1 

Report on MDB Reform Commitments 

Consistent with Section 7082 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub.L. 112-74, the 

Department of the Treasury is providing the following report describing the manner in which the 

World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 

are making substantial progress in the following areas. 

(1) implementing specific reform commitments agreed to by the World Bank and the AfDB as 

described in the Pittsburgh Leaders’ Statement issued at the Pittsburgh G20 Summit in 

September 2009 concerning sound finances, effective management and governance, 

transparency and accountability, focus on core mission, and results; 

The Pittsburgh Leaders’ statement notes that: “additional resources must be joined to key 

institutional reforms to ensure effectiveness: greater coordination and a clearer division of labor; 

an increased commitment to transparency, accountability, and good corporate governance; an 

increased capacity to innovate and achieve demonstrable results...” 

Following this statement, the shareholders of the World Bank and the AfDB negotiated reform 

commitments, in conjunction with commitments to provide additional resources, consistent with 

the Leaders’ statement. As discussed below, the World Bank and the AfDB have undertaken 

robust implementation of these commitments and have made substantial progress in these critical 

areas since September 2009. 

World Bank:

 Sound Finances: In 2010, the World Bank adopted a new financial framework that 

strengthens budget discipline. Specifically, for the first time in 2011, the World Bank 

made major financial decisions on budget, pricing, and net income transfers at one time 

(i.e., in June, which is the end of the Bank’s fiscal year), compelling management and 

shareholders to consider important budgetary trade-offs. This is a significant 

improvement over previous practice, which was to consider these matters separately. In 

addition, the World Bank increased rates on loans with longer term maturities. As a 

result, loan prices now cover a larger share of the World Bank’s administrative budget, a 

practice that will strengthen the Bank’s sustainability. 

In 2010, World Bank shareholders also agreed to a rules-based approach to net-income 

transfers from the hard loan window (the International Bank for Reconstruction and 

Development, or IBRD), to the concessional window (the International Development 

Association, or IDA), a measure that will help make support to IDA more predictable and 

sustainable while maintaining prudent reserve levels. This agreement further strengthens 

IDA’s financial model and reduces its dependence on donor contributions. 

 Effective Management and Governance: At the same time as it approved the general 

capital increase (GCI) for the IBRD, World Bank shareholders also endorsed a package 

of reforms related to voice and participation. The key feature of this agreement was to 

realign shares to allow for greater voice and vote to developing and transition countries. 
2 

Separately, shareholders also agreed to add a twenty-fifth Board seat to represent 

countries in sub-Saharan Africa. While some member countries saw their shares fall, the 

United States maintained both its shareholding, its single-constituency Board seat, and 

retained the same veto power that we had prior to the GCI. 

In addition, the World Bank adopted a series of human resource reforms to more strongly 

link the performance evaluation process to reflect results and to more closely link staff 

pay to performance. Specifically, on February 8, 2011, the Executive Board voted (with 

U.S. support) to eliminate a formula that had previously led to automatic annual salary 

increases. Under the new system, there are no automatic cost-of-living increases. 

Instead, World Bank Management is using a mix of public sector and private sector labor 

market indicators to calculate an overall change in the staff salary structure, which is then 

apportioned out to staff strictly based on merit. 

 Transparency and Accountability: The World Bank’s revised disclosure policy, which 

set a new, high-quality standard among MDBs, took effect on July 1, 2010. The new 

policy included a shift from a “positive list” approach, for which disclosure is considered 

exceptional, to a “negative list” approach, for which disclosure is considered the norm 

other than in exceptional circumstances. Other important policy changes include: 1) the 

creation of a formal, independent appeals process, through which members of the public 

can seek disclosure if they believe that it has been wrongfully denied; 2) a commitment 

to release significant policy documents and certain project documents to the public at the 

same time that they are released to the World Bank Board of Directors; and 3) a 

commitment to reliably provide project progress reports that permit recourse for affected 

parties who are concerned about project implementation impacts. 

 Focus on Core Mission: In April 2010, the World Bank adopted a new “Post-Crisis 

Directions” strategic framework that addresses the Bank’s comparative advantages in 

supporting poverty reduction and economic development, including engagement on 

global public goods. Under this strategy, the Bank has agreed to more closely align 

internal resources with its priorities. Management has agreed to implement a Corporate 

Scorecard to assess the World Bank’s performance, to be published annually. This 

Scorecard was circulated to the Executive Board for the first time on August 29, 2011. 

The current scorecard is provided in Annex 1.

 Results: Starting on July 1, 2009, the World Bank committed to report on development 

results across the institution using indicators that aggregate standardized data from 

projects supported by IDA in seven sectors – education, health, roads, water supply, 

micro- and small- and medium-enterprise, urban development, and information and 

communication technology. This is a significant improvement over the previous 

approach, which focused primarily on outputs (e.g., textbooks purchased) rather than 

outcomes (e.g., literacy rates) and on project-level results that did not link to sector, 

country and institutional goals. These indicators serve as the basis for annual results 

reporting in the context of the IDA Annual Report and more regular reporting through the 

Corporate Scorecard. 
3 

Although not part of the GCI agreement, it is worth noting that IDA remains a leader 

among MDBs in developing systems to aggregate project-level results up to the portfolio 

level. IDA’s “Results Framework” is aimed at better understanding the broad-based 

impact that water, transportation, health, and education projects are having in recipient 

countries. IDA is expanding this framework to include small- and medium-enterprises, 

urban development, and information and communication. The latest replenishment for 

IDA (IDA-16), approved in December 2010, also incorporates notional targets for 

outcomes in key sectors across IDA countries. 

 African Development Bank

 Sound Finances: In April 2011, the AfDB adopted a comprehensive income model 

designed to improve the management and sustainability of the Bank’s capital. The new 

model includes the following noteworthy commitments: (1) that loan pricing results in 

coverage of related administrative costs over the medium-term (by 2014); (2) that the 

AfDB periodically calculate the sustainable level of lending and annual reserve 

accumulation target, consistent with long-term financial sustainability; and (3) that the 

AfDB provide a minimum level of annual net income transfers to the concessional 

window (the African Development Fund, or AfDF), which serves Africa’s poorest 

countries. 

 Effective Management and Governance: 

o Risk Management. AfDB Management is in the process of implementing 

commitments to strengthen risk management, and took important steps in March 

2011 by setting limits on the amount of risk capital allocated to different types of 

risk and establishing a Credit Risk Committee to strengthen risk governance. In 

early 2012, AfDB management began work on an Enterprise Risk Management 

plan. An important step that we have urged is to designate the risk function as a 

stand-alone unit with a Head of Risk office reporting to the President, consistent 

with the best practice at other MDBs. 

o Human Resources. In December 2011, the AfDB Board, with our support, 

adopted a new compensation framework. Specific areas of improvement include: 

(1) eliminating a specific salary target as a percentage of World Bank/other MDB 

salaries; (2) adopting broader measures of market competitiveness; and (3) 

strengthening the links between performance and compensation. 

o Anti-corruption. There have been important structural changes designed to 

strengthen the AfDB’s anti-corruption activities. For example, in 2010 the 

Integrity Office was upgraded to a stand-alone division reporting to the President, 

and in 2011, a Director was recruited to manage a staff that had grown to ten 

professionals (twice as many as in 2008). 
4 

 Transparency and Accountability: The AfDB is in the midst of revising its disclosure 

policy, in consultation with external stakeholders, to align with international best 

practices. Adoption of the new policy is expected in early 2012. We anticipate that the 

new policy will contain improvements comparable to other recently updated MDB 

policies, including a shift from a “positive list” approach, for which disclosure is 

considered exceptional, to a “negative list” approach, for which disclosure is considered 

the norm. The new policy is also expected to set deadlines for responding to requests for 

information and establish an appeals process for requests that are denied. In addition, 

following a robust international recruiting process, the AfDB is in the final stages of 

selecting a new Auditor General (AG). The new AG will lead an office of 17 staff, up 

from 15 in 2009. 

 Focus on Core Mission: In late 2011, AfDB management tapped a group of experts to 

develop a Long Term Strategy, a process that we expect will take at least a year. We 

believe this effort will build on the Bank’s very strong Medium-Term Strategy, adopted 

in 2008. Under this strategy, the Bank made significant progress in narrowing its focus 

by establishing a set of priority areas based on its comparative advantage: infrastructure, 

economic governance, private sector development and higher/vocational education. 

 Results: In November 2010, the AfDB adopted a Bank-wide Results Measurement 

Framework (see Annex 2) that includes indicators to measure investment operations, 

policy-based operations, regional operations and private sector operations as part of a 

single reporting framework that covers all of the Bank’s interventions. This was a 

significant improvement as it replaced the previous Results Framework, which had 

covered only the concessional AfDF operations. 

(2) implementing specific reform commitments agreed to by the IDB in Resolution AG–7/10 

‘‘Report on the Ninth General Capital Increase in the resources of the Inter-American 

Development Bank as approved by the Governors on July 12, 2010, including transfers of at 

least $200,000,000 annually to a grant facility for Haiti;” 

The table in Annex 3 describes the status of each specific reform commitment at the IDB. As the 

table makes clear, the IDB has made substantial progress in meeting the commitments that were 

negotiated in the context of the GCI. This includes the annual transfer to Haiti of $200,000,000. 

The first transfer was approved by Governors at the IDB Annual Meeting in March 2011. 

(3) implementing procurement guidelines that maximize international competitive bidding in 

accordance with sound procurement practices, including transparency, competition, and costeffective results for borrowers; 

The World Bank established the current framework for today’s international best practice 

standard for MDB procurement guidelines in 1995. These guidelines supported transparency, 

competition and cost-effective results by requiring, among other things, strong international 

advertising requirements, the use of open competition in the contracting process, and mandatory 

use of publicly available standard bidding documents for international competitive bidding. In 
5 

subsequent years, the IDB and AfDB also made major revisions to their policies in an effort to 

closely harmonize with those of the World Bank. In 2006, the IDB adopted new procurement 

rules, including the required use of standard bidding documents, consistent in most respects with 

the World Bank’s revised guidelines of 2004. The AfDB followed suit in 2008. 

In January 2011, the World Bank Board approved modifications to its guidelines designed to 

further enhance the transparency and efficiency of the procurement process under World Bankfinanced investment projects. This included, for example, requirements for strengthened 

advertising of project bid opportunities and for posting of project procurement plans. We are 

engaging with the IDB and AfDB to encourage harmonization with these latest guidelines. 

Beginning in Q1 2012, the World Bank will launch another review of its procurement policy, 

and we will engage very closely to ensure that current standards are strengthened further. 

 

In addition, in April 2010, each MDB signed a cross-debarment agreement under which the 

MDBs committed to cross-debar any company determined to be in violation of the fraud and 

corruption provisions of an individual MDB. So far, the World Bank and IDB (in May 2010 and 

March 2011 respectively) have amended their procurement guidelines/policy to provide for cross 

debarment with the MDBs. The AfDB is preparing a similar amendment to its procurement 

rules. 

(4) implementing best practices for the protection of whistleblowers from retaliation, including 

best practices for legal burdens of proof, access to independent adjudicative bodies, results that 

eliminate the effects of retaliation, and statutes of limitation for reporting retaliation; 

Over the past five years, the World Bank, AfDB, and IDB have all made substantial progress in 

implementing policies to prohibit retaliation against individuals who report corruption, fraud or 

other official misconduct. 

1) Shifting legal burdens of proof to management, rather than having them fall on 

employees who allegedly have been subject to retaliation after reporting misconduct to 

management. In 2007 and 2008, respectively, the AfDB and World Bank incorporated 

provisions into their whistleblower policies that appropriately shift burdens of proof in 

whistleblower cases. Specifically, if an employee can show that he or she was subject to 

adverse action after reporting wrongdoing at a Bank, the managements of these 

institutions must show by clear and convincing evidence that they would have taken the 

same action absent the reporting of wrongdoing. The IDB Board of Directors recently 

approved a comparable policy at the IDB, and we expect it to come into force later this 

year. 

