### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT NASHVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 8, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. BR IAN ER IC M CGO WEN, A. K.A . B RA D L EE O’RYAN

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-A- 506 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2004- 00109-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Augu st 18, 2005

The a ppellant, B rian Eric McGow en, a.k.a . Br ad L ee O ’Ry an, wa s convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first deg ree felony murder, e specia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry , and attempted espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry . The trial c ourt sentenc e d th e a p p e ll an t t o li f

e imprisonment in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection for his murder co nviction, to forty y ear s incarc eration for his espec ially ag g ravated robbery conviction, and to twe nty y ear s incar cer ation for his attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry conviction. On appe al, the appe llant raises numer ous issues for our revie w, including the suffic iency of the evidenc e supporting his c onvictions, e videntiary issues, jury instructions, and sentenc ing. Upon our review of the record, we merg e the a ppellant’s convic tion f o r a t t e m p t e d e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y i n t o h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o r e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. We affirm the judgme nts of the trial court in all other respe cts.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d and Ca se Re m ande d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

J eff ery Allen DeV asher

(on appe al), Richar d Tenne nt (at trial) , and Sharon Ruiz (at trial), Na shville, Tenne ssee, f

or the a ppellant, B rian Eric McGow en, a.k.a . Br ad L ee Ry an.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Re ne e W. Tu rn e r, As sis ta nt At torne y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and James Todd and Micha el Rohling, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound The State’s pr oof at trial reve aled that at approximately noon on Friday , Fe bruary 18, 2001,-2-

the victims, J oseph and Patricia Bar ker, went into Seanachie ’s Restaura nt, which was loc ated ne ar the intersec tion of Br oadwa y and Fourth A venue in dow ntown Nashville. The c ouple ate lunc h and discussed pl an s fo r their upc oming va cation. Appr ox imately one hour la ter, the c ouple left the restaur ant and walked toward an alley beside the restaur ant where their vehicle, a maroon Chevr olet Taho e , w a s p ark e d. Mr . B ark e r, wh o wa s pla nn ing to dr ive , wa lke d to wa rdthe dr ive r’ s d oo r w hil e Mrs. Ba rker walked towa

rd the fr ont passeng er door . As Mr. B arke r appr oache d the door, he saw something out of the corne r of his e y e, to his rig ht. He turne d and saw a y oung man, later identified
as Richard Wheeler, pull a tobog g an ca p over his fa ce a nd point a pistol at him . At trial, Mr. B arke r testified that he immediately rea liz ed what was taking place. Wheeler demanded money from Mr. Ba rker . Mr. B arke r explained to Wheeler that he did not have any cash, but he offe red Whee ler a beepe r. Wheeler

took the beepe r.

Mrs. Ba rker , who was on the other side of the ve hicle, aske d, “[W ]hat’s going on? ” Wheeler , he ari ng he r v oic e , ins truc te d Mr

. B ark e r to “ te ll y ou r old la dy to c ome ov e r h e re .” Mr . B ark e r d id
n o ts ayan y t h i n g t o M rs

. Ba rk er

. Ho we v er , t h ro u gh t h e c arwi n d o ws , h e s aw t h at s h e w as m o v i n g. Mr. B arke r testified that he did not want his w ife involved. He g rabbe d Wheeler’ s arm and scr eame d at his wife to g et away . Mr. B arke r explained:

A strug g le ensue d. And [W heele r] broke aw ay . . . . And as [Mr s. B ark e r] c a me aro un d th e ba c k o f the c ar, he sh ot her a t le a st
once a nd, may

be, twice . And I

was able to g et ahold of him, ag ain. I don’t know whe ther he shot he r ag ain, but w e wer e in – strug g ling at that point.

An d I , f in a ll y , r e a ll y , g o t a g o o d h o ld o f h im

. A n d h e was able to – he ha d– his g un hand was fre e. And I was hit ting him. And he wa s kind o f

– an d I

g uess the term would be pistol whipping, or
so me th in g

. H e w a s h it ti n g me in th e f a c e

. B u t th e n e xt instance I
re a lize d, a ndit’ s o ne of tho se – y ou do n’ t r e a lize it u nti l y ou ’r e in i t, but the g un was pointed rig ht at my chest. I had bee n – I

had fa llen do wn . I wa s o n my

kn e e s. An d th e g un was po in ted rig ht at my
c he st.

An d w ith my

le ft ha nd , n ot rig ht m y

ri g ht h a nd , I

kn oc ke d it up. And just the s ec o n d that I knocked the g un up, it went off, beca use I re m em b er t o this day , and I ’ve sa id this before tha t sim ult a ne ou sly

wi th kno c kin g the gun up, I – I he ardthe g un sh ot. An d I s m el l ed t h e – th e ex p l o s i v e ch ar ge. An d I fe l t , y o u k n o w, h u ge intense pain a s the bullet hit me. I t hit me up in myleft shoulder. B ut I don’t know how these things happen, but the bullet ended up g oing do wn . A ndI

g ue ss tha t’ s w hy

– I g ue ss b e c a us e I

wa s do wn on my kn e e s, a nda s I

kn oc ke d it

up , it st il l had [tr a ve le d] do wn int o my body

.-3-

As the strug g le continued, Mr. Ba rker manag ed to pul l off Wheeler ’s jacke t and tobog g an. Additionally , Wheeler lost control of the pistol. Wheeler esca ped fr om Mr. Ba

rker ’s hold and ra n fr om the sc e ne

. Mr . Ba

rk e r cr a wl e d to whe re Mr s. B ark e r w a s lying on he r b a c k. She wa s b ri e fl y conscious bef

ore a n ambulance arrived at the sc ene.
Wit hin minutes, poli ce a nd emer g ency medical se rvice s arrived at the scene

. The B arke rs wer e take n to the hospital. At the hospital, Mrs. Bar ker w as rushe d into surge ry

. Ho wever, her injuries wer e too seve re, a nd she died during the proc edure

.
At tr ial, Mr. B ark e r t e sti fi e d th a t hi s in jurie s w e re e xten siv e . T he bu lle t tr a ve le d f ro m hi s left shoulder dow n the left side of his body . The b u l l et fr actur ed all of his ribs on the lef t side, g razed his he art, went throug h his splee n and lung, and lodge d in his back. Mr. B arke r’s splee n was de str oy e d a ndha d to be re mov e d. Mr . B ark e r u nd e rw e nt s e ve ra l su rg e ri e s a s a re su lt o f h is i nju ri e s. Howeve r, doctors w ere unable to extract the bullet fr om Mr. Ba rker ’s body

. Whil e the B arke rs wer e being transporte d to the hospital, police beg an searching the ar ea f or the per petra tor or per

petra tors. Police quickly appre hended Wheeler a short distance from the sc ene. Wheeler w as take n into custody and tra nsported to the Criminal J ustice Center (CJ C) for a n interview. The interview beg an at 4:00 p.m. that day . During the interview , Wheeler told police of the appe llant’s involv em ent in the cr ime and that he c ould possiblybe found at a house on Ape x Street. At 5:30 p.m., police we nt to 876 Apex S tree t and ar rested the appellant. At the r esidenc e, police discove red a

black c oat with a re d and white “ Fila” emblem.

A c ou ple o f d a y s a ft e r the sh oo tin g , Ch arl e s Ma lon e wa s in te rv ie we d b y po lic e . A t tria l, Ma lon e te sti fi e d th a t on the da y of the sh oo tin g , he wa s wa lki ng to wo rk a t the He rm ita g e Ho te l in downtown Nashville whe n h e saw two “Mexicans,” or men with dark c omplex ions, who “looked kind of suspicious.” He believed that the t wo m en were panhandling . Malone watched a s the men walked towa

rd wha t Malone believe d to be a Chevr olet Bla zer, then the males sepa rate d. One of

the men, whom Malone la ter identified a s Wheeler, approa ched the Ba rker s, and the other male, whom Malone identified a s the appe llant, stood at the corne r of the b u i l d i n g. Malone then he ard thre e g un sh ots a ndsa w Mr

. B ark e r a nd Whe e le r str ug g lin g ov e r a

g un . M a lon e re c a lle d th a t th e app e lla nt, wh o w a s w e ar in g a b la c k c o a t w ith a r e d a n d w h it e “ F il a ” e mb le m, “ to o k o f f running” when the strug g le over

the g un beg an.
Richard Wheele r testified at trial on beha lf of the State. Wheele r stated that prior to trial, he pled g uiltyto felony

murder a nd espec ially ag g ravated robbery due to his participation in the crimes ag ainst the Ba

rker s. Wheeler testified that he was sixteen y ear s old at the time of the off enses.
Whe e le r s ta te d th a t on F ri da y , F e br uary 16 , 2 00 1, he we nt t o s pe ndthe we e ke ndwi th h is friend, A nthony

J ames Z onneville at his home at 876 Ape x Street in Nashville. Z onneville, the appellant’ s step-son, was f ourtee n y ear s old. Floy d Gillihan, a nother juvenile frie nd of Wheeler and Z onneville, was a lso at the reside nce. T he appe llant arrive d at the re sidence on Fe bruary 16, and he was the only

adult in the house.-4-

At trial, Wheeler said that ear ly in the day on Fe bruary

16, befor e g oing to Ape x Street, he ha d p ur c ha se d a

Pit . 38 0 c a lib e r s e mi- a uto ma tic pis tol be c a us e he “ wa s h a vin g pr ob le ms” wi th h is g i r l f r i e n d ’ s f o r m e r b o yf r i e n d

. T h e p i s t o l w a s l o a d e d w i t h f o u r o r f i v e b u l l e t s

. T h e f

o l l o w i n g d a y, Fe bruary 17, 2001, Wheeler showe d the pistol to Gil lihan, Z onneville, and the a ppellant.

On the mornin g of Sun da y , Fe br ua ry 18 , 200 1, Gi lli ha n an d Z on ne vil le le ft the ho us e to v isi t friends. Whee ler a nd the appe llant stay ed at the house . The a ppellant told Wheeler that he was g oing dow ntown to “g et him some money ” and a sked Wheeler if he wa nted to g o with him. Wheeler ag ree d to go w ith the appellant. As they wer e g etting r eady

to leave, the appellant g ave Whee ler a dark tobogg an cap to put on, advising him that it wa s cold outside. Wheeler wore a g ray jacke t, and the appe llant wore a

black c oat which ha d a re d and white “ Fila” emblem on the bac k.

After leaving the house, Wheele r and the appellant be g an the f orty -five minute tre k downtown, walking beside the railroa d trac ks. As they wer e walking , the appellant a sked Wheeler if he still had the pistol. W heele r pulled out the pistol and g ave it to the appe llant. The appe llant “foole d around w ith it for a while” a nd then re turned the pistol to Wheeler.
Eventually , the pair a

rrived dow ntown. At trial, Wheeler reca lled that near Printer’s Alley

there was a

g uy with some g ray

hair talking on the ce ll phone in the trunk of his BMW. And [the appellant] just comes out and sa y s, let’s rob him. And so I

was, like, no. At fir s t , Iwas, like, no. And the n h e s a i d , w h a t , ar e y o u g o n n a b e a b i t c h ?

