Filed 11/1/23 In re L.S. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.S., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D082294

 (Super. Ct. No. J520665)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed. 

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

Defendant M.T. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order

terminating her parental rights as to her son, L.S. under Welfare and 

Institutions Code1 section 322.26. Her sole contention is that the court 

should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to 

adoption, pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm the 

order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petition

In January 2021, the Agency received a report of a serious car accident 

in which the vehicle went down an embankment and overturned with then 

five-year-old L.S. in the car. Mother was driving. L.S.’s father (Father)2 was 

also present. They were both intoxicated and admitted consuming alcohol 

and engaging in a verbal argument that contributed to the accident. No one 

suffered major injuries but Mother and L.S. were transported to a hospital to 

address minor injuries and pain. 

Mother was initially arrested but then released at the hospital. Once 

L.S. was medically cleared, he was released to Father’s care. Three days 

later, the Agency observed the family’s home in disarray with broken or 

missing windows covered in plywood, the front door being held closed by a 

stretch cord, and empty alcohol bottles in the front yard. A neighbor reported 

that there was “a ton of alcohol use” and that she constantly heard people in 

the family home using profanity and being verbally abusive. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise stated. 

2 Father’s parental rights were also terminated. He is not a party to this 

appeal. 
3

Paternal grandfather explained that Mother and Father have a lot of 

issues that are exacerbated by drug and alcohol use. He reported Father uses 

marijuana and Adderall, and has tested positive for amphetamines. Mother 

has also used methamphetamine. L.S. did not suffer physically, but paternal 

grandfather noticed psychological effects. He shared that from when L.S. 

was “a little boy,” Mother and Father would scream and yell at him if he was 

being too loud or interrupting, and there is still “a lot of yelling and cussing” 

at L.S. 

The Agency attempted to mitigate the safety concerns by offering 

voluntary services, but ultimately filed a petition in February 2021, under 

section 300, subdivision (b), alleging L.S. was at substantial risk of harm due 

to Mother’s and Father’s substance abuse. Mother and Father agreed to a 

safety plan for L.S. to stay in the home of paternal grandparents, and to not 

have unsupervised contact with L.S. 

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Period

The Agency reported that the family had prior child welfare referrals 

related to alcohol abuse and domestic violence. In October 2018, there was a 

substantiated referral for general neglect after Father hit Mother in the head 

with a plastic water pitcher while then two-year-old L.S. was present. It was 

reported that L.S. was present on numerous occasions when there were large 

parties and other incidents of at least verbal domestic abuse. 

Paternal grandfather reported that over the past few years, L.S. 

expressed that he does not want to see fighting anymore. When Mother and 

Father yell at each other, sometimes L.S. would “wind[ ] up in the middle of 

it” or step in and tell them to stop, and act like a “marriage moderator.” 

Paternal grandmother agreed that L.S. has “seen a lot of fights” and would be 

the “mediator.” 
4

L.S. was assessed to have anxiousness and/or unhappiness and there 

were concerns regarding possible trauma from the accident. He had

nightmares almost every night, was “fairly panicked and anxious,” and was 

cautious of going anywhere by himself. However, he was adjusting well to 

living with paternal grandparents, doing well in school, and becoming more 

confident. L.S. said he wanted to live at paternal grandparents’ house, but he 

also liked being at his parents’ house. 

Mother separated from Father within one month of the petition. She

visited L.S. randomly and would disappear for days at a time; no one would 

know where she was, which “distress[ed]” L.S. When she did visit, the visits 

were positive. 

The juvenile court sustained the petition in April 2021, removed L.S. 

from Mother’s and Father’s custody, placed L.S. with paternal grandparents, 

and ordered supervised visitation and reunification services to include 

substance abuse treatment and testing. 

C. Reunification Period

Mother did not engage in substance abuse treatment until April 2022—

one year after L.S.’s removal. Throughout the reunification period, L.S. 

continued to do well in paternal grandparents’ home. He was ultimately 

diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). With the support of 

paternal grandparents and the stability of living in their home, L.S. 

progressed in school and therapy, although he sometimes had setbacks and 

was negatively impacted by Mother’s inconsistency. 

