20-3520-cr (L)

United States v. Raniere

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

AUGUST TERM 2021

No. 20-3520-cr (L); 20-3789-cr (Con)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

KEITH RANIERE, also known as Vanguard, and CLARE BRONFMAN,

Defendants-Appellants,

ALLISON MACK, KATHY RUSSELL, LAUREN SALZMAN, and NANCY 

SALZMAN, also known as Prefect,

Defendants.

1

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York

ARGUED: MAY 3, 2022

DECIDED: DECEMBER 9, 2022

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above. 
2

Before: CALABRESI, CABRANES, and SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.

Following a jury trial before the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of New York (Nicholas G. Garaufis, Judge), 

Defendant Keith Raniere was convicted of numerous crimes related to 

his leadership of two organizations, a self-styled executive coaching 

and self-help organization called NXIVM and a secret society called 

DOS. On appeal, Raniere challenges his convictions for sex trafficking 

crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. At the center of his appeal is 

the meaning of “commercial sex act,” which Section 1591 defines as 

“any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or 

received by any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3). Raniere principally 

argues that to qualify as a “commercial sex act,” there must be a 

monetary or financial component to the “[]thing of value” that is given 

or received and the relevant sexual exploitation must be for profit. He 

contends that evidence the Government submitted at trial showing 

that individuals received benefits, such as privileged positions within 

an organization, are insufficient to sustain his sex trafficking 

convictions. We conclude that Section 1591 requires neither that a 

“[]thing of value” have a monetary or financial component nor that the 

sexual exploitation be conducted for profit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM 

the October 30, 2020 judgment as it concerns Raniere’s sex trafficking

offenses: the sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of 
3

Nicole (Count 6), the attempted sex trafficking of Jay (Count 7), and 

the racketeering act of sex trafficking of Nicole (Act 10A).

TANYA HAJJAR, Assistant United States 

Attorney (Kevin Trowel, Assistant United 

States Attorney, on the brief), for Breon 

Peace, United States Attorney, Eastern 

District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for 

Appellee United States of America.

JOSEPH M. TULLY, Tully & Weiss Attorneys 

at Law, Martinez, CA (Jennifer Bonjean, 

Bonjean Law Group, PLLC, New York, NY, 

on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant Keith 

Raniere.

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

After a six-week jury trial, Keith Raniere was convicted in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 

(Nicholas G. Garaufis, Judge) of numerous counts related to his 

leadership of two organizations: a self-styled executive coaching and 

self-help organization called NXIVM and a secret society called 

“DOS,” an acronym for “Dominus Obsequious Sororium,” a phrase 

that roughly translates to “Lord/Master of the Obedient Female 

Companions.” At trial, the Government presented evidence that 
4

Raniere led both entities as pyramid organizations, and that he—

alongside his “inner circle”—committed, attempted, or conspired to 

commit various crimes, including sex trafficking, forced labor, identity 

theft, wire fraud, racketeering, sexual exploitation of a minor, 

possession of child pornography, and obstruction of justice. During 

the lengthy trial, the Government also presented evidence that 

members of the organizations recruited and groomed sexual partners 

for Raniere, and that numerous women were coerced to engage in 

nonconsensual sexual acts with Raniere. 

On appeal, Raniere raises numerous challenges to his various 

convictions. By summary order issued on the same day as this 

opinion, we dispose of most of Raniere’s arguments (along with the 

appeal of Raniere’s co-defendant, Clare Bronfman). We write 

separately here to address Raniere’s arguments concerning his sex 

trafficking convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1591.

Raniere’s arguments turn on the meaning of “commercial sex 

act,” which the statute defines as “any sex act, on account of which 

anything of value is given to or received by any person.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1591(e)(3). He principally argues that to qualify as a “commercial 

sex act,” there must be a monetary or financial component to the 

“[]thing of value” that is given or received, and the sexual exploitation 

must be for profit. We conclude that the statute has no such 
5

requirement. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment 

concerning his sex trafficking convictions.2

I. BACKGROUND3

In or around 2003, Raniere founded an organization called 

NXIVM, a self-styled executive coaching and self-help organization. 

New members paid thousands of dollars to attend self-help 

workshops. NXIVM members referred to Raniere as “Vanguard.” 