Th e app e lla nt t oldWhe e le r tha t Whe e le r’ s to bo g g a n c ap h a d e y e ho le s cut ou t of it. Whe e le r a g a in ref used to rob the man, sta ting that he did not “fee l like doing it.” Additionally , Wheeler notice d that a man, Chester

Malone, wa s standing ne arby , watching them.

The a ppellant bec ame a ng ry

with Wheeler a nd instructed W heele r t o follow him. W heele r said that he followe d the ap p el l an t b eca use he “ wanted to f

it in with hi m.” Wheeler and the
ap p e l l a n tc o n t i n u e d t o w a l k u n t i l t h e y r e a c h e d th e i n t e r s e c t i o n o f F o u r t h A v e n u e a n d B r o a d w a y. Acr oss the street they saw the Ba rker s leaving Seanac hie’s Restaura nt. The appe llant pointed to Mr. Ba rk e r a n d s a id , “ [W] e ’ r e f ixi n g to r o b h im

. ” Wh e e le r in it ia ll y r e f u s e d

. T h e ap p e ll a n t sa id,

“ [ W ] h a t , ar e yo u g o n n a

b i t c h o u to n m e a g a i n ? ” W h e e l e r t h e n a g r e e d t o p ar t i c i p a t e i n t h e r o b b e r y. Wheeler and the appellant started crossing the street at the same time. Wheeler, be l i ev i n g the Ba rker s would g et into their vehicle befor e he c ould rea ch them, incr ease d his speed. En route , he pu lle d h is t ob og g a n c ap o ve r h is f a c e a ndpu lle d o ut h is p ist ol. Whe e le r state d that he didno t pu ll the tobog g an over

his face until he was nea

r Mr. Ba rker beca use he did not want to attra ct attention to himself.

Whe e le r t e sti fi e d th a t he c on fr on te d M r. B ark e r a nd dem and ed mone y . M r. B ark e r t old Wheeler tha t he had no money ; howeve r, he offe red W heele r hi s beepe r. As Wheeler r eac hed for the bee per, he hear d Mrs. Ba rker ’s voice f

rom behind. Wheeler turned to look toward the direc tion-5-

of Mrs. Barke r’s voice , and Mr. B arke r g rabbe d the pistol. The two men “started to rassling ,” and Wheeler heard a g unshot. The strug g le over the pistol continued, until Mr. Bar ker struc k Wheeler. Wheeler stated that the blow “broug ht me back to my senses.” Mr. B arke r had a g rip on Wheeler’ s ja c ke t. Wh e e le r w ig g le d o ut o f h is j a c ke t a ndra n, le a vin g be hin d h is p ist ol, his jac ke t, a ndhis tobogg an. As he ran f

rom the sce ne, Wheeler

saw Malone standing acr oss the street.

Wit hin a matter of minutes, police apprehe nded W heele r. Wheeler identified the appe llant
a s th e pe rs on wi th h im, a nda lso a dv ise d p oli c e that th e app e lla nt c ou ld l ike ly be fo un d a t th e ho us e on Ap e x Stre e t. Wh e e le r t e sti fi e d th a t th e app e lla nt w a s w e ari ng a ha t and a “ F ila ” ja c ke t a t th e tim e of the off enses. Wheele r further testified tha t he had ne ver met the appe llant prior to Fe bruary 16, 2001.
Kenny

Warren, a

hospital facility

direc tor, testified that on Sunday , Feb ru ary 18, 2001, he
a ndhis wi fe dr ov e to d ow nto wn Na sh vil le a ft e r atte nd ing c hu rc h. Th e c ou ple dr ov e so uthon F ou rth Street. As they

crosse d Br oadwa y , Warren noticed four people standing in a parking lot. Three of the individuals, the Ba

rker s and an unidentified m an, were standing fairly close togethe r. Another man was standing approximately fiftee n fee t to the left of the other s. Warren state d that he noticed the g roup bec ause the man with the B arke rs was we ar i n g a g ray jacke t and had his tobog g an ca p pulled down in a mask ove r his fac e. Warre n found t hat unus ual because of the warm day . Warren stopped his car

and saw that the m an in t he mask wa s holding a pistol, “kind of on the lady .” Warre n rec alled:

Mr

. B ark e r g r ab b e d f o r t h e g u n

. T h e g e n t l e m a n h a d t h e g un on his wife. He went for the g un. And that’s whe n one shot was f ired. And they g ot into a strugg le, which is more toward the sidewalk. That’s when a nother two or thr ee shots we re fired. [Mrs.] Ba rker collapsed. And he c raw led bac k to wher e his wife was. There wa s a g entleman, a blac k g entleman [ Malone] behind me or right ther e at the le ft corne r of our Explorer. He saw the w hole thing.

Warren sta ted t hat M r. Barke r g rabbe d the shooter’ s coat during the strug g le. The othe r man, who had be en standing a short distance awa y , ran w hen shot s b egan to be fired. War ren sa id that the man wa s wea

ring a dark jacke t a nd that he saw “something red w hen he w as running awa y on the bac k of his coat.”

Dr

. John E. Ge rb e r te sti fi e d that he pe rf or me d the a uto ps y

on Mr s. B ark e r. Dr . G e rb e r s a id that Mrs. Ba

rker had bee n struck by

three bullets. The first shot was fired from a distance g reater than t wo feet and st ruck her abdomen. The bullet we nt throug h the liver, the infe rior vena cava , the dia ph ra g m, a ndthe ri g ht lun g , ult imate ly lod g ing in the sk e le ta l mus c le

. Dr

. Ge rb e r state d that th is wound was f

atal and c aused immediate incapa citat i o n

. T h e sec ond g unshot wound entere d the victim’s left fore arm a nd was fir ed fr om a distance g reater than two fee t. T he third bullet enter ed the bac k of the victim’s left thig h and wa s a conta ct wound. Dr. Gerber opined that the manne r of death wa s homicide and the c ause of death wa s multi ple g uns h o t wounds to the torso and-6-

extremiti es.
At trial, the appellant testified in his own behalf

. The appellant stated that he ar rived a t 876 Apex late on the evening of Friday , Fe bruary 16, 2001. During the wee kend, he ing ested c ocaine , dilaudids, marijuana, a nd alcohol. On Saturday , the appe llant beca me awa re t h at W h ee ler ha d a pistol at the house. The a

ppellant aske d Z onneville, his stepson, to tell Wheeler to g et the pistol out of the ho us e . T he app e lla nt e xpla ine d th a t he tho ug ht Z on ne vil le sh ou ld or de r Whe e le r to d isp os e of the we apon bec ause Z onneville was “ running things” at the house.
On Sunday , Fe bruary

18, 2001, Z onneville and Gillihan left the appe llant and Wheeler at the residenc e. The appellant planne d to g o downtown t o g et m oney for dr ug s. The appe llant testified that he pla nn e d to ob ta in the mon e y by ste a ling fr om c ars or

by g oin g to T he Jung le , a

g a y ba r, to eng ag e in male pr ostitut ion. Wheeler a ccompa nied the appe llant downtown. On direc t examination, the appe llant stated that Wheeler pulled the pistol out while they wer e on the r ailroad tra cks but that the appe llant never touched it. Howeve r, on cr oss-examination, the appellant ave rre d that he did not see the pistol unt il after the y arrived downtown.

After the pair r eac hed downtown, t hey saw a man standing at the trunk of his B MW. The trunk containe d a toolbox and a c ordless drill. The man w as talking on a ce llular telep h o n e. The appellant wa nted to steal the toolbox and the drill, but t he man would not step a way from his vehicle

. Wheeler ta lked about “sma cking ” the man in the he ad with the pistol. The appe llant thought Wheeler w as “c razy .”

T h e p a ir p r o c e e d e d to F o u r th A v e n u e a n d B r o a d w a y w h e r e th e y s a w th e B ark ers on the street. Wheele r told the appe llant, “Watch this shit.” W heele r then ru s h ed across the stre et. He pulled down his mask and pointed h i s p i s t o l as he a pproac hed the B arke rs’ ve hicle. I nitially , the appellant testified that “whe n the gun come out, I left.” Howeve r, he la ter stated tha t he left the a rea when the strug g le for the pistol bega n.
After leaving downtown, the appe llant returne d to 876 Apex S tree t. The appe llant ha d stolen chec ks out of a ca

r the pre vious ev en i n g, and he use d the che cks to obtain money for dr ug s. The appellant state d that he wa s “hig h” whe n the police arr i v ed to arrest him. The appe llant admitted that he wa s wea

ring a blac k coat with a r ed and w hite “F ila” emblem on the day of the shooting

.
Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the jury convicted the appellan t o f first deg ree felony murder, espec ially ag g ravated robbery , and attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbery

. The appellant r ece ived a total ef fec tive sentenc e of life imprisonment plus six ty y ear s. On appe al, the appe llant raises the fo llo wi ng iss ue s:

[(1 )] D id the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr in d e ny ing the [ap pel lan t’ s] mo tio n to suppress his statement to police?
[(2)] Did the trial court err in admitting the tape -re corde d preliminary-7- heari n g testimonyof a pr osecution witness whe re the State made insufficient e fforts to establish that the witness was una vailable a nd the wit ness was not subjected to cross-e x amination at the pre liminary h e ar i n g ?
[(3 )] I s th e e vid e nc e con tai ned in the re c or d s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a finding by a rational trier of fac t that the [ appellant] is guilty bey ond
a r e a s o n ab l e d o u b to f

f e l o n y m u r d e r , e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, a n d a t t e m p t e d e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y?
[(4)] Did t he trial c ourt err in reve rsing its pretrial ruling t h at the [ appellant’ s] prior conviction for ag g ravated robbe ry was ina dmi ssibl e fo r i mpe a c hme nt p ur po se s, a ndin a llo wi ng sa id conviction into evi d ence on the basis that def ense c ounsel had “opene d the door” to its admiss ion?
[(5)] Did t he tr ial court e rr in g ranting the State’s spec ial jury instruction reque st when said instruction allowed the jury to disreg ard the “natural and pr obable c onsequenc es” r ule?
[(6)] Did t he trial c ourt er r i n i mposing the ma x imum sentences on the [appellant’s] con v i ct i ons for e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry , and attempted espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry , and did the court further err in i mpo sin g c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s o n a ll c ou nts ?

