62406 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Parts 571 and 595

[Docket No. NHTSA–97–3111]

RIN 2127—AG61

Air Bag On-Off Switches

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; denial of petition for

reconsideration.

SUMMARY: This final rule seeks to

preserve the benefits of air bags, while

providing a means for reducing the risk

of serious or fatal injury that current air

bags pose to identifiable groups of

people, e.g., people who cannot avoid

sitting extremely close to air bags,

people with certain medical conditions,

and young children. The benefits are

substantial; current air bags had saved

about 2,620 drivers and passengers, as

of November 1, 1997. However, those air

bags had also caused the death of 87

people in low speed crashes, as of that

same date. Most of those people were

unbelted or improperly belted.

Although vehicle manufacturers are

beginning to replace current air bags

with new air bags having some

advanced attributes, i.e., attributes that

will automatically avoid the risks

created by current air bags, an interim

solution is needed now for those groups

of people at risk from current air bags

in existing vehicles.

This final rule exempts motor vehicle

dealers and repair businesses from the

statutory prohibition against making

federally-required safety equipment

inoperative so that, beginning January

19, 1998, they may install retrofit

manual on-off switches for air bags in

vehicles owned by or used by persons

whose requests for switches have been

approved by the agency. While the

administrative process necessary to

provide prior approval is more complex

than the process proposed by the agency

in January 1997 for enabling vehicle

owners to obtain switches, prior

approval is warranted by several

considerations. The requirement for

prior approval of requests for switches

emphasizes to vehicle owners the

importance of taking the safety

consequences of a decision to seek and

use on-off switches very seriously.

While some people need and will be

benefited by on-off switches, the vast

majority of people will not be. Further,

checking the requests for switches is

more appropriately performed by the

agency than by the dealers and repair

businesses who will install the

switches. Finally, prior approval will

enable the agency to monitor directly,

from the very beginning, the

implementation of the regulation and

the effectiveness of its regulation and

the associated educational materials in

promoting informed decisionmaking

about on-off switches.

Under the exemption, vehicle owners

can request an on-off switch by filling

out an agency request form and

submitting the form to the agency. On

the form, owners must certify that they

have read an information brochure

discussing air bag safety and risks. The

brochure describes the steps that the

vast majority of people can take to

minimize the risk of serious injuries

from air bags while preserving the

benefits of air bags, without going to the

expense of buying an on-off switch. The

brochure was developed by the agency

to enable owners to determine whether

they are, or a user of their vehicle is, in

one of the groups of people at risk of a

serious air bag injury and to make a

careful, informed decision about

requesting an on-off switch. Owners

must also certify that they or another

user of their vehicle is a member of one

or the risk groups. Since the risk groups

for drivers are different from those for

passengers, a separate certification must

be made on an agency request form for

each air bag to be equipped with an onoff switch.

If NHTSA approves a request, the

agency will send the owner a letter

authorizing the installation of one or

more on-off switches in the owner’s

vehicle. The owner may give the

authorization letter to any dealer or

repair business, which may then install

an on-off switch for the driver or

passenger air bag or both, as approved

by the agency. The on-off switch must

meet certain criteria, such as being

equipped with a telltale light to alert

vehicle occupants when an air bag has

been turned off. The dealer or repair

business must then fill in information

about itself and its installation in a form

in the letter and return the form to the

agency.

This final rule also denies a petition

for reconsideration of the agency’s

January 1997 decision in a separate

rulemaking not to extend the option for

installing original equipment

manufacturer on-off switches for

passenger air bags to all new vehicles

equipped with air bags. As a result of

that decision, the option continues to

apply only to those new vehicles

lacking a rear seat capable of

accommodating a rear-facing infant

restraint.

DATES: Effective Date: Part 595 is

effective December 18, 1997. The agency

will begin processing air bag on-off

switch requests on that same date. If a

form is submitted before December 18,

it will be given the same priority as a

form submitted after that date.

Accordingly, there will be no advantage

to submitting forms early. Motor vehicle

dealers and repair businesses may begin

installing switches on January 19, 1998.

The amendments to Part 571 are

effective January 19, 1998. Compliance

with those requirements is optional

before that date.

Petitions: Petitions for reconsideration

must be received by January 5, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration

should refer to the docket number of

this rule and be submitted to:

Administrator, National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

information about air bags and related

rulemaking: For additional information,

call the NHTSA Hotline at 1–800–424–

9393; in the D.C. area, call 202–366–

0123. In addition, visit the NHTSA Web

site at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/

airbags/. Among the available materials

are descriptions of the procedures for

requesting authorization to obtain an

on-off switch and a list of questions and

answers about air bags and on-off

switches. There are also crash videos

showing what happens in a crash to a

belted, short-statured dummy whose

driver air bag is turned off.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary of this Final Rule.

A. Final Rule.

B. Comparison of NPRM and Final Rule.

II. Overview of Problem and the Agency’s

Remedial Actions.

A. Introduction.

B. Background.

1. Air Bags: Safety Issues. a. Lives Saved

and Lost. b. Causes of Air Bag Fatalities.

2. Air Bag Requirements.

C. Comprehensive Agency Plan to Address

Air Bag Fatalities.

1. Interim Rulemaking Solutions.

a. Existing and Future Vehicles-in-Use.

b. New Vehicles.

2. Longer-Term Rulemaking Solution.

3. Educational Efforts; Child Restraint and

Seat Belt Use Laws.

III. Deactivation Proposal (January 1997).

IV. Summary of Public Comments on

Proposal.

V. NHTSA’s Use of its Prosecutorial

Discretion to Provide Case-by-Case

Authorizations of Air Bag Deactivation.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62407

1An advanced air bag senses or responds to

differences in crash severity, occupant size or the

distance of the occupant from the air bag at the time

of a crash. The advanced air bag adjusts its

performance by suppressing deployment in

circumstances in which fatalities might otherwise

be caused by the air bag, but not by the force of the

crash or by reducing the force of deployment in

those circumstances.

2This final rule applies to leased as well as

owned vehicles. See part VIII.G.8 of this preamble.

For the sake of simplicity, however, most references

in this preamble are to owners only. Those

references should be deemed to include lessees as

well as owners.

VI. Focus Group Testing of Information

Brochure and other Educational

Materials (June 1997).

VII. Physicians Conference on Medical

Conditions that Warrant Turning Off an

Air Bag (July 1997).

VIII. Agency Decision to Issue Exemption

Authorizing Installation of Retrofit OnOff Switches.

A. Summary.

B. The Challenge and Overall Rationale.

1. Risk versus Perception of Risk.

2. Which Groups Are Really at Risk?

3. Agency Actions to Minimize Risks.

C. Changes in Circumstances since the

NPRM Make Retrofit On-Off Switches

Preferable to Deactivation.

D. Specifying that Retrofit On-Off Switches

Are the Only Means Authorized Under

the Exemption for Turning off Air Bags

Is Reasonable and Consistent with

Safety.

E. Case-by-Case Agency Authorizations of

Retrofit On-Off Switch Installation,

Based on Vehicle Owner Certification of

Risk Group Membership and on

Informed Consumer Decisionmaking, Is

Reasonable and Consistent with Safety.

F. Continued Use of Prosecutorial

Discretion for Case-by-Case

Authorization of Air Bag Deactivation

until Retrofit On-Off Switches Become

Available.

G. Other Issues.

1. Request Form.

2. Dealer and Repair Business Liability.

3. Information Brochure.

4. Dealer and Repair Business

Responsibilities regarding the Request

Form and Information Brochure.

5. Insert for Vehicle Owner’s Manual.

6. Recordkeeping.

7. Labels.

8. Lessees.

9. Definition of Repair Business.

10. Effective Date.

11. Sunset Date or Event.

12. On-Off Switches for New Vehicles.

13. Conforming Terminology Changes to

Occupant Crash Protection Standard.

IX. Implementation of Agency Decision.

A. Limited Continued Use of Prosecutorial

Discretion to Authorize Deactivation:

Procedures and Requirements.

B. Providing Retrofit On-Off Switches

under the Exemption: Procedures and

Requirements.

C. Steps to Promote Informed

Decisionmaking by Consumers about

Retrofit On-Off Switches.

1. Information Brochure.

2. Insert for Vehicle Owner’s Manual.

3. Physicians’ Guidance regarding Medical

Conditions Warranting Turning Off an

Air Bag.

4. Campaign to Increase Use of Child

Restraints and Seat Belts.

X. Net Safety Effects and Costs of On-Off

Switches.

A. Effect of Turning off Air Bags on the

Performance of Some Seat Belts.

B. Net Safety Effects and Costs.

XI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices.

Regulatory Text

I. Executive Summary of This Final

Rule

A. Final Rule

This final rule seeks to preserve the

benefits of air bags, while providing a

means for reducing the risks that some

current air bag designs pose to discrete

groups of people due to their extreme

proximity to air bags. This final rule

exempts motor vehicle dealers and

repair businesses from the statutory

prohibition against making federallyrequired safety equipment inoperative

so that, beginning January 19, 1998, they

may install, subject to certain

conditions, retrofit manual on-off

switches for the air bags of vehicle

owners whose request is approved by

NHTSA. To obtain approval, vehicle

owners must submit a request form to

NHTSA on which they have certified

that they have read an agency

information brochure about air bag

benefits and risks and that they or a user

of their vehicle is a member of one of

the risk groups identified by the agency.

The agency will begin processing and

granting requests on December 18, 1997.

Air bags have saved the lives of about

2,620 drivers and passengers, primarily

in moderate and high speed crashes, as

of November 1, 1997. However, air bags

have also caused fatal injuries, primarily

in relatively low speed crashes, to a

small but growing number of children,

and on rare occasion to adults. These

deaths were not random. They occurred

when people were too close to their air

bag when it began to inflate. The vast

majority of these fatalities could have

been avoided by preventive steps such

as using seat belts, moving the front

seats back as much as possible, and

putting children in the back seat.

Nevertheless, a relatively small number

of people may still be at risk, even after

taking these steps, because they will be

more likely than the general population

to be too close to their air bags.

Although advanced air bags are the

ultimate answer and manufacturers are

beginning to install air bags with some

advanced attributes, an interim solution

is needed for those identifiable groups

of persons for whom current air bags in

existing vehicles may pose a risk of

serious or fatal injury.1

Under the exemption, vehicle

owners 2 may request a retrofit on-off

switch, based on informed

decisionmaking and their certification

of their membership or the membership

of another user of their vehicle in one

of the risk groups identified by the

agency. After reading the agency

information brochure, owners can fill

out and sign an agency request form and

submit it to NHTSA. The information

brochure, which provides guidance

about which groups of people may be at

risk from air bags and about appropriate

use of on-off switches, is intended to

inform consumers about which people

are at risk from air bags and to promote

informed decisionmaking by consumers

about whether to request an on-off

switch for those persons. To increase

the likelihood that the decisions are, in

fact, informed, owners requesting a

retrofit on-off switch must certify on the

request form that they have read the

information brochure. To limit the

availability of on-off switches to persons

at risk of serious air bag injury, the

owners must also certify that they or a

user of their vehicle is a member of one

or more of the risk groups described on

the information brochure and listed on

the request form. The particular risk

group in which membership is claimed

must be identified. Since the risk groups

for driver air bags are different from

those for passenger air bags, a separate

certification must be made for each air

bag to be equipped with an on-off

switch.

To reinforce the importance of taking

great care in accurately certifying risk

group membership, the agency is

requiring owners to submit their

requests to the agency. The agency

expects that owners will accurately and

honestly make the necessary

certifications and statements on their

request forms, but reserves the right to

investigate. The prior approval

procedure will also enable the agency to

monitor, from the very beginning, the

volume of requests and patterns in

switch requests and risk group

certifications. The computerization of

the process of preparing authorization

letters will minimize the time needed by

the agency to process and respond to the

requests. The precise amount of time

will depend in large measure on the

volume of requests.

The agency strongly urges caution in

obtaining and using on-off switches. As

noted above, on-off switches are not
62408 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

3The ABSC represents all automobile

manufacturers (domestic and importers), air bag

suppliers, many motor vehicle insurance companies

and the National Safety Council.

needed for the vast majority of people

since they are not at risk. Most people

can take steps that will eliminate or

significantly reduce their risk without

turning off their air bag and losing its

protective value. If they take those steps,

they will be safer than if they did not

take those steps and simply turned off

their air bag. The most important steps

are using seat belts and other restraints

and moving back from the air bag. More

important, people who are not at risk

will be less safe if they turn off their air

bag.

This exemption is subject to certain

conditions to promote the safe and

careful use of on-off switches. For

example, the on-off switches installed

pursuant to this exemption must meet

certain performance criteria, such as

being operable by a key and being

accompanied by a telltale to alert

vehicle occupants whether the air bag is

‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off.’’ In addition, to provide a

reminder about the proper use of on-off

switches, vehicle dealers and repair

businesses must give vehicle owners an

owner’s manual insert describing the

operation of the on-off switch, listing

the risk groups, stating that the on-off

switch should be used to turn off an air

bag for risk group members only, and

stating the vehicle specific safety

consequences of using the on-off switch

for a person who is not in any risk

group. Those consequences will include

the effect of any energy managing

features, e.g., load limiters, on seat belt

performance.

In response to comments indicating

that the definition of ‘‘advanced air bag’’

was too vague and that dealers could

not reasonably ascertain whether a

vehicle was equipped with such air

bags, the agency has deferred adoption

of that aspect of its proposal which

would have prohibited installation of

on-off switches for advanced air bags.

NHTSA expects to adopt such a

prohibition after it develops a more

complete definition of ‘‘advanced air

bags’’ that applies to driver as well as

passenger air bags. This deferral should

have no practical significance. Although

the vehicle manufacturers are beginning

to introduce air bags with advanced

attributes, the agency does not expect

the installation of significant numbers of

advanced air bags before it is ready to

establish a better definition.

The agency has selected January 19,

1998, as the beginning date for the

installation of retrofit on-off switches

under this rule. This date allows time

for completion of the design, production

and distribution of on-off switches and

the training of installation personnel. It

also allows time for the public

education campaign of the agency and

other interested parties (e.g., the Air Bag

Safety Campaign (ABSC),3 American

Automobile Association (AAA), Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention

(CDC), Insurance Institute for Highway

Safety (IIHS), motor vehicle dealers, and

state motor vehicle departments) to

effectively reach a substantial

percentage of the public before the

installation of on-off switches begins.

Until on-off switches become available

from the vehicle manufacturer for a

given vehicle make and model, NHTSA

will continue to exercise its

prosecutorial discretion to grant

requests for deactivating the air bags in

that make and model. In view of the

relative inflexibility and permanence of

deactivation, the discretion will be

exercised on a case-by-case basis in the

same limited set of circumstances in

which the requests are currently

granted, e.g., in cases in which unusual

medical conditions suggest that

deactivation is appropriate, and in cases

in which infants must be carried in the

front seat of vehicles lacking a rear seat

capable of accommodating a rear-facing

infant seat.

B. Comparison of NPRM and Final Rule

The final rule being issued today

follows, in several important respects,

the agency’s January 1997 proposal.

Most important, the rule makes a means

of turning off air bags available to

vehicle owners. It simplifies the current

process of obtaining a means of turning

off air bags. Instead of having to

compose an original request letter and

type or write the letter out in longhand,

as they must to obtain authorization

from the agency for deactivation,

vehicle owners will be able to fill out an

agency request form. To promote

informed decisionmaking, this rule

requires owners to certify on the request

form that they have read an air bag

information brochure prepared by

NHTSA so that owners can separate fact

from fiction about who is really at risk

and therefore may need an on-off

switch.

However, the final rule differs from

the proposal in several other important

respects. First, the sole means

authorized for turning off air bags is a

retrofit on-off switch. Deactivation (i.e.,

modifying the air bag so that it will not

deploy for anyone under any

circumstance) is not allowed under the

exemption. Although the agency

recognized in January 1997 that retrofit

on-off switches offered some

advantages, the agency proposed

deactivation because the apparent

unavailability of retrofit on-off switches

in the near term made them

impracticable. When the deactivation

proposal was issued, there were

indications from the vehicle

manufacturers that they would not be

able to provide retrofit on-off switches

for existing vehicles in a timely manner.

Subsequent to the January 1997

proposal, a number of major vehicle

manufacturers began reassessing the

practicability of on-off switches and

making statements to the agency and the

media that they were able to provide

retrofit on-off switches for existing

vehicles, and for future vehicles. The

change to on-off switches in this final

rule will enhance safety because the onoff switches are a more focused, flexible

means of turning off air bags. They

enable consumers to leave air bags on

for people who are not at risk and thus

will benefit from their protection, and

turn them off for people at risk.

Second, vehicle owners must certify

that they are a member of one of several

specified risk groups or that their

vehicle will be driven or occupied by a

person who is a member of such a

group. The agency proposed to allow

any person to choose to have his or her

air bags deactivated, without having to

demonstrate or state a particular safety

need. Under the proposal, applicants

would simply have had to fill out an

agency form on which they indicated

that they had received and read an

information brochure explaining the

safety consequences of having an air bag

deactivated. For the final rule, the

agency has devised a new form on

which owners desiring an on-off switch

for either a driver or passenger air bag

not only must certify that they have read

the brochure, but also that they or one

of the users of their vehicle fall into an

identifiable risk group for that air bag.

Use of the revised form will help

provide reasonable assurance that the

exemption is implemented in a manner

consistent with safety.

Third, the agency is requiring owners

to submit their filled-out forms to the

agency for approval. Together with the

requirement for certification of risk

group membership, the necessity for

obtaining agency approval will help

limit the installation and use of on-off

switches to people who are at risk from

air bags and give the agency information

about the volume of requests and

patterns in switch requests and risk

group certifications.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62409

4The vast majority of the deaths appear to have

occurred in crashed in which the vehicle was

traveling at less than 15 miles per hour when the

air bag deployed. Almost all occurred at vehicle

speeds under 20 miles per hour. NHTSA notes that

Federal safety standards do not specify a vehicle

crash speed at which air bags must deploy.

5The Federal safety standards do not require a

‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach to designing air bags.

They permit a wide variety of technologies that

would enable air bags to deploy with less force in

lower speed crashes or when occupants are out-ofposition or suppress deployment altogether in

appropriate circumstances.

6 In States with ‘‘secondary’’ seat belt use laws,

a motorist may be ticketed for failure to wear a seat

belt only if there is a separate basis for stopping the

motorist, such as the violation of a separate traffic

law. This hampers enforcement of the law. In States

with primary laws, a citation can be issued solely

because of failure to wear seat belts.

7Studies published in the November 5, 1997

issue of the Journal of the American Medical

Association by IIHS and by the Center for Risk

Analysis at the Harvard School of Pulbic Health

confirm the overall value of passenger air bags,

whle urging action be taken quickly to address the

loss of children’s lives due to those air bags. IIHS

found that passenger air bags were associated with

a substantial reduction in crash deaths. The Center

evaluated the cost-effectiveness of passenger air

bags and concluded that they produce savings at

costs comparable to many well-accepted medical

and public health practices.

II. Overview of Problem and the

Agency’s Remedial Actions

A. Introduction

While air bags are providing

significant overall safety benefits,

NHTSA is concerned that current air

bags have adverse effects on certain

groups of people in limited situations.

Of particular concern, NHTSA has

identified 87 primarily low speed

crashes in which the deployment of an

air bag resulted in fatal injuries to an

occupant, as of November 1, 1997.4

NHTSA believes that none of these

occupants would have died if they had

not been seated in front of an air bag.

The primary factor linking these

deaths is the proximity to air bags at the

time of their deployment. All of these

deaths occurred under circumstances in

which the occupant’s upper body was

very near the air bag when it deployed.

There were two other factors common

to many of the deaths. First, apart from

12 infants fatally injured while riding in

rear-facing infant seats, most of the

fatally injured people were not using

any type of child seat or seat belt. This

allowed the people to move forward

more readily than properly restrained

occupants in a frontal crash. Further,

the air bags involved in those deaths

were, like almost all current air bags, socalled ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ air bags that

have a single inflation level.5 These air

bags deploy with the same force in very

low speed crashes as they do in higher

speed crashes.

The most direct behavioral solution to

the problem of child fatalities from air

bags is for children to be properly belted

and placed in the back seat whenever

possible, while the most direct

behavioral solution for the adult

fatalities is to use seat belts and move

the driver seat back as far as practicable.

Implementing these solutions

necessitates increasing the percentage of

children who are seated in the back and

properly restrained in child safety seats.

It also necessitates improving the

current 68 percent rate of seat belt usage

by a combination of methods, including

the enactment of State primary seat belt

use laws.6

The most direct technical solution to

the problem of fatalities from air bags is

to require that motor vehicle

manufacturers install advanced air bags

that protect occupants from the adverse

effects that can occur from being too

close to a deploying air bag.

All of these solutions are being

pursued by the agency. However, until

advanced air bags can be developed and

incorporated into production vehicles,

behavioral changes based on improved

information and communication about

potential hazards and simple, manually

operated technology are the best means

of addressing fatalities from air bags,

especially those involving children.

To partially implement these

solutions, and preserve the benefits of

air bags, while reducing the risk of

injury to certain people, NHTSA issued

two other final rules in the past year.

One rule requires new passenger cars

and light trucks whose passenger air

bags are not advanced to bear new,

enhanced warning labels. (61 FR 60206;

November 27, 1996) The other final rule

provides vehicle manufacturers with the

temporary option of ensuring

compliance by conducting a sled test

using an unbelted dummy instead of

conducting a vehicle-to-barrier crash

test using an unbelted dummy. (62 FR

12960; March 19, 1997) The purpose of

the option is primarily to enable vehicle

manufacturers to expedite their efforts

to lessen the force of air bags as they

deploy.

On the behavioral side, the agency has

initiated a national campaign to increase

usage of seat belts through the

enactment of primary seat belt use laws,

more public education, and more

effective enforcement of existing belt

use and child safety seat use laws.

In conjunction with the National

Aeronautical and Space Administration,

as well as Transport Canada, and in

cooperation with domestic and foreign

vehicle manufacturers, restraint system

suppliers and others through the Motor

Vehicle Safety Research Advisory

Committee (MVSRAC), NHTSA is

undertaking data analysis and research

to address remaining questions

concerning the development and

introduction of advanced air bags. As

noted above, the Federal motor vehicle

safety standards have permitted, but not

required, the introduction of advanced

air bags. NHTSA recognizes that, if it

were to require advanced air bags, it

would have to take into consideration

the differing leadtimes for the various

kinds of advanced bags under

development, and the fact that the

longest leadtimes will be those for the

most advanced bags. The agency also

recognizes the engineering challenge

and potential costs associated with

incorporating some of the advanced air

bag design features into the entire

passenger car and light truck fleet. A

proposal to require the installation of

advanced air bags is expected this

winter.

B. Background

1. Air Bags: Safety Issues

a. Lives Saved and Lost. Air bags have

proven to be highly effective in reducing

fatalities from frontal crashes, the most

prevalent fatality and injury-causing

type of crash. Frontal crashes cause 64

percent of all driver and right-front

passenger fatalities.

NHTSA estimates that, between 1986

and November 1, 1997, air bags have

saved about 2,620 drivers and

passengers (2,287 drivers (87 percent)

and 332 passengers (23 percent)). 7 Of

the 2,620, 1,800 (69 percent) were

unbelted and 700 (31 percent) were

belted. These agency estimates are based

on comparisons of the frequency of front

seat occupant deaths in vehicles

without air bags and in vehicles with air

bags. Approximately half of those lives

were saved in the last two years. These

savings occurred primarily in moderate

and high speed crashes. Pursuant to the

mandate in the Intermodal Surface

Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

(ISTEA) for the installation of air bags

in all passenger cars and light trucks,

the number of air bags in vehicles on the

road will increase each year. As a result,

the annual number of lives saved by air

bags will continue to increase each year.

Based on current levels of effectiveness,

air bags will save more than 3,000 lives

each year in passenger cars and light

trucks when all light vehicles on the

road are equipped with dual air bags.

This estimate is based on current seat
62410 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

8 29 (or 78%) of the 37 forward-facing children

who were fatally injured by air bags were not using

any type of belt or other restraint. This included 4

children who were sitting on the laps of other

occupants. The remaining 8 children included some

who were riding with their shoulder belts behind

them and some who were wearing lap and shoulder

belts but who also should have been in booster seats

because of their small size and weight. Booster seat

use could have improved shoulder belt fit and

performance. These various factors and pre-crash

braking allowed the children to get too close to the

air bag when it began to inflate.

9For information on the restraint most

appropriate for a particular child, see the table at

the end of the information brochure in Appendix

A in the regulatory text.

10Mercedes Benz offers passenger air bags whose

deployment threshold is 12 mph if the passenger is

unbelted and 18 mph if the passenger is belted.

11The air bags installed in approximately 10,000

GM cars in the 1970’s were equipped with dual

stage inflators. Today, Autoliv, a Swedish

manufacturer of air bags, has a ‘‘gas generator that

inflates in two steps, giving the bag time to unfold

and the vent holes to be freed before the second

inflation starts. Should the bag then encounter an

occupant, any excessive—gas indeed bag pressure—

will exit through the vent holes.’’

belt use rates (about 68 percent,

according to State-reported surveys).

While air bags are saving large

numbers of people in moderate and high

speed crashes, they sometimes cause

fatalities, especially to children, in

lower speed crashes. As of November 1,

1997, NHTSA’s Special Crash

Investigation program had confirmed a

total of 87 crashes in this country in

which the deployment of an air bag

resulted in fatal injuries. Forty-nine of

those fatalities involved children. Three

adult passengers have also been fatally

injured. Thirty-five drivers are known to

have been fatally injured.

In addition to the 87 confirmed air

bag related deaths, there were 18 deaths

under investigation, as of November 1,

1997, 1 involving a 1996 crash and 17

involving 1997 crashes. The single 1996

death still under investigation involved

a driver. The 17 deaths in 1997 involved

1 infant, 11 children ranging in age from

1 to 11 years, and 5 drivers. Although

the agency cannot predict how many of

the deaths under investigation that will

ultimately be categorized as confirmed

air bag related deaths, the agency notes

that roughly 80 percent of the deaths

investigated to date have ultimately

been confirmed.

The trends in the annual numbers of

child and adult deaths differ

significantly. The annual number of

confirmed fatally-injured children

increased significantly in 1993 through

1996 (1 in 1993, 5 in 1994, 8 in 1995

and 22 in 1996), while the number of

confirmed fatally-injured drivers did not

increase appreciably in the same period

(4 in 1993, 7 in 1994, 4 in 1995, and 6

in 1996). As of November 1, 12 children

and 6 drivers had been confirmed as

having been fatally injured by air bags

this year. However, as noted above,

additional deaths are under

investigation. The total number of

confirmed deaths for this year will not

be known until some time next year.

The number of vehicles with either

driver air bags or both driver and

passenger air bags increased steadily

over the last four years. Since the fall of

1996, the number of vehicles with both

driver and passenger air bags has been

increasing at the rate of 1 million

vehicles per month. The ratio of driver

deaths to vehicles with driver air bags

decreased significantly between 1993

and 1996. The ratio of child deaths to

vehicles with passenger air bags also

decreased, but not nearly so much.

b. Causes of Air Bag Fatalities. The

one fact that is common to all who died

is not their height, weight, sex, or age.

Instead, it is the fact that they were too

close to the air bag when it started to

deploy. For some, this occurred because

they were sitting too close to the air bag.

More often this occurred because they

were not restrained by seat belts or child

safety seats and were thrown forward

during pre-crash braking.

Air bags are designed to save lives

and prevent injuries by cushioning

occupants as they move forward in a

front-end crash. They keep the

occupants’ head, neck, and chest from

hitting the steering wheel or dashboard.

To accomplish this, an air bag must

move into place quickly. The force of a

deploying air bag is greatest in the first

2–3 inches after the air bag bursts

through its cover and begins to inflate.

Those 2–3 inches are the ‘‘risk zone.’’

The force decreases as the air bag

inflates further.

