IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 197A19

Filed 28 February 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: S.E., S.A., J.A., V.W.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 7 

March 2019 by Judge Wesley W. Barkley in District Court, Burke County. This 

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 5 February 2020 but 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

N. Elise Putnam for petitioner-appellee Burke County Department of Social 

Services.

Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by John E. Pueschel and Patricia I. Heyen, 

for respondent-appellee guardian ad litem.

Anné C. Wright for respondent-appellant mother.

HUDSON, Justice

Respondent-mother appeals from an order entered by the trial court 

terminating her parental rights to her children, S.E. (Sara), S.A. (Shanna), J.A. 

(Jacob), and V.W. (Vera).

1 After careful consideration of respondent-mother’s 

 

1 The minor children will be referred to throughout this opinion as “Sara,” “Shanna,”

“Jacob,” and “Vera,” which are pseudonyms used to protect the children’s identities and for 

ease of reading. The children also had an older sibling who was part of the underlying abuse, 

neglect, and dependency case but turned eighteen years old prior to the termination of 

parental rights case. 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W.

Opinion of the Court

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challenges to the trial court’s jurisdiction and conclusion that grounds exist to 

terminate her parental rights on the basis of her willful failure to pay a reasonable 

portion of the cost of care for the children during their placement in DHHS custody,

we affirm the trial court’s order.

On 26 June 2016, the Burke County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) 

obtained non-secure custody of Sara, Shanna, Jacob, and Vera, and filed a petition 

alleging they were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. DSS had received a 

report alleging Jerry A. had been physically assaulting the children.2 At the time of 

the filing the children were respectively, twelve, nine, eight, and two years old. DSS 

interviews with the children uncovered specific and repeated instances of physical 

abuse of the children and regular instances of domestic violence between respondentmother and Mr. A. Shanna also disclosed numerous instances of sexual abuse by Mr. 

A., of which she had informed respondent-mother and an aunt. Respondent-mother 

was questioned about the sexual abuse and initially denied knowing about it, but she 

subsequently admitted Shanna had told her about the abuse. DSS also learned 

respondent-mother and the children had been involved in a child protective services 

case in Oklahoma. Respondent-mother had temporarily left Mr. A., which led to the 

closure of the Oklahoma case. She then moved to North Carolina with the children, 

where she reconciled with Mr. A. 

 

2 Jerry A. is the biological father of Shanna and Jacob.
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After multiple continuances due to DSS’s difficulty serving the children’s 

fathers, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on 23 March 2017 and

entered its adjudication order on 18 April 2017. Respondent-mother and Mr. A. 

stipulated to the relevant facts and allegations in the petition, and the court found 

them to be true. The court found Mr. A. had physically abused Shanna, Jacob, and 

respondent-mother; and he had sexually abused Shanna on multiple occasions.

Respondent-mother knew about the physical and sexual abuse of the children and 

failed to protect them. Respondent-mother had been convicted of intentional child 

abuse inflicting serious injury on 2 November 2016. She was sentenced to a 

suspended term of 38 to 58 months imprisonment and placed on supervised probation 

for 24 months. Mr. A. had been convicted of first-degree statutory rape on 13 February 

2017. He was sentenced to an active term of 221 to 326 months imprisonment. The 

court adjudicated all the children to be abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles.

Disposition was continued, but the trial court kept custody of the children with DSS 

and suspended visitation with their parents. 

The trial court entered its dispositional order on 1 June 2017. The court found 

aggravated circumstances existed in that a parent sexually abused a child in the 

home while the other children were home and the respondent-mother allowed the 

abuse to occur. Reunification efforts were initially found not to be in the best interests 

of the children except for Vera, whose biological father had been located. DSS was in 

the process of completing a home-study under the Interstate Compact on the 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W.

Opinion of the Court

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Placement of Children (“ICPC”) on Vera’s father’s home to see if he would be an 

appropriate placement for her. The court continued custody of the children with DSS 

and directed DSS to provide respondent-mother with one two-hour visitation with the 

children, after which she was to have no further contact with them. DSS was also 

directed to identify and inform respondent-mother of programs that would assist her 

with the issues she was facing. The primary permanent plan for Vera was identified

as reunification with her father, with a secondary plan of guardianship. The primary 

permanent plan for Sara, Shanna, and Jacob was identified as adoption, with a 

secondary plan of guardianship.

The trial court conducted four permanency planning hearings from 18 May 

2017 to 9 August 2018. Respondent mother offered an out-of-state relative as a 

possible placement for the children, which required DSS to request and obtain a home 

study under the ICPC. In its orders from the first three hearings, the court 

consistently found the children may benefit by being adopted, but they were not free 

to be adopted due to the outstanding home studies of their relatives and Vera’s father. 

