The c harg e def ined the ter

m “due dilig ence ” as “ that standard of d i l i gen ce to procure 1 service which an or dinaril y prudent pe rson would have used under the same or

simil ar 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 204 -CV

Cha r le s Hul l , A ppe lla nt

v. Abel Dutch Vidaurri , Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO.2 O F TRAVIS COUNTY NO. C-1- CV-05 -28 3889 , HO NORAB LE ERIC SHEP P ERD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N
I nteg ral to our sy stem of justice is r eliance upon the fa ct-finde r to resolve disputed issues of fa ct. Se e J

aff e Ai rc raft Cor

p. v . Ca rr , 867 S.W .2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1993). Be cause the
ma jor ity mis a pp lie s th e sta

nd ard of re vie w, ste ps int o th e sh oe s o f t he fa c t- fi nd e r, and

su bs tit ute s it s
ow n ju dg me nt f

or tha t of the jur y on a qu e sti on of fa c t, I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. The majority

asser ts that this case turns on whether Vidaurr i e x erc ised due dilig ence in serving Hull after

the limitations period e x pired. Af ter c onsidering the evidenc e and testimony prese nted at trial, the jury considere d the following question:
Fr om Febr

uary 23, 2005 when the pe tition was filed throug h September 6, 2005 the date the pe tit ion

wa s se rv e d, did

Pla int if f A be l V ida ur ri e xer c ise du e dil igen c e to h a v e D e f e n d an tC h ar l e s H u l l s e r

v e d w i t h t h e o r i g i n a l p e t i t i o n ?[ ] 1c ir c ums tanc e s. Th e du ty to exe rc ise du e dil ig e nc e in s e rv ic e of pr oc e ss o f t

he Or ig ina l Pe tit ion

is a continuous one be g inning on the da te suit is filed until the petition is served.”

2 The jury answe red this question in the aff irmative. On appe al, Hull challeng es t h e le g a l and fa ctual suff

iciency of the e vidence to support the jur y ’s ve rd ic t on this iss ue . Whe n re vie wi ng the jur y ’s fi nd ing s for

le g a l su ff ic ie nc y , th e su

pr e me
c ourt ha s in str uc te d th a t w e mus t vi e w the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht mos t fa

vo ra ble to the jur

y ’s ve rd ic t,
cre diting fa

vorable evidenc e if a

reas o n ab l e fact-f

inder c ould, and disreg ardingcontra ry evidenc e unless a re asonable fac t-finder could not. City of Keller v

. W ilson , 1 6 8 S. W. 3 d

8 0 2 , 8 0 7 ( T e x. 2005). The te st for leg al suffic iency is whether the evidenc e would enab l e re as o nable a nd fair- minded people to r eac h the judgme nt be ing revie wed. Id
. at 8 2 7 -2 8 . I n conductinga leg al sufficie ncy revie w, we presume that the jur y made a ll inferenc es in favor of their ve rdict. Id. at 821. I n revie wing the factual sufficiency of t he evidence, we consider and weig h all of t he evidence in the
rec ord, and w e may

overturn a judgme nt only if it is so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the e v i d en ce as t o be cle arly wrongand manife stly

unjust. Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (T e x. 19 86 ); Dyson v . Olin Corp. , 6 9 2 S
. W
. 2 d 4 5 6 , 4 5 7 ( T e x . 1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g In re Kin g’ s E sta te , 244 S.W .2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951)). F urther, w hen re viewing a jury verdic t for leg al and f

actua l sufficie n c y , w e mu s t r e me mb e r th a t it is th e ju r y
— n o t an a p p e ll a te c o u rt s itti n g in r e v ie w o f the jury ’s ver dict—that is the sole judg e of the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s and the we ight to be g iven their t estimony
. See G olden Eagle Arc hery v . Jack son , 116 S.W .3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). As the trier of fac t, the jury may resolve inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses and may believe one witness and not a

nother. See M

cGalliard v. Kuhlmann , 722 S.W .2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).3 When, as here , a defe ndant raises the defe nse of limit ations and the plaintiff provides an explanation to justi fy

a dela y in service , Tex as co u rts have c onsistently rec og nized that the question of the plaintiff’ s diligenc e in eff ecting service is one of fac t for the f act- finder to r esolve. Se e Pr ou lx