In 2015, Raniere created the secret society “DOS,” which was 

structured as a pyramid, with Raniere at the head, followed by firstline “masters” and their subordinate “slaves.” “Slaves” were expected 

to be obedient to their “masters.” 

2 In particular, through this opinion, we AFFIRM his convictions for the sex 

trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of Nicole (Count 6), the 

attempted sex trafficking of Jay (Count 7), and the racketeering act of sex trafficking 

of Nicole (Act 10A). 

3 Because Raniere appeals his convictions following a jury trial, we recite 

the facts from the trial evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” 

Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (“The reviewing court considers 

only the ‘legal’ question ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see also, e.g., United States v. Napout, 963 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 

2020) (noting that “[b]ecause appellants . . . appeal their convictions following a 

jury trial, we recount the facts viewing the evidence adduced in the district court in 

‘the light most favorable to the government, crediting any inferences that the jury 

might have drawn in its favor’” (quoting United States v. Rosemond, 841 F.3d 95, 99–

100 (2d Cir. 2016))).
6

Apart from Raniere, all DOS members were women. And 

Raniere’s identity as the head of DOS was initially concealed from 

newly recruited “slaves,” who were told that the organization was a 

“women’s-only secret society.” 

DOS “masters” recruited slaves mostly from NXIVM and 

targeted women who were experiencing difficulties in their lives. To 

join, DOS recruits were required to provide “collateral” to prove their 

commitment to the organization. “Collateral” took many forms, 

including sexually explicit photographs and videos of themselves,

rights to financial assets, and letters containing damaging 

accusations—whether true or untrue—about family members and 

friends. 

DOS “slaves” were expected to provide their “masters” with 

services called “acts of care,” which included buying them groceries, 

editing videos, cleaning, and organizing. Each “slave” was expected 

to provide about an hour of work per week for her “master” as her 

“normal contribution.” In some cases, “masters” assigned their 

“slaves” to engage in sexual conduct with Raniere and implied that 

collateral might be released if the salves refused. DOS “slaves” were 

also required to be branded with a symbol that, unbeknownst to them,

consisted of Raniere’s initials. During the branding ceremony, 

participants were normally required to be nude and to say, “Master[,]

please brand me. It would be an honor, an honor that I want to wear 

for the [re]st of my life.” 
7

Allison Mack—a DOS “master” and one of Raniere’s codefendants who pleaded guilty to racketeering and racketeering 

conspiracy—recruited Nicole4 to join DOS as a “slave” in February 

2016. As part of that process, Mack asked that Nicole provide 

“collateral.” Nicole provided a series of letters she wrote falsely 

alleging sexual abuse by her father and other damaging accusations, 

as well as a sexually explicit video of herself. She was later required 

to provide additional “collateral,” including credit card authorizations 

and the right to her grandmother’s wedding ring. 

Mack subsequently “assigned” Nicole to contact Raniere and 

tell him that she would do “anything that he asked.” On May 31, 

2016—while Nicole and Mack were together in Mack’s house—

Raniere called Mack, and Mack instructed Nicole to go outside so that 

Nicole would meet Raniere “across the grass” from the house’s 

backdoor. Raniere subsequently blindfolded Nicole, led her into a car, 

and drove her to a house. He then led Nicole—still blindfolded—

through some trees and inside a building. There, he instructed her to 

undress and tied her to a table. Another person in the room, whose 

identity was unknown to Nicole, performed oral sex on Nicole. Nicole 

subsequently told Mack about the incident, and Mack called Nicole 

“really brave.” 

Nicole had additional sexual encounters with Raniere during 

her time as a DOS “slave.” Mack regularly required Nicole and other 

4 The District Court ordered that during trial, certain witnesses were only to 

be referred to by first name or pseudonym. 
8

“slaves” to pose for nude photographs, including close-up 

photographs of their genitalia. Nicole also performed uncompensated 

work for Mack, including transcribing tapes and reviewing articles. 

Mack also recruited another “slave,” India, who in turn 

recruited a second-order “slave” named Jay. Jay provided “collateral” 

to India, including a sex tape and a video describing abuse to which 

she was subjected as a child. She provided further “collateral” on a 

monthly basis. 