Occupants who are very close to or in

contact with the cover of a stored air bag

when the air bag begins to inflate can be

hit with enough force to suffer serious

injury or death. In contrast, occupants

who are properly restrained and who sit

10 inches away from the air bag cover

will contact the air bag only after it has

completely or almost completely

inflated. The air bag then will cushion

and protect them from hitting hard

surfaces in the vehicle and thus provide

a significant safety benefit, particularly

in moderate to serious crashes.

The confirmed fatalities involving

children have a number of fairly

consistent characteristics. First, all 12

infants were in rear-facing infant seats.

Second, the vast majority of the older

children were not using any type of

restraint. 8 Third, almost all of the small

number of older children who were

using some type of restraint were

improperly restrained or were leaning

so far forward that benefits of being

restrained were largely negated. For

example, some were too small to be

using just a vehicle lap and shoulder

belt. Fourth, as noted above, the crashes

occurred at relatively low speeds. If the

passenger air bag had not deployed in

those crashes, the children would

probably not have been killed or

seriously injured. Fifth, the infants and

older children were very close to the

dashboard when the air bag deployed.

Properly installed rear-facing infant

seats are always very close to the

dashboard. For essentially all of the

older children, the non-use or improper

use of occupant restraints or the failure

to use the restraints most appropriate to

the child’s weight and age, in

conjunction with pre-impact braking,

resulted in the forward movement of the

children. 9 As a result, they were very

close to the air bag when it deployed.

Because of their proximity, the children

sustained fatal head or neck injuries

from the deploying passenger air bag.

As in the case of the children fatally

injured by air bags, the key factor

regarding the confirmed adult deaths

has been their proximity to the air bag

when it deployed. The most common

reason for their proximity was failure to

use seat belts. Only 11 of the 35 drivers

were known to be properly restrained by

lap and shoulder belts at the time of the

crash. Moreover, of those eleven, two

appeared to be out of position (blacked

out, due to medical conditions, and

slumped over the steering wheel) at the

time of the crash. As in the case of

children, the deaths of drivers have

occurred primarily in low speed

crashes.

The other cause of air bag fatalities is

the design of current air bags. Air bag

fatalities are not a problem inherent in

the concept of air bags or in the agency’s

occupant restraint standard, Standard

No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208). That standard

has long permitted, but not required, a

variety of design features that would

reduce or eliminate the fatalities that

have been occurring, e.g., higher

deployment thresholds that will prevent

deployment in low speed crashes, 10

different folding patterns and aspiration

designs, dual stage inflators, 11 new air

bag designs like the Autoliv ‘‘Gentle

Bag’’ that deploys first radially and then

toward the occupant, and advanced air

bags that either adjust deployment force

or suppress deployment altogether in

appropriate circumstances. While some

of these features are new or are still

under development, others have been

around for more than a decade. The

agency identified a number of these

features in conjunction with its 1984

decision concerning automatic occupant
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62411

12Air bag firsts—In view of the confusion evident

in some public comments on this rulemaking and

even now in some media accounts about when air

bags were first required, and by whom, the agency

has set forth a brief chronology below:

• 1972 First year in which vehicle manufacturers

had the option of installing air bags in passenger

cars as a mean of complying with Standard No. 208.

Vehicle manufacturers also had the option of

complying by means of installing manual lap and

shoulder belts. GM installed driver and passenger

air bags in approximately 10,000 passenger cars in

the mid-1970’s.

• 1986 First year in which vehicle manufacturers

were required to install some type of automatic

protection (either automatic belts or air bags) in

passenger cars. This requirement was issued by

Secretary Dole in 1984. At the time of issuance, the

agency expressly noted the concerns expressed by

vehicle manufacturers about out-of-position

occupants. In response, NHTSA identified a variety

of technological remedies whose use was

permissible under the Standard. Between 1986 and

1996, vehicle manufacturers chose to comply with

the automatic protection requirements by installing

over 35 million driver air bags and over 18 million

passenger air bags in passenger cars. Another 12

million driver air bags and almost 3 million

passenger air bags were installed in light trucks in

that same time period.

• 1996 First year in which vehicle manufacturers

were required to install air bags in passenger cars.

this requirement was mandated by the 1991

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act.

13At least 80 percent of each manufacturer’s light

trucks manufactured on or after September 1, 1997

and before September 1, 1998 must be equipped

with an air bag and a manual lap/shoulder belt.

Every light truck manufactured on or after

September 1, 1998 must be so equipped.

protection and noted that vehicle

manufacturers could choose among

those features to address the problems

reported by those manufacturers

concerning out-of-position occupants.

Although Standard No. 208 permits

vehicle manufacturers to install air bags

incorporating those advanced features,

very few current air bags do so. Instead,

vehicle manufacturers have thus far

used designs that inflate with the same

force under all circumstances. Although

the vehicle manufacturers are now

working to incorporate advanced

features in their air bags, the

introduction of air bags with those

features is only just beginning.

Introduction of significant numbers of

advanced air bags may not begin for

another several model years.

With the help of a recent amendment

to Standard No. 208, vehicle

manufacturers have been able to

expedite the introduction of depowered

air bags. While these new air bags will

reduce, but not eliminate, the likelihood

of air bag-caused deaths, they still

deploy with the same force in all

crashes, regardless of severity, and

regardless of occupant weight or

location. Many manufacturers have

introduced substantial numbers of these

less powerful air bags in the current

model year (1998).

2. Air Bag Requirements

Today’s air bag requirements evolved

over a 25-year period. NHTSA issued its

first public notice concerning air bags in

the late 1960’s. However, it was not

until the fall of 1996 that manufacturers

were first required to install air bags in

any motor vehicles.12

When the requirements for automatic

protection (i.e., protection by means that

require no action by the occupant) were

adopted in 1984 for passenger cars, they

were expressed in broad performance

terms that provided vehicle

manufacturers with choices of a variety

of methods of providing automatic

protection, including automatic belts

and air bags. Further, the requirements

allowed broad flexibility in selecting the

performance characteristics of air bags.

Later, those requirements were

extended to light trucks. Ultimately,

strong market demand led

manufacturers to begin to install air bags

in all of their passenger cars and light

trucks.

In 1991, Congress included a

provision in ISTEA directing NHTSA to

amend Standard No. 208 to require that

all passenger cars and light trucks

provide automatic protection by means

of air bags. ISTEA required at least 95

percent of each manufacturer’s

passenger cars manufactured on or after

September 1, 1996, and before

September 1, 1997, to be equipped with

an air bag and a manual lap/shoulder

belt at both the driver and right front

passenger seating positions. Every

passenger car manufactured on or after

September 1, 1997, must be so

equipped. The same basic requirements

are phased-in for light trucks one year

later.13 The final rule implementing this

provision of ISTEA was published in

the Federal Register (58 FR 46551) on

September 2, 1993.

Standard No. 208’s automatic

protection requirements, whether for air

bags or (until the provisions of ISTEA

fully take effect) for automatic belts, are

performance requirements. The

standard does not specify the design of

an air bag. Instead, vehicles must meet

specified injury criteria, including

criteria for the head and chest,

measured on test dummies. Until

recently, these criteria had to be met for

air bag-equipped vehicles in barrier

crashes at speeds up to 30 mph, both

with the dummies belted and with them

unbelted.

However, on March 19, 1997, the

agency published a final rule amending

Standard No. 208 to temporarily provide

the option of testing air bag performance

with an unbelted dummy in a sled test

incorporating a 125 millisecond

standardized crash pulse instead of in a

vehicle-to-barrier crash test. This

amendment was made primarily to

expedite manufacturer efforts to reduce

the force of air bags as they deploy.

Standard No. 208’s current automatic

protection requirements, like those

established 13 years ago in 1984, apply

to the performance of the vehicle as a

whole, and not to the air bag as a

separate item of motor vehicle

equipment. The broad vehicle

performance requirements permit

vehicle manufacturers to ‘‘tune’’ the

performance of the air bag to the

specific attributes of each of their

vehicles.

The Standard’s requirements also

permit manufacturers to design seat

belts and air bags to work together.

Before air bags, seat belts had to do all

the work of restraining an occupant and

reducing the likelihood that the

occupant will strike the interior of the

vehicle in a frontal crash. Another

consequence of not having air bags was

that vehicle manufacturers had to use

relatively rigid and unyielding seat belts

that can concentrate a lot of force along

a narrow portion of the belted

occupant’s body in a serious crash. This

concentration of force created a risk of

bone fractures and injury to underlying

organs. The presence of an air bag

increases the vehicle manufacturer’s

ability to protect belted occupants.

Through using energy managing

devices, such as load limiters, a

manufacturer can design seat belts to

give or release additional belt webbing

before the belts can concentrate too

much force on the belted occupant’s

body. When these new belts give, the

deployed air bag is there to prevent the

belted occupant from striking the

vehicle interior.

Further, Standard No. 208 permits,

but does not require, vehicle

manufacturers to design their air bags to

minimize the risk of serious injury to

unbelted, out-of-position occupants,

including children and small drivers.

The standard gives the manufacturers

significant freedom to select specific

attributes to protect all occupants,

including attributes such as the crash

speeds at which the air bags deploy, the

force with which they deploy, air bag

tethering and venting to reduce inflation

force when a deploying air bag

encounters an occupant close to steering

wheel or dashboard, the use of sensors

to detect the presence of rear-facing

child restraints or the presence of small

children and prevent air bag inflation,

the use of sensors to detect occupant

position and prevent air bag inflation if

appropriate, and the use of dual stage
62412 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

14For a discussion of the actions taken by NHTSA

before November 1996 to address the adverse effects

of air bags, see pp. 40787–88 of the agency’s NPRM

published August 6, 1996 (61 FR 40784).

15A 5th percentile female dummy has a standing

height of 5 feet and a weight of 110 pounds.

versus single stage inflators. Dual stage

inflators enable air bags to deploy with

lower force in low speed crashes, the

type of crashes in which children and

drivers have been fatally-injured, and

with more force in higher speed crashes.

C. Comprehensive Agency Plan to

Address Air Bag Fatalities

In late November 1996, NHTSA

announced that it would be

implementing a comprehensive plan of

rulemaking and other actions (e.g.,

consumer education and encouragement

of State seat belt use laws providing for

primary enforcement of their

requirements) addressing the adverse

effects of air bags.14 While there is a

general consensus that the best

approach to preserving the benefits of

air bags while preventing air bag

fatalities will ultimately be the

introduction of advanced air bags, those

air bags will not be widely available in

the next several years. Accordingly, the

agency has focused on rulemaking and

other actions that will help reduce the

adverse effects of air bags in existing

vehicles as well as in vehicles produced

during the next several model years.

The actions which have been taken, or

are being taken, include the following:

1. Interim Rulemaking Solutions

a. Existing and Future Vehicles-inUse. This final rule exempts, under

certain conditions, motor vehicle

dealers and repair businesses from the

‘‘make inoperative’’ prohibition in 49

U.S.C. 30122 by allowing them,

beginning January 19, 1998, to install

retrofit manual on-off switches for air

bags in vehicles owned by people whose

request for a switch is approved by

NHTSA. The purpose of the exemption

is to preserve the benefits of air bags

while reducing the risk that some

people have of being seriously or fatally

injured by current air bags. The

exemption also allows consumers to

have new vehicles retrofitted with onoff switches after the purchase of those

vehicles. It does not, however, allow

consumers to purchase new vehicles

already equipped with on-off switches.

b. New Vehicles. On March 19, 1997,

NHTSA published in the Federal

Register (62 FR 12960) a final rule

temporarily amending Standard No. 208

to facilitate efforts of vehicle

manufacturers to depower their air bags

quickly so that they inflate less

aggressively. This change, coupled with

the broad flexibility already provided by

the standard’s existing performance

requirements, provided the vehicle

manufacturers maximum flexibility to

quickly reduce the adverse effects of

current air bags.

On November 27, 1996, the agency

published in the Federal Register (61

FR 60206) a final rule amending

Standards No. 208 and No. 213 to

require improved labeling on new

vehicles and child restraints to better

ensure that drivers and other occupants

are aware of the dangers posed by

passenger air bags to children,

particularly to children in rear-facing

infant restraints in vehicles with

operational passenger air bags. The

improved labels were required on new

vehicles beginning February 25, 1997,

and were required on child restraints

beginning May 27, 1997.

On January 6, 1997, the agency

published in the Federal Register (62

FR 798) a final rule extending until

September 1, 2000, an existing

provision in Standard No. 208

permitting vehicle manufacturers to

offer manual on-off switches for the

passenger air bag for new vehicles

without rear seats or with rear seats that

are too small to accommodate rearfacing infant restraints.

2. Longer-Term Rulemaking Solution

The longer term solution is advanced

air bags. The agency has established a

working group under the

Crashworthiness Subcommittee of

MVSRAC to work cooperatively with

the vehicle manufacturers, restraint

system suppliers and other

organizations regarding advanced air

bags. Activities include sharing data and

information from research, development

and testing of advanced air bags and

providing test procedures that could be

used in evaluating the advanced air bag

technologies. While some of these

technologies are complex, others are

relatively simple and inexpensive.

NHTSA plans to issue an NPRM to

require a phasing-in of advanced air

bags and to establish performance

requirements for those air bags. While

Standard No. 208 has provided vehicle

manufacturers with the flexibility

necessary to introduce advanced air

bags, the Standard has not required

them to take advantage of that

flexibility. Among other things, the

agency anticipates proposing tests using

a 5th percentile female dummy 15 and

advanced child dummies and specify

appropriate injury criteria for those

dummies, including neck injury criteria,

as part of its rulemaking regarding

advanced air bags.

3. Educational Efforts; Child Restraint

and Seat Belt Use Laws

In addition to taking these actions,

and conducting extensive public

education efforts, the Department of

Transportation announced this past

spring a national strategy to increase

seat belt and child seat use. Higher use

rates would decrease air bag fatalities

and the chance of adverse safety

tradeoffs occurring as a result of turning

off air bags. The plan to increase seat

belt and child seat use has four

elements: stronger public-private

partnerships; stronger State seat belt and

child seat use laws (e.g., laws providing

for primary enforcement of seat belt use

requirements); active, high-visibility

enforcement of these laws; and effective

public education. Substantial benefits

could be obtained from achieving higher

seat belt use rates. For example, if

observed belt use increased from 68

percent to 90 percent, an estimated

additional 5,536 lives would be saved

annually over the estimated 9,529 lives

currently being saved by seat belts. In

addition, an estimated 132,670 injuries

would be prevented annually. The

economic savings from these

incremental reductions in both fatalities

and injuries would be $8.8 billion

annually.

III. Deactivation Proposal (January

1997)

On January 6, 1997, NHTSA

published an NPRM (62 FR 831) to

exempt motor vehicle dealers and repair

businesses conditionally from the

statutory ‘‘make inoperative’’

prohibition of 49 U.S.C. § 30122, so that

they could deactivate either or both the

driver and passenger air bags at the

request of a vehicle owner. As noted

above, this proposal was issued to help

reduce the fatalities and injuries that

current air bags are causing to persons

who may be facing special risks from air

bags.

The agency stated that, while it

expected that advanced air bags will

offer means for significantly reducing or

eliminating the risk of adverse side

effects from air bags, advanced air bags

will not be widely available in the next

several years. The agency said it

believes that, in the interim, steps need

to be taken to minimize the possibility

that air bags will cause harm in existing

vehicles and in new vehicles produced

prior to the availability of advanced air

bags. Just as depowering will provide a

technological solution that will prevent

a significant number of the air bag

fatalities that might otherwise have
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62413

16 In expressing their views on these issues, even

those commenters who discussed on-off switches as

a means that should be available under the

Continued

occurred in new vehicles, so

deactivation would provide a

technological solution for persons facing

special risks in existing vehicles.

Although the agency recognized that

retrofit on-off switches offered certain

advantages, the agency proposed

deactivation instead of installation of

retrofit on-off switches based on

information from the vehicle

manufacturers indicating that they

could not provide retrofit on-off

switches for existing vehicles in a

timely manner.

Noting that a depowered passenger air

bag may not completely eliminate the

risk to an infant in a rear-facing infant

seat or to an unrestrained child who is

near the dashboard as a result of precrash braking, the agency stated that

deactivation of depowered passenger air

bags would be permitted. However,

since on-off switches and advanced air

bags could be used to essentially

eliminate the risks to children,

deactivation of a passenger air bag

would not be permitted under the

proposal if that air bag were equipped

with such an on-off switch or if the air

bag were an advanced air bag.

NHTSA proposed to limit

authorization to deactivate driver air

bags to existing vehicles and vehicles

lacking advanced driver air bags. The

agency indicated that it might further

restrict authorization to deactivate

driver air bags by excluding vehicles

with depowered driver air bags.

NHTSA noted that there were safety

tradeoffs associated with air bag

deactivation. The agency strongly

recommended that air bag deactivation

be undertaken only in instances in

which the vehicle owner reasonably

believes that the air bag poses a

significant risk, based on the

individual’s particular circumstances.

The agency indicated that there would

be limited need for passenger air bag

deactivation and even less need for

driver air bag deactivation.

The mechanics of the proposed

exemption from the make inoperative

prohibition were based in large measure

upon recommendations from BMW and

Volvo in 1996 that the agency develop

procedures similar to those being used

in Europe for temporarily deactivating

air bags. According to BMW,

(I)n Europe, a BMW dealer is allowed to

temporarily deactivate the passenger air bag

for individuals who may have a special need

or normally transport children after advising

them of the benefits of air bags and approval

forms are signed.

Given the administrative complexity

and time that would be associated with

reviewing individual applications, the

agency proposed to allow any person to

choose to deactivate, without having to

demonstrate a particular safety need.

However, applicants would have had to

submit a written authorization to the

dealer or repair business performing the

deactivation and indicate that they had

received and read an information

brochure explaining the consequences

of having an air bag deactivated.

NHTSA requested commenters to

provide views regarding a number of

specific issues, including—

• Should deactivation of air bags be

allowed at the owner’s option in all

cases or should deactivation be limited

to situations in which death or serious

injury might reasonably be expected to

occur?

• Would the administrative details

involved in establishing and

implementing limitations on eligibility

overly complicate the availability of

deactivation?

• If it becomes permissible to

deactivate air bags, with the result that

an air bag could be turned off

permanently, should the agency permit

lesser measures as well, such as an onoff switch?

• Should there be a requirement that

deactivation be performed in a manner

that facilitates reactivation?

• In the rulemaking regarding OEM

on-off switches, the agency estimated

that there would be more benefits than

losses if the misuse rate were less than

7 percent. Since a seat with a

deactivated air bag may sometimes be

occupied by a person who would

benefit from the air bag, is there a

percentage of such occupancy that

would result in the losses from

deactivation outweighing the benefits?

• Should a vehicle lessee be allowed

to seek deactivation?

IV. Summary of Public Comments on

Proposal

There were approximately 700

comments on the NPRM. About 600 of

those were from members of the general

public. The rest were from companies or

trade associations representing vehicle

manufacturers, dealers and repair

businesses, fleet managers and owners,

equipment manufacturers, consumer

safety groups, insurance companies,

physicians and health-related groups,

former NHTSA administrators, and

miscellaneous other organized groups.

Because so many commenters took the

same or similar positions on the issues,

the commenters are not identified in

this preamble unless there is some

special significance to their identity.

Instead, they are referred to simply as

‘‘general public’’ commenters and

‘‘company and group’’ commenters

(even if some of the ‘‘company and

group’’ comments are from individual

companies).

The general public commenters

supported, and the company and group

commenters did not oppose, the

agency’s exempting dealers and repair

businesses from the make inoperative

prohibition so that air bags could be

turned off. However, the commenters

were divided on many of the details of

how this should be accomplished and

on the breadth of the exemption.

Almost all commenters supported

deactivation as a means for turning off

air bags. Most of the companies and

groups also supported permitting

retrofit on-off switches at least as an

alternative to deactivation. GM, a

dealer’s group, a service group, and a

number of safety groups went further,

stating that on-off switches should be

the only permitted way of turning off an

air bag. About one in six of the general

public commenters also stated that onoff switches should be installed in lieu

of, or as a preferred means of, turning

off air bags. IIHS, which supported

deactivation, stated that it reluctantly

supported on-off switches as well. Its

reluctance arose in large part from the

amount of apparent interest in on-off

switches. Based on a January 1997

public opinion survey that it

commissioned showing a strong public

preference for on-off switches over

deactivation, IIHS suggested that more

people would choose to have on-off

switches installed than would choose to

have deactivations performed. A few

commenters opposed on-off switches.

BMW stated that on-off switches should

not be allowed because their

development will divert resources from

development of advanced air bags,

conflict with the decision not to require

them on new vehicles, and introduce

complexity for service and repair,

compared with the ‘‘simple

reprogramming’’ necessary for

temporary deactivation of its air bags.

Both BMW and IIHS expressed concern

that allowing on-off switches would

encourage placing children in front

where the risk of serious injury is

greater, with or without air bags. Most

company and group commenters

thought that on-off switch misuse would

be a significant problem.

The issues which drew the most

comments were ‘‘who should be

allowed to have their air bags

deactivated, and under what

procedure?’’ 16 The general public
62414 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

exemption for turning off air bags generally

discussed the eligibility and procedural issues in

terms of deactivation alone. NHTSA understands

that the commenters generally intended those views

regarding eligibility and procedure to apply equally

to deactivation and on-off switches.

commenters almost universally favored

allowing air bag deactivation for anyone

who wants it, i.e., regardless of whether

a person is actually in a risk group. Both

the National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) and IIHS also supported

deactivation for any vehicle owners who

want it, i.e., without requiring

membership in a risk group. In addition,

one equipment manufacturer, and three

groups supported deactivation for

owners who want it and based their

support on personal liberty arguments.

However, most of the other company

and group commenters were opposed to

deactivation for everyone who wants it.

The main argument given by the

general public commenters for broad

availability of deactivation was that

there should be personal choice as to

whether to turn one’s air bag on or off.

These commenters emphasized the

danger that they believe air bags pose

and many mentioned media reports that

they had seen. They frequently noted

that there were circumstances that they

believed would tend to put them or

their family members at risk. Generally,

these circumstances included short

stature, pregnancy, being elderly,

needing to transport children, and

certain medical conditions. Many stated

that they wore their seat belts, and that

they believed that the air bags were of

marginal benefit.

IIHS said that it supported broad

availability because of the apparent

extent of public interest in turning off

air bags for at least some vehicle

occupants. The organization suggested

that trying to limit the availability of

deactivation would create an adverse

public reaction. In support of this

suggestion, IIHS cited its January 1997

survey indicating that 30 percent of

their respondents would like an on-off

switch for the driver air bag, and 67

percent would like one for the passenger

air bag. Thirteen percent said they

would like a permanent deactivation of

the driver air bag, and 19 percent

wanted permanent deactivation for the

passenger air bag.

The main argument of the company

and group commenters against relying

on informed decisionmaking in

allowing deactivation was that there

would be widespread deactivation by

frightened and misinformed consumers

who were not actually at risk. Many

company and group commenters

expressed concern that the issues

relating to air bag risks might be too

complex for the general public to

comprehend so that it would be difficult

for the public to make informed

decisions. Some commented that

allowing deactivation for everyone

would even encourage deactivations by

implying that air bags were so

dangerous that they generally should be

disconnected. The great majority of

company and group commenters

favored a continuation of NHTSA’s

current practice of authorizing

deactivations only in limited

circumstances and solely on a case-bycase basis. In August 1997, a broad

coalition of vehicle manufacturers,

dealers, insurers, public interest groups,

medical societies and others met first

with the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) and later with NHTSA to

urge that eligibility under the exemption

be limited to persons in risk groups

identified by the agency and that the

agency approve each request for an onoff switch before a switch can be

installed. The coalition re-iterated its

concerns in a mid-October meeting with

OMB.

Several individual vehicle

manufacturers, and the industry

associations representing all domestic

and foreign vehicle manufacturers, said

that NHTSA does not have the statutory

authority to allow deactivation based on

informed decisionmaking. General

Motors (GM) argued that the proposal

did not meet the three tests which it

believes are implicit in the statute: (1)

an exemption must be for a single

individual, not classes of people; (2) an

exemption for a specific individual

must be based on the agency’s

judgment, not the individual’s

judgment; and (3) an exemption must be

consistent with vehicle safety. These

commenters noted that the agency

emphasized in the NPRM that only in

limited instances would deactivation be,

on balance, in the best interests of a

driver or passenger. They argued that

the predicted widespread deactivations

provided to anyone who wanted one

would result in more people being

killed and injured in situations in which

the air bag might have saved them, thus

resulting in a reduction of motor vehicle

safety. Finally, Ford argued that the

agency’s desire for administrative

simplicity does not overcome the

necessity for complying with the statute.

The company and group commenters

advanced a number of safety arguments

against allowing deactivation based on

informed decisionmaking. Some of them

suggested that depowering air bags

would obviate the need for a broad

availability of deactivation. Several

stated that occupant restraint systems

are integrated. Seat belts designed to

work with air bags may not work so well

as conventional seat belts if the air bags

are deactivated. In particular, it was

stated that, depending on how it was

performed, deactivating the air bag

could also deactivate seat belt

pretensioners that use the same crash

sensors as the air bag. GM suggested that

it is the safety conscious people who

already buckle themselves and their

children who will tend to deactivate

their air bags in reaction to media

reports of air bag deaths and injuries.

Because people who wear belts are

seldom harmed by air bags, GM

concluded that, ironically, many or

most who disconnect will be at

increased risk. A majority of the

company and group commenters stated

that vehicles with deactivated air bags

would be sold to other parties who

might not know of the deactivation, or

in the case of vehicles with retrofit onoff switches, might misuse the on-off

switch.

The company and group commenters

almost universally stated that

deactivation was, given its permanency,

appropriate only in rare circumstances.

Most of these commenters did not

identify those circumstances, but stated

that NHTSA should determine the

proper categories of persons who would

be better off without the air bag, based

on its expertise and data. To the extent

that the circumstances were noted, they

are discussed briefly below.

There was universal agreement that

certain young children riding in the

front need to be protected from the risk

of serious injury from air bags. Nearly

all commenters said that owners and

lessees who have vehicles lacking a rear

seat capable of accommodating a rearfacing infant restraint and who need to

transport infants in such restraints

should be able to have the passenger air

bag deactivated. Some commenters

suggested that air bags should be turned

off for young children with medical

conditions that need frequent

monitoring by the driver. In contrast,

the American Academy of Pediatrics

stated that situations in which a child

needs immediate attention are very rare,

and that it was more dangerous to

attend to them while driving. Another

circumstance suggested by some

commenters is the presence of too many

children in a vehicle to place all of them

in the back seat.

Other categories mentioned by some

of the commenters include people of

short stature, the elderly, and people

with certain medical conditions or

disabilities. These categories were also

mentioned extensively in the general

public comments. However, the

company and group commenters tended
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62415

to minimize the risk to these categories

of people. They generally did not

include the elderly as a category, and

some of them suggested that exemptions

for medical reasons should be

accompanied by a doctor’s note. One

safety group suggested NHTSA employ

a licensed medical professional or panel

to examine requests. One medical group

suggested that NHTSA and a panel of

medical professionals define qualifying

medical conditions. While some

commenters agreed that short people

were in danger, they emphasized the

difficulty of determining how short was

too short.

More recent submissions and

statements from the company and group

commenters argue that the issue is not

occupant height, but sitting distance

from the air bag module. IIHS submitted

a survey indicating that only 5 percent

of female drivers (approximately 2.5

percent of all drivers) are accustomed to

sitting within 10 inches of their air bag

module. Of those 5 percent of female

drivers, 66 percent normally sit 9–10

inches from their air bag, and an

additional 17 percent normally sit 8–9

inches away. The remainder, accounting

for less than 1 percent of female drivers,

normally sit within 8 inches of their air

bag.

IIHS also found that a high percentage

of short-statured female drivers could

adjust their driving position to achieve

a 10-inch distance. This finding was

based on 13 women, from 4 feet, 8

inches tall to 5 feet, 2 inches tall, who

were asked to try to achieve that

distance in a dozen vehicles of varying

sizes. Ten of the women achieved 10

inches in all of the vehicles; the

remaining 3 did so in all but a few of

the vehicles. All drivers were able to

achieve at least 9 inches in all vehicles.

