COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Senior Judge Overton*

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JAMES RODNEY SAULS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY 

v. Record No. 0947-98-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 FEBRUARY 2, 1999 

BARBARA SAULS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge 

 Robert E. Long (Deirdre Farrington, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 E. Thomas Cox for appellee. 

 James Rodney Sauls (husband) appeals a decree granting 

Barbara Sauls (wife) a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. He has 

presented several issues for appellate review, all of which 

question the trial court's decision to incorporate the parties' 

settlement agreement into the divorce decree. Because we hold 

that the trial court did not err by incorporating the agreement, 

we affirm. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedental 

value, no recitation of the facts is necessary. 

 

 *Judge Overton participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

January 31, 1999 and thereafter by his designation as a senior 

judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.01:1. 

 **Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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 "Property settlement agreements are contracts subject to the 

same rules of formation, validity, and interpretation as other 

contracts." Bergman v. Bergman, 25 Va. App. 204, 211, 487 S.E.2d 

264, 267 (1997) (citing Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 513, 351 

S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986)). If the agreement is valid, the trial 

court may incorporate it into a final decree of divorce. See

Code § 20-109.1. On appeal, we will reverse the trial court's 

decision to incorporate such an agreement only upon an abuse of 

discretion. See Forrest v. Forrest, 3 Va. App. 236, 239, 349 

S.E.2d 157, 159 (1986). 

 Husband's first contention is that the agreement was invalid 

because the copy he received and signed was incomplete. 

Specifically, he alleges a letter referenced in the agreement as 

"exhibit B" was not included with the agreement. According to 

husband, failure by wife's attorney to attach the letter resulted 

in an invalid contract. 

 "An incomplete contract . . . is one from which one or more 

material terms have been entirely omitted. . . . While a contract 

to be valid and enforceable must be so certain that each party 

may have an action upon it, reasonable certainty is all that is 

required." Smith v. Farrell, 199 Va. 121, 128, 98 S.E.2d 3, 7 

(1957). Paragraph 13 of the settlement agreement, titled "advice 

of counsel," states in pertinent part: 

 The parties acknowledge that they are 

entering into this Agreement freely and 

voluntarily, that they have ascertained and 

weighed all the facts and circumstances 

likely to influence their judgment herein; 
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that they have sought and obtained legal 

advice independently of each other; that they 

clearly understand and assent to all the 

provisions of this Agreement. Wife is 

represented by Stuart A. Saunders who has not 

provided any representation or given any 

legal advice to the Husband, who has sought 

such legal advice as he deems appropriate. 

The representation by Stuart A. Saunders is 

modified by a letter to Husband and Wife 

dated October 5, 1995, a copy of these 

letters are attached hereto as Exhibit B. 

The letter disclosed that wife's attorney had an attorney/client 

relationship only with wife, that husband should seek independent 

legal counsel if he had questions about the agreement and that 

husband had agreed that wife's attorney was responsible for 

drafting the agreement. Husband received a letter, addressed to 

him, labeled "exhibit B." 

 According to the terms of Paragraph 13, it is clear that 

wife received her own letter, addressed to her, and husband 

received one addressed to him. These are the letters described 

by the agreement. Because husband has failed to show that his 

letter is not the "exhibit B" letter referenced in the agreement, 

we hold that the agreement is not incomplete. 

 Husband next alleges that the trial court erred by failing 

to send the issues of fraud, duress and oppression to a 

commissioner in chancery. The decision to refer a case to a 

commissioner in chancery is, like other administrative decisions, 

entrusted to the trial court's sound discretion. See Watkins v. 

Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 480, 331 S.E.2d 422, 431 (1985). 

Because we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by 
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hearing the evidence and ruling on the issues itself, we affirm 

its decision. 

 Husband also alleges that the trial court erred by excluding 

certain evidence. The trial court excluded evidence of marital 

discord which occurred throughout the marriage. The trial court 

ruled that such animosity, even if severe, did not prove duress 

or oppression at the time husband acquiesced to the agreement. 

 The testimony which husband offered into evidence was far 

removed in place and time from the formation of the agreement by 

the parties. The testimony did not concern the agreement or 

husband's motivation to sign it. When testimonial evidence 

relevant to the question of duress or oppression was offered, the 

trial court admitted it. Indeed, husband testified at length 

about his state of mind at the time he signed the agreement. The 

trial court simply chose not to believe him. 

 Husband finally argues that the trial court erred by ruling 

it had jurisdiction to amend spousal support in the future if 

circumstances changed. This allegation is completely without 

merit. The trial court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear 

the bill of complaint requesting divorce. See Code § 20-96. The 

trial court further ruled that it had jurisdiction to decide 

whether the parties' separation agreement was valid and should be 

incorporated into the divorce decree. See Code § 20-109.1. The 

trial court did not rule that it could later change the amount of 

spousal support more than 21 days after the decree was issued. 
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See Rule 1:1.1 It was husband's perception of the trial court's 

ruling that was erroneous, not the ruling itself. 

 Husband has presented two further questions for review: 

whether a scrivener's error occurred in the agreement and whether 

wife made fraudulent statements to husband which would render the 

contract invalid. Because husband did not preserve these 

questions by a timely objection in the trial court, we are barred 

from considering them on appeal. See Rule 5A:18. See also

Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 

631 (1991). 

 We hold that the trial court committed no reversible error. 

 Accordingly, the trial court's decree of divorce is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

 

 1While Code § 20-109 allows a circuit court to modify 

spousal support upon a change of circumstances, if a separation 

agreement has been incorporated into the decree the court may 

only modify spousal support in conformance with that agreement. 

Because the parties' agreement did not provide for such 

modification, the court cannot change the terms of spousal 

support in the future.