Docket Nos. 86891, 87002 cons.–Agenda 28–September 1999.

THE COUNTY OF KNOX ex rel. ROBERT MASTERSON, Knox County Zoning Department Administrator, et al., Appellants, 

 v. THE HIGHLANDS, L.L.C., et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed December 2, 1999.

	CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the

court:

	The Highlands, L.L.C., filed a complaint in the circuit court of

Knox County against the Knox County zoning board of appeals

(board), Knox County State’s Attorney Paul Mangieri, and John

Leonard, one of others hereafter collectively referred to as

“Objectors.” The Highlands sought a determination that it could

proceed to construct and operate a large-scale hog confinement

facility. In two separate complaints against the Highlands, Knox

County (county) and Leonard sought an injunction barring the

construction of the facility.

	The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the

Highlands. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, upheld

the judgment of the circuit court. 302 Ill. App. 3d 342. We allowed

the county’s and Leonard’s separate petitions for leave to appeal

(177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and consolidated the causes for review. We

now affirm the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

	The record contains the following pertinent facts. Patricia

Beaaird, a co-owner of the Highlands, and her husband James, own

land in a rural, unincorporated area of the county. The Highlands

applied to the county zoning department for a construction permit

to erect six buildings as part of a hog confinement facility. Several

days later, the zoning department issued the permit.

	Approximately three months later, the Objectors appealed the

issuance of the construction permit to the board. They contended, inter alia, that “the use of the property [i.e., a large-scale hog confinement facility] is not a customary agricultural use in this

area.” They sought to “cancel construction permit and maintain ‘F’

[farming] zoning.” The permit was suspended, thereby staying construction pending the appeal.

	The board held a public hearing on the appeal, where it

received testimony and written evidence both for and against the

issuance of the construction permit. Four of the five board

members were present. At the close of the evidence, two members

voted to rescind the permit and one passed his vote. The chairman

did not vote; he explained that since four votes were necessary to

rescind the permit, the motion to rescind could not carry even if he

voted in its favor. Accordingly, the chairman ruled that the motion

to rescind failed.

	Two days later, however, Mangieri advised the zoning

department that the construction permit suspension should remain

effective until the legal effect of the board’s action was clarified.

Mangieri subsequently opined that the motion to rescind the

construction permit had passed. The zoning department notified

the Highlands that the board had granted the appeal and canceled

the construction permit.

	Despite having been told that the permit had been canceled,

the Highlands began ground preparation on the proposed

construction site. The zoning department then notified the

Highlands that it was in violation of the county zoning rules and

directed it to cease all construction activities immediately.

	The Highlands filed in the circuit court a complaint for

declaratory and injunctive relief, in which it sought to enjoin the

county from enforcing its zoning rules (counts I through III). The

Highlands also sought administrative review of the board’s decision

(count IV). The county then filed a complaint seeking injunctive

relief against the Highlands; Leonard filed a similar complaint.

	The Highlands then moved for summary judgment in all three

pending cases. In the cases brought against it, the Highlands sought

summary judgment on all counts. In the case it brought, the

Highlands sought summary judgment only on the counts seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court granted the

Highlands summary judgment in all three cases. The court included

a finding that the board lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the

Highlands was engaged in an agricultural purpose, which is exempt

from zoning regulations pursuant to the Counties Code. See 55 ILCS 5/5–12001 (West 1998). In light of this finding, the

Highlands subsequently dismissed the remaining count of its

complaint seeking administrative review.

	The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, upheld the

judgment of the circuit court. 302 Ill. App. 3d 342. The appellate

court held that: (1) the circuit court could hear the Highlands’

motions for summary judgment (302 Ill. App. 3d at 344-45); and

(2) the county lacked zoning authority over the Highlands (302 Ill.

App. 3d at 345-48). The county and Leonard appeal to this court.

DISCUSSION

	In reviewing a trial court’s entry of summary judgment, the

only issue on appeal is whether “the pleadings, depositions, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735

ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 1998). This case turns on the meaning of

the term “agriculture” found in the Counties Code. 55 ILCS

5/5–12001 (West 1998). The interpretation of a statute is a matter

of law for the court and appropriate for summary judgment.

Matsuda v. Cook County Employees’ & Officers’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill. 2d 360, 364 (1977); see Lane v. Titchenel, 204 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1053 (1990);   People ex rel. Rappaport v. Drazek, 30 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313-14 (1975). Review is de novo. Matsuda, 178 Ill. 2d at 364. Prior to addressing the merits, however, we must first address a preliminary matter.