Jay was required to perform uncompensated services for Mack, 

including cleaning her house, doing her laundry, and picking up her 

groceries. She was also required to transcribe certain videos without 

compensation. In addition, Mack gave Jay a “special assignment” to 

“seduce” Raniere and “have him take a naked picture” of Jay; Jay 

understood this assignment to include having sex with Raniere. Jay 

refused to carry out the assignment and decided to leave DOS. 

After Raniere and several members of his “inner circle” were 

indicted, each of Raniere’s co-defendants pleaded guilty to various 

crimes. Following a six-week jury trial before Judge Garaufis, Raniere 

was convicted of: racketeering conspiracy (Count 1); racketeering 

(Count 2); forced labor conspiracy (Count 3); wire fraud conspiracy 

(Count 4); sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5); sex trafficking of 

Nicole (Count 6); and attempted sex trafficking of Jay (Count 7).5 In 

support of their guilty finding for Count 2, the jury found that the 

5 We refer to the counts as they appear on the verdict sheet.
9

Government had proved that Raniere had engaged in all of the alleged 

racketeering acts: four acts of conspiracy to commit identity theft, two 

acts of identity theft, conspiracy to unlawfully possess an 

identification document, two acts of sexual exploitation of a child,

possession of child pornography, conspiracy to alter records for use in 

an official proceeding, trafficking for labor and services, document 

servitude, 6 extortion, sex trafficking of Nicole, and forced labor.7 The 

District Court sentenced Raniere principally to 120 years’ 

imprisonment and a $250,000 fine. 

II. DISCUSSION

We dispose of most of Raniere’s arguments on appeal in a

summary order filed simultaneously herewith. We write separately in 

this opinion to address Raniere’s argument that a “commercial sex 

act”—statutorily defined as “any sex act, on account of which anything 

6 Document servitude occurs when one:

knowingly destroys, conceals, removes, confiscates, or possesses 

any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, 

or any other actual or purported government identification 

document, of another person . . . to prevent or restrict or to attempt 

to prevent or restrict, without lawful authority, the person’s liberty 

to move or travel, in order to maintain the labor or services of that 

person, when the person is or has been a victim of a severe form of 

trafficking in persons.

18 U.S.C. § 1592(a).

7 The racketeering act of sex trafficking of Nicole was referred to on the 

verdict sheet as Act 10A.
10

of value is given to or received by any person,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3)—

must involve the exchange of monetary or financial benefits. We first 

address the statutory text before turning to Raniere’s specific 

challenges.

A. “Commercial Sex Act”

Congress enacted the statute at the center of this appeal, 18 

U.S.C. § 1591, as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 

(“TVPA”), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). In passing the 

TVPA, Congress’s purpose was “to combat trafficking in persons, a 

contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are 

predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective 

punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.” 22 U.S.C. 

§ 7101(a). 

In relevant part, Section 1591 provides for punishment of any 

individual:

(a) Who[] knowingly—

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, . . .

recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 

advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means 

a person; or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, 

from participation in a venture which has engaged in an 

act described in violation of paragraph (1),
11

[while also] knowing[] . . . that means of force, threats of force, 

fraud, coercion . . . , or any combination of such means will be 

used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added). 

Section 1591 goes on to define a “commercial sex act” as “any 

sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by 

any person.” Id. § 1591(e)(3) (emphasis added). The statute does not

explicitly define the phrase “anything of value,” and the scope of that 

phrase is the subject of the present appeal. 

Raniere argues that Section 1591 “was designed to punish sexual 

exploitation for economic profit.” Raniere’s Br. 23–24; see also 

Raniere’s Supp. Br. 9. He therefore concludes that the phrase 

“anything of value,” as it is used in the statute, must mean “economic 

benefit[].” Raniere’s Br. at 24. We do not agree. 

We begin our analysis “with the statutory text, exhausting ‘all 

the textual and structural clues’ bearing on its meaning and construing 

each word ‘in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it.’” 

United States v. Bedi, 15 F.4th 222, 226 (2d Cir. 2021) (footnote omitted) 

(first quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018);

then quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)). Where, as here, a 

phrase is “not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord 

with its ordinary or natural meaning.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 

223, 228 (1993). If we find that a phrase is unambiguous and is 

“coherent and consistent” with the statutory scheme, then “the inquiry 

ceases.” Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton, 
12

841 F.3d 133, 148 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. 

United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016)); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 

1744, 1756 (2017) (rejecting a proposed “resort to legislative history” as 

unpersuasive because a court’s “inquiry into the meaning of the 

statute's text ceases when ‘the statutory language is unambiguous and 

the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent’”) (quoting Barnhart v. 

Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 456 (2002)).

We start with the prefix “any” in the phrase “anything of value.”

“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, one 

or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of 

Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (cleaned up).8 Our understanding of 

“anything of value” is thus guided by the expansive meaning of “any.”

See United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir. 2015) (“The phrase 

‘anything of value’ [in Section 1591(e)(3)] is extremely broad.”). In 

addition, we observe that Congress’s definition of “commercial sex 

act”—“any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to 

or received by any person,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3) (emphases added)—

uses the word or prefix “any” three times. Congress’s repeated use of

the word “any” in its definition “commercial sex act” further supports 

8 In United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997), the Supreme Court 

“considered a provision [18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)] that imposed an additional sentence 

for firearms used in federal drug trafficking crimes and provided that such 

additional sentence shall not be concurrent with ‘any other term of imprisonment.’”

Ali, 552 U.S. at 219 (quoting Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 4). “Notwithstanding the 

subsection's initial reference to federal drug trafficking crimes, [the Court] held that 

the expansive word ‘any’ and the absence of restrictive language left ‘no basis in 

the text for limiting’ the phrase ‘any other term of imprisonment’ to federal 

sentences.” Id. (quoting Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5).
13

an expansive understanding of the specific phrase at issue here,

“anything of value.”

We have previously had occasion, albeit in other contexts, to 

consider the remainder of the phrase. We have clarified in those other 

contexts that the phrase “thing of value” “is generally construed to 

cover intangibles as well as tangibles.” United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 

69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979). In Girard, we observed that all of the following 

are “things of value”: “amusement,” “[s]exual intercourse, or the 

promise of sexual intercourse,” “a promise to reinstate an employee,” 

“an agreement not to run in a primary election,” and “[t]he testimony 

of a witness.” Id. (citations omitted). And in United States v. Maneri, 

we held that the phrase “thing of value” includes intangibles, 

specifically “the opportunity for a sexual encounter, in return for 

distributing child pornography” in the context of the advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines for 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 353 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 

2003). Although the statutory phrase at issue here is “anything of 

value” and not a misspelled version, “any thing of value,” our earlier 

holdings on “thing of value” remain instructive. Indeed, adding the 

expansive prefix “any” onto “thing” only underscores our 

understanding that “anything of value” should be broadly understood 

to include intangibles. A “thing of value” as it appears in Section 1591 

may be intangible.

Finally, and consistent with our expansive understanding of the 

phrase thus far, we interpret the word “value” to refer to “a subjective, 

rather than objective, concept.” Cook, 782 F.3d at 988 (quoting United 

States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 858 (8th Cir. 2012)). Stated differently, 
14

in the ordinary sense, we construe the word “value” to “focus . . . on 

the value which the [recipient] subjectively attaches to what is sought 

to be received.” Id. at 988–89 (quoting Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 858); see also 

United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 623 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding 

that the phrase “anything of value,” as it is used in the bribery statute, 

18 U.S.C. § 201, “has consistently been given a broad meaning” and 

that the district court correctly construed the phrase “to focus on the 

value that the defendants subjectively attached to the items received”). 

This conforms with the dictionary definition of “value,” which 

includes “relative worth, utility, or importance.” 3 Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary 2530 (1976).

Bearing in mind these textual clues, we conclude that, as it is

used in Section 1591, the phrase “anything of value” need not have a

monetary or financial component. Nothing in the statutory text 

indicates such a requirement, and in fact, a natural reading of the 

broad language used in Section 1591(e)(3) forecloses such a reading. 

Put another way, for purposes of the statute, monetary worth is not 

the sole measure of “value.” See United States v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d 539, 

543 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing the phrase “thing of value” as it is used 

in 18 U.S.C. § 876). Accordingly, we hold that for sexual exploitation 

to be actionable under Section 1591, it need not have been conducted—

as Raniere argues it must—for profit.9

9 A number of district courts within our Circuit have reached similar 

conclusions concerning Section 1591’s definition of “commercial sex act” in civil 

cases brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595, which provides for a civil cause of action 

for violations of the TVPA. In these cases, courts have concluded that the statutory 
15

B. Raniere’s Arguments

Turning to Raniere’s specific arguments on appeal as they 

concern his sex trafficking convictions, we find none of them 

persuasive. 

a. Challenges to the Jury Instruction

Raniere first argues that the District Court erred in its 

instructions to the jury on the sex trafficking counts.

