COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KELLY YVETTE TIMBERS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1702-97-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 AUGUST 18, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 Diana H. Wheeler for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Kelly Yvette Timbers (appellant) was convicted of two counts 

of forgery. In this appeal, she challenges the trial court's 

admission into evidence of statements she made to a deputy 

sheriff while she was incarcerated in a Madison County holding 

cell. She contends the statements were obtained in violation of 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that the statements 

were the unlawful fruit of an earlier detention in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment. She also contends the evidence was 

insufficient to support her convictions for forgery. We hold 

that law enforcement authorities violated appellant's Miranda

rights to obtain her statement, and we reverse her convictions 

for forgery. 

 On November 15, 1996, law enforcement authorities executed a 

search warrant at an apartment complex in Madison County. In 

addition to searching appellant's apartment, law enforcement 
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authorities searched the apartment of John Johnson. Johnson 

owned a blue Lincoln Town Car which he sometimes loaned out in 

trade for crack cocaine. During the execution of the search 

warrant, an officer saw the blue Lincoln enter the area of the 

apartment building. 

 The Lincoln then left the area of the apartment building and 

drove away. An officer of the Virginia State Police stopped the 

Lincoln because he was instructed to do so by an undisclosed 

person on his radio. During a search of the Lincoln, law 

enforcement officers found a small packet of cocaine in the car, 

and a Madison County deputy arrested appellant, who was the 

driver, and the other occupant of the car. 

 At the sheriff's office, Deputy Robert MacFall asked 

appellant for identifying information, including her name, date 

of birth, and Social Security number. Appellant told MacFall 

that her name was Gwendolyn Ann Timbers. After appellant was 

fingerprinted, she signed the fingerprint card and a Central 

Criminal Records Exchange (CCRE) form with the name, "Gwendy 

Timbers." MacFall prepared and served appellant with a warrant 

for possession of cocaine. 

 Between a half-hour and an hour after appellant's booking, 

while appellant was in the holding cell at the sheriff's office, 

a woman came into the lobby of the sheriff's office and asked to 

give MacFall an item of clothing for Kelly Timbers. MacFall 

testified that, after this exchange, he immediately went "to the 
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holding cell where we had Ms. Timbers and questioned her as to 

what her real identity was." When asked to specify his actions, 

MacFall testified as follows: "I went to the holding cell door, 

I called her by the name of Kelly Timbers and she looked at me. 

And I told her if she was Kelly Timbers, that she needed to come 

forth with that information." MacFall testified that he did not 

directly ask appellant if her name was Kelly. 

 Appellant acknowledged that she was actually Kelly Timbers. 

 Appellant was not advised of her Miranda rights at any point 

prior to this acknowledgement. The deputy charged appellant with 

one count of forgery for the fingerprint card, one count of 

forgery for the CCRE card, and one count of giving false 

information to a police officer, in addition to possession of 

cocaine. 

 Appellant moved to suppress the cocaine on the basis that no 

reasonable suspicion supported the stop of the Lincoln, and moved 

to suppress the fingerprint cards and the statement she made in 

the holding cell that she was in fact Kelly Timbers on the basis 

that these statements were fruits of the unlawful stop. After a 

hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress the 

cocaine on the basis that no evidence established that the person 

who ordered the Lincoln stopped had reasonable suspicion to 

justify the stop. The court denied the motion to suppress the 

fingerprint cards and statement, reasoning that "there is a new 

act occurring here and this is not a fruit of the poisonous 
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tree." 

 On the basis of evidence introduced in the first suppression 

hearing, appellant filed a motion to suppress her statements to 

the deputy on the basis that the statements were obtained in 

violation of her Miranda rights. At a hearing on appellant's 

second motion, appellant testified that MacFall approached the 

holding cell where she was incarcerated, asked if she was Kelly 

Timbers, and told her that he knew she was Kelly Timbers, so she 

might as well admit it. She testified that MacFall left for five 

to ten minutes, then returned and told her that someone had come 

to the office and said that appellant's name was Kelly. 

According to appellant, MacFall told her that someone was going 

to retrieve a picture of appellant, so appellant should admit 

that her name was Kelly. Appellant testified that MacFall left 

again, returned, and told her that they would not press charges 

if she admitted her name was Kelly. Appellant testified that she 

admitted her identity at this point. 

