NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0700n.06 Nos. 09-3485, 09-3486 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. ROY HAIRSTON, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COUR T F O R THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O O P I N I O N

BEFORE: DAUG HTREY, GILMAN, M cK EAGU E , Ci r c uitJudg e s. McK eague, Circ uit Jud ge. Roy Ha i rs t on pled g uilty

to one count of posse ssion of a ha nd g un by a fe lon , in vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g )( 1) , a nd wa s se nte nc e d to fi ft

y mon ths ’ imprisonment. Prior to his plea, Ha irston fil ed a motion to suppress the handgun that was seized from his ca

r by office rs, ar guing that the tip on which the offic ers r elied to stop his v ehicle w as
uncorr oborate d and anony mous, and d i d not cre ate the r equisite rea sonable suspicion to initiate a stop pursuant to Te rry

v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The district court denie d the motion, concluding that the tip was not anony mous and rea sonable suspicion ex isted to justify the stop. Hairston now
a pp e a ls the de nia l of

his mot ion

and a lso c ha lle ng e s th e su

bs tanti ve and

pr oc e dura l r e a so na

ble ne ss of his se nte nc e . B e c a

us e the of fi c e rs ha d r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

to s top Ha ir sto n’ s c ar, and be c a us e Hairston wa ived his rig ht to appea l his sentenc e, we AFF I RM Ha irston’s conviction and se ntence
.U.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 2 - I. BACKG ROUND On Octobe r 8, 2008, at a

pproxi mately

2:55 a.m., t he C leveland Poli ce D epar tment Dispatch Ce nte r re c e ive d a c a ll fr om a wo man n a me d A lic e . A s a g re e d to by Ha ir sto n a

nd summa ri zed a t hi s plea he aring , Alice r eporte d that a blac k male dre ssed in a suit and drivinga silver Char g er had just offere d marijuana to her male friend in e x chang e for sex wit h h er . S h e fu rt her a dvised the dispatch office r that she ha d seen the man with a silver ha ndg un and that she f

elt threatened by that firea rm. She provided the dispatch officers with her phone number a nd her fu ll a dd re ss, inc lud ing he r a

pa rtme nt numbe r. She a lso wa s a ble duri ngthe c ours e of the ph on e c onve rsatio n to pr ov ide the of fi c e rs wi th r e a l ti me mov e me nts , indicators of his movements, a nd also when he had pulled up next to her home. Patrol Offic er K evin Stanard a nd his partner

rec eived a

radio a ssignment f

rom the dispatche r who took Alice’ s call, askingthem t o respond to the a ddress provide d by Alice. Stanar d testified at Hair ston’s suppression hea ring that the addr ess was in a “hig h crime a

rea , [wit h] a lot of drug activity , [and a] lot of prosti t u t i o n ac t i v i t y . . . .” The dispatcher told St anar d and his partne r that they wer e looking for a

well-dre ssed black ma le drivi ng a si lver Dodge Charg er who had thre atene d a fe male with a g un at the addre ss g iven. The dispatcher also told them that the vehicle was still on the vic tim ’s str e e t in

fr on t of he r h ome . T he a ssi g nme nt w a s g ive n a “ Cod e 1, ” wh ic h is the “ hig he st pr ior ity” that c an b e g ive n w he n a c a ll i s r a dio e d o ut a

nd ty pic a lly me ans tha

t a se ri ou s c ri me is
cu rr en t l y o cc u rr i n g. Of fi ce r S t an ar d

re s p o n d edt o t h e a re a a tap p ro x i m at el y 3 : 0 0 a. m . an d

n o t i ce d a s i l v er Do d ge Charg er, the only

car in the are a, at a

stop sign dire ctly

in front of the a ddress g iven by the dispatcher . As Off

icer Stanard’s c ar a

pproac hed, the Charg er “sped awa y ” and made a lef

t turn at a “ve ry high spe ed,” i n excess of the spee d limit . Offic er Stana rd and his par

tner followe d theU.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 3 - ve hic le , w hic h f