Other reasons given for not allowing

deactivation based on informed

decisionmaking were assertions that

NHTSA’s current system of case-by-case

determinations was believed to work

well and only needed unspecified

streamlining; that the few deactivation

requests NHTSA received until recently

proved that actual need was low; and

that the authorization form would be

ineffective, especially with respect to

subsequent purchasers of vehicles with

deactivated air bags, as a means of

alleviating the liability concerns of the

manufacturer, dealer, and repair

business groups. In an August 1, 1997

letter, a broad coalition of company and

group commenters argued that since the

agency was reportedly answering all

deactivation requests within 72 hours

and had no backlog of unanswered

requests, the agency should be able

under the final rule to continue its

current practice of reviewing and

approving each deactivation request.

In addition to objecting generally to

the proposal for deactivation based on

informed decisionmaking, many of the

company and group commenters

expressed concerns about particular

aspects of the proposed process for

implementing the exemption from the

make inoperative prohibition. The

dealer and repair business groups, and

generally also the vehicle manufacturers

and safety groups, were opposed to the

dealers having any role in the process of

distributing information brochures or

making any kind of decision in the

process. They indicated that it would be

difficult to reject the request of an

owner who wanted deactivation or

advice on whether to deactivate, yet the

dealers did not have the expertise to

advise owners on deactivation. Dealer

and vehicle manufacturer groups also

stated that the existing definition of

‘‘advanced air bags’’ was too vague and

that a dealer could not be expected to

determine whether a vehicle was

equipped with one, and therefore

ineligible for deactivation.

Some of the company and group

commenters stated that NHTSA should

require guidance from the vehicle

manufacturers on how to perform

deactivations. A dealers’ group

commented that if NHTSA did not

require the vehicle manufacturers to

provide procedures, dealers/repairers

might perform improper repairs, and

that deactivations should be done only

by factory trained and certified

deactivation technicians at a franchised

dealership. Two manufacturers

suggested that NHTSA require

manufacturers to provide such

procedures, and one suggested requiring

deactivation kits. Ford commented that

NHTSA should require deactivation to

be done in accordance with

‘‘manufacturer recommendations.’’

A large majority of company and

group commenters also stated that any

recordkeeping under the exemption

from the make inoperative prohibition

should be done by NHTSA. Vehicle

manufacturers uniformly stated that

NHTSA should keep the records

because the agency could provide a

centralized information clearinghouse

on air bag deactivations. Vehicle

manufacturers also commented that

since they have no role in authorizing

or performing deactivations, or in

enforcement, they should not have

recordkeeping responsibilities.

Multinational Business Services (MBS)

stated that the agency should be the

recordkeeper so that it could analyze

trends among the requests for

deactivation and make any appropriate

policy adjustments. The insurance and

safety groups suggested that NHTSA

notify insurers of any deactivations,

because permanent deactivation would

eliminate the basis for the air-bag

discount many insurance companies

offer. GM suggested that recordkeeping

would be totally unnecessary if on-off

switches were installed.

Many of the company and group

commenters opposed an immediate

effective date. Jaguar suggested at least

60 days would be needed for label

printing, software development,

preparations of procedures for

disconnect/reconnect, and training.

Other manufacturers, who urged that

retrofit on-off switches be allowed as an

alternative to permanent deactivation,

stated that additional time would be

needed for development of on-off

switches. Ford said that it would need

5–6 months to have a large supply of

retrofit on-off switch kits in dealer

inventory. In an August 29, 1997

meeting with NHTSA representatives, a

broad coalition of company and group

commenters urged that adequate

leadtime be provided to give the

government as well as many of the

company and group commenters

sufficient opportunity to communicate

their safety messages about air bag

safety and risks to the public.

Opinion about sunsetting (i.e.,

terminating) the exemption was

divided. GM opposed sunsetting the

exemption when ‘‘smart air bag,’’ i.e.,

advanced air bags, are introduced. The

company said that until the term can be

adequately defined, NHTSA should

remove the term from the rule, along

with any sunsetting associated with it.

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety

commented that sunsetting the

exemption was appropriate.

Some company and group

commenters discussed the costs

associated with deactivation. Some

manufacturers merely stated that

additional parts and extensive labor

would be required for both deactivation

and reactivation. Only Ford gave

specific cost estimates. Ford estimates

for parts and labor (but not including

profit) ranged from $16 for a simple

shorting bar removal, to $124 for an onoff switch. The NTSB commented that

some manufacturers had indicated to it

that the cost of on-off switches would be

$300–400 per on-off switch. Some

insurance groups indicated that insurers

might eliminate the air bag discount,

even with on-off switches, because they

would be unable to identify deactivated

vehicles. This would penalize those

who do not disconnect.

IIHS submitted a July 1997 report in

which that organization concluded the
62416 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

17 In the absence of any other source of expertise,

such as the July 1997 National Conference on

Medical Indications for Air Bag Disconnection,

described below, the agency has relied in the past

almost solely upon statements from the physicians

of persons requesting disconnection of air bags.

While many of the requests were granted based

upon a physician’s statement, some were granted

notwithstanding the absence of a physician’s

statement. In those cases, the grant was based upon

either the unique characteristics of the medical

condition involved or the existence of physician’s

statements attached to earlier deactivation requests

of other individuals with the same medical

condition. As discussed below in part IX.A, the

agency has changed its practices with respect to

physicians’ statements in response to the National

Conference.

18The majority of medical conditions were

related to apnea, although exemptions have also

been granted for children in wheelchairs, and

children with a tendency to spit up and choke.

results of 40 mph offset frontal crash

tests demonstrate that turning off an air

bag increases the risk that a belted

driver will be seriously injured in a

crash. Crash tests using dummies

representing an average size male driver

indicated that without an air bag, the

safety belts alone would not have

prevented a belted driver from suffering

‘‘life-threatening’’ head and neck

injuries. Similarly, another July 1997

IIHS report concerning 35 mph barrier

crash tests with 5th percentile female

dummies indicated that short-statured

women can obtain significant protection

from an air bag even when the driver’s

seat is moved all the way forward. The

tests indicated that without air bags to

spread the crash forces over the entire

head, the crash forces would instead be

concentrated on a narrow portion of the

middle or lower portions of the face

where the bones are more fragile. IIHS

noted that a study of 15 restrained

drivers fatally injured in frontal crashes

with head injuries of AIS 4 or greater,

found that steering wheels were the

sources of head injuries for 9 of these

drivers, and that 13 drivers suffered

their head injuries from loading to the

facial bones.

Some company and group

commenters noted that the adverse

effect of turning off air bags would be

greater for some vehicles equipped with

seat belts specially designed to work

with air bags. If the crash forces become

too great, these new seat belts ‘‘give’’ or

yield to avoid concentrating too much

force on the chest. Some of these belt

systems yield by allowing more belt

webbing to spool out when a

predetermined force level is reached.

The inflated air bag prevents the

occupant from moving too far forward

after the seat belts give. Without the air

bag, the new belts allow the occupant to

move farther forward in moderate and

high speed crashes.

Commenters addressed the conditions

that should apply to deactivations. A

wide variety of companies and groups

commented that, whatever the method

of deactivation, it should be done in a

manner that facilitates reactivation. All

commenters who addressed the

question stated that the air bag readiness

indicator should have to remain

functional for the remaining air bag,

even if one air bag were deactivated.

The companies and groups also

generally commented that if both air

bags have on-off switches, the air bags

should be individually controllable.

Nearly all company and group

commenters emphasized the importance

of the information brochure in

promoting an informed decision by

individual members of the public about

deactivation. Many said improvements

were needed in the information

brochure. The most common assessment

was that the brochure was too long and

technical. Others commented that

NHTSA should focus-group test the

effectiveness of the brochure prior to

distributing it. Several suggested that

the information be provided in a video.

Many company and group

commenters argued that the agency

significantly underestimated the

number of people who would seek

deactivation under the proposal. Many

commenters argued that the agency

should consider public opinion surveys

in making a new estimate. One

commenter urged the agency to base its

estimates on the IIHS’ January 1997

survey. The most recent survey, an

August 1997 survey from IIHS,

indicated that 12 percent of vehicle

owners were interested in obtaining an

on-off switch for the driver’s air bag and

16 percent for the passenger’s air bag.

Based on early 1997 surveys, that

commenter contended that the proposal

would have significant net adverse

effects on safety. In an August 1, 1997

letter, the vehicle manufacturers argued

that the net effects must be assessed in

order to ensure that the exemption

meets the statutory criterion of

consistency with safety.

V. NHTSA’s Use of Prosecutorial

Discretion to Provide Case-by-Case

Authorization of Air Bag Deactivation

From October 1, 1996, through

October 30, 1997, NHTSA received

11,838 written requests for air bag

deactivation. The volume of these

requests peaked in the spring, possibly

in response to the extensive publicity

surrounding the NTSB hearings in midMarch, then fell steadily until the last

month. In April–May, the agency

received approximately 400 letters per

week. In August, the weekly volume fell

to slightly less than 300 letters. By midSeptember, the volume bottomed out at

slightly above 100. During October, the

volume rebounded, averaging slightly

less than 200 letters per week. That

increase followed the media’s reporting

of the agency’s submission of a draft

final rule to the Office of Management

and Budget on October 2.

Since October 29, 1996, the NHTSA

Hotline has received over 27,000 calls

seeking information about air bags.

Approximately 13,500 of them were

from people interested in deactivating

their air bags.

More than 60 percent of the written

requests, approximately 7,100 out of

11,838, concerned short adults. The vast

majority of the remaining 4,738 requests

concerned adults (many of whom were

short) with certain medical conditions.

The rest concerned children. Of those

remaining requests, approximately

4,200 were granted, and 500 denied, by

the agency. Approximately 85 percent of

the grants were for adult medical

conditions. The remaining

approximately 15 percent involved

children, including both children with

medical conditions and children riding

in vehicles lacking a rear seat capable of

accommodating a rear-facing infant seat.

In its grant letters to persons with

medical conditions, the agency told

owners that if their physicians

concluded that the risks associated with

their medical condition and the

deployment of their driver air bag

exceeded the risks to their safety from

the air bag’s not deploying, NHTSA

would not regard deactivation of the air

bag as grounds for an enforcement

proceeding.17 Similarly, NHTSA told

vehicle owners whose vehicle lacked a

back seat in which to carry an infant or

who needed to monitor closely a child

with a special medical condition 18 that

the agency would not regard the

deactivation of the passenger air bag by

a dealer or repair business as grounds

for an enforcement proceeding against

the dealer or repair business. The

agency urged that the air bag be

reactivated when the circumstances

necessitating its deactivation ceased to

exist.

Based on the current procedures for

handling these requests, it is estimated

that an average of about one hour is

spent on each letter. This estimate

covers time spent categorizing letters,

making a decision whether to grant or

deny, typing a response, keeping track

of the letters in a data base, reviewing

the response, having the response

signed, mailing it, etc. Based on a

weighted average of salaries of those

involved, plus 15 percent overhead, and

the costs of paper and postage, it is

estimated that the cost to the agency of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62417

19As noted more fully in footnote 23 below, it is

safer for children sit in the rear seat in all passenger

vehicles, even if the vehicle does not have a

passenger air bag. NHTSA recommends that all

children aged 12 and under sit in the rear,

regardless of whether there is a passenger air bag

in the front seat.

responding to these requests is about

$30 per request.

VI. Focus Group Testing of Public

Education Materials (June 1997)

To aid the agency in assessing the

effectiveness of the materials it was

developing to increase the public’s

understanding of air bags risks, and

ways of reducing or eliminating those

risks, NHTSA conducted nine focus

groups in three cities to test consumer

reaction to those materials. As noted

above in the summary of public

comments, a number of commenters

urged that the agency take the time to

enlist the help of focus groups.

Two focus groups were conducted in

each of the following cities: Chicago,

Illinois, on June 16, 1997, and

Greenbelt, Maryland, and Sarasota,

Florida, on June 18. Three more focus

groups were conducted in Greenbelt on

June 24 to look at educational materials

concerning air bags. Since public

concern about air bag safety has tended

to be concentrated in three categories of

vehicle owners, i.e., parents of young

children, short-statured adults, and

older adults, the focus group

participants were evenly drawn from

those categories. There were three

parent focus groups, three short-statured

adult focus groups, and three older

adult focus groups. Each group had

about 10 participants.

The knowledge and views of the

various groups were fairly similar.

While they had heard about some

aspects of the air bag safety story, they

did not know significant parts of it.

They said that while they had heard or

seen media reports about risks that air

bags can pose for children, they had

received little information about the

reasons for those risks, the life-saving

benefits of air bags and the methods of

reducing risk for people of different

ages. Early in each focus group session,

and before examining any agency

materials, some participants made

remarks critical of the media for using

what they called scare tactics and for

focusing almost exclusively on the

negative, eye-catching aspects of the air

bag story. They said that media

attention to air bag dangers for young

children had created an atmosphere of

fear and mistrust of air bags. They stated

that many of their perceptions had been

shaped by those media reports. They

had many detailed questions about air

bags, including air bag designs,

deployment speed and force, severity

and types of crashes in which they

deployed, life-saving benefits, risk

factors, types of injuries, and correct

seating adjustments. They emphasized

that public information and education

would reduce misconceptions about air

bags and the associated fear.

Among the very important safety

messages that had not yet reached many

of the focus group participants was that

the recommendation for children to sit

in the back seat applies to all children

aged 12 and under, not just infants. In

an attempt to get this message to vehicle

owners last fall, the agency issued a

final rule requiring labels in new

vehicles expressly warning purchasers

about air bag dangers for children aged

12 and under and recommending that

children sit in the rear.19 Further, the

vehicle manufacturers’ distributed

copies of these labels to virtually all

owners of existing vehicles with

passenger air bags. Many participants

were also unaware that proximity to the

driver air bag at the time of deployment

is the primary source of the risk to

drivers of serious air bag-related

injuries. They were pleased to be

provided with a specific

recommendation (10 inches) about the

distance that drivers should sit from

their air bags. Many participants said

that they would attempt to change their

driving position.

To determine how much air bag

information the public really wants, the

three June 24 focus groups were asked

to compare a short brochure (essentially

a 3-fold accordion brochure) and a long

brochure (i.e., an earlier draft of the

information brochure in Appendix A of

the rule) concerning air bags and on-off

switches. Each of the three groups

unanimously endorsed the long

brochure. These groups, consisting of an

older adult group, a short-statured adult

group and a parents group, stated that

they wanted a lot of detailed, balanced

information concerning air bags and air

bag safety so that they could make up

their own minds about seriousness and

sources of the risks, and about their

ability to avoid those risks. For example,

they wanted to know why the upper

limit on the group of children who

should sit in back was stated in terms

of age, instead of height or weight.

The educational value of the

additional detailed information in the

draft long brochure was demonstrated in

a number of instances. For example,

about 30–40 percent of the participants

expressed surprise at learning that air

bags differ in design and performance

from vehicle model to vehicle model.

They asked for more detailed

information on how and why the air

bags differed. An equal number were

surprised to learn that air bags were

vented and deflated in seconds after a

crash. Before learning that, they thought

that an air bag would remain inflated

and could smother them or prevent their

exiting from their vehicle after a crash.

They expressed relief when they were

informed that if they had to transport

too many children to place them all in

the rear seat, they could virtually

eliminate any risk by placing a child

(preferably the eldest) in the front seat,

ensuring that the child properly used

the seat belts and remained sitting

upright against the back of the vehicle

seat, and moving the seat all the way

back.

VII. Physicians’ Conference on Medical

Conditions That Warrant Turning Off

an Air Bag (July 1997)

At the request of NHTSA, the Ronald

Reagan Institute of Emergency Medicine

at George Washington University

conducted a National Conference on

Medical Indications for Air Bag

Disconnection on July 16–18, 1997. The

purpose of the conference was to make

recommendations on specific medical

indications, i.e., conditions, that might

warrant disconnecting an air bag. The

conference consisted of a panel of

representatives of 17 medical specialty

societies or organizations. NHTSA

selected the societies and organizations,

in consultation with the University,

based on the types of medical

indications that vehicle owners were

citing in their letters to NHTSA as

possible justification for air bag

disconnection. Each society and

organization, in turn, selected a

representative to attend the conference.

Among the specialty areas and types of

physicians represented were cardiology,

ophthalmology, otolaryngology (ear,

nose and throat), obstetrics and

gynecology, physical and rehabilitative

medicine, general surgeons, plastic and

reconstructive surgery, orthopaedic

surgery, neurological surgery,

pediatrics, geriatrics, and emergency

physicians. The American Medical

Association was also represented.

The agency arranged for this

conference for several reasons. First,

informal agency conversations with

emergency room physicians and

surgeons familiar with the trauma

caused by motor vehicle crashes had

suggested to the agency that very few

medical conditions warrant turning off

an air bag. Second, several commenters

on the January NPRM urged that the

medical profession be enlisted to help

identify those conditions. The American

Academy of Pediatrics said that such
62418 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

professional guidance was needed to

educate dealers, repair businesses and

some parts of the medical community

itself about the circumstances under

which it is appropriate to turn off an air

bag. Advocates for Highway and Auto

Safety urged that a panel of medical

experts be convened to examine each

vehicle owner request to turn off an air

bag based on medical reasons.

While the agency does not believe

that it is necessary or desirable for a

panel of medical experts to review each

such request, the agency did agree that

general authoritative advice is needed to

answer the concerns of some vehicle

owners about air bags and help guide

their actions. Since individuals with

particular medical conditions can be

expected to consult their physician

prior to deciding whether to have an onoff switch installed, the medical

profession also needs some guidance on

when deactivation would be indicated.

In preparation for the conference, the

representatives reviewed the available

medical and engineering literature about

air bag technology and injury risk and

prevention. At the conference, the 17

representatives were divided into

subpanels. Based on their literature

review and clinical experience, the

subpanels addressed each medical

indication with respect to seven factors:

known data, unknown data,

recommendation, level of confidence in

the recommendation, rationale for the

recommendation, specific concerns

about the recommendation, and

stakeholders. The entire panel then

discussed the work of the subpanels and

adopted final recommendations.

General Panel Conclusions

Air bags are effective lifesavers whose

benefits exceed the risks for most of the

medical conditions considered by the

panel. A medical condition does not

warrant turning off an air bag unless the

condition makes it impossible for a

person to maintain an adequate

distance from the air bag. NHTSA

believes that 10 inches is an adequate

distance.

Specific Recommendations

Excerpts from the panel’s specific

recommendations follow, beginning

with the recommendations regarding the

medical indications most commonly

cited by persons who have written to

NHTSA requesting deactivation based

on a medical indication. Unless

specifically indicated, the

recommendations relate to drivers.

Medical Indications Not Warranting

Disconnection of Air Bags

Medical Indications Most Commonly

Cited by Vehicle Owners

• Osteogenesis Imperfecta

The panel recommends air bag not be

disconnected for persons with

osteogenesis imperfecta.

While there is little population-based

data in the crash experience of this

group, it is anticipated that the injury

risk to these persons is higher without

an air bag and proper restraint than with

an air bag.

• Osteoporosis/Arthritis

For persons with osteoporosis,

arthritis, and other skeletal conditions,

air bags should not be disconnected

unless the person cannot sit back a safe

distance from the air bag.

Persons with specific conditions, such

as ankylosing spondylitis, may have a

relatively stiff spine and thus may be

unable to place themselves an

acceptable distance from the steering

wheel while driving. Other than in this

specific circumstance, persons with

osteoporosis and types of arthritis are

generally benefitted by the presence of

an air bag.

• Pacemakers

There is no evidence to support

disconnecting airbags for occupants

who have pacemakers, implantable

defibrillators, or similar devices.

Pacemakers and similar hardware are

specifically designed to withstand

impact. The forces associated with air

bag deployment are typically distributed

throughout the chest and are not

directed at one specific area. The impact

suffered without an air bag may in fact

be more severe and more localized than

that with an air bag. Clinical experience

does not demonstrate any significant

concern about the effects of air bag

deployment on this type of hardware

when properly installed. As forces to

the chest in areas directly contacted by

seatbelts may exceed forces from air

bags, it is important the belts be placed

properly and not directly over these

devices.

• Median Sternotomy

We recommend that persons who

have undergone median sternotomy not

disconnect air bags.

Uneven pressure on the chest can

harm a patient with a recent median

sternotomy because the external wound

may be opened. An air bag does not

cause this uneven force; seatbelts or

striking an object like a dashboard can

cause this uneven force.

• Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary

Disease/Emphysema/Asthma

We recommend not to disconnect air

bags for patients with these chronic lung

diseases.

There is no risk of oxygen deprivation

during air bag deployment because of

the quick deflation of the device. There

is some equivocal evidence to suggest

that the chemical irritants produced

may precipitate bronchospasm in

persons with asthma. However, there is

no evidence to suggest that this

phenomenon is occurring with any

greater frequency in the presence of air

bags. There is no reason to suspect that

persons with any type of chronic lung

disease will be adversely affected by an

air bag deployment sufficiently enough

to justify disconnection of the device.

• Short Stature

We are not able to determine an

absolute cut-off height and weight for

disconnection of air bags.

Short stature is a common area of

concern for the public in regard to air

bag deployment. As proximity to the air

bag is the major issue, the passengerside air bag should not be disconnected

for a passenger of short stature. Beyond

just short stature, weight, arm length,

and leg length also play important roles

in driver positioning. We know that a

disproportionate number of the deaths

attributed to air bag deployment have

occurred in persons of short stature.

However, of the 150,000 estimated air

bag deployments involving persons of

short stature, only 14 are known to have

been fatal.

Some of the Less Commonly Cited

Medical Indications

• Eyeglasses

There is no reason to recommend

disconnection of air bags for persons

wearing eyeglasses.

There are a number of anecdotal cases

of eye injuries after air bag deployment,

both with and without eyeglasses.

Eyeglasses may, in fact, be protective

during air bag deployment. There is no

obvious increased risk of injuries in the

presence of eyeglasses; moreover,

impact with the steering column or

dashboard may be more dangerous to

someone wearing eyeglasses than

impact with an air bag. Persons who

need eyeglasses should wear them to

drive and should not have air bags

disconnected solely because of the

eyeglasses.

• Hyperacusis or Tinnitus

We recommend not to disconnect air

bags for persons with hyperacusis or

tinnitus.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62419

20NHTSA believes that the safe distance for

drivers with osteoporosis/arthritis is the same as

that for persons without any medical indications,

i.e., 10 inches between the center of the driver air

bag cover and the center of the driver’s breastbone.

21NHTSA defines properly positioned to mean

positioned so that there is at least 10 inches

between the center of the air bag cover and the

center of the driver’s breastbone.

(T)he phenomenon of hearing loss has

not been noted to occur due to air bags.

The specific conditions of hyperacusis

and tinnitus are not associated with

hearing loss and persons with these

conditions would have no greater

likelihood of hearing loss from air bag

deployment than any other persons.

Some persons with tinnitus report that

noise triggers attacks of tinnitus;

however, it is difficult to separate the

noise of an air bag from the noise of a

crash in many situations.

• Advanced Age

Advanced age by itself does not

suggest the need for air bag

disconnection.

It is known that older persons are at

greater risk of injury in all types of

crashes. The data suggests that air bags

may be less effective in the older

population although the cause of this

finding is unclear. There is no evidence

to suggest that advanced age by itself, in

the absence of other potential risk

factors examined here, warrants air bag

disconnection.

With respect to passenger seat

occupants in general, the conference

participants said:

Under most circumstances, with the

notable exception of infants in rearfacing infant seats, the person in the

passenger position can be made safe

from inadvertent injury by the use of

proper restraint and placement of the

seat in the most rear position. Certain

vehicles with bench seats may

complicate this issue and may need to

be considered carefully on a case-bycase basis.

Medical Indications Warranting

Disconnection of Air Bag

• Osteoporosis/arthritis

For persons with osteoporosis,

arthritis, and other skeletal conditions,

air bags should not be disconnected

unless the person cannot sit back a safe

distance from the air bag.20 (Emphasis

added.)

• Scoliosis

If capable of being positioned

properly, persons with scoliosis should

keep air bag connected in their

vehicles. 21 (Emphasis added.)

This specific condition might make it

impossible for a person to sit upright

and away from the air bag. This very

small portion of the population of

persons with scoliosis might be

candidates for disconnection. It must be

remembered that a person sitting far

forward in either the driver or passenger

seat is also at increased risk of injury

from other structures (steering column,

dashboard) in front of them.

This specific condition might make it

impossible for a person to sit upright

and away from the air bag. This very

small portion of the population of

persons with scoliosis might be

candidates for disconnection. It must be

remembered that a person sitting far

forward in either the driver or passenger

seat is also at increased risk of injury

from other structures (steering column,

dashboard) in front of them.

• Wheelchairs

For persons in wheelchairs the

decision to allow disconnection of the

air bag should be handled on a case-bycase basis. Disconnection may be

needed if installation of special

equipment requires removal of the air

bag. If wheelchair installation or

steering column configuration does not

necessitate air bag removal, we

recommend not to disconnect air bags.

• Achondroplasia

In persons with achondroplasia we

recommend allowing disconnection of

driver-side air bag only if the person is

unable to sit back from the air bag.

Persons with significantly

congenitally shortened limbs may be

required to sit very close to the steering

wheel in order to operate a vehicle. In

this situation, pedal-extenders will offer

limited assistance as the arms are also

affected. However, there is no reason to

disconnect the passenger-side air bag for

an occupant with achondroplasia.

(Emphasis added.)

• Down syndrome and atlantoaxial

instability

Disconnection of the passenger air bag

is warranted if a person with this

specific condition cannot reliably sit

properly aligned in the front seat, such

as in those with developmental delay.

Children and adults with severe

developmental delay, including some

with Down syndrome, may be incapable

of consistently maintaining a position

away from a passenger-side air bag. If

these individuals cannot ride in a back

seat, air bag disconnection may be

warranted.

While there is no known data on this

specific situation in relation to air bags,

atlantoaxial instability is present in 20%

of persons with Down syndrome. This

instability creates the clear risk of

atlantoaxial subluxation. Persons with

this condition should clearly sit

properly restrained in the back seat of

a vehicle. In situations in which they

must sit in the front seat, air bag

disconnection may be warranted

because of the risk of cervical injury,

particularly if these individuals have

developmental delay which prevents

them from consistently maintaining

proper positioning. (Emphasis added.)

• Monitoring of Infants and Children

The panel recognizes that there are a

few specific medical conditions in

which infants and young children must

be in the front seat for monitoring by the

adult driving. In such situations, the

passenger side air bag may need to be

disconnected.

Parents are frequently concerned that

they will be unable to properly monitor

their infants if the infants are in the

back seat without an adult. The

American Academy of Pediatrics has

clearly recommended that infants

without underlying medical conditions

can safely ride alone in the back seat

properly restrained in a rear-facing

restraint. The data shows that in the

absence of an air bag, the injury risk in

the back seat is 30% less than the risk

in the front seat. The panel recognizes

that certain vehicles do not have back

seats. In these vehicles the option of onoff switches is already available.

Monitoring of certain infants may

require placement of the car seat in the

front passenger seat when the only adult

in the vehicle is the driver. These

situations may warrant air bag

disconnection or an on-off option.

Parents should clearly recognize that

distraction while driving significantly

increases the risk of a crash. Ideally, if

a child needs attendance in a vehicle,

someone other than the driver should be

available. It is anticipated that the

American Academy of Pediatrics will

make recommendations regarding

which specific conditions warrant close

monitoring while driving.

VIII. Agency Decision To Issue

Exemption Authorizing Installation of

Retrofit On-Off Switches

A. Summary

This final rule exempts, under certain

conditions, motor vehicle dealers and

repair businesses from the ‘‘make

inoperative’’ prohibition in 49 U.S.C.

30122 by allowing them, beginning

January 19, 1998, to install retrofit

manual on-off switches for air bags in

vehicles owned by people whose

request for a switch is approved by

NHTSA. The purpose of the exemption

is to preserve the benefits of air bags

while reducing the risk that some
62420 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

22As explained below, full deactivation will

continue to be available in limited circumstances

through the agency’s exercise of its prosecutorial

discretion.