 The court denied appellant's motion to suppress her 

statements. The court found MacFall's testimony to be credible 

and found that the sequence of events was not as appellant 

described. The court specifically found as follows: "Certainly 

the defendant was in custody, but what occurred was not 

interrogation." After a trial without a jury, the court found 

appellant not guilty of providing false information to a police 

officer, but found her guilty of both counts of forgery. 
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 I. 

Miranda

 Appellant contends her statement in the holding cell that 

she was in fact Kelly Timbers was obtained in violation of 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We are bound by the 

trial court's findings of historical fact unless those findings 

are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. See, 

e.g., McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 

259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 

U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). We review de novo questions of law and 

the trial court's application of defined legal standards to the 

particular facts of a case. See, e.g., Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25 

Va. App. 702, 712-13, 492 S.E.2d 470, 475-76 (1997) (citing 

cases) (holding that whether a person has invoked her Miranda

right to counsel and whether she has waived that right are 

reviewed de novo); McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261 

(1997) (citing cases) (holding that issue of whether seizure 

occurred is reviewed de novo); Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. 

App. 394, 398, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996) (citing Ornelas, 517 

U.S. at 699) (holding that determinations of reasonable suspicion 

and probable cause are reviewed de novo); Watson v. Commonwealth, 

19 Va. App. 659, 663, 454 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1995) (citing Wilson 

v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 551, 413 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1992) 

(holding that issue of whether a seizure continues or has abated 

is reviewed de novo). 
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 "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether 

exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 

of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 

self-incrimination," commonly known as Miranda warnings. 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. "Failure to give Miranda warnings 

prior to custodial interrogation requires suppression of any 

illegally obtained statements." Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. 

App. 10, 13, 371 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 

at 479). "Before Miranda is triggered, however, an individual 

must be both in 'custody' and subjected to 'interrogation.'" Id.

 The Commonwealth concedes that appellant was not 

administered Miranda warnings at any point prior to her 

statement. Similarly, the Commonwealth conceded in the trial 

court that appellant was in custody at the time of the statement 

and is bound by that concession here. See, e.g., Johnson v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 674, 683, 496 S.E.2d 143, 147 (1998) 

(citing Manns v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 677, 679-80, 414 

S.E.2d 613, 615 (1992)). Initially, we must determine whether 

appellant was subjected to interrogation, i.e., "express 

questioning or its functional equivalent." See Rhode Island v. 

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). The Commonwealth also argues 

that MacFall's statements to appellant fall under a "routine 

booking question" exception to Miranda, and that, even if 

appellant's statements were obtained in violation of Miranda, the 
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exclusionary rule should not apply because the Commonwealth would 

have inevitably discovered the evidence. Finally, the 

Commonwealth argues that the admission of appellant's statements 

was harmless error. 

 A. 

Functional Equivalent of Questioning 

 After hearing evidence that appellant's name was Kelly 

Timbers rather than Gwendolyn Timbers, MacFall called appellant 

by the name Kelly Timbers and told her that, if she was Kelly 

Timbers, she needed to come forth with that information. MacFall 

did not expressly question appellant. For Miranda purposes, 

however, interrogation also includes the functional equivalent of 

questioning. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. 

 The Supreme Court has defined the functional equivalent of 

questioning as "any words or actions on the part of the police 

. . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit 

an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 

301; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-01 (1990) 

(citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 

526-27 (1987) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). The Supreme Court 

indicated that whether a practice "is designed to elicit an 

incriminating response" is a factor in determining whether the 

practice is "reasonably likely" to elicit an incriminating 

response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 n.7. 

 Virginia courts have formulated and applied the Innis
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standard in several ways. In applying the Innis standard, 

Virginia courts have discussed (1) the subjective intent of the 

police, see, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 743, 746, 

348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1986) (noting "the total absence of any 

evidence that the questioning here was intended or designed to 

produce an incriminating response"), (2) the objective likelihood 

of self-incrimination, see, e.g., Riddick v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. 

App. 136, 145, 468 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1996) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. 

at 301) (explaining that "police activities reasonably incidental 

to arrest and custody . . . are unlikely to elicit an 

'incriminating response'"), and (3) an objective evaluation of 

the manifestation of the officer's intent. See, e.g., Blain, 7 

Va. App. at 15, 371 S.E.2d at 841 (interpreting the Innis

standard to require "a determination whether an objective 

observer would view an officer's words or actions as designed to 

elicit an incriminating response"). 

