Filed 10/18/23 D.P. v. M.J. CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

D.P.,

Respondent,

v.

M.J.,

Appellant.

 B320624

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 17STPT01146)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Elizabeth Potter Scully, Judge. Affirmed.

M.J., in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

____________________________
2

Appellant M.J. (mother) and respondent D.P. (father) have 

a child, A.P., born in February 2017. In April 2018, mother 

obtained a domestic violence restraining order against father that 

expired in October 2019. Mother claims1 the family court issued 

the restraining order because father had physically attacked her 

on one occasion in December 2015 and on another in April 2016.

In March 2022, the family court issued an order granting

the parents joint legal custody and awarding father “a significant

amount of parenting time” according to a schedule that was also 

part of the court’s order. The court found that father had 

rebutted the Family Code2 section 3044 presumption that an 

award of joint legal custody to a person who has perpetrated 

domestic violence would be detrimental to that child’s best 

interest. In support of this finding, the court applied certain

statutory analytic factors, including: Father had not committed 

further acts of domestic violence and had successfully completed 

a parenting class and more individual counseling than was 

ordered, and the restraining order was no longer in place.

Mother, who is self-represented, appeals the family court’s

custody and visitation order. Her principal contention is that the

family court committed legal error in finding that father had 

successfully rebutted the section 3044 presumption because the 

court erroneously believed only acts of physical violence can 

constitute domestic violence under section 3044. She contends

the family court erred in ignoring that father’s frivolous ex parte 

1 Mother’s appellate brief is somewhat opaque as to the 

procedural history of this case including the basis for the prior 

restraining order. 

2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Family Code.
3

filings disturbed her peace, which constitutes domestic violence 

under section 3044. Mother also challenges the evidentiary 

sufficiency of the court’s finding that father did not commit

further acts of domestic violence for the purpose of section 3044.

The record does not support mother’s argument that the

family court believed that only physical violence can be domestic 

violence under section 3044. Rather, the record demonstrates

that, in determining that father had successfully rebutted the 

section 3044 presumption, the family court evaluated the merits 

of mother’s claim of further domestic violence based on father’s 

ex parte filings disturbing her peace. Further, mother fails to

discharge her burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the 

family court’s ruling is not supported by substantial evidence. 

We also reject mother’s challenges to the parenting time 

provisions of the family court’s order. Lastly, to the extent 

mother attempts to level any other appellate claims, she fails to 

do so cogently. We thus affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition 

of this appeal.

On September 29, 2017, father commenced the instant 

parentage action concerning A.P., who had been born in February 

of that year.

Although we discern mother is asserting in her appellate 

brief that on October 27, 2017, the family court temporarily 

3 Our Factual and Procedural Background is largely taken 

from the family court’s ruling. (See Baxter v. State Teachers’ 

Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340, 349, fn. 2 [utilizing 

the summary of facts provided in the trial court’s ruling].)
4

awarded her sole legal and physical custody of A.P., the record 

citation she provides does not substantiate that claim. 

On April 6, 2018, the family court issued a domestic 

violence restraining order that protected mother from father and 

expired on October 6, 2019; A.P. is not listed as a protected party 

on the restraining order.4 The April 6, 2018 restraining order

and the evidence mother introduced to secure that order are not 

in the record before us.

5 Although mother’s briefing on this point 

is not entirely clear, mother apparently claims the family court

issued the restraining order based on her allegations that father 

had physically attacked her on December 10, 2015 and 

April 5, 2016. Mother also appears to claim that she and father 

had resided together at the time of these alleged altercations, and 

that mother moved out of father’s residence at some point after 

A.P.’s birth. 

On January 24, 2020, the family court denied mother’s 

request to renew the restraining order. In its ruling, the court 

observed, “significant changes . . . ha[d] taken place since the 

original order was issued,” to wit, father had “completed three 

parenting classes, including one co-parenting class,” and “[t]he 

parties ha[d] both utilized the services of a therapist with the 

goal of reducing conflict.” The court also remarked, “It appears to 

the Court that, while there is still a great deal of conflict between 

4 Although the March 16, 2022 ruling that is the subject of 

this appeal states the restraining order expired on 

“October 6, 2020” (italics added), this is a typographical error. 

5 We further note that many filings referenced in mother’s 

appellate brief are also absent from our record, notably father’s 

purported frivolous ex parte filings. 
5

the parties and more work to do, there has been some positive 

movement between the parties.” 