v . W e lls , 235 S.W .3d 213, 216 (Tex. 2007) (whe ther plaintiff’ s expl anation demonstrates dil ig e nc e wa s a

fa c t qu e sti on

fo r t he tr ie r of fa c t) ; W ebster v. Thomas , 5 S. W. 3 d 2 8 7 , 2 8 9

- 9 0 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14t

h Di st. ] 1 99 9, no pe t.) ; Eichel v . Ullah , 831 S.W. 2d 42 , 44 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 1992, no writ). In as s essi ng diligenc e, the r eleva nt inquiry is whether the plaintiff ac ted as a n ordinarily prudent pe rson would have ac t ed under the same or

simil ar c ircumstance s and wa s d i l i gen t up until the tim e the de fenda nt was ser

ved. Pr ou lx , 2 35 S.W. 3d a t 21 6; see Tate v . Beal , 11 9 S. W.3 d 3 78 , 3 81 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 3, pe t. d e nie d)
. A pla int if f is not re qu ir e d to us e the hig he st de g re e of dil ig e nc e in or de r t o to ll the statut e of lim itatio ns ; he ne e d o nly sh owthat hi s actions and e ffor

ts to serve the de fenda

nt wer e reasonably

diligent. Se e Pr ou lx , 235 S.W .3d at 216;

se e als o M

ar tin e z v . B e c e rra , 797 S.W .2d 283, 284-85 (Tex. A pp.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); Beav ers v. Darling , 491 S.W .2d 711, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.—W aco 1973, no w rit).

As set forth in the majority opinion, there wa s conflicting evidenc e pre sented at trial on the question of due dilig ence . Ba rbar a Stinnet, the p ro ce s s s erver hire d by Vidaurr i, and Chr is Mo rg an, an atto rn e y wh o r e pr e se nte d H ull on

a n unr e la te d matte r, te sti fi e d o n b e ha lf of Hu ll. I n support of his claim that h e ex er cis ed due dilig ence , Vidaurr i presente d the testimony of De bo ra h F os te r, a

para le g a l f

ro m th e law f

ir m w ho re pr e se nte d V ida ur ri . In a dd iti on

to t he se witnesses, Hull te stified that he was in jail at the time Vidaur ri filed suit and that he move d to Dallas upon his relea se. Hull also testified that, since the ac cident, h e n ever lived any wher e long er tha

nI t is not surprising that the majority relies heavily on the t estimony of Morg an and Stinnet 2 to support its co n cl u s ion that Viduarri did not exercise due diligenc e bec ause the se we re the two witnesses who testified at trial in support of Hull’s claim that there was a lack of due dilig ence . But e ve n if on e accep ts the te sti mony of Mo rg an a

nd Stinne t a s tr

ue , th e re is s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to support the jury ’s ver dict of due diligenc e. That the majority ref uses to view the e vidence in the light most favora

ble to t h i s v er d i ct demonst rate s the majority ’s complete f ailure to a

pply the prope r standard of

revie w. Th e maj ori ty ’s re lia

nc e on the “ e qu a l in fe re nc e ru le ” to d isc re dit the jur y ’s ve rd ic t is 3 misguided. Whil e the equal inferenc e rule does not allow a jury to infer e ither of two f

acts whe re circ umstances are equally consistent with both facts, see City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005), that rule is inapplicable here . Morg an’s testimony was undisputed that he r ece ived three phone calls in “ the summer of 2005” inquiring about servingHull. This testim ony is clear that Morg an re ceive d the phone c alls during the alleg ed four- month g ap as f ound by the majority . The 4 six months and that, while in Dallas, he lived w ith friends i n v ar i o u s m o t els. Hull stated that he
wo uld pa y the fr ie nd s in

c a shor buy g ro c e ri e s a

nd that he ne ve r r e g ist e re d a s a mot e l g ue st. Hu ll also testified that he ha d worke d at var ious restaura nts in the Dallas ar ea, but none for long er tha n
a fe w m on ths
. B a s e d o n t h e t e s t i m o n y o f M o r g an a n d S t i n n e t , t h e m a