 An interpretation of the "reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response" test as purely objective would require a 

case-by-case evaluation of how likely a defendant is to respond 

to a given statement by police. See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. 

Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.7(a) (1984). A requirement of 

actual proof that "questioning . . . was intended or designed to 

produce an incriminating response," Wright, 2 Va. App. at 746, 

348 S.E.2d at 12, on the other hand, is contrary to the Supreme 

Court's admonition that the definition of interrogation "focuses 
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primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the 

intent of the police." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 

 Although Virginia courts have articulated the requirements 

of the Innis standard in several ways, we are bound by the 

interpretation of Innis outlined in Blain, 7 Va. App. at 15, 371 

S.E.2d at 841. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430, 

478 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996) (holding that a decision by one panel 

of this Court is binding on a subsequent panel unless overruled 

by this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court of Virginia). 

 In Blain, we held: "We interpret the Innis standard as 

requiring a determination of whether an objective observer would 

view an officer's words or actions as designed to elicit an 

incriminating response." 7 Va. App. at 15, 371 S.E.2d at 841. 

Although other Virginia cases have applied the Innis test as 

either purely subjective or purely objective, Blain contains the 

only square holding on the issue. The Blain interpretation is 

also "consistent with the result reached in Innis, 'will not be 

difficult to apply' because it is an objective test which does 

not require a determination of the actual perception of the 

suspect, but yet is 'fully responsive to the concerns of the 

Miranda decision' because it identified the situation in which 

the subject 'will experience the "functional equivalent" of 

direct questioning' by concluding that the police are trying to 

get him to make an incriminating response." LaFave & Israel, 

supra, at § 6.7(a) (quoting Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without 
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Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 

Mich. L. Rev. 1209, 1236 (1980)). 

 Applying this standard, we hold that MacFall's statements to 

appellant constituted interrogation. After learning that 

appellant's real name was probably Kelly Timbers rather than 

Gwendolyn Timbers, MacFall went to the holding cell door and 

called appellant by the name Kelly Timbers. In the first 

testimony he gave on the issue, MacFall described this exchange 

as "question[ing] her as to what her real identity was." After 

appellant looked at MacFall, MacFall told her that if she was 

Kelly Timbers, she needed to admit that fact. MacFall testified 

that in response to these statements, appellant "came clean to me 

and said that she was actually Kelly Yvette Timbers." A 

reasonable observer would view MacFall's statements as designed 

to elicit appellant's incriminating statement that she was, in 

fact, Kelly Timbers. 

 B. 

Routine Booking Question Exception 

 The Commonwealth argues that Miranda warnings were 

unnecessary because MacFall's interrogation of appellant was an 

attempt to obtain accurate booking information pursuant to arrest 

and custody. In Innis, the Supreme Court of the United States 

defined the functional equivalent of interrogation as "any words 

or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally 

attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
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reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 

suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 

 Applying this definition, we held in Wright, 2 Va. App. at 

746, 348 S.E.2d at 12, that the police need not administer 

Miranda warnings prior to obtaining biographical information for 

a fingerprint card. In so holding, we reasoned as follows: 

 Under the facts presented here, we believe 

that [the defendant's] statement concerning 

his address [made on a fingerprint card] was 

obtained as a result of conduct normally 

attendant to arrest and custody. We also 

note the total absence of any evidence that 

the questioning here was intended or designed 

to produce an incriminating response. For 

these reasons, Miranda warnings were 

unnecessary. 

Id. As previously discussed, we adopted an interpretation of the 

Innis standard in Blain, 7 Va. App. at 15, 371 S.E.2d at 841, 

which governs our inquiry in this case: "whether an objective 

observer would view an officer's words or actions as designed to 

elicit an incriminating response." 