On August 25, 2020, the family court denied father’s 

request to modify its custody and visitation orders, but 

nonetheless “increased Father’s parenting time.” In rendering 

this decision, the court stated: “ ‘While the Court applauds 

[father’s] efforts to date, at this time the Court does not find the 

[section 3044] presumption has been rebutted. . . . It is clear to 

the Court that [ ]Father has made efforts to make himself a 

better father. These efforts, combined with the passage of time 

and the increased maturity of the minor child, suggest to the 

Court that it is in the minor’s best interests to have longer blocks 

of time with her father.’ ” 

On January 28, 2022, the family court tried issues of child 

custody and visitation, and took the matter under submission. 

On March 16, 2022, the family court issued its signed

ruling for the trial. As a preliminary matter, the court observed,

“The parties stipulate to parentage, which was not a contested 

issue at trial.” The court also found that, although the thenexpired April 6, 2018 restraining order against father had 

triggered “the Section 3044 presumption against awarding joint 

legal or physical custody,” the presumption had been rebutted 

because father had “demonstrated that it is in the best interests 

of [A.P.] that the parents share joint legal custody and [that A.P.]

spend a significant amount of parenting time with Father as well 

as with Mother . . . .” In connection with this ruling, the court 

found the “factors set forth in [section] 3044, subd. (b)(2), on 

balance, support the legislative findings set forth in 

[section] 3020.” 

“Specifically: 
6

“a. [Father] was not previously ordered to complete 

an approved batterer’s treatment program; the court 

earlier specifically declined to adopt [a] . . . 

recommendation that he do so. 

“b. The court finds that alcohol or drug counseling 

is not appropriate. There was no allegation of alcohol 

or drugs being a factor.

“c. The court finds that a parenting class is 

appropriate and that [father] has successfully 

completed a parenting class.

“d. [Father] is not on probation or parole.

“e. A protective order is no longer in place to restrain 

[father].

“f. [Father] has not committed further acts of 

domestic violence.

“g. [Father] has completed substantially more 

individual counseling than was previously ordered.

“h. There was no evidence presented at trial that 

[father] is in possession of any firearm or 

ammunition.” 

Next, the family court awarded mother and father joint 

legal custody of A.P., “awarded [father] parenting time according

to the . . . schedule” included in the March 16, 2022 ruling,

declared that “[t]he child shall be in the physical care of the 

Mother at all times not designated as the Father’s parenting 

time,” and issued other orders concerning the parties’ parental

rights (e.g., the family court imposed certain restrictions on their 

co-parenting communications).
7

On April 26, 2022, mother timely appealed the family 

court’s March 16, 2022 ruling.

6

APPLICABLE LAW

A. The Section 3044 Presumption and Section 6320’s 

Definition of Domestic Violence

Section 3044, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: 

“Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a 

child has perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five 

years against the other party seeking custody of the child, . . . 

there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint 

physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has 

perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest 

of the child, pursuant to Sections 3011 and 3020.[7] This

6 The March 16, 2022 ruling includes a provision requiring

father’s counsel to “prepare a Judgment and circulate it for 

review and signature.” Nevertheless, another provision states,

“This custody order after trial is a final order[ that] may be 

changed only on showing of substantial change in circumstances.” 

Furthermore, we, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the family 

court’s docket as of October 2, 2023, which indicates that the 

court did not subsequently enter judgment. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 

subd. (d), 459.) Under these circumstances, we conclude that the 

March 16, 2022 ruling constitutes a final appealable order. (See

Sarah B. v. Floyd B. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 938, 940, fn. 2 

[noting that “ ‘the substance or effect of the judgment and not its 

designation is determinative of its finality[,]’ ” and that a

“ ‘memorandum of decision may be treated as an appealable order 

or judgment when it is signed and filed, and when it constitutes 

the trial judge’s determination on the merits’ ”].)

7 Section 3011 sets forth factors a court must consider 

when “determin[ing] . . . the best interests of the child” (see 
8

presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” (§ 3044, subd. (a).)

“To overcome the presumption set forth in subdivision (a), 

the court shall find that paragraph (1) [of subdivision (b) of 

section 3044] is satisfied and shall find that the factors in 

paragraph (2), on balance, support the legislative findings in 

Section 3020.” (§ 3044, subd. (b).) Subdivision (b)(1) in turn

requires “[t]he perpetrator of domestic violence [to have] 

demonstrated that giving sole or joint physical or legal custody of 

a child to the perpetrator is in the best interest of the child 

pursuant to Sections 3011 and 3020. In determining the best 

interest of the child, the preference for frequent and continuing 

contact with both parents . . . may not be used to rebut the 

presumption, in whole or in part.” (See § 3044, subd. (b)(1).)

