Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 4 , 202 4
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 2 3

- 00 317

- C R

_ ___________ EX PARTE PATRICK DON EL GREENE
On Appeal from the 1 77 th District Court

Harris Count y , Texas Trial C ourt Ca u se No
. 1 8 14197

M EMORA N DUM O PINIO N Appellant P a trick Donel Greene brings this habeas appeal from from the trial court’s h abeas

- co rpus judgmen t mai n taining bail at $ 1 8 0,000 in association with a murder c harge

. We affirm.
B A CKGROUND
On March 20, 2022 , a ppe llant was placed in custody in Prince G e orge ’ s County , Maryland, in association with a charge for unlawfully carrying a weapon in violation of Maryland law. On March 22, 2022, in connection with appellant having been identified as a suspect in a shoot i ng de ath in Texas, Harris County authorities put a hold on appellant while he remained in custody in Maryland.2

A ppellant was ultimately sentenced to time served on the Maryland charge, wh ich he testified resulted in a 297

- day sentence of imp risonment. As sumin g a ppellant actually began serving that sentence on March 20, 2022, his s entenc e would have ended on January 11, 2023. In the immediate aftermath of appellant completing his sentence, he remained in custody in Maryland, though no evidence was provide d duri ng the t rial court ’ s proceedings about why he remained in Maryland custody

. However, a ppellant testified that about two weeks after he completed his Maryland sentence h e was placed in c ustody by Harris County

. After initiall y having bail set at $20 0 ,000 , a nd after appellant was indicted on his Texas murder charge on Febr u ar y 17, 2023, appellant ’ s bail was ulti mat ely reduced to $1 8 0,000 on February 28 , 2023. On April 5, 2023, appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Essentially, the a

pp lication contended that the State was no t rea dy for trial within th e time specified by ar ticle 17.151 of t he Texas Code o f Cri minal P r ocedure. B ecause of thi s, a ppellant asserts he was en t itled to be released either on pers onal b ond or by a reductio n of bond to an amount appellant could post. The trial court held a hearing on Apr il 18, 2023, and denied the application in an order signed that same day. This appeal followed.
A NAL YSIS
We rev i ew a trial court ’ s deci sion o n a challenge pursuant to article 17 .151 for an ab use of discretion

. See Ex part e Gill , 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 ( T ex. Crim. Ap p
. 20 13). See Ex parte Rubac , 61 1 S.W. 2d 848, 850 ( Tex. Crim. App

. [Panel Op.] 1981). Un der this stan dard, a trial court abu ses it s discretion when it app lies

an erro n eous legal standard or when no reasonable view of the record supports the tria l court ’ s conclusion under the correct law and facts viewed in the light most3

fa vorable to its legal conclusion

. See Nicholas v. State , 56 S .W.3d 760, 7 65 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 4th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref ’ d).
Under article 17 .151, “ [a] defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of an accusation against him must be released either on personal bo nd or b y reducing the amount of bail requ ired , if the sta te is not re ady f or trial of the criminal action for which he is being detained within[] 90 days from the commencement of his detention if he is accused of a felony. ” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. An n. art. 17.151, § 1.
In h is sole issue on appeal , ap pe llant c ontends that he had been deta ined for more than 90 days when he sought and was subs equently denied habeas rel ief. Thus , appellant contends, the habeas court err e d when it declined to reduce bail to an affo rdable amount and further de clin ed to release him on a person al bond. Whether appellant is entitled to relief de pend s on when the “ commencement of hi s detention ” began. Appellant argues his “ deten tion ” for purposes of article 17.151 began when Ha rri s C ounty au thorities placed a hold on him while he was in custody in Maryland . The S tate ’ s arguments assert appellant ’ s relevant “ de tention ” b egan much later, when app ellant was trans ferred to Harris County custody. We a gree with the Sta te.
W h en Harris County authorities placed a hold on appellan t , he was already in custody of Maryland authori ties. While he was de tained in Maryland, Harris County had no ability to exercise direct control over appellant or conduct in

- person proceedings in Harris County

. Th e Dallas Court of Appea l s emphasized similar facts in Ex par te Tay lor , ultimatel y conc luding that a Texas authority ’ s time for
ge tting ready for trial under ar ticle 1 7.151 begins when it obtain s control over a defendant, rather than an earlier time when the defendant is in another4

jurisdic ti on ’ s custody. See No. 05

- 21

- 00447

- CR, 20 22 WL 110 1693, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Apr. 13, 20 22, no pet.) . As the court observed, “ [ i ] t d oe s not

a dv an ce the purpose of [article 17. 151] to start the State ’ s time clock to be ready for trial when the defenda nt is detained on other charges in a differ ent juris diction and the State may not

. . . be able to obtain control over the defendant a nd t he
power to t ry the defendant for an un certain period of time

. ” Id

. Th e Taylor court ’ s conclusion is not only consisten t w ith our conc lusion, but is also consi s ten t with t wo other Texas Courts of Appeals that have considered similar circum stan ce s, where a j urisdiction first attempts to exer cise some control

over a defendant in a nother jurisdiction ’ s custo d y. See Ex p arte Remeik a , No. 10

- 09

- 00 37 9

- CR, 2010 WL 1495 746 , at * 2 (Tex. App.

