20-2011-cv

Snyder v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 

24th day of March, two thousand twenty one.

Present: DENNIS JACOBS,

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

 Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________________________

JESSE SNYDER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 20-2011-cv

ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________________________________________

Appearing for Appellant: Mark A. Schneider, Plattsburgh, N.Y.

Appearing for Appellee: Andreea L. Lechleitner, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (Ellen E. 

Sovern, Of Counsel, Regional Chief Counsel, Region II, Office of 

the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, on the brief), 

for Antoinette T. Bacon, Acting United States Attorney for the 

Northern District of New York, Albany, N.Y.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York 

(Baxter, M.J.).
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ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED. 

Jesse Snyder appeals from the June 25, 2020 judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of New York (Baxter, M.J.) affirming the denial of disability insurance

benefits and supplemental security income by the Commissioner of Social Security. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues 

for review.

Our review of the administrative record is de novo, and this Court will uphold the 

administrative law judge’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal 

standards were applied. Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). On appellate review, 

“our focus is not so much on the district court’s ruling as it is on the administrative ruling.”

Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 

F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Snyder first argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) failed to adequately 

reweigh the factors in accordance with a prior remand order. That remand order instructed the 

ALJ to reevaluate Snyder based on a failure to adequately consider evidence of limitations based 

on mental health. Jesse S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-0854, 2018 WL 4509492, at *7-8

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2018). However, Snyder acknowledges that the ALJ did find that he had 

depressive disorder, substance use disorder, and limitations bearing on his mental condition, and 

considered those when calculating Snyder’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Accordingly, 

his challenge goes to the ALJ’s weighting of the various sources rather than compliance with the 

remand order. As the district court properly determined, the ALJ’s opinion is supported by 

substantial evidence. Snyder argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion of 

Elizabeth Greis, a nurse practitioner, who described him as unable to function in work settings. 

The ALJ properly accorded Greis’s opinion limited weight in comparison to the opinions of 

physicians. Greis only treated Snyder twice prior to issuing her opinion, and the relevant 

regulations describe the history of treatment as relevant for consideration of medical opinions. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1527(c)(2)(i); 416.927(c)(2)(i). The ALJ also noted that the evidence in 

the record was inconsistent with some of Greis’s opinions regarding Snyder’s capacity. Greis 

described Snyder’s thought process as without delusions and his cognition as normal. His 

orientation, memory, attention, and concentration were intact. Moreover, the ALJ found that 

Greis’s opinion was based only on Snyder’s mental impairments, which were well managed with 

prescribed treatment methods. The record also suggested that Snyder frequently stopped his 

mental health treatment but still consistently demonstrated normal cognition. This Court has 

found that conservative treatment may weigh against a disability finding. See, e.g., New Haven 

Terminal Corp. v. Lake, 337 F.3d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a claimant’s “failure 

to seek further medical treatment . . . . may raise some doubt about the severity of [the 

claimant’s] disability”). The ALJ fully explained why it rejected Greis’s opinions regarding 

Snyder’s marked limitation in favor of the opinions suggesting Snyder suffered, at most, 

moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions; 

maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; keeping to a schedule and 
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maintaining regular attendance. The ALJ was entitled to weigh all of the evidence and make an

RFC finding that corresponds with the record as a whole. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 399 (1971) (“We therefore are presented with the not uncommon situation of conflicting 

medical evidence. The trier of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.”).

With respect to his physical impairments, the ALJ also properly weighed the medical 

evidence. The ALJ discussed the opinions of Dr. S. Putcha, Dr. Nader Wassef, Dr. Louis A.

Fuchs, and Dr. Lai Kuang and found that each described Snyder’s limitation as moderate. Snyder 

argues that the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of Kuang regarding Snyder’s moderate 

limitations. We disagree. The ALJ thoroughly analyzed. Kuang’s opinions and gave it “some 

weight” because it was only “somewhat consistent with the record as a whole,” including 

evidence in the record that Snyder had moderate limitations but controlled his pain with 

medication and injections. The ALJ noted that Snyder engaged in activities of daily life and 

found that Kuang’s opinions supported a finding that Snyder had the capacity to perform light 

work. Snyder also argues that the ALJ should not have afforded Fuchs’s opinion that Snyder 

could perform light work any consideration. The ALJ noted that Snyder was more disabled than 

Fuchs suggested, but nevertheless accepted some of his findings, as Fuchs reviewed the record in 

detail and his opinion comported with others in some ways. The ALJ was entitled to consider 

these opinions in determining that Snyder could perform light work.

Snyder argues that the ALJ improperly discounted Snyder’s testimony regarding his 

debilitating pain and inability to work. “The regulations provide a two-step process for 

evaluating a claimant’s assertions of pain.” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010).

First, “the ALJ must decide whether the claimant suffers from a medically determinable 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged.” Id. Second, 

the ALJ must consider ‘the extent to which the claimant’s symptoms can reasonably be accepted 

as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence’ of record.” Id. (quoting 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)) (alteration removed). In making this determination, the ALJ “consider[s] 

‘statements the claimant or others make about his impairment(s), his restrictions, his daily 

activities, his efforts to work, or any other relevant statements he makes.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). With respect to the first step, the ALJ concluded that Snyder 

suffers from impairments that could produce the symptoms alleged. However, the ALJ observed 

that the evidence revealed some discrepancies between the medical records and Snyder’s 

statements. The ALJ noted that Snyder managed most of his activities of daily living himself and 

frequently described his treatments as helping with his pain. Considering the deferential standard 

of review, the ALJ did not err in finding that the limitations described by Snyder did not fully 

match the medical records provided. See Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d 

Cir. 2012) (describing a reviewing court’s role as deferring to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting 

evidence).
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We have considered the remainder of Snyder’s arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk