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June 30, 2015

Donn J. Viviani 4907 Yorktown Blvd Arlington, VA 22207 Email: oceanpetition@gmail.com

Gina McCarthy Administrator U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20460 Email: McCarthy.Gina@epa.gov

Re: Supplement to the Petition for Rulemaking Pu rsuant to section 21 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2620, Concerni ng the Regulation of Carbon Dioxide

Dear Administrator McCarthy,

On June 30, 2015, the Environmental Protection Ag ency (EPA) received a petition to regulate carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from cradle to grave under section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) or in the alternative to develop a testing rule for CO 2 . The petition provides information concerning the devastating risk to the marine envi ronment and wildlife, and risk to human health from ocean acidification. Accordingly, EPA mu st make a determination as to whether CO 2 presents or may present an unreasonable risk of inju ry to the environment or human health due to the severe environmental consequences of ocean acidification. As a cosigner of that petition, I submit this supplement to the petition under my signature.

US EPA section 21 guidance states: “The key fi ndings relating to unreasonable risk must be made both when a new regulation is proposed, a nd when an existing regulation is amended or repealed. Petitioners should provide data to support these finds.” This supplement provides additional information supporting the unreasonable ri sk find. I respectfully request that EPA consider the data and information provided in this supplement to the petition in making its determination on our petition.

Petitioners demonstrated that the acidification of the open ocean has a single cause but multiple effects. That the decreasing ocean pH is being inexorably driven by the increase in the atmospheric concentration of carbon di oxide from anthropogenic emissions and is the incontrovertible result of the second law of thermodynamics. Th at this physical and chemical dynamic has been observed, monitored, documented, and is stra ightforward to predict into the future. 1 That it has many harmful effects on the ecol ogy of the ocean, some of the harmful effects are well established, others lack conclusive information or ar e more speculative. Many of these are significant

1 Caldeira and Wickett, Nature 425, 2003 and Journal of Geophysical Research 110, 2005; Orr et al. 2005 Nature 437; Raven et al. 2005 ,The Royal Society.2

effects, and some could be catastrophic. That th ese harmful effects are exacerbated in near shore areas by NOx and SOx emissions, runoff, temperature rise and other effects. 2

Climate Impacts

According to scientific experts: “Reducing CO 2 emissions is the only way to minimise [sic] longterm, large-scale risks” (IBGP et al. 2013). So any abatement will by necessity also abate Climate change disamenities.

Under TSCA the reasonableness of the risk depe nds on whether the costs of the ecological and health disamenities outweigh the benefits from mitigation, minus the costs of mitigation. To the extent possible the costs and bene fits must be quantif ied to make this determination. According to USEPA Benefit Assessment Guidelines action to mitigate ocean acidification would be classified as a “significant regulatory action” ...the ... “ economic analys is of regulatory or policy options should present all identifia ble costs and benefits that are incremental to the regulation or policy under consideration. These should include dire ctly intended effects a nd associated costs, as well as ancillary (or co-) benefits and costs.”

In EPA regulations, ancillary benefits can be much larger than direct benefits. (For example, Agency regulations to control NOx emissions are premised on the enormous ancillary particulate matter and ozone reduction benefits that result indirectly from the NOx reduction and control). This is also the case for ocean acidification (Although ocean acidification mitigation has enormous human health and environmental benefits in it’s own right). Mitigation options for ocean acidification have by necessity th e ancillary effect of slowing global temperature rise and preventing the disamenities associated with a global rise in temperature. Therefore this supplement presents both ocean acidification and climate info rmation relevant to th e reasonable risk finding.

Mitigation Under TSCA Includes Sequestration of Legacy Carbon

While current emissions may be the immediate cause of the increase in o cean acidification, past emissions are the proximate cause. The oceans have absorbed from about a third of the 500 plus billion tons of past or leg acy carbon emissions, lessening Climate impact. However, these emissions have eroded, i.e., “used up” the buffering capacity of the oceans. This buffering capacity is what keeps ocean pH in a narrow, bio-friendly range. As the buffering capacity lessens, smaller and smaller amounts of CO 2 will result in larger and larger decreases in pH. The absorption by the ocean of legacy emissions over the past decades have caused the rapid current decrease in pH and have made the projected future decrease in pH to carbonate unsaturati on levels possible, and have caused it to accelerate. Sin ce legacy emissions are the proximate cause of both the current level and the acceleration in the decrease in pH, these emissions must be part of the design and funding of any remedy, or an undue burden is pl aced on the current emitters to remedy the damage caused by past emitters. The courts have held, e.g., in CERCLA cases that requirements stemming from past actions (which were legal at the time) isn't retroactive, but rather a reimbursement obligation. 3

2 Duarte et al. Coastal and Estuarine Research Federation 2013

3 UNITED STATES v. MONSANTO COMPANY, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988)3

Again, the oceans absorb about a third of the anthropogenic emissions. This means that for decades rent seekers have extracte d the benefits of fo ssil energy without payi ng for the environmental damages of the carbon emission, including the loss of the buffering capacity of the ocean and the attendant damages from ocean acidification. This is a classic “tragedy of the commons” situation. EPA has a long standing tradition and poli cy of making the pollute r pay for environmental injury. Petitioner asks that both legacy and current emissions be included in determining the remedies and who must comply, based on the co ntributory proportion to the harm from ocean acidification, using, for example, the Emission Inve ntory. (The Agency has the authority to ignore small emitters when transactional costs of including them are too large)

CO 2 Poses an Unreasonable Risk to Human Health

Petitioner asks the Agency to c onsider not only the well documente d health effects from climate change 4 discussed in the petition but al so the direct health impact from ocean acidification. Some of these are very signific ant and can be quantified.