“We review de novo a properly preserved challenge to a jury 

instruction, reversing where the charge, viewed as a whole, either 

failed to inform the jury adequately of the law or misled the jury about 

the correct legal rule.” United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 116 (2d Cir. 

2021) (quoting United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 581–82 (2d Cir. 

2015)).10 “In reviewing a jury instruction, we ‘examine not only the 

specific language that the defendant challenges but also the 

instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct 

interpretation of the law.’” United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 127 

phrase “anything of value” encompasses promises to help a person with career 

advancement. See,e.g., Eckhart v. Fox News Network, LLC, No. 20-CV-5593 (RA), 2021 

WL 4124616, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2021); Ardolf v. Weber, 332 F.R.D. 467, 478 

(S.D.N.Y. 2019); Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 168 

(S.D.N.Y. 2019); Canosa v. Ziff, No. 18-CV-4115 (PAE), 2019 WL 498865, at *22 n.26 

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019); Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 

10 We assume without deciding that Raniere preserved the relevant 

challenges to the jury instructions below.
16

(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94–95 (2d Cir. 

2000)).

The District Court instructed the jury on the “element” of sex 

trafficking as follows:

The third element that the Government must prove is that the 

Defendant knew that Nicole would be engaged in a commercial 

sexual act. A commercial sexual act is any sex act of which anything 

of value is given to or received by any person because of such sex act. 

It is not required that the victim actually performed a 

commercial sex act as long as the Government has proved that 

the Defendant recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, 

provided, obtained, maintained, patronized or solicited the 

victim for purposes of engaging in commercial sex acts. A thing 

“of value” need not involve a monetary exchange and need not have 

any financial component. The phrase “any sex act” should be 

given its plain meaning and may include any act performed 

with another for sexual gratification.

Jury Charge at 99–100, United States v. Mack, No. 18-CR-204 (NGG)

(E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2019), ECF No. 728 (emphases added). 

Raniere’s initial objection is to the first italicized sentence above. 

In particular, he disputes the propriety of the District Court’s usage of 

the phrase “because of” and argues that the sentence should have read: 

“A ‘commercial sex act’ is any sex act on account of which anything of 

value is given to or received by any person.” Defendant Keith 

Raniere’s Requests to Charge at 64, 86, Mack, No. 18-CR-204 (June 7, 
17

2019), ECF No. 692-1 (emphasis added). He argues that the phrase 

“because of” “means only a ‘connection to’ or a proximate causational 

relationship to,” whereas “on account of” “underscores a quid pro quo.” 

Raniere’s Supp. Br. 18. 

We find no error in the District Court’s use of the term “because 

of.” Although the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3), uses the phrase “on 

account of,” we find no meaningful difference between that phrase 

and “because of.” Raniere does not point to any authority supporting 

his view of the difference in meaning between “because of” and “on 

account of,” which we understand to be virtually indistinguishable.

Indeed, in a different context, the Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he 

words ‘because of’ mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’” Gross v. FBL 

Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (quoting 1 Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary 194 (1966)). As a result, the District 

Court’s use of “because of” neither failed to inform the jury adequately 

of the law nor misled the jury about the correct legal rule.

Raniere next challenges the second italicized sentence in the 

above jury instructions: “A thing ‘of value’ need not involve a 

monetary exchange and need not have any financial component.” He 

argues that a “commercial sex act” must involve the exchange of 

monetary of financial benefits. For the reasons stated in Section II.A 

of this opinion, ante, we reject his argument. As we have concluded,

the phrase “anything of value” need not have a monetary or financial 

component, and the actionable sexual exploitation need not have been 

conducted for profit. The jury was neither misinformed nor misled 
18

about the law. 11 Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s 

instruction.

b. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Challenge to the Sex 

Trafficking Counts

Next, Raniere challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

presented against him at trial concerning his Section 1591 counts: sex 

trafficking conspiracy, sex trafficking of Nicole, and attempted sex 

trafficking of Jay. 