j o r i t y f i n d s t h a t th e re is a fo ur -m on th g a

p— be tw e e n M arc h 2 9, 20 05 , a nd Au g us t 1, 20 05 —in Vi da ur ri ’s e xplanatio n o f h is eff orts to serve H ull. I n so doing, the majority substitut es its own judgme nt f or that of the jury

and all but ignor es the re cord e vidence favor able to the jury ’s finding of due dilig ence . B ut c on tr a ry to 2 the ma jor ity ’s op ini on , the re c or d d e mon str a te s th e re wa s n o f our- mon th g a

p in Vi da ur ri ’s e ff or ts to l oc a te and

se rv e Hu ll. Mo rg an te sti fi e d th a t, a ft e r h is c on ve rs a ti on wi th Vida ur ri ’s a tto rn e y

in Marc h 2005, he re ceive d three phone ca lls inqui ring about serv i n g Hu l l an d that those ca lls were
re c e ive d “ in t

he int e rv e nin g tim e ” duri ng“ the su mme r o f 200 5” —i. e ., duri ngthe a lle g e d f our- mon th g a p a s f ou nd by th e maj or ity . B a se d o n th is und isp ute d te sti mony , th e jur y c ou ld h a ve ratio na lly inf e rr e d th a t th e re we re no un e xpla ine d g a ps in V idu arr i’ s e ff

or ts t o lo c a te and

se rv e Hu ll. 3jury was there fore entitled to inf er that these ca lls related to Viduar ri’s ef forts to serve Hull during the re levant time per iod. 5

I n addition, Foster te stified that the law f irm tried to call Hull seve ral times and that the fi rm ’s in- ho us e inv e sti g a tor tr ie d uns uc c e ssf

ull y to t ra c k d ow n H ull by

loo kin g fo r a

pa pe r t ra il and trying to f

ind an addr ess for H ul l based on his ce ll phone number. F oster stated that she dis c ov e re d la

te r t hat H ull “ ha d li ke fi ve dif fe re nt ad dr e sse s at the tim e and that on e of

the m w a s in jail.” Foster also testified that the law f irm’s in-house investig ator ra n “auto tra ck” se arc hes to try
and loc a te Hu ll a

nd that th e “ a

uto tr a c k s y ste m is us ual ly pr e tty de c e nt at he lpi ngus tr a c k p e op le down,” but “[w]e just weren’ t ge tting any results there .” B ased on this evidenc e, Iwould conclude that whether

Vidaurr i exercised due dilig ence in try ing to l o ca t e and serve H ull was a que stion of fa ct for the jur

y , not this C ourt, to resolve. Se e Pr ou lx , 235 S.W .3d at 216 (holding question of pla int if f’ s d ili g e nc e in e ff

e c tin g se rv ic e is g e ne ra lly on e of fa c t) ; see als o E l a m v . A rmstrong , No. 03-07-00565- CV, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 6227, at *9-11 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug
. 14, 2008, no pet.) (me m. op., not desig nated for publ ication) (finding que stion of due dilige nce w as question of fa ct that defe ated summary judgme nt de spite plaintiff’s inability to state fre quency

or extent of int e rn e t se arc he s f

or de fe nd ant) ; Lawrence v. G EIC O Ge n . Ins. Co. , N o . 0 1

- 0 7
- 0 0 8 7 3 , 2 0 0 9 T e x. App. L EXI S 5082, at *9-11 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] J uly 2, 2009, no pet.) (me m. op., not desig nated f

or publication) ( aff

irming tria l court’s f

inding of due dilige nce ba sed on lawy er’ s testimony that “not a sing le month . . . passed that something wasn’t be ing done ”). Th e ma jor ity , h ow e ve r, fa

ult s F os te r f

or no t “ pr ov id[i ng ] any

date s o r f ur the r d e ta ils for a ny of these a ctions” and f

or testifying inconsistently about which attorney s at the law f irm were6

actively trying to se rve H ull. Bu t t h e record is c lear that the law f

irm’s in-house investig ator wa s conducting auto trac k sear ches during the alleg ed four- month g ap identified by the majority , and the jury c o u ld h a v e in f

e r r e d f r o m F o s te r ’ s te s ti mo n y th a t St inn e t w a s n o t th e o n ly p e r s o n w o r k in g on trying to locate and se rve Hull and that the law firm’s in-house inve stigator was a ctively attempting to locate Hull duringt h e t i m e t h at S t i nnet was not. See City of Keller , 168 S.W .2d at 821 (pre suming that jury

