UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOYCE HENDERSON,

Plaintiff, 

v.

AMERICAN EAGLE PROTECTIVE

SERVICES CORPORATION,

Defendant.

No. 19-cv-1765 (EGS)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Joyce Henderson (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Henderson”)

brings this action against Defendant American Eagle Protective 

Services Corporation (“Defendant” or “AEPS”) alleging 

discrimination on the basis of sex/gender under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et 

seq., (Count I) and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. 

Code § 2-1402.11, et seq., (Count III); and retaliation in 

violation of Title VII (Count II) and the DCHRA (Count IV). 

Pending before the Court is AEPS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Ms. 

Henderson’s: (1) gender discrimination claims under Title VII 

and DCHRA arising from a hostile work environment; and (2) 

gender discrimination claims under Title VII and the DCHRA

arising from a discriminatory pay differential.1 Upon careful 

 

1 Defendants updated the claims for which they seek dismissal 

based on Plaintiff’s clarification of her claims in her 

Opposition briefing. See Def.’s Reply, ECF 12-1.
2

consideration of the motion, the opposition, the reply thereto, 

the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court 

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART AEPS’s Partial Motion to 

Dismiss. 

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts reflect the allegations in the 

operative complaint, which the Court assumes are true for the 

purposes of deciding this motion and construes in Ms. 

Henderson’s favor. See Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2

(D.C. Cir. 2015). Ms. Henderson began working for AEPS in or

about October of 2013, as a security officer/special police 

officer and eventually became a lieutenant. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 

3 ¶ 6.2 Ms. Henderson alleges that in April of 2016, a 

subordinate officer made sexual advances towards her, which she 

rebuffed. See id. at 3 ¶ 7. After the rebuff, the subordinate 

officer filed an internal complaint against Ms. Henderson 

alleging that she was “spending too much time with a [another 

officer].” Id. Thereafter, Ms. Henderson alleges that the 

subordinate officer became a “continuing problem at work,” 

because he was “routinely insubordinate” in refusing to follow 

 

2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document.
3

Ms. Henderson’s instructions. Id. According to Ms. Henderson, 

whenever she would report the issues involving the subordinate 

officer to her superiors, she was “ignored, insulted, and/or

harassed.” Id. Specifically, Ms. Henderson alleges that when she 

reported the subordinate officer to Captain Brooks, one of her

superiors, he responded that “there was a report that [Ms. 

Henderson] was having sex with a co-employee at work.” Id. Ms. 

Henderson believes that Captain Brooks repeated the accusation

as if he adopted the statement as fact, but noted that it still 

would not justify the subordinate officer’s insubordination.

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3-4 ¶ 7. Ms. Henderson found the statement 

“demeaning and insulting.” Id. at 4 ¶ 8. During a later 2016

meeting between Ms. Henderson, the subordinate officer, and Mr. 

Covington, her direct supervisor, the subordinate officer stated 

to Ms. Henderson, “you came down here [i.e., work] in a dress 

with no underwear on.” Id. at 4 ¶ 9. Ms. Henderson later 

reported the incident to AESP’s Human Resources department, but 

nothing was done. Id. Over the years, the subordinate officer 

continued to make comments, similar to the “no underwear” 

comment, towards Ms. Henderson. Id. Ms. Henderson expressed her 

frustration to Mr. Covington, who told her that if she filed a 

charge against the subordinate officer, she “could be fired for 

using profanity.” Id. at 4-5 ¶ 9. Ms. Henderson alleges that 

“Mr. Covington, on multiple occasions, sexistly [sic] and 
4

inappropriately, referred to [her] as ‘Joey’s girl’ (‘Joey,’

presumably being a reference to Joe Ortman [a project manager])” 

and sexually propositioned her by asking “when are you going to 

let me come to Waldorf?” Id. at 5 ¶ 10.

