RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2703-17T5

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL

COMMITMENT OF S.M.,

SVP-308-03.

_____________________________

Argued March 12, 2019 – Decided April 8, 2019

Before Judges Hoffman, Suter and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP-308-03.

Susan R. Silver, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant S.M. (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Susan R. Silver, of counsel 

and on the briefs).

Stephen J. Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Gurbir S. 

Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen J. 

Slocum, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant S.M., a sex offender who was civilly committed in 2003 to the 

Special Treatment Unit (STU) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act 

(SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38, appeals from a January 9, 2018 Law 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

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Division judgment continuing his commitment after a review hearing. We 

affirm.

Appellant's lengthy history of sexual offenses was recounted in this court's 

prior opinions upholding his commitment under the SVPA.1In 1986, appellant 

sexually assaulted an adult female at knifepoint in upstate New York, resulting 

in his conviction for attempted rape, assault and criminal possession of a 

weapon. In 1988, appellant was charged with sexually assaulting a different 

victim at knifepoint in Buffalo, New York, and entered into a plea agreement to 

a lesser charge of attempted burglary. In 1993, he was charged with aggravated 

sexual assault of another woman at knifepoint and pleaded guilty to a lesser 

charge of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

In 1997, appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted of the predicate 

offense of aggravated sexual assault, amended to sexual assault, of another 

victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3), along with a drug possession count, N.J.S.A. 

 

1

 See In re Civil Commitment of S.B.M., No. A-6426-04 (App. Div. Apr. 16, 

2007) (upholding appellant's initial commitment); In re Civil Commitment of 

S.B.M., No. A-2384-07 (App. Div. Sept. 3, 2008) (remanding the matter to a 

different judge for hearing); In re Civil Commitment of S.B.M., No. A-1703-08 

(App. Div. June 22, 2009) (upholding appellant's continued commitment); In re 

Civil Commitment of S.M., No. A-2105-09 (App. Div. June 2, 2010) (same); In 

re Civil Commitment of S.M., No. A-2623-12 (App. Div. Jan. 24, 2014) (same); 

In re Civil Commitment of S.M., No. A-0027-15 (App. Div. Dec. 7, 2015) 

(same).
3

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2C:35-10(a)(1). He was sentenced to a ten-year term at the Adult Diagnostic 

and Treatment Center (ADTC). Appellant does not contest he has engaged in 

sexual offenses rendering him eligible for civil commitment under the SVPA.

Substantial motion practice preceded the most recent annual review 

hearing from which appellant now appeals. Appellant served respondent with a 

notice in lieu of subpoena seeking discovery of all documents relating to the 

creation of the Therapeutic Community at the STU.

2

 The trial court granted 

respondent's motion to quash the subpoena, but ordered respondent to provide 

appellant with any Therapeutic Community training materials or documents 

concerning the Therapeutic Community given to STU residents. The trial court 

found the majority of the documents sought were not relevant to the review 

hearing. The trial court noted appellant could challenge the propriety of the 

Therapeutic Community in a separate action. 

 

2

 In addition to numerous other documents, the notice in lieu of subpoena 

specifically requested production of the following: research that was considered 

on the effectiveness of Therapeutic Communities in treating sex offenders; 

internal memoranda about the establishment and governance of the Therapeutic 

Community at the STU; and internal correspondence among STU staff about the 

creation and maintenance of the Therapeutic Community.
4

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Thereafter, appellant served respondent with interrogatories and Dr. 

Tarmeen Sahni3 with a subpoena for oral testimony and production of the 

following information and documents: (1) "[r]esearch on which you relied in 

concluding Therapeutic Communities are effective therapeutic interventions for 

sex offenders;" (2) "[r]esearch on which you relied in concluding that [appellant] 

is highly likely to sexually reoffend if not confined to the [STU];" (3) "[r]esearch 

on which you relied in concluding that [appellant] must attend the Therapeutic 

Community at the STU in order to reduce his risk below the statutory threshold;" 

(4) "[t]he raw data for any tests you conducted of [appellant] in assessing his 

risk;" and (5) "[r]esearch on which you relied in determining what it means to 

complete treatment." 

Respondent advised appellant the discovery requests would not be 

answered, contending the discovery sought was not authorized by the SVPA or 

any court rule and the trial court denied appellant's prior request for many of 

these same documents. Appellant moved to compel the requested discovery. 

The trial court denied the motion, stating there is no right to depositions or 

interrogatories in SVPA proceedings. The trial court noted Rule 4:74-7(d)

 

3

 Dr. Sahni authored the most recent Treatment Progress Review Committee 

("TPRC") report. She did not testify during the review hearing.
5

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provides separate discovery requirements for civil commitment hearings. The 

trial court also noted the same discovery issue was frequently raised during the 

past sixteen years and rejected each time. We denied appellant's motion for 

leave to appeal from the two discovery orders. 

The trial court conducted a two-day review hearing in December 2017. 

The State presented two expert witnesses at the review hearing: Dr. Dean M. 

DeCrisce, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Nicole Paolillo, a psychologist who is a 

member of the TPRC at the STU. Appellant presented the expert testimony of 

a psychologist, Dr. Christopher P. Lorah. All of the mental health experts were 

deemed qualified to offer their opinions, and their written reports were admitted 

into evidence without objection. Appellant did not testify.

Dr. DeCrisce examined appellant and issued a report containing his 

findings. He relied, in part, on information from prior evaluations, but formed 

his own diagnostic impressions and opinions. Dr. DeCrisce diagnosed appellant 

with Antisocial Personality Disorder and Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder 

(Nonconsent). These dual diagnoses "contribute[] to the overall offense 

dynamics of essentially an individual that takes what he wants when he wants it 

whenever he wants it." Notably, appellant admitted in the past to arousal to fear 
6

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of his victims, the desire to punish and humiliate a victim, and masturbating to 

fantasies of rape. Appellant also exhibited impulsivity and poor judgment.

Dr. DeCrisce noted appellant was hostile and resistant in treatment and 

did not gain mastery of any treatment concepts while incarcerated at the ADTC. 

Early on during his commitment to the STU, appellant was hostile, verbally 

assaultive towards peers, and uncooperative and was placed on treatment 

probation in 2006 to 2007. He has, however, made progress over the years. In 

2008, he was recommended for Phase III of treatment, appeared less hostile than 

in the past, and had gained some understanding of his sexual dynamics. He 

exhibited the same personality characteristics but slightly attenuated. 

Beginning in 2011, appellant was recommended for placement in the 

Therapeutic Community at the STU in "an attempt to try [to] address some of 

[his] personality characteristics, which are considered dynamic factors that can 

contribute to sexual reoffense." By 2016, appellant still refused to participate 

in the Therapeutic Community despite being offered an accelerated six-month 

review if he participated in it. Appellant did not attend any self-help groups 

until 2017 and had not taken modules (didactic classes) for the past year.

The Therapeutic Community provides "a substantially higher and more 

intensive treatment level than is available in the regular groups." Approximately 
7

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seventy percent of the sexually violent predator programs in this country use 

components of the Therapeutic Community. Dr. DeCrisce opined participating 

in the Therapeutic Community would lower appellant's risk by "address[ing] his 

continued antisocial orientation and some of the charact[e]rological 

disturbances." He noted appellant did not appear to have "a substantial and 

extensive ability to relate his triggers, potential interventions, problems, 

shortcomings, and things of that nature."

Appellant admitted the coercive nature of the 1986 offense was sexually 

arousing. Dr. DeCrisce reviewed appellant's offense history and "pattern of 

offense behavior." He gave less weight to charges that did not result in

convictions. Dr. DeCrisce noted appellant also admits to the 1996 rape at 

knifepoint and to being aroused by the fear he put in the victim. Appellant 

admitted he was aroused to fear since he was a child. Dr. DeCrisce found 

appellant's criminal history significant, stating appellant had committed: 

at least two, if not three, admitted sexual offenses that 

are violent, using knives. He's admitted to arousal to 

fear. One of the offenses was to punish and humiliate 

a woman. He's had a history of consensual bondage 

play coercive behaviors in the past. And also has a 

severely violent and impulsive criminal history 

throughout his life.
8

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Dr. DeCrisce stated appellant's lifelong history of criminality was the 

basis for his diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder. He concluded 

appellant had "a particularly severe version of antisociality" "that is difficult to 

treat" as evidenced by his Psychopathy Checklist-Revised test (PCL-R) score of 

30, "which suggests that he meets the construct for psychopathy."4 Dr. DeCrisce

noted "people with higher PCL-R scores are more prone to violent behaviors." 

While acknowledging appellant is "improving and doing well in 

treatment," Dr. DeCrisce opined appellant remained a high risk to sexually 

reoffend unless confined in a secured treatment facility because he had not yet 

"achieved an adequate level of mitigation through treatment to adequately 

[m]itigate his high risk . . . for substantial community harm." He noted several 

actuarial instruments placed appellant at "a high risk of community sexual 

harm." Dr. DeCrisce opined the treatment gains made by appellant thus far were 

"not adequate to reduce that risk," but he may achieve "those gains if he goes to 

the therapeutic community, and does reasonably well."

 

4

 "The PCL-R test is a widely used method to measure psychopathic personality 

traits." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 206 (2001) (Baime, J., 

dissenting). A score of thirty is the cutoff for reliable classification as a 

psychopath. Ibid.
9

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Dr. Paolillo, a member of the TPRC, was admitted as an expert in 

psychology and the Therapeutic Community. She evaluated appellant as part of 

his annual TPRC review and prepared the TPRC's report and an addendum to 

the report, addressing appellant's "eligibility and need for exposure to the 

[Therapeutic Community]." Like Dr. DeCrisce, Dr. Paolillo considered the 

reports and diagnostic impressions of other evaluators, but formed her own 

diagnoses and opinions. She too diagnosed appellant with severe Antisocial 

Personality Disorder and Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder (Nonconsent), 

which caused him to have serious difficulty in controlling his sexual offending 

behavior and predisposed him to commit acts of sexual violence. She found 

appellant had a high risk of sexually reoffending in the foreseeable future. 

Dr. Paolillo reported actuarial instruments placed appellant in the "Well 

Above Average Risk Level IVb" under the Static-99R and "high level of 

dynamic needs" category under the Stable-2007.5 She noted appellant's scores 

 

5

 "The Static-99 is an actuarial test used to estimate the probability of sexually 

violent recidivism in adult males previously convicted of sexually violent 

offenses." In re Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 164 n.9 (2014) (citing 

Andrew Harris et al., Static-99 Coding Rules Revised-2003 5 (2003)). The 

Stable-2007 is an actuarial instrument used to assess dynamic risk factors that 

can change over time. Kevin Baldwin, Sex Offender Risk Assessment, 

Assessment and Planning Initiative 2-3 (July 2015), 

https://www.smart.gov/pdfs/SexOffenderRiskAssessment.pdf. 
10 A-2703-17T5

on the PCL-R "suggest that he meets the clinical threshold for the construct of 

psychopathy" and "has a high number of psychopathic traits which require 

therapeutic attention and which may interfere with therapeutic progress." His 

PCL-R score "results in the 'severe' qualifier" on his Antisocial Personality 

Disorder diagnosis. 

Dr. Paolillo noted appellant was in "the initial stage of the core phase of 

treatment." The Therapeutic Community is "a more advanced subset" of the 

core phase of treatment. She opined appellant requires "a more intense exposure 

to treatment." While appellant can advance in treatment without participating 

in the Therapeutic Community, his "progress will occur more slowly," as it had 

"for so many years."6 

Dr. Lorah acknowledged appellant's offenses, including those he was not 

convicted of, have clinical significance even when the individual denies 

committing them. As did the State's experts, Dr. Lorah diagnosed appellant with 

Antisocial Personality disorder and Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder 

(Nonconsent). Dr. Lorah confirmed both of these conditions predispose 

 

6

 The Therapeutic Community is not mandatory. As noted by Dr. Paolillo in 

her addendum report: "Entry or exposure to the Therapeutic Community is not 

a preliminary requirement to attaining discharge candidacy . . . ." Committees 

are recommended for the Therapeutic Community on an individual basis. They

must then apply to participate in the Therapeutic Community. 
11 A-2703-17T5

appellant to sexually reoffend. He also agreed the combination of these

conditions is among the most robust predictors of reoffense. 

Despite these findings, Dr. Lorah opined appellant had received "enough 

in treatment at the STU to address the emotional, cognitive, and/or volitional 

aspects of the statute and that he would be less than highly likely to commit a 

sexual offense if released to the community under a conditional discharge." He 

concluded appellant "has a firm understanding of his offense cycle, and . . . has 

addressed cognitive distortions and justifications that supported his sex crimes." 

He found appellant is "learning how to control his anger," and is "developing an 

understanding of victim empathy." He also opined appellant is highly likely to 

comply with a conditional discharge plan based on his behavior and compliance 

with recommendations during the past seven years at the STU. Notably, 

appellant's refusal to participate in the Therapeutic Community did not factor 

into Dr. Lorah's opinion. 