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

	The parties disagree on whether the circuit court could hear

the Highlands’ claim for injunctive relief. The county and Leonard

characterize the Highlands’ claim as an improper collateral attack

on the board’s decision, which should have been subject only to

administrative review.

	In support of their position, the county and Leonard correctly

note that, pursuant to the Counties Code, the county has the power

to regulate the location and use of buildings on unincorporated

land. See 55 ILCS 5/5–12001 (West 1998). Further, the Counties Code provides that all final decisions of zoning boards of appeals

are subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative

Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq. (West 1998)). See 55 ILCS 5/5–12012 (West 1998). The county and Leonard then rely

on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: a party

aggrieved by an administrative decision ordinarily cannot seek

judicial review without first pursuing all available administrative

remedies. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308 (1989). The exhaustion doctrine includes administrative

review in the circuit court. Where the Administrative Review Law

is applicable and provides a remedy, a circuit court may not redress

a party’s grievance through any other type of action. The court’s

power to resolve factual and legal issues arising from an agency’s

decision must be exercised within its review of the agency’s

decision and not in a separate proceeding. Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 498-99 (1989); see Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 312, 316-17 (1996).

	This aspect of the exhaustion doctrine is well established.

However, it has several exceptions that are equally established.

Two such exceptions are “where no issues of fact are presented or

agency experience is not involved *** or where the agency’s

jurisdiction is attacked because it is not authorized by statute.”

Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309. This court has held that where an administrative assertion of authority to hear or determine certain

matters is challenged on its face as not authorized by the enabling

legislation, such a facial attack does not implicate the exhaustion

doctrine and exhaustion is not required. This court has explained

that where an agency’s statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction

is at issue, no questions of fact are involved. The agency’s

particular expertise is not implicated in the necessary statutory

interpretation. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Chicago State University v. Illinois Fair

Employment Practices Comm’n, 78 Ill. 2d 143, 147-48 (1979), quoting Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill. 2d 541, 550-51 (1978); accord Reiter v. Neilis, 125 Ill. App. 3d 774, 777- 78 (1984) (“plaintiffs did not have to comply with the

Administrative Review Act in order to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the zoning board of appeals”). In the present case,

the appellate court relied on this exception to conclude that the

circuit court could hear the Highlands’ claim for equitable relief.

302 Ill. App. 3d at 344-45.

	The county and Leonard contend that these exceptions to the

exhaustion doctrine do not apply. They rely heavily on the

reasoning of the appellate court dissent. The dissent opined that the

board had the authority to determine whether the Highlands’

buildings were subject to permit requirements. The dissent noted

that “jurisdiction” is a limited concept, which refers only to the

authority to hear and decide the case and does not depend on the

correctness of the decision made. Thus, a body has “jurisdiction”

to make a wrong as well as a right decision. Accordingly, the

dissent reasoned:

		“While the Code prohibits the county from requiring

permits on land used for agricultural purposes, it is the

county that must determine for what purpose land is being

used. Its jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness

of its decision. It has the right to be wrong; it therefore

has jurisdiction over the matter.” 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349

(McLaren, J., dissenting).

	We disagree. It must be remembered that the “jurisdiction” of

an administrative agency has an aspect in addition to the

“jurisdiction” of a court. This court has explained:

		“An administrative agency is different from a court

because an agency only has the authorization given to it by

the legislature through the statutes. Consequently, to the

extent an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it acts

without jurisdiction. [Citation.] ‘The term “jurisdiction,”

while not strictly applicable to an administrative body, may

be employed to designate the authority of the

administrative body to act ***.’ [Citation.] Thus, in

administrative law, the term ‘jurisdiction’ has three

aspects: (1) personal jurisdiction–the agency’s authority

over the parties and intervenors involved in the

proceedings, (2) subject matter jurisdiction–the agency’s

power ‘to hear and determine cases of the general class of

cases to which the particular case belongs’ [citation], and (3) an agency’s scope of authority under the statutes.”

Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243 (1989).

Thus, it is not entirely accurate to characterize the appellate court

as having held that the board “has no jurisdiction over zoning.” 302

Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Rather, it is more

accurate to state that the board has no jurisdiction over zoning

where the board’s enabling legislation expressly denies the board

zoning authority over land used for agricultural purposes. See 55

ILCS 5/12001 (West 1998).

	The dissent viewed the Highlands as not attacking the board’s

jurisdiction, but rather as attacking the correctness of   “the Board’s

decision that the use of the land was not exempt from permit

requirements. This is an attack on the correctness of the Board’s

decision, which should only be attacked through administrative

review.” 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren, J., dissenting).