The body of the petition cites increased mortality and morbidity from loss of fisheries and declines in marine based diets. These human health effects are in addition to the increased toxicity of algal blooms mentioned in th e body of the petition, which can cause paralytic shellfish poisoning in humans. The loss of fisheries from ocean acidification, and the resultant scarcity of seafood also has significant human h ealth impacts. For example, in a Harvard School of Public Health comprehensive analysis of fish and heal th, combining the evidence for major health effects of omega-3 fatty acids, while accounting for th e health risks of mercury, and health risks of PCBs and dioxins in both adults and infants/ young children: resu lts show that the benefits of eating a modest amount of fish per week--about 3 ounces of farmed salmon or 6 ounces of mackerel--reduced the risk of death from coronary heart disease (CHD) by 36%. By combining results of randomized clinical trials , the investigators also demonstrated that intake of fish or fish oil reduces total mortality--deaths from any causes--by 17%. 5

USEPA consumption surveys find that about 10 % of the US population consumes at least enough fish to garner the benefit. 6 Depending on price elasticity of demand this could translate into up to half a million premature deaths/year from loss of fisheries and the resultant scarcity of seafood. 7 In addition, increase in seafood prices will result in a loss of consumer surplus. Petitioner asks that the Agency develop a deterministic or a probabilistic assessment to quantify mortality and morbidity from the decreased availab ility and consumption ofseafood that would result from ocean acidification fishery damage, as mentioned in the body of the petition (e.g., effects on salmon from plankton impacts). This will help the risk assessment to capture this significant human health impact as required in EPA’s Benefit Assessment Guidelines.

There are also indirect effects and economic consequences, wh ich after consider ation of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and

4 National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014

5 JAMA. 2006;296(15):1885-1899;]

6 Estimated Per Capita Fish Consumption in the United States, USEPA August 2002

7 Am J Public Health. 2010 February; 100(2): 216–2224

public health as required under TSCA , are reasonably ascertainable. 8 These include other effects on Fisheries. It is probable that wild catch seafood loss, at least in part, will be replaced by aquaculture (currently about half of the world’s seafood is farmed 9 ). Farmed fish are fed fishmeal, soy and grain. It has been well established that fisheries have and will be increasingly negatively affected by ocean acidification. This will cause s carcities of fishmeal, both driving up the price of farmed fish (and negatively affecting consum ption) and causing more reliance on grain and

soy.

The substitution of grain and soy for fishmeal, and the additional amounts of grain and soy needed for the increased farmed fish to replace the decreasing availability of wild catch may itself result in increased cost and, in some cases subs titution may not be not possible due to grain and soy yield limitations. A recent Nature Communication article 10 shows robust evidence of yield plateaus due to biophysical limitations for rice, wheat and maize, whic h together account for ~85% of global cereal production and contribute a majority of hu man calories eaten directly as staple foods, or indirectly through consumption of livestock fed with grain. Seafood accounts for about 15% of the global dietary pr otein from animal sources. Both farmed seafood and livestock will be stressed by the plateauing grain yields.

Aside from increasing demand, grain costs will al so increase due to greater input requirements 11 as marginal lands are brought into production to keep up with the increased demand. This demand and cost increase will be exacerbated by p opulation growth, currently changing global increases in dietary animal protein, and increased labor costs from the fine tuning of many different facets of management in the production syst em required to increase or maintain yields.

Another factor to be considered is the dietary exposure effect of using increased soy and grain for aquaculture. The Food Quality Protection Ac t (FQPA) requires EPA to assess the cumulative risks of pesticides that share a common mechanis m when developing tolerances. EPA has issued guidance relative to assessing that risk. 12 13 Pesticides with common mechanisms (organophosphates (OPs), N-methy carbamates, triazines, ch loroacetanides, pyrethrin s/pyrethroids) all have grain and soy tolerances. This will change cumulative exposure, and under FQPA requirements EPA must reassess tolerances if these exposure pathways become larger contributors. Additionally, the metabolic pathways for the degradation pr oducts will have to be determined if they are different for aquatic species.

Petitioner requests EPA address th is through its FIFRA informati on gathering authority and tolerance reassessment program, or explain why it's not necessary to do so. Petitioner asks that the additional exposure and risk be shar ed with the public if tolerances are maintained at current levels, and that these risks to human health be included in the benef its assessment. If tolerances are

8 TSCA section 6(c) 4

9 State of the World Fisherie s and Aquaculture, FAO, 2010

10 Nature Communications 4, Article number: 2918 doi:10.1038

11 CGIAR Research Priorities for Marginal Lands. FAO 1997

12 General Principles For Performing Aggregate Exposure And Risk Assessments USEPA, 2001

13 Guidance on Cumulative Risk Assessment of Pesticide Chemicals That Have a Common Mechanism of Toxicity. Office of Pesticide Programs, USEPA 20025

lowered, petitioner asks that any costs to growers or loss of consumer surplus be also included in the assessment.

As FQPA requires local effects be considered, USEPA should consider whether farm location relative to runoff of these pesticides need be considered in the assessment, perhaps using the monitoring protocols and mathematical models that OPP typically relies on to generate exposure estimates for water quality assessments. As more of the US population become locovores 14 , local fish farming and local crops may expose speci al populations to increased cumulative risk.

Executive Order 12898 requires that "each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and a ddressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or e nvironmental effects of its prog rams, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations”. EPA’s Framework for Human Health Risk Assessment to Inform Decision Making 15 recommends including social considerations and environmental justice in informing decisions on ris k. In addition, under eith er NEPA’s (National Environmental Policy Act) guidance or TSCA’s “functional equivalence” 16 the analyses should consider the effects on a community by addressing the full range of consequences of a proposed action as well as other environmental stresses wh ich may be affecting the community, including diets, or differential patterns of consumption of natural resources, which may suggest increased exposures to environmental pathwa ys presenting potential health risk. To comply with these goals petitioner asks that EPA consider the Envi ronmental Justice implications of whether the increased cost of seafood high in omega-3’s will result in a more unhealthy ratio of omega-3 to omega-6 oils in certain low income communities. This ratio has been shown to be an important driver in mortality and morbidity studies.

Petitioner asks that the Agency consider the net effect on diet from ocean acidification and include the expected morbidity and mortality from all the changes in diet described above.

Market Failure

Petitioner endorses the Pr esident’s Counsel of Economic Advisors’ statement that “The emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) harms others in a way that is not reflected in the price of carbon-based, energy, i.e., CO 2 emissions create a negative externality. Because the price of carbon-based, energy doe s not reflect the full cost or economic damages, of CO 2 emissions, market forces re sult in a level of CO 2 emissions that is too high. Because of this market failure, public policies are needed to reduce CO 2 emissions and thereby limit the damage to economies and the natural world from further climate change.” 17 One of these “harms” is Ocean Acidification. The petition and the options presen ted herein provide vehicles for implementing the public policy called for by the Counsel necessary to rectify the market failure.

