NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARK A. RICHARDS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-2868

D.C. No.

2:18-cr-00039-MCE-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 15, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, CALLAHAN, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Mark A. Richards appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion for compassionate relief. Richards pleaded guilty to advertising child 

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2551(d), and was sentenced to 210 months 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 17 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

imprisonment. After serving approximately thirty percent of his sentence, 

Richards moved for compassionate release based on his terminal diagnosis of endstage kidney disease. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

The district court’s discretion to grant or deny a motion for compassionate 

release “is controlled by three substantive considerations”:

First, the district court must determine whether extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant a sentence reduction. Second, the court must evaluate 

whether a reduction would be consistent with applicable policy statements 

issued by the Sentencing Commission. Third, the court must consider and 

weigh the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to decide whether the 

requested sentence reduction is warranted under the particular circumstances 

of the case.

United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A court “may deny compassionate release if a defendant 

fails to satisfy any of these grounds.” Wright, 46 F.4th at 945. We review the 

district court’s denial of a motion for compassionate release for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 944. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Richards’s motion 

for compassionate release. The court acknowledged his end-stage renal disease as 

a terminal illness, but found that his medical condition did not constitute an 

“extraordinary and compelling reason” to justify release because Richards suffered 

from many of the same ailments at his sentencing, which the court knew “would 

likely deteriorate over time” and considered in its original sentencing.
3

Even if Richards’s terminal medical condition constitutes an “extraordinary 

and compelling reason,” we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 

application of the § 3553(a) factors to determine that Richards’s particular 

circumstances did not warrant a reduction in sentence. See id. at 945. The district 

court considered the “utmost seriousness” of his offense, the small fraction of his 

210-month custodial sentence he had served, and the danger Richards posed to the 

community and the need to protect the public. The court emphasized the public 

safety factor, observing that Richards is technologically sophisticated and capable

of reoffending even in his poor health, and has demonstrated a willingness to do so

in the past even while under federal investigation. On this record, we cannot 

conclude that the district court’s discretionary determination was illogical, 

implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record. 

See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 

AFFIRMED.