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Mark R. Christensen and Lydia Brasch, appellants, 

v. John Gale, Secretary of State of the

State of Nebraska, et al., appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 12, 2018. No. S-18-825.

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary 

judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from 

the evidence.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach 

an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below.

3. Judgments: Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional question that does not involve 

a factual dispute is a matter of law.

4. Judges: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in determining the relevance of evidence, and a trial 

court’s decision regarding relevance will not be reversed absent an abuse 

of discretion.

5. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum. The power of initiative in article III, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution is “[t]he first power 

reserved by the people” under article III, § 2.

6. ____: ____. The right of initiative is precious to the people and one 

which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure 

of spirit as well as letter.

7. Initiative and Referendum: Statutes. Statutory provisions authorizing 

initiative petitions should be construed in such a manner that the legislative power reserved in the people is effectual and should not be circumscribed by restrictive legislation or narrow and strict interpretation of the 

statutes pertaining to its exercise.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/12/2018 08:09 AM CDT
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8. Initiative and Referendum. The sworn statement provision of Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 32-1405(1) (Reissue 2016) is mandatory.

9. Initiative and Referendum: Statutes: Words and Phrases. “Sponsoring 

the petition” in the context of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1405(1) (Reissue 

2016) means assuming responsibility for the initiative or referendum 

petition process.

10. Initiative and Referendum: Words and Phrases. Defining sponsors 

as those who assume responsibility for the petition process serves the 

dual purposes of informing the public of (1) who may be held responsible for the petition, exposing themselves to potential criminal charges 

if information is falsified, and (2) who stands ready to accept responsibility to facilitate the referendum’s inclusion on the ballot and defend 

the referendum process if challenged.

11. Initiative and Referendum: Statutes. The statutory scheme governing 

initiative and referendum petitions requires filings with the Secretary of 

State identifying the persons or entities taking legal responsibility for 

the petition process, while the Nebraska Political Accountability and 

Disclosure Act focuses on identifying those persons or entities financially supporting the petition process.

12. ____: ____. Limiting the category of “sponsors” for purposes of Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 32-1405 (Reissue 2016) to those persons or entities who 

have specifically agreed to be responsible for the petition process and 

serve in the capacities the statutes require of sponsors, lends clarity and 

simplicity to the petition process, thereby facilitating and preserving 

its exercise.

13. ____: ____. A non-named person or entity’s motivation to decline to 

be a named sponsor is irrelevant to the question of who must be listed 

pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1405(1) (Reissue 2016).

14. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum: Intent. The controlling consideration in determining the singleness of a proposed amendment is its singleness of purpose and the relationship of the details to the 

general subject.

15. ____: ____: ____. The controlling consideration in determining the 

singleness of a subject for purposes of article III, § 2, of the Nebraska 

Constitution is its singleness of purpose and relationship of the details to 

the general subject, not the strict necessity of any given detail to carry 

out the general subject.

16. Initiative and Referendum: Statutes: Intent. Whether the elements 

of complex statutory amendments can be characterized as presenting 

different policy issues, the crux of the question is the extent of the differences and how the elements relate to the primary purpose.
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17. Courts: Justiciable Issues. Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that 

courts consider in determining whether they may properly decide a 

controversy.

18. Courts. The fundamental principle of ripeness is that courts should 

avoid entangling themselves, through premature adjudication, in abstract 

disagreements based on contingent future events that may not occur at 

all or may not occur as anticipated.

19. Initiative and Referendum: Justiciable Issues. Unlike challenges to 

the form of a ballot measure or the procedural requirements to its placement on the ballot, which are challenges to whether the measure is 

legally sufficient to be submitted to the voters, substantive challenges to 

proposed initiatives are not justiciable before the measures are adopted 

by voters.

20. Judges: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in determining the relevance of evidence, and a trial 

court’s decision regarding relevance will not be reversed absent an abuse 

of discretion.

21. Judges: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion in a ruling on 

the admissibility of evidence occurs when the trial judge’s reasons 

or rulings are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a 

substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for 

disposition.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Darla

S. Ideus, Judge. Affirmed.

J.L. Spray and Ryan K. McIntosh, of Mattson Ricketts Law 

Firm, for appellants.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Ryan S. Post for 

appellee John Gale.