14 R.E. Galt Counting and Mapping Community Supported Ag riculture, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 2011, 10 (2), 131 - 162

15 Framework for Human Health Risk Assessment to Inform Decision Making, April 5, 2014, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

16 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

17 The Cost of Delaying Action to Stem Climate Change, CEA, July 2014.6

Emission Reduction and Sequestration

Given the magnitude of the ocean acidification problem, the mitigation prescription to address this market failure must also be large. Natu re maintains carbon dioxide atmospheric concentrations within a narrow band, by balancing emission s with sequestration. Na ture efficiently removes atmospheric carbon by transforming it into biomass and minerals, or “storing” it in the oceans (the source of the ocean acidification problem). Unlike th e natural cycle which is in dynamic equilibrium, the anthropogenic carbon cycle is not in equilibrium and is unbalanced. Man takes Gigatons of fossil carbon and puts it in the air, bu t takes very little back. In excess of a third of this increase in atmo spheric carbon ends up in the ocean and lowers the ocean pH. The economics of the anthropogenic carbon cycle don’t take in account the externalities of ocean acidification (or climate change) so the economic carbon cycle is skewed towards emissions and away from sequestration. While the amount of th e imbalance is relatively small when compared to the annual amount of carbon nature moves into and out of the atmosphere, it is consistently biased in one direction and ove r the years has almost doubled th e baseline atmospheric carbon.

While the Administration has not directly atte mpted to regulate ocean acidification it has attempted to reduce carbon emissions because of Climate considerations. The Administration’s recent Climate Initiative and in fact, almost all of USEPA’s climate and carbon initiatives to date, are and have focused on reducing emissions. Almost none of the efforts focus on sequestering carbon. Petitioner stresses that the carbon cycle can’t presen tly be balanced by reducing emissions only, since, in the foreseeable future, ther e will continue to be a large net bias towards carbon emissions over carbon removal stemming from increasing energy demand, as well as wealth and population effects and the fossil fuel re quirements of the extant energy infrastructure. (Petitioner observes that if you can ’t turn a sink faucet off, then you must open the drain to avoid an overflow...our energy infrastructure is a “faucet” and sequestration ca n be the “drain”)

This is a market failure, because the environmenta l cost of emissions is not included in the price of energy, and therefore the enviro nmental benefit of sequestration is not valued. Petitioner recommends that the Agency include options in the co st analysis that can significantly affect this bias, i.e., options which sequester carbon as well as options which reduce emissions. In any case, in order to determine if a risk is unreasonable under TSCA, the Agency must determine the efficacy, efficiency and supply function of all significant mitigation remedies.

Remedies

Determining whether a risk is unreasonable unde r TSCA is a function of government. However, as the Agency’s Petition Guidance points out, petit ioners have an obligation to present as much information as possible, e.g, to identify releva nt aspects of the unreasonable risk determination and demonstrate that these aspects are knowable . Petitioner believes the Agency is both knowledgeable and active concerning carbon emission reduction, but less well versed and less active in sequestration. It’s beyond the pe titioner’s responsibility and abil ity to provide an exhaustive, quantitative list of sequestration options. Rather examples are provided herein to demonstrate that sequestration opportunities to offset both le gacy carbon and current em issions exist. The list is limited and not meant to be de finitive of sequest ration opportunities.7

TSCA requires that the Agency consider “the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after considera tion of the effect on the nati onal economy, small business, technological innovation , the environment, and public health” (emphasis added). 18 Some of the sequestration opportunities mentioned below are currently being employed, ot hers are in small demonstration or pilot stages and may re quire additional technological i nnovation to become economically competitive. (Irrespective of thei r current status all rely on the same chemical, physical or biological mechanisms / processes that nature uses effectively to sequester large volumes of carbon.)

There is considerable literature on the ability of both Market Pull policies or Technology Push policies to increase th e rate of innovation. 19 . While not all of these sequestration technologies/methods are available at the current time to provide significant mitigation, they could be in the near future given the proper market. In any ca se, the Agency has a successful history of setting regulatory “reach” targets (e.g., CAFE standards).

If information on the efficacy of se questration technologies is inade quate to determine if the risk is unreasonable, Petitioner asks that the Agency use TSCA Section 4 to remedy the inadequacy. The Agency has in the past required TSCA test rules for many chemicals already released and in the environment in high volumes (such as dyes, plasticizers, flame retardants) to determine if treatment/mitigation methods (for example aerobic di gestion) are sufficient to reduce the risk to human health and the environment to a reasonable level. Petitioner asks the Agency to assess the information available on the efficiency and co st of sequestration technology and methods to treat/mitigate released CO 2 to determine the adequ acy of data for the purpose of a robust unreasonable risk determination. Pe tition asks that the Agency by rule require that testing be conducted to address any inadequacy.

Petitioner suggests costs for testi ng (and for remedies under sections 6 or 9, vide infra) be apportioned among CO 2 emission contributors acco rding to the cumulative CO 2 emission inventory information the Agency has collected. This could be structured similar to the sponsorship format used in TSCA ʼ s High Production Volume (HPV) Program (a more complex format than for a single chemical, i.e., CO 2 , it covered thousands of chemicals and thousands of tests from both foreign and domestic sources). 20

Since any carbon emissions that result from sequest ration actions must be s ubtracted to calculate net carbon sequestration, the Agency should in part icular examine options that rely (completely or substantially) on alternative energy, such as biosequestration relying on solar power. Nature removes an order of magnitude more carbon out ofthe atmosphere every year using natural processes. By increasing the process area, volume, orefficiency of these naturally occurring processes gigatons of carbon can be sequestered. Fo r example, grass pastures can build soil carbon slowly through microbial processes. Legume-based pastures that fix N and drive higher biomass

18 TSCA section 6a (4)

19 “Impact of Renewable Energy Policy and Use on Innovation”A Literature Review, Felix Groba and Barbara Breitschopf 2013, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung

20 EPA, High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge; http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/index.htm8

production of associated grasses, drive a more rapid carbon accretion. 21 Marginal lands can be managed to trap a ton of carbon per hectare a ye ar to equilibrium with proper management. Enhanced soil carbon is beneficial not only from it’s increased producti vity but also because it enables greater infiltration and rete ntion of rainfall and this compensates for expected increases in temperature and more uncertain rainfall. In the oceans, microalgae can be fertilized sequestering carbon and then removed- harvested for products. For example the nutritiona l value of micro algae 22 , and it’s potential as a biodiesel source 23 have been extensively re searched. In cluding ancillary benefits like these with the net sequestration benefit will provide a more complete analysis.