II. Ana lys is

A. Mo tio n to Sup pr e ss

F ir st, the app e lla nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in fa ili ng to s up pr e ss h is s ta te me nt t o police. I n revie wing a trial court’s determinations reg arding a suppression hearing, “ [q] uestions of
cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the e vidence , and re solution of conflicts in the evidenc e are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fa ct.” State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . T hu s, “ a tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t in a su pp re ssi on he ari ng wi ll b e up he ld u nle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise .” I d. Neve rtheless, a ppellate c o u rt s will review the tr ial court’s a pplication of law to the facts purely de novo. S ee State v. Walton , 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). F urthermor e, the State, a s the preva iling party , is “ entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidence adduce d at t he suppre ssion hearing as we ll as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces that ma y be dr a wn fr om tha t e vid e nc e .” Od om, 92 8 S .W .2 d a t 23 . M or e ov e r, we no te that “ in
e va luatin g the c or

re c tne ss o f a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g on a

pr e tr ia l mo tio n to su pp re ss, app e llate c ou rt s may consider the proof a dduced both at the suppression hea ring and at trial.” State v. Henning , 975 S.W .2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998)

.-8-

Gene rally , the Fif

th Amendment to the United Stat es Constit ution and Article I , Section 9 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provide a privileg e ag ainst self-incrimination to t hose ac cused of criminal activity , making an inquiry into the voluntariness of a c onfession nec essary . See State v. Callahan, 979 S.W .2d 577, 581 (Tenn. 1998). Howeve r, if an a ccuse d is informed of his Miranda rig hts and knowing ly and voluntarily waives those rights, he may waive the privileg e ag ainst selfincrimination. I d.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 478-79, 86 S. Ct . 1602, 1612, 163 0 (1 9 6 6 ). Additionally , the trial judg e’s f indings of f

act at the motion to s uppress he aring are acc orded t h e weig ht of a jury verdic t. See State v. Tate , 615 S.W .2d 161, 162 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). Ac cording ly , the trial court’s decision is binding upon this court unl es s t he evide nce preponde rate s otherwise. O dom, 928 S.W .2d at 22-23.

Prior to trial, the appellant filed a motion to suppress his statement to police, a rg uing that at the tim e the state me nt was mad e he “was no t of ri g ht m ind

. . . [a nd ] he didno t, a ndc ou ld n ot, compre hend his rig ht to remain silent, and thus he did not knowing ly and vo l u n t ar i l y wa ive such rig ht.” At the suppre ssion hearing , the appellant arg ued that he wa s under the inf luence of drug s and alcohol at the time he made his statement.

At the suppression hea

ring , Detec tive Mike Chastain with the Metropolitan Na shville Pol ice Depa rtment (Metro) Armed Robbery Unit testified t hat t he appellant was arre sted at t he re sidence at 876 Apex Street j ust hours after the offe nses. When police entered the residenc e, the a ppellant “appe are d to be in fine c ondition.” The appe llant was standing near the kitchen a nd

appea red to be manipulating some thing a round his arm a

rea . As soon as he sa w [t he police] e ntering the house, he ma de a da sh for the sink, but, after further investigation, there wa s a sy ring e and needle in the drain of the sink.

Detec tive Chastain testified that the appe llant had blood on his arms, i n d i cating that he had be en “shooting something up,” or had be en pre paring to do so. The needle was not rec overe d or tested fo r d ru g s. De te c tiv e Cha sta in re c a lle d see ing be e r co nta ine rs a t the re sid e nc e , but h e didno t r e c a ll if the c on ta ine rs we re fu ll o r e mpty

. Add it iona lly , h e be lie ve d th a t th e re mig ht h a ve be e n s ome marijuana “re sidue” in the house.

Detec tive Chastain acknow ledg ed that he did not ask the appellant if he had be en drinking or using drug s prior to his statement. Howe ver, D etec tive Chastain noted that during the cour se of the nin e ty -m inu te int e rv ie w, the app e lla nt d id n ot a pp e ar t o b e un de r the inf

lue nc e of a n in toxic a nt. Detec tive Chastain stated that the a ppellant was not unste ady on his f eet, his speech w as not slurred, he did not “re ek” of

any intox icating substance, a nd he wa s able to eng ag e i n conver sation. Prior to the interview, D etec tive Chastain rea d the appe llant his Miranda rig hts, and the appe llant signe d
a wa iver of those rig hts.

Du ri ng the int e rv ie w, the app e lla nt a dmi tte d th a t he we nt d ow nto wn wi th Wh e e le r. He a lso
a c k n o w l e d g e d w a l k i n g h a l f w a y a c r o s s t h e s t r e e tt o w ar d t h e B ark e r s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e r o b b e r y.-9-

Howeve r, the a

ppellant denied tha t he intented to rob the B arke rs.
At t h e suppression hea

ring , the appe llant testified that shortly befor e he w as ar

rested he “dra nk sev eral fo rt y -o un c e be e rs

. . . s mok e d a c ou ple of

dim e ba g s o f w e e d .

. . [a]n d s ho t so me c oc a ine a nd dil a ud ids .” Th e app e lla nt s a id tha t w he n h e wa s a rr e ste d, “ I wa s h ig h.

. . . I

tho ug ht I
wa s o n a ba d trip.

. . . A ve ry , ve ry we ir d dr e a m.” He a lso c la ime d that he c ou ld re c a ll o nly “ bit s and piec es” of

the interview with Detec tive Chastain. The a ppellant allege d that at the time of the i n t er v i ew , “I wa s p ar an o i d

. I wa s s t i l l gee k ed o n t h e c o ca i n e. On e m i n u t e I was –I wa s cr as h i n g. I was in and out.”

Th e app e lla nt a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he re me mbe re d be ing re a d his Mir a nd a ri g hts , b ut h e sa id that he did not reme mber what those rig hts w ere

. He c ontended that he did not understand what was g oing on a nd did not realize that he did not have to a nswer que stions. The appellant a dmitted that he ha d pre vio us ly be e n ar

re ste d for oth e r o ff

e ns e s a ndon tho se oc c a sio ns he ha d b e e n r e a d h is rig hts

. Howeve r, he ma intained that he did not under stand the wa iver of rights.

I n the orde r denying the motion to s uppress, the tria l court stated:

After revie wing the video tape of the intervie w, the Co urt does not f ind tha t the [appellant] s howed a ny obvious signs of be ing
un de r the inf

lue nc e of dr ug s o r a lc oh ol. Th e [ap pe lla nt] w a s a ble to
c omm un ic a te c le arl y

wi th the de te c tiv e s a nd was re sp on siv e to questioning. The [appellant] was also steady during the cour se of the int e rv ie w a ndapp e are d to ha ve no dif fi c ult y c on tr oll ing his movements. There fore , based upon the testimony o f D etective Chastain and the video of

the interview , the C ourt does not ac cept the [ap pe lla nt’ s] c on te nti on that dr ug a nda lc oh ol u se a ff

e c te d h is a

bil ity to understand his rig hts at the time of the intervie w.

. . . . The Court also finds that the [ appellant] chec ked off and signe d the written wa iver of rights form given to him by the de te c tiv e s, wh ic h c le arl y show s th a t th e [ap pe lla nt] c on se nte d to
a ns we r q ue sti on s.

Un d er all of the fa cts and c ircumstance s, the Court is of the op in io n th a t th e [ap p e ll a n t] c o n s e n te d to s p e a k w ith th e d e te ctives kn o w in g ly

a n d v o lu n ta

r il y

. T h e Co u r t f

in d s n o e v id e n c e th a t the [appellant] was threatene d or c o erc ed into waiving his rights. The Cou rt a lso fi nd s no e vid e nc e that th e [ap pe lla nt] w a s u na ble to understand or

compre hend his rig hts, when re ad by the detec tives and g iven to him in written form.

Our re view of the rec ord re veals that the trial court’s ruling is supported by the re cord. Detec tive Ch a s ta in te s ti f

ie d th a t th e ap p e ll a n t m ig h t h a v e b e e n p r e p ar in g to “ s h o o t[ ] u p ” d ru g s at-10-

the time o f h i s ar re s t , but he was unsur e if the a ppellant had a lrea dy

done so. F urther, D etec tive Chastain stated that the appellant did not appea r to be under the influence of any i n t o x i ca ting
su bs ta nc e

. Th e app e lla nt wa s app ri se d of his ri g hts , a nd he sig ne d a writt e n w a ive r o f tho se ri g hts

. The trial c ourt implicitl y

acc redited D etec tive Chastain’s t estimony and dis cre dited the appe llant’s testimony . The re cord doe s not preponder ate a g ainst this ruling. Ac cording ly , we c onclude that the trial court did not er

r in finding that the appe llant’s statement wa s admissible at trial.

B . U na va ila

ble Witn e ss

T h e ap p e ll a n t’ s s e c o n d is s u e c o n c e r n s th e tria l c o u r t’ s ru li n g th a t th e p r e li mi n aryhear ing testimonyof the a

ppellant’s stepson, Anthony J ames Z onneville, could be introduc ed at trial. The substance of Z onneville’s preliminary hearing testimonywas that he was pre sent when the appellant returne d to the 876 Apex St ree t addre ss f ollowing the crime. Z onneville stated that the appe llant was
nervous a nd said that he a nd Wheeler ha d “wa l k ed u p o n ” a couple. Z onneville testified that the appellant sa id that he left whe n Wheeler be g an shooting

.
Pr io r to tria l, th e St a te f

il e d a mo ti o n a s k in g th e tria l c o u r t t o f in d th a t Z o n n e v il le was unavailable so that his preliminary hearing te stimonycould be intro d uced at trial. The appe llant objected, a

rg uing that Z onneville was not una vailable a nd t h at the def ense did not cr oss-examine Z onneville at the pr eliminary hearing. T he tri al co u rt held two evide ntiary hearings to de termine Z onneville’s unava ilability

. T he first e videntiary hearing w as held on May 16, 2003, and wa s continued to allow for

additional eff

orts to locate Z onneville. The se cond hea ring was he ld on May 27, 2003, afte r additional attempts to locate Z onneville wer e unsucc essful.

J oe Wilkins , a ca se mana g er w ith the Department of Children’s Service s (DCS), te stified that at the time of the hearing, the Depa rtment of Children’s Service s had leg al custody of Z onneville. Howeve r, his wher eabouts we re unknow n. Acc ording to Wil kins, Zonne ville had bee n place d at the W i l s o n C o u n t y Y o u t h R a n c h o n A p r i l 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 , a n d h e h a d ab s c o n d e d f r o m t h e r a n c h f

o u r d a ys later. There afte r, a juvenile court arr est order was issued for Z onneville beca use of his e s cape. Wil kins state d that locating Z onneville’s last residenc e wa s “somewha t complicated, be cause of the itinerant nature of his family .”

Detec tive Mike Chastain testified that appr ox imately ten d ay s prior to the May 16, 2003, h ea ri n g,

I

put out a b o l o [be on the lookout] on the police sha red computer, w hich is sent t o al l stations, patrol stations, any police pe rs on ne l tha t g e ts p oli c e sh are , s ta tin g that w e we re loo kin g fo r h im as wit ness i n this case

. And I g ave two loc ations, previous addr esses that he ’s us e d in the pa st a ndse nt that ou t.

Th e pr e vio us a dd re sse s w e re the 87 6 Ap ex S tr eet a dd re ss a ndtw o lo c a tio ns on Cart e r S tr e e t. Additionally , Detec tive Chastain spoke with offic ers who kne w Z onneville, and he was advised that Z onneville had last be en see n in the ar ea of Apex St ree t or Carter

Street three months prior to the-11-

hearing. D etec tive Chastain also spoke with reside nts of Carter Street, and the y

maintained that Z onneville had not lived in the are a for sever al months. Howeve r, Z onneville had been “ spotted on
oc c a s i o n c ru i s i n g t h r o u g h t h e ar e a

. ” D e t e c t i v e C h a s t a i n l e ar n e d t h a t Z o n n e v i l l e h a d a l t e r e d h is appea ranc e by cutting his ha ir.