— Waco Apr. 14, 2010 , writ struck) ; Balawajder v. State , 75 9 S. W

. 2d 504 , 506 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref ’ d)

. Appellant has not provided us w ith, nor has our res e arch revealed , any Texas Court of Appea ls opinion concluding that th e 90

- d ay time frame set by article 17 .151 be gins while a defendant is in the custo dy of a different jurisdiction , when the St ate a u thority has do ne no more than pla ced a hold or taken some other step to exercise co ntrol over th e defendant on ce the other ju risdic tion releases the defendant from its c ontrol. We are h esitant to deviate from what our sister courts of appeals ha ve d ec ided without a compelling reason, and appellant has not provided one to this court. See M a rtinez v. Hous. McLane Co. , LLC , 41 4 S .W.3d 219, 225 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)

. We a ccordingly conclude that , for purposes of reviewi ng whe th er appellan t was entitled to release on personal bond or a reduced bail amount under article 17.151, the “ commencement of his det ention ” is deemed to have begun when he

was transferred to Harris County c ustody

. However, the evidence provided by th e part ie s is imprecise about when exactly that occurred. In particular , the parties ’ evidence contains sever al estimate s of when key e ven ts occ u rred, n amely when5

appellant wa s taken i nto custody in Maryland on a Maryland charge , what dat e the sentence on h is Mar yl and charge ended, and the date appellant was taken to and d et ained by Harris Cou nty

. H o wever, for pu rposes of this appeal , thi s c ourt d oes not need to a scertain what specific date appe llant was transferred t o Harr is County custody. As previously noted, we need only determine whether the facts, when viewed in the light most fa vorable to th e trial court ’ s legal conclusion , support de nying appellant hab eas relief

. See Nicholas , 56 S.W.3d at 7 65

. The tr ial co urt did not make any specific finding as t o when Harris County took custody of appellant, but more generally, but it implicitly found that on April 1 8, 2023, 90 days had not e la p sed wi th appellant in Harris County custody. Stated differently, the tria l court impli citly held appellant had been taken into Harris County custody no earlie r than January 18, 2023, or 90 days before the tri al court denied ha beas relief. T h u s, to reso lve this habeas corpus appeal, we only need to determine whether the trial cour t could have reasonably found Harris County took appellant into custody no earlier than January 18, 2023. See Ex parte Flores , 483 S.W. 3d 632, 639 (Te x. App.

— Hous ton [14th Dist .] 2015, pet. ref ’ d) (acknowledging that under the abuse

- of

- discretion stan dard , appellate c ourts must

“ defer to implied factual findings supp orted by the record ” ).
The evidence in the record is suffic i ent to suppo rt the trial co urt ’ s judgment

. S imply by us ing ap pellant ’ s testimony as to when rel ev ant events occurred , the trial court could reasonably have foun d th e following: (1) Maryland authorities first took custody over appellant i n association with a Maryland charge on March 20, 2022 ; (2) h is sentenc e f or tha t charge lasted 297 days from that d ate, ending on January 11, 2023 ; and (3) Harris County took custody of appellant on January 25, 2023 , two weeks after his Maryland sentence ended

. S ectio n 17.151 did not6

require appell ant ’s release on personal or reduce d bon d since fewer than 90 days had elapsed since he entered H arris County custody. Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court ’ s conclusion that appellan t wa s not enti tle d to relief unde r s ection 17.15 1

. We a cknowledge the evi d enc e i s s ome what ambiguous as to whether section 17.151 actually entitl e s appellant to relief

. For instance, it remains unclear as to wh ether fewer than two weeks elapsed be tween th e en d of appellan t ’ s sentence and Harris County taking custody of appellan t , as wel l as whether appellant remain ing in Maryland custody for a s hort time after his Maryland sentence ended was because of Harris Cou nty ’ s hold

. However, as indicated above, th e fa ct s available to the trial co urt can reasona bly be viewed as supportin g i ts ru l ing

. Accordingly, there is no basis for this cou rt to g rant appellant the relief he seeks. See Nicholas , 56 S.W.3d at 7 65

. A lthough appellant argues as part o f his so le appellat e issue that he cannot af ford bail in th e amount of $180 ,000, we n eed not a ddress thi s argument as art icle 17.151 would only grant appell ant entitlement to relief if the S t ate was not ready for trial within the statuto ry 90

- day time frame. Cf

. Ex parte La nclos , 625 S.W .3d 923, 92 7 (Tex. Crim. A pp
. 2021). And as has alr ead y been discusse d , the trial
court acted within its discretion in holding appellant was not entitled to such relief

. Thus, we over rule appellant ’ s sole issue on appeal.
C ONCL US IO N
We af fi rm the trial court ’ s habe as
- cor p us judgm ent

.

PER CUR I AM
P anel c ons ist s of J usti c es Wise, Zimmerer, and Poissant. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).