2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-2-2004

USA v. Washington

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-2757

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Washington" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 632.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/632
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-2757

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 v.

JEFFREY DAVID WASHINGTON

a/k/a

Kenny Don Cotts

 Jeffrey Washington,

 Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 01-cr-00231)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 25, 2004

Before: RENDELL, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges

(Filed June 2, 2004)

__________

OPINION

__________
 

1Washington has also made a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, which we will not

decide, based on our practice of deciding such issues on a petition for relief under habeas

corpus, rather than on direct appeal. United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 132 n. 7 (3d

Cir. 2002).

- 2 -

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Jeffrey David Washington pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base and was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment. He complains that the

District Court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea, based on

ineffectiveness of counsel and lack of voluntariness. He also urges that the government

breached the plea agreement in pressing for a sentence higher than had been agreed

upon.1

The government urges that he is foreclosed from challenging his plea on appeal

based upon his waiver of that right as part of his plea agreement. Accordingly, it has

moved to dismiss the appeal. We will grant this motion.

Washington’s plea agreement provided that:

[t]he defendant is aware that Title 18, United States Code,

Section 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the

sentence imposed. Acknowledging all of this, the defendant

knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed

within the statutory maximum, or the manner in which that

sentence was determined, on the grounds set forth in Title 18,

United States Code, Section 3742, or any other grounds. The

defendant also waives the defendant’s right to challenge any

sentence or the manner in which the sentence was determined
- 3 -

in any collateral proceeding, including but not limited to a

motion brought under Title 18, United States Code, Section

2255.

In addition, Washington also signed a document entitled Statement of Defendant, which

states: “I further understand that as a part of the plea agreement, I am waiving my right to

appeal and/or challenge my conviction and sentence, and the manner in which it was

imposed.”

We have held that waivers of appeals in plea agreements are valid if entered into

knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001). 

Here, the District Court specifically questioned Washington’s understanding of his

waiver. The Court asked: if he had signed, read and understood the plea agreement; if

he had discussed it with his counsel; if he had had enough time to discuss it with his

counsel; if his counsel had explained everything in it; and, if everything in it was true and

correct. Washington replied, “Yes.” The Court then explained the effect of the waiver

on his rights to appeal and to collaterally attack the proceedings and the sentence

imposed, and asked whether he understood of all this. Again, Washington replied,

“Yes.” The Court concluded, on the basis of this thorough colloquy, that Washington

had waived his rights of appeal knowingly and voluntarily. We agree. Thus, the waiver

is valid, and divests us of jurisdiction over Washington’s appeal. Id. at 563. 

Accordingly, we will dismiss his appeal.