Andre R. Barry and Shawn D. Renner, of Cline, Williams, 

Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for appellees Insure the 

Good Life, Sarah Amanda Gershon, Kathy Campbell, and 

Rowen Zetterman.

Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, and Freudenberg, 

JJ.
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Freudenberg, J.

NATURE OF CASE

This case presents a challenge to an initiative petition seeking to expand Medicaid coverage. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant sponsors and the 

Secretary of State. The court concluded that the measure did 

not violate the single subject rule, because the maximization 

of federal funding for the expanding of Medicaid eligibility 

had a natural and necessary connection to the expansion. The 

court also concluded that the list of sponsors was not incomplete under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1405(1) (Reissue 2016). One 

of the sponsors, “Insure the Good Life,” was both a political 

committee and a service mark. While the controlling members 

of the committee were named sponsors, the nonprofit organization holding the service mark was not. The court reasoned 

that because the nonprofit organization did not assume responsibility for the initiative process, it was not a sponsor. The 

court found that further challenges to the proposed measure 

as being an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and an improper appropriation were not ripe for review. 

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

An initiative petition to expand coverage in the Medical 

Assistance Act1 was filed with Secretary of State John Gale. 

The petition proposed the addition of “Section 2” to that 

act, with five subsections and the general object to “expand 

eligibility to cover certain adults ages 19 through 64 whose 

incomes are one-hundred-thirty-eight percent (138%) of the 

federal poverty level or below . . . and to maximize federal 

financial participation to fund their care.”

Specifically, the subsections of proposed section 2 would: (1) 

expand Medicaid to adults ages 19 through 64 whose income 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 68-901 to 68-991 (Reissue 2009, Cum. Supp. 2016 & 

Supp. 2017).
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is equal to or less than 138 percent of the federal poverty 

level, (2) direct the Department of Health and Human Services 

(DHHS) to submit a state plan amendment and all other necessary documents seeking required approvals or waivers to the 

federal centers for Medicare and Medicaid services, (3) direct 

DHHS to take all actions necessary to maximize federal financial participation in funding medical assistance pursuant to section 2, (4) require that no greater burdens or restrictions may 

be imposed on persons eligible for medical assistance under 

section 2 than any other population eligible for medical assistance, and (5) require that section 2 shall apply notwithstanding 

any other provision of law or federal waiver.

The sworn statement filed with the Secretary of State 

listed four sponsors of the petition: Sarah Amanda Gershon, 

Kathy Campbell, Dr. Rowen Zetterman, and Insure the Good 

Life (the named sponsors). Insure the Good Life is both a 

ballot question committee and a service mark registered by 

Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest 

(Appleseed).

Mark R. Christensen, a former member of the Nebraska 

Legislature and a parent of a child who received Medicaid 

benefits, and Lydia Brasch, a current member of the Nebraska 

Legislature, brought an action for declaratory judgment under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 (Reissue 2016) 

and injunctive relief pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1412(2) 

(Reissue 2016) against the named sponsors of the petition and 

Gale in his capacity as Secretary of State. They alleged that 

(1) the initiative violated the single subject rule of article III, 

§ 2, of the Nebraska Constitution; (2) the initiative failed to 

contain a sworn statement containing the names and addresses 

of every person, corporation, or association sponsoring the 

petition, as required by § 32-1405(1); (3) the proposed amendment constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 

authority2; and (4) the proposed amendment failed to meet the 

2 See Neb. Const. art. II, § 1.
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criteria set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-804 (Reissue 2010), 

for appropriations.

Specifically, Christensen and Brasch alleged that the initiative violated the single subject rule, because the expansion of Medicaid eligibility and the maximization of federal 

financial participation in funding Medicaid are two separate 

and distinct subjects. They alleged that the initiative violated 

the mandate of § 32-1405(1), that it list every person, corporation, or association sponsoring the petition, because it 

failed to include Appleseed. They alleged that the proposed 

amendment unconstitutionally delegated legislative power by 

directing DHHS to develop a plan for implementation of the 

amendment without sufficient statutory guidance or limitations. And they alleged that the proposed amendment was an 

appropriation, because it “requires DHHS to expand medical 

assistance to thousands of additional individuals at a cost of 

millions of dollars,” and such appropriation did not satisfy the 

criteria of § 49-804.

The Secretary of State and the named sponsors moved 

to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. 