Eddie Simm ons, an investigator with the District Attorney Gene ral’s of

fice , testified that he ha d a tte mpt e d to loc a te Z on ne vil le

. Ho we ve r, he e xpla ine d th a t hi s r e so ur c e s f or fi nd ing a juv e nil e wer e “ve ry

limit ed.” Simmons chec ked seve ral a ddres s es wi thout success. F urther, Simmons attempted to find Z onneville’s friend, Floy d Gillihan, but Si mmons was unable to locate him.

I n an ef fort to locate Mary

Ann Malone, Z onneville’s mother, Simmon s we n t to a shelter wh er e s h e h ad s t ay ed and to a n addre ss she had listed as he r re sidence on some traf fic ticke ts. Howeve r, he w as unable to locate he r. Simm ons also went to the home of Z onneville’s g irlfriend, and, althoug h the re sidence appea red to be inhabited, no one a nswere d the door.

At the c on c lus ion of

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t th e S tat e ha d ma de a n “ ho ne st, g ood-fa ith effort” to locate Z onneville. Ther efor e, the tria l court found that Z onneville was unavailable . The trial c ourt furthe r found that a lthough the a ppellant failed to cross-e x amine Z onneville at the preliminary hearing, the appellant had the opportuni ty to do so. The court stated, “I think t h e m o t i v e – the ca se is the same. The defe ndant is the same. Theissues are the same.” Acc ordi ng ly , the trial court determined tha t Z onneville’s pre liminary hearing te stimonycould be introduced at trial.
On app ea l , the appe llant claims that “the State did not sufficie ntly establish Z onneville’s unavailability ,” and “the S tate did not establish that the m otive not to cross-examine Z onneville at the pr e lim ina

ry he ari ng wa s si mil ar to the mot ive to c ro ss- e xami ne him a t tr ia l.” Th e app e lla nt a lso
c la ims that th e a dmi ssi on of Z on ne vil le ’s pr e lim ina

ry he ari ng te sti mon y

vio la te d h is rig ht t o confr ontation.

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 801(c) define s hear say as “a statement, other tha n one made by the dec lara nt while testify ing at the trial or hea ring , offe red in e vidence to prove the t ru t h of the matter a sserte d

. ” Generally , “[h] ear say is not admissi ble except as provide d by these rule s or otherwise by law.” T enn. R. Evid. 802. Clearly , Z onneville’s pre liminary hearing te stimonywas hear say . See Te nn. R. Evid. 801(c). How ever , in limi ted ci rc u m s t an ce s , prior testimony may be
a dmi ssibl e a t tria l vi a

a he ars a y e xce pti on if

the de c lara nt i s u na va ila ble a ndif the pa rt y a g a ins t whom the testimony

is offer ed had a n opportunity and a similar moti v e t o d evelop the te stimony throug h methods such as cro s s -e x am i n ation. See Te nn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). O ne method for demonstrating unavailability is if the witness “[i] s absent fr om the hearing a nd the propone nt of a statement has be en unable to procurethe dec lara nt’s attendanc e by proce ss. ” Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a) (5). M o re o v er , this court has conc luded that when the State seeks to introduce former te sti mon y of a n u na va ila

ble wi tne ss, the Sta te mus t

establish two p re re q uisites in order to satisfy the def endant’ s constitutional rig ht of confr ontation. First, the state must show that-12- the de c lara nt i s tr

uly un a va ila ble a ft e r g oo d f

a ithe ff orts t o o bta in h is prese nce, a nd second, tha t the evi d en ce car ries its own indicia of
r e l i ab i l i t y. State v. Summers, 159 S.W .3d 586, 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004)

.
As we no te d e arl ie r, the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud ed th at th e S ta te “ ma de a n h on e st, g oo d- fa ith eff ort,” to find Z onneville. We ag ree with the t rial court. The State pre sented a mple testimonyof
re p ea t ed , t h wa rt ed at t em p t s t o s ec u re Zo n n ev i l l e’ s at t en d an ce at t ri al

. W e c o n cl u d e t h at t h e e v idence supports the trial court’s finding that Z onneville was unavailable for tria l. Additionally , we note that our supre me court has determined that the former t estimony exception to the hearsay rule is based
u p o n s u c h a s o l i d f

o u n d a t i o n t h a t i t m e e t s t h e i n d i c i a o f r e l i ab i l i t y r e q u i r e m e n t

. S e e S t a t e v

. C a u s b y, 706 S.W .2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986). I n other wor ds, “by definition the forme r testimony was g iven under oath, traditionally

a st ro ng indicia of truthfulne ss.” Neil P. Cohen et al., Te nnessee L aw of Evidence , § 8.34[2] [a] (LEXI S publis hing, 4th e d. 2000).

Th e app e lla nt al so c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that he ha d a sim ila r m oti ve to c ro ssexamine Z onneville at the preliminary hearing a nd at trial. The a ppellant conc edes tha t he did not
cross-e x amine Z onneville at the pr eliminary hearing. Rule 804( b)(1) pro v i d es t hat the former testimonyof an una vailable witness is admissible if the party ag ainst whom the testimony is being offe red ha d both “an opportunityand a similar motive to deve lop the testimony .” Te nn. R. Evid. 804(b)( 1). Notably , a lea ding tr eatise ha s expl ained that “the witness need not have a ctually been examined by

the party ag ainst whom it is being used in orde r for the rule to be satisfied. . . . Counsel who forg oes extensive . . . cross-e x amination takes a risk that the witness’s testimony may be later used if the witness be comes una vailable.” Cohen, supra, § 8.34[5]. I n the instant case , the appe llant had the op

po rtu nit y to cross-e x amine Z onneville at the preliminary hearing; howeve r, he chose not to exercise this opportunity

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fu rthe r f ou ndthat th e motiv e to c ro ss- e xami ne Z on ne vil le wa s th e sa me be c a us e the iss ue s a nd the pa rt ie s we re c on sis te nt a t the pr e lim ina ry he ari ng a nd a t the tr ia l. We no te that “ the pu rp os e of

a pr e lim ina

ry he ari ng is .

. . to d e te rm ine wh e the r the re e xists pr ob able c a us e to believe that a crime ha s been c ommitt ed and tha t the acc used committed the crime.” State v. L ee, 693 S.W .2d 361, 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). Additionally , in State v. Howell, 868 S .W.2d 238, 251 (Tenn. 1993) , our supre me court concluded tha t the preliminary hearing testimonyof a c odefe ndant could be introduc ed at tria l under the f ormer te stimonyexception. T he court noted tha t the def endant had a “full opportunity and simil ar motive to develop the prior te stimony .” I d. The
c ou r ts t a t e d t h a ti n r e a c h i n g i t s d e c i s i o n , i tc o n s i d e r e d s e v e r a l f a c t o r s

. I d

. H o w e v e r , “ t h e m o st emphasis was pla ced on the fac t that at both the [ preliminary ] hearing and the subseque nt trial, the testimonywas addressed to the same issue of ‘ [w] hether or not the def

endant[] had committ ed the offe nse’ c harg ed.” I d.; see a lso Causby , 706 S.W .2d 631-32.

I n the instant c ase, the purpose of Z onneville’s testimony

at the pre liminary

hearing a nd at trial was to de monstrate the appellant’ s involvement in the robbery and murde r. See H owell, 868 S.W .2d at 251; State v. Robert Anthony Devito, No. 01C01-9509-CC-00285, 1996 WL 682148, at-13-

*5 (Tenn. Crim. App. a t Nashville, Nov. 27, 1996). Ac cording ly , the trial court did not err in finding that the motives were simil ar at both procee dings.

Fina ll y , th e ap p e ll a n t a

r g u e s th a t a d mi tt in g Z o n n e v il le ’ s p r e li mi n ar y h e ar in g te s timony “violated his constitutional rig ht to confront and c ross-examine witnesses u nder the Six th and Fourt ee n t h Am endments t o the United States Constitut ion, Article I , Section 9 of the Te nnessee Con sti tut ion , a nd the Un ite d Sta te s Sup re me Cou rt ’s de c isi on in Cr a wf or d v. Was hin g ton , [541 U. S. 36, 124 S. Ct . 1354 (2004)].” The S ix th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the ac cused sha ll e njoy the rig ht .

. . to be confr onted with the witnesses
a g a ins t hi m.” L ike wi se , A rt icl e I , S e c tio n 9 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion pr ov ide s th a t “ in a ll criminal prose cutions, the ac cused hath the rig ht to . . . meet the witnesses fa ce to f ace .”

I n Crawf ord, the Supreme Court examined the right to c onfrontation. The court summarized the fa c tua l ba sis of

the c a se by

sa y ing , “ Pe tit ion e r .

. . sta bb e d a ma n w ho a lle g e dly

tr ie d to ra

pe his wife, Sy lvia. At his trial, the State play ed for the jury Sy lvia’s tape- rec orded state ment to the police describing the sta

bbing, e ven thoug h he had no opportunity for c ross examination.” 541 U.S. at 38, 12 4 S. Ct. a t 13 56 -5 7. Th e c ou rt no te d, “ Whe rete sti mon ia l e vid e nc e is at is sue, . . . th e Sixth Amendment dema nds what the c ommon law require d: unavailability and a prior opportunity

for
cross-e x amination.” I d. at 68, 127 S. Ct. 1374. C lear ly , preliminary hearing te stimon y m eets the definition of “testimonial evidenc e.” I d. Thus, to satisfy constitutional concerns and the dicta tes of Craw ford, the te stimoni al evidenc e must have be en off ere d by an unava ilable witn es s an d the party ag ainst whom the evidenc e is offe red must ha ve had a prior opportunity for c ross-examination. Se e Sta te v. Go me z, 16 3 S.W. 3d 63 2, 64 2 (T e nn

. 20 05 ). We ha ve a lr e a dy c on c lud e d th a t Z on ne vil le
was una vail ab l e an d that the appe llant had the opportunity to cross-e x amine Z onneville at the preliminary

hearing. T here fore , the appe llant’s rig ht to confrontation wa s not violat ed b y the admission at trial of Z onneville’s pre liminary hearing te stimony

. C. Sufficiency

of the Evidenc e
Th e app e lla nt n e xt ch a lle ng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su pp ortin g his c on vic tio ns

. Spe c if ic a lly , th e app e lla nt a sse rt s: (1) “ The [appell ant’s] convictions are based upon c ircumstantial evide n ce that does not exclude every rea sonable hy

pothesis except that of his g uil t” ; (2) “ The [appellant’s] convictions cannot stand be cause they wer e based upon the uncorr oborate d testimonyof his alleg ed ac complice, Richard Wheele r”;
(3) “ The e vidence is insufficient to c onvict the [appellant] of felony murder beca

use the murder of Patricia Ba rker was not the na tural and probable conseque nce of Wheeler’ s robbery

and/or a ttempted robbery ”;-14- ( 4 ) “ T h e e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n tt o s u p p o rtt h e [a p p e lla nt’ s] conviction for e specia lly

ag gra v at ed robbe ry

beca use Wheeler

was unsucce ssful in taking pr operty from Joseph Bar

ker” ; and
(5) “ The [app el l ant’s] convictions for both e specia lly ag g ravated robbery and attempted e specia lly ag g ravated ro b b ery

of Jos eph Ba rker violate double jeopa

rdy .”
On appe al, a jury

conviction r em o v es t he pre sumption of the appellant’s innoce nce a nd repla ces it with one of g uilt, so that the appellant car ries the bur den of de monstrating to this court why the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s finding s. See State v. Tug g le, 6 3 9 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The a

ppellant must establish that no reasona ble trier of fa ct co u ld have f ound the essential ele ments of t he offense bey ond a re asonable doubt. See J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct . 2781, 2789 (1979); Te nn. R. App. P. 13(e).