2) Providing greater access to independent adjudicative bodies for employees who allegedly 

have suffered retaliation for whistleblowing. The AfDB, World Bank, and IDB (in 2007, 

2008, and 2010 respectively) delineated or expanded the scope of protected disclosures 

and prohibited retaliatory conduct in their whistleblower policies. These changes have 

led to an increase in the scope of permissible claims for retaliation that can be referred to 

independent Administrative Tribunals; and 
6 

3) Extending whistleblower policies beyond protection of the jobs and livelihoods of Bank 

employees and into protecting the integrity of the institutions. In the MDBs’ most recent 

policy iterations (i.e., 2007 for the AfDB; 2008 for the World Bank; and 2010 for the 

IDB), the MDBs have modified their whistle blower policies to broaden the scope of 

protection. This includes policies to hold individuals accountable for reprisals against 

whistleblowers and to permit reporting of significant suspected wrongdoing to authorities 

outside of the MDBs when employees have a reasonable basis to believe that the Banks’ 

internal mechanisms are inadequate to deal with the issue or that the whistleblower would 

be subject to reprisal. 

In addition, the MDBs have in place remedies to eliminate the effects of possible retaliation. The 

governing statutes of all three MDBs’ Administrative Tribunals provide a presumption that the 

dismissed employee must be reinstated unless the tribunal (for the World Bank) or the President 

of the Bank (for the IDB and AfDB) determines that such action would not be practicable or in 

the Bank’s interest, in which case it must order compensation. The MDB policies, like 

comparable U.S. law governing federal employees, do not provide for an across-the-board 

guarantee of reinstatement, but their practices are on par with or better than those of other major 

international organizations. 

The World Bank and AfDB also provide for remedies, such as compensatory damages, for 

financial losses linked to retaliatory action, emotional distress (for the AfDB only), legal costs, 

and interim relief for whistleblowers in the midst of a review or investigation. The IDB is also 

seeking to add these remedies, and the relevant policies are expected to be implemented later this 

year. 

Finally, with respect to retaliation claims, each of the MDBs has a reasonable timeframe for 

statutes of limitations relating to acting on rights (e.g., 90-120 days). 

(5) requiring that each candidate for budget support or development policy loans provide an 

assessment of reforms needed to budgetary and procurement processes to encourage 

transparency, including budget publication and public scrutiny, prior to loan approval; 

World Bank: The World Bank’s most recent operational policy on Development Policy Loans 

(DPLs), approved in August 2004, stipulates that prior to seeking Board approval for budget 

support loans, the World Bank requires that borrowing countries have an adequate macro policy 

framework based on Bank and IMF assessments. This policy also requires an assessment of a 

borrowing country’s systems of public financial management and procurement before bringing a 

DPL to the Board and, if necessary, a commitment to time-bound actions to address deficiencies 

and help mitigate risks. 

In addition, Management and the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) also conduct 

periodic retrospective analyses of DPL performance in borrower countries. The last DPL 

retrospective – covering seven IDA countries -- was conducted by the IEG in 2009, and another 

one is currently underway. The 2009 retrospective found that the World Bank’s budget support 

operations helped to advance public financial management and procurement reform in most 
7 

borrowing countries, and also provided somewhat greater predictability of aid flows in recipient 

countries. The findings of the current review will be released in November 2012. 

AfDB: Strengthening public financial management is a key objective of AfDB budget support 

lending. The AfDB’s 2004 Policy on Policy-Based Lending requires that before receiving 

budget support, countries must have a satisfactory assessment against a four-pillar Fiduciary 

Risk Management Framework, one pillar of which is budget. (The other pillars are procurement, 

audit and reporting, and corruption.) The assessment judges whether national systems are 

sufficiently strong or, where there are weaknesses, whether the government is committed to 

making necessary reforms as demonstrated by a positive trajectory of change. In the first quarter 

of 2012, the AfDB will adopt a new operational policy governing its budget support operations, 

which will further highlight the expectation that governments receiving budget support should 

have transparent budgets. 

IDB: In April 2005, the IDB adopted formal guidelines for the preparation and implementation 

of budget support operations (known at the IDB as policy-based loans). In accordance with these 

guidelines, in preparation for a budget support operation, the IDB assists borrowing countries in 

performing fiduciary capacity assessments. These assessments measure the performance of the 

borrowing country’s public financial management systems, including budget preparation and 

execution, internal controls, accounting, auditing, fiscal transparency and procurement processes. 

Once the country’s fiduciary capacity has been reviewed, the IDB identifies steps needed to 

strengthen the borrowing country’s national fiduciary systems for the operation. In order to 

ensure continuity, the IDB engages in on-going monitoring of national public financial 

management systems with special attention to any recommended reforms. 

