, the exception of no cause of action is overruled, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Appellees are assessed with the costs of this appeal and all other costs are to await the final determination of this cause.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PEDRO JULIAN MONTOYAGONZALEZ,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-5136

(N.D. Oklahoma)

(No. 4:14-CV-00640-GKF-TLW and 

4:12-CR-00023-GKF-1)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

 

Defendant Pedro Julian Montoya-Gonzalez pleaded guilty in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to the charge of reentry of a 

deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He was sentenced to 46 months’ 

imprisonment. After our dismissal of his appeal for failure to prosecute, he filed a pro se 

motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to request (1) credit for the 27 days Defendant was incarcerated after 

his arrest but before he was taken into federal custody, and (2) a downward departure 

based on the “fast-track” early-disposition program, see United States v. Luna-Acosta, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 10, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

715 F.3d 860, 861 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The so-called ‘fast track’ program allows a 

defendant, upon motion of the government, to obtain up to a four-level downward 

departure from his offense level in exchange for pleading guilty pursuant to an early 

disposition program.”); USSG § 5K3.1. The district court denied the motion because it 

was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) and Defendant now seeks a certificate of 

appealability (COA) to appeal that denial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring 

COA to appeal denial of § 2255 motion). We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. 

Motions under § 2255 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See id. 

§ 2255(f). This court dismissed Defendant’s direct appeal on July 8, 2013, because he 

had failed to pay the filing fee or file a proper motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis (ifp). The limitations period started to run on October 6, 2013, upon expiration 

of the 90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. 

See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 523, 532 (2003). Defendant submitted his § 2255 

motion more than a year later, on October 13, 2014. In district court he asserted that his 

motion was timely because he had only recently found a case supporting his argument, 

but the district court explained that this discovery was irrelevant under § 2255(f). In his 

appellate brief, Defendant does not contest the district court’s timeliness ruling and has 
3 

 not offered any basis for overcoming the statutory bar. We therefore DENY the request 

for a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We also DENY the motion for leave to proceed ifp. 

Appellant is ordered to pay the filing fee to the district court forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

 Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge
#### MONTGOMERY WARD AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Appellant, v. Charles A. RICHARDS, Appellee.

No. S-281.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Sept. 6, 1973.

Tracy Danese, Jacksonville, and Thomas F. Woods, of Woods & Johnston, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Gordon H. Lee, Jacksonville, for appel-lee.

JOHNSON, Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal there is only one question: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to vacate and set aside the default judgment which had been entered against the appellant for failure to plead to complaint ?

It appears to this Court that the motion to vacate was well-founded in fact and that the trial court did abuse its discretion when it refused to set aside the default. The facts constituted excusable neglect on *192the part of the defendant. We recognize the law in Florida to be well-established as found in Crystal Lake Golf Course, Inc. v. Kalin, 252 So.2d 379 (Fla.App.4th, 1971), and based upon the holding of said Crystal Lake Golf Course, Inc. v. Kalin, supra, we do reverse the order denying the appellant’s motion to vacate the default and do hereby direct the trial court to vacate said default and fix a reasonable time within which the defendant may plead as it may be advised.

RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR, J., concur.
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. John C. PREVATT and John H. Bennett, Jr., Relators, v. Honorable Warren H. EDWARDS, as Judge of the Criminal Court of Record in and for Orange County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 70-101.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 13, 1970.

Prohibition denied.
```

[Federal Register: July 19, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 137)]
[Notices]               
[Page 41820]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr19jy10-42]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

 
Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE:  Wednesday, July 21, 2010; 10:30 a.m.-12 Noon.

PLACE:  Hearing Room 420, Bethesda Towers, 4330 East West Highway, 
Bethesda, Maryland.

STATUS:  Closed to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Compliance Status Report

    The Commission staff will brief the Commission on the status of 
compliance matters.
    For a recorded message containing the latest agenda information, 
call (301) 504-7948.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:  Todd A. Stevenson, Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East West 
Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814, (301) 504-7923.

    Dated: July 13, 2010.
Todd A. Stevenson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-17593 Filed 7-15-10; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
```
#### Succession of Mertice Cobb McGOWAN v. Mrs. Canton P. SEITZ et al.

No. 7936.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

April 13, 1970.

*467Joel B. Dickinson, Baton Rouge, for appellants.

Miriam T. Attaya, Gonzales, for ap-pellee.

Before LOTTINGER, BLANCHE and PICKETT, JJ.

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is a suit by a brother and sister to have a last will and testament annulled and set aside. The plaintiffs have alleged that their sister, the decedent, was mentally incompetent to make a will due to habitual and excessive use of alcohol, and that due to her mental state she was easily persuaded and influenced into leaving the bulk of her property to the defendant who had taken care of the decedent for some time prior to her death. The Trial Court found judgment in favor of the defendant, and it is from this judgment that the plaintiffs have appealed.

