World Bank Inga 3 Bass Chute (BC) and Midsized Hydropower Development 

Technical Assistance (TA) Project

March 20, 2014

U.S. Position

Greater access to power is urgently needed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and

throughout Africa. Inga 3 could offer tremendous benefits, including significant power 

generation, economic growth and employment, expanded access to electricity, support to poverty 

reduction, and the potential to offset significant amounts of climate-harmful carbon emissions in 

the region. If implemented successfully, Inga 3 could help drive economic growth throughout 

the region.

Notwithstanding the project’s potential, there are significant governance and environmental risks 

that need to be effectively managed for such a large, complex project to succeed. So far,

rehabilitation of Inga 1 and 2 (a much simpler project than construction of Inga 3) has been 

disappointing and efforts to reform the state utility, Société nationale d'électricité (SNEL), have 

been unsuccessful. Showing greater progress on Inga 1 and 2 before embarking on the 

preparation of Inga 3 would build greater confidence in the Government’s capacity to undertake 

what is a much more ambitious project. The United States urges the Government to redouble its 

efforts to fulfill these prior commitments. In light of this track record, we would like to see 

rigorous and time-bound benchmarks for progress in the development of Inga 3.

On the proposed technical assistance (TA) package for Inga 3, the United States welcomes the 

Government of DRC’s commitment to create the Inga Development and Promotion Authority 

(ADEPI) to manage the project. However, the timeline to establish ADEPI as an effective entity 

seems ambitious, especially in the context of capacity constraints in the DRC.

The United States also would have liked to see a plan to manage the project’s revenue, given the 

size of Inga 3. In this regard, the United States would have preferred details on how the 

Government would collect and account for its share of revenues from the project. Looking 

forward, the United States will want to see clear evidence that these revenues are being invested 

to improve the lives of the Congolese people. 

Along similar fiduciary lines, the United States is concerned that at least one of the three prequalified consortia includes a company that is debarred from participating in World Bank 

projects. The United States welcomes assurances that the existing consortia can be reconfigured 

so that any debarred firms are not part of the winning consortium. The United States hopes that 

this would be done under an open and transparent process.

The United States also believes that the Bank could have taken a more prudent approach to 

characterizing and mitigating environmental risks. The United States appreciates that the Bank 

flagged this TA package as high-risk given the nature of the project it will develop. 

Nevertheless, the United States is concerned about the sequencing of the environmental and 

social impact assessment (ESIA) and the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the selection of the 

private developer. Environmental impacts can be mitigated best when they are identified as 

early as possible during the project development cycle. The United States understands that 
public consultations will take place on the intermediate ESIA, and that outcomes from 

consultations will be incorporated into the RFP. Nevertheless, the United States would have 

preferred to have the final ESIA’s findings to be reflected in development of the bidding 

specifications for common infrastructure and the RFP.

The United States also believes that the scope of the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the ESIA 

could have been more comprehensive. An ESIA should consider fully the impact of all facilities 

associated with the project. The United States understands that not all associated facilities are 

known at this point, and that the TOR for the ESIA provides that such facilities will be assessed

as associated impacts in line with the Bank’s safeguards policies. While this may be the intent, 

the United States is not comfortable providing approval to this TA package without additional 

assurances on what the scope of the ESIA will include.

The United States recognizes some key positive elements on the social and environmental front. 

We are pleased with the Bank’s commitment to address legacy resettlement issues. As work gets 

underway for identifying the social impact, we urge the Bank to prioritize proper consultation 

with the affected communities upstream and downstream of the project zone prior to the 

construction, and to provide proper compensation for project impacts. The United States also 

appreciates the requirement that the South African-funded transmission lines outside the DRC

must meet sound environmental and social safeguards, subject to World Bank approval.

In addition, the United States would like to commend the Bank for including the mid-sized 

hydropower component in the scope of the TA. The United States recognizes the potential 

benefits of mid-sized projects in the region, especially for extending electricity access to rural 

areas. The United States notes, however, that this component could have built confidence in the 

DRC’s capacity to implement and regulate sustainable hydropower projects if it had been 

proposed as a stand-alone project or as a first step before Inga 3.

In conclusion, the United States appreciates the work that the Bank has undertaken to mitigate 

the risks inherent in the TA package for this complex project. However, the United States

believes that given the enormous challenges associated with Inga 3, the governance and 

environmental risks required further mitigation as part of this TA proposal. Therefore, the 

United States wishes to be recorded as abstaining. Going forward, we urge Bank management to 

keep the Board apprised as implementation proceeds.