Ms. Henderson alleges that “Mr. Covington treated women

differently than men,” and as an example alleges that he shouted 

at her improperly, saying “you need to stay your ass here, to 

complete two schedules,” even though it was his job to complete 

the schedules. Id. at 5 ¶ 11. According to Ms. Henderson, Mr. 

Covington was reprimanded by Mr. Ortman. Id. In a separate 

incident, Ms. Henderson alleges that when she advised Captain 

Brooks that she could not work past her shift due to a family 

obligation, he stated to her, “you’re full of shit,” and Mr. 

Covington later told her that if she was asked to work past her 

shift, she had to work past her shift. Id. at 5 ¶ 12. Ms. 

Henderson alleges that she is not aware any of her male 

colleagues being spoken to in the same manner or being held to 

the same standard, noting that her male colleague, Lieutenant

Sims, “rarely if ever worked [past his shift]” and was 

“repeatedly and consistently given scheduling preferences” even 

though Ms. Henderson was more senior. Id. Though Lieutenant Sims

was hired in “approximate 2016-17,” he was paid “more (or the 

same) for less work performance duties than [Ms.] Henderson 

performed,” and Ms. Henderson alleges that AEPS’s “‘night 
5

differential’ [pay] was discriminatory ....” Id. at 6 ¶ 13.

Ms. Henderson alleges that “[o]n January 18, 2018, [she] 

filed a written internal complaint of sexual discrimination with 

[AEPS].” Id. at 6 ¶ 14. Ms. Henderson alleges that, after filing 

the internal complaint, AEPS immediately began to retaliate 

against her, and ostracize her by assigning her tasks without 

her knowledge, which would cause her to either have to hurriedly 

complete the task or fail to complete the task. Id. at 6 ¶ 15.

Ms. Henderson alleges that, on March 8, 2018, for the first 

time, AEPS failed to advise her of a “lock-out” at work, which 

she found out about by chance; but had she failed to perform her 

“lock-out” duties, she would have been subject to discipline. 

Id. at 6-7 ¶ 16. Ms. Henderson alleges that Mr. Covington 

continued to “engage[] in verbally threatening and/or harassing 

conduct towards” her, such on March 15, 2018, when he and AEPS 

terminated her without providing a reason. Id. at 7 ¶ 17. Ms. 

Henderson alleges that her “male colleagues were not terminated 

for committing such significant infractions as sleeping at work, 

negligently discharging a weapon at work, and leaving a loaded

weapon unattended; [and she] had never been disciplined before 

her termination.” Id. Finally, Ms. Henderson notes that, during 

her termination meeting, AEPS stated that her “unemployment

[benefits] will not be contested.” Id. at 7 ¶ 18.

Ms. Henderson filed a Charge with the Equal Employment 
6

Opportunity Commission(“EEOC”) on or about June 29, 2018 and was 

issued a Right-to-Sue Notice on March 20, 2019. Id. at 2 ¶ 3.

B. Procedural History

On June 18, 2019, Ms. Henderson filed the operative

complaint, see Compl., ECF No. 1, in response to which AEPS

filed its Partial Motion to Dismiss on August 16, 2019. See

Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9 (“Def.’s Mot.”). Ms. 

Henderson filed her Opposition to Partial Motion to Dismiss on 

September 5, 2019, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Partial Mot. to Dismiss, 

ECF No. 11 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), and AEPS filed its Reply to

Opposition to Partial Motion to Dismiss on September 12, 2019. 

See Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12

(“Def.’s Reply”).

The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication. 

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning 

v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court will 

dismiss a claim if the complaint fails to plead “enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint 

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2), “in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the 
7

... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if it 

“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

[a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint alleging facts which are 

“‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

The “doors of discovery” should not be opened for a “plaintiff 

armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 679.

