United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2006-1386 

PARKDALE INTERNATIONAL, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

RUSSELL METALS EXPORT, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Richard P. Ferrin, Hunton & Williams LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for 

plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was William Silverman. 

David S. Silverbrand,Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee 

United States. With him on the brief were David M. Cohen, Director, and Patricia M. 

McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were John D. McInerney, Chief 

Counsel; Berniece A. Browne, Senior Counsel; and Kemba T. Eneas, Attorney, Office of 

the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, United States Department of Commerce, of 

Washington, DC. 

Jeffrey D. Gerrish, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, of Washington, 

DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States Steel Corporation. With him on the 

brief were John J. Mangan and Robert E. Lighthizer. 

Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade 

Judge Judith M. Barzilay 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

 

2006-1386 

PARKDALE INTERNATIONAL, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

RUSSELL METALS EXPORT, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 ______________________ 

 DECIDED: February 9, 2007 

 _______________________ 

Before MAYER, RADER and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges. 

MAYER, Circuit Judge. 

Parkdale International (“Parkdale”) appeals the judgment of the United States 

Court of International Trade denying its motion for summary judgment on the agency 
record.∗

 Parkdale Int’l v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). 

Because the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) application of its May 6, 2003, 

reseller policy to Parkdale’s subject entries during the Period of Review (“POR”), August 

1, 2002 to July 31, 2003, does not have an impermissibly retroactive effect, we affirm. 

Background

Parkdale is a reseller, importer, and exporter of corrosion-resistant carbon steel

products (“CORE”) from Canada to the United States. Commerce first published an 

antidumping duty order on CORE from Canada in 1993. Antidumping Duty Orders: 

Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada, 58 Fed. Reg.

44,162 (Aug. 19, 1993). Consequently, subject CORE may enter the United States only

if accompanied by a cash deposit of the estimated dumping duties. See 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673e(a)(3). While liability to pay dumping duties accrues upon entry of subject 

merchandise, see 19 C.F.R. § 141.1(a), the actual duty is not formally determined until 

after entry, and not paid until the goods are liquidated by the Bureau of Customs and 

Border Protection (“Customs”), see, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 27 F. 

Supp. 2d 201, 207 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998) (“Given the retrospective nature of Commerce's 

administrative reviews, an exporter can not expect to predict exactly its potential 

antidumping duty liability at the time of import into the United States.”). 

On August 1, 2003, Commerce provided an opportunity for interested parties to 

request an administrative review of producers, resellers, and importers of subject CORE 

for the POR between August 1, 2002 and July 31, 2003. Antidumping or Countervailing 

Duty, Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation; Opportunity to Request 

 ∗ Russell Metals Export was a plaintiff in the proceeding before the Court of 

International Trade, but did not file a notice of appeal here. 

2006-1386 2
Administrative Review, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,218 (Aug. 1, 2003). Several parties requested 

a review, but Parkdale chose not to participate. Commerce issued its preliminary 

results in September 2004, Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products

from Canada: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Administrative Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 

55,138 (Sept. 13, 2004), which Parkdale challenged as an interested party. Commerce 

rejected Parkdale’s challenge, and issued its final results in March 2005. Certain 

Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada: Final Results of 

Antidumping Administrative Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,458 (Mar. 21, 2005), as amended

70 Fed. Reg. 22,846 (May 3, 2005) (“Final Results”). There, Commerce provided that

its May 6, 2003, reseller policy would apply to unreviewed resellers, like Parkdale, who 

purchased their CORE from a reviewed producer who did not know its goods were 

destined for the United States. See Final Results, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,459; see also

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings: Assessment of Antidumping Duties, 

68 Fed. Reg. 23,954 (May 6, 2003) (“Reseller Policy”). As a result, Parkdale’s subject 

goods entered during the POR are set to be liquidated at the “all-others” rate (i.e., a 

simple average of the calculated company-specific dumping rates), not the producerspecific cash deposit rate that it paid upon entry of its goods (i.e., CORE producer 

Stelco, Inc.’s, dumping margin). The all-others rate is considerably higher than 

Parkdale’s producer-specific cash deposit rate, 18.71% as compared to 4.24%. 

Commerce initially proposed the Reseller Policy in 1998, for the purpose of 

clarifying how it applied the automatic liquidation provisions under 19 C.F.R. § 351.212 

to resellers exporting subject merchandise to the United States. Antidumping and 

Countervailing Duty Proceedings: Assessment of Antidumping Duties, 63 Fed. Reg.