1. Six-Month-Review Period

L.S. began therapy in June 2021 and was starting to develop positive 

coping mechanisms. His therapist reported he felt safe and happy with 

paternal grandparents. He also started kindergarten, which he enjoyed. He
5

appeared to be adjusting well to school and making friends easily. 

Throughout this period, Mother continued to be inconsistent in visiting L.S. 

L.S. described his visits with Mother as “good” but said “I don’t see my 

mommy a lot.” 

Mother began outpatient treatment at McAlister’s North Central 

Women’s Recovery Center (McAlister) in August 2021, but her participation 

was unsatisfactory, she had multiple unexcused absences, and she continued 

to test positive. She was discharged in October 2021. 

2. 12-Month-Review Period

In January 2022, Mother said she was trying to get into detox. She told 

L.S. that she might not be able to visit for a week or two and told him it was 

something she needed to do to get him back. L.S. displayed aggressive 

behavior at school that month. When discussing this in therapy, L.S. 

explained that Mother was telling him he would be going home soon. He 

seemed to be grieving the removal from Mother, which he was exhibiting 

with anger. His therapist reported he was protective of his parents, 

particularly Mother, and opined that he had an anxious attachment to her. 

Mother’s visits continued to be inconsistent, including late arrivals, 

cancelations, and no-shows. Her inconsistent visitation impacted L.S.’s mood 

and caused him to worry and have increased anxiety. When she did visit, the 

visits were positive. 

L.S. continued his therapy where the focus was on separation from 

Mother and Father since that appeared to be impacting him the most. L.S.’s 

trauma symptoms improved, in general, but he continued to experience more 

generalized anxiety and continued to have sleep disturbances. By April 2022, 

L.S. had begun communicating his feelings better and was doing well with 

the consistency and structure that paternal grandparents provided. L.S.’s 
6

teacher also noted that the stability and structure contributed to his growth 

in school. Maternal grandmother reported that L.S. was still very concerned 

about whether his parents were “okay,” especially Mother. And his therapist 

was still concerned with Mother’s inconsistency in his life. 

Mother began treatment at McAlister again in April 2022. In June 

2022, she reported she was almost two months “clean.”

3. 18-Month Review Period

During this period, Mother continued to be engaged in treatment and 

provide negative drug tests. As a result, she began unsupervised visits in 

August 2022, which took place in the community. However, paternal 

grandmother expressed frustration that Mother was still inconsistent with 

her visits. The Agency discussed a consistent visitation schedule with 

Mother, who agreed it would be helpful. 

L.S. reported the unsupervised visits were positive and he would be

“okay” with having visits at Mother’s home. While L.S. did not have any 

concern or fear with returning to Mother, he wanted to continue living with 

paternal grandparents where he had been for over a year and a half. By this 

time, he started first grade and was still doing well academically and with his 

peers. He was also still benefiting from therapy. L.S. expressed that he was 

happy with the stability he had with paternal grandparents and did not want 

any changes. The Agency recommended terminating reunification services 

because although Mother made progress in her treatment, she was still very 

new in her recovery given her long history of substance abuse and was not 

ready to take on full parenting responsibilities if L.S. were returned to her 

care. 

At the contested 18-month review hearing in October 2022, the court 

found that returning L.S. to Mother would create a substantial risk of 
7

detriment to L.S.’s well-being and did not find exceptional circumstances to 

extend services beyond the 18-month deadline. It therefore terminated 

Mother’s reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.

D. Permanency Planning Period

During a child family team meeting in February 2023, the participants 

discussed concerns that L.S. still saw himself as his parents’ caretaker and 

needed reminders to not worry about his parents. Paternal grandfather

explained that L.S. was “ ‘very wary and guarded’ ” about his parents’

feelings and watched for changes in their mood and behavior. He also 

seemed to be careful about what he said or did not say to Mother because he 

did not want to hurt her feelings or disappoint her. 