 In Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief 

of the United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (quoting United States 

v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989))), a 

four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court1 reiterated the Innis

 

 1Four justices found it "unnecessary to determine whether the 

questions fall within the 'routine booking question' exception to 

Miranda" recognized by the plurality. Id. at 608 (Rehnquist, 

C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and 

dissenting in part). The ninth justice rejected the "routine 

booking question" exception on the basis that the exception 

"would necessitate difficult, time-consuming litigation over 

whether particular questions asked during booking are 'routine,' 

whether they are necessary to secure biographical information, 
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"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" standard, 

but wrote that the answers to biographical questions asked during 

booking "fall within a 'routine booking question' exception which 

exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 

'"biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial 

services."'" In a footnote, the plurality wrote: "As amicus

United States explains, 'recognizing a "booking exception" to 

Miranda does not mean, of course, that any question asked during 

the booking process falls within that exception. Without 

obtaining a waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights, the police 

may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to 

elicit incriminatory admissions.'" Id. at 602 n.14 (plurality 

opinion) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae). 

 No Virginia court has addressed the viability or scope of a 

routine booking question exception in Virginia subsequent to 

Muniz. Assuming without deciding that a routine booking question 

exception exists in Virginia, MacFall's interrogation of 

appellant does not fall within the exception. Most importantly, 

MacFall did not confront appellant in the holding cell to clarify 

an ambiguity in her statements made during booking; rather, he 

sought to investigate what he believed to be false information. 

In addition, MacFall's statement that if appellant had given a 

 

whether that information is itself necessary for recordkeeping 

purposes, and whether the questions are--despite their routine 

nature--designed to elicit incriminating testimony." Id. at 608 

(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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false name, she needed to come forward with that information, can 

hardly be considered a routine booking question. Finally, 

MacFall's interrogation of appellant does not fall under a 

routine booking question because, under the standard in Blain, 7 

Va. App. at 15, 371 S.E.2d at 841, a reasonable observer would 

view MacFall's statements as designed to elicit appellant's 

incriminating statement that she was, in fact, Kelly Timbers. 

 C. 

 Inevitable Discovery 

 The Commonwealth argues that, notwithstanding a violation of 

Miranda, we should not apply the exclusionary rule in this case 

because the police inevitably would have discovered appellant's 

true identity. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984), the 

Supreme Court of the United States held that "if the government 

can prove that the evidence [obtained by illegal means] would 

have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been 

admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is 

no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury." We have 

explained the requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine: 

 the inevitable discovery exception requires 

that the prosecution show: "(1) a reasonable 

probability that the evidence in question 

would have been discovered by lawful means 

but for the police misconduct; (2) that the 

leads making the discovery inevitable were 

possessed by the police at the time of the 

misconduct, and (3) that the police also 

prior to the misconduct were actively 

pursuing the alternative line of 

investigation." 
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Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 656, 347 S.E.2d 175, 185 

(1986) (quoting United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th 

Cir. 1985)). 

 Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that because the 

police had appellant's fingerprints, they would have inevitably 

discovered appellant's true identity. No Virginia court has 

applied the inevitable discovery doctrine outside of the 

derivative "fruit of the poisonous tree" context. Furthermore, 

no Virginia court has applied the inevitable discovery doctrine 

to the suppression of a statement obtained in violation of 

Miranda. See Keeter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 134, 140 & n.2, 278 

S.E.2d 841, 845 & n.2 (1981) (noting in dicta that evidence 

seized after assumed illegal entry was not "fruit of the 

poisonous tree" because search warrant was in process of 

preparation); Warlick v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 263, 266, 208 

S.E.2d 746, 748 (1974) (explaining that inevitable discovery is 

an exception to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine); 

Commonwealth v. Ealy, 12 Va. App. 744, 758, 407 S.E.2d 681, 690 

(1991) (holding that consent to search a garage was fruit of 

illegal search, and rejecting claim that police would have 

inevitably searched the garage); Walls, 2 Va. App. at 656-57, 347 

S.E.2d at 185 (holding that consent to search a trailer was fruit 

of illegal entry, and rejecting claim that police would have 

inevitably searched the trailer). 

 Assuming without deciding that inevitable discovery analysis 
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applies in the context of a statement directly obtained in 

violation of Miranda, the Commonwealth has not carried its burden 

to prove the three Walls factors. The Commonwealth did not argue 

the inevitable discovery doctrine to the trial court. In 

addition, the Commonwealth did not present evidence at the 

hearing that the police were actively pursuing any alternative 

line of investigation into appellant's identity. The court 

specifically found credible MacFall's denial that he had told 

appellant he had sent an officer to Culpeper, Virginia, to obtain 

a photograph of her; this action was the only alternative line of 

investigation mentioned. Most importantly, the Commonwealth 

never presented any evidence that the police fingerprint cards 

would have established appellant's identity. We will not exempt 

the violation of appellant's Miranda rights from the exclusionary 

rule under these circumstances. 