“The legal presumption [created by section 3044] is not . . . ‘that a 

parent who has committed an act of domestic violence should not 

be awarded sole or joint legal or physical custody of a child.’ [A

parent’s] burden [is] only to persuade the court his [or her] 

custody would not be detrimental to [the child’s] best interest. 

[Citations.] The determination of custody is not to reward or 

punish the parents for their past conduct, but to determine what 

is currently in the best interests of the child.” (See S.Y. v. 

Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 324, 334 (S.Y.).)

§ 3011, subd. (a)), and section 3020 also provides, inter alia, “[t]he 

Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this 

state to ensure that the health, safety, and welfare of children 

shall be the court’s primary concern in determining the best 

interests of children when making any orders regarding the 

physical or legal custody or visitation of children” (see § 3020, 

subd. (a)).
9

Subdivision (b)(2) of section 3044 identifies seven factors a

court must consider in determining whether the perpetrator of 

domestic violence has rebutted the presumption, including

whether “[t]he perpetrator is restrained by a protective order or 

restraining order, and has or has not complied with its terms and 

conditions,” and whether “[t]he perpetrator of domestic violence 

has committed further acts of domestic violence.” (See § 3044, 

subds. (b)(2)(E) & (b)(2)(F).) 

As relevant here, “a person has ‘perpetrated domestic 

violence’ when the person is found by the court to have 

intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily 

injury, . . . or to have engaged in behavior involving, but not 

limited to, threatening, striking, harassing, . . . or disturbing the 

peace of another, for which a court may issue an ex parte order 

pursuant to Section 6320 to protect the other party seeking 

custody of the child . . . .” (See § 3044, subd. (c).)

Section 6320, subdivision (a) in turn provides in relevant 

part: “The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party 

from . . . attacking, striking, . . . threatening, . . . battering, . . . 

harassing, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party . . . .” 

(See § 6320, subd. (a).) “As used in subdivision (a), ‘disturbing 

the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct that, based on the 

totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional 

calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed directly 

or indirectly, including through the use of a third party, and by 

any method or through any means . . . . This conduct includes, 

but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern of 

behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a 

person’s free will and personal liberty.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) 
10

Courts have recognized that under section 6320, “ ‘ “the 

requisite abuse need not be actual infliction of physical injury or 

assault.” ’ [Citation.]” (See Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 

1, 11 (Curcio).) Although courts are not required to “apply an 

objective, reasonable person standard when deciding whether a 

person has ‘disturb[ed] the peace of the other party’ ” (see 

Parris J. v. Christopher U. (Oct. 4, 2023, B313470, B316247, 

B317613) --- Cal.App.5th ---, --- [2023 WL 6458520, at p. *7]), 

conduct that merely “upsets” a party is not sufficient under 

section 6320 (see Curcio, at pp. 12, 14). 

B. Standards of Review

“[Family] courts have great discretion in fashioning child 

custody and visitation orders. We therefore review those orders 

for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘A court abuses its 

discretion in making a child custody order if there is no 

reasonable basis on which it could conclude that its decision 

advanced the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court also 

abuses its discretion if it applies improper criteria or makes 

incorrect legal assumptions. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the [family] court exceeds the bounds of 

reason; even if we disagree with the [family] court’s 

determination, we uphold the determination so long as it is 

reasonable. [Citation.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (See S.Y., supra,

29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 333–334, italics omitted.)

“The [family] court’s factual findings are reviewed for 

substantial evidence . . . .” (See S.Y., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 334.) “Under this deferential standard of review, findings of 

fact are liberally construed to support the [order] and we consider 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, 

drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” 
11

(See Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) An 

aspect of the substantial evidence standard is “ ‘the doctrine of 

implied findings[,]’ ” which provides that “ ‘the reviewing court 

must infer . . . that the [family] court impliedly made every 

factual finding necessary to support its decision.’ [Citation.]” 

(See ibid.)

