IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-839

No. COA21-694

Filed 20 December 2022

Granville County, No. 21 SPC 42

IN THE MATTER OF: E.B. AAU/MPU WARDS GRANVILLE COUNTY

Appeal by respondent from order entered 4 March 2021 by Judge John H. 

Stultz in Granville County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 August 

2022.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General John Tillery, 

for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Hannah 

Hall Love, for respondent-appellant. 

TYSON, Judge.

¶ 1 E.B. (“Respondent”) appeals from an order requiring 90 days of inpatient 

commitment as being mentally ill and being dangerous to self. We affirm. 

I. Background 

¶ 2 Dr. Gary Pohl (“Petitioner”) a state employee who is employed at Central 

Regional Hospital signed and filed a petition seeking Respondent’s involuntary 

commitment on 21 January 2021, opining she “has a very extensive history of severe 

mental illness,” was “noncompliant with medication and she is currently very 

psychotic,” and was experiencing “paranoid delusions.” Respondent underwent a first 
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examination the following day, with the physician-examiner, Dr. Barbara Mattox, 

MD, who opined Respondent was “dangerous to herself or others.” The examiner 

specifically noted Respondent believed: (1) someone had implanted tracking devices 

into her ears, vagina, and uterus; (2) she had undergone genital mutilation; and, (3) 

that a “snake filled with cocaine” was inside of her gastrointestinal tract. 

¶ 3 The trial court ordered Respondent to inpatient involuntary commitment for 

30 days, based upon the report and findings “she cannot take care of her physical and 

medical needs outside of Central Regional Hospital at this time. [Respondent] would 

cease to take medications if released leading to her decompensation.” 

¶ 4 Dr. Justin Gettings, Respondent’s treating physician, completed another 

examination on 25 February 2021 and opined Respondent was still dangerous to 

herself. According to his examination, Dr. Gettings concluded Respondent “remained 

psychotic and delusional. She believes she has cocaine filled snakes and retained 

fetal products in her uterus. . . . At present[,] [Respondent] represents a danger to 

herself if discharged in her current condition.” 

¶ 5 A re-hearing on Respondent’s continued involuntary commitment was held on

4 March 2021. Dr. Gettings testified for the State, and opined Respondent currently 

suffers from “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.” He further opined Respondent 

continued to and would be a danger to herself if discharged. He based his opinion 

upon observations, despite treatment with medication, Respondent “continue[s] to 
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have persistent delusions that . . . pose a danger to her and make her unsafe to return 

to the community at this time.” Specifically, Dr. Gettings testified: 

[W]hen [Respondent] initially presented, [she] had a 

delusion that she’d actually had something retained in her 

uterus. So the content of what has been retained has 

changed over time, but it’s varied from either a cocainefilled snake—she’s mentioned that she has retained fetal 

product from a prior abortion.

I was worried initially, during the initial part of her 

admission, that she was actually doing self-examinations 

of her utero-genital region which could pose potentially a 

physical danger to herself. . . . [E]ven as recently as this 

morning, [Respondent] was advocating that she still has 

retained material in her uterus.

The second delusion that has been very prominent is that 

[she] continues to endorse that she’s the owner of the Pepsi 

Cola Company. She stated that she had sole ownership of 

this product and is owed distributions—financial 

distributions from the sale of this product. . . . These 

delusions have remained persistent in spite of treatment.

Third . . . , she has a lot of concern and questioning about 

the credentials of people involved in her care. . . . [S]he has 

questioned credentials of some of my colleagues.

She’s also questioned the credentials of attorneys that are 

representing her in a custody case in Durham County. 

She’s told me multiple times that she’s had those 

individuals disbarred. [Respondent] has a history of filing, 

you know, litigation against folks in Durham County 

related to that custody battle and getting restraining 

orders.

I’m bringing all this up because I worry that, if she’s in a 

position in the community where she questions the 

credentials of professionals, including, you know, 
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potentially police or people that are representing her in 

civil matters, it could put her at risk and danger to herself.

So those are the three main areas.