Recently, the World Bank investigated the capacity of different agricultural land use management practices to sequester carbon. Biomass, and es pecially it’s soils, se quester carbon out of the atmosphere and this role as a carbon sink and as a carbon store can be strategically optimized through proven farming techniqu es and methods that simultaneously reduce emissions. These technical elements of climate-smart agriculture are well understood, and in addition to their technical feasibility, they can be highly productive and profitable. In the Report they estimate a enormous capacity of agriculture to sequester carbon and in turn provide marketable carbon offsets. Looking at different scenario s, that are based on different leve ls of international integration and ecological concern, the employment of land use and management techniques in Asia, Africa and Latin America could sequester between 12 and 18 Gt of carbon, with net positive welfare benefits, of between 1.4 a nd 1.6 trillion dollars by 2030. 24

More aggressively, it has b een proposed that lignin rich crops, which sequester carbon refractorially, might be used directly as a so il amendment to enrich and provide carbon to desertified or otherwise depleted lands, enabli ng the growth of more lignin crops to produce additional fertile soils, geometrically magnifying the sequestration. 25 Climate change may worsen desertification because of temporal changes in radiation, wind, temperature, rainfall and other parameters driven by the incr eased energy in the atmosphere 26 . Another economically beneficial use for tree, litter and other forestry a nd agricultural high lignin sources (>15%) would be for erosion control necessitated by the expected in crease in rainfall in many areas from the rising temperatures. 27

Sustainable biocharring has both an energy and a sequestration component. biocharring can be used to produce fuels and the char itself can be used to increase soil fertility and NPP, enabling sequestering more carbon. Research ers estimate that up to 12% of anthropogenic emissions can be offset by biochar. 28

21 Dalal, RC, Strong, WM, Weston, EJ, Cooper, JE, Lehane , KJ, King, AJ, Chicken, CJ (1995). Australian Journal of Experimental Agriculture, 35

22 FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 361

23 NREL/TP-580-24190

24 Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soils, The World Bank, REPORT NO. 67395-GLB, 2012

25 pp 150-168, Viviani, Bioenergy and Biobased Products, DOE National Bioenergy Center Strategic Partnerships Workshop April 11-12, 2001 Colorado

26 World Meterological Oraganization, Climate_Change Desertification, 2007.

27 Trees, Crops, and Soil Fertility: Concepts and Research Methods edited by G. Schroth, Fergus L. Sinclair

28 Nature Communications 1: 56 doi:10.1038/ncomms10539

Reforestation and reducing defore station can also play enormous roles and most importantly, they provide a relatively straight forward remedy that can be paid for directly by those found responsible under TSCA for the legacy carbon in the oceans. Reforestation to combat desertification is underway in Mongolia by the Mongolian government and South Korean 29

Additionally, “blue” or coastal carbon can also play a very significant role. NOAA is encouraging the conservation of these coastal sinks and po ints out that current st udies suggest that mangroves and coastal wetlands annually sequester car bon at a rate two to four times greater than mature tropical forests and store three to five ti mes more carbon per equivale nt area than tropical forests. 30 Most coastal blue carbon is stored in the soil, not in above-groundplant materials (biomass), as is the case with tropical forests.

The Agency should also examine options whic h produce (and net) carbonates from carbon dioxide 31 , especially those producing salable products, such as carbon mineralization processes making carbonate building materials from carbon dioxide, e.g., green bricks and green cement, and can net energy. Building materials comprise an enormous market, as th ere are about 30 billion tons of concrete produced and used each year alone. Concrete accounts for about 7% of global carbon emissions. Sequestering CO 2 into green cement provides multiple opportunities and benefits: potential increases in conc rete’s strength, reductions in emissions, carbon sequestration, and provides significant opportunitie s for offset purchase.

The use of timber in high rises (to 40 stories or some cases more) to replace some of the concrete and steel can also reduce the ca rbon footprint of construction dr astically (as both concrete and steel are carbon intens ive) and can sequester atmospheric car bon at the same time. A cubic meter of wood substituted for other construction material can result in savings of 0.75 to 1 ton of
CO 2

. 32 This can reduce the carbon footprin t of buildings by two thirds.

Practice and performance based economic incentives could be used to enc ourage sequestration in the building and forestry/agricultu ral sectors. Banked credits could be sold to offset any added cost from the differing practices/products. In th e US, government construction accounts for about a quarter of new projects. These projects could account for significant se questration if additional green construction were required to be incorporat ed in design. In government directed economies it could be higher.

3D printers, which can and do use biological ma terials (containing car bon harvested from the atmosphere) as substrates can produce myriad c onsumer products. This is particularly helpful because increased consumer expenditures and economi c growth is almost always associated with increased energy/resource use and drive carbon emi ssions. In this case consumer purchases can

29 Min-Kyung Kang et al, Jour. Korean For. Soc. Vol. 99 No. 5, pp 655-663 (2010)

30 http://www.habitat.noaa.gov/coastalbluecarbon.html

31 Annu Rev Chem Biomol Eng. 2013;4:103-17. doi: 10.1146/annurev-chembioeng-062011-080951. Epub 2013 Feb
28.

32 International Institute for Environment and Development, Using Wood Products to Mitigate Climate Change,
200410

actually reduce net atmospheric carbon. Other resear ch demonstrates direct storage of CO2 into nonbiological compounds which can also be accessed to make consumer products 33

These sort of options help bring the economic carbon cycle more into balance, providing value by removing carbon from the atmosphere. CO 2 not only becomes an essentially limitless resource, which can be both reduced or oxidized to produce products and/or energy, it also couples sequestration with popula tion and economic growth.

The Agency, through TSCA section 9’s access to other Federal programs, could use economic incentives to foster growth of some these opt ions by the general popula tion. For example, DOE and EPA’s Energy Star program has prevented 1 .8 billion tons of GHG emissions, by providing information that helps consumers select energy e fficient devices. A similar program could be established that provides information about the ne t amount of atmospheric carbon sequestered in products.

Providing information to consumers concerned a bout ocean acidification (and climate change) enables them take direct action to mitigate thes e problems, and also provides a marketing incentive to companies to develop and sell these products. There is al ready a trend in the US for development of biocarbon products substituting for pe troleum or mineral based products. Examples range from large volume products, such as home foam insulation based on soy, to smaller niche products, such as wetsuits made using biorubber rather than petroleum based neoprene (Patagonia).