“The judgment or order of the lower court is presumed 

correct on appellate review.” (S.Y., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 333.) “Thus, ‘ “ ‘it is the appellant’s responsibility to 

affirmatively demonstrate error’ ” ’ by ‘ “ ‘supply[ing] the 

reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal 

analysis and citation to the record.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] 

The appellant bears this burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness accorded to the [family] court’s decision, regardless of 

the applicable standard of review.” (See Association for 

Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 

94 Cal.App.5th 764, 777–778.)

Additionally, “[t]he rules of appellate procedure apply to 

[mother] even though [she] is representing [herself] on appeal.” 

(See Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 

595.) Although “[a] party may choose to act as his or her own 

attorney[, w]e treat such a party like any other party,” meaning 

“he or she ‘ “is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration 

than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (See 

ibid.)
12

DISCUSSION

A. The Family Court’s Decision Was Not Predicated on 

an Error of Law

Mother argues the family “court’s determination that 

[father] rebutted the [section] 3044 presumption by crediting 

evidence [father] had not engaged in any further acts of ‘physical’ 

abuse is an error of law that mandates reversal of its decision, 

because engaging in litigation abuse is continuing to engage in 

acts of domestic violence.” Mother contends the family “court’s 

decision [was] influenced by an erroneous understanding of 

applicable law,” to wit, the court did not recognize that 

“ ‘domestic violence’ . . . is not merely physical, but also 

encompasses mental and psychological abuse, to further include 

litigation abuse.” In support of her position, mother argues that 

“[a]cts that disturb the peace of a party have been held to include 

those that destroy the party’s mental or emotional calm,” and 

that “[d]estroying the peace of a party through successive, 

frivolous, and baseless ex parte and other filings . . . is just a 

different form of domestic violence.” According to mother, 

because the family court failed to recognize that domestic 

violence is not limited to physical abuse, the court’s order “is not 

an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.” 

“Normally, we . . . presume the [family] court was aware of 

and understood the scope of its authority and discretion under 

the applicable law.” (See Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC

(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 299, 333–334.) “ ‘If the record 

affirmatively shows’ ” that the family court’s “ ‘decision [was] 

influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law[,]’ ”

however, “the presumption has been rebutted,” and the order “ ‘is 

subject to reversal even though there may be substantial 
13

evidence to support that order. [Citations.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (See 

id. at p. 334, italics added.) 

Mother has not affirmatively demonstrated that the 

family court’s decision was influenced by an erroneous 

understanding of the applicable law. At no point in its order did

the court opine that only physical violence can constitute “further 

acts of domestic violence” for the purpose of the section 3044 

presumption. (§ 3044, subd. (b)(2)(F).)

Instead, the family court acknowledged mother’s 

“position . . . that [father’s] litigation conduct, specifically his 

repeated ex parte requests to travel with the minor child to meet 

his extended family, amounts to additional domestic violence in 

the form of ‘coercive control’ and ‘litigation abuse,’ and that his 

[electronic] communications [with mother on talkingparents.com]

reflect ‘gaslighting’ and ‘manipulation.’ ”

Regarding the latter contention, the court observed, “One 

example of such ‘gaslighting’ and ‘manipulation,’ according to 

[mother’s] trial testimony, was that on one occasion [father] put 

‘IMPORTANT’ in the subject line for a message which [mother] 

did not feel warranted it.”

8

The family court also criticized mother for alleging that 

father’s ex parte requests constituted “ ‘litigation abuse’ ” by

“not[ing] that [mother] herself filed two ex parte requests to 

modify custody and visitation which were denied.” Further, the 

court observed that mother’s “justification for refusing to permit 

the child to travel to visit [A.P.’s] paternal relatives was that 

‘given [Mother’s] history of being held against her will,’ the 

8 On appeal, mother does not reassert her claim that 

father’s communications with mother on talkingparents.com 

constitute acts of domestic violence under section 3044. 
14

concept of the travel was triggering for her.” The court remarked

that “this is not a child-focused reason to object to proposed 

travel,” and that “it is in the best interest of the minor child to 

form connections and relationships with family both on her 

maternal and on her paternal side and to gain exposure to her 

cultural and linguistic heritage via contact with both extended 

families.” The court thereafter found that father had “not 

committed further acts of domestic violence” for the purpose of 

section 3044, subdivision (b). 

The March 16, 2022 ruling thus reveals that the

family court considered and rejected mother’s claim that father’s 

ex parte requests to travel with the child amounted to “ ‘litigation 

abuse . . . .’ ” Accordingly, the court’s decision that father had 

successfully rebutted the section 3044 presumption was not

predicated on an erroneous legal assumption that only physical 

abuse constitutes domestic violence. 