it the de sc ri pti on

g ive n b y the dis patc he r. Of

fi c e r S tana

rd te sti fi e d th a t he n e ve r l os t sight of the Charg er, the only vehicle on th e ro ad at t h e t i me, and he followed it as the dr iver proce eded down the street, made a rig ht tur n at a stop sig n, and then made a lef t turn at another

stop sign, a ll while proce eding at a hig h rate of spee d. Afte r f o ll o w in g th e v e h ic le f

o r a f e w b lo c k s , O f

f ic e r St an ar d a c ti v a te d h is li g h ts an d

s ir en and pulled the ve hicle over , althoug h he had not identified the driver or conf irmed the drive r’s attire prior to initiating the stop. Office r Stanard a nd his partner

exit ed their c ar a

nd, suspectingthat the dr i v e r w a s ar m e d b a s e d o nt h e i n f

o r m a t i o np r o v i d e d

b y t h e d i s p a t c h e r , a

p p r o a c h e d

“ c a u t i o u s l y” while y elling f

or the driver to put his ha nds outside of the window in pla in sight. The dr iver, late r de te rm ine d t o be Ha ir sto n, e ve ntu a lly c omp lie d a ft e r n

ume ro us re qu e sts . O ff

ic e r S tana rd and his partne r approa ched the car , remove d Hairston from the vehicle, pla ced him on the g round, and put him in hand c uf

fs
. Th e of fi c e rs c on du c te d a pat

do wn of Ha ir sto n a

nd pla c e d h im i n th e ba c k o f t he ir patrol car, advising hi m that he was not under a rre st but that his vehicle matched the descr iption of the one they

had bee n looking f

or base d on the dispatcher ’s aler t. Office r Stanard a

nd his partner
sear ched the Charg er, obse rving “five or six clumps” of marijuana sitti ng in the console in the front seat. The office rs also found a chrome g un under the driver’ s side seat c ontaining thr ee r ounds of live ammunition and one round in the c hamber
. After other off icer s arr ived on the sce ne, Of fice r Stanard a

nd h i s partne r left to locate the vic tim s. W h e nt h e y

ar r i v e d a tt h e a d dr e s s o r i g i n a l l y

g i v e nt o t h e mb y

t h e d i s p a t c h e r , t h e v i c t i ms
wer e standingat t h e co rn er and flag g ed down the of fice rs. Off

icer Stanard a

nd his partner int e rv ie we d th e vic tim s, wh o expla ine d that H a ir sto n h a d d ri ve n b y and a lmo st r an into t

he m w ithU.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 4 - his car; that somehowthey beg an spea

king to Ha irston and appr oache d his car; a nd that Hairston wa s

“ tr yingto b ro ke r s ome kin d o f d e a l” to g ive the ma le vic timmar ij uan a in e xch ang e fo r s e x with Al ic e . A t so me po int

the ma le vic time nd e d u

p w iththe mari

jua na in h is po sse ssi on but r e tur ne d it to Hairston, informed him that they did not want to do what he wa s asking , and re turned to Alice ’s apar tment. Both victims a lso c onfirmed the 911 repor t that Hairston had a

g un in his hand and wa s “waving it ar ound and basic ally threatening them with it.” Hairston filed a

motion t o s u p press the ha ndg un, arguing that beca use the c aller w as
ano ny mou s and the tip wa s unc or

ro bo ra te d, the of fi c e rs la c ke d th e re qu isi te re a so na ble su sp ic ion

to stop his car. At the suppr ession hear ing, the court de termined that the 911 caller was not anony mous beca use she ha d provided he r name , phone number , addre ss, and apa rtme nt n u mbe r to the dispatche r. On the basis of the information provided by Alice, a s well as the c ircumstance s prec edingthe stop, the c ourt fo un d th a t th e of