¶ 6 When asked by the State whether Respondent might injure herself while 

engaging in self-examinations of her genitalia and uterus if released, Dr. Gettings 

responded: “I mean—on a very concrete fashion, yes. I would worry just with, you 

know, it’s an odd delusion . . . . Yes.” Dr. Gettings further asserted his opinion it is 

reasonably probable Respondent would suffer physical debilitation, if immediately 

released because “she engages in poor self-care, tenuous housing which definitely 

put[s] her at risk to herself.” He also opined, “if we don’t have her fully—fully treated 

and fully at her baseline, she has a high risk of decompensating and requiring repeat 

or further hospitalization in the future.” 

¶ 7 Respondent’s counsel elicited expert testimony and competent evidence 

tending to show she had previously lived independently, was compliant with the 

hospital’s rules, has engaged in treatment, and was improving in her condition. Dr. 

Gettings responded and opined, “I don’t believe she’s at her baseline, and that 

formulation is coming from reviewing past medical records. . . . I do think that there 

is potentially room for ongoing improvement.” 

¶ 8 When asked what steps have been taken to try and accommodate Respondent’s 

future discharge, Dr. Gettings asserted “she’s essentially homeless,” and caregivers 
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had pursued lodging through a transitional housing program. That housing program 

placed Respondent’s application on hold because “the people who organize that 

program have very significant concerns about [Respondent’s] stability and ability to 

sort of live independently.” 

¶ 9 Respondent was also sworn, testified, and asserted she would be able to find

immediate employment and she had enough money to pay for lodging in short-stay 

hotels. She testified to continuing to have an obstruction in her gastrointestinal tract 

and/or uterus despite contrary medical tests, examinations, and treatment revealing 

no such presence or obstruction. 

¶ 10 Respondent also denied needing medication: “Pretty much all of my pills and 

stuff that was ordered by [Dr. Gettings]. . . . I don’t see the problem with me. I see 

the problem with staff and the billing error. . . . I see, you know, me being consistently 

held back.” While Respondent stated she took laxatives multiple times a day to treat 

the purported obstructions and blockages, Dr. Gettings did not testify to that effect. 

¶ 11 The trial court found and concluded Respondent was mentally ill and

dangerous to herself and required further involuntary commitment:

she suffers from a mental illness, which is schizoaffective 

disorder. . . . [S]he is currently in possession of a delusion, 

that there is something retained within her body and . . . 

that there are other items that are inside of her body that 

are causing a blockage. The Court finds that these 

complaints have been medically checked out (sic) and are 

continuing to be evidence of a delusion. The Court finds 
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that she has persisted in this delusion and that the 

delusion has changed in nature from a cocaine-filled snake 

to fetal material to now a blockage in her gastro-intestinal 

tract that has resulted in her need for high doses of 

laxatives.

The Court finds that this type of behavior is likely to cause 

physical self-injury if not stabilized by medication. The 

Court finds that she does not have adequate insight into 

her mental health issues. She has indicated that she does 

not need medication. 

. . . .

She has been unable to maintain safe, stable housing and 

that, without this stable housing coupled with her—her 

own testimony about how she arrived at Central Regional 

Hospital is incredible, and therefore, that [she] would pose 

a significant debilitation if she were outside of this 

hospitalization.

¶ 12 The trial court found Respondent’s asserted gastrointestinal or uterine 

blockage(s) were found to be non-existent and Respondent’s “delusional thinking puts 

[her] at risk for self-inflicted injury due to attemtps [sic] to remove an internal 

iobstruction [sic].” The Court also found that Respondent’s “[n]on-compliance of 

medication, the lack of stable housing and lack of insight into her condition, taken 

together, pose a[] serious risk of rapid decompensation if in the community. She 

therefore poses a significant danger to herself.” The trial court concluded and ordered 

Respondent to be involuntarily committed for 90 days on 4 March 2021, and expressly 

incorporated Dr. Gettings’ report into its oral findings. Respondent appealed.

II. Jurisdiction 
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¶ 13 Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(2) and 

122C-272 (2021). “When the challenged order may form the basis for future 

commitment or may cause other collateral legal consequences for the respondent, an 

appeal of that order is not moot.” In re Webber, 201 N.C. App. 212, 217, 689 S.E.2d 

468, 472-73 (2009). This appeal is properly before this Court “notwithstanding the 

fact that the period of [Respondent’s] involuntary commitment has ended.” In re 

Whatley, 224 N.C. App. 267, 270, 736 S.E.2d 527, 529 (2012) (citation omitted). 