23Contrary to some media reports, the back seat

has always been much safer than the front seat.

Sitting in the back seat significantly reduces the

likelihood of fatal injury for children, even in

vehicles without air bags. Further, sitting in the

back seat helps restrained children just as much as

it helps unrestrained children. To quantify the

benefits of sitting in the back seat, NHTSA analyzed

data from vehicle crashes in 1988–1994. Very few

of the vehicles in those crashes had passenger air

bags. The agency concluded that placing children

in back reduced the risk of death in a crash by 27

percent. This conclusion applies to restrained as

well as unrestrained children. The size of this

reduction can be appreciated from considering the

following example. The number of children killed

each year while riding in the front seat of a vehicle

is over 500. If those 500 children had instead been

sitting in the back seat, 135 of those children would

still be alive because the back seat is a much safer

seating environment for reasons having nothing to

do with air bags. A new study of IIHS reaches a

similar conclusion about the benefits of sitting in

the back seat. After examining data from essentially

the same time period regarding more than 26,000

children riding in vehicles that were involved in

fatal crashes and lacked passenger air bags, IIHS

concluded that sitting in the back seat reduced the

death rates by more than 27 percent, whether the

children were restrained or not. The safest position

of all was the center rear seat.

24NHTSA is recommending 10 inches as the

minimum distance that drivers should keep

between their breastbone and their air bags for

several reasons. First, the agency believes that

drivers who sit 10 inches away and buckle up will

not be at risk of serious air bag injury. Drivers who

can maintain that distance will be much safer if

they keep their air bags on.

The 10-inch distance is a general guideline that

includes a clear safety margin. IIHS recommended

the same distance in its comments. The 10-inch

distance ensures that vehicle occupants start far

enough back so that, between the time that precrash braking begins and time that the air bag

begins to inflate, the occupants will not have time

to move forward and contact their air bag until it

has completed or nearly completed its inflation.

The 10-inch distance was calculated by allowing 2–

3 inches for the size of the risk zone around the air

bag cover, 5 inches for the distance that occupants

may move forward while the air bags are fully

inflating, and 2–3 more inches to give a margin of

safety. The 5–inch rule of thumb commonly used

in air bag described in the paper, ‘‘How Airbags

Work (Design, Deploying Criteria, Costs,

Perspective)’’ presented by David Breed at the

October 19–20, 1992 Canadian Association of Road

Safety Professional International Conference on

Airbags and Seat Belts.

Second, the agency is focusing attention on the

10-inch distance because it wants drivers to strive

to get back 10 inches. NHTSA believes that almost

everyone can achieve at least 10 inches and get the

extra margin of safety that comes from sitting that

far back. See the July 1997 survey submitted by

IIHS.

However, some drivers who cannot get back a full

10 inches will still be safer, on balance, if they are

protected by their air bag. The nearer that these

drivers can come to achieving the 10-inch distance,

the lower their risk of being injured by the air bag

and the higher their chance of being saved by the

air bag. Since air bag performance differs among

vehicle models, drivers may wish to consult their

vehicle manufacturer for additional advice.

NHTSA considered an alternative suggestion by

Ford in late August 1997 meeting with the agency

that the 10-inch distance be measured from the air

bag to the chin instead of the breastbone. The

agency has decided to use the breastbone as the

measuring point because of the greater safety

margin provided.

25 Vehicle manufacturers that install on-off

switches in new vehicles lacking a rear seat capable

of accommodating a rear-facing infant seat must,

among other things, include in the owner’s manual

a statement of the safety consequences of using the

on-off switch to turn off the passenger air bag for

persons other than infants in such seats. See S4.5.4

and S4.5.4.4 of Standard No. 208. To comply with

people have of being seriously or fatally

injured by current air bags.

Although the agency still believes that

it is appropriate to exclude vehicles

with advanced air bags from the

exemption, it has not done so in this

final rule. It is not necessary to do so yet

since widespread introduction of

advanced air bags is not expected

during the next several years. This will

give the agency time to develop an

improved definition of ‘‘advanced air

bag’’ and to address how dealers and

repair businesses will be able to

ascertain whether a particular vehicle

has advanced air bags.

The agency has decided not only to

authorize retrofit on-off switches, but to

specify that they will be the only means

authorized under the exemption for

turning off an air bag.22 The agency has

made that choice because on-off

switches are a more flexible and focused

solution than deactivation to the risks

which air bags may pose to certain

people and thus are significantly more

consistent with safety than deactivation.

With retrofit on-off switches, air bags

can be left on for the vast majority of the

persons who will benefit from air bag

protection and turned off for the

relatively few persons at risk. By

contrast, deactivation is essentially

permanent and makes no distinction

between vehicle users who are at risk

from air bags and those who are not at

risk from air bags and who will benefit

substantially from them.

Under the exemption, vehicle owners

can obtain a retrofit on-off switch from

a dealer or repair business after filling

out and submitting a request form to the

agency and obtaining the agency’s

approval. The agency will begin

processing and granting requests on

December 18, 1997.

To promote the making of informed

decisions about requesting and using

on-off switches, consumers must certify

on the form that they have read an

agency information brochure providing

guidance about the risks created by

current air bags and describing the

groups of people for whom it may be

appropriate to obtain and use on-off

switches to turn off air bags. The

requirement for this certification is

intended to help encourage persons

considering on-off switches to focus on

the factors that create risk from air bags

and to reflect on whether they or their

passengers are really at risk. Owners

must also certify that they or another

user of their vehicle is a member of one

of the particular risk groups identified

by the agency. Since the risk groups for

drivers are different from those for

passengers, a separate certification must

be made for each air bag to be equipped

with an on-off switch.

The agency strongly urges caution in

obtaining and using on-off switches to

turn off air bags. While on-off switches

may be needed by a limited number of

people in particular circumstances, they

are not needed for the vast majority of

people since they are not in a risk

group. In fact, if people not at risk were

to turn off their air bags, they would be

less safe, not safer. Even those people in

a risk group can take steps that will

eliminate or significantly reduce any

risk they might currently have without

going to the extreme of turning off their

air bag and losing its protective value.

The easiest way of eliminating the risk

for children is to place them in the back

seat and buckle them up.23 Those

drivers who are at risk can eliminate

that risk by using their seat belts and by

moving the driver’s seat rearward and/

or tilting the back of the driver’s seat so

that there is 10 inches or almost 10

inches between the center of their

breastbone and the center of the driver

air bag. The primary risk of injury

occurs 2–3 inches from the air bag cover

because that is where the force of a

deploying air bag is greatest.24

This exemption will be subject to

certain conditions to promote the safe

use of on-off switches. Each on-off

switch must meet certain performance

criteria similar to those applicable to the

manual on-off switches that vehicle

manufacturers may currently install for

passenger air bags in new vehicles that

do not have a rear seat capable of

accommodating a rear-facing infant seat.

One is that the on-off switch be operable

by a key. Another is that there be a

telltale light to indicate to vehicle

occupants whether an air bag equipped

with an on-off switch is on or off. As a

reminder about the proper use of on-off

switches, the agency is requiring that

vehicle dealers and repair businesses

give owners an owner’s manual insert

describing the operation of the on-off

switch, listing the risk groups, stating

that the on-off switch should be used to

turn off an air bag for risk group

members only, and stating the vehicle

specific safety consequences of using

the on-off switch for a person who is not

in any risk group.25 Those consequences
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62421

that requirement, manufacturers must state that the

air bag will not inflate in a crash and that the

occupant therefore will not have the extra

protection of the air bag. To conform S4.5.4.4 to this

final rule, NHTSA has amended that provision in

this final rule so that the provision requires the

listing the same risk groups listed in the

information brochure and requires a statement of

the vehicle specific safety consequences of using

the on-off switch for persons not listed in those

groups.

would include the effect of any energy

managing features, e.g., load limiters, on

seat belt performance. NHTSA

anticipates that the inserts would be

obtained primarily from the vehicle

manufacturers, although in some cases

the inserts might be obtained from

independent switch manufacturers.

As noted above, the agency is setting

January 19, 1998 as the date on which

dealers and repair business may begin to

install switches. This date was selected

to allow time for the design and

production of on-off switches and the

proper training of installation

personnel. Until then, NHTSA will

continue its current practice of using its

prosecutorial discretion to grant

requests for deactivation on a case-bycase basis in a limited set of

circumstances, e.g., unusual medical

conditions. Beginning on January 19,

vehicle manufacturers and aftermarket

parts manufacturer may make on-off

switches available to vehicle owners

who have an agency authorization letter.

NHTSA expects that vehicle

manufacturers will make on-off

switches available for the majority of

vehicle makes and models. The agency

will continue to consider deactivation

requests after January 19 only for

vehicles for which retrofit on-off

switches are not available from the

vehicle manufacturer. If aftermarket

parts manufacturers make on-off

switches available for any of those

vehicles after January 19, motor vehicle

dealers and repair businesses may

install such switches for owners who

have an agency authorization letter.

B. The Challenge and Overall Rationale

1. Risk Versus Perception of Risk

While air bags have proven to be

highly effective in reducing fatalities in

frontal crashes, and have saved about

2,287 drivers and 332 passengers (as of

November 1, 1997), they are also known

to have killed 35 drivers, 49 children,

and 3 adult passengers (as of November

1, 1997). As discussed above, all of

these fatalities occurred because of

extreme proximity to the air bag, and

almost all could have been prevented by

behavioral changes, such as not placing

infants in rear-facing infant restraints in

the front seat, placing all children in the

back seat, moving front seats farther

back, and ensuring that all occupants

are properly restrained.

As a whole, media reports about air

bag fatalities have contributed to the

heightening of the public’s concerns

about air bags, and of their desire to

deactivate their air bags. Those reports

deserve credit for helping spread the

word about the real risks associated

with air bags for some people. Increased

public knowledge about the risks has

helped induce changes in behavior to

reduce or even eliminate those risks,

e.g., by putting children in the back seat

of vehicles.

However, some behavioral effects of

those accounts may not be positive.

Some media accounts which initially

served the public by drawing attention

to an initially unknown or

underappreciated risk may ultimately

have had the unintended consequence

of causing people to generalize and

exaggerate those risks. Unfortunately,

many members of the public have

focused their attention on the possibility

of being killed by an air bag, to the

exclusion of other factors that may be

more determinative of their overall

safety. These factors include the very

small magnitude of risk from the air bag,

the ability of teenagers and adults to

preserve the benefits of air bags and

nearly eliminate any risk by behavioral

actions such as wearing safety belts and

moving front seats back, and the much

greater risk, almost always faced by the

same occupants in the absence of an air

bag, of hitting their heads, necks or

chests on the steering wheel or

dashboard in a moderate or serious

crash.

By focusing on only one of an

interrelated set of risks which

consumers face while traveling by motor

vehicle, and thus magnifying that one

risk out of proportion to those other

risks, some media accounts may also

have had the effect of obscuring those

other risks. Those accounts may cause

some people to so focus on that one risk

to the exclusion of the other risks that

they induce those people to take actions

that increase, instead of decrease, their

overall risk of injury in a motor vehicle.

The potential exists for a significant

number of people doing just that. As

noted elsewhere in this notice, several

public opinion surveys indicate that the

extent of the public interest in turning

off air bags exceeds the number of

persons actually at risk from them. For

many of the teenagers and adults among

these people, concern about air bags

apparently tends to overshadow a much

greater risk faced by these same

occupants, i.e., the risk that, in the

absence of an air bag, they will strike

their head, neck or chest on the steering

wheel or dashboard in a moderate to

severe crash. This risk exists even for

properly belted occupants.

2. Which Groups Are Really at Risk?

As noted above, air bag-related deaths

are not random. They tend to involve

particular groups of people who share

common behavioral or other

characteristics. The relatively few

people who share those characteristics

will be safer overall if they turn off their

air bags. Conversely, people who do not

share those characteristics would be less

safe overall if they did so.

The primary source of risk is contact

with or close proximity to the air bag

module at the initial instant of

deployment. The deploying force is the

greatest in the first 2–3 inches of

deployment.

On the passenger side, it is primarily

children who get too close to the air bag.

Infants get too close by being placed in

a rear-facing infant restraint. That

positions the child’s head so that it is

very close to the dashboard where the

air bag is stored. Older children, i.e.,

children age 1–12, get too close

typically because they are allowed to

ride completely unrestrained. During

pre-crash braking, these unrestrained

children slide forward and are up

against or very near the dashboard when

the air bag begins to deploy. A few

children have gotten too close because

although they were placed in lap and

shoulder belts, they either removed

their shoulder belt or leaned far

forward.

On the driver side, the fatally-injured

drivers are believed to be people who

sat close to their steering wheels

primarily out of habit, although some

may have done it out of necessity. Some

may have been drivers who were

physically unable to maintain a 10-inch

distance between their air bag cover and

their breastbone because of the limits of

their reach (arm and leg length) or

because of fatigue or other physical

factors. However, they were generally

tall enough that all or almost all of them

should have been able to get back 10

inches. While they may have been able

to maintain that distance, perhaps they

did not do so because they had grown

accustomed to sitting close to their

steering wheel as matter of a preference.

A few of the drivers were slumped over

their steering wheel at the time of

deployment due to medical conditions.

A second source of potential risk is a

very limited number of medical

conditions. Apart from the medical

conditions which caused several drivers

to lose consciousness and slump over

their steering wheels, none of the air bag
62422 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

26Two of the fatally-injured drivers were

diabetics. While diabetes did not by itself make

those persons more prone to injury, it did cause

them to black out and slump over their steering

wheel prior to the fatal crash.

27 In its August 1997 survey concerning public

interest in turning off air bags, IIHS asked the 137

respondents who owned dual air bag vehicles and

said they carried children in the front seat why they

carried children in that location. Approximately 20

percent of the respondents gave answers indicating

that they carried children in the front seat out of

necessity, e.g., ‘‘no room in back seat,’’ ‘‘big

family,’’ ‘‘car pool,’’ and ‘‘no rear seats in vehicle.’’

Over half of the remaining 80 percent of the

respondents said either ‘‘child wants to ride in front

seat,’’ or ‘‘driver wants child in front seat.’’

fatalities confirmed to date has been

attributed to the existence of a preexisting medical condition that made

the fatally-injured person more

susceptible than the average person to

injury from an air bag. 26 To provide

vehicle owners and their physicians

with guidance concerning which

medical conditions warrant turning off

an air bag, NHTSA arranged for the

convening of representatives of the

medical community in July 1997. The

results of their deliberations are

discussed above. Briefly, it appears that,

in a very small number of cases in

which a medical condition prevents a

person from getting back 10 inches, a

medical condition might, in

combination with an air bag, present

enough of a risk to warrant turning off

either a driver or passenger air bag.

3. Agency Actions to Minimize Risks

In the longer term, the problems

associated with air bags will be

addressed and largely eliminated by

changes in technology, initially by

depowering and making various

incremental improvements to air bags,

and ultimately by installing advanced

air bags. Standard No. 208 has provided

all the flexibility necessary to enable

vehicle manufacturers to develop and

introduce those air bags, but thus far has

not required their introduction.

However, the challenge now facing

NHTSA and the public is how to

preserve the life-saving benefits of

current air bags, while addressing the

needs of the relatively small number of

persons facing risks from these air bags

as well as the fears being experienced by

a much larger number of persons.

In meeting this challenge, NHTSA

believes that it is essential to consider

safety benefits in both the shorter term

and longer term. The agency recognizes

that, given the small number of fatalities

associated with air bags as compared to

the number of lives saved, the short-run

safety benefits of air bags would be best

preserved by minimizing the situations

in which air bags are turned off, i.e.,

limiting the situations to the relatively

rare ones where a person is actually

better off with his or her air bag turned

off.

However, the agency believes that

great care must be taken with respect to

how this is accomplished, to avoid a

potentially much greater loss of safety

benefits in the longer run. As the agency

discussed in the depowering final rule,

the continued availability of any safety

device as standard equipment, whether

provided voluntarily by manufacturers

or pursuant to a regulation, is ultimately

dependent on public acceptability. The

agency believes that air bags which

fatally injure occupants, particularly

children in low speed crashes, place the

concept of air bags at risk despite their

overall net safety benefits. Thus, the

agency believes it must take great care

in how it responds to requests for

turning off air bags, lest its actions have

the unintended effect of reducing the

public acceptability of air bags and their

potential as a life-saving device.

Mindful of these considerations, the

agency is taking the following actions:

1. In light of changed circumstances

which make retrofit on-off switches a

much more readily available option,

NHTSA is specifying that they will be

the only means authorized under the

exemption for turning off an air bag.

This will ensure that any air bag which

is turned off for an occupant at risk can

be readily turned on again for occupants

who are not at risk. (In very limited

cases, deactivation will continue to be

available through the agency’s exercise

of its prosecutorial discretion.)

2. NHTSA has taken a balanced

approach in establishing the process for

determining which vehicle owners may

have a dealer or repair business install

an on-off switch. The agency is not

going to insist that facts establishing the

need for turning off an air bag be

documented by the vehicle owner.

Instead, the agency is requiring owners

who wish to obtain on-off switches to

certify, by marking a box on a request

form developed by the agency, that they

have read an agency information

brochure providing guidance about the

risks created by current air bags and

discussing the circumstances in which

it may be appropriate to use on-off

switches. Owners must also certify that

they or a user of their vehicle belongs

to one of the risk groups identified by

the agency. NHTSA is also requiring

that vehicle owners submit their

completed request forms to the agency

for approval. This requirement will help

reinforce the need for care and accuracy

by owners in certifying risk group

membership. The requirement will also

enable the agency to monitor, from the

very beginning, the patterns in switch

requests and risk group certifications.

The agency has identified four risk

groups. Based on the agency’s

assessment of risk, persons in the first

two groups have a high enough risk that

they would definitely be better off if an

on-off switch is used to turn off their air

bag:

• Infants in rear-facing infant seats.

A rear-facing infant seat must never be

placed in the front seat unless the air

bag is turned off. If a vehicle owner

must transport an infant in the front

seat, the owner is eligible for an on-off

switch for the passenger air bag. The

owner should get an on-off switch and

turn off the air bag when the infant rides

in front.

Note: NHTSA emphasizes that air bagrelated risks for infants can be completely

avoided by placing them in the back seat.

The back seat has always been a much safer

place for children than the front seat, even

before there were any passenger air bags.

• Drivers or passengers with unusual

medical or physical conditions.

These are people who have been

advised by a physician that an air bag

poses a special risk to them because of

their condition. However, they should

not turn off their air bag unless their

physician also has advised them that

this risk is greater than what may

happen if they do turn off their air bag.

Without an air bag, and even if belted,

such persons could hit their head, neck

or chest on the steering wheel in a

crash. Medical conditions will not pose

special risks unless the conditions make

it impossible to sit 10 inches from the

air bag. Only a few conditions have that

effect. See the above discussion of the

national conference of physicians.

Persons in the two other groups of

people may be better off using an air bag

on-off switch.

• Children ages 1 to 12.

Children in this age group can be

transported safely in the front seat if

they are properly belted, they do not

lean forward, and their seat is moved all

the way back. Almost all fatally injured

children in this age range were

completely unrestrained. But children,

even when properly restrained,

sometimes sit or lean far forward. The

simple act of leaning forward to see out

of the window or to change the radio

station can place even a belted child in

danger. They may also slip out of their

shoulder belts, putting themselves at

risk. If a vehicle owner must transport

a child in the front seat, the owner is

eligible for an on-off switch for the

passenger air bag.27 Since air bag

performance differs from vehicle model

to vehicle model, the vehicle owner may
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62423

28 Drivers who think that they are currently sitting

closer than 10 inches should get a ruler and

measure the distance. Research shows that many

drivers underestimate the distance between them

and their air bags. When they actually measure the

distance, they often find that it is 10 or more inches.

29 Drivers may underestimate their ability to

change their driving position to achieve the 10-inch

distance. A recent IIHS survey indicates that only

5 percent of female drivers (approximately 2.5

percent of all drivers) normally now sit less than

10 inches away from their air bag module. Another

recent IIHS survey shows that most short-statured

female drivers (10 out of 13 women ranging in

height from 4 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 2 inches) could

adjust their driving position to achieve that 10 inch

distance in all 12 test vehicles used by IIHS. The

remaining three drivers could achieve 10 inches in

almost all of the vehicles.

30An additional safety advantage of on-off

switches will be that they, together with the ‘‘Air

Bag Off’’ telltale, will provide a permanent means

of ensuring that people will not ride in a vehicle

without knowing that an air bag has been turned

off.

wish to consult the vehicle

manufacturer for additional advice.

Note: The air bag related risks for these

children can be avoided completely by

placing them in the back seat.

• Drivers who cannot get back 10

inches.

Ideally, drivers should sit with at least

10 inches between the center of their

breastbone and the cover of their air bag.

Since the risk zone at the time of

deployment is the first 2–3 inches from

the air bag cover, sitting back 10 inches

provides a clear margin of safety. By

using their seat belts and sitting at that

distance, drivers will eliminate the risk

of serious air bag injury, and thus any

need for an on-off switch.

Very few drivers are unable to achieve

and maintain the 10-inch distance. The

vast majority of drivers already sit that

far or farther from their air bag.28 The

vast majority of those drivers who do

not now sit that far back can change

their position and achieve that distance.

(See the information brochure for advice

about changing position.) 29 Drivers

unable to get back 10 inches, even after

following that advice, should consult

their dealer or vehicle manufacturer for

additional advice or for information

regarding vehicle modifications to help

them to move back.

Drivers who cannot get back 10

inches, despite all efforts, may wish to

consider an on-off switch. However, the

nearer they can come to getting back

that distance, the less likely the air bag

will injure them and the less need there

will be to get an on-off switch. If drivers

can get back almost 10 inches, the air

bag is unlikely to seriously injure them

in a crash and they probably do not

need an on-off switch. These drivers,

plus those who cannot get back almost

10 inches, may wish to consult the

vehicle manufacturer for additional

advice since air bag performance differs

among the various vehicle models.

3. Finally, the agency plans, in

conjunction with other organizations, a

public education information campaign

to put air bag risks and benefits into

proper perspective, to encourage those

persons at special risk from current air

bags to take steps to reduce those risks

without losing the protection of their air

bags, and to promote the enactment and

effective enforcement of State laws

concerning the use of seat belts and

child restraints.

C. Changes in Circumstances Since the

NPRM Make Retrofit On-Off Switches

Preferable to Deactivation

In the January 1997 deactivation

proposal, the agency compared the

merits of deactivation to those of on-off

switches in a companion notice, i.e., a

January 1997 final rule extending the

duration of the option allowing on-off

switches for passenger air bags in

certain new vehicles. NHTSA

concluded in the preamble to the on-off

switch final rule that it was better from

a safety standpoint to selectively

deactivate the air bags after the vehicles

had been produced, in response to

specific consumer requests, than to

authorize installation of on-off switches

as standard equipment in those vehicles

when they were produced. NHTSA

placed great weight in that discussion

on the long leadtime that vehicle

manufacturers had previously said

would be needed to integrate standard

equipment on-off switches into new

vehicles and on concerns expressed by

the vehicle manufacturers that the

integration efforts would disrupt the

development of advanced air bags. In

response to an August 1996 NPRM, the

vehicle manufacturers had indicated

that development and installation of

standard equipment on-off switches for

makes and models not already equipped

with them would take at least one year.

As a practical matter, given the time

estimates from the vehicle

manufacturers regarding on-off switch

availability, deactivation was the only

readily available means for turning off

air bags in existing vehicles.

Accordingly, in issuing the NPRM, the

agency proposed to allow deactivation.

Nevertheless, it expressly requested

comment regarding on-off switches. A

wide variety of commenters responded

to that request.

The facts underlying the agency’s

comparison of the relative merits of

deactivation and on-off switches

changed dramatically after issuance of

the deactivation NPRM. Not long after

the issuance of the January 1997 NPRM,

a number of major vehicle

manufacturers began announcing that

retrofit on-off switches could be made

available at reasonable cost and in

anywhere from 2 to 6 months.

These announcements fundamentally

changed the agency’s assessment of the

relative merits of on-off switches and

deactivation. As a result of the new

information from the vehicle

manufacturers, on-off switches were

elevated from a theoretically available

alternative to an alternative that is

actually available within a relatively

short time. The new information also

indicated that retrofit on-off switches

could be made available without

disrupting the development of advanced

air bags.

D. Specifying That Retrofit On-Off

Switches Are the Only Means

Authorized Under the Exemption for

Turning Off Air Bags Is Reasonable and

Consistent With Safety

The ready availability of on-off

switches and their safety advantage over

deactivation make authorizing

deactivation both unnecessary and

undesirable. The primary source of that

safety advantage is the flexibility of onoff switches.30 With an on-off switch, an

air bag’s operational status can be

changed at the flip of a switch. The

flexibility of on-off switches gives them

considerably greater potential than

deactivation for promoting overall

safety. On-off switches allow air bags to

be turned off and on as needed,

according to whether an air bag creates

risks for particular occupants.

In addition to making it possible to

accommodate the different risks faced

by different people, on-off switches can

likewise accommodate the changing

needs, knowledge and attitudes of

people. For example, a child will be at

increasingly less risk as he or she grows

older. In addition, a person whose

attention is focused now on the

perceived risk of an air bag fatality if he

or she does not turn the air bag off may

later recognize that there is a much

greater risk of serious injury or death if

he or she does not leave the air bag on.

Finally, subsequent owners of existing

vehicles may have no need to turn off

their air bags. The ability of on-off

switches to allow vehicle owners to

respond to these changes will have

important implications for the

percentage of occasions on which air

bags are able to deploy when needed.

NHTSA recognizes that the opinion

survey conducted by IIHS in January

indicates that there is apparently

significant public interest in on-off

switches. The agency is aware also of
62424 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

31There are other reasons for discounting the

results of this early 1997 IIHS survey as a basis for

predicting how many people will obtain on-off

switches. In asking the respondents whether they

wanted on-off switches, the surveyors did not ask

whether the respondents were aware of a number

of key factors that might heavily influence the

extent of their desire for an on-off switch. Further,

the surveyors did not take the alternative approach

of informing the respondents of these factors and

then asking them whether learning any or all of this

information influenced their desire for an on-off

switch. Based on the factors that affect how the

public perceives risk (see footnote 35), three

undiscussed factors in particular seem key: (1) most

people would be making significant safety tradeoffs

if they turned off their air bags; (2) most people

could control and virtually eliminate the risk of

serious air bag injuries by changing their driving

and riding habits instead of physically changing

their vehicle; and (3) the cost of an on-off switch

is not insubstantial. A survey by the Harvard School

of Public Health’s Center for Risk Analysis in late

February and early March had similar

shortcomings. The absence of these factors from

these surveys in part simply reflects the fact that

there was less of a consensus in early 1997 about

the air bag-related risks and the most appropriate

measures for reducing them. Nevertheless, their

absence is a concern since the survey results

themselves may not only measure (or at least

attempt to measure) existing public attitudes

regarding air bags and on-off switches, but also

potentially affect future public attitudes regarding

those matters.

NHTSA expects that when media reports and the

agency’s information brochure make the public

more aware of the safety tradeoffs and available

means of controlling and reducing risk, the level of

public interest in obtaining on-off switches will fall.

Interest is expected to fall further in response to the

public education campaign to be conducted the

agency and other organizations about air bags.

32The difference between the new IIHS survey

and the January IIHS survey regarding the level of

general interest in on-off switches for passenger air

bags appears to demonstrate the influence which

media accounts of recent air bag fatalities can have

on survey results. The January survey, which was

taken when media accounts of a particular child

fatality were relatively fresh in the public mind,

indicated that 67 percent of the respondents were

generally interested in an on-off switch for

passenger air bags. The August survey was not

closely preceded by similar accounts. Its figure for

general interest in passenger air bag on-off switches

was 26 percent.