(6) making publicly available external and internal performance and financial audits of such 

institution’s projects on the institution’s Web site; 

In the last three years, the World Bank and IDB have revised and improved their disclosure 

policies, which govern issues related to the availability of external and internal performance 

audits. The AfDB’s review is currently underway. 

The World Bank, AfDB and IDB all post overview assessments of project performance on their 

respective web sites: 

 The World Bank makes publicly available its annual assessment of the Results and 

Performance of the World Bank Group. Additionally, it posts a yearly update of the 

Status of Projects in Execution, which assesses each project’s progress. 

 

 The AfDB’s Annual Development Effectiveness Review uses a set of indicators to 

measure broad performance on four levels, including external and internal performance, 

aggregate outputs of AfDB operations, contributions to poverty reduction and 

organizational effectiveness. 
8 

 The IDB’s annual Development Effectiveness Overview and Project Monitoring Report 

provide updates on the progress made towards increasing the effectiveness of the Bank’s 

work and track the implementation of project results. 

Under the World Bank’s 2009 revised policy on Access to Information, borrowers are required 

to disclose the audited annual financial statements of projects as a precondition for doing 

business with the Bank. The World Bank discloses the statements upon receiving them. 

The IDB approved a revised access to information policy in April 2010 that does not allow for 

disclosure of these statements. However, Management has agreed to consider further revisions 

to its disclosure policy in the coming year, which will provide us with the opportunity to seek 

further progress in this area. 

The AfDB is revising its policy on disclosure and access to information, a process that is likely 

to extend into 2012 to allow for ample consultation with all relevant parties. At U.S. urging, the 

chair of the Committee on Development Effectiveness has called on Management to include 

transparency of audited annual financial statements for projects in the next draft of the policy. 

We will continue to seek progress as part of the disclosure policy review. 

(7) adopting policies concerning the World Bank’s proposed Program for Results (P4R) to limit 

P4R to no more than 5 percent of annual World Bank lending as a pilot for a period of not less 

than two years; require that projects with potentially significant adverse social or environmental 

impacts and projects that affect indigenous peoples are either excluded from P4R or subject to 

the World Bank’s own policies; require that at the close of the pilot there will be a thorough, 

independent evaluation, with input from civil society and the private sector, to provide guidance 

concerning next steps for the pilot; and fully staff the World Bank Group’s Integrity Vice 

Presidency, with agreement from Borrowers on the World Bank’s jurisdiction and authority to 

investigate allegations of fraud and corruption in any of the World Bank’s lending programs 

including P4R; 

Since the World Bank’s original P4R policy paper was released to the Committee on 

Development Effectiveness (CODE) on August 3, 2011, the Bank has made substantial progress 

in meeting the conditions in the legislation. This progress is reflected in the revised proposal of 

December 29, 2011, approved by the World Bank Board on January 24, 2012, and has been 

further confirmed in our direct engagement with World Bank senior management. Specifically: 

1. The August 3 proposal did not impose any limitation on the size of the P4R instrument 

relative to overall World Bank financing. The United States was successful in 

fundamentally reorienting the proposal so that P4R can only proceed in the near term as 

a pilot program. As a result of our efforts, the final proposal limits P4R financing to five 

percent of total IBRD/IDA commitments for the first two years. Any proposal to increase 

the cap must be justified by a review of implementation experience. In addition to 

Management’s planned assessment, we intend to request that the Independent Evaluation 

Group (IEG) prepare its own review of initial results. Both reviews will benefit from 

input from borrowers, development partners, and other stakeholders, including civil 

society and the private sector. 
9 

2. The August 3 proposal did not seek to impose any limitations on the ability of P4R to 

finance projects that have social and environmental risks associated with them, and the 

United States was also successful in reorienting this facet of the World Bank’s proposal. 

As a result, the proposal as approved on January 24 indicates that “activities that are 

judged to be likely to have significant adverse impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or 

unprecedented on the environment and/or affected people are not eligible for Programfor-Results financing, and are excluded from the Program.” Under this exclusion, 

“affected people” includes indigenous peoples. Further, the final proposal makes clear 

that all P4R-financed projects will continue to be subject to the Bank’s own policies on a 

range of issues including, notably, poverty reduction, country assistance strategies, 

development cooperation and conflict, lending operations (choice of borrower and 

contractual arrangements), the inspection panel, and the Access to Information Policy. 