III. Issues

¶ 14 Respondent asserts the evidence and the trial court’s findings are inadequate 

to support the conclusions of being mentally ill and of being dangerous to herself. She 

claims the evidence and findings fail to draw the requisite “nexus between past 

conduct and future danger” required to make and sustain such a conclusion. In re 

J.P.S., 264 N.C. App. 58, 63, 823 S.E.2d 917, 921 (2019) (“Although the trial court 

need not say the magic words ‘reasonable probability of future harm,’ it must draw a 

nexus between past conduct and future danger.”) (citation omitted)). 

IV. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review 

¶ 15 Respondent, like all individuals before the district court and this Court, is 

presumed to be sane and is entitled to her liberty and right to be free of restraint. 

See N.C. Const. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his 
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freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of 

his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”); Sane, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019) (“Having a relatively sound and healthy mind; capable of reason and 

of distinguishing right from wrong.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 

72 L. Ed. 944, 956 (1928) (Brandis, J., dissenting) (The founders “conferred, as against 

the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the 

right most valued by civilized men.”). The State’s burden of proof to deprive 

Respondent of her liberty demands competent and relevant evidence and findings of 

fact to be based upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence at the involuntary 

commitment hearing. This Court reviews an involuntary commitment order “to 

determine whether the ultimate finding concerning the respondent’s danger to self or 

others is supported by the court’s underlying findings, and whether those underlying 

findings, in turn, are supported by competent evidence.” In re W.R.D., 248 N.C. App. 

512, 515, 790 S.E.2d 344, 347 (2016) (citation omitted). 

¶ 16 On issues of admission and credibility of the evidence this Court does “not 

consider whether the evidence of respondent’s mental illness and dangerousness was 

clear, cogent and convincing,” In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 

(1980), as that “is for the trier of fact to determine.” In re Underwood, 38 N.C. App. 

344, 347, 247 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1978). 
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¶ 17 The trial court’s conclusions of law to involuntarily commit and deprive 

Respondent of her liberty must be supported by its findings of fact and supporting 

evidence on each required statutory element and those conclusions are reviewed de 

novo on appeal. Id. The State’s quantum of evidence must meet and sustain its 

burden of proof. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-268(j) (2021); Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 

N.C. 463, 472, 67 S.E.2d 639, 645 (1951) (“Whether a statement is an ultimate fact or

a conclusion of law depends upon whether it is reached by natural reasoning or by an 

application of fixed rules of law.”) (citations omitted)). Our colleague’s separate 

opinion misstates this Court’s duty and role to review conclusions of law. If this Court 

were to adopt the separate opinion’s standard of review, the logical conclusion of that 

standard deprives Respondent of any effective appellate review. In re Duvall, 268 

N.C. App. 14, 18, 834 S.E.2d 177, 181 (2019); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2021) 

(“The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction . . . to supervise and control the proceedings 

of any of the trial courts of the General Court of Justice[.]”). 

B. Dangerousness to Self 

¶ 18 A respondent may be found to be dangerous to herself under the requirements 

of the statute if, “[w]ithin the relevant past,” she has demonstrated the following:

I. The individual would be unable, without care, 

supervision, and the continued assistance of others not 

otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and 

discretion in the conduct of the individual’s daily 

responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy the 
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individual’s need for nourishment, personal or medical 

care, shelter, or self-protection and safety.

II. There is a reasonable probability of the individual’s 

suffering serious physical debilitation within the near 

future unless adequate treatment is given pursuant to this 

Chapter. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational, 

of actions that the individual is unable to control, of 

behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or 

of other evidence of severely impaired insight and 

judgment shall create a prima facie inference that the 

individual is unable to care for himself or herself.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a)(1) (2021). 

¶ 19 Here, the trial court’s order finds and concludes Respondent’s involuntary 

commitment is required, and it concluded Respondent’s “[n]on-compliance [with] 

medication, the lack of stable housing and lack of insight into her condition, taken 

together, pose a [ ] serious risk of rapid decompensation if in the community. She 

therefore poses a significant danger to herself.” 

¶ 20 Because these findings are supported by creditable relevant evidence, the trial 

court concluded State-Petitioner had met its burden of proof under the statute. Since 

findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion of involuntary commitment of 

Respondent, we affirm the trial court’s order, and we need not address Respondent’s 

other argument concerning whether involuntary commitment is proper based on any 

danger to herself posed by injurious self-examination. 

