DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ELISOL ST. LOT,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-3022

[October 28, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Charles A. Schwab, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502016CF002238A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Breanna Atwood, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lindsay A. Warner, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

LEVINE, C.J.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting out-of-court 

statements as child hearsay and in excluding evidence about a previous 

sexual assault involving the victim’s mother. We affirm the trial court and 

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the child 

hearsay statements under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2019), and 

State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994). Further, we find that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence about the 

mother’s sexual abuse because the perpetrator was not the same person,

and any relevance was attenuated at best. We find no error in the denial 

of the motion for judgment of acquittal and affirm that issue without 

comment. 

Prior to trial, the state filed an amended notice of intention to use 

hearsay statements of a child victim pursuant to section 90.803(23), 

Florida Statutes. The parties stipulated that the victim was incompetent 

to testify due to lack of memory. The victim was four years and nine 

months old at the time of the offense. 
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During the child hearsay hearing, the victim’s mother testified that she 

lived with appellant whom she had known her whole life. On the evening 

in question, the mother walked past appellant’s bedroom and saw 

appellant and the victim on appellant’s bed. The victim was lying on her 

back, and appellant’s stomach was touching the victim’s stomach. 

Appellant was wearing gym shorts with no shirt, and his hand was 

covering the victim’s mouth. 

The mother screamed. Appellant quickly jumped off the victim. The 

mother asked what was going on, and appellant said nothing was going on 

and left. The victim was “very scared,” “in shock and shaking.” The victim 

told the mother that appellant “pull[ed]” her into his room as she was 

walking by and “tried to sleep with” her. The mother had never heard the 

victim use that language before. The mother saw bite marks on the 

victim’s chin. 

The victim told the mother that she was “burning” and that appellant 

“poured something in her private area and that he hurt her.” When 

referring to her private area, the victim used the word “bobot,” which is 

Creole for vagina. The victim also said that appellant “was rubbing 

something soft on her private part and then rubbed something hard on 

her thighs” and “was rubbing something on her bobot.” The mother 

observed that the bottom of the victim’s dress and underwear were wet as 

if something had been poured onto her. She also saw handprints on the 

victim’s inner thighs near her vaginal area. 

In the car on the way to the emergency room, the victim repeated what 

happened. She also said that appellant squeezed her and that she could 

not breathe. At the hospital, the detective left a recorder in the room. In 

the recording, the victim said that appellant scratched her face and that 

“he pushed it,” meaning his penis. A detective who responded to the 

hospital observed scratches on the victim’s chin, bruising on one thigh, 

and a scratch on the other thigh. 

The trial court found that the child hearsay statements were admissible 

under State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994), and made detailed 

findings as to the reliability of the statements. The trial court also found 

the statements were corroborated by eyewitness testimony and physical 

evidence. 

Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine to prevent the defense 

from presenting evidence that the mother had been sexually assaulted as 

a child. The defense wanted to cross-examine the mother about her past 
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sexual assaults. The trial court granted the motion and excluded the 

evidence, finding it would “have minimal, if any, relevance” and would 

result in “a trial within a trial.” 

The case proceeded to trial. The evidence adduced at trial was similar 

to that presented during the child hearsay hearing. Additionally, the 

mother testified that when appellant jumped off the victim, his pants were 

so low his pubic hair was visible. The jury found appellant guilty as 

charged. This appeal follows. 

Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s outof-court statements as child hearsay. “We review both a trial court’s 

determination that a statement is reliable under section 90.803(23) and 

the sufficiency of the trial court’s findings of fact for an abuse of 

discretion.” Elghomari v. State, 66 So. 3d 416, 418-19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, sets forth a hearsay exception for 

statements of a child victim: 

(a) Unless the source of information or the method or 

circumstances by which the statement is reported indicates a 

lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement made by a 

child victim with a physical . . . age of 16 or less describing . . 