	We disagree. The transcript of the board hearing shows that

the Highlands attacked the jurisdiction of the board. Also, count I

of the Highlands’ complaint expressly attacks the county’s zoning

authority in this case. Quoting the Counties Code, count I

expressly alleges that the statute does not authorize the board to

regulate land used for agricultural purposes. Further, on this

theory, inter alia, the Highlands based its motion for summary judgment.

			“ ‘This court has consistently held that, inasmuch as an

administrative agency is a creature of statute, any power or

authority claimed by it must find its source within the provisions of

the statute by which it is created.’ ””" Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540, 551 (1977). The issue of an administrative body’s authority presents a question of law and not

a question of fact. The determination of the scope of the agency’s

power and authority is a judicial function and is not a question to

be finally determined by the agency itself. Lake County State’s Attorney v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 151, 156 (1990) (and cases cited therein); accord Rockford Memorial Hospital v. Department of Human Rights, 272 Ill. App. 3d 751, 759 (1995). Of course, administrative agencies often determine the

scope of their jurisdiction. When an agency acts or refuses to act in a case, it necessarily determines whether the subject matter and

its activity are or are not within the purview of the statute creating

the agency. Again, however, ‘“"this is a question of law and not of

fact.’”" People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 321 (1974).”; 

Aaccord 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §77 (1994); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law & Procedure §64 (1983).

	In its claim for injunctive relief, the Highlands attacked the

Board’s jurisdiction. This is a question of law ultimately for a court

and not for the Board. Thus, the Highlands’ claim fell within

established exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. Accordingly, the

appellate court correctly upheld the circuit court’s power to hear

the Highlands’ claim for injunctive relief.

II. “Agriculture”

	Turning to the merits, the county and Leonard assign error to

the circuit court’s finding that the Highlands was engaged in an

agricultural purpose, which is exempt from zoning regulations

pursuant to the Counties Code. Section 5–12001 of the Code

grants counties authority to regulate and restrict the use of land

and the use and location of structures thereon. However, the Code

expressly limits this authority in pertinent part:

			“The powers by this Division given shall not be

exercised *** so as to impose regulations *** or require

permits with respect to land used for agricultural

purposes, which includes the growing of farm crops, truck

garden crops, animal and poultry husbandry, apiculture,

aquaculture, dairying, floriculture, horticulture, nurseries,

tree farms, sod farms, pasturage, viticulture, and wholesale

greenhouses *** other than parcels of land consisting of

less than 5 acres *** or with respect to the erection,

maintenance, repair, alteration, remodeling or extension of

buildings or structures used or to be used for agricultural

purposes upon such land except that such buildings or

structures for agricultural purposes may be required to

conform to building or set back lines ***.” 55 ILCS

5/5–12001 (West 1998).

	The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give

effect to the intention of the legislature. A court first looks to the

words of the statute. The language of the statute is the best

indication of the legislative intent. When the statutory language is

clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of

interpretation. In interpreting a statute, it is never proper for a

court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute

exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly

expressed legislative intent. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996); Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994).

	In the present case, we agree with the appellate and circuit

courts that a hog confinement facility falls within the “agricultural

purposes” exemption from zoning regulation, except for

conforming to building or set back lines. 55 ILCS 5/5–12001

(West 1998). “Agriculture” literally refers to “the science or art of

cultivating the soil, harvesting crops, and raising livestock.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 44 (1993); accord

Black’s Law Dictionary 69 (7th ed. 1999); 3 Am. Jur. 2d

Agriculture §1, at 934-35 (1986). “Husbandry” is literally a synonym for “agriculture.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 44, 1104 (1993) (definitions of “agriculture” and  

“husbandry,” respectively); accord 3 C.J.S. Agriculture §2, at 524- 25 (1973). “Animal husbandry” is literally “a branch of agriculture

concerned with the production and care of domestic animals.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 85 (1993); accord

3 C.J.S. Agriculture §2, at 525 (1973).

	The literal meanings of these terms are broad and inclusive.

We are not at liberty to say that they mean something else. Also,

as the above definitions show, the meanings of these terms are

current. They are not based on some archaic court decision, or on any particular case, old or recent. “In modern usage, agriculture is

a wide and comprehensive term, and statutes using it without

qualification must be given an equally comprehensive meaning.” 3

C.J.S. Agriculture §2, at 524 (1973). Illinois courts have recognized this wide-ranging definition of the term “agriculture.”

E.g., People ex rel. Pletcher v. City of Joliet, 321 Ill. 385, 388-89 (1926); County of Lake v. Cushman, 40 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1048 (1976).

