1 Filed 2/19/15 Lopez v. Ralph’s Grocery CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

PAULA LOPEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. RALPH’S GROCERY COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents. E059969 (Super.Ct.No. CIVBS1100443) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Sa n Bernardino County. David Cohn, Judge. Affirmed. Law Offices of Richard Devirian and Ri chard C. Devirian; Esner, Chang & Boyer and Andrew N. Chang for Pl aintiffs and Appellants. Cihigoyenetche, Grossberg & Clouse, Katharine L. Spaniac and Anthony C. Ferguson for Defendan ts and Respondents. Plaintiffs and appellants Paula Lopez a nd Stephen A. Lopez brought suit against defendants and respondents Ralph’s Grocer y Company (Ralph’s) and TVL Properties,2 LLC (TVL or, collectively with Ralph’s, de fendants) following the death of Patrocinio Lopez, who was the husband of Paula Lopez a nd father of Stephen A. Lopez. Mr. Lopez died from injuries suffered when he tripped and fell in the pa rking lot of a grocery store operated by Ralph’s and locate d on property owned by TVL. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’ s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs conten d, among other things, that de fendants failed to meet their initial burden of production, that the trial cour t’s reliance on the trivial defect doctrine to find defendants not liable as a matter of law wa s erroneous, and that they raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether the condition that injured Mr. Lopez was open and obvious. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On July 13, 2011, at about 7:00 p.m., while retrieving a shopping cart in the parking lot of a “Food 4 Less” grocery store in Barstow, California, Mr. Lopez tripped over a speed bump and fell. Tragically, he died of injuries resulting from the fall— specifically, a ruptured spleen. The speed bump at issue is rubber, and wa s installed by attaching it to the asphalt of the parking lot on July 25, 2010. It is approximately six feet long, one foot wide, and two and one-fourth inches in height. It is black in color, with large, yellow diagonal stripes painted across the top curved portion. Between that top curved portion and the bottom edge of the speed bump is a vertical edge of be tween one-half and nine-sixteenths of an inch in height. According to plai ntiffs’ accident rec onstruction expert, who3 examined the site of Mr. Lopez’s accident, the speed bump had also separated somewhat from the asphalt to which it was a ttached, causing the vertical edge to “migrate[], in some locations, to a height as great as 13/16 of an inch.” Plaintiffs’ expert’s theory, based on his examination of the accident site and review of security video of Mr. Lopez’s fall, is that Mr. Lopez’s foot did not just strike the speed bump, but also became “trapped” underneath it, causing him to lose his balance and fall. 1 Plaintiffs’ “Complaint for Wrongful Deat h,” filed on August 24, 2011, alleges two causes of action. The first cause of action is untitled, but in substance asserts a claim for negligence or premises liability. (See Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998 [elements of premises liability cause of action are the same as negligence cause of action].) The second cause of action is for product liability. 2 Defendants’ motion for summary judgme nt or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, was filed on May 2, 2013. After a hearing on August 9, 2013, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defe ndants. The court entered judgment on September 13, 2013.

1 The security video was not submitted as evidence in support of or in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, so it does not appear in our record on appeal. Apparently, however, both defendants ’ and plaintiffs’ experts did review that video.