As mentioned above, Nature cycles atmospheric carbon primarily by storing it in the ocean, reducing it into biological materials and oxidizing it into minerals. Th is latter process also provides sequestration opportunities. The IPCC 34 estimates that magnesium and calcium silicate deposits are sufficient to fix all the CO 2 that could be produced from th e production of all fossil fuels resources. There have been demonstr ation and pilot projects that have sequestered carbon at a costs ranging from $50 to $300/ ton. 35 Some of these processes also have the advantages of yielding salable product. For example olivine has been used as an amendment to replenishing beach sand, and the weathering of the sand from the ocean wave s has the potential to raise the pH of the waters. 36

There are high volume industrial wast e materials, such as ‘red mud’ from aluminum production 37 as well as steel and blast furnace slag, fly ash a nd waste concrete that can sequester atmospheric carbon, and in some cases produce salable products 38

33 CO 2 Coordination by Inorganic Polyoxoanion in Water, Guanggang Gao et al, JACS communications, 2008

34 IPCC Special Report Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, 2005

35 Chem. Soc. Rev., 2014, 43, 8049

36 International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 4 (2010) 855–856

37 Peterson et al. Science of The Total Environment Volume 338, Issue 3, 15 February 2005

38 Coal Combustion Residual Beneficial Use Evaluation: Fly Ash Concrete and FGD Gypsum Wallboard USEPA, February 201411

IntraAgency Coordination

Petitioner is aware that the Agen cy has operated cross-Agency progr ams, i.e., initiatives that all media program and other offices are required to participate in. Examples include, P2 Pollution Prevention, the IntraAgency Integration Program a nd the Priority Pollutan t Program, all of which required coordination to achieve an environmental goal(s). Almost every Agency action, initiative, grant, etc. has carbon implications. Petitione r asserts that Ocean Acidif ication is, at the very least, on a par with the problem these programs were designed to address. If this is not already being done, the petitioner asks the Agency to requ ire that all significant actions take carbon benefits explicitly into account.

The Economic Costs of CO 2 and Discount Rate

The discount rate is critical in the unreasonable risk determina tion, as benefit estimates depend heavily on the discount rate applie d. There is debate as to app licability of current methodologies to derive these rates when applied to distant even ts and transgenerational effects. As Cowen and Parfit pointed out “Why should costs and benefits receive less weight, si mply because they are further in the future? When the future comes, th ese benefits and costs will be no less real. Imagine finding out that you, having just reached your tw enty-first birthday, must soon die of cancer because one evening Cleopatra want ed an extra helping of dessert”. 39 . Or putting it in terms of dollars instead of baklava: Frank Partnoy, ( Univer sity of San Diego) observed “A human life is often estimated to be worth around $10 million. But if you apply a three percent discount rate to this, that means that a human life five hundr ed years from now is only worth $3.81 today.”

Further, the basis for a discount ra te is the opportunity cost of ta king action today to avoid future effects, i.e., the discount used mu st reflect the profitability of th e best alternative investment opportunity. However, global warming, and even o cean acidification will ha ve such enormous effects on agriculture, real estate, wa ter availability, fisheries, etc, that investments in many sectors could well have limited or even negative disc ount rates without mitigation action. People may well be poorer in the future because of ocean aci dification and climate change and have less rather than more resources to mitigate and adapt 40

.
To use an ocean acidification example, an inve stment in ocean property in Florida could well have a negative return (if not for the owner, than for federal government which guarantees flood insurance) when the coral reefs erode and flatten (as discussed in the body of the petition) and fail to provide adequate buffer for storm surges, as could investments in commercial fisheries. Climate change effects on investment returns woul d be even larger. For example, the IPCC predicts a 2% net decrease in agricultural produc tion per decade from global warming. Petitioner asks the Agency to take into account how ocean ac idification and climate ch ange will affect return on capital investment when setting a discount rate in their assessment of benefits as recommended in USEPA’s Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analysis. OMB Guidance on regulatory analysis states “ In some instances, if there is reason to expect that the regulation will cause resources to be reallocated away from private i nvestment in the corporat e sector, then the oppor-

39 Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin, eds, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations 144, 145 (Yale 1992).

40 Johnson et al, Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences September 2012, Volume 2, Issue 3, pp 205-22112

tunity cost may lie outside th e range of 3 to 7 percent. ” 41 The same logic must apply when it is not the regulation but the effect itself that pr ovides an economic distor tion in the absence of regulation.

Petitioner asks the Agency to consider and explain the choice of using either a Willingness to Pay (WTP), or a Willingness to Accept (WTA) in the economic valuation of benefits. This seems germane relative to the loss of oceanic bufferi ng capacity due to past absorption by the 600 billion tons of carbon emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. Like many other effects of Ocean Acidification this loss of capacity is not presentl y included in the calcula tion of the SCC. If the Agency decides to use a Contingent Valuation Method to value the lost buffering capacity, then WTA may be appropriate as th is capacity is a public good. 42

Low Probability Catastrophic Impact Effects

Current climate cost and benefit estimates do not take into acc ount many low probability effects with catastrophic impacts. For example, there is research to estimate pr obability densities for positive feedback and/or climactic tipping points, such as unstable methane deposit releases from permafrost 43 , the collapse of the marine food web, impacts to cloud albedo 44 , or alterations in ocean circulation 45 . These may be low probability events, but have enormous consequences. Many of these can have catastroph ic Earth System effects and on ce they occur are essentially irreversible. Because of this, current cost and benefit estimates must be considered conservative. 46

This is one of the reasons why the Presid ent’s Council of Economic Advisors recommended treating Climate Change prevention action as an insurance investment. Current regulations, proposed regulations, and planned regulations, do not address these severe Earth System potential impacts and do not, measurably decrease their lik elihood of occurrence. Petitioner agrees with the President’s Council that Climate Change be tr eated as an insurance investment, and asks that the potential cost of these low pr obability, very high impact effect s, be valued to inform the TSCA section 6 unreasonable risk decision. In lieu of a better Agency alternative, Petitioner suggests the Agency estimate the cost of an insurance premium using occurrence and impact probability of these tipping points/catastrophic events as basis, much like insurance premiums in

41 OMB Circular A-4

42 Kahneman et al, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 22 57-70, 1992

43 Schaefer, K., T. Zhang, L. Bruhwiler, and A. P. Barrett (2011), Amount and timing of permafrost carbon release in response to climate warming, Tellus Series B: Chem. Phys. Met., DOI: 10.1111/j.1600-0889.2011.00527.x.; oven teal, Analysis of Permafrost Therma l Dynamics and Response to Climate Change in the CMIP5 Earth System Models, JOURNAL OF CLIMATE
2013

44 Six K.D., Kloster S., Ilyina T., Archer S.D., Zhang.K, Maier-Reimer,E., Global warming amplified by reduced sulphur fluxes as a result of ocean acidification. Nature Climate Cha nge, doi:10.1038/nclimate1981, 2013.