fi c e rs ha d re a so na

ble su sp ic ion to sto p Ha ir sto n’ s veh ic le , a nd a c c or din g ly denied Ha irston’s motion to s uppress the gun. Af te r his mot ion wa s den ie d, Ha ir sto n ple d g uil ty to be ing a fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm , waiving his rig ht to file any appea l except one cha lleng ing the denial of his motion to suppress and any sentenc e in excess of the statutory maxi mum or Sentencing Guidelines ra ng e. At his sentenc ing hear ing, the district court dete rmined that, consis te nt w it h his presente nce r eport (“ PSR ”), H airston’s Guidelines ra

ng e of imprisonment was 46–57 months. Considering all the rele vant fac tors, the cour t
c on c lud e d th a t H a ir sto n w a s n ot e nti tle d to a va ri anc e or de pa rt ur e , a nd se nte nc e d him to fi ft

y
mon ths in p ri so n. Ha ir sto n f ile d th is t ime ly

a pp e a l.U.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 5 - II. AN AL YSI S A. M ot ion to Suppr e ss Hairston fi rs t challeng es the district cour t’s denial of his motion to suppress the handgun
re tr ie ve d f

ro m hi s c ar a ft e r he wa s sto pp e d by Of fi c e r Sta na rd , arguin g that the re wa s n o r e a so na ble suspicion to just ify

the st o p . “In revie wing a motion to suppress, we r eview the district court’s fa c tua l f ind ing s f or c le ar e rr or

and le g a l de te rm inatio ns de novo. ” United States v. Long , 464 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006). Where the district c ourt has denie d the motion, this court “ must consider the evidence in the l ight most favor able to the g overnme nt.” Un ite d Sta te s v . Er win , 155 F.3d 818, 82 2 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 8) . F a c tua l de te rm inatio ns ma de by the dis tr ic t c ourt

wi ll be ov e rt

ur ne d only if

thi s court has “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.” Long , 464 F.3d at 572 (interna l quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s rig ht to be fre e fr om “unre asonable sear ches
and se izur e s, ” and

ty pic a lly re qu ir e s th a t a

se arc h o r s e izur e be su

pp or te d b y pr ob a ble c a us e . U .S. Const. am en d
. I V. However, in Te rry , the Supreme Court he ld that an offic er ma y conduct a

n investigatory

stop without proba

ble ca use, whe re the office r “obse rves unusua l conduct which le ads him reasona

bly to c onclude in lig ht of his experience that criminal ac tivity may be af oot and that the persons with whom he is dea ling may be ar med and p re s en t l y d an gerous . . . .” 392 U.S. at 30. “H o we v er , to justi fy

a Te rry stop, an ‘inchoate and unpa rticularized suspicion or hunc h’ is not sufficie nt.” Un ite d S

tates v . S mi th , 5 9 4 F. 3 d

5 3 0 , 5 3 6 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Te rry , 392 U.S. at 27 ). Th e of

fi c e r “ mus t be a

ble to p oint to sp e c if

ic and art ic ula ble fa c ts whic h, take n to g e the r w ith rational infere nces from those fac ts, r easona bly war rant that intrusion.” Te rry , 392 U.S. at 21. W henU.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 6 - making such infer ence s, office rs may drawon th eir own ex perie nce in law enfor ceme nt and specia liz ed tra ining. Se e Sm ith , 5 94 F .3 d at 53 7; United States v. Flores , 5 71 F .3 d 5 41 , 5 44 (6 th Cir. 2009). Whil e an individual’s pr esenc e in a hig h-cr ime are a is insufficient to support a f inding of rea sonable suspicion sta nding alone, “a location’s char acte ristics are rele vant ‘i n d et ermining whether the circ umstances a

re sufficiently suspicious to warr ant furthe r investig ation.’” Flores , 571 F. 3 d at 5 4 4 (q u o t i n g Il lin ois v . W ar dlo w, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). “In assessing the re asonable ness of the stop, the f acts are ‘judg ed ag ainst an objec tive standard: would the fac ts available to the of fice r at the moment of the seizure . . . war rant a man of
rea sonable c aution in the belief’ that the action taken wa s appropr iate? ’” Un ite d S tates v . H ar dn e tt , 8 0 4 F. 2 d 3 5 3 , 3 5 6 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Te rry , 392 U.S. at 21–22). W hen under taking a re view of an inve sti g a tor