B. Mother Fails to Demonstrate the Family Court Erred 

In Finding That Father Had Not Committed Further 

Acts of Domestic Violence

Mother mounts an evidentiary challenge to the family 

court’s finding that father’s ex parte filings did not constitute 

further acts of domestic violence under section 3044. Mother 

asserts that “[a]s a result of [father’s] outrageously excessive ex 

parte applications, [mother] lost work, income, and experienced 

severe distress.” She argues this evidence establishes that 

father’s “baseless ex parte” filings “destroy[ed her] mental or 

emotional calm” and thereby “disturb[ed her] peace” for the 

purpose of sections 3044 and 6320. 

To support her position that these filings disturbed her 

peace, mother cites an excerpt from the reporter’s transcript for a
15

September 29, 2021 hearing wherein mother stated: “This has 

been frightening—I’ve lost work. I have not slept. This is—this 

has been litigation abuse. I lost so much money and lost so much 

time. We have always been open to [A.P.] seeing her 

grandparents. I have pictures. She’s with him every—almost 

every weekend. He has—we would be glad to do audio or video. 

This is—I lost so much money and work.”9

Mother thus asks us to credit this testimony from the 

September 29, 2021 hearing.

10 This request ignores the 

applicable substantial evidence standard of review, which bars us 

from reevaluating witness credibility. (See Applicable Law, 

part B, ante [noting that the family court’s factual findings are 

reviewed for substantial evidence]; Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 12 [“We do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence 

[under the substantial evidence standard].”].) Indeed, “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he 

trial judge, having heard the evidence, observed the witnesses, 

their demeanor, attitude, candor or lack of candor, is best 

qualified to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented 

by their testimony.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (S.Y., supra, 

29 Cal.App.5th at p. 334.) 

Furthermore, even if we credited mother’s testimony at the 

hearing, it does not necessarily follow that the family court erred 

9 In connection with this assertion, mother also cites

certain documents she submitted to the family court to support a

request for an award of attorney fees and costs. These documents 

do not reference or discuss father’s ex parte filings.

10 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of a minute order 

from the September 29, 2021 hearing, which provides that “[t]he 

parties [we]re placed under oath and testif[ied].” (Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
16

in finding that father’s ex parte filings did not 

“destroy[ mother’s] mental or emotional calm . . . . ” (See § 6320, 

subd. (c) [defining “ ‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ ”].) 

For mother to succeed on her evidentiary challenge, she would 

need to establish—as a matter of law—that father’s conduct rose 

to “the level of destruction of [her] mental and emotional calm[ ] 

sufficient to support the issuance of a domestic violence 

restraining order.” (See Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 13;

see also Wickham v. Southland Corp. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 49, 

54 [“A contention that the evidence establishes a particular fact 

as a matter of law when the fact finder has determined the fact to 

the contrary is but another way of asserting that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the determination of the fact finder.”].)

Mother’s testimony falls short of satisfying this standard, given 

that she vaguely claimed that father’s ex parte filings

“frighten[ed]” her and caused her to lose an unspecified amount 

of sleep, work, time, and money. 

Mother raises several other arguments to support her 

challenge to the family court’s finding, none of which is 

persuasive.

Mother contends that at the September 29, 2021 hearing, 

the family court found father’s ex parte filings were 

“ ‘inappropriate, expensive, inconvenient, [and]

unwarranted . . . .’ ” Yet, in making these remarks, the court 

explained it was “not making any findings . . . at th[at] time” 

regarding mother’s “argument . . . that . . . these requests [we]re 

being filed as a way of harassing” her. Reviewing the record in 

the light most favorable to the court’s determinations, we 

conclude the family court’s comments at the September 29, 2021 
17

hearing are consistent with its subsequent finding that father 

did not commit further acts of domestic violence against mother.

Additionally, mother asserts father “stated[ ] during the 

custody hearing on January 28th, 2022, that he knew all the 

ex parte applications he filed would be denied, but filed them 

anyway.” The record excerpts she cites, however, do not support 

this claim. One of her citations actually corresponds to the

transcript of a hearing held on December 20, 2019; in the portion 

of the transcript mother cites, there is no discussion of father’s 

ex parte filings. Mother’s other citations refer to colloquies

between the family court and mother’s counsel at the 

January 28, 2022 hearing. Significantly, we cannot determine 

independently whether father’s ex parte filings were frivolous 

because they are not in our record. (Fn. 5, ante.)

