alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 12.1

COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES  EXHIBIT 12.1COMPUTATION OF THE RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

The following table sets forth the ratio of earnings to fixed charges of the Company for the six months ended June 30, 2008 and
2007 and the years ended December 31, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004 and 2003, computed by dividing net fixed charges (interest expense on all debt plus the interest element (one-third) of
operating leases) into earnings (earnings before income taxes and fixed charges).

Six Months Ended
June 30,

Years Ended
December 31,(dollar amounts in thousands)

2008

2007

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003Net (loss) earnings

$
(3,223,152
)
$
919,049

$
(703,538
)
$
2,674,846

$
2,528,090

$
2,197,574

$
2,372,950Income tax (benefit) expense


(2,084,911
)

446,444


(606,736
)

1,659,289


1,619,676


1,398,299


1,472,822Interest expense


3,881,834


5,392,693


10,287,800


9,133,682


5,616,425


2,608,338


1,940,207Interest portion of rental


43,976


43,218


85,528


77,055


62,104


53,562


36,565Earnings available to cover fixed charges

$
(1,382,253
)
$
6,801,404

$
9,063,054

$
13,544,872

$
9,826,295

$
6,257,773

$
5,822,544Fixed charges:Interest expense

$
3,881,834

$
5,392,693

$
10,287,800

$
9,133,682

$
5,616,425

$
2,608,338

$
1,940,207Interest portion of rental expense


43,976


43,218


85,528


77,055


62,104


53,562


36,565Total fixed charges

$
3,925,810

$
5,435,911

$
10,373,328

$
9,210,737

$
5,678,529

$
2,661,900

$
1,976,772Ratio of earnings to fixed charges


(0.35
)

1.25


0.87


1.47


1.73


2.35


2.95


---



QuickLinks
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-60131

Conference Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

L.C. LEWIS,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:94-cr-88-BN

- - - - - - - - - -

(October 19, 1995)

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

L.C. Lewis challenges the sentence he received after he

pleaded guilty to distributing one ounce of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). According to Lewis there is

no scientific distinction between cocaine base and cocaine

powder, and, therefore, no reason for an enhanced penalty.

The disparate sentencing provisions for crack cocaine and

cocaine powder in the sentencing guidelines do not violate
No. 95-60131

-2-

constitutional due process guarantees. United States v. Thomas,

932 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1038

(1992). This court noted that Congress was entitled to treat the

two substances differently because they are different chemical

substances that are prepared for use in different manners. Id.;

United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1992). 

"[T]he fact that crack cocaine is more addictive, more dangerous,

and can therefore be sold in smaller quantities is reason enough

for providing harsher penalties for its possession." United

States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504

U.S. 928 (1992). Thus, the district court did not incorrectly

apply the guidelines.

Lewis's argument that the rule of lenity should apply to his

sentence because Congress did not define cocaine base is also

foreclosed by existing case law. In Thomas, 932 F.2d at 1090,

the court proclaimed: "We also reject the contention that [§ 841]

is infirm because it does not define the term `cocaine base.'" 

Lewis's argument that the court should look to a purported

amendment to the guidelines which does away with any distinction

between cocaine base and cocaine powder is likewise without

merit.

This appeal borders on being frivolous. Counsel cites no

cases in this Circuit to support any of his arguments. In fact,

two of his arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit

case law, which he fails to acknowledge. Additionally, this

court will not apply a purported proposed amendment to the

guidelines that has yet to take effect. And yet, counsel
No. 95-60131

-3-

requests oral argument to expound his groundless contentions. 

Counsel is cautioned that he is subject to sanctions and has a

duty not to bring frivolous appeals. See United States v.

Burleson, 22 F.3d 93, 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 283

(1994).

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002











In connection with the Annual Report of Sooner Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, R.C. Cunningham II, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Date:  December 23, 2010/s/ R.C. Cunningham IIR.C. Cunningham IIChief Executive Officer






A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Sooner Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Sooner Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

,

v.

DAVID BARRON

,

Appellee

. '

'

'

'

'

' No. 08

- 1 2

- 00 245

- CR

Appeal from the

2 10 th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 20120D01101 )

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appell ee’ s third motion for extension of time to file the brief

until August 14 , 2013

. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

THE APPELLEE’ S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. M. Clara Hernandez

, the Appell ee’ s Attorney

,

prepare the Appell ee’ s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before August 14 , 201 3

.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10 th day of July , 201 3

.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera and Rodriguez, JJ.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2463 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to require the TSA to offer certain 

secondary screenings of passengers prior to a physical inspection if an 

object of concern is detected, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 13, 2021 

Mr. COHEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Homeland Security 

A BILL 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to require the TSA 

to offer certain secondary screenings of passengers prior 

to a physical inspection if an object of concern is detected, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘TSA Second Screening 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AVAILABILITY OF SECONDARY SCREENING. 