1. Inability to Satisfy Healthcare Needs 
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¶ 21 In challenging the trial court’s determination that she is unable to adequately 

provide for her own medical care, Respondent first argues that “it was undisputed 

that [she] voluntarily arrived at Central Regi[o]nal Hospital seeking medical care.” 

Presuming this fact is true, this assertion misses the mark in two respects: 

¶ 22 First, the trial court expressly found Respondent’s testimony not credible in its 

recitation of the oral findings, which were later incorporated into the written 

commitment order. We do not “second-guess” the trial court’s evaluation of 

Respondent’s and the other properly admitted witnesses’ credibility. See In re A.B.C., 

374 N.C. 752, 761, 844 S.E.2d 902, 909 (2020) (noting in a juvenile case that when 

the trial court sits and hears testimony as a finder of fact, “it is not the role of this 

Court to second-guess the trial court’s credibility determination”) (citation omitted). 

¶ 23 Second, Respondent testified she had voluntarily sought medical care for a 

uterine or gastrointestinal blockage, a condition the expert treating physicians 

addressed in their testimony and which the trial court found to be non-existent and 

a subject of Respondent’s persistent delusions. These unchallenged findings are

binding upon appeal. In re Moore, 234 N.C. App. 37, 43, 758 S.E.2d 33, 37 (2014). 

¶ 24 These delusions, recounted in the physicians’ testimony and the trial court’s 

findings, became evident when Respondent testified, she has no mental health issues, 

does not need medication for mental illness, and requires copious amounts of 

laxatives on a daily basis to treat her asserted uterine or gastrointestinal blockages 
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and obstruction(s). To the extent Respondent presented and sought, and continued 

to seek, medical treatment, the tests showed she did so for an imagined ailment, the 

physicians testified, and the trial court found does not exist, and Respondent is in

denial and neglect of ongoing diagnosed mental illness(es). The trial court’s 

supported findings and its conclusions thereon disclose Respondent, “in the relevant 

past,” has acted in a way that demonstrates a present inability to provide for her 

medical care, as is required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a)(1)(I) (2021). 

2. Inability to Satisfy Need for Shelter 

¶ 25 Respondent challenges the trial court’s finding that Respondent “lacks stable 

housing.” Respondent correctly and rightly points out that she had previously lived 

in an apartment and at several hotels prior to her initial commitment. Dr. Gettings 

testified from hearsay “what I understand, that [Respondent’s] condo is in a state of 

disarray to such a severe level that she was not able to continue inhabiting that 

housing which has then, in turn, led to her living in short-stay hotels. That’s—those 

are not—you know, she’s essentially homeless.” 

¶ 26 Dr. Gettings further testified his attempts to qualify Respondent for a 

transitional living program was “put on hold,” because of “very significant concerns 

about [Respondent]’s stability and ability to sort of live independently[.]” These 

portions of Dr. Gettings’ testimony were elicited on cross-examination without 

objection, and any objections thereto are waived. See In re A.J.D., 283 N.C. 1, 7,
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2022-NCCOA-258, ¶ 17, 871 S.E.2d 575, 578 (2022) (“[A] review of the Record reveals 

Respondent did not object to the admission of Dr. Zarzar’s testimony on any basis, 

including impermissible hearsay. As such, Respondent failed to preserve this issue 

for appellate review.” (citing In re F.G.J., 200 N.C. App. 681, 693, 684 S.E.2d 745, 

753-54 (2009)); State v. Gobal, 186 N.C. App. 308, 319, 651 S.E.2d 279, 287 (2007) 

(“Statements elicited by a defendant on cross-examination are, even if error, invited 

error, by which a defendant cannot be prejudiced as a matter of law.” (citation 

omitted)). 

¶ 27 While Respondent’s testimony concerning her housing contradicted Dr. 