33 John F. Ross, Risk: Where Do Real Dangers Lie?

Smithsonian, November 1995, at 42. See also

Marcia Angell, Overdosing on Health Risks, New

York Times, May 4, 1997, Magazine Section, which,

in part, notes that the media are not the only

players that affect public risk perception; Michael

Ryan, What Is Really Risky? Parade Magazine, June

15, 1997, which discusses a recent Harvard study

concerning differences between the risk perceptions

of scientists and the general public; and Matthew

Wald, Freewheeling Freedom; Appalled by Risk

Except in the Car, New York Times, June 14, 1997,

section 4, Week in Review. For a related account

of the difficulty in obtaining comparative

information on risks and tradeoffs, see David

Shaw’s three-part series, Living Scared. Why Do the

Media Make Life Seem So Risky? in the Los Angeles

Times, September 11–13, 1994.

IIHS’ suggestion that its January 1997

survey indicates that if the agency

specifies on-off switches as the means

for turning off air bags, more people

may get on-off switches than would

have had their air bags deactivated.

However, there are several reasons for

believing that the January 1997 survey

substantially overstates the number of

people who will obtain on-off switches

under this final rule. First, and

foremost, the agency’s decisions to

require agency approval of each request

and to limit eligibility for on-off

switches to those vehicle owners who

can certify membership in a particular

risk group will significantly and

appropriately limit the availability of

on-off switches to persons with a real

safety need for them. Further, the

agency does not believe that a

respondent’s expressed interest in on-off

switches in that January 1997 telephone

public opinion survey will necessarily

translate into a decision in January 1998

or thereafter to go to a dealer or repair

business and pay to obtain an on-off

switch. In addition, a consumer’s

decision to acquire and even to use the

on-off switch does not mean that the

consumer will continue to use the

switch. The survey methods and results

reflect not only the underlying safety

problem, but also the atmosphere in

which the survey was taken. That

atmosphere was colored heavily by

those media accounts that focused on an

important, but limited, portion of the

full story about air bags. Some of that

same narrow focus can be seen in the

survey.31

NHTSA recognizes that a new survey

by IIHS cures some of the shortcomings

of its January 1997 survey.32 The new

survey, conducted in August 1997,

informed respondents about the cost of

deactivation and on-off switches, the

benefits of air bags and the steps that

can be taken to minimize or even

eliminate air bag risks for the vast

majority of people. While the new

survey suggests that many people are

interested in on-off switches, it also

shows that providing people with even

minimal facts regarding these matters

substantially reduced the extent of that

interest. Before the respondents were

provided with such information, 27

percent of the respondents indicated

that they wanted on-off switches for

driver air bags and 26 percent wanted

them for passenger air bags. After

receiving the information, these

percentages fell to 12 percent and 16

percent, respectively. As noted below,

the agency believes that a sustained,

comprehensive public education

campaign would reduce the level of

interest in obtaining on-off switches

even further.

Since the percentage of respondents

to both IIHS surveys who expressed

general interest in turning off their air

bags far exceeds the percentage of the

population at any significant risk, it is

evident that the risks of air bag fatalities

are significantly overestimated by many

people. It is equally apparent that the

misperception of risk regarding air bagrelated fatalities is leading some

consumers to insufficiently appreciate

the risks of turning off an air bag. The

agency expects that the requirement that

owners certify that they have read the

information brochure as well as the

public education campaign will lead to

a more balanced view of the risks

associated with current air bag designs,

and that the requirement for agency

approval and for owner certification of

risk group membership will

appropriately limit the requesting of onoff switches.

The misperception of the risks in

everyday life, whether related to air bags

or other problems, arises from a variety

of factors. An article published in

Smithsonian, the magazine of the

Smithsonian Institution, addressed

some of the factors that make assessing

and comparing risks difficult for

scientists and engineers, and even

harder for the average person without

access to all available information and

analytical methods:

In a landmark test in 1980, a group of

psychologists asked a representative

sampling of the populace to rank 30 activities

and technologies by risk; then they compared

the results with rankings assigned by a panel

of risk-assessment experts. In places, the two

groups agreed, such as on the risk of motor

vehicles, placed number one by the experts

and number two by the public. But on others,

there were large discrepancies: the public

rated nuclear power as their number one risk,

whereas the experts ranked it as a lowly

number 20. Experts ranked x-rays as number

7, while the man-in-the-street saw them as a

number 22. What, the risk-communication

scientists next asked, was influencing the

public’s perception of risk?

For starters, they found that the public

responds differently to voluntary and

involuntary risks. You and I are willing to

tolerate far greater risks when it is our own

doing, such as smoking cigarettes or climbing

mountains. But if the risk is something we

can’t control, such as pesticides on food or

radiation from a nuclear power plant, we

protest, even if the threat is minimal.

Second, we tend to overestimate the

probability of splashy and dreadful deaths

and underestimate common but far more

deadly risks. . . .

Yet another factor about how we rank risks

revolves around whether or not the risk is

perceived as ‘‘natural. * * *’’ 33

As the author also noted, our problem

in making everyday decisions about the

risks we face is more difficult than

simply assessing a single risk correctly.

We’re also realizing that the trade-offs are

not always so clear. Reducing risk in one area
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62425

34 Ibid.

35The requirement for a telltale light that

indicates if the air bab is not operational will also

eliminate the possibility that occupants will

unknowingly ride without the protection of an air

bag.

may very well increase the risk in

another.* * * 34

The actions being announced by

NHTSA in this final rule will have the

effect, directly or indirectly, of giving

the public a sense of control over the

risks associated with current air bags,

and restoring objectivity to the public’s

perception of those risks. As a result,

whatever the extent of the public’s

initial inclination to acquire and use onoff switches, these actions will thereby

reduce that inclination. The air bag

deaths are not random. Further, the risk

of death is highly influenced by

behavior. Through informing the public

about how the vast majority of people

can eliminate or substantially minimize

any risk through behavioral changes and

how the rest can eliminate the risk

through the use of an on-off switch, the

agency will give the public a

significantly increased sense of control

over the risk of air bag fatalities.

Through these same means, the agency

will inform the public about the steps

that they can take to reduce, and thus

control, this risk without turning off air

bags.

Together, these actions will put air

bag risks into proper perspective, enable

those truly at risk to reduce or eliminate

their risk, and calm the fears of others.

As the public comes to appreciate more

fully just how limited and controllable

the risks are, interest in obtaining and

using on-off switches to turn off air bags

is expected to decline. Likewise, any

inappropriate use of on-off switches will

be reduced to a minimum. As noted

above, the August 1997 IIHS survey

demonstrates that giving the public even

the barest facts reduces the level of

interest in on-off switches. NHTSA

believes that a sustained public

education campaign which includes

comprehensive reading materials,

explanatory graphics and video clips

will reduce the level of interest even

further.

NHTSA notes also that some company

and group commenters argued that onoff switches would be misused. They

were particularly concerned that air

bags would be turned off for people who

are not at risk of serious air bag injuries

and who would benefit from air bag

protection. The agency recognizes that

misuse is a possibility. However, the

agency does not have any information

indicating that there is a misuse

problem associated with the 1.3 million

vehicles equipped with an original

equipment manufacturer (OEM) on-off

switch for the passenger air bag.

Further, the agency believes that any

problem of misuse will be small,

particularly given the requirements for

agency approval and for vehicle owners

to certify the reading of the information

brochure and risk group membership.

The public education campaign will

also help minimize that problem.

Because of these factors, the people who

submit request forms for on-off switches

will be aware of the dangers of misusing

on-off switches by leaving them off

when the vehicle is being used by

people who are not at risk of being

seriously injured by an air bag.35

Further, any small possibility of

misuse will be more than offset by the

fact that the use of an on-off switch

instead of deactivation to turn off air

bags will make it much more likely that

air bags will be on for those people who

will benefit from them. Compared to

retrofit on-off switches, deactivation is

an inflexible, overly broad, and

essentially permanent method of

turning off air bags. With deactivation,

the consequence is universal, i.e., ‘‘off

for one, off for all.’’ Deactivation does

turn off an air bag for those who are at

risk and need the air bag to be off, and

thereby can prevent air bag fatalities.

However, it accomplishes this only at

the price of sacrificing protection for

those who could benefit from that

protection. The net effect of widespread

deactivation would likely be even

greater loss of life. Further, another

likely consequence of deactivation is

permanency, i.e., ‘‘once off, forever off.’’

In most instances, a consumer is unable,

on his or her own, to change the

operational status of a deactivated air

bag to suit the needs of occupants on a

particular trip. Likewise, a consumer

cannot go to a dealer or repair business

each time that the operational status of

an air bag needs to be adjusted to meet

the needs of the occupants on a

particular trip. Given the time and

expense involved, relatively few of the

vehicle owners who have their bags

deactivated are expected to make a

return trip to the dealer or repair

business to have them reactivated when

needs or attitudes change, or when the

vehicle is sold.

E. Case-by-Case Agency Authorizations

of Retrofit On-Off Switch Installation,

Based on Vehicle Owner Certification of

Risk Group Membership and on

Informed Consumer Decisionmaking, Is

Reasonable and Consistent with Safety

As noted above, this rulemaking is

being conducted under section

30122(c)(1) of Title 49, U.S.C., which

provides that the Secretary of

Transportation may prescribe

regulations ‘‘to exempt a person from

* * * [the make inoperative

prohibition] * * * if the Secretary

decides the exemption is consistent

with motor vehicle safety and section

30101 of this title.’’ Section 30101 sets

forth the purpose and policy of Chapter

301, ‘‘Motor Vehicle Safety,’’ of Title 49.

The section states that, among other

things, ‘‘(t)he purpose of this chapter is

to reduce traffic accidents and deaths

and injuries resulting from traffic

accidents.’’ This final rule will promote

safety by reducing the fatalities caused

by current air bags, particularly in

existing vehicles, and promoting the

long run acceptability of the concept of

air bags.

This final rule will achieve these

safety goals by authorizing persons at

risk to obtain retrofit on-off switches,

based on a combination of informed

decisionmaking, owner certification of

risk group membership, and agency

approval of each request. To promote

informed decisionmaking, the agency

will, in conjunction with other

organizations (ABSC, AAA, NSC, and

IIHS), conduct a public education

campaign explaining that most people

are not at risk and that even among

people at risk, not all people need

obtain and use on-off switches to turn

off their air bags. The agency will

discuss who is at risk from air bags, who

is not at risk, and why. It will advise

consumers of a series of easy steps that

will reduce this risk to a point that

obtaining an on-off switch is

unnecessary for all but a relatively small

number of people. Only if those steps

are insufficient should motorists

consider seeking an on-off switch. These

messages will be reinforced and echoed

in an agency information brochure.

Further, the request form provides a

place where each vehicle owner

desiring an on-off switch must certify

that he or she has read the information

brochure.

To obtain a switch that turns a driver

air bag on and off, vehicle owners must

also certify on the request form that the

owner or a driver of their vehicle is a

member of a particular driver risk

group. Similarly, to obtain an on-off

switch for a passenger air bag, vehicle

owners must certify on the request form

that they or a passenger of their vehicle

is a member of a particular passenger

risk group. If an owner wants on-off

switches for both air bags, the owner

must make separate certifications on the

same request form, one for the driver air

bag and another for the passenger air

bag.
62426 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

36Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of

Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1345 (D.C. Cir.

1979).

37 GM suggested that the agency select and

describe the most frequent circumstances

warranting an on-off switch and develop a ‘‘ * * *

form letter that owners could complete (i.e.,

checking the appropriate one of the circumstances

specified on the form), sign and submit to NHTSA.’’

As to ‘‘* * * requests that do not fit under one of

the defined circumstances * * *,’’ owners could

still submit them‘‘* * * to NHTSA in non-form

letters that detail the reasons for the request.’’ GM

apparently contemplated that the agency would

quickly examine the form letters and concentrate on

the non-form requests. GM described the agency’s

review function as follows: ‘‘The agency could

process requests made with the form letter in an

expedited manner, and focus attention principally

on the non-form requests.’’ (Emphasis added.)

NHTSA believes that requiring

owners to certify that they have read the

information brochure and that they or a

user of their vehicle is a member of a

risk group and requiring that each

request be approved by the agency is

justified by the current climate of

heightened, and exaggerated, concern

about air bag fatalities. These

requirements will help limit the

availability of on-off switches to persons

with a genuine safety need for them.

Having to make the certifications will

help induce consumers to read the

information brochure, separate fact from

fiction, and avoid trading one safety risk

for another, larger safety risk. The

necessity of obtaining agency approval

will induce an even greater level of care

and caution in requesting an on-off

switch. As the public education

campaign moves forward, media

coverage expands to cover the safety

benefits, risks and tradeoffs associated

with air bags more broadly, public and

private efforts result in increased seat

belt use rates, and air bags with

advanced attributes start to appear in

new vehicles, the public will

increasingly appreciate the low risk of

air bag fatalities and the steps they can

take, short of turning their air bags off,

to reduce that risk. The requirement for

vehicle owners to certify that they have

read the information brochure and fill

out the request form will also help

ensure that any decision to seek and use

on-off switches is a thoughtful,

responsible one.

Allowing vehicle owners to obtain onoff switches, based on risk group

certification and on informed

decisionmaking, and subject to agency

approval, will enhance safety because it

will speed the reduction of serious and

fatal injuries related to air bag

deployment. It will also enhance the

public acceptance of air bags. Public

acceptance of motor vehicle safety

technology is not only a relevant

consideration in assessing the

practicability of a Federal motor vehicle

safety standard,36 but also it is vital to

the long run success of any vehicle

safety program and to the effectiveness

of all types of safety equipment.

Making retrofit on-off switches

available will promote public

acceptance of air bags by providing

those people at risk with a means of

eliminating their risk. NHTSA

anticipates members of the public will,

with their concerns thus allayed, be

increasingly receptive to the public

education campaign concerning air bag

safety and seat belt use. The agency

anticipates that the public will also

increasingly come to appreciate the

limited nature of the risk, the factors

that create that risk, the limited number

of people affected by those factors, and

the ways in which those people can

reduce and even eliminate the risks

without sacrificing the benefits of air

bag protection. The public will come to

appreciate also that turning off air bags

will make the vast majority of people

less safe, not more safe. As a result, the

demand for retrofit on-off switches, and

the inclination to use them to turn off

air bags, will decrease.

Making retrofit on-off switches

available will also have other salutary

effects that are consistent with motor

vehicle safety and section 30101. As

noted elsewhere, the agency is mindful

of the surveys by IIHS and others

showing that the percentage of

respondents interested in deactivation

or on-off switches exceeds the

percentage of the general population

that is at risk. Availability of on-off

switches will minimize the likelihood

that consumers, potentially including

consumers not actually at risk, will

obtain unauthorized deactivations with

the negative consequences discussed

above. It will also lessen the possibility

of owners attempting to deactivate their

air bags on their own. While owners are

not prohibited by Federal law from

removing or disabling safety features

and equipment installed pursuant to

NHTSA’s safety standards, attempts by

inexperienced people to deactivate air

bags or install on-off switches could

result in serious injuries to those

people. Further, whether performed by

commercial entities or the owners

themselves, these illicit deactivations

would not only be inflexible and

essentially permanent, but they could

also be invisible to current users and

future owners, since they might not be

accompanied by any labeling or

recordkeeping.

NHTSA recognizes that the final rule

will not allow installation of on-off

switches for people who are concerned

about their air bags, but who are not at

risk and thus cannot certify that they

are, or a user of their vehicle is, in a risk

group. It would not be consistent with

safety for the agency to authorize these

people to obtain on-off switches and to

turn off their air bags, since their doing

so would make them significantly less

safe. However, action is needed to

address the concerns of these people.

The agency is seeking to alleviate their

concerns by providing the public with

information about who really is at risk,

and why. The information brochure and

public education campaign are the key

elements of that effort.

Before deciding to limit the

availability of on-off switches to

members of risk groups and to allow

installation of on-off switches only after

prior approval by the agency of each

request for switches, the agency

considered a spectrum of possible

approaches, listed below in decreasing

degree of administrative complexity: (1)

full documentation by the vehicle

owner of the facts establishing

membership in a particular risk group

specified by the agency and case-by-case

agency review of the owner’s request

and documentation before the agency

authorizes installation of an on-off

switch, (2) case-by-case agency approval

of the owner’s request (unaccompanied

by documentation of the underlying

facts) to confirm that he or she has

properly certified membership in a

particular risk group specified by the

agency before it authorizes installation

of an on-off switch, (3) presentation by

owner to a dealer or repair business of

his or her certification of having read

the information brochure and of

membership in a particular risk group

specified by the agency, plus postinstallation submission by the dealers

and repair businesses of the certification

to agency, (4) presentation by owner to

a dealer or repair business of his or her

certification of having read the agency

information brochure and retention of

the certification document by dealer or

repair business of certification, and (5)

presentation by owner to dealer or

repair business of his or her simple

request. The second approach was

suggested in a comment by GM,37 the

fourth was proposed by the agency in

January, and the fifth was suggested in

a comment by the Competitive

Enterprise Institute (CEI).

In developing the fourth approach,

i.e., its January 1997 proposal, the

agency indicated that it had considered

the relative merits of two alternatives:

continuing case-by-case agency

approval of individual requests from

persons seeking authorization to turn off
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62427

38The agency’s decision to require that vehicle

owners be initially authorized by the agency to

obtain a on-off switch moots the arguments by some

commenters, most notably GM and the Association

of International Automobile Manufacturers, that the

agency can exempt individuals on a case-by-case

basis, but lacks authority to exempt classes of

people. To reach this conclusion, those commenters

attributed unwarranted significance to the use of

the singular ‘‘person’’ in the statutory exemption

provision. Since the exemption authority runs to

dealers and repair businesses, not to consumers,

these commenters apparently contemplated that the

agency issue a separate exemption to each dealer or

repair business and perhaps even issue a separate

exemption for each owner who desires a retrofit

cutoff switch.

There is no reason to believe that Congress

intended to limit exemptions to ones granted to

specific individuals. In the agency’s view, the

exemption provision can reasonably be read to

permit an exemption based on classes of people.

The singular includes the plural, absent contrary

statutory language or purpose. Section 30122

neither contains any language nor has any purpose

that would preclude reading ‘‘person’’ in the plural.

NHTSA notes that similar use of the singular in 15

U.S.C. 1402(e), the statutory predecessor to 49

U.S.C. 30118(a) regarding the making of a defect

and noncompliance determination concerning a

motor vehicle or replacement equipment, has

repeatedly been judicially interpreted to permit

NHTSA to make determinations regarding classes of

vehicles or equipment. Section 30118(a) was

enacted in the same public law, Pub. L. No. 93–492,

that contained the make inoperative prohibition.

39NHTSA notes that some proponents of prior

agency approval of on-off switch requests credted

the introduction of streamlined practices and

increased use of information technologies with

being the key factors leading to substantial

decreases this year in the agency’s average

processing time of air bag deactivation requests.

Those parties further suggested that use of the same

information technologies will enable the agency to

process on-off switch requests with equal speed.

While the introduction of those practices and

technologies increased the efficiency of the agency’s

processing of the deactivation requests, by far the

most important factor was the steady and

substantive decline in the number of deactivation

requests. The volume fell from a high of 400

requests per week in April and May to 100 requests

per week in September.

their air bags based on a demonstrated

safety need, or providing an information

brochure informing vehicle owners

about the factors that create risk and

who is at risk, requiring owners to

certify that they had read the brochure,

and then letting them make their own

decision. Given the complexity and

time-consuming nature of the process

then being used by the agency for

processing deactivation requests, the

agency proposed the latter alternative,

which would have allowed any person

to choose to deactivate, without having

to demonstrate or claim a particular

safety need, and without having to

obtain the agency’s approval. However,

under the proposal, applicants would

have had to submit a written

authorization to the dealer or repair

business performing the deactivation

and certify that they had read an agency

information brochure explaining the

consequences of having an air bag

deactivated.

Nevertheless, NHTSA requested

views regarding the feasibility and

advisability of limiting eligibility for

deactivation to persons in specified risk

groups. Specifically, the agency asked—

• Should deactivation of air bags be

allowed at the owner’s option in all

cases or should deactivation be limited

to situations in which death or serious

injury might reasonably be expected to

occur?

• Would the administrative details

involved in establishing and

implementing limitations on eligibility

overly complicate the availability of

deactivation?

The agency has decided that it is

necessary to go beyond the fourth and

even the third approaches and adopt

provisions that give greater assurance

that on-off switches are installed only

when it is consistent with the interests

of safety to do so. The complexities

associated with such additional

provisions are outweighed by other

factors. Prior approval of requests for

switches will encourage greater

attention to the importance of on-off

switches being requested and used only

for people whose safety would be

enhanced by turning off their air bag. As

was noted by many of the group and

company commenters, consistency with

safety is the basic requirement of the

statutory provision permitting the

agency to issue exemptions from the

make inoperative prohibition. Safety is

also NHTSA’s primary focus and

responsibility under Chapter 301. Prior

approval will also enable the agency to

monitor directly, from the very

beginning, the implementation of the

regulation and the effectiveness of its

regulation and the associated

educational materials in promoting

informed decisionmaking about air bag

on-off switches.38

The final rule supplements the

provision regarding informed

decisionmaking by requiring that

vehicle owners desiring on-off switches

certify that the owner or a user of their

vehicle is a member of a particular

safety risk group. The necessity of

certifying membership in a particular

risk group will induce greater care on

the part of vehicle owners who are

considering authorizing the installation

of an on-off switch. NHTSA notes, as it

did in its proposal, that people not in a

risk group would be less safe, not more

safe, if they turned off their air bags. The

further necessity for obtaining agency

approval for an owner’s request will

induce vehicle owners to exercise even

greater caution and to consider even

more carefully whether they are at risk

and, if so, whether they should request

a switch.

A secondary reason for the decision to

require agency approval of owner

requests for on-off switches is the belief

that the task of reviewing the owner

request forms is more properly

performed by NHTSA instead of the

dealers and repair businesses. This

belief became decisive with the addition

of the provision for risk group

certification. Determining eligibility for

exemptions from statutory requirements

and prohibitions is traditionally and

most suitably a governmental function.

NHTSA recognizes that the decision

to require prior agency approval of each

request will add increased cost and

administrative complexity to the

process of obtaining on-off switches and

is accordingly taking steps to streamline

the approval process. The form has been

designed to allow for a speedy review.

To minimize any disruption of normal

agency activities, the agency will

contract out for the performance of the

review process. The agency will ensure

that word and data processing

technologies are used to establish

efficient processes for reviewing the onoff switch request forms and recording

data from them.39

NHTSA also rejected the first

approach which was more

administratively complex and

cumbersome than the final rule in that

it would have required each vehicle

owner to document the facts underlying

his or her claim of risk group

membership. NHTSA believes that a

requirement for documenting risk group

membership would be unduly

burdensome and impracticable for

vehicle owners. For example,

documenting the necessity for carrying

children in the front seat would be time

consuming and difficult, if not

impossible. Would a vehicle owner

whose family has too many young

children to place all of them in the back

seat have to submit the birth certificates

of each child? Would a parent who car

pools children to soccer games have to

submit affidavits from the parents of the

other children? And would a driver

unable to maintain the proper distance

from his or her steering wheel have to

submit photographs showing the driver

holding a ruler? Finally, the delays

under such an approach might create

unsafe conditions, either by inducing

people to seek illegal deactivations or by

simply extending the time that people

must drive their vehicles without means

for eliminating the risks for people in

risk groups.

NHTSA also rejected the fifth

approach, suggested by CEI, which
62428 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

40However, if on-off switches become available

for a vehicle make and model from an independent

aftermarket manufacturer, but not the vehicle

manufacturer, the agency will continue to authorize

deactivation for that make and model. While the

agency believes that on-off switches are superior to

deactivation from a safety standpoint, it will

continue to authorize deactivation in this limited

circumstance in view of the agency’s greater

difficulty in tracking the availability of on-off

switches from aftermarket manufacturers and the

lace of a mechanism for testing the performance of

an on-off switch as installed in a particular vehicle.

41The agency is aware that the incidence of air

bag facilities is not the same for all manufacturers

and that some manufacturers have indicated that

they may not make on-off switches available.

NHTSA notes that its exemption authority under

section 30122 does not permit it to require

manufacturers to make these on-off switches

available.

would let people obtain an on-off switch

without even requiring that they first

read the agency information brochure so

that they could make a fully informed

decision. CEI also suggested that air

bags should be optional instead of

required equipment. This suggestion is

premised primarily on the shortcomings

of current air bag designs. Making air

bags optional is inconsistent with safety.

It is also inconsistent with the ISTEA,

which mandates air bags. Further, the

rationale underlying CEI’s suggestion is

akin to the rationale unsuccessfully

used by this agency in the early 1980’s

to rescind the automatic restraint

requirements adopted in the mid 1970’s.

The agency rescinded those

requirements because the vehicle

manufacturers chose to comply with

them by means (detachable automatic

seat belts) that were potentially

ineffective and might not have produced

significant safety benefits, instead of by

more effective means (either

nondetachable automatic seat belts or

air bags) that were available to the

vehicle manufacturers. The U. S.

Supreme Court unanimously concluded

that the appropriate regulatory response

of the agency under the Vehicle Safety

Act to ineffective or undesirable design

choices under the automatic restraint

requirements should not be simply to

rescind those requirements, but first to

consider the alternative of amending the

requirements to preclude those choices.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 403 U.S. 29 (1983).

Similarly, the judgment that current air

bag designs do not provide an optimal

level of safety is not a sufficient reason

to undercut or negate the Congressional

mandate for air bags. Instead, the

appropriate short term response is to

allow the installation of on-off switches

so that air bags can be readily turned off

for people who are actually at risk from

current air bags, as well as to require

new labeling and expedite the

depowering of air bags. Ultimately, the

solution is to ensure that the

manufacturers introduce advanced air

bag designs.

F. Continued Use of Prosecutorial

Discretion for Case-by-Case

Authorizations of Air Bag Deactivation

Until Retrofit On-Off Switches Become

Available

Between now and January 19, 1998,

the date on which on-off switch

installation may begin, NHTSA will

continue its current practice of using its

prosecutorial discretion to grant

requests for deactivating the air bags in

all vehicle makes and models. This will

be done on a case-by-case basis in a

limited set of circumstances, e.g., those

in which certain medical conditions

suggest that deactivation is appropriate.

The agency will continue to limit the

circumstances because of the inflexible

and relatively permanent nature of

deactivation.

After January 19, NHTSA will cease

granting deactivation requests for those

vehicle makes and models for which the

vehicle manufacturer makes on-off

switches available.40 NHTSA expects

that most vehicle manufacturers will

promptly make on-off switches available

for most vehicle makes and models.41

Vehicle owners can consult with dealers

about the availability of such switches.

As on-off switches become available

from a vehicle manufacturer for a

specific make and model, NHTSA will

cease granting deactivation requests for

that make and model. Owners of the

make and model can then fill out

request forms and send them to NHTSA

for approval. If on-off switches are

available both from the vehicle

manufacturer and from an independent

aftermarket manufacturer, a vehicle

owner who obtains an authorization

letter from the agency for a switch can

choose to have the on-off switch

installed by either a dealer or a repair

business.

Owners of vehicle makes and models

for which the vehicle manufacturer has

not made available an on-off switch may

have several options after January 19,

1998. They can write to NHTSA for

authorization to deactivate their air

bags. The agency will continue to grant

such requests indefinitely under the

same criteria that the agency is currently

using in making such grants. Owners

can also consult with a repair business

to determine if an aftermarket parts

manufacturer has made an on-off switch

available for the owner’s particular

make/model. If such an on-off switch is

available, these consumers could fill out

a request form, send it to the agency,

and ask it for authorization to have an

on-off switch installed.

Since the agency will continue to

authorize deactivation at least until

January 19, and since some vehicle

owners may have been delaying

submitting a request for deactivation in

anticipation of the issuance of this rule

with an immediate effective date,

NHTSA is providing below an updated

explanation of its procedure and criteria

for reviewing and granting deactivation

requests. This will help vehicle owners

understand the limited circumstances in

which NHTSA will be authorizing

deactivations. Those circumstances

have been modified to reflect the

issuance of the physicians’ report on

medical conditions. The explanation

will also inform the public about the

nature of the information that NHTSA

needs from vehicle owners to make

appropriate decisions about the

deactivation requests.

G. Other Issues

1. Request Form

NHTSA is requiring owners who want

an on-off switch to submit a filled out

request form and obtain agency

approval before they can have an on-off

switch installed. Most commenters who

addressed the issue supported the use of

a request form. As revised in this final

rule, the form serves three major

purposes.