45 Rahmstorf, S., Box, J., Feulner, G., Mann, M., Robinson, A., Rutherford, S., Schaffernicht, E. (2015): Evidence for an exceptional 20th-Century slowdown in Atlantic Oc ean overturning. Nature Climate Change (online) [DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2554 ]

46 Weitzman, Martin L. 2009. Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1): 1-19.13

the nuclear energy industry against catastrophic incidents are calcul ated and apply that as a surrogate for the cost of not reducing carbon emi ssions to mitigate ocean acidification and accompanying climate benefit.

Other Insurance Considerations

Petitioner asks that the Agency consider as a cost any direct insurance impact from Climate change: “Climate change can also adversely impact the prevalence of vector-borne diseases, food poisoning, water quality, aeroa llergens, and the health of natu ral systems that can cause economic losses for humans, sometimes insured” “Changing weathe r patterns and rising ocean temperatures as a result of climate change will also likely continue to put financ ial stress on the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Currently, the NFIP has a $19 billion defi cit, and this deficit may increase each year because of $900 million in subsidies to properties that are not paying actuarially based rates. In addition, the cost to the NFIP of servici ng its debt consumes much of its revenue. ... millions of Americans depend upon the NFIP for flood coverage ...“

According to Dr Evan Mills ( US Departmentof Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) “there is growing acknowledgement among in surers that the impact of climate change on future insured losses is likely to be profound. Th e chairman of Lloyd’s of London has said that climate change is the number- one issue for that massive insurance grou p. And Europe’s largest insurer, Allianz, stated that climate change stands to increase insured losses from extreme events in an average year by 37 per cent within just a decade. Losses in a bad year could top US$1 trillion. Insurers increasingly recognise that it is the lack of action to combat climate change that is the true threat to th eir industry and the broader economy; engaging with the problem and mounting solutions represents not only a duty to sh areholders but also a boon for economic growth.

The insurance sector thus finds itself on the front lines of climate change. The response of many, particularly in the United States, has been to focus on financial means for limiting their exposure to high-risk areas along the coastlin es and areas prone to wildfires. Allstate, for instance, has said that climate change has prompted it to cancel or not renew policies in many Gulf Coast states, with recent hurricanes wiping out all of the profits it had garnered in 75 years of selling homeowners insurance. 47 The company has cut the number of homeowners’ policies in Florida from 1.2 million to 400,000 with an ultimate target ofno more than 100,000. The company has curtailed activity in nearly a dozen other States.”

EPA Can Use TSCA to Complement Existing Federal Laws

Petitioner asks that, as required under TSCA, the Agency determine ifrelief is more efficient under any other Federal statute and if so, to us e that authority as is required under TSCA § 9. Choosing a regulatory strategy and determining whatactions are required to mitigate unreasonable risks is, again, inherently a governmental func tion. However, the cost and the efficiency of the mitigation options that are considered during regulatory development and assessment drive the determination of whethe r a risk is “unreasonable” and the array of alte rnatives considered need to be robust.

47 Conley 2007 in "Insurance in a Climate of Change: Av ailability & Affordability." Berkeley Lab, U.S. Department of Energy.14

Because of the magnitude of Ocean Acidificat ion risk, Petitioner believes good government demands the Agency consider a complete array of options using all authorit ies and tools available to efficiently address the problem . Petitioner will show that in addition to requiring relief under TSCA § 6, the Agency can use the TSCA § 9 authority to require acti on under either, or both, the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Comprehensive En vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) authorities. Relief under thes e statutes should also be considered in determining the cost, benefit and the most efficient remedies to mitigate the harm and risk from Ocean Acidification.

Petitioner is aware that the Agency has recently planned and initiated several emission reduction actions aimed at slowing the rate at which car bon emissions are increa sing. These actions by themselves while laudable, will not stabilize atmospheric CO 2 at a level that prevents widespread harm from ocean acidification. Consider that even with a successful implementation of the Agency’s planned emission reduction regulations, atmospheric concentration will pass 450 ppm around 2030, a tipping point likely to induce arag onite undersaturation in surface waters. Petitioner believes that a combination of aggressive emission reduction and sequestration is necessary to mitigate the unreasonable risk and ha rm caused by ocean acidification. Both CERCLA and the CAA can provide relief.

Petitioner asks that the Agency consider whet her that CERCLA and/or CAA authorities present efficient opportunities for reme diating ocean acidification.

1) Remedies under the Clean Air Act (CAA)

There are several remedies under the CAA eith er directly accessible or accessible under TSCA section 9. Title 42 § 7415 of the Clean Air Act addresses endangerment of public health or welfare in foreign countries from pollution emitt ed in United States, an d directs “the Administrator, upon receipt of repor ts, surveys or studies from any du ly constituted in ternational agency”...to have... “ reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air po llution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country ...the Admi nistrator shall give form al notification thereof to the Governor of the State in which such emi ssions originate. The notic e of the Administrator shall be deemed to be a finding under s ection 7410 (a)(2)(H)(ii ) of this title “

There have been many reports addressing the en dangerment of public health or welfare from ocean acidification that have been published by duly constituted international agencies and of which the Agency is well aware and in some cas es participated in. Thes e include: the Royal Society 48 ; The European Union’s European Project on Ocean Acidification (EPOCA) published over a hundred scientific papers detailing the effects; the UN’s Climate Change and Ocean Acidfication Synegies and opportunities within the UNFCCC, Harrould-Kolieb and Herr; and Australia’s GBRMPA published Climate Change and the Great Barrier Reef: A Vulnerability Assessment in association with 85 scientific a nd management experts; as well as numerous IPCC Reports, in which the Agency and other Departme nts of the Federal Gove rnment actively participate.