2006-1386 3
55,361 (Oct. 15, 1998). The October 1998, notice provided that if “the Department

determines in the administrative review that the producer did not know that the 

merchandise it sold to the reseller was destined for the United States, the reseller's 

merchandise will not be liquidated at the assessment rate the Department determines 

for the producer or automatically at the rate required as a deposit at the time of entry. In 

that situation, the entries of merchandise from the reseller during the period of review

will be liquidated at the all-others rate if there was no company-specific review of the 

reseller for that review period.” Id. at 55,362. 

Commerce subsequently requested additional comments on its proposal.

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings: Assessment of Antidumping Duties, 

67 Fed. Reg. 13,361 (Mar. 25, 2002). Parkdale responded in April 2002, stating that, 

“until issuance of that March 25, 2002 notice, Canadian resellers had every reason to 

believe, at the time of importation, that their imports were subject to the existing 

practice, which has been either to apply automatic liquidation to all reseller entries, or to 

liquidate at the relevant manufacturers’ rate, not to apply the ‘all others’ rate as a 

possible alternative rate depending on what the manufacturer did or did not know.” 

Parkdale’s comments notwithstanding, Commerce adopted the Reseller Policy on May

6, 2003, substantially as proposed in October 1998. In other words, prior to 

Commerce’s adoption of the Reseller Policy, if Parkdale did not participate in an 

administrative review, its entries were liquidated at Stelco, Inc.’s (“Stelco”), cash deposit 

rate, regardless of whether an administrative review had been requested for Stelco. 

With the adoption of the new policy, however, because Stelco requested an 

2006-1386 4
administrative review for the 2002-03 POR, Parkdale’s decision not to undergo a review 

guaranteed that it would be subject to the higher all-others rate. 

While Commerce initially characterized the Reseller Policy as a mere 

“clarification,” it acknowledges that the policy gives rise to a “relatively significant 

change” for affected parties. Parkdale, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 1333 (“Commerce concedes

that . . . there was a relatively significant change in [its] treatment of resellers.”). 

However, the policy’s impact is circumscribed because it only applies “to entries for

which the anniversary month for requesting an administrative review is May 2003 or

later.” Reseller Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,956. Accordingly, any reseller potentially 

affected by the policy had notice of its impact prior to having to make the decision 

whether to participate in a subsequent administrative review, and thereby have its 

goods liquidated at a rate calculated specifically for it; or not to participate, and have its

entries liquidated at the all-others rate. 

After Commerce issued its Final Results, Parkdale filed suit in the Court of 

International Trade, arguing that application of the Reseller Policy to its subject goods 

entered prior to May 6, 2003, had an impermissibly retroactive effect. The trial court 

denied its challenge, and Parkdale appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5). 

Discussion

“We review the Court of International Trade’s judgment, affirming or reversing 

the final results of an administrative review, de novo. In so doing, we apply anew the 

same standard used by the court, and will uphold Commerce’s determination unless it is

unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with 

2006-1386 5
law.” Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “While we essentially step into the shoes

of the Court of International Trade and duplicate its review, . . . we do not altogether 

ignore its informed opinion.” Royal Thai Gov’t v. United States, 436 F.3d 1330, 1335 

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 

Parkdale contends that Commerce’s application of its reseller policy to subject 

merchandise entered prior to its promulgation on May 6, 2003, is impermissibly

retroactive. We disagree. 

It is true that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law.” Bowen v. Georgetown 

Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). However, a statute, rule, or policy “does not

operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct

antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, 

the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to

events completed before its enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 

269-70 (1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). To determine whether the 

application of a law or policy is impermissibly retroactive, we examine the “nature and 

extent of the change of the law,” “the degree of connection between the operation of the 

new rule and a relevant past event,” and “considerations of fair notice, reasonable 

reliance, and settled expectations.” Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 

1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). 

The government concedes that Commerce’s Reseller Policy constitutes a 

relatively significant change. Prior to its adoption, Commerce liquidated subject goods 

for resellers like Parkdale at the relevant producer-specific cash deposit rate, unless the 

2006-1386 6
reseller or another interested party requested an administrative review of the reseller’s

entries. Under the Reseller Policy, however, because Stelco participated in the 

administrative review for the 2002-03 POR, Parkdale lost its ability to have its entries 

liquidated at Stelco’s cash deposit rate. While this factor points in Parkdale’s favor, the 

remaining two Landgraf factors align heavily against it, and preclude our finding 

impermissible retroactivity. 

