AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed July 30, 2013.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-12-00832-CR

REID CARLTON RENICKER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 001-86948-2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices FitzGerald, Francis, and Lewis 

Opinion by Justice Lewis

A jury found appellant Reid Carlton Renicker guilty of driving while intoxicated. The 

trial court assessed his punishment at a $900 fine and 120 days’ confinement, the latter being 

suspended in favor of fifteen months of community supervision. In a single appellate issue,

Renicker contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to 

present a case during the punishment phase, failed to object to the introduction of improper 

character evidence during trial, and failed to file a motion to suppress—or object to—evidence of 

extraneous bad acts. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled 

principles of law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. We affirm.

The evidence at issue here was offered through the testimony of Plano police officer John 

Britton. Britton was driving an unmarked car and working burglary surveillance at 

approximately two thirty in the morning when the vehicle driven by Renicker cut in front of 
–2–

Britton and almost hit his car. Renicker turned on tail-light flashers, and Britton noticed a 

firefighter emblem on Renicker’s license plate. Britton followed Renicker on city streets and 

observed him accelerate to approximately seventy miles per hour and then—after cutting in front 

of Britton again—slow almost to a stop, flick a lit cigarette so that it bounced off the hood of

Britton’s car, and drive off. (Britton testified he thought this conduct was “strange” and “very 

bad behavior” given that Renicker was a firefighter and the area was experiencing a drought.) 

Following the cigarette incident, Britton pulled up alongside Renicker, and Renicker stopped his 

vehicle in the road. He looked over at Britton, yelled “I am a f______ fireman,” flipped Britton 

off, and took off again. Renicker then made a u-turn and stopped where another officer—whom 

Britton had called for back-up—was parked with his car’s lights on; Renicker told the officer he 

was being followed. The second officer performed field sobriety tests, and Renicker was 

arrested.

Renicker contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his 

attorney did not object to Britton’s characterization of Renicker’s behavior with the cigarette as 

“strange” and “very bad behavior.” Renicker argues that testimony amounted to inadmissible 

character evidence. He also complains that his counsel did not move to suppress, or at least 

object to, the evidence of Renicker’s offensive behavior toward Britton, which he contends was 

irrelevant or, if not, was unfairly prejudicial when compared to any relevance it had to the 

charged conduct. Finally, Renicker also complains that his attorney failed to present a case 

during the punishment phase, stating only:

This is the defendant’s first DWI. There is no other allegation that he has ever

been arrested before. We would ask for a $300 fine, six months’ probation, 24 

hours community service and standard conditions.

Thank you, Your Honor.
–3–

We examine ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the standard set out in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and adopted by Texas in Hernandez v. State, 726 

S.W.2d 53, 56–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Renicker’s burden is to show by a preponderance of 

the evidence that (a) trial counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below the prevailing 

professional norms, and (b) but for the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999). We examine the totality of counsel’s representation to determine whether 

appellant received effective assistance, but we do not judge counsel’s strategic decisions in 

hindsight; rather, we strongly presume counsel’s competence. Id. Any allegation of 

ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively 

demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Id.

In this case, Renicker filed a motion for new trial alleging, among a number of grounds, 

that he received ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to file a motion to suppress. 

The motion contained no argument on the point, and there is no record of a hearing at which 

Renicker’s trial counsel was afforded the opportunity to explain his actions or trial strategy. 

Therefore, as was the case in Thompson, our record provides no discussion of trial counsel’s 

purported errors. It contains no discernible explanation of the motivation behind his decision not 

to file a motion to suppress, his decision not to object to any particular evidence, or his strategy 

in presenting the punishment phase of the trial. Because the record is silent regarding any 

explanation for counsel’s actions, appellant has failed to meet his burden to overcome the strong 

presumption of reasonable assistance. See Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003) (“The record in this case is insufficient to support the conclusion [that appellant 

received ineffective assistance of counsel] because appellant did not develop a record in the trial 

court for the purpose of establishing this claim.”); Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. 
–4–

Crim. App. 1994) (appellate court is not required to indulge in speculation concerning counsel’s 

decision-making processes or to imagine reasons why counsel acted or failed to act in particular 

manner).1 

On the record before us, we cannot conclude Renicker has established that his trial 

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, he has failed to 

satisfy the first prong of Strickland and has not shown his trial counsel’s assistance was 

ineffective. We overrule his single issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

120832F.U05

 1 Because the reasonableness of trial counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record, an application for 

writ of habeas corpus is often the more appropriate vehicle to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 

642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

/David Lewis/

DAVID LEWIS

JUSTICE
–5–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

REID CARLTON RENICKER, Appellant

No. 05-12-00832-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 1, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 001-86948-2011.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lewis. 

Justices FitzGerald and Francis participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 30th day of July, 2013.

/David Lewis/

DAVID LEWIS

JUSTICE