Gettings’ hearsay assertions, his testimony supports the trial court’s finding and 

conclusion that Respondent “lacks stable housing.” The trial court resolves conflicts 

in the evidence and determines whether Dr. Gettings’ testimony was creditable. In 

re J.C.D., 265 N.C. App. 441, 448, 828 S.E.2d 186, 191-92 (2019). The record contains 

a finding, assertedly based upon “clear, cogent and convincing” evidence, that 

Respondent is unable to adequately meet her needs for shelter within the relevant 

past pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a)(1)(I). Collins, 49 N.C. App. at 246, 

271 S.E.2d at 74. Even if unsupported, other properly supported facts support the 

trial court’s conclusion. 

3. Reasonable Probability of Serious Physical Debilitation in Near 

Future 
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¶ 28 Respondent argues the trial court failed to make adequate findings to support 

a conclusion that a reasonable probability exists of her serious physical debilitation 

in the near future. She asserts no finding disclosing such probable harm and “[t]here 

was simply no evidence that, even if [Respondent] refused to take mental health 

medication upon discharge, . . . her failure to take the medication would create a 

serious health risk in the near future.” 

¶ 29 The trial court expressly found Respondent was presently unable to meet her 

health and housing needs, and when “taken together, pose[s] serious risk of rapid 

decompensation if in the community.” This Court has upheld conclusions of the need 

for involuntary commitments for dangerousness-to-self based on substantially 

similar findings. See In re Moore, 234 N.C. App. at 44-45, 758 S.E.2d at 38 (“The trial 

court found that respondent ‘is at a high risk of decompensation if released and 

without medication,’ and that Dr. Fahs thought respondent, if released, would 

‘relapse by the end of [the] football season.’ The trial court’s findings indicated 

respondent was a danger to himself in the future. The trial court properly found that 

respondent is a danger to himself because there is a reasonable possibility that he 

will suffer serious physical debilitation in the near future.”). 

¶ 30 Further, the trial court’s finding that Respondent is at “serious risk of rapid 

decompensation” satisfies N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a)(1)(II)’s requirement of a 
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temporal finding of “reasonable possibility” of “serious physical debilitation in the 

near future.” Id. (emphasis supplied). 

¶ 31 The trial court’s finding and conclusion of a reasonable probability of serious 

physical debilitation exists “in the near future” is also supported by other evidence. 

Id. When asked by the State if “it’s reasonably probable in the near future, if she’s 

discharged with her delusions, that she could suffer physical debilitations,” Dr. 

Gettings testified “I do [sic]. . . . I would worry that, if we don’t have her fully—fully 

treated and fully at her baseline, she has a high risk of decompensating and requiring 

repeat or further hospitalization in the future.” 

¶ 32 The trial court also incorporated Dr. Gettings’ report into its order, which 

states Respondent “has remained psychotic and delusional . . . [and] at present

represents a danger to herself if discharged in her current condition.” (emphasis 

supplied). The trial court’s conclusion that Respondent is at risk of rapid 

decompensation due to her inability to manage her medical and immediate housing 

needs is supported by findings of fact based upon clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence in the record. 

V. Conclusion 

¶ 33 The trial court could order the involuntarily commitment of Respondent, if 

Petitioner met its burden of proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to prove 

she was unable to care for her health or need for shelter in the relevant past and of a 
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reasonable possibility of physical debilitation in the near future. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

122C-3(11)(a)(1)(I)-(II). 

¶ 34 The trial court found Respondent’s “[n]on-compliance with medication, the lack 

of stable housing and lack of insight into her condition, taken together, pose a[ ] 

serious risk of rapid decompensation if in the community. She therefore poses a 

significant danger to herself.” 

¶ 35 These findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The 

trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law of Respondent being mentally ill 

and being dangerous to herself is supported by evidence in the record. The trial 

court’s order is affirmed. It is so ordered. 

AFFIRMED.

Judge GORE concurs. 

Judge INMAN concurs in result only by separate opinion. 
No. COA21-694 – In re E.B.

INMAN, Judge, concurring in the result.

¶ 36 I agree with the majority that the trial court’s involuntary commitment order 

should be affirmed, but I respectfully disagree with the standard of review it employs 

in resolving this appeal. Under the proper standard applicable to involuntary 

commitment orders, competent record evidence supports the trial court’s findings of 

fact, and those findings of fact support the ultimate finding of dangerousness to self. 

Applying this well-established framework, I concur in the result.