By the fourth hearing, however, the trial court found the ICPC home studies for 

Vera’s father and respondent’s relatives indicated their homes were not appropriate 

placements for the children. In its permanency planning order entered from the 9 

August 2018 hearing, the trial court set the primary permanent plan for Vera as 

adoption and the secondary permanent plan as reunification with her father. The 
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primary and secondary plans for Sara, Shanna, and Jacob remained adoption and 

guardianship. 

DSS filed a petition to terminate parental rights to the children on 27 

September 2018. As to respondent-mother, DSS alleged grounds existed to terminate

her parental rights on the bases of abuse, neglect, willfully leaving the children in 

foster care for more than 12 months without making reasonable progress to correct 

the conditions that led to their removal, willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion 

of the cost of care for the children during their placement in DHHS custody, and for 

committing a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to a child residing in 

the home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (8) (2017). After a hearing on 7 February 

2019, the trial court entered an order on 7 March 2019, terminating respondentmother’s parental rights to the children.3 The court concluded grounds existed to 

terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights on the bases of neglect, willfully 

leaving the children in foster care for more than 12 months without making 

reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal, and willfully 

failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children during their 

placement in DSS custody.4 The court further concluded terminating respondent-

 

3 Mr. A. relinquished his parental rights to Shanna and Jacob on 18 October 2018. 

The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the fathers of Sara and Vera. 

None of the fathers are parties to this appeal.

4 At the hearing, DSS elected not to proceed on N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(8). 
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Opinion of the Court

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mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent-mother 

appeals. 

Respondent-mother first argues the trial court’s order as to Sara is void for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and must be vacated.5 Respondent-mother 

contends the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Sara’s underlying juvenile 

case, because it failed to meet the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). See N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-201–204 (2017). She

argues an allegation in the initial juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency petition 

that one of the children reported child protective services in Oklahoma took the 

children out of her home put the trial court on notice there was a prior Oklahoma 

custody determination involving the children, which required the trial court to 

contact the Oklahoma court to determine if that court would cede jurisdiction to the 

North Carolina trial court. Respondent-mother’s arguments are misplaced.

“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law and cannot be 

conferred upon a court by consent. Consequently, a court’s lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction is not waivable and can be raised at any time.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 

345–46, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Nonetheless,

“where the trial court has acted in a matter, every 

 

5 Respondent-mother only challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over 

the juvenile case involving Sara and concedes the court had jurisdiction over the cases 

involving the other children. 
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presumption not inconsistent with the record will be

indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else 

appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of 

rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court 

of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, 

“[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction 

to show such want.”

In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707, 782 S.E.2d 502, 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. 

Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557, 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987) then quoting 

Williamson v. Spivey, 224 N.C. 311, 313, 30 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1944)). 

The UCCJEA applies to proceedings in which child custody is at issue,

including those involving juvenile abuse, neglect, dependency and termination of 

parental rights; and a trial court must comply with its provisions to obtain 

jurisdiction in such cases. See N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-102(4), -201(a)–(b) (2017). Generally, 

North Carolina courts have jurisdiction to make a child custody determination if 

North Carolina is the home state of the child. N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1). “ ‘Home state’ 

means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent 

for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a childcustody proceeding.” N.C.G.S. § 50A-102(7) (2017). If a court of another state has 

home state jurisdiction, North Carolina courts do not have jurisdiction unless one of 

several statutory exceptions applies. See N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(2)–(4).

Respondent-mother contends the allegations in the initial juvenile petition 

established that a prior child-custody determination had been made as to Sara in 
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Oklahoma6, and the trial court failed to take the requisite action under the UCCJEA 

to obtain jurisdiction over her case. Respondent-mother, however, relies on 

allegations and inferences to support her argument and has not met her burden of 

showing the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Sara’s case. She neglects to mention 

the finding of fact made by the trial court in its initial adjudication order, wherein 

the court found only Shanna was removed from respondent-mother’s custody by child 

protective services in Oklahoma. Furthermore, the respondent-mother stipulated to 

the court that the child protective services matter in Oklahoma had been closed, a 

fact she had a duty to disclose pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50A-209(a) (2017). Given these 

stipulations and other record facts, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that 

Oklahoma did not have continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 

Sara had lived with respondent-mother in North Carolina during the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the juvenile petition, and North Carolina 

was her home state. The record before us establishes the trial court thus had “home 

state” jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial child-custody determination 

regarding Sara. See N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1). The trial court’s orders granting DSS 

custody of Sara are not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and DSS had 

standing to file the petition to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to Sara

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3).