	Based on the broad nature of the foregoing definitions, it is

clear that hog facilities fall within the meaning of agriculture or

animal husbandry. Courts in other jurisdictions have so held and

further held that local governments should treat them accordingly

for purposes of zoning. See Carp v. Board of County Commissioners, 190 Kan. 177, 373 P.2d 153 (1962); Building Inspector v. Curvin, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 494 N.E.2d 42 (1986). In this state, the Illinois Attorney General has reached the

same conclusion. See 1978 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. 146 (“A county does

not have the power to regulate a hog confinement structure under

[the Counties Code] as [the Code] prohibits regulation by zoning of

agricultural uses, other than to set building or set back lines”).

	In plain and unambiguous terms, the legislature has prohibited

zoning regulation of agricultural uses, such as animal husbandry,

other than to conform to building or set back lines.

		“Where the words employed in a legislative enactment are

free from ambiguity or doubt, they must be given effect by

the courts even though the consequences may be harsh,

unjust, absurd, or unwise. [Citations.] Such consequences

can be avoided only by a change of the law, not by judicial

construction ***.” People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic, 32 Ill. 2d 11, 15 (1964).

Accord Powers v. Retirement Board of the Policemaen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 249 Ill. App. 3d 280, 282 (1993). It is our duty to give effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain

language of the Counties Code.

	The appellate court reached this conclusion, as we have, based

on the language of the Counties Code. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 345-46.

We note that the appellate court additionally referred to the

Livestock Management Facilities Act (510 ILCS 77/1 et seq. (West 1998) (effective May 21, 1996)) to bolster its conclusion that a

county lacks the power to assert zoning authority over land used

for agricultural purposes. Pointing to this act, the appellate court

surmised that “the legislature appears to have continued to preempt

agriculture from local zoning and reserved unto state government

the uniform regulation of such facilities.” 302 Ill. App. 3d at 348. However, we express no opinion as to this act. Since the language

of Counties Code section 5–12001 (55 ILCS 5/5–12001 (West

1998)) is plain and unambiguous, we do not resort to other tools

of interpretation (see Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 216 (1994)), including looking to other statutes (see Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 219-20 (1983)).

	Citing a wide variety of sources, including journal and

newspaper articles, and government and industry reports, the

county and Leonard contend that a large-scale hog confinement

facility is more closely related to industry rather than agriculture.

Leonard argues that “the livestock production industry and its

potential for affecting the public health, safety, comfort and general

welfare of its environs has changed completely since [the

enactment of the county zoning statute].” Accordingly, to the county,

“as a matter of public policy, the potential environmental stress

created by such an operation warrants a 21st century clarification

of what agriculture is in this State.” Attacking the appellate and

circuit courts in upholding the broad definition of agriculture, the

county contends: “Such a myopic view wrongfully ends any debate

upon the true nature of the given enterprise.”

	We disagree. The holding of the appellate court shifts this

debate from the judiciary to where it properly lies–with the

legislature. It is for the legislative branch of the government–not

the judicial branch–to determine when and where conditions exist

requiring an exercise of the police power to meet existing evils. 11

Ill. Law. & Prac. Constitutional Law §149, at 498 (1981). Clearly, “the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the

public interest and welfare require, but to determine the measures

needed to secure such interest.” Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 364 (1985).

		“No mere omission or failure on the part of the legislature

to amend [in this case, the Counties Code] to meet

changing conditions will justify any judicial addition to the

language of the [Code]. Changes can be made by the

legislature when it deems such changes necessary or

proper in view of changed conditions.” Arnold v. City of Chicago, 387 Ill. 532, 541 (1944).

	At what level of activity does a hog production facility cease

to be “agricultural” and becomes “industrial”? This is an exercise

in line-drawing classically meant for the legislature.

	We note that the legislature knows how to limit the

agricultural exemption from zoning regulation by specifying what

“agricultural purposes” do not include. See County of Kendall v. Aurora National Bank Trust No. 1107, 219 Ill. App. 3d 841, 843-45 (1991) (explaining Public Act 85–1421, art. I, §3, eff. Dec.ember

15, 1988, which excluded certain mining activities from

“agricultural purposes”).

CONCLUSION

	We uphold the determination of the appellate and circuit

courts that the county may assert zoning authority over the

Highlands only so far as to require it “to conform to building or set

back lines.” 55 ILCS 5/5–12001 (West 1998). This holding

obviates discussion of the legal effect of the Board’s vote to

rescind the construction permit, as to which the parties disagree.

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court

is affirmed.

Affirmed.