drewall infere nces in fa

vor of its verdic t). I n addition, when conside ring whether Vi d au rr i wa s diligent in his eff orts to serve Hull, the majority

ref uses to acknow ledg e Hull’s own testimony , which deta iled his many chang es of addr ess during the rele vant time pe riod and his la ck of a perma nent job. Cf. Pr ou lx , 235 S.W .3d at 217 (c onsidering evidenc e that defenda nt was actively

avoiding service in determining whether pla int if f exe rc ise d due dil ig e nc e ); Martinez , 7 97 S.W. 2d a t 28 5 ( fi nd ingthat de fe nd ant’ s mu lti ple chang es of a ddress a

nd attempts to avoid service “we igh he avily in favor of

finding due dilige nce” ). Coupled with Foster’ s testimony that Hull “ had like five differ ent addre sses at the time and that one of them wa s in jail,” the jury could have inferr ed from Hull’s testimony that he wa s actively

avoiding service or, at a

minimum , was at t em p t ing to c oncea l his wherea bouts. See City of Keller , 16 8 S. W.2 d at 82 1; see also Martinez , 7 97 S.W. 2d a t 28 5 ( fi nd ingthat c on c e a lme nt w e ig hs he a vil y in favo r of fi nd ing du e dil ig e nc e ); Be av e rs , 491 S.W .2d at 714 (“ we c annot say as a matter of law that P lai nt if

f- Ap pe lla nt f a ile d to e xer c ise du e dil ig e nc e ” in e ff e c tin g se rv ic e wh e re a tte mpt s at servic e we re thwa

rted beca

use def endant moved a

nd chang ed jobs without leaving forwa rding information).7 Rely ing on Ashley v. H

awkins , 2 93 S.W. 3d

17 5, 17 9 ( Te x. 20 09 ), the ma jor ity conclude s that Viduarr i’s explanation of his e ffor ts to serve Hull fa iled to demonstrate due diligenc e
as a ma tter o f la

w . I n th a t c a s e , th e c o u rt f o u n d mu lt ip le u n e xp la in e d g a p s o f e ig h t mo n th s and two months in t he plaintiff’ s eff orts to serve the defe ndant. Id. a t 18 0 & n. 6. Th e re c or d a lso sh ow e d th a t, d e sp ite havin g loc a te d th e de fe nd ant i n Ca lif or nia , it to ok th e pla int if

f a lmo st two months to accomplish service
. Id. a t 18 0 n.6
. Whil e a tw o- mon th de lay wo uld no t amou nt t o a lac k of due dilig ence as a matter of la w in most circumstance s, the supreme court e x plained that this ga p, coupled with a

n ear lier unexplained g ap of five months, amounted to a lack of due dilige nce
as a matter of law
. Id. I n c on tr ast , th e un dis pu te d te sti mony he re sh ow s n o une xpla ine d g a ps in Viduarr i’s eff

orts to se rve Hull. More importantly , there is no evidenc e that Viduar ri knew of Hull’s wh ere abouts prior to ac complishing substituted service . The majority ’s re liance on Ashley is there fore inapposite.

Ba sed on the evidenc e in the rec ord befor e us and viewingthis evidence in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t, I would conclude that a rea sonable jury could have found that Vidaur ri
a c te d a s a re a so na bly pr ud e nt p e rs on

wo uld have a c te d a

nd that V ida ur ri a c te d d ili g e ntl y

un til Hu ll
was ser ved. Althoug h the majority finds that the issue of due dilig ence in this case is a que stion of law, it i s c le ar f

ro m th e state of the re c or d be fo re us that the ma jor ity ins te a d h a s c ho se n s imp ly to disreg ard the jury ’s ver dict, step into the shoes of the f act- finder, a

nd re- weig h the evidenc e in favor of Hu ll. B e c a

us e the ma

jor ity ha s e ff e c tiv e ly us urp ed th e rol e of

the jur y and ha s su bs tit ute d it s judgme nt for t h at o f t h e j u ry on a question of f

act we ll within t he jury ’s province to resolve, I
re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.8 __________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Filed: January

22, 2010