y sto p, we mus t look

to t he tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s to de te rm ine if re a so na ble suspicion exis ted t o justify the s top at i ts inception. United States v. Lane , 9 09 F .2 d 8 95 , 8 97 (6 th Cir. 1990). Rely ing he avily

on Fl or ida v . J

.L. , 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) a nd Feathers v . Aey , 319 F.3d 84 3, 85 0 ( 6th Cir
. 20 03 ), Ha ir sto n argue s th a t th e tip re lie d o n b y Of fi c e r S tana

rd to s top his ve hic le
wa s a no ny mou s unti l a ft e r t

he sto p a nd se arc h o c c ur

re d, and was unc or

ro bo rate d. Ac c or din g to Hairston, the district cour t used “sele ct circ umstances” rathe r than e x amining the totality of the
c ir c ums tanc e s, imp ro pe rl y imp uti ng to the of fi c e r the inf

or matio n that ha d b e e n g ive n to the ra dio dispatcher
. Hairston asser ts that the re was no rea sonable suspicion, makingthe Te rry stop unlawful and re quiring suppression of the ha ndg un.U.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 7 - The c ases on which Hairston relies to support his claim ac tually support our conc lusion that
r e a s o n a b le s u s p ic io ne xis te d

to justi fy the s to p . F ir s t, th is c ir c u it h a s e xp r e s s ly

s tate d th a t “ [a ]n informant’s tip is sufficie nt to establish reasona ble suspicion; it need not be base d exclusively on an office r’s pe rsonal obser

vations.” Ha rd

ne tt , 804 F .2 d at 35 6. Mo re imp or tantl y , a nd c on tr ary to Hairston’s a

rgument, even if

Offic er Stana

rd did not know all of t h e i n fo rm ation g iven to the dispatcher , this court expl ai n ed in Fe ath e rs that it “must im pute to the individual office rs the d is p a tc h e r ’ s kn o w le d g e ” a b o u t a ti p f

o r th e p u r p o s e o f d e te r

mi n in g w h e ther the T

erry stop was
rea sonable. 319 F .3d at 849. Acc ording ly , on the informant’ s call alone , “if the dispatcher had sufficie nt inf

ormation to find rea sonable suspicion for a Te rry stop, the stop was permissible.” Id. L ike w is e , “ if

th e d is p a tc h e r

la c k e d s u f f ic ie n t i n f o r mati o nto s a ti s f

y th e r e a s o n a

b le s u s picion require ment, and the of

fice rs’ subseque nt observations did not produce rea sonable suspicion, then the stop violated [Hairston’s] Fourth Amendment rig hts.” Id. Her e, the infor

mant Alice pr ovided the ra dio dispatcher w ith her name , addre ss, apar tment
numbe r, and

ph on e numbe r, a ll o f wh ic h mus t be imp ute d to Of fi c e r S tana

rd pr ior to t he sto p. Th is inf or matio n a lso wa s late r v e ri fi e d w he n O ff ic e r S tana rd and his pa rt ne r w e nt t o th e g ive n a dd re ss and spoke w ith the victims about the incident. Thus, unlike J .L. , wher e the c aller r efuse d to provide
a name and the c aller’ s location was unknown, it c annot be said that Alice was “anony mous.” See J .L. , 529 U.S. at 270. Her “re putation [could] be assessed” and she could “be held re sponsible if her alleg ations turn[ed] out to be fabr icated.” Id. Fur thermore , the information Alice provided on the audio recording to the di spatche r, unl ike the information provided by the informants in both J