When preserved, we review claims of insufficient evidence de 

novo. Capers, 20 F.4th at 113. When hearing a sufficiency challenge on 

appeal, we make a “limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant 

receives the minimum that due process requires: a ‘meaningful 

opportunity to defend’ against the charge against him and a jury 

finding of guilt ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Musacchio v. United 

States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

314–15 (1979)). “All that a defendant is entitled to on a sufficiency 

challenge is for the court to make a ‘legal’ determination whether the 

evidence was strong enough to reach a jury at all.” Id. at 244 (quoting 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

11 To the extent Raniere also contends that the second italicized sentence in 

the above jury instructions is duplicative because the first italicized sentence’s 

reference to “anything of value” already implied that the thing of value need not 

involve a monetary exchange or have any financial component, we fail to see how 

any potential redundancy misled the jury about the correct legal rule.
19

It is no surprise then that a defendant raising a sufficiency 

challenge “face[s] a heavy burden.” Capers, 20 F.4th at 113 (quoting 

United States v. Ho, 984 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2020)). Indeed, “we must 

sustain the jury’s verdict if, crediting every inference that could have 

been drawn in the government’s favor and viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). We “may enter a judgment of acquittal only 

if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is 

nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Atilla, 966 

F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2020)). 

In conducting our review, “[w]e must analyze the evidence in 

conjunction, not in isolation, and apply the sufficiency test to the 

totality of the government’s case and not to each element, as each fact 

may gain color from others.” Atilla, 966 F.3d at 128 (cleaned up). And 

“[w]e must credit every inference that the jury might have drawn in 

favor of the government, because the task of choosing among 

competing, permissible inferences is for the jury, not for the reviewing 

court.” Id. (cleaned up).

i. “Anything of Value”

Raniere first argues that the Government failed to provide 

evidence that “anything of value” was received or given in connection 

with a sex act. We disagree.
20

The Government did in fact present evidence at trial that DOS 

“masters,” including Mack, obtained “things of value” in connection 

with assigning their DOS “slaves” to engage in sexual acts with 

Raniere. For example, the Government presented evidence that Mack 

was able to maintain and strengthen her privileged position in the 

DOS hierarchy because of the relationship between Raniere and one of 

Mack’s “slaves,” Nicole. The Government also presented evidence 

that Raniere set an expectation that DOS “masters” would receive 

approximately 40 hours of “work” per week from their various 

“slaves.” Gov. App’x 235 (testimony of Lauren Salzman, one of 

Raniere’s co-conspirators who pleaded guilty to racketeering and 

racketeering conspiracy). Moreover, those “masters” who were able 

to recruit a sufficient number of “slaves” (and “slaves” of “slaves”)

would qualify for a “special position” and receive “special privileges” 

from Raniere. Id. Furthermore, the Government presented evidence 

that Raniere authorized certain payments to Mack for her work as 

“head trainer” at the same time that Mack encouraged a “slave,” India,

to “complete [an] assignment” involving “tak[ing] all her clothes off, 

while [Raniere was] clothed, pos[ing] in the most revealing way, and 

hav[ing Raniere] take a picture of her.” Id. at 1269, 1271 (emails 

between Raniere and Mack). 

Raniere argues that “[m]aintaining a spot in the first line” of 

DOS cannot constitute “anything of value” for purposes of Section 

1591. Id. at 1047 (Government counsel’s trial summation). But as 

discussed above, we reject the argument that only the exchange of 

things with monetary value can suffice for purposes of the statutory 
21

definition of “commercial sex act.” A privileged position in an 

organization may constitute intangible “value.” And indeed, here, 

evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the privileged position 

came with direct benefits, including free labor from the “slaves” who 

were expected to perform “acts of care” for their “masters.”

The evidence regarding the giving or receiving of “anything of 

value” submitted at trial was neither nonexistent nor meager. We 

conclude that the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury and that

Raniere was afforded at least “the minimum that due process 

requires.” Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243. We therefore decline to disturb 

Raniere’s convictions on these counts. The Government did not fail to 

provide sufficient evidence that “anything of value” was received or 

given in connection with a sex act. 

ii. “On Account of”

Next, Raniere argues that even if things of value were given or 

received, they were not given or received “on account of” a sexual act. 