First, the request form provides the

agency, and the dealer or repair

business, with a measure of assurance

that the person requesting the on-off

switch is the person with authority to

authorize the installation of a switch.

The dealer or repair business may, in

addition, require further proof of

ownership or authority. However, the

necessity of submitting a signed request

form on which the signer of the form

must claim, subject to 18 U.S.C. 1001,

ownership of the vehicle to be modified

should help forestall installation

requests by persons other than the

owner of a vehicle.

Second, as noted above, the form

reinforces the value of the information

brochure by requiring the owner to

certify that the owner has read the

brochure and that the owner or a user

of the vehicle is a member of a risk

group listed on the brochure. In

response to the concern expressed by

several commenters that, partly because

of the complexity of the subject matter

involved, owners would not read the

proposed information brochure, NHTSA

has changed the brochure to make it

more customer-friendly.

Third, the request form is intended to

make the owner understand that he or

she is responsible for the consequences

of the decision to install, and later to
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62429

use, the on-off switch. To that end, the

form includes statements that the owner

is aware of the safety risks and

consequences of turning off an air bag.

The agency will begin processing of

request forms on December 18, 1997. If

a form is submitted before that date, it

will be given the same priority as a form

submitted after that date. Accordingly,

there will be no advantage to submitting

forms early.

2. Dealer and Repair Business Liability

To address the anticipated concerns

of motor vehicle dealers, repair

businesses and others regarding liability

issues associated with turning off air

bags, the agency proposed making the

decision of vehicle owners to obtain onoff switches dependent upon informed

decisionmaking, acknowledgment of the

adverse safety consequences of turning

air bags and execution of a limited

standardized waiver in the proposed

authorization form. The waiver would

have stated that the owner’s act of

authorizing a deactivation would waive

any claim or cause of action that the

owner might have against the dealer or

repair business by virtue of the fact that

the air bag had been deactivated. A

number of commenters questioned the

efficacy of any such waiver, asserting

that it would not apply to other possible

vehicle occupants, such as family

members or friends of the owner or to

future owners and their family members

and friends. Several vehicle

manufacturers expressed concern that

the waiver did not extend to actions and

claims involving vehicle manufacturers.

One commenter stated that only

legislation could provide effective relief

from liability risks.

NHTSA believes that the liability

risks have been essentially eliminated

and that those risks should not interfere

with the implementation of this

exemption. First, under this final rule,

dealers and repair businesses will play

no role in determining whether vehicle

owners qualify for the installation of onoff switches. Those parties will have no

involvement in the process until the

vehicle owners contact them with

agency authorization letters in hand.

Second, in recognition of the dealers’

and repair businesses’ concerns,

NHTSA has switched from an

authorization form to a request form and

included a statement alerting vehicle

owners that dealers and repair

businesses may condition their

agreement to install an on-off switch

upon the owner’s signing of a liability

waiver. Owners desiring an on-off

switch must acknowledge that

possibility by marking the box next to

that statement. This will facilitate the

efforts of dealers and repair businesses

to obtain waivers from owners.

Upon reviewing its proposal and the

public comments, the agency decided

not to include a standardized waiver in

the request form. NHTSA agrees that the

proposed waiver would not have

covered all possible litigants. Further,

the agency is concerned about state-tostate variations in the law regarding the

precise language that is sufficient to

waive a claim even by the vehicle

owner. Those variations could

undermine the value of any

standardized waiver. Moreover, NHTSA

is concerned that adoption of a

standardized waiver might give some

dealers and repair businesses false

assurances of protection from liability in

all states and in all cases. Finally,

NHTSA believes that, to the extent

dealers want vehicle owners to sign a

waiver before they will install an on-off

switch, this is an issue between them

and vehicle owners. By taking this

position regarding waivers, the agency

believes that dealers and repair

businesses will be in a better position to

craft individualized waivers that reflect

the law of the State in which they

operate.

The agency’s decision not to include

a waiver moots the requests of some

commenters to expand the proposed

waiver to cover claims against vehicle

manufacturers, distributors and

employers who operate fleets. This final

rule places no limitation on efforts by

those parties to seek waivers from

vehicle owners. Vehicle manufacturers

can work together with their dealers to

develop a waiver that covers both.

Further, no implication should be

drawn from this decision that the

general concept of seeking of such

waivers is in any way inappropriate. To

the contrary, it reflects NHTSA’s belief

that any waiver is more appropriately a

decision between the vehicle owner and

the dealer or repair business. Dealers

and repair businesses may condition

their installation of on-off switches

upon the making of waivers by vehicle

owners. Employers that provide fleet

vehicles to their employees may write

their own waivers and condition any

installation of on-off switches on the

employees’ signing those waivers.

Third, NHTSA believes that the

various provisions included in the final

rule regarding informed decisionmaking

and risk group membership have the

additional effect of significantly

reducing the liability concerns of the

dealers and repair businesses.

Fourth, the agency’s decision to

restrict the means of turning off air bags

under the exemption adopted in this

final rule to on-off switches

substantially increases the likelihood

that air bags will be turned on and

protect those persons not in a risk

group. One concern with allowing

deactivation as proposed in the NPRM

was that a deactivated air bag would not

deploy in situations in which

deployment would save lives. This

concern was particularly great with

respect to the friends and family of

vehicle owners and the subsequent

purchasers of vehicles with deactivated

air bags. The presence of on-off switches

in the clearly marked ‘‘off’’ position

and/or the illumination of their

indicator lights will be readily obvious

to all front seat occupants, largely

eliminating the concern about

uninformed vehicle occupants and

owners. In addition, the provisions

requiring that owners read a government

information brochure warning about the

dangers of turning off air bags and that

the owners expressly acknowledge those

dangers should have the effect of

reducing liability concerns.

There are additional reasons why the

agency’s decision to specify on-off

switches will reduce any potential

liability of manufacturers, dealers, and

repair businesses. Under the

deactivation proposal in the NPRM, it

would have been the dealer or repair

business itself that turned off the air

bag. Subsequent purchasers might not

know that an air bag has been turned

off. In contrast, with on-off switches, no

air bag will be turned off except by the

hand of the owner or another user of the

owner’s vehicle. The last critical action

or inaction that determines whether a

vehicle’s air bags will deploy in a crash

is that of an occupant of that vehicle

who has chosen whether the air bags are

on or off. This is just as much true if the

vehicle is owned by a subsequent

purchaser as if it is still owned by the

person who authorized the installation

of the on-off switch.

The agency has not added a

statement, requested by the National

Association of Independent Insurers,

that the obtaining or using of on-off

switches may affect insurance

premiums, or that it is the owner’s

responsibility to report the installation

of an on-off switch to the insurance

carrier. NHTSA wishes to maintain a

strict safety orientation to the request

form, and keep the paperwork to a

minimum. Further, these are matters

between insurers and their customers.

An insurer can require its customers to

notify it of on-off switch installation or

attach whatever conditions it deems

appropriate to continuing coverage of

vehicles with on-off switches.
62430 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

42NHTSA notes, however, the focus groups

expressed a clear desire for extensive and detailed

information about air bag safety and on-off switches

to increase their understanding and aid their

decisionmaking. Accordingly, the agency has not

shortened the information brochure as urged by

some commenters. It has, however, attempted to

provide that information in a simple, readily

understandable form. As printed by the agency, the

information brochure will be supplemented with

various graphics.

43 GPO Access is a service of the U.S. Government

Printing Office and is available directly as a

subscription, or free through participating Federal

Depository Libraries.

3. Information Brochure

In response to the commenters and

the focus groups, the agency has revised

the information brochure to make it

much more informative. The focus

groups requested not only detailed

information about who was at risk and

why, but also basic background

information about how air bags work.

That information is needed to address

persistent misconceptions about some

aspects of how air bags operate. The

revised brochure—

• explains how air bags work,

• explains how air bags save many

lives and prevent many injuries,

• describes the groups of people who

have been killed by air bags,

• identifies the single factor that is

common to all air bag deaths,

• makes clear why certain groups of

people are at risk,

• gives practical advice to consumers

on how to reduce their individual risk

and that of the users of their vehicle

without modifying their vehicles, and

• as printed by the agency, includes

simple graphics showing the steps that

drivers at risk can take to reduce those

risks.

NHTSA agrees with IIHS and other

commenters that the proposed

information brochure was too technical,

and has completely rewritten it to make

it more consumer-friendly.42 The data

tables on historical fatalities and

injuries in the proposed information

brochure have been replaced by a

practical, succinct, question and answer

format. This makes it much more likely

that the brochure will be read, and

understood, in its entirety.

The agency recognizes that no single

information brochure will fully meet

everyone’s needs and that some

consumers will prefer more information.

However, the agency disagrees that not

being able to tailor the information

brochure to individual needs means that

the brochure will not contribute to

informed decisionmaking by consumers.

The brochure contains basic

information, geared to the average

person. Persons wishing more

information can visit NHTSA’s Internet

Web site or call the agency’s toll-free

Hotline.

NHTSA will distribute the

information brochure widely. In

addition, on its Internet Web site, the

agency is providing the public with an

opportunity to view video clips of crash

tests showing the difference in the

amount of protection that test dummies

receive when using both seat belts and

air bags and when using seat belts alone.

The clips show that when the air bag is

turned off and does not deploy in a

moderate to severe crash, the head of a

dummy representing a short female

driver strikes the steering wheel hard

enough to cause fatal injuries. The

opportunity to view these video clips is

prominently noted on the information

brochure. The agency believes that this

multi-media approach will effectively

inform consumers about the importance

of air bag protection and about the

limited circumstances in which turning

off an air bag should be considered.

However, although the video is a useful

educational tool, the agency is not

conditioning eligibility for an on-off

switch upon viewing a video

presentation of the information in the

brochure, as suggested by one

commenter.

The agency disagrees with Chrysler’s

argument that basing advice to drivers

on distance from the steering wheel is

not meaningful. While Chrysler is

correct that differences in air bag

systems and steering wheel inclinations

will affect the appropriate distances,

NHTSA believes that giving general

advice is useful and effective, and that

no other measure is better (height being

only a rough proxy for distance).

Moreover, the vehicle manufacturers

have not provided information to the

agency on which it could base distance

recommendations that are individually

tailored to each vehicle make and

model. By focusing on the ability of the

vast majority of drivers, particularly

short ones, to move a sufficient distance

away from the steering wheel, this

general guidance will help drivers

identify ways they can reduce and even

eliminate their risk. NHTSA anticipates

that the vehicle manufacturers will

supplement this general guidance as

appropriate to fit the circumstances and

air bag performance of their individual

makes and models of vehicles.

4. Dealer and Repair Business

Responsibilities Regarding the Request

Form and Information Brochure

Many dealer and repair business

commenters objected to the agency’s

proposal to require them to receive

authorization forms from vehicle

owners and to check the forms. Under

this final rule, dealers and repair

businesses will not have these

responsibilities. They will be performed

instead by the agency.

Many dealer and repair business

commenters also objected to the

agency’s proposal to require them to

distribute the request form and the

information brochure. NHTSA is not

requiring that they do so. The

information brochures and request

forms will be available to anyone who

visits NHTSA’s Internet Web site or uses

U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO)

Access.43 The public can also call the

agency’s Hotline and arrange to have

copies faxed or mailed to them. NHTSA

will also send copies to dealers and

repair businesses and to State

Departments of Motor Vehicles. In

addition, other organizations, such as

the American Automobile Association,

will assist in distributing these

documents.

5. Insert for Vehicle Owner’s Manual

NHTSA has decided not to adopt its

proposal that dealers and repair

businesses be required to provide

vehicle owners with a copy of the

information brochure as an insert for the

vehicle owner’s manual. A requirement

that the dealer or repair business

provide the entire brochure seems

unnecessary given that the owner must

certify that he or she has read the

brochure prior to signing the request

form.

However, as a reminder about the

proper use of on-off switches, the

agency is requiring that vehicle owners

be given an owner’s manual insert

describing the operation of the on-off

switch, listing the risk groups, stating

that the on-off switch should be used to

turn off an air bag for risk group

members only, and stating the vehicle

specific safety consequences of using

the on-off switch for a person who is not

in any risk group. Those consequences

will include the effect of any energy

managing features, e.g., load limiters, on

seat belt performance. (See the

discussion of safety belts with energy

managing features in part II.B.2 above.)

6. Recordkeeping

In the deactivation proposal, the

agency proposed to require that dealers

and repair businesses send filled-out

authorization forms to the appropriate

vehicle manufacturer and that vehicle

manufacturers be required to retain

those forms for five years. The primary

purpose of these proposals was to

ensure that subsequent owners had a

way of learning whether their air bags

had been deactivated. The agency

realized that the deactivated status of an
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62431

44NHTSA assumes that, in many cases, fleet

maintenance facilities are owned by the same

business that owns the fleet itself. Since vehicle

owners are not subject to the make inoperative

prohibition, and thus can modify their vehicles as

they wish, subject to state and local law, the

common ownership of the facilities and the fleet

means that the fleet owners can have their

maintenance facilities install on-off switches or

even deactivate their air bags without NHTSA

authorization. If the facilities are not operated by

the owners of the fleet, then they are considered to

be repair businesses, for purposes of 49 U.S.C.

30122(a).

air bag is not readily apparent from a

visual examination of a vehicle interior

and that the labels proposed by the

agency could fall off, deteriorate over

time or be removed.

NHTSA has concluded that

recordkeeping by the vehicle

manufacturers is not necessary to

accomplish the primary goal of ensuring

that the public is aware of the

operational status of air bags that have

been turned off by means of on-off

switches. On-off switches and their

warning lights are relatively

conspicuous and more permanent than

labels. Thus, keeping records for the

benefit of other vehicle occupants and

subsequent owners is unnecessary, and

indeed, not so effective as these visible

cues.

Instead, NHTSA is requiring that,

when a dealer or repair business

receives an agency authorization letter

from a vehicle owner and installs a

switch, the dealer or repair business

must fill in the form provided in the

letter for reporting information about

the dealer or repair business and about

the installation. See Appendix C. The

form must then be returned to NHTSA.

This requirement will facilitate agency

efforts to ensure that the exemption

from the make inoperative prohibition is

being implemented in accordance with

the conditions set forth in this final rule.

It will also aid the agency in monitoring

the volume of requests and the

geographic and other patterns of switch

requests and installations. To ensure

that the forms are returned to the agency

in a timely fashion, NHTSA is requiring

that each form be mailed within seven

days of the installation of an on-off

switch by the dealer or repair business.

With respect to its continued exercise

of prosecutorial discretion to authorize

deactivation, NHTSA will keep records

regarding the vehicles for which it has

allowed deactivations and for which it

is able to obtain sufficient information.

NHTSA will be sending labels to all

owners for whom it has authorized

deactivation, and will enclose a request

for information on whether a

deactivation was performed, whether it

was a driver or passenger air bag

deactivation (or both), and the vehicle

identification number (VIN). This will

enable NHTSA to keep records on

vehicles for which the agency has

approved air bag deactivation. The VINs

of those vehicles, but no other

identifying information, will be made

available on NHTSA’s Internet Web site,

or by phone to aid subsequent

purchasers in identifying vehicles with

deactivated air bags.

7. Labels

The agency proposed labeling for the

same reason it proposed recordkeeping,

i.e., the difficulty of determining by

visual inspection whether an air bag has

been deactivated. Since the agency has

decided to specify retrofit on-off

switches instead of deactivation as the

means for turning off air bags, a labeling

requirement is unnecessary. To be

eligible for the exemption, the dealer or

motor vehicle repair business must

install a retrofit on-off switch meeting

certain requirements, including a

requirement for a telltale light that

illuminates to indicate when the air bag

is off and a requirement that the device

be operable only by means of a key. The

‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ position of the on-off

switch and/or illumination or nonillumination of the telltale light will be

readily apparent to other occupants and

future owners and inform them of the

on or off status of the air bags.

NHTSA intends to distribute warning

labels to people who receive

deactivation letters before retrofit on-off

switches become available and for

vehicles for which on-off switches do

not become available. The agency will

also distribute those labels to persons

who have already received such a letter

from the agency. The agency expects

that those labels will be available in the

near future.

8. Lessees

A leasing association and a fleet

managers association commented that

the proposal did not address how to

handle special issues concerning

deactivations of air bags in leased

vehicles. These associations emphasized

the contractual distinctions between

commercial (corporate fleets) and

consumer (individual) lease

arrangements, the difficulty that a repair

business would have in determining

whether the person presenting the

leased vehicle for modification has

authority to have the air bag

deactivated, and the many different use

scenarios and occupants of fleet

vehicles. One association stated that the

corporate employer in charge of the

operation of fleet vehicles, whether as

an owner or lessee, should be the sole

party with authority to request

deactivation. It also stated that a fleet

maintenance facility should be

considered a ‘‘repair facility.’’ 44

NHTSA appreciates the complexity of

the issue, and that it may be difficult for

a dealer or repair business to determine

whether the person presenting a leased

vehicle has authority to request an onoff switch. This is, in part, why the

agency did not make a specific proposal,

but instead raised the issue of lessees

and asked how issues relating to them

should be addressed.

Under this final rule, the exemption

from the make inoperative prohibition

applies to leased vehicles as well as

owned vehicles. The request form has

been changed accordingly.

9. Definition of Repair Business

The agency has become aware that

some businesses are holding themselves

out as being willing and able to

deactivate a vehicle’s air bags. This is

permissible so long as the owner of the

vehicle has a letter from NHTSA

authorizing the deactivation of the air

bags. However, some businesses have

suggested that they will deactivate air

bags even for people who do not have

such a letter from NHTSA, on the theory

that they are ‘‘air bag technicians’’ (or

perhaps mere ‘‘agents’’ of the owners)

and not motor vehicle repair businesses.

The relevant part of 49 U.S.C.

30122(b) states that a ‘‘manufacturer,

distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle

repair business may not knowingly

make inoperative any part of a device or

element of design installed on or in a

motor vehicle or motor vehicle

equipment in compliance with an

applicable motor vehicle safety

standard. * * *’’ Air bags are items of

safety equipment installed in

compliance with applicable motor

vehicle safety standard No. 208, and

deactivating them, by definition, makes

them inoperative.

The term motor vehicle repair

business is defined in 49 U.S.C.

30122(a) as ‘‘a person holding itself out

to the public to repair for compensation

a motor vehicle or motor vehicle

equipment.’’ Especially in light of the

broadly inclusive list of commercial

entities in the statutory provision,

NHTSA interprets this term as including

the activities of mechanics, technicians,

or any other individuals or commercial

entities that knowingly make

modifications to or perform work on

safety equipment for a fee, if those

modifications cause the vehicle no

longer to comply with applicable

Federal motor vehicle safety standards.
62432 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

The agency believes that Congress was

drawing a distinction in the make

inoperative prohibition between

commercial entities that might work on

a vehicle and a vehicle owner, or an

owner’s friend or relative who might

work on a vehicle without

compensation.

The legislative history of the Motor

Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety

Amendments of 1974, which added the

‘‘make inoperative’’ prohibition,

supports this broad interpretation. The

Conference Report states that it ‘‘is

intended to ensure that safety

equipment continues to benefit

motorists for the life of the vehicle. The

protection of subsequent . . . purchasers

of a vehicle is thereby assured.’’ H.R.

Rep. No. 93–1452, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.

39 (1974). It would subvert the purposes

of Congress in enacting this prohibition

to read the statutory term ‘‘repair’’

literally and allow a business to

perform, for compensation, the very acts

which the prohibition was intended to

prohibit. Deactivating an air bag makes

its benefits unavailable to subsequent

purchasers.

NHTSA is aware that there is a court

decision that addressed the definition of

‘‘repair business.’’ A United States

District Court concluded that businesses

installing window tint film were not

repair businesses because ‘‘the plain

meaning of the term ‘‘repair business’’

will prevail. * * * The plain meaning

of the word ’repair’ is to restore to

sound condition something that has

been damaged or broken . . . they are not

in the business of restoring or replacing

motor vehicle equipment.’’ United

States v. Blue Skies Projects, Inc., 785 F.

Supp. 957, 961 (M.D. Fla. 1991).

NHTSA believes this case was not

correctly decided. The court did not

recognize and give sufficient effect to

Congress’s intent, expressed in

legislative history, that federallyrequired safety equipment should

continue to ensure safe performance of

vehicles over their lifetime. Further, it is

evident from the inclusion of repair

businesses among the listed entities

subject to the prohibition that some

repair businesses sometimes do things

other than restoring components and

systems to sound condition. This

implies a broader definition of ‘‘repair’’

than the one offered by the court.

Accordingly, NHTSA interprets the

term ‘‘motor vehicle repair business’’ to

include mechanics, technicians, or any

other individuals or commercial entities

that, for compensation, add, remove,

replace or make modifications to motor

vehicles and motor vehicle equipment,

including safety equipment such as air

bags, regardless of whether the vehicle

or component was previously ‘‘broken’’

or needed to be ‘‘repaired.’’ The

description that a business applies to

itself is not controlling; it is the

business’ commercial relationship with

the public and the nature of the

operations it performs on motor vehicles

that is determinative. Any business

currently deactivating air bags for

customers who have not received

authorization from NHTSA is violating

the law and subject to enforcement

action by the agency.

10. Effective Date

NHTSA proposed an immediate

effective date in the January 1997

NPRM. As noted in the summary of

comments, the vehicle manufacturers

indicated that an immediate effective

date would not be sufficient even for

deactivation, for which minimal parts, if

any, are needed. NHTSA recognizes that

special parts are needed for on-off

switches, and that their production

requires additional time. The industry

has indicated that the time necessary to

produce retrofit on-off switches in large

enough quantity to meet all of the

anticipated demand is 4 to 6 months.

This period was calculated from

March 1997, not from the actual date of

a final rule. In anticipation of retrofit

on-off switches being allowed as an

alternative, vehicle manufacturers began

developing them in March. At an NTSB

hearing regarding air bag safety on

March 17–19, 1997, two manufacturers

stated that the time needed to develop

switches was dependent on the volume

needed. Smaller volumes would take

less time. Although NHTSA has no

information indicating that anyone

other than vehicle manufacturers plans

to produce on-off switches, it notes that

independent aftermarket producers

would not be precluded from doing so.

Their implementation time might be

different from that estimated by the

vehicle manufacturers.

NHTSA has decided to make the

exemption effective on December 18,

1997 and to set January 19, 1998, as the

date on which switch installation may

begin. NHTSA finds good cause for

making the exemption effective less

than 30 days after the publication of the

final rule. Making the exemption

effective on December 18 is necessary to

enable the agency to begin processing

requests at an early enough date that

owners can have their agency

authorization letters in hand by January

19. In this way, persons at risk can begin

obtaining switches on that date or as

soon thereafter as switches become

available for the make and model of

their vehicle.

A delayed date for the beginning of

switch installation will promote the

orderly implementation of the

exemption. Based on the calls to

NHTSA from consumers regarding

deactivation, it appears likely that most

owners who obtain agency authorization

for switches will go to dealerships to

obtain their switches. The date of

January 19, 1998, will allow the

manufacturers time to complete design

of on-off switches, start production, and

begin delivery to their dealers before

consumers start expecting their requests

to be filled. It will also allow them to

develop procedures for installing on-off

switches, and conduct necessary

training for dealer service technicians.

The date will also give the agency and

many of the company and group

commenters the time required to

educate the public about air bag benefits

and risks before the on-off switches

become available.

Although the selection of January 19

provides less time than the

manufacturers suggested in early 1997

would be needed to satisfy all

anticipated requests for on-off switches,

NHTSA believes that this date provides

sufficient time for the manufacturers to

begin to make retrofit on-off switches

available for installation. The agency

reiterates that the 4 to 6 month estimate

by the vehicle manufacturers was made

with reference to March of this year, not

the date of the issuance of this rule.

Further, a number of vehicle

manufacturers are already producing

on-off switches in anticipation of this

final rule. In addition, on-off switches

from aftermarket manufacturers might

be available to satisfy any unmet orders

for on-off switches.

11. Sunset Date or Event

The NPRM proposed that deactivation

of advanced air bags would not be

permitted under the exemption. NHTSA

also stated that it would consider not

allowing deactivation of driver air bags

that had been depowered. GM and other

manufacturers stated that NHTSA had

not adequately defined ‘‘smart’’ (i.e.,

advanced) air bags, and that it was

therefore inappropriate to sunset the

availability of deactivation once

advanced air bags were introduced. A

safety group stated that a sunset was

appropriate because on-off switches

would not be necessary after advanced

air bags were available.

Although NHTSA continues to

believe, based on safety considerations,

that it should prohibit dealers and

repair businesses from retrofitting

advanced air bag vehicles with on-off

switches, there is no immediate need to

do so. Widespread installation of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62433

advanced air bags is not expected to

begin for another several years. Further,

NHTSA notes that the existing

definition of ‘‘advanced’’ air bag does

not include driver air bags and needs

updating. NHTSA will address these

issues in the proposal on advanced air

bag rulemaking scheduled to be issued

this winter and will include a proposed

sunset date for retrofit on-off switches.

As to permitting on-off switches for

depowered air bags, NHTSA anticipates

that those air bags will pose less of a risk

of serious air bag injuries than current

air bags. However, the agency will wait

and accumulate data on depowered air

bags before making a final decision on

this issue. The agency may revisit this

issue in a future rulemaking if data

indicate that on-off switches are not

appropriate in vehicles with depowered

air bags. For the present, the exemption

will apply to vehicles with depowered

air bags.

12. On-Off Switches for New Vehicles

Many public commenters on the

January 1997 deactivation proposal

favored extending the existing option

for installing on-off switches in certain

new vehicles to all new vehicles.

However, the company and group

commenters were overwhelmingly

opposed to the idea. NHTSA considered

this idea and then rejected it in its

January 6, 1997 final rule regarding onoff switches for passenger air bags in

new vehicles with no rear seat or an

inadequate rear seat for rear-facing

infant seats (62 FR 798). The major

reasons for this decision were (1)

assertions of the vehicle manufacturers

(at that time) that OEM on-off switches

for new vehicles could not be developed

quickly, (2) the possibility that

extending the option to all new vehicles

might result in on-off switches’ being

installed as standard equipment instead

of being installed upon special request

by those at risk, (3) the possibility that

universal installation of on-off switches

in new vehicles might do more harm

than good (4) the lower cost of

deactivation, and the fact that the cost

would be borne primarily by those who

actually at risk and therefore in need of

deactivation, and (5) the possibility that

the effort to develop on-off switches and

integrate them into the design of new

vehicles might necessitate a diversion of

manufacturer engineering resources

from development of advanced air bags.

While the extension of the option for

OEM on-off switches for new vehicles to

all air bag vehicles is outside the scope

of this rulemaking, that same issue was

raised in a pending petition from the

National Motorists Association for

reconsideration of the January final rule.

NHTSA remains concerned that

extending the option to all new vehicles

might result in on-off switches’ being

installed as standard equipment in all

new vehicles, thus resulting in many

more vehicles being equipped with onoff switches than will occur under this

final rule. The agency has concluded

that such widespread installation of onoff switches without regard to whether

individual consumers are actually at

risk would not be in the best interests

of safety. The agency also remains

concerned that integrating on-off

switches into new vehicles, which

would entail redesigning dashboards,

will require more resources than

retrofitting on-off switches and thus

could divert resources from the

development of advanced air bags. For

these reasons, NHTSA denies this

petition for reconsideration.

13. Conforming Changes to Occupant

Crash Protection Standard

This final rule amends Standard No.

208 so that the Standard refers to ‘‘onoff switches’’ instead of ‘‘cutoff

switches.’’ It also amends the Standard

to revise the owner’s manual insert for

passenger air bag on-off switches

installed in new vehicles. Instead of

stating that use of the switch should be

limited to instances in which the right

front passenger seating position is

occupied by an infant in a rear-facing

infant seat, the insert will say that use

should be limited to persons in one of

the passenger risk groups identified in

the request for in Appendix B of Part

595.