III. Analysis

AEPS initially argued that Ms. Henderson’s claims of gender 

discrimination should be dismissed because, outside of her 

termination, she failed to identify any adverse employment 

actions to support her claims of discrimination” and that any 

“claims of discrimination . . . based upon discrete acts or

episodes” that occurred in 2016 should be dismissed as untimely

under both Title VII and the DCHRA. Def.’s Mot, ECF No. 9-1 at 

6-9. 
8

In her Opposition, Ms. Henderson states that each of her 

“[d]iscrimination counts has three components: (i) 

discriminatory employment discharge; (ii) hostile work 

environment; and (iii) discriminatory pay differential.” Pl.’s 

Opp’n, ECF 11 at 1. Ms. Henderson then argues that “(1) AEPS’s 

attempt to dismiss foundational factual allegations under Rule 

12(b)(6) is legally improper ....;” (2) her complaint “states 

viable claims for hostile work environment and discriminatory 

pay differential; and (3) “even if Plaintiff has not stated a 

viable claim for hostile work environment and/or discriminatory 

pay differential, allegations sought to be dismissed should not 

be ordered removed from the [c]omplaint because they provide

pertinent ‘background information’ and/or are the subject of 

proof and discovery in this case.” Id. at 1.

In its Reply, AEPS “clarifies that its Motion for Partial 

Dismissal should be read to seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims 

for ‘hostile work environment’ and ‘discriminatory pay

differential.” Def.’s Reply, ECF 12 at 7-8. AEPS then argues 

that Ms. Henderson’s hostile work environment claims under Title 

VII and the DCHRA are untimely, see id. at 8-13, and reiterates 

that her pay differential claim should be dismissed (1) under

Title VII for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and (2)

under the DCHRA because it is untimely. See id. at 14-17.
9

A. AEPS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is Appropriate.

In her Opposition, Ms. Henderson argues that AEPS’s 

“Partial” Dismissal Motion is legally improper. See Pl.’s Opp’n, 

ECF No. 11 at 4. Citing several cases from district courts 

outside this Circuit, Ms. Henderson contends that “[f]ederal 

District Courts have recognized that it is legally improper to 

dismiss component allegations of an otherwise proper cause of 

action.” Id. AEPS counters that the Court is not precluded from 

granting a Motion for Partial Dismissal and notes that the Court 

has granted similar motions on multiple occasions. See Def.’s 

Reply, ECF 12 at 6.

To support her argument, Ms. Henderson cites Charles v. 

Front Royal Volunteer Fire & Rescue Dep't, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 

620, 629 (W.D. Va. 2014), where the court ruled that a motion 

for partial dismissal cannot be based on the type of relief 

requested. However, this case is not persuasive because AEPS’s 

motion does not seek dismissal based on the type of relief Ms. 

Henderson is requesting, but instead seeks dismissal of the 

actual claims alleged in her complaint. See Def.’s Reply, ECF 

No. 12. Indeed, as AEPS points out, this Court has granted 

motions for partial dismissal in several cases. See, e.g., Brown 

v. Vilsack, 866 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd, No. 13-

5051, 2013 WL 4711192 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2013); Alston v. Whole 
10

Foods Mkt. Grp., No. CV 17-2580 (EGS), 2018 WL 2561041, at *1 

(D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2018). Accordingly, the Court finds AEPS’s 

Motion for Partial Dismissal to be appropriate.

B. Ms. Henderson’s Gender Discrimination Claims under Title 

VII and the DCHRA arising from a Hostile Work 

Environment are Timely

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, the DCHRA 

prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual 

on the basis of a sex. See D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1). Because 

the legal standards for establishing discrimination claims under 

Title VII and the DCHRA are substantively the same, the Court 

will analyze Ms. Henderson’s claims under these statutes 

together. See Burrell v. Shepard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 

2018) (Sullivan, J.) (citing Carpenter v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. 