3. The August 3 proposal did not explicitly state that the Bank's Integrity Vice Presidency 

(INT) would have investigative rights into both Bank and borrower funds. The United 

States was successful in getting specific language into the Bank's P4R operational policy 

stating that the INT would have the right to investigate allegations of fraud and 

corruption in the program supported by P4R, including projects financed under the 

program, not only those allegations related to Bank financing (i.e., the use of government 

funds would be included as well). The Bank's debarment list will also apply to all 

financing sources of the program. 

4. On INT staffing, INT's financial and personnel resources have increased significantly in 

recent years. INT's annual budget increased by 40 percent from FY08 to FY11 to $20.4 

million, while staffing increased by 70 percent (to 92 full-time staff) over the same 

period. INT's increasing resource base has allowed it to increase its capacity in litigation 

and forensic services, and reduce its reliance on external firms in these areas. 

5. Finally, under P4R, the Bank will be able to impose sanctions against firms and 

individuals in accordance with its sanctions policies and procedures (i.e., because 

borrowers are bound by this policy, explicit borrower consent is not needed). 

Going forward, we expect to seek further progress during the pilot implementation phase in 

pursuit of the goals identified in the legislation. We will monitor to be sure that P4R financing 

does not exceed 5 percent of IBRD/IDA lending. We will also apply rigorous scrutiny of the 

Bank’s P4R-related assessments of countries’ systems and capacities, as well as the nature of the 

programs to be funded, to be sure that sensitive projects are appropriately excluded. Finally, we 

will monitor the role of INT to be sure that it is able to engage appropriately in P4R-financed 

programs. 

(8) concerning the World Bank, strengthening the public availability of information regarding 

International Finance Corporation (IFC) subprojects when the IFC is funding a financial 

intermediary, including—(A) requiring that higher-risk subprojects comply with the relevant 

Performance Standard requirements; and (B) agreeing to periodically disclose on the IFC Web 
10 

site a listing of the name, location, and sector of high-risk subprojects supported by IFC 

investments through private equity funds. 

Beginning in 2009, the IFC conducted an extensive review of its Sustainability Framework, 

which resulted in IFC Board’s adoption of an updated framework in May 2011. The IFC 

Sustainability Framework consists of: 

 The Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, which defines the IFC’s own 

responsibilities and certain requirements for Financial Intermediaries (FIs) that are IFC 

clients; 

 The Performance Standards, which define most IFC client responsibilities (other than 

those covered by the Policy on Environment and Social Sustainability); and 

 The Access to Information Policy (AIP), formerly the Policy on Disclosure of 

Information, which articulates IFC disclosure responsibilities. 

The updated Sustainability Framework entered into force on January 1, 2012, and represents 

substantial progress over the previous policy, both in broad terms and with respect to disclosure 

requirements for subprojects financed by Financial Intermediaries (FIs). 

Specifically, the new policy expands the type and number of FI subprojects subject to the IFC 

Performance Standards, including requirements to disclose information to, and consult with, 

stakeholders, especially affected communities. More concretely, the previous policy required 

application of the Performance Standards by FI subprojects likely to have significant 

environmental/social impacts (“Category A” subprojects), while the updated policy requires that 

“higher risk” subprojects apply the Performance Standards. “Higher risk” subprojects include 

not only subprojects with potential significant impacts, but also those with moderate impacts 

(“Category B” subprojects). Given that there tend to be few Category A-equivalent subprojects 

and relatively many “higher risk” subprojects, this is a major expansion of subprojects that will 

be subject to public disclosure requirements. 

In addition, the new policy requires the IFC to disclose information about its subprojects (which 

the former policy did not do). Under the new Access to Information Policy, the IFC will 

periodically disclose a listing of the name, location and sectors of high-risk subprojects that have 

been supported by IFC investments through private equity funds, subject to regulatory 

constraints and market sensitivities. 

Attachments: 

Annex 1: World Bank Corporate Scorecard: 

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-

1244163232994/6180403-1316547116912/DC2001-0014(E)Scorecard.pdf 

Annex 2: AfDB Results Measurement Framework: 

http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Bank%20Group%2

0Results%20Measurement%20Framework%20-%20REV%202[1].pdf 

Annex 3: IDB Implementation Report