COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DARNELL D. CRAWLEY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2496-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MARCH 23, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

Buford M. Parsons, Judge 

 Matthew P. Geary (Goodwin, Sutton, Duval & 

Geary, on brief), for appellant. 

H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Darnell D. Crawley (appellant) appeals from his bench trial 

conviction for breaking and entering pursuant to Code § 18.2-91. 

On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to prove 

(1) that he was the person whose fingerprints were found at the 

scene of the break-in and (2) that he acted with the requisite 

intent to commit larceny, assault and battery or any felony 

other than murder, rape or robbery. For the reasons that 

follow, we reverse appellant's conviction on the first issue 

and, therefore, do not reach the second issue. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 
 - 2 -

S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court, sitting 

without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict 

and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence 

to support it. See id. The credibility of a witness, the 

weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn 

from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder's 

determination. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 

379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

 Any element of a crime may be proved by circumstantial 

evidence. See, e.g., Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 

524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). Such evidence "is as competent 

and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided 

it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 

Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). However, "the 

Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of 

innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring 

from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). 

Whether a hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of 

fact. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 290, 373 

S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988). 

 On appeal, appellant divides into two parts his challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove identity. He 
 - 3 -

contends the evidence was insufficient, first, because the 

Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence through the officials 

who prepared the Henrico County and Virginia State Police 

fingerprint cards that appellant was the person from whom they 

took the prints; and second, because Investigator Curran did not 

take appellant's fingerprints and, therefore, could not match 

them to the prints on the Henrico and State Police cards or to 

the fingerprints taken from the scene of the break-in. The 

Commonwealth contends that these arguments relate only to the 

admissibility of the fingerprint cards. Because the cards were 

admitted without objection, it contends, appellant waived any 

right to challenge their authenticity. The Commonwealth also 

argues that, even if the arguments relate to sufficiency, the 

evidence of appellant's name, birth date, gender and race was 

sufficient to prove appellant's identity as the perpetrator 

beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with portions of both 

arguments. 

 1. 

ADMISSIBILITY OF FINGERPRINT CARDS 

 "It is a generally recognized rule that records and reports 

prepared by public officials pursuant to duty imposed by 

statute, or required by the nature of their offices, are 

admissible as proof of the facts stated therein." Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 213 Va. 45, 46, 189 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1972); see
 - 4 -

Code § 19.2-390 (requiring, in part, that every person arrested 

for a felony be fingerprinted and the fingerprints filed with 

the Central Criminal Records Exchange). However, this rule 

applies only to those portions of such documents "relat[ing] 

facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of 

the recording official to which he could testify should he be 

called as a witness." Williams, 213 Va. at 45-47, 189 S.E.2d at 

379-80 (holding arrest report which contained arrestee's age as 

reported by arrestee was inadmissible to prove arrestee's age 

because age information was hearsay). 

 Because appellant registered no hearsay objection to the 

admissibility of the cards, he waived the right to contest their 

admissibility on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; Woodson v. 

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288-89, 176 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1970) 

("A litigant may not, in a motion to strike, raise for the first 

time a question of admissibility of evidence."). At trial, 

appellant merely objected to the admission of the cards subject 

to cross-examination, and he never conducted any 

cross-examination, thereby waiving any objections to 

admissibility. Therefore, for purposes of appeal, the evidence 

establishes conclusively that the fingerprints on the Henrico 

County and State Police cards were obtained from Darnell Devan 

Crawley, a black male 5'8" tall and weighing 140 pounds, with a 

tattoo on his right arm, a birth date of December 15, 1968, a 
 - 5 -

Social Security number of 223-11-2032, and an address of 2828 

Fairfield Avenue, Richmond, Virginia 23223, as of April 24, 

1996. 

 2. 

 SUFFICIENCY OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE TO PROVE IDENTITY 

 Despite appellant's inability to challenge the proof that 

the Henrico County and State Police fingerprint cards came from 

a Darnell Devan Crawley with the above vital statistics, he 

properly may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 

that he is the person whose fingerprints are contained on those 

cards and were found at the scene of the break-in. Citing Cook 

v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 225, 230, 372 S.E.2d 780, 783 

(1988), the Commonwealth contends that the evidence of identity 

was sufficient to prove the fingerprints were appellant's 

because the "[i]dentity of names carries with it a presumption 

of identity of person." We reject the application of this 

principle to the facts of this case. 