Acc ording ly , on appea l, the State is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable infere nces which may be draw n there from. State v. Wil liams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). I n other words, questions c oncerning the cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, a s well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidence, a re r esolved by the trier of

fac t, and not the appe llate courts. St ate v. Prue tt, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

.
I n the light most favor able to the State, the proof adduced at trial reve aled that the a ppellant
a ndWhe e le r l e ft a re sid e nc e in e a st N a sh vil le a ndwa lke d to do wn tow n N a sh vil le in o rd e r t o o bta in money . The a

ppellant g ave Whee ler a

tobogg an ca

p befor e they left the residenc e. While walking
near the railroa d trac ks, the appe llant beca me awa re tha t Wheeler possesse d a pistol he had shown the app e lla nt e arl ie r i n th e we e ke nd . T he app e lla nt a sk e d to se e the pis tol , exam ine d it , a ndg a ve it back to W heele r. Upon t heir arrival in the downtown are a, they saw a man standing at the trunk of his BMW automobile. The appe ll ant s ug g ested that he and Wheeler rob the man a nd informed Wheeler tha t the tobogg an ca p had ey e holes cut out of i t. Wheeler refuse d to rob t he man, and the appellant c alled him a “bitch.”

The two men c ontinued walking until they rea ched F ourth Avenue and B roadw ay wher e they saw the B arke rs. The a

ppellant poin ted to J oseph B arke r and sa id, “[W ]e’re f ix ing to r ob him.” Wheeler a g ain re fused to participate in the crime until the appellant taunted, “[W ]hat, are y ou g onna bitch out on me ag ain? ” The appellant a nd W h ee l er t h en proc eede d acr oss the street towa rd the Ba rker s. Wheeler, f

earing the Ba

rker s would g et into their vehicle befor e he rea ched them, incre ased his pa ce. As he approa ched Mr. Ba rker , Wheeler pulled down his tobogg an, pointed his g un at Mr. Ba rker , and dema nded money . Mr. B arke r re sponded that he ha d no money but offer ed a be eper instead. Mr. B arke r testified that Wheele r took the bee per. Mr s. Ba rker came around the bac k of the ve hic le , a nd , du ri ng a str ug g le wi th M r. B ark e r o ve r the g un , Wh e e le r s ho t he r. She die d a s a result of he r gunshot wounds. Also during the s trug g le, M r. Barke r was beate n and shot. He w as sever ely injured and ha d to underg o three surg erie s. A bullet, lodge d in his back, co u l d not be
remove d.-15-

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g , th e app e lla nt w a s c on vic te d of the fi rs t de g re e mur de r of Pa tr ic ia B ark e r c omm itt e d d ur ing the pe rp e tr a tio n o f o r atte mpt to p e rp e tr a te a rob bery , w hic h o ff e ns e is otherwise known as felony murder. Fe lony murder is de fined a s “[a] ki lling of a nother c ommitt ed in the perpe tration of or attempt to perpetrate any

. . . robbery .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 2) (1997).

The appellant was also convicte d of the e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

of Jos eph B arke r by taking his be eper and the attempted espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

of Jos eph B arke r by

attempting to t ake Un ite d St a te s c ur

re nc y . E sp e c ia lly

a g g ra va te d r ob be ry

is r ob be ry a c c omp lis he d witha de a dly
wea pon wher e the victim suff ers serious bodily

injury . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-403(a )(1) and (2) (1997)

. R o b b er y i s define d as “the intentional or knowing theft of pr operty from the pe rson of another by violence or

putting the pe rson in fea

r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 401(a) (1997).

I n its ju ry c h ar g e , th e tria l c o u r t a ls o in s tr u c te d th e ju r y o n th e th e o r y o f cr iminal respo ns ib il it y . “ A p e rs on is c ri min a lly re sp on sib le a s a

pa rt y to a n o ff

e ns e if the of fe ns e is
c omm itt e d b y

the pe rs on ’s ow n co nd uc t, by the c on du c t of a no the r f or wh ic h th e pe rs on is c ri min a lly responsible , o r

b y b o th

. ” T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 4 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 9 9 7 )

. T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tated section 39-11- 402(2) ( 1997) provides tha t a n appellant is c riminally responsible for the ac tions of
a no the r w he n, “ [a]c tin g wi th i nte nt t o p ro mot e or a ssi st t he c omm iss ion of

the of fe ns e , o r t o b e ne fi t in the pr oc e e ds or

re su lts of

the of fe ns e , [th e app e lla nt] s oli c its , d ire c ts, a ids , o r atte mpt s to a id another person to commit the offe nse.” Spec ifically , when an appe llant is aware of the intentions of his c o- de fe nd a nt a ndpr oc e e ds to ai d or at te mpt to ai d in the e nd e a vo r, the app e lla nt i s r e sp on sib le for a ll natural and pr obable c onsequenc es of his co- d efendant’s a ctions during the commission of the cr ime. See State v. Richmond, 90 S.W .3d 648, 654 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tenn. 1997) . Specifica lly , the natura l and proba ble conse quence s rule

extends the s cope of criminal l iability to the targ et crime intended by
a de fe nd a nt a s w e ll a s to oth e r c ri me s c omm itt e d b y a c on fe de rate that wer e the natural and pr obable consequenc es of the commission of the orig inal crime.

State v. Howar d, 30 S.W .3d 271, 276 (Tenn. 2000)

. First, we will address the a ppellant’s conc ern tha t his con v i ct i o n s were base d solely upon circ umstantial evidence . I t is well-established that a g uiltyverdic t can be based u p on direc t
e vid e nc e , c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e , o r a c omb inatio n o f d ir e c t a ndc ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e . Se e Sta te v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), o v er ru l ed o n other g rounds by State v. Hooper , 29 S.W. 3d1, 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . M or e ov e r, wh ile a g uil ty ve rd ic t ma y

re su lt fro m pu re ly
c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e , in or de r t o s us ta in the c on vic tio n th e fa c ts a nd c ir c ums ta nc e s of the of fe ns e “must be so strong and coge nt as t o exclude every other reasona ble hy pothesis save the g uilt of the [appellant].” St ate v. Cra wford , 470 S.W .2d 610, 612 (Tenn. 1971)

. Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

577 (7 ed. 1999) de fin e s d ire ct evidenc e as “ [e] vidence that is based

th on persona l knowledg e or obse rvation and tha t, if true, prove s a fa ct wi t h o u t i n fer ence or-16-

presumption.” Dire ct evidenc e is also consider ed to be “ [a] witness’s statement that he or she perc eived a

fac t in issue by

one of the five sense s, or that the witness was in a particula r phy sical or
m en t al s t at e. ” I d. at 579. In the instant case , Wheeler te stified to the appellant’ s prese nce at the
sc e ne a nd his int e nt to ro b the vic tim s. Ad dit ion a lly , Mal on e te sti fi e d th a t th e app e lla nt w a s w ith Wheeler immediate ly

prior to a nd during the shooting. F urther, the appellant himself testified that he wa s w ith Whe e le r w he n th e ro bb e ry a ndsh oo tin g be g a n to take pla c e . A c c or dingly , at lea st a po rt ion of the pr oo f a g a ins t th e app e lla nt d e ri ve d fr om d ir e c t e vid e nc e . T he re fo re , th e c a se a g a ins t the appe llant was not purely circ umstantial.

N e x t , w e t u r n t o w h e t h e r W h e e l e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y w a s c o rr o b o r a t e d b y o t h e r p r o o f

. G e n e r a l l y,

“ a de fe nd a nt c a nn ot b e c on vic te d u po n th e un c or ro bo rate d te sti mon y

of [an ] ac c omp lic e [].” Sta te v. McKnig ht, 900 S.W .2d 36, 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “An acc omplice is defined a s a per son who knowing ly , voluntarily , and with common i n t en t with the principal off ers to unite in the commission of a crime.” I d. Be cause Wheeler w as ar rested a nd indicted for the same off enses a s the appe llant, we conc lude that he was an acc omplice as a matter of la w. See State v. B ox ley , 76 S.W .3d 381, 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

.
I n order for Wheele r’s testimony

to be cor robora ted,

there must be some fac t tes t ified to, entirely independe nt of the
acc omplice’s testi mony , which, taken by itself, leads to the infe renc e, not only that a crime has been committed, but a lso that the defe ndant is i mpl ic a te d in it; a nd thi s inde pe nd e nt co rr ob or a tiv e te sti mon y mus t
a l s o i n c l u d e s o m e f

a c te s t ab l i s h i n g t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s i d e n t i t y. Henley v. State, 489 S.W .2d 53, 56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972)

. “T h e co rrobor ation need not be conclusive, but it i s sufficient if this evidenc e, of itself, te nds to connec t the defe ndant with the commission of the offense, although the evidenc e is slight and entitled, when standing alone, to but l i t t l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

. ” S t a t e v

. H e f l i n , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 5 1 9 , 5 2 4 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 9 )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, such cor robora t i ve evide nce ma y

be dire ct or c ircumstantial. See State v. Spada fina, 952 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “[T] he question of corr oboration of an acc omplice’s testimony is f o r th e ju r y to d e te r mi n e

. ” St a te v

. Ro b e r t A ll e n G ar n e r , N o

. 0 3 C0 1

- 9 2 0 5

- CR

- 0 0 1 7 8 , 1 9 9 3 WL 3474, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J an. 11, 1993).

O u r r e v i e w o f th e r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a tt h e ap p e l l a n tc o rr o b o r a t e d m o s to f W h e e l e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y. The a ppellant’s ver sion of events closely rese mbled Wheeler’ s acc ount, with the exception of who initiated the discussion reg arding the robbe ry of the man standing near the B MW and the robbery of the B arke rs. Moreo v er , M al one testified that he had see n the appe llant and Wheeler walking around dow ntown ear lier in the day and that the a

ppellant and Wheele r wa lked tog ether toward the Ba rker s at t he beginning of t he robbery

. Another w itness, Kenny Warren, sa w a man sta nding te n to fifteen f

eet a way from Wheeler

and Mr. B arke r as they wer e fig hting ove r the g un. The man w as wea ring a dar k coat with “som ething red on the back.” Z onneville’s testimony reve als that the appellant told him t h at h e and Whee ler “ walked up on a couple a nd [W heele r] had the g un. And the n [th e app e lla nt] s a id tha t he ’s – w he n – he he ard thr e e sh ots , a nd he wa s g on e .” B a se d u po n th is-17-

proof, we conclude that Wheeler’ s testimonywas more than ade quately corr oborate d.