Ass'n, 165 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). To state a claim for 

hostile work environment under both Title VII and the DCHRA, “a 

plaintiff must show that [her] employer subjected [her] to 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 

victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”

Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal 
11

quotation marks and citations omitted). However, to succeed “on 

a motion to dismiss, it is not necessary to establish a prima 

facie case.” Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the D.C., 113 

F. Supp. 3d 297, 310 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Gordon v. U.S. 

Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 

Nonetheless, Ms. Henderson “must allege facts that, if true, 

would establish the elements of each claim.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Before commencing an action based on Title VII, a plaintiff 

must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a 

timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Lewis v. City 

of Chicago, Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 210(2010). Generally, “a Title 

VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or 

retaliatory acts must file his charge within the appropriate 

time period . . . 300 days – set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1).” Nat'l. Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 

101, 122 (2002). The lawsuit following the EEOC charge is 

“limited in scope to claims that are like or reasonably related 

to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such 

allegations.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 

1995). Specifically, a plaintiff's claims “must arise from the 

administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to 

follow the charge of discrimination.” Id. To be actionable under 

the DCHRA, the plaintiff must file a claim “within one year of 
12

the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof . . . 

.” D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a).

Because “[a] hostile work environment claim is composed of 

a series of separate acts that collectively constitute ‘one 

unlawful employment practice,’” the timeliness analysis for 

those claims is different than claims involving discrete acts. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. For a hostile work environment claim to 

be timely, “the employee need only file a charge within ... 300 

days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment”

claim. Singletary v. Dist. of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 527 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003) (emphasis in the original); see also Morgan, 536 U.S. 

at 122 (“A charge alleging a hostile work environment claim ... 

will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the 

claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at 

least one act falls within the time period.”).

AEPS argues that Ms. Henderson’s hostile work environment 

claims are untimely since they “arise from sexual advances and 

hostile remarks that allegedly took place over several months in 

2016 and centered around Plaintiff’s relationship with” the 

subordinate officer. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 8-9. 

Specifically, AEPS contends that because Ms. Henderson “filed 

her EEOC Charge on June 29, 2018, the limitations period 

applicable to her Title VII claims reaches back 300 days to 

September 2, 2017.” Id. at 9. AEPS also argues that Ms. 
13

Henderson’s hostile work environment claims under the DCHRA 

should exclude any incidents taking place before September 28, 

2017. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 12. 

Ms. Henderson argues that the “‘timely filing provision 

only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a

certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened

[and] [i]t does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that 

some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall 

outside the statutory time period.’” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 

9-10 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117). In reply, AEPS, argues 

that “‘the Morgan principle is not an open sesame to recovery 

for time-barred violations’” and that Ms. Henderson “may not 

recover under a hostile work environment theory based upon 

nothing more than an amalgamation of loosely related discrete 

acts.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 11 (quoting Baird, 662 F.3d 

at 1251).

To be timely, at least one act contributing to the claim 

must fall within the statutory filing period, but the incidents 

must be “adequately linked into a coherent hostile environment 

claim.” Baird, 662 F.3d at 1251. To determine if a link exists, 

the Court examines whether the incident “involve[s] the same 

type of employment actions, occur relatively frequently, and are 

perpetrated by the same managers.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks, brackets, and citations omitted). AEPS argues that Ms. 
14

Henderson “cannot rescue her time-barred hostile work 

environment claims under Title VII or the DCHRA, because the 

only hostile work environment [actions] described in the

Complaint pre-dated the limitations periods, and there is no act 

falling within the limitations periods . . . .” Def.’s Reply, 

ECF 12 at 11. 

Giving Ms. Henderson the benefit of all inferences that can 

be derived from the alleged facts, see Kowal v. MCI Comm’cns 

Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the Court is 

persuaded that she has sufficiently stated a timely claim for 

hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII and the DCHRA.

Ms. Henderson’s EEOC charge, filed June 29, 2018 alleges sex 

discrimination and retaliation beginning on April 10, 2016 and 

continuing through March 15, 2018. Ex., ECF No. 9-3 at 5. In 

that charge, she alleges that the sexual harassment and/or 

discrimination began in April 2016 when she rejected the 

subordinate officer’s sexual advances, and “[f]rom then on” 

whenever she complained to her supervisors about the subordinate 

officer’s insubordination, she was “ignored, insulted, and 

harassed.” Id. She further alleges that on January 18, 2018, she 

filed an internal complaint of sexual discrimination. Id. Ms. 