.L. andU.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 8 - Fe ath e rs , g ave a

n acc ount of criminal ac tivity that had take n place in her pre sence , provided sig ni f i c a nt i d e nt i f y inginf or matio n, and

c on ve y e d r e a l ti me up date s r e g ard ingHa ir sto n’ s mo ve me nts and pre sent location. Se e J .L. , 529 U.S. at 272 (explaining that an ac curate desc ription of location and appe ara

nce is re liable in the “limited sense” of identifying the individual accuse d of cr iminal activity , but to amount to reasonable suspicion, there also must be reliability in a ti p’s asser tion of il le g a lity ); Fe ath e rs , 3 1 9 F
. 3 d

a t 8 5 0 ( h o ld in g th a t r e a s o n a b le s u s p ic io nd o e s n o t e xis t wh e nthe information provided consists of “ea sily obtained fac ts a nd conditions e x isting at the time of the tip” that only descr ibe an individual in a re levant ar ea)
. Moreove r, the tip was not uncor robo rated. Alice told the dispatche r that Ha irston was driving a silver Char g er a

nd that it was locate d in front of he r re sidence , for which she provided the
e xac t a dd re ss. Whe n O ff

ic e r S tana rd arr ive d o n th e sc e ne he saw j us t w hat A lic e ha d d e sc ri be d: a silver Charg er w as located in front of the addre ss give n t o Stanard a s the addre ss of the victim’s apar tment. When Offic er Stana rd appr oache d in his poli ce ve hicle, the Char g er spe d awa y from the
scene at a hig h rate of speed until pulled over by Offic er Stana

rd. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . Ca ru the rs , 458 F.3d 459, 466 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“Give n that simply walkingawa

y from the police does not g ive ri se to r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion , w e a g re e that the sp e e d of the su sp e c t' s mo ve me nts may be re le va nt i n the totality

of the c ircumstance s.” (inter nal quotation marks and c itations omi tted)). Finally , the “c ontext ual consider ations” support a finding of rea sonable suspicion. Office r Stanard testified that he re ceive d the ca ll from dispatch at a lmost 3: 00 a.m. and that the a ddress wa s in a hig h crime a

rea . S ee W a r d low , 5 28 U. S. at 12 4 ( e xpla ini ngthat “ of fi c e rs are no t r e qu ir e d toU.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 9 - ignor e the r eleva

nt char acte risti cs of a loc ation in determining whether the circ umstances a

re sufficie ntly

suspicious to warra

nt further investigation”). This c ourt previously has dete rmined that “an individual, whose g ener al appe ar an ce a nd location matche d the desc ription give n in the anony mous shot-fired c all, [who] fled a nd made furtive m ovements when approa ched by the police late at nig ht in a high- crime a rea –provided re asonable suspicion to conduct a Te rry stop.” Car uth e rs , 458 F.3d at 468. Here , not only are the re levant fa cts nea

rly identical, but the ca ller wa s actua lly identified rather than a

nony mous. Thus, it was not error for the district c ourt t o fi n d that
rea sonable suspicion existed to st op Hairston’s c ar a nd thus deny

Hairston’s motion to suppress. B. Reasonableness of

Sentence Hairston also a

rgues that his sentenc e wa s proce durally and substantively

unrea sonable due to the district court’s fa ilure t o consider his reque st for a lower se ntence and the “ excess amount of weig ht” g iven to his prior criminal history
. Howeve r, as Hairston rea dily conce des, he e x ecute d a ple a a g re e me nt c on ta ini ngan a pp e llate wa ive r. Th e ple a a g re e me nt s tate d th a t H a ir sto n e xpre ssl y waived all rig hts to appea l his sentenc e, except a sentenc e that was “in exces s o f t h e s t at utory maxi mum” and or one that exceede d “the maximum of the sentencingrang e dete rmined under the
a dvis ory S ente nc ingGu ide lin e s, e xce pt a s e xce e de d b y the statut or

y mand a tor

y min imum, i n
acc ordanc e with the sente ncing stipulations and computations in [ the plea] agr ee m en t , using the criminal History

