RENDERED: MAY 14, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0144-MR

ROBERT RAGLE APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CI-01509 

LOUISVILLE ROAD VENTURES, 

LLC; AND COMMONWEALTH OF 

KENTUCKY APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Robert Ragle appeals from the Warren Circuit Court’s order 

granting summary judgment to Louisville Road Ventures, LLC (LRV), in a slip 

and fall case. We affirm.

Ragle is an investigator for the Commonwealth of Kentucky 

Department of Workers’ Claims. His office is located in Bowling Green, 

Kentucky, on premises leased by the Commonwealth from Louisville Road 
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Ventures, LLC. On November 27, 2017, Ragle tripped on a loose threshold on his 

way into the office, hitting the door frame. He was required to undergo surgery to

repair his injured knee.

On October 31, 2018, Ragle filed a complaint against the building’s 

owner (LRV) and manager (J. Allen Builders, Inc.), alleging that they breached 

their duty of care by failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition and by

failing to warn of an unreasonably dangerous condition on the property. Ragle 

sought past and future medical expenses, lost wages, and compensation for 

permanent impairment of his ability to earn wages. He additionally sought an 

award for physical and mental anguish and emotional distress. J. Allen Builders, 

Inc., was dismissed as a party per agreed order one month later.

On March 15, 2019, the Commonwealth moved for leave to intervene, 

stating that Ragle’s injuries were incurred in the course and scope of his 

employment, that compensation had been made to him pursuant to Kentucky 

Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 342, and that the Commonwealth was entitled to 

recover the amount it had paid should Ragle be successful in his complaint against

LRV. The Commonwealth filed an amended motion to intervene two weeks later. 

The circuit court granted the motion on May 6, 2019. Ragle’s deposition was 

taken on May 21, 2019.
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LRV filed a motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2019, arguing 

that, because the property was leased in its entirety to the Commonwealth, LRV 

had relinquished control of the property. LRV stated that the Commonwealth was 

responsible for the premises. Furthermore, LRV continued, “multiple 

Commonwealth employees were aware that the piece of trim had been loose prior 

to the fall,” yet no one notified LRV of this dangerous condition; instead, the 

lessee chose to make the repairs itself. Thus, LRV claimed it was entitled to 

summary judgment because there was no hidden danger and the tenant was 

responsible for any damages.

Ragle filed his first amended complaint on July 15, 2019, correcting 

the date of injury (from November 22 to November 27, 2017). Two weeks later, 

Ragle responded to the motion for summary judgment, stating that he was never 

aware of the loose trim, that the lease agreement required LRV to maintain the 

premises, and that there existed genuine issues of material fact which made 

summary judgment inappropriate. Several exhibits, including photos of the 

entranceway, Ragle’s medical records, and a copy of the lease agreement, were 

appended to the response. 

A hearing was held on August 5, 2019. The circuit court entered its 

order granting LRV’s motion on January 9, 2020. Ragle filed his notice of appeal 

on January 22, 2020.
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We begin by stating the standard of review for summary judgments, 

namely:

“The standard of review on appeal of summary 

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found there 

are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Carter 

v. Smith, 366 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Ky. 2012). Summary 

judgment involves only legal questions; whether a fact is 

material and, if so, whether there is a genuine issue 

regarding that material fact are legal questions. Stathers 

v. Garrard County Bd. of Educ., 405 S.W.3d 473, 478 

(Ky. App. 2012). Thus, we utilize a de novo review 

standard. Id.

Kentucky courts have repeatedly stated, and we 

continue to adhere to these bedrock principles, that 

summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy, it is to be 

“cautiously applied[,]” and it “should not be used as a 

substitute for trial.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service 

Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991). “The trial 

court must review the evidence, not to resolve any issue 

of fact, but to discover whether a real fact issue exists.” 

Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc’y, 413 S.W.3d 901, 

905 (Ky. 2013) (footnote omitted). This requires both 

the trial court and this Court to review the record “in a 

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for 

summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in 

[its] favor.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480.

Joiner v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 582 S.W.3d 74, 77-

78 (Ky. App. 2019). Here, the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to 

Ragle as we review the propriety of the circuit court’s ruling. Id. at 78.

Ragle first argues that summary judgment was improperly granted 

because LRV breached its duty to maintain and repair the premises under the terms 
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of the lease. In order to succeed under this theory of recovery, it was incumbent 

upon Ragle to prove that LRV “owed a duty to [Ragle], breached that duty, and 

consequent injury followed.” Shelton, 413 S.W.3d at 906 (citation omitted). Ragle 

concedes that whether LRV owed him a duty was a question of law to be 

determined by the circuit court. Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 89 

(Ky. 2003). 

Ragle’s contention here is that the lease agreement between LRV and 

the Commonwealth included express language requiring LRV to maintain and 

repair the premises. Therefore, Ragle continues, the circuit court erred in holding 

thus in its order granting summary judgment:

When a contractual duty to repair exists, landlords are 

liable only for the costs of repair. Miller v. Cundiff, 245 

S.W.3d 786, 788 (Ky. App. 2007). If the defect is 

obvious and known, recovery is precluded. Pinkston v. 

Audubon Area Comm. Serv., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 190 

(Ky. App. 2006). While it is arguable that the lease in 

this case contained a contractual duty to repair, the loose 

rubber flooring joint was known to be an issue by other 

employees of Tenant [Commonwealth]; Defendant 

[LRV] was never informed of the defect; and Tenant 

[Commonwealth] had full control over the area in which 

the defect was located.

But Joiner v. Tran & P Properties, LLC, holds similarly: “Kentucky 

law provides that the remedy for breach of an agreement to repair is the cost of the 

repair. Because the [tenants] did not pay for the repairs, they cannot assert a claim 

for damages.” 526 S.W.3d 94, 102 (Ky. App. 2017). Ragle does not contend, nor 
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did he offer proof of any kind in that regard, that LRV was made aware of the 

danger concerning the loose threshold material. The Commonwealth, as lessee of 

the building, had control over the premises and did not alert LRV to any hazards. 

The circuit court properly ruled that LRV did not breach a duty to Ragle. Joiner v. 

Kentucky Farm Bureau, 582 S.W.3d at 77-78.

Ragle secondly maintains that there was a genuine issue of material 

fact regarding whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Again, we 

disagree. In his deposition testimony, Ragle stated that other employees in his 

building were aware of the loose threshold material. And he only insists that LRV 

should have known of the defect, not that it actually did know. The question also 

remains one of damages: it was a question of law, not fact, that damages were 

limited to the cost of repair, not any personal injuries to Ragle (who was 

compensated for his injuries through his workers’ compensation claim). Pinkston, 

supra; Miller, supra; Joiner v. Kentucky Farm Bureau, supra. See also True v. 

Fath Bluegrass Manor Apartment, 358 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Ky. App. 2011).

The judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Richard M. Guarnieri

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

LOUISVILLE ROAD VENTURES:

James P. Freel

Brian M. Gudalis

Lexington, Kentucky

NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE 

COMMONWEALTH OF 

KENTUCKY