### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

ACACIA E. DAVIS
, Individually

Appellant,

v.

DEBORAH HENGEN, as Co

- Personal Representative of the Estate of CLIFFORD DAVIS, ACACIA E. DAVIS, as Co

- Personal Representative of

the Estate of CLIFFORD DAVIS, and THE ESTATE OF CLIFFORD DAVIS, deceased

, Appellee s

.

No. 4D 15

- 966

[ May 11, 2016 ]

CORRECTED OPINION

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Meenu Sasser, Judge; Howard H. Harrison and Roger B. Colton, Senior Judge s ; L.T. Case No. 2014CA010928XXXXMB

.

Douglas H. Reynolds and Jeffrey M. Fauer of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Julie H. Littky

- Rubin and Christa L. McCann of Clark, Fountain, La Vista, Prather, Keen & Littky

- R ubin, LLP, West Palm Beach, for appellee s

.

M AY
, J.

Does a child

, who ha s reached the age of majority, have standing to bring a claim for unpaid child support owed pursuant to a marital support
agreement if the parent has filed a claim? The answer: no. We therefore

affirm.

The parents entered into a marital and property settlement agreement

, which was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution. Pursuant to the agreement, the father was obligate d to pay the m other monthly child
support for their daughter

. The father died intestate, survived by his daughter , the mother, and his current wife. At the time of his death, the father owed child support arrearages

.2

The daughter and current wife were a ppointed co

- personal representatives of the father’s estate . The m other filed a statement of claim against the e state for the child support arrearages. T he m other later filed an amended statement of claim and an independent complaint against the

c o

- p erso nal r epresentative s and e state for th e arrearages.

The d aughter also filed a statement of claim against the e state for the child support arrearages. The current w ife

, as c o

- personal r epresentative

, objected to the d aughter’s claim. The d aughter also filed a n independent complaint against the c o

- person al representatives and the e state for the child support arrearages.

The current w ife moved to dismiss the d aughter’s complaint , arguing

she lacked standing to pursue the child support arrearages because the rights vested solely in her m other. The daughter then moved to consolidate

her action with the m other’s action. The daughter also petitioned the probate court for appointment of an administrator ad litem b ecause she was unable to represen t th e e state as a co

- personal representative due to

her s tatement of claim against it.

T he trial court granted the motion to dismiss for three reasons: (1) a conflict in counsel representing the mother and daughter for the same arrearages; (2) a conflict i n the daughter as co

- personal representative and claimant; and (3) the mother having the vested right to the child support, citing Kranz v. Kranz , 661 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). T he trial court

denied the d aughter’s motion to consolidate , and her moti on for rehearing

. The daughter now appeals.

The d aughter argues the trial court erred in dismissing her cla i m for lack of standing and conflict s of interest. The current w ife responds that only the m other ha s the vested right to collect the child support

arrearages. The daughter replies that her mother’s vested right does not prevent her from pursuing the same claim

.

We have de novo review

. Agee v. Brown , 73 So. 3d 882, 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)

.

“Parents have a legal duty to support their children.” Dep’t of Revenue

v. Jackson , 846 So. 2d 486, 492 (Fla. 2003) ; see § 61.09, Fla. Stat. (2015)

. “An obligation to pay accrued support is not extinguished even when the child reaches majority, notwithstanding that the parent’s obligation to support normally ends when a child reaches eighteen. ” Kranz

, 6 61 So. 2d

at 878 (citation omitted)

.3

We have held that a child has standing to enforce rights that ripen after the child reaches the age of majority. Brown v. Brown

, 484 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) . But we have never held, nor has any other court held, that the rights that accrue during the age of minority can be enforced by anyone other than the child’s legal representative. 1

We affirm. W e do not reach the conflict of interest issues ra ised as they are unnecessary to our holding

.

Affirmed.

C IKLIN
, C.J., and T AYLOR J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 We are aware the Third District Court of Appeal has stated in dicta that a child can pursue child support arrearages as a third party beneficiary. See Newman

v. Newman , 459 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Nevertheless, the court actually held the custodial parent of an emancipated child retained the right to enforce child support arrearages that accrued before the child’s emancipation

. Id. Our o pinion should not be read to prevent an emancipated child from pursuing child support arrearages if the parent is unable or unwilling to pursue

them.