Based on appellant's treatment knowledge and impact, Dr. Lorah opined 

appellant is "less than highly likely" to reoffend if released on a conditional 

discharge. In reaching that conclusion, Dr. Lorah noted actuarial assessments 

do not alone accurately predict risk of re-offense. 
12 A-2703-17T5

The trial court issued a lengthy oral decision recounting appellant's 

offense history and the voluminous record. It emphasized it was not relying on 

hearsay to support its conclusions, but noted the State's witnesses were permitted 

"to utilize and to rely upon TPRC reports, treatment notes, juvenile presentence 

reports, [and] clinical certificates supporting the petition." The trial court found 

the documents relied upon by the experts are the kind of documents relied upon 

by experts in the field of performing risk assessments. The trial court also noted

reports by STU teams are business records admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). 

The trial court focused on treatment effect. It credited the State's experts'

shared conclusion that, although appellant had progressed, he still needs further 

treatment progress to justify a conditional release. In that regard, appellant "still 

needs to show the integration that he's made, the internalization that he's made 

of what he's learned." The court further credited the State's experts' conclusions

that appellant exhibited a number of characteristics that militate against such a 

finding. The court concluded appellant should participate in the Therapeutic 

Community, finding the State's experts were in a much better position than Dr. 

Lorah to evaluate appellant's need for the Therapeutic Community. 

The trial court noted it was undisputed appellant suffered from Antisocial 

Personality Disorder and Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder (Nonconsent) and 
13 A-2703-17T5

has psychopathic traits. The trial court found the State proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that: (1) appellant suffers from a mental abnormality and a 

personality disorder, which predispose him to sexually reoffend; (2) if released, 

appellant would have serious difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior 

within the reasonably foreseeable future; and (3) appellant is highly likely to 

engage in acts of sexual violence if he were released at this time. The trial court

entered judgment continuing appellant's involuntary civil commitment to the 

STU. This appeal followed. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the State did not meet 

its burden of proof since its expert quantified appellant's sexual recidivism as 

no higher than 36.3 percent; (2) the trial court erred by considering information 

outside the record and misapplying the standard for commitment; (3) the trial 

court erred by adopting an interpretation of the "highly likely" standard that 

considered victim impact; (4) the court rules authorize a committee to engage in 

discovery through depositions, document requests, and interrogatories; (5) the 

trial court's decision was based on inadmissible hearsay; (6) the State's experts 

were unqualified to testify as fact or expert witnesses on the Therapeutic 

Community; and (7) the State's experts rendered inadmissible net opinions 
14 A-2703-17T5

regarding the need for continuing commitment. We have considered these 

arguments and find they lack merit.

We first address appellant's argument that he was entitled to engage in 

discovery through interrogatories, deposing a member of the TPRC, and 

production of documents pertaining to the Therapeutic Community. He 

contends, as a civil litigant, his right to discovery is governed by Rules 4:10-1 

and -2, which permit parties in civil cases to undertake discovery through 

interrogatories, depositions, and requests for production of documents. Relying 

on an unpublished opinion,7appellant further contends Rule 4:74-7(d) does not 

deprive him of the right to conduct the requested discovery in an SVPA 

proceeding. We are unpersuaded by this argument. 

Appellate courts "normally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery 

matters." Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 559 (1997). We "apply an 

abuse of discretion standard to decisions made by . . . trial courts relating to 

matters of discovery." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 

344, 371 (2011) (citing Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 428 (2006)). 

 

7

 "No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any 

court." R. 1:36-3. Indeed, unreported decisions "serve no precedential value, 

and cannot reliably be considered part of our common law." Trinity Cemetery

Ass'n v. Twp. of Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 48 (2001) (Verniero, J., concurring). 
15 A-2703-17T5

Ordinarily, "we decline to interfere with discretionary rulings involving 

discovery unless it appears that an injustice has been done." Cunningham v. 

Rummel, 223 N.J. Super. 15, 19 (App. Div. 1988). 

We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying appellant's 

motion to compel discovery through interrogatories, depositions, and document 

demands, but reach that conclusion on different grounds than the trial court. See

State v. Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 416 (App. Div. 2011) (stating an appellate 

court is "free to affirm the trial court's decision on grounds different from those 

relied upon by the trial court"). 

We begin our analysis by noting appellant received substantial discovery 

from the State. The State timely provided all of appellant's treatment records, 

treatment notes, and its experts' reports and curriculum vitae. 