2 On appeal, plaintiffs have raised no cl aims of error with respect to the trial court’s ruling on their second cause of ac tion, asserting only arguments relating to negligence or premises liability . We therefore do not furthe r discuss the product liability cause of action.4 II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review The well-known principles generally go verning appellate review of an order granting a motion for summary judgment are as follows: “A trial c ourt properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of ma terial fact exists an d the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [C itation.] We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of th e evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the unc ontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has ‘shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established,’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff to sh ow the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set fo rth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action . . . .’” ( Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “In reviewing whether these burdens have be en met, we strictly scrutin ize the moving party’s papers and construe all facts and resolve all doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion.” ( Innovative Business Partnership s, Inc. v. Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 623, 628 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)5 B. Analysis The trial court found defendants not liabl e for negligence or premises liability based on the trivial defect doctrine, and a lternatively because the speed bump at issue was an “open and obvious condition . . . .” Plaintiffs contend defendants did not meet their initial burden of productio n in support of their motion, and that in any case they produced sufficient eviden ce to preclude application of the trivial defect doctrine, and to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the condition that injured Mr. Lopez was open and obvious. For the r easons stated below, we affi rm the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendants. 1. Defendants made an adequate prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. Plaintiffs note that the exact measuremen ts of the speed bump at issue, or the alleged defect in the speed bump, were not included in defendants’ moving papers, and argue on that basis that defendants failed to meet their initial bur den of production to show that the trivial defect doctrine applies or that the condition th at injured Mr. Lopez was open and obvious. Although pl aintiffs’ premise is undisput ed, we disagree with their conclusion. As the trial court noted in the heari ng on defendants’ motion, nothing in the moving papers and supporting documents es tablished the exact measurements of the speed bump at issue, or the alleged defect in the speed bump. Those measurements were provided to the court later, by plaintiffs’ expe rt’s declaration submitted in support of the6 opposition. Nevertheless, if defendants had failed to meet their initial burden, it would not matter what plaintiffs later submitted; the motion would be pr operly denied. (See Barber v. Chang (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1463 [“If the evidence does not support judgment in the defendant’s favor, we must reverse summary judgment without considering the plaintiff’s opposing evidence”].) Despite the lack of exact measurements , however, defendants’ moving papers did include photographs of the speed bump at i ssue. These photogra phs enabled the trial court to view the allegedly h azardous speed bump, and to make a general evaluation of its size and the surrounding conditions, even if ex act measurements were not available. Plaintiffs cite no authority—and we are aw are of none—in support of the notion that, absent exact measurements of an alleged de fect, a defendant seek ing summary judgment cannot make even a prima facie showing that th e defect is trivial, or that the allegedly dangerous condition is open and obvious. We conclude, upon de novo review of th e evidence, that the trial court correctly concluded defendants ha d satisfied their initial burden of pr oduction. We turn, therefore, to plaintiffs’ arguments that they produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of fact. 2. Summary judgment in favor of defendan ts is appropriate under the trivial defect doctrine. “The trivial defect doctrine is not an affi rmative defense. It is an aspect of a landowner’s duty which a plainti ff must plead and prove.” ( Stathoulis v. City of7 Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567 ( Stathoulis ).) The fundamental principle underlying the doctrine is that “[s]ome defects are bound to exist even in the exercise of reasonable care in the maintenance of proper ty and cannot reasonably be expected to cause accidents.” ( Id. at p. 566.) In applying the doc trine, the trial court determines whether a defect is trivial as a matter of la w, serving thereby as “a check valve for the elimination from the court system of unwa rranted litigation which attempts to impose upon a property owner what amounts to absolu te liability for injury to persons who come upon the property.” ( Ursino v. Big Boy Restaurants (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 394, 398- 399.) “The legal analysis involves several st eps. First, the court reviews evidence regarding the type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analys is reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence of any a dditional factors such as the weather, lighting and visibility conditions at th e time of the accident, the existence of debris or obstructions, and plaintiff’s know ledge of the area. If th ese additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law and gr ant judgment for the landowner.” ( Stathoulis , supra , 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 567.) Our preliminary analysis of the evidence yields the conc lusion that, to the extent there is any defect in the speed bump at issue, that defect is trivial. As noted, the purported defect on which plainti ffs rest their arguments is th e vertical edge of the speed bump, combined with any area beneath th e speed bump resulting from separation from8 the asphalt. Based on the testimony of plainti ffs’ expert, this combination resulted in a vertical tripping hazard of something less than an inch and a half in height—a maximum of thirteen-sixteenths of an inch of separation from the as phalt, and a maximum of ninesixteenths of an inch of vertical edge. 3 An inch-and-a-half defect in a walkway is within the size range that previous courts have found to be trivial. (See Barrett v. City of Claremont (1953) 41 Cal.2d 70, 74 [collecting cases]; Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 724, fn . 4 [collecting cases].) Of course, “a tape measure alone cannot be used to determine whether the defect was trivial,” because additional factors may ma ke a defect “more dangerous than its size alone would suggest.” ( Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal. App.4th 922, 927 ( Caloroso ).) In this case, however, there are no additional factors that indicate the alleged defect to be “sufficiently dangerou s to a reasonably careful person . . . .” ( Stathoulis , supra , 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 567-568.) It was still light out at the time of Mr. Lopez’s accident, 7:00 p.m. on a summer ev ening. There is no evidence of anything concealing the speed bump, or any part of it, from Mr. Lopez’s view, or any weather or other conditions of the parking lot that might have made the speed bump more hazardous to a reasonably careful person. Mr. Lopez was generally familiar w ith the area, having