48 Royal Society (Ocean acidification due to increas ing atmospheric carbon dioxide, 30 June 200515

The Columbia Journal of Law 49 describes the applicability of Section 115 to CO 2 regulation for ocean acidification mitigation, in cluding the legislative history and how SIPs under section 7410 are mandated. The Agency’s current Proposed Rule for Electric Utilitie s using section 7411, can serve as a template. The flexibility for State SIPs in the Rule in cludes by reference, their current State programs as applicable to compliance with the Rule. Some of these cited include provisions for, and allow “offsets” or carbon sequestration to be counted in reaching program goals, using for example, Cap and Trade. State by State asse ssment of legacy carbon could be calculated by the Agency from the Emission Inventory and th ese could be included in State Implementation Plans.

§ 7415 includes the requirement that a reciprocity finding that the affected foreign country gives the U.S. "essentially the same ri ghts with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is give n that country”. This requirem ent directly addresses the often raised argument against US EPA action that posit s: since Ocean Acidifica tion has a global cause, only international action can address it successfully. Implementation of State plans would presuppose a concurrent implementation internationa lly. The Montreal Protocol (which found it’s genesis in a TSCA action) could serve as a te mplate for coordinating international plans for ocean acidification mitigation. The EuropeanUnion’s REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restrictions of Chemicals) regulation serves as an example of how a large attractive market (like the EU or the US) can indu ce foreign companies and government directed economies who wish to have continued access to the markets, to comply with environmental regulation.

Recently the US and China, which account for almost 40% of global carbon emissions, jointly announced new targets to cut emissions. Germany, Finland and other indu strialized counties are also drastically cutting emissions. The foundation for a reciprocity agreement with the nations that account for most of th e legacy and current emissi ons is already in place.

Alternatively, the CAA emission trading mechanism, which offers an often used, efficient market approach might also be accessed directly th rough TSCA section 9 to mitigate ocean acidification.

Under TSCA section 6: (1) A requirement ...." (B ) limiting the amount of such substance or mixture which may be manufactured, pro cessed, or distributed in commerce.” ...clearly gives the Agency authority to limit current emissions, a nd Section 6’s: "Any manuf acturer or processor subject to a requirement to replace or repurchase a chemical substance or mixture may elect either to replace or repurchase the substance or mi xture and shall take either such action in the manner prescribed by the Administrator.” gives authority for tradi ng options. While ‘repurchase’ is sequestration, "rep lace" is trading.

Since EPA has treated air pollutants like CO 2 as fungible in order to e fficiently regulate when the
“net” pollution is key, replacing carbon emitting facilitie s with new facilities that rely on renewable sources will reduce the net carbon in the a tmosphere and thereby reduce the amount in the oceans. This would be one way for facilities to “pay down” their legacy carbon debt. The

49 Cap-and-Trade Under The Clean Air Act?: Rethinking Section 115 , H Chang, April 201016

Agency could consider a current carbon emitting f acility’s development of green (e.g. solar or wind) energy capacity to replace (not augment) fossil energy as a legacy offset. (Assuming this is not double counting, i.e., being used to bring th e facility into complian ce for current emissions under another requirement). The new energy production from the no- or low- emitting source would “replace” the carbon that would be emitted from the existing energy production source, leading to a net reduction in carbon emissions. This type of offset also has the advantage of helping to build the market base for green energy and eventually lower costs for additional facilities, accelerating the needed energy in frastructure change. This is an approach the German State is pursuing through subsidies.

2) Remedies under CERCLA Under the 42 U.S. Code § 9604 Response authorities

W henever (A) any hazardous substan ce is released or there is a s ubstantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which ma y present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act (under 42 U.S. Code § 9621), consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardo us substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated natural resource).

CO 2 can meet the CERCLA definition of “hazardous s ubstance in in either of two ways: 1) under 9602 “The Administrator shall promulgate and revi se as may be appropri ate, regulations designating as hazardous substances... such elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when released into the e nvironment may present s ubstantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment, or, 2) by definition: “any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to whic h the Administrator has taken acti on pursuant to section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act”.

If the Administrator takes action under TSCA §7 based on the imminent hazard to coral reefs and marine life, as explained in the petition, CERCLA becomes applicable 50 . While some risks to marine organisms from ocean acid ification may be uncertain, many are not. Also, the risk to the coral reefs which provide protec tion to life and propert y along America’s coastlines as well as significant recreational a nd nutritional benefits is both manife st and well documented and the risk is “imminent” within the definition of TSCA. (Alternatively, these same dangers might be used by the Administrator to directly designate CO 2 as a hazardous substance)

The imminence stems not from the point in time wh en the threat will be completely manifest but rather from the point in time when action must be begun to effectively mitigate or avoid the threatened effect(s). That time is now, primarily because of the enormous inertia in the carbon economic cycle. The infrastructure of energy use relies on fossil fuel combustion. There are no alternatives of sufficient capacity in the near term. To avoi d reaching the point, mid to late century (given the current trajecto ry) where the oceans are undersat urated in carbonate and shells and coral begin dissolving wholes ale, either a robust sequestrati on program must be developed,

50 CERCLA section 101(14)17

and/or significant energy alternat ives must be made available. These are both long term programs that require decades, and must begin now.

S cientists are well aware of the enormous risk posed by ocean acidification. A recent study in Science found that the largest extinction ev ent on earth was caused by ocean acidification 51

. Dr. Jane Lubchenco, The head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration from 2008 -2013 has called ocean acidification global warming's "equally evil twin.” Unfortunately, unlike the risk from Climate Change, th e magnitude of the risk to the oceans from acidification is not well known or unders tood by the general public. A TSCA § 7 Notice informing the public of the serious risks to coral reefs, provides the informa tion needed to decide if changes in personal energy use, and consumption is warranted. (TSCA § 7 grants EPA authority to "require warning labels and/or instru ctions on containers or products ” . USEPA could encourage consumer choice by labeling products with large embedded carbon volume).

Changes in energy use and consum ption can begin to retard the ongoing increase in atmospheric
CO 2 and to lessen the effect of aci dification on coral reefs. Change s in consumer choice toward less carbon intensive products could build markets for those products, making them less expensive and spurring innovation. Inform ation on the risks can help local ities plan as well. Notification of risks is one of the TSCA § 7 remedies. A TSCA § 7 Notice explaining the risks would help inform decisions concerning wh ere to live in order to be secu re in life and property, given the inevitable loss of protection to some coastal areas from extreme weather events (coincidently expected to increase with climate change ) which will occur with the loss of reefs.