The trial court concluded discovery in civil commitment hearings is 

limited by Rule 4:74-7(d) to a "right to inspect and copy all records relating to 

the patient's mental condition, including the patient's clinical chart." The SVPA 

and the court rules are silent as to the nature and extent of discovery available 

to a sexually violent predator, other than the right under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(a) 

to review the documents resulting in the temporary commitment. We decline to 

apply Rule 4:74-7 to SVPA proceedings "because the rule predates the SVPA 
16 A-2703-17T5

and by its terms it applies to civil commitments generally, incorporating the 

definitions in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2." In re Commitment of G.D., 358 N.J. Super. 

310, 316 (App. Div. 2003) (citing R. 4:74-7(a)).

Even so, the statutory procedures are far more circumscribed than other 

types of civil proceedings. A civil committee under the SVPA does not have 

the right to trial by jury. In re Civil Commitment of G.G.N., 372 N.J. Super. 42, 

46 (App. Div. 2004) (citing In re Civil Commitment of J.H.M., 367 N.J. Super. 

599, 606-07 (App. Div. 2003)). Nor does a civil committee have the right to 

review the report prepared for the Department of Corrections' use in determining 

whether he should be referred to the Attorney General for civil commitment 

proceedings. Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257 (App. 

Div. 2006). In addition, the SVPA requires a final hearing within twenty days 

of the temporary commitment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(a). Meeting that deadline 

would not be possible if the committee were permitted to propound 

interrogatories and conduct depositions. 

The SVPA took effect in August 1999. L. 1998, c. 71, § 1. No published 

opinion during the intervening nineteen years recognizes the right to engage in 

such discovery. Nor has the Supreme Court adopted specific SVPA discovery 
17 A-2703-17T5

rules. Such considerations "are more appropriately the subject of evaluation by 

the Civil Practice Committee." G.D., 358 N.J. Super. at 317.

We further note trial courts may limit discovery on motion of a party or 

on its own initiative. R. 4:10-2(g). Not only did appellant have possession of 

the treatment records, treatment notes, and expert reports prior to the hearing, 

but both of the State's experts were extensively cross-examined by defense 

counsel. Thus, appellant suffered no unfair prejudice as a result of the discovery 

limitation imposed by the trial court. 

That being said, we recognize "committees have the right to present 

evidence" at review hearings "on the issue of whether or not they have been 

receiving appropriate treatment." In re Civil Commitment of K.D., 357 N.J. 

Super. 94, 98 (App. Div. 2003). The SVPA charges the Division of Mental 

Health Services with providing treatment for the committee. Id. at 98-99. "Such 

treatment shall be appropriately tailored to address the specific needs of sexually 

violent predators." Id. at 99 (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(b)). Consequently, 

courts have the inherent power to examine the conditions of confinement and

treatment recommended for an SVPA committee. Ibid. Nevertheless, a review 

hearing is not the proper proceeding to challenge a sex offender's treatment 

program. Ibid. As we stated in K.D.:
18 A-2703-17T5

We certainly do not suggest that any individual 

commitment review hearing be converted into a 

challenge to the sexual offender's treatment program 

available routinely to the general population of 

committees at the [STU]. Such a challenge must be 

brought in a plenary individual or class action in the 

regular trial courts, state or federal, and not in a 

particular committee's individual initial or annual 

review hearing under the SVPA, the purpose of which 

is to decide if confinement under the SVPA and [In re 

Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109 (2002)] standards 

is proper.

[Ibid.]

The Therapeutic Community is in regular use at the STU. According to Dr. 

Paolillo, it is utilized at the STU "to support[] the treatment needs of those 

[r]esidents who present with sexual preoccupation, antisocial and/or addictive 

behaviors."8 

The trial court expressly stated appellant could challenge the 

appropriateness of the Therapeutic Community in a separate action. We agree. 

Although appellant has the right to challenge his treatment program, including 

the recommended Therapeutic Community, he must do so in a separate plenary 

 

8

 The Therapeutic Community is also part of the sex offender treatment program 

at the ADTC, G.G.N., 372 N.J. Super. at 47, and is used at correctional facilities 

to treat "inmates with moderate to extreme substance use disorders," N.J.A.C. 

10A:24-1.3. 
19 A-2703-17T5

action, not in a review hearing. Appellant can pursue the types of discovery he 

sought in this matter in such a plenary action. 