For the majority of this period, Mother was having consistent 

unsupervised visitation with L.S. The visits were positive but at times L.S. 

wanted the visit to take place at paternal grandparents’ home where he felt 

“more safe.” When visits did take place at Mother’s home, L.S. had paternal 

grandmother wait outside rather than leave him alone with Mother. By May 

2023, one month before the section 366.26 hearing, Mother once again

became inconsistent with her visitation. She was difficult to contact, would 

not confirm locations or times, would not show up to visits, and rescheduled 

visits at the last minute. 

At Mother’s request, the court ordered a bonding study. The 

psychologist who conducted the study observed Mother and L.S. during a 

four-hour visit in the community. She found that L.S. “engages in healthy 

(secure) attachment behaviors toward Mother.” The interactions were 

positive, playful, reciprocal, and appropriate. L.S. seemed relaxed and calm

with Mother, and Mother was affectionate and appropriate. The psychologist 

concluded that “[c]onsidering the beneficial relationship between Mother and 
8

Child, severing contact could be detrimental. Even if not immediately 

destabilizing, there may be challenges related to negotiating the ambiguous 

loss that can result where there is a healthy parent-child relationship that is 

severed without significant reason (e.g., a continuously unhealthy or unsafe 

parent).” She recommended that the court “consider the substantial, positive 

relationship observed between the child and his mother when making any 

determinations regarding the future of both parties.” 

The Agency reported that there was no doubt L.S. loves Mother and 

Mother loves him, but they appeared to have more of a best friend 

relationship rather than a mother-son relationship. While there were periods 

when Mother was unable to keep in consistent contact, L.S. looked forward to 

visits, which had been positive, engaging, and fun. During visits, they 

played, joked around, smiled, and laughed together. However, L.S. ended

visits with no distress or emotional dysregulation, and he never asked for 

Mother when he was hurt or frightened, or between visits. 

The Agency assessed that the issues L.S. may experience if Mother’s 

parental rights were terminated did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. 

Paternal grandparents provided a stable and safe home environment for L.S., 

who continued to progress in school, extracurricular activities, and therapy. 

In the past two years in paternal grandparents’ care, L.S. became 

increasingly independent and higher functioning in his daily activities. He 

also gained confidence and skills to regulate his emotions, set boundaries, 

and self-advocate. Noting that Mother’s visitation recently became sporadic

again, the Agency emphasized that L.S. deserved stability, consistency, and 

structure. When asked, L.S. initially did not know how he would feel if he 

could not see his parents again and then said he would feel sad and very mad 

if his parents were no longer part of his life. However, he expressed that he 
9

wanted to continue living with paternal grandparents. Paternal 

grandparents were committed to adopting L.S.

4. Permanency Planning Hearing

At the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, the court found 

that L.S. was generally and specifically adoptable. Regarding the parentchild relationship exception to adoption, the court noted Mother’s visits had

been fluctuating shortly before the hearing but nonetheless found that there 

was sufficient visitation and contact to satisfy prong one. 

The court then reasoned the fact that then seven-year-old L.S. spent 

the first five years of his life with Mother weighed in favor of satisfying prong 

two. However, the court noted L.S.’s relationship with Mother was that of a 

best friend, L.S. did not experience anxiety or dysregulation after visits with 

Mother, and until recently, L.S. preferred to have visits inside or near 

paternal grandparent’s home where he felt safer. Additionally, reports that 

L.S. worried about his parents, saw himself as the caretaker for his parents, 

watched for changes in his parents’ behavior, and took on the role of mediator 

in the first five years of his life demonstrated parentified behavior, which 

weighed against finding that prong two was met. The court also noted L.S. 

did not ask for Mother when he was hurt or frightened nor asked to see her 

between visits, which weighed against finding that prong two was satisfied. 

On balance, the court found Mother did not satisfy prong two. 

In assessing prong three, the court gave “little weight” to the bonding 

report because of the psychologist’s limited observation. It recognized that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights “could likely have lasting impacts on 

[L.S.].” But when considering the benefits of adoption, the court found that 

severing the relationship would not be detrimental. Concluding no exception 
10

to adoption applied, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to L.S. and 

ordered the plan of adoption. 

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the beneficial 

parent-child relationship exception did not apply. We conclude, however, 

that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that L.S. did not have a 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to Mother, and the juvenile court 

was within its discretion to decline to apply the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception. 