Cook is distinguishable, first, because it was a 

sentence-enhancement case which dealt with the admissibility of 

certain documents and not their sufficiency to prove the 

defendant's prior convictions.1 For any type of evidence to be 

 

 1The defendant in Cook did not challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence on appeal, and any statements in Cook regarding 

sufficiency, therefore, are dicta. 
 - 6 -

admissible, its offeror need only prove that it is 

"material--tending to prove a matter . . . properly at issue in 

the case--and relevant," Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 

598, 601, 347 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1986), or that "it has any 

logical tendency, however slight, to prove a [matter at] issue." 

Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 

1186, 409 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1991). The standard for judging the 

sufficiency of evidence to prove identity or any other key fact 

in a criminal case is much higher--the Commonwealth must prove 

that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 529, 414 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1992) 

(en banc); Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 533, 536, 159 

S.E.2d 611, 613-14 (1968). Therefore, just because a particular 

document is admissible does not mean it constitutes proof of a 

disputed fact sufficient to support a conviction beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Second, Cook is distinguishable because it 

involved a document that "bore the defendant's exact name and 

birth date." 7 Va. App. at 230, 372 S.E.2d at 783. Here, 

although the Henrico County and State Police fingerprint cards 

bore the same first and last names and identical birth dates, no 

evidence in the record proved appellant's name or birth date. 

 As the Supreme Court previously has held, "[w]hen the 

Commonwealth relies solely upon fingerprint evidence to identify 

a criminal agent, it bears the burden of excluding every 
 - 7 -

reasonable hypothesis of innocence . . . ." Tyler v. 

Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 166, 487 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1997). 

Viewing the circumstantial evidence of identity here in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we hold that it was 

insufficient to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of appellant's 

innocence. The evidence admitted established that a Darnell 

Devan Crawley, a black male 5'8" tall, 140 pounds, and with a 

tattoo on his right arm, a birth date of December 15, 1968, a 

Social Security number of 223-11-2032, and an address at the 

time of the break-in of 2828 Fairfield Avenue, Richmond, 

Virginia 23223, which was located in the same vicinity as the 

victim's apartment, broke the glass in the rear door of the 

victim's apartment and was on the premises without permission. 

However, the only evidence admitted at trial that linked 

appellant to the break-in was that his gender, race and height 

were the same as those of both the perpetrator, as proved by the 

fingerprint cards, and the person seen fleeing the scene of the 

crime. Assuming without deciding that appellant's statements 

upon arraignment constituted evidence that he was Darnell D. 

Crawley,2 the indictment itself contained only his name and did 

 

 2

Appellant admitted during his arraignment that he was 

Darnell D. Crawley, the person listed in the indictment, but 

this statement was not formally admitted as evidence in the 

case. Compare Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 454, 457, 418 

S.E.2d 343, 345 (1992) (holding that defendant's arraignment 

under a certain name was not evidence that it was, in fact, his 
 - 8 -

not list any other identifying characteristics. We are unable 

to conclude that the mere similarity of appellant's name with 

the names on the two fingerprint cards and the fact that 

appellant was of the same gender, race and approximate height as 

the person fingerprinted and the person seen fleeing the 

vicinity of the break-in proved that appellant was the person 

whose prints were on the cards and in the victim's apartment. 

 The Commonwealth attempted to have Investigator Curran 

fingerprint appellant during the trial so it could prove 

appellant's prints matched the perpetrator's. However, 

appellant objected, and the trial court denied the 

Commonwealth's request. The Commonwealth objected to the 

denial, recognizing that it had the burden of "prov[ing] 

identification beyond a reasonable doubt," but it did not 

proffer appellant's fingerprints and offered no other evidence 

to prove appellant was the perpetrator.3 Although the 

 

name), with Sheffey v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 602, 602-04, 194 

S.E.2d 897, 898-99 (1973) (in case challenging sufficiency of 

evidence to prove identity, listing accused's arraignment as 

John Henry Sheffey as part of evidence proving that he was same 

John Henry Sheffey whom testifying officer arrested on 

outstanding warrant and upon whom officer found heroin in a 

search performed incident to that arrest). The arrest warrant 

purported to list appellant's name, birth date, Social Security 

number and address, but the warrant was neither offered nor 

admitted as evidence, and the officer who arrested appellant on 

that warrant did not testify regarding the arrest. 

 3Code § 19.2-390 requires, in part, that every person 

arrested for a felony be fingerprinted and the fingerprints 
 - 9 -

circumstances were suspicious, they failed to exclude all 

reasonable hypotheses of innocence and, therefore, did not prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was inside the victim's 

apartment. 

 For these reasons, we reverse appellant's conviction. 

Reversed.

 

filed with the Central Criminal Records Exchange. Presumably, 

therefore, appellant was fingerprinted upon his arrest for the 

instant felony offense. However, the record provides no 

indication that the Commonwealth attempted to offer these 

fingerprint records into evidence.