The Government presented evidence that on May 31, 2016, Raniere 

blindfolded Nicole, ordered her to undress, and tied her to a table, 

after which a third person performed oral sex on Nicole in Raniere’s 

presence. Raniere argues that the Government failed to present 

evidence that Mack—Nicole’s “master”—received anything of value 

“on account of” the May 31, 2016 sexual act. 

In another context, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 

phrase “‘on account of’ to ”require[e] a causal connection between the 

term that the phrase ‘on account of’ modifies and the factor specified 
22

in the statute . . . .” Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 326 (2005) 

(interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)). Similarly, we interpret the 

statutory language in Section 1591(e)(3) to require a causal connection 

between the sexual act and the giving or receiving of anything of 

value. 

With that in mind, we conclude that Raniere’s sufficiency 

challenge lacks merit. At trial, the Government offered evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mack’s receipt of 

various things of value were causally connected to her assigning her 

“slaves” to engage in sexual acts with Raniere, including the May 31, 

2016 incident. This included testimony that Mack directed Nicole “[t]o 

reach out to . . . Raniere,” which Nicole first did in April 2016 by email. 

Gov. App’x 747–48 (testimony of Nicole). The Government also 

offered testimony that Nicole understood Mack’s relationship with 

Raniere to be the “most important relationship” to Mack, and that,

accordingly, Nicole understood that it was “important to [Nicole’s] 

relationship with [Mack] to make [Raniere] happy” and that how 

Nicole “related to [Raniere] . . . reflected on [Mack].” Id. at 764–65 

(testimony of Nicole). Nicole understood that she needed to be “well 

behaved” in front of Raniere. Id. at 765. And Nicole kept Mack 

apprised of her relationship with Raniere, including by informing her 

of the May 31, 2016 incident. Id. at 760. She further received 

encouragement from Mack to “make [Raniere’s] life easier.” Id. at 764. 

The Government’s evidence purporting to establish that Mack 

received things of value “on account of” her assigning “slaves” to 

engage in sexual acts with Raniere was neither nonexistent nor 
23

meager. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that 

Mack’s privileged position in DOS was causally connected with her 

“assignment” of Nicole to Raniere for sexual purposes. As with the 

evidence that “anything of value” was received or given in connection 

with a sex act, the evidence relevant to whether Mack received things 

of value “on account of” her assigning “slaves” to engage in sexual 

acts with Raniere was strong enough to reach a jury. Thus, we 

conclude that Raniere had a meaningful opportunity to defend 

himself.

iii. “Coercion”

Finally, Raniere argues that there was no evidence that the 

sexual acts were “coerced” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The statute 

defines “coercion” to include “threats of serious harm,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(e)(2)(A), and the statute in turn defines “serious harm” to mean:

any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including 

psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is 

sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding 

circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the 

same background and in the same circumstances to 

perform or to continue performing commercial sexual 

activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.

Id. § 1591(e)(5). 

Nicole testified that she felt that she had “[n]o choice” in 

complying with Mack’s instruction to “tell [Raniere] that [she] would 
24

do anything that he asked [her] to do.” Gov. App’x 756 (testimony of 

Nicole). She further testified that she had submitted “collateral” to 

Mack in the form of, inter alia, letters implicating her family members 

in criminal activity, a sexually explicit video, and a letter about a 

prominent former romantic partner that could “ruin [Nicole’s] career.” 

Id. at 740. Nicole testified that she understood that breaking her

“commitment” to DOS and her “master” would mean that her

“collateral” would be released. Id. at 746.

Once again, Raniere has failed to persuade us that there is 

insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. Any rational trier of

fact could have found coercion beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize: We hold that to qualify as a “commercial sex act” 

for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the “[]thing of value” given or 

received need not have a monetary or financial component. Thus, for 

sexual exploitation to be actionable under Section 1591, it need not 

have been conducted for profit.

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons explained in our 

summary order also entered today, we AFFIRM the District Court’s 

judgment of conviction entered on October 30, 2020, as it concerns the

sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of Nicole 

(Count 6), the attempted sex trafficking of Jay (Count 7), and the 

racketeering act of sex trafficking of Nicole (Act 10A).