alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 71-459.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 6, 1972.

John Germany and C. Lawrence Stagg of Holland & Knight, Tampa, for appellant.

Wm. Reece Smith, Jr. of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals a final summary judgment entered against it in a suit arising out of a written contract.

The able trial judge, after taking voluminous testimony, ruled that the contract was not ambiguous and therefore refused to consider the parol evidence.

We hold that the contract itself was ambiguous in its terms and upon considering the parol evidence genuine issues of material fact as to the correct interpretation of the language of the contract were created. This being the case, it was error to enter a final summary judgment.

Reversed and remanded.

PIERCE, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.

McNULTY, J., dissents with opinion.

McNULTY, Judge

(dissenting).

I must respectfully dissent. There are no latent ambiguities in the contract herein, when read as a whole, which would render its terms amenable to parol for clarification.
**Exhibit 32.2**
 
 Certification of CFO Pursuant to
 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
 As Adopted Pursuant to
 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Crested Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Robert Scott Lorimer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:
 
 (1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 
 
 
 
 /s/ Robert Scott LorimerRobert Scott Lorimer,Chief Financial OfficerNovember 15, 2004 
 
 This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Crested Corp. and will be retained by Crested Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Charles E. BRICK, Appellant, v. Nancy J. BRICK, Appellee.

No. 71-147.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 22, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH 

	NO. 2-03-376-CV

IN RE MACKIEL BILLINGSLEY						   RELATOR

		------------

	ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	The court has considered relator's petition for writ of mandamus and the response of Real Party In Interest, the State of Texas.  On January 15, 2004, the trial court dismissed the causes of action to which the petition relates.  Accordingly, relator's petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED AS MOOT.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL B:	McCOY, DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, JJ.

DELIVERED: January 21, 2004
<PAGE>
                                                                      Exhibit 18

                                              Louisville Galleria
                                              2300 Meidinger Tower
                                              Louisville, KY 40202-3460
                                              January 29, 1997

LG&E Energy Corp.
220 W. Main Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Dear Gentlemen:

This letter is written to meet the requirements of Regulation S-K calling for a
letter from a registrant's independent accountants whenever there has been a
change in accounting principle or practice.

Effective January 1, 1996, LG&E Energy Corp. changed from the accrual method of
accounting for its price risk management activities to the mark-to-market
method. According to the management of the Company, this change was made to more
fairly present the current results of the Company's operations related to this
business and to recognize that value is created, and the earnings process
completed, when the contractual commitments are finalized.

A complete, coordinated set of financial and reporting standards for determining
the preferability of accounting principles among acceptable alternative
principles has not been established by the accounting profession. Thus, we
cannot make an objective determination of whether the change in accounting
described in the preceding paragraph is to a preferable method. However, we have
reviewed the pertinent factors, including those related to financial reporting,
in this particular case on a subjective basis, and our opinion stated below is
based on our determination made in this matter.

We are of the opinion the Company's change in method of accounting is to an
acceptable alternative method of accounting, which, based upon the reasons
stated for the change and our discussions with you, is also preferable under the
circumstances in this particular case. In arriving at this opinion, we have
relied on the business judgment and business planning of your management.

Very truly yours,


/s/ Arthur Andersen LLP
Arthur Andersen LLP
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of CRYO-CELL International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the
year ended November 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mercedes Walton, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and I, Jill M. Taymans, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Act of 1934; and

2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Mercedes WaltonMercedes WaltonChief Executive OfficerFebruary 8, 2008/s/ Jill M. TaymansJill M. TaymansVice President, Finance, Chief Financial OfficerFebruary 8, 2008
PROGRAM PROGRAM DESCRIPTION FINANCIAL AGENT FY2023

Total $6,389,861

Houlihan Lokey $3,875,000

Loop Capital $1,498,201

Bank of New York Mellon* $1,016,660

Total $3,073,740

Bank of New York Mellon $120,000

CastleOak Securities LP $2,953,740

Total $16,530,424

Fannie Mae $8,739,275

Freddie Mac $7,245,901

Bank of New York Mellon $525,000

CastleOak Securities LP $20,249

Total $270,085

Bank of New York Mellon $225,000

CastleOak Securities LP $45,085

Total $1,000,000

Bank of New York Mellon $1,000,000

Financial Agent Programs

*The Bank of New York Mellon billed to FY2021 funds through April 2023 for its CARES Act financial agent services.

New Issue Bond Program (NIBP) NIBP provides temporary financing to Housing Finance Agencies to issue housing 

bonds.

Treasury’s Office of Financial Agents oversees the designation, management, and oversight of financial agents who support a variety of stabilization and 

stimulus programs.

TARP programs support mortgage affordability and mortgage assistance programs, 

as well capital investment and financing programs for financial institutions.

SBLF programs provide capital to community banks and Community Development 

Loan Funds.