7 Subparagraph (B) of section 44901(l)(2) of title 49, 

8 United States Code, is amended by inserting before the 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2463 IH

1 period at the end the following: ‘‘, including by ensuring 

2 passengers undergoing such screening are afforded an op3 portunity to undergo a second such screening prior to un4 dergoing a physical inspection if such initial screening de5 tects an object of concern’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 235 (Monday, December 8, 1997)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 64521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-32036]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 71

[Airspace Docket No. 97-AWP-17]


Establishment of VOR Federal Airway; CA

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; delay of effective date.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action delays the effective date for the establishment of 
Federal Airway 607 (V-607) between Mendocino, CA, and Arcata, CA, until 
further notice. The FAA is taking this action due to a procedural 
change requiring the addition of an intersection on V-607. The addition 
of the intersection necessitates additional flight inspection.

DATES: The effective date of 0901 UTC, January 1, 1998, is delayed 
until further notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken McElroy, Airspace and Rules 
Division, ATA-400, Office of Air Traffic Airspace Management, Federal 
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 
20591; telephone: (202) 267-8783.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

    Airspace Docket No. 97-AWP-17, published in the Federal Register on 
October 27, 1997, (62 FR 55502), established V-607 between Mendocino, 
CA, and Arcata, CA. A need to establish an intersection at the dogleg 
of the Arcata 153 deg. radial and the Mendocino 346 deg. radial 
requires additional flight inspection and delays the effective date of 
V-607 until further notice.
    The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an 
established body of technical regulations for which frequent and 
routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. 
Therefore, this regulation (1) is not a significant regulatory action 
under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under 
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 
1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a Regulatory Evaluation 
as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter 
that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is 
certified that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 71

    Airspace, Incorporation by reference, Navigation (air).

Delay of Effective Date

    The effective date of the final rule, Airspace Docket 97-AWP-17, as 
published in the Federal Register on October 27, 1997 (62 FR 55502), is 
hereby delayed until further notice.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40120; E.O. 10854, 24 
FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on November 26, 1997.
Nancy B. Kalinowski,
Acting Program Director for Air Traffic Airspace Management.
[FR Doc. 97-32036 Filed 12-5-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
• 

The Galena Gazette 

Galena Gazette 

716 S. Bench St 

PO Box 319, 

Galena, IL 61036-

0319 

815-777-6929 

815-777-0019 

fax: 815-777-3809 

Editor: 

Hillary Dickerson 

email: editor@ 

galgazette.com 

Reporter: 

Art Ricker 

email: iambitusa 

@att.net 

April16, 2013 

FOIA/PA Request 

Disclosure Services 

Department of the Treasury 

Washington, D.C. 20220 

Pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act I 

formally request the following: 

1. A copy of the 31 CFR application completed for travel to Cuba 

by: 

Beyonce Giselle Knowles {Sasha Fierce) 

2. A copy of the 31 CFR application completed for travel to Cuba 

by: 

Shawn Corey Carter {J-Z) 

Your prompt attention to this request -~~ begre~r 

JJ 

'.;,., }' ' I 

() 

n 

galenagazette.com galenagazette.com galenagazette.com ga1enagazette.com galenagazette.com
#### Pauline BOYLES and Arthur Boyles, her husband, Appellants, v. Kathryn OSINGA, and First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County, Appellees.

No. 2651.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Nov. 26, 1969.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.01

                    Rule 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) Certifications
                    ---------------------------------------

I, Kenneth E. Steben, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K of Futures Portfolio Fund Limited
Partnership.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

     a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
     disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
     to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
     its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
     entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
     prepared;

     b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
     and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
     effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
     the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
     control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
     most recent fiscal quarter ( the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in
     the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
     reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control
     over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
     operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
     reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
     process, summarize and report financial information; and

     b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
     employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
     control over financial reporting.

Date: March 31, 2006

/s/ Kenneth E. Steben
---------------------
By:
Kenneth E. Steben
President of the General Partner
(Principal Executive Officer)
#### Michael John McALLISTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-469.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 15, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of DE Acquisition 3, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 28, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Dennis Nguyen, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Dennis Nguyen

Dennis Nguyen

Principal Financial Officer

May 31, 2011
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert Louis KOVACH, Appellee.