In sum, we conclude mother has failed to discharge her 

burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the family court erred 

in finding that father had not committed further acts of domestic 

violence.

C. We Reject Mother’s Challenges to the Parenting 

Time Provisions

The family court set forth a “parenting time” schedule in 

the March 16, 2022 ruling. In particular, the court ordered that, 

“[b]eginning March 18, 2022 and continuing until the Minor 

Child starts kindergarten, Father’s parenting time shall be on 

the first, third and fifth weekends of the month from Fridays at 

3:00 PM to Sundays at 3:00 PM,” and that “Father shall have 

parenting time every Wednesday afternoon from 3:00 pm to 

6:00 pm” “beginning March 23, 2022 . . .” The court further 

ordered, “Once the child starts kindergarten in the fall of 2022, 

Father’s parenting time shall be on the first, third and any fifth 
18

weekends of the month from Fridays pick-up after school (or at 

3:00 PM if there is no school) to Monday mornings return to 

school (or at 9:00 AM if there is no school).” The order provides 

that after A.P. begins kindergarten in the fall of 2022, father’s 

“Wednesday afternoon visit[s] shall take place within five miles 

of the minor child’s school.” The court required that “any 

parenting exchanges on vacation days or days the minor child’s 

school is not in session [occur] at the Van Nuys police station” 

from “March 18, 2022 . . . until the Minor Child starts 

kindergarten in the fall of 2022 . . . .” 

Additionally, the court granted each parent certain 

vacation time each year, required the parties to “meet and confer 

regarding vacation scheduling via talkingparents.com,” and 

provided that “if their proposed vacation dates conflict and they 

are not able to work out that conflict by mutual agreement,” then 

“Father’s preferred schedule shall take precedence in evennumbered years and Mother’s preferred schedule shall take 

precedence in odd-numbered years.”

Mother’s challenges to this scheduling order appear to focus 

on father’s Wednesday parenting time. First, she claims that

“[t]he transitioning of a high conflict custody exchange from the 

Van Nuys[ ] police station to a school yard at 6 pm mid-week, 

after-hours, when there is no security, squarely places [mother] 

in danger.”

11

Second, mother contends that requiring her to pick up A.P.

from the child’s school at 6 p.m. on Wednesdays would cause her

11 We assume arguendo that mother has correctly 

interpreted the March 16, 2022 ruling as requiring that

Wednesday custody exchanges occur at A.P.’s school, even though 

the order does not explicitly state as such. 
19

“financial hardship.” Specifically, she claims compliance with the 

order would compel her to “work fewer hours” on Wednesdays 

because, according to mother, she “testif[ied that she] work[s] 

from 9am to 5pm” and there is an “acknowledged two-hour 

distance” between her place of employment and the school. She

further claims that the Wednesday parenting time schedule could 

“adversely affect” mother’s and A.P.’s “housing and food security” 

because mother “is the sole financial provider for the minor child 

as [father] is on General Relief, and has chosen to be 

unemployed, despite the capacity to work for several years and 

has been previously exempt from paying child support due to 

being on Public Welfare-General Relief.” 

Concerning mother’s complaints of lack of security during 

custody exchanges, we observe that the April 6, 2018 domestic 

violence restraining order against father had expired more than 

two years before the family court set this parenting schedule, and

that the family court found father had not committed further acts 

of domestic violence against mother. (See Factual & Procedural 

Background, ante.) Accordingly, the court’s decision to change 

the pickup location from the Van Nuys police station to A.P.’s 

school did not “exceed[ ] the bounds of reason . . . .” (See S.Y., 

supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 333 [describing the abuse of 

discretion standard].)

Furthermore, mother fails to support properly her 

allegation that the Wednesday parenting time schedule would 

cause her to suffer financial hardship. Mother cites a declaration 

from her counsel to substantiate mother’s claims that she works 

from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and that A.P.’s school is two hours away 

from her work location. Counsel’s declaration does not address 

either of those issues. Further, mother cites a transcript from a 
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May 17, 2022 hearing in a child support matter for A.P. that is

pending in a different county to support her assertions that she is 

the “sole financial provider” for A.P. and that father has shirked 

his financial obligations.12 Because that hearing occurred after

the family court issued its March 16, 2022 ruling, it has no 

bearing on this appeal. (See In re Marriage of Brewster & 

Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481, 498 [“When reviewing the 

correctness of a trial court’s judgment, we only consider matters 

that were part of the record at the time the court entered 

judgment . . . .”].)