§ 6-1112(b)(1) and (6), for failure to state a claim and lack of 

jurisdiction. Christensen and Brasch moved for a “Judgment on 

the Complaint” or, alternatively, for summary judgment.

At the hearing on the motions, the Secretary of State offered, 

and the court received, exhibits 1 and 2. Exhibit 1 is a copy of 

the petition sponsor’s sworn statement, the object statement, 

the proposed text of the statutory initiative petition, and the 

sample initiative petition form. Exhibit 2 is a certification by 

the Secretary of State that Insure the Good Life was registered 

as a service mark by Appleseed on September 28, 2015, with 

the stated purpose of being used on materials distributed to 

support expansion of Medicaid in the sale or advertising of 

services. These exhibits were also attached to the complaint. 

The parties agreed that the receipt of these exhibits, alone, did 

not convert the motions to dismiss into motions for summary 

judgment. But both parties offered further exhibits.
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Christensen and Brasch offered exhibits 3 and 4. Exhibit 3 

was a certified copy of proposed 2017 Neb. Laws, L.B. 441, 

with attached fiscal analyst notes from the 105th Legislature, 

First Session. The court sustained the sponsors’ and the 

Secretary of State’s relevancy objections, as L.B. 441 was a 

bill that did not pass. The bill sought to expand Medicaid, and 

the attached fiscal analyst notes estimated the increased state 

expenditures that would result.

Exhibit 4 is an exhibit by Christensen and Brasch’s attorney, 

averring that he had personally observed Appleseed’s social 

media accounts displaying the Insure the Good Life logo. 

Several posts were attached. The Secretary of State objected 

on relevancy. The sponsors objected on relevancy and hearsay 

grounds. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the sponsors also objected that it was evidence outside the pleadings. 

Christensen and Brasch renewed the offer of exhibit 4 with the 

understanding that the motions to dismiss would be considered 

motions for summary judgment. The court received exhibit 4 

into evidence.

The sponsors then offered exhibits 5 through 8 for purposes 

of summary judgment. The exhibits contain records of the 

Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission.

Exhibit 5 is a statement of organization of a political committee, stating that Insure the Good Life is such a committee. 

The statement of organization lists Noelle Obermeyer as the 

treasurer of the committee and names Gershon, Campbell, and 

Zetterman as the controlling individuals of the committee.

Exhibits 6 through 8 are Insure the Good Life’s campaign 

statements filed with the commission. Christensen and Brasch 

objected to exhibit 5 on relevancy and foundation grounds 

and to exhibits 6 through 8 on relevancy. Exhibit 7 shows that 

Insure the Good Life disclosed to the commission contributions 

by Appleseed. The court overruled the objections and entered 

exhibits 5 through 8 into evidence.

Treating the motions to dismiss as motions for summary 

judgment without any objection by the parties, the court 
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ultimately entered summary judgment for the named sponsors and the Secretary of State. The court concluded that the 

initiative did not violate the single subject rule because the 

maximization of federal financial participation in the Medicaid 

expansion had a natural and necessary connection to the expansion. The court reasoned that even viewing the evidence in a 

light most favorable to Christensen and Brasch and concluding 

that Appleseed supported the initiative through a public relations campaign and posts on social media accounts, such facts 

would not make Appleseed a sponsor of the petition under 

§ 32-1405(1), because Appleseed did not assume responsibility 

for the initiative process. The court found that the remaining 

separation of powers and appropriations claims were not yet 

ripe for review. Christensen and Brasch appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Christensen and Brasch assign, summarized and restated, 

that the district court erred by (1) dismissing as unripe and 

failing to find merit to its claims that the ballot measure was 

an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and did 

not meet the criteria set forth in § 49-804 for appropriations, 

(2) failing to determine that the initiative petition was constitutionally deficient because it contained more than one subject, 

(3) failing to determine that the initiative petition was constitutionally deficient because it did not list Appleseed as a sponsor, 

and (4) excluding exhibit 3 from the evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court 

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 

against whom the judgment was granted, giving that party 

the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the 

evidence.3

3 City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 781 N.W.2d 456 (2010), abrogated 

on other grounds, City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 282 Neb. 328, 803 

N.W.2d 469 (2011).
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[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below.4