Categ ory found applica

ble by the [c]ourt.” I t is well-settled i n this circuit that “[a]ny rig ht, even a

constitutional right, may be
surre ndere d in a plea ag ree ment if that waiver was made knowing ly

and voluntarily .” United StatesU.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 10 - v. Ashe , 4 7 F .3 d 77 0, 77 5– 76 (6 th C ir . 1 99 5) ; see also United States v . Fleming , 239 F.3d 761, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2001) (“ The sine qua non o f a va lid waiver is that the de fenda nt enter into the ag ree ment knowing ly

and voluntarily .”). Under Rule 11 of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e, the district court “must inform the defe ndant of, a nd deter mine that the def

endant unde rstands . . . the te rm s o f a

ny ple a -a g re e me nt p ro vis ion wa ivi ngthe ri g ht t o a

pp e a l . .
. . ” Fed. R. C ri m. P
. 11(b)( 1)(N) . Rule 11, howeve r, “doe s not require a district cour t s p ecifically

to ask a de fenda

nt whether he under stands the t erms of a wa iver provision; rathe r, it only require s a cour

t to ‘determine’ that the defendant understands t he terms of such pr ovision.” United States v. Zumot , 337 F. App’ x 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2009). “We re view de novo the question of whethe r a de fenda nt waived his rig ht to a ppeal his sentenc e in a va lid plea ag ree ment.” United States v. Almany , 5 98 F .3 d 2 38 , 2 40 (6 th Cir. 2010). Hairston does not a

rgue, nor does the record sugg est, that his waiver of appe llate rig hts was any thing less than know ing a nd voluntary
. I n fac t, at the plea hear ing the district court conf irmed with Hairston and his counse l that Hairston under stood the appellate -wa iver provision. The c ourt
we nt t hr ou g h th e wa ive r p ro vis ion and fu lly e xpla ine d the lim ite d c on te xts in wh ic h H a ir sto n c ou ld fi le an a pp e a l. H a ir sto n r e pe a te dly state d th a t he un de rs too d h e wa s g iv in g u p all of his ri g hts to
a pp e a l e xce pt in tho se sp e c if ic a lly de sig nate d c ir c ums tanc e s. Th e ple a a g re e me nt i tse lf

a lso
co n tained a pr ovision acknowledg ing that Hairston “f ree ly and voluntarily” ente red into the
a g re e me nt a

nd tha t he ha d d isc us se d th e c a se wi th h is atto rney and ha d b e e n a dv ise d o f h is r ig hts prior to ac ceptingthe plea.U.S. v. Hairston

Case Nos. 09-3485, 09- 3486

- 11 - Hairston also does not a

rgue that any of the exceptions to the waiver apply
. Had he raised such an a rg ument, it would be without merit
. As n oted, Hair ston waived a ll rights to appe al any
s en t en ce , ex ce p to n e t h at ex ce ed edt h e s t at u t o ry m ax i m u m o rex ce ed edt h e s en t en ci n g ra n ge established by

the U.S. SentencingGuidelines Manua l (“U.S.S.G.”). H airston was c onvicted of possession of a ha

ndgun by a fe lon, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , which is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) by

a maximum sentenc e of ten y ear s. Additionally , as the pa rties stipulated in the plea a g ree ment, Hairston’s ba se off ense le vel was twe nty -four under U .S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)( 2). Ha ir sto n r e c e ive d a

thr e e -l e ve l r e du c tio n f

or a c c e pta nc e of re sp on sib ili ty , makin g his tot a l of fe ns e l e v e l t w e n t y - o n e . W i t h h i s p r i o r c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y , H a i r s t o n ’ s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y c a t e g o r y w a s III , resulting in a Guidelines rang e of imprisonment of f orty -six to fifty -seve n months. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, sentenc ing ta

ble. The district c ourt imposed a mid-ra ng e sentence of

fifty months in prison, wh ic h d oe s n ot e xce e d th e statut or y ma ximumor

the e sta bli sh e d Gui de lin e s rang e . Thu s, be c a us e Hairston’s a

ppellate wa iver wa s knowing and vo l u n t ar y and none of the exceptions to his waiver
a pp ly , h is c ha lle ng e to t

he re a so na

ble ne ss o f h is s e nte nc e is n ot p ro pe rl y be fo re thi s c ourt
. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AFF I RM Hairston’s conviction and se ntence
.