In a single sentence unsupported by case law, appellant further contends

the trial court's limitation on discovery violated his right to due process. 9 We 

disagree. Appellant will be afforded full due process if he brings a separate 

plenary action to challenge his treatment plan, including the right to obtain 

relevant discovery through the methods permitted under Rules 4:10-1 and -2. 

For these reasons, the trial court's discovery limitation did not violate appellant's 

due process rights.

Appellant further argues the State's experts offered inadmissible net 

opinions. We disagree.

"When reviewing an evidentiary ruling whether to bar expert testimony, 

we apply considerable deference to the trial court and generally do not disturb 

the trial court's decision unless the ruling demonstrably comprises an abuse of 

discretion." In re Civil Commitment of A.Y., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. 

Div. 2019) (slip op. at 24) (citing Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 16 (2008)).

 

9

 "[P]arties may not escape their initial obligation to justify their positions by 

specific reference to legal authority. Paucity of such reference suggests a like 

paucity of authority helpful to the party." State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294, 

296 (App. Div. 1977); see also Sackman v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 445 N.J. 

Super. 278, 298-99 (App. Div. 2016). 
20 A-2703-17T5

"An expert may not provide an opinion at trial that constitutes 'mere net 

opinion.'" Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 410 (2014) 

(quoting Pomerantz, 207 N.J. at 372). The net opinion rule bars admission "of 

an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data." 

Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53-54 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 

196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)). "The expert must provide the factual basis and 

analysis that support the opinion, rather than stating a mere conclusion." A.Y., 

(slip op. at 25) (citing Davis, 219 N.J. at 410). "[T]he net opinion doctrine 

requires experts to 'be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions, 

explain their methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the 

methodology are [scientifically] reliable.'" Id. at 26. (quoting Townsend, 221 

N.J. at 55). 

Both of the State's experts interviewed appellant and relied on prior 

evaluations, treatment records, other appropriate documents, including actuarial 

instruments, which supported their conclusions. Appellant contends the trial 

court's decision was based on inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

"[T]o the extent the information the experts relied upon is of a type 

reasonably relied upon by experts in that field, the State can prove the grounds 

for commitment without calling as a witness each person who provided 
21 A-2703-17T5

information upon which the expert relied." Id. at 21 (citing In re Civil 

Commitment of W.X.C., 407 N.J. Super. 619, 641 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd on 

other grounds, 204 N.J. 179 (2010)).

10

 "Prior expert opinions are admissible, 

not as substantive evidence, but as a basis for the expert's opinion." Id. at 22 

(citing In re Commitment of E.S.T., 371 N.J. Super. 562, 576 (App. Div. 2004)).

The State's experts provided the factual bases for their conclusions and 

explained the methodologies they employed. Their testimony confirmed their 

opinions were based on a review of data and information of the type relied upon 

by others in their scientific community. Although their conclusions differ from 

those of Dr. Lorah, the trial court properly determined they did not render net 

opinions. 

The applicable law and our scope of review is well settled. Involuntary 

civil commitment under the SVPA can follow an offender's completion of a 

custodial sentence when he or she "suffers from a mental abnormality or 

personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual 

violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." 

 

10

 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution does not apply to civil commitment hearings under the SVPA. 

G.G.N., 372 N.J. Super. at 57 (citing Commonwealth v. Given, 808 N.E.2d 788, 

794 n.9 (2004)). 
22 A-2703-17T5

N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. The SVPA defines "mental abnormality" as "a mental 

condition that affects a person's emotional, cognitive or volitional capacity in a 

manner that predisposes that person to commit acts of sexual violence." Ibid.

The mental abnormality or personality disorder "must affect an individual's 

ability to control his or her sexually harmful conduct." W.Z., 173 N.J. at 127. 

A showing of an impaired ability to control sexually dangerous behavior will 

suffice to prove a mental abnormality. Id. at 129; see also R.F., 217 N.J. at 173-

74.

At an SVPA commitment hearing, the State has the burden of proving the 

offender poses a threat:

to the health and safety of others because of the 

likelihood of his or her engaging in sexually violent 

acts. . . . [T]he State must prove that threat by 

demonstrating that the individual has serious difficulty 

in controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is 

highly likely that he or she will not control his or her 

sexually violent behavior and will reoffend.

[W.Z., 173 N.J. at 132.]