 

6 Oklahoma has also adopted the UCCJEA. See Okla. Stat. tit. 43 §§ 551-101–402

(2019).
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We next address respondent-mother’s argument that the trial court erred in 

concluding grounds exist to terminate her parental rights due to her willful failure to 

pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children although physically and 

financially able to do so, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). Respondent-mother 

concedes she paid nothing toward the cost of care for her children and could have 

done so but argues her failure to pay was not willful. She contends she did not know 

she could pay towards the cost of care for her children, did not know how to pay

towards the cost, and could not reasonably have been expected to do so. We disagree.

Termination of parental rights under the North Carolina Juvenile Code 

involves a two-stage process—an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. 

N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2017). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears 

the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one 

or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” 

In re A.U.D., 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (N.C. 2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2017)). 

“If a trial court finds one or more grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1111(a), it then proceeds to the dispositional stage,” id., where it “determines 

whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 

7B-1110(a) (2017).

At the time DSS filed its petition, a court could terminate parental rights upon 

finding that:

The juvenile has been placed in the custody of a county 
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department of social services . . . and the parent has for a 

continuous period of six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition or motion willfully failed to pay a 

reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile 

although physically and financially able to do so.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (Supp. 2018). The cost of care “refers to the amount 

it costs the Department of Social Services to care for the child, namely, foster care.”

In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 113, 316 S.E.2d 246, 254 (1984). “A parent is 

required to pay that portion of the cost of foster care for the child that is fair, just and 

equitable based upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.” In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 

604, 281 S.E.2d 47, 55 (1981).

Respondent-mother’s argument that she did not know she had to pay a 

reasonable portion of the cost of care for her children or how to do so is fundamentally 

without merit. The absence of a court order, notice, or knowledge of a requirement to 

pay support is not a defense to a parent’s obligation to pay reasonable costs, because 

parents have an inherent duty to support their children. See In re T.D.P., 164 N.C. 

App. 287, 289, 595 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2004) (citing In re Wright, 64 N.C. App. 135, 139, 

306 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1983) (“Very early in our jurisprudence, it was recognized that 

there could be no law if knowledge of it was the test of its application. Too, that 

respondent did not know that fatherhood carries with it financial duties does not 

excuse his failings as a parent; it compounds them.”)), aff’d per curiam, 359 N.C. 405, 

610 S.E.2d 199 (2005); see also In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 339, 274 S.E.2d 236, 

241 (1981) (holding “[a]ll parents have the duty to support their children within their 
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means . . . .”). Given her inherent duty to support her children, respondent cannot 

hide behind a cloak of ignorance to assert her failure to pay a reasonable portion of 

the cost of care for her children was not willful. Moreover, respondent-mother was on 

notice of her failure to pay something towards the cost of care for her children, as 

shown by the trial court’s repeated findings in each of its permanency planning orders 

that none of the respondent-parents were paying child support. 

In support of this ground to terminate respondent’s parental rights, the trial 

court found:

42. The respondent mother is an able bodied person 

capable of gainful employment and is capable of paying a 

sum greater than zero per month toward the support of the 

minor children during the six months prior to the filing of 

the petition to terminate her parental rights. The 

respondent is employed . . . and has been for over one year 

prior to the date of this hearing and earning at least $600 

to $700 per week.

43. During the six months prior to the filing of the 

petition to terminate parental rights, a period of time from 

March 27, 2018 through September 27, 2018, the 

respondent mother paid zero toward the support of the 

minor children.

44. A reasonable portion of the cost of care for the minor 

children for the respondent mother to have paid during the 

six months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate 

said respondent’s parental rights would have been an 

amount greater than zero per child per month.

Apart from her argument that she had no knowledge she was required to pay a 

reasonable portion of the cost of care for her children or how to do so, which we have
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rejected, respondent-mother does not challenge the evidentiary basis for these 

findings of fact. These findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence and are binding on appeal. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 

58 (2019) (citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)).

We hold that the findings in this case fully support the trial court’s conclusion that 

grounds exist to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights based upon her 

willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children during 

their placement in DHHS custody pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). The trial 

court’s conclusion that one ground existed to terminate parental rights “is sufficient 

in and of itself to support termination of [respondent-mother’s] parental rights[,]” In 

re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 413, 831 S.E.2d at 62, and we need not address her arguments 

challenging the remaining grounds. Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial 

court’s conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best 

interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondentmother’s parental rights to Sara, Shanna, Jacob, and Vera.

AFFIRMED.