¶ 37 To order an individual’s involuntary inpatient commitment, “the [trial] court 

shall find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally 

ill and dangerous to self . . . or dangerous to others . . . . The court shall record the 

facts that support its findings.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-268(j) (2021) (emphasis 

added). Consistent with the statute’s language, dangerousness to self has long been 

(and remains) understood as an ultimate finding of fact. See In re Hogan, 32 N.C. 

App. 429, 433, 232 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1977) (“Whether a person is mentally ill . . . and 

whether he is imminently dangerous to himself or others, present questions of fact.”); 

In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980) (“To enter the 

commitment order the trial court was required to ultimately find two distinct facts, 

i.e., that the respondent was mentally ill and was dangerous to himself or to others.” 

(emphasis added) (citation omitted)); In re A.J.D., 2022-NCCOA-258, ¶ 15 (“Findings 

of mental illness and dangerousness to self are ultimate findings of fact.” (citation 

and quotation marks omitted)). 
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INMAN, J., concurring in the result

¶ 38 Though occasionally difficult to differentiate, ultimate findings of fact are 

distinct from both evidentiary facts and conclusions of law:

There are two kinds of facts: Ultimate facts, and 

evidentiary facts. Ultimate facts are the final facts 

required to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action or the 

defendant’s defense; and evidentiary facts are those 

subsidiary facts required to prove the ultimate facts.

. . . .

Ultimate facts are those found in that vaguely defined area 

lying between evidential facts on the one side and 

conclusions of law on the other. In consequence, the line of 

demarcation between ultimate facts and legal conclusions 

is not easily drawn. An ultimate fact is the final resulting 

effect which is reached by processes of logical reasoning 

from the evidentiary facts. Whether a statement is an 

ultimate fact or a conclusion of law depends upon whether 

it is reached by natural reasoning or by an application of 

fixed rules of law.

Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 470-72, 67 S.E.2d 639, 644-45 (1951) (citations 

omitted). 

¶ 39 Consistent with the above distinctions between ultimate findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, this Court held more than four decades ago that ultimate findings 

of mental illness and dangerousness are not to be treated or analyzed as conclusions 

of law. Hogan, 32 N.C. App. at 433, 232 S.E.2d 492 at 494 (“In the order appealed 

from in the present case the court purported to make these determinations [of mental 

illness and dangerousness] as ‘matters of law.’ We will ignore the incorrect 
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INMAN, J., concurring in the result

designation and treat the court’s conclusions as findings of the ultimate facts required 

by [the then-applicable involuntary commitment statute].”).

¶ 40 In In re Whatley, this Court equated, without authority and in passing, 

ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerousness with conclusions of law. 224 

N.C. App. 267, 271, 736 S.E.2d 527, 530 (2012) (“The trial court must also record the 

facts that support its ‘ultimate findings,’ i.e., conclusions of law, that the respondent 

is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others.”). To the extent that this statement 

in Whatley amounts to more than mere dicta, it is in direct conflict with: (1) Woodard’s 

distinction between ultimate findings and conclusions of law, 234 N.C. at 470-72, 67 

S.E.2d at 644-45; (2) undisturbed precedents establishing mental illness and 

dangerousness as ultimate findings of fact, Hogan, 32 N.C. App. at 433, 232 S.E.2d 

492 at 494; and (3) the applicable statute requiring the trial court to “find” a 

respondent mentally ill and dangerous in order to involuntarily commit her, N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 122C-268(j). Because one panel of this Court cannot overrule another 

and we are required to follow our Supreme Court’s precedents, In re Civil Penalty, 

324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989), Whatley’s conflation of ultimate findings 

of mental illness and dangerousness with conclusions of law is not binding. 

¶ 41 When an appellant challenges the trial court’s ultimate finding of 

dangerousness in an involuntary commitment order, our longstanding standard of 

review is straightforward: “We review the trial court’s commitment order to 
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INMAN, J., concurring in the result

determine whether the ultimate finding concerning the respondent’s danger to self or 

others is supported by the court’s underlying findings, and whether those underlying 

findings, in turn, are supported by competent evidence.” In re W.R.D., 248 N.C. App. 

512, 515, 790 S.E.2d 344, 347 (2016). I can find no published decision before or after 

Hogan purporting to apply de novo review to ultimate findings of mental illness and 

dangerousness, and we have explicitly rejected that standard in at least one 

unpublished decision of this Court. See In re E.L., 268 N.C. App. 323, 834 S.E.2d 189, 

2019 WL 5726811, *1 (unpublished) (refusing, based on Hogan, to apply the de novo 

standard urged by an appellant to ultimate findings of mental illness and 

dangerousness).