No. 76-1723.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 5, 1977.

As Modified On Denial of Rehearing Nov. 2, 1977.

*802Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

Jack 0. Johnson, Public Defender, and Robert H. Grizzard, II, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the state from an order of discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule.

It is difficult to state the pertinent dates and facts with particularity because no witnesses testified at the hearing on the motion for discharge. The judge made his ruling based on proffers of what the witnesses would testify made by both attorneys. Suffice it to say, the record clearly reflects that the judge entered the order of discharge because he was of the view that after the appellee was located in Ohio the speedy trial time ran out when the state failed to follow through with extradition.

If the appellee failed to voluntarily waive extradition, this case would be governed by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(e) which provides that an accused is not entitled to compute for speedy trial purposes the time which elapses when he voluntarily removes himself from the jurisdiction of the court or otherwise acts to make himself unavailable for trial. *Cf. O’Bryan v. State,*326 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

Since the record leaves so much doubt as to what really occurred, the order of discharge is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded with directions to have a further hearing at which time testimony can be taken toward developing whether the ap-pellee was be entitled to discharge for failure to provide him with a speedy trial.

McNULTY, Acting C. J., and GRIMES and OTT, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 240 (Monday, December 15, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 65733]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-32664]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service


Surety Companies Acceptable on Federal Bonds Termination of 
Authority: Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company

SUMMARY: Dept. Circ. 570, 1997--Rev., Supp. No. 5.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Surety Bond Branch (202) 874-7116.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that the Certificate 
of Authority issued by the Treasury to Pennsylvania Manufacturers' 
Association Insurance Company, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, under the 
United States Code, Title 31, Sections 9304-9308, to qualify as an 
acceptable surety on Federal bonds was terminated effective November 
13, 1997.
    The Company was last listed as an acceptable surety on Federal 
bonds at 62 FR 35571, July 1, 1997.
    With respect to any bonds currently in force with Pennsylvania 
Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company, bond-approving officers 
may let such bonds run to expiration and need not secure new bonds. 
However, no new bonds should be accepted. In addition, bonds that are 
continuous in nature should not be renewed.
    The Treasury Department Circular 570 may be viewed and downloaded 
through the Internet (http://www.fms.treas.gov/c570.html) or through 
our computerized public bulletin board system at (202) 874-6887. A hard 
copy may be purchased from the Government Printing Office (GPO), 
Subscription Service, Washington, DC, telephone (202) 512-1800. When 
ordering the Circular from GPO, use the following stock number: 048-
000-00509-8.
    Questions concerning this notice may be directed to the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, Funds 
Management Division, Surety Bond Branch, 3700 East-West Highway, Room 
6A11, Hyattsville, MD 20782.

    Dated: December 4, 1997.
Charles F. Schwan III,
Director, Funds Management Division, Financial Management Service.
[FR Doc. 97-32664 Filed 12-12-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-35-M
MATERIALS NOT INCLUDED IN

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) DOCKET

FAA-2011-1285

Docket Number

2010-SW-073-AD

Directorate Identifier

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in DMS Docket and Maintained 

in the Supplemental AD Docket

Eurocopter Emergency ASB Nos. BO105-10-124 and BO105LS-10-12

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Office of the Regional Counsel,

Southwest Region

Rules Docket

2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663

Fort Worth, Texas 76137

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 23

- 20610 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,** 
Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus
**Kenneth Adams,**
Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:22

- CR

- 389

- 1

**______________________________** Before **Haynes, Higginson,** and **Douglas,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** ***** Kenneth Adams appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers. The district court sentenced Adams to the top of the guidelines range of imprisonment.

**_____________________**

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir**

**. R** 

**.** 47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED September 13, 2024 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 23-20610 Document: 54-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/13/2024No. 23

- 20610

2 Adams argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court improperly balanced the sentencing factors. A sentence imposed within a properly calculated guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Cooks , 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009). The presumption of reasonableness “is rebutted only upon a showing that the sentence does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor , or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.” Id

. Before imposing the sentence, the district court considered (1) Adams’s sentencing memorandum, which included requests for downward departures and a sentence outside of the guidelines range , (2) the Government’s motion for a downward departure, and (3) the parties’ arguments in favor of a lesser sentence. T he district court imposed a sentence within the guidelines based on Adams’s criminal history

. Adams has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness. Accordingly, the judgment is **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 23-20610 Document: 54-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/13/2024