Coronavirus Aid, Recovery, and 

Economic Security Act (CARES 

Act), Division A, Title IV (and 

subsequent legislative extensions)

The CARES Act Payroll Support Program and Loan Program provide financial 

assistance and liquidity to passenger and cargo air carriers, businesses critical to 

maintaining national security, and certain other eligible businesses.

Troubled Asset Relief Program 

(TARP)

Small Business Lending Fund 

(SBLF)

ECIP provides capital to certain depository institutions to provide loans, grants, and 

other assistance to businesses and communities disproportionately impacted by the 

economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Emergency Capital Investment 

Program (ECIP)
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the annual report on Form 10-K of Investview, Inc.
(the “Company”) for the year ended March, 31, 2018, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, William C. Kosoff, the Acting
Chief Financial Officer, of the Company, do hereby certify pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief
that:





(1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and





(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.





Dated:
July 13, 2018





/s/
William C. KosoffWilliam
C. KosoffActing
Chief Financial Officer (principal financial and accounting
officer)
Exhibit 35.1

Servicer Compliance Statement of AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.

This Annual
Statement as to Compliance is delivered to you pursuant to Section 4.10 (a) of the Sale and Servicing Agreement dated as of March 25, 2010 (the Agreement) and Item 1123 of Regulation AB, executed in connection with
the formation of AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-A (the Trust), the issuance of the Notes by the Trust and the closing of the transactions and the execution and delivery of the various documents by General Motors Financial
Company, Inc. (f/k/a AmeriCredit Corp.), AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (the Servicer) and AFS Sensub Corp. in connection therewith. The capitalized terms used herein shall have the same meanings as in the Agreement.

The undersigned certifies that I am the Executive Vice President, Accounting Corporate Controller of the Servicer. I further certify as
follows:



| | 1. | I have conducted, or caused to be conducted under my supervision, a review of the Servicer during the preceding period from March 25, 2010 through
December 31, 2010, and its performance under the Agreement.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, following such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement throughout such period, and, to the best of my
knowledge, there has been no default in the fulfillment of any such obligation.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.



|    |  |                    |  |                                 |  | 
|--- |  | ------------------ |  | ------------------------------- |  | 
|By: |  | /s/James Fehleison |  | Dated: March 28, 2011          
|    |  |                    |  | James Fehleison                 |  | 
|    |  |                    |  | Executive Vice President,       |  | 
|    |  |                    |  | Accounting Corporate Controller |  |
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1998
<CASH>                                         499,696
<SECURITIES>                                   719,393
<RECEIVABLES>                                   47,642
<ALLOWANCES>                                    13,380
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               983,220
<PP&E>                                       2,515,399
<DEPRECIATION>                                 143,405
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,079,129
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,694,752
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        76,546
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,191,667
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,079,129
<SALES>                                        331,134
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               331,134
<CGS>                                          218,018
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,269,675
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              51,868
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,250,618)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2094

USMV RIGHTS OF MAN, Thales Biddle Davidson,

Master,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

PETER M. DAVIDSON, Mate; JOHN D. WILLARD, the

Vessel’s Owners; ALBERT B. HOUSE; ANDREW J.

KAELIN,

Plaintiffs,

versus

CITY OF ANNAPOLIS,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

EDWARD C. HARTMAN, II; CHESAPEAKE CHARTERS;

PORT OF ANNAPOLIS; THE STATE OF MARYLAND;

CHESAPEAKE MARINE TOURS AND CHARTERS;

ANNAPOLIS BOAT SHOWS, INCORPORATED; THE BALTIMORE SUN; CAPITAL GAZETTE COMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED; PAUL GOETZKE; JOHN C. PATMORE;

EILEEN FOGARTY; RUSSELL MORGAN; TERESA DE

GRAFF; WAYNE TURNER; SHEPARD TULLIER; LOUISE

HAMMOND; EMORY HARRISON; F. WILLIAM SIELING,

III; MARYLAND WATERMEN'S ASSOCIATION,

Defendants.
2

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Joseph H. Young, Senior District Judge.

(CA-97-3354-Y)

Submitted: April 30, 1999 Decided: May 25, 1999

Before WILKINS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thales Biddle Davidson, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of

appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson,

361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have thirty

days within which to file in the district court notices of appeal

from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only

exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends

the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its order on May 20, 1998; Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on July 20, 1998, which is beyond

the thirty-day appeal period. Appellant’s failure to note a timely

appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves this

court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s

appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Lawrence Lee SMITH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 42792.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 6, 1973.

*28Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Donald K. Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

DEKLE, Justice.