The court must address the offender's present "serious difficulty with 

control over dangerous sexual behavior." Id. at 132-33. To commit or continue 

the commitment of the individual to the STU, the State must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that it is highly likely the individual will sexually 
23 A-2703-17T5

reoffend within the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 133-34; see also R.F., 

217 N.J. at 173. Because commitment under the SVPA is based on "present

serious difficulty with control over dangerous sexual behavior," the "annual 

court review hearings on the need for continued involuntary commitment" 

require assessment of "fresh information concerning the committee's 

dangerousness." W.Z., 173 N.J. at 132-33. 

The trial court correctly applied these standards to the evidence adduced 

at the 2017 review hearing. The testimony of the State's experts clearly 

demonstrates appellant continues to have mental abnormalities that pose a 

serious danger that he will sexually reoffend if released from the STU. Although 

Dr. Lorah opined appellant was not highly likely to sexually reoffend, the trial 

court is "not required to accept all or any part of" an expert's opinion. R.F., 217 

N.J. at 174 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 61 (1996)). The trial court had a 

reasonable basis to credit the testimony of the State's experts over the more 

positive opinions expressed by Dr. Lorah. See Angel v. Rand Express Lines, 

Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86 (App. Div. 1961) (recognizing the fact-finder's 

prerogative to accept the opinions of certain testifying experts and to reject 

competing opinions of an opposing expert). Moreover, "[t]he ultimate 
24 A-2703-17T5

determination is 'a legal one, not a medical one, even though guided by medical 

expert testimony.'" R.F., 217 N.J. at 174 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 59).

Appellant argues the State failed to meet its burden of proof because the 

actuarial instruments used by the State's psychiatrist quantified appellant's risk

of sexually reoffending at less than fifty percent. We disagree. 

In W.Z., the trial court and the Appellate Division viewed the likelihood 

determination "as if comparable to a preponderance, or fifty-one percent chance 

of probability." W.Z., 173 N.J. at 131 (citing In re Commitment of W.Z., 339 

N.J. Super. 549, 578-80 (App. Div. 2001)). Our Supreme Court rejected this 

description of the probability of reoffending standard, stating "[t]hose 

descriptions can cause confusion where the parties must present and the trial 

court must evaluate difficult, nuanced medical evidence and reduce it to specific 

findings affecting a person's liberty." Id. at 132. 

"[I]n cases where lack of control is at issue, 'inability to control behavior' 

will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision." Kansas v. Crane, 534 

U.S. 407, 413 (2002). The Supreme Court declined to establish a precise 

standard for the degree of "lack of control" that must be proven. Ibid. "Our 

Supreme Court likewise did not impose a technical meaning or quantitative 

threshold, holding 'the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence . . . it 
25 A-2703-17T5

is highly likely that the person will not control his or her sexually violent 

behavior and will reoffend.'" A.Y. (slip op. at 27) (alteration in original) 

(quoting W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133-34). 

Actuarial instruments "are admissible for consideration by the State's 

experts" at SVPA proceedings "as a factor in the overall prediction process." In 

re Commitment of R.S., 339 N.J. Super. 507, 534, 548 (App. Div. 2001), aff'd, 

173 N.J. 134 (2002). Although properly considered as part of the calculus of 

information, the quantification of the risk of sexually reoffending provided by 

actuarial instruments is not controlling. On the contrary, actuarial information 

is "simply a factor to consider, weigh, or even reject, when engaging in the 

necessary factfinding under the SVPA." R.F., 217 N.J. at 164 n.9 (quoting R.S., 

173 N.J. at 137).

Our scope of review of judgments in SVPA commitment cases is 

"extremely narrow." R.F., 217 N.J. at 174 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 58). "The 

judges who hear SVPA cases generally are 'specialists' and 'their expertise in the 

subject' is entitled to 'special deference.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Civil Commitment 

of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 2007)). "We give deference to 

the findings of our trial judges because they have the 'opportunity to hear and 

see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court 
26 A-2703-17T5

cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). 

"Accordingly, an appellate court should not modify a trial court's determination 

either to commit or release an individual unless 'the record reveals a clear 

mistake.'" Id. at 175 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 58). "So long as the trial court's 

findings are supported by 'sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' 

those findings should not be disturbed." Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162); 

see also In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 197 N.J. 563, 597 (2009). 

Although appellant has exhibited some progress in the years following his 

review hearing in May 2015, we are satisfied the trial court's order of continued 

commitment is both legally sound and supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record. 

Appellant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.