[3] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual 

dispute is a matter of law.5

[4] The exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in determining the relevance of evidence, and a trial court’s decision regarding relevance will not be reversed absent an abuse 

of discretion.6

ANALYSIS

[5-7] Raising issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation, Christensen and Brasch seek to invalidate an initiative petition that received enough signatures to be placed on 

the November 2018 ballot. The power of initiative in article 

III, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution is “[t]he first power 

reserved by the people.”7 The right of initiative is precious 

to the people and one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter.8

Statutory provisions authorizing initiative petitions should be 

construed in such a manner that the legislative power reserved 

in the people is effectual and should not be circumscribed by 

restrictive legislation or narrow and strict interpretation of the 

statutes pertaining to its exercise.9

Sponsors

[8,9] Christensen and Brasch first contend that the initiative 

is invalid because Appleseed was a “sponsor” of the initiative 

4 Hargesheimer v. Gale, 294 Neb. 123, 881 N.W.2d 589 (2016).

5 Loontjer v. Robinson, 266 Neb. 902, 670 N.W.2d 301 (2003).

6 State v. Swindle, 300 Neb. 734, 915 N.W.2d 795 (2018).

7 Neb. Const. art. III, § 2.

8 See Hargesheimer v. Gale, supra note 4.

9 See id.
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and was not listed in the sworn statement as required by 

§ 32-1405(1). Section 32-1405(1) provides:

Prior to obtaining any signatures on an initiative or referendum petition, a statement of the object of the petition and the text of the measure shall be filed with the 

Secretary of State together with a sworn statement containing the names and street addresses of every person, 

corporation, or association sponsoring the petition.

The sworn statement provision of § 32-1405(1) is mandatory.10

Section 32-1405(1) and related statutes do not provide definitions for the word “sponsor” or the phrase “sponsoring the petition.” But we held in Hargesheimer v. Gale11 that sponsoring 

the petition means assuming responsibility for the initiative or 

referendum petition process.

[10] In Hargesheimer, we explained that defining sponsors 

as those who assume responsibility for the petition process 

serves the dual purposes of informing the public of (1) who 

may be held responsible for the petition, exposing themselves 

to potential criminal charges if information is falsified,12 and 

(2) who stands ready to accept responsibility to facilitate the 

referendum’s inclusion on the ballot and defend the referendum 

process if challenged.13 The initiative petition statutes impose 

several responsibilities upon named sponsors once the initiative process has commenced, and we indicated that the primary 

purpose of the “sworn statement containing the names and 

street addresses of every person, corporation, or association 

sponsoring the petition” in § 32-1405(1) is to identify those 

individuals agreeing to accept such responsibilities.14

10 Loontjer v. Robinson, supra note 5.

11 Hargesheimer v. Gale, supra note 4.

12 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1502 (Reissue 2016).

13 Hargesheimer v. Gale, supra note 4.

14 See Loontjer v. Robinson, supra note 5 (Hendry, C.J., concurring in result; 

Gerrard, J., joins). See, also, e.g., §§ 32-1405(2) and 32-1412(2) and Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 32-1409(3) (Reissue 2010).
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We specifically rejected the argument that sponsors must 

include all financial contributors to the petition, so that the 

public has notice of who such persons are. We explained that 

not only did amendments to § 32-1405(1) remove language 

including as sponsors all individuals or entities “‘“contributing 

or pledging contribution of money or other things of value,”’”15

the public has access to the identity of all financial contributors through reports filed with the Nebraska Accountability and 

Disclosure Commission.16

[11] We summarized that the statutory scheme governing 

initiative and referendum petitions17 requires filings with the 

Secretary of State identifying the persons or entities taking 

legal responsibility for the petition process, while the Nebraska 

Political Accountability and Disclosure Act18 focuses on identifying those persons or entities financially supporting the petition process.19

[12] We also explained that limiting the category of “sponsors” for purposes of § 32-1405 to “those persons or entities 

who have specifically agreed to be responsible for the petition 

process and serve in the capacities the statutes require of sponsors,” lent clarity and simplicity to the petition process, thereby 

facilitating and preserving its exercise.20 To interpret the term 

more broadly would make “compliance with the statute more 

precarious” by “inject[ing] ambiguity” and “expos[ing] the 

petition process to procedural challenges and the risk of defects 

unrelated to the substance of the petition.”21

15 Hargesheimer v. Gale, supra note 4, 294 Neb. at 132, 881 N.W.2d at 596-

97 (emphasis omitted).

16 See, generally, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 49-1401 to 49-14,141 (Reissue 2010, 

Cum. Supp. 2016 & Supp. 2017).