“After reunification services have terminated, the focus of a dependency 

proceeding shifts from family preservation to promoting the best interest of 

the child including the child’s interest in a ‘placement that is stable, 

permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional 

commitment to the child. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 529, 534 (Fernando M.).) At a permanency plan hearing, the 

court may order one of three alternatives: terminate parental rights and 

order adoption, appoint a legal guardian, or long-term foster care. If the 

dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over 

the alternative permanency plans. (Ibid.; In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 

1218, 1224.) Once the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable, the burden 

shifts to the parent to demonstrate that a statutory exception applies. (Id. at 

p. 1225; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the parent does not establish the 

applicability of a statutory exception, the juvenile court must terminate 

parental rights. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316 

(Katherine J.).) 

One such statutory exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies if “[t]he court finds a 
11

compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to 

the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and 

contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception requires the 

parent to prove three elements: “1) regular visitation and contact with the 

child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; (2) a substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment 

implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship; and 3) 

a showing that terminating the attachment would be detrimental to the child 

even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive 

home.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 847.) 

“We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the 

existence of a beneficial parental relationship, for substantial evidence.” (In 

re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 [citing to In re Caden C. (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 614, 639–640 (Caden C.)].) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’ ” and 

will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings even where substantial evidence 

to the contrary also exists. (Caden C., at p. 640, citations omitted.) “[T]he 

ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with [the] parent—is 

discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) A court 

abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) 

Here, the juvenile court found Mother satisfied the first element of 

regular visitation and contact with L.S. The Agency conceded this point 

below and does so again on appeal. 
12

Turning to the second element—the existence of a beneficial parentchild relationship—the juvenile court must “consider the evidence showing 

whether the parent’s actions or inactions ‘continued or developed a 

significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ ” (In re B.D.,

supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230 [italics added].) To determine whether the 

parent has established this element, the court considers factors including the 

age of the child, the amount of time the child spent in the parent’s custody, 

the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and 

the child’s particular needs. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The 

court should also examine “how children feel about, interact with, look to, or 

talk about their parents.” (Ibid.) 

Mother contends there was overwhelming evidence of a positive 

emotional attachment between L.S. and her such that L.S. would benefit 

from continuing that relationship. We do not disagree that Mother and L.S. 

have a meaningful relationship. Seven-year-old L.S. spent the first five years 

of his life in Mother’s care, loves Mother, enjoys his visits with her, and would 

be sad or mad if she were not part of his life. However, we must affirm the 

lower court’s finding if supported by substantial evidence even though other 

evidence may support a different result. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 640.) To this point, Mother argues the juvenile court’s determination that 

the negative effect of interaction between her and L.S. outweighed the 

positive was not supported by the record. We disagree. 

First, Mother contends the court’s finding that L.S. exhibited 

“parentified behavior” did not accurately describe the current relationship at 

the time of the hearing. We acknowledge that the parenting behavior 

developed during L.S.’s first five years of his life when he lived with Mother 

and Father. However, those early years shaped L.S.’s relationship with 
13

Mother and the negative effect carried on. As recent as February 2023, there 

was still concern that L.S. saw himself as his parents’ caretaker and needed 

reminders to not worry about them. Paternal grandfather informed the 

Agency that L.S. continued to worry about his parents, was guarded about

their feelings, and watched for changes in their mood and behavior. As such, 

there was substantial evidence that L.S. still exhibited parentified behavior 

at the time of the hearing. 

Second, Mother argues the fact that L.S. did not ask for her between 

visits or when he was hurt or frightened, and L.S.’s ability to separate from 

her without anxiety or distress shows secure attachment rather than a lack of 

attachment. However, we must indulge all reasonable inferences in support 

of the court’s ruling. (Adoption of Arthur M. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 704, 

717.) It was reasonable to infer from this evidence that L.S. did not have a 

significant, positive, emotional attachment to Mother. Moreover, other 

evidence supports this inference. As of May 2023, there were reports that

L.S. still preferred to visit with Mother at paternal grandparents’ home

where he felt “more safe.” Until recently, maternal grandmother stayed in 

the vicinity of unsupervised visits with Mother because L.S. wanted her to be 

nearby. When L.S. did have visits at Mother’s house, L.S. would have

maternal grandmother wait in the driveway until he told her she could leave. 