. . any act of sexual abuse against a child, . . . or any offense 

involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or 

penetration performed in the presence of, with, by, or on the 

declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in 

evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:

1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence 

of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the 

statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. In 

making its determination, the court may consider the mental 

and physical age and maturity of the child, the nature and 

duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child 

to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of 

the child victim, and any other factor deemed appropriate; and

2. The child . . . 

b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other 

corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense. . . .

. . . .
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(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, 

as to the basis for its ruling under this subsection.

To be admissible under section 90.803(23), “the statement must meet 

two specific reliability requirements: (1) the source of the information 

through which the statement was reported must indicate trustworthiness; 

and (2) the time, content, and circumstances of the statement must reflect 

that the statement provides sufficient safeguards of reliability.” 

Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 954 (emphasis omitted). 

In Townsend, the Florida Supreme Court articulated a non-exclusive 

list of other factors to be considered in determining the reliability of a child 

hearsay statement: 

the statement’s spontaneity; whether the statement was made 

at the first available opportunity following the alleged incident; 

whether the statement was elicited in response to questions 

from adults; the mental state of the child when the abuse was 

reported; whether the statement consisted of a child-like 

description of the act; whether the child used terminology 

unexpected of a child of similar age; the motive or lack thereof 

to fabricate the statement; the ability of the child to 

distinguish between reality and fantasy; the vagueness of the 

accusations; the possibility of any improper influence on the 

child by participants involved in a domestic dispute; and 

contradictions in the accusation.

Id. at 957-58. “[A] court is to use a totality of the circumstances evaluation 

in determining reliability.” Id. at 958. 

In the instant case, the trial court considered the totality of the 

circumstances and made specific findings based on the factors set forth in 

section 90.803(23) and Townsend. We affirm the trial court’s ruling since 

there exists in the record competent substantial evidence supporting these 

findings under section 90.803(23) and Townsend. The trial court found, 

inter alia, that immediately after the incident, the mother asked the victim 

what happened, and the victim responded. The victim was shaking and 

in shock. There was limited time between the alleged offense and the 

statements the victim made to fabricate a story that a four-year-old could 

adhere to. There was no indication of animosity between the victim or the 

mother and appellant. The language used by the victim was not 

inconsistent with that which would be used by a child of that age. There 
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was nothing vague in the child’s repeated statements or anything 

indicative of fantasy, embellishment, or lying. 

Significantly, the victim’s statements were corroborated by eyewitness 

testimony and physical evidence. The mother witnessed appellant on top 

of the victim, lying stomach to stomach, wearing no shorts, with his hand 

covering her mouth. Upon being confronted, appellant immediately 

jumped up and left. The victim had a handprint-shaped bruise on her 

thigh near her vagina, and the bottom of her dress and underwear were 

wet. 

Thus, because the circumstances of the victim’s statements provided 

sufficient safeguards of reliability and were additionally corroborated by 

other evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

them. 

Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in granting the state’s 

motion in limine and precluding the defense from cross-examining the 

victim’s mother about the fact that the mother was sexually assaulted as 

a child. A trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed for abuse 

of discretion, as limited by the rules of evidence. Patrick v. State, 104 So. 

3d 1046, 1056 (Fla. 2012). A trial court’s ruling concerning the scope of 

cross-examination is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. McDuffie v. 

State, 970 So. 2d 312, 324 (Fla. 2007). 

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 

motion in limine because there was no showing of how the mother’s prior 

history of sexual abuse would be relevant. See § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2019). 

The incidents involving the mother occurred many years ago and involved 

unrelated perpetrators and different circumstances. Cross-examination of 

the mother on this issue would not have in any way proved or disproved a 

material fact of the crimes alleged in this case. See Graham v. State, 207 

So. 3d 135, 142 (Fla. 2016) (affirming ruling prohibiting defense counsel 

from cross-examining the victim’s mother about her own history of sexual 

abuse because it was not relevant). 

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

child hearsay statements and in granting the motion in limine, we affirm. 

Affirmed.

CONNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. 

* * *
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Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.