Henderson further alleges that her supervisor was verbally 

threatening and harassing towards her and that she was 

terminated on March 15, 2018. Id. 
15

In her Complaint, Ms. Henderson alleges that: (1) a 

subordinate officer began harassing her in 2016 and continued 

making improper comments of a sexual nature “over the years,” 

see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ 9; (2) Captain Brooks restated the 

subordinate officer’s allegations that she was having sex with a 

co-employee at work as facts, see id. at 3 ¶ 7; told her “you’re 

full of shit” after she could not work beyond her shift, but he 

did not make similar comments to her male colleagues, see id. at 

5 ¶ 12; and (3) Mr. Covington (i) refused to discipline the 

subordinate officer when he made demeaning comments to Ms. 

Henderson in front him, see id. at 4 ¶ 9; (ii) referred to her 

as “Joey’s Girl,” on multiple occasions, id. at 5 ¶ 10; (iii) 

made sexual propositions to her, see id.; (iv) yelled to her 

“you need to stay your ass here, [and] complete two schedules,” 

id. at 5 ¶ 11; (v) forced her to complete extra duties while her 

male colleagues were not required to do the same, see id. at 5 ¶ 

16; and (vi) she filed an internal complaint of sex 

discrimination on January 18, 2018, id. at 6 ¶ 14.

Though Ms. Henderson does not provide specific dates for 

most of her allegations, she does allege that they occurred over 

the years. Critically, Ms. Henderson filed her internal 

complaint on January 18, 2018, which is within the statutory 

time period. Based on the filing of the internal complaint, the 

Court can make the reasonable inference that the incidents were 
16

continuing through that date. Accordingly, since Ms. Henderson 

has alleged that at least one act contributing to the claim 

falls within the statutory filing period, Baird, 662 F.3d at

1251, she has stated a timely claim at this juncture. 

Furthermore, many of the incidents involved her direct 

supervisor, many of the comments are of a sexual nature, and 

they are alleged to have been uttered frequently. Ms. Henderson 

has alleged that after she rebuffed a subordinate officer’s 

sexual advances, he became routinely insubordinate to her, 

routinely made comments of a sexual nature to her, and that her 

direct supervisor and another superior refused to discipline 

him. Accordingly, these incidents are “adequately linked into a 

coherent hostile environment claim.” Baird, 662 F.3d at 1251.

Although at this juncture, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. 

Henderson’s hostile work environment claims should be dismissed, 

it is her burden to put forward evidence supporting the 

timeliness of her claims as the case moves forward. See 

Bartlette v. Hyatt Regency, 208 F. Supp. 3d 311, 326-27 (D.D.C. 

2016) (declining to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment 

claim even though he “faces an uphill battle” based on his 

allegations of sexual harassment, constant denial of breaks, and 

constant unwarranted disciplinary action).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES AEPS’s Motion to Dismiss as 

to Ms. Henderson’s gender discrimination claims under Title VII 
17

and the DCHRA arising from a hostile work environment.

C. Ms. Henderson Failed to Exhaust Gender 

Discrimination Claim under Title VII arising from a 

Discriminatory Pay Differential and her Pay 

Differential Claim is Time-Barred under the DCHRA

AEPS argues that the gender discrimination claims under 

Title VII and the DCHRA arising from a discriminatory pay 

differential should be dismissed. Specifically, AEPS contends 

that the EEOC Charge does not “contain any allusion to 

Lieutenant Sims receiving more money than Plaintiff for the same 

work, nor does it mention pay discrimination or males being paid 

more than females, [which] leaves the EEOC without any clue or 

hint that she – or any other female employees – may be receiving

less money than males.” See Reply, ECF No. 12 at 16. Ms. 