No w, we wi ll a dd re ss t

he iss ue s r a ise d b y the app e lla nt r e g ard ing his ro bb e ry c on vic tio ns

. The a ppellant contends tha t the proof did not show t h at W h ee ler took a be eper from Mr. B arke r. Howeve r, Mr. B arke r testified that be cause he had no c ash he of fer ed Wheeler a beepe r and tha t Wheeler took the be eper . Acc ording ly , there was proof in the rec ord that Wheeler exercised c ontrol over the beepe r. Mr. Ba

rker testified that he was “sca red to de ath.” Moreove r, during the cour se of the robbe ry , Wheeler shot Mr. B arke r, re sulting in se vere injuries that require d three surg erie s and left a bullet lodg ed in his ba ck. Thus, Mr. B arke r suffe red se rious bodily injury . See Te nn. Code A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 1 0 6 ( a ) ( 3 4 ) ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; St a te v

. O n e a l Sa n f o r d , N o

. E 1 9 9 9

- 0 2 0 8 9

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 1 WL 681312, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Kn ox ville, J une 18, 2001). F urther, both the a ppellant and Wheeler asserted that the appe llant wanted to g o downtown to g et money . Wheeler te stified that he pursued the r obbery

of the B arke rs at the appellant’s ins truction. Thus, the appe llant was “[a]cting wi th i nte nt t o pr omo te or a ssi st the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e , o r t o b e ne fi t in the pr oc e e ds or re su lts of the of fe ns e , [w he n h e ] . . . dir ect [ed ] . . . [Whe e le r] t o c omm it the of fe ns e ,” re nd e ri ng him criminally

responsible for

Wheeler’ s actions. Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-11-402( 2). Acc ording ly , we conclude that t h e p roof at trial overwhe lmingly established that the a

ppellant was g uiltyof the espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

of Mr

. Barker . L ikewise, the pr oof wa s sufficient f or a jury to find the appe llant criminally

responsible for

the attempted e specia lly ag g ravated robbery of Mr. B arke r by the unsucc essful attempt to take his ca sh.

Th e app e lla nt a lso arg ue s th a t “ the mur de r o f Mr s. B ark e r wa s no t th e na tur a l a ndpr ob able conseque nce of Wheeler’ s robbery and/or attempted robbery ” of Mr. Barke r. Our supreme court has explained:

“The [natural and proba ble consequence s] rule underlies the doc trine of criminal responsibilit y and is based on the rec og nition that aiders and abettors should be responsible f or the c riminal harms they have natura lly , probably

and for esee ably

put into mot ion.” I n contra st, the felony murder statute . . . does not requir e that a homicide committed during t h e course of one of the e numera ted fe lonies be for esee able. “When one e nters into a sche me with another to com mit one of the fe lon ie s e nu me rate d in the fe lon y mur de r s ta tut e s, a ndde a th e ns ue s, both de fenda nts a

re responsible for the death reg ardle ss o f w ho actua lly committed the murder a nd whe ther the killing was specific ally

contemplated by

the other.”

Sta te v. Wint e rs , 1 37 S.W. 3d64 1, 65 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 03 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . I n o the r w or ds , the app e lla nt w a s r e sp on sib le fo r the mur de r o f M rs . B ark e r w hic h w a s c omm itt e d d ur ing the c ou rs e of the robbe ry , whether

or not the murder

was for esee able. I d. Mrs. Ba rker died as a result of the g unshot wounds she sustained during t he course of the espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

of Mr. B arke r, rende ring the homicide fe lony murder.
Finally , the appe llant claims that his conviction for the espec ially ag g ravated robbery of Mr.-18-

Ba rker by taking a bee per and his c onviction f or the attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry of Mr. Ba rk e r b y th e a tt e mp t to ta

k e c a s h v io late d o u b le je o p ar d y

. T h e d o u b le je o p ar d y c lauses of the United States and Te nnessee constitutions protect an ac cused f rom: (1) a

sec o nd prosec ution fo llo wi ng a n a c qu itt a l; ( 2) a se c on d p ro se c uti on fo llo wi ng c on vic tio n; a nd(3 ) m ult ipl e pu nis hme nts fo r the sa me of

fe ns e . Se e Sta te v. De nto n, 93 8 S. W.2 d 3 73 , 37 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) . T he pr e se nt c a se involves the third cate g ory . I n Tenne ssee, whe ther two off enses are the ‘same ’ for

double jeopar dy purposes depends upon a close and ca ref ul analy sis of the offe nses involved, the statutory definitions of the c rimes, the leg islative intent and the particular fac ts a nd circ umstances. See State v. Bla ck, 52 4 S. W.2 d 91 3, 91 9 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) . T his a na ly sis is g uid e d in pa rt by the app lic a tio n o f the te st
a nn ou nc e d in B loc kb ur g e r v . U nit e d St a te s:

Where the sa me ac t or transa ction co n s t i t utes a violation of two distinct st at u t o ryprovisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offe nses or only one is whethe r ea ch provision
re qu ir e s p ro of

of a n a dd iti on a l f

a c t w hic h th e oth e r d oe s n ot.

Bla ck, 524 S.W.2d at 919 (quoting Bloc kburg er v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct . 180, 182 (1932)) . I n order to de termine if double je opardy attache s, our supreme court de vised a four -part te st:
(1 ) a

B loc kb ur g e r a na ly sis of

the statut ory

of fe ns e s; (2) a n a n a ly s is , g u id e d b y th e p r in c ip le s o f [D u c h a c v

. St a te , 505 S

. W

. 2 d 2 3 7, 239 (Tenn. 1973) ], of the evidence used to prove the of fe ns e s; (3 ) a c on sid e ratio n of wh e the r the re we re mul tip le vic tim s o r d isc re te acts; and
(4 ) a c omp ari so n o f the pu rp os e s o f the re sp e c tiv e statut e s. Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 381. However , “if the offense s are the ‘same ’ under Bloc kburg er, the fede ral constitutional double jeopar d y p ro tections have been violate d and the inquiry may end.” State v. Hay es, 7 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

The State c ontends that the attempted taking of t he money and the c ompleted taking of the beepe r were “two separ ate acts of robbery .” We disag ree

. The proof at t rial re veals that Wheele r demande d money , but Mr. Ba rker had none. A s an alternative, he offe red Whee ler a beepe r, which Wheeler took. We c onclude that the acts “we re acc omplished at the same time a nd are but parts of a sing le continuing criminal ac t, inspired by the same c riminal intent which is essential to eac h offe nse.” State v. Warr en, 750 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); see al s o State v. Hen d e r s o n , 6 2 0 S. W. 2 d 4 8 4 , 4 8 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 1 )

. T h e r e f o r e , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e ap pellant’s conviction of a ttempted espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

should be m erge d into the appellant’s conviction of e specia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry

.-19- D. I mpeac hment

The a ppellant asserts that t h e trial c ourt err ed in its rulings re g arding the admission of the appellant’ s prior convic tion for ag g ravated robbe ry for impea chment purpose s. Pr i o r t o trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to use severa l of the appe llant’s previous convic tions for impeachme nt purposes should the appe llant choose to testify

. Among the listed c onvictions were
sever al convictions for theft and a conviction for a g g ravated robbe ry . The a ppellant cha lleng ed the State’s ability

to use the prior a g g ravated robbery conviction, ar g uing that the ag g ravated robbe ry conviction was similar to the i nstant char g es. The appellant arg ued that the evidence of the previous robbery conviction would be unduly prejudicia l, servin g as prope nsityevidenc e. The trial court ini tia lly ru le d th a t “ ou t of

a n a bu nd a nc e of

c a uti on , . . . th a t c on vic tio n w ith that othe r r ob be ry sh ou ld
no t be c on sid e re d if

thi s ma n te sti fi e s.

. . . I

do n’ t be lie ve that th ey wou ld do any thi ng bu t g o to propensity

and would ca

use the Jury

to – to look at f

rom the standpoint this is a robbe ry , that was a robbe ry , and so forth.”
At trial, during direc t examination, t he following colloquy occur red:

De fe ns e c ou ns e l: Oka y . N ow I wa nt t o a sk

y ou the big question. Whydid y ou come to downtown Na shville on Fe b ruary 18 of 2001? th

Th e app e lla nt: To g e t so me qu ic k ea sy mon e y fo r som e dr ug s.

. . . . Def ense c oun s el : Was robbery one of the methods y ou c o n s i d e r e d f

o r m ak i n g m o n e y t h a td a y?

The a ppellant: Neve r.

. . . . Th e app e lla nt: Th e truthis I wen t do wnto wn to m a ke so me money at the Jungle or ste al s o m et h ing. I wasn’t looking for no violent crimes. I ’m just trying to g et high. That’s a ll I ’m doing . I do it every day

. Every day I g o down there . Quick, ea sy money is what I was a fter.

After the conc lusion of the appellant’ s d i re ct ex amination, the State ag ain moved to be allowed to question the a

ppellant re g arding the prior convictions, arg uing that the appellant ope ned the door to the a dmission of the prior ag g ravated robbe ry convic t i o n b y s t ati ng that he neve r cons id e r e d r o b b e r y a s a w a y to ma k e mo n e y th a t d a y

. T h e tria l c o u r t o b s e r v e d th a t the appellant denied c onsidering robbery “[i] n a very

emphatic way

. [Defense counsel] asked the que stion, was
ro bb e ry on e of y ou r c on sid e ratio ns to m a ke mon e y that day ? An d h e ve ry

fi rm ly a nde mph a tic a lly-20-

said, neve r. . . . I noticed

. . . and made a note of it, a s a matter of fac t.” The c ourt stated that “it wa s a cle ar e mphatic neve r, ever ty pe of answe r. And Ithink that’s clear ly implied that he would never
resort to any thing like that.”

After considering the implications of allowing the prior r obbery conviction to be admissible, t h e t ri al co u rt m ad e t h e f

o l l o wi n g ru l i n g:

I ’v e tho ug ht a

bo ut this , y ou kn ow , v e ry c are fu lly a nda s f a ir ly a s I can. A nd the issue is whether or not when this [ appellant] g ets on the sta nd

. . . an d whe n a sk e d w a s r ob be ry on e of y ou r c on sid e ratio ns to
make mon e y

that day , a ndhe a ns we re d that qu e sti on in a way that is , obviously , more than just that day , which is what [counsel], Ithink, meant to be only

asking , by say ing, never , in a very emphatic way

that he said it, that I

was sitting he re looking at hi m when he said it, and
as was the J ury

. And when, la ter on, he talks about he’s not looking fo r a ny kin d o f vio le nt crime s at all , he ’s jus t looking to m a ke so me quick money , the implication be ing he ’s hustling g ay s at the Jungle, or wha tever , or stealing some ca r, that he w ould never

in v olve himself in that type of an offe nse of violence, that that is misl eading to the Jury . It, c le arl y , in dic a te s b y str on g imp lic a tio n th a t he wo uld
never , has never invol ved him self in things such as wha t we’r e her e about, which is a r obbery

.
I n try ing to c onsider it all, and try ing to be as bala nced a s I can be about it, and r ecog nizi ng that there ’s s o m e p re judice on any

of these c onvictions , but particular ly , this one, I would say

that I think the rig ht way

to do this i s coming from the fac t that I think he opened the door.

The trial c ourt furthe r instructed the State to simpl y ask the a ppellant if he ha d ever

been c onvicted of a ro bb e ry , o rd e ri ng the Sta te to no t de lve int o the nu mbe r of pr e vio us ro bb e ry c on vic tio ns or

the ir desig nation as ag g ravated robbe ries. The State complied with the court’s order , asking “And y ou ha d .