IX. Implementation of Agency Decision

A. Limited Continued Use of

Prosecutorial Discretion to Authorize

Deactivation: Procedures and

Requirements

Between now and January 19, 1998,

the date on which switch installation

may begin, NHTSA will continue its

current practice of granting requests for

deactivating the air bags in all vehicle

makes and models. This will be done on

a case-by-case basis. The agency will

grant those requests only if they are

based on the justifications that are

currently being accepted under existing

agency practice, as modified to reflect

changed circumstances such as the

issuance of the report on medical

conditions warranting turning off an air

bag. Continuing to limit deactivation to

requests based on these justifications is

appropriate, given the inflexibility and

relative permanency of deactivation.

NHTSA will grant deactivation

requests after January 19, 1998, only for

those vehicle makes and models for

which the vehicle manufacturer does

not make on-off switches available.

NHTSA expects that vehicle

manufacturers will make on-off

switches available for most vehicle

makes and models. For those specific

makes and models for which on-off

switches are available on January 19, the

agency will cease granting deactivation

requests as of that date. Likewise, as onoff switches become available from the

vehicle manufacturer for a specific make

and model after that date, NHTSA will

cease granting deactivation requests for

that make and model. Owners of that

make and model can fill out an on-off

switch request form and send it to the

agency for approval. If an on-off switch

is also manufactured by an aftermarket

manufacturer, a consumer may wish to

request that a dealer or repair business

install it. For vehicle makes and models

for which the vehicle manufacturer does

not make available an on-off switch, the

agency will continue to grant

deactivation requests, even if an

aftermarket parts manufacturer makes

an on-off switch available for those

vehicles.

As noted above, this section describes

the procedures and practices that the

agency will follow in response to

changed circumstances such as the

issuance of a report by the National

Conference on Medical Indications for

Air Bag Disconnection. Those

procedures and practices differ from the

ones previously followed regarding

requests based on medical conditions

since that report does not recommend

deactivation for many of the medical

conditions for which deactivation

requests have been granted in the past.

In addition, this section describes the

legal effect of an agency letter

authorizing deactivation and describes

the conditions which motor vehicle

dealers and repair businesses must meet

in deactivating an air bag pursuant to

such a letter.

Summary

If the owner of an air bag-equipped

vehicle wishes to obtain the agency’s

authorization to have an air bag

deactivated, based on one of the

justifications described below, the

consumer may write to NHTSA stating

the consumer’s justification and

requesting authorization for

deactivation. If the agency determines

that the justification meets the criteria

for granting requests, it sends the

consumer a letter authorizing a dealer or

repair business to deactivate the

consumer’s air bag. The consumer

presents the letter to a dealer or repair

business. Since the letter authorizes, but

cannot require, the dealer or repair
62434 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

45The reference to owners is intended to include

lessees as well.

46As noted above in IV, Summary of Comments

on Proposal, IIHS conducted a study in which it

found the almost all women in a group of women

ranging in height from 4 feet 8 inches to 5 feet to

2 inches were able to get about 10 inches from their

driver air bag in all test vehicles and all of the

women could achieve that distance in almost all of

those vehicles.

47The physicians at the National Conference did

not recommend turning off air bags for pacemakers,

supplemental oxygen, eyeglasses, median

sternotomy, angina, chronic obstructive pulmonary

disease, emphysema, asthma, breast reconstruction,

mastectomy, scoliosis (if the person is capable of

being positioned properly), previously back or neck

surgery, previous facial reconstructive surgery or

facial injury, hyperacusis, tinnitus, advanced age,

osteogenesis imperfecta, osteoporosis and arthritis

(if the person can sit back at a safe distance from

the air bag), previous opthalmologic surgery, Down

syndrome and atlantoaxial instability (if the person

can reliably sit properly aligned in the front seat),

or pregnancy. However, the physicians did

recommend turning off an air bag if a safe sitting

distance or position cannot be maintained by a

driver because of scoliosis or achondroplasia or by

a passenger because of scoliosis or Down syndrome

and atlantoaxial instability. The physicians also

noted that a passenger air bag might have to be

turned off if an infant or child has a medical

condition and must ride in front so that he or she

can be monitored. This report is summarized more

fully earlier in this notice. To obtain a complete

copy of the detailed recommendations by the panel,

call the NHTSA Hotline (1–800–424–9393) or

download if from the NHTSA Web site.

48Physicians considering whether a person’s

medical condition makes it desirable for that person

to turn off his or her air bag should consider the

report of the National Conference and the following

three points and guidance.

• Most medical conditions present no greater risk

of air bag injury for a person with one of those

conditions than the risk faced by the general public.

• The risks of air bag injury are generally less and

almost never greater than the risks of injury from

striking the steering wheel or dashboard.

• The types of injury sustained by persons who

strike the steering wheel or dashboard are far more

serious (except in extremely rare circumstances that

occur only a few times a year) than the types of

injury sustained as a result of contacting deploying

air bags. Injuries from striking the steering wheel or

dashboard typically include brain trauma and

severe facial injuries. The facial injuries can be very

disfiguring and may require multiple, complicated

surgical procedures.

As noted above in the description of the report

of the National Conference, very few medical

conditions will cause an air bag to create a special

risk. The few conditions that do create such a risk

do so by making it necessary for persons with one

of those conditions to sit less than 10 inches from

an air bag. This is true for both low speed crashes

and higher speed crashes. This guidance is based

on the following facts:

1. The force of a deploying air bag decreases as

the air bag moves away from the steering wheel or

dashboard, and

2. An air bag spreads out the forces that a person

experiences during a crash, reduces the crash forces

that seat belts transmit to particular areas of the

body, and decreases the risk that the person’s head,

neck or chest (even those of a belted person) will

strike the steering wheel or dashboard.

business to perform a deactivation, the

dealer or repair business then decides

whether to deactivate the air bag(s), as

authorized in NHTSA’s letter. If the

dealer or repair business decides to do

so, it must meet certain conditions in

deactivating the air bag.

Vehicle Owners

Air Bag Deactivation: Who is Eligible,

and how is Authorization Obtained?

1. NHTSA 45 will authorize

deactivation based upon the following

justifications:

• A rear-facing infant restraint must

be placed in front seat of a vehicle

because there is no back seat in the

vehicle or the back seat is too small for

the child restraint (passenger air bag

only).

• A child age 12 or under must ride

in the front seat because the child has

a medical condition that requires

frequent monitoring in the front seat.

• The owner, or a driver or passenger

of the owner’s vehicle, has a medical

condition that, in combination with an

air bag, poses a special risk to the

person with the condition, and

• That risk outweighs the increased

risk that the person’s head, neck or

chest will violently strike the steering

wheel or dashboard during a crash if the

air bag is turned off (driver and/or

passenger air bag, as appropriate).

• Drivers who are extremely shortstatured (i.e., 4 feet, 6 inches or less)

(driver air bag only).46

2. An owner who wants deactivation

for any of the above reasons should

describe the reason in a letter and send

it to: National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, Attention: Air Bag

Deactivation Requests, 400 7th St. S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590. Deactivation is

not available for other reasons. The

request can also be faxed to (202) 366–

3443.

The request must contain the

following:

• Name and address of the vehicle

owner.

• The justification for the request.

(See the list of accepted justifications

above.) The letter should be as specific

as possible about the justification and

state whether the request applies to the

driver or passenger air bag, or both.

• A description of the facts creating

the need for deactivation.

• Each request based on a medical

condition must be accompanied by a

statement from a physician, if the

condition is not one for which the

National Conference recommended

deactivation.47 The physician’s

statement must not only identify the

particular condition of the patient, but

also state the physician’s judgment—

a. That the condition causes air bags

to pose a special risk to the person, and

b. That the condition makes the

potential harm to the person from

contacting an air bag in a crash greater

than the potential harm from turning off

the air bag and allowing the person’s

head, neck or chest to hit the steering

wheel, dashboard or windshield.

(Hitting the vehicle interior is likely in

a moderate to severe crash, even if the

person is using seat belts.) 48

If the request concerns a child that

must ride in the front seat to enable the

driver to monitor the child’s medical

condition, the supporting physician’s

statement must identify the condition

and state that frequent monitoring by

the driver is necessary. NHTSA notes

that the American Academy of

Pediatrics has stated that medical

conditions requiring such monitoring

are very rare. According to the final

report of the National Conference on

Medical Indications for Air Bag

Disconnection: ‘‘It is anticipated that the

American Academy of Pediatrics will

make recommendations regarding

which specific conditions warrant close

monitoring while driving’’ (passenger

air bag only).

3. The agency will respond in writing,

enclosing a copy of the information

brochure in Appendix A of Part 595,

labels to be attached to the vehicle

interior for alerting vehicle users about

the deactivated air bags, and a form to

be filled out and mailed back to the

agency regarding the deactivation.

NHTSA will answer the deactivation

requests as quickly as possible. It

screens the incoming requests for

requests involving rear-facing child

restraints (because of the higher risk

associated with those requests) and

processes those requests first.

Depending on the volume of requests

being received by the agency, the

processing usually occurs within several

days. All other requests are handled in

the order in which they are received.

These requests currently take a couple

days longer to answer.

The central reason for convening the

National Conference on Medical

Indications for Air Bag Disconnection

was that the belief that the public and

many physicians might benefit from

guidance by physicians having expertise

relating to automotive crash-induced

trauma. The agency will attempt to

ensure that due consideration is given

the National Conference’s report. If the

agency receives a deactivation request

accompanied by a physician’s statement

based on one of the medical conditions

for which the National Conference did

not recommend deactivation, the agency

will defer to the requestor’s physician

and send a letter to the requestor

granting his or her request. However,

the agency will also enclose the report
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62435

and urge that the requestor discuss it

with his or her physician before having

any modifications made to the

requestor’s air bags. NHTSA will also

send a copy of the letter and report

directly to the physician to ensure that

he or she is made aware of the report’s

contents.

4. If a request has been granted, the

recipient should call his or her dealer or

a repair business and ask if it will

disconnect the air bag. If the dealer or

repair business says that it will, the

recipient should ask further whether it

is necessary to bring proof of owner

status to the dealer or repair business.

5. Some dealers and repair businesses

have a policy of not disconnecting air

bags. NHTSA has no authority to require

them to do so—that is the dealer’s or

business’ decision. The owner may have

to shop around to find a qualified

automotive mechanic or technician who

will disconnect the air bag.

6. If there is a motor vehicle insurance

premium discount based on the

presence of air bags in a vehicle, the

premiums may increase slightly if the

air bag(s) is(are) disconnected.

7. Seat belts should always be worn,

whether a person’s air bag is operational

or deactivated. If a person’s air bag is

deactivated, seat belts are the only

available means of restraint to reduce

the likelihood that the person will hit

the vehicle interior in a crash. Thus, it

will be more important than ever to be

properly restrained at all times.

8. NHTSA strongly urges owners to

have their air bag reactivated if the

condition that caused the deactivation

ceases to exist, or if they sell the

vehicle. If they do not reactivate the air

bag upon sale, they should inform the

new owner that the air bag has been

deactivated.

9. If the agency denies a request, it

will give the reason for the denial. The

reason may be that there was not

enough explanatory or supporting

information submitted for NHTSA to

approve the request. In that event, the

request may be resubmitted with the

necessary information. If a request was

denied because the owner does not

provide an accepted justification, the

owner must wait for retrofit on-off

switches to become available for his or

her make/model of vehicle in order to

turn off the air bag(s). If the owner or a

user of his or her vehicle is a member

of a risk group, the owner may request

an on-off switch once one becomes

available.

Motor Vehicle Dealers and Repair

Businesses

Steps Which Must Be Taken if an Air

Bag is Deactivated Pursuant to an

Agency Authorization Letter

1. If a person requests deactivation of

an air bag, the dealer or repair business

should determine that the person is the

owner of the vehicle and that the person

possesses a letter from the agency

authorizing that person to have that air

bag deactivated. Owner status can

normally be checked by looking at the

vehicle title or registration. (NOTE: A

dealer or repair business is prohibited

by statute from deactivating a vehicle’s

air bag unless the owner has an

authorization letter from the agency.)

2. The agency letter will indicate

which air bag(s) may be deactivated. If

the letter authorizes deactivation of the

driver air bag, the passenger air bag may

not be deactivated, and vice versa.

3. NHTSA recommends that the

dealer or repair business consult with

the vehicle’s manufacturer regarding a

deactivation procedure if there are any

doubts about how to deactivate an air

bag.

4. An air bag must be deactivated in

a manner such that:

• It will not deploy in a crash; and

• Reactivation is facilitated, if

possible. This means, for example,

leaving the air bag module in the

vehicle.

5. These steps may be supplemented

in any manner, such as by keeping a

copy of the agency grant letter. Some

dealers and repair businesses are

requiring owners to permit them to

apply warning labels to the vehicle or

sign waivers of liability.

B. Providing Retrofit On-Off Switches

Under the Exemption: Procedures and

Requirements

Consumers can request the

installation of an on-off switch by

completely filling out the request form

in Appendix B of Part 595 and sending

it to NHTSA for approval. The agency

will begin processing request forms on

December 18. If a form is submitted

before that date, it will be given the

same priority as a form submitted after

that date. Accordingly, there will be no

advantage to submitting forms early.

When the agency approves a request,

it will send an authorization letter to the

vehicle owner. Motor vehicle dealers

and repair business may begin installing

switches on January 19, 1998. If a dealer

or repair business installs an on-off

switch, it must comply with the

conditions set forth in Part 595. Those

conditions include obtaining the

owner’s authorization letter which

includes a form to be filled in by the

dealer or repair business and mailed

back to NHTSA.

Vehicle Owners

Air Bag On-Off Switches: Who is

Eligible, and How is Authorization

Requested?

1. Ask a dealer or vehicle repair

business if a retrofit on-off switch is

available. As noted above, NHTSA will

grant deactivation requests after January

19, 1998 for only those vehicle makes

and models for which the vehicle

manufacturer does not make on-off

switches available. As on-off switches

become available from the vehicle

manufacturer for a specific make and

model, NHTSA will cease granting

deactivation requests for that make and

model. If an owner of such a make and

model writes to NHTSA requesting

authorization to have an air bag

deactivated, NHTSA will deny the

request and notify the person that a

retrofit on-off switch is available.

Eligible owners of the make and model

may fill out a request form and send it

to the agency for approval. If the agency

approves the request and sends an

authorization letter to the owner, the

owner may then give the letter to a

dealer or repair business, and ask it to

install the vehicle manufacturer’s on-off

switch. If an on-off switch is also

manufactured by an aftermarket

manufacturer, a consumer may wish to

request that a dealer or repair business

install it.

For vehicle makes and models for

which the vehicle manufacturer does

not make available an on-off switch, the

agency will continue to consider

deactivation requests, even if an

aftermarket parts manufacturer makes

an on-off switch available for those

vehicles. If an aftermarket parts

manufacturer does make an on-off

switch, the eligible owner of such a

vehicle has the choice of requesting the

agency to authorize deactivation or

submitting an on-off switch request

form to the agency for approval. If the

agency approves the request for a

switch, the owner can then give the

agency authorization letter to a dealer or

repair business, and ask it to install the

aftermarket on-off switch.

2. Determine if the vehicle owner or

a user of the owner’s vehicle meets the

criteria in one of the risk groups and if

obtaining a retrofit on-off switch is

appropriate. The information brochure

in Appendix A of Part 595 will help the

owner make this decision. The owner

will have to certify on the request form

that he or she has read the information

brochure and that he or she or a user of
62436 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

the owner’s vehicle is a member of one

of the risk groups listed on the form.

Separate certifications, one for a risk

group related to the driver air bag and

another for a risk group related to the

passenger air bag, must be made on the

form if the owner wants an on-off

switch or switches for both the driver

and passenger air bags.

3. Completely fill out the request form

in Appendix B of Part 595. The agency

cannot approve a request for an on-off

switch unless the form is completely

filled out and signed and dated by the

owner.

4. Send the completed form to

NHTSA.

5. Upon reviewing the owner’s form

and approving it, NHTSA will send an

authorization letter to the owner.

6. Call your dealer or repair business

and ask about the installation of a

switch and the associated costs.

7. Give your authorization letter to a

dealer or repair businesses willing to

install the switch and request the

installation of an on-off switch.

8. Use the retrofit on-off switch

appropriately. The on-off switch should

only be used if the person occupying the

seating position is a member of one of

the risk groups listed in the information

brochure in Appendix A of Part 595. At

all other times, the air bag should be on.

Motor Vehicle Dealers and Repair

Businesses

Steps Which Must Be Taken if an Air

Bag On-Off Switch is Installed Pursuant

to the Exemption From the Make

Inoperative Prohibition

1. Make sure the vehicle owner

presents an authorization letter from

NHTSA. The dealer or repair business

may also require the owner to fill out a

form devised by the dealer or repair

business. That form may include a

waiver of liability.

2. Install a retrofit on-off switch for

each air bag covered by the agency’s

authorization.

3. Ensure that each on-off switch

meets all of the following performance

requirements—

a. Be activated solely by a key.

b. Cause the air bag to remain turned

off until manually turned back on using

a key and the on-off switch.

c. Be accompanied by a telltale light

in the vehicle interior. The telltale must

indicate when an air bag has been

turned off and be visible to an occupant

of the driver’s seat, in the case of a light

for the driver air bag, and to all front

seat occupants, in the case of a light for

the passenger air bag.

d. Not affect the ability of the required

air bag readiness indicator to monitor an

air bag that is not turned off. The

indicator must show whether the air bag

is functioning properly.

e. If a single on-off switch is installed

to control both the driver’s and

passenger’s air bag, the on-off switch

must be capable of turning off one air

bag without turning off the other. For a

single on-off switch controlling both air

bags, the telltale light must indicate

which air bag is off.

4. Provide the owner with an insert

for the vehicle owner’s manual

describing the operation of the on-off

switch, listing the risk groups on the

request form, stating that the on-off

switch should only be used to turn off

an air bag for a member of one of those

risk groups, and stating the vehicle

specific consequences for using it for

persons who are not members of any of

those risk groups. Those consequences

must include the effect of any energy

managing features, e.g., load limiters, on

seat belt performance. NHTSA

anticipates that the inserts can be

obtained primarily from the vehicle

manufacturers, although in some cases,

they might be available from

independent on-off switch

manufacturers.

5. Fill in information about your

dealership or repair business and about

the installation on the form included in

the authorization letter and return the

form by mail to NHTSA within seven

days of your installation of an on-off

switch pursuant to that letter.

C. Steps to Promote Informed

Decisionmaking by Consumers About

Retrofit On-Off Switches

1. Information Brochure

To limit the obtaining and use of

retrofit on-off switches to persons who

may be at risk from serious air bag

injury, the agency is issuing guidance to

aid consumers in determining if they or

a user of their vehicle is in a risk group

and in making informed decisions about

requesting and using retrofit on-off

switches. This guidance is contained in

the information brochure in Appendix

A of Part 595. In response to public

comments about the information

brochure in the deactivation NPRM, the

brochure has been rewritten in a

question and answer format to be more

user friendly. The brochure will be

distributed widely and made available

on the Internet. The electronic version

of the information brochure on

NHTSA’s Web site will supplemented

by video clips showing what happens to

a belted dummy in a crash test when the

driver air bag is turned off.

The information brochure explains

which consumers may be at any risk

from air bags, and which are not. The

brochure identifies the factors that

create risk and tells consumers how to

reduce that risk. For those who may be

at risk, it stresses how infrequently

people, particularly drivers and adult

passengers, are fatally injured by air

bags.

The information brochure also

emphasizes that on-off switches should

not be used to turn off air bags for the

people not at risk. They represent the

vast majority of vehicle occupants.

Their use of on-off switches to turn off

air bags will not make them safer in low

speed crashes, but will make them less

safe in moderate and high speed

crashes.

2. Insert for Vehicle Owner’s Manual

To remind vehicle owners and users

about the proper use of on-off switches,

the agency is requiring that dealer or

repair businesses which install switches

give vehicle owners an owner’s manual

insert describing the operation of the

on-off switch, listing the risk groups,

stating that the on-off switch should be

used to turn off an air bag for risk group

members only, and stating the vehicle

specific safety consequences of using

the on-off switch for a person who is not

in any risk group. Those consequences

would include the effect of any energy

managing features, e.g., load limiters, on

seat belt performance.

3. Physicians’ Guidance Regarding

Medical Conditions Warranting Turning

Off an Air Bag

As noted above, a national conference

of physicians, convened by George

Washington University at the request of

NHTSA, has examined the medical

conditions that have been cited by

vehicle owners as the basis for

requesting deactivation of air bags. The

conference participants recently issued

a report containing their assessment of

each of those conditions as a

justification for deactivation. The

agency expects that publicizing the

report will reduce some of the confusion

and misapprehension about which

medical conditions really justify air bag

deactivation. NHTSA has briefly

summarized the report in the

information brochure and is placing it

on the agency’s Web site.

4. Campaign to Increase Use of Child

Restraints and Seat Belts

NHTSA is also undertaking a

campaign in conjunction with safety

groups, vehicle manufacturers and state

and local authorities to promote

increased use of all types of occupants

restraints. NHTSA is urging motorists to

use child restraints and seat belts and
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62437

place children in the back seat,

whenever possible, as well as spreading

the word about the benefits of air bags

for most people. Proper use of the

restraint(s) most appropriate to the

weight and age of each child fatally

injured to date by air bags would have

saved all or almost all of them. While

increasing numbers of parents are

placing their children in the back seat

or ensuring that they are properly

secured in the front seat, much

consumer education work remains to be

done.

Disturbingly, most of the fatallyinjured children were allowed to ride in

the front without any type of restraint

whatsoever. And, as of July 15, 1997,

five out of the last seven fatally injured

children aged 1 to 12 were simply ‘‘held

in place’’ on the lap of a front seat

passenger. There were no similar

fatalities before December 1996. It is not

known whether the sudden appearance

of fatalities under these particular

circumstances is mere chance or a

response to the publicity given child air

bag fatalities last fall. It is known that

the combined effects of the risk of an air

bag to an unrestrained child, and the

weight that an adult places on a child

during a frontal crash can make the

decision to attempt to hold a child in

place a fatal one. Children should ride

fully restrained, and in the back seat

whenever possible.

In addition, NHTSA is seeking to

increase the rate of seat belt use from

the current 68 percent to 90 percent by

2005 by promoting the enactment of

primary seat belt use laws and highvisibility enforcement of use laws. Such

an increase could save an estimated

additional 5,000 lives each year. Since

most persons fatally injured by air bags

have been unbelted, this increase would

also provide an additional way of

preventing air bag fatalities. This

provides an additional reason why onoff switches should only be used when

a person in one of the identified risk

groups is in the seat.

X. Net Safety Effects and Costs of OnOff Switches

A. Effect of Turning Off Air Bags on the

Performance of Some Seat Belts

A number of industry commenters

stated that deactivating air bags could

result in substandard performance of the

seat belts. Senator John McCain also

sent NHTSA a letter requesting that the

agency investigate this possibility.

A good general introduction to this

issue appeared in an article on March 31

in the Kansas City Star:

The seat belts on some newer cars were

designed to work with their air bags,

automakers say. Alone, they will not protect

a person in a serious crash as well as an

older-style belt.

The newer belts allow a person to travel

forward a few more inches than older belts,

and when used in conjunction with air bags

have some advantages, experts say. If the air

bag is removed, however, the person faces a

greater risk of head or chest injuries from

hitting the steering wheel or dashboard.

In minor or moderately severe crashes, the

redesign of the belt won’t make a difference,

auto and safety officials say. But in severe

crashes, a person is more likely to travel

forward far enough to hit the dashboard or

steering wheel, sustaining head and chest

injuries, they say.

When used with an air bag as designed, the

newer belt has some definite advantages over

the traditional one

Because it is looser, it is less likely to break

a rib or collarbone in a severe crash. * * *

That is particularly of concern for elderly

people.

In older cars without air bags, the work of

restraining an occupant falls solely on the

belt * * *

The newer belt can * * * give way a little

bit so that the air bag takes up some of the

force of the crash and spreads it out over a

broader section of your body * * * The

result: fewer belt injuries.

Seat belts are required to meet

minimum performance requirements in

Standard No. 209, ‘‘Seat belt

assemblies,’’ and seat belt anchorages in

vehicles are required to meet minimum

performance requirements in Standard

No. 210, ‘‘Seat belt anchorages.’’

However, dynamically tested belts

(automatic belts or manual belts with air

bags) do not have to meet the

requirement of Standard No. 209 that

places a maximum of 30 percent on the

amount of permitted webbing

elongation. In addition, the anchorages

for dynamically tested belts do not have

to meet the anchorage location

requirements of Standard No. 210.

These requirements are not necessary

for belts which are dynamically-tested,

because the dynamic test ensures that

the system works to protect the

occupant from the type of injuries these

requirements are designed to prevent.

The elongation requirements also do not

apply to belts that are equipped with

‘‘load limiters’’ and that are installed at

a seating position with an air bag. A

load limiter is a component of a seat belt

system used to limit the levels of forces

transferred to an occupant restrained by

the belt during a crash. In very severe

crashes, the forces in the seat belt

system may rise above levels considered

safe. If a belt system has a load limiter,

parts in the system deform so that the

belt forces transferred to the occupant

do not rise above a predetermined

maximum level. There are different

designs of load limiters, ranging from

simple folds stitched into the seat belt

webbing that are designed to tear under

a certain load, to more complex

mechanical systems, some of which

play out a small amount of additional

webbing at incremental increases in

load levels. The exclusion from the

elongation requirements does not

unnecessarily prevent manufacturers

from using a design for these devices

that operates by affecting the length of

the webbing.

The exclusion from the elongation

requirement is not likely to significantly

affect the safety of the belt system.

Although manufacturers may have

designed belt systems in some air bag

equipped vehicles with more ‘‘give’’

than those in non-air bag equipped

vehicles, a 1991 NHTSA study showed

that webbing in vehicles with air bags

far exceeded Standard No. 209’s

requirements despite the exclusion from

the elongation requirement. The study

showed that maximum elongation,

when tested according to the

requirements of Standard No. 209, was

15 percent or less, or about half the

permitted amount of elongation.

NHTSA updated this study and again

found that the maximum elongation was

15 percent or less.

Some manufacturers have,

appropriately, been using the flexibility

in Standard No. 209 to optimize their

belt systems to work with air bags.

Additional webbing elongation and load

limiters would not normally be a

problem in an air bag equipped vehicle,

because the air bag would limit

occupant excursion. This additional

‘‘give’’ in the seat belts is normally

beneficial because it prevents the belt

from causing injuries. However, some

load limiters, those releasing a relatively

large amount of additional webbing,

could result in additional deaths and

injuries if the air bags are turned off.

Unfortunately, if the air bag cannot

function because it has been turned off,

the ‘‘give’’ in these seat belts would

increase the chance that occupants

would hit their heads and upper bodies

more easily on the steering wheel, the

A-pillar, the windshield, or other hard

parts of the vehicle interior, and suffer

serious injury. In some cases, the only

way to solve this problem might be by

replacing the entire belt assembly.

Another type of safety device that

could be affected by turning off the air

bags is a seat belt pretensioner. These

devices retract the seat belt webbing to

remove slack almost instantly in a crash,

thus enhancing the effectiveness of the

seat belts by reducing the distance that

the occupant might otherwise travel

forward. Pretensioners are not powerful

enough to pull the occupant back into
62438 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

the vehicle seat; they merely remove

slack. Some seat belt pretensioners are

triggered by the same sensor that

actuates the air bag, and may be wired

into the same circuit as the air bag.

Therefore, unless on-off switches are

designed correctly, turning off the air

bag may also disable the seat belt

pretensioners. Pretensioners are not

required by NHTSA standards, but are

an improvement added at the

manufacturer’s option. NHTSA is not

aware of any belt systems with

pretensioners that allow more slack to

be introduced than is allowed by

systems without pretensioners.

However, the system is likely to be more

effective if the pretensioner is not

disconnected as a result of the

installation and use of an on-off switch.

To NHTSA’s knowledge, all air bags in

vehicles with pretensioners can be

turned off without disabling the

pretensioners.

The exclusion of air bag equipped

vehicles from the requirements in

Standard No. 210 may have also been

used by manufacturers to optimize their

seat belt anchorage locations for seat

belts used in conjunction with air bags.