3 Plaintiffs’ expert’s declaration does not specifically establis h that the point of maximum separation of the speed bump from the asphalt coincides w ith the point where the vertical edge of the speed bump is at its maximum. The declaration also does not establish that either maximum coincides with the specific part of the six-foot-long speed bump where Mr. Lopez tripped, though that in formation may well have been discernable from the security camera f ootage of the accident.9 visited the same grocery store on many occasions previously. Where, as here, there is no evidence that any other conditions made th e alleged defect dangerous, it is properly deemed trivial as a matter of law. ( Caloroso , supra , at p. 927.) As noted, plaintiffs did submit the declar ation of an accident reconstruction expert, opining among other things that the speed bump that tripped Mr. Lopez was a serious hazard. We conclude, however, that this expe rt testimony is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. The declaration cont ends that the speed bump violates certain standards for walkways—specifically, “ASTM document F1637”—but does not establish that this standard has been accepted as the pr oper standard to apply to business parking lots in California. (See Caloroso , supra , 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925, 928 [agreeing with trial court’s rejection of expert opinion re lying on ASTM standards].) The expert’s citation to California regulations applicable to work areas—gener ally requiring that walkways be kept free of dangerous obstruc tions, and that hazards be marked by some method—does nothing to show that the speed bum p at issue in this ca se was hazardous to a reasonably careful person, or inadequately marked as a hazar d. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 3272, subd. (c), 3273, subds. (a) & (b ).) Plaintiffs’ expert also makes much of the circumstance that the yellow stripes of the speed bump do not extend down from the curved top of the speed bump onto its vertic al edge or, obviously, the space between the speed bump and the asphalt. He cites no au thority, however, other than his own ipse dixit, tending to indicate that this circumstance violates any accepted standard or regulation. In any case, “regardless of wh ether a witness can be found to opine on the10 subject of a dangerous condition, the co urt must independently evaluate the circumstances.” ( Caloroso , supra , at p. 928.) Here, our independent evaluation of the circumstances leads us to the same conclusion as the trial court: to the extent plaintiffs have identified any defect in th e speed bump at issue, that def ect is trivial as a matter of law. Dolquist v. City of Bellflower (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 261 ( Dolquist ), a case emphasized by plaintiffs, does not require a different result. In that case, a woman was injured when she tripped over a piece of re inforcing steel protrudi ng up one-fourth inch from a concrete tire stop, wh ich itself was a maximum of five and seven-sixteenths inches high, in a business’s parking lot. ( Id. at pp. 264, 268.) The Dolquist court found the protruding “rebar” di d not constitute a trivial defect as a matter of law, rejecting the “strict tape measure approach ” urged by the defendant. ( Id. at p. 268.) It found that the protrusion was at least arguably “large enough to cause an injury while being small enough to avoid easy detection,” and concluded on that basis that reasonable minds could differ as to the dangerousn ess of the protrusion. ( Id. at p. 270.) We agree with the Dolquist court that a strict tape measure approach would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the circumstan ces of our case are different, and require a different conclusion. The allege d defect at issue here is the bottom portion of a speed bump, and the small space betwee n the bottom of the speed bu mp and the asphalt of the parking lot. A reasonably careful pedestrian stepping onto or over the speed bump at issue would encounter no difficult-to-detect pr otrusion similar to that described in11 Dolquist . To encounter the alleged defect at all would require the pedestrian to strike his or her foot against the bottom portion of a plainly visible speed bump. We therefore reach a different conc lusion than did the Dolquist court, applying the same law to quite different facts. Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities , Inc . (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, another case emphasized by plainti ffs, is similarly distinguishable. In that case, the alleged hazard at issue was a drain that was not flush with the surrounding br ick of the walkway, creating a depression varying in depth from one thirty-second of an inch to fivesixteenths of an inch, and fi ve inches in diameter. ( Id. at pp. 21, 28-29.) However, in reversing the trial court’s finding that the de fect was trivial as a matter of law, the Kasparian court credited the plaintiffs’ expert’s opi nion that the drain at issue “‘pose[d] a safety hazard to pedestrians who do not have any expectation that a ny drain is not flush with the surrounding brick pavers.’” ( Id. at pp. 28-29.) No similar expectation of a perfectly flat walkway is reasonably attributed to pedestrians in park ing lots such as the one where Mr. Lopez fell; speed bumps in parking places are commonplace. We have no quarrel with the Kasparian court’s explication of the law, but applying that law to the facts of this case yields a different result. In short: After de novo review of the evidence, construing all facts and resolving all doubts in favor of plaintiffs, we are nevert heless persuaded that, to the extent plaintiffs12 have identified any defect in th e speed bump at issue, that def ect is trivial as a matter of
law. 4
III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Defendant s shall recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

HOLLENHORST J. We concur:

RAMIREZ P.J. RICHLI J.

4 Because this conclusion is an inde pendently sufficient basis for granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, we need not and do no t discuss the trial court’s alternative ruling that the condition that injured M r. Lopez was ope n and obvious, or the parties’ arguments w ith respect to that ruling.