. . a pr ior c on vic tio n for ro bb e ry , co rr e c t?” Th e app e lla nt re pli e d in the a ff ir ma tiv e . O n a

pp e a l, the appe llant arg ues t hat t he trial c ourt err ed by allowing the State to question the appe llant reg arding his prior conviction for

robbery

. The a dmissibi lityof prior convictions for impeachment purposes is g overne d by Rule 609(a) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e . Ru le 60 9 p ro vid e s:

For the purpose of attacking the cre dibilit y of a witness, evide nce that the witness has be en con v i ct ed o f a crime may be admitted if the following proce dures a nd conditions are satisfied:
(1) The witness must be asked about the c onviction on-21- cross-e x amination . . . .
(2) The crime must be punishable by d eath or impri s o n m ent in excess of one y ear under the law
un de r w hic h th e wi tn ess wa s c on vic te d o r, if no t so pu nis ha ble , the c ri me mus t ha ve inv olv e d d ish on e sty
or fa lse state me nt.
(3) I f t he witness to be impeac hed is the ac cused in a criminal prose cution, the State must give the acc used
rea sonable written no t ice of the impeac hing
c on vic tio n b e fo re tr ia l, and the c ou rt up on re qu e st must determine that the conviction’s probative value
on cre dibilit y

outweig hs it s u n f

air prejudicia l effe ct on the s u b s ta n ti v e is s u e s

. T h e c o u r t may ru le o n the admissibili ty of such proof prior to trial b u t i n any event sha ll rule prior to the testimony of the a ccuse d. I f the court makes a f

inal determination that such proof is ad missibl e for

impeachme nt purposes, the
acc used nee d not actually testify at t he trial to later challeng e the pr opriety

of the de termination.

I n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r the pr ob a tiv e va lue of a pr ior c on vic tio n on the iss ue of c re dib ili ty outweig hs its prejudicial eff ect on the substantive issues, “a trial court should (a ) ‘a ssess the simil arity betwee n the cr ime on trial and the c rime under ly ing the impeaching conviction’ and (b) ‘ana ly ze the rele vance the impeac hing conviction has t o the i ssue of cre dibilit y .’” State v. Fa rmer, 841 S.W .2d 837, 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Neil P. Cohen et al., Tenne ssee L aw of Evidence § 609.9, at 288 (2d e d. 1990)). A trial court’s r uling unde r Rule 609 will not be r ever sed on appea l absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Bla nton, 926 S.W .2d 953, 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
Our supre me court ha s stated, “Robbery is a crime involving dishonesty and may be used f or impeachme nt purposes.” State v. G almore, 994 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tenn

. 1 999). Ther efor e, the appellant’ s prior convic tion of ag g ravated robbery is probative of his cr edibility . Howeve r, the conviction is substantiallysimil ar to the of fense of espe cially

ag g ra v at ed robbe ry

for whic h the appellant wa s on trial and which w as the off ense unde rly ing the felo n y m u rd er ch arge . When an impeaching conviction is substantiallysimil ar to the ch ar g ed off ense, a dang er e x ists that a jury could be imprope rly

influence d by

such evide nce. State v. Waller , 118 S.W .3d 368 , 373 (Tenn. 2003) (c iting State v. Mix on, 983 S.W .2d 661, 674 (Tenn. 1999) ). “H oweve r, evide nce of a prior conviction that is substantiallysimil ar to the c harg ed off ense is not per se inadmissible for impeachme nt purposes. Unde r these ci rcumstances, a tria l court should car efully balanc e the impeaching conviction’s re levanc e with re g ard to c redibility ag ainst its unfair pre

judicial eff

ect on substantive issues.” I d. (citations omitted).-22-

The trial c ourt initially ruled that the appellant’s prior convic tion for ag g ravated robbe ry was inadmissible for impeac hment purposes. How ever , afte r the a ppellant’s direct testimony , the trial court found that the a

ppellant’s empha tic assertion that he never considere d robbery

as a me thod for making money

on the day

of the shooting was misleading to the j ury and im plied that the appe llant had neve r and w ould never consider pa

rticipating in a robbe ry . We conclude that the trial court, who was in a position to se e the appellant a s he testified a nd to hear the inflec tion in his voice during the testimony , was in the best position to determine whether the appe llant’s testimonyopened the door to the admission of hi s prior robbery conviction. See C hilds v. State, 584 S.W .2d 783, 788 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Dankw orth, 919 S.W .2d 52, 55 (Tenn. Crim

. App. 1995). The appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

E. J ury I nstructions

As his next issue, the appe llant challeng es the jury instructions give n by

the trial court. The appellant c omplains that the t rial court instructed the jury on the natura l and proba

ble conse quence s rule, then, at the State’s re quest, g ave the following specia l instruction:

When one enter s a scheme with a nother to commit a robbe ry and a ki l ling e nsues, all def endants may

be held r esponsible for the death, reg ardle ss of who actua lly committed the murder a nd whether the killing wa s specific ally contemplated by

the other. As long as the defe ndant intended to commi t t h e robbery and a killing resulted during the robbe ry

or attempt to perpet rate the robbery , eac h defe ndant is criminally

responsible for

the murder , reg ardle s s of whether he intended f

or the victim to die or participa ted in the act of murder.

The appellant arg ues that the “trial court err ed in instruc ting the jury pursuant to the State’s spe cial
re qu e st, be c a us e sa id ins truc tio n e ff e c tiv e ly inv ite d the jury to dis re g ardthe ‘n a tur a l a ndpr ob able conseque nces r

ule.’”

“‘The g ener al principle in c riminal case s is that there is a duty u pon the trial judg e to g ive a complete char g e of the law applica ble to the fa cts of the case and the defe ndant has a rig ht to have
every issue of fa ct ra ised by

the evidenc e and ma t er i al to his defense submitt ed to the jury upon proper instructions by

the judg e.’” State v. Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Te nn. 2001) (quoting State v. Thompson , 5 1 9 S. W. 2 d 7 8 9 , 7 9 2 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 5 ) )

. I n r e lati o n to th e s p e c if ic is s u e r a is e d b y

the
app e lla nt, we no te th a t th is c ou rt ha s e xpla ine d th a t “ the na tur a l a ndpr ob able c on se qu e nc e s r ule instruction is required only for incide ntal crimes a nd not for the tar g et crime.” State v. Winters, 137 S.W .3d 641, 659 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). I n the i nstant case , the appellant was not entitled to a
na tur a l a ndpr ob able c on se qu e nc e s in str uc tio n o n e sp e c ial l y

a g g ra va te d r ob be ry

be c a us e that of

fe ns e was the ta rg et cr ime. I d.
Additionally , this court has explained:T he ap p el l ant recei ved an aut o m at i c l i fe sent ence f o r hi s fel o ny m urder co nvi ct i o n and do es not chal l enge 1
this se n te n c e o n a p p e a l. S e e T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 9 -1 3 -2 0 8 (c ) (2 0 0 3 ).
-23- “The [natural and proba

ble conse quence s] rule underlies the doc trine of criminal responsibilit y and is based on the rec og nition that aiders and abettors should be responsible f or the c riminal harms they have natura lly , probably

and for esee ably

put into mot ion.” I n contra st, the felony murder sta tute, both as it ex isted at the time of the c rime and tod a y , d oe s n ot r e qu ir e that a ho mic ide c omm itt e d d ur ing the c ou rs e of one of the enumer ated f

elonies be f

orese eable

.
I d. (quo t i n g S t at e v

. Howar d, 30 S.W .3d 271, 276 (Tenn. 2000) ). I n other wor ds, “‘[w]hen one enter s into a scheme w ith another to commit one of the f elonies enume rate d in the felony murder statut e s, a ndde a th e ns ue s, bo th d e fe nd a nts are re sp on sib le fo r the de a th r e g ard le ss o f w ho a c tua lly committed the murder a nd whet h er t h e k i lling wa s specific ally contemplated by

the other.’ ” I d. (quoting State v. Hinton, 42 S.W .3d 113, 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ). More over , we note that this court has pre viou sly

expressly approve d of an instruc tion nearly identical to the instruction g iven in th e in s ta n t c a s e

. Se e St a te v

. Jo e A

. G a ll a h e r , N o

. E 2 0 0 1

- 0 1 8 7 6

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 3 WL 21463017, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J une 25, 2003). Thus, the jury instruction give n by the trial court was a f

air a nd acc urate explanation of the law. This issue is without merit.

F. Sentenc ing

I n h is f ina l is su e s, the app e lla nt c ha lle ng e s the len gth of h is s e nte nc e s f or e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

and attempted e specia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry

and the impos ition of conse cutive sentenc es. Ap p el l ate r eview of the leng th, rang e or ma nner of service of a se ntence is de novo. 1 See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2003). I n conducting its de novo review , this court considers the following fac tors: (1) the e vidence , if any , re ceive d at the trial a nd the sentenc ing he aring ; (2) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; ( 3) the pr inc ipl e s o f se nte nc ing a nd arg ume nts a s to se nte nc ing a lte rn a tiv e s; (4) th e n a tu r e a n d c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f th e c r im in a l c o n d u c t i n v o lv e d ; ( 5 ) e v id e n c e a n d in f o r mation of fe re d b y the pa rt ie s o n e nh a nc e me nt a ndmit ig a tin g fa c tor s; ( 6) a ny state me nt b y

the app e lla nt i n his own behalf; a nd (7) the pote ntial for re habilitation or trea tment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35- 10 2, -1 03 , -2 10 (2 00 3) ; se e a lso Sta te v. As hb y , 82 3 S.W. 2d 16 6, 16 8 (T e nn

. 19 91 ). Th e bu rd e n is on the appe llant to demonstrate the impropriety of his se ntence s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . M or e ov e r, if the re c or d r e ve a ls tha t th e tr ia l cou rt a de qu a te ly considere d sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s, this court will accor d the t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o rr e c t n e s s

. Id

. a t ( d ) ; A s h b y , 8 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t1 6 9

. In the instant c ase, the trial court misapplied certain enhanc ement fac tors; theref ore, w e will revie w the appellant’ s sentence purely de novo.

1. L eng th of Sentence s

F ir st, we wi ll a dd re ss the app e lla nt’ s c omp la int re g ard ing the le ng th o f the se nte nc e fo r h isB ecause we have co ncl ud ed t hat t he ap p el l ant ’ s co nvi ct i o n fo r at t em p te d e sp eci al l y aggravat ed rob b ery 2

s houl d be m er ged i nt o hi s conv i ct i on for e s peci al l y ag gr ava t ed r ob bery , we wi l l not addres s t he propri et y of hi s s ent enc e fo r a ttem p te d e sp e c ia lly a g g ra v a te d ro b b e ry.