The agency cannot quantify or even

estimate the extent to which vehicle

manufacturers have availed themselves

of this opportunity. NHTSA’s anchorage

location requirements are intended to

reduce the likelihood that occupants

would ‘‘submarine,’’ i.e., slide forward

under the lap belt. Submarining would

cause the seat belt loads to be

transferred to an occupant up on the soft

tissue of the abdomen instead of down

on the pelvic bones, thereby increasing

the likelihood of abdominal injury. The

static test in Standard No. 210 is

intended as a substitute for a dynamic

test where the interaction between the

occupant and the lap belt can be

observed. Since manual belts used with

air bags do not have to meet Standard

No. 210’s anchorage location

requirements, manufacturers may have

located the anchorage locations to

optimize the interaction between the

belt and the air bag in controlling the

forward motion of the occupant. With

the air bag turned off, the system as a

whole will not operate as designed, and

the chance of abdominal injuries could

be increased.

A minority of vehicles have load

limiters or seat belt pretensioners. Using

information provided by manufacturers

on the design of 1997 model year

vehicles and sales numbers of 1996

vehicles, NHTSA estimates that vehicles

with pretensioners will comprise only 5

percent of 1997 vehicle sales. Using the

same information, NHTSA estimates

that vehicles with load limiters

comprise about 22 percent of 1997

model year sales. Very few models have

both load limiters and pretensioners.

Since the number of vehicles with these

features has been increasing in recent

years, the actual percentage of models

with these features in the entire on-road

vehicle fleet is lower than the

percentage in 1997 model vehicles.

Nonetheless, NHTSA expects vehicle

manufacturers, dealers and repair

businesses will take appropriate steps to

inform consumers whether their vehicle

is equipped with one of these devices

and to advise them whether any

modifications to the vehicle belt system

should be made. The agency’s

information brochure advises vehicle

owners to ask the manufacturer of their

vehicle about this issue.

NHTSA agrees with the industry

commenters that turning off the air bag

could result in a seat belt system with

less than optimal performance. Modern

vehicle restraint systems are highly

complex and integrated, with the seat

belt and air bag components often

designed to work together. The seat belt

systems may not be designed to work

alone. Taking out one component of the

integrated system could result in

reductions in performance. Because

many of the features identified by

NHTSA are designed to operate only

when high loads are placed on the belt

system, the presence of these features

will be of no consequence in low

severity crashes in which the air bag has

been turned off, especially when a

small/light weight person is using the

belt. However, those features will be

consequential in a more severe crash. In

such a crash, the belts will not provide

their full benefits for a vehicle occupant

if that person’s air bag is turned off.

B. Net Safety Effects and Costs

People not in any of the four risk

groups specified in this final rule will

be worse off if they turn off their air bag.

These people include the vast majority

of teenagers and adults, including older

drivers. By turning off their air bags,

they will increase their chance of death

or serious injury in moderate to serious

crashes. Even belted occupants and the

vast majority of short occupants will

increase their risk of serious or fatal

head, neck or chest injury if they turn

off their air bags.

The net safety effects of retrofit on-off

switch use will depend in part upon

what proportion of the switch users are

people at risk. Among persons in risk

groups, the net safety effect of use of the

on-off switch will depend on the

whether that group is, on balance,

benefited or harmed by air bags. For a

group, like infants, which has had

members fatally injured, but not saved,

by air bags, use of the on-off switch to

turn off passenger air bags will produce

a net positive safety effect for the group.

However, for other groups, use of the

on-off switch to turn off driver air bags

could have a net negative safety effect

for the group.

Survey data provided by commenters

suggest that many more people want onoff switches than could possibly benefit

from them. As suggested above, the

agency believes that this is because

people tend to hear more about, and be

more reactive to, the small number of

fatalities from air bags than the large

number of lives saved by air bags. The

January 1997 survey provided by IIHS

suggested that 30 percent of respondents

were generally interested in on-off

switches for the driver air bag, and 67

percent in on-off switches for the

passenger air bag. Several commenters

suggested that widespread availability

of on-off switches would raise the

possibility of what they termed

‘‘misuse,’’ i.e., use of on-off switches by

persons who are not at risk and who are

clearly better off with their air bag left

on. If this were to occur, it could result

in a negative effect on safety. However,

to the extent that the reported interest

in on-off switches simply reflected a

desire to make it possible to turn off an

air bag should a person at risk ever be

carried, then the likelihood of use by

persons not at risk would be smaller.

As previously noted, the more recent

IIHS survey, conducted in August,

indicates that the general interest in onoff switches for passenger air bags has

declined considerably since January.

According to the new survey, 26 percent

of respondents expressed a general

interest in passenger air bag switches.

General interest in driver air bag on-off

switches was essentially unchanged,

with 27 percent of respondents

expressing an interest in those switches.

The new survey also showed that

interest in on-off switches declined after

the respondents were informed about

matters such as air bag benefits, steps

for reducing risk and the cost of

switches. The figure for passenger air

bags dropped from 26 percent to 16

percent and the figure for driver air bags

dropped from 27 percent to 12 percent.

To minimize the possibility of adverse

safety consequences, persons who wish

to apply for retrofit on-off switches must

certify that they have read a NHTSA

information brochure that explains the

benefits and risks related to air bags to

ensure that they make informed

decisions both with respect to obtaining,

and then using, an on-off switch. The

brochure identifies which groups may

be at risk, and which are not. More
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62439

49The agency notes that IIHS and BMW raised the

possibility in their comments that use of on-off

switches could lead to increased occupancy of the

front seat, especially by children, and thus to

increased injuries and fatalities. The extent to

which this phenomenon might occur, if at all, is

speculative and therefore not quantifiable.

50Some nonfatal injuries are unrelated to the

factors (sitting distance from air bag and medical

conditions) which define the driver risk groups. For

example, since all drivers must hold the steering

wheel, they are all subject to arm injuries without

regard to those factors.

51This potential increase applies to all drivers,

not just those in a risk group.

important, persons interested in on-off

switches must certify that they or a user

of the seating position in question meets

the criteria for one of the relevant risk

groups. Limiting eligibility for on-off

switches to vehicle owners who are able

to certify risk group membership should

minimize the possibility that persons

not in a risk group will have an

opportunity to use a on-off switch to

turn off their air bag and reduce the

possibility that the switch will be used

improperly. Finally, owners must

submit their request to the agency for

approval.

Given the large numbers of lives

currently being saved by air bags and

the very small chance of a fatality due

to an air bag, and notwithstanding the

limitation on eligibility for a on-off

switch, NHTSA recognizes the

possibility that authorizing the

installation of retrofit on-off switches

could result in a net loss of life. The

agency has analyzed these adverse

effects in its Final Regulatory Evaluation

(see summary below). NHTSA notes that

to the extent such a loss occurs, it

would be the unfortunate result of

several readily avoidable events: the

incorrect certification of risk group

membership, the use of on-off switches

by persons who are not members of risk

groups, and the failure to use seat belts

and/or child restraints properly and to

take other readily available

precautionary measures.

NHTSA is issuing this final rule,

notwithstanding its potential to reduce

the number of lives saved by air bags,

because the agency believes that it must

consider both the short-run and longrun implications of this rulemaking on

safety. Ultimately, the continued

availability and use of any safety device,

whether provided voluntarily by

manufacturers or pursuant to a

regulation, is dependent on public

acceptability. The agency believes that

air bags which fatally injure occupants,

particularly children in low speed

crashes, weaken the acceptability of air

bags, despite their overall net safety

benefits. Accordingly, to help ensure

that air bags remain acceptable to the

public and ultimately achieve their full

potential in the future (as advanced air

bags are developed and introduced), the

agency believes it is reasonable and

appropriate to give persons in risk

groups the opportunity to obtain and

use an on-off switch, upon the making

of the requisite certifications on the

agency request form and obtaining

agency approval for each request.

The potential savings and savings

foregone are described in the executive

summary of the Final Regulatory

Evaluation (FRE). The following

discussion is based on that summary.49

The Final Regulatory Evaluation

analyzes the potential impact of

allowing motor vehicle dealers and

repair businesses to install air bag on-off

switches in vehicles. This option is

being considered in response to

concerns that current air bags may

injure or kill some occupants in low

speed crashes.

Data indicate that only a small portion

of vehicle occupants are actually at risk

of fatal harm from air bags, and that

these occupants tend to fall into welldefined groups. Because both the actual

risk and the public’s perception of this

risk are quite different for drivers and

passengers, this analysis addresses each

occupant position separately.

On-off switches will not be necessary

after advanced air bags become

available. Vehicle manufacturers are

expected to install some kind of

advanced air bags throughout their fleet

by the year 2002. An analysis was

therefore performed of the impacts that

might occur during the 1998–2001

period, when an average of 45 percent

of the on-road vehicle fleet will have

driver air bags, and 32 percent will have

passenger air bags. Safety impacts will

continue to occur over the remaining

life of these pre-2002 model year fleets,

but at a declining rate as more vehicles

are retired from the fleet without being

replaced by on-off-switch-equipped

vehicles. For the purposes of isolating

and analyzing the impacts of this

rulemaking, it is assumed that there is

no change in air bag design, i.e., the

potential impact of depowering or other

design changes are not included. It is

also assumed that there is no change in

driver/passenger behavior, belt use,

child restraint use, or the percent of

children sitting in the front seat. Since

the agency has significant education and

labeling efforts underway, and the

manufacturers are constantly improving

air bags, the population which could be

positively affected by retrofit on-off

switches is actually smaller than that

assumed for the purpose of this

analysis. The results of this analysis are

as follows:

Drivers

If on-off switches are installed and

used by all drivers actually at risk, the

switches could prevent 45 fatalities

during the 1998–2001 period, an

average of 11 each year. For every one

percent of those not in a risk group who

always use on-off switches to turn off

the driver air bag, the number of drivers

saved by air bags would be reduced by

42 for that period, an average of 11

drivers each year. Nonfatal injuries

impact a broad range of occupants for

which particular risk groups cannot be

properly identified.50 For each one

percent of drivers always use on-off

switches to turn off the driver air bag,

a net increase of 490 moderate to critical

injuries would occur during 1998–2001

(123 annually).51

Passengers

Passenger impacts vary dramatically

by age group. If on-off switches are

always used for all child passengers

(ages 0–12), they could prevent 177

deaths over the 1998–2001 period, an

average of 44 deaths annually. The vast

majority of these benefits would come

from infants and from children 1–12

years old who ride completely unbelted,

remove their shoulder belt, lean forward

or otherwise place themselves at risk.

The net impact of on-off switches on

nonfatal injuries is uncertain, but the

agency believes that on-off switches

would provide a net benefit to children.

The agency cannot identify the

teenage and adult at-risk group, with the

exception of a minimal number of

medical cases. The agency advises all

those passengers above 12 years of age

to leave air bags on. For every one

percent of teenage and adult passengers

who always utilize on-off switches to

turn off their air bag, 9 additional

fatalities and 93 additional moderate to

critical injuries would occur, an average

of 2 more fatalities and 23 more injuries

annually.

Costs

NHTSA estimates that an on-off

switch for one seating position would

cost between $38 and $63 and that the

cost for an on-off switch to control both

the driver and right front passenger air

bags would cost between $51 and $76

(1996 dollars) to install on aftermarket

vehicles. These costs would be

voluntary and incurred at the initiative

of the vehicle owner. Ford was the only

commenter on costs. Ford estimated the

cost of installing an aftermarket on-off

switch that controls both the driver and
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52The agency is using the volume of requests

from the peak period during 1997, i.e., April and

May. The volume averaged about 400 letters per

week during that period. By contrast, the volume

in late August-early September was slightly less

than 300 per week. In mid-September, the average

was even lower, just over 100. However, in October,

the weekly average increased to nearly 200.

right front passenger air bag to be $95

to $124.

NHTSA notes that one commenter,

MBS, submitted an analysis suggesting

that a final rule would result in a large

annual number of additional deaths by

the year 2000. After reviewing MBS’

analysis, the agency concludes that it

rests on a number of incorrect

assumptions about key matters and

consequently cannot reliably assess the

impacts of this final rule. First, MBS’

analysis assumes the final rule would

authorize deactivation, which is

permanent and eliminates air bag

protection for all vehicle users, instead

of on-off switches. As noted above, onoff switches make it possible to leave air

bags on except when a person at risk is

riding in the vehicle. Second, MBS’

analysis assumes that anyone may have

their air bag turned off, based on

informed decisionmaking alone. In fact,

the final rule is based on informed

decisionmaking, certification of risk

group membership, and agency

approval of each request. As a result, the

final rule will reduce inappropriate

requests for on-off switches, i.e., those

requests based on reasons other than

safety risk. Third, MBS’ analysis relies

on highly speculative assumptions

about the percentage of respondents to

telephone surveys (the January IIHS

survey and a later survey by Ford) who

will actually go to their dealers or repair

business and purchase an on-off switch.

Given the shortcomings of those early

surveys, which are detailed above, they

do not provide a reliable basis for

estimating the level of interest in on-off

switches. Although the more recent

(August) survey by IIHS avoided those

shortcomings and demonstrated the

potential for education to reduce

interest in on-off switches, that survey

too does not provide a basis for reliably

estimating the number of people who

will obtain on-off switches under this

final rule. Even though the new survey

introduced key information about cost

and safety, it did so only to the very

limited extent that it was reasonable and

practicable to do so in the context of a

brief survey. Only the barest of facts

were given to the respondents. Further,

since IIHS was conducting an opinion

survey, not a public education

campaign, its efforts to educate

respondents about who is at risk from

air bags was very cursory. The public

education campaign planned by the

agency and other interested parties will

provide the public with a much fuller

description of the facts and present

those facts in the context of persuasive

explanatory discussions and graphics.

Third, instead of using data representing

the passenger vehicle fleet in 2000, MBS

incorrectly used NHTSA data

representing a later fleet fully equipped

with driver and passenger air bags. By

contrast, only 47 percent of the vehicles

in the 2000 fleet will have driver air

bags and 35 percent will have passenger

air bags. The effect of this error was to

magnify greatly MBS’s estimate of the

effects of a final rule.

XI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

NHTSA has considered the impact of

this rulemaking action under Executive

Order 12866 and the Department of

Transportation’s regulatory policies and

procedures. This rulemaking document

was reviewed by the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) under

E.O. 12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and

Review.’’ This rule is not economically

significant under E.O. 12866. However,

the action has been determined to be

‘‘significant’’ under the Department of

Transportation’s regulatory policies and

procedures because of the degree of

public interest in this subject. This rule

is not a major rule under Chapter 8 of

Title 5, U.S. Code.

Further, the agency does not believe

that the annual net economic impacts of

the actions taken under this rule will

exceed $100 million per year. This final

rule does not require a motor vehicle

manufacturer, dealer or repair business

to take any action or bear any costs

except in instances in which a dealer or

repair business agrees to install an onoff switch for an air bag. For consumers,

the purchasing and installation of on-off

switches is permissive, not prescriptive.

Accordingly, universal use of on-off

switches by risk group members is

unlikely. As noted below, the agency

estimates that the percentage of vehicle

owners who will ultimately choose to

seek and use on-off switches is

relatively low. Further, while NHTSA

has specified four risk groups and made

them eligible for on-off switches, the

agency is affirmatively recommending

only that two of the four specified risk

groups obtain on-off switches. As a

result, the agency does not believe this

rule will yield benefits whose value

exceeds $100 million in any one year.

When an eligible consumer obtains

the agency’s authorization for the

installation of a retrofit on-off switch

and a dealer or repair business agrees to

install the switch, there will be costs

associated with that action. The agency

estimates that installation of an on-off

switch would typically require less than

one hour of shop time, at the average

national labor rate of up to $50 per hour.

NHTSA estimates the cost of providing

an on-off switch for the passenger air

bag is $38 to $63 and the cost of

providing an on-off switch for both

driver and passenger air bag is $51 to

$76. Ford estimated the cost of

installing an aftermarket on-off switch

that controls both the driver and

passenger air bag to be $95 to $124.

At this time, any estimate of the

number of vehicle owners who will

actually fill out request forms, obtain

agency authorization and pay for retrofit

on-off switches is necessarily subject to

substantial uncertainty. The agency’s

experience with requests for

deactivation suggests a figure that is

much lower than the estimates offered

by some commenters based on public

opinion surveys. The agency believes

that actual experience provides a

sounder basis for making an estimate.

Based on the volume of deactivation

requests,52 the greater public interest in

on-off switches than in deactivation, the

burst of publicity likely to surround the

issuance of the final rule, and the time

needed for the public education

campaign to take full effect, NHTSA

estimates that at least 100,000 request

forms will be submitted to the agency in

the first year after the issuance of this

final rule, and that the annual average

for the three-year period including that

year and the next two years will be at

least 80,000.

Because of the public interest in air

bags, the publicity that will surround

the issuance of this final rule, and the

continuing public education campaign,

NHTSA expects that many more people

will read the information brochure than

will fill out request forms and seek

authorization for on-off switches. The

agency has no directly relevant

experience upon which to base an

estimate. However, NHTSA estimates

that the number of persons who read the

brochure will be at least 1,000,000 over

the three year period following the

issuance of this final rule. Thus, the

annual average will be at least 330,000

people.

In view of the preceding analysis,

there are no mandatory costs associated

with this rule. A final regulatory

evaluation for this notice has been

placed in the docket.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62441

Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has considered the effects of

this rulemaking action under the

Regulatory Flexibility Act. Most

dealerships and repair businesses are

considered small entities, and a

substantial number of these businesses

may perform on-off switch installations

pursuant to this rule, and would

presumably profit from these

installations. However, the economic

impact on any given business will not

be significant. For every 100,000 vehicle

owners who voluntarily decide to seek

authorization to have an on-off switch

installed and who obtain that

authorization, the average new vehicle

dealer will install about 4.4 on-off

switches before the introduction of

advanced air bags solves the problem.

NHTSA estimates the cost of providing

a single on-off switch that operates both

driver and passenger air bag is $51 to

$76. Ford estimated that cost as $95 to

$124. Based on a range from $51 to

$124, the average dealer will receive, for

each 100,000 on-off switches installed

nationwide, additional revenues of

between $224 and $545, before

subtracting the cost of materials, labor,

and overhead. This does not represent a

significant amount of money for these

businesses.

To the extent that consumers take

their vehicles to the much larger

number of used car dealers and smaller

repair businesses for on-off switch

installations, the economic impact

would be diluted on a per-business

basis. A small number of businesses

may specialize in on-off installation,

and this rule would have a large impact

on them. However, NHTSA has noted a

reluctance, on the part of the people

receiving letters of authorization to

deactivate their air bags, to take their

vehicles to businesses other than

dealerships. Assuming that this lack of

‘‘demand’’ for the independent

businesses extends to on-off switch

installation, and given the general

liability concerns even on the part of the

dealerships, the agency does not believe

that a substantial number of businesses

will specialize in on-off switch

installation.

Because the economic impact, per

average business, is so small, I hereby

certify that it will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. NHTSA notes

again that the requirements will not

impose any mandatory economic impact

on any entities, small or otherwise.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) requires

agencies to prepare a written assessment

of the costs, benefits and other effects of

proposed or final rules that include a

Federal mandate likely to result in the

expenditure by State, local or tribal

governments, in the aggregate, or by the

private sector, of more than $100

million annually. This rule does not

meet the definition of a Federal

mandate, because it is completely

permissive. In addition, annual

expenditures will not exceed the $100

million threshold.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

The agency has analyzed this

rulemaking in accordance with the

principles and criteria set forth in

Executive Order 12612. NHTSA has

determined that this rule does not have

sufficient federalism implications to

warrant the preparation of a Federalism

Assessment.

Civil Justice Reform

This final rule has no retroactive

effect. NHTSA is not aware of any State

law that would be preempted by this

final rule. This final rule does not repeal

any existing Federal law or regulation.

It modifies existing law only to the

extent that it replaces an agency

procedure under which vehicle owners

had to obtain authorization to have their

air bags deactivated with a new

procedure under which owners may

seek authorization to have on-off

switches installed. This new procedure

involves reading an information

brochure about air bag safety and

submitting to NHTSA a signed and

dated request form on which the owner

certifies that he or she has read the

brochure and that he or she, or a user

of his or her vehicle, is a member of a

risk group defined by the agency. If the

agency approves the request, it sends an

authorization letter to the vehicle

owner. This final rule does not require

submission of a petition for

reconsideration or the initiation of other

administrative proceedings before a

party may file suit in court.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Several of the conditions placed by

this final rule on the exemption from

the make inoperative prohibition are

considered to be information collection

requirements as that term is defined by

the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) in 5 CFR part 1320. Specifically,

this rule conditions the exemption for

motor vehicle dealers and repair

businesses upon vehicle owners filling

out and submitting a request form to the

agency, obtaining an authorization letter

from the agency and then presenting the

letter to a dealer or repair business. The

exemption is also conditioned upon the

dealer or repair business filling in

information about itself and the

installation in the form provided for that

purpose in the authorization letter and

then returning the form to NHTSA. The

information collection requirements for

part 593 have been approved by OMB,

pursuant to the requirements of the

Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.

3501 et seq.).

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 571

Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor

vehicles, Rubber and rubber products,

Tires.

49 CFR Part 595

Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor

vehicles.

In consideration of the foregoing,

NHTSA amends chapter V of title 49 of

the Code of Federal Regulations as

follows:

PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR

VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

1. The authority citation for Part 571

of Title 49 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,

30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at

49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section 571.208 is amended by

revising S4.5.2, 4.5.4 and 4.5.4.4 to read

as follows:

§ 571.208 Standard No. 208, Occupant

crash protection.

* * * * *

S4.5.2 Readiness indicator. An

occupant protection system that deploys

in the event of a crash shall have a

monitoring system with a readiness

indicator. The indicator shall monitor

its own readiness and shall be clearly

visible from the driver’s designated

seating position. If the vehicle is

equipped with a single readiness

indicator for both a driver and passenger

air bag, and if the vehicle is equipped

with an on-off switch permitted by

S4.5.4 of this standard, the readiness

indicator shall monitor the readiness of

the driver air bag when the passenger air

bag has been deactivated by means of

the on-off switch, and shall not

illuminate solely because the passenger

air bag has been deactivated by the

manual on-off switch. A list of the

elements of the system being monitored

by the indicator shall be included with

the information furnished in accordance

with S4.5.1 but need not be included on

the label.

* * * * *

S4.5.4 Passenger Air Bag Manual

On-Off Switch. Passenger cars, trucks,
62442 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

buses, and multipurpose passenger

vehicles manufactured before

September 1, 2000 may be equipped

with a device that deactivates the air bag

installed at the right front passenger

position in the vehicle, if all the

conditions in S4.5.4.1 through 4.5.4.4

are satisfied.

* * * * *

S4.5.4.4 The vehicle owner’s manual

shall provide, in a readily

understandable format:

(a) Complete instructions on the

operation of the on-off switch;

(b) A statement that the on-off switch

should only be used when a member of

a passenger risk group identified in the

request form in Appendix B to part 595

of this chapter is occupying the right

front passenger seating position; and,

(c) A warning about the safety

consequences of using the on-off switch

at other times.

3. Part 595 is added to read as follows:

PART 595—RETROFIT ON-OFF

SWITCHES FOR AIR BAGS

Sec.

595.1 Scope.

595.2 Purpose.

595.3 Applicability.

595.4 Definitions.

595.5 Requirements.

Appendix A to Part 595—Information

Brochure.

Appendix B to Part 595—Request Form.

Appendix C to Part 595—Installation Of Air

Bag On-off Switches.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,

30117, 30122 and 30166; delegation of

authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

§ 595.1 Scope.

This part establishes conditions under

which retrofit on-off switches may be

installed.

§ 595.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to provide

an exemption from the ‘‘make

inoperative’’ provision of 49 U.S.C.

30122 and authorize motor vehicle

dealers and motor vehicle repair

businesses to install retrofit on-off

switches for air bags.

§ 595.3 Applicability.

This part applies to dealers and motor

vehicle repair businesses.

§ 595.4 Definitions.

The term dealer, defined in 49 U.S.C.

30102(a), is used in accordance with its

statutory meaning.

The term motor vehicle repair

business is defined in 49 U.S.C.

30122(a) as ‘‘a person holding itself out

to the public to repair for compensation

a motor vehicle or motor vehicle

equipment.’’ This term includes

businesses that receive compensation

for servicing vehicles without

malfunctioning or broken parts or

systems by adding or removing features

or components to or from those vehicles

or otherwise customizing those vehicles.

§ 595.5 Requirements.

(a) Beginning January 19, 1998, a

dealer or motor vehicle repair business

may modify a motor vehicle by

installing an on-off switch that allows

an occupant of the vehicle to turn off an

air bag in that vehicle, subject to the

conditions in paragraphs (b)(1) through

(5) of this section:

(b)(1) The dealer or motor vehicle

repair business receives from the owner

or lessee of the motor vehicle a letter

from the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration that authorizes

the installation of an on-off switch in

that vehicle for that air bag and includes

a form to be filled in by the dealer or

motor vehicle repair business with

information identifying itself and

describing the installation it makes.

(2) The dealer or motor vehicle repair

business installs the on-off switch in

accordance with the instructions of the

manufacturer of the switch.

(3) The on-off switch meets all of the

conditions specified in paragraph

(a)(4)(i) and (ii) of this section.

(i) The on-off switch is operable solely

by a key. The on-off switch shall be

separate from the ignition switch for the

vehicle, so that the driver must take

some action other than inserting the

ignition key or turning the ignition key

in the ignition switch to turn off the air

bag. Once turned off, the air bag shall

remain off until it is turned back on by

means of the device. If a single on-off

switch is installed for both air bags, the

on-off switch shall allow each air bag to

be turned off without turning off the

other air bag. The readiness indicator

required by S4.5.2 of § 571.208 of this

chapter shall continue to monitor the

readiness of the air bags even when one

or both air bags has been turned off.

(ii) A telltale light in the interior of

the vehicle shall be illuminated

whenever the driver or passenger air bag

is turned off by means of the on-off

switch. The telltale for a driver air bag

shall be clearly visible to an occupant of

the driver’s seating position. The telltale

for a passenger air bag shall be clearly

visible to occupants of all front seating

positions. The telltale for an air bag:

(A) Shall be yellow;

(B) Shall have the identifying words

‘‘DRIVER AIR BAG OFF’’ or

‘‘PASSENGER AIR BAG OFF,’’ as

appropriate, on the telltale or within 25

millimeters of the telltale;

(C) Shall remain illuminated for the

entire time that the air bag is ‘‘off;’’

(D) Shall not be illuminated at any

time when the air bag is ‘‘on;’’ and,

(E) Shall not be combined with the

readiness indicator required by S4.5.2 of

§ 571.208 of this chapter.

(4) The dealer or motor vehicle repair

business provides the owner or lessee

with an insert for the vehicle owner’s

manual that—

(i) Describes the operation of the onoff switch,

(ii) Lists the risk groups on the request

form set forth in Appendix B of this

Part,

(iii) States that an on-off switch

should only be used to turn off an air

bag for a member of one of those risk

groups, and

(iv) States the safety consequences for

using the on-off switch to turn off an air

bag for persons who are not members of

any of those risk groups. The

description of those consequences

includes information, specific to the

make, model and model year of the

owner’s or lessee’s vehicle, about any

seat belt energy managing features, e.g.,

load limiters, that will affect seat belt

performance when the air bag is turned

off.

(5) In the form included in the agency

authorization letter specified in

paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the

dealer or motor vehicle repair business

fills in information describing itself and

the on-off switch installation(s) it makes

in the motor vehicle. The dealer or

motor vehicle repair business then

sends the form to the address below

within 7 working days after the

completion of the described

installations: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, Attention: Air

Bag Switch Request Forms, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590–

1000.

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
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62448 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
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62450 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62451
62452 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62453
62454 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 225 / Friday, November 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 62455

BILLING CODE 4910–59–C

Issued on: November 17, 1997.

[Signature page for Docket No. NHTSA–97–

3111 (final rule)]

Ricardo Martinez,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–30485 Filed 11–18–97; 10:00

;am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P