[Cite as State v. Searight, 2023-Ohio-3584.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

JARRIEL SEARIGHT,

 Defendant-Appellant.

:

:

:

:

:

:

APPEAL NO. C-230060

TRIAL NO. B-2102119

 O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause

Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 4, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Angela J. Glaser, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

BERGERON, Judge.

{¶1} Following pleas of no contest to felony charges of fentanyl trafficking 

and possession, the trial court sentenced defendant-appellant Jarriel Searight to an 

aggregate sentence of 3 to 4 1/2 years in prison under Ohio’s Reagan Tokes Law 

(“RTL”). Mr. Searight now appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court failed to 

provide the proper RTL notifications at his sentencing hearing. The state concedes 

this point, and we agree. Mr. Searight also challenges the RTL’s constitutionality, but, 

in this respect, he essentially recycles arguments already rejected by this court and the 

Supreme Court of Ohio while failing to develop a unique argument under the Ohio 

Constitution. Therefore, we uphold the substance of his pleas and sentence, but we 

remand solely for proper sentencing notifications under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). Apart 

from the discrete matter remanded, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.

{¶2} In April 2021, Cincinnati police officers pulled Mr. Searight over for an 

open traffic capias. After smelling marijuana and observing “shake,” a small amount 

of marijuana ash and dust, on the back seat of his car, the officers removed Mr. 

Searight and searched the vehicle. They located white powders, later identified as 

fentanyl and fluorofentantyl, and several scales. Prosecutors indicted him on two 

counts of fentanyl trafficking and two counts of fentanyl possession, all second-degree 

felonies. 

{¶3} At a change of plea hearing in October 2022, Mr. Searight entered no 

contest pleas to all four charges. Because each charge represented a second-degree 

felony not eligible for a life sentence, the RTL’s indefinite sentencing scheme applied. 

Prior to accepting his pleas, the trial court informed Mr. Searight that it could sentence 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3

him to prison for a minimum of 2 years to a maximum of 8 years on each count. The 

court explained that his sentence would be indefinite, and that prison administrators 

could increase his time in prison by up to 50 percent based on his conduct in prison. 

Mr. Searight signed a plea form further elaborating upon this sentencing structure 

created by the RTL, including the presumption of release at the end of his minimum 

term and the conditions under which prison administrators could extend his sentence. 

{¶4} Three months later, the trial court sentenced Mr. Searight to two prison 

terms of 3 to 4 1/2 years each, run concurrently, after merging the possession counts 

into the trafficking counts. At the January 2023 sentencing hearing, the trial court 

explained that the RTL applied but skimmed over the details. The court explained, 

“Mr. Searight, your sentence is three years but you’re subject to an additional one-anda-half, not at my discretion but at the discretion of your institution or the Department 

of Corrections,” and wrapped up the hearing.

{¶5} Mr. Searight now claims error in the trial court’s failure to apprise him 

of the RTL sentencing hearing notifications required under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). He 

also challenges the RTL’s constitutionality, alleging violations of due process, the right 

to trial by jury, and separation of powers under both the federal and state 

constitutions. 

II.

{¶6} Mr. Searight’s first assignment of error strikes at the sentencing court’s

abbreviated summary of the RTL’s sentencing framework. He maintains, and the state 

concedes, that the trial court failed to apprise him of the RTL sentencing hearing 

notifications required under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). “When sentencing an offender to 

a nonlife felony indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes Law, a trial court must 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4

advise the offender of the five notifications set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v) at 

the sentencing hearing to fulfill the requirements of the statute.” State v. Jackson, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-200332, 2022-Ohio-3449, ¶ 20, citing State v. Whitehead, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109599, 2021-Ohio-847, ¶ 43. The required notifications include 

descriptions of the RTL’s central mechanism for extending a prisoner’s sentence: the 

prisoner’s presumption of release, the prison administration’s ability to rebut the 

presumption, and the conditions and consequences of rebuttal. R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v). Although the language of Mr. Searight’s assignment of error 

suggests that the trial court’s sentencing discourse rendered the pleas not knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary, the substance of his argument and his request for proper 

notifications on remand stick to the sentence, not the pleas. Likewise, our review

considers only how the failure to deliver the notifications affects his sentence, as we 

see no infirmity with the plea colloquy.

{¶7} The statute’s command regarding the RTL notifications is clear: “if the 

sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary 

or required, the court shall do all of the following: * * * [i]f the prison term is a nonlife felony indefinite prison term, notify the offender of all of the [R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications].” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) and

(B)(2)(c). In several recent decisions, this court has consistently “interpret[ed] this 

language as a mandatory directive.” State v. Greene, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220160, 

2022-Ohio-4536, ¶ 6; see Jackson at ¶ 20; State v. Kelly, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C200013, 2022-Ohio-3628, ¶ 9 (“A trial court must advise a defendant of all five 

notifications set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the sentencing hearing.”). Further, 

we have held that a trial court’s failure to advise the defendant of the notifications 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5

during the sentencing hearing is not cured by inclusion of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) 

provisions in a plea entry signed by the defendant. Greene at ¶ 3, 11. 

{¶8} Here, like in Greene, the plea entry’s description of the RTL does not 

suffice. Id. Similarly, the trial court’s discussion of the RTL’s sentencing system at the 

October 2022 plea hearing does not satisfy the statutory requirement that the trial 

court deliver the notifications “at the sentencing hearing.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2); see 

Greene at ¶ 9; Jackson at ¶ 20; Kelly at ¶ 9. Mr. Searight’s sentencing hearing took 

place three months later, in January 2023, and the extent of the sentencing court’s 

description of the RTL at that hearing fell short of what the legislature directs in R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(c). In accordance with our prior decisions and authority from other 

districts, remand for proper notification is required. Greene at ¶ 10 (requiring remand 

and collecting similar decisions from other districts). 

{¶9} We sustain Mr. Searight’s first assignment of error only insofar as it 

challenges the trial court’s failure to notify Mr. Searight of the RTL provisions required 

under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). Consistent with Greene, Jackson, and Kelly, we remand 

solely for the trial court to complete the proper notifications. In all other respects, 

including the length and nature of Mr. Searight’s sentence and the validity of his pleas, 

we overrule the first assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

III.

{¶10} Mr. Searight next challenges the constitutionality of the RTL, assigning 

error on issues of due process (second assignment), trial by jury (third), and 

separation of powers (fourth). For each assignment, he raises arguments under, or at 

least references, both the federal and state constitutions. Ultimately, however, his 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

6

arguments break no new ground, attempting only to revive arguments already rejected

by this court and the Supreme Court of Ohio.

{¶11} Mr. Searight first maintains that R.C. 2967.271, the RTL’s core 

sentencing provision, on its face deprives criminal defendants of liberty without 

protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution. The Supreme Court of Ohio recently upheld the RTL against a due 

process attack, concluding that the law was not void for vagueness and “is not facially 

unconstitutional because it provides that offenders receive a hearing before they may 

be deprived of their liberty interest.” State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio2535, ¶ 40. However, the court “confine[d] [its] discussion” in Hacker to the federal 

Due Process Clause because the appellants there did not separately raise a challenge 

under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution (Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause).

Id. at ¶ 29, fn. 3. Nevertheless, prior to the court’s decision in Hacker, this court 

rejected substantive and procedural due process arguments against the RTL under 

both the federal Due Process Clause and Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause, treating 

them as “equivalent in the protections they afford” under those circumstances. State 

v. Guyton, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190657, 2022-Ohio-2962, ¶ 29, appeal allowed, 

168 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2022-Ohio-3752, 196 N.E.3d 850, citing Stolz v. J & B Steel 

Erectors, Inc., 155 Ohio St.3d 567, 2018-Ohio-5088, 122 N.E.3d 1228, ¶ 12.

{¶12} Here, by citing to Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution instead 

of Section 16’s Due Course of Law Clause, Mr. Searight perhaps hints at a different 

approach. Section 10 covers Ohio criminal defendants’ right to confront witnesses, to 

a speedy and public trial, and to the privilege against self-incrimination, among other 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

7

protections. Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. However, because he fails to

explain how or why Section 10 would provide due process protections beyond those 

afforded to him by the federal Due Process Clause or by Ohio’s Due Course of Law 

Clause, we decline to ponder these questions.

{¶13} Mr. Searight next faults the RTL as a violation of the right to trial by jury 

under the federal Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 5 of the 

Ohio Constitution. Not so, under Hacker and this court’s precedent. Although the 

Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a jury trial right argument against the RTL without 

distinguishing between the federal Sixth Amendment’s and the Ohio Constitution’s 

jury trial right, this court disposed of an argument citing both provisions. See Hacker

at ¶ 28; State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210449, 2022-Ohio-3629, ¶ 8, 13.

Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court turned down separation of powers arguments akin to 

those raised by Mr. Searight under both the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio 

Constitution. Hacker at ¶ 25. Without a federal or state constitutional leg to stand on, 

Mr. Searight’s due process, jury trial, and separation of powers arguments against the 

RTL collapse. We therefore overrule his second, third, and fourth assignments of 

error.

* * *

{¶14} Ultimately, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and remand

this cause for the limited purpose of informing Mr. Searight of the Reagan Tokes Law 

sentencing notifications required under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), sustaining in part and 

overruling in part his first assignment of error. We overrule his second, third, and 

fourth assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

8

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

ZAYAS, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.