¶ 42 Our review in applying the competent evidence standard is not unfettered. “It 

is for the trier of fact to determine whether evidence offered in a particular case is 

clear, cogent, and convincing. Our function on appeal is simply to determine whether 

there was any competent evidence to support the factual findings made.” In re 

Underwood, 38 N.C. App. 344, 347-48, 247 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1978) (emphasis added) 

(citations omitted). “We do not consider whether the evidence of respondent’s mental 

illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent and convincing. It is for the trier of fact 

to determine whether the competent evidence offered in a particular case met the 

burden of proof.” Collins, 49 N.C. App. at 246, 271 S.E.2d at 74 (emphasis added) 

(citing Underwood, 38 N.C. App. at 347, 247 S.E.2d at 781).
IN RE E.B.

2022-NCCOA-839

INMAN, J., concurring in the result

¶ 43 The majority recognizes some of the caselaw concerning the proper standard 

of review while deviating from precedents in key respects. Its assertions that the 

ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerousness to self are conclusions of law 

and that the involuntary commitment thereunder is subject to de novo review ignores 

prior decisions establishing: (1) mental illness and dangerousness as ultimate 

findings rather than legal conclusions, Hogan, 32 N.C. App. at 433, 232 S.E.2d 492 

at 494; and (2) the proper standard of review applicable to those ultimate findings, 

see, e.g., W.R.D., 248 N.C. App. at 515, 790 S.E.2d at 347. 

¶ 44 In supporting its assertion of de novo review, the majority misstates the 

standard applied in Underwood. That decision treats dangerousness as an ultimate 

finding and does not employ de novo review: 

Our function on appeal is simply to determine whether 

there was any competent evidence to support the factual 

findings made. . . . [T]he petitioner’s testimony furnished 

competent evidence to support the trial court’s factual 

findings . . . . These factual findings in turn furnished 

ample support for the court’s ultimate findings that 

respondent was mentally ill and imminently dangerous to 

self or others . . . .

38 N.C. App. at 347-48, 247 S.E.2d at 781. Relatedly, I disagree with the majority’s 

repeated misnomer of the trial court’s ultimate findings in this case as legal 

“conclusions.” 
IN RE E.B.

2022-NCCOA-839

INMAN, J., concurring in the result

¶ 45 The majority’s claim that the well-established standard of review set forth in 

this concurring opinion “deprives Respondent of any effective appellate review, 

including constitutional claims . . . and issues of statutory interpretation and 

application,” ignores the more than forty years of caselaw reviewing and reversing

involuntary commitment orders under precisely this standard. See e.g., Hogan, 32 

N.C. App. at 434, 232 S.E.2d at 495 (reversing an involuntary commitment order 

because the underlying findings were unsupported by competent evidence and did 

not support the ultimate findings). Respondent has not challenged the 

constitutionality of her involuntary commitment, and she has not presented any 

argument concerning statutory interpretation. Nor has she requested de novo review. 

Instead, her brief simply asks that we employ the exact standard applied in decades 

of caselaw and in this concurring opinion.

¶ 46 I similarly decline to adopt the majority’s several assertions that the trial 

court’s “findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence,” as such

judgments on the weight of the evidence are beyond this Court’s purview. See id. at 

347-48, 247 S.E.2d at 781; Collins, 49 N.C. App. at 246, 271 S.E.2d at 74. Stated 

simply, because this Court is not authorized to consider whether evidence is clear, 

cogent, and convincing, we should not purport to decide that issue.

¶ 47 Even though I believe the majority applies the wrong standard of review, I 

reach the same result applying the correct standard. The evidence recited in the 
IN RE E.B.

2022-NCCOA-839

INMAN, J., concurring in the result

majority opinion is competent to support the trial court’s evidentiary findings that 

Respondent is unable to manage her own medical and housing needs and is at rapid 

risk of decompensation if released. Those evidentiary findings, in turn, support the 

trial court’s ultimate finding that Respondent is dangerous to herself. I therefore 

concur in the result affirming the trial court’s order.