It also seems reasonable that, to the extent the US is harmed, it can use CERCLA to fund remedies from transboundary actors, as was th e case in the Trail Smelter Arbitration. 52 Wherein the downstream Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, and the State of Washington, in the US sued a Canadian smelter for dumping into the Columbia River upstream in Canada under CERCLA. This is a successful resolution of an intern ational dispute that provided an important principle of international customary law concer ning state responsibility and transboundary pollution. (Again, a TSCA § 7 action for CO 2 effect on coral reefs would define CO 2 as hazardous under CERCLA.)

Another important theory of international law is the polluter-pays principle. This theory stands for the proposition that nations should focus on in ternalizing environmental costs for purposes of public interest by making the pollu ter bear the cost of pollutio n. By mandating that the responsible party bear these costs, the polluter-pays prin ciple achieves the effect of encouraging individual responsibility for environm ental harm. The countries attendi ng the Rio Convention, including the US and Canada, reaffirmed this princi ple in Article 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration” 53 CERCLA’s strict, joint and se veral liability, holds pollute rs responsible for damage.

The oceans have essentially been a “dump site” for CO 2 emissions, so CERCLA is a natural vehicle for seeking remedy. CERCLA has been app lied to other water bodies, e.g., the upper 40 or

51 Clarkson et al. Science 10 April 2015: Vol. 348 no. 6231 pp. 229-232

52 United States District Court for the East ern District of Washington, April 4, 2012

53 Greenfield: CERCLA’S applicability abroad, Emory International Law Review;Fall2005, Vol. 19 Issue 3, p169718

so miles of the Hudson are a NPL site for pcb co ntamination. CERCLA is an excellent tool for seeking remedy from multiple, diverse parties, i.e ., “CERCLA casts a wide net in bringing in responsible parties. Through the broad definition of hazardous substance (§101(14) - liability is extended to anything that presents an "imminent and substantial danger"), the loose interpretation of "release" (there is no tim e constraint on this) and the wide scope of liability (each party involved may be responsible for the entire clean up ) the statute seeks to fund the clean up of these sites. Although there have been challenges to th e apparently retroactive na ture of this (because people are being held liable for actions that pred ate the statute), and as noted above, the courts have held that as the waste is continuing to cause problems, and the statute is not a punishment but rather a reimbursement obligatio n, the statute is not retroactive, and thus not unconstitutional. And again, small contributors can be and are r outinely ignored if transaction costs are high.

Summary

Ocean acidification and its effects are complex and the state of knowledge is uneven. Depending on what USEPA knows and believes about the effects of ocean acidification there are a number of decisions that the Ag ency must make and actions asso ciated with those decisions. I n the introduction and in th e body of the petition, petitioners as k USEPA to take several actions under TSCA § 4 and 6, and in this supplement petitioner asks the Agency to take additional appropriate actions under other fe deral statutes through TSCA § 9 and other TSCA authority, in order to mitigate the human health and envir onmental risk from ocean acidification caused by CO2 emissions.

The following describes the different paths the Agen cy can take in responding and what the petitioner believes the public deserves in each case. While mentioned below is the possibility of taking action under TSCA § 7, petitioner understands that § 21 cannot be used to for § 7 action, however, petitioner believes that the threat to coral reefs presented in the petition and as discussed herein make a compelling case for § 7 action.

1) EPA could decide that the cu rrent state of knowledge concerni ng ocean acidification is sufficient to decide that the risk(s) of ocean acidification are not unreas onable. This requires evidencethat the demonstrated loss of the coral reefs, decrease in shell fish harvests, loss of competitiveness of pteropods and other organisms that secr ete calcium carbonate and other ecological and health effects are known to the Ag ency, as are the ancillary climat e benefits that occur with atmospheric carbon controls, are either outweighed by the cost of mitigation, which is also known to the Agency, or are not significant effects. In this case, petitioner asks that the Agency publish and share this information with the public.

2) EPA could decide that all or some of the in formation necessary to make the unreasonable risk finding is either not sufficient or not available, but this lack of data does not meet the criteria for action under TSCA § 2(b)(1) and/or TSCA § 4 . Petitioner expects in this case, an explanation of why the triggers are not met by th e information presented in the pe tition. Since much of the risk cited in this petition come from EPA, NOAA, a nd other government sources, petitioner asks if USEPA has information that supersedes or disco unts these conclusions, a nd if so to publish and share this informa tion with the public.19

3) EPA could decide that all or some of the in formation necessary to make the unreasonable risk finding is either not sufficient or not available, and take action under TSCA § 4. Petitioner expects in this case that the Agency will explain wh at information is sufficient and what is not, and develop test rules to gather info rmation sufficient to make an unreasonable risk finding in a timely fashion.

4) EPA could decide that some of the risks from ocean acidification are unreasonable and take action under TSCA § ʼ s 6, 9 and other statutes, but that so me information is lacking for other risks and write a TSCA § 4 rule to develop the missing info rmation. Petitioner expects in this case that the Agency will explain what information is sufficient and what is not, develop test rules to gather information sufficient to make an unreasonable risk finding for the risks that are uncertain, and take action for the risks that are unreasonable.

5) The Agency, in combination with any of the above options, could publish a TSCA § 7 Notice informing the public of the serious risks to cora l reefs associated with ocean acidification, it ʼ s causes, and what must be done to mitigate it. As explained above this information is needed by the public to judge the se verity of the risk, adequacy of governments response to protect human health and the environment, and what pr ecautions, if any, are necessary to take.

6) EPA could grant the petition and propose rule s to mitigate ocean acid ification using TSCA, CERCLA, CAA and/or other Agency and Federal au thorities as appropriate . Petitioner endorses this action.

Sincerely,

/ s/ Donn J. Viviani

Donn J. Viviani PhD.

Donn J. Viviani is a retired U.S. Environmental Pr otection Agency sc ientist. He was the Director of the Climate Policy Assessment Division in the Office of Poli cy, Economics and Innovation. He also served as Chairman of the Great Lakes Wa ter Quality Board's Toxic Substances Committee, and as a member of the Science Coordinating Committee for the International Joint Commission for the Great Lakes. Dr. Viviani greatly enjoys the ocean and cosigns the petition and submits this supplement, in part, so his grandchild ren will be able to enjoy it as well.