L.S.’s therapist also opined that there was an anxious attachment between 

L.S. and Mother. In sum, Mother’s argument that the court should have 

considered L.S.’s ability to separate from her as evidence of a positive 

attachment fails. 

Finally, Mother claims the juvenile court failed to explain why the 

negative aspects of the relationship outweighed the positive aspects. 

However, the court was not required to recite its grounds, reasons, or specific 
14

findings regarding any of the three elements in determining that the parentchild relationship exception does not apply. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 

1131, 1156.) Nonetheless, the court correctly explained that interaction 

between the child and parent will always have some incidental benefit to the 

child but that is not enough. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 

229 [the parent must demonstrate “more than incidental benefit to the child” 

and “more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the 

child, or pleasant visits”].) The court weighed the evidence in finding that 

L.S. did not have a significant, positive, emotional attachment to Mother. It 

is not our place to reweigh the evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 640, citations omitted.) 

The third element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception 

requires the juvenile court to determine whether terminating the parental 

relationship would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at p. 633.) “[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the 

trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s 

relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement 

in a new adoptive home. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632.) This requires the 

juvenile court to determine “how the child would be affected by losing the 

parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an 

adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) The 

juvenile court must then weigh the loss of this relationship with “the benefit 

of placement in a new, adoptive home . . . .” (Ibid.) 

Mother contends the court’s conclusion that severing L.S.’s relationship 

with her would not be detrimental lacked analysis. But again, the court was 

not required to recite its grounds, reasons, or specific findings in determining 

that the parent-child relationship exception does not apply. (In re A.L., 
15

supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156.) Mother also contends the court abused its 

discretion in declining to adopt the findings of the psychologist who 

conducted the bonding study. Although she contends there was no evidence 

the report was flawed or inaccurate, the court’s basis for giving “little weight” 

to it was that the psychologist observed Mother and L.S. together for only 

four hours. Again, it is not for us to reweigh evidence when evaluating the 

factual basis for an exercise of discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 641.) 

Nonetheless, the court did not wholly disregard the bonding study. The 

court recognized that severing the relationship with Mother “could likely 

have” impacts on L.S. during his childhood and into adulthood. However, on 

balance when considering the benefits of adoption, the court concluded that

terminating the relationship would not be detrimental to L.S.—i.e. any harm 

from terminating the relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption.

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) We must affirm the court’s 

determination unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (Id. at 

p. 641.) We cannot say that it was. 

This is a difficult case where Mother did have a meaningful 

relationship with L.S. However, the outcome is clear when considering that 

at this point, when reunification services have been terminated, the focus 

shifts from family preservation to promoting the children’s best interest, 

including the children’s interest in a stable, permanent home. (Fernando M., 

supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) Given L.S.’s PTSD and other issues 

stemming from the first five years of his life in Mother’s care, stability was 

crucial for him. Paternal grandparents provided that and in the two years in 

their care, L.S. progressed in school, extracurricular activities, and therapy. 

Mother, on the other hand, was at times inconsistent and unreliable, 
16

including canceling, not showing up to, arriving late to, or rescheduling visits 

at the last minute. This negatively impacted L.S.’s mood and caused him 

worry and increased anxiety. As recent as May 2023, the month before the 

section 366.26 hearing, Mother had begun this pattern again. The court 

noted her recent “fluctuating” visits, and although this did not preclude the 

court from finding that Mother satisfied the first element of regular visitation 

and contact, it reasonably supports the court’s ultimate conclusion that the 

benefit of stability provided by adoption outweighed any harm from 

terminating the parental relationship. 

The record here does not support a conclusion that this is an 

extraordinary case where preservation of the parent’s rights should prevail 

over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement. (In re Jasmine D. 

(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) Accordingly, the court did not abuse its 

discretion when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception to adoption and terminated Mother’s parental rights. 
17

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

CASTILLO, J.