17 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-1401 to 32-1417 (Reissue 2016).

18 §§ 49-1401 to 49-14,141.

19 See Hargesheimer v. Gale, supra note 4.

20 Id. at 134-35, 881 N.W.2d at 598.

21 Id. at 134, 881 N.W.2d at 598.
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Christensen and Brasch attempt to distinguish this case 

from Hargesheimer by focusing on the novel fact that Insure 

the Good Life was a service mark registered by Appleseed. 

They do not address the fact that Insure the Good Life is also a 

registered political committee and that all its controlling members were named in the sworn statement as sponsors.

[13] A “[s]ervice mark” is “any word, name, symbol, or 

device or any combination thereof used by a person, to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a 

unique service, from the services of others.”22 To be licensed 

to use a service mark is to have the right or permission to use 

it.23 Christensen and Brasch argue that Appleseed was a sponsor not because of its involvement in financing or promoting 

the petition, but because it purposefully attempted to deceive 

voters by participating in the initiative process under a service mark without listing its corporate identity. They argue 

that because Insure the Good Life was a sponsor, Appleseed 

must also be a sponsor. Christensen and Brasch’s arguments 

are not meaningfully different than the arguments that were 

made in Loontjer v. Robinson, of hiding behind a “‘sham 

committee.’”24 In the course of setting forth the definition 

of sponsor that we later expressly adopted in Hargesheimer, 

Chief Justice Hendry found those arguments unpersuasive. A 

non-named person or entity’s motivation to decline to be a 

named sponsor is irrelevant to the question of who must be 

listed pursuant to § 32-1405(1).

We rejected in Hargesheimer the concept of analyzing a 

person or entity’s involvement in financing or promoting the 

petition, because doing so would inject ambiguity, making 

compliance with the statute more precarious and exposing the 

22 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-128(8) (Reissue 2014). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 28-618(19) (Reissue 2016) and 87-301(22) (Cum. Supp. 2016).

23 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1714.01 (Reissue 2010).

24 Loontjer v. Robinson, supra note 5, 266 Neb. at 916, 670 N.W.2d at 312 

(Hendry, C.J., concurring in result; Gerrard, J., joins).
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petition process to procedural challenges and the risk of defects 

unrelated to the substance of the petition.25 To inject into the 

sponsorship analysis questions of intent, as Christensen and 

Brasch suggest we ought, would inject even more ambiguity 

into the petition process than the test suggested and rejected by 

this court in Hargesheimer. This would unnecessarily undermine the first power reserved by the people.

Again, the sponsor is nothing more than the person or entity 

identifying himself, herself, or itself as willing to assume 

statutory responsibilities once the initiative process has commenced. Under the definition adopted in Hargesheimer, Insure 

the Good Life, Gershon, Campbell, and Zetterman are the 

sponsors, and there are no other persons or entities who are 

sponsors. The issues raised by Christensen and Brasch concerning the public’s need to know who or what entity might be 

“hiding” their involvement are addressed through the Nebraska 

Political Accountability and Disclosure Act and Appleseed’s 

disclosure of its contributions to Insure the Good Life, a ballot 

question committee.

We agree with the district court that the list of sponsors in the 

sworn statement is complete and does not violate § 32-1405(1).

Single Subject

Second, Christensen and Brasch challenge the initiative 

as violating the single subject rule. Article III, § 2, of the 

Nebraska Constitution provides, among other matters related 

to initiatives, that “[i]nitiative measures shall contain only one 

subject.” A purpose of this language is to avoid voter confusion 

and logrolling, which is the practice of combining dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment so that voters 

must vote for or against the whole package even though they 

would have voted differently had the propositions been submitted separately.26

25 See Hargesheimer v. Gale, supra note 4.

26 See State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014).
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[14] We, like the majority of jurisdictions, follow the natural and necessary connection test: “‘[W]here the limits of a 

proposed law, having natural and necessary connection with 

each other, and, together, are a part of one general subject, the 

proposal is a single and not a dual proposition.’”27 The controlling consideration in determining the singleness of a proposed 

amendment is its singleness of purpose and the relationship 

of the details to the general subject.28 The general subject is 

defined by its primary purpose.29

In State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale,

30 we held that a proposed ballot measure violated the separate-vote provision of 

article XVI, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution, which imposes 

the same requirements as the single subject provision under 

article III, § 2. The proposed ballot measure asked voters to amend the state Constitution, which permitted only 

live and simulcast horseracing wagers, in order to allow 

for slot-machine-type gambling on replayed horseraces.31

Additionally, as to both live and replayed horseracing, the 

measure proposed directing the tax revenues to property tax 

relief and education funding, thereby redirecting the live 

horseracing tax revenue which was at that time going elsewhere.32 The proposed amendments did not otherwise address 

live horseracing.