Henderson argues that she “exhausted her claim for unlawful pay 

differential on the basis of sex” when she noted in the EEOC 

Charge that “I was being treated differently than my male 

colleagues” and that she had been “discriminated against in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 

analogous District of Columbia law.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 

16. AEPS replies the use of “boilerplate or generic language” 

does not put the EEOC on notice of the discriminatory act and 

“deprive[s] [the] EEOC of the information needed to investigate 

and conciliate alleged violations of Title VII, as intended by 

Congress.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 12 at 15. AEPS further contends 
18

that the failure to “include any allegation of pay 

discrimination in her EEOC charge causes her discriminatory pay 

differential claim to be subject to a shorter DCHRA limitations 

period that reaches back only to June 18, 2018.” Id. at 17.

Even giving Ms. Henderson the benefit of all inferences 

that can be derived from the allegations, see Kowal, 16 F.3d at

1276, the Court agrees with AEPS. In reviewing whether a 

plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, this Court 

examines whether the claims within the complaint are like or 

reasonably related to the allegations in the EEOC Charge. See 

Park, 71 F.3d at 907. “A court cannot allow liberal 

interpretation of an administrative charge to permit a litigant 

to bypass the Title VII administrative process.” Id. In 

pertinent language Ms. Henderson quotes from her EEOC Charge:

The sexual harassment and/or discrimination 

began in April of 2016. A subordinate of mine, 

Officer Jones, had made sexual advances 

towards me. After I rejected him, he filed a 

bogus complaint against me for spending too 

much time with a coworker. From then on, 

Officer Jones was a constant problem. He was

insubordinate. Whenever I complained about it 

to my superiors, I was ignored, insulted and 

harassed. A co-worker told me there were 

rumors that I was having sex at work, which 

was not true. On January 18, 2018, I filed an 

internal complaint of sexual discrimination. 

I was being treated differently than my male

colleagues.

Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 11; EEOC Charge of Discrimination 

570-2018-02700, ECF No. 9-3. The Court notes that “the central 
19

question is whether the employee’s complaint contained 

‘sufficient information’ to put the agency on notice of the 

claim and to ‘enable the agency to investigate’ it.” Crawford v. 

Duke, 867 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Here, nothing in the 

quoted language from Ms. Henderson’s EEOC Charge would provide 

any notice to the EEOC to investigate any differences in pay 

among Ms. Henderson and her male colleagues. In Crawford, the 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that 

the plaintiff properly exhausted two claims that were not 

mentioned in his EEO complaint because they were mentioned in

accompanying memorandum, but held that the plaintiff failed to 

properly exhaust the third claim when it was not included in the 

complaint or in the documentation attached to the complaint. See

867 F.3d at 109-11; see also Hicklin v. McDonald, 110 F. Supp. 

3d 16, 21 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that plaintiff’s “retaliation 

claim is not ‘like or reasonably related’ to his race and 

religious discrimination claims in light of the fact that his 

amended complaint lacks any indication that the allegedly 

unlawful conduct described was motivated by [plaintiff]'s prior 

EEO charge.”). 

As the Court has found that Ms. Henderson’s discriminatory 

pay differential claim was not included in her EEOC Charge, the 

Court must also find that the statute of limitations for this 

claim under the DCHRA was never tolled. Under the DCHRA, Ms. 
20

Henderson was required to bring her pay differential claim 

within a year of her termination. See D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a).

As Ms. Henderson was terminated in March 15, 2018, but filed the 

instant action on June 18, 2019, she is time-barred under the 

DCHRA.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS AEPS’s Motion to Dismiss as 

to Ms. Henderson’s gender discrimination claim under Title VII 

and the DCHRA arising from a discriminatory pay differential.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART 

and DENIES IN PART AEPS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. The Court 

DENIES AEPS’s Motion to Dismiss as to Ms. Henderson’s gender 

discrimination claim under Title VII and the DCHRA arising from

a hostile work environment. The Court GRANTS AEPS’s Motion to 

Dismiss as to Ms. Henderson’s gender discrimination claim under 

Title VII and the DCHRA arising from a discriminatory pay 

differential. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum 

Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

March 26, 2020