This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 30,221 4 MIGUEL OSORNIO, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY 7 William G. Shoobridge, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 12 Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 FRY, Chief Judge. 17 Defendant appeals his convic tions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon 18 and resisting, evading or obstructing an offi cer. [MIO 1] We proposed to affirm in 19 a notice of proposed summary disposition, and pursuant to an extension, Defendant 202 has filed a timely memorandum in opposition. Remaining unpersuaded by 1 Defendant’s memorandum, we affirm his convictions. 2 Limitation on Voir Dire 3 Defendant claims that the district court denied him a fair trial by limiting his 4 voir dire to fifteen minutes. [MIO 2- 4] In our notice of proposed summary 5 disposition, we observed that it is within the discretion of the district court as to 6 whether to permit attorneys to examine prospective jurors. Rule 5-606(A) NMRA 7 (“The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of 8 prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination.”). Moreover, the extent of 9 the voir dire examination is within the district court’s discretion. See State v. 10 Martinez , 99 N.M. 353, 357, 658 P.2d 428, 432 (1983). 11 In our notice, we also observed that Defendant did not suggest that the time 12 allotted to him was different or less than th e time allotted to the State, and he failed 13 to make any showing that he was prej udiced by the limitation on the amount of voir 14 dire. See State v. Fernandez , 117 N.M. 673, 676, 875 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Ct. App. 15 1994) (recognizing that a restriction on a party's voir dire by the court will not 16 constitute reversible error unless the de fendant shows he was prejudiced by the 17 restriction). Given that Defendant faile d to show that he was prejudiced by the 18 limitation on voir dire and given that the district court is not required to allow any 193 specific amount of time for examination of prospective jurors, we proposed to hold 1 that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting voir dire to fifteen minutes and 2 thus proposed to affirm on this issue. See Martinez , 99 N.M. at 357, 658 P.2d at 432 3 (recognizing that “the extent of voir dire is left to the sound discre tion of the trial court 4 and limited only by the essential demands of fairness”); see also State v. Martinez , 5 2002-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 31-35, 131 N.M. 746, 42 P.3d 851 (holding that the district 6 court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the defendant’s voir dire in keeping with 7 its general policy of limiting voir dire to fift een minutes per side in the absence of a 8 specialized showing that additional time was needed). 9 In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant fails to rebut our observations as 10 to a lack of prejudice. [MIO 3-4] More over, he has failed to convince us that the 11 district court abused its discretion in limiting voir dire. [MIO 3-4] Therefore, we 12 affirm on this issue. 13 Lesser Included Offense Instruction 14 Defendant contends that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 15 on disorderly conduct as a lesser offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 16 [MIO 4-7] See NMSA 1978, § 30-20-1 (1967). “A de fendant is entitled to have the 17 jury instructed on his theory of the case if that theory is supported by the evidence.” 18 State v. Nieto , 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 15, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442. “In order to 194 obtain an instruction on a lesser included offense, there must be some view of the 1 evidence pursuant to which the lesser o ffense is the highest degree of crime 2 committed, and that view must be reasonable.” State v. Brown , 1998-NMSC-037, ¶ 3 12, 126 N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 313 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks and 4 citation omitted). 5 In our notice of proposed summary dis position, we proposed to affirm on this 6 issue because Defendant faile d to provide any review of the evidence introduced at 7 trial in support of conviction or any evidence or testimony he introduced in his 8 defense. We noted that review of the r ecord only indicates that Defendant fought with 9 a few men and threatened Daniel Roses withtwo knives. [RP 16, 67] We further 10 observed that it is Defendant’s burden as th e appellant to provide this Court with a 11 recitation of the facts necessary to evaluate his appeal, and that Defendant failed to 12 meet this burden. See Rule 12-208(D)(3) NMRA (stating that the docketing statement 13 shall contain “a concise, accu rate statement of the case summarizing all facts material 14 to a consideration of the issues presented”); Thornton v. Gamble , 101 N.M. 764, 769, 15 688 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that counsel must set out all relevant 16 facts in the docketing statement). Give n that we had no information about the 17 evidence and testimony introduced at trial, we could not analyze whether Defendant 18 may have been entitled to an instruction on disorderly conduct. We thus invited 195 Defendant to inform us of the evidence and testimony introduced at trial and explain 1 how this evidence could be reasonably viewed as supporting a conviction for 2 disorderly conduct as the highest degree of crime committed. 3 In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant sets out general statements of law 4 relevant to the issue of whether a crime can be considered a lesser included offense 5 to another crime. [MIO 5-6] He thenclaims that he could not have committed 6 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon without also committing disorderly conduct. 7 [MIO 6] While this may be true, it merelyestablishes that di sorderly conduct is a 8 lesser-included offense to the crime of a ggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 9 However, as previously stated, Defendant is not entitled to an instruction on disorderly 10 conduct as a lesser included offense unless th ere was some evidence in the record that 11 could support a finding that disorderly conduct “is the highest degree of crime 12 committed.” Brown , 1998-NMSC-037, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation 13 omitted). Given that Defendant had failed to provide this Court with any indication 14 of whether the evidence introdu ced at trial could establish that disorderly conduct was 15 the highest degree of crime committe d, we affirm on this issue. See State v. Gaitan , 16 2002-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 15-24, 131 N.M. 758, 42 P.3d 1207 (holding that the defendant 17 was not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included 18 offense to second degree murder and volunt ary manslaughter because there was “no 196 reasonable view of the evidence, pursuant to which involuntary manslaughter is the 1 highest degree of crime [committed]”). 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the foregoing reasons as well as those set forth in our notice of proposed 4 disposition, we affirm Defendant’s convictions. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

10 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 11

12 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 13