We said that the legalization of a new form of horseracing 

lacked a natural and necessary connection to the measure’s 

proposal to the use tax revenues for property tax relief and 

education.33 We explained:

27 Id. at 999, 853 N.W.2d at 513. See, also, Munch v. Tusa, 140 Neb. 457, 

300 N.W. 385 (1941).

28 See State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 26.

29 See id.

30 Id.

31 See id.

32 See id.

33 See id.
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The appropriation proposal’s only connection to the 

wagering proposal was to enhance the odds that voters 

would approve the new form of wagering. Many voters 

who might oppose proposals for new forms of wagering, standing alone, might nonetheless want new funding 

for property tax relief and kindergarten through 12th 

grade education. But they would be presented with a 

take-it-or-leave-it proposition. And this type of proposition is at the heart of the prohibition against logrolling. 

Conversely, even voters who would support the new type 

of wagering might prefer that the parimutuel tax revenues continue to be credited to the state’s general fund, 

instead of devoted exclusively to property tax relief 

and education.34

In the case before us, we do not view the funding proposal 

in section two of the proposed initiative language as being 

only to enhance the odds that voters would approve Medicaid 

expansion. And furthermore, in contrast, in City of Fremont v. 

Kotas,

35 we held that an initiative petition did not violate the 

single subject rule. Despite several components of the proposed measure dealing with the subjects of occupancy, licensing, electronic verification, government uses, resources, and 

penalties, and the application to both landlords and employers, 

we held that these subjects had a natural and necessary connection with each other and were part of the general subject of 

regulating illegal immigration. The proposed measure was not 

confusing or deceiving to the voters.36

Christensen and Brasch argue that there were two distinct 

subjects in the initiative: (1) the expansion of Medicaid and 

(2) whether such expansion would be funded, as much as 

possible, by the federal government. While they argue for 

the first time on appeal that the initiative also contained the 

34 Id. at 1004, 853 N.W.2d at 515.

35 City of Fremont v. Kotas, supra note 3.

36 See id.
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separate subject of “delegat[ing] to the executive branch 

the obligation to amend the State’s Medicaid plan adopting, 

accepting and assenting to all applicable provisions of Title 

XIX and Title XXI of the federal Social Security Act,” they 

did not raise this contention below.37 Therefore, we will not 

address it.38

We agree with the district court that the expansion of 

Medicaid and its funding have a natural and necessary connection with each other and, thus, a singleness of purpose. The 

general subject is Medicaid expansion, and maximizing federal 

funding for that expansion is a detail related to the singleness 

of purpose of expanding Medicaid.

[15] This ballot measure is not like the one in State ex rel. 

Loontjer. It is more akin to Kotas, where several subelements 

related to the single subject of regulating illegal immigration. The single subject test is not, as Christensen and Brasch 

propose, whether the initiative could theoretically have proposed the expansion of Medicaid without also proposing that 

federal funding is maximized in order to do so; i.e., whether 

federal dollars are absolutely “necessary” to effectuate an 

increase in Medicaid. The controlling consideration in determining the singleness of a subject for purposes of article III, 

§ 2, of the Nebraska Constitution is its singleness of purpose 

and relationship of the details to the general subject, not 

the strict necessity of any given detail to carry out the general subject.39

[16] Because its parts all relate to the same general subject, the initiative petition does not create voter confusion and 

logrolling. Christensen and Brasch assert that some voters 

might be in favor of Medicaid expansion but not in favor of 

expanding federal funding and that the measure presents “two 

separate, large substantive police [sic] issues with a single 

37 Brief for appellants at 12.

38 See, e.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 290 Neb. 973, 863 N.W.2d 153 (2015).

39 See State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 26.
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vote.”40 Whether the elements of complex statutory amendments can be characterized as presenting different policy 

issues, the crux of the question is the extent of the differences 

and how the elements relate to the primary purpose.