The record points out that the last will and testament was executed on October 25, 1965, and that the decedent died on August 15, 1966. The plaintiffs-appellants contend that prior to the time the last will and testament was executed the decedent was known to be a heavy drinker, and that her intake of alcohol was so great as to render her incompetent to validly execute her last will and testament. The plaintiffs placed many witnesses on the stand who testified in essence that the deceased was a heavy drinker to some extent, but after reading the entire record, none of these witnesses of the plaintiffs’ tend to lead us to believe that the decedent drank sufficiently at any particular time prior to the execution of the last will and testament as to render her incapable of executing same. In particular, the plaintiffs placed on the witness stand the physician of the decedent who testified that he had treated her in August of 1965 for heart disease. He further testified that he saw her on September 30, 1965, and that the decedent was doing fine, and his notes made no mention of alcohol. He does make some mention of her intake of alcohol, but this was when he treated her in March of 1966.

It is acceptable to look into the testamentary capacity of an individual prior to, at the time of, and after the execution of a last will and testament to determine and draw a conclusion as to the condition of the testator or testatrix at the exact moment that the last will and testament is executed. After reading the testimony of all of the witnesses who testified in this proceeding, we must conclude, as did the Trial Judge, that the plaintiffs have not carried their burden sufficiently so as to have judgment in their favor. We *468have no question but that the decedent was a heavy drinker, but we find no evidence in the record to convince us that her drinking was of such a state prior to or at the time of the execution of the will so as to render her incapable of executing a valid last will and testament.

Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal to be paid by plaintiffs-appellants.

Judgment affirmed.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

January 12, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

130810 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

In re Estate of JIHAD H. MOUKALLED, Maura D. Corrigan 

Deceased. Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, ________________________________________/ Justices 

BRUCE BAKIAN,

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v SC: 130810 

 COA: 257732 
 Oakland Probate: 

NATIONAL CITY BANK, Personal 01-276297-DA 

Representative of the Estate of JIHAD 

H. MOUKALLED, Deceased,

Respondent,

and 

FIFTH THIRD BANK,

Respondent-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 16, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral 

argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 

7.302(G)(l). At oral argument, the parties shall address the following questions: 

(1) Under the facts of this case where the petitioner is seeking priority over other 

creditors with respect to the Heather Hills real estate, did the Court of Appeals 

appropriately invoke the doctrine of equitable lien to grant the petitioner a security 

interest in that real property, and if not, by what method should the petitioner have 

secured an interest in the real property? (2) Was the "Security Agreement" subject to the 

recording requirements found for example in MCL 565.201, and if so did it meet those 

requirements? (3) Does the fact that the Register of Deeds accepted the "Security 

Agreement" for filing definitively prove compliance with a recording statute? The 

parties may file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order, but they 

should avoid submitting a mere restatement of the arguments made in their application 

papers. 

d0109 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

January 12, 2007 

Clerk
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 250 (Wednesday, December 31, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 68282-68283]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-34111]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. CP98-146-000]


Northern Natural Gas Company; Notice of Request Under Blanket 
Authorization

December 24, 1997.
    Take notice that on December 18, 1997, Northern Natural Gas Company 
(Northern), 1111 South 103rd Street, Omaha, Nebraska 68124-1000, filed 
in Docket No. CP98-146-000 a request pursuant to Sections 157.205, and 
157.212, of the Commission's Regulations under the Natural Gas Act (18 
CFR 157.205, 157.212) for authorization to install four new delivery 
points and appurtenant facilities in Sterling and Glasscock Counties, 
Texas to accommodate incremental interruptible natural gas deliveries 
to Conoco, Inc. (Conoco)

[[Page 68283]]

under Northern's blanket certificate issued in Docket No. CP82-401-000 
pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, all as more fully set 
forth in the request that is on file with the Commission and open to 
public inspection.
    Northern States that it requests authorization to install the 
proposed delivery points to accommodate incremental interruptible 
natural gas deliveries to Conoco under Northern's currently effective 
throughput service agreements. Northern asserts that Conoco has 
requested the proposed delivery points for use at their plants. 
Northern estimates a cost of $97,074 to construct the proposed delivery 
points. Conoco will reimburse Northern for the total cost to construct 
the proposed delivery points.
    Any person or the Commission's staff may, within 45 days after 
issuance of the instant notice by the Commission, file pursuant to Rule 
214 of the Commission's Procedural Rules (18 CFR 385.214) a motion to 
intervene or notice of intervention and pursuant to Section 157.205 of 
the Regulations under the Natural Gas Act (18 CFR 157.205) a protest to 
the request. If no protest is filed within the time allowed therefor, 
the proposed activity shall be deemed to be authorized effective the 
day after the time allowed for filing a protest. If a protest is filed 
and not withdrawn within 30 days after the time allowed for filing a 
protest, the instant request shall be treated as an application for 
authorization pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-34111 Filed 12-30-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M