 D. 

 Harmless Error 

 Finally, the Commonwealth argues that the Miranda error, if 

any, was harmless. A violation of Miranda is subject to review 

for harmless error. Pearson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 936, 945, 

275 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1981). In Virginia, constitutional error 

"is harmless only when the reviewing court is 'able to declare a 

belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 

Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d 910, 

911 (1991) (en banc) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
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24 (1967)). 

 We cannot say the trial court's error in admitting 

appellant's admission that she was Kelly Timbers rather than 

Gwendolyn Timbers was harmless. Appellant's admission to MacFall 

was the most important evidence admitted at appellant's trial for 

forgery on the issue of whether appellant's signature as Gwendy 

Timbers was, in fact, false. The only other evidence admitted at 

trial on the issue was MacFall's testimony that a person came 

into the sheriff's office and asked for Kelly Timbers. Without 

testimony as to appellant's admission, there would have been 

little evidence of the falsity of appellant's signature. Under 

these circumstances, we cannot declare a belief that the error, 

if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lavinder, 12 Va. 

App. at 1005, 407 S.E.2d at 911 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 

 Therefore, we reverse appellant's convictions because of the 

violation of her Miranda rights. Given our disposition of this 

issue, we need not reach appellant's argument that her statement 

to MacFall was the fruit of her illegal arrest. Notwithstanding 

the fact that we reverse for a Miranda violation, however, we 

address appellant's sufficiency of the evidence argument because 

the Commonwealth would be barred on double jeopardy grounds from 

retrying appellant if we were to reverse for insufficiency of the 

evidence. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 

(1978). 

 II. 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support 

her convictions for forgery because no evidence at trial proved 

that "Gwendy Timbers" was not her usual signature. "When the 

sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we must 

determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, and the reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible from that evidence, prove every essential 

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Stevenson v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 453, 459, 499 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1998) 

(citing cases), reh'g en banc granted, __ Va. App. __, __ S.E.2d 

__ (July 21, 1998). "We will not disturb a jury's verdict unless 

it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Id.

(citing George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 278, 411 S.E.2d 12, 

20 (1991)). 

 Code § 18.2-172, codifying the common law crime of forgery, 

provides that "[i]f any person forge any writing, . . . to the 

prejudice of another's right, . . . [she] shall be guilty of a 

Class 5 felony." Under the common law, forgery "is defined as 

'the false making or materially altering with intent to defraud, 

or any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal 

efficacy, or the foundation of legal liability.'" Fitzgerald v. 

Commonwealth, 227 Va. 171, 173-74, 313 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1984) 

(quoting Bullock v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 558, 561, 138 S.E.2d 

261, 263 (1964)). 
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 Essentially, appellant argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that her signature, "Gwendy Timbers," was 

false. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support an 

inference that appellant's signature was false. 

 While being fingerprinted, appellant told MacFall that her 

name was Gwendolyn Ann Timbers. Appellant signed the fingerprint 

card bearing the name Gwendolyn Ann Timbers with the signature, 

"Gwendy Timbers." The trial court was entitled to reasonably 

infer that "Gwendy" was a short form of "Gwendolyn." A woman 

brought clothing for appellant while appellant was incarcerated 

and referred to appellant as "Kelly." The trial court was 

entitled to infer from this evidence that appellant was commonly 

known as "Kelly" rather than "Gwendy." Finally, when confronted 

by MacFall, appellant admitted she was Kelly Timbers and not 

Gwendolyn Timbers. Cf. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41 

(1988) (holding that reviewing court should consider all admitted 

evidence, including illegally admitted evidence, in assessing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction). Given this 

evidence, the court was entitled to reasonably infer that 

appellant falsely signed the name "Gwendy" in conjunction with 

her provision of the false name "Gwendolyn." See Reid v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 468, 471-72, 431 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1993) 

(approving inference that defendant signed false name). The 

evidence, along with the reasonable inferences deducible 

therefrom, was sufficient to support appellant's convictions. 
 -19- 

 We reverse and remand for a new trial, if the Commonwealth 

be so advised. 

 Reversed and remanded.