The voters considering the initiative petition here at issue 

are unlikely to be confused and persuaded to vote for the primary purpose of expanding Medicaid in order to obtain, more 

generally, federal funds. The subject of federal funding does 

not present a level of dissimilarity that creates a risk of confusion and logrolling.

We agree with the district court that the initiative did not 

violate the single subject rule.

Ripeness

[17,18] Likewise, we agree with the district court that 

Christensen and Brasch’s remaining two challenges are not 

ripe for review. Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that courts 

consider in determining whether they may properly decide a 

controversy.41 The fundamental principle of ripeness is that 

courts should avoid entangling themselves, through premature adjudication, in abstract disagreements based on contingent future events that may not occur at all or may not occur 

as anticipated.42

[19] Unlike challenges to the form of a ballot measure or 

the procedural requirements to its placement on the ballot, 

which are challenges to whether the measure is legally sufficient to be submitted to the voters, substantive challenges 

to proposed initiatives are not justiciable before the measures 

are adopted by voters.43 An opinion on the substantive challenge based on the contingent future event of the measure’s 

passage would be merely advisory. Furthermore, preelection 

40 Brief for appellants at 14.

41 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 26.

42 Id.

43 See, id.; City of Fremont v. Kotas, supra note 3.
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judicial review of substantive challenges to initiatives tends to 

lessen the effectiveness of the constitutional initiative power 

“reserved by the people,”44 and, regardless of the merits of 

the proposed initiative, inappropriately injects the courts into 

political debates.45

Christensen and Brasch rely on State ex rel. Brant v. 

Beermann46 to argue that a challenge to the measure for its 

substantive defects, at least where those defects touch upon the 

requirements of article III, § 2, of the Nebraska Constitution, 

is ripe when patently clear. In State ex rel. Brant, we refused 

to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to 

place a measure on the ballot, after the Secretary of State had 

determined that the measure was a mere statement of position 

and had no semblance of a law within the initiative provisions 

of the constitution. But we did not specifically address ripeness, and in State ex rel. Loontjer, we expressly recognized 

that our holding in State ex rel. Brant had been abrogated by 

Duggan v. Beermann.47

We said in State ex rel. Loontjer that we had “assumed 

[in State ex rel. Brant] the Secretary [of State] could reject 

a proposed ballot measure for its substantive constitutional 

defects.”48 But in Duggan, we had made clear that substantive 

defects are not ripe for review.49

A substantive challenge to a ballot measure is not ripe until 

the measure is voted into law. Both Christensen and Brasch’s 

challenges to the proposed law as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and as violating the criteria 

44 Neb. Const. art. III, § 2.

45 Stewart v. Advanced Gaming Tech., 272 Neb. 471, 723 N.W.2d 65 (2006).

46 State ex rel. Brant v. Beermann, 217 Neb. 632, 350 N.W.2d 18 (1984).

47 Duggan v. Beermann, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68 (1996). See State ex 

rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 26.

48 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 26, 288 Neb. at 987, 853 N.W.2d 

at 505.

49 See, id. (citing Duggan v. Beermann, supra note 47).
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for appropriations set forth in § 49-804 are substantive challenges to the initiative. These substantive challenges are not 

ripe for judicial review, and we express no opinion on any 

of them.

Exhibit 3

[20,21] Finally, Christensen and Brasch assert that the district court erred in sustaining the Secretary of State and named 

sponsors’ relevancy objection to exhibit 3. The exercise of 

judicial discretion is implicit in determining the relevance of 

evidence, and a trial court’s decision regarding relevance will 

not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.50 An abuse of 

discretion in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence occurs 

when the trial judge’s reasons or rulings are clearly untenable, 

unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying 

just results in matters submitted for disposition.51 Christensen 

and Brasch assert that exhibit 3 was relevant to demonstrate 

the extent of the expenditure that the proposed measure would 

entail. In other words, they assert that exhibit 3 was relevant 

to their appropriations challenge. Because that challenge was 

not ripe, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

that exhibit 3 was not relevant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court, which dismissed Christensen and Brasch’s complaint with prejudice.

Affirmed.

Miller-Lerman, J., participating on briefs.

Papik, J., not participating.

50 State v. Swindle, supra note 6.

51 Worth v. Kolbeck, 273 Neb. 163, 728 N.W.2d 282 (2007).