Lastly, mother appears to contest provisions of the 

March 16, 2022 ruling concerning travel and vacation time. She 

argues, “[W]hen returning from travel/vacation with the minor 

child, [father] is able to schedule at any time of his choice, 

whether late at night or during the day[,] when [mother] will 

retrieve the child upon the custody exchange with [father].” 

Mother cites subdivision (b) of section 3031 to support this 

argument. 

Section 3031, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part: 

“Whenever custody or visitation is granted to a parent in a case 

in which domestic violence is alleged and an emergency protective 

order, protective order, or other restraining order has been issued, 

the custody or visitation order shall specify the time, day, place, 

and manner of transfer of the child for custody or visitation to 

limit the child’s exposure to potential domestic conflict or violence 

12 The family court had observed in its March 16, 2022 

ruling that “[c]hild support is being handled in a separate case in 

Ventura County, and both parties stipulated it was not at issue 

at the trial.” Mother does not contest that portion of the 

March 16, 2022 ruling. 
21

and to ensure the safety of all family members.” (Italics added.) 

Mother provides no analysis explaining how the family court’s 

order violates this provision. This failure is particularly 

troublesome because at the time the family court issued its travel 

and vacation time schedule, no emergency protective order, 

protective order, or other restraining order was extant. By failing 

adequately to support her challenge to the family court’s order 

regarding travel and vacation time, mother has waived her claim 

of error. (See Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [“[A]n appellant is required to not 

only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it applies 

in [her] case.”]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 

194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill) [“ ‘We are not bound to develop 

appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of 

cogent legal argument . . . allows this court to treat the 

contention as waived.’ ”].) 

D. We Decline To Address Factual Assertions That 

Mother Fails To Discuss in the Legal Argument

Section of Her Brief and the Vague Assertions of 

Error That She Fails Cogently To Analyze in That 

Section

Although mother states on appeal that father engaged in 

misconduct, she does not clarify whether these assertions give 

rise to error not already addressed in our Discussion. 

As illustrative only, mother argues father’s supposed 

“ ‘litigation abuse’ . . . must be considered continuing acts of 

domestic violence that falls within the scope of abuse that may be 

enjoined under . . . [ ]§ 6320 and the civil harassment statute

(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)).” (Italics added.) Mother 

does not clarify, however, whether she is raising an appellate 
22

claim predicated on Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 or 

otherwise explain the relevance of that statute to the instant 

case. (See Applicable Law, part A, ante [indicating that § 3044, 

subd. (c) references § 6320, and not Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, in 

defining domestic violence relevant to the § 3044 presumption].)

Another example is a heading in which mother states: “The 

trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider [father’s] 

litigation abuse that was compounded by false claims of indigency

as continued acts of domestic violence that require application of 

the 3044 presumption.” (Underscoring, boldface, & some 

capitalization omitted; italics added.) Yet, in that section of 

mother’s brief, she does not discuss father’s alleged “false claims 

of indigency” at all, let alone explain whether they disturbed

mother’s peace for the purpose of section 6320 or otherwise have 

some relevance to this appeal. (See also fn. 12, ante [noting that 

child support was being handled by a court in a different county

and that it was not at issue in the trial for this case].)

Furthermore, the statement of the case and the factual 

history sections of mother’s appellate brief contain complaints

that are not analyzed cogently as claims of error in the argument 

section of her brief. For instance, mother asserts in the factual 

history section that at “[n]umerous [unspecified] times[, father] 

abusively screamed at [mother] and forced the visitation 

exchanges to last an inordinately long time, even reaching the 

point where intervention by the police was required.” Mother 

also complains in her statement of the case that father made

“fraudulent claims of being indigent,” an assertion that, as we 

explained above, mother does not develop in the argument 

section of her brief.
23

We do not “develop [mother’s] arguments’ ” for her (see 

Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956), nor do we guess how 

these complaints are related to any legal challenge to the 

March 16, 2022 ruling (see Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 

213 Cal.App.4th 704, 725–726 [holding that an appellant 

forfeited a contention by failing to “present [it] in the argument 

section of either the opening or reply brief”].) We thus do not

address further any other complaints not tethered to legal 

argument in her appellate briefing. 

DISPOSITION

We affirm the family court’s March 16, 2022 order. The 

parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.