We granted certiorari based upon a de-cisional conflict with Spataro v. State, 179 So.2d 873 (Fla.App.2d 1965) ; and Markman v. State, 210 So.2d 486 (Fla.App.3d 1968). These cases are in accord with the joint occupancy rule appearing in Frank v. State, 199 So.2d 117 (Fla.App.1st 1967). The conflict arises from the First District’s ruling here at 265 So.2d 538 (Fla.App., 1972), which would create an exception to the general rule of joint occupancy requiring direct evidence of defendant’s knowledge of the contraband upon the premises which cannot be inferred, absent the defendant’s exclusive possession or control. The exception asserted by the First District here is in the instance of the joint occupancy of premises by persons living together in a legal husband and wife relationship. Specifically, the investigating officers located illegal drugs along with women’s costume jewelry in a dresser drawer in the bedroom jointly occupied by defendant and his wife. This would appear to require some evidence to tie in the husband to the presence of such illegal drugs by the essential knowledge on his part. No such direct evidence was offered. Absent such proof, the motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted.

The First District held that the required knowledge of the presence of the contraband can be inferred to the husband as “head of the household”. A couple living together without benefit of clergy under the same situation would apparently enjoy the advantage of a different result, requiring direct evidence of knowledge; such a rule would penalize those who follow the legal requirements of marriage.

The State puts the issue: “The husband and wife relationship is another relationship by which essential knowledge can be inferred without the requirement for direct proof.” We do not feel in today’s world that this is a valid basis to avoid the required evidence to prove knowledge in such a relationship.

Our recent holding in Markham v. Markham, 272 So.2d 813 (Fla.1973), that the husband had no right to invade the wife’s own right of privacy by utilizing electronic devices on her telephone, supports our view and raises serious question about placing reliance upon a husband’s traditional role of “head of the household” as a basis for inferring knowledge.

The continuing expanded independence of the wife casts a different light upon the husband’s control, and thus inferred knowledge, in these circumstances. It could well render unduly harsh results against a husband in altogether innocent circumstances.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment of acquittal.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C. J„ ERVIN, and Mc-CAIN, JJ., and GALE, Circuit Judge, concur.
----

**Exhibit      32.1**

| (1)    | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| (2)    | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the                Company. |

|   | /s/                Harold F. Herron |   |
|--------|-------------------------------------|--------|
|   | HAROLD                F. HERRON,    |   |
|   | President                           |   |
|   | November                11, 2005    |   |

Index
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

N o

. 0 8

- 3 1 0 9 9 S u m m a r y C a l e n d a r

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A ,
P l a i n t i f f

- A p p e l l e e

v

.
L E O L O S T O N ,
D e f e n d a n t

- A p p e l l a n t

A p p e a l f

r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e W e s t e r n D i s t r i c t o f L o u i s i a n a U S D C N o

. 5 : 0 5

- C R

- 5 0 0 0 4

- A L L

B e f o r e J O L L Y , G A R Z A , a n d S T E W A R T , C i r c u i t J u d g e s

. P E R C U R I A M : *

T h e F e d e r a l P u b l i c D e f e n d e r a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t L e o L o s t o n h a s m o v e d
f o r l e a v e t o w i t h d r a w a n d h a s f i l e d a b r i e f i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h A n d e r s v

. C a l i f o r n i a , 3 8 6 U

. S

. 7 3 8 ( 1 9 6 7 )

. L o s t o n h a s f i l e d a r e s p o n s e i n w h i c h h e a r g u e s
t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 3 5 8 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) m o t i o n b e c a u s e h e i s e l i g i b l e f

o r r e l i e f u n d e r A m e n d m e n t 7 0 6 t o t h e S e n t e n c i n g G u i d e l i n e s a n d
b e c a u s e r e l i e f w a s w a r r a n t e d

. L o s t o n a l s o s e e k s t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f n e w

c o u n s e l

. O u r i n d e p e n d e n t r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d , c o u n s e l ’ s b r i e f , a n d L o s t o n ’ s U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Novembe r 23, 20 10
Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm ined t hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 08-31099 Document: 00511302688 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/23/2010N o

. 0 8

- 3 1 0 9 9

r e s p o n s e d i s c l o s e s n o n o n f r i v o l o u s i s s u e f

o r a p p e a l

. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o w i t h d r a w i s G R A N T E D , L o s t o n ’ s m o t i o n f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f n e w

c o u n s e l i s D E N I E D , c o u n s e l i s e x c u s e d f r o m f u r t h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s h e r e i n , a n d

t h e A P P E A L I S D I S M I S S E D

. S e e 5 T H C I R

. R

. 4 2

. 2

.

2 Case: 08-31099 Document: 00511302688 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/23/2010
#### DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, State of Florida DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the State of Florida, and St. Lucie County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. FLORIDIAN BUILDERS OF VERO BEACH, INC., et al. (Parcel 107), Appellees.

No. 73-1201.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 11, 1974.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Lucie County; Wallace Sample, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Bobby Ray SPATES v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 61426.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 10, 1978.

In re: Bobby Ray Spates applying for writ of habeas corpus. Caddo Parish.

Granted. Applicant’s sentence is set aside, and the trial judge is instructed to appoint counsel and resentence applicant with benefit of counsel.
#### George WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 40196.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 12, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1970.

Certiorari denied. 238 So.2d 137.

ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.