A retroactive rule “must also have a significant retroactive connection with past

events.” Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 1366. Parkdale argues that because resellers 

do not have the option of undoing importations entered before May 6, 2003, the 

connection between those entries of goods and the new rule is significant. We do not 

agree. Although the new policy affects Parkdale’s ultimate liability, the degree of 

connection between the policy and Parkdale’s subject entries is minimal. 

Parkdale’s decisions relating to the volume of CORE it imports in a given year

are certainly dependant, at least in part, on what dumping rate it anticipates will 

ultimately be assessed against it. However, resellers import goods with the knowledge 

that changes may occur to duty margins until liquidation of subject entries. See 19 

U.S.C. § 1500; Dart Exp. Corp. v. United States, 43 C.C.P.A. 64, 76 (1956); see also

Bethlehem Steel, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 207; D & L Supply Co. v. United States, 841 F.

Supp. 1312, 1315 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1993) (“The uncertainty of knowing the final amount of 

duties due at the time of entry is simply an inherent part of importing merchandise into

the United States.”). Indeed, “[n]o vested right to a particular classification or rate of 

duty or preference is acquired at the time of importation.” N. Am. Foreign Trading

 Corp. v. United States, 783 F.2d 1031, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Norwegian 

2006-1386 7
Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318, (1932)). This stems from the 

fact that “the United States uses a ‘retrospective’ assessment system under which final 

liability for antidumping and countervailing duties is determined after merchandise is

imported.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(a). While importers entering merchandise subject to an 

antidumping duty order are required to make a cash deposit of estimated antidumping 

duties, this rate is not final where an administrative review is initiated. Accordingly, in 

cases involving importers’ challenges to the application of new laws based on 

retroactivity, we have looked at liquidation as the paramount relevant “past event.” See, 

e.g., Travenol Labs., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 749, 753 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding

that liquidation of entries “is the triggering or operative event” for deciding whether

application of a statute or regulation is impermissibly retroactive); see also Syva Co. v. 

United States, 681 F. Supp. 885, 890 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1988) (stating that “the statute 

merely prescribes the time for payment of duties once the entries are liquidated, and 

since liquidation, the operative event triggering the time for assessment of interest,

occurred after the statute was enacted, there is no retroactive application which would 

deprive plaintiff of any vested substantive right”). 

Viewing liquidation, or commencement of the administrative review, as the proper

“triggering event,” as opposed to entry of subject goods, is particularly appropriate here

because but for Stelco’s participation in the challenged administrative review, the 

Reseller Policy would not have precluded Parkdale from having its goods liquidated at

Stelco’s duty margin. Accordingly, because the significance of the Reseller Policy to 

entries pre-dating it is minimal, and the primary effect of the policy is prospective, i.e., it 

applies to liquidations post-dating its adoption, we conclude that its effect cannot

2006-1386 8
properly be considered impermissibly retroactive. To the extent that weighing the first 

two Landgraf factors nonetheless permits of uncertainty in this holding, considerations

of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations remove any doubt. 

As discussed above, an importer’s duty is not fixed until liquidation. Therefore,

despite the fact that Parkdale enjoyed liquidation at Stelco’s dumping margin for several 

years, it, nevertheless, could not have an objectively reasonable settled expectation that 

it would not, at some point, be subjected to a different margin. This is especially so

because an overriding purpose of Commerce’s administration of antidumping laws is to 

calculate dumping margins as accurately as possible, and this requires altering dumping 

rates to reflect changes in, inter alia, policy or commercial realities. See, e.g., Rhone 

Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, since 

1998, Parkdale was on notice that Commerce might adopt the Reseller Policy. In view

of the additional notice Commerce provided in 2002 and the comments Parkdale 

submitted in response, it undoubtedly had fair notice of the change. Finally, after its 

comments in April 2002, because Parkdale could reasonably anticipate that adoption of 

the Reseller Policy was imminent, it ceased to have a credible claim to reasonable 

reliance on the assumption that Commerce would nevertheless continue to apply its 

previous reseller policy in future administrative reviews. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade is 

affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

2006-1386 9