B eg i n n i n g on J u n e 7, 2005, T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 35- 114 ( 2003) a n d 40- 35- 210 ( 2003) 3
were d el et ed i n t hei r ent i ret y

. See S

. B i l l 2 2 4 9 , 1 0 4 G en. A ss em b l y , 1 R eg. Sess. (T enn. 20 0 5 ). T hese s ect i o ns were t h st

re p la c e d w ith la n g u a g e re n d e rin g the e n h a n c e m e n t f a c to rs a d v iso ry o n ly. S e e T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 (2 0 0 5 ). A d d iti o n a lly, T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 4 0 -3 5 -2 1 0 (2 0 0 5 ) a b a n d o n e d a sta tuto ry m inim u m se n te n c e

. -24- e sp e c ia lly a g g ra va te d r ob be ry

c on vic tio n. To be g in a se ntencin g de te rm inatio n, a c ou rt sh ou ld 2 beg in at the presumptive minimum , then “enhance the s entenc e withi n the rang e as appropria te for the enha nceme nt fac tors, and then r educe the sentenc e as a ppro p ri at e for

the mitigating fac tors.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). Especia lly ag g ravated robbery is a Class A felony . Tenn. Code 3 Ann. § 39-13-403( b) (1997) . The pre sumptive sentence for a Class A felony is the midpoint
s e n te n c e w ith in th e ap p r o p r iate r a n g e

. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 ( c )

. T h e ap p e ll a nt was sentenc ed as a Rang e I I multipl e offe nder, and on appea l, doe s not c halleng e this designa tion. See Tenn. Code An n

. § 40-35-106( a)( 1) (2003) . Acc ording ly , the pre sumptive sentence for the appellant’ s Class A felony conviction was thirty -two and one -half y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(b) (1) ( 2003).

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th e e xiste nc e of

the fo llo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s: (2) The [appellant] has a previous history of criminal c onvictions or criminal beha vior in addition to thos e necessary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; (3 ) T he [ap pe llant] w a s a le a de r i n the com mis sio n o f a n o ff e ns e inv olv ing tw o ( 2) or

mor e c ri min a l a c tor s; (9 ) T he [ap pe lla nt] h a s a pr e vio us his tory of un wi lli ng ne ss t o c omp ly with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase into the community ; and
(1 1) Th e [ap pe lla nt] h a d n o h e sit ati on abo ut c omm itt ing a c ri me when the risk to human life was hig h.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2), (3) , (9), a nd (11). In apply ing the se enha nceme nt fac tors, the trial court imposed the maximum pos sible sentence of forty y ear s. S ee T en n

. Code Ann. § 40-35- 112(b)( 1).

I nit ia lly , w e no te that th e app e lla nt c omp la ins that th e tr ia l c ou rt erred in a pp ly ing c e rt a in enhanc ement fac tors in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004). At the time the appe llant f iled his brief, this court ha d maintained that B lakely “ca lls int o question the continuing validity

of o u r current sente ncing scheme .” State v. Jul ius E. Smi th, No. E2003--25-

0 1 0 5 9

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 4 WL 1 6 0 6 9 9 8 , a t * 4 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. a t K n o xv il le , Ju ly 19, 2004). Ho we ve r, re c e ntl y

in S ta te v. Go me z, 16 3 S.W. 3d 63 2, 66 1 (T e nn

. 20 05 ), a ma jority of ou r s up re me court found tha t, unlike the sentenc ing sc heme discusse d in Blake ly , “Te nnessee ’s sentenc ing structure does not violate the Six th Amendment.” As suc h, in the instant case, w e must conclude that th e tr ia l c ou rt

didno t e rr

in f a ili ng to s ub mit

the e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s to the j ury

fo r the ir determination.

The a ppellant does not cha lleng e the trial court’s finding that he “ha s a pre vious historyof
c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or c ri min a l be ha vio r i n a dd iti on to tho se ne c e ssa ry to e sta bli sh the app ro pr ia te rang e.” T en n

. C ode Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) . The a ppellant’s pre sentenc e re port ref lects that the
ap p e ll a n t h a s tw o c o n v ic ti o n s f o r r o b b e r y , mu lt ip le c o n v ic ti o n s f o r th e f t a n d a s s a ult, and a
c on vic tio n f

or c ri min a l impe rs on a tio n. Mo re ov e r, the app e lla nt t e sti fi e d to his e xten siv e dr ug us e a ndthat he c omm itt e d th e ft s to su pp ort hi s a dd ic tio n. Th e re fo re , w e c on c lud e that th e re c or d a mpl y supports the applica tion of this enhance ment fac tor.

The a ppellant contests the tria l court’s finding that he was a lea der in the c ommissi on of the offe nse. I d. at (3). “O u r case s have e stablished that enhanc ement for being a lea der in the commission of an offe nse does not re quire that the [appellant] be the sole leade r but only that he be ‘a’ leade r.” State v. H icks, 868 S.W .2d 729, 731 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. The trial court f ound that “cle arly

[t he appe llant’s] i nvolvement and his influenc e and his part i ci p ati on with the person nineteen y ear s y oung er tha n him clear ly causes t h i s Court to believe betwe en the two of them he would be the lea der.” This conclusion is supported by Wheeler’ s testimony at trial that the robbe ry was prompted by the appellant. Acc ording ly , we conclude that the t rial court did not err in f inding the appe llant to be a lea der in the c ommissi on of the off ense.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt a lso fo un d tha t “[t]he [ap pe lla nt] h a s a pr e vio us his tory

of un wi lli ng ne ss t o comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase into the communi ty .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (9 ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt e xpla ine d, “ He ’s , I

be lie ve , h a d a pr e vio us his tory of un wi lli ng ne ss to comply with the conditi ons of a sentenc e, obvious ly . He wa s on parole [when he committed the instant offense s].” “We note that this court has pre viously i n d i ca t ed t h at t he commission of the offe nse for

which a de fenda nt i s being sentenc ed should not make fa ctor [(9)] applicable, emphasizing that ther e must be a previous history of unwillingne ss.” State v. Hay es, 899 S.W.2d 175, 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Acc ording ly , the trial court err ed in apply ing this enha nceme nt fac tor. Howe ver, be cause the rec ord ref lects that the appellant was on parole at the time the instant offe nses wer e committed, enha nceme nt fac tor (14) is appli ca b l e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 114(14)( B)

. Finally , the trial court foun d the exist ence of enha nceme nt fac tor (11), noting that the
app e lla nt h a d n o h e sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me wh e n th e ri sk

to h uma n li fe wa s hig h. Th is court ha s previously

explained that “there is nece ssarily a hig h risk to huma n l i fe and the g reat potential for bodily

injury whene ver a

deadly wea pon is used.” State v. Nix , 922 S.W .2d 894, 903 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ). Th us , th e hig h r isk to h uma n li fe is inh e re nt in the of fe ns e of e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry . I d. There fore , the trial court should not have a pplied this enhance ment fac tor.-26-

I n sum, we conc lude t h at enhancement f actor s (2), (3) , and (14) areapplicable to the app e ll a n t. T h e tr

ia l c o u r t f

o u n d n o mi ti g a ti n g f

a c to r s

. T h e ap p e ll a n t d o e s n o t arg ue that any mitigating fac tors exis t. L ikewise, we can f ind no evidence in the rec ord supporting the application of mitiga ting f

actor s. Despite the e rror

in the application of e nhance ment fac tors (9) a nd (11), we conclude that the trial court properly sentenc ed the a

ppellant to the maxim um sentence of forty y ear s incar cer ation for the a g g ravated robbe ry conviction.

2. Consecutive Sentenc ing

L astly , the appellant arg ues that the trial court should not have order ed that his se ntence for
e sp e c ia lly a g g ra va te d rob be ry be se rv e d co ns e c uti ve ly to his se nte nc e fo r fe lon y mur de r. We n ote that “[w]hether sentenc es ar e to be serve d concur rently or consecutively is a matter addre ssed to the sound discretion of the tr ial court.” State v. Adam s , 9 7 3 S

. W .2d 224, 230-31 (Te nn. Crim. App. 19 97 ). Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b ) ( 20 03 ) c on ta ins the dis c re tio na ry c ri te ri a for imposing consec utive sentenc ing. See also State v. Wil kerson , 9 0 5 S .W.2d 933, 936 (Tenn. 1995). The tr ial court may impose consec utive sentenc ing upon finding the exist ence of any one of the criteria. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115. I n the instant case , the trial court found the
e xiste nc e of

the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s: (1 ) T he [ap pe lla nt] is a

pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l w ho ha s k no wi ng ly devoted suc h [appellant’s] li fe to c riminal act s as a major sour ce of livelihood;
(2 ) T he [ap pe lla nt] i s a n of fe nd e r w ho se re c or d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity is extensive; and
(4) The [appellant] i s a dang erous of fende r whose be havior indica tes littl e or no reg ard for hum an li fe, and no hesitation about committing
a crime in which the risk to human life is hig h.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b) (1), ( 2), and ( 4) (2003)

. On app e a l, the app e lla nt s pe c if ic a lly do e s n ot d isp ute the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s th a t he i s a pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l or

that he ha s a n e xten siv e c ri min a l his tory . O ur re vie w o f the re c or d r e ve a ls that the appe ll an t confe ssed to eng ag ing in thef ts “eve ry day ” in orde r to support his $200 to $300 per day drug habit, lending cre dence to the t rial court’s finding that the appe llant is a profe ssional criminal. See G ray

v. State, 538 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976) (def ining a profe ssional criminal as “one w ho has knowing ly

devoted [her]self to criminal ac ts as a major sour ce of livelihood or who has substanti al i n co me or re source s not shown to be derive d from a sour ce othe r than c riminal activity ”). F urther, the rec ord re flec ts that the appellant’s c riminal history consists of multipl e fe lony and misdemea nor convic tions, w ar ranting the trial court’s finding that the appe llant’s criminal history is ex tensive.

Ho we ve r, the app e lla nt d oe s d isp ute his c la ssi fi c a tio n a s a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r. I n o rd e r t o-27-

find that a de fenda nt is a dang erous of fende r, a court must also find that (1) the se ntence s are ne c e ssa ry in o rd e r t o p ro te c t the pu bli c fr om fu rthe r mis c on du c t by the de fe nd a nt a nd(2 ) “ the te rm s are re a so na

bly re la te d to the se ve ri ty of the of fe ns e s. ” Wilk e rs on , 90 5 S. W.2 d a t 93 8; s e e a lso Sta te v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. I n apply ing the dang erous offende r factor, the trial court
re ma rk e d, “ I be lie ve thi s ma n is a

da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r a ndthe pu bli c ne e ds to be pr ote c te d f ro m hi m and whose behavior indicates li ttle or no reg ard for hum an life, no he sitation about committ ing the crime in whic h the risk to human life is hig h.” There fore , we c onclude that the trial court made the
nece ssary finding that consec utive sentenc ing w as nec essary to pr otect the public. Howeve r, the trial court fa iled to make the r equire d finding that the s entenc es are reasonably rela ted t o the seve rity of the of fe ns e s. We co nc lud e that th e se nte nc e s a re re a so na

bly re la te d to the se ve ri ty

of the of fe ns e s. Reg ardle ss, consec utive sentenc ing is permissible upon finding only one of the qualify ing c riteria. I n the instant case , three criteria ar e applica ble. The trial court did not er r in imposing conse cutive sentenc ing.

III. Conclusi on

I n sum, we conc lude that the appe llant’s attempted espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction should be merg ed into his especia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction. The a

ppellant’s convictions of espec ially ag g ravated robbery and felony murder conviction are aff irmed, and the appe llant’s total sentenc e is life plus f

orty y ear s. We r emand to the trial court f or